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Principles of War
Principles of war have taken many forms and have been viewed
differently by various military communities and scholars.
To some a principle was a law that demanded certain actions. To some it
was a prevailing condition that always led to success in war. To others it
was a general truth, an element, or a fundamental inherent in the nature of
war, and to still others, a principle was a guide that could sometimes be
violated but always had to be considered.1

Some urge that codified principles of war be abandoned, while

others would enshrine them as a road map to success in war. Neither
view is entirely appropriate. The first view ignores the principles’
educational and guiding influence, and the second tends to abuse them
as some sort of recipe that supplants initiative, improvisation, and
judgment. All of the principles are interrelated and interacting
elements of warfare. They are not separate and distinct entities from
which a commander selects when employing forces. Put in
perspective, the principles of war help provide a better understanding
of warfare, but they are not a series of checklist items that necessarily
lead to success. The principles are important to the understanding and
mastery of warfare, but professional expertise requires a depth of
knowledge far beyond mere principles.2

Nine Principles
Although Sun Tzu presented principles of war about 500 B.C., and
numerous authors wrote about principles of war in the eighteenth and
especially in the nineteenth centuries, modern codification of the
principles of war was accomplished by Col J. F. C. Fuller in 1916. In
addition to eight “strategical principles,” Fuller also presented three
“tactical principles”—demoralization, endurance, and shock. In 1920
the British army adopted Fuller’s strategic principles. The following
year the US Army listed these eight principles, plus the principle of
simplicity, in War Department Training Regulation 10-5, Doctrine,
Principles, and Methods. Although various principles have been

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added and subtracted over the intervening years, the list we have today
is essentially the 1921 US Army list (movement is now called
maneuver and cooperation is now called unity of command). This list
of principles of war is not immutable, nor does it correspond in detail
with the principles of war used by other nations.3
Objective—Direct military operations toward a defined and
attainable objective that contributes to strategic, operational, or
tactical aims.4 The military objective of a nation at war must be to
apply whatever degree of force is necessary to attain the political
purpose for which the war is being fought. Strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives can be clearly identified and developed only when
the political purpose has been determined and defined by the national
command authorities (NCA). Thus, when the political purpose is the
total defeat of the adversary, the strategic military objective will most
likely be the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces and the destruction
of his will to resist.
Offensive—Act rather than react and dictate the time, place,
purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must
be seized, retained, and fully exploited. The principle of the offensive
suggests that offensive action, or maintaining the initiative, is the most
effective and decisive way to pursue and to attain a clearly defined
goal. This aspect of the principle is fundamentally true at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war. Although it may sometimes be
necessary to adopt a defensive posture, this posture should be only
temporary until the necessary means are available to resume offensive
operations. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all
defensive operations—the defense must be active, not passive.
Offensive action, whatever form it takes, is the means by which the
nation or armed forces capture and hold the initiative, maintain
freedom of action, and achieve results. It permits political leaders or
military commanders to capitalize on the initiative, impose their will
on the enemy, set the terms and select the place of confrontation or
battle, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations
and unexpected developments. No matter what the level of war, the

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side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the
enemy to react rather than to act.
Mass—Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place.
At the strategic level of war, this principle suggests that the nation
should commit, or be prepared to commit, a preponderance of national
power to those regions or areas where the threat to vital security
interests is greatest. Accurate and timely determination of where the
threat to vital national interests is greatest is difficult. In today’s
volatile world, the nature and sources of threats often change in
dramatic fashion. Since every possible contingency or trouble spot
cannot be anticipated, much less planned for, planners and forces
must retain flexibility of thought and action. At the operational level,
this principle suggests that superior combat power must be
concentrated at the decisive time and place to achieve decisive results.
Economy of Force—Create usable mass by using minimum
combat power on secondary objectives. Make fullest use of all forces
available.5 As a reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force
at the strategic level of war suggests that, in the absence of unlimited
resources, a nation may have to accept some risks in areas where vital
national interests are not immediately at stake. Since the NCA should
focus predominant power toward a clearly defined primary objective,
they cannot allow attainment of that objective to be compromised by
diversions to areas of lower priority. Economy of force involves risks,
requires astute strategic planning and judgment by political and
military leaders, and again places a premium on the need for flexibility
of thought and action.
At the operational level, the principle of economy of force requires
that minimum means be employed in those areas where the main
effort is not to be made. It requires, as at the strategic level, the
acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority in
the area where decision is sought. Thus, economy of force may require
forces in a particular area to attack, defend, or delay or to conduct
deception operations, depending on the importance of the area.
Maneuver—Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage
through the flexible application of combat power. In the strategic

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sense, this principle has three interrelated dimensions: flexibility,

mobility, and maneuverability. The first of these involves the need
for flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. Such flexibility
enhances the ability to react rapidly to unforeseen circumstances. The
second dimension involves strategic mobility, which is especially
critical in reacting promptly to concentrate and project power against
the primary objective. The final strategic dimension involves
maneuverability within a theater to focus maximum strength against
enemy weakness and thereby gain strategic advantage.
In a theater of operations, maneuver is an essential element of
combat power. It contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative,
to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing
vulnerability. The object of maneuver is to concentrate or to disperse
forces in a manner designed to place the enemy at a disadvantage,
thus achieving results that would otherwise be more costly in men
and materiel.
At all levels of war, successful application of this principle requires
not only fire and movement but also flexibility of thought, plans, and
operations and the considered application of the principles of mass
and economy of force. Maneuver is the means by which the
commander sets the terms for battle, declines battle, or acts to take
advantage of tactical actions.
Unity of Command—Ensure unity of effort for every objective
under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all
efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common goal. At
the strategic level of war, this common goal equates to national
political purposes and the broad strategic objectives that flow from
them. The common goal at the strategic level determines the military
forces necessary for its achievement. To develop full combat power,
these forces must be coordinated through unity of effort. Coordination
may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by
vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all
forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.
In the United States, the president is the commander in chief of the
armed forces and, at the strategic level, is assisted in this role by the

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secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Combatant commanders contribute to attaining national objectives by
achieving theater and subtheater goals.
Security—Protect friendly forces and their operations from enemy
actions which could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage.
Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly
vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security measures,
however, should not be allowed to interfere with flexibility of thought
and action, since rigidity and dogmatism increase vulnerability to
enemy surprise. In this regard, detailed staff planning and thorough
understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine can improve
security and reduce vulnerability to surprise.
At the strategic level of war, security requires that active and
passive measures be taken to protect the nation and its armed forces
against espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection.
Campaigns depend on security of forces and security of plans for
success. At the operational and tactical levels, security results from
the measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise,
observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, and
harassment. Security may be achieved by establishing and
maintaining protective measures against hostile acts or influence, or
it may be assured by deception operations designed to confuse and
dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the forces being secured.
Surprise—Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for
which he is unprepared. To a large degree, the principle of surprise
is the reciprocal of the principle of security. Concealing one’s
capabilities and intentions creates the opportunity to strike the enemy
when he is unaware or unprepared, but strategic surprise is difficult
to achieve. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance technology make
it increasingly difficult to mask or cloak large-scale marshaling or
movement of personnel and equipment. Still, rapid deployment of
combat forces into a crisis area can forestall or upset the plans and
preparations of an enemy.
Surprise is important for the joint force for it can decisively affect
the outcome of battles. With surprise, success out of proportion to the

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effort expended may be obtained. Surprise results from going against

an enemy in a time, place, or manner for which he is unprepared. It
is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he
become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to
surprise include speed and quickness, employment of unexpected
factors, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds,
variations of tactics and methods of operation, and operations
security.
Simplicity—Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing,
planning, and conducting military operations. Guidance, plans, and
orders should be as simple and direct as attainment of the objective
will allow. At the national level, the strategic importance of the
principle of simplicity extends well beyond its more traditional
military application. It is an important element in the development
and enhancement of public support. Political and military objectives
and operations must therefore be presented in clear, concise, and
understandable terms.
In its military application, this principle promotes strategic
flexibility by encouraging broad guidance rather than detailed and
involved instruction. At the joint-force level, simplicity of plans and
instructions contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans
and clear, concise orders are essential in reducing misunderstanding
and confusion. A simple plan executed properly and promptly may
be preferable to a complex plan executed later.

Additional Principles

Obviously, one can formulate principles of war in addition to the

nine used by the Air Force today. For example, John Alger presents
a 68-entry chronological compendium of principles of war from the
time of Sun Tzu through 1978.6 As recently as the 1984 edition of
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,
the Air Force listed the principles of timing and tempo, logistics, and
cohesion.7 Although these concepts are important considerations in

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war, they do not have the weight of authority lent by familiarity with
those codified in the 1920s.
Apart from candidates for addition to the principles of war are
proposals for “principles of deterrence.” Robert H. Reed and John M.
Collins, among others, have proposed such principles, maintaining
that deterrence differs so basically from war fighting that it requires
separate principles. Reed proposes: credibility of means, credibility
of will, clarity of intent, controllability, flexibility, negotiation, unity
of effort, economy of effort, and interdependence.8 Collins proposes:
preparedness, nonprovocation, prudence, publicity, credibility,
uncertainty, paradox, independence, change, and flexibility.9 Both of
these proposals are criticized in the July–August 1980 edition of the
Air University Review.10

Conclusion
The so-called principles of war merely represent generally
accepted “truths” that have proven effective for commanders
employing forces in combat. Theory, of course, is no substitute for
military genius or even for professional judgment. The complex
nature of war in general and the unique character of each war in
particular prohibit using the principles of war as a checklist to assure
successful military operations. They cannot substitute for initiative
and improvisation; rather, they offer a conceptual framework within
which to evaluate possible actions.
Notes

1. For an excellent historical account of the principles of war, see John I. Alger,
The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1982), 189.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, who was averse to systematizing military theory into
so-called principles of war, warns of the inherent danger of relying upon them,
especially on the battlefield. Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael E. Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps. 2 through
4 of bk. 2. For the utility of the principles of war, see Jay Luvaas, “Military History:
Is It Still Practicable?” Parameters, March 1982, 2–14; see also Lt Col Richard M.
Swain, “On Bringing Back the Principles of War,” Military Review, November

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1980, 40–46, which presents a helpful approach to battle/campaign analysis that

uses the principles of war as a tool. Col George M. Hall, “A Field Expedient for the
Principles of War,” Military Review, March 1983, 34–42, presents four “practical”
rules (based on combinations of the nine principles of war) which, he maintains,
can be used as a sort of battlefield decision tree.
3. Alger, especially for Fuller’s contribution, 113–25, 187–88, and 232–33.
4. The explanation of this and the eight principles that follow is based, almost
verbatim, on Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995,
A-1 through A-3.
5. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1959), 26.
The term “economy of force,” . . . derives from an interpretation
governed by the nineteenth century connotation of the word
“economy,” meaning judicious management but not necessarily limited
use. Thus, the violation of the indicated principle is suggested most
flagrantly by a failure to use to good military purpose forces that are
available. Of late, however, the term has often been interpreted as
though it demanded “economizing” of forces, that is, a withholding of
use.
6. Alger, 195–270.
7. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 16 March
1984, 2-8 through 2-10.
8. Col Robert H. Reed et al., “On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective,” Air
University Review, May–June 1975, 2–17.
9. John M. Collins, “Principles of Deterrence,” Air University Review,
November–December 1979, 17–26.
10. “Commentary,” Air University Review, July–August 1980, 77–84.

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