Ataullah

Abstract
This thesis addresses the problem of how to interpret Islamic writers without imposing generic
frameworks of later and partly Western derivation. It questions the overuse of the category
Sufism which has sometimes been deployed to read anachronistic concerns into Islamic
writers. It does so by a detailed study of some of the key works of the 13th century writer Ibn
Ata Allah (d. 709/1309). In this way it fills a gap in the learned literature in two ways. Firstly, it
examines the legitimacy of prevalent conceptualisations of the category Sufism. Secondly, it
examines the work of one Sufi thinker, and asks in what ways, if any, Western categories may
tend to distort its Islamic characteristics. The methodology of the thesis is primarily exegetical,
although significant attention is also paid to issues of context.
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One sets up the problem of Sufism as an organizational
category in the literature. In doing so, this part introduces the works of Ibn Ata Allah, and
justifies the selection from his works for the case study in Part Two. Part Two provides a
detailed case study of the works of Ibn Ata Allah. It opens with some of the key issues involved
in understanding an Islamic thinker, and gives a brief overview of Ibn Ata Allahs life. This is
followed by an examination of materials on topics such as metaphysics, ontology,
epistemology, eschatology, ethics, and soteriology. In each case it is suggested that these topics
may be misleading unless care is taken not to import Western conceptuality where it is not
justified by the texts. Emphasis is placed on the soteriological character of Ibn Ata Allahs
writings, to which the Western terms theology and philosophy are only partly appropriate.
Part Two concludes with a short study of the interaction between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn
Taymiyya designed to illustrate how a less Western conceptual approach may modify aspects of
the existing reception of Ibn Ata Allahs thought.
The central point of the thesis is that Ibn Ata Allah needs to be reread, taking more account of
the Islamic contexts of his work. The thesis does not pretend to settle every issue of
interpretation and it only deals with some of Ibn Ata Allahs texts. In arguing for contextual
Islamic approaches to Ibn Ata Allah as opposed to the more standard generic readings, such as
Ibn Ata Allah as Sufi or philosopher, the thesis raises issues relevant not only to Islamic
studies, but also to studies in comparative religion generally. While limited by its focus on only
one writer, it hopefully may stimulate further research into how Islamic writers may best be
3
studied in ways which respects their religious commitments, while acknowledging the need to
relate their work to concepts of Western origin.
4
Acknowledgements
This work represents part of a personal journey, both inner and outer, that has been rife with
trials and successes. While the trials have been my own, the successes that have come are due
in no small part to those who have travelled with me. While there are too many to
acknowledge individually, I am grateful for their company along this path.
Without the tireless effort of Professor Wayne Hudson and Dr Leila Toiviainen this work would
not be what it is. The support, guidance, and encouragement that you have both given is
something that I cannot repay. You both have a gift for bringing the best out in my work and I
am indebted to you both for this.
To my parents for your continued, and at times unsolicited, support and encouragement. Is it
finished yet? It is now. Thank you.
The University of Tasmania Document Delivery team must also be recognised. Without your
tireless efforts to track down those works that were otherwise out of my reach, your patience
in answering my questions, and your smiles when loading a pile of books and papers into my
arms, this work would be scantly recognisable. May your continuing efforts be the hidden
secret behind so many scholarly successes.
To all my brothers and sister, especially Shaykh Ali ElSenossi, Muqaddam Ahmad Salih
McCauley (may Allah sanctify his secret), and Wasi Dawud Abu Junayd Gos, for your unending
support, encouragement, and guidance. Without your constant illuminations I would be left in
the dark. Thank you for allowing me to be amongst your companions, acting as lampposts along
my journey.
5
Contents
Part I
Chapter 1 - Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 10
The Transmission of Sufism ............................................................................................................... 13
Limitations ........................................................................................................................................ 14
Problematising Sufism .................................................................................................................... 15
The Works of Ibn Ata Allah .............................................................................................................. 21
Chapter 2 Problematising Sufism ........................................................................................................ 24
Approaches to the Term Sufism...................................................................................................... 24
Sufism as Islamic Mysticism......................................................................................................... 24
Sufism as Islamic Sufism .............................................................................................................. 31
The Term Sufism............................................................................................................................. 36
Systematic Sufism.............................................................................................................................. 40
One Further Difficulty ........................................................................................................................ 41
Some Consequences for the Study of Sufism ..................................................................................... 43
Part II
Chapter 3 The Case of Ibn Ata Allah .................................................................................................. 48
Provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn Ata Allahs Oeuvre .............................................................. 48
Quranic Hermeneutics ...................................................................................................................... 51
The Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah) ................................................................................... 54
The Importance of Ibn Ata Allah ...................................................................................................... 58
The Life of Ibn Ata Allah ................................................................................................................... 60
Re-examining the Works of Ibn Ata Allah ......................................................................................... 63
6
The Interconnections ......................................................................................................................... 65
Chapter 4 Metaphysics ....................................................................................................................... 68
Definition of Metaphysics .................................................................................................................. 68
Tawhid, the Oneness of Allah ............................................................................................................ 70
Tawhid in the Quran and Hadith ....................................................................................................... 71
Understanding there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah)............................................................... 72
The Proofs of Tawhid ......................................................................................................................... 75
The Goal of Tawhid ............................................................................................................................ 83
Implications of the Metaphysics of Tawhid ........................................................................................ 87
Chapter 5 Ontology ............................................................................................................................ 90
From Essence (dhat) to Existence (kawn) ........................................................................................... 92
The Isthmus (barzakh) ....................................................................................................................... 95
The Role of Creation .......................................................................................................................... 96
Cause and Effect .............................................................................................................................. 101
Obedience (taa) .............................................................................................................................. 104
Poverty (faqr) and the Poor (faqir) ................................................................................................... 106
Rizq within the Ontological Domain ................................................................................................. 108
The Perception of Hardships ............................................................................................................ 111
Chapter 6 Epistemology .................................................................................................................... 114
The Importance of Self-Knowledge .................................................................................................. 115
Repentance (tawba) and Disobedience ............................................................................................ 117
Patient Endurance (sabr) and Contentment (rida) ............................................................................ 118
The Goal of Knowledge .................................................................................................................... 120
Servanthood (ubudiyyah) and Self-direction (tadbir)....................................................................... 123
Obedience and Disobedience .......................................................................................................... 125
7
Certainty (yakin) .............................................................................................................................. 128
Knowledge and Rizq ........................................................................................................................ 130
Chapter 7 Eschatology ...................................................................................................................... 133
Eschatology as an Impetus ............................................................................................................... 135
The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter .................................................................... 138
The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter in Allahs Foreknowledge ............................ 138
The Hereafter and Allahs Mercy (rahma) ........................................................................................ 140
Obedience (taa) and Disobedience (masiya) .................................................................................. 142
The Paradox of the Life to Come ...................................................................................................... 144
The Soteriological Elements of Eschatology ..................................................................................... 146
Chapter 8 Ethics................................................................................................................................ 149
The Importance of adab .................................................................................................................. 149
The Function of adab ....................................................................................................................... 153
The Process of adab......................................................................................................................... 154
Forgetfulness (ghaflah) and Remembrance (dhikr)........................................................................... 156
The Degrees of adab ........................................................................................................................ 157
Adab with Allah ............................................................................................................................... 160
Adab and rizq .................................................................................................................................. 162
Anxiety over Rizq ............................................................................................................................. 163
Seeking from Allah........................................................................................................................... 164
Adab and Soteriology ...................................................................................................................... 166
Chapter 9 Soteriology ....................................................................................................................... 168
The Problem and Goal of Ibn Ata Allahs Soteriology...................................................................... 168
Signs (ayat) in the Quran................................................................................................................. 172
Signs (ayat) upon the horizons and within themselves ..................................................................... 173
8
Soteriological Development ............................................................................................................. 174
The Soteriological Function of Knowledge ....................................................................................... 176
Arriving at the Qualities of the faqir ................................................................................................. 177
Contentment (rida) and Soteriological Development ....................................................................... 181
The Pedagogical Function of the Problem of Rizq............................................................................. 182
The Problem of rizq as a Sign (ayat) ................................................................................................. 183
The Solution to the Problem of rizq ................................................................................................. 184
Chapter 10 - Ibn Ata Allah and Islamic Orthodoxy .............................................................................. 187
The Opposition between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya ............................................................... 188
Ibn Taymiyyas Charges against the Sufis ......................................................................................... 191
Tawhid, Allah, and creation (khalq) .................................................................................................. 193
The implications of tawhid for ontology........................................................................................... 196
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 200
Appendix 1 - The Lacuna...................................................................................................................... 201
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 218
9
Part I
Chapter 1 - Introduction
The problem of Sufisms relation to Islam has a long history both within the works of Muslim
scholars throughout the history of Islam and within the works of modern scholars who have
attempted to survey the field. Sufisms relation to Islam has often evoked two diametrically
opposed positions, on the one hand of those who posit Sufism as something foreign to and
outside of Islam and, on the other hand, those who posit that Sufism is an integral aspect of
Islam.
This thesis problematises generic understandings of Sufism and exemplifies a more

contextual approach by an in depth study of a 13th century Sufi. It is divided into two parts. The
first part deals with the problems with the categorisation of Sufism. The second part is a study
of Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre in order to evaluate a) the interrelations between his works and b)
what, if any, are the relations to and affirmations of an Islamic paradigm. This work can be
situated amongst emerging studies which are acknowledging the limited and limiting
approaches that have tended to impose alien frameworks on works that are deemed foreign,
both linguistically and culturally.
Part two of this work has a tiered structure. Each chapter, while focusing on one aspect of Ibn
Ata Allahs work, acts as the basis for each successive chapter. The chapters are arranged to
facilitate a highlighting of the interconnections within Ibn Ata Allahs works between domains.
This part, as explained later, will utilise the concept of provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn
Ata Allahs works. The goal is to show that the interconnections between Ibn Ata Allahs
works are not limited to certain topics.
Part two opens with a chapter introducing Ibn Ata Allah and his works. This chapter places Ibn
Ata Allah within his historical context, through an overview of his life, while also providing his
historical and transhistorical importance. This chapter also looks at some of the issues that arise
within Sufi studies, such as Quranic hermeneutics and the science of Prophethood, and
determines how these could be dealt with in the study that follows.
10
The fourth chapter examines Ibn Ata Allahs use of the Oneness of God (tawhid) as a
metaphysical principle. Through examining his analysis of the Islamic affirmation of Oneness
(kalimah tawhid) there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah) it will be shown that, for Ibn Ata
Allah, tawhid is the only viable and sound basis for metaphysics. It will be seen, in turn, that the
problem of rizq is a direct result of this metaphysical scheme. Thus, the domain of metaphysics
is seen to be the source of the problem of rizq. It will be shown that the metaphysical
consistency throughout his works is applied in varying ways when developing, analysing, and
solving the problem of rizq.
The fifth chapter examines the ontological implications of Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics and
how, within this domain, the problem of rizq takes prominence. As provision occurs within the
ontological domain, this domain is seen to be the site of the problem of rizq. One of the themes
explored, which arises as a consequence of his metaphysics, is ontological poverty (faqr). If
Allah is the principle of existence then everything other than Allah, being contingently existent,
has ontological dependence. This raises the issue of an evident relation between ontological
poverty (faqr) and selfish calculation (tadbir). It will be shown that Ibn Ata Allahs argument
against acting according to ones selfish desires is, in some ways, an argument against acting
contrary to tawhid.
The sixth chapter examines the epistemological impact of Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics and
ontology. The move towards the realisation of creations ontological poverty will be shown to
be achieved through an ever increasing awareness of Divine Unity within/underpinning
multiplicity. The epistemological domain is the location of the solution to the problem of rizq.
Here it will be seen that Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology is an extension of his metaphysics and
ontology.
The seventh chapter delves into the eschatological issues that, within Ibn Ata Allahs works,
can be seen to result from the problem of rizq. From an eschatological perspective, the problem
of rizq is both widened and problematised. It is widened in that the problem of rizq is seen to
be an aspect of the overarching soteriological concern for both this world and the next. The
problem of rizq is, however, problematised in that in being a concern of gaining provision for
the next world, the provision of this world is forgone in preference for the next. This is
11
problematic in as far as it is seen to be antithetical to the issues detailed in the preceding
chapters. Irrespective of the domain that one is concerned with, the problem of rizq can be
seen to have a pedagogical function in that it provides impetus for the individual for pursuing
both this world and the next.
The eighth chapter examines the moral implications of embodying the metaphysics of tawhid
and the implications this has for the problem of rizq. It will be shown that through the
perfection of ethical behaviour (adab), as Ibn Ata Allah encourages, the metaphysics of tawhid
becomes embodied. Here is will be seen that it is within the ethical domain that the solution to
the problem of rizq is enacted.
The ninth chapter focuses on the individuals soteriological development through overcoming
the problem of rizq and embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. While his soteriological
semiotics is alluded to throughout this work, due to its centrality, its analysis is held over until
this chapter. There are two reasons for this, a) an understanding of Ibn Ata Allahs worldview
is indispensible for understanding his views on soteriology and b) it is here that the importance
of Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics for resolving the problem of rizq becomes apparent.
The tenth chapter takes a differing approach to Ibn Ata Allahs dependence on an Islamic
paradigm. This chapter examines the well known, though little commented on, relationship
between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya is renowned for, amongst other things,
his criticisms of what he saw as heterodox practices of many Sufis. The degree to which Ibn
Ata Allah adhered to an Islamic paradigm can be examined through his responses to these
criticisms.
Throughout this analysis of Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre his use of the Quran and the Hadith, as the
foundational texts of Islam, is foregrounded. There are instances, however, where verses of the
Quran and Hadith have been included because they are a) alluded to in a manner familiar to
those familiar with these sources or b) illustrate his consistency with these sources when they
are not mentioned. This has been done in order to show the degree to which Ibn Ata Allah,
and those thinkers like him, depends on an inherently Islamic context for understanding their
works.
12
The Transmission of Sufism
The transmission of Sufism into Europe has a long history. It began in earnest in the Middle
Ages with the translation of Islamic texts into Latin and has continued since then with varying
degrees of intensity. The colonialisation of Muslim countries that occurred from the 17th
century onward saw a renewed interest in attempts to understand a doctrine that appears both
foreign and familiar. Orientalists attempted to chart the major thinkers and foregrounded what
they saw as the major texts. Subsequently, an extensive scholarly literature emerged in several
European languages.
Nonetheless, this literature is not without its biases. This bias has shifted over time. The
medieval translations were almost exclusively works of science or philosophy. Aside from issues
of translation, which were often very problematic with a marked tendency to Latinise Semitic
expressions, these works were often divorced from their Islamic context. The problem was
arguably exacerbated by European colonialism with its sense of superiority. In the case of
Sufism, Orientalists indentified bodies of material they valorised as important but then often
highlighted the similarities in content and sophistication of certain aspects of Islamic thought
with the European intellectual heritage. This was often done at the expense of the inherently
Islamic nature and context of the works concerned. Attention to sources sometimes made
Sufism a patchwork of Greek, Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian philosophy, only loosely
connected with the Quran. While this, to some degree, resulted from some Islamic scholars of
Sufism Islamicised non-Islamic materials and then developed readings of Sufism based on their
own specific interpretations of what is and what is not Islam, it does not account for the degree
to which some Sufi works have been divorced from an Islamic context. Clearly Sufism needs
to be conceptualised in clearer and more critical terms and without reference to essentialist
conceptions of either Greek philosophy (which was also very diverse and historically variable) or
a narrow reductionist view of Islam.
13
Limitations
A prominent issue that frequently arises within works on Sufism is an insufficient

contextualisation of the materials. This can result in studies that deny the possibility of Sufism
being indigenous to Islamic paradigms as well as studies that deny the possibility of influences
external to Islam on particular Sufi literature or practices. As a result, there is some confusion
about what the terms Sufi and Sufism cover. In following the twofold aim, this work uses a
strategy that consists of two movements. Firstly, in order to determine whether or not Sufism is
indigenous to Islam, it assumes that there is an integral relation between Sufism and an Islamic
paradigm. Secondly, in order to test this assumption, an analysis of the works of one individual
who is regarded as an important Sufi thinker is undertaken to determine if there are
correlations or disjunctions between their work and an Islamic paradigm. For this study, the
works of Ibn Ata Allah have been chosen. In breaking down Ibn Ata Allahs worldview into
various domains, the strategy has been to examine his views and then to determine how
consistent they are with the foundational texts of Islam.
Focusing on the works of one thinker opens this work to certain limitations. While this has the
benefit of limiting the scope of the work, it also limits the any generalisations that may be made
within the fields of Islamic or Sufi studies. As a result, caution must be exercised when
presenting evidence for Sufisms relation to Islamic paradigms. Care is also needed in handling
the issue of Islamic orthodoxy. It is important both to avoid reading in a single interpretation of
what Islam is and not to negate the plurality that exists within any tradition.1 Here views will be
said to be compatible with Islamic paradigms when there is evidence that can be read to
support them within the Quran or the Hadith. It should also be noted that Ibn Ata Allahs
work is presented for the Western educated reader and is organised in terms of categories
drawn from the Western philosophical tradition, categories which were not, of course,
deployed by Ibn Ata Allah himself. This is a standard practice in the field, but it means that
nuances are called for. In some cases the Arabic meaning is difficult to convey in Western
terms.
Given the aim of this work of examining the relation of Sufism to Islam, this work is open to a
criticism of the division of Ibn Ata Allahs worldview in accordance with categories generally
associated with what may be called the Western philosophical tradition. While it would be a
1
For a tradition that bases itself on the affirmation of the Onenes of God (tawhid), the idea of a plurality of
interpretations is not as controversial as it might seem, as is evinced by the four schools of Sunni law.
14
stretch to state that Arabic literature is boring unless it bears a family resemblance to
European literature,2 it is acknowledged that there is some necessity for what Kilito terms
cultural translation. It is hoped that in the current study it may be regarded as a
praiseworthy pedagogical operation in as far as it is based on a sense of openness and
respect for the Other and [ones] cultural frame of reference.3 As Kilito states,4 cultural
translation which is widely followed by scholars is not necessarily innocent, for it can often
obscure that which is translated both intentionally and unintentionally. It is for this reason
that it is openly acknowledged that Ibn Ata Allah did not utilise categories such as
metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, etc. and that the division of his worldview, as presented
in his existent works, into these categories is, while useful for this study, somewhat arbitrary. If
we take, as an example, soteriology as a category, then two comments can be made
highlighting the manner in which cultural translation can be deemed a hinderance. Firstly, as
will become apparent from the study below, it would not be incorrect to state that Ibn Ata
Allahs oeuvre does not have a metaphysics or an ontology or an epistemology, each of his
works are focused solely on soteriological matters. If elements of these others categories are to
be found, as has been suggested in each chapter, then they exist in so far as the serve Ibn Ata
Allahs soteriological concerns. Secondly, it could also be stated that, strictly speaking, Ibn Ata
Allah does not have a soteriology. Given the etymology and philological development of
soteriology and its relationship to salvation, saviour, and, by extension, redemption from sin,
then soteriology can be seen to have inherently Christian underpinnings. If this is accepted as
the case, then it would be an imposition on Ibn Ata Allahs worldview to state that each of his
works are focused solely on soteiological matters. With these concerns in mind, the categories
upon which each chapter is based are utilised in as far as they provide a useful means for
highlighting certain aspects of the works discussed with a desire to show openness and respect
for the Other and [ones] cultural frame of reference.5
Problematising Sufism
2
Abdelfattah Kilito, Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language, trans. Wail S. Hassan (New York: Syracuse University
Press, 2008), 15
3
Ibid, 10.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
15
The history of Sufism as a category of academic study has a rich history. Some of the earliest
studies on Sufism can be found in the works of Barthlemy dHerbelot de Molainville (1625-
1695), a French Orientalist, Franois Bernier (1625-1688), a French physician and traveller, and
Franois Ptis de la Croix (1653-1713), a French Orientalist and diplomat. As early as the
Seventeenth century, in the works of these individuals, there emerged two trends that continue
to impact the field of Sufi studies: academic/scholarly studies, which analysed primary texts,
and anthropological studies, which documented particular expressions of Sufism. In examining
a range of these early studies it has been said that they are marked by:
A discipline that started as a first and foremost philological, text-centred

exercise gradually evolved into a subdivision of cross-religious studies
pursued by curious amateurs (diplomats, travellers, colonial officials),
Biblicists, and area studies specialists, or Orientalists.6
The legacy of these early studies is twofold.
Firstly there is the legacy for works that are primarily academic. Often coming from scholars of
the Bible and Orientalists, authors of such works were reluctant to consider mystical
propensities to be intrinsic to the Islamic religion.7 Intentionally or not, these authors often
viewed Islam as inferior to Christianity, the result of which was a prevailing view that Islam
was incapable of producing the vaulted spirituality and sophisticated theology they observed
in Sufi texts.8 Thus, despite any conclusive evidence to support it, Sufism was seen as being
extrinsic to Islam. The severity of this can be seen in the fact that all major histories of Islam
published in Europe between 1850 and 1890 tended to draw a sharp distinction between
Sufism and mainstream Islam.9 Despite no such sharp distinction being apparent within the
anthropological literature of the time, there are numerous examples that attempt to show
Sufisms alleged Hindu, neo-Platonic, Christian, or other origin, a trend that continues within
modern academic literature.
6
Alexander D. Knysh. Historiography of Sufi Studies in the West, in A Companion to the History of the Middle
East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 107.
7
Ibid., 109.
8
Ibid., 109.
9
Ibid., 109.
16
Secondly there is the legacy for works that are primarily anthropological. The empirical data
of these early anthropological studies are often mired in the colonialist perspectives of the
observers. This literature has been seen to be predominantly produced by colonial
administrators who presided over the conquest and pacification of indigenous Muslim
populations and, as such,
the data that its authors perceived to be authentic and objective is, in fact,
permeated by underlying colonial and imperial assumptions and stereotypes
about the Muslim societies in question.10
This inherent bias has been documented in works produced by the French and British,11 the
Russians,12 and the Dutch,13 though without exhausting such instances.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries scholars tested the views of their
predecessors. A primary concern for all these scholars [was] to identify the place of Sufi
teachings, literature, and practices vis--vis orthodox Islam.14 Indicative of the scholarship of
this era is the work of Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) who presented the view that Sufi exegetes
embraced the allegorical method of Quran interpretation, which set them apart from the
mainstream Sunni commentators who focused on the historical, legal and philological aspects
of the Muslim scripture.15 While views such as this placed Sufism within an Islamic paradigm, it
did so at the expense of placing it in opposition to Islamic thinkers and works that were deemed
mainstream, popular, and, ultimately, orthodox. In accounting for a supposed
otherness within Sufi teachings, literature, and practices, many scholars continued to assert
foreign sources and influences. Despite any conclusive evidence for this view, it can be seen to
10
Alexander D. Knysh, Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm: The Issue of Motivations of Sufi Resistance Movements
in Western and Russian Scholarship, Die Welt des Islams 42 (2002): 140.
11
Knysh, Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm; Knysh, Historiography of Sufi Studies.
12
Knysh, Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm.
13
Martin van Bruinessen, Studies of Sufism and Sufi Orders in Indonesia, Die Welt des Islams 38 (1998).
14
Knysh, Historiography of Sufi Studies, 112.
15
Ibid., 112.
17
be a result of a late nineteenth century shift in the academic study of religion where the
project of developing a scientific study of religion was framed in a quest of origins.16
The early twentieth century witnessed a rapid expansion in the number of scholars and works
specialising in Sufi studies. However, these often continued the biases of their predecessors, as
it has been noted by building on the foundations established by a handful of nineteenth-
century pioneers, their twentieth-century successors generated a considerable body of
academic literature.17 The anthropological approach continued to frame its observations in
accordance with questionable agendas as the field data assembled by colonial administrators-
cum-scholars was definitely shaped by their colonial and imperial presuppositions and
anxieties.18 During this period, within academic approaches to Sufis studies there emerged
two major approaches to Sufism in western scholarship.19 Without necessarily negating each
other, a historicist approach emerged, which emphasised the concrete circumstances of
Sufisms evolution across time and space, as well as a trans-historical, which viewed the
contents of Sufism as consistently emphasising the eternal human aspiration to a higher reality
and to a unitive/monistic vision of the world.20 As the study of the trans-historical aspect of
Sufism attracted researchers who were similarly committed to a religious vocation, some
critics of the literature of this era have noticed a Christianisation of some aspects of Sufi
thought.21 Nevertheless, the works produced during this period of scholarship laid solid
textual and factual foundations for the study of Sufism in western academia.22
Second half of the twentieth century saw a shift in focus within religious studies. The shift being
referred to here is largely due to the critique of Orientalism and the rise of post-Orientalist and
16
Marcia Hermansen. The Academic Study of Sufism in American Universities, The American Journal of Islamic
Social Studies 24 (2007): 29.
17
18
Ibid., 118.
19
Ibid., 118.
20
Ibid., 112.
21
Hermansen, The Academic Study of Sufism, 30.
22
18
postcolonial approaches to the academic study of the worlds religions.23 With regard to the
field of Sufi studies
one can say that Sufi studies have successfully survived the critique of
western Orientalism launched in the 1960s and 1970s by Abdul Latif
Tibawi and Edward Said, who indicted its representatives for their
complicity with the western colonial project and the resultant deliberate
distortion of Islams image in the west.24
However, unpacking a definition of having successfully survived this critique can be taken to
mean that very little has changed, for overall we find surprisingly little soul-searching among
the western Sufiologists of the last decades of the twentieth century.25 Examples of this can
be seen in the two articles that specifically deal with Sufi materials within Rethinking Islamic
Studies,26 both of which deal specifically with postcolonialist approaches to the position of
hagiographical materials within academic discourse without touching on the contextualisation
of Sufism and the potential impact that this may have for scholarly studies.
The problem of contextualising Sufism can be seen to arise from two distinct, though
interrelated, areas of scholarship. Firstly there is a general problem of cultural translation that
arises within comparative philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and any form of cross-cultural
hermeneutics. It is recognised that comparative philosophy often imports hermeneutical and
philosophical methods to the study of non-Western texts that succeed in distorting or simply
missing the significance of those texts in the context of their home cultures27 such that there
is a dramatic distortion of alien traditions through the imposition of hermeneutic and
23
It should be recognised that to delve into the wealth of postcolonial literature would take this work too far
afield. Varying responses abound regarding the benefits and limitations of this work. Without detailing them and
without siding with either camp, it is interesting to acknowledge that it has become commonplace within
postcolonial studies to lament the colonizing propensities of postcolonial studies Donald R. Wehrs. Satres
Legacy in Postcolonial Theory; or, Whos Afraid of Non-Western Historiography and Cultural Studies, New Literary
History 34 (2004): 761.
24
25
Ibid., 121.
26
Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, eds., Rethinking Islamic Studies (Columbia: The University of South Carolina
Press, 2010).
27
Jay L. Garfield, Empty Words (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 152.
19
doxographic frameworks entirely foreign to the traditions themselves.28 This distortion
becomes increasingly dramatic when it is acknowledge that many early Western studies or
religion carried with them European ideas and presuppositions of what religion was or ought to
be.29 This scholarly imperialism raises concerns that asymmetrical translations and
transcreations of non-Western texts displace the indigenous understanding by reframing and
reencoding the signs precisely within a Euro-centred imaging or the world whose cognitive
claims are derived from the historical experiences of European (modernist) cultures.30 These
are issues that are being examined in relations to several of the worlds traditions, including,
though not limited to Indian Philosophies,31 Judaism,32 and Islam.33 In terms of the study
provided here, it is intended that, by attempting to explore the internal logic of the texts,
insight can be made by judging the materials according to their own claims.
The second area where the problem of contextualisation arises is within Sufi studies. This can
be seen as being an example of the problematic nature of a practical implication of cross-
cultural translation. As is discussed in the next chapter, the study of Sufism suffers from
methods of categorisation that impose upon it ill fitting constraints that are, at times, at conflict
with the claims and internal logic of the materials. One example, explored further below, is that
of categorising Sufism as a form of mysticism. While this type of categorisation does give it a
family resemblance to European literature,34 it does so at the expense of limiting, to the point
of negating, the paradigm which Sufi works claim as the underpinning framework.
28
Ibid., 169.
29
Purushottama Bilimoria, What is the Subaltern of the Philosophy of Religion?, in Postcolonial Philosophy of
Religion, eds. Purushottama Bilimoria and Andrew B. Irvine (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 10 11.
30
Ibid., 15.
31
See Purushottama Bilimoria and Andrew B. Irvine, eds., Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion (Dordrecht: Springer,
2009).
32
See Peter Schafer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
33
See Ernst and Martin, Rethinking Islamic Studies.
34
Kilito, Thou Shalt Not Speak, 15.
20
The Works of Ibn Ata Allah
Although almost all of Ibn Ata Allahs works have been translated into one or another
European language, especially English and French, an analysis of the connections between his
works remains undeveloped. In his introduction to the first complete English translation35 of
the Kitab al-Hikam from the original Arabic, Danner wrote:
His principal work is of course the Kitab al-Hikam ... It was immediately
successful and is considered by subsequent generations as a masterful
summary, in easily learned aphorisms, of the truths of the Path.
Next in importance to the Hikam is his work Miftah al-falah wa misbah al-
arwah (The Key of Success and the Lamps of Spirits), a concise and
comprehensive exposition of the Sufi method of Invocation (dhikr). It is
perhaps the first work in Sufism that gives the general and technical aspects
of the dhikr in a single book. A short book, the Miftah is written in a lucid
style replete with citations drawn from the Quran and Hadiths, not to
mention the early Sufis. It was written in the last decade or so of his life and
is quite popular in present-day Sufi circles.
A companion-piece to the Hikam is his Kitab at-Tanwir fi isqat at-tadbir

(Light on the Elimination of Self-Direction), which is a simple and clear
exposition of the Shadhili approach to the virtues, such as patience, sincerity,
hope, love, fear, and the like. But they are all seen as contained in a single
synthetic virtue, which is that of the elimination of self-direction (isqat at-
tadbir). It is a question of the disciples aligning his own tadbir with that of
Gods. The book ends in a series of intimate discourses (munajat) of rare
beauty on the matter of tadbir. Since the work contains a reference to the
great Tunisian Sufi, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Marjani (d. 699/1299),
followed by the usual formula for the deceased, we may conclude that it was
35
Victor Danner, Sufi Aphorisms (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973). The first English translation of the Kitab al-Hikam was a
partial translation from a Malay translation, see Raymond L. Archer, Muhammadan Mysticism in Sumatra (PhD
diss., Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1935). A second partial translation, and perhaps the first directly from Arabic,
can be found in Ralph W. J. Austin, Counsels of a Sufi Master, Studies in Comparative Religion 5 (1971): 207
215.
21
written in the last decade of Ibn Ataillahs life. The book abounds in
citations from the first two masters of the Shadhiliyya.
His biographical work, Kitab al-Lataif fi manaqib Abi l-Abbas al-Mursi wa

Shaykhihi Abi l Hasan (The Subtle Blessings in the Saintly Lives of Abu l-
Abbas al-Mursi and His Master Abu l-Hassan), is not so much a
reconstruction of their lives as it is a record of what they said. It is somewhat
autobiographical in that it has numerous references to the religious and Sufi
notables of Ibn Ataillahs time. Without the Lataif, it would be practically
impossible to say more than a few lines on the life of Ibn Ataillah himself.
This work is important for its transmission of the observations of the first
masters of the Shadhiliyya, and as such is one of the basic sources for the
early period of that order. All future works from Shadhili masters invariably
refer to the Lataif for their citations. Apart from its straightforward prose, it
contains numerous ahzab from the Shadhili masters. It seems to be amongst
his last compositions.
His small work, al-Qasd al-mujarrad fi marifat al-Ism al-Mufrad (The Pure
Goal Concerning Knowledge of the Unique Name), is likewise written in
sober style. It sets out the doctrine of the Supreme Name, Allah, both in itself
and in relation to the other Divine Names of God in Islam. There is a veritable
metaphysical theory linking all of his exposition of the Divine Names. The
Qasd is not as well known as his previous works, but it figures as part and
parcel of the corpus that was handed down as coming from him. Its date of
composition is difficult to assess.
His other writings are of minor importance, even though one of them, the Taj
al-arus al-hawi li-tahdhib an-nufus (The Brides Crown Containing the
Discipline of Souls), seems still to be quite popular. Composed largely of
extracts from his Hikam, Tanwir, and Lataif, it is a composite work, and this
may account for its popularity. It might have been composed by him as a
memory aid or a brief synthesis of his other works, but it definitely lacks any
interior unity. This might well be one of his last writings.
Apart from the aforementioned titles, Ibn Ataillahs remaining

compositions, such as his Unwan at-tawfiq fi adab at-tariq (The Sign of
Success Concerning the Discipline of the Path), a gloss on a poem by Abu
22
Madyan on the relations between master and disciple, as less well known. Of
his lost works we have only titles.36
This account of Ibn Ata Allahs main works overlooks their interconnections. While it is
mentioned that the Kitab at-Tanwir is a companion-piece to the Hikam, that aphorisms from
the Hikam occur within other works, and that, when read in conjunction with the Hikam, the
other books of Ibn Ataillah, such as the Tanwir, the Qasd, the Lataif, and the Miftah, open up
still further angles of insight, it concludes that the Hikam itself, when properly understood
and assimilated, ends up by being its own best commentary.37 This overlooks any further
interconnections between these texts. Most subsequent studies have almost uncritically
accepted and utilised the above passage, as can be seen within Appendix 1. Furthermore, a
summation such as this does not attempt to contextualise those works which means that a key
aspect to comprehending them is missing. This work draws predominantly from the literature in
English and French.38 Furthermore, no attempt is made to delve into manuscripts or examine
the large body of traditional commentary literature.39
36
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 12 14. This Passage, with minor variations, is also in Victor Danner, The Book of
Wisdom (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 29 32.
37
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 17.
38
Apart from the fact that many of the secondary materials in Arabic are not available in translation, this work
does not engage with disputes and issues of translation of the original Arabic sources, which falls within the
domain of Classical Arabic studies.
39
Arguably the most famous commentaries on the Kitab al-Hikam are works by Ibn Abbad al-Ronda (8th/14th
th th th th th th
century), Ahmad Zarruq (9 /15 century), and Ibn Ajiba (12 -13 /18 -19 century). That this literature too has
been largely ignored by scholars is discussed by Yunus Schwein, Illuminated Arrival in the Hikam al-Ataiyyah and
Three Major Commentaries, (MA diss., University of Georgia, 2007).
23
Chapter 2 Problematising Sufism
This chapter examines some of the prominent methods of defining Sufism and highlights the
problems inherent within these definitions. It also considers some of the prominent biases
within the literature on Sufism.
Approaches to the Term Sufism
It has been said that today Sufism is a name without a reality, but formerly it was a reality
without a name.1 It could be said, with regard to contemporary approaches to Sufism, both
popular and scholarly, that Sufism is merely a name, an umbrella term so broad that its
content, or reality, remains an unresolved dispute. Without attempting to resolve this dispute it
is possible to see that some of the prominent scholarly methods for categorising Sufism do not
adequately contextualise the material under examination. In order to understand how Sufic
materials are misrepresented it is first necessary to examine examples of how Sufism is
miscontextualised.
Sufism as Islamic Mysticism
There is a large body of literature in English that treats Sufism and Islamic mysticism as
synonyms. It is apparent in works ranging from Nicholsons (1914) The Mystics of Islam to
Knyshs (2000) Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, amongst others.2 Without documenting the
1
Abul Hassan Fushanja, quoted in Ali Bin Uthman Hujwiri, The Kashf al Mahjub, trans. Reynold J Nicholson (Delhi:
Taj Company, 2002), 44.
2
For instance, see Oluf Schnbeck, Sufism in the USA: Creolisation, Hybridisation Syncretisation? in Sufism
Today: Heritage and Tradition in the Global Community, eds. Catharina Raudvere and Leif Stenberg (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2009), 177, who acknowledges that the classification of Sufism as Islamic mysticism is a tradition still used
today, somewhat uncritically. Even putting the popular literature aside, many nuanced and cautious scholarly
works suffer the same uncritical classification of Sufism. For instance Ian Netton, Sufi Ritual: The Parallel Universe
(Surry: Curzon Press, 2000), 6 casually states that Sufism is the mystical dimension of Islam. A further problem
arises for Netton, Sufi Ritual, 7, in that rather than discussing what possible form of mysticism Sufism supposedly
is, it is stated that it is a truism that [God is] the desired Divine Focus of mystical union, a point raised and
24
history of this conflation, it is possible that this view of Sufism arose from the idea that it was
extraneous to Islam and that it is a syncretic mixture of previous doctrines. Whilst Arberrys
work is dated, his assertion that it is proposed for the sake of brevity to accept that the Sufis
owed much or little of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic,
Hermetic, Zoroastrian or Buddhist example3 can be seen to persist in both scholarly and
popular literature with statements like the Quran provides little explicit treatment of mystical
themes4 and that Islam took much longer to develop than has usually been supposed, and
that in the slow process of development Christian materials were used to build the mystical
side of the religion, the side which was to become Sufism.5 Yet, irrespective of how the term
Islamic mysticism arose, it abounds in both popular and scholarly literature to such an extent
that it is commonly accepted to answer what is Sufism? with Islamic mysticism without
taking into account the problematic nature of the term mysticism.
An understanding of the term Islamic mysticism depends on what is meant by mysticism. A

main problem here is that, despite varying conceptions of mysticism, discussions detailing
which kind of mysticism Sufism supposedly represents are lacking. There is a plethora of
different kinds of mysticism, such that in 1899 Dean W. R. Inge listed twenty-five definitions,6
and a detailed discussion of each would take us too far afield.7 If mysticism is understood in
rejected in chapter 7 below. Cyrus A. Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics (Columbia: The University of Carolina Press, 2011),
passim, uses the words Sufi and mystic interchangeably without hesitation or discussion.
3
Arthur J. Arberry, Sufism (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 11.
4
Richard J. A. McGregor, Sancity and Mysticism in Medieval Egypt (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 2.
5
Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 9. This point is a matter of dispute for
it has been seen that chronologically, Sufism precedes Christian love mysticism, Louis Dupr, Mysticism [First
Edition], in Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd Edition (Farmington Hills: Thomson Gale, 2004), vol. 9, 6348.
Nevertheless, the view that Sufism is a syncretic mix of preceding mysticisms is one that persists. For instance, in
the existing literature it is common that an author will assert such conflicting view as Sufism is an expression of
mysticism indigenous to Islam while at the same time the Islamic mystical movement [is] the direct heir of
Hellenistic asceticism, Winston E. Waugh, Sufism: The Mystical Side of Islam (United States of America: Xulon
Press, 2005), 8 10. All of that overlooks the well documented observance that with the exception of certain
antinomian (rule-breaking) groups, Sufis have generally followed the lifeways of Islamic custom, Nile Green,
Sufism: A Global History (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 8.
6
Dupr, Mysticism, 6341.
7
An example of how this may be seen to be problematic is the comment that Sufism is the major mystical
tradition in Islam, Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
25
its etymological sense relating to the mysteries inherent within each religion, then this issue
would not arise, for there are numerous Sufi works that discuss unveiling and perceiving the
unseen.8 The conflation of mysticism and Sufism may be the result of early studies which
focused on unique cases, such as al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bistami,9 where ambiguous statements
have caused controversy. Within the history of Islam such statements have led to accusations
of apostasy due to the view that such individuals are claiming identity with God (ittihad) and
has been a source of controversy levelled against the Sufis at various times throughout
history,10 a point rejected by most given the title Sufi.11 This understanding of mysticism as a
rejection of orthodoxy may be evident in other traditions though, despite claims of identity
with God by some who have been labelled Sufis, a careful study of even the strongest claims
for mystical identity with God across the three [Jewish, Christian, and Islamic] traditions
demonstrates that few mystics have consciously adopted an antinomian stance or broken with
the common religious practices and institutional claims of their tradition.12 Irrespective of how
it arose, this view of mysticism often involves a general ambivalence towards the revealed
law such that it is said that the mystic does not have respect for the laws of religion since he
2007), 1. While it does acknowledge disperate mystical approaches within Islam, there is no deliniation on a) what
is meant by mystical tradition or mysticism or b) how Sufism differs from other, so called, mystical traditions
within Islam.
8
It could even be suggested that the Greek qualifier mustikos, from which mysticism is derived, which is itself
derived from the verb muein, meaning to close the mouth or eyes has some correlation with Sufi ideals in that its
goals include seeing the world as the words of God, thus closing the human mouth, and perceiving the Divine unity
(tawhid), thus closing the eyes to multiplicity, though this would require further elaboration than can be done
here. That there is a clasificatory problem with the term Islamic mysticism has been acknowledged by, amongst
others, Eric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam, trans. Roger Gaetani (Bloomington: World
Wisdom, 2010), 2, states that this expression does have a certain relevance if one understands it as the
knowledge of the mysteries, though is cautious not to take it any further because in the Christian world, the
term mysticism has been extended to apply to cases which are imbued with individual subjectivism, which he
feels does not apply here.
9
Massignon has been accused, in his study of al-Hallaj, of utilising one example to make generalisations which are
not representative of Sufis in general.
10
Reynold A. Nicholoson and Georges C. Anawati, Ittihad, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1978), vol. IV, 283.
11
For example, Ibn Arabi, The Universal Tree and the Four Birds, trans. Angela Jaffray (Oxford: Anqa Publishing,
2006), 53, rejects this accusation because ittihad is that two essences become one, which is, as Souad al-Hakim,
Ibid., 35. recognizes, impossible according to Ibn Arabi for this would be counter to the metaphysics of tawhid.
12 nd
Bernard McGinn, Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, in Encyclopedia of Religion, 2 Edition
(Farmington Hills: Thomson Gale, 2004), vol. 9, 6336.
26
has another and more direct route to the truth, that of experience of God.13 One method for
supposedly clarifying any possible confusion between Sufism and other forms of mysticism is to
add that there were mystics in the Islamic world who could be characterized in this way, but
the system of mysticism is just as systematic as any other form of intellectual enquiry.14 While
at first glance there appears to be a distinction between Sufism as Islamic mysticism and other
forms of mysticism, there is no contrast between mysticism as a rejection of revealed law and
the rigorous adherence to the revealed law (sharia) stressed by numerous Sufis. The necessity
of Sufis adhering to the revealed law (sharia) is evident in statements including, though not
limited to, al-Junayds saying that, regarding the Sufi path, our knowledge must be controlled
by conformity with the Quran and the Sunna15 and Abul Hassan al-Shadhilis saying that if
your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Quran and Sunna, hold fast to these two and
take no notice of your unveiling; tell yourself that the Quran and Sunna is guaranteed by God
Most High, which is not the case with the unveiling inspiration and mystical perceptions.16
Rather, positing Sufism as a sort of systematic form of mysticism misses a crucial aspect of
the relationship between the Sufi and the law (sharia).
With the large number of possible types of mysticism, the term itself can be considered
problematic. The problem is that no definition could be both meaningful and sufficiently
comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some point or other, have been described as
mystical.17 As has been suggested the process of mysticisms reinvention in departicularized
form needs itself to be particularized and seen in its own historical complexity.18 This issue is
compounded with a separate, though equally problematic, issue of the umbrella term
13
Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
192.
14
Ibid., 193.
15
Muhammad A. H. Ansari, The Doctrine of One Actor: Junayds View of Tawhid, The Muslim World 73 (1983):
36.
16
Al-Sharani quoted by Pierre Lory, Al-Shadhili, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1997), vol. IX, 171.
17
Dupr, Mysticism, 6341. Thus, descriptions of Sufism such as it being a devotional and mystical current within
the Islamic tradition become significantly less meaningful than they first appear, Martin van Bruinessen and Julia
D. Howell, Sufism and the Modern in Islam (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 3.
18
Leigh E. Schmidt, The Making of Modern Mysticism, Journal of the American Academy of Religions 71 (2003):
275.
27
Sufism.19 It has been recognised that Sufism is not a simple and monolithic entity but a
collection of rich and diverse traditions with numerous currents that sometimes compete with
each other.20 Whilst it is problematic, it would be premature to discard the term Sufism
given that its conflation with mysticism can be seen to mis-contextualise the material it
supposedly covers. This is especially so, given the difficulty in determining which, if any, form of
mysticism Sufism conforms to. In this regard it is useful to ask to what extent ... does the use
of a term created in the modern Christian West distort the meaning of key figures, movements,
and texts from the traditions of Judaism and Islam,21 especially when it is used
indiscriminately. As the term has no real counterpart in other traditions, it is not surprising
that the suitability of mysticism as a neutral, global term has been questioned by some
scholars,22 yet a gap remains in the literature which discusses Sufism as Islamic mysticism.
Rather than attempting to bridge this gap, this work attempts to highlight the need for a closer
reading of primary materials in order to suggest the need for revisiting these broad, and
sometimes limiting, categorisations.
A consequence of the problematic nature of the terms involved is that there is the potential to
de-Islamisize Sufism. By equating Sufism with Islamic mysticism it can force studies of
Sufism to conform to the paradigms used to analyse other forms of mysticism. Others have
suggested that there has been a disproportionate emphasis of earlier Western translations
and secondary studies that, while quite understandable in terms of pioneering European
scholars natural interests, has left a legacy of that problematic initial definition of Islamic
mysticism.23 This initial definition has reinforced a potent combination of theological
presuppositions and questionable historical paradigms that together have largely blocked a
19
This problem is not unique to the field of Sufi studies. Other religious studies are beginning to realise that, far
from denying that forms of mysticism exist, the generic term mysticism has a normative affect on the materials
that are subsumed within its boarders, undermining the richness and diversity of those materials. For an overview
and example of how this arises within studies on Jewish mysticism see Schafer, Origins of Jewish Mysticism, 1 30.
20
Ahmed Afzaal, Sufism, in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Nature (London: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), 1604.
21
McGinn, Mystical Union, 6334.
22 nd
Peter Moore, Mysticism [Further Considerations], in Encyclopedia of Religion, 2 Edition (Farmington Hills:
Thomson Gale, 2004), vol. 9, 6355.
23
James W. Morris, Situating Islamic Mysticism: Between Written Traditions and Popular Spirituality, in Mystics
of the Book, ed. Robert A. Herrera (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993), 308.
28
more adequate scholarly perception of Islamic mysticism.24 This lack of adequate scholarly
understanding is partly from an unwarranted tendency on the part of many Western scholars
to underemphasise in Islamic intellectual thought those Arabic and Persian ideas ... as well as
those original and particularly Sufic themes which are not essentially related to Greek
philosophy or to [other] monotheistic traditions, the result of this being an approach that
tends to reduce Sufic themes to an outgrowth of Greek philosophy or a mere dimension of
Islamic religion.25 As a result of this non-Muslim observers from many backgrounds have
continued to read their own models of religion and religious authority including equally
inappropriate notions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy into the most diverse Islamic
settings.26 In support of this it has been noted that the notion of [Sufism as] mysticism relied
on a culturally Protestant, temporally modernist and intellectually cosmopolitan construction of
religion in which the authority of the solitary individuals direct, unmediated experience was
seen to be the fountainhead of authentic religiosity across all cultures and all people.27 There
is some truth in this claim. Indeed, at times Sufism has been assigned the part of the
syncretistic bastard in the family of world religions.28 In contrast to this, there is the traditional
view that the realisation of the spiritual virtues and their relation to the metaphysical ground
and destiny of human souls is itself at the very centre of the explicit, exoteric Quranic
text.29 Equating Sufism with forms of mysticism de-contextualises its heritage. The assertion
that Sufism is as a syncretic outgrowth of multiple traditions, and other similar views which
attempt to equate Sufism with mysticism, distorts the material under examination because it
fails to adequately contextualise Sufi works.
24
Ibid., 308.
25
Parviz Morewedge, Sufism, Neoplatonism, and Zaehners Theory of Mysticism, in Islamic Philosophy and
Mysticism, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York: Caravan Books, 1981), 223.
26
Morris, Situating Islamic Mysticism, 310. An example of this is Helena Hallenberg, Ibrahim al-Dasuqi (1255
1296): A Saint Invented (Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 2005). Here an overtly Christian notion of
sainthood is utilised to evaluate the status of a Muslim considered by many to be a saint, the result of which is a
study that misrepresents both Ibrahim al-Dasuqi and Islamic notions of sainthood. A similar observation could be
seen in Waughs view of Sufism as a kind of Christianised Islam. Despite overlooking certain important scholars and
traditional texts within his work, it is apparent that Waughs views are heavily influenced by his vocation as senior
pastor where for over 21 years he became a journeyman dispenser of the Word of Jesus Christ, Waugh, Sufism,
backcover. To reiterate a previous statement, this in no way denies crosscultural influences, though, without
further evidence, such views cannot but be seen as the authors personal leanings.
27
Green, Sufism, 2.
28
Schnbeck, Sufism in the USA, 177.
29
Morris, Situating Islamic Mysticism, 309.
29
An alternative to describing Sufism as Islamic mysticism has been to understand Sufism as
Islamic esoterism. In understanding Sufism as Islamic esoterism it is helpful to see that
exoterism (ilm az-zahir) and esoterism (ilm al-batin) are in no way contradictory or conflicting,30
nor is priority given to one or the other. Esoterism is the internal complement of exoterism for
what, in exoterism, are dogmas and observances, become, in esoterism, unconditioned truth
and ways of realisation.31 The corollary of this is that in Islam as in all other traditions, it
would not be possible to have an authentic esoterism without exoterism.32 However, these
terms too are problematic and their boundaries are not clear cut. One example of the
problematic nature of this bifurcation is that that the division of Islam into an esoteric Path
and an exoteric Law was not as clear-cut a phenomenon in its early history as it was to be later
on33 and it could be suggested that within certain circles this division is still not clear-cut. A
glance at the texts or practices of those deemed to be Sufis shows the blurred nature of these
distinctions for their works encompass both aspects without strictly categorising as exoteric or
esoteric.34 Furthermore, the use of esoteric in this context has been seen as problematic in
that the popular but uncritical tendency to render the word al-batin as esoteric derives from
the spiritual hermeneutics of the Western Romanticism and Occultism, which implicitly affirms
the above mentioned bifurcation by distinguishing Sufism from fulfilling the socio-political
religious laws.35 It has been acknowledged that the spiritual aspects of Islam were neither
absent before the twelfth century, when organised Sufi orders started to play a major role in
30
The importance of this subtle point cannot be overstated, especially when scholars who are aware of this use
phrases that do not adequately reflect this interrelation. An example of this is the statement the knowledge of
the inner (ilm al-batin), as opposed to exoteric knowledge (ilm az-zahir), Eric Geoffroy, Approaching Sufism, in
Sufism: Love and Wisdom, eds. Jean-Louis Michon and Roger G. Gaetani (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 50,
which, while making a meaningful contradistinction between the two, still includes the idea of an opposition.
Though there is some clarification that this is not an actual opposition for God presents Himself as, at the same
time, the Outer (al-zahir) and the Inner (al-batin), under seemingly opposite Names which the Sufi will have to
reconcile during his spiritual search, Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism, 1.
31
William Stoddart, Aspects of Islamic Esoterism, in Sufism: Love and Wisdom, eds. Jean-Louis Michon and Roger
G. Gaetani (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 237.
32
Geoffroy, Approaching Sufism, 53 54.
33
Victor Danner, The Necessity for the Rise of the Term Sufi, Studies in Comparative Religion 6 (1972): 72.
34
An example of where there is such a division is Ibn Ajibas Quranic commentary al-Bahr al-madid, which utilises
exoteric and esoteric methods of commentary to complement each other, see Ibn Ajiba, The Immense Ocean,
trans. Mohamed F. Aresmouk and Michael A. Fitzgerald (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2009).
35
Algis Uzdavinys, Sufism in the Light of Orientalism, Acta Orientalia Vilnensia 6 (2005), 121.
30
Muslim societies, nor were they ever codified within such orders,36 which supports the view
that Sufism is not a source of esoterism independent of the Islamic tradition.37 While it can be
admitted that there is something that sets Sufi texts apart from other Islamic texts, to assert
that it is their esoteric nature is too simplistic.
Despite the practice of conflating Sufism with what is generally understood as mysticism, a
further issue needs to be highlighted. While Sufism and mysticism are by no means
interchangeable expressions,38 it must be recognized that this conflation has gained such
currency within both popular and scholarly materials that it has almost become standard to
refer to Sufism as Islamic mysticism.
Sufism as Islamic Sufism
While not as entrenched as Islamic mysticism, the labelling of Sufism as Islamic Sufism, and
to a lesser extent Quranic Sufism,39 are also problematic. It is seen to be problematic
because Islamic Sufism implies the idea that there are kinds of Sufism, some of which are
Islamic and other which are not.40 The use of the phrase Islamic Sufism differs from the issues
surrounding Islamic mysticism in that its problematic nature is often acknowledged. Rozehnal
writes that for some Islamic Sufism may sound redundant, although utilised this expression
36
Afzaal, Sufism, 1604.
37
Despite a statement such as while it is true that Sufism encompasses many mystical elements, the broad social
reach that it acquired over centuries of expansion rendered it much more than the path of an esoteric elete,
Green, Sufism, 1, has a greater degree of nuance than earlier works, the degree to which it relies on ideas of
Sufism as mysticism and an esoterism renders it somewhat problematic.
38
Josef Van Ess, Sufism and its Opponents, in Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies
and Polemics, ed. Federick De Jong and Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 44.
39
It should be pointed out that the work of Mir Valiuddin, The Quranic Sufism (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
2002) is not an example of the tautology discussed within this section. Despite the title, Valiuddins, Ibid., 6, view is
that Sufism is a purely Islamic discipline and this work examines Sufism in light of the Quran as a rebuttle of
those who would suggest that Sufism is extraneous to an Islamic paradigm.
40
These categories of Sufism in the West are seen to include Islamic Sufi orders in the West, Quasi-Islamic Sufi
orders or organisations, Non-Islamic Sufi orders or organisations, and organisations or schools related to Sufism or
Sufi orders, Aziz E. K. Idrissi, Islamic Sufism in the West, trans. Aisha Bewley (Norwich: Diwan Press, 2013), 20.
31
to convey Sufism as the essence of Islamic orthodoxy, an authentic discourse and practice
firmly grounded in the dictates of normative law (sharia) and prophetic precedent (sunna).41
Even in popular literature this problem has been acknowledged. Examples include statements
including, though not limited to, as one author states there is no form of Sufism other than
Islamic, I was compelled to use the adjective Islamic before Sufism, so that the uninitiated may
not confuse it with other such non-Islamic movements which due to utter ignorance are styled
Sufism.42
A further issue with the term Islamic Sufism is that it often hides a particular cultural bias.
Hammer writes that books such as Sufism and Psychology and Sufism as Therapy are only
imaginable in a culture that is impregnated with the vocabulary of popular psychology.43
Similarly, while Hammer is critical of ideas such as universal Sufism and Global Sufism, the
distinction between Islamic Sufism and Western neo-Sufism plays on a cultural bias that
views Sufism as a universalist, or at least non-Islamic, tradition. Given that Hammer is
commenting on the radical change of approaches to Sufism as it transitions from one cultural
context to another, of which there are multiple examples,44 this could have been flagged.
Rather than comparing Islamic Sufism with Western neo-Sufism,45 it could have been a
comparison between Sufism, of which a quality is that it predominantly arises within an Islamic
cultural context, and neo-Sufism, which could be said to occur predominantly within a non-
Islamic cultural context. Had this been done, both the cultural bias and tautology within the
term Islamic Sufism could have been avoided.
41
Robert Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 12. An example of where the
tautological nature of the term Islamic Sufism is not explicitly acknowledged can be seen in the statement that
when the Master says Islam and I say Sufism, we both mean the same thing, i.e., Islamic Sufism, Henry
Bayman, The Station of No Station (California: North Atlantic Books, 2001), xvi. While there may be some implicit
recognition of the tautology, the decision not to use Islamic Sufism is a result of it being quite cumbersome to
say Islamic Sufism repeatedly, despite continuing to do so, Ibid., xvi. This further makes the view that the term
Sufism has remained pristine and unloaded clearly unfounded, Ibid., xvi.
42
Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, Islamic Sufism (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1971), 14.
43
Olav Hammer, Sufism for Westerners, in Sufism in Europe and North America, ed. Olav Westerlund (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 142.
44
Ibid., 129 138.
45
Ibid., 139.
32
In order to discard the idea of Islamic Sufism as a tautology it is necessary to examine the
possibility of a non-Islamic Sufism. For this it is necessary to look at the source of the Sufis
adherence to the revealed law (sharia), and the Prophetic example from which it is derived, in
order to determine if there is an equivalency in other traditions. The Quran states that verily,
in the Apostle of Allah you have a good example (33:21) and again say [O Prophet]: If you
love Allah, follow me, [and] Allah will love you (3:31). In both instances the focus is on
following the example of the Prophet, which, aside from the Quran, is a main source for the
revealed law (sharia). From their adherence to the revealed law (sharia), it is possible to see
why devotion to the Prophet is signalled as one of the key characteristics of the great Sufi
masters.46 That the imparting of a revealed law is a function of a messenger is apparent in the
Quranic statement We have sent unto you an apostle from among yourselves ... to impart
unto you revelation and wisdom (2: 151). Revelation, in this verse, is a translation of al-kitab,
literally the book, referring to the Quran. Wisdom (al-hikma) in this verse, can be taken to
refer to both the Prophetic example (Sunnah) and to the revealed law (sharia). Thus, within
Sufism adherence to the revealed law (sharia) involves adhering to and following the good
example of the Prophet Muhammad.
Within the Quran there is evidence that can be read to suggest the possibility of a non-Islamic
Sufism. It is apparent in the statement that indeed, you have had a good example in Abraham
and those who followed him (60: 4). If, as mentioned, adherence to a revealed law (sharia) is
akin to following the example of a messenger, then those who followed him can have two
interpretations, one regarding the genealogy of Abraham, the other regarding the companions
of Abraham. Firstly, this could refer to the Prophets and Messengers from Abrahams sons
Ishmael and Isaac, who are the forefathers of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian traditions
respectively. If this is the case then this Quranic passage merely indicates models of salvation
with a common genealogical root in Abraham. Secondly, it could, more specifically, refer to the
direct followers of Abraham who embodied his example. While these two readings are not
mutually exclusive, in both cases the existence of prophetic models preceding Islam is
acknowledged. This would in no way come as a surprise to Muslims for whom it is an article of
faith to acknowledge all prophets and messengers from Adam to Muhammad. However, it is
important to point out that this passage is phrased in the past tense, which in Arabic refers to
completed actions. Thus linguistically, there is an indication that following Abrahams example
is completed and, as a result, no longer viable.
46
Carl W. Ernst, Teaching of Sufism (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 20 21.
33
It may be suggested that the Quran merely precludes an active non-Islamic Sufism whilst
maintaining the possibility of pre-Islamic forms of Sufism. There are two responses to this.
Firstly, the term Islamic Sufism is a relatively new phenomenon as is the claim by certain
groups to be representative of non-Islamic Sufism and thus this idea of a pre-Islamic Sufism is
not at stake in this case. Secondly, Abraham states that that those who follow him are those
who have surrendered themselves to God (22: 78), literally the Muslims, and not amongst
those who are Sufis. This seems to preclude the idea that those who follow him (60: 4) are
a form of non-Islamic Sufism. However, it could be suggested that adherence to the example
set by a Prophet, being a key feature of Sufism, is to be found amongst pre-Islamic groups. The
Quran seems to affirm the view that there were such groups, such as those who follow him
(60: 4). However, just as there is a distinction between Prophets, it is useful to distinguish
between the groups that follow them. As a result, it can be seen to be useful to reserve
Sufism for referring to those who follow the example of the Prophet Mohammed. This has
two consequences. Firstly, it preserves the inherently Islamic nature of Sufism. Secondly, by
localising Sufism, rather than using it as an umbrella term for a trans-historic methodological
approach to prophethood, the phrase Islamic Sufism becomes tautological.
The phrase Islamic Sufism arose to assert the integral relationship between Islam and Sufism.
The necessity for this can be seen to arise from assertions such as the Sufis owed much or little
of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, Hermetic, Zoroastrian or
Buddhist example47 or that is was a sort of Jewish Christianity, by which is meant the
recognition of Jesus as the Messiah along with the observance of Jewish law,48 such that one
expects Christianity to anticipate Sufism.49 While these views of Sufism are too crude to be
useful, they do indicate a prevailing view of Sufism as a syncretic belief system. Furthermore,
this view prevails despite the fact that some of the greatest commentaries on the Quran and
Islamic practices come from those recognised as great Sufi authors, such as Ibn Arabi, Ahmad
al-Ghazali, and Abd al-Qadir Jilani. Yet, despite this, the prefix Islamic in the phrase Islamic
Sufism has had less of an effect of clarifying Sufisms integral relationship with Islam. Contrary
to its initial intentions, the phrase Islamic Sufism has had the effect of implying the possibility
of a non-Islamic Sufism.
47
Arberry, Sufism, 11.
48
Baldick, Mystical Islam, 9.
49
Ibid., 15.
34
One attempt to assert the possibility of a non-Islamic Sufism has, unwittingly, lent more weight
to the view that Islamic Sufism is a tautology. Taji-Farouki distinguishes between Islamic
Sufism, where the spiritual path is conceived in terms of an Islamic frame of reference, and
Universal Sufism, where Sufi resources [are] divorced from their Islamic framework and used
as techniques in human transformation.50 While Universal Sufism, as it is here conceived
with no requirement to embrace Islam,51 seems to overlook the techniques in human
transformation inbuilt within the Islamic framework, it also overlooks the relationship
between Sufism and Islam inherent within its own definition. Universal Sufism is made
universal through separating Sufi resources from their Islamic framework, thus positing an
intrinsic relationship between Islam and Sufism. This, as a result, means that, in this instance,
the phrase Islamic Sufism is a tautology.
The above examples of the use of Islamic Sufism have been predominantly directed towards a
non-Islamic audience. For this reason it is beneficial to examine the work of Abu l-Wafa al-
Taftazani (1930 1994) which uses Islamic Sufism in work directed specifically towards an
Islamic audience in order to gain a better understanding of how this phrase has gained
currency. Within al-Taftazanis work there is a presentation of Sufism as Islamic mysticism,
where the change from the generic noun tasawwuf to the attributive compound al-tasawwuf
al-islami is meant to indicate that Sufism was generically different (to other forms of mysticism)
and that it originated from the orthodox (Sunni) norms of the Quran and the Sunna of the
Prophet.52 In its intention, al-Taftazanis use of al-tasawwuf al-islami can be seen to be no
different from other uses of Islamic Sufism; however, rather than confronting non-Muslim
prejudices about the sources of Sufism, it is attempting to confront Muslim prejudices about
the practices of Sufism. It is important to note that al-Taftazani is writing in Egypt where state
control of the Sufi orders was reorganised and bureaucratised in the form of an administrative
body ... which published regulations, organised events, and was indirectly accountable for the
50
Suha Taji-Farouki, Beshara and Ibn Arabi: A Movement of Sufi Spirituality in the Modern World (Oxford: Anqa
Publishing, 2009), 404.
51
Ibid., 404.
52
Andreas Christmann, Reconciling Sufism with Theology: Abu l-Wafa al-Taftazani and the Construct of al-
Tasawwuf al-Islami in Modern Egypt, in Sufism and Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2007), 177.
35
orders activities.53 This administrative body, eventually called the Supreme Council for Sufi
Orders, was specifically charged with regulating Sufism in Egypt in accordance with what was
deemed proper Islamic principles.54 Irrespective of al-Taftazanis relation to the Supreme
Council, the influence of this administrative body cannot be overlooked in the decision to use
al-tasawwuf al-islami in discussing Sufism. The Supreme Council apparently defended the
existence of Sufi orders ... by emphasizing the mainstream features of Sufi devotions55 and, in
this regard, al-Taftazani, in using Islamic mysticism, can be seen to echo this form of defence
by curtailing his mode of expression. Thus, while al-Taftazanis use of al-tasawwuf al-islami is
similar in effect to other uses of Islamic Sufism, his case is different due to the proselytising
influence of the Supreme Council curbing his mode of expression.
The Term Sufism
While the terms Islamic mysticism and Islamic Sufism problematise two conceptualisations
of Sufism, the term is problematic in itself. There are three dominant approaches in attempting
to understand the term Sufism, each of which can be seen to be inadequate. These are the
etymological approach, the historical approach, and an approach that treats Sufism as a kind
of Islamic learning, each of which can be seen to be inadequate for contextualising Sufism.
Firstly, there is an etymological approach to the term Sufism. A main problem with this
approach to Sufism is that there is a presupposition regarding its content without any clear or
adequate definition. Many scholars examine the various possible etymologies for the word
Sufi in an attempt to understand the referent with varying alternatives advanced, such that
any number of definitions and descriptions can be culled from their [scholarly] studies.56 Of
the alternatives offered, that which is given preference often reveals more about the bias of
53
Michael Frishkopf, Changing Modalities in the Globalisation of Islamic Saint Veneration and Mysticism: Sidi
Ibrahim al-Dasuqi, Shaykh Muhammad Uthman al-Burhani, and their Sufi Orders, Religious Studies and Theology
20 (2001): 29.
54
Ibid., 29.
55
Ibid., 30.
56
William C. Chittick, Sufism: A Beginners Guide (Oxford: OneWorld, 2008), 3.
36
that author57 rather than adequately defining Sufism such that it has even been advanced
that it has no true etymology.58 As a result, despite it being a common starting point for
understanding Sufism, an etymological approach does not yield significant insight into the
content of Sufism.59 Furthermore, it is often overlooked that debate over the origins of the
term Sufi does not cover new ground as there was controversy over the origins of the term
sufi among the authors of the early texts, and modern scholars have reproduced this
controversy at different levels in their own writing.60 As a result the material is reiterated
without giving further insight.
One aspect of the problem of an etymological approach to defining Sufism is that there is some
confusion regarding that to which Sufi refers. With some writers there is a conflation of the
terms Sufi and dervish. This has led to some writers attempting to create a distinction
between these two terms that does not correspond to traditional usage. For instance it has
been suggested that the term dervish indicates more the dimension of practice, while Sufi
designates more that of theory: the dervish is a Sufi in action, and the Sufi is a dervish in the
abstract.61 One reason that the term Sufi may be considered abstract is that within the
Sufic tradition, the term Sufi is applied only to the initiate who has reached the end of the
path.62 The term Sufi can be considered to have an abstract quality in that it refers to the
goal to be achieved and, as such, those who could be described by it would not claim to be a
Sufi themselves. As a result, the use of the word Sufi as a generic term for anyone connected
to a Sufi order indicates a lack of understanding of a) the term itself and b) its relation to the
soteriological framework or Sufism.
57
An example of this is Baldicks, Mystical Islam, 15, preferred etymology is that the very word Sufi has usually
been seen as reflecting a Christian influence, being derived from the Arabic word for wool (suf), in confirmation of
his view that Sufism is a form of Jewish Christianity.
58
Hujwiri, Kashf al Mahjub, 34.
59
As Carl Ernst noted the word was given prominence not by the Islamic texts, but rather by British Orientalists,
who wanted a term that would refer to various sides of Islamic civilization that they found attractive and congenial
and that would avoid the negative stereotypes associated with the religion of Islam - stereotypes that they
themselves had often propagated, in Chittick, Sufism, 2.
60
Ahmet Karamustafa, What is Sufism?, in Voices of Islam, ed. Vincent J. Cornell (Westport: Praeger Publications,
2007), 249.
61
62
Danner, Rise of the Term, 71.
37
Secondly, there is a historical approach to Sufism. This method attempts to define Sufism
through its historical development. Such a history shows that around the 3rd Century AH/9th
10th Centuries CE there were certain individuals whose hermeneutic approach to Islam seemed
to include certain practices others did not. In the 11th 13th Centuries CE there was a
development which saw a large body of texts being produced in all areas of Islamic learning and
again those texts labelled as Sufic seemed to, without excluding other areas, include certain
ideas that other texts did not. If the label Islamic mysticism is excluded, for the reasons
mentioned above, then Sufism becomes little more than an umbrella term encompassing a
wide variety of practices, people, and texts which, due to their diversity, would seem to have
little in common. De Jong and Radtkes (1999) edited collection of papers Islamic Mysticism
Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics proceeds with the assumption that
each of the controversies and polemics are directed against the same thing, namely Sufism,
without contesting the idea of Sufism itself despite a disparate range of issues being
addressed. This is problematic because historically, this aspect of Islam has given rise to
diverse traditions of spiritual techniques, individual and collective rituals, metaphysical and
Theosophical expositions, hagiographic writings, and mystical love poetry, as well as
institutional forms of discipline, education, and mentoring all of which have been called
Sufism,63 albeit without distinguishing the position of the labeler with regard to Sufism.64 Also,
it must be acknowledged that there is some confusion in the view that Sufism has given rise to
diverse traditions given that all ... have been called Sufism retroactively. Furthermore, in
current academic language it [Sufism] serves as a generic, catch-all sociological term, the result
of which is an entrenched view of contemporary Sufism as a monolithic, superstitious,
syncretic cult mired in profiteering and political wrangling.65 While it could be disputed that
this reductive view of Sufism is held by most Western scholars of Islam, it is interesting to
note that it is a view that parallels the attacks leveled against Sufism by its Islamist
detractors.66
63
Afaal, Sufism, 1604.
64
This can be seen in traditional texts where the term has been used both pejoratively and complimentarily.
65
Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism, 13.
66
Ibid., 13.
38
Histories of Sufism are problematic in as far as they proceed with the assumption that Sufism
is predefined such that when it is applied to the history of Islam all the Sufis become readily
apparent. Without denying that there is Sufism in the works of those included, the popular
approach of providing a list of Sufis can range from being an arbitrary selection of Muslims to
having a normative affect on approaching the works of such individuals.67 Opposed to this,
elements of Sufism can be found in those thinkers labelled as anti-Sufi.68 While a historical
approach does yield some reference points with regard to that which is considered Sufic,
showing where the boundary lies with regard to that which is accepted as Sufism, it must be
acknowledged that it does not provide a definition.
Thirdly, there is an approach that treats Sufism as a category of Islamic learning. The problem
with this approach is not that it draws an integral link between Sufism and Islam, for despite
assertions that it is necessary to attack a position often taken for granted, namely that it
[Sufism] grew out of the Koran,69 it has rarely been taken for granted with some continuing
to hold that the Quran provides little explicit treatment of mystical themes.70 Rather, a
problem with treating Sufism as a category of Islamic learning is that Sufism does not adhere to
a strict categorisation in the way categories such as Quranic exegesis (tafsir), Hadith studies,
Islamic law (fiqh), Arabic Grammar, or any other category of Islamic learning does. These
categories of Islamic learning have defined boundaries with regard to content, for example
those examining the authenticity of Hadith study the legitimacy of the chains of transmission
(isnad), while those examining Islamic law (fiqh) examine how laws can be extrapolated from
the Quran and Hadith. There is some degree of interaction between these disciplines, an
example of which is those examining Islamic law (fiqh) are dependent on those examining the
authenticity of Hadith to determine which Hadith can be used for extrapolating laws. However,
even a cursory glance at some of the better known Sufi works shows many examples of cross-
disciplinary studies encompassing the breadth of Islamic learning whilst containing an element,
which, for lack of a better word, could be called Sufic that is rarely found in works that belong
67
Examples of these kind of lists include Claud Field, Mystics and Saints of Islam (London: Francis Griffiths, 1910)
and Karamustafa, Sufism, 3 5, and What is Sufism, 250.
68
For instance, regarding Ibn Taymiyyas Sufi elements see George Makdisi, Ibn Taymiya: A Sufi of the Qadiriya
Order, American Journal of Arabic Studes 1 (1973) and Th Emil Homerin, Ibn Taimya's al-Sfyah wa-al-Fuqar,
Arabica 32 (1985).
69
70
McGregor, Sancity and Mysticism, 2.
39
strictly to one of the other categories of Islamic learning. Whilst further study is required to
establish this point, it is evident that it is problematic to view Sufism, due to its cross-
disciplinary nature, as strictly another discipline of Islamic learning.
Systematic Sufism
Again, is it often suggested that Sufism is not systematic. This claim persists because Sufi texts
are generally not holistic, in the sense of encapsulating the system, from which it is inferred
that Sufism is incomplete and thus limited. While it is possible to agree with this conclusion, it
would be for different reasons. The assertion that Sufism has no system arises from the basis
that no system can be derived from the examined texts. However, this overlooks a) the
purposes of the texts and b) the paradigm that underpins them. The purpose is sometimes
explicit, being composed in response to a specific request. Though, even when the purpose is
unclear, it is evident that the texts are underpinned by a doctrine not covered within the text
itself. Even works such as al-Ghazalis Ihya ulum al-din or Ibn Arabis Futuhat al-makkiyya, even
though the breadth of both is almost incomparable, each is incomplete without an Islamic
paradigm. As a result, Sufi texts need not be self-contained, though this in no way implies that
they are unsystematic or incomplete. As will be shown in the study that follows, Ibn Ata
Allahs works affirm this view in that they freely quote the Quran and Hadith and include
elliptical statements that would be incomprehensible without knowledge of Islam.
It can be seen that, in part, the view that Sufism is incomplete and unsystematic arise from the
view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam. While the view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam emerged
amongst Orientalists,71 it persists with statements like the Quran provides little explicit
treatment of mystical themes.72 It persists despite Nicholson, who in his early work advanced
the view that Sufism cannot be traced back to a single definite cause,73 later retracted his
71
Amongst whom comments like asceticism has no place in the teaching of the Quran and is alien to the
character of early Islam, De Lacy OLeary, Arab Thought and its Place in History (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
LtD, 1992), 181-82, while unfounded, are common. While OLeary would not be considered an Orientalist,
comments like these show that, even if he was not directly influenced by them, he shared their sentiments.
72
McGregor, Sancity and Mysticism, 2.
73
Reynold A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (London: Arkana, 1989), 8. Furthermore, Arberry, Sufism, 11,
Nicholsons student and successor, in his summary of Sufism, wrote that it is proposed for the sake of brevity to
40
original position, stating that it is a fact that Sufism, like every other religious movement in
Islam, has its roots in the Koran and the Sunna.74 The view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam has
been refuted by Rabbani,75 among others,76 by advancing the argument that if Sufism is
ancillary to Islam then so is Quranic exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic law (fiqh) as none of these
were evident during the advent of Islam. Danner supports this, writing that the Sufis are well
aware that nothing called Sufi existed in the time of the Prophet77 and that the four major
schools of Sunnite jurisprudence ... all go back to their founders who lived in the second/eighth
and third/ninth centuries,78 during which the term Sufi gained currency. The problematic
nature of the existence of Sufism is not unique to modern scholarship, for example, as a young
man Ibn Ata Allah did not hold this view, and only later came to see Sufism as being integral to
Islam. It was Abu Al-Abbas knowledge of Islam, especially the interconnections between its
exoteric and esoteric aspects, which convinced Ibn Ata Allah of the integral connection. While
such interconnections may remain a matter of dispute, they have been repeatedly affirmed,
especially in works labelled Sufic.
One Further Difficulty
Even acknowledging the long history of the problem of defining Sufism, and the issues this
gives rise to, only covers part of the issues with the use of this category. The lack of a consensus
on the etymology of the term is further problematised due to disagreements on claims on, and
ascriptions of, being a Sufi. This point touches on the distinction between authentic Sufism and
pseudo-Sufism, an issue that cannot be fully discussed here. The problem as it stands is that, on
accept that the Sufis owed much or little of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic,
Hermetic, Zoroastrian or Buddhist example. Not only did Arberry believe that Sufism was a syncretic mixture of
previous doctrines, he, Ibid., 136, further felt that Sufism has run its course, signalling deathblows to both
Sufisms originality and continuance.
74
Reynold A. Nicholson, The Idea of Personality in Sufism (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), 4.
75
Wahid B. Rabbani, Islamic Sufism (Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen, 1992), 123.
76
Geoffroy, Approaching Sufism, 49 50, advances the same argument, adding that the term salafi, which
designates modern Muslims who claim to be like the first believers (salaf) and who reject all doctrinal, and notably
mystical, contributions, does not have any greater claim to scriptural support.
77
Danner, Rise of the Term, 72.
78
Ibid., 73.
41
one hand, Sufism has been used as a degenerate term to undermine, rightly or wrongly, various
groups within the history of Islam,79 while, on the other hand, it can be seen to occupy an
ambiguous position even within pro-Sufi texts and writers.80 If we take Ibn Taymiyyas
opposition to Sufism as a case in point, it is possible to see that his ascription of unorthodox
practices to various Sufi groups arises as a result of misunderstanding the particular practices of
these groups.81 The misunderstanding of Sufi views and practices has also caused fears of
potential political turmoil due to the numbers various Sufi groups have gained in various
regions across the Islamic world throughout its history, resulting in the ostracising, and
suppression, of such groups in many of those regions.82 This is further problematised in
modern, non-Muslim countries where the terms Sufi and Sufism are being used to
characterise a vast and composite field covering more traditional Sufi orders with an
unambiguous and explicit Islamic frame of reference as well as less traditional Sufi groups
and movements, which apart from a limited nomenclature and a few practices have nothing in
common with Islamic faith.83 While these points require further analysis, they are sufficient to
illustrate some of the reasons for the ambiguous and sometimes negative view of Sufism.
Another, perhaps more interesting, reason for the difficulty of creating a clear distinction
between Sufism and pseudo-Sufism can be found in apparently pro-Sufi texts and writers. The
issue is that in some works there is the view of a Sufi as the culmination of soteriological
development while in others the Sufi is discussed as merely a soteriological stage through
which the aspirant passes to further soteriological development. While further study is required
to understand these two conceptions of Sufi, and the reasons for its variegated used, one
79
This is particularly so in the modern era and can be seen on numerous discussion boards where statements such
as this is Sufi are synonymous with this is untrustworthy.
80
As has been noted that some of the harshest criticism [of Sufism] has traditionally come from within the ranks
of the Sufis, Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern
World (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), ix.
81
This form of criticism due to a lack of understanding is well documented by Alexander D. Knych, Ibn Arabi in the
Later Islamic Tradition (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), in the history of the anti-Ibn Arabi polemic.
82
A recent example of this is the closing and outlawing of the tekkes in Turkey, despite the popularisation and
promotion of the whirling dervish as a tourist attraction to the point where it has almost become a national icon.
83
Schnbeck, Sufism in the USA, 183. For a brief overview of Sufisms recontextualisation within Islamic circles in
a predominantly British setting see Netton, Sufi Ritual, 1 6. For changes to Sufic and Islamic practice within one
Sufi order in Germany see Sren C. Lassen, Strategies for Concord: The Transformation of the Tariqa Burhaniya in
the European Environment, in Sufism Today: Heritage and Tradition in the Global Community, ed. Catharina
Raudvere and Leif Stenberg (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 189 207.
42
thing is clear. Irrespective of whether a Sufi is someone who has reached their summit of
soteriological development or someone who has reached a particular point within their
soteriological development, the esteem given to the Sufis is high, even if they are not beyond
the criticism of some writers.
Some Consequences for the Study of Sufism
There has been some acknowledgement that the scholarly approach to Sufism needs to be
modified with the suggestion that the study of Sufism requires that we re-evaluate some basic
analytical assumptions underlying the study of Sufism.84 While correct, this does not penetrate
the issue as those basic analytical assumptions are often symptoms of the mis-categorisation
of Sufism. There have been suggestions, especially with regard to Islamic materials, to challenge
existing categorisations, apparent in the view that somewhat uncritical, for a time, in Western
work was the use of the category scripture as a general and rather taken-for-granted rubic,
under which the Quran was included.85 Yet, such challenges are yet to be applied to the
category Sufism. Acknowledging the above-mentioned classification errors is important for
developing a better understanding of Sufism. However, simply acknowledging them does not
readily propose a method for positively categorising Sufism. Sufism could be, for example, a
form of Islamic mysticism though it should be recognised that there are subtle and major
differences of understanding in the Islamic case differences [too] significant for a generic
concept86 and any discussion of Sufism as Islamic mysticism should document what kind of
mysticism Sufism represents and how the Islamic case differs from others. However, discussions
of Sufism within scholarly literature too often uncritically accept prior categorisations rather
than questioning the legitimacy of the categorisation itself.
84
John O. Voll, Contemporary Sufism and Current Social Theory, in Sufism and the Modern in Islam, eds. Martin
van Bruinessen and Julia D. Howell (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 282.
85
Wilfred C. Smith, A Note on the Quran from a Comparativist Perspective, in Islamic Studies Presented to
Charles J. Adams, eds. Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 183.
86
Ibid., 183. Smith is here referring to the Quran being categorised as scripture. While he is challenging a
different categorisation the sentiment is fitting for the context.
43
Despite the necessity for critical reflection and reassessment of its classification, Sufism can
be utilised as a legitimate grouping. It is important to realise that Sufism is not a static,
homogenous thing that can be studied in isolation,87 thus a correct contextualisation is
necessary. By acknowledging that it is active within Islamic contexts it is possible to see that
Sufism, despite its diversity of manifestation, is continuous in its function. By contextualising
Sufism as such it could be tentatively suggested that its function is to act as a counterbalance to
extremist and dogmatic views within Islamic communities, which would go some way to
explaining the diversity amongst those who have been labelled Sufi.
It is possible to identify that Sufism combines two interrelated elements or that it performs two
functions, both of which illustrate that Sufism is unmistakably underpinned by Islamic
paradigms. Firstly, and proactively, Sufism can be seen to consist of a hermeneutic method that
intends to highlight the predominantly soteriological elements within Islamic doctrine. In doing
so, Sufism emphasises the constant and intimate relationship between the individual and Allah,
often with emphasis on the personal responsibilities of the former if they are to realise, affirm,
and embody the degree of intimacy towards the latter that exists irrespective of the individuals
awareness of it. As has been suggested:
If the Quran and Tradition are at pains to teach what the relation of God to
the world is, and what man must do to be saved, the purpose of the Sufis
was to elucidate how, to elaborate a theoretical explanation of the modality
of the relationship holding between Creator and creation.88
In this regard, Sufism can be seen as personal and proactive in that the focus is on the individual
and their engagement in the soteriological process. While this is of primary importance for
understanding Sufism, it is an element that is well known and is often the primary focus for
texts on the topic.
Sufism can also be seen to have a reactive element. This element is often overlooked in
discussions on Sufism and it is important because it a) partly explains the reasons behind the
prominence of particular Sufi figures within various eras and localities and b) places Sufism
87
Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism, 14.
88
Anthony H. Jones, Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History, Journal of Southeast Asian History
2 (1961): 13.
44
undeniably within an Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, examining this reactive element allows
for a there to be some consistency across the history of Islam for there to be a transhistorical
thing deemed Sufism, despite varied and shifting concerns in those figures and texts labelled
Sufic. Given that the primary and proactive element of Sufism is a continued access to the
salvific growth of the individual, the reactive element can be seen to be an attempt to maintain
this within the greater community. It is generally accepted that Sufism grew out of the activities
of Islamic ascetics that arose within the 3rd AH/9th CE century, a movement that has been seen
as a response to the growing focus of worldly concerns within the greater Islamic community.89
This function of refocusing the community on the salvific nature of the Islamic doctrine is a
trend that can be seen within most of the figures that are seen as having been great and
important Sufi figures. Within the history of Sufism, this refocusing can be seen to have come
about through both external and internal influences on the Islamic community that have been
deemed as being a distraction from the soteriological development of the individual.
A sample of Sufic figures can sufficiently illustrate the importance that this reactive element
has had within Islamic communities. While the ecstatic utterances of Hallaj could be read as a
reaction to the stifling aridity of the scholars of his era, there is perhaps stronger evidence for
the reactive element of Sufism in the action of his Shaykh. Despite the outcry of many, it was
not until Junayd, Hallajs Sufi teacher, agreed to sign what was effectively a death warrant that
action was taken. Despite his reticence of agreeing to the warrant, Junayds actions can be read
as attempting to maintain the salvific potential for those who were/could have been put off by
such ecstatic utterances. Many of al-Ghazalis writings can be seen to have arisen as a response
to the utilisation of external, and to some extent un-Islamic, materials. A clear example of the is
his Incoherence of the Philosophers, which effectively illustrates some of the contradictions
inherent in those who have attempted to reconcile, and ultimately rely on, Neoplatonic and
Aristotelian materials with Islamic ones, particularly the Quran. Such contradictions are
problematic for they undermine the position of revelation with regard to the individuals
salvation. Even Ibn Ata Allahs position as Ibn Taymiyyas infamous interlocutor can be seen in
the same light, for, as text of their alleged debate shows, the latter was raising objections to
certain practices and individuals that was liable to cause distraction or, at worst, harm to the
generality of the Islamic community in the manner in which they carried out their daily
89
Examples of such individuals who possessed reactive tendencies towards what they deemed to be cultural shifts
that could potentially hinder the continuance of the salvific nature of the Islamic doctrine are riddled throughout
the history of Islam, for Gibb points out that after the fall of the Caliphate, the Sufis played an increasingly
important part in preserving the unity of the Islamic world, counteracting the tendency of the territories of the
Caliphate to fissure into Arabic, Persian, and Turkish linguistic regions, Ibid., 14.
45
devotions. Despite there being no evidence that Ibn Ata Allah was implicated in Ibn Taymiyyas
objections, he nevertheless marched against him. Thus it is possible that his primary cause for
marching against and confronting Ibn Taymiyya was to attempt to curtail the enmity that such
views were liable to raise between the Muslims within their community.
Furthermore, the reactive element can also be found within contemporary expressions of
Sufism. There has been, within the work of modern scholars, about two decades of intellectual
debate about whether Sufism had, in fact, changed its focus in a significant way during the
eighteenth-century reform movements to emphasize Hadith studies and the Prophets role
rather than the Gnostic monism of Ibn Arabi.90 Without commenting on this discussion
explicitly, given what has been suggested here about the reactive element of Sufism, while a
shift such as this might be perceived as a significant change in focus, it can also be seen as a
necessary one for maintaining the salvific potential of Islam accessible to those who propose to
realise it. Further support of this is evident in the fact that Sufism has come to play a more
important role among the more recent trends in cultural theorizing, since it is the expression of
Islam that most incorporates local cultural elements and embodies local Islams.91 This
recognition of Sufisms focus on locality and the local community could be seen as Sufisms
focus on attempting to maintain the salvific element within and through the communitys
expression of Islam. While this is merely a sample of figures from the multitude of Sufic
figures within the history of Islam, it sufficiently shows that a) the primary concern of the
reactive element of Sufism is to Islamic communities and b) this concern is for the continued
access to the salvific potential within Islam.
Taken in conjunction, the proactive and reactive elements, both together and individually,
illustrate reasons why Sufism cannot be considered as merely another discipline like other
Islamic disciplines like Quran study and commentary, Hadith studies, jurisprudence, or any
other. The proactive element of Sufism, in focusing on the soteriological development of the
individual, draws from all other Islamic disciplines in as far as each of these disciplines can
contribute to the individuals salvation. The reactive element of Sufism, in focusing on an
attempt to maintain the salvific potential within the community, will, at times, utilise certain
uniquely Islamic disciplines to promote the accessibility of salvation, whether it be through
90
Hermansen, Academic Study of Sufism, 36.
91
Ibid., 32.
46
Quranic commentary or Friday sermons, while speaking out against elements that threaten the
communitys access to salvation, whether it be al-Ghazalis writing against reliance on non-
Islamic philosophical sources, Junayds agreement to move against al-Hallaj, or even Ibn Ata
Allahs march against Ibn Taymiyya. It is for these reasons that it is proposed that it is necessary
to re-evaluate the materials and thinkers who have been collected under the label of Sufism
in order to better understand the content of their works and what, if any, contribution they
make to the history of Islam generally and Sufism specifically.
47
Part II
Chapter 3 The Case of Ibn Ata Allah
Provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn Ata Allahs Oeuvre
To highlight Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological cosmography, as well as some of the

interconnections between his works, this work will attempt to explore these interconnections
through the examination of the problem of Provision (rizq). Provision, or specifically its pursuit,
belongs to the domain of creation, though this poses a rationally perplexing problem. The
problem is as follows: as contingently existent beings, that is, as creations we are not self
sufficient and, as such, require provision for our continued existence. However, as our existence
and that of our provision comes from the same source, namely Allah, what impetus is there to
seek provision and how are we to respond when provision is either granted or denied? This
problem covers a diverse range of areas and its implications are equally diverse, covering
domains such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, morality, eschatology, and soteriology.
Far from providing a comprehensive analysis of Ibn Ata Allahs views on these areas, each
successive chapter will examine one area and its relation to the problem of rizq. This method
should sufficiently show the continuity of goal and method throughout Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre,
without making a comprehensive analysis necessary while foregrounding his reliance on an
inherently Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, this analysis will highlight one of Ibn Ata Allahs
primary methodological tools, which is here being called his soteriological semiotics.1
Rizq literally means anything granted by someone to someone else as a benefit, hence
bounty, sustenance, nourishment.2 The Quran states verily, unto Allah do we belong and,
verily, unto Him we shall return (2: 156), which is taken as an indication that all real benefit
derives from Allah. This view is strengthened by verses such as partake of the good things
which We have provided for your sustenance (2: 57), amongst others.3 In the Quran,
1
As will become apparent as this work progresses, soteriological semiotics is, in a way, a hermeneutics of tawhid
which takes all things within creation as being signs and signifiers from Allah as a method of communication for the
individual able to perceive them, drawing them towards the affirmation of tawhid.
2
Jane D. McAuliffe, RIZK, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), vol. VIII, 567.
3
Without being exhaustive, see also 2: 60, 2: 172, 3: 169, 5: 88, 5: 114, 6: 142, 6: 151, 7: 160, 8: 26, and 10: 31.
48
wherever rizq, or its related verbal forms, occur Allah is virtually always the subject or implied
agent.4 That all sustenance rests on Allah is put beyond dispute in the Quranic statement that
there is no living creature on earth but depends for its sustenance on Allah (11: 6). Thus, the
problem of rizq includes questions of the pursuit of sustenance given that we and our
sustenance depend equally on Allah, how sustenance should be pursued if ultimately it does
not come through individual effort, and, perhaps most importantly, how this can be achieved
without making partners with Allah.
One, seemingly unrelated, use of the term rizq occurs within military terminology. Here, rizq
refers to regular payments made to registered soldiers.5 In the Quran it states that Allah
grants abundant sustenance, or gives it in scant measure, unto whomever He wills6 (42: 12)
and that it is granted in due measure (42: 27). Just as the measure due to a soldier depends
on the amount they have served, the measure due to the individual depends on their sincerity
and consistency of worship, as the Quran states seek, then, all sustenance from Allah, and
worship Him and be grateful to Him (29: 17). Similarly, just as the soldier struggles against
opponents, which is known as the lesser struggle (jihad as-sagir) the individual struggles against
their own ego, which is known as the greater struggle (jihad al-kabir). While the significance of
this point will become evident in the chapter on Ibn Ata Allahs soteriology, it is important
here to see that in moving from an egocentric worldview to a God-centred worldview that
knowledge of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah) being the method for such
transition, is crucial. Thus, rizq is not solely provision in a gross materialistic sense, but also
includes the measure of knowledge each individual has, amongst other things.
That rizq is not limited to materialistic sustenance has been discussed by various thinkers.
Insight into the breath of this term can be gained from al-Ghazalis commentary on the Divine
name al-razzaq, the Provider, where he states that,
Al-razzaq the Provider is the one who created the means of sustenance
as well as those who are sustained, and who conveys the means to the
creatures as well as creating for them the ways of enjoying them. Sustaining
4
McAuliffe, RIZK, 568.
5
Clifford E. Bosworth, RIZK, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), vol. VIII, 568.
6
This tenet, with minor variations, is repeated throughout the Quran. See 2: 212, 3: 27, 13: 26, 16: 71, 17: 30, 24:
38, 28: 82, 29: 62, 30: 37, 34: 36, 34: 39, and 39: 52, among others.
49
is of two kinds: outward, consisting of nourishment and food, which is for the
sake of what is outward, namely the body. Inwardly, it consists in things
known and things revealed, and that is directed to our hearts and in most
parts. This latter is the higher of the two modes of sustenance, for its fruit is
eternal life; while the fruit of external sustenance is bodily strength for a
short period of time. God great and glorious Himself attends to creating
the two modes of sustenance and is graciously disposed to convey both
kinds, but He extends sustenance to whomever He wills and decrees
(42:12).7
If there was still any question about the breadth of rizq, al-Ghazali further states that the Divine
name al-muqit, the Nourisher, means the same as Provider [al-razzaq], yet this name is more
specific, since provision includes what is other than food as well as food.8 For Ibn Ata Allah, as
focus is given to eschatological and soteriological concerns, greater emphasis is placed on
inward sustenance, though this in no way undermines the procurement of outward sustenance.
With regard to the study that follows, it is worth pointing out that Ibn Ata Allah, despite his
initial reservations, did not change his vocation as a religious scholar (faqih) upon becoming a
Sufi (faqir), despite an alleged bifurcation between the religious scholar (faqih) and the Sufi
(faqir). Ibn Ata Allah came from a long line of distinguished religious scholars (faqih) and had
gained a certain renown even though he was quite young.9 To his joy, he learned from the
Shaykh [al-Mursi] that his entry into the [Sufi] Path did not prevent him from pursuing his
studies of the Law and upon mastering the Sufi path he did not discard one mode of learning
for the other, as can be seen from that fact that he spent the remainder of his life as an
honoured and well-known Sufi master and Maliki faqih.10 Thus, by mastering both the outward
and inward teachings of Islam, Ibn Ata Allah justifiably received the title Crown of the religion
(taj ad-din). In being both faqir and faqih, Ibn Ata Allah is not alone amongst the Sufis, for
many excelled in classical Islamic education as well as Sufi training. Numerous Sufi
commentaries on the rites of Islam attest to this as they illustrate both the breadth and depth
7
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, trans. David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1992), 78.
8
Ibid., 109.
9
10
Ibid., 9.
50
of knowledge crucial for the effective practice of such rites. Unlike many Sufi figures, Ibn Ata
Allahs mastery of Islamic law is widely acknowledged.11 While this may be a factor contributing
to the lack of scholarly analysis, establishing this would take us too far afield.
Quranic Hermeneutics
In contextualising Sufism within an Islamic paradigm it is necessary to understand the basis

upon which it is founded, these being the Quran and the Hadith.12 The Quran is taken as the
immutable, irrefutable word of Allah revealed to Muhammad. Against this text all things are
weighed, one reason that the Quran is also known as the Criterion (al-furqan). The justification
for utilising the Quran as a criterion is itself a Quranic injunction.13 The Quran, as the Speech
of Allah, is the barzakh or isthmus between mans intelligence and Gods knowledge of things
as they are in themselves ... whereby man can come to know things in themselves, without the
distortions of egocentrism.14 If this is true for the Islamic worldview, so too can it be seen
within the general outlook of Sufism and many of those labelled Sufis explicitly assert this
view. The above quoted statements of Junayd and Abul Hassan Al-Shadhili attest to this. Thus,
while not distinct to the Shadhiliyya, Ibn Ata Allah adheres to Abul Hassans position of
verifying his position by the Quran.
11
Similarly, al-Ghazali is recognised for his mastery of both the exoteric and esoteric elements of Islamic law. This
point can be further illustrated by the recognition of Ibn Arabi as a master of Islamic law is, if mentioned, rarely
studied, despite his significant esoteric commentaries on the pillars of Islam within the Futuhat al-makkiyya. An
exception to this is FaqihSultan Nurasiah, Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-Arabi and Shariah (MA diss., McGill University,
1998).
12
While not alone in this view it is of note that the early community of Baghdadi Sufism has been viewed as being
best characterised as Ahl al-Hadith culture, name that these early Sufis were owners of the interpretive
conviction that the chief source of religious authority was the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet, Laury Silvers,
A Soaring Minaret (Albany: Suny Press, 2010), 2. Thus, this established an early orthodox precident of basing Sufic
views on the Quran and Hadith.
13
See verses including if ye fear Allah, He will grant you a criterion (to judge between right and wrong), remove
from you (all) evil (that may afflict) you, and forgive you (8: 29) and Blessed is He who sent down the criterion to
His servant, that it may be an admonition to all creatures (25: 1).
14
William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany: Suny Press, 1989), xv xvi.
51
Part of Ibn Ata Allahs Quranic hermeneutics is intimately connected to his primary
soteriological method, which involves identifying and deciphering the signs. The Quran states
We have indeed made the signs clear unto you, if you would only use your reason (3: 118)
and that on the earth there are signs [of Gods existence, visible] to all who are endowed with
inner certainty, just as [there are signs thereof] within your own selves (51: 20 21). These
signs (ayat), for Ibn Ata Allah, are existent so that the Oneness of Allah (tawhid) can be
understood and affirmed through multiplicity. While they are evident upon the earth and
within the individual, they can be seen to be concentrated within the Quran, as each verse
(ayat) is a sign, and the text as a whole can be considered a book of signs. Through Ibn Ata
Allahs work it is apparent that deciphering these signs, being as they are the communication
between Creator and creation, is a primary aspect of understanding and developing the
soteriological status of the individual. While the signs (ayat) are there irrespective of their
comprehension, the Quran states that We have made all the signs manifest unto a people
who are endowed with inner certainty (2: 118). As a result of this, Ibn Ata Allahs Quranic
hermeneutics and soteriological method can be seen to consist of a twofold approach which
involves a) the development of certainty (yakin) for the individual to be able to read the signs
and b) company with someone who is endowed with inner certainty so that the signs (ayat)
can be indicated to the individual in order to develop their certainty (yakin).
Ibn Ata Allahs hermeneutic method does not simply extrapolate on the meaning of particular
passages. Rather, he utilises a hermeneutic method which highlights the multiple levels of
meaning that arise from the specific phrasing of the Quran. Ibn Ata Allah does not simply
state that the Quran does not contain this or that. At times, he analyses a phrase or sentence
to highlight why it was not phrased in another manner. An example of this is his commentary
on the verse 7: 201 where he rules out the inclusion of and, then, and hence because all
have, among other things, an allusion to a temporality that he says is inconsistent with the
verse.15 In another example, in commentating on the verse 4: 65, he points out that He did not
say, But no, by the Lord, but rather, But no, by your Lord, because in that wording there is a
confirmation of the swearing and that sworn upon which the other wording does not
contain.16 Thus, for Ibn Ata Allah, this passage cannot be worded in any other manner if it is to
convey the intended meaning.
15
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir fi isqatal-tanwir, trans. in Ibrahim Hakim, Illuminating Guidance on the Dropping
of Self-Direction (Virginia: Green Mountain School, 2007), 49.
16
Ibid., 2.
52
Ibn Ata Allah utilises reason to inform his Quranic hermeneutics. Rational arguments are
utilised in as far as they a) are secondary to revelation and b) affirm the revealed Word. This
use of rational arguments within Sufi pedagogic methods is not unique to Ibn Ata Allah. Abul-
Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 465/1072), whose work the Risala is considered a major early Sufi text,
believed that Sufi Shaykhs should not shirk from using rational arguments in training their
disciples when necessary.17 Ibn Ata Allah endorses this view, utilising rational arguments
where necessary, condones irrational views, and at times proposes supra-rational ones. Ibn
Ata Allah writes that believers belong to one of two categories: those who have come to faith
in God based on intellectual assent (tasdiq) and submission (idhan), and those who have come
to faith in God based on witnessing (shuhud) and direct experience (ayan).18 Thus, for
soteriological development, rational arguments are utilised in as far as they aid in achieving this
goal.
The Quran is a difficult text. The themes that take precedence depend on the hermeneutical
approach.19 Ibn Ata Allahs prime concern is soteriological. This focuses on the Creators
relation with, and disposition towards, creation. By taking soteriological development as a
prime concern, it appears that Allah is disposed to display mercy and guidance towards
creation20 and that the revealed Speech is dominated by the attributes of mercy and
guidance.21 A similar hermeneutic method is evident in al-Ghazalis comment that there is no
17
In Karamustafa, Sufism, 259.
18
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, trans. in Nancy Roberts, The Subtle Blessings in the Saintly Lives of Abu al-Abbas
al-Mursi and His Master Abu al-Hasan (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2005), 222 23.
19
For an example of how chronology of revelation can be utilized see Mahmoud M. Taha, The Second Message of
Islam (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 124 164. Within his work a distinction is made between the
Meccean suras and the Medinian suras, highlighting a different, and complementary, emphasis in each phase of
revelation.
20
It is important to understand the reason for saying disposed to display, for while Allah is not limited to behave
in any particular manner, in referring to Himself with such names as the Most Gracious (al-rahman) and the
Dispenser of Grace (al-rahim) He has agreed to display such qualities, for otherwise He would not make Himself
known through these names. An example of Allahs disposition to display His mercifulness can be seen in the
Hadith Qudsi where Allah states that I have forbidden oppression for Myself and have made it forbidden amongst
you, so do not oppress one another, in an-Nawawi, Forty Hadith, trans. Ezzeddin Ibrahim and Denys Johnson-
Davies (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2010), 80.
21
Chittick, Sufi Path, xv.
53
evil in existence which does not contain some good within it, and were that evil to be
eliminated, the good within it would be nullified, and the final result would be an evil worse
than the evil containing the good.22 That Ibn Ata Allah is of a similar view is evident in
statements such as deprivation (al-man) hurts you only because of the lack of your
understanding of God in it.23 Thus, Ibn Ata Allahs hermeneutic method emphasises the signs
of Allahs mercy. Tahas Quranic hermeneutics distinguishes between the Meccean suras,
which focus on the Oneness of Allah, and the Median suras, which focus on the codification of
daylily life, is useful here. While Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) tends to focus on the
implementation of the codification of daily life, it could be stated that the focus of Sufi
hermeneutics is on the embodiment of Allahs Oneness within daily life. Critics of Sufism, both
traditional and modern, attempt to make a case for Sufisms hertodoxy by focusing on an
apparent dichotomy between what is labelled Sufi practices and adherence to Islamic law
(shariah). However, when the distinction between the two hermeneutic methods is
understood, Sufisms orthopraxy is apparent in as far as Sufi hermeneutics utilises the
codification of daily life as a means to realise Allahs Oneness (tawhid). This is not to suggest
that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) downplays Allahs Oneness (tawhid), rather it highlights a
difference between merely adhering to Islamic law (shariah), on the one hand, and utilising this
law as a means realising and embodying the earlier Quranic message of Allahs Oneness
(tawhid), found in the Meccian suras. While this explains, to some extent, the disjunction
between the two hermeneutic methods, and the debates that ensued, this in no way
overshadows other sources of conflict between these groups, such as vying for political favour,
which, due to their complexity, cannot be covered here.
The Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah)
The view that Sufism is unsystematic overlooks the Sufi methodology known as the Science of
Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). This involves the knowledge and implementation of the
practices of the Prophet Muhammad. The focus on the practices implemented by Muhammad
involves a distinction between the Sunnah, being the practices the Prophet implemented upon
himself, and the shariah, being what can be extrapolated from them,24 as they are commonly
22
al-Ghazali, Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names, 55.
23
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, trans. in Victor Danner, Sufi Aphorisms (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 37.
24
This distinction is, perhaps, most clearly delineated in Taha, Second Message, 34 37, where he writes that the
Sunnah contains Sharia and thus exceeds it.
54
conflated. The Quran states verily, in the Apostle of Allah you have a good example (33:21),
which can be taken as referring to Muhammad and his practices.25 Again the Quran states Say
[O Prophet]: If you love Allah, follow me, [and] Allah will love you (3:31). Verses such as these
strengthen the view that the Prophetic example is God-given as opposed to being the fruit of
human effort.26 The result of this is, by basing oneself on the Prophetic model, a move away
from self-centred worldview towards a God-centred worldview. By abrogating self-choice the
individual moves from an affirmation of multiplicity that is implied therein towards an
affirmation of Allahs unity (tawhid) through the constant adherence to Allahs choice for
creation as it is evident within the Prophetic model. The process through which affirmation of
Allahs unity (tawhid) develops within the individual is what is here meant by soteriological
development. Whilst it is somewhat self-evident, Sufisms focus on the figure of Muhammad, to
which countless texts and figures attest, places it within a uniquely Islamic paradigm.
Access to the prophetic practices relates to the transmission of the science of Prophethood.
The transmission of the science of Prophethood has two aspects, one historical and the other
trans-historical. The historical aspect involves the collection Hadith, which are the reports of
the statements and actions of the Prophet transmitted to posterity by his companions27 and
later through a chain of authorities (isnad),28 and their eventual codification into the
authentic (sahih) collections. The foundations of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah)
are contained within the Quran and the Hadith, the latter of which record the Sunnah. Without
delving into any of the debates that surround this body of literature, it is important to note the
breadth of this literature and as such is bound to contain material that each reader will be
unaware of. For this reason it is considered necessary to accompany someone who has
assimilated the prophetic model in as far as it is possible to adhere to the Prophets etiquette,
his moral and spiritual states, and, whenever possible, his inner realities.29 This relates to the
25
For those who assert that Sufism predates Islam there is a similar proposition regarding the pre-Islamic prophets
indeed, you have had a good example in Abraham and those who followed him (60: 4). However, it is important
to note that this is phrased in past tense. From a practical position it follows that these examples are no longer
accessible in as far as knowledge of their actions are, at best, fragmentary and thus incomplete.
26
Karamustafa, What is Sufism, 250.
27
Victor Danner, The Islamic Tradition (New York: Amity House, 1988), 50.
28
Ibid., 234.
29
Vincent Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1998), 199. It must be recognized that due to the difference between prophets, messengers, and others such
imitation cannot be perfect in all aspects.
55
trans-historical aspect of transmission. Just as the Hadith were initially collected, passed on,
and verified through their isnad, so too was the trans-historical transmission of the virtues and
practices of the prophetic model transmitted through a chain of authorities known as a silsilah.
A silsilah designates a lineage that is in unbroken succession from the Prophet.30 With regard
to the transmission of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) it should be noted that the
historical aspect of transmission trumps the trans-historical aspect in as far as deviation from
the historical aspect voids the salvific guarantee for additional practices not found in the
prophetic model cannot be considered to affirm tawhid to the degree that they in the practices
of a Prophet or Messenger.
In light of the soteriological centrality of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah), the
reasons why many Sufis take great pains to adhere to, and stress the importance of, the
prophetic model becomes evident. It is not just in the adherence to the prophetic model in acts
of prayer, fasting, or other acts of worship that it is important. It is recognized that the
imitation of the Prophets Norm, or Sunnah, in the performance of the rituals and in moral and
social matters is what gives to the Islamic religion its rock-like stability throughout the ages
such that of all the major religions still extant, Islam is the only one that is essentially the same
now as it was in the days of its founder.31 From this it becomes apparent that a salvific
guarantee exists to the extent that one embodies the prophetic model in all aspects of daily life
and that the relationship which is established between the saint and the prophet who is his
model is not a vague patronage for it confers a precise and visible character on the behavior,
virtues and graces of the adherent.32 For this reason many stories illustrating the extent to
which some go to adhere to the prophetic model are taken to be preposterous, and therefore
hagiographic. It may seem odd, or at best benign, when we hear the story of a certain scholar
who refrained from eating watermelons because, while he knew that the Prophet Muhammad
had eaten them, he was not aware of how he had done so, and this is why he abstained from
them.33 This illustrates an important soteriological principle, namely that actions made purely
on self-choice are potentially detrimental in as far as they do not guarantee salvation. Even
30
Danner, Islamic Tradition, 241.
31
Ibid., 49 50.
32
Michel Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn Arabi, trans. Liadain
Sharrard (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 75.
33
Imam Abdallah Ibn Alwi al-Haddad, The Book of Assistance, trans. Mostafa al-Badawi (Louisville: Fons Vitae,
2003), 51.
56
esoteric insights are to be subjected to this same yardstick if they are to participate in the
salvific guarantee. This view is reinforced by Abul Hassan al-Shadhilis statement that if your
mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Quran and Sunna, hold fast to these two and take
no notice of your unveiling.34 As it is the prophetic model that is the guarantee of sanctity, any
action or moral value that is not in accord with the example of the prophet it represents, from
this perspective, has no salvific guarantee. As a result, in as far as those labelled Sufis adhere
to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) acts
as a safety net protecting the inherently Islamic nature of Sufism.35 Furthermore, this highlights
the importance of the transmission of the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah). While the
adherent will strive to embody the prophetic example there will undoubtedly be blind spots
that can potentially limit further soteriological development. For this reason the expertise of
someone who conforms to the prophetic model is necessary.
With regard to Ibn Ata Allahs works, there is evidence that he too elaborates on the Science
of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). The Quran states We have sent unto you an apostle from
among yourselves ... to impart unto you revelation and wisdom (2: 151). Revelation, in this
verse, is a translation of al-kitab, literally the book, referring to the Quran. Wisdom (al-hikma)
here can be seen as referring to the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). The justification
for this is in the fact that the Prophet Muhammad bequeathed to humanity the Quran and the
Sunnah. Ibn Ata Allahs first, and most famous, work, the kitab al-Hikam, literally The Book of
Wisdoms, being essentially a collection of wisdom (hikma), can be seen, in this light, as an
elaboration on the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah). It should be noted that the
content of the kitab al-Hikam is not so much about the outward practices of the Prophet, but
rather a commentary on the internal corollary of such activities. Thus, Ibn Ata Allah can be
seen to be contributing to the understanding and implementation of the Science of
Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). Furthermore, this can be seen as being acknowledged explicitly
in statements such as Allah opened the way of guidance through the prophets and
messengers, so those who came after them walked their path, and the true believers persisted
34
Al-Sharani quoted by Lory, al-Shadhili, 171.
35
This view has been maintained by subsequent Sufis, including Ahmad Zarruq (d. 899/1493) who, in clarifying and
confirming this position, wrote that there is no Sufism except through fiqh, because Gods exoteric laws (ahkam
Allah al-zahira) can only be known through it; and there is no fiqh but through Sufism, for praxis (amal) is only
carried out through truthfulness (sidq) and an orientation towards the divine (tawajjuh), in Vincent Cornell,
Faqih verses Faqir in Marinid Morocco, in Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and
Polemics, ed. Federick De Jong and Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 207. Ibn Ata Allah confirmed and embodied
this by combining his formal training with his Sufi training was simultaneously both faqih and faqir.
57
in following them.36 While acknowledging that a God-centred worldview was opened through
all prophets and messengers for everyone to walk their path, Ibn Ata Allah states that only
the true believers persisted in following them, indicating that the salvific guarantee inherent
in this path is only maintained through adherence to the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-
nabuwah). By taking Muhammad as his prophetic model, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to be
taking an explicitly and exclusively Islamic paradigm as the basis for his work, and through
which it needs to be seen if it is to be understood.
The Importance of Ibn Ata Allah
With the above-mentioned issues in mind, it could be stated that, with the type of analysis
proposed here, the choice of Islamic thinker is somewhat arbitrary. Without denying this
suggestion it should be recognised that utilising Ibn Ata Allah as a case study fulfils several
criteria for a study of this kind. Ibn Ata Allah is well known and since his death in 709 AH/1309
CE, his works have been widely translated and read. He is historically important in that amongst
the masters of the Shadhiliyya37 Ibn Ata Allah was the first to compose treatises. It is not that
the founder of this Sufi order (tariqa), Abul Hassan al-Shadhili, or his successor, Abul Abbas al-
Mursi, did not write or compose anything, as both are known to have written many letters and
are renowned for their litanies (hizb).38 However, Ibn Ata Allah, the third of the Shadhiliyya
masters, has the honour of composing the earliest works on the Shadhiliyya teachings and
methods. He also has a trans-historical importance, given that since their composition his works
have be constantly studied by an ever increasing variety and number of people. Furthermore,
despite his works being widely available within European languages, upon which this study
relies, an analysis of these and their interconnections has been overlooked. In treating Ibn Ata
Allah as an intrinsically Islamic thinker the analysis developed here show Ibn Ata Allah to be a
36
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 60 61.
37
It is necessary to distinguish between Shadhili, referring to Abul Hassan and often cited ash-Shadhili or al-
Shadhili, and the Shadhiliyya, which refers to the Sufi order that was founded by Abul Hassan.
38
For some examples of such material see Elmer H. Douglas, Prayers of al-Shadhili, in Medieval and Middle
Eastern Studies in Honour of Aziz Suryal Atiya, ed. Sami A. Hanna (Leiden: Brill, 1972); Ibn al-Sabbagh, The Mystical
Teachings of al-Shadhili, trans. Elmer H. Douglas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Abdullah N.
Durkee, The School of the Shadhdhuliyyah: Volume 1 Orisons (Malaysia: The Other Press, 2005).
58
uniquely Islamic soteriological cosmographer who deploys a soteriological semiotics in order to
evoke within his adherents a performative cosmography.39
Ibn Ata Allahs works are the first compositions on the Shadhili method, without which little
would be known of the first three leaders of the Shadhiliyya order, Abul Hassan al-Shadhili,
Abul Abbas al-Mursi, and Ibn Ata Allah himself.40 Moreover, it was the dissemination of his
works, especially the Kitab al-Hikam, which helped popularise the Shadhiliyya. Ibn Ata Allahs
works also provide insight into the practice of Sufism. Regarding his works, Ibn Abbad of Ronda
(d. 792 AH/1390 CE) wrote, in response to an aspirant, that the book which you have by Ibn
Ata Allah, the Kitab at-Tanwir, comprises all that the books on Sufism, whether detailed or
condensed, contain including both detailed explanations and concise expressions.41 While
Ahmad Zarruq (d. 899 AH/1494 CE) said that the Hikam are to Sufism what the eyes are to the
body.42 More recently, Ibn Ata Allahs works have been used to glimpse the ideas that were
preached to the ordinary people43 in Mamluk Egypt and have been considered sufficient to
stand as the sole representative of Sufism.44 Without being exhaustive, it is evident that
39
An equally fitting description of Ibn Ata Allah is Ian Almonds, The Shackles of Reason: Sufi/Deconstructive
Opposition to Rational Thought, Philosophy East and West 53 (2003): 26, description of Ibn Arabi as a thinker
who insists that God is both immanent and transcendent and who was trying to escape binary thinking about
God. It could be stated that Ibn Ata Allahs works arise only as a result of such binary thinking, which he is
attempting, through his works, to correct.
40
This is not to deny the value of Ibn al-Sabbaghs Mystical Teachings as a source of information on Abul Hassan,
despite the fact that it was composed some time after the biographical Lataif al-Minan. However, Cornells, Realm
of the Saint, 147 pejorative view that the Lataif al-Minan is mitigated by the fact that it was written as an
apologia for the Egyptian branch of the Shadhiliyya cannot be accepted for, among other reasons, no such
apologia would be necessary. For another early biography of Abul Hassan see Kenneth Honerkamp, A Biography
of Abu l-Hasan al-Shadhili dating from the Fourteenth Century, in Une voie soufie dans le monde: le Shahiliyya, ed.
Eric Geoffroy (Paris: Maisonneuve, 2005). For studies of Abul Hassans life prior to his migration to Egypt, see A.
M. Mohamed Mackeen, The Early History of Sufism in the Maghrib Prior to al-Shadhili (d. 656/1258), Journal of
the American Oriental Society 91 (1971) and The Rise of al-Shadhili (d. 656/1258), Journal of the American
Oriental Society 91 (1971), and, to a lesser extent, Elmer H. Douglas, al-Shadhili, a North African Sufi, According to
Ibn Sabbagh, The Muslim World 38 (1948).
41
In Mary A. K. Danner, The Key to Salvation: A Sufi Manual of Invocation (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1996),
16.
42
In John Renard, Ibn Abbad of Ronda: Letter on the Sufi Path (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1986), 44.
43
Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 14.
44
Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 194 197.
59
because of his importance, both historical and trans-historical, Ibn Ata Allahs works deserve
attention.
Furthermore, beyond his importance, both historical and trans-historical, and the lack of
modern scholarly analysis, Ibn Ata Allahs works are ideal for a study of this kind because they
do not explicitly indicate any external influence. Whilst other Islamic thinkers explicitly discuss
Greek or Indian philosophy and science or show a marked degree of influence, Ibn Ata Allah,
whilst not being alone, neither discusses or indicates any predominate influence from non-
Islamic materials. The sources he quotes, the people he mentions, and the examples he raises
are all devoid of any apparent external influences. For this reason it is somewhat easier to
foreground Ibn Ata Allahs inherently Islamic approach than it is with others who show such
influences.
The Life of Ibn Ata Allah
Taj ad-Din Abul-Fadl Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim b. Ata Allah al-Iskandari al-
Judhami al-Shadhili, known simply as Ibn Ata Allah, was born in Alexandria, Egypt, somewhere
around the middle of the 7th AH/ 13th CE century in Alexandria.45 He was born into a
distinguished family of Malikite religious scholars, of whom his grandfather was either the
founder or the reviver of a dynasty of scholars known as the Banu Ibn Ataillah.46 Ibn Ata
Allah received a traditional Islamic education ... under some of the best and most illustrious
teachers of Alexandria.47 He looked to be following in his grandfathers footsteps as an
accomplished scholar in Maliki jurisprudence, gaining certain renown even though he was
45
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 1; Book of Wisdom, 13; Danner, Key to Salvation, 2. For further biographical material see
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 1 12; Book of Wisodm, 13 28; Danner, Key to Salvation, 2 10; Durkee, School of the
Shadhdhuliyyah, 51 57; Maurice Gloton, Traite sur le nom Allah (Paris: Les Duex Oceans, 1981), 10 12; Riordan
Macnamara, La clef de la realisation spirituelle et lillumination des ames (Beyrouth: Albouraq, 2002), 15 26;
George Makdisi, Ibn Ata Allah, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), vol. III, 722
23; Paul Nwyia, Ibn Ata Allah (m. 709/1309) et la naissance de la confrerie sadilite (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq,
1990), 18 35.
46
Danner, Book of Wisodm, 19.
47
Danner, Key to Salvation, 2.
60
quite young.48 Even though his father was a disciple of Abul Hassan al-Shadhili, the founder of
the Shadhiliyya, Ibn Ata Allah was initially opposed to Sufism because his fellow students had
warned him that anyone who delved into Sufism would never master the Law.49 Thus, early in
his education he was committed to becoming, and was recognised by others as, a renowned
jurisprudent (faqih).
The opposition to Sufism manifested itself in arguments with the students of Abul Abbas al-
Mursi,50 the successor to Abul Hasan al-Shadhili.51 This was until 674 AH/1276 CE when Ibn
Ata Allah attended a public lecture given by Abul Abbas al-Mursi, whereupon he changed
from an opponent to Sufism to one of Abul Abbas al-Mursis most serious and promising
students.52 This change of heart came as a result of Abul Abbas knowledge of Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) which forced Ibn Ata Allah to reassess the judgement of his fellow
students. Ibn Ata Allah was committed to both Sufism and religious law, becoming a master of
both, teaching at both the Azhar Mosque and the Mansuriyyah Madrasah in Cairo53 while
simultaneously devoted to his duties as a shaykh in the Shadhili order ... [being] considered
48
49
Ibid., 9. Danner, Key to Salvation, 3 4, writes that Ibn Ata Allah was rather hostile to Sufism much like his
grandfather but not for any definite reason.
50
On this figure see Ibn Ata Allahs Lataif al-Minan; Douglas M. Dunlop, A Spanish Muslim Saint: Abul-Abbas
Al-Mursi, The Muslim World 35 (1945); and Sobhi M. Botros, Abu al-Abbas al-Mursi: A Study of Some Aspects of
His Mystical Thought (M.A. diss., McGill University, 1976).
51
Cornell, Realm of the Saint, 147, challenges Abul Abbas al-Mursi as Abul Hassans successor. He states that the
Lataif al-Minans primary purpose, against the commonly held view that it captures the teachings of the founder
and first successor of the Shadhiliyya, was to legitimize the leadership of Abul-Abbas al-Mursi and, by
extension, his successor, Ibn Ataillah. While this comment is not upheld within other sources, it is
understandable given comments that it was through the circulation of Ibn Ata Allahs works the Shadhili Way
began to spread in the Maghrib, which had rejected the master [i.e. Abul Hassan ash-Shadhili], J. Spencer
Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 50, and that that Cornells work
examines a branch of the Shadhiliyya derived from the Tunisian, not Egyptian, linage. While this may make his
comments understandable, this does not make either Trimingham or Cornell correct. Furthermore, Cornells
argument ignores the fact that Abul Abbas al-Mursi upon his death bequeathed the order to two men, Durkee,
School of the Shadhdhuliyyah, 57.
52
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 9; Book of Wisdom, 24; Danner, Key to Salvation, 4.
53
61
the foremost spokesperson for Sufism in the Mamluk capital.54 Thus, during his life, Ibn Ata
Allah was recognised as both faqih and faqir, being renowned for his knowledge of both the
exoteric (ilm az-zahir) and esoteric (ilm al-batin) aspects of Islamic doctrine. Ibn Ata Allah
became one of the successors of his teacher upon the latters death.55 Ibn Ata Allah died in
Cairo at around sixty years of age in the middle of Jumanda II 709 AH/November 1309 AD.56
Ibn Ata Allah lived during the Mamluk sultanate, which ended shortly after his death. While it
is impossible to know how many Egyptians actively joined Sufi orders,57 it is recognised that
during this time Sufism in Cairo flourished.58 Sufism was seen as something quite distinct from
the religious authorities of the Law59 and because of this a kind of court protocol arose ...
[for] those masters of the [Sufi] Path recognized by the state as the official spokesmen for the
Sufi adherents.60 During this period in Egypt, Sufism became a reified class, distinguished by
the bestowal of special titles, specific garb, and sectioning of the court seating, all of which
demarcated the Sufi adherents from the other aspects of the community, each of whom had
their title, garb, and seats. This reached the point where in Mamluk society from the
thirteenth century, the term Sufi could designate a legitimate professional occupation within
the religious establishment.61 This exteriorisation of piety differed greatly from classical
conceptions of Sufism as an interior struggle towards virtue. In contrast Abul Hassan al-Shadhili
abolished the ostentatious show of piety by encouraging the Shadhiliyya adherents to wear no
distinctive garments setting them apart from the world around them nor did they abandon
54
55
Durkee, School of the Shadhdhuliyyah, 57.
56
57
Shoshan, Popular Culture, 12.
58
As can be seen from the number of Sufi Shaykhs listed on incomplete list of known Sufi Shaykhs in Mamluk
Cairo, Ibid., 79 82.
59
Danner, Book of Wisdom, 18.
60
Ibid., 17.
61
De Jong & Radtke, Islamic Mysticism Contested, 6.
62
their professions or trades.62 This is one of the reasons that Abul Hassan al-Shadhilis methods
were seen as a return to the way of the Prophet.
Re-examining the Works of Ibn Ata Allah
This study of In Ata Allahs worldview makes it possible to revisit the interconnections
between his works. In doing so, it is useful revise Danners overview that was quoted in full in
the introduction. The interconnections between the works of Ibn Ata Allah will become more
apparent as this work progresses, though it is useful to foreground and highlight the salient
features of each work and, more importantly, through this highlighting their interconnections
begin to become visible.
From the works that are available, there are:
Kitab al-Hikam (The Book of Wisdom): This is perhaps the most widely known of his
works. It is generally considered his earliest known composition. Consisting primarily of
aphorisms, this work has often been the source of much contemplation and has inspired
numerous commentaries. The kitab al-hikam is seen as a masterful summary of the
lessons necessary for travelling the Sufi path.
Kitab al-Lataif fi manaqib Abi l-Abbas al-Mursi wa Shaykhihi Abi l Hasan (The Subtle
Blessings in the Saintly Lives of Abu l-Abbas al-Mursi and His Master Abu l-Hassan): This
biographical work records some of the sayings and litanies (ahzab) Shadhiliyya Shaykhs.
All subsequent works on Abu l-Hassan al-Shadhili and Abu l-Abbas al-Mursi refer, to
varying degrees, to the Lataif and is an essential source for information on this period
of development of the Shadhiliyya order. This work is also somewhat autobiographical,
without which very little could be said about the life of Ibn Ata Allah himself.
62
Danner, Book of Wisdom, 21. This integration into society contributes to the difficulty of determining the extent
to which the Shadhiliyya spread.
63
Miftah al-falah wa misbah al-anwah (The Key of Success and the Lamps of Spirits):
While not the first to discuss the topic of Sufi invocation (dhikr), this work is the first to
deal solely with this topic. Ibn Ata Allah draws on the Quran and Hadiths, as well as
earlier Sufis, to illustrate the necessity of invocation in attaining spiritual felicity. This
work deals with both the general and technical aspects of invocation, covering such
topics as its salvific necessity, the aliments that can be cured through the use of specific
Divine names, as well as some of the etiquette (adab) that one should uphold within
Sufi circles.
Kitab al-Tanwir fi isqat al-Tadbir (Light on the Elimination of Self-Direction): As the title
suggests, this work deals with the elimination of self-direction. Ibn Ata Allah details
how the elimination of self-direction (isqat al-tadbir) is necessary for the affirmation of
Allahs Unicity (tawhid). In doing so, it is illustrated how this virtue elicits a plethora of
virtues associated with the Sufi path, including, though not limited to, patience,
sincerity, hope, fear, and love. This work abounds with the sayings of the first two
Shadhiliyya Shaykhs and as such is another important source for understanding their
teaching. As quoted above, it has been considered one of the most important works in
traversing the Sufi path.
Al-Qasd al-mujarrad fi marifat al-Ism al-Mufrad (The Pure Goal Concerning Knowledge
of the Unique Name): This work discusses various aspects of the Supreme Name, Allah.
While all of his works are steeped in a metaphysics of Unicity (tawhid), this work draws
out the ontological implications of this doctrine. In doing so, the relation of the Supreme
Name, Allah, to the other Divine Names is discussed.
Taj al-arus al-hawi li-tahdhib an-nufus (The Brides Crown Containing the Discipline of
Souls): Previously thought to be a composite work, this work is now considered to
contain the sermons (khutbah) delivered by Ibn Ata Allah to both students and non-
student alike. It is deemed to contain the essential principles of Sufi, though stripped of
the technical language and controversial topics found in other Sufi works, presented in a
manner palatable for a general audience.
64
Unwan at-tawfiq fi adab at-tariq (The Sign of Success Concerning the Discipline of the
Path): This short work is a commentary on a Qasida of Abu Madyan. Through his
commentary, Ibn Ata Allah highlights the importance of the relationship between a
Shaykh and their student (murid). In doing so there is a discussion of a) the importance
of keeping company with individuals who are more spiritually advanced than oneself, b)
the etiquette (adab) of keeping such company, and c) the importance of such etiquette.
The Interconnections
Despite being composed on different aspects of the Sufi path, there are some important
interconnections between the works of Ibn Ata Allah. Ibn Ata Allah is aware of such
interconnections and almost encourages his readers to seek them out, as can be seen in
statements such as we have explained this statement in Kitab al-Tanwir, hence, we will not
repeat our discussion of it here63 or that we have stated the same truth in our book al-
hikam.64 As a Sufi Shaykh of the Shadhiliyya and as a teacher of other Islamic fields, Ibn Ata
Allah understands the pedagogical value of indicating out such lines of inquiry while allowing
his readers to gain the benefit of seeking them out for themselves. Yet, despite this, the extent
of these interconnections has not been drawn out within contemporary works.65
It could be submitted that there are two ways of viewing Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre. The first, and
perhaps most popular, is to view his works as merely a self-commentary on the Kitab al-
Hikam.66 Danner asserted this position, as can be seen in the statement that, in relation to the
Kitab al-Hikam, the other books of Ibn Ataillah, such as the Tanwir, the Qasd, the Lataif, and
the Miftah, open up still further angles of insight.67 This view is supported by the fact that the
Kitab al-Hikam is the earliest of his existent works and there are frequent allusions to it within
his other works. However, despite the breadth of the Kitab al-Hikam, it is submitted that this
63
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 244.
64
65
See Appendix 1.
66
This view is expressed throughout the introductions to translations to his other works, see Appendix 1.
67
65
view is unsatisfactory for the following reason. Firstly, to some degree it discounts the value
that each of his other works hold, making them, in a sense, a footnote to the Kitab al-Hikam
rather than highlighting the salient features of each text. Furthermore, given Ibn Ata Allahs
reluctance to repeat himself, it is unlikely that he would write these other works if they were
intended primarily to be commentaries on the Kitab al-Hikam. Thus, while there are some
points of correspondence between the Kitab al-Hikam and Ibn Ata Allahs other texts, it could
not be asserted that there are any more interconnections between this work and the others
than between any particular work and the rest of the oeuvre.
A second approach is to view each of Ibn Ata Allahs works as being equally important and
examining what, if any, interconnections exist. This is the approach that has been made
throughout this work and, as can be seen from the preceding study, while the primary concern
of each work differs, the oeuvre, when taken as a whole, presents a consistent worldview that
is dependent on an Islamic paradigm for cohesion and comprehension. The method of
approach used here has been to draw attention to the cohesiveness of Ibn Ata Allahs
worldview while using the footnotes to highlight that a) this cohesiveness is consistent across
each work and b) the areas within which interconnections can be made are cover the broad
range of topics covered here. As can be seen within the preceding chapters, and in the outline
of Ibn Ata Allahs works above, within each text there is a dominant theme, or it may be said
that there is a predominant discussion of a particular domain. Nevertheless, as has been shown
within this work, each domain is intimately interconnected, underpinned as it is by tawhid, and
as such each work is interconnected providing a) a consistent worldview and b) an oeuvre that
requires both an understanding of an Islamic paradigm and a familiarity with each of Ibn Ata
Allahs works for a deeper comprehension and appreciation of each of this authors works.
Despite the popularity of the Kitab al-Hikam, it does not follow that Ibn 'Ata' Allah's other
works subsume a subordinate role to his earliest known work. Even though the Kitab al-Hikam
is the most widely available of his works, an example of which can be seen in Appendix 1, it is
not necessarily to be considered his most important, as can be seen from Ibn Abbad of Ronda's
statement, that the book which you have by Ibn Ata Allah, the Kitab at-Tanwir, comprises all
that the books on Sufism, whether detailed or condensed, contain including both detailed
explanations and concise expressions.68 While the Kitab al-Hikam's breadth is not in dispute, it
cannot be singled out as being the only work of Ibn 'Ata' Allah that covers a range of domains,
68
In Danner, Key to Salvation, 16.
66
as can be seen from both the preceding quote and the material discussed in the chapters
above. This becomes increasingly apparent when Ibn 'Ata' Allah's discussion implicitly relies on
matters discussed in other works, such as the nature of tawhid, implicit in Unwan at-Tawfiq fi
adab at-Tariq, which connects the metaphysical and ethical domains. As a result, there are two
reasons for favouring the second approach to Ibn 'Ata' Allah's oeuvre. Firstly, the footnotes
throughout the discussion of Ibn 'Ata' Allah's works show, of the domains discussed, there is no
domain that is the sole, exclusive subject of a particular text. Secondly, due to the centrality of
tawhid to both an Islamic paradigm and Ibn 'Ata' Allah's worldview, there is bound to be
interconnections that can only be drawn out if the texts are treated as being, to some degree,
equally, rather than viewing certain texts as subordinate to one specific work. This supports the
view taken here that each of Ibn 'Ata' Allah's works are equally important and deserve equal
weighting.
67
Chapter 4 Metaphysics
It could be suggested that Ibn Ata Allah does not have a metaphysics as he neither explicitly
discusses nor uses the term. Moreover, like other Sufi authors, Ibn Ata Allahs work is
underpinned by the principle of tawhid, the Oneness of Allah. It is from this principle that the
multitude of things comes into existence, and to which they return. As Ibn Ata Allah admits,
Allahs Oneness is difficult to grasp because a) it has, in and of itself, no opposite to contrast it
against; and b) it is the foundation upon which all of creation (khalq) depends. Throughout his
works, Ibn Ata Allah devotes many passages explaining how tawhid is to be understood and
how its affirmation is to be maintained. Occupying, as it does, such a central and foundational
position within Ibn Ata Allahs worldview, it is suggested that, when pared of all other
concerns, the Oneness of Allah constitutes what is meant here by the domain of metaphysics
and is what is intended by Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics of tawhid.
Within the domain of metaphysics, provision (rizq) is simply not an issue because, on one hand,
the self-existent principle is without need and thus does not require provision, and, on the
other hand, the provision for all of existence is provided by the self-existent principle. However,
in working out the details and consequences of these two positions rizq begins to become an
issue. In this sense the domain of metaphysics is the source of the problem of rizq.
Understanding the relationship between creation and Creator, especially in affirming and
embodying this relationship, has been a prime concern for theologians, philosophers, and Sufis
across the Islamic world, and Ibn Ata Allah was no different in this regard. Through an
examination of Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics of tawhid, and teasing out the aspects that relate
to the problem of rizq, it will be seen that, even in the texts that are not explicitly metaphysical,
there is a complex interrelation between his works with Allahs Oneness as a central tenet
throughout.
Definition of Metaphysics
The word metaphysics has no natural correlation in Arabic. As a result of this, too often
medieval Arabic metaphysics is regarded as either simply a paraphrase of or commentary on
Aristotles Metaphysics, or a curious and rather unsuccessful blend of Aristotelian metaphysics
68
and Neoplatonism.1 While this may be true for some figures, it is not true for all. While Arabic
lacks a native word for metaphysics, the Islamic tradition is not devoid of metaphysical
material. Too often discussions on metaphysics specifically, and philosophy in general, makes
the Arabic writers to appear derivative and unoriginal, thus denying any intrinsic Islamic
metaphysics.2 While the influence of preceding philosophies, especially Greek cannot be
denied, one should remember that the Muslim sages accepted only such Greek wisdom as was
compatible with the Islamic notion of Tawhid.3
Metaphysics, as it is employed here, is understood as the sense of Being qua Being. Being in
this sense refers to the quiddity of Allah, a chief aspect of which is tawhid. There are two
approaches that can be taken with regard to Allahs quiddity, that of Allahs transcendence
(tanzih) and immanence (tashbih). In an attempt to understand tawhid it is useful to emphasise
Allahs transcendence (tanzih). In this aspect, Allah, in being beyond creation, is not part of the
ontic scheme. The metaphysics of tawhid appears to be a cold and impersonal domain due to
Allahs transcendence (tanzih) and seeming detachment from creation (khalq), though, despite
creation (khalq) being bracketed within the discussion here, it is seen to have a warmth and
intimacy when integrated with Allahs immanence (tashbih) for it emphasises the direct and
personal connection between Allah and each individual. The metaphysics of tawhid is seen as
being central to Ibn Ata Allahs worldview and is the foundation from which all other aspects
of his thought develop, such that it can be said that this is a far-reaching intellectual
expression of intertwined experience and ideas which addresses ultimate and transcendent
issues of cosmogony and cosmology, God and man, this world and the next.4
1
Thrse Durart, Metaphysics, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, eds. Peter Adamson and
Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 327. An alternative to this is Ronald Nettler, Sufi
Metaphysics and Quranic Prophets (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), though it focuses specifically on Ibn
Arabis Fusus al-Hikam.
2
Majid Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism (Oxford: Oneworld Publishers, 1997), is an example of
this as he views Islam as a melting pot of all that precedes it.
3
Danner, Islamic Tradition, 159. Regarding Islamic philosophy it has been said to differ from other non-Islamic
philosophies because the former incorporates the idea that it is impossible to pursue wisdom without at the same
time pursuing God, Leaman, An Introduction, 191.
4
Nettler, Sufi Metaphysics, 3 4.
69
Tawhid, the Oneness of Allah
Like other Sufi writers, the Oneness of Allah (tawhid) is the central principle of Ibn Ata Allahs
metaphysics. For Ibn Ata Allah, who quotes Imam al-Ghazali, affirming the unity of God
(Tawhid) is that one see all things as coming from God Most High thus preventing one from
giving undue consideration to intermediate causes.5 Though discussions of tawhid are
considered to encompass a variety of differing aspects and it has been stated that
Tawhid as used in Sufi literature means four different things. It refers, first,
to a mans belief about Gods unity, and consists essentially of some
propositions about the nature of God and His relation with man and the
world. These propositions may differ according to the believers status,
whether he is an ordinary man or a learned theologian. Tawhid refers,
secondly, to disciplining ones life, internal and external, in light of ones
beliefs. Here again there may be differences between individuals regarding
the areas of life that they subject to discipline and the emphasis they may
place on them. Tawhid refers, thirdly, to the mystical experience of unity or
union. This tawhid is neither belief nor discipline, it is an affective experience
differing in some ways from ordinary affective experiences. There are, as we
have seen, different levels of this experience... Tawhid refers, fourthly, to a
view of reality that arises from the mystical experience of unity. It is a
combination of transcendental perception (mushahada) and belief, a
philosophical construction of reality, of the relation of the Eternal, as the
mystics put it, with the contingent in the light of the mystical experience.6
While Ibn Ata Allahs works encompass all four senses of tawhid, not all are equally
prominent. This work can be seen as an attempt to explore the fourth sense of tawhid as it
occurs throughout Ibn Ata Allahs works in that tawhid acts as a foundation for his worldview.
The current chapter is an attempt to explore Ibn Ata Allahs views of the first sense of tawhid,
5
Ibn Ata Allah, Miftah al-Falah wa Misbah al-Arwah, trans. in Mary A. K. Danner, The Key to Salvation
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1996), 109.
6
Ansari, Doctrine of One Actor, 48 49. Ansaris, Ibid., 49, view is that tawhid in the fourth sense is not found in
the earlier Sufis and that it started with al-Junayd (d. 298/910). Whilst it may be true that al-Junayds writing are
the earliest expression of a worldview founded on tawhid, both al-Junayd and the Shadhiliyya would reject the
view that it is not found in earlier Sufis or in earlier Islamic communities, for both explicitly founded their doctrines
on the Quran and Sunna.
70
especially in as far as it provides the framework of later discussions. The second sense of tawhid
can be seen as the process through which an individual must pass in order to arrive at an
affective experience of tawhid in the third sense. As Ibn Ata Allahs works were composed for
pedagogical purposes he is less concerned with explicating the third sense than he is with
aiding individuals through the second. Thus, while the affective experience of tawhid is touched
on, it is not explicitly explored within Ibn Ata Allahs works nor will it be done so here.
This chapter is primarily concerned with Ibn Ata Allahs discussion of that which he considers
essential to understanding Allahs Unicity. For this he quotes freely from the Quran and Hadith,
though his discussion is not limited to it. He also uses logical proofs to argue for the
metaphysical necessity of only one God, to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Ibn Ata Allah
asserts that soteriological success depends, not only on knowing the relevant Quranic material,
but also on knowing and understanding the rational proofs of Allahs singularity.
Tawhid in the Quran and Hadith
From the opening chapter which states Thee alone do we worship; and unto Thee alone do we
turn for aid (1: 5), the proclamation of tawhid in the Quran is repeated throughout. There is
no deity save Him is repeated several times, including minor variations in the phrasing,7
confirming tawhid as a central doctrine. According to the Quran it was also the central tenet of
the teaching of the pre-Islamic prophets and messengers. Noah said worship Allah alone: you
have no deity other than Him (7: 59), which is repeated by Hud (7: 65), Salah (7: 73), and
Shuayb (7: 85). The declaration of tawhid is made even more forceful when stated in second
person your god is the One god (16: 22) and your only deity is Allah (20: 98), culminating in
the injunction to say: He is the One God (112: 1). Ibn Ata Allah affirms this view, writing that
Gods prophets and messengers teach others on His authority in order that others may
likewise be gathered together on the basis of His divine oneness.8 For Ibn Ata Allah it is not
enough to know that Allahs Unicity (tawhid) is one of the central tenets of the Quran, for him
it is necessary to understand the implications of this tenet.
7
See, for example, verses including, but not limited to, 2: 255, 3: 18, 7: 59, 11: 14, 16: 51, 20: 98, 23: 23, 23: 166,
47: 19, 59: 22. This is not an exhaustive list and only lists verses that contain this explicit expression, and minor
variations thereof.
8
71
Understanding there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah)
For Ibn Ata Allah, understanding what is meant by the kalimah tawhid (lit. words of Oneness)
is a central aspect of understanding tawhid. This is partly because bearing witness to there is
no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah) is integral in the daily life of every Muslim. Ibn Ata Allah
highlights the centrality of this phrase in stating that it is mentioned in thirty-seven passages in
the Quran.9 For this reason, amongst others, it is important to understand exactly what is
meant when one asserts la ilaha illallah. Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allah states that the obligation
to understand this phrase arises because He [Allah] requires His servants to affirm His
singularity.10 By analysing its linguistic nuances, Ibn Ata Allah illustrates that la ilaha illallah is
the expression and affirmation of Allahs Unicity (tawhid) in the simplest form. As has been
stated, By saying la ilaha (there is no deity), one says no to every sort of pseudo-deity, and
by saying illallah (but God), one says yes to God alone.11 From this understanding of la ilaha
illallah Ibn Ata Allah develops his metaphysics of tawhid.
The first element, and the one most contentious for grammarians, is that of negation, la, no.
Ibn Ata Allah writes that according to grammarians, when la (no) is joined to an indefinite
noun, it signifies a general negation, negating both the few and the many.12 Yet, this would
mean that it would not be correct to add but one or more to the negation. If this were the
case, then the phrase can be conceived as having ellipsis, such that it could express we have no
divinity but Allah or there is no divinity in existence but Allah. With regard to the former
statement, as Ibn Ata Allah points out, it would not have the meaning of True Unity.13 It
does not have the meaning of true unity because, while this statement asserts that we have no
other God, it includes the possibility that others might.
9
Ibn Ata Allah, Miftah al-Falah, 146.
10
11
Bilal Sambur, Prayer in the Psychology of Religion with Special Reference to al-Ghazali, Ibn Ata Allah and
Iqbal, (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2000), 221.
12
13
Ibid., 131.
72
As to the statement that there is no divinity in existence but Allah this includes the negation of
divinity in both essence and existence, depending on how the phrase is understood. Ibn Ata
Allah writes that it is known that the negation of essence is more powerful in affirming Unity
than the negation of existence, and as such focuses the examination of this sentence in the
sense that it negates essence.14 Ibn Ata Allah proposes two options, essence and existence are
either the same or they are different. If they are the same then the negation of both results in
absolute nonexistence, which is absurd. However, if they are different then it is possible to
negate the essence of divinities other than Allah. If their existence is negated this merely
negates their actuality, but not their potentiality. Whereas, if la illaha illallah is understood to
negate the essence of deities other than Allah, then this is tawhid for not only does it deny the
actuality of other deities, but also their potentiality.
The next element given attention is illa, but or except. In highlighting the possible meanings of
illa, in order to determine the correct one, Ibn Ata Allah cites the Quran, if there were, in the
heavens and the earth, other gods besides (illa) Allah then verily, there would have been
confusion in both (21 :22). Ibn Ata Allah argues that, given the possibilities, the meaning of
illa in this sense is equal to ghayr, other than, rather than meaning exception.15 The reason for
this is that in the latter case, la ilaha illallah becomes there are no divinities from which God is
to be excluded, which is not an expression of Unity.16 Alternatively, if illa is equated with ghayr
then the phrase is understood to express there is no divinity other than Allah. Ibn Ata Allah
points out that as it is agreed that it conveys the meaning of pure Unity; so it is necessary to
ascribe to illa (except) the meaning of ghayr (other than).17
Finally there is the affirmation. After the negation of all deities, the sentence la ilaha illallah, as
an expression of tawhid, affirms the existence of the one sole Deity. Ibn Ata Allah, in
examining the grammar, states that it is in keeping with the logic of the sentence that in
14
Ibid., 132.
15
Ibid., 133.
16
Ibid., 133 34.
17
Ibid., 134.
73
apposition one rejects the first part of the phrase and accepts the second, as in this instance
the apposition illallah, except Allah, is in the nominative case.18 Thus, it is in keeping with the
grammatical form of the sentence that the existence of Allah is affirmed. However, as Ibn Ata
Allah is quick to point out, there are some who hold that the exception from negation is not an
affirmation.19 For when there is both a judgement of non-existence as well as the negation of
non-existence ... this exception might conceivably go back to the judgement of non-existence
such that the exception remains undiscussed and unevaluated as either negative or
affirmative without certainty.20 Ibn Ata Allah concedes that the sentence la ilaha illallah is
not recognition of the existence of Allah, but rather a declaration negating the remaining
deities.21 He admits that while the meaning of the affirmation is conveyed through a
conditional, such that the meaning becomes if there is any god then it is One Allah, it does not
contradict the general meaning of the sentence. It does, however, change the wording of the
sentence and this is unacceptable because abandoning whatever the wording might be is a
contradiction to the general meaning.22 Ibn Ata Allahs response is that, while the sentence la
ilaha illah is an implicit affirmation of the Oneness of Divinity, the explicit affirmation of Divinity
is a precondition of this sentence, without which it makes no sense as it comes through the
grasp of a principle of language.23
Ibn Ata Allah goes further, showing the necessity of the negation preceding the affirmation,
while maintaining the priority of the latter. Before showing the priority of the affirmation of
Divinity, Ibn Ata Allah writes that the concept of non-existence and negation is impossible
before the concept of affirmation, because non-existence is unintelligible except in relation to a
specific thing.24 Ibn Ata Allah gives three reasons for the priority of the affirmation of the sole
Divinity in la ilaha illallah, one grammatical, two symbolic and metaphysical. He writes that
negating divinity other than Allah Most High and then affirming it in regard to Him is more
18
Ibid., 133.
19
Ibid., 134.
20
Ibid., 134.
21
Ibid., 135.
22
Ibid., 135.
23
Ibid., 136.
24
Ibid., 137.
74
emphatic than affirming it of Him without negating it in other-than-Him.25 Next, Ibn Ata
Allah states that every man has one heart and one heart cannot be occupied with two things
at the same time,26 which is evocative of the Quranic verse which states that never has God
endowed any man with two hearts in one body (33: 4), an allusion that would not have been
lost on his audience. Ibn Ata Allahs point is that this exclusion means that whenever an
individual is concerned with anything other-than-Allah, they are excluded from being
concerned and aware of Allah, which should be ones prime concern if they are to develop
soteriologically. It is for this reason, writes Ibn Ata Allah, that for the one who says la ilaha
illallah that he intend by la ilaha the expulsion of what is other-than-Allah from his heart so
that the authority of God is present therein.27 Finally, following on from this, the negation of
other-than-Allah is seen to be a precondition of the affirmation of Allah Most High, just as
ritual purity precedes prayer or cleaning a house of dirt precedes the arrival of a king
therein and for this reason it is necessary that la ilaha precede illallah.28 Thus, for Ibn Ata
Allah, the phrase la ilaha illallah is the simplest expression of the affirmation of the Oneness of
Allah.
The Proofs of Tawhid
For Ibn Ata Allah, the proof of tawhid is clearly stated in the Quran. The Quran, as the
irrefutable word of Allah, states, regarding Allahs Unicity your God is the One God: there is no
deity save Him (2: 163). For Ibn Ata Allah, this is sufficient proof for accepting Allahs
Oneness, as can be seen from his writing,
For me, the supposition of the existence of two deities is rationally

impossible, because the Divinity is One Who has the attributes of Majesty
and Beauty, both dynamically and passively. Then who is there other-than-
25
Ibid., 137.
26
Ibid., 137
27
Ibid., 137. This has been recognised by Sambur, Prayer in the Psychology, 222, who writes that the tawhidic
world view of Islam is the best proof of this principle, since il ilaha illallah cannot accommodate anything other-
than-God in human nature and the universe.
28
Ibn Ata Allah, Miftah al-Falah, 137. It is possible to see from this one of the reasons that the phrase la ilaha
illallah is utilized as a dhikr, and even seen as the best form of dhikr, for cleaning the rust of heart and bringing
about the presence of God therein. This is further discussed in the chapter on soteriology.
75
He? In the other-than-He, those attributes are acquired from Him. Thus, the
Divinity is naught but One, and He is Allah, as is evidenced through His
Words (may He be exalted!). If there were, in the heavens and the earth,
gods besides God, then verily, there would have been confusion in both . . .29
Beyond this, Ibn Ata Allah presents numerous proofs illustrating the logical necessity of the
Oneness of Allah, to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Given the above quote, their
inclusion cannot be considered as attempting to verify the truthfulness of the Quran; rather, in
line with his overarching concern, they can be seen to be included because their knowledge is
necessary for soteriological development. On this Ibn Ata Allah writes that on condition of
having belief in Allahs Oneness, it is necessary to back up this belief with decisive proofs.30 At
the same time, these proofs of tawhid, in reaffirming the above mentioned material from the
Quran, are an aid to understanding, affirming, and accepting the Quran as the irrefutable word
of Allah.
Ibn Ata Allahs proofs take two formats, one intellectual and the other traditional.31 Of the
intellectual proofs, most follow the method of reciprocal hindrance (tamau). In utilising this
method Ibn Ata Allah follows a consistent format generally beginning with if we assume two
deities. Ibn Ata Allah introduces an attribute of Allah and shows that it is logically inconsistent
to apply this attribute to two things simultaneously. While Ibn Ata Allah does not state this
anywhere, it follows that he is aware that in refuting the assumption of two deities he also
refutes the assumption of three or four or more as these would elicit the same absurdities as
the existence of two. Furthermore, a refutation of tawhid only requires a proof of the existence
of two deities and for this reason the inclusion of any more into the argument does not alter
the result.
Ibn Ata Allah first considers the quality of being the master over all possibilities.32 In
supposing two deities, Ibn Ata Allah wonders about the result of two deities desiring opposing
29
Ibid., 138 39, quoting the Quran 21: 22. In this quote Ibn Ata Allah follows Abu al-Hasan Ash-Shadhuli, whom
he has quoted as saying We view God with the perceptive powers of faith and certainty, which has freed us from
the need for evidence and proof, Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 53.
30
31
Ibid., 140 146 and 146 148 respectively.
32
Ibid., 140.
76
things, i.e. one wanted Zaid to move while the other wanted him to be still.33 Both of these
hypothetical deities cannot be a master over all possibilities because both outcomes cannot
occur due to the impossibility of combining two opposites.34 Zaid either moves or he does
not, either way the will of one deity will overcome the other, which would require the
predominance of one of the two equals without any predominating element; and this is
absurd.35 Ibn Ata Allah then raises the possible objection that this opposition of wills is not
necessary due to their knowing all things knowable and their possession of the wisdom of
what is good and not good such that both deities agree to will the same thing, avoiding
contradiction.36 Interestingly, Ibn Ata Allah accepts the validity of this objection but replies
that it is merely conceivable, not real.37 His reason for doing so involves a transition from
strictly logical considerations to metaphysical ones, replying that it is absurd to assert that a
deity wills something merely because it is good, for that would mean that the deity would be
the result of his deeds, not the creator of them.38 This response is not as far removed from the
logical proof as it first seems. For Allah to be master over all possibilities means that what is
willed is not subject to anything, whether it be another deity or the concept of the good, for if it
was then Allah would be limited to certain possibilities, not master over them. According to Ibn
Ata Allah, to hold otherwise the consequence is plain, namely that as Allah is transcendent
above having others share in the choice with Him ... whoever pretentiously claims to have any
personal choice alongside Allah is one who associates (mushrik), who claims Lordship for
himself.39 Thus, according to Ibn Ata Allah, there cannot be two or more masters over all
possibilities.
Ibn Ata Allah repeats this argument, each time focusing on a different attribute of Allah
including self existence, omnipresence, omnipotence, and the like. Each time Ibn Ata Allah
examines one of these qualities he argues that since it is logically impossible that these qualities
33
Ibid., 140.
34
Ibid., 140.
35
Ibid., 141.
36
Ibid., 141.
37
Ibid., 141.
38
Ibid., 141.
39
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 12.
77
be ascribed to two or more existents then the Unicity of Allah (tawhid) is affirmed. For example,
if two or more deities have the power over all possibilities, then either one has more power
than the other, in which case it cannot be affirmed that both have power over all possibilities.
Furthermore, it is absurd that if they agreed on a possible creation then the power of one of
them would not be worthier to create than the other as both have the power over all
possibilities.40 For any particular possibility, a deed would either be dependent on one deity and
independent of the other or vice versa, which would mean that it is in need of both and yet is
in no need of both,41 which is absurd, hence, the existence of two deities is impossible.42
Alternatively, if they disagree then one would prevail, meaning that the other is weak, or if they
do not disagree then they are both weak, as their decisions would be depend on each other,
both of which are unacceptable because the weak cannot be a deity.43 For Ibn Ata Allah,
these arguments all point to the Unicity of Allah (tawhid).
One quality that covers a number of these proofs is self-existence. The first, and most obvious,
argument against two, or more, self-existents is that each would have to be a partner to the
other in existence and at variance with him in himself.44 While embracing and including
elements from the previous arguments the necessity of variance adds some new elements and
possibilities. In the case of assuming of two deities, existence would consist of a compound, yet
that through which the partnership comes about is other than that through which the variance
occurs.45 As existence depends on the partnership of two, or more, deities, these deities
cannot be considered as self-existent as they depend on each other for this partnership, which
is extraneous to both deities.
If the above argument was not sufficient for rejecting the possibility of two or more self-
existent deities, Ibn Ata Allah examines the quality distinguishing the self-existent beings. In
doing so, he aims at putting the impossibility of multiple self-existents beyond doubt. Either
40
41
Ibid., 142.
42
Ibid., 141.
43
Ibid., 142.
44
Ibid., 142 43.
45
Ibid., 143.
78
that which distinguishes these deities is an attribute of perfection or it is not, or it is of
considerable importance or it is not. In the former case, if distinction is a result of an attribute
of perfection, then, by being devoid of the distinguishing attribute, the deities are imperfect. If
the distinction is not the result of an attribute of perfection, then, being an attribute of
imperfection, the deities are imperfect. Either way the imperfect cannot be a god.46 In the
latter case, if the quality is of considerable importance in distinguishing divinity, then the one
devoid of this quality is not a god. If the quality is not of considerable importance then being
distinguished by it is not necessary and a distinction is still required. This lack of distinction is
proof that this is not a deity for he who is in need is one who lacks and is not a deity.47 While
this does not exhaust the intellectual proofs offered by Ibn Ata Allah, it is evident that
throughout these arguments the sole aim is to show that positing more than one deity is
metaphysically and logically incorrect. As a result, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to be clearing the
ground so that a solid foundation is established.
Ibn Ata Allah is aware that, while these are arguments to disprove the possibility of multiple
deities, they do not explicitly assert the existence of one Sole Deity. For this traditional proofs
are necessary, all of which are taken from the Quran. For Ibn Ata Allah, some of them are self
explanatory, such as Your God is One God; there is no deity save Him (2: 163), Say: He is
God, the One (112: 1), God says: Do not take two gods, for He is only One God... (16: 51).
In passages such as these the assertion of one sole Principle to the exclusion of any others is
self-evident. In other Quranic passages Allahs attributes are mentioned. In these instances Ibn
Ata Allah provides commentary illustrating how each passage is an assertion of tawhid. Two
examples of this kind of proof are the verses He is the First and the Last... (57: 3) and
everything will perish save His countenance (28: 88). With regard to the passage He is the
First and the Last... (57: 3), Ibn Ata Allah writes that to be the First is to be the One without
antecedent48 so that if one were to say the first slave I buy will be freed and then proceeds
to purchase two slaves simultaneously it is not incumbent on them to free either because the
first must be a single person and any subsequent slaves purchased will be kept too because
the first must be prior to the others.49 Ibn Ata Allahs point is that when God Most High
describe Himself as being the First, it is incumbent that He be unique and prior to all else;
46
Ibid., 143.
47
Ibid., 143.
48
Ibid., 146.
49
Ibid., 146.
79
hence, this requires that He not have a partner.50 Hence, Allahs being the First is taken to be
indicative of Allahs Unicity.
As to the passage everything will perish save His countenance (28: 88), Ibn Ata Allah reminds
his readers that whatsoever is non-existent, and then comes into being, cannot be eternal, as
the eternal cannot possibly be non-existent and what is not eternal is not a god.51 Ibn Ata
Allahs argument is elliptical and his readers are left to tease out the implication. This argument
follows the line that since only His countenance does not perish, nothing else can be considered
eternal, and thus there are no partners alongside of Allah. It may be objected that this proof
merely mirrors the intellectual proofs, in that it rejects the possibility of multiple eternal
existents. However, by affirming the existence of His countenance, this proof not only rejects
all possible partners but also affirms the existence of the Oneness of Allah. While this does not
exhaust Ibn Ata Allahs traditional proofs, it does convey the intent and form of Ibn Ata
Allahs hermeneutics in that it aims to place this conception of tawhid at the centre of the
Quran.
Ibn Ata Allah accepts unequivocally that the Divinity is One Who has the attributes of Majesty
and Beauty.52 This is important, for when these proofs are elucidated the reader knows that
Ibn Ata Allah has no doubt about the validity of the Quranic passages. When Ibn Ata Allah
quotes the passage if there were, in the heavens and the earth, gods beside God, then verily
there would have been confusion in both (21: 22),53 then the reader can see that the aim of
the proofs is to remove any such confusion on the part of the reader. If Ibn Ata Allahs goal is
not limited to elucidating a sound metaphysical foundation, it is also directed to developing the
necessary basis for such a foundation. For without a solid foundation anything that is built is
suspect. The relation of these proofs to the discussion of la ilaha illallah is integral. Ibn Ata
Allah states that, as a condition of affirming la ilaha illallah, one back up his belief with
decisive proofs, unless he is not from among the people of contemplation, unveiling, and
revelation.54 However, understanding the decisive proofs, like those examined above, is not
50
Ibid., 146.
51
Ibid., 147.
52
Ibid., 139.
53
Ibid., 147.
54
Ibid., 139.
80
the goal.55 The final condition of affirming la ilaha illllah is to be from amongst the people of
contemplation, unveiling, and revelation.56 Thus, for Ibn Ata Allah, understanding and
affirming la ilaha illallah is pivotal for soteriological development.
Being from amongst the people of contemplation, unveiling, and revelation57 is considered
the pinnacle of human achievement. Throughout his works Ibn Ata Allah encourages his
readers to aspire to become from amongst this group and his books can be seen to be written
to help others achieve this goal. To be from amongst this group means ones worship of God
becomes sincere.58 Sincerity in worship means he does not turn to anyone but Him, nor does
he have hope in or fear other than Him, nor does he see harm or benefit except as coming from
Him to the point that he abandons whatsoever is not He.59 This culminates in ridding oneself
of inward and outward associationism (shirk),60 which can be seen as being the pinnacle of
affirming and embodying tawhid. The degree of subtlety involved might not at first be
apparent. Beyond the obvious attribution of partners to Allah, Ibn Ata Allah quotes Abul
Abbas al-Mursi as having said kindness is a veil which conceals the One who is Most Kind.61
Regarding this, Ibn Ata Allah comments that kindness is a veil when one finds repose in it and
is tempted to be content with the kindness itself.62 This is further emphasised in quoting al-
Wasitis statement that the enjoyment of obedience is a deadly poison, to which Ibn Ata
Allah explains that enjoyment of obedience often results in a missed opportunity to
demonstrate sincere devotion as ones devotion continues because of the sweetness and
55
Ibn Ata Allah seems to share al-Qushayris view who in describing the principle stages of mans progress
towards the Creator ... identifies the first as positioning oneself vis-a-vis God (muhadara). The mystic in the state of
muhadara still remains behind the veil of the discursive proof (burhan) and of the workings of the intellect (aql),
whereas later discursive reasoning (burhan) gives way to the irrefutable and ultimate proof (bayan), Knysch,
Islamic Mysticism, 312. This giving way to the irrefutable and ultimate proof could be likened to Ibn Ata Allahs
discussion of certainty (yakin). See chapter 3 below.
56
57
Ibid., 139.
58
Ibid., 140.
59
Ibid., 140.
60
Ibid., 140.
61
62
Ibid., 276.
81
enjoyment that you find in them and not out of loyalty to your Lord.63 Finding repose in
kindness or the sweetness of devotion is contrary to tawhid for it treats contingent things as an
end, whereas to affirm tawhid is to know that with God is all journeys end (3: 28). Without
skipping ahead, it is important to see, as is discussed below, that, for Ibn Ata Allah, affirming
tawhid entails, as far as possible, embodying it in such a way that ones intentions correspond
with ones words which correspond with ones actions and ones actions are such that they do
not place anything alongside Allah. Anything less would be considered associationism (shirk).
Ibn Ata Allah is careful in asserting that being from amongst the people of contemplation,
unveiling, and revelation64 is the final goal. He is quick to add that the science of unveiling has
no end to it,65 and that the truth is that the Gnostic sciences have no limit.66 This is
important, for to state otherwise would be inconsistent with the metaphysics of tawhid. In
provoking a response to this Ibn Ata Allah asks how can it be conceived that something veils
Him, since He is the One (al-Wahid) alongside of whom there is nothing?67 Ibn Ata Allah
answers
The Real (al-Haqq) is not veiled from you. Rather, it is you who are veiled
from seeing It, for, were anything to veil It, then that which veils It would
cover It. But if there were a covering to It, then that would be a limitation of
Its Being: every limitation of anything has power over it. And He is
Omnipotent, above His servants.68
To claim to have reached the point beyond which there is no further unveiling would entail
implicitly claiming that Allah is limited and would contradict the verse every day He manifests
Himself in yet another [wondrous] way (55: 29). Yet, as the proofs have shown, this is
inconceivable and logically impossible. Rather, while the science of unveiling has no end, the
63
Ibid., 278.
64
65
Ibid., 140.
66
67
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 26.
68
Ibid., 29. Quoting the Quran (65: 7).
82
individual has a limit and the infinite cannot be apprehended by the contingent. For each
individual, as the above aphorism shows, is veiled beyond their limit.
However, this metaphysics of tawhid, while affirming the limitless unveiling for the creation,
affirms that the Creator is not at any time, or in any sense, veiled. Ibn Ata Allah inquires how
can it be conceived that something veils Him, since He is the one who manifests everything,69
to which he responds that, due to the nature of Allahs Unicity, He appears even in those
entities through which He is veiled such that there is, in reality, no veil.70 In denying creation
through affirming la ilaha illallah attention is turned away from the created universe only with
respect to its creatureliness, not with respect with the Truths appearance therein.71 The result
is that it is not to His failure to appear in everything but rather, to their [creations] inability to
perceive Him in everything.72 Tawhid is not an effacement of creation, rather the contingently
existent creation must acknowledge their contingency for [earthly] causes must needs exist,
while at the same time, one must be absent to them in order to witness [the Divine causality
behind them].73 Thus, it is Allahs Unicity that veils creation from perceiving His Oneness.
The Goal of Tawhid
While it is necessary, according to Ibn Ata Allah, to back up belief with decisive proofs,74 this
is not the goal. Beyond belief or faith (iman) there is certainty (yaqin) and one of the purposes
of the proofs employed by Ibn Ata Allah is to develop certainty. Ibn Ata Allah writes that all
certainty entails faith, though not all faith entails certainty as the difference between them is
that while faith might be attended by heedlessness, such is not the case with certainty.75 The
69
Ibid., 25.
70
71
Ibid., 49.
72
Ibid., 49.
73
Ibid., 54.
74
75
83
distinguishing mark of certaintys (yaqin) superiority over faith (iman) is that the former entails
knowledge attended by action, whereas the latter only entails the affirmation of such
knowledge, hence the potential for heedlessness. The importance of knowledge coupled with
action will become apparent through the discussions on ethics and soteriology. However, it is
important to keep in mind that, for Ibn Ata Allah, faith and belief, and, as will be seen below,
even certainty, are not ends-in-themselves, but are a means to realise the relationship between
the Absolute and the contingent, the One and the many.
Ibn Ata Allah states that the fruit of the affirmation of tawhid is trust in God.76 For Ibn Ata
Allah, this trust, while informed by various proofs, is not theoretical or abstract. This kind of
trust in Allah is one that is embodied and enacted. Ibn Ata Allah asserts that your striving for
what has already been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are
signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira),77 emphasising that ones motivation should be
correctly orientated. Focusing on what is demanded of you ensures the affirmation of la ilaha
illallah because it emphasises the performative aspect of embodying and enacting tawhid
without alterities like striving for what has already been guaranteed. The kind of trust in Allah
being advocated for involves abstaining from intermediaries, as is seen from the abstinence of
the elect ... [which] includes, for example, their wariness of relying on any being but God,
inclining in love towards anything or anyone other than Him, or aspiring to anything but His
grace and goodness78 or finding repose in kindness rather than the One who is Most Kind.79
Ibn Ata Allah further writes that detachment from the world arises solely from genuine trust
in God, while genuine trust in God arises solely from faith in God based on a personal vision of
and encounter with Him.80 The encounter that Ibn Ata Allah mentions engenders trust in
Allah through the realisation of His Unicity and creations inherent ontological poverty.
Closely aligned to trust in Allah, is being pleased with Him. Ibn Ata Allah writes that being
pleased with Allah means that one has submitted to Him, and yielded to His order, and left
76
77
78
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 155-56.
79
Ibid., 276.
80
Ibid., 161.
84
his control to His leadership.81 Commenting on the Quranic verse God has bought of the
believers their lives and their possessions, promising paradise in return (9: 111), Ibn Ata Allah
states you have no management or authority over what you do not own.82 At first glance this
may appear self-evident, however, Ibn Ata Allah made the comment in connection with the
Quranic verse to indicate that as our lives and possessions have been bought, we, in reality,
have no authority over them. The importance of this is that if one has trust in Allah, then one
should be pleased with His choice regarding their lives and their possessions. Allahs
closeness to each and every creation is evident through His having power and choice over every
course of action, the result of which is that the intimacy of His nearness makes him absent
from the perception of the afflictions.83 Awareness of this intimacy indicates a perception of
the mercy that extends from the Absolute to the contingent, such that for whoever is deprived
and knows that the deprivation is a mercy to him, then that deprivation is in reality a gift.84 Ibn
Ata Allah is indicating that Allahs choice, irrespective of whether one conceives it as a trial or
not, is directed to enabling the individual to recognise the source of all action. However, implicit
within this is that the knowledge required to be content with Allahs choice, thus being pleased
with and trusting in Allah, is to know that all contingent creation has the selfsame source, that
is, knowledge of tawhid. As the goal of tawhid is its affirmation, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to
be establishing what is here called a soteriological semiotics with Allah revealing Himself to
creation through creation.
While Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics may seem to be world denying it should be kept
in mind that Allah appears even in those entities through which He is veiled.85 Ibn Ata Allah
writes that attention is turned away from the created universe only with respect to its
creatureliness, not with respect with the Truths appearance therein86 such that the worlds
only blameworthiness is what keeps you away from Allah and from dealing with Him.87
81
82
Ibid., 24.
83
Ibid., 9.
84
Ibid., 7.
85
86
Ibid., 49.
87
85
Soteriologically, the denial of creation only occurs to the extent that one is unable to perceive
the Divine causality behind it. On this, Ibn Ata Allah writes that not all who seek the world are
blameworthy, but only the one who seeks it for himself and not for his Lord.88 Thus, while two
actions may appear outwardly similar, they can differ greatly in their intention, which is the
criterion against which they are judged for the reward of deeds depends upon the
intentions.89 Ibn Ata Allahs position regarding the world is that it is not totally blameworthy
without exception, and neither is it totally praiseworthy without exception.90 To the extent
that perception of the Divine pierces the veil of creation the world can be affirmed due to its
Divine underpinnings. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, Ibn Ata Allah cannot be
considered world denying for he recognises that it is within the world that one comes to know
and affirm tawhid. Secondly, if either praise or blame is attributed to creation it should be
examined to see how it either highlights or covers the Divine.
Furthermore, the type of trust that Ibn Ata Allah is advancing stems from the deepening
awareness of creations, and thus ones own, total contingency. The understanding of la ilaha
illallah that Ibn Ata Allah is promoting extends beyond what is commonly assented to when
tawhid is affirmed. He writes that ordinary people only sense their great need of God in the
face of certain distressing life events because their vision is dominated by the realm of
sensory experience such that, due to this veil, their need of God is fleeting.91 However, this
misses a vital point of the relationship between Allah and creation in that the creatures need
for God is a function of the servants essential nature, since he is a contingent being, and every
contingent being is in need of an external source of supply.92 In elaborating in the servants
essential nature, he writes that among the requirements of servitude are the following:
manifesting need of Allah, and standing before Him with the quality of poverty, and raising the
aspiration (himma) from other than him.93 It is for this reason that the saint is constantly in
distress,94 for they know that their need of Allah is not fleeting and the imperative need (al-
88
Ibid., 68.
89
al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, trans. Muhammad M. Khan (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), # 1.
90
91
92
Ibid., 194.
93
94
86
idtirar) of the Gnostic never vanishes, nor is his repose (qarar) in anyone but God.95 To awaken
creations awareness of their contingency the Truth afflicts them with [outward] conditions
which alert them to their need of Him.96 This culminates in the constant awareness of
creations contingency and their need for Allah, while embodying qualities that ensure that
associationism (shirk) is avoided.
Implications of the Metaphysics of Tawhid
It has been shown that Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics is founded on the Oneness of Allah
(tawhid). Central to the metaphysics of tawhid is to bear witness (shahid) to the testimony of
faith (shahadah) there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah). For Ibn Ata Allah, this involves
more than mere lip service, as a sincere affirmation involves embodying Allahs Unicity.
However, accepting this involves a seemingly irreconcilable rift between abandoning all that is
other-than-He and continuing ones everyday existence since this requires an ontology that is
underpinned by a non-ontic entity. This discussion will be confined to the topic of provision
(rizq) in order to draw out the implications of the metaphysics of tawhid. One outcome of this
metaphysics of tawhid is that, irrespective of the domain, unicity underpins every discussion.
While confining this discussion to provision (rizq), it will be seen that, on all levels, tawhid plays
a crucial role in both developing the problem and defining the solution. In highlighting some of
the implications of this metaphysics of tawhid it should be acknowledged that these issues are
developed and examined in greater length in later chapters.
In examining the metaphysics of tawhid its ontological implications become apparent. This may
seem like a slight digression, but the importance of the concept of the descent of Being
(tanazzul) cannot be understated. While a full understanding of this descent is not possible
within this work, it is possible to cover the pertinent aspects. Tanazzul is the descent of the
Essence (adh-dhat), which is unknowable, through the Divine Names (asma Allah), and
Attributes (sifat) to the corporal world (al-dunya).97 The descent of Being (tanazzul) is often
95
96
97
For a further discussion see Khaja S. K. Khan, The Secret of Anal Haqq (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1992),
especially chapter one through eight, and Abd al-Karim al-Jili, Universal Man, trans. Titus Burckhardt and Angela
Clume-Seymour (Gloucestershire: Beshara Publications, 1995), especially chapter one through six.
87
portrayed as a hierarchy with each tier having its own internal hierarchy. An example of this is
that the names of Allah (asma Allah) are covered by the Supreme Name Allah for it refers to
the essence which unites all attributes of Divinity, so that none of them is left out, whereas
each of the remaining names only refers to a single attribute.98 The top-down approach shows
the descent of Being (tanazzul) as a sort of map showing the hierarchy of existence. However,
this map can be inverted such that the possibility of a return or reintegration becomes evident.
With regard to the individual the Quran states We create man in the best conformation and
thereafter We reduce him to the lowest of the low (95: 5-6), which sets up the entire
soteriological endeavour. The best conformation entails being witness to the reality of la
ilaha illallah. The human being, having experienced this descent (tanazzul), is compelled to
regain their best conformation. While human beings cannot escape their contingency, they
may shed their baseness by re-establishing an awareness of the relationship between the
Absolute and the contingent. While Ibn Ata Allah does not express it in this manner, it is
implied within his works and informs his discussions of provision (rizq).
The importance of an understanding of the Divine descent (tanazzul) becomes apparent when
it is acknowledged that the distinction between Creator and creature is the site of the problem
of rizq. Allah, being the Creator and source of all existence, cannot be divorced from the
creation for this would mean that creation is separate, which conflicts with tawhid. Allah is both
transcendent, for there is nothing like unto Him (42: 11), and immanent, for wherever you
turn, there is Gods countenance (2: 115). While creation is manifest by and through the grace
of Allah, its nature is such that it is taken as an end in itself and its source is obscured. On this,
Ibn Ata Allah writes that the Cosmos (al-kawn) is all darkness and is illumined only by the
manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.99 He further states that it is not possible that the
heart be illumined while the forms of creatures are reflected in its mirror.100 His point is that
those who stop at the creation, without acknowledging the Creator in it or by it or before it or
after it,101 do not affirm tawhid. Given Allahs Self-sufficiency it is absurd that there could be a
lack or want, even though from the perspective of creation the pursuit of rizq is necessary.
98
99
100
Ibid., 25.
101
Ibid., 25.
88
The heart of the problem of rizq is this: if Allah is Self-Sufficient and Allah is the only true
existent, then why is rizq necessary? The short answer is that the problem of rizq involves a
domain error. Ibn Ata Allah asserts that one must know that things have a certain being in
the foreknowledge of Allah and that the Real takes charge and regulates its affairs while it is
in His foreknowledge.102 Rizq is only a problem without an understanding of the ontic
hierarchy. A sufficient understanding of the ontic hierarchy is implicit in the affirmation of
tawhid as presented by Ibn Ata Allah. Though, it is evident from the extent that this arises
throughout his works that this common problem arises as a result of a lack of knowledge. It is
clear from this chapter that Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics, rooted as it is in tawhid, is not only
aware of the problem of rizq but also has an answer. Ibn Ata Allahs answer to the problem of
rizq involves fleshing out the implications of tawhid across domains, including ontology,
epistemology, eschatology, and soteriology.
102
89
Chapter 5 Ontology
If the metaphysical domain is the source of the problem of rizq, then the ontological domain is
the site of the problem. Within the metaphysical domain, tawhid means that there is no
opposite or opposition to Allah as a result of His Self-sufficiency. However, the corresponding
ontological extension of this metaphysics of tawhid involves an arena wherein provision is
pursued, attained, and consumed, opposites appear to attract and repel, and opposition
appears to be an overwhelming experience, though only for the contingently existent. If the
metaphysics of tawhid can be typified as harmony, then, for Ibn Ata Allah, one of the key traits
of the ontological domain is disjunction. Within this domain all things, due to their inherent
contingency, are placed under strain as they arise within their boundaries. However, rather
than renouncing the world, Ibn Ata Allah acknowledges its existence and advises that things
should not be given more attention than they are due. It can be seen that this approach stems
directly from his understanding of tawhid as there is no god other than (ghayr) Allah, for to
reject creation is to reject Allahs appearance therein. The result is that creation is
acknowledged, though only as far as it gives rise to the perception of the Divine. Due to its
ontological contingency, creation has an inherent ontological poverty. This means that the
contingently existent has no control over its, or anything elses, inherent contingency. For Ibn
Ata Allah, it will be seen that this inherent ontological poverty is a crucial factor in both a)
highlighting the relationship between Creator and creation and b) opening the possibility of
contact between creation and Creator.
The distinction between the metaphysical and ontological domains is not necessarily obvious,
though it is seen to play an important role within the writings of Ibn Ata Allah. Metaphysics, as
it has been used here, refers to the principles of existence as they are within themselves, prior
to ontic existence, the chief for Ibn Ata Allah is, as discussed, tawhid. To distinguish the
ontological domain from the metaphysical is important as the former deals primarily with
manifestation, i.e. ontic entities, whereas as the later is, in a sense, independent of
manifestation.1 To make this distinction clearer it could be stated that the metaphysical domain
encompasses the potentially possible, i.e. that which is or will be manifest, as well as the
1
al-Junayd described the final state of tawhid as an experience of nearness (qurb), rather than union, Ansari,
Doctrine of One Actor, 51. This pre-empts Ibn Ata Allahs view for it indicates that Allah cannot be reached by a
contingent creation in either an ontological or teleological sense if it is taken as understanding Allahs essence as a
non-ontic entity.
90
potentially impossible, i.e. that which is possible for Allah to manifest though has no possibility
of being due to the limitations Allah has placed on Himself with regard to His creation. The
potentially impossible is limited due to such things as His mercy superseding his wrath (7: 156)
and His not burdening his creation with more than they can bare (2: 286) and other such Self-
imposed limitations which are stated in the Quran and the Hadith. As a result, the ontological
domain is limited to the potentially possible.2 It is important to note that the choice of stressing
the potentiality of any possibility or impossibility is deliberate, for the necessity of anything
other than Allah would impose limitations on Allah and remove Allahs quality of being,
amongst others, the all powerful (al-qadir), which, as previously discussed, would mean that
what is being referred to is not God.
Within Ibn Ata Allahs works the ontological domain, comprising of that which is potentially
known, is considered to be the source of all knowledge of Allah for His creation. However, as it
comprises of, in a sense, the first veil on the ipseity of Allah, the ontological domain is the
source of tension between the Absolute and the contingents apprehension thereof. While the
metaphysical domain, typified by tawhid, is a domain of undifferentiated, uniform harmony,
the ontological domain is punctuated by the tension involved in differentiating Creator and
creation. It will be seen that Ibn Ata Allahs discussion of what is here called the ontological
domain encompasses the twofold importance of this domain, that of containing the
contingents knowledge of Allah whilst being the site of their distinction.
For Ibn Ata Allah, a correct understanding of the ontological domain is crucial in as far as it
prefigures all potential soteriological development. The centrality of the ontological domain
with regard to his soteriology lies in this domain being an isthmus (barzakh) between the
metaphysical reality and an individuals epistemological apprehension of it, either aiding or
hindering the harmonious interplay between the Absolute and the individual. To avoid any
disjunction between the Absolute and the individual, so as to avoid contradicting tawhid, Ibn
Ata Allah can be seen to deploy a soteriological semiotics. As stated, Ibn Ata Allahs
soteriological semiotics arises as an aid to affirming and embodying the metaphysics of tawhid.
2
On this Ibn Arabi states that the ontological evil that creatures meet derives from their possibility (al-imkan)
their ambiguous ontological situation halfway between the Necessity of Sheer Being and the impossibility of sheer
nothingness, William C. Chittick, Death and the World of Imagination: Ibn al-Arabis Eschatology, The Muslim
World 79 (1988): 78 79. Thus, Ibn Ata Allahs view that there is no inherent evil can been seen to be a
consequence of the ontological expression of tawhid.
91
As it is through creation that Allah communicates with creation, it is within the ontological
domain, being the site of disjunction between Creator and creation, that his soteriological
semiotics becomes an invaluable tool for aligning the individuals epistemological outlook with
the metaphysical reality.
Intimately tied to, and implicit within, Ibn Ata Allahs discussion of the kalimah, that is no god
but Allah (la ilaha illallah), is the second half of this kalimah is Muhammad is the Messenger of
Allah (Muhammadur rasulullah). This can be seen to express two things. Firstly, it can be taken
to describe how the Absolute relates to the contingent, that is, how the metaphysics of tawhid
is expressed ontologically. The message of tawhid expressed in la ilaha illallah is conveyed to
creation through the Messenger in Muhammadur rasulullah. Secondly, it illustrates how the
contingently existent can affirm the metaphysics of tawhid. That is, by following the Messenger
of Allah, it is possible to act in accordance with the preference of Allah. This chapter will focus
on the first of these two implications.
From Essence (dhat) to Existence (kawn)
The description of descent from essence (dhat) to existence (kawn) is not explicitly discussed by
Ibn Ata Allah in the available texts. However, in order to understand the content of this
chapter it is necessary to briefly clarify the relationship between the essence (dhat) and
creation (khalq), for the latter does not proceed directly from the former. In clarifying this, the
discussion will briefly go beyond the bounds of Ibn Ata Allahs writings, though, in order
maintain the focus on his work, this discussion will remain brief. However, it should be
acknowledged that the relationship between, and descent from, the essence and existence was
not unknown to Ibn Ata Allah, as can be seen from the many allusions made to this subject
throughout his work that this chapter draws on, nor would he have been unfamiliar with the
authors that will be drawn on for this material, as can be seen from the fact that the list of
books used by both Shaykhs [Abul Hassan and Abul Abbas al-Mursi] is quite impressive and
indicative of the high calibre of their religious instruction.3 Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allahs
defence of Ibn Arabi illustrates familiarity with and comprehension of the latters works, many
3
92
of which clearly discuss the descent from Being to being.4 For these reasons the following brief
discussion of the relationship between the essence and existence is not beyond the scope of
either Ibn Ata Allahs works or his knowledge.
Many Sufis agree on the difficulties of expressing the relationship between essence and
existence. Part of this difficulty is due to the limits of language in expressing that which
encompasses and surpasses language. This is one of the reasons the relation between essence
and existence is said to have an inherent mystery.5 Creation (khalq) is not seen to proceed
directly from the essence (dhat) for nothing is brought into being directly from the One (ahad);
rather existence comes about from oddness or singularity.6 A distinction is made here
between ahadiyyah on the one hand and wahdah and wahidiyyah on the other. While ahad
and ahadiyyah are commonly understood as the One and Oneness respectively, it is better
understood as the Supreme Unity or the outward aspect of the Essence (dhat). With this, it is
possible to understand that the reason that multiplicity does not proceed directly from the
ahad is because this level is isotropic and further descents are necessary before the
metaphysical unity is expressed as an ontological totality. Wahdah is situated between the
Supreme Unity (ahadiyyah) and the outward Oneness or Singleness (wahidiyyah) where the
Essence is conscious of the Names and Qualities. It is outward, not in the sense of being
separate from, but in as far as it has a contingent ontological extension. Thus, in the Quran it
states His being alone is such that when He wills a thing to be, He but says unto it, Be and it
is (36: 82). This is the site of the contingent ontological extension.
4
An example of Ibn Ata Allahs familiarity with Ibn Arabi can be seen in his debate with Ibn Taymiyya, see
chapter 10 below and Muhammad H. Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine According to Ahl al-Sunna (Mountain
View: As-Sunna Foundation of American, 1996), 372 379.
5
On this inherent mystery David Burrell, Creation, in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology,
ed. Tim Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 142, states that any pretension to have
articulated the founding relationship [between Creator and creation] will have reduced that relation to one
comprehensible to us, and so undermine and nullify the distinction expressed by tawhid for this distinction states
that everything which is not God comes forth from God yet cannot exist without God, so how are they distinct.
Ibn Ata Allah explicitly acknowledges the inherent inexpressibility of this and, because of this, can be seen to shift
the focus away from this to the immanent soteriological issues.
6
Cecilia Twinch and Pablo Beneito in Ibn Arabi, Contemplation of the Holy Mysteries, trans. Cecilia Twinch and
Pablo Beneito (Oxford: Anqa Publishing, 2001), 99.
93
The Arabic word for be (kun) reflects the mysterious and ineffable relation between Allahs
essence (dhatillah) and his creation (khalaq). This word is made up of three letters, kaf waw
noon. The kaf corresponds to the One in relation to Its Essence, the noon corresponds to
the relationship of the One to the World, while the waw is the link which connects both
aspects of the One.7 This link, the waw, is hidden since it does not appear in the written form
and thus encapsulates the mysterious distinction between Creator and creation. Furthermore,
the letter waw signifies and, which is the link between two aspects8 and, within this context,
includes both aspects of an isthmus (barzakh), both joining and separating, in the same sense
as the ontological domain is an isthmus between the metaphysical and epistemological
domains. Interestingly, this means that the word k[u]n, therefore, represents all that is
manifest and nonmanifest.9 Regarding this, Ibn Ata Allah quotes a poem he heard Abul
Abbas recite, which states:
And when He appears to you, know that you are not He,
Nor, indeed, are you anything but He.
Two entities which have not been united, but herein lies
A mystery which we are hard pressed to explain.10
This succinct and poetic summary aptly shows two key points. Firstly, it illustrates the difficulty,
even for figures such as Abul Abbas and Ibn Ata Allah, of expressing the finer points regarding
the relationship between the Creator and creation. Secondly, it supports the view that the
preceding comments, despite not being explicitly discussed by Ibn Ata Allah, would not have
been beyond the scope of his understanding.
7
Ibid., 99.
8
Ibid., 99.
9
Salman H. Bashier, Ibn al-Arabis Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship Between God and the
World (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 3.
10
94
The Isthmus (barzakh)
To understand the mystery of unity in multiplicity it is useful to understand the isthmus

(barzakh). The isthmus (barzakh) is a hidden barrier between any two things. In the three times
it occurs within the Quran it signifies a limit or a barrier that separates two things, preventing
them from mixing with each other.11 However, it is important to note that at the same time,
by preventing the two entities from mixing with each other, the isthmus (barzakh) also provides
for their unity.12 Just as a veil conceals and in doing so reveals something about what it is
concealing, so too does the isthmus (barzakh), in separating two entities, creates the point of
contact between the two entities. Ibn Ata Allah refers to the Prophet Mohammed as the
most splendorous barzakh13 and the supreme, all-encompassing barzakh.14 This follows from
Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (Muhammadur rasulullah) as indicating the point of
contact between Creator (al-khaliq) and creation (khalq). This part of the kalimah is taken as
indicating that the prophetic model is the means to Allah in that, by following the Messenger, it
is possible to draw close to the source of the message. On this Ibn Ata Allah has stated that
he [Muhammad] is the intermediary between God and us, our guide to Him, and our means of
knowing Him through gnosis.15 Thus, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (Muhammadur
rasulullah) indicates the meeting point between Creator and creation and the limit to which
creation may approach their Creator.
The understanding of Muhammad as an isthmus (barzakh) also relates to the Science of

Prophethood (ilm al-Nubuwah). In general terms the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah)
has two key aspects, a) the implementation of the practices of the prophet of a religion by the
adherents of that religion, and b) the transmission of this knowledge. The knowledge and
implementation of the prophetic practices is central because the prophets and messengers are
seen as the models par excellence for knowing Allah in all states, while the accurate
transmission of this knowledge is crucial for maintaining access to the salvific guarantee of
11
Bashier, Ibn al-Arabis Barzakh, 11.
12
Ibid., 11.
13
14
Ibid., 370.
15
95
knowing Allah in all states. In being a point of contact between the Absolute and the
contingent, the model set out by Muhammad, if followed, allows for a similar point of contact
between the Absolute and the particular individual implementing the model. It is necessary to
say that further points of contact are similar for several reasons, chief of which is the fact that
Muhammad was appointed to act as a prophetic model, and thus it is divinely perfected within
him, while for subsequent individuals the degree to which they come to embody this model will
differ greatly. Ibn Ata Allah is acutely aware of this fact, for he states that the lights which are
manifest in the friends of God derive from none other than the radiance of the lights of
prophethood ... the Muhammadan reality is like the sun, while the hearts of the saints are like
moons.16 The likeness of Muhammad to the sun and those who follow him to moons are
indicative of Muhammadan model being the source of contact between the Creator and
creation, while the saints, in following this model, reflect this contact to the degree that they
embody this prophetic model.
For Ibn Ata Allah, Muhammad is the supreme isthmus (barzakh) because of his elevation over
the other prophets and messengers. One the one hand, Muhammad approached Allah until he
was but two bow-lengths away, or even nearer (53: 9). On the other hand, Muhammads
elevated status is due to the fact that the Real attached His Name (of Lord) to Muhammad,
referring to verse 4: 65, whereas He attached Zakariyyas [Zechariahs] name to Him, referring
to verse 19: 2, so that the slaves may know the difference between the two stations, and the
inequality of the two degrees.17 In the figure of Muhammad there is both aspects of the
isthmus (barzakh), for his approach demarcates the separation between the Absolute and the
contingent, while Allahs attaching of His Name to Muhammad illustrates the meeting point of
the Absolute with the contingent. Whereas, Zakariyyas name being attached to the Real marks
a point of contact and not the limit of the possible contact.
The Role of Creation
For Ibn Ata Allah, creation is not meant to be an end-in-itself. Underpinned as it is by tawhid,
creation has ontological existence so that it can act as a means to affirm its metaphysical basis.
16
17
96
For Ibn Ata Allah, this partly indicates that knowledge arises through opposites, as can be seen
in statements such as sometimes darknesses come over you in order that He make you aware
of the value of His blessings upon you and he who does not know the values of graces when
they are present knows their value when they are absent.18 Within the metaphysical domain,
tawhid has no opposite and as a result it requires multiplicity for its affirmation. The point of
creation, and the ontological domain, is to signify that which underpins it. However, this is not
an intrinsic quality of creation for if created entities do lead [us] to God, they do so not out of
some capacity which they possess in and of themselves ... for nothing can lead to Him but His
own divinity.19 This refers back to the inherent tension within the ontological domain. For, in
Ibn Ata Allahs view, creation is an indication of its Creator, though only in as far as the Creator
has bestowed this capacity on them. Furthermore, this quote also hints at the paradoxical
position given to creation within Ibn Ata Allahs ontology, namely of being both the source of
knowledge of Allah whilst being the source of distraction from Allah.
As Ibn Ata Allah sets up the relation between creation and the Creator, he does not renounce
creation in the sense of denying it value. He is aware that each individuals interaction with
Allah is mediated by creation. He writes that the Truth afflicts them with [outward] conditions
which alert them to their need of Him,20 which culminates in the awareness of the constancy
of this need. Ibn Ata Allah further adds that if God, glory be to Him, wishes to give a servant
something, He gives him a sense of his need to seek it from Him.21 However, implicit in this is
the awareness that existence is too often taken to be an end-in-itself and creation is to be
shunned in so far as it hinders the awareness of tawhid. Ibn Ata Allah charts a fine course
between immersion in creation and its rejection. Ibn Ata Allah states do not stretch out your
hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-Muti) amongst them is your
Lord, however if such is your case, then take what knowledge says is suitable for you.22 This
is a clear indication of the twofold nature of creation of being both a veil on Allah as, in this
example, the Giver (al-Muti), while being the site at which Allahs giving takes place. This can
18
19
20
Ibid., 195.
21
Ibid., 195.
22
97
be seen to culminate when you see the Doer in all you see all being as agreeable.23 Thus,
creation is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad and is only so in as far as it blinds or
aids the perception and awareness of its Divine underpinnings.
A consequence of this intense focus on tawhid is that it gives rise to utterances that are liable
to be misconstrued. An example of this is the saying attributed to Abul Abbas al-Mursi:
Lead people to God, and nothing else. He who leads you to this world has
deceived you, and he who leads you to [good] deeds will wear you down; but
he who leads you to God has counselled you aright.24
The potential for confusion within this statement arises due to the focus within Islam being on
the accumulation of good to be placed within the scales on the Day of Judgement. The point is
the goodness of deeds, as it is not a value intrinsic to them, can hinder the perception of
Allahs actions and attributes moving the created realm. Similarly, Ibn Ata Allah shares this
sentiment in stating:
Let not obedience make you joyous because it comes from you, but rather,
be joyous because it comes from God to you. Say: In the grace of God and in
His mercy, in that they should rejoice. It is better than that which they
hoard.25
Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to be implying that even good deeds, which they hoard, are
insignificant unless it is understood that they are a grace that comes from God to you.
Despite the potential for reading these statements as being unorthodox, both Ibn Ata Allah
and his teacher are ensuring that Allah is given primacy without a second, thus affirming the
ontological manifestation of tawhid.
Creation in Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre seems to have a semi-paradoxical ontological status. It is
apparent that creation does not have a necessary existence, for if it did it would exist eternally
23
Ibn Ata Allah, Unwan al-Tawfiq fi adab al-Tariq, trans. in Aisha A. R. at-Tarjumana, Self-Knowledge:
Commentaries on Sufic Songs (Capetown: Madinah Press, 2005), 11.
24
25
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 33. Quoting the Quran (10: 58).
98
alongside Allah, thus contradicting tawhid. Yet, at the same time, it is not ontologically non-
existent for this goes against common experience. Thus, in order to affirm tawhid and its
implications, it becomes necessary to deploy a sort of ambivalence towards the manifest realm.
Ibn Ata Allah sums up the paradoxical ontological status and the subsequent ambivalence in
stating that when we renounce this earthly realm, we are thereby affirming its existence, since
we testify to its existence by renouncing it.26 In the act of renouncing creation there is an
admission, or more correctly attribution, of inherent existence in creation. This act, however
subtle it may be, contradicts tawhid in that it posits the existence of something other than
Allah. On this Ibn Ata Allah writes that if you have true understanding, you will know that
there can be no abandonment of that which has no existence.27 That is, it is impossible to
abandon anything that has existence independent of Allah, as the metaphysics of tawhid allows
for no such thing.28 Ibn Ata Allah can be seen here as continuing the view of Abul Hassan al-
Shadhili who forbid his adherents from wearing any particularly Sufi garb, as had become a
custom in the courts of Egypt, for any appearance of renunciation was an indication that
creation had, for that individual, an intrinsic value in as far as it needed renouncing.29 Thus the
asceticism of the Shadhiliyya could be seen to play on two conceptions of zuhd, that of
renunciation and nonattachment.30 Ibn Ata Allah, through his soteriological method, can be
seen to be advocating nonattachment, for to renounce something, even though it is negated, is
to, albeit subtly, place that thing alongside of Allah, which contradicts tawhid.
26
27
Ibid., 227.
28
From this it is understandable why, central to the monotheistic religions, it is forbidden to worship false gods.
The Divine mercy is considered to be capable of forgiving any and all acts that have dependent existence because
they are, in a sense, real. Whereas the worship of deities independent of the one Divine principle cannot be
forgiven because they have no reality.
29
30
Mokrane Guezzou, Shaykh Muhammad al-Hashimi: His Life and Works (United Kingdom: Viator Books, 2009),
185n.9. On this point, the Shadhiliyya position again echoes that of al-Junayd whose view was that renunciation is
not so much freedom of the hand from the possession of property, money or goods, as it is freedom of the heart
from being possessed by these things and of the mind from being distracted from God, Ansari, Doctrine of One
Actor, 38.
99
Despite their privileged epistemological status among ontologically contingent beings, humans
have no ontologically privileged status. Ibn Ata Allah records Abul Abbas al-Mursi as stating
that
Human beings came to exist after having not existed, and they will cease to
exist after having existed. From both ends, therefore, they are nothingness. It
follows, then, that they are, in essence, nothingness.31
And that
Indeed, we see no creature. After all, is there, in all of existence, anything but
the True Sovereign? And even if we must acknowledge other entities, they
differ little from the fine dust particles in the air which, when you examine
them carefully, you will find to be nothing at all.32
The second statement is more understandable in light of Abul Hassan al-Shadhilis statement
that
The Sufi is someone who, in his inward being, sees human beings as so much
fine dust in the air neither existent nor non-existent just as they are in the
knowledge of the Lord of the worlds.33
Thus, the ontological status of humans does not differ from the status of any other contingently
existent object. Yet, this seems to contradict the Islamic view that extol the virtues of the
human over the other creations, such as the Quranic verses which state that verily, We create
man in the best conformation (95: 4) and that He imparted unto Adam the names of All
things (2:31). These comments are understandable when it is seen that the human, as a
contingently existent being, is one creature amongst creation and, as such, does not deserve
any special consideration. However, in terms of soteriological potential, which can be seen to
be central to Ibn Ata Allahs work, the human is unique amongst creation. It is for this reason
that since all beings participated in receiving existence and sustenance, Allah wanted to
differentiate some from others, to show how vast and far-reaching His will is.34 Thus, while,
31
32
Ibid., 261 62.
33
Ibid., 261.
34
100
ontologically, all of creation is the same, one aspect of Allahs communication with creation can
be seen through the differentiation between creations.
However, it should be noted that, as Abul Hassan is quoted as stating, the focus of the
individuals perception should be on the inward being of a Sufi rather than their outward
actions. One reason for this is that ones inward being includes the relationship between the
ontological and metaphysical domains, whereas ones outward being includes their relationship
with other similarly ontologically contingent beings. The interaction of creatures within the
ontological domain is dependent on sets of proscriptions and prohibitions, which result from
the metaphysics of tawhid. While these are discussed below, it is important here to understand
why Abul Hassan makes the distinction between the individuals inner and outer being. As all
of creation is inherently ontologically contingent, creation cannot but interact outwardly with
creation. Yet, individuals have an inherent potentiality to internally perceive that this outward
interaction is an aspect of Allahs communication with creation. To decipher this
communication between Creator and creation Ibn Ata Allah deploys a method referred to
here as soteriological semiotics. To deny creation through outward actions, supposedly for the
sake of Allah, is to deny Allahs communication with creation. There is a Hadith Qudsi within
which Allah states
O son of Adam, I asked you for food and you fed Me not. He will say: O Lord,
and how should I feed You when You are the Lord of the worlds? He will say:
Did you not know that My servant So-and-so asked you for food and you fed
him not? Did you not know that had you fed him you would surely have
found that with Me?35
It can be seen that the proscriptions and prohibitions are set up to outwardly express what is
perceived inwardly.
Cause and Effect
The domain of creation is the domain of cause and effect. For Ibn Ata Allah it can be seen that
the process of cause and effect has a pedagogical role as Allah deploys it to test the perspicacity
35
In Ezzedin Ibrahim and Denys Johnson-Davies, trans., Forty Hadith Qudsi (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society,
1997), 88.
101
of creation in perceiving the motion of the Divine through the contingently existent. Ibn Ata
Allah writes that causes must needs exist, which at the same time, one must be absent to
them in order to witness36 and that he who stops at these [causes and effects] is bound to
meet with disillusionment.37 In order to witness the creative expression of the Divine one
must be absent from causes that seem to indicate effects resulting from creation for this, for
Ibn Ata Allah, is disillusionment. Furthermore, He has made the familiar chains of cause and
effect, mediating forces and earthly causes to be like veils which conceal His power, and like the
clouds which obscure the suns of His oneness.38 Ibn Ata Allah mentions that cause and effect
are like veils for, like the sun veiled by clouds, the Divine Unicity prevails even though its
perception is obscured. It will be seen that it is in the removal of these veils that constitutes
an increasing awareness of tawhid.
For Ibn Ata Allah, a difficulty arises regarding sustenance for the individual who, ignorant of
tawhid, attributes to himself the ability to affect an outcome. The reason for this is that such an
individual will readily assert that it is through their efforts that they gain sustenance. However,
the Quran repetitively states, in varying formulations, eat and drink of the sustenance
provided by God (2: 60).39 For this reason, Ibn Ata Allah encourages his readers to seek your
sustenance from God, whose goodness embraces all creation in grace and compassion.40 With
those who assert that food satisfies my appetite, Ibn Ata Allah queries Does the food itself
satisfy or is it that it is Allah who satisfies your appetite through the food.41 It is important to
reiterate that Ibn Ata Allah does not deny the ontological existence of creation. However, in
doing so, he recognises that Allah engages the ontologically contingent entities by means of
other creations in a manner that does not impinge on their potential for understanding the
primacy of Allah. On this Ibn Ata Allah writes that when the forgetful man (al-ghafil) gets up
in the morning, he reflects on what he is going to do, whereas the intelligent man (al-aqil) sees
36
37
Ibid., 84.
38
Ibid., 84.
39
Similar statements can be found at 2: 172, 2: 212, 2: 254, 3: 27, 3: 37, 3: 169, 4: 39, 5: 88, 5: 114, 6: 142, 6: 151,
7: 50, 1: 160, 8: 3, 10: 31, and 10: 59 among others.
40
41
In Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine, 371.
102
what God is doing with him.42 Ibn Ata Allah is pushing for contentment with God alone,43
while reassuring the reader that Allahs mercy is unrestricted and inclusive. This contentment is
expressed as trust in Allah (tawakkul) and nonattachment to the world.
Allahs inclusive mercy evokes another problem, similar to the problem of rizq. Like rizq, it may
be objected that impediments and their solution spring from the selfsame source. It is possible
to see that this is both true and untrue at the same time. From the perspective of Ibn Ata
Allahs metaphysics of tawhid it is true, for if either were independent of each other then this
would equate to two existents, which is incongruent with tawhid. From the perspective of Ibn
Ata Allahs ontology, this problem arises as a result of fixating on creation, which veils Allahs
actions (sifat) and names (asma). Relief comes, not from the veils, but through that which is
veiled. Ibn Ata Allahs solution is to appeal to no one but Him to relieve you of a pressing
need that He Himself has brought upon you.44 In apprehending this, an aspect of this which is
veiled is revealed,45 as Ibn Ata Allah recognises, deprivation (al-man) hurts you only because
of the lack of your understanding God in it.46 The Quran states that for everyone who is
conscious of God (65: 2) Allah provides for him in a manner beyond all expectation (65: 3).
Thus, for those who understand the reasons Allah brings a pressing need upon them, i.e. those
who understand what God is doing with him,47 trust in Allah (tawakkul) is increased. Ibn Ata
Allahs soteriological semiotics can be seen to be shifting the focus away from the ontological
domain and the creation (khalq) as an end-in-itself so that the reality (al-Haqq) can be affirmed.
While it appears that deprivation and trial arises through the ontological domain, such events
arise through Allahs providing for the needs of creation (khalq) irrespective of a) the latters
awareness of this process or b) whether or not the latter believes that any particular event is
necessary. Implicit within this view is that the ultimate need is the unwavering awareness of
42
43
44
45
It is interesting to note the dual nature of reveal in that it can be understood as both to uncover as well as to
re-cover.
46
Ibid., 37.
47
Ibid., 40.
103
Allah, this being Ibn Ata Allahs overarching soteriological concern. While, in a sense,
impediments and their solution have their roots in the selfsame source, it appears that the
problem arises as a result of the conflation of the metaphysical and ontological domains as they
are here defined. Thus, Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics repeatedly attempts to
demarcate the signs that Allah deploys through the ontological domain to assert His
metaphysical Unicity.
Obedience (taa)
Obedience (taa) to Divine decree is another means for testing the commitment to the
metaphysics of tawhid. Obedience includes commissions and omissions, in other words,
things which the Truth requires you to do, and things which He requires you to refrain from
doing.48 However, whilst adhering to or abstaining from certain actions is set out by Divine
decree, Ibn Ata Allah, in maintaining the metaphysics of tawhid, illustrates that such actions
are not good-in-themselves. These actions are beneficial solely because they are the most
effective means for removing the veils that efface the awareness and affirmation of tawhid.
These commissions and omissions are effective in as far as an individual, through them, is
effaced before Allah. Disposing of ones egocentric behaviour is necessary for soteriological
development as every action requires the concentration of ones whole being on God.49
Again, to maintain a disposition that is metaphysically consistent with tawhid, it is not enough
to perform such acts out of a preference against the alternative. Ibn Ata Allah writes that the
servant is moved by a desire to perform such acts [religious obligations] because God, may He
be praised, has appointed their number, their times, and their causes.50 Ibn Ata Allahs point
is that such actions may be performed without an individual concentrating their whole being
on God and as a result their performance has no corresponding soteriological value. For an
individuals ontological prolongation to be consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid requires a
shift from a self-centred consciousness to a God-centred consciousness, which involves a total
deference to Allah.
48
49
Ibid., 34.
50
Ibid., 34. Nor is it soteriologically beneficial to do them because of the pleasure that can be found there in, as
was previously mentioned.
104
The pursuit of obedience to the Divine results in another, seemingly paradoxical relationship,
though this time with regard to creations contingency. Ibn Ata Allah states that the servants
fulfilment of these obligations has nothing to do with his choice for himself, and everything to
do with Gods choice for him.51 It is for this reason that it should be sufficient recompense for
obedience that He has judged you worthy of obedience,52 indicating that obedience to the
proscribed commissions and omissions come as a result of Allahs favour of the individual and
not as a result of the latters choice. However, that the fulfilment of obligations depends on
Allahs choice for this individual highlights the fact that the worth any action is in the awareness
of Allah that it engenders. Ibn Ata Allah recognises this in stating that a disobedience that
bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an obedience that bequeaths self-
infatuation and pride.53 For this reason sometimes He opens the door of obedience for you
but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a
cause of arriving at Him.54 Thus, while it is necessary to adhere to the proscriptions and
prohibitions, the worth of an action is in the degree that it engenders deference to Allah for this
in turn develops trust in Allah (tawakkul) and nonattachment to the world.
Obedience to Allah, as conceived by Ibn Ata Allah, is the point from which freedom can be
obtained. Whilst in a narrow sense, obedience to the Divine decree is the condition for entering
paradise, freedom from damnation is not the kind of freedom alluded to, here. Furthermore, it
must be recognised that, due to the nature of existence, contingently existent beings cannot be
ontologically free, for this contradicts tawhid. However, this does not preclude freedom
altogether. The kind of freedom that Ibn Ata Allah is implicitly advocating is epistemological
freedom. Ibn Ata Allah, through his works, is aiming to show the point where the individual
will perceive the wisdom in his Lords choice.55 This follows the Quranic injunction that
when thou hast decided upon a course of action, place thy trust in God (3: 159), such that
for everyone who places his trust in God He [alone] is enough (65: 3). This culminates in
trusting Allah and deferring to Allah in all actions. While the perception of choice posits
multiple possibilities, tawhid accepts only one reality, for not a breath (nafas) do you expire
51
Ibid., 35.
52
53
Ibid., 37.
54
Ibid., 37.
55
105
but a decree of Destiny has made it go forth.56 In knowing this, and, more importantly,
embodying it, the individual is free to pursue the necessary course of action without being
dogged by doubt, regret, or self-reliance. The implications and importance of this is highlighted
in the following chapters.
Poverty (faqr) and the Poor (faqir)
Ibn Ata Allah, like other Sufis, maintains that a consequence of tawhid is the total dependency
of creation on their Creator. Creation has nothing that Allah needs,57 while Allah has everything
that creation needs, as the Quran states it is you, who stand in need of God, whereas He
alone is self-sufficient (35: 15). Ibn Ata Allah notes that the friend of God has gone from
disposing of his own affairs to relying upon Gods disposal thereof ... by his sincere reliance on
God.58 The element of trust (tawakkul) implicit within this act, while not intrinsic to Allahs
disposing of the affairs of creation, is essential for soteriological development. While this is
further discussed in the following chapter, it should be acknowledged that this seemingly
simple act incorporates a number of soteriologically important elements. Firstly, acknowledging
ones complete dependence on Allah and ones own ontological poverty entails an act of
humility. Secondly, it removes feelings of or for self-subsistence and thus all claims to godhood.
Thirdly, the trust it engenders allows the individual to focus on what is required of them, as Ibn
Ata Allah stated striving for what has already been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in
what is demanded of you, are signs of the blurring of your intellect.59
Soteriological development depends on understanding the ontologically contingent position of

creatures in relation to Allah. This culminates in embodying this position and affirming it
through action. Ibn Ata Allah advises that one must cling to the attributes of His Lordship and
56
57
This is meant in an absolute sense without detracting from particular applications, such as Allah, as Lord (rubb),
is said to need creation so that He has something to be lord over or as the All Merciful (al-rahman) for this requires
a recipient of this mercy.
58
59
106
realize the attributes of your servanthood.60 He further reminds his readers that if you want
gifts to come your way, then perfect the spiritual poverty (al-faqr) you have, quoting the
Quranic passage that alms are only for the poor (9: 60).61 Ibn Ata Allah is here making an
esoteric allusion to the Islamic alms (zakat) that corresponds to their exoteric interpretation.
Just as material alms are a gift from those without need to those in need, Allah, who is
ultimately without need, bestows gifts to those who recognise their ontological poverty and
complete dependency on Allah. This sort of poverty is here qualified as ontological for, in
relation to Allah, creation is likewise epistemologically poor. Epistemic poverty, within the
domain of cause and effect, would include being veiled to creations intrinsic ontological
poverty. Insight into and recognition of ones inherent ontological poverty would be an
example of the kind of alms mentioned by Ibn Ata Allah.
The ability to embrace, and thus embody, ontological poverty, according to Ibn Ata Allah,
requires contentment with this ontological position. In the Quran it is stated that animals
sacrificed to Allah are to be utilised to feed the poor who is contented with his lot (22: 36). In
enumerating the qualities of those who embrace poverty (faqir), Ibn Ata Allah writes that the
faqir is the one who casts off secondary causes and turns away from hindrances and has no
qibla [direction] nor goal except Allah.62 In doing this the one who embraces poverty refuses
everything that is other than God so that they may realise the reality of la ilaha illAllah
Muhammadun Rasulullah.63 This shows that for Ibn Ata Allah there is an intimate connection
between embracing ontological poverty and affirming the metaphysic of tawhid.
Acknowledging ones ontological poverty requires embodying certain characteristics. However,

before discussing these character traits, it is important to note that embodying and affirming
the inherent ontological poverty of contingent beings does not equate with being destitute.
Whilst periods of destitution, or appearing destitute, may be utilised in affirming ones
ontological poverty, it is not the goal. Ibn Ata Allah highlights this point with the story of a
student of a poor fisherman going to visit his teachers teacher, only to find the latter living a
luxurious life which bewilders the student. The events that transpire do not surprise the
60
Ibid., 41.
61
Ibid., 49, quoting Danners translation of the Quran.
62
Ibn Ata Allah, Unwan al Tawfiq, 7.
63
Ibid., 7.
107
fisherman for he knows that, regarding his teacher, God has purified his heart of the world, yet
has placed it in his hand and given him the appearance of a worldly man while as for me, He
has taken it out of my hand, yet I still long for it.64 The point of this story highlights the
differing conceptions of zuhd as asceticism and nonattachment, for while the poor fisherman
was utilising ascetic practices to inculcate nonattachment, his teacher embodied
nonattachment and as a result could be surrounded with worldly luxuries without longing for
their presence. On this, Ibn Ata Allah states that it is not one of their conditions that they not
have wealth; rather, among them are those who have wealth and those who have nothing.65
The confusion of the student resulted from his seeing asceticism as an end rather than as a
means to nonattachment.66
In embodying ones ontological poverty, the virtues that are affirmed are not affirmed for their
human qualities, nor are they ends-in-themselves. The qualities necessary for the poor (faqir)
are not virtues in the sense that they relate to the peak of human potentiality, for these
qualities do not begin with humanity, allowing individuals to reach towards Allah. Rather, in
accordance with tawhid, virtues are the result of the expression of Allahs names (asma) and
attributes (sifat). The goal of which, for the faqir, is to take on the character of their master.67
In acknowledging their ontological poverty and dependency, the faqir is able to partake in the
Divine characteristics in as far as they are able to embody and enact tawhid.
Rizq within the Ontological Domain
The ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq for it is within this arena that provision
is pursued, attained, and consumed. Due to the inherent ontological poverty of contingent
beings, such beings are always in need of something beyond themselves. One reason for this is
creations contingency, which, whether acknowledged or not, creates a compulsion to seek
64
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 302 303.
65
66
Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allahs view that asceticism is not an end-in-itself is further clarified in stating that the
Real did not require from the servants to not partake of enjoyments, but rather required them to give thanks when
they enjoy them, Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 103.
67
Ibn Ata Allah, Unwan al Tawfiq, 11.
108
fulfilment. Another reason for this is creations ontological poverty, which ensures that they
cannot attain fulfilment through themselves. This compulsion is liable to yield purely self-
interested pursuits and, to curtail this, the Quran emphasises compassionate consideration of
others, encouraging people to spend on others out of what God has provided for you as
sustenance (36: 47). However, armed with an incomplete understanding of tawhid, the
common response, goaded by self-interest, is likely to be shall we feed anyone whom, if God
had so willed, He could have fed (36: 47). This verse illustrates how the problem of rizq arises
from a misunderstanding of how tawhid is manifested ontologically. Further verses highlight
the fact that the implications of tawhid are not always fully thought out. In a verse where
polytheists are questioned the Quran states if thou ask them, who is it that has created the
heavens and the earth? they will surely answer, God (39: 38), however, in response to a
follow up question, have you, then, ever considered what it is that you invoke instead of God
(39: 38), they have no response.68 Thus, the problem of rizq can be seen to arise as a result of
misunderstanding the relation between the ontological and metaphysical domains.
In attempting to understand the ontological domain, if this understanding is to be consistent

with tawhid, then an intermediary cannot be placed before Allah. Ibn Ata Allah states that
ones experience is nothing except the compassion that He sent to you and to the servants
through the outward manifestations of father and mother, as a means of making you come to
know of His love for in reality, nothing cared for you except His Lordship, and nothing
nurtured you and satisfied you except His Divinity.69 Tawhid is maintained for Allah
communicates to creation through creation. As Ibn Ata Allah further explains, you have never
left, nor will you ever come out of the circle of His beneficence.70 Metaphysically, this is a
given, for Allah encompasses all that exists, without being limited to it. The corollary of this is
that it is possible to understand all experience as being augmented so that, irrespective of the
individual, all creation has the greatest possibility of acknowledging their Lord. However, due to
the contingency inherent within creation, as it is played out ontologically, this point is often
veiled. This shows one of the benefits of Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics, for, in
understanding that Allah communicates to creation through creation, he is able to highlight the
signs of this communication such that each individual may realise their potential for
acknowledging Allah in all circumstances.
68
This topic is similarly discussed in 13: 16, 31: 25, and 35: 40.
69
70
Ibid., 21.
109
It might seem obvious to state that the problem of rizq is only a problem when provision (rizq)
seems in short supply. This is because the perception of constrained quantities often invokes
anxiety and hardship in the resulting pursuit for further provisions. It is necessary to state that
rizq seems in short supply because there is no abundance or lack other than what will allow an
individual the greatest possibility of acknowledging Allah. The Divine command, to give or
withhold provision, is not the command of other than Him, that it should become a source of
hardship for you, for it is the command and the decree of your Master, the very same One
who supports you with His beneficence and comes to you with His benevolence.71 In this it can
be seen that difficulty arises as a result of not comprehending the source of hardship, for in
understanding that it is the decree of your Master transforms the situation from one of
hardship into a communication between the Absolute and the contingent. Thus, both the
source of the hardship and the solution to it are the same and both, when understood in this
manner, are an indication of the Unicity of Allah (tawhid). Ibn Ata Allah succinctly summarises
this sentiment as there is nothing for him [from Him] that he could choose for himself [other
than His choice].72 Anxiety over the perception of constrained quantities is an indication of a
lack of trust (tawakkul). The solution to this is in developing trust in Allahs choice for His
creation and contentment in the knowledge that it has occurred through the choice of Allah.
In order to further clarify the reception of perceived hardships, Ibn Ata Allah likens them to
bitter medicine. Those who are content with the choice of Allah take the heat for the sake of
seeking contentment, as the sick man bears the bitter medicine for the sake of recovery and
health.73 The recovery that patient endurance elicits, by way of understanding and
contentment with Allahs choice, results in the realisation of the necessity of such actions in as
far as they accord with tawhid. Thus, the metaphysics of tawhid enjoins contentment with the
necessity of events, for thy Sustainer creates whatever He wills; and he chooses whatever is
best for them (28: 68). Ibn Ata Allah acknowledges that unpleasant events exist, though he
recognises that they do not exist solely for their unpleasantness.74 He writes that afflictions
71
Ibid., 5.
72
Ibid., 5.
73
Ibid., 8.
74
This is similar to the position of al-Ghazali, Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names, 55, who posits that evil does not have
inherent existence, rather there is no evil in existence which does not contain some good within it, and were that
evil to be eliminated, the good within it would be nullified.
110
extinguish and humiliate the ego and prevent it from seeking after its desires, and that with this
humility is victory.75 With regard to the problem of rizq, it is now possible to see that any
perceived lack of provision is merely a perception, and not a real lack, for it is an aspect of the
bitter medicine. However, rather than accepting the medicine for what it is, more often than
not it is avoided, and the treatment prolonged.
The Perception of Hardships
According to Ibn Ata Allah the perception of hardships is at the centre of human earthly
existence.76 For this reason it is crucial to gain a correct understanding of this issue, without
which no solution can be pursued. He writes that error and fault are a fundamental part of
your existence, nay, even the source (ain) of your existence.77 The fault being referred to is
the selfs perceived independence. Independence is only perceived, for any real independence
would contradict tawhid. For this reason it is the selves which are the places of agitation and
which contend with Allah,78 meaning that they are agitated due to their inherent ontological
poverty and contend with Allah over causative effectiveness. On this Ibn Ata Allah writes that
he who wishes that at a given moment there appear other than what God has manifested in it,
has not left ignorance behind at all.79 This agitation is an indication of distrust towards Allah,
for one of the signs of relying on ones own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall
occurs.80 Thus, it becomes apparent that the solution to the problem of rizq, according to Ibn
Ata Allah, is in the acquisition and application of a soteriological semiotics that affirms tawhid.
Yet, Ibn Ata Allah is quick to point out that a perceived downfall is a means to realising the
nature of the relationship between the Absolute and the contingent. He reminds his readers
75
76
The distinction between earthly existence and the entire ontological domain is necessary for the latter
includes paradise (Janna) despite it being defined by its lack of hardship and trials for its inhabitants.
77
Ibid., 50.
78
Ibid., 30.
79
80
Ibid., 23.
111
that when He gives, He shows you His kindness (birr); when He deprives, He shows you His
power (qahr), however, and above all, in all that, He is making Himself known to you and
coming to you with His gentleness.81 An example of this is the fall of Adam, of which Ibn Ata
Allah writes that it was a fall in form, but an ascent in meaning.82 Ibn Ata Allah considers it
an ascent for a) He could make Himself known to them through forbearance, covering-up of
deeds, forgiveness, relenting, and choosing as well as b) making possible two stances towards
Allah, namely returning to Him repentant, and guidance from Him.83 While, from a contingent
perspective, the fall is seen as the source of all hardship and suffering, it is, from this
perspective, the event that gave all the children of Adam the potential to realise their intrinsic
relationship with Allah. Regarding this, he stated that He only made affliction come at the
hands of people so that you not repose in them so that by using creation to drive creatures
from depending on creation Allah ensured that nothing would drive you from Him.84 This
highlights one aspect of Ibn Ata Allahs assertion that sometimes He opens the door of
obedience for you but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and
it turns out to be a cause of arriving at Him.85 The so called sin, and subsequent fall, was the
means through which each human gained the potential of arriving at Him.
Ibn Ata Allah holds that the reality of rizq is that it proceeds indefinitely from Allah. He writes
that for Allah created all beings, and bestowed His grace upon them, first, through giving them
existence, and second, through uninterrupted sustenance.86 The importance of this passage,
with regard to the problem of rizq, is twofold. Firstly, it shows that, irrespective of ones
awareness of Allah, provision for creation is uninterrupted, thus the problem of rizq is not how
to get more but how to a) realise the necessity of the provision bestowed and b) find
satisfaction in that provision. Secondly, it shows that, even though existence implies an
inherent error/friction, it is also a grace for it contains the solution to that apparent
error/friction. It is necessary to differentiate an implied or apparent error from a real error, for
81
Ibid., 37.
82
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 30. This shows the distinction between form and meaning that only becomes
apparent through the acquisition of a soteriological semiotics.
83
Ibid., 32.
84
85
Ibid., 37.
86
112
the latter would mean that there is a contradiction in tawhid, which is not possible according to
an Islamic paradigm, while the former does not penetrate beyond mere appearances. This
relates to Ibn Ata Allahs view that the intellect is the greatest bounty Allah has granted His
slaves,87 for the intellect has the potential to pierce the outward forms in order to apprehend
their metaphysical foundation, which is perceived through the application of a soteriological
semiotics.
It is possible to see why the ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq. The problem
of rizq is the problem of contingency and, thus, occupies the domain within which contingency
abounds. While rizq is not a problem relating to reality as such, it is intimately bound up with
the contingently existents relationship with, and apprehension of, reality as such. For Ibn Ata
Allah, apprehending the true relationship between the Absolute and the contingent cuts to the
core of our being and for this reason imposes the obligation of finding and applying the solution
to this issue. The solution to the problem of rizq is not extraneous to the ontological domain for
a) it is located within this domain and b) the ontological domain, being underpinned by tawhid,
does not contain anything that acts independently from this inherent unity. For these reasons,
the solution to problem of rizq, while located within the epistemic domain, is to be found in the
correct understanding of, and approach to, the ontological domain, which, in turn, is dependent
on the metaphysic of tawhid.
87
Ibid., 65.
113
Chapter 6 Epistemology
For Ibn Ata Allah, as has been seen, due to the inherent contingency of creation, the
ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq. Within the domain of epistemology there
is a shift of focus from creation, as it is within the ontological domain, to a focus on the
individuals comprehension of creation. For Ibn Ata Allah the goal for the individual is to
comprehend the nature of their contingency and, as a result, the relationship between the
metaphysical and ontological domains. Statements such as My God, how near You are to me,
and how far I am to You1 indicate the gap between the metaphysical reality and the epistemic
state of the individual. Within the epistemological domain an understanding of the relationship
between the two aspects of the kalimah, namely there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah) and
Muhammad is the messenger of Allah (Muhammad rasul Allah), is developed. It will be shown
that in understanding this, the conflation of domains that gives rise to the problem of rizq is
corrected and a solution can be found.
Ibn Ata Allah does not explicitly develop an epistemology, although his works indicate that he
advances a specific epistemic model. This epistemic model, like the rest of his work, is founded
on tawhid such that it could be said that the goal of Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology is to
comprehend, and thus affirm, tawhid as it is manifest in creation. He states that every knower
whatever his kind might be, and whether he knows it or not understands Him and affirms
Oneness of Him, as God Most High has said, And unto God falleth prostrate whosoever is in the
heavens and the earth, willingly or unwillingly ...2 The unwilling prostration is understood to
result from creations inherent contingency and its unavoidable reliance on Allah, though it is
committed in ignorance. Conversely, to prostrate willingly requires knowledge of Allah and
creations relation to Allah. This he calls beneficial knowledge, which is that through which aid
is sought in obedience to Allah, it overpowers and subdues caprice,3 and uncovers the veil
over the heart.4 Beneficial knowledge also includes the knowledge of Allah and the
knowledge of His commandments5 and is seen to impact on the understanding of, and
1
2
Ibn Ata Allah, Miftah al-Falah, 170 71. Quoting (13: 15).
3
4
5
114
approach to, the ontological domain in that by virtue of that experiential knowledge ... the
witnessing of creatures as active independent agents falls from their hearts.6 The chief tool
used to aid in the acquisition of beneficial knowledge and affirm tawhid is his soteriological
semiotics which, as seen, decodes the signs within creation that Allah uses to communicate
with creation. As a result, Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology cannot be considered strictly noetic.
The Importance of Self-Knowledge
It is evident within Ibn Ata Allahs works that self-knowledge is important in understanding the
relationship between the Absolute and the individual. He cites the well known saying whoever
knows himself knows his Lord for this indicates that self-knowledge leads to the knowledge of
God.7 Ibn Ata Allah quotes Abul Abbas as stating that this can be interpreted in two ways,
either a) if someone knows himself in his lowliness, helplessness and poverty, he will come to
know God in His glorious might, power and self-sufficiency or b) this saying means that if
someone knows himself, this is evidence that he had already known God before this.8 Both
interpretations indicate that the epistemic state of an individual is intimately connected with
their knowledge of their ontological reality and that self-knowledge is a crucial aspect of that.
Regarding the importance of self-knowledge, it has been suggested within Sufism that self-
knowledge is not only the condition but also the goal of the mystical quest.9 Thus, it is
necessary to explore the centrality of self-knowledge in correctly apprehending the contingency
of creation and its accord with tawhid.
6
Ibid., 161.
7
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 54. There is some disagreement between scholars and Sufis as to the exact
source of this well known saying, often quoted amongst Sufi circles. Many Sufis, Ibn Ata Allah amongst them,
believe that the saying whoever knows himself knows his Lord to be Hadith, though other scholars trace it to
Yahya Ibn Muadh al-Razi, including Roberts, Subtle Blessings, 395n79, while Armin Eschraghi, I was a Hiddenn
Treasure. Some Notes on a Commentary Ascribed to Mulla Sadra Shirazi: Shar Hadith: Kuntu kanzan
makhfiyyan, in Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages, ed. Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 92
states that its earliest known occurrence seems to be in Abdallah Ansaris (d. 1089) Tabaqat al-sufiyya.
8
9
Jean-Louis Michon, The Spiritual Practices of Sufism, in Islamic Spirituality:Foundations, ed. Seyyed Hossein
Nasr (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 285.
115
Ibn Ata Allah repeatedly indicates that gaining self-knowledge is connected to realising ones
potentiality. He states that whenever you admit your ignorance and fall back on your root, the
recognition of your self will appear to you10 for in the knowledge of their inherent ontological
poverty, the individual ceases to rely upon what they attribute to be their own capacities and,
in turning away from these, Ibn Ata Allah would have the individual turn to the source of all
potentiality, namely Allah. This is further emphasised in stating that when you are convinced
about your attributes and you have seen the faults of your nafs [ego] although they are
concealed then you will obtain the manifestation of the attributes of your Master.11 It is
important to note that the reception, and embodiment, of the Masters qualities is a passive act
by the recipient. The receptivity of the individual is dependent on their realisation of their total
ontological poverty and the reception of virtues is evidence of, or witness to, their acceptance
and embodiment of this ontological poverty.
There is a simple manner of approaching self-knowledge. According to Ibn Ata Allah, there are
four possible epistemic states that an individual can find their self in. Ibn Ata Allah quotes
Abul Abbas al-Mursi as stating,
There are four times in which the servant will find himself, of which there is
no fifth: blessing, affliction, obedience, and disobedience. In each of these
times, there is an aspect of servanthood which the Truth requires of you by
virtue of His lordship. If it is a time of obedience, your path is to bear witness
to Gods grace, since it is He who has guided you into this obedience and has
made it possible for you. If it is a time of disobedience, your path is to seek
Gods forgiveness and repent. If it is a time of blessing, your path is to give
thanks, which means for your heart to rejoice in God. If it is a time of
affliction, you path is to be content with Gods decree and to endure
patiently.12
These four epistemic states delimit the possible states of the contingently existent with regard
to Allah. It is important to note that these four states are not necessarily connected to the
individuals soteriological development, in as far as the transition through them does not
necessitate progress nor does their occurrence indicate any particular development within the
10
Ibn Ata Allah, Unwan al-Tawfiq, 9.
11
Ibid., 9.
12
116
individual. Rather these can be considered as four doors at the centre of Ibn Ata Allahs
soteriological semiotics which demarcate the possible conditions confronting the individual and
their four keys, for once a condition has been correctly diagnosed the appropriate key can be
utilised, thus opening the way to pass onto another epistemic state. The importance of self-
knowledge for the individuals soteriological development is here evident in that it allows for a)
a correct diagnosis and b) the knowledge of which key to utilise.
Repentance (tawba) and Disobedience
Repentance is connected to the seeming contradiction between servanthood (ubudiyyah) and

self-direction (tadbir). Repentance occupies an important place within Islamic, and specifically
Sufi, soteriology. As the previous quote from Abul Abbas al-Mursi indicates, repentance
(tawba) is a condition for moving from a state of disobedience. However, if, ontologically,
servanthood (ubudiyyah) is an inherent aspect of creation, due to the metaphysics of tawhid,
how can creation be accused of disobedience? While Ibn Ata Allah does not tackle this
question directly, there is sufficient evidence in his works to propose an answer.
From Ibn Ata Allahs works it becomes apparent that disobedience does not occur
ontologically, but epistemologically. He writes that sometimes He opens the door of
obedience for you but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and
it turns out to be a cause of arriving at Him13 indicating that, if understood and responded to
correctly, acts of disobedience have the potential to alter the apprehension of Allah. This makes
disobedience an epistemologically useful pedagogical tool through which greater obedience is
possible. This is further confirmed by a Hadith which states that had you not committed sins,
Allah would have brought into existence a creation that would have committed sin (and Allah)
would have forgiven them.14 Thus, there can be seen to be an intrinsic relationship between
disobedience and repentance. It is through disobedience that repentance becomes both
possible and necessary. Disobedience is often the result of absentmindedness, an act which is
corrected through consciously remembering Allah in order to repent, for it is only those who
have the ability to forget that remembrance (dhikr) is possible. This is one reason Ibn Ata Allah
13
14
Muslim, Sahih Muslim, trans. Abdul Hamid Siddiqi (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2000), # 6620. This sentiment is
also reported in Sahih Muslim Hadiths # 6621 and 6622 as well.
117
states that disobedience or sin can be a cause of arriving at Him for sincerity in repentance
can be greater than it is in an act of obedience, hence obedience does not always lead to the
door of acceptance.
Patient Endurance (sabr) and Contentment (rida)
Ibn Ata Allahs call for patient endurance (sabr) arises due to what he sees as a) a lack of self-
knowledge and b) a lack of understanding Allahs methods. He writes that he was informed by
Abul Abbas that patient endurance (sabr) is derived from the word asbar, which refers to the
target used by archers such that the person with patient endurance is one who sets himself
up as a target for the arrows of divine decree15 and that if, then, one is unmoved by them
[the arrows of divine decree], he or she is said to have patient endurance.16 The patient
endurance of and contentment with divine decree is connected with creations ignorance in as
far as He knows best that in which your true well-being lies.17 It is the ontological poverty
inherent in creation that is emphasised through hardship and a failure to acknowledge that this
is a veil which conceals tawhid. In acknowledging that it is God who delivers us from those
impediments which threaten to keep us from Him,18 contingent creation endures the arrows
of divine decree as a means to witness Allah as the sole Creator and affirm tawhid. It is for this
reason that the Real desired to manifest the essential and desperate need of the animal
towards nourishment and food,19 for instilling this fundamental requirement makes it possible
for creation to become aware of their lack of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, in being content
with the arrows of divine decree the individual elicits their trust in Allah (tawakkul) for, rather
than attempting to avoid hardship, they adhere to Allahs choice for them.
According to Ibn Ata Allah sabr can be divided into three basic categories. These are: (1)
perseverance in the performance of duties, (2) self-control in the face of what is forbidden, and
15
16
Ibid., 251.
17
Ibid., 178.
18
Ibid., 161.
19
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab at-Tanwir, 94.
118
(3) steadfastness and equanimity in affliction.20 These three categories all relate to instilling
and maintaining an awareness of creations lack of self-sufficiency. In spelling out these
categories, Ibn Ata Allah draws in the etymology of sabr, indicating that an individual may feel
targeted when called upon to maintain composure and control when facing affliction.
Regarding the third category of patient endurance, through the experience of hardships it is
necessary to remember the verse Allah does not burden any human being with more than he
is well able to bear (2: 286). Through his understanding of this verse, Ibn Ata Allah is telling
his reader that as Allah has promised humanity the strength to bear all trials that are presented
to them, they should trust in Allah to uphold this promise by having patience with their
circumstances.
The three categories of sabr, while encompassing the boundaries of what it is to have patience,
do not reach the limits of patient endurance. Without diminishing their status regarding either
the difficulty of attaining them or the exaltedness of those who have achieved all three of these
categories of sabr, Ibn Ata Allah states that they are to be considered basic only in
comparison with the patient endurance exhibited by the greatest of Gods saints.21 The basic
categories of sabr involve patiently enduring the effects of the actions that each individual
commits, whereas the sabr of the greatest of Gods saints involves enduring the afflictions
placed upon them through others, as Ibn Ata Allah recognises God has afflicted those who
belong to this community through other people in order that, by virtue of their patient
endurance of peoples persecution, He might elevate their status.22 Thus, hardships are not
meant to be viewed as merely punishment for they are the catalyst through which
soteriological development occurs. This is indicated in the Hadith that states that no calamity
befalls a Muslim but that Allah expiates some of his sins because of it, even though it were [sic]
the prick he receives from a thorn.23 It is for this reason that this bitter medicine is necessary.
20
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 179. This threefold division of the kinds of patience (sabr) is also for in Abul-
Qasim al-Qushayri, Sufi Book of Spiritual Ascent, trans. Rabia Harris (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1997), 135,
where it states that patience with the things for which he is responsible for is itself in two parts: patience in what
God Most High has commanded him to do and patience in what He has forbidden him from doing, corresponding
to the first two basic categories respectively, and as for patience in what the servant has not earned, it consists of
enduing whatever hardship attaches itself to him by the decree of God, corresponding to the third category of
patience.
21
22
Ibid., 296.
23
al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, # 5640. Similar sentiments are stated in Hadiths # 5641, 5642, and 5647.
119
Furthermore, such afflictions are far from negative in that it should be also borne in mind that
if everyone believed in Gods friends, they would miss the opportunity to endure patiently the
disbelief of those who do not believe in them.24 Ibn Ata Allah provides a list of examples of
the things indicating the sabr exhibited by the greatest of Gods saints, though without
dwelling on them, with regard to the levels of sabr, it should be noted that their difference is in
degree not in kind. While the number of arrows shot by Divine decree differs, the qualities that
both levels of patient endurance (sabr) engender are the same, though differing in intensity.
Similar to, and closely connected with, patient endurance (sabr) is contentment (rida). Ibn Ata
Allah shows this connection in stating that if it is a time of affliction, your path is to be content
with Gods decree and to endure patiently.25 Both sabr and rida are necessary responses to
affliction. Regarding the etymology of rida, Ibn Ata Allah writes that contentment (rida) is to
break (radd) oneself of ones passions.26 Ones passions often include the desire to be free of
hardships, which, as seen, would preclude the soteriological development that potentially
results from such hardships, thus prolonging the bitter medicine. Ones passions also include
the desires one has for oneself even though the Quran states it may well be that you hate a
thing the while it is good for you, and it may well be that you love a thing the while it is bad for
you: and God knows, whereas you do not know (2: 216). For these reasons it is necessary to
show contentment (rida), patience (sabr), and trust (tawakkul) so that soteriological
development can occur.
The Goal of Knowledge
For Ibn Ata Allah the acquisition of knowledge is not an end in itself. The value of knowledge is
predominantly soteriological in that its acquisition enhances the contingently existences
potentiality to act in accordance with the Absolute. Ibn Ata Allah writes that the evidence of
that knowledge which God seeks is reverent fear, while the evidence of the presence of
reverent fear is obedience to Gods commands.27 This is a clear example illustrating that the
24
25
Ibid., 251.
26
Ibid., 251.
27
Ibid., 22.
120
purpose of knowledge is action.28 However, as the preceding quote shows, not just any action
is acceptable, rather it is action for the sake of Allah. It is apparent that patient endurance
(sabr) and contentment (rida) implies a certain set of directives. Ibn Ata Allah states that it is
impossible that one would be content with Allah as Lord but not with Islam as a religion, or be
pleased with Islam as a religion but not with Muhammad as a prophet.29 As a result it is clear
that acknowledging the oneness of Allah results in a set of directives that Ibn Ata Allah views
as immutable. Ibn Ata Allah is uncompromising on this point, writing that someone who
acquires knowledge in order to gain this world and to achieve status therein may be likened to
someone who picks up excrement with a sapphire spoon.30 While this may seem stern, given
his project, it is understandable. The kind of knowledge that Ibn Ata Allah is encouraging his
readers to pursue is that which gives insight into the principle of manifestation. Thus,
knowledge, and its resulting action, cannot be accepted as an end in itself for, being done for
the sake of that which is other than Allah would contradict tawhid.31
The kind of knowledge that Ibn Ata Allah is pursuing, and encouraging others to pursue, is that
which allows the individual to acknowledge the connection between Allah and His creation. The
Unicity of Allah, being the source of existence, is the ultimate end of any pursuit for true
understanding returns you to Allah.32 Ibn Ata Allah believes that the reason for this is that
understanding from Allah unveils to you the secret of servanthood in you.33 For Ibn Ata
Allah, servanthood (ubudiyyah)34 is affirmed through true understanding because it enacts the
28
Ibid., 23.
29
30
31
While this view affirms that it is impossible to pursue wisdom without at the same time pursuing God, Leaman,
An Introduction, 191, it does not follow that this provides at one level a role for God in a world which has no role
for him at another level, ibid., 192. This is the view that Ibn Ata Allah is trying to eradicate for it shows
forgetfulness or an attempt to cover Allah at whichever level supposedly has no role for Him.
32
33
Ibid., 5 6.
34
For clarity a comment on this term is necessary. The idea of being a servant has been sullied over the past few
centuries and because of this may justifiably appear irksome to modern sensibilities. A servant cannot be
continually mistreated, the fruits of which are evinced through the numerous slave revolts in colonised countries.
Rather, if it is understood in the form used here, as within many Islamic texts, it gives a clue to solving the problem
of rizq. A true servant can serve their master without concern for materialistic gain because they are safe in the
121
ontological poverty inherent within the individual and reconnects them with the Absolute in as
far as they confirm the Unicity of Allah. For this reason, it is understandable that amongst the
signs of success at the end is turning to God at the beginning35 because turning to Allah means
embodying ones servanthood and, being a sound beginning, ensures success at the end.
Servanthood takes place through obedience to Gods commands and surrender to His
decrees,36 and, most simply stated, the meaning of this is that He [Allah] requires His servants
to affirm His singularity.37 In acknowledging the contingents connection with the Creator, the
individual is directed towards understanding, what is for Ibn Ata Allah, an intrinsic aspect of
their being, namely their inherent contingency. Considered an inherent aspect of creation, the
awareness of contingency is increased through self-knowledge because as each individual
increases their understanding of what they are, they also increase their understanding of how
they are. When the metaphysics of tawhid underpins an individuals epistemological outlook,
that individual realises that they are for Allah by Allah and that, being a creation, their
contingency is integral to their being. In understanding the simplest expression of His
singularity, as the awareness of it deepens, it may be enacted more thoroughly through
thought, speech, and deed for the purpose of knowledge is action. This process culminates in
the unification of the individual in their inward and outward movements, allowing them to
draw closer to embodying the metaphysical Unity of tawhid.
Within Ibn Ata Allahs works, knowledge of servanthood (ubudiyyah) can be seen to involve
an understanding of its ontological foundations. He states that you have not loved anything
without being its slave, but He does not want you to be someone elses slave.38 Loving
something, in Ibn Ata Allahs view, involves turning to face that which is loved to the exclusion
of others such that there is a degree of enslavement to it. Ibn Ata Allah in stating that He
does not want you to be someone elses slave recognises that becoming a slave to contingent
things involves a perpetuating cycle moving from one contingent thing to another, like the
knowledge that a true master will unconditionally meet all such needs. While mortal masters may not always live
up to this ideal, the point is that in connecting oneself with the Master of all existence ones needs are met to the
degree that the individual embodies their inherent slavehood. This is what is meant by the term ubudiyyah.
35
36
37
Ibid., 188.
38
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donkey at the mill.39 Furthermore, facing that which is loved is important for, if seen in
conjunction with the Quranic verse wherever you turn, there is Gods countenance (2: 115),
means that being a slave to Allah is ontologically unavoidable, though the degree to which this
is understood depends on the epistemological awareness of the individual.
While an active pursuit of servanthood (ubudiyyah) deepens the awareness of tawhid, it in no

way denies the realness of contingent change. Rather, it is the orientation towards creations
inherent contingency that appears to change. From Ibn Ata Allahs discussion of tawhid it can
be seen that there is no instance where any creation does not embody it, though their
awareness of such embodiment may be lacking. It is through a deeper awareness of their
ontological state, through self-knowledge, that the individual comes to realise their total
embodiment of tawhid. Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics utilises a selection of symbolic
markers whose key function is to help induce self-awareness within the individual. As a result, it
cannot be said that the world changes through soteriological development, rather it can be
seen that there are concrete changes in the paradigm of selfhood that change the individuals
orientation with regard to their inherent contingency. A prime aspect of this change in
orientation towards contingency is the move away from (apparent) self-direction (tadbir)
towards the realisation of servanthood (ubudiyyah).
Servanthood (ubudiyyah) and Self-direction (tadbir)
Ibn Ata Allah attributes an exulted position to servanthood (ubudiyyah).40 He states that the
most sublime abiding station in which the servant could be established [in] is the station of
39
Ibid., 31.
40
Ibn Ata Allah is not alone in attributing an exulted position to ubudiyyah. Other thinkers who do so include al-
Tustari (d. 283/896) who states that the mark of true servanthood is the individual gives up his own management
(tadbir) and becomes satisfied with the management of God, Exalted is He, for him, Sahl ibn Abd Allah al-Tustari,
Tafsir al-Tustari, trans. Annabel Keeler and Ali Keeler (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2011), 101, Abu Ali l-Daqqaq (d. c.
412/1021) who stated that servanthood is more perfect than worship (ibada), in Ibn Ajiba, The Book of
Ascension to the Essential Truths of Sufism, trans. Mohamed F. Aresmouk and Michael A. Fitzgerald (Louisville:
Fons Vitae, 2011), 20, Ibn Arabi (d. 638/1240) whose view is that the relation between the individual and Allah is a
situation of total slavehood or servanthood (ubudiyyah), in Chittick, Sufi Path, 24, and Ibn Ajiba (1224/1809)
whose view is that servanthood (ubudiyyah) is to maintain the comportment that is due to the Lord along with an
awareness of our human weakness, Ibn Ajiba, Book of Ascension, 20, to mention but a few.
123
servitude.41 Support for this view in verses such as Limitless in His glory is He who transported
His servant by night... (17: 1), and in what We bestowed from on high upon Our servant (8:
41), and whenever a servant of God stands up in prayer to Him (72: 19). It is the intimacy and
connection between Allah and His servant that is the focus for Ibn Ata Allah, whether the
servant stands to commune with, receives bestowal from, or is moved by his Master. For an
individual to develop this intimate connection with Allah, according to Ibn Ata Allah, it is
imperative to understand that the spirit of servitude and its secret is to abandon self-choice
(ikhtiyar), and not contest the Divine Decrees.42 The reason for this is that self-choice,
discussed below, treats the individual as an independent, rather than contingent, entity, thus
contradicting tawhid. In order to abandon self-choice Ibn Ata Allah divides this task into two
distinct aspects, writing its outer is compliance with Allah, and its inner is the lack of
contention with Him.43 Outer compliance, which includes proscriptions and prohibitions,
involves the abandoning of self-choice in preference for deferring to the Prophetic example,
whereas inner compliance, involving the lack of contention with Him, is abandoning self-
choice in preference for Allahs choice and contentment (rida) with this choice. In both cases
servanthood can be seen to detach the individual from preoccupation with worldly concerns so
that they are free to devote their attention to Allah.
Self-direction and self-reliance are intimately connected, and for this reason are equally
contrary to tawhid. Ibn Ata Allah quotes Abul Hassan as having said make no choice upon
your own authority in anything,44 which, in light of tawhid, is understandable considering that
taking oneself as an authority effaces the authority of Allah. Abul Hassan is advocating for
tawhid in two ways. Firstly, by abrogating self-choice the individual is effaced through a denial
of self-reliance and, in turn, the alternative is trust in, reliance on, and contentment with Allah.
On this point Ibn Ata Allah writes that if you wish to enter into the presence of God ... then
that will not be possible for you so long as other than God lords it over your heart, for verily,
you belong to whosoever has authority over you.45 Secondly, the possibility of choice
presupposes multiplicity which is reaffirmed through self-choice. The Quran states thy
41
42
Ibid., 37.
43
Ibid., 57.
44
Ibid., 1.
45
Ibn Ata Allah, Miftah al-Falah, 103 04.
124
Sustainer creates whatever He wills; and He chooses [for mankind] whatever is best for them
(28:68). Regarding this Ibn Ata Allah writes that if He creates and chooses what He wills, then
He plans and manages as He wills,46 indicating that knowledge of creations ontological
inefficiency, as he takes this Quranic passage to specify, should be sufficient to abrogate self-
direction and self-reliance. For Ibn Ata Allah47 the verse is, then, He who creates comparable
to any [being] that cannot create (16: 17) closes the possibility of further disputing this point.
Obedience and Disobedience
In light of Ibn Ata Allahs presentation of tawhid, it would appear that the distinction between
obedience and disobedience could fail. For, to accept Ibn Ata Allahs position appears to entail
shirking from attributing actions to oneself and, thus, the associated reward or punishment, as
contingent entities are not the authors of their actions. Accusations of antinomianism have
been repeatedly levelled against many Sufis. Ibn Taymiyya was fond of utilising this accusation,
while it has been considered to be a key aspect of the anti-Ibn Arabi polemic.48 A simplified
version of the argument follows the line that if everything is Allah then everything is
permissible and the law (sharia) is abrogated, with the accused being censured for allegedly
advocating antinomian views. It is possible that this accusation rests on a conflation of the
metaphysical and ontological domains.49 However, for Ibn Ata Allah, that everything is from
Allah does not free creations from their obligations. Ibn Ata Allahs rejection of antinomianism
is twofold.
Ibn Ata Allahs first reason relates to the verse when He wills a thing to be, He but says unto
it, be and it is (2: 117). As Creator, Allah has command over cause and effect, as Ibn Ata
Allah acknowledges just as He creates obedience by His grace, He creates disobedience by His
justice.50 Whilst all action and creation originates with Allah, acts of disobedience, being a part
46
47
Ibid., 12.
48
See Knych, Later Islamic Tradition, passim.
49
This is further discussed in chapter 9 below.
50
125
of cause and effect, are contingent, as he writes not a breath (nafas) do you expire but a
decree of Destiny has made it go forth.51 The contingency of disobedience is dependent on the
contingency of creation and are therefore attributable to particular individuals. However, these
actions cannot be considered inherently bad because both good and bad issue form the
selfsame source, though this leads to the second point. This position relates to the
abandonment of self-direction, discussed above. While it could be advanced that the individual
is not responsible for their actions as all action originates with Allah, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen
to place responsibility on the individual in their response to the circumstances in which they are
to be found. He states do not look forward to being free of alterities (al-aghyar), for that is
what cuts you off from vigilant attention (al-muraqaba) to Him in that very state He has
assigned to you.52 Desiring to be free of alterities indicates a lack of trust in Allah (tawakkul)
in that the individual does not trust Allahs reasons for placing them in that very state He has
assigned to you. According to Ibn Ata Allah, it is possible to diagnose this for one of the signs
of relying on ones own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall occurs.53
Following on from the first point, Ibn Ata Allahs second reason for rejecting antinomianism
involves the existence of evil. In this he holds a position akin to al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali states that
Allah intended good for the good itself, yet intended evil not for itself but because there is
some good within it such that good is accomplished essentially but evil is accomplished
accidentally.54 Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to follow this view for he writes that the attribution
of evil to an action or object is a secondary, or accidental, attribution, indicating that he too
believes that there is no inherent evil. This connects to Ibn Ata Allahs view of patient
endurance (sabr) in that afflictions cannot be considered inherently bad because such
afflictions are the means through which He might elevate their status.55 The same position is
applied to disobedience in that, for Ibn Ata Allah, any action is not in itself essentially bad,
but only because of its connection to a prohibition.56 Implicit in this position is its relation with
tawhid, which, once it is made explicit, makes it untenable to accuse Ibn Ata Allah of
51
52
Ibid., 27.
53
Ibid., 23.
54
55
56
126
antinomianism. Any and all prohibitions are connected with the prime prohibition of submitting
to anything other than Allah, a corner stone of an Islamic paradigm and key to Ibn Ata Allahs
metaphysics of tawhid for the Real made it clear that He did not create the slaves for
themselves, but rather created them so that they might worship Him and declare His
Oneness.57
Interestingly, Ibn Ata Allahs statement that they might worship Him includes the possibility
of not worshipping Allah. This possibility is further reinforced by the statement that
disobedience is an ugly action from the servant only because it is in opposition to the Divine
Command.58 However, this seems impossible for metaphysically tawhid makes it impossible
that anything should oppose Allah, for if it did then that would imply a god besides Allah. Ibn
Ata Allah affirms this in stating that whosoever reflects deeply will find that all creatures
affirm the Oneness of God Most High in accordance with the subtleness of their breaths.59
Furthermore, given that He did not create him except to obey Him and serve Him,60 it
becomes apparent that ontologically the possibility of opposing Allah is again impossible.
However, a problem remains as to why Ibn Ata Allah would imply what has so far been shown
to be apparently incongruent with his metaphysics and ontology. It could be that the use of this
expression has a pedagogical function. It is conceivable that this phrase is directed towards
novices who may be overwhelmed by the implications of Ibn Ata Allahs discourse. Support for
the view that this phrase has a pedagogic function can be drawn from many of his works, most
of which explicitly state that they were composed for pedagogic reasons. The Miftah al-Falah,
amongst other reasons, resulted from a prompt by a pious brother ... to compose a book
wherein I have assembled those things that would facilitate understanding the remembrance of
God,61 while the Unwan al-Tawfiq repeatedly enjoins O brother! Know..., O full brother,62
O wayfarer,63 and concludes with this inscription is for whoever longs for the meaning of
57
Ibid., 106.
58
Ibid., 56.
59
60
61
62
63
Ibid., 13.
127
these verses,64 indicating that both texts were composed for pedagogic purposes. Even each
chapter in the Kitab al-Hikam begins with he said65 indicating that Ibn Ata Allah was
conveying his knowledge to others. In this case, the inclusion of the possibility of disobedience
acts as a pressure valve for those students who perhaps cannot grasp the implications of Ibn
Ata Allahs works.
While reading the inclusion of the possibility of disobedience as a pedagogical tool may go
some way to explain this issue, it is insufficient. Furthermore, if it was strictly the case then Ibn
Ata Allah would not need to add that the one of understanding is the one who has
understood the secret of existence and acts accordingly,66 as this puts beyond doubt the
existence of individuals who do not have such knowledge and thus do not act accordingly. It
seems that Ibn Ata Allah roots disobedience to the epistemological domain. Tawhid ensures
that creation cannot but obey Him and serve Him and thus everything affirms tawhid through
every action. Though, due to creations contingency, this is done unwillingly, meaning in
ignorance. Whereas, Allah can be seen to have created the distinction between obedience and
disobedience to distinguish between those who have the knowledge to affirm tawhid willingly
and those who do not.
Certainty (yakin)
While Ibn Ata Allah utilises proofs (burhan), for him they are only a stepping stone towards
certainty (yakin). Proofs are no guarantee of certainty for, whereas the former are completely
noetic, certainty (yakin) arises as a result of enacting a deep seated conviction. This was
touched upon in relation to Ibn Ata Allahs metaphysics of tawhid and it is worth repeating
that for him all certainty entails faith, though not all faith entails certainty as the difference
between them is that while faith might be attended by heedlessness, such is not the case with
certainty.67 Certainty is epistemologically greater than proofs because it carries an unshakable
64
Ibid., 15.
65
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 23, 26, and 29, amongst others. Reasons for the inclusion of he said within the
text have been discussed in some o the commentary literature on the Kitab al-Hikam.
66
67
128
and unrefusable resolve unlike evidence or proofs. He writes that Shaykh Abu al-Hasan (may
God be pleased with him) said, we view God with the perceptive powers of faith and certainty,
which has freed us from the need for evidence and proof.68 While this in no way discards
evidence or proofs, as Ibn Ata Allah has been seen to utilise them,69 this quote contains three
important points regarding Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology. Firstly, evidence and proofs are seen
to be only a preliminary stage, which the individual is later free to hold or discard upon the
advent of certainty (yakin). Secondly, the superiority of certainty (yakin) over proof is in the
soundness of the former compared to the mere validity of the latter. Thirdly, and of particular
reference to modern discussions, the denigration of faith as unfounded belief is not applicable
here in that it is built on proof and develops into certainty (yakin).
The development of certainty (yakin) is it intimately connected with action, and thus is an
aspect of the goal of knowledge. This can be seen from Ibn Ata Allahs discussion on the
function of, and response to, miracles, where he states that a miracle serves to unsettle
doubts concerning divine grace, [and] to [bring about] experiential knowledge of Gods bounty
towards the one at whose hands it was performed.70 This can be seen to illustrate a clear
connection between the development of certainty and action for he sees one function of a
miracle to be the unsettling of doubts concerning divine grace. Regarding the response to
miracles he writes that for those to whom they are manifested, they may be taken note of by
spiritual seekers who are still at the start of their journey, while they may be overlooked by
those who have reached the end of their spiritual treks.71 It can be seen that the point of
soteriological development plagued by doubts, generally at the start of their journey,
requires events that with strengthen the individuals resolve, an example of which, according to
Ibn Ata Allah, is miracles. Thus the purpose behind it [the miracle] is to enable the servant
who witnessed it to see the validity of the path being followed by the saint at whose hands the
miracle was performed.72 Whereas, upon attaining certainty (yakin), as a result of their
soteriological endeavours, such individuals are not in need of such confirmation and thus
need not take heed of miracles.73 From this it is evident that the superiority of certainty (yakin)
68
Ibid., 53.
69
As seen in chapter 4.
70
Ibid., 85.
71
Ibid., 85.
72
Ibid., 86 87.
129
over mere proofs is that the former, as it occurs in conjunction with action, engenders
experiential knowledge whereas the latter does not.
While there is an intimate interconnection between certainty and action, it can be seen to
change with soteriological development. As in the case of miracles, during the early stages of
soteriological development certainty (yakin) develops as a result of particular actions. Whereas,
for those who are not in need of such confirmation the relationship between certainty (yakin)
and action can be seen to alternate in that certainty increases action. Thus, irrespective of an
individuals soteriological development, there is an intimate and inseparable connection
between certainty and action within Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology.
Knowledge and Rizq
From the above material it appears that within the epistemological domain the solution to the
problem of rizq is dependent upon the degree of knowledge attained regarding the relationship
between the metaphysical and ontological domains. In commenting on the verse it is God who
has created you, and then has provided you with sustenance (30: 40), Ibn Ata Allah states
that this indicates that creation and provision are coupled together.74 For Ibn Ata Allah,
armed with this knowledge it follows that as you have agreed that Allah is the sole Creator
without claiming for yourselves any part in creating, then in the same way agree to the reality
that He is the sole Provider, without any share in that.75 For Ibn Ata Allah, this follows
because in the above cited verse He linked the two together as an argument against the slaves
and to prohibit them from witnessing any provision coming from other than Him, or seeing
beneficence coming from His creation.76 Furthermore, implicit within this verse is the view
that rizq is already taken care of, and its affair concluded,77 placing beyond doubt the degree
to which creation can affect their provision.
73
Ibid., 85.
74
75
Ibid., 111.
76
Ibid., 111.
77
Ibid., 111.
130
Allah as the sole Provider involves, primarily, two points. Firstly, provision is guaranteed, as, for
Ibn Ata Allah, it is clearly stated in the Quran that We do not ask thee to provide sustenance:
it is We who provide sustenance for thee (20: 132). According to Ibn Ata Allah, this guarantee
of provision comes because it is as if He knew that the slaves might become perturbed in their
worship by seeking provision, and that that disturbance would veil them from being wholly
engaged in obedience.78 By shifting the focus away from how provision arrives and onto
developing the knowledge that it will arrive, Ibn Ata Allah is implicitly drawing a connection
between the knowledge of provisions certain arrival and the development of trust in Allah
(tawakkul). On this he writes that whoever is preoccupied with what is already guaranteed for
him instead of what is demanded of him, his ignorance is great, and his heedlessness is vast79
and that your striving for what has already been guaranteed for you, and your remissness in
what is demanded of you, are signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira).80 While the
discussion of rizq has come to centre on the fruitlessness of its pursuit, it has done so without
contradicting tawhid. Ibn Ata Allahs reason for discouraging the pursuit of rizq is that it
becomes a distraction from obedience towards Allah, which is a way of reiterating that the
pursuit of rizq is the pursuit of secondary causes.
The second point that the guarantee of rizq raises is the lack of specification with regard to its
bestowal. According to Ibn Ata Allah, this too is deliberate. The fulfilment of needs is not
specified so that the servant may become restless and agitated out of desperation.81 He
explains that the reason for this is threefold, a) the need for Allah is intensified, b) the individual
ceases to rely on their own efforts, and c) it tests the sincerity and commitment of each
individuals trust in Allah (tawakkul) so that it may be strengthened. For had the time, the
cause, and the intermediate means been specified, then the slaves would not experience the
desperation that exists when these are unknown82 and thus the above three impacts would
remain unknown. This concealing develops self-knowledge, for whoever knows his self with its
need, poverty, abasement, and humiliation, will know his Lord in His Might, His Authority, His
78
Ibid., 117.
79
Ibid., 117.
80
81
82
Ibid., 98.
131
Being, and His Beneficence and other similar attributes of perfection.83 Thus, like the
guarantee of provision, the concealing of its distribution is designed to increase within the
individual the conscious awareness of their dependence on Allah.
The problem of rizq can now be seen to be at the centre of the Creator/creation paradigm.
While tawhid ensures that there is no problem with rizq, the appearance of the problem of rizq
is due to its pedagogic function, for, as presented by Ibn Ata Allah, it can be utilised to teach
and encourage creation to consciously embody their contingency. Rizq exists so that creation
can become aware of their need of Allah, as the Quran states it is you who stand in need of
God, whereas He alone is self-sufficient (35: 15). In considering this verse, Ibn Ata Allah writes
that need is a doorway to Allah and a means of arrival to Him84 because through need the
individual becomes aware their insufficiency and turns to Allah. Nourishment and food, being,
in a sense, the most basic, common, and gross forms of rizq, exists for each individual because
it gives each and every individual an equal opportunity to recognise their inherent contingency
and in turn voids all claims of being ignorant of such contingency. Ibn Ata Allah recognises the
necessity of this, for if He were to leave them without need, they would have become
presumptuous and made pretentious claims.85 Thus, the existence of need is inherent to
creation in order for creation to become aware of its inherent contingency and, ultimately, to
limit all contention with Allah.
It has been seen that for Ibn Ata Allah there are three domains to be known in order to solve
the problem of rizq. These three domains, being Allah, creation, and the self, involve knowledge
of Allahs Unicity, the contingency of creation, and the mediation of these two domains within
the self. It has been seen that affirming tawhid means deferring to Allah. However, the specifics
of this have not been explored. The self, being the site of knowing, requires a particular mode
of being in order to mediate between a) affirming Allahs Unicity, b) interacting with creation
and c) being aware of the requirements of the self in its changing states. Ibn Ata Allahs
soteriological semiotics can be seen as advancing an etiquette that attends to the threefold
requirements of solving the problem of rizq without abrogating the requisite commitments to
any of the three domains.
83
Ibid., 95.
84
Ibid., 95.
85
Ibid., 95.
132
Chapter 7 Eschatology
Ibn Ata Allahs eschatology is mentioned less frequently than other topics and, as a result,
appears to occupy a less important role within his works. This may seem like a digression from
the main theme, and to some degree it is. However, the inclusion of a chapter on Ibn Ata
Allahs eschatology is important for three reasons. Firstly, given the importance of
eschatological discourse within an Islamic paradigm, it is necessary to see how closely Ibn Ata
Allahs worldview is aligned to this paradigm. Secondly, given that Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre
contains eschatological material, no study of his work would be complete without it. Thirdly,
the relationship of this material to Ibn Ata Allahs overarching soteriological concerns is
important for deepening the understanding of the problem of rizq. In order to gain a clearer
understanding of his eschatology, the implications of his discussion of other domains needs to
be drawn out, especially the intimate relation between eschatological and epistemological
domains. It can be seen that by holding eschatological views there are transformative
ramifications on the epistemic state of the individual, specifically regarding the performance of
ethical duties.
Works on Islamic eschatology
deal with such questions as the nature of the human being and his
relationship with God, the reason for mans creation, his ultimate good and
the manner in which he can achieve it, the various types of individuals that
make up the human race and their respective lodging places in the next
world, the ontological distinctions between this world and the next, and the
interpretation of the data found in the Quran and the Hadith concerning
death, resurrection, and heaven and hell.1
Furthermore, eschatology embraces not only teachings about death, resurrection, immortality
and judgment, but also the traditions understanding of beginnings, the meaning of history and
the direction and purpose towards which everything in creation tends such that theologically
it orients our ultimate purpose and this should be central in its interpretation.2 While this
1
Chittick, Eschatology, in Islamic Spirituality: Foundations, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New York: Crossroad, 1991),
387.
2
Marcia Hermansen, Eschatology, in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 308.
133
domain encompasses a wide range of topics, this future has the potential to focus in on the
present in so far as current events contribute to each individuals ultimate state. Within Ibn
Ata Allahs works, eschatology can be seen to provide much of the impetus for the individuals
daily actions, which govern the individuals relationship with Allah. It is suggested here that Ibn
Ata Allahs discussion of eschatological issues primarily focuses on its formative ramifications,
which is bound to direct the individual to achieve their ultimate good. This ultimate good is,
for Ibn Ata Allah, the affirmation of tawhid. It may be that a more detailed account has been
excluded because, for Ibn Ata Allah, the state of the individual in the hereafter depends on the
will of Allah, with which the individual cannot contend, rendering further description, beyond
striving for the individuals ultimate good, unnecessary.
One of the primary aspects of Islamic eschatology is the idea of return (maad). The concept of
a return to God both personal and collective is Quranic,3 which states as it was He who
brought you into being in the first instance, so also [unto Him] you will return (7: 29). While
all human life in this lower world (dunya) is viewed as a path of return,4 discussions of the
return (maad) are generally divided into discussions of the voluntary return (al-ruju al-
ikhtiyari) and the compulsory return (al-ruju al-idtiyari) where the first deals with the path of
attaining spiritual perfection in this life, [and] the second with the nature of physical death and
bodily resurrection.5 Ibn Ata Allah is explicitly aware of the compulsory return, and it could be
said to be prefigured into his discussion of the relation between the metaphysics of tawhid and
the ontological domain. As a result, rather than detailing the compulsory return, it can be seen
to fill a formative function for bringing about an impetus for the voluntary return. In this sense,
the voluntary return encompasses the compulsory and, in some ways, exceeds it.
The ontological domain, wherein is the path of return, is in a state of constant, unrepeatable
flux, for every day He manifests Himself in yet another [wondrous] way (55: 29). One
interpretation of day in this verse is that His day (yawm) is the indivisible moment (an).6
Abul Abbas circumscribing of the four epistemic states of the individual, of which there is no
3
Ibid,. 310.
4
Ibid., 308.
5
Chittick, Ibn al-Arabis Eschatology, 51.
6
Chittick, Sufi Path, 18. For an extended discussion of the differing kinds of days, see Mohamed Haj Yousef, Ibn
Arabi Time and Cosmology (New York: Routledge, 2008), 51 65.
134
fifth,7 can here be considered as four kinds of moments. Given that wherever you turn, there
is Gods countenance (2: 115), an implication is that every moment is an unrepeatable instant
of return (maad) within which the individual voluntarily returns through affirming tawhid or
compulsorily returns as a result of their inherent ontological contingency. As a result,
eschatology concerns not only the ends things, but also every instant that leads to them.
Eschatology as an Impetus
Ibn Ata Allah is aware of the implications of the verse I have not created the invisible beings
and men to any end other than that they may [know and] worship Me (51: 56). Yet he is also
aware that this verse does not appear to give impetus to such worship. Eschatology provides
such an impetus for eschatological doctrines test the limits of our rational and customary
experience, thereby reminding us of the fragility of our attachment to conditions that strike us
now as unquestionably real.8 While provision (rizq) in the herenow is given to creation so that
they have the time and strength to know and worship Allah, provision for the hereafter does
not have the same instant gratification. Yet, the Quran still states and make provision for
yourselves - but, verily, the best of all provisions is God-consciousness (2: 197). For Ibn Ata
Allah, that this world, namely, that part of it which is necessary for your maintenance, is
guaranteed for you because your afterlife is required of you, i.e. working for it.9 Thus, by
maintaining an awareness of eschatological issues, Ibn Ata Allah provides an imminent
impetus for soteriological development.10 While provision for the herenow highlights the
ontological poverty of creation, the individual is liable to fall into a state of forgetfulness once
they reach satiation. However, the necessity of provision for the hereafter precludes such
7
8
Hermansen, Eschatology, 308.
9
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al Tanwir, 117.
10
As a result of his eschatology, it could be argued that Ibn Ata Allah has a teleological ethics. An issue would
then arise as to whether his view is consequentialist or perfectionist, though this would depend on where the
focus is placed. For instance, if the hereafter is brought into foreground, it would make him appear to hold the
former theory. However, if the herenow is brought into foreground, it would make him appear to hold the latter
theory. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this work, it would appear that Ibn Ata Allah does not
strictly adhere to either a consequentialist theory or a perfectionist theory of teleological ethics. For a brief
overview of teleological ethics within Islam see Ayman Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 53 56.
135
forgetfulness because it places an unwavering focus on creations ontological poverty due to
the lack of a) instant gratification and b) the guarantee of such provision.
Yet, while holding an eschatological doctrine can provide impetus, the need for such an impetus
can be seen to result from a weak understating of tawhid. At the risk of appearing repetitive, it
is informative to requote Ibn Ata Allahs view that ordinary people only sense their great
need of God in the face of certain distressing life events, so much so that their need of God is
fleeting.11 That eschatological issues provide such as a source of distress, misses a vital point of
the relationship between Allah and creation, namely that creations function is worship. If this
essential relationship were recognised then the individual would stand before Him with the
quality of poverty and raise their aspiration (himma) from other than him.12 It is for this
reason that the saint is constantly in distress,13 for they would know that their need for God
is never-ending.14 In developing a constant awareness of creations contingency, their
ontological poverty, and the need for Allah, the impetus that an eschatology doctrine gives is,
to some degree, redundant for it is superseded by an impetus that results from the affirmation
of tawhid. From this two things become apparent. Firstly, advancing an eschatological doctrine
has a pedagogical function for it instils a sense of creations inherent ontological poverty in
those who cannot sense their constant need of God. Secondly, even for those who sense
their Need of God, dealing as it does with the ultimate end of an individual, it ensures that
the sense of that need is constant throughout the individuals engagement within the herenow.
Beyond the obvious impetus that an eschatological doctrine gives, Ibn Ata Allah draws on the
Quran to show the potential exaltedness an individual may attain and the eschatological
repercussions of such soteriological development. He quotes the verse where Allah addresses
the individual O thou human being that hast attained to inner peace! Return thou unto thy
Sustainer, well-pleased [and] pleasing [Him]: enter, then, together with My [other true]
servants yea, enter thou My paradise! (89: 27 30). For Ibn Ata Allah, to be well-pleased
[and] pleasing are stages of soteriological development which come about due to complete
11
12
13
14
Ibid., 194.
136
submission and total reliance upon Him.15 Being well-pleased is indicated by being pleased
with the Decrees of Allah and can be seen to involve a high degree of trust in Allah (tawkkul).
The injunction return thou unto thy Sustainer (89: 28), for Ibn Ata Allah, is as if Allah had
said We have permitted you entrance into Our Presence, and eternity in Our paradise,
indicating that in attaining this degree of soteriological development in the herenow Allah has
made it incumbent that the recompense is Divine presence and paradise, which becomes a
source of intimacy for it, and mutual tenderness, honor, and love.16 Thus, more than just
following the commands (amr) and prohibitions (nahy), Ibn Ata Allahs eschatology sees
soteriological development as imperative to the individuals engagement with the herenow,
without abrogating the individuals pursuit of the hereafter.
An aspect of the individuals engagement with the herenow that Ibn Ata Allahs eschatology
promotes is the pursuit of divine knowledge. On this he states that souls, after leaving their
bodies, are not distinguished from one another save as regards the type of gnosis and
knowledge imprinted upon.17 The ramifications, with regard to the herenow, are that nor will
you be able, after that separation, to find any kind of gnosis or knowledge except what was
there originally,18 and such divine knowledge must be acquired before the soul leaves the
body. That it is strictly divine knowledge that Ibn Ata Allah is referring to is clear from
statements such as contemplation and vision [in the hereafter] will be commensurate with
ones knowledge of God Most High, His Names and His Attributes. The vision referred to here
may be a reference to the verse wherein the disbeliever, on the Day of Judgment, will ask "O
my Sustainer! Why hast Thou raised me up blind, whereas [on earth] I was endowed with
sight?" (20: 125) and, as such, vision can be considered as being commensurate with each
individuals knowledge of tawhid. In light of this, Ibn Ata Allahs comment that no one will be
more severely chastised on the Day of Judgement than the person who has memorised a verse
and then forgotten it is understandable for the verses of the Quran are considered the source
of tawhidic knowledge par excellence. Thus, the necessity for an epistemology that affirms the
metaphysics of tawhid is as important for the hereafter as it is for the herenow.
15
16
Ibid., 90.
17
18
Ibid., 113.
137
The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter
Given the relationship between the hereafter and the herenow, by developing an awareness of
the inevitability of the events of the hereafter each individual is able to heighten their
awareness of each action they perform. Regarding this, Ibn Ata Allah cites the Hadith which
states whoever sits down in a place and does not remember God therein is subject to Gods
retribution.19 He adds that the etymology of the word tirah (retribution) has to do with
shortcoming; but here it means consequence.20 To be forgetful of Allah is to be forgetful of
creations inherent contingency, which is a shortcoming in both knowledge and servitude
(ubudiyyah). The Quran states I have not created the invisible beings and man to any end
other than that they may worship Me (51: 56) and one aspect of retribution for not doing so at
each moment, or when an individual sits down in a place, is deprivation. On this, Ibn Ata
Allah states that deprivation (al-man) hurts you only because of the lack of your
understanding of God in it.21 While this has been previously quoted with regard to immediate
deprivation, it can be read as containing eschatological undertones. Deprivation could be
understood to include the denial of paradise (jannah), though, as Ibn Ata Allah highlights, even
the inhabitants of hell (jahannan) have the potential for understanding Allah therein.22
The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter in Allahs

Foreknowledge
The individual and their relationship to the hereafter in Allahs foreknowledge can be seen to
be intimately connected to the relationship between creations inherent contingency and
destiny (qadar) and decree (qada). Ibn Ata Allah writes, regarding destiny and decree, know
that Allah has for you a destiny that He must enact, and a Decree that He must manifest.23 At
first sight, this passage would imply that Allah is limited, in that He must enact and must
19
In ibid., 63.
20
Ibid., 63.
21
22
See N. 34 below.
23
138
manifest, though, as Ibn Ata Allahs proofs of tawhid have shown, this would contradict the
attribute of being master over all possibilities.24 Yet, such a reading overlooks the limitations
Allah has placed on Himself with regard to the manifestation of the ontological domain.
To draw out the necessity of certain events, and their relation to Allahs freedom from
restriction, some aspects of Ibn Ata Allahs view of the Divine attributes (sifat) need to be
discussed. He writes, know that praising the attribute is more effective, intense and far-
reaching than praising the action and that is because the attribute refers to something fixed
and established, whereas actions are subject to renewal and cessation.25 Taken in conjunction
with the passage regarding what He must enact and must manifest, these quotes provide
further insight into Ibn Ata Allahs view of cause and effect. For Ibn Ata Allah, Allah cannot be
considered limited in anyway, apart from being other than Allah, for the imperfect cannot be a
god.26 However, in Allahs revealing of Himself to creation in the manner that He has chosen
to, indicates that Allah has willingly placed certain restrictions on His Self-manifestation. As
mentioned, these restrictions can be seen to result from Allahs compassionate kindness
towards creation. Thus, (qadar) and decree (qada), as enacted through Allahs attributes
(sifat), follow a pattern of cause and effect. This is not because this is the only way that things
can be, but because of Allahs choice for creation. Creation is enjoined to praise Allahs
attributes (sifat) for two reasons, a) their fixity ensures Allahs compassionate kindness towards
creation and b) that the attributes are fixed and established means that they are closer Allahs
unchanging ipseity than creation, with their renewal and cessation, drawing the individual away
from creation towards Allah. Thus, even though destiny (qadar) and decree (qada) ensures
that there are certain things He must enact and must manifest within the ontological
domain, Allah remains master over all possibilities for that which is enacted and manifest is
done for creations soteriological benefit.
Yet, to base everything on destiny (qadar) and decree (qada) potentially leads to
antinomianism. Rather than abrogating the necessity of a revealed law (Sharia), destiny
(qadar) and decree (qada) can be seen to fulfil a formative role in the soteriological
development of the individual. Destiny (qadar) and decree (qada) can provide meaning in even
24
25
26
139
the most seemingly accidental of incidents for it reminds the individual that such events are the
result of the Divine Will and, as such, contain subtle aspects of the soteriological semiotics that
Ibn Ata Allah is attempting heighten the awareness of. Thus, it is through Allahs
foreknowledge of creation that each individual is situated in a position within which, as they
proceed towards the hereafter, that they have the greatest potentiality of affirming the
metaphysics of tawhid at each and every moment in the herenow.
The Hereafter and Allahs Mercy (rahma)
Ibn Ata Allahs focus on the attributes of beauty (jamal) is highlighted in his reporting of Abul
Abbas al-Mursis commentary on the verse Satan is a foe unto you: so treat him as a foe (35:
6). He stated that
One group understood from this that Allah ordered them to fight the
Shaytan, so they directed their entire aspiration to fighting him, and thus
became distracted from the love of the Beloved. Another group understood,
Shaytan is your enemy and I am your Lover, so they became preoccupied
with the love of Allah, and by their becoming so preoccupied with Allah,
Shaytan was prevented from having his way with over them.27
As Ibn Ata Allah points out, amongst the reasons Satan was prevented from having his way
over them was because, as the Quran states, he [Satan] has no power over those who have
attained to faith and in their Sustainer placed their trust (16: 99). Even though Satan is a for
unto you, by focusing on the attributes of beauty (jamal) the individual is in a greater position
to realise the mercy (rahma) that Allah is disposed to enact towards creation and thus reach
the point where they may place their trust (tawakkul) in their Sustainer.
Ibn Ata Allah is able to capture the differing approaches to Allahs attributes, while illustrating
their respective pedagogical roles. He states that there is no minor sin (saghira) when His
justice confronts you; and there is no major sin (kabira) when His grace confronts you.28 In
being confronted by Allahs attributes of majesty (jalal), like His justice, and taken to account,
27
28
140
the individual is differentiated from other creations and thus isolated such that there is no
minor sin because all sins, according to this attribute, reaffirms such isolation. However,
Allahs attributes of beauty (jamal), like His grace, being inclusive, embraces the individual,
and all of creation, such that there is no major sin. This distinction between the jalal and
jamal attributes is emphasised in Ibn Ata Allahs statement:
When He gives, He shows you His kindness (birr); when He deprives, He

shows you His power (qahr). And in all that, He is making Himself known to
you and coming to you with His gentleness.29
In this statement Ibn Ata Allah deploys his soteriological semiotics to highlight that Allahs
communication with creation happens through all instances confronting the individual with the
sole goal of making Himself known. Eschatologically, this would imply that even punishment
in the hereafter, being a show of His power, is a means of making Himself known. On this
point he quotes Abul Hassan who states that he who wishes that there be no rebellion against
Allah in His kingdom has desired that His forgiveness not be manifest.30 Given Ibn Ata Allahs
overarching soteriological concern of affirming tawhid, it appears that the punishment of the
hereafter is a means to such soteriological realisation. This view is not unique to Ibn Ata Allah,
as can be seen in the following quote from Rumi, which states
The inhabitants of hell are happier in hell than they were in this world
because in hell they are aware of God, while in this world they were not.
There is nothing sweeter than the awareness of God.31
By focusing on the attributes of beauty (jamal), Ibn Ata Allah affirms that you have never left,
nor will you ever come out of the circle of His beneficence32 and that even the most severe
punishment in the hereafter is an aspect of Allah coming to you with His gentleness. In one
way, Ibn Ata Allah clarifies the confusion and apparent contradiction between Allahs mercy
and the existence of punishment in writing that deprivation (al-man) hurts you only because
of the lack of your understanding of God in it.33 Thus, suffering would cease if the individual
29
Ibid., 37.
30
31
Jalaluddin Rumi, Signs of the Unseen, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston (Boston: Shambala, 1999), 239.
32
33
141
were capable of perceiving Allah in such punishment.34 If tawhid is affirmed then gentleness
(birr) and power (qahr) are seen to be just two means of communication between Creator and
creation.
Obedience (taa) and Disobedience (masiya)
By engaging Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics, obedience (taa) and disobedience
(masiya) can be seen as mutually exclusive modes through which Allah communicates each
creations status with Him to them. He states that
To soften for you the suffering of affliction, He has taught you that He is the
One who causes trials to come upon you (al-Mubli laka). For the one who
confronts you with His decrees of Fate (al-aqdar) is the same who has
accustomed you to His good choice (husn al-ikhtiyar).35
As with affliction and trials, obedience and disobedience result from His good choice in that
just as He creates obedience by His grace, He creates disobedience by His justice.36 Allahs
creation of disobedience can be considered a mercy in as far as it contains the potential for
soteriological development for sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a
cause of arriving at Him.37 One reason that a sin can be a cause of arriving at Him is because
of the epistemological shift that can result through realizing that such an action contradicts the
metaphysics of tawhid. Conversely, as an individuals actions within the herenow are the
determining factor for their position in the hereafter, all of humanity will be brought before
Allah, whether it be though their obedience (taa) or disobedience (masiya).
34
This view is not unique to Ibn Ata Allah for even Ibn al-Arabis contention that the chastisement of hell will
not last forever is hardly new in Islamic thought; even a majority of exoteric theologians were forced to conclude
the same thing, Chittick, Ibn al-Arabis Eschatology, 77.
35
36
37
142
For Ibn Ata Allah, the creation of obedience can be taken as an injunction for creation to be
obedient, though there is also an indication that it is more than a mere injunction. While the
verse I have not created the invisible beings and men to any end other than that they may
[know and] worship Me (51: 56) can be read as such an injunction, it can also be read as a
statement of fact. This would be consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid for it precludes any
possible co-existent alongside of Allah and thus any opposition to the Divine will. This alternate
reading gives weight to Ibn Ata Allah statement that He knew of the irresolution of servants
in dealing with Him, so He made obedience (taa) to Him obligatory for them.38 A consequence
of this is that He made the service (khidma) of Him obligatory upon you, which is as much as to
say that He made entry into Paradise obligatory for you.39 Paradise can here be read in two
ways. Firstly, there is the ontological realm of paradise. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly for Ibn Ata Allahs overarching soteriological concern, there is the epistemological
paradise of knowing Allah through affirming the metaphysics of tawhid. The ontological
paradise of the hereafter is for those individuals who attain the epistemological paradise in the
herenow. The receipt of punishment in the hereafter, coming as it does after the resurrection
and subsequent judgement, is received with an undeniable awareness of Allahs ipseity. This
would mean that such punishment is meant to bring about the epistemological paradise in the
hereafter that those individuals failed to gain in the herenow, reaffirming the view that such
punishment is meant as a means to soteriological realisation.
Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allah states that what God seeks from His servants is the concentration
of their entire beings upon Him40 and for this there is a distinction between acts of obedience
and acts of disobedience as
acts of obedience are the causes behind such concentration and the means
by which it is achieved, which is why God has commanded them, while acts
of disobedience are the causes for separation and the means by which it
comes about, which is why God has forbidden them.41
38
Ibid., 51.
39
Ibid., 51.
40
41
Ibid., 35.
143
The distance referred to here is not an ontological distance, for this is precluded by the
metaphysics of tawhid, but rather an epistemological distance, the locus of which is the
individual who is ignorant of their inherent contingency and, as a result, perceive
independence. This perceived independence, metaphysically false as it may be, is the
separation referred to above quote, which creates a distance, so to say, between the individual
and Allah. Ontologically, such acts are forbidden because this would contradict the metaphysics
of tawhid. Epistemologically, such acts have been forbidden for they are against the reason for
creation, namely that humanity was not created to any end other than they may [know and]
worship Me (51: 56).
Regarding the judgment, Ibn Ata Allah writes that the pretenders are held to account, and
the heedless are questioned, those who perceive themselves as owning dominion, or as being
independent active agents alongside Allah.42 From this it appears that it is the degree to which
the individual embodies tawhid that determines the eschatological status of the individual. Ibn
Ata Allah reminds the individual of their ontological poverty (faqr), for either through the
judgment or through the knowledge of tawhid they come to know that they do not own
anything with Allah it is only a secondary attribution attached to you.43 Those who embody
tawhid in the herenow are aware that their inherent contingency precludes the possibility of
ownership in the sense of outright possession.
The Paradox of the Life to Come
It might appear that for Ibn Ata Allah, while rizq is guaranteed for creation in the present life,
that obedience to Allahs proscriptions and prohibitions are the means to rizq in the afterlife.
This view is sustained by statements like He is the One by Whom subsist the world and the
hereafter, Who establishes the world with His freely given sustenance, and the hereafter with
His rewarding.44 From this it appears that there here now and the hereafter subsist in differing
modes, as the former requires sustenance for it is perishing while the latter is given as
recompense. Given Ibn Ata Allahs epistemology, it could be said that Allah freely gives
42
43
Ibid., 156.
44
Ibid., 25.
144
sustenance to the herenow so that creation can subsist with the knowledge of Lordship,
whereas creation subsists in the hereafter as reward to the degree that Allahs Lordship is
recognised. Yet, this touches on two, seemingly, paradoxical issues. The first issue is connected
to Allahs knowledge and Ibn Ata Allahs comments that it is imperative to know that things
have a certain being in the foreknowledge of Allah and that the Real takes charge and
regulates its affairs while it is in His foreknowledge,45 potentially affecting the individuals
impetus to act and making them liable of antinomianism. The second issue is connected to the
seeming incongruence of Allahs mercy and the punishment of the hereafter, given that Ibn
Ata Allah states that you have never left, nor will you ever come out of the circle of His
beneficence.46 This seeming incongruence highlights a differing conceptualisation of the
punishment of the hereafter than is generally given, which can be seen to result from a greater
focus being placed on Allahs attributes of beauty (jamal). These two issues will be dealt with in
turn.
Regarding the first issue of Allahs foreknowledge, there is an important relation between rizq
and trust (tawakkul). With regard to the herenow, it has been seen that the individuals pursuit
of rizq without contending with its bestowal is indicative of that individuals trust in Allah
(tawakkul). With regard to the hereafter, the exhibiting of trust is taken further. Commenting
on the verse and there is no living creature on earth but depends for its sustenance on God;
and He knows its time-limit [on earth] and its resting-place [after death] (11: 6), Ibn Ata Allah
writes that rizq is a guarantee He has undertaken for the sake of His servants, as a way of
making His love known to them.47 As Ibn Ata Allah has previously indicated, those who
exhibit servanthood (ubudiyyah) know that rizq is only from Allah and that its bestowal is
indicative of Allahs preference for His creation. Yet, as there are two places of provision, the
herenow and the hereafter, the former impermanent and the later permanent, the foregoing,
or even denial, of the impermanent provision in preference to the permanent provision is
indicative of a greater degree of trust in, and dependence on, Allah because the satisfaction of
this worldly provision is instantaneous, whereas there is only access to the hope for provision in
the hereafter during the herenow. However, as all rizq is from Allah, Ibn Ata Allah would be
aware that the Quran verse cited equally ensures the provision necessary for all transactions
during the hereafter, especially given that the herenow is the means to such provision.
45
Ibid., 19.
46
Ibid., 21.
47
Ibid., 121.
145
Regarding the second issue, there is a seeming incongruence between the punishment of the
hereafter and Ibn Ata Allahs views of Allahs mercy (rahma). This is even more so given some
of the account of said punishment found in the Hadith literature. Nevertheless, the punishment
of the hereafter, while acting as a deterrent and giving an impetus for action in the herenow,
can be seen as a means of bringing about soteriological development in the hereafter that was
meant to be gained in the herenow. In achieving this, the punishment in the hereafter can be
seen to bring each individual to a point where they can realize Allahs Unicity and embody the
metaphysics of tawhid, for failing to do so would be seen as a punishment from which there is
no redemption. If Allah were to exclude anyone from realizing His Unicity, then this would be
seen as an abrogation of His mercy (rahma) irrespective of the means through which it was
realized.
The Soteriological Elements of Eschatology
Rather than being strictly teleological, Ibn Ata Allahs eschatology places a sense of immediacy
on the individual. This sense of immediacy is intended to place within the individual an impetus
for soteriological development. For Ibn Ata Allah, the connection between the return to Allah
(maad) and soteriological development is clearly stated in the Quranic verses:
O thou human being that hast attained to inner peace! Return thou unto thy
Sustainer, well-pleased [and] pleasing [Him]: enter, then, together with My
[other true] servants yea, enter thou My paradise! (89: 27 30)
Ibn Ata Allah distinguishes three degrees of soteriological development, namely commanding
toward the evil (ammara), self-reproaching (lawwama), and at rest (mutmainna),48 and
notices that, in these verses, He directed His speech towards the third49 such that no
permission is granted for returning to Allah (in the manner of the noble) for the soul that incites
to evil or the self-blaming soul.50 For Ibn Ata Allah this is an arousal for the believers to
48
Ibid., 89.
49
Ibid., 89.
50
Ibid., 90.
146
acquire this station of peace for themselves for its recompense is entrance into paradise.51
Moreover, the acquisition of this soteriological station is not achieved in the hereafter, after the
individual has already returned, as Ibn Ata Allah acknowledges it indicates that he cannot
attain to the good pleasure of Allah with him in the hereafter until he is pleased with Allah here
in this world.52 The recompense of paradise is given to those who have attained to inner peace
(mutmainna) for the attributes and characteristics of the soul at peace are what prepared it
and allowed it to be summoned to enter in the company of His slaves, and to enter His
Garden.53 Thus, the site of return (maad), namely the herenow, is also the site of
soteriological development, which, in turn, means that eschatology focuses the individual on
the transformative potential within each and every action as they are performed.54
The state of being well-pleased with Allah can be seen to involve many virtues. Being well-
pleased involves, amongst other things, contentment with, and trust in, Allahs choice. Ibn Ata
Allah states that he who wishes that at a given moment there appear other than what God has
manifested in it, has not left ignorance behind at all.55 The desire for circumstances to be other
than they are involves a lack of both contentment with and trust in Allahs choice and is
indicative of not being well-pleased with Allah. With this Ibn Ata Allah provides the individual
with a semiotic key to preclude any claim to a soteriological state that they do not possess.
Another such semiotic key can be found in the following quote
Were the light of certitude (nur al-yakin) to shine, you would see the
Hereafter so near that you could not move towards it, and you would see
that the eclipse of extinction had come over the beauties of the world
(mahasin ad-dunya).56
51
Ibid., 90.
52
Ibid., 90.
53
Ibid., 91.
54
This view is not unique to Ibn Ata Allah, it can also be seen in Ibn Arabi who holds that a persons outward
situation at the resurrection and what follows depends totally upon what he has made of himself in this world,
Chittick, Ibn al-Arabis Eschatology, 67.
55
56
Ibid., 43.
147
Here is it possible to see the epistemic shift that occurs with the attainment of certainty (yakin).
For those who see the Hereafter so near there is an indication that they have developed a
degree of certainty (yakin) and for those who do not see this are precluded from any claim of
certainty (yakin). Thus, the individuals relationship to the hereafter is taken up within the
soteriological semiotics to help the individual understand their soteriological development.
Another aspect that eschatology places an immediate focus on the individual is the correlation
between the end of time and the death of the individual. It has been noted that the
experience of death for the microcosm corresponds to the coming of the Hour for the
macrocosm such that the Quranic accounts of the end of the world can also be understood
as referring to the death of the individual.57 This can be further divided into the inevitable
death of the individual at the end of their life and the voluntary death involving the cessation of
an ego-centered epistemological framework. Ibn Ata Allahs focus on this voluntary death can
be seen to be connected with his focus on the attributes of mercy. The pursuit of the voluntary
death, or more specifically the death of the ego-centered epistemological framework, can be
seen to come about through the individuals choice of action. The choice of a God-centered
epistemological framework, while resulting in soteriological development, manifests itself in
ethical decisions.
57
Chittick, Eschatology, 398.
148
Chapter 8 Ethics
Within the work of Ibn Ata Allah ethics and ethical behaviour (adab) has a central role. Ethics
is significant within his work for it plays a connective role between the abstractness of tawhid
and its affirmation through soteriological development. This chapter will examine this role in
order to highlight the ethical domain as the arena within which the solution to the problem of
rizq is enacted. This is important for it is not until the solution is enacted that the problem of
rizq can be resolved. One important aspect of ethical behaviour (adab) is the role played by the
figure of Muhammad. In acting as a touchstone for embodying the metaphysics of tawhid, the
prophet Muhammad is seen as the example par excellence from which ethical behaviour (adab)
should be gained and intimately connected with the science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah).
This is part of what it means to acknowledge that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah
(muhammadur rasulullah).
Adab is an umbrella term. Depending on its use it can mean ethics, ethical behaviour, cultured,
polite, courteous, good manners, decency, and rules of conduct, amongst others. The rules of
good manners (adab) are many and the literature discussing these within Islam generally, and
Sufism specifically, is extensive, though it could be surmised that their common goal is to aid in
developing an adib, an individual who constantly displays adab.1 Throughout Ibn Ata Allahs
works multiple examples of and requirements for adab are listed. Rather than examining the
actions that constitute good manners, this chapter will focus on the role adab plays within the
work of Ibn Ata Allah. By examining the importance of adab, its function, the process of
acquisition, and its degrees, it will emerge that, for Ibn Ata Allah, adab is not limited to a
human to human exchange. Rather, its wider significance encompasses the comportment of
the individual in each and every moment irrespective of who, what, or where they may be.
Ultimately adab can be seen to be integral to developing an awareness of the relationship
between Creator and creature.
The Importance of adab
1
For a summary of the various meanings of adab and its particular importance within Sufi literature, see Qamar-ul
Huda, The Light Beyond the Shore in the Theology of Proper Sufi Moral Conduct (Abab), Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 72 (2004): 462 463.
149
Much of Ibn Ata Allahs approach to, and importance placed on, adab can be seen to be a
direct result of the approach of Abul Hassan al-Shadhili. Abul Hassan al-Shadhilis approach
was to emphasise the importance of mans internal development over against his external
behaviour and ostentation and to highlight this he took a negative attitude toward begging
and wearing distinctive clothing, which had become a part of Mamluk court protocol of his
time, and is said to have dressed with elegance, also he did not take part in the gatherings
that induced trances or involved spectacular phenomena.2 This shows Abul Hassan al-Shadhili
to be an advocate of sober Sufism. Furthermore, as it occurs within Ibn Ata Allahs works, it
illustrates an emphasis on internal development whilst realising that such development arises
through adhering to a specific set to behaviours, for it is acknowledged that the exponents of
the Shadhiliyya tended to play down the importance of saintly miracles, preaching instead self-
restraint and sobriety in word and deed.3 While this approach makes a contradistinction
between an internal development of virtues and an external adherence to moral actions, they
are in no way seen as contradicting nor does one abrogate the other, otherwise Abul Hassan
al-Shadhili would not have said: If your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Quran and
Sunna, hold fast to these two and take no notice of your unveiling; tell yourself that the Quran
and Sunna is guaranteed by God Most High, which is not the case with the unveiling inspiration
and mystical perceptions.4 This emphasis on the Quran and the Sunnah is deliberate in that
these are the sources from which adab is derived.5
With regard to the Shadhiliyya in general, and Ibn Ata Allah specifically, it is important to
notice that the emphasis on adab is not at the expense of metaphysical speculation. While it is
acknowledged that al-Shadhilis spiritual method emphasised the practical aspects of
mysticism, this is not, as the preceding chapters show, as some have held over against the
more metaphysically oriented mysticism of Ibn Arabi and his followers.6 While it might be true
that Abul Hassan al-Shadhili saw little value in the speculative exercise of reason,7 it is
2
Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 210.
3
Ibid., 217.
4
5
This connects directly to the comments on the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) in chapter 3.
6
Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 210.
7
Ibid., 210.
150
possible to see within both his litanies (ahzab) and the accounts of him8 a highly developed
metaphysics, which follows from the metaphysics of his teacher Ibn Bashish, and is later
developed by Ibn Ata Allah. Furthermore, the rejection of the speculative exercise of reason
is equally apparent in Ibn Ata Allah, who keeps reason orientated towards an applicable end,
without a diminished metaphysics.9
In order to highlight the centrality of adab within Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre it is useful to repeat a
quote he uses by Abul Abbas al-Mursi, which states,
There are four times in which the servant will find himself, of which there is
no fifth: blessing, affliction, obedience, and disobedience. In each of these
times, there is an aspect of servanthood which the Truth requires of you by
virtue of His lordship. If it is a time of obedience, your path is to bear witness
to Gods grace, since it is He who has guided you into this obedience and has
made it possible for you. If it is a time of disobedience, you path is to seek
Gods forgiveness and repent. If it is a time of blessing, your path is to give
thanks, which means for your heart to rejoice in God. If it is a time of
affliction, you path is to be content with Gods decree and to endure
patiently.10
That this advice delimited the four possible epistemic states which could be considered as the
four doors at the centre of Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics. Abul Abbas also
demarcates the four keys, which can now be seen as the necessary moral action for passing
through each door. As he is adamant that there are only four times of which there is no fifth
that an individual will find themselves in, this can be seen as delimiting the moral responses
necessary for traversing these four states. Furthermore, there being no fifth indicates that all
events can be categorised as one of these four kinds, blessing, affliction, obedience, or
disobedience. Identifying the kind of event also identifies the morally acceptable response
required for traversing it, for the responses are also limited to four.
8
Apart from Ibn Ata Allahs Lataif al-Minan, which is the earliest, the other known accounts of Abul Hassan al-
Shadhilis life are by Ibn Sabbagh, Mystical Teachings, and another is discussed by Honerkamp, A Biography.
9
This can be seen in Ibn Ata Allahs use of proofs in chapter 4 above.
10
151
While Ibn Ata Allah utilises what appears to be a simple demarcation of potential adab
responses, because it encompasses all possible events, it illustrates that each moment has a
corresponding adab requirement. Regarding this he writes that
it is possible to fulfil some obligations at times, but it is impossible to fulfil

the obligations of every moment, for there is no moment wherein God does
not hold against you a new obligation or a definite matter11
That there is no fifth means that the servant will constantly alternate between the four kinds
of events, though as one leads into another there is perpetuity to this cycle. Ibn Ata Allah is
clear that not all obligations towards Allah can be fulfilled and this can be seen result from
creations inherent contingency, for the limitations that contingency imposes ensures that it is
impossible to fulfil the obligations of every moment. That not all obligations of adab can be
fulfilled may be an extension of creations ontological makeup, as it was acknowledged that
error and fault are a fundamental part of your existence, nay, even the source (ayn) of your
existence12 and, for this reason, the slave is never free of shortcoming.13 This emphasises the
constancy of maintaining adab. Furthermore, it is antecedent to the discussion of mistakes
below.
Due to its centrality, adab can be seen to be a key element of Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological
semiotics. It can be seen that, according to Ibn Ata Allah, due to creations inherent
contingency, it is not possible to extricate oneself from cause and effect.14 Being an aspect of
creations ontological makeup, cause and effect ensures that the requirement of adab is, in a
sense, isotropic. This highlights one aspect of Ibn Ata Allahs saying that you striving for what
has already been guaranteed for you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are
signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira).15 In this context, what is demanded of you
11
12
13
14
It could be argued that for Ibn Ata Allah miracles are bound by cause and effect for he states that a miracle
serves to unsettle doubts concerning Divine grace, [and] to [bring about] experiential knowledge of Gods bounty,
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 85, indicating that they are, in a sense, caused by a lack of certainty (yakin) and
their effect is to bring about its subsequent increase.
15
152
refers to the requirements of adab, which, due to creations inherent contingency and the
existence of cause and effect, is constant regardless of individual circumstances. This is one
reason for the importance of the above demarcation and correctly identifying each successive
event. Furthermore, due to this constancy, to be remiss of the adab that is demanded of you,
even if only momentarily, is indicative of a blurring of your intellect (basira), namely a lack of
self-knowledge, which is crucial for soteriological development. Thus, the importance of adab is
not over and above other domains such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, or any other
domain, rather adab acts as a connector between the other domains in as far as they are
embodied within and enacted by the individual.
The Function of adab
One of the primary functions of adab is in its ability to aid the individual in embodying tawhid
within a domain of multiplicity. For what cannot be articulated conceptually can nonetheless
be worked out in the way one lives, so the faith in Divine Unity (tawhid) which reminds us
forcibly that the prime analogate for agent is the Creator, can be lived out in a life of trust in
Divine providence (tawakkul).16 This shows that the focus of the ethical individual (adib) is,
rather than choosing how to respond to an event, to find what response is applicable. In doing
so, the individual puts aside their self-centeredness and, in choosing the action proscribed by
Allah through the Quran and the Sunnah, maintains and embodies tawhid through a God-
centred consciousness.
For Ibn Ata Allah, the existence of clearly defined adab aids in effacing personal choice and
embodying tawhid. He writes that the way of arriving to Allah is through the effacement of
personal choice, and the rejection of personal choice.17 This effacement cannot be an
ontological effacement for creation cannot transcend its inherent contingency. Rather, Ibn Ata
Allah is advocating an epistemological effacement. That is where personal choice is abrogated
by obligations to Allah, which are, in turn, enacted through creation. A connection between his
view of adab and his metaphysics of tawhid can be seen in statements such as whosoever
16
Burrell, Creation, 155.
17
153
negates his nature by There is no divinity (la ilaha) affirms His being by but God (illallah).18 It
is through adab that one negates his nature by negating ones choices and affirming the
proscribed actions which, in turn, affirms His being. In this sense, servanthood (ubudiyyah) is
developing and maintaining correct adab.
If effacement is taken to be an aspect of the process of adab, then servanthood or the station
of servitude (ubudiyyah) is the goal. Regarding this Ibn Ata Allah writes know that the most
sublime abiding station in which the servant could be established is the station of servitude;
and know also that all other stations of the Path are a way to it, serving it.19 In explaining the
ramifications of this, he quotes the Quranic verse that states I have not created the invisible
beings and man to any end other than that they may worship Me (51: 56). In quoting this verse
it is evident that Ibn Ata Allahs intention is to draw out the relation between worship and
servitude, which he states as worship (ibada) is the outer form of servitude, and servitude is
its spirit.20 Worship is the means through which servanthood (ubudiyyah) is established and,
once it has become an abiding station, servanthood (ubudiyyah) enlivens worship in a
continuing process. It is a continuing process as the spirit of servitude and its secret is to
abandon self-choice (ikhtiyar), and not contest with the Divine Decrees,21 one of which is
worship as established in the previous Quranic verse. Adab, in as far as it is Divinely prescribed,
effaces self-choice and, through such effacement, opens to servanthood (ubudiyyah).
The Process of adab
For Ibn Ata Allah, it can be seen that there is a process in developing and increasing ones
adab. As adab is a means to soteriological development there are certain practices that he
recommends for heightening such development. However, the implementation of adab,
especially when judging the success of such implementation, is not a self-regulatory process.
18
19
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 36. It is important to note that Ibn Ata Allah takes Quranic passages, including,
8: 42, 17: 1, 19: 2, and 72: 19, as his evidence for calling ubudiyyah the most sublime station.
20
Ibid., 37.
21
Ibid., 37.
154
While whoever knows himself knows his Lord,22 this refers to real self-knowledge and not
some deceptive smokescreen presented by the ego. This lack of self-knowledge is one of the
reasons that Ibn Ata Allah writes that when two matters seem confusing to you, see which is
heavier on the ego and follow it through because even though self-knowledge is lacking for
soteriological development nothing weighs on the ego but that which is true.23
While there is a correct response for each situation, the process of adab does involve an
element of trial and error. Ibn Ata Allah writes that the business is not that you do not do
wrong actions, the business is that you do not persist in wrong action.24 Ibn Ata Allah can be
seen to be again reiterating the sentiment of the Hadith which states that had you not
committed sins, Allah would have brought into existence a creation that would have committed
sin (and Allah) would have forgiven them.25 The point of this is that in committing a mistake,
repenting, and turning from it to draw closer to Allah, a drawing that proceeds indefinitely
according to the capacity of the individual, the individual draws closer to Allah than they would
have had they not committed this mistake. Ibn Ata Allah shows an acute awareness of this in
stating that sometimes He opens the door of obedience for you but not the door of
acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a cause of arriving at
Him and that a disobedience that bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an
obedience that bequeaths self-infatuation and pride.26 To emphasise this point Ibn Ata Allah
states that a disobedience that bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an
obedience that bequeaths self-infatuation and pride.27 Mistakes have a pedagogic function
and an important aspect of this is their ability to highlight the extreme need or ontological
poverty of creation towards Allah. The necessity of this aspect of the process of adab can be
seen to arise due to creations inherent contingency which ensures a degree of fallibility. The
degree of fallibility highlights an aspect of agency within creation. While fallibility is an intrinsic
aspect of creation, it can be seen that creations fallibility is not the aspect which is condemned
by Allah, rather it is the persistence in an action that has been shown to be fallible that is
22
Ibn Ata Allah, Lataif al-Minan, 54. See above Chap 6 n.7.
23
24
25
Muslim, Sahih Muslim, # 6620.
26
27
Ibid., 37.
155
condemned. This point is confirmed in the following Hadiths which state that if an individual
has intended a bad deed and has not done it, Allah writes it down with Himself as a full good
deed,28 indicating that while individuals are liable to have bad intentions it is only those that
are acted upon that are condemned, and follow up a bad deed with a good one and it will
wipe it out,29 indicating that while an individuals actions are likely to manifest a degree of
fallibility, that fallibility is only counted against them if they persist in engaging in it and fail to
repent and make amends.
Forgetfulness (ghaflah) and Remembrance (dhikr)
One type action which Ibn Ata Allah highlights as being at the foremost cause of all
subsequent errors is forgetfulness (ghaflah). The perniciousness of forgetfulness lies in its
presupposition of possessing knowledge that is subsequently overlooked. In his discussion of
forgetfulness (ghaflah) it is likely that Ibn Ata Allah had in mind the Quranic verse:
And whenever thy Sustainer brings forth their offspring from the loins of
Adam, He [thus] calls upon them to bear witness about themselves: Am I
not your Sustainer? to which they answer: Yea, indeed, we do bear
witness thereto! [Of this We remind you,] lest you say on the Day of
Resurrection, Verily we were unaware of this (7: 172)
This covenant, taken in pre-eternity, is taken as evidence of humanitys knowledge of its

inherent ontological contingency and poverty and of humanitys inability to claim we were
unaware of this. Forgetfulness alters the outlook of the individual, affecting their
epistemology, for when the forgetful man (al-ghafil) gets up in the morning he reflects on
what he is going to do, whereas the intelligent man (al-aqil) sees what God is doing with
him.30 Forgetfulness (ghaflah) results in a self-centred consciousness, while Ibn Ata Allah is
advocating for a God-centred consciousness.
28
In an-Nawawi, Forty Hadith, 116.
29
In ibid., 66.
30
156
To combat forgetfulness (ghaflah) Ibn Ata Allah proscribes remembrance (dhikr). He states
that the remembrance of God is liberation from ignorance and forgetfulness through the
permanent presence of the heart with Truth.31 While it is evident that by remembrance Ibn
Ata Allah specifically means the remembrance of Allah, his definition of what constitutes
remembrance is so broad that whosoever observes what God has commanded and abstains
from what God has forbidden is one who remembers God.32 There is a symbiotic relationship
between forgetfulness (ghaflah) and remembrance (dhikr) in that only he to whom
forgetfulness is possible is to be reminded; and only he to whom inattention is possible is to be
warned.33 Thus, for the one who forgets,
remembrance is used to strengthen ones presence with God Most High, to

maintain the proper conduct towards Him, to guard against heedlessness, as
a refuge from the accursed devil, and to help foster the attentiveness of the
heart during acts of worship34
While it could be suggested that each of these benefits of remembrance are reiterations of a
the key point from differing angles, it is interesting, given Ibn Ata Allahs broad definition, to
see that maintaining the proper conduct towards Him is another aspect of observing what
God has commanded and worshipping Him. This is a clear indication that adab is a) a
component of worship and b) a key component in combating forgetfulness.
The Degrees of adab
Within Ibn Ata Allahs works there are two ways to distinguish varying degrees of adab. These
can be distinguished as degrees of acquisition and degrees of implementation. Whilst it should
be acknowledged that such a distinction is artificial it is useful for highlighting varying aspects of
the degrees of adab. Regarding the acquisition of adab, Ibn Ata Allah recommends seeking the
company of others who have good adab. The reason for this, he writes, is that the self is
naturally inclined to imitation and resemblance, and to adorning itself with the characteristics
31
32
Ibid., 45.
33
34
157
of those it associates with, thereby becoming like them such that your companionship with
the heedless causes heedlessness.35 However, he is quick to point out that merely attaining
the company of others is not enough for company is a form, and adab is its ruh [spirit],
indicating that adab is the internal compliment of company, such that if you join the form and
the ruh [spirit], you will benefit of their company yet without its internal compliment your
company is a corpse.36 This indicates that the company of an individual with good manners
(adib) is only soteriologically beneficial if their example is used to help establish and maintain
adab within oneself.
Ibn Ata Allah is insistent on being scrupulous in choosing the right company. He states do not
keep company with anyone whose state does not inspire you and whose speech does not lead
you to God.37 He further demarcates the minimum criteria for those whose company is to be
kept, stating,
Shaykh Abul Hassan said: If the faqir who is occupied with his means of
livelihood does not observe the following four properties (adab), attach no
importance to him, even if he be the most knowledgeable of men. They are:
avoiding oppressors preferring the people of the other world relieving the
poor and constancy in the five prayers with the congregation.38
While each of these, to varying degrees, are obvious signs of piety, their combination marks the
minimum adab for inspiring others and leading them to realise their inherent contingency and
ontological poverty. While Ibn Ata Allah draws on the Quran and the Hadith in justifying each
of the four properties as virtues, consistent across each justification is the idea that these
properties maintain and strengthen, for the individual who observes them, the means of
realising and embodying creations inherent ontological poverty. By avoiding oppressors the
practice of religion is secure, the people of the other world, here meaning the friends of Allah
(awliya),39 aid in the implementation of adab, the poor are a symbolic reminder of each
creations ontological poverty and their aid helps in detaching from contingent things, while
35
36
37
38
39
Ibid., 82.
158
maintaining the congregational prayers both strengthens the resolve of the attendees and
removes each individual from their worldly pursuits to refocus and reorient themselves towards
Allah.40 These four properties ensure for those who observe them the minimum for constancy
in adab such that, without even one of these, their soteriological development would stagnate
and could not be considered as fitting company for those who desire further soteriological
development.
In implementing adab the company of others is informative. For soteriological development Ibn
Ata Allah recommends that an individual keep company with a faqir for the faqir is the one
who casts off secondary causes and turns away from hindrances and has realised the reality
of la ilaha illAllah Muhammadan Rasulullah.41 Their casting off secondary causes is a direct
indication of their company with Allah and their realisation of the kalimah is indicative of their
embodiment of tawhid. The reasoning behind keeping a faqirs company is that they are able to
make you recognise the Path and he [the faqir] will surmount the steep roads for you and
remove impediments from your heart.42 In having undergone soteriological development, the
faqir, in a sense, knows the road and is able to steer the aspirant around various stumbling
blocks which can cause impediment, such that when the seeker finds a guide, then let him
obey what he orders him to do, and let him abstain from what he prohibits or restrains him
from doing.43 In doing so, the aspirant is able shorten the journey of embodying the
metaphysics of tawhid due to their avoiding impediments. Furthermore, the faqir acts as a
tangible example of an ethical individual (adib) and as such can be used to highlight ways of
embodying the virtues necessary for soteriological development. For these reasons, amongst
others, Ibn Ata Allah advises get his company and have adab in his assembly.44
Yet the company of a faqir is not the goal. The faqirs company is meant to be a means to
having company with Allah. Ibn Ata Allah writes prepare for this behaviour with your
brothers, the fuqara, so that it will become a stairway for you by which you obtain access to
40
Ibid., 82 83.
41
Ibn Ata Allah, Unwan al-Tawfiq, 7
42
Ibid., 7.
43
44
159
behaving with the Lord of heaven.45 The reason why the company with the fuqara is a
preliminary measure is because they take on the character of their Master, as it is related,
take on the good character of Allah.46 The importance of this passage is threefold in that a) it
shows that the ultimate example for adab is Allah, b) by taking on the character of their
Master the fuqara strive for harmony between the contingent and the absolute, and c)
following on from the previous point, it is through adab that tawhid is affirmed and, in a sense,
experienced within multiplicity. Ibn Ata Allah can be read as commenting on this last point
when he states that when you see Allah as the Doer in all you see all beings as agreeable,47
for in knowing that creation acts in accordance with tawhid, as Allah is the Doer, nothing can be
considered disagreeable for this would be contending with Allah. This relates directly to having
trust in Allah (tawakkul) as previously discussed.
Adab with Allah
Adab culminates in developing a good etiquette towards Allah. Ibn Ata Allah quotes a Hadith
that states God Most High says, I am of the same thinking as my servant is towards Me,48
which can be seen as a key to Ibn Ata Allahs ethics. This Hadith gives impetus to develop and
implement adab, for the way the servant thinks of Allah will be returned to them. To think good
of Allah involves knowledge of Allah and, as whoever knows himself knows his Lord, this
involves both knowledge of tawhid and knowledge of creations inherent ontological poverty. To
ensure that such knowledge improves each individuals thinking of Allah, Ibn Ata Allah writes
if you have not improved your thinking of Him because of His nature, improve it because of His
treatment of you.49 As the reward of deeds depends upon the intentions,50 by improving
ones thinking of Allah, as a result of knowledge, the intentions are correspondingly raised. In
turn, better etiquette is developed because the individuals thinking of Allah has improved, as
have their intention.
45
Ibid., 10.
46
Ibid., 11.
47
Ibid., 11.
48
49
50
al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, # 1.
160
Whilst adab with Allah can be seen as a particular tier of etiquette, above other such tiers, it is
also to be understood as the zenith in the hierarchy of tiers for it encompasses all subsequent
tiers. There is a Hadith Qudsi within which Allah states
O son of Adam, I asked you for food and you fed Me not. He will say: O Lord,
and how should I feed You when You are the Lord of the worlds? He will say:
Did you not know that My servant So-and-so asked you for food and you fed
him not? Did you not know that had you fed him you would surely have
found that with Me?51
This can be read as a clear indication that maintaining good manners with creation is, in
accordance with tawhid, maintaining them with Allah. However, Ibn Ata Allah shows an
awareness of the difficulty of a) maintaining an awareness of this implication and b)
maintaining a corresponding degree of etiquette. He writes that outwardly, creatures (al-
akwan) are an illusion (ghirra), but, inwardly, they are an admonition (ibra)52 indicating that a)
abiding with creatures, rather than Allah, is an admonition from Allah for it indicates a
weakness of the awareness of tawhid and b) when abiding with Allah, it is through creatures
that Allahs admonition comes. Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allah states that if you want to know
your standing with Him, look at where He has made you abide now,53 indicating that ones
position within creation is indicative of ones relation with Allah. The development of adab with
Allah does not result in an ontological effacement of creatures. Rather, the realisation that
creatures (al-akwan) are an illusion (ghirra) is an epistemological reorientation which leaves
creations contingent reality intact while realising that they are a pedagogical trope that
enacts a soteriological semiotics. Thus, the primacy and Unity of Allah is affirmed through
engagement with the multiplicity of ontologically contingent creatures.
51
In Ibrahim and Johnson-Davies, Forty Hadith Qudsi, # 18.
52
53
Ibid., 35.
161
Adab and rizq
For Ibn Ata Allah there is a direct connection between adab and rizq. Citing the Quranic
passage enter houses through their doors (2: 189), he comments that the door of rizq is the
obedience to the All-Provider and that His provision is not sought after except through
obedience to Him.54 Adab, within these passages, involves obedience to Allah, which is an
aspect of ubudiyyah. Central to obedience to Allah is God-wariness (taqwa) for he writes that
God-wariness (taqwa) is the key to the two provisions: the rizq of this world, and the rizq of
the Next World.55 An increase in provision can be seem to arise through correct adab with
regard to Allah, so much so that it is arguable that this is the sole source of the rizq of the Next
World, which comes about through a heightened awareness of and focus on the primacy of
Allah. Correct adab implies the knowledge and perception of the principles of creations
ontological foundations, the primary of which is tawhid. It is important to make a distinction
between the knowledge of and the perception of these principles for this knowledge ensures
that the correct responses are known independently of particulars while the perception of
these principles ensures the correct employment of these responses within particular
circumstances. Thus, the existence of rizq, in a sense, necessitates adab, which in turn, due to
its centrality within contingent existence, ensures that each creation have a minimum
understanding of the metaphysics of tawhid.
It is now possible to examine the connection between adab and rizq in the Quranic injunction
I have not created the invisible beings and men to any other end other than that they man
[know and] worship Me (51: 56). For Ibn Ata Allah, in this verse it is as if Allah said I do not
want from them that they should sustain themselves and that I do not want them to provide
for themselves, because I am the Provider for them, such that this verse includes the
following: guaranteeing the slaves their provisions.56 Thus, beyond the guarantee of rizq there
is the injunction to worship Allah and, in doing so, places a focus on the development of adab
through following that which required of creation. These points can be seen to be covered in
the aphorisms a) rest yourself from self-direction (tadbir), for what Someone Else (ghayruka)
has carried out on your behalf, do not yourself undertake to do it and b) your striving for
54
55
Ibid., 120.
56
Ibid., 108.
162
what has been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are signs
of the blurring of your intellect (basira).57 In both instances, what Someone Else (ghayruka)
has carried out on your behalf and what has been guaranteed to you refers to provision,
rizq. He enjoins his reader do not yourself undertake to do it, namely seeking rizq, and to do
so is a blurring of your intellect (basira) because Allah did not create the invisible beings and
men to any other end than worship (51: 56), including seeking provision, and as such can be
considered guaranteed to you. Thus, to pursue any other end than worship is to show poor
adab towards Allah in His position as Creator and Sustainer.
Whilst rizq is generally conceived as being relevant only within the realm of creation, Ibn Ata
Allah is insistent on not seeing creation as an end-in-itself. As in his likening movement from
creation to creation to a donkey going in circles within a mill, he cites the Quranic verse in
heaven is your sustenance (51: 22) to reiterate this point, stating that this implies the lifting
of the aspirations (himma) of the creation from the creatures, and that they not ask except
from the True King.58 There is a twofold motion that such a turning to the True King implies,
for firstly it directs the individual away from secondary and contingent means and secondly it
directs the individuals aspirations towards Allah. In turning towards Allah the individual comes
to affirm tawhid in their pursuit of rizq. Yet, this is not a pursuit of rizq in the sense of trying to
gather it oneself or in attempting to increase it. Rather, it involves displaying the correct adab
towards Allah and creation with the knowledge and trust (tawakkul) that rizq will come as and
when it is required.59
Anxiety over Rizq
Ibn Ata Allah discusses at length the relationship between pursuing rizq and the subsequent
anxiety felt by the individual. Due to the existence of such anxiety, Ibn Ata Allah sees the
existence of a means of livelihood as a consolation for their selves from Allah due to their
57
Ibn Ata Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 23 24.
58
59
Jalaluddin Rumi, The Rumi Collection, ed. Kabir Helminski (Boston: Shambala, 1998), 66, can be seen to
commenting on this point when he writes Dont seek the water; increase your thirst.
163
incapacity of attaining to the reality of sincere trust in Allah.60 The existence of a means of
livelihood is taken to be indicative of Allahs mercy (rahma) towards creation in that it grants
the individual the feeling of security with regard to their provision. Yet, for Ibn Ata Allah, the
existence of a means of livelihood is indicative of more than just Allahs mercy (rahma) and he
illustrates its pedagogical function. To begin with, when the slaves work for their means they
are distracted from disobedience to Him, and from engaging their time in rebellion against
Allah, and, while such preoccupation in means is a mercy of Allah, this lack of contention
with Allah can be a means to developing a greater trust in Allah (tawakkul) and exhibiting
better adab.61 Thus, anxiety over rizq can be a means, if correctly understood, towards
affirming the primacy of Allah.
Yet, the existence of anxiety over rizq is evidence that knowledge of tawhid is lacking. Despite
the existence of a means of livelihood, Ibn Ata Allah is definite, writing that
the final word is: means exist (wujud) for you, and you must be absent from
them in your witnessing (shuhud). So confirm it in the same way His wisdom
confirmed it, but do not lean on it for supports, because of your knowledge
of His Oneness62
Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to be encouraging the acknowledgment of a means of livelihood for
it is acknowledging Allahs mercy (rahma) to creation, which helps remove anxiety over rizq.
Yet, he is indicating that such acknowledgement is not an end-in-itself and is not to be used as a
crutch. Ibn Ata Allah can be considered as stating that anxiety over rizq can be a means
towards affirming His Oneness, but utilising the existence of a means of livelihood to reduce
anxiety over rizq indicates a lack of knowledge of the metaphysics of tawhid.
Seeking from Allah
While discussing the etiquette of asking from Allah, Ibn Ata Allah returns to the topic of
maintaining servitude (ubudiyyah). His view is that making a request from Allah is not a sign of
60
61
Ibid., 136.
62
Ibid., 138.
164
distrust in His providing for creation, though this view can be seen laden with conditions. He
writes that asking and requesting from Allah does not oppose the station of pure servitude.63
The reasons behind this view are that a) asking is enjoined upon the slave, for he states when
He loosens your tongue with a request, then know that He wants to give you something64 for
God is most kind unto His creatures (42: 19), and thus it is acting in accordance with
ubudiyyah and b) asking is a sign of need, meaning ontological poverty, which turns the
individual towards Allah. However, this presupposes the satisfaction and acceptance of the
manner in which Allah fulfils such requirements, for if not accompanied by acceptance of, and
trust in, Allah the existence of need can be misunderstood. Furthermore, implicit in this view is
that the individual has a sufficient understanding of the metaphysics of tawhid such that they
are unable to stretch out your hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-
Muti) amongst them is your Lord.65
Ibn Ata Allah is careful in delimiting the process and etiquette of seeking from Allah. He writes
that
being polite in seeking is that one seek from Allah and not specify an
amount, or cause, or moment, so that the Real provides for him whatever He
will, in the manner He wills, and at the moment He wills.66
Among the reasons for omitting these specifics is to avoid the potential pitfalls. For if these
specifics are omitted from a request then the likelihood of dissatisfaction and distrust is
diminished. He writes that any doubt in Divine provision constitutes doubt in the Provider.67
These doubts are liable to result in a perceived independence from Allah, of being outside of
Allahs care. While indicating a lack of both knowledge and embodiment of tawhid, such views
ignore the Quranic passage that states there is no living creature on earth but depends for its
sustenance on God (11: 6), which Ibn Ata Allah takes to mean trust in Me as a Guarantor,
and take me as a trustworthy disposer of affairs.68 It is possible to see here Ibn Ata Allahs
63
Ibid., 98.
64
65
Ibid., 50.
66
67
Ibid., 133.
68
Ibid., 121.
165
soteriological semiotics in that the method of asking form Allah and the response to that which
is received demarcates the relationship between each particular creation and their Creator.
Adab and Soteriology
Adab can now be seen to be a central soteriological process. Ibn Ata Allahs soteriological
semiotics is deployed so that each individual can read the signs (ayat) given to them so that
they can enact the correct response to each situation. Key to this understanding of adab is the
ability to comprehend the signs (ayat) so that correct comportment can be displayed. This
reading is preliminary to soteriological development. Regarding this he states that that which
hearts find in the way of worries and sadnesses is due to that which prevents their having inner
vision (al-iyan).69 Worries and sadnesses arise due to a lack of inner vision (al-iyan), for if
inner vision was present then it would be seen that the existence of the veil is the cause of
suffering and that while varied in its manifestations, suffering (aladhab) is due only to the
existence of His veil.70 Knowing this opens up the possibility of examining the way in which
creation is veiled from Allah, for a veil, by its nature, reveals aspects of what is veiled. By
contemplating the manner in which Allah reveals Himself to creation through His veils, rather
than being preoccupied with these veils as ends-in-themselves, opens the possibility of inner
vision and, by seeing the veils for what they are, decreases worries and sadnesses.
Regarding the discussion of veils, there is an important point regarding the use of language, one
that Ibn Ata Allah is explicit about. He asks rhetorically how can it be conceived that
something veils Him, since He is the one who manifests everything (azhara kulla shay)? and
again how can it be conceived that something veils Him, since He is the One (al-Wahid)
alongside of whom there is nothing?71 On this he has stated
The Real (al-Haqq) is not veiled from you. Rather, it is you who are veiled
from seeing It, for, were anything to veil It, then that which veils It would
cover It. But if there were a covering to It, then that would be a limitation of
69
70
Ibid., 55.
71
Ibid., 25 26.
166
Its Being: every limitation of anything has power over it. And He is the
Omnipotent, above His servants.72
Ibn Ata Allah is careful to point out that Allah is not veiled from creation, as the Quran states
We are closer to him that his neck-vein (50: 16), rather creation is veiled from Allah. This
point touches on many domains. It is a metaphysical issue with regard to tawhid, while being an
ontological issue with regard to any real distance between Creator and creation, and an
epistemological issue with regard to the perception of such distance. Furthermore, it is also an
issue of adab in that it involves the manner in which creation relates to Allah. It is in this light
that his saying do not deem His giving to be slow; but rather, deem your approaching to be
slow73 can be understood. It is not that Allah is absent, for this would be contrary to the
metaphysics of tawhid. Rather the extent to which the contingent is ignorant of Allahs
presence is the perceived distance between the creation and Creator. Thus, the correct adab is
for creation to censure themselves and deem your approaching to be slow for Allah is ever
present.
Thus, the problem of rizq can be seen to exist, not because the acquisition of rizq is an issue.
Rather, the problem of rizq exists because of the pedagogical ramifications of the existence of
such a problem. The development of correct adab, both towards Allah and creation, ensures,
through the performative process it engenders, that the correct comportment of the
metaphysics of tawhid is embodied. Correct adab ensures that the virtues necessary for
resolving the problem of rizq are enacted, allowing the individual to realise that the problem of
rizq exists for its soteriological implications.
72
Ibid., 29, quoting the Quran (6: 18),
73
Ibid., 53.
167
Chapter 9 Soteriology
If the preceding chapters can be considered as describing the stages of descent from essence
(dhat) to creation (kawn), then this chapter should be considered as demarcating the ascent of
the individual towards embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. If the epistemic domain is the
site of the solution to the problem of rizq, then the soteriological domain is the domain wherein
the problem of rizq is resolved through enacting the metaphysics of tawhid. As the
soteriological domain is the site wherein the individuals epistemic framework is actively
brought into harmony with the metaphysics of tawhid, it is here that tawhid is affirmed, as this
is the goal of Ibn Ata Allahs works. Drawing as it does on the prophetic example and the
science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah), it has been seen that Islamic ethics generally, and
Ibn Ata Allahs specifically, has been seen to be an embodiment of Muhammad rasul Allah.
Yet, as this mode of ethics is underpinned by the metaphysics of tawhid, it is in the
soteriological domain that the purpose of ethical behaviour (adab) bears fruit. Thus, it is in this
domain that the two halves of the kalimah, la ilaha illallah and Muhammad rasul Allah, can be
seen to be united. As bearing witness to the kalimah is central to an Islamic paradigm,1
achieving this unity between the two parts can be seen as the peak and purpose of Islamic
soteriology.
The Problem and Goal of Ibn Ata Allahs Soteriology
One of the main problems that Islamic soteriology seeks to address is the abolition of idols.
Central to this is the affirmation of tawhid in as far as it precludes all forms of associationism
(shirk). Whilst it is a central and unifying theme within his work, it is not unique to Ibn Ata
Allah. The Quran shows the abolition of associationism as being trans-historical problem, one
that occurs throughout the history of humanity and one that focuses on the individuals
struggle against all forms of idols. In its most externalised form it involves abolishing the
worship of physical object, as in the case of Prophet Abrahams statement By God, I shall most
certainly bring about the downfall of your idols (21: 57). However, while this form of
associationism (shirk) may persist, the form of idol worship that requires the most
confrontation is its internalised form. It is these internalised idols that Ibn Ata Allah can be
seen as attempting to topple, as he states Abraham, upon him be peace, came upon physical
1
As it is the first, and primary, pillar of Islam.
168
idols and shattered them though you have spiritual idols, which he demarcates as being
specifically, you have five idols: the ego, craving, Satan, carnal appetite, and this earthly
existence.2 Each of these distorts the epistemic outlook of the individual by positing an
irreconcilable disjunction between Allahs inherent Unicity and the perception of multiplicity.
In entering upon Islam the goal of affirming tawhid is set as a prerequisite, though the problem
of reconciling Allahs Unicity with the apparent multiplicity remains. While there is debate as to
what Allah requires of humanity, within Islam there is an agreement that this involves affirming
tawhid. For Ibn Ata Allah, as was seen in the discussion on the metaphysics of tawhid, it is of
the utmost importance to correctly understand tawhid and its implications so that a worldview
that is consistent with it may be developed. What such a worldview would consist of has been
explored in the previous chapters. While the goal is agreed upon, there is some disagreement
upon what this entails for the individual. Much of the anti-Ibn Arabi polemic can be seen as a
reaction to this point.3 So too can the alleged debate between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya
be seen as an argument over the implications of tawhid upon the individual.4 Debates such as
these have often escalated to include accusations of antinomianism and apostasy. Though, for
Ibn Ata Allah, these can be seen to result from conflating the ontological and epistemological
domains.
While destiny (qadar) and decree (qada) play a role in the soteriological development of the
individual, the individual should be cautioned against emphasising their role. Ibn Ata Allah
would agree with those who are seen to be his detractors that an overreliance on destiny
(qadar) and decree (qada) can result in antinominalistic tendencies. Though rather than
disempowering the individual, Ibn Ata Allahs works can be seen to empower the individual by
embracing destiny (qadar) and decree (qada) in such a way that the inevitability of events is a
means of detaching the individual from reliance on creation, which results in a turning to Allah.
The result of this is, rather than an abolition of the law (Sharia), an embodiment of it due to
the awareness that, being within the domain of cause and effect, knowledge of future events,
especially the ultimate outcome of the individual, remains for each contingent creation
unknown. The law (Sharia), and especially the Sunna, are actively maintained in as far as they
2
3
See Knysh, Later Islamic Tradition.
4
See Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine, 367 379. See also chapter 10 below.
169
allow the individual to navigate within the domain of multiplicity whilst affirming tawhid. In
participating in the world, and without actively seeking difficulties, the individual who is
attempting to establish a God-centred consciousness can, with an understanding of destiny
(qadar) and decree (qada), reflect on their circumstances so as to see what Allah requires of
them and the reasons for their current situation without relinquishing hope. This encourages
the individual to develop contentment (rida), see below. As a result, there does not appear to
be a world denying attitude that is apparent in other mystical or ascetic traditions, though this
affirmation of the world is not done for its own sake.
For Ibn Ata Allah, soteriological development seems particularly incumbent upon each
individual due to the nobility given solely to the human amongst creation. While it has been
previously seen that humans were created for worship, he cites the verse of Quran which
states that He has made subservient to you, [as a gift] from Himself, all that is in the heavens
and the earth (45: 13). He also mentions that he heard Abul Abbas say Allah said: O son of
Adam, I created all things for your sake, and I created you for Me, so do not become distracted
with what is created for you from Him Whom you are created for.5 On this Ibn Ata Allah
comments that the nobility of the human over other than him among the creatures is the fact
that the creatures are created for his sake, and he is created for the Presence of Allah,6 from
which it can be seen that the purpose of creation is to aid in embodying the metaphysics of
tawhid.
However, for the majority it is unclear how creation aids in embodying the metaphysics of
tawhid. For this it becomes necessary to develop a hermeneutic tool which allows the
individual to be able to read the signs (ayat) as the Quran states: We shall make them fully
understand Our messages (ayat) [through what they perceive] in the utmost horizons [of the
universe] and within themselves, so that it will become clear unto them that this [revelation] is
indeed the truth (41: 53). Within this verse it can be seen that the Koran refers to all things as
signs (ayat) of God, which is to say that Koranically, the meaning of things is determined by
the mode in which they signify the God7 and that the Divine Speech guides through its signs
(ayat) or verses, just as the cosmos which is also the Speech of God, articulated within the
5
6
Ibid., 122.
7
William C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 3.
170
Breath of the All-merciful gives news of God through its signs, which are the phenomena of
nature.8 In order for individuals to be able to read the signs (ayat) on the horizons and within
themselves Ibn Ata Allah displays and encourages the development of what is here being
termed a soteriological semiotics. It is a study of semiotics in that it examines creation in such a
way as to determine the mode in which they signify the God and it is soteriological in that this
study of symbols aims to bring about the perception and embodiment of the metaphysics of
tawhid.
As Ibn Ata Allahs goal is to lead people to a correct understanding of Allahs signs, he does not
explicitly discuss those individuals who fail to reach the soteriological goal. There are two
possible ways that an individual can fall short of consciously embodying tawhid either a) they
are attempting to and die before it is achieved or b) they do not even attempt any sort of
soteriological development. Of these two cases, the condition of the latter is easier to assess for
the Quran states
Say: Shall we tell you who are the greatest losers in whatever they may do?
[It is] they whose labour has gone astray in [the pursuit of no more than] this
worlds life, and who none the less think that they are doing good works; it is
they who have chosen to deny their Sustainers messages (ayat) and the
truth that they are destined to meet Him. Hence all their [good] deeds come
to nought, and no weight shall We assign them on resurrection Day. (18: 103
105)
The literal meaning of this Quranic verse is clear in stating that those who do not attempt to
develop a soteriological semiotics by denying their Sustainers messages (ayat) will have to
contend with it in the hereafter. The case of those who fall short in their soteriological
development is not so clear. That these people do not deny their Sustainers messages (ayat)
then their condition is different from the former group. Given Ibn Ata Allahs focus on Allahs
attributes of mercy it is conceivable that he would quote the Hadith that the reward of deeds
depends upon the intentions,9 which would increase the possibility that people in this
condition would be included amongst those who attain to faith and do righteous deeds the
gardens of paradise will be there to welcome them (18: 107). However, Ibn Ata Allah would
8
Chittick, Sufi Path, XV.
9
Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, # 1.
171
be cautious to add Allah knows (Allahu alam) for theirs is a condition that cannot be
reasonably known about.
Signs (ayat) in the Quran
The Quran provides insight into the semiotic schemata by repeatedly mentioning Allahs signs
(ayat). The Quran states that among His signs are the night and the day, as well as the sun
and the moon: [hence,] adore not the sun or the moon, but prostrate yourselves in adoration
before God, who has created them - if it is Him whom you [really] worship (41: 37), the
creation of the heavens and the earth, and of all the living creatures which He has caused to
multiply throughout them (42: 29), the ships that sail like [floating] mountains through the
seas (42: 32), and how He gives life to the earth after it had been lifeless (30: 50). The
highlighting of His signs is not arbitrary for never did We send those signs for any other
purpose than to convey a warning (17: 59). However, these signs (ayat) are not always readily
apparent and require the exercise and development of faculties latent within the human being
for the Quran states that We have made all the signs manifest unto people who are endowed
with inner certainty (2: 118), We have indeed made the signs [thereof] clear unto you, if you
would but use your reason (3: 118), and that on earth there are signs [of Gods existence,
visible] to all who are endowed with inner certainty (51:20). The necessity for developing a
soteriological semiotics is evident in the verse which states that verily, in all this there are
messages indeed for those who can read the signs (15:75). Ibn Ata Allah states that created
entities are the mirrors of the [divine] attributes,10 thus, it could be said that the signs (ayat)
of God are those manifestations of the divine reality that make up the cosmos.11 By
understanding these signs it becomes possible to affirm unity (tawhid) through multiplicity.
It could be said that Ibn Ata Allahs task, at least as far as his writings are concerned, is to
develop the individuals potential to be amongst those who can read the signs. For this Ibn
Ata Allah enjoins on his readers to reflect upon the Quran. The reason for this is twofold, a) in
as far as it is composed of verses (ayat), it is to be considered the book of signs (ayat) and b) the
10
11
William C. Chittick, Spectrums of Islamic Thought: Said al-Din Farghani on the Implications of Oneness and
Manyness, in The Heritage of Sufism: The Legacy of Persian Sufism (1150 1500), ed. Lenard Lewisohn (Oxford:
Oneworld, 1999), 212.
172
symbolic interplay is, at times, more overt than within creation.12 To begin with, when reciting
the Quran, Ibn Ata Allah enjoins the individual to consider in you recitation what qualities
and attributes God praises therein, the ones with which He describes those servants of His
whom He loves ... and see what God Most High reproves in the Quran for God Most High did
not mention them to you ... except to have you act accordingly.13 Whilst this instruction
involves reflection on that which explicitly meets with Allahs approval/disproval, it provides an
entry point to further reflection upon the symbolic content of the Quran. He cites specific
examples of this as including those who, whenever they are moved to anger, readily forgive
(42: 37) and whom later may reach the point where they hold in check their anger (3: 134).14
It is important to note that this reflection is not simply idle, for in acting accordingly Ibn Ata
Allah is reiterating that the purpose of knowledge is action.15 In order to enact such
knowledge it is useful to remember that Muhammad was described as a walking Quran for a)
it highlights a clear example of where the knowledge in the Quran has been put into action and
b) it provides a resource or model of how creation, with their inherent ontological contingency,
through action, come to embody the metaphysics of tawhid, as the Quran states in the
Apostle of God you have a good example (33: 21).
Signs (ayat) upon the horizons and within themselves
The ability to read Allahs signs has a singular end. The Quran states that in time We shall
make them fully understand Our messages [through what they perceive] in the utmost horizons
[of the universe] and within themselves, so that it will become clear unto them that this
[revelation] is indeed the truth (41: 53). Furthermore, the Quran states that anyone who
honours the symbols set up by God [shall know that] verily, these [symbols derive their value]
from the God-consciousness in the [believers] hearts (22:32). The challenge of developing a
soteriological semiotics is in correctly honouring, or interpreting, the symbols set up by God
12
Regarding these two points Chittick, Sufi Path, XV, writes that the revealed, written Speech can be more readily
understood than the revealed, cosmic Speech and for this reason it provides the key through which opening
can take place the opening of the door to comprehension of the signs within the macrocosm and microcosm, the
universe around us and within us.
13
14
15
Ibid., 23. See Chapter 6 above.
173
for once this is achieved it will become clear unto them that this [revelation] is indeed the
truth. In grappling with this issue, Ibn Ata Allah asks how can created entities bring about
the knowledge of Him when He is the One who has brought about knowledge of them?16
The challenge of correctly interpreting the signs of Allah is further complicated given the
metaphysics of tawhid. Everything is a sign of Allah for He appears even in those entities
through which He is veiled.17 Ibn Ata Allah comments on this, stating that the truth has thus
been veiled from His servants by the very magnificence of His appearance, while their sight has
been prevented from witnessing Him by the very brilliance of His light.18 In order to resolve
this issue it is useful to bracket off the various domains, as has been done here, even though
such bracketing is artificial. Ontologically each creation is a sign of Allah, though it is only
through the epistemic outlook of the individual that the semiotic value of said creation is
determined. Furthermore, the soteriological development of the individual may foreground
particular signs (ayat), at the expense of others, in order to highlight certain areas of
development.
Soteriological Development
For Ibn Ata Allah, as humans were created noble, each individual has the potential for
regaining their nobility. Commenting on the Quranic verse We have conferred dignity on the
children of Adam, and borne them over land and sea, and provided for them sustenance out of
the good things of life, and favoured them far above most of Our creation (17: 70), Ibn Ata
Allah states that the substance of man was originally created noble and honourable and as
there was honour in the original prototype, then mans being purified is in accordance with his
prototype, while his being defiled is in opposition to his original prototype.19 On this the
Quran states We create man in the best conformation, and thereafter We reduce him to the
lowest of the low (95: 4 5). While this can be read as a cosmological description of creations
descent (tanazzul), soteriologically it shows a) that the humans inherent disposition is in the
16
Ibid., 54.
17
Ibid., 49.
18
Ibid., 52.
19
174
best conformation and b) that, for the generality, this conformation has been, temporally, lost
as they are the lowest of the low. That the soteriological goal is to regain the best
conformation becomes apparent in the verse directly following, which states excepting only
such as attain to faith and do good works: and theirs shall be a reward unending (95: 6).
Faith can be understood as affirming la ilaha illallah and good works would be those that
are consistent with ones faith and as such would follow the prophetic example.
The process of attaining to faith and doing good works, for Ibn Ata Allah, means affirming
tawhid. Quoting the verse those who ascribe divinity to aught besides God are nothing but
impure (9: 28), Ibn Ata Allah states that impurity is in opposition to the prototype, and his
being who affirms the Oneness of God necessitates purity to begin with, because he is in
conformity with the prototype.20 This is further confirmed in his statements that amongst the
signs of success at the end is the turning to God at the beginning and He who is illumined at
the beginning is illumined at the end.21 Thus, the process of soteriological development
involves affirming the Oneness of Allah through embodying the metaphysics of tawhid.
Without the individuals adherence to the law (Sharia) wavering, its pedagogical function
means that the relationship to the law (Sharia) changes with soteriological development. Ibn
Ata Allah writes that each individual
must not practice dissimulation but must observe the code of conduct of the
Law, both in its minor and major points, if he knows them. If he does not
know them, then with respect to every situation in which he finds himself, he
asks, What does the Law prescribe therein? Whosoever betrays the code of
the Law is more likely to betray the divine secrets. God Most High only
bestows His secrets on the trustworthy.22
In the beginning, adherence to the law (Sharia) aids in curbing the egos inclinations. This, in
turn, moves to manifesting good actions, namely those prescribed by the law, and abstaining
from bad actions. Once the egos inclinations have been curbed, it becomes possible to realise
that adherence to the law (Sharia) is an affirmation of tawhid. This is partly because, as Abul
20
Ibid., 158.
21
22
175
Hassan states, the Quran and Sunna is guaranteed by God Most High23 and in adhering to the
Divine law the individual curbs to the point of effacing the egos inclinations in preference to a
God-centred consciousness.
The Soteriological Function of Knowledge
As mentioned in chapter 3, the metaphysics of tawhid requires a radically different

epistemological framework than that normally utilised in engaging with creation. This is
because it is founded on Allahs Unity, rather than treating the multiplicity of creation as
fundamental. From this it is apparent that knowledge is crucial for soteriological development.
While it has been mentioned that the purpose of knowledge is action,24 Ibn Ata Allah further
states that when knowledge (ilm) is mentioned in the Quran or in the statements of the
Messenger of God, it refers to that knowledge which is beneficial, which suppresses passionate
craving, and suppresses [earthly desires], and which is attended by reverent fear and
repentance.25 The kind of knowledge that Ibn Ata Allah sees being referred to is that which
lessens a self-centred consciousness so that it can be replaced with a God-centred
consciousness, for Gods path is far from discord and from the manifestations of the egos
inclinations.26 In support of this point he quotes the verse of all His servants, only such as are
endowed with knowledge stand [truly] in awe of God (35: 28), indicating the intimate
connection between servanthood (ubudiyyah) and being endowed with knowledge.27
Knowledge is transformative in as far as its acquisition affects the individuals interaction with
creation and because it has the potential to affect it is soteriological.
For soteriological development, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen to be advocating a radical re-
orientation of the epistemological framework. The affirmation and embodiment of tawhid,
23
24
25
Ibid., 22.
26
27
176
which is central to soteriological development, requires an epistemological, rather than
ontological, shift for
Your union with God is union through knowledge of Him (al-ilmu bihi).
Otherwise, God is beyond being united with anything or anything being
united with Him.28
The importance of this statement cannot be underestimated as it cuts to the centre of the anti-
Sufi polemic and undermines one of the main accusations levelled against the Sufis, namely the
accusation of unity with Allah (ittihad), used in attempts to illustrate Sufisms supposedly
heterodox views. Without denying that claims of unity (ittihad) have abounded within the
history of Islam, it is clear from Ibn Ata Allahs statement that claims of ontological unity are
not consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid and are therefore invalid. Ibn Ata Allah
undermines any accusation of ontological unity with Allah (ittihad) by indicating that it is only
through an epistemological shift, through knowledge of Him (al-ilmu bihi), that an individual
can willingly integrate the metaphysics of tawhid into their ontological contingency.
Arriving at the Qualities of the faqir
For Ibn Ata Allah, realising the metaphysics of tawhid can be simply stated. Succinctly stated,
the soteriological process and goal is to cling to the attributes of His Lordship and realise the
attributes of your servanthood.29 In unpacking this statement it becomes apparent that an
aspect of realising servanthood (ubudiyyah) involves a conscious awareness of creations
inherent ontological poverty, for which the company of the faqir, as was mentioned previously,
is indispensible.
While Ibn Ata Allah is not alone in indicating that there are two paths to Allah, his intention of,
and reasons for, focusing on one rather than the other is clear. These two paths are those of
the spiritual wayfarers (al-salikin) and the divinely possessed (al-majdhubin). The former type is
categorised by the saint who has allied himself with God30 and comes about through sincere
28
29
Ibid., 125.
30
177
effort for God and loyalty to Him in pursuit of His reward.31 The latter is categorised by the
saint with whom God has allied Himself32 and comes about through annihilation to everything
other than God, while remaining present in everything through God.33 As the divinely
possessed (al-majdhubin) are taken by Allah, rather than arriving at Allah through work, Ibn
Ata Allah states that the first might be thought of as a lesser sainthood, as it were, and the
second, as a greater sainthood,34 though this is an imperfection, because God, may He be
praised, only revealed the kingdom in order that He might be seen therein such that if
someone is absent to the created universe, he will likewise be absent to the vision of the Truth
therein.35 According to Ibn Ata Allah, to be annihilated to everything other than Allah is to
miss the soteriological function of creations for created entities were not set up in order for
you to see them, but rather, in order for you to see their Master within them such that if
someone is absent to the created universe, he will likewise be absent to the vision of Truth
therein.36 On this point the Quran, in stating for, all who ally themselves with God and His
Apostle and those who have attained to faith - behold, it is they, the partisans of God, who shall
be victorious (5: 56), can be seen to affirm the view each individual allying themselves with
Allah and achieving nearness through consistent efforts at attaining to faith is the higher of the
two paths to Allah.
For Ibn Ata Allah, soteriological development involves adherence to a definite and established
order. He encourages his readers engage in spiritual discipline, namely, in refining moral
character, in avoiding levity, and in bearing wrong for it is rare that any good fortune can
come from him whose illumination precedes his spiritual discipline.37 Thus, soteriological
development involves a rigorous process that is intimately connected with the development of
good moral character (adab). Commenting on what it means for those who ally themselves
with God (5: 56), Ibn Ata Allah states that your alliance with God emerges from spiritual
31
Ibid., 48.
32
Ibid., 41.
33
Ibid., 48.
34
Ibid., 42.
35
Ibid., 48.
36
Ibid., 48.
37
178
warfare, your alliance with His Apostle emerges from your emulation of his Sunnah, and your
alliance with those who believe emerges from you imitations of the imams.38 From this it can
be seen that alliance with Allah requires moving from a self-centred consciousness to a God-
centred consciousness which is evident in the Prophetic example and is achieved through
adherence to the Prophetic example, as can be seen in those most knowledgeable of the
Prophetic example. From another perspective, with regard to the divinely possessed (al-
majdhubin), being annihilated to everything other than God,39 it is considered rare that any
good fortune can come from him whose illumination precedes his spiritual discipline40 because
they do not fulfil the obligations of creation in that they are absent to the created universe.41
Whilst it is necessary to struggle in order to achieve soteriological development, Ibn Ata Allah
indicates that it is not as a result of the individuals struggle that soteriological development
occurs. He states,
If you were to be united with Him only after the extinction of your vices and
the effacement of your pretensions, you would never be united with Him.
Instead, when He wants to unite you to Himself, He covers your attribute
(wasf) with His Attribute and hides your quality (nat) with His Quality. And
thus He unites you to Himself by virtue of what comes from Him to you, not
by virtue of what goes from you to Him.42
This statement can be taken to indicate that the ontological error of the perception of
independence, being an aspect inherent in contingency, does not leave the individual. The
perception that soteriological development is the result of the individuals effort is false, as can
be seen in the case with the divinely possessed (al-majdhubin), for it posits causative power
with the individual who, as was previously stated, is ontologically poor. In order for the
metaphysics of tawhid to be maintained throughout the process of soteriological development,
the individual is required to adhere to an epistemic framework that maintains that any effort
38
39
Ibid., 48.
40
41
42
179
expended is bestowed on the individual by Allah as He unites you to Himself by virtue of what
comes from Him to you, not by virtue of what goes from you to Him.43
Similarly, Ibn Ata Allah is aware that this perceived ontological independence can result in an
epistemological error that hinders soteriological development. He states that
It is not the existence of any being alongside of Him (wujud mawjud maah)
that veils you from God, for nothing (la shaya) is alongside of Him. Rather,
the illusion of a being alongside of Him (tawahhum mawhud maah) is what
veils you from Him.44
The faulty perception of Allah is not the result of an ontological entity but rather the attribution
of existence to some such entity. The perception of ontological entities alongside of Allahs
ontic manifestation results from an epistemological error of apprehending the implications of
the metaphysics of tawhid. In order to avoid perpetuating the soteriologically stagnant cycle of
moving from creature to creature, like the above mentioned donkey at the mill,45 it is
necessary to deploy a soteriological semiotics that sees the Cosmos (al-kawn) illumined only
by the manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.46 For Ibn Ata Allah this is a Quranic
injunction, as he states
He has permitted you to reflect on what is in created being but He has not
allowed you to stop at the selfsame creatures. Say: Behold what is in the
heavens and the earth! Thus, with His words Behold what is in the
heavens He opened up the door of instruction to you. But He did not say,
Behold the heavens, so as not to lead you to the mere existence of
bodies.47
43
Ibid., 42.
44
Ibid., 43.
45
Ibid., 31.
46
Ibid., 25.
47
Ibid., 44. Quoting Quran 10: 101.
180
Thus, by advocating for an epistemology that is underpinned by the metaphysics of tawhid, Ibn
Ata Allah can be seen to deploy a method of apprehension that perpetuates soteriological
development.
Contentment (rida) and Soteriological Development
In chapter six the necessity of showing contentment (rida) when faced with difficulty was seen.
The kind of contentment (rida) discussed previously aimed at developing steadfastness through
adversity and focused on events where the individual could not affect the outcome. Yet, Ibn
Ata Allah raises the example of a man [who] was sitting in the shade, and then the sun shone
over the container he was drinking from, but he did not move it.48 His decision not to move it
because he is ashamed to follow my selfs desires by moving it to the shade, while being
indicative of a servant who seeks truthfulness from his self is not indicative of complete
adherence of the Divine.49 This state of contentment (rida) is being utilised in its soteriologically
transformative aspect in that it enjoins steadfastness in opposing a self-centred consciousness.
True contentment (rida) involves adhering to Allahs injunctions, two of which Ibn Ata Allah
raises with regard to this example being God wills that you shall have ease, and does not will
you to suffer hardship (2: 185) and God wants to lighten your burdens: for man was created
weak (4: 28). Given this had his station been perfected he would have lifted the water away
from the sunlight, intending by that the fulfilment of the rights of the self, which Allah ordered
to be fulfilled.50 This would be more in line with Moses actions, having watered a flock of
animals he withdrew into the shade and prayed: O my Sustainer! Verily, in dire need am I of
any good which Thou mayest bestow upon me (28: 24), for this indicates both fulfilling the
rights of the self and displaying trust (tawakkul) and contentment (rida) with Allahs choice of
the good bestowed, which the individual has no choice in. Furthermore, Ibn Ata Allah relays
this incident indicating the soteriological benefit of keeping the water cool:
Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan said: My Shaykh said, My Son, cool the water. If you
drink other than cold water you will say praise be to Allah (Alhamdulillah)
out of a sense of obligation but without feeling. But if you drink cool water
48
49
Ibid., 102.
50
Ibid., 102.
181
and say praise be to Allah each and every one of you organs will respond to
the Benevolence of Allah with praise.51
Thus, in avoiding unnecessary hardship there is soteriological benefit for a) it affirms a Divine
injunction, b) by being unburdened the individuals resolve for further soteriological
development is not weakened, and c) it eases the development of contentment (rida) by
satisfying the body with that which is pleasant.
The Pedagogical Function of the Problem of Rizq
Given what has been said of the problem of rizq in the preceding chapters, the existence of this
problem makes sense when seen in light of soteriological development. The problem of rizq has
been seen to arise within the ontological domain. Due to creations inherent contingency, it is
an epistemological problem that can be seen to result from the conflation of the metaphysical
and ontological domains. The existence of this problem seems to be connected with changing
the condition of the individual for the hereafter, which is achieved through correct
comportment within the herenow. Whilst this is an aspect of the problem of rizq, given Ibn Ata
Allahs overarching concern, that of soteriological development, the preceding seems
insufficient. If this was the case then the inhabitants of paradise would receive Allahs enduring
provision and the inhabitants of hell would be deprived of it. Yet, given that Ibn Ata Allahs
view is that deprivation (al-man) hurts you only because of the lack of your understanding of
God in it,52 in the case of the inhabitants of hell, they are receiving both the provision of hell
and the provision of being deprived of inhabiting paradise.
Whilst rizq embraces all aspects of creation, at its highest levels it has a strictly soteriological
function. Giving a sort of typology of rizq Ibn Ata Allah writes that
Sustenance of the outer man comes from the movements of the body;
sustenance of the inner man comes from the movements of the heart;
spiritual sustenance of ones most interior being is through tranquillity; and
51
Ibid., 104.
52
182
the sustenance of the intellect is through extinction of ones consciousness of
tranquillity, so that the servant is tranquil for God and with God.53
Whilst these can be seen as differing kinds of rizq, operating on different levels, they can also
be seen as differing conceptions of rizq according to soteriological development. The
individuals tranquillity for God can be seen to engage the ethical and epistemological
domains in as far as doing something for God implies injunctions that a) are to be followed,
hence are ethical injunctions and b) requires knowledge of why and for whom these injunctions
are being carried out, hence a shift in the epistemological paradigm of the individual. The
individuals tranquillity with God can be seen as covering the epistemological and ontological
domains in that being with God implies a) knowledge of how the individuals mode of being
can willingly reintegrate them in accord with Allah, thus involving an epistemological shift and
b) the congruence of being with implies acceptance of creations ontological disposition. This
can be seen to culminate in the extinction of ones consciousness which draws the individual
back to the metaphysical domain in that in accepting creations ontological contingency results
in a shift away from a self-centred consciousness to a focus on the metaphysics of tawhid and
the development of a God-centred consciousness. Thus, in this short passage Ibn Ata Allah
describes a hierarchy through which the problem of rizq can take an individual in order that
they may ultimately affirm the Unicity of Allah (tawhid).
The Problem of rizq as a Sign (ayat)
From the above discussion it is apparent that the existence of the problem of rizq is one of the
signs of Allah. In being a sign (ayat) it functions to inform the individual of their relation with
Allah and their affirmation and embodiment of tawhid. In affirming and embodying tawhid the
individual must come to a position where they realise their complete dependence on Allah and
defer from contesting with the Divine will through self-direction (tadbir) for God grants
sustenance unto whom He wills, beyond all reckoning (2: 212). Provision, like all other aspects
of creation, is a sign (ayat) indicative of the individuals relation with Allah and its bestowal,
whether given or withheld, can be seen to come such that the individual is given the greatest
possible potential of affirming tawhid. The lack of trust on Allahs bestowal of provision, due to
a misunderstanding of the function of the problem of rizq, is easily recognised for one of the
53
183
signs of relying on ones own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall occurs.54 Regarding
this Ibn Ata Allah can be considered to be expanding this point when he states that
Know that the people of insight consider [self-direction] tadbir with Allah to
be a form of contention with His Lordship. And that is because if He makes
some undesirable affair descend upon you which you want lifted, or if He lifts
away some desirable affair which you want Him to set down with you, or if
you accuse Him of neglecting something you know He has taken charge of
and established for you (like sustenance), then all that is considered
contending with His Lordship, and leaving the reality of pure servanthood.55
Thus, the existence of the problem of rizq is to act as a sign (ayat) which affirms creations
ontological poverty and inherent contingency. As a result, the problem of rizq can be seen to an
entry point, for those who delve into it, into soteriological development.
The Solution to the Problem of rizq
At the opening of the Lataif al-Minan Ibn Ata Allah states to God, exulted is He, do I turn for
aid, upon Him do I rely God is our sufficiency.56 In this statement two things are apparent,
firstly, the key to the solution to the problem of rizq, secondly, evidence that Ibn Ata Allah had
solved this problem. In turning to, and relying on, Allah, Ibn Ata Allah is echoing an opening
verse of the Quran, Thee alone do we worship; and unto Thee alone do we turn for aid (1: 5).
This verse is recited repeatedly throughout the day by Muslims everywhere. Yet, unless they
are willing to undergo soteriological development, this verse will merely describe an
unavoidable ontological condition. If the individual is to make this declaration along with the
epistemological implications that it has, then the individual will have reached the point where
they cannot but stretch out your hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-
Muti) amongst them is your Lord57 because God is our sufficiency.58 Allah is sufficient for
the individual in as far as they are aware of Him.
54
55
56
57
184
For the individual to find their epistemological sufficiency in Allah,59 the individual is required to
realise, know, and remember that what comes to them through creation ultimately comes to
them from Allah. Regarding this, Ibn Ata Allah states that verily, the remembrance of God
Most High is the key to salvation and the lamp of souls60 as remembrance of Allah (dhikr)
involves both the awareness of tawhid and creations contingency. Furthermore, as tawhid and
creations contingency are constant irrespective of the individuals soteriological development,
they cannot be ignored or forgotten. For this reason, the remembrance of God is the
foundation of the Path and the pivotal support of the realised sages.61 As a result, the
remembrance or invocation of Allah is necessary as the invocation is the nourishment of the
soul just as food is the nourishment of the body.62 Invocation, or the practice of remembrance
(dhikr), involves the process through which the individual comes to the constant awareness of
their inherent contingency and Allahs Oneness, for invoking polishes the heart of its rust,
which is forgetfulness (ghaflah) and the pursuit of its passions.63 Forgetfulness of creations
ontological poverty is a prime hurdle that is to be overcome in order for the affirmation and
embodiment of tawhid.
That the individual was created to worship Allah alone is the means and goal of soteriological
development. It is the means of soteriological development in that through a deepening
sincerity of practice the individual embodies their inherent ontological contingency, which, in
turn, makes possible the virtues discussed in the preceding chapters, such as trust, certainty,
contentment, patient endurance, and obedience, amongst others. In attempting to bring about
an epistemology that relegates creation to an ontological position consistent with the
metaphysics of tawhid, the individual takes on a particular ethical comportment that, rather
58
59
It is necessary to differentiate between the individuals ontological sufficiency, which due to the metaphysics of
tawhid, comes from Allah without the option of another source, and the individuals epistemological sufficiency,
which can either be directly Allah or indirectly Allah as the individual attempts to full their existence with
contingent things unaware that they have ultimately comes from Allah.
60
61
Ibid., 43.
62
Ibid., 74.
63
Ibid., 74.
185
than diminishing once established, increases to the point where they are said to have reached a
stage of servanthood. Servanthood is marked by a greater degree of worship because the
individual, in embodying tawhid both unwillingly, through their ontological existence, and
willingly, through their epistemological realisation and acceptance of their existence, realises
that unto God do we belong and, verily, unto Him we shall return (2: 156) and Allah alone will
suffice for any and all needs.
The solution to the problem of rizq is for the individual to find their sufficiency in Allah. Due to
the contingent nature of creatures, sufficiency cannot be found in creation, as Ibn Ata Allah
recognises in stating travel not from creature to creature, otherwise you will be like a donkey
at the mill: roundabout he turn, his goal the same as his departure.64 The journey from
creature to creature is never-ending and unfulfilling because the Cosmos (al-kawn) is all
darkness,65 however the individual is saved from remaining relegated to the lowest of low
(95: 5) and can regain their potentiality of the best conformation (95: 4) solely because the
Cosmos is illumed only by the manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.66 Allahs signs (ayat)
within creation are not arbitrary, and Ibn Ata Allah advises that the individual do[es] not look
forward to being free from alterities (al-aghyar), for that is indeed what cuts you off from
vigilant attention (al-muraqaba) to Him in that very state He has assigned to you.67 Nor is
there a lack of provision, for He does not give them sustenance except as a result of His
knowledge that the state in which they are is not actually due to themselves for rather, it is
due to God68 In that very state He has assigned you is all the provision (rizq) necessary for
realising, affirming, and willingly embodying Allahs Oneness (tawhid) and creations poverty
(faqr). Thus, to say, along with Ibn Ata Allah, that God is our sufficiency69 is to realise that
the problem of rizq is only a problem in as far as the individual has yet to find their sufficiency
with Allah.
64
65
Ibid., 25.
66
Ibid., 25.
67
Ibid., 27.
68
69
186
Chapter 10 - Ibn Ata Allah and Islamic Orthodoxy
This work has thus far has attempted to elucidate Ibn Ata Allahs worldview. In doing so his
commitment to Islam has been highlighted through foregrounding his utilisation of the primary
texts of Islamic orthodoxy, the Quran and the Hadith, and how indebted his work is to an
Islamic paradigm. Another approach can be made to further support claims for Ibn Ata Allahs
orthodoxy. Given the emphasis that has been placed on Ibn Ata Allahs supposed opposition to
Ibn Taymiyya one could be led to believe that Ibn Ata Allah held heterodox views, given Ibn
Taymiyyas fervour for opposing what he saw to be heretical beliefs. However, this chapter will
attempt to show that, far from being heterodox, Ibn Ata Allah agrees with Ibn Taymiyyas
opposition of such beliefs, as he too would consider them to be heretical. However, Ibn Ata
Allah does disagree with Ibn Taymiyya on who can be deemed to have held such beliefs. Given
the view, held by many both historically and today, that Ibn Taymiyya is a champion of Islamic
orthodoxy, Ibn Ata Allahs support of such view would further strengthen claims of Ibn Ata
Allahs orthodoxy.1
Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are generally considered to be opponents. This position is
based on the formers support and the latters rebuttal of specific Sufi tenets. There is also the
fact that Ibn Ata Allah provided evidence which contributed indirectly to Ibn Taymiyyas
imprisonment. Ibn Ata Allah supposed opposition to Ibn Taymiyya, more often than not,
overshadows Ibn Ata Allahs achievements. This chapter utilises the text of the alleged debate
between these two, which is said to have occurred upon Ibn Taymiyyas release from prison, to
foreground and assess Ibn Ata Allahs position with regard to his relationship with Ibn
Taymiyya. Irrespective of the historical authenticity of this debate, the text is important
because it touches on several key issues within Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre.
This chapter has two main sections. The first surveys the modern scholarly literature, showing
that it generally overstates Ibn Ata Allahs opposition to Ibn Taymiyya. In re-examining their
relationship, it becomes possible to see that, rather than having a strict opposition, their
differences are due to different ontologies. The second utilises the key issues raised by Ibn
1
This in no way suggests that Ibn Taymiyya can be viewed as a paradigm of Islamic orthodoxy for criticisms of his
works abound, though to detail them would take us too far afield and these accusations do not detract from the
issues detailed here.
187
Taymiyya against the Sufis in the text of the debate. It will be seen that, rather than hitting his
target, Ibn Taymiyyas accusations stem from an ontology foreign to Ibn Ata Allahs works.
Crucial in highlighting their differences is the role given to the Unicity of Allah (tawhid). It will be
shown that Ibn Taymiyyas criticisms elicit from a misunderstanding of the Sufi approach to
tawhid, of which Ibn Ata Allah is an advocate. Rather than dismissing Ibn Taymiyyas concerns,
Ibn Ata Allah agrees with his interlocutor that individuals who hold such views deserve to be
rebuked as heterodox, however that such accusations need to be aimed correctly.
Without denying that they were opponents, this traditional reading maybe overly strong which
imposes a limited and limiting interpretation on some of Ibn Ata Allahs comments. While it is
documented that Ibn Ata Allah, amongst others, marched against Ibn Taymiyya,2 this
opposition has been taken further and read into the formers works. An example of this is Ibn
Ata Allah criticism of strictly exoteric interpretations of Islamic law. Without dismissing the
possibility that Ibn Taymiyya is implied within these comments, it should be remembered that
in his youth Ibn Ata Allah was of the view that beyond the letter of the Law there is nothing
else to seek,3 that is, a strictly literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine. With this in mind, it is
possible that Ibn Ata Allah, in his comments cautioning his readers against the shallow-
minded doctors of Islamic exoterism,4 is referring to the folly of his youth, as well as those
inclined towards such views and particular figures whose interpretation he disagrees with. The
limited and limiting interpretation of this phrase alone gives good reason to delve into and re-
examine the relationship and debate between these two figures.
The Opposition between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya
Of the events of Ibn Ata Allahs life, those surrounding the trial, imprisonment, and
subsequent release of Ibn Taymiyya all but obscure the other aspects of Ibn Ata Allahs life. It
has been stated that the most remarkable event in his [Ibn Ata Allahs] life was his
2
Makdisi, Ibn Ata Allah, 723; Henri Laoust, Ibn Taymiyya, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 1971), vol. III, 952; Shoshan, Popular Culture, 16.
3
4
Ibid., 26.
188
confrontation with the Hanbali theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyya.5 Ibn Ata Allah is
conventionally regarded as having been doctrinally opposed to Ibn Taymiyya, in much the
same way as Ibn Taymiyya is usually regarded as having disapproved of Sufism and the Sufis
with the best-known conventional accounts [giving] scant indication that this view might be
questioned.6 He has been called one of the foremost adversaries of the Hanbali jurist and
theologian,7 one of the most vigorous opponents of Ibn Taymiyya,8 and is considered to be
among the most vociferous critics of Ibn Taymiyya.9 It is said that Ibn Taymiyyas very first
fatwa at Cairo, which was directed against the cult of the saints, earned him the enduring
hostility of two personages, Ibn Ata Allah al-Iskandari (d. 709 AH) and Karim ad-Din al-Amuli10
and that Ibn Taymiyya was attacked by the Alexandrian [Ibn] Ata Allah al-Iskandari ... one of
al-Shadhilis fervent disciples.11 Furthermore, assertions that Ibn Ata Allah made a lasting
contribution to the consolidation and expansion of the Shadhiliyya tariqa by the leading role he
played in defending Sufi beliefs against their detractors and that Ibn Ata Allah made a name
for himself as an articulate and determined defender of Sufi beliefs against these attacks [by
Ibn Taymiyya]12 all but ignores all other achievements of Ibn Ata Allah. Such comments seem
to make Ibn Ata Allah a footnote in the life of Ibn Taymiyya, despite the fact that Ibn Ata
Allah is rarely mentioned in the literature regarding the latter. They further overlook the fact
that Ibn Ata Allahs march against Ibn Taymiyya occurred during one of the last few years of
his life, obscuring all earlier achievements, amongst which is the composition of the Kitab al-
Hikam, which was completed during the life of his Shaykh and has, since its composition, been
widely held in high regard.
5
Sambur, Prayer in the Psychology, 196.
6
Julian Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt: The Battle for Islamic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996), 104.
7
Makdisi, Ibn Ata Allah, 722.
8
Carl Brockelmann, Ibn Ata Allah, in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 147.
9
John Renard, Historical Dictionary of Sufism (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), 115 16.
10
Muhammad U. Memon, Ibn Taimiyas Struggle Against Popular Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), 54.
11
Ibid., 341 n.152.
12
Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, Muslim Communities of Grace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 110. This view
is partially supported by Austin, Counsels, 207, who states that the Qasd al-mujarrad was written partly in
answer to Ibn Taymiyyas attack on the practice of dhikr or the invocation of the divine Name.
189
One of the main events used to support Ibn Ata Allahs opposition to Ibn Taymiyya is his being
at the head of a march in protest against the latter. He is known to have supported the charges
that led to the latters arrest in 707 AH/1308 CE13 and was at the head of a vast stream of
hundreds of fuqara and Shaykhs ... [who] confronted Ibn Taymiyya under the watchful eyes of
the religious authorities.14 Another account states that a crowd of over 500 commoners (al-
amma) joined Ibn Ata Allah and the master of the Sufi khanqah of Said as Suada in their
march to the Citadel ... to protest against Ibn Taymiyya.15 The historian Ibn Kathir reported
that in the presence of the authorities (al-dawla) ... Ibn Ata [Allah al-Sikandari] made a
number of accusations against [Ibn Taymiyya], none of which was proven.16 However,
contemporary accounts of their opposition are often too simplistic despite a lack of historical
evidence. In considering the content and tone of Ibn Ata Allahs works, it appears implausible
that words as strong as adversary17 or vociferous critic18 can be applied unquestioningly.
Furthermore, the text of their alleged debate, as it stands,19 presents its own difficulties.20 One
of these issues is that Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are too polite,21 so much so that it is
with reluctance that the text of their alleged encounter is referred to as a debate in the
13
Makdisi, Ibn Ata Allah, 722 23.
14
15
Shoshan, Popular Culture, 16.
16
Ibn Kathir in Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, 105.
17
Makdisi, Ibn Ata Allah, 722.
18
Renard, Dictionary of Sufism, 116.
19
Translated in Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine, 367 79.
20
There are dramatically opposing positions regarding this text. Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, 108, writes
that the origin of this dialogue remains something of a problem due to a lack of reference to it in any of the
histories or biographical works of the period, while Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine, 367, introduces the text as
a historical debate which took place between the two. A further issue is that Johansens, Sufism and Islamic
Reform, 113, discussion of the text hints that there is more to the dialogue than is translated in Kabbani, namely
than beyond where this translation finishes there is a section where Ibn Ata Allah suggests that the two busy
ourselves with matters which are more to the general benefit of the community and he advises that is the Sultan
were to return to power [for] Ibn Taymiyya to go to him in the capacity of an adviser, though this does not
detract from the issues raised here.
21
Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, 108.
190
conventional sense. Also, it would not be a stretch to make a case that Ibn Taymiyya is little
more than a trope, though there are other possible explanations for his curt replies. If, as the
text makes out, this conversation occurred almost immediately after Ibn Taymiyya was
pardoned and released from prison, one would expect the supposed antagonism to be evident.
If the rivalry was rife, as reported, one would expect that they denounce each other rather than
acknowledging that the difference between them is no more than a question of approach and
interpretation.22 Another issue regarding this encounter is that Ibn Taymiyya supposedly
arrived back in Cairo on 8 Shawwal 709 AH/11 March 1310 CE23 while Ibn Ata Allah is
considered to have died in the middle of Jumada II 709 AH/November 1309 CE,24 making it
impossible that their debate occurred upon Ibn Taymiyyas release and return to Cairo if these
dates are correct. Yet, despite these issues, the text of their debate is useful in that it covers
many of the key points of difference between these two scholars.
Ibn Taymiyyas Charges against the Sufis
Ibn Taymiyyas charges against the Sufis that take precedence within the debate with Ibn Ata
Allah fall into three categories, antinomianism, calling for help (istighatha) and seeking a means
(tawassul) other than Allah, and the ideas that individuals can indwell in Allah (hulul) and attain
unity with Allah (ittihad). The charge of antinomianism arises as a result of Ibn Taymiyyas other
charges. Istighatha and tawwasul relate to the affirmation of Allahs unicity (tawhid) and
accusations of associationism (shirk). These two are grouped together because within the
debate Ibn Ata Allah states that istighatha or calling for help is the same as tawassul or
seeking a means and asking for intercession (shifaa) and both he and Ibn Taymiyya agree that
it is the Messenger, on him be peace, [who] is the one whose help is sought since he is our
means and he is the one whose intercession we seek.25 Hulul and ittihad, while related to
tawhid and shirk, depend upon differing conceptions of tawhid to those advocated for by Ibn
Taymiyya. While hulul has several connotations, the kind that Ibn Taymiyya can be seen to be
22
Ibid., 113.
23
Laoust, Ibn Taymiyya, 952. Memon, Ibn Taimiyas Struggle, 57, confirms that Ibn Taymiyya was released from
prison on March 4, 1310 CE.
24
Danner, Key to Salvation, 9. Brockelmann, Ibn Ata Allah, 147, cites the date of Ibn Ata Allahs death as the
th st
16 Djumada II 709 AH/ 21 Nov. 1309 CE.
25
Kabbani, Islamic Belief & Doctrine, 369.
191
arguing against is any doctrine which upholds the idea of Divine incarnation in human form26
for this would mean, amongst other things, that a) there are two eternals, namely God and the
receptive object, and b) God would become divisible through the division of the receptive
object.27 Amongst the different ways ittihad is understood, the sense in which it is rejected by
Ibn Taymiyya is that a thing becomes another while remaining itself such that it can be said
that one is the other and reciprocally, which is problematic within Islamic theology for, when
related to Allah, outlandish claims can be made regarding identity.28 These two are grouped
together because ittihad and hulul are here generally taken as synonymous, and the concept
of a union of divinity with humanity is regarded as contradictory.29 It should be noted that Ibn
Ata Allah does not advocate for any of these issues. Rather, within the text, Ibn Ata Allah can
be seen to be attempting to illustrate how these charges are not applicable to the ontology that
he and those like him advance.
Despite the text being of an alleged debate, there is some historical evidence that the issues
raised were the main issues in Ibn Taymiyyas relationship with Ibn Ata Allah. Regarding
tawassul and istighatha, it is said that following a popular demonstration, he [Ibn Taymiyya]
was summoned where he was questioned on his interpretation of the doctrine of the
intercession of the saints (tawassul; istighatha), as a result of which, while he was authorised
to return to Syria, he was nevertheless held in Cairo and imprisoned for several months.30
Furthermore, it is asserted that following a demonstration by some 500 Sufis at the Cairo
citadel against his teachings on the Ittihadiyya Sufis, Ibn Taymiyya was again brought to trial31
and that in Shawwal 707 AH/1308 CE, he [Ibn Taymiyya] was examined regarding a work which
26
Cyril Glass, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam (London: Stacey International, 1989), 161.
27
Louis Massignon and Georges C. Anawati, hulul, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1971), vol. III, 571.
28
Nicholoson & Anawati, ittihad, 282 83.
29
Ibid., 283.
30
Laoust, Ibn Taymiyya, 952. Regarding the issue of intercession, Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, 106,
argues that Ibn Taymiyya subscribed to a view of intercession which some of his latter-day readers and editors
find difficult to accept and that his views could be taken as being indicative of Sufi inclinations in Ibn Taymiyya
though the work in which he puts forth these views was subjected to an investigative discussion (mihna) at Court
in AH 712, which is after Ibn Ata Allahs death.
31
Donald P. Little, The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya,
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 4 (1973): 312.
192
he had written against the Ittihadiyya,32 indicating that the event involved the charge of
ittihad. Thus, while there is some doubt regarding the text of the alleged debate, the content
that it covers has historical legitimacy.
No attempt is made in this chapter to examine the issues raised by Ibn Taymiyya. These charges
have a long history within Islam and are not confined to Ibn Taymiyya. Nor is there any attempt
to explore their relation to Ibn Taymiyyas work as a whole. The importance of these seemingly
disparate issues, aside from being raised with the debate, is that all three categories of charges
can be seen to depend on two differing conceptions of tawhid. It will be suggested that from
the way these issues are raised by Ibn Taymiyya within the debate, while affirming tawhid, his
conception of tawhid gives an ontological primacy to creation (khalq), whereas Ibn Ata Allahs
conception gives ontological primacy to Allah, with no second.
Tawhid, Allah, and creation (khalq)
One of the key issues within this debate centres on an understanding of tawhid. As seen in
chapter one, tawhid is the act of believing and affirming that God is one and unique
(wahid).33 It is not contended that either of these two figures denied tawhid. However, it is in
the application of the implications of this phrase that Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya can be
seen to differ. While the term is absent from the Quran, the principle that God is single is
definitely proclaimed there in many instances and beyond this the oneness of God is
something which the theologians ... are at pains to demonstrate rationally, with the most
common argument being that of reciprocal hindrance (tamau),34 a method that Ibn Ata
Allah is well acquainted with.
Tawhid can be seen to be at the centre of Ibn Ata Allahs worldview. As it appears within the
text of the alleged debate, the affirmation of tawhid underpins each point. This is evident from
the beginning where Ibn Ata Allah, in response to Ibn Taymiyyas presence, remarks look how
32
Mohammed Cheneb, Ibn Taimiya, in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 151.
33
Daniel Gimaret, tawhid, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), vol. X, 389.
34
Ibid., 389.
193
the Divine plan works itself out35 indicating the ontological primacy the former accords to
Allah. As will be seen, Ibn Ata Allahs conception of tawhid leaves no room for anything
alongside Allah. Without denying the contingent existence of creation, in accordance with Ibn
Ata Allahs conception of tawhid, it would not be possible to assert that his remark gives
precedence to the Creator, and the Divine plan, over the creation (khalq) because this would
place Creator and creation on the same ontological level. Rather, as will be argued, it is the
ramifications of the exclusivity of Allahs unicity that is the mark of difference between Ibn Ata
Allahs and Ibn Taymiyyas conceptions of tawhid. This difference is highlighted by the fact that
Ibn Taymiyya considers istighatha and tawwasul or hulul and ittihad possible for, as will be
argued, this would mean that there is something that has ontological co-existence alongside of
Allah.
For Ibn Taymiyyas accusations to hold, it would seem that he is reading into Ibn Ata Allahs
soteriological cosmography the collapse of formal structures which conflates creation and
Creator. Yet this does not hold for Ibn Ata Allah in that his argument can be construed as
asserting that despite creations dominance within empirical data its cosmographical status is
hierarchically inferior to the position generally assigned to it. Ibn Ata Allahs response appears
to emphasise the hierarchical prominence of Allah, though he is aware that no such hierarchy
formally exists, in order to evoke within his adherents a performative cosmography. On the
other hand, Ibn Ata Allah can be seen as dismissing Ibn Taymiyyas support of formal
structures in as far as it creates a false dichotomy between Creator and creation.
As a result of Allahs ontological primacy, Ibn Ata Allah, and those who share this conception
of tawhid, cannot be charged with istighatha, calling for help, or tawassul, seeking aid, from
other than Allah. Ibn Ata Allah does not respond directly when Ibn Taymiyya questions are
you claiming that I am misguided when I deny the validity of calling on anyone save Allah for aid
(istighatha)36 for it is obvious to both of them that to do so would involve shirk as Ibn
Taymiyya states it smacks of idolatry.37 In seeking evidence for his point, Ibn Taymiyya cites
that the Prophet commanded his cousin Abd Allah Ibn Abbas not to ask of anyone to help
35
Kabbani, Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine, 368 369.
36
Ibid., 369.
37
Ibid., 370.
194
him other than Allah.38 Ibn Ata Allahs response opposes Ibn Taymiyyas conception of
istighatha on several fronts. Firstly, Ibn Ata Allah, in clarifying the example raised by his
opponent, protects Ibn Taymiyya from criticising and imputing shirk on one of the companions
of Muhammad, which is considered blasphemous, by explaining that Muhammad wanted him
[Ibn Abbas] to draw near to Allah not through familial relationship to the Prophet but through
his knowledge.39 This is followed by the challenge is there any Muslim possessed of real faith
and believing in Allah and His Prophet who thinks that there is someone other than Allah who
has autonomous power over events or someone who can reward him for his good deeds and
punish him for his bad deeds other than Allah.40 In posing this question, Ibn Ata Allah can be
seen to be narrowing the scope of their inquiry to those who affirm tawhid which limits Ibn
Taymiyyas response for if he were to reply in the affirmative he would be accused of shirk.
Furthermore, in light of Ibn Ata Allahs conception of tawhid, this question highlights the
subtle difference in the ontologys of Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya. For, if Ibn Taymiyya were
to reply in the affirmative then this would be an implicit denial of Allah being the master of all
possibilities and having power over all possibilities.
The differences between the two ontologies proposed by these two figures are brought to the
foreground in Ibn Ata Allahs example of the sentence this food satisfies my appetite.41 Ibn
Ata Allah queries does the food itself satisfy or is it the case that it is Allah who satisfies
your appetite through the food.42 While Ibn Ata Allahs questions are left open, their
implication is clear. If satiety is ascribed to food, in the same way that aid can be ascribed to
individuals, then, in light of Ibn Ata Allahs conception of tawhid, it must be considered shirk
because it is an ascription of power to something other than Allah. In no way can Ibn Ata Allah
be construed as advocating for a prohibition of food, or, by proxy, on seeking aid from
individuals, for two reasons. Firstly, Ibn Ata Allah acknowledges that Allah satisfies your
appetite through the food,43 indicating the necessity of food. Secondly, Ibn Ata Allah deftly
illustrates that Ibn Taymiyyas position implies a reduction ad absurdum, namely that if
38
Ibid., 370.
39
Ibid., 370.
40
Ibid., 371.
41
Ibid., 371.
42
Ibid., 371.
43
Ibid., 371.
195
istighatha or seeking help is forbidden in the Sharia because it can lead to idolatry, if this is
the case, then we ought to prohibit grapes because they are a means to making wine.44 Food
and aid, like grapes, according to Ibn Ata Allah, are licit as long as they are accompanied with
the awareness and knowledge that it is Allah who satisfies needs through them. This is an
important example of where Ibn Ata Allah admits formal structures while assigning them an
inferior hierarchical importance than Ibn Taymiyya. In arguing against istighatha, Ibn
Taymiyyas position can be seen to imply a subtle form of shirk in that he, in a sense, is either
giving ontological primacy or co-existence to contingent objects, whereas Ibn Ata Allah,
arguing from his understanding of tawhid, presents a position that gives ontological primacy to
Allah alone.
The implications of tawhid for ontology
Another of Ibn Taymiyyas criticisms is that he felt that the conception of tawhid advocated for
by Ibn Ata Allah and others implied antinomianism.45 This accusation can be seen to stem
directly from Ibn Taymiyyas ontology being applied to a conception of tawhid similar to that of
Ibn Ata Allahs. For, if, in accordance with Ibn Taymiyya, one holds that creation has
ontological primacy or co-existence, then, confronted with the position that there is nothing
alongside of Allah, as is held by Ibn Ata Allah and others, it would appear that creation does
not have to do anything to obey Allahs commandments, hence antinomianism. From this,
according to Ibn Taymiyya, follows the idea that man can incarnate Allah (hulul) or attain unity
with Him (ittihad).46 There are two parts to this accusation. Firstly, there are groups who make
claims of hulul and ittihad and Ibn Ata Allah acknowledges the existence of such individuals,
such as the phenomena of pseudo-Sufis,47 and accepts Ibn Taymiyyas criticisms of them.
Secondly, such accusations are understandable if and only if there is a confusion regarding the
ontological domain. If one holds that creation has independent ontological existence, when
confronted with the view that Allah is the sole ontological existent, is liable to make an error
44
Ibid., 371.
45
This, if proven, would be a particularly damaging charge, for it would be indicative of apostacy by those who
hold these views.
46
Ibid., 376.
47
Ibid., 375.
196
equivalent to confusing panentheism with pantheism.48 If Creator and creation is ontologically
conflated, as appears to be the case with Ibn Taymiyya within this debate, then accusations of
creations identity with the Creator are liable to run rife. However, it follows from Ibn Ata
Allahs conception of tawhid that both hulul and ittihad involve forms of associationism (shirk)
in as far as both views posit two existents, the Incarnator and the incarnated, in the case of
hulul, and the identifier and the identified, in the case of ittihad. For this reason Ibn Ata Allah,
and those who share his conception of tawhid, would agree with Ibn Taymiyyas rejection of
both ideas. In this agreement it becomes apparent that Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are not
opponents in the sense of two individuals holding mutually exclusive positions.
Within the text of the debate, Ibn Ata Allah cleverly side steps all possible accusations of
antinomianism. At the beginning of their encounter Ibn Ata Allah queries what is it you know
about me to which Ibn Taymiyya responds that he believes his interlocutor to be a man of
scrupulous piety, abundant learning, integrity and truthfulness in speech and that there is no
one like [Ibn Ata Allah] either in Egypt or Syria who loves Allah more nor who is more self-
effacing in Him nor who is more obedient.49 Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya later states that Ibn
Ata Allah is from the men of Sharia.50 It is important to see that such praise is neither
arbitrary nor self-serving. Ibn Ata Allah narrowed the scope of their discussion to those
believing in Allah and His Prophet who also affirm that only Allah has autonomous power
over events.51 As a result of this their respective positions can be considered to have meaning
in as far as they themselves are included amongst such individuals. In this context an ad
hominem argument is a legitimate rebuttal of ones opponent if it shows them not to believe in
Allah and His Prophet. In eliciting this response from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Ata Allah precludes this
line of argument, with regard to himself, from his opponents arsenal. Ibn Taymiyyas
acknowledgement that Ibn Ata Allah is obedient to Allah and follows the Sharia indicates that
his practices are contrary to antinomianism. Furthermore, as an adherent of the Shadhiliyya,
48
While there may be an argument to be made that Ibn Ata Allahs position is equivalent to panentheism, a claim
that is not strictly being made here, it should be recognized that his views are contrary to process theology. While
the discussion presented within this does not necessarily correspond with the following, an interesting discussion
of panentheism within Islam can be found within Meena Sharify-Funk and William Rory Dickson, Traces of
Panentheism in Islam: Ibn al-arabi and the Kaleidoscope of Being, in Panentheism Across the Worlds Traditions,
ed. Loriliai Biernacki and Phillip Clayton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 142 160.
49
Ibid., 369.
50
Ibid., 375.
51
Ibid., 371.
197
Ibn Ata Allah is an advocate of Abul Hassan Al-Shadhilis position on this matter, who stated
that if your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Quran and Sunnah, hold fast to these
two and take no notice of your unveiling,52 illustrating that he cannot be considered an
advocate of antinomianism.
For Ibn Ata Allah, adhering to the Sharia is the means to affirm tawhid and the safeguard
against associationism (shirk). This culminates in ridding oneself of inward and outward
associationism (shirk).53 The degree of subtlety involved might not at first be apparent. Beyond
the obvious attribution of partners to Allah, Ibn Ata Allah quotes Abul Abbas al-Mursi as
having said kindness is a veil which conceals the One who is Most Kind.54 Regarding this Ibn
Ata Allah comments that kindness is a veil when one finds repose in it and is tempted to be
content with the kindness itself.55 This point is further emphasised in al-Wasitis statement,
quoted by Ibn Ata Allah, that the enjoyment of obedience is a deadly poison, to which Ibn
Ata Allah explains that enjoyment of obedience often results in a missed opportunity to
demonstrate sincere devotion as ones devotion continues because of the sweetness and
enjoyment that you find in them and not out of loyalty to your Lord.56
Ibn Ata Allahs position regarding the contingent existence of formal structures is evident in
his discussion of the phrase there is no gods but Allah (la ilaha illallah). For Ibn Ata Allah,
the affirmation of this phrase, being an affirmation of tawhid and a denial of shirk, contains an
assertion that ontological existence belongs solely to Allah, while being aware that Allah is not
confined by that which is ontologically existent. According to Ibn Ata Allah, in affirming la ilaha
illallah attention is turned away from the created universe only with respect to its
creatureliness, not with respect with the Truths appearance therein57 because it is not to His
failure to appear in everything but rather, to their [creations] inability to perceive Him in
52
53
54
55
Ibid., 276.
56
Ibid., 278.
57
Ibid., 49.
198
everything.58 For Ibn Ata Allah, tawhid is not strictly an effacement of creation, rather the
contingently existent must acknowledge their contingency for [earthly] causes must needs
exist, while at the same time, one must be absent to them in order to witness [the divine
causality behind them].59 From this it is possible to see that, according to Ibn Ata Allah,
without denying the contingent existence of the formal structures, the empirical nature of such
structures has a dramatic epistemic impact. For Ibn Ata Allah, while creation has contingent
existence, it does so only in as far as it the means through which Allah communicates with each
creation, just as in the case with food, grapes, and aid.
By paring back the traditional reading of the relationship between Ibn Ata Allah and Ibn
Taymiyya a new picture emerges. While they did not agree with each others positions, they
cannot be considered opponents in the sense of holding contrary positions regarding any of the
issues raised within the course of the text of their alleged debate. Ibn Ata Allah repeatedly
illustrates that he does not occupy the space that Ibn Taymiyya accuses him of and that, as a
result, such accusations bypass Ibn Ata Allah, as well as those who share his position. Ibn
Taymiyyas accusations do not affect Ibn Ata Allahs position. Contrary to their supposed
staunch opposition, Ibn Ata Allah is seen to agree with the conclusion of his interlocutor on
each of the issues raised. While this chapter has taken a different approach, it can be seen to
confirm what has been shown in each of the preceding chapters, namely that, while it is not
always explicit, Ibn Ata Allah is staunchly committed to an Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, Ibn
Ata Allahs commitment to an orthodox Islamic paradigm, while advancing views labelled
Sufic, is openly acknowledged by his supposedly hostile critic in the course of the debate they
allegedly had.
58
Ibid., 49.
59
Ibid., 54.
199
Conclusion
This thesis has had two objectives. First, to contextualise and redefine the category Sufism
and secondly, to show that a more refined conception of Sufism is needed in order to account
for the works of Ibn Ata Allah. While it was assumed that Ibn Ata Allah was indebted, to some
degree, to an Islamic paradigm, it can now be seen that unless his works are contextualised
within an Islamic framework they would lack much of their coherence.
This thesis has argued that the work of Ibn Ata Allah is best understood within Islamic
paradigms. Nevertheless, the thesis only makes a modest contribution towards rethinking the
category and the field. There are strict limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from the
study of one Sufic thinker. However, it has been shown that more attention to
contextualisation is necessary to account for the diverse thinkers and works that are included
within the vast, complex, and contested category of Sufism. In the case of Ibn Ata Allah, it
can now be seen that unless his works are contextualised within an Islamic framework they are
likely to be misunderstood. This one example points to the limits of Sufism as a generic
category, especially if it is interpreted in anachronistic terms as a form of mysticism or as a
manifestation of the perennial philosophy.
Thus from this work two things become apparent. Sufism is not merely a form of Islamic
mysticism. It is a dynamic and complex phenomenon whose function, while differing and
adapting across temporal and geographical localities, can be seen as constant. Furthermore,
Sufism generally, and the work of Ibn Ata Allah specifically, cannot but be understood within
an Islamic paradigm. However, in utilising this category for understanding Islam it must be
acknowledged that it is unlike other genres of Islamic learning due to its pan-discipline
approach to the material that it draws on in order to maintain its function. While this work has
emphasised the proactive element of Sufism within Ibn Ata Allahs works, due to a prevailing
view that his achievements are bound up with the reactive element of Sufism and his response
to Ibn Taymiyya, it can be seen that a) he combines both elements of Sufism and as such
maintains the function of Sufism, keeping open the salvific potential for both the individual and
the community and b) like Sufism generally, his oeuvre indicates the work of an inherently
Islamic thinker.
200
Appendix 1 - The Lacuna
This sample of translations of the works of Ibn Ata Allah has a twofold function. Firstly, it
shows the importance of Ibn Ata Allah through the range of languages into which his works
have been translated. Secondly, and more importantly, it shows that, despite the wide
dissemination of his works, there is yet to be an attempt to analyse the relationship between
the works of Ibn Ata Allah in any of these languages. It is understandable that such an analysis
has not been made within the works cited here, as their purpose is primarily to present the
works of Ibn Ata Allah to the non-Arabic reading world. Nevertheless such an analysis has yet
to be made within a non-Arabic language. This sample of translations is of primarily European
languages, however, without being definitive, it is sufficient for illustrating the above two
points. It will be shown that, despite the translation of Ibn Ata Allahs work into multiple
languages, there is a lacuna in the analysis of the interrelations within Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre
which this work partly bridges.
The works cited below can be divided roughly into two groups, representing two
complementary ways used to present a work of Ibn Ata Allah. One approach has been to
contextualise the text by focusing on the history of its genre and its reception, as typified by the
work of Nwyia.1 Another approach has been to contextualise Ibn Ata Allahs historical
significance by focusing on his position within Mamluk Egypt and within the Shadhiliyya, as
typified by the works of Danner.2 These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; however,
the method of contextualisation is often dependant on the degree of influence of or
dependence on the works on Nwyia and Danner respectively. This has resulted in translations
developing a sort of standardised introduction, which varies, not in content, but in the depth of
detail. One point of difference in these two approaches is in regard to mentioning works of Ibn
Ata Allahs other than that being translated, which generally follows, either explicitly or
implicitly, Danners overview, which has been quoted in full in the introduction.
That there is a sort of standardised introduction to the works of Ibn Ata Allah goes someway
to illustrating why the lacuna has persisted. As mentioned above, and elaborated below, the
1
Nwyia, Ibn Ata Allah, especially 46 71.
2
Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 1 14; Book of Wisdom, 13 34.
201
majority of the works dealing with Ibn Ata Allah have been translations. While most of these
succeed in presenting Ibn Ata Allahs works to an audience who cannot read Arabic, there is
little room for any analysis of the material. The standardised introduction generally includes
some introductory comments on Sufism in general, and the Shadhiliyya particularly, some
biographical information on Ibn Ata Allah, sometimes extending to include his two
predecessors, some comments on the genre of the text, and some comments on the
translation. While there are some variations on the standardised introduction, they are mostly
minor differences, which in no way rectify the lacuna highlighted within this work.
Before proceeding to illustrate the depth and consistency to which this lacuna persists, a
preliminary note is necessary. Without the work of the individuals mentioned below this work
would not be possible. It should be noted that no comment is made regarding the translations
of Ibn Ata Allahs works, nor is any comparative approach between translations attempted, for
this is beyond the scope of this work. With the majority of these works the primary intention
has been the translation and, as a result, not much attention has been given to analysing the
content of the text, even less on its relationship with Ibn Ata Allahs other works.
Acknowledging this is important because it explains why most follow the standardised
introduction. Furthermore, acknowledging the standardised introduction format should not be
seen as either a lack on the part of the translator or criticism thereof. The point remains
throughout to show that despite the work of these translators, across numerous languages, an
analysis of Ibn Ata Allah has yet to be significantly pursued within a European language.
English
While Danner was the first to translate the kitab al-Hikam into English as a whole, it was
preceded by two partial translations. These were Archer and Austin respectively. Archers early
translation preceded the now two standard translations of Nwyia and Danner by almost forty
years. Archers stated intention was to secure a body of information on the character of
Muhammadan Mysticism (Sufism) [sic] to be found in the Dutch East Indies, and particularly
that type of mysticism found in the Island of Sumatra.3 Archers interest in Ibn Ata Allah, and
the Kitab al-Hikam specifically, extends only so far as it is indicative of Sumatran Sufism. His
sole entry on Ibn Ata Allah merely mentions that he was a member of the Shadhili order,
3
Archer, Muhammadan Mysticism, i.
202
was a most vigorous opponent of Ibn Taimiya, and died in the Madrasa al-Mansuriya in Cairo
in the year 1309.4 Aside from attempting to make the meaning of the Hikam easier by
providing a gist of the translation5 before the translation itself, Archer has no concern for Ibn
Ata Allah or his other works. As a result, Archers translation does not follow the standardised
introduction, which is perhaps a result of his interest in Sumatran Sufism taking precedence
over any interest in the work of Ibn Ata Allah.
As a precursor, Austins partial translation does not follow a standardised introduction. The
Kitab al-Hikam is singled out for particular attention as it must rank amongst the finest works
of spiritual counsel, not only in Islam, but in the world.6 Austin gives the briefest of overviews
of Ibn Ata Allahs life, though manages to cite his supposed antagonism with Ibn Taymiyya.
There is some mention of the commentary literature as well as a short discussion of the works
central themes.
Danner released two versions of the Kitab al-Hikam. While these two works are essentially the
same translation, the earlier is aimed at a scholarly audience, more so than the latter. The
earlier work has key terms transliterated throughout the text, while the latter omits these.
While the introduction to the earlier work presupposes a greater depth of understanding of
Sufism than the latter, the method of introducing Ibn Ata Allah is essentially the same. Danner
places emphasis on situating Ibn Ata Allah within his cultural milieu, detailing his place within
the revitalisation of Sufi gnosis (marifa) that was so evident in the 7th/13th century,7 while
locating him amongst the earliest Shadhiliyya adherents to gain repute, due to his works being
the earliest written documents of the Sufi order Shadhiliyya.8 While both works contain
sections on Ibn Ata Allahs other works, the earlier of which was quoted in full in the
introduction, little emphasis is placed on Ibn Ata Allahs use of genre, nor is his work
contextualised within the literary genre he utilises. Regarding what Danner calls Ibn Ata Allahs
4
Ibid., i.
5
Ibid., ii.
6
Austin, Counsels, 207.
7
8
203
literary legacy, he writes we can easily see his importance, historically speaking.9 Danner is
here referring to Ibn Ata Allah being the earliest of the Shadhiliyya to compose any known
literary works, rather than commenting on his use of specific writing styles. Danners use of
historical contextualisation represents one of the primary methods for introducing Ibn Ata
Allah, which has been continuously referred to throughout a large portion of the material on
Ibn Ata Allah.
As mentioned above, Danners summation of Ibn Ata Allahs works has become standard and,
along with Nwyia, is the work most frequently cited. Shoshans work, while not explicitly about
Ibn Ata Allah, relies heavily on it, especially the Taj al-arus, for an understanding of Mamluk
Egypt. Regarding Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre, Shoshan10 reiterates Danners work,11 while adding a
few references not available to Danner. However, Shoshan emphatically disagrees with
Danners view that the Taj al-arus is of minor importance, 12 countering that it is a unique
source that allows us to glimpse the ideas that were preached to the ordinary people by a
leading Sufi shaykh. 13 While this refutation reinstates the importance of the Taj al-arus, it
does not provide any detailed insight into its relation to the rest of Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre.
Danner-Fadae essentially follows the same outline.14 Danner-Fadae includes a few more details,
highlighting and repeating passages, including that the Kitab al-Tanwir is a kind of
commentary on the Hikam, though no further details on this comment are provided.15 While
neither Shoshan nor Danner-Fadae intended to explicitly bridge the hiatus in the existing
literature, nor was their intentions to examine the corpus of Ibn Ata Allah, both have helped
9
10
Shoshan, Popular Culture, 90 91.
11
Cited in full above.
12
Shoshan, Popular Culture, 91 n. 61.
13
Ibid., 14.
14
Danner, Key to Salvation, 13 21. Mary Ann Danner-Fadae, as she is now known, is referred to as Danner-Fadae
within this section of the text to differentiate her work from that of her late husband Victor Danner.
15
Ibid., 15.
204
maintain the view that, aside from a few repeated passages, the content of each text is
independent of the others.
Like Danner-Fadae and Shoshan, Roberts work follows the method of Danner. Roberts does
not consider it necessary to restate the available material, writing for a detailed and scholarly
overview of Ibn Ata Allahs literary corpus, as well as additional biographical information ... see
the Translators Introduction to Dr. Mary Ann Koury Danners The Key to Salvation and the
Lamp of Souls.16 While Roberts does direct the reader to one of the most through
introductions to Ibn Ata Allah, as mentioned above, Danner-Fadae does not present any
information regarding the relationship between Ibn Ata Allahs various works. Furthermore, by
directing readers away to another work, Roberts fails to locate and adequately discuss the
importance of the Lataif al-Minan. This is surprising as it is, after the Kitab al-Hikam, Ibn Ata
Allahs most sighted work, though primarily for the biographical information that it contains.
While Roberts work does not explicitly contribute to the gap, there is nothing within it that
would help dismiss it.
That the lacuna exists within Shoshan, Danner-Fadae, and Roberts is perhaps a result of their
works depending, to varying degrees, on the initial work of Danner. The work of Durkee, while
acknowledging Danners great service to the readers of the English language through his
magnificent translation of the Hikam,17 does not. The work of this contemporary Shaykh of the
Shadhili order, while not unscholarly, is more devotional than those previously discussed. While
the section on Ibn Ata Allahs works is too long to quote in full here,18 it is readily apparent
that, like the others, the intention is to present an overview of the works of Ibn Ata Allah.
While similar in format to Danners work, Durkees overview contains more details on both the
content of the texts as well as their history. While Durkee does acknowledge the scholarly
works that have been done, he allows Ibn Ata Allah to convey the content and tone of some
works by including quotes from the texts. Despite the significant differences, Durkee, like the
others discussed, does not examine any possible interrelations between the works of Ibn Ata
Allah. Thus, despite approaching the works of Ibn Ata Allah from a different angle, Durkee
does not make any contribution towards dismissing the lacuna.
16
Roberts, Subtle Blessings, vii.
17
Durkee, School of the Shadhdhuliyyah, 54.
18
Ibid., 54 56.
205
Reliance on Danners work cannot be considered the sole reason for this lack of inter-textual
analysis. Hakim, a student of Durkee, makes no reference to any of the other works relating to
Ibn Ata Allah in his translation of the kitab al-Tanwir. Instead of introducing the works of Ibn
Ata Allah, he focuses on the importance of the kitab al-Tanwir, of which he writes, it deals
with a cardinal doctrine of the Shadhdhuli teaching, also citing that of this work it has been
said it combines completeness with conciseness.19 That Hakims concerns do not venture
beyond this work are understandable in light of the fact that his Shaykh told him to take on the
task of translating this book20 for his own and others spiritual and intellectual development.21
While Hakims work keeps to the instructions given to him in translating the kitab al-Tanwir, it
does not help to fill the gap.
Kugle22 makes some moves towards filling the gap, though this is not his focus and the links are
not developed. Kugles focus is to show that comments regarding the Kitab al-Tanwir, such as
companion piece to and a kind of commentary on the Hikam, are too soft.23 Kugle asserts
that, not only is the Kitab al-Tanwir an introduction to the Hikam, this text serves as an
introduction to Ibn Ata Allahs other texts.24 His view is that the Kitab al-Tanwir aims at
developing virtues while the Hikam aims at developing insight, the Miftah al-falah draws on the
structured practice advocated for in the Kitab al-Tanwir to implement the invocation it
prescribes, and the anecdotes of the Lataif are commented on and explained in the Kitab at-
Tanwir.25 While these views could be deemed correct, they are far from comprehensive,
19
Hakim, Illuminating Guidance, iii.
20
Ibid., i.
21
Ibid., ii.
22
The choice of quoting Hakims translation of the Kitab al-Tanwir over Kugles translation throughout this work
has been done for several reasons. Chief among them is Kugles attempt at a non-gendered translation which,
aside from appearing odd at times for those familiar with Ibn Ata Allahs other works, contradicts the metaphysics
and ontology set out by Ibn Ata Allah. Ibn Ata Allah, like other Sufi authors, encourages his readers to be
masculine, meaning active, towards creation and feminine, meaning receptive, towards the Divine. A non-
gendered translation is liable to omit this important distinction.
23
Scott Kugle, trans., The Book of Illumination (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2005), 37.
24
Ibid., 40.
25
Ibid., 40 41.
206
dealing with the relation of one text to the others rather than the interrelations within the
corpus. Furthermore, without disagreeing with Kugles view, it must be acknowledged that his
broad sweeping statement lacks all but the most minimal evidence and thus cannot be said to
rectify the lacuna.
at-Tarjumanas translation of Unwan al-Tawfiq fi adab al-Tariq26 provides no introduction to

either Ibn Ata Allah or the text. It does provide a translation of the Qasida of Abu Madyan,27
upon which it is based, as well as two other commentaries of the Qasida alongside of Ibn Ata
Allahs. at-Tarjumana does include Sharanis short biography of Ibn Ata Allah, which does not
state much more than his soteriological lineage, his death, the place of his tomb, and a list of
some of his better known works.28 While this work does not introduce Ibn Ata Allah in the
standardised method mentioned above, it does show that Danners method of introduction
could be seen as an extension of Sharanis biography.
Schweins work, while involving the work of Ibn Ata Allah, focuses on the lacuna within
contemporary Islamic studies regarding commentary literature. Schwein acknowledges the
importance of the Kitab al-Hikam as a succinct exposition of the principles and practices of
mystical awakening,29 noting that Ibn Ata Allahs most important other works are the Lataif
al-Minan and the Kitab al-Tanwir.30 However, his focus is not so much on the Kitab al-Hikam as
it is on its commentary literature. Schweins goal to expose the importance of commentary
literature within Islamic studies is achieved through an inter-commentary analysis which
focuses on six of Ibn Ata Allahs Hikam and their commentary by Ibn Abbad, Ahmad Zarruq,
and Ibn Ajiba. Although Schweins work does not directly relate to the work undertaken here,
its importance lies in highlighting a further and important gap in the literature concerning Ibn
Ata Allah.
26
at-Tarjumana, Self Knowledge, 6 18. While this translation is less scholarly than that of Kugles, especially given
that a) there are no explanatory footnotes and b) some of the technical terms have been left untranslated, it is
given precedence over Kugles translation for the reasons cited above, see footnote 22.
27
Another translation of this Qasida can be found in Vincent Cornell, The Way of Abu Madyan (Cambridge: Islamic
Texts Society, 1996), 162 165.
28
at-Tarjumana, Self Knowledge, 23.
29
Schwein, Illuminated Arrival, 3.
30
Ibid., 4.
207
Samburs work on the psychology of prayer is heavily indebted to Danners work and as such it
is not surprising that it uses a Danner style biography to contextualise Ibn Ata Allah.31 Aside
from this, a comment should be made on Samburs understanding of the Shaykh-student
dynamic, especially as presented by Ibn Ata Allah. While there is an authoritarian aspect to
this dynamic, Sambur sees the Shaykh as occupying the position of intermediary between Allah
and the individual. In discussing the function of soteriological practices he writes that the
[Divine] Names and the worship become tools in the hands of Shaykhs in order to maintain
their authoritarian power.32 This does not entertain the possibility of a Shaykh acting as a
facilitator to the student to realise their inherent relationship with Allah. Rather than being
seen as an aim to preserve the power elites of Sufi orders33 or a form of spiritual
militarism,34 the Shaykh-student dynamic can be viewed in a manner that is borne out by Ibn
Ata Allahs soteriological semiotics. The Shaykh, like all of creation, can be seen as a sign (ayat)
of Allah, though, being in the same form as the student, is less subtle than other signs and is
more easily comprehended, thus providing more direct feedback for the students
soteriological development. Nevertheless, there is potential for the Shaykh-student dynamic to
be exploited, which is why many Sufis, Ibn Ata Allah included, have written on the necessity of
finding an authentic Shaykh and what constitutes one.
While I am aware of Danners thesis on Ibn Ata Allah and Roberds partial translation of
Shadhiliyya devotional literature, I have been unable to consult them. Furthermore, while I am
aware of Jacksons translation of the Taj al-arus, it became available after the substantive
research for this work had been concluded and has not been included at the time of
submission.35
French
31
See Sambur, Prayer in the Psychology, 191 198.
32
Ibid., 233.
33
Ibid., 233.
34
Ibid., 234.
35
Sherman Jackson, trans., Sufism for Non-Sufis? Ibn Ata Allah al-Sakandaris Taj al-Arus (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
208
Of the languages that Ibn Ata Allahs works have been translated into, French is probably the
most common; having translations of almost all of Ibn Ata Allahs known works. The earliest,
and best known, is Nwyias translation of the Kitab al-Hikam. Nwyia does situate Ibn Ata Allah
within the history of Sufism generally, and within the history of the Shadhiliyya more
specifically, giving a brief history of the rise of this order. However, greater attention is given to
documenting multiple examples of the aphoristic genre utilised throughout the history of
Sufism and locating this work within this tradition. By contextualising Ibn Ata Allah according
to the literary genre of the Kitab al-Hikam, Nwyia does so at the expense of examining the
relation of this particular genre to the rest of Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre.
Similarly, Gloton, though not as explicitly as Nwyia, locates Ibn Ata Allahs work al-qasd al-
mujarrad fi marifa al-ism al-mufrad Allah within the genre of commentaries on the Divine
names. Through a series of etymological discussion, Gloton situates this work amongst other
Sufi works dealing with the names of Allah, such as Fakh ad-Din al-Razi,36 Ibn Arabi, and Abd al-
Karim Jili,37 amongst others. While Ibn Ata Allah has written elsewhere on the soteriological
benefits of the invocation (dhikr) of various Divine names, as Gloton recognises,38 the primary
focus of this work being the solitary name (al-ism al-mufrad) places this text alongside of those
works that deal with various Divine names, such as those by al-Ghazali or Fakh ad-Din al-Razi,
due to the all-comprehensive nature of the Divine name Allah. Thus, without explicitly
following Nwyias lead, Gloton follows a similar method in contextualising this work of Ibn Ata
Allah.
Thibon, in the preface to Penots translation of the kitab al-Tanwir, approaches the text from
different angles in order to contextualise the work. From an examination of the main concepts
of the text, namely tadbir and rizq,39 to highlighting key points in the method of presentation
and some notes on apparent influences,40 Thibon sees within the work of Ibn Ata Allah, and
36
Gloton, sur le nom Allah, 39.
37
Ibid., 47 47, 66.
38
Ibid., 67 75.
39
Thibon in Abd Allah Penot, trans., De lAbandon de la Volnt proper (Lyon: Alif, 1997), 12, 16.
40
Ibid., 18, 21.
209
the Kitab al-Tanwir specifically, a melting pot of variegated influences from Ibn Arabi and al-
Ghazali,41 to the malamatiyya42 and Abu Yazid Bistami.43 While Thibon concedes that a
thorough study of these influences need to undertaken, in bringing these influences to the fore
the kitab al-Tanwir is seen to occupy an important place within the history of Sufi literature. In
contextualising the work in this manner, Thibons preface can be seen to follow a Nwyia style
introduction.
While Geoffroys introduction to his translation of the Lataif al-Minan has a Danner style
contextualisation of Ibn Ata Allah, it is short, only capturing some of the main events in his life.
However, in the postscript, Geoffroy delves into some of the themes of the Lataif al-Minan,
including the Muhammdean inheritance,44 Sainthood,45 and the Unicity of Being,46 and in doing
so can be included amongst those of Nwyias style of contextualisation. Interestingly, Geoffroys
study of Ibn Ata Allahs conception of the Unicity of Being shows that it is closer to Ibn Arabis
conception than has been previously thought, especially by Nwyia.47 Nevertheless, the
interrelations between Ibn Ata Allahs works remain unexamined.
Geoffroy has also provided a more comprehensive introduction than the above to the French
translation of al-Boutis extensive commentary on the Kitab al-Hikam.48 Geoffroy takes much of
the biographical information presented here from his previously mentioned translation of the
Lataif al-Minan, though it is interesting to note that he states that Ibn Ata Allah was born in
1259 CE, where as all other sources merely state that he was born sometime around the middle
41
Ibid., 23, 21.
42
Ibid., 14, 22 23.
43
Ibid., 22.
44
Eric Geoffroy, trans., La sagesse des matres soufis (Paris: Grasset, 1998), 285.
45
Ibid., 291.
46
Ibid., 301.
47
Ibid., 302.
48
Geoffroy in Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti, Paroles Sublimes, trans. Abdallah D. Penot, Idris Devos, and
Samia Touati (Paris: Sagesse dOrient, 2011), 15 34.
210
of the 13th century.49 If it was not enough to side this introduction with the Nwyia style
contextualisation simple due to the degree to which it draws on the work of Nwyia, it is
interesting that not only is there a section titled the genre of the Hikam before and after Ibn
Ata Allah,50 there is also material contextualising al-Boutis commentary within the existing
commentary literature on the Kitab al-Hikam.51 Geoffroy does comment that in the opinion of
all the commentators and observers, the Hikam is impregnated, often implicitly, with the spirit
of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet and that it is of course the conformity to the
Sunni model from which appreciation of this work stems,52 a point that, while known in
traditional circles, is not often acknowledge in academic discourse. Yet, despite taking quotes
from the Lataif al-Minan and the Kitab al-Tanwir to illustrate how Ibn Ata Allah comments,
often implicitly, on his own work, this introduction does not bridge the gap in the existing
literature.
It is only Macnamaras translation of the Miftah al-Falah that has a truly Danner style
contextualisation of Ibn Ata Allah. The focus on the biographical elements of Ibn Ata Allahs
life shows him to be a forerunner of the literary tradition of the Shadhiliyya. While giving an
overview of Ibn Ata Allahs literary output, the analysis is brief. While acknowledging the
popularity of the Kitab al-Hikam,53 Macnamara, contrary to the majority, does not view it as Ibn
Ata Allahs most important work, stating of all of Ibn Ata Allahs works, the work presented
here [the Miftah al-Falah] is the most important and most needed as it concerns and discloses
the practices and general method of the Shadhiliyya.54 Without doubting that this is one of the
reasons that the Miftah al-Falah is important, Macnamara would have to delve deep into Ibn
Ata Allahs oeuvre to substantiate this claim.
Of the remaining translations into French, neither could be categorised into either a Danner or
Nwyia style contextualisation. Penots translation of the Taj al-arus does not have an
49
Ibid., 20.
50
Ibid., 27 28.
51
Ibid., 25.
52
Ibid., 29.
53
Macnamara, clef de la ralisation, 29.
54
Ibid., 35.
211
introduction or postscript and thus cannot be placed into either category. Burckhardts short
introduction to his and Burets translation of the Kitab al-Hikam focuses on the spiritual
psychology inherent within the text. While there is basic biographical information,
Burckhardts focus can be summed in the following passage: one would not just say that the
Hikam contains all the Shadhiliyya (Shadhilite) teaching or better that this amounts to the
total Sufi doctrine; to make this, these contents must above all be applied to the life of the soul
in all situations and at every moment.55 Burckhardt is highlighting that, while the Kitab al-
Hikam is full of metaphysical insights, they remain empty words until they are embodied. For
Burckhardt the aphorisms of the Kitab al-Hikam are continuously alluding to the extremely
subtle and precarious issue of the point of contact between the created and uncreated, the
limited and the limitless, man and God,56 which has been highlighted in the preceding chapters
through the problem of rizq. Rather than focusing on the genre of the text or too much on the
author of the words, Burckhardt is encouraging the readers to partake in the soteriological
process presented within the text. In this manner, Burckhardts introduction cannot be placed
alongside either Danner or Nwyia.
Spanish
Of the works of Ibn Ata Allah available in Spanish, two have come indirectly from the Arabic.
The Kitab al-Hikam appears to have come from Danners English translation with a translation
of introduction, endnotes, and glossary of his more accessible and less scholarly English
edition.57 The Spanish edition of the Lataif al-Minan is a translation of Geoffroys French
translation.58 These include nothing more than what is in the original and thus, aside from
making these works available in Spanish, do not contribute anything further to the analysis of
Ibn Ata Allahs oeuvre.
Of the translations that have come direct from the Arabic, Gonzlezs translation of the Kitab
at-Tanwir is particularly important. This is because, aside from general comments on the
55
Burckhardt in El Haj Abd-ar-Rahmane Buret and Titus Burckhardt, trans., Hikam Paroles de sagesse (Milano:
Arche, 1999), 8.
56
Ibid., 8.
57
Danner, Book of Wisodm. Carmen Liao, trans., El libro de la sabidura (Madrid: Sufi, 2001).
58
Geoffroy, La sagesse. Mara Tabuyo and Aqustn Lpez, trans., La enseanza de los maestros sufes (Madrid:
Alquitara, 2008).
212
importance of the Kitab at-Tanwir, Gonzlez notes that his translation was the first complete
translation into a European language.59 Gonzlez relies primarily on the work of Nwyia and
Palacios, yet, while aware of his own contribution, does not acknowledge any other
forerunners. Aside from noting that Ibn Ata Allah is the first commentator for the
Shadhiliyya,60 that the Kitab al-Hikam is his most widely read work, and that the Lataif al-
Minan is a sort of spiritual history of the Shadhiliyya,61 there is no further analysis of the
oeuvre.
Two other translations have been made directly from the Arabic, both of which are translations
of the Kitab al-Hikam. Larakis introduction has a short biography, though it does place the
Kitab al-Hikam in the tradition of al-Ghazalis Ihya Ulum ad-Din, al-Qushairis Risala, Abu Talib
al-Miakkis Qut al-Qulub, and Suhrawardis Awarif,62 and for this, while brief, can be counted
amongst those of Nwyias style of contextualisation. Gutirrezs more extensive introduction
draws out some of the soteriological aspects of Ibn Ata Allahs work, similar to Burckhardt,
though places it with the more widely known aspects of the Sufi soteriological framework.
Gutirrez writes that man in this world is plunged into spiritual oblivion, in an egoistic state,
believes it is an I independent and autonomous with respect to the will of God63 and that
rectifying this and reaffirming the covenant that the humankind made with God testifying to
the latters Lordship as mentioned in the Quran (7: 172) is the driving force behind Ibn Ata
Allahs writings, amongst others. It is difficult to side Gutirrezs work with Nwyia for while it
does contextualise the content of Ibn Ata Allahs main themes, with little biographical
information, it does so solely within the Shadhiliyya without contextualising it within a wider
framework.
The work of Palacios, as an early forerunner within this field, is worth noting. The work that is
closest to the topic at hand focuses on Ibn Abbad of Ronda,64 who is renowned for, among
59
Juan J. Gonzlez, trans., Sobre el abandono de s mismo (Madrid: Hiperin, 1994), 7.
60
Ibid., 7.
61
Ibid., 10.
62
Ali Laraki, trans., Al-Hkam Aforismos Sufes (Palma de Mallorca: Kutubia Mayurqa, 2003), 12.
63
Francesc Gutirrez, trans., Al-Hikam (Aforismos Sufes) (Barcelona: Los Pequeos Libros De La Sabidura, 2010),
16.
64
Origionally published in 1933, see Miguel A. Palacios, Saint John of the Cross and Islam, trans. Howard W. Yoder
and Elmer H. Douglas (New York: Vantage, 1981).
213
other things, his commentary on Ibn Ata Allahs Kitab al-Hikam. The bulk of this work consists
of a partial translation of Ibn Abbads commentary. Palacios mentions that Ibn Ata Allahs
most famous works after the Kitab al-Hikam are entitled Tanwir and Lataif, and are the ones
that Ibn Abbad used so much in his commentaries on the Hikam.65 Yet, despite this early
acknowledgement of the traditional commentators realisation of the interconnectedness of
Ibn Ata Allahs works this has still been overlooked by modern scholars and commentators.
German
Schimmels introduction to her translation of the Kitab al-Hikam follows the above mentioned
standardised biographical overview. It is mentioned that Ibn Ata Allah is to be counted among
the great early adherents of the Shadhiliyya.66 Moving to the events and catastrophes that
shaped the 13th century Islamic world, such as the Mongol invasion and the fall of Baghdad,
Schimmel noted that only Egypt was left standing, which shifted the existing political
landscape.67 After giving a summary of basic Sufi doctrine, as well as mentioning some of their
practices, she moves onto Ibn Ata Allahs works. However, aside from common comments
regarding the Kitab al-Hikam, such as its succinctness,68 the difficulty of translation,69 its
handbook nature,70 its lack of apparent logical order,71 and its focus on themes such as
obedience, thankfulness, and wisdom, the only other work mentioned is the Lataif al-Minan,
which is done so only in passing.72 It is surprising that there is not a Danner style summary of
Ibn Ata Allahs works, though this is understandable in light of the fact that, while
acknowledging Danners work, in Schimmels eyes, Nwyia is considered the greatest interpreter
and translator of Ibn Ata Allah in the west.73 Considering that Schimmel did not deem it
65
Ibid., 30.
66
Annemarie Schimmel, trans., Bedrngnisse sind Teppiche voller Gnaden, (Germany: Herder, 1987), 7.
67
Ibid., 7 8.
68
Ibid., 13.
69
Ibid., 16.
70
Ibid., 14.
71
Ibid., 18.
72
Ibid., 13.
73
Ibid., 15.
214
necessary to even mention Ibn Ata Allahs other works, it is not surprising that this lacuna has
persisted.
While I am aware of Sobierojs partial translation of the Miftah al-Falah and Schwarzmllers
comparative study of Ibn Ata Allah and Meister Eckhart, I have been unable to procure copies
of these theses.
Italian
Valdr, while relying heavily on Nwyias work, finds a middle ground between the two
approaches in her translation to the kitab al-Hikam. Initially there is a biographical overview of
the Shadhiliyya74 and Ibn Ata Allahs place within it.75 This is immediately followed by a study
of the Kitab al-Hikam, mainly drawn from Nwyias work, though it does include some
comments from Ibn Ajibas commentary on the Kitab al-Hikam. While Valdr is not the only
one to include both biographical and literary comments, her introduction seems to find a
balance between the two, whereas others give greater attention to one aspect, sometimes at
the expense of the other.
Swedish
Ogns translation of the Kitab al-Hikam follows the standardised pattern. While Ogn draws
from both Danner and Nwyia, he attaches more weight to the former than the latter. He
includes the Danner style overview76 and, while acknowledging that commentary literature
exists, closes his introduction by stating that Danner was absolutely right in writing that the
Hikam itself, when properly understood and assimilated, ends up by being its own best
commentary.77 To conclude with this, without elaborating, at best, causes confusion, or, at
74
Caterina Valdr, trans., Sentenze e Colliquio mistico (Milano: Aldelphi, 1981), 17 20.
75
Ibid., 20 24.
76
Gran Ogn, trans., Sufiska visdomsord (Lund: Ogn, 1997), 106.
77
Ibid., 18, quoting Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 17.
215
worst, contributes to the lacuna. While Danners comment is correct, it is so for those with an
advanced understanding, and consistent practice, of Sufism, for these individuals would have
passed through a point where they utilised Ibn Ata Allahs other works as well as the extensive
literature. As Schweins work illustrates, it is through the commentary literature that the extent
to which the Kitab al-Hikam is commentary on itself becomes apparent. Like the other works
mentioned above, while Ogn successfully brings one of Ibn Ata Allahs texts into another
language, it does not bridge the gap in our understanding of the relationship between Ibn Ata
Allahs works.
Arabic
Mention must be made of Abu l-Wafa al-Taftazanis work Ibn Ata Allah al-Sikandari wa-
tasawwufuh (Ibn Ata Allah and Sufism) for it, aside from commentary literature, represents
the only apparent attempt to understand Ibn Ata Allahs worldview. Despite a long held
intention of Durkee to translate this work into English, it has yet to be done, and has not been
consulted.78 Without commenting on the content of this work, a few comments can be made,
extending those made in the introduction. It should be remembered that al-Taftazani was
writing under a regime where modernism, secularism, socialism and Islamism (in that order)
were dominant as official (or, in the case of Islamism, disguised) state ideologies in which the
adherents of Sufism were often portrayed as fatalists, obscurantist or heretics.79 These no
doubt, at best, influenced his mode of expression or, at worst, curbed it, such that his work, in
one way or another, had to be curtailed in order for it to find acceptance under the regime
within which it was written. Without having read the work, it is comments such as it was in his
MA thesis on Ibn Ata Allah al-Sikandari that he used psychological theories to explain
religious experiences for the first time and that al-Taftazani used the arguments of European
psychologists of mysticism such as J. H. Leuba, R. H. Thouless and W. James, who argued that
religious feelings are an autonomous region of human experience,80 that would cause the
78
Abdullah Durkee, The School of the Shadhdhuliyyah: Volume 2 Origins (Virginia: Green Mountain School,
forthcoming).
79
Christmann, Reconciling Sufism, 177.
80
The use of the phrase autonomous region of human experience is somewhat troubling given Ibn Ata Allahs,
as well as many Islamic thinkers, insistence on tawhid underpinning creations ontological existence, for a) if it was
a region independent of creations inherent contingency it would contradict the metaphysics of tawhid and b)
many, if not most, Islamic thinkers would view their religious experience as resulting from the manner in which
216
reader to proceed with caution.81 While these comments in no way invalidate the value of al-
Taftazanis work, caution is necessary because a) the Sufi thinkers cannot be construed as
presenting the views of modern rationalist psychologists, b) the manner in which the regime
influences his manner of expression must be taken into account, and c) rather than
representing his own views, especially given that he was the head of the Shadhiliyya in Egypt
for a time, may have been written to increase the acceptance of Sufism within a regime that
dismissed this mode of Islamic expression. Despite these cautions, his work, once translated,
will be a welcome addition to the literature on Ibn Ata Allah.
Other Languages
As stated, the above is a sample of the available translations of Ibn Ata Allahs works. It would
take this work too far afield to detail all the currently available translations for, while the above
deals primarily with European languages, Ibn Ata Allahs works are available in Turkish, Malay,
and Indonesian, name a few of the languages that have been left out. Nevertheless, of these
other languages into which Ibn Ata Allahs works have been translated, aside for general
introductory comments, there does not seem to be an analysis of the interconnections of his
oeuvre or a study of the worldview presented therein.
they lived and thus cannot be divorced from that as a region autonomous or separate to the other aspects of
their lives, for again this would contradict the ontological extension of the metaphysics of tawhid.
81
Ibid., 184.
217
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Abstract

Chapter 1 - Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 10

The Transmission of Sufism ............................................................................................................... 13

Problematising Sufism .................................................................................................................... 15

The Works of Ibn Ata Allah .............................................................................................................. 21

Chapter 2 Problematising Sufism ........................................................................................................ 24

Approaches to the Term Sufism...................................................................................................... 24

Sufism as Islamic Mysticism......................................................................................................... 24

Sufism as Islamic Sufism .............................................................................................................. 31

The Term Sufism............................................................................................................................. 36

One Further Difficulty ........................................................................................................................ 41

Some Consequences for the Study of Sufism ..................................................................................... 43

Chapter 3 The Case of Ibn Ata Allah .................................................................................................. 48

Provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn Ata Allahs Oeuvre .............................................................. 48

Quranic Hermeneutics ...................................................................................................................... 51

The Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah) ................................................................................... 54

The Importance of Ibn Ata Allah ...................................................................................................... 58

The Life of Ibn Ata Allah ................................................................................................................... 60

Re-examining the Works of Ibn Ata Allah ......................................................................................... 63

Chapter 4 Metaphysics ....................................................................................................................... 68

Definition of Metaphysics .................................................................................................................. 68

Tawhid, the Oneness of Allah ............................................................................................................ 70

Tawhid in the Quran and Hadith ....................................................................................................... 71

Understanding there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illallah)............................................................... 72

The Proofs of Tawhid ......................................................................................................................... 75

The Goal of Tawhid ............................................................................................................................ 83

Implications of the Metaphysics of Tawhid ........................................................................................ 87

Chapter 5 Ontology ............................................................................................................................ 90

From Essence (dhat) to Existence (kawn) ........................................................................................... 92

The Isthmus (barzakh) ....................................................................................................................... 95

The Role of Creation .......................................................................................................................... 96

Cause and Effect .............................................................................................................................. 101

Obedience (taa) .............................................................................................................................. 104

Poverty (faqr) and the Poor (faqir) ................................................................................................... 106

Rizq within the Ontological Domain ................................................................................................. 108

The Perception of Hardships ............................................................................................................ 111

Chapter 6 Epistemology .................................................................................................................... 114

The Importance of Self-Knowledge .................................................................................................. 115

Repentance (tawba) and Disobedience ............................................................................................ 117

Patient Endurance (sabr) and Contentment (rida) ............................................................................ 118

The Goal of Knowledge .................................................................................................................... 120

Servanthood (ubudiyyah) and Self-direction (tadbir)....................................................................... 123

Obedience and Disobedience .......................................................................................................... 125

Knowledge and Rizq ........................................................................................................................ 130

Chapter 7 Eschatology ...................................................................................................................... 133

Eschatology as an Impetus ............................................................................................................... 135

The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter .................................................................... 138

The Hereafter and Allahs Mercy (rahma) ........................................................................................ 140

Obedience (taa) and Disobedience (masiya) .................................................................................. 142

The Paradox of the Life to Come ...................................................................................................... 144

The Soteriological Elements of Eschatology ..................................................................................... 146

Chapter 8 Ethics................................................................................................................................ 149

The Importance of adab .................................................................................................................. 149

The Function of adab ....................................................................................................................... 153

The Process of adab......................................................................................................................... 154

Forgetfulness (ghaflah) and Remembrance (dhikr)........................................................................... 156

The Degrees of adab ........................................................................................................................ 157

Adab with Allah ............................................................................................................................... 160

Adab and rizq .................................................................................................................................. 162