Ganzon Vs CA

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Extra-ordinary Diligence Required of Common Carriers

Commencement, Duration and Termination of carriers responsibility


over the goods (Articles 1736-1738, NCC)

G.R. No. L-48757 May 30, 1988

MAURO GANZON, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GELACIO E. TUMAMBING, respondents.

Antonio B. Abinoja for petitioner.

Quijano, Arroyo & Padilla Law Office for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The private respondent instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila


an action against the petitioner for damages based on culpa contractual.
The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent Court, are undisputed:

On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of


Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to
the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman". Pursuant to that
agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where
it docked in three feet of water. On December 1, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing
delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter,
for loading which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the
lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of the scrap iron
was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived
and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the
shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose
Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing. The gunshot
was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga,
Bataan, for treatment.

After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on
December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three
policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap
iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the compound
of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron

On the basis of the above findings, the respondent Court rendered a


decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed


and set aside and a new one entered ordering defendant-
appellee Mauro Ganzon to pay plaintiff-appellant Gelacio E.
Tumambimg the sum of P5,895.00 as actual damages, the sum
of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the amount of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against defendant-appellee
Ganzon.

In this petition for review on certiorari, the alleged errors in the decision of
the Court of Appeals are:

THE COURT OF APPEALS FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER


GUILTY OF BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND IN IMPOSING A LIABILITY AGAINST HIM COMMENCING
FROM THE TIME THE SCRAP WAS PLACED IN HIS CUSTODY AND
CONTROL HAVE NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
II

THE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE LOSS OF


THE SCRAP WAS DUE TO A FORTUITOUS EVENT AND THE
PETITIONER IS THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR LOSSES AS A
CONSEQUENCE THEREOF.

REULING:

1st issue:

The private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Filomeno Niza for
loading in the lighter "Batman," That the petitioner, thru his employees,
actually received the scraps is freely admitted. Significantly, there is not the
slightest allegation or showing of any condition, qualification, or restriction
accompanying the delivery by the private respondent-shipper of the
scraps, or the receipt of the same by the petitioner. On the contrary, soon
after the scraps were delivered to, and received by the petitioner-common
carrier, loading was commenced.

By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by
the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed
perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary
responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility
would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact
that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not
impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the
custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.
2nd issue:

The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any
of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code,
namely:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or


calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted


negligently.

Petitioner maintains that he is exempt from any liability because the loss of
the scraps was due mainly to the intervention of the municipal officials of
Mariveles which constitutes a caso fortuito as defined in Article 1174 of the
Civil Code.

We cannot sustain the theory of caso fortuito. In the courts below, the
petitioner's defense was that the loss of the scraps was due to an "order or
act of competent public authority," and this contention was correctly
passed upon by the Court of Appeals which ruled that:

... In the second place, before the appellee Ganzon could be


absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was
ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron,
it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power
to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was
issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to
establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting
mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither
has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the
Municipality of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the
stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was
accilmillated by the appellant through separate purchases here
and there from private individuals The fact remains that the
order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the
sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula
to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of the
acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for appellee
Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.

In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials was not in any case,
of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of
its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order
to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient
proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or
intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's
employees. The mere difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not
considered force majeure. We agree with the private respondent that the
scraps could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO
compound, so that after the dispute with the local officials concerned was
settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the contract
of carriage.

There is no incompatibility between the Civil Code provisions on common


carriers and Articles 361 8 and 362 9 of the Code of Commerce which were
the basis for this Court's ruling in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Ynchausti & Co. and which the petitioner invokes in tills petition. For Art.
1735 of the Civil Code, conversely stated, means that the shipper will suffer
the losses and deterioration arising from the causes enumerated in Art.
1734; and in these instances, the burden of proving that damages were
caused by the fault or negligence of the carrier rests upon him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Yap, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

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