7 - David v. SET (From Lawphil)

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EN BANC
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, G.R. No. 221538

Petitioner,
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**
BRION,***
PERALTA,
-versus- BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
CAGUIOA, JJ.
SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE Promulgated:
!/.: . . .
?O, 7
x : _____ !-------------x
DECISION
LEONEN,J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to

callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
No part.
)
No part.
No part.
"' '
I
Decision 2 G.R. No. 221538
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered

despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a
reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude
that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these
inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its
sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of
the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of
every single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are
unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not
natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the
scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise
different from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner

Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15. 2 The
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo
Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private respondent Mary
Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such
office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed
December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling

whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. 6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the
church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. 7 He later turned her over to
Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. 8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. 9
She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 10 The
Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
j
2
Id. at 73.
Id. at 227-258.
4
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Rollo, pp. 80-83.
6
Id. at 8.
7
Id. See also rollo, p. 227, SET Decision.
Id.
9
Id. at 227.
10
Id. at 681, Poe Comment.
Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate

stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH

CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30
A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS
PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO
MILITARAT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO ... 11
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal

promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe
by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.)
and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). 12 The
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 13 On
October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the
Decision had become final in a Certificate ofFinality. 14
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the

Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's
foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and
Jesusa Poe. 15 This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling
certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa
Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon.
Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No.
138. 16
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro

Manila when she turned 18 years old. 17 The Commission on Elections
issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986. 18
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a

19
Philippine passport. Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19,
1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014. 20 Having
11
12
Id. at 8.
Id. at 681.
/
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17
Id. at 9.
1s Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 228.
"
become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on

December 19, 2013. 21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the

Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to
obtain her college degree. 22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in
Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 23
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth. 24 The
marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila. 25
On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her
husband. 26 For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the
United States. 27
Senator Poe and her husband .had three (3) children: Brian Daniel
(Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika). 28 Brian was
born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10,
1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines. 29
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on

October 18, 2001. 30 She was subsequently given a United States passport. 31
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. 32 To support
her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Philippines on April 8, 2004. 33 After the Elections, she returned to the
United States on July 8, 2004. 34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that
she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika. 35
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and

eventually "slipped into a coma." 36 Senator Poe returned to the Philippines j
21
Id. at 682.
22
Id. at 9 and 682.
23
Id. at 9.
24
Id. at 682--683.
25
Id. at 228.
26 Id.
27
Id. at 9.
28
Id at 683.
29 Id.
30
Id. at 9.
31 Id.
32
Id. at 683.
33
Id. at 9.
34 Id.
35
Id. at 683.
36
Id. at 10.
on December 13, 2004. 37 On December 14, 2004, her father died. 38 She
stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral
and to attend to the settling of his estate. 39
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She
40
never looked for work again in the United States.
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her

children, they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving
Susan Roces. 42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools in
Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the
following semester. 43 She came back on May 24, 2005. 44 Her children also
arrived in the first half of 2005. 45 However, her husband stayed in the
United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the
family home there." 46
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of

Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005. 47
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines: 48
I, Marv Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support

and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation ufon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 4
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and/or
Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50
She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." 51
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40
Id. at 684.
41
Id. at 228.
42
Id. at 684.
43 Id.
44
Id. at 685.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47
Id. at 228.
48
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 685.
50
Id. at 228.
51
Id. 686.
. ..
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr: 52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the

instant petition indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of
the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a
natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen
and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR
and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine
Citizenship. 53 (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of

the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No.
9225." 54 Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of
Justice or any other agency of Govemment." 55
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification

Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her children. 56 It stated that
Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per
Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M.
Almoro dated July 18, 2006." 57
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San

Juan City on August 31, 2006. 58
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America

between 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935. 59
She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010." 60 The following are the flight
records given by the Bureau of Immigration:
f
52
Id. at 228.
53
Id. at 686.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56
Id. at 686-687.
57
Id. at 687.
58 Id.
59
Id. at 256.
60 Id.
Departures Flight No.

November 1, 2006 SQ071
July 20, 2007 PR730
October 31, 2007 PR300
April 20, 2009 PR104
July 31, 2009 PR730
November 15, 2009 PR103
December 27, 2009 PR112
March 27, 2010 PR102
Arrivals Flight No.

November 4, 2006 SQ076
July 23, 2007 PR731
November 5, 2007 PR337
May 8, 20.08 PR103
May 21, 2009 PR105
August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15, 2009 PR103 61
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed

Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB). 62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship, 63 stating:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age,

and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the
law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly
and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/ American
citizenship, with all rights and privileges and all duties and
allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation
intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or
undue influence. 64 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October

21, 2010. 65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB
Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010. 66 Her oath of office
stated:
61 Id.
I
62
Id. at 10.
63
Id. at 687.
64
Id. at 687--088.
65
Id. at 688.
66
Id. at 229.
PANUNUMPASAKATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa

katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang
buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin
ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at
ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at
tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at
mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan
ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito,
nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN ko ngayong ika-21

6
ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas. (Emphasis in the
original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of

Nationality of the United States 68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E.
Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011. 69 On this occasion, she also filled out the
Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S.
Citizenship. 70 On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe. 71 The certificate was
approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February
3, 2012. 72
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. 73 On

September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was
submitted to the Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012. 74 She won
and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013. 75
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed

before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August
76
6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution." 77
67
68
69
Id. at 689, Poe Comment.
Id. at 229.
Id.
/
70 Id.
71 Id.
72
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
11 Id.
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01

requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." 78 David filed
his amended Petition on August 17, 2015. 79
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to
the amended Petition. 80
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion to

Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and other
related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015. 81
The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO-
kept Birth Certificate. 82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion. 83 The same Resolution
directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned
officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office. 84
The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00
a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of
the requested documents. 85 The subpoenas were complied with by both the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1,
2015. 86
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer

with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing
on Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to
Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect
Contempt of Court. 87
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued

Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference
brief on or before September 9, 2015. 88 The Resolution also set the
Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015. 89 During the Preliminary
Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground
of prescription. " 90
78
79
Id. at 230.
Id.
I
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 23 1.
89 Id.
9o Id.
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on

September 21, 2015. 91 The parties were then "required to submit their
respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA
evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date." 92
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the
submission of DNA test results. 93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the
Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November
5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA
Testing, 95 which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took
provided results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological
parents. " 96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue
to find closure regarding the issue and submit any development to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-
bom Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal
arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal." 97 On November 6,
2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted
the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for resolution." 98
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its

assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. 99 The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935

Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the
1987 Constitution, as she is a "citizen of the Philippines from birth,
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine
citizenship.
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-

born Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, as required under Section 3 ofR.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002

(the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of
Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-bo:rn Philippine
citizenship.
91 Id.
/
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
9s Id.
99 Id. at 257.
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the

moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.
She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until
today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo

warranto is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. 101 The

Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24,
2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for
Recons1.deration.
. 102
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration on December 1, 2015. 103 David's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December
3, 2015: 104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified

Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November
2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11

dated 24 November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the
Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for
Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to
appear and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de
Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae)
earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
SO ORDERED. 105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was

received by David. 106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the present
Petition for Certiorari before this Court. 107
100
Id at 253-257.
101
Id. at 84-100.
102
Id. at 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
103
Id. at 81.
104
Id. at 80-83.
105
Id. at 82.
106
Id. at 7.
107
Id. at 7-8.
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral

Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." 108 The Resolution also
set oral arguments on January 19, 2016. 109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on
December 30, 2015. 110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4,
2016. 111
This case held in abeyance pending the resolution of the

Commission on Elections case on the issue of private respondent's
citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral

Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its
finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to
hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review

through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on
private respondent's citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a

consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence
relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the
remedial vehicle-a petition for certiorari-through which one who is
aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief
from this Court.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution: 112
108
109
110
111
Id. at 647, SET Comment".
Id.
Id. at 669.
I
Id. at 677-828.
112
A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice-President was also created by
the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4 ....
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis supplied)
Through VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all

other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the
Commission on Elections 113 ) the power to rule on contests 114 relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of
the House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and
distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of
The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the
I
purpose.
113
Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of local elective offices.
CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(2) provides:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
114
The term "contest" refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil.
421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court referring to the counterpart electoral tribunal for the
President and Vice President - the Presidential Electoral Tribunal - explained: "Ordinary usage would
characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e. to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" promulgated by the Supreme
Court en bane on 18 April 1992, would support this premise ....
"The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could
file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
"It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held."
the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is
exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task;
it performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce

into our legal system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose." 115
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the. National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to members of the National Assembly. 116 This was a departure from
the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American
colonial rule-namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
1916-which vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature
itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended to make room for a
bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for there to be
separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress. 117 The 1973
Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they have since
been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions-under the 193 5 and 1987

Constitutions-which provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their
predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their
language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal: 118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of

the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete." ... Under
115
116
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399 (1988). [Per J. Cortes, En
Banc].
CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 4 provides:
f
SECTION 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
117
CONST. (1935 amended), art. VI, sec. 11 provides:
SECTION 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
118
250 Phil. 390 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal ... and it remained as full, clear and complete as
that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission....
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. 119
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election,

returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of
their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before
them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President
and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal)
may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any
review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the
"sole" judge must be.read in harmony with Article VIII, Section l's express
statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice ...
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still
possible. In Libanan v. House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal: 120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants
the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court ... the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal ... excludes the exercise of any authority
on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
even affect the same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in

exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the
Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however,
but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, ... upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
J
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court
has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
119
Id. at 399-400.
120
347 Phil. 797 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary

and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process."
The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when
it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion
so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for
remedial action. 121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral

Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is
limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction,
not an error in judgment.
I. B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral

Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the
appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
independent civil action. 122 The viability of such a petition is premised on
an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion." 123
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer
to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
121
Id. at 804-805.
122
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rapp/er v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, April 5, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/april2016/222702.pdt> 2-3
[Per J. Carpio, En Banc]and in Villanueva v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/april2015/211833 _ leonen.pd
t> 4-5 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
123
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and

hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave. 124
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as

the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes
manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
accounted for. 125
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory

provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of
126
jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion. The
arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or

frivolously departs from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of
partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the

tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its
conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the
evidence; 127 (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from
reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used"; 128 "(c)
where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable"; 129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant
considerations in resolving an issue. 130
124
125
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division) and
I
Arnulfo R. Flores, 670 Plril. 136, 151 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
126
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/october2015/212096.pdt> 7
[Per J. Brion, Second Division].
127
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777-778, 782 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
128
Id. at 787.
129
Id. at 778. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for relying on very select facts
that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a manner as to make it appear that the
candidate whose residence was in question was not qualified. Viewing these facts in isolation
indicated a practically deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at sustaining a previously-conceived myopic
conclusion:
"In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically focused solely on its
consideration of Mitra's residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs of the
premises. In the [Commission on Elections'] view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully
concurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra's residence
because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra's personality and that it lacks loving
attention and details inherent in every home to make it one's residence. This was the main reason that
the [Commission on Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
"Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by
and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the [Commission on Elections]
thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person's residence based solely on very personal and
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal

acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a

faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from
an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the

Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the
citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown,
considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly
makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its
original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that
point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked
to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering
the established personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not
have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial
fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose
because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so
throughout her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It

did not insist on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving,
within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she has never
been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about
her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with
the degree of proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not
absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of
evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
subjective assessment St'!fidards when the law is replete with standards that can be used. Where a
f
dwelling qualifies as a residence - i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to
and to remain - his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial."
130
In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315 (2010) [PerJ. Brion, En Banc]), this
Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1214, 1226 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]
stated: "[A] court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of
the factors relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly
irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous
conclusions oflaw or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions."
conclusion." 131
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children

with the misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents.
Far from redudng them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and
defending the wellbeing of children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
for public service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the

requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen

and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two
(2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
private respondent fails to satisfy the }us sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence
of the Constitution's- determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as
private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never have
reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly
comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV,

Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino
citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens
"[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner
similarly claims that, as private respondent's foundling status is settled, the
burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With private respondent
having supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable
conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a co_nstitutional ambiguity.

Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can
be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at
critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider
I
131
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the

foundling, remains unknown. 132 Resolving this controversy hinges on
constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the

sovereign's purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations
of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily,
the actual words-text-and how they are situated within the whole
document-context-govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from
the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may
settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain
text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted
to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual
meaning of the Constitution.
III. A
The entire exercise .of interpreting a constitutional provision must

necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being
interpreted is the principal source from which this Court determines
. .
const1tut10na1 mtent.
. 133
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning;

this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. 134 The Constitution is
truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of
the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a
plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than
technical-legal, understanding. Thus:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is
to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
132
CONST., art. IV, sec. 1(2):
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]

I
133
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308, 338 (2001) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
134
See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 501-523
(2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power

of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. 135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation

with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a
constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that
animates each of its components through the dynamism of these
components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore,
be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit-ut magis valeat quam
pereat. 136 Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that
gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational
. . 1es to its
prmc1p . fimest fi1xmgs.
. 137
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values
color each provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil
L z'b ertzes
. unzon
TT- . secretary: 138
v. Executzve
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no

one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and

must lean in favor of construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 139
(Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that

has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is
founded on the basic principle that "O]udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
f'
135
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc],
citing J.M Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando,
Second Division]. This was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/212426.pdt>
[Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
136
Francisco v. House ofRepresentatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
137
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos (Resolution), 486 Phil. 754, 773 (2004) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc] states that "[t]he Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes."
138
272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
139
Id. at 162, as cited in Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326, 341 (2010)
[Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
system." 140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law.

Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text
itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial
construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to
effect. 141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering
prior interpretation as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how

the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the
result of the re-adoption---often with accompanying re-calibration---of
previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often
introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text: by comparing its

current iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of
changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive
changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more
moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension
between consistency and change galvanizes meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who

are citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart
provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws 142 and
143
in similar mechanisms introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts
nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of

legal interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always
singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on
144
Elections, this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they

(respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text: on
the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no
14

141
CIVIL CODE, art. 8.
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J.B. L. Reyes, En Banc].
j
142
The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
crystallized the concept of "Philippine citizens." See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil.
421, 467-468 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
143
For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on December 18, 1889,
making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on
Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 465 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc).
144
G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/april2015/208062.pdt> [Per
J. Leonen, En Banc].
distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via

subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s
desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that
subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the parties'
positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be
the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant
ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor

that foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal
interpretation are. commonsensical and need not be belabored. These
dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in
everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for
humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A
pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the
legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain
language is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning
is a rarity. -A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus,

holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of
the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals.
The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief ofwhich is
the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the
word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution - saligan -
demonstrates this imperative ofconstitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in

isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation
that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed
at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered
provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative effect to
achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand
fealty from the Constitution. 145 (Emphasis supplied)
111.B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text

may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. 146
It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a
reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify
or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
145
146
Id. at 26.
I
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]:
"Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one
way, or ofreferring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous,
it must admit of two or more possible meanings."
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the

realization that the business of understanding the Constitution is not
exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and
even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue
requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which
interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings,
however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or
deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle underlies the
basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions.
Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are
narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained. 147
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence

(that is, judicial decjsions on similar, but not the very same, matters or
concerns), 148 as well as thematically similar statutes and international norms
that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and
aims of the text in light of the specific facts under consideration. It is also
only at this juncture-when external aids may be consulted-that the
supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through records
of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation,

inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the
original understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic document is
the weakest approach.
These leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation.

Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the
framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the
records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not
actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a
proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete
agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that
the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises.
Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it
compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical episodes
through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modem lenses. j
147
See, for example, In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/january2015/ 15143 .pdt>
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
148
Cf what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the very same text.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not

always uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified it.
In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates

and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framer's understanding thereof 149
(Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine

citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making
her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable
reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides
its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its
framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading
proceeds from several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the

specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution's actual
definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This
definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes
a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are

natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is
necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate )
of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
149
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 169-170 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En
Banc].
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human
rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public
offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'

commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born.
Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status
upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly,
she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
V.A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are

citizens of the Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 150
Article IV, 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
150
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the provisions are now
substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the present Constitution provides clarity
for "natural born" status. For comparison, the 1935 provisions state:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines.
!
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. Philippine c.itizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 2' s significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the

term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section l's enumeration
of who are citizens. As against Section l's generic listing, Section 2
specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better

appreciated when supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts
of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As- will be seen,
the term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined,
foreign concept.
V.B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the

"right to have rights." 151 It is one's "personal and . . . permanent
membership in a political community. . . . The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public
office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance." 152
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of

which one is part. 153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion
that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection
provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have
been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical

development of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial
rule. 155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects." 156 Church records
show that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative
identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the
colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior. 157 Natives were,
thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish

territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards. This
classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article
151
152
C.J. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Gov. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, 149 [Per J. Mendoza,
R
Third Division], citing BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A
COMMENTARY (2009 ed.).
153 Id.
154
468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
155
Id. at 464-470.
156
Id. at 464.
151 Id.
89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special

laws. 158 It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical
. of wh o were spams
enumerat10n . h citizens,
.. 159 t h us:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. 160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands
were ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of
Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris
did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens. 161
Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the
Congress of the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory

over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom . . ..
In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they may reside.
Thus-
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
Congress. 162
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native

inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of
the United States." 163
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in

legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine
Bill of 1902: 164
158
159
Id. at 465.
Id.
J
160
Id. at 465----466, citing The Civil Code of Spain, art. 17.
161
Id. at 466----467, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION, 22-23
(1965).
162
Id. at 466, citing RAMON M. VELA YO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965).
163
Id. at 467.
164
Id. at 467----468.
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to

reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children

born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as
of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of children
born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was
expressed that the common law concept ofjus soli (or citizenship by place of
birth), which was operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine
Islands. 165
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of

the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the
enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso
read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby

authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States ifresiding therein. 166
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones

Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship
provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended: 167
Section 2.-Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of )
165 Id.
166 Id. at 468.
167 Id.
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein

provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the

Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April
11, 1899 if he or she was "(l) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country." 168
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference
to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship. 169 Article III, Section
1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the

193 5 Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and
Vice-President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-

President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did
not define the term.
I
168 Id. at 469.
169 Id.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution-read with the then
civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizenship
by women who marry alien husbands-was discriminatory towards
women. 170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic situation:
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien

shall retain her PJ:iilippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citizenship. 171
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the
term "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship. 172
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973

Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution." 173
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
170 Id.
/
171
CONST. (1973), art. III, secs. 1 and 2.
172
CONST. (1973), art. III, sec. 4.
173
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 470 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 174
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous

definition of natural-born citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to pelform any act to acquire or pelfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign"

concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935
Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and Vice-President of
the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated,

the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an
eligibility requirement for the presidency. 175 It is not defined in that
Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a
requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records of
constitutional deliberations. 176 However, it has been suggested that, as the
United States was under British colonial rule before its independence, the
requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against
foreign infiltration in the administration of national government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was

inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington,
and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable

to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners
into the administration of our national Government; and to
declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the
American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any
but a natural born Citizen.
174
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the provisions are now
substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the present Constitution provides clarity
for "natural born" status. For comparison, the 1935 provisions state:
f
SECTION I. The following are citizens of the Philippines.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship. .
SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
175
See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
176
Id. at 3-4.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von

Steuben, who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose
subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay
letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors that
the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
monarch. 177
In the United States, however, citizenship is based onjus soli, notjus

sanguinis.
v.c
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-
bom and naturalized.
A natural-bomcitizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is

a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a
naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal 178 articulates this definition by
dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is

apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: ... A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. 179
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on

the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson:
naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to
undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence
to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens." 180
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is

generally required to file a verified petition. 181 He or she must establish,
177
178
179
Id. at 5.
409 Phil. 633 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
;
Id. at 651.
180
Id. at 656.
181
See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (I) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof,
a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the
latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:
among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and
has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or
otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time. 182
Com. Act No. 473, sec.7 provides:

SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall
)
file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the
petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the
name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the approximate date of his or her
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the
ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has
complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their
opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The
certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
182
See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person
desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her
petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his/her entire period of in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government
as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution duly recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she
have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which
he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents,
also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by
reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the
Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Comm. Act No. 473, sec.2 provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications. - Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in wfi.ich he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine
languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat to the
state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs. 183
V.D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an

enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This
constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which
delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent
with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed
written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous
intent.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to

establish bloodline is- misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It
divines Section 1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the
succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and
Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private
respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do
anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an
183
Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Disqualifications. - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens
I.
under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
( c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Com. Act No. 473 (1939), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Who are Disqualified. - The following can not be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions,
and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during
the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a

Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went

through the actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward
and more effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total
and utter lack of proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach

to foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted. 184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an
adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to
become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or
she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic
Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It
privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different
premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis

natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual process of
naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other
procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open
for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
V.E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human

thoroughbred.
184
The Civil Code states:
/
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that

to be a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics,

pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino

citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions
of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can,
therefore, be ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree:

parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant.
There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of

Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper
proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is
a Filipino citizen.
V.F
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
proceedings attests to how at least one-if not both-of her biological
parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically

impossible. To begi!J with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She
was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful
of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render
testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is
improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private

respondent to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial

evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People: 185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the
)
aid of any inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the
185
571 Phil. 170 (2008) [Per.J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the
existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
186
probable consequence.
People v. Raganas 187 further defines circumstantial evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than

the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with
such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory
conclusion. 188 (Citation omitted)
'
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance,
stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction
in criminal proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce

a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of

circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court
has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings. 189 There is no rational basis for making the use of
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a

conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property)
anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would
require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence
suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less
stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
186
1
Id. at 189-190, citing Lack County v. Neilan, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74, p. 212; State v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475,
494, 21 S.W. 193; and Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8.
187
374 Phil. 810 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
188
Id. at 822.
189
See Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De Laig, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, 172 Phil. 283 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division]; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398 (2004)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003)
[Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial

evidence. 190
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish

Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. 191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did
most-if not all-Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino
population. 192 Private respondent is described as having "brown almond-
shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped
face." 193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. 194 Further, in 1968, there was
no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference

that her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic
Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in
a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved.
The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and
surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave
her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
features nonetheless attest to it.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on

Elections, 195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more
probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a
foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his statistical
inference: 196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN

IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 AND 2010-2014
FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN
YEAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES IN THE PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
190
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. Also, Rule
,I
133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Section 5. Substantial evidence. - In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
191
Rollo, p. 8.
192
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/march2016/221697_ leonen.
pdt> 83 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
193 Id.
194 Id.
195
G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/march2016/221697.pdt>
196
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221698-
700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/march2016/221697_leonen.
pdt> 83 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
1967 1,440 840,302

1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
[illegible] 197
Thus, out of the 900, 165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968,
only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly
99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying

her parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to
sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.
VI
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is

sustained by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a
I
comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous construction of
the Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the evidence
pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune
to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of
proving-through proof of her bloodline-her natural-born status.
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private

respondent upon a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption

that all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines
are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to
prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible
condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd
when there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy-the identity of her
biological parents-is simply not known.
197
Id. at 84.
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts

in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations; that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue." 199
1 8
Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the
burden of evidence. . This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie
case in his or her favor. 200 The other party then bears the "burden of going
forward" 201 with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on

the party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is
ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before
quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. 202 This burden was petitioner's to
discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of
evidence shifts to the respondent.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish

a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the
identities of private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does
not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt,
however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case
and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner

trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously
established as substantive evidence of private respondent's parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a
newborn;
(3) She wasfound sometime in September 1968; I

198
Uytengsulllv. Baduel, 514Phil. l (2005) [PerJ. Tinga, Second Division].
199
Jison v. Court ofAppeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
200 Id.
201
Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
202
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was

registered as a foundling;
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those

of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an

imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more
reasonable inference from these facts is that at least one of private
respondent's parents is a Filipino.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen

consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition
of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the
Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother
and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2 ), any such countervailing proof must
show that both-not just one---of a foundling's biological parents are not
Filipino citizens.
VII.A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De

Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision,
petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born
citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He insists that it is
private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino
parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common

sense dictates that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving
citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly established in
jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions.

Ruling on the allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan
Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first,
203
Rollo, pp. 56-58.
I
Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870,
while the country was still under Spanish colonial rule; 204 and second, that
Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his death certificate, must
have also been his place of residence before death, which subjected him to
the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship
effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902.205 This Court then noted that
Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe
Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then
have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935
Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino
fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of

discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take
on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in tum, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate. 206
It is true that there is jurisprudence-Paa v. Chan 207 and Go v.

Ramos28 (which merely cites Paa')-to the effect that presumptions cannot
be entertained in citiz.enship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine

citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenshifc, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved
in favor of the State. 09 (Emphasis supplied)
204
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 473-474 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
205
Id. at 473-474 and 488.
206
Id. at 487-488.
207
128 Phil. 815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
208
614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
209
128 Phil. 815, 825 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this

Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can
be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This
reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically
referencing the duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement-using the definitive article "the"-reveals that its
conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise,
this Court would have used generic language. Instead of the definite article
"the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of g_ claimant of Philippine
citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that would
show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine
citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this

case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In
Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was
likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably
establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In
contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of
private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it
appear that the same pronouncement was generally applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to

prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor
of the state. 210 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial

translation. In any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It
cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc.
Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are different from
those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and
undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth
certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his
siblings were adduced. J
210
Go. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
VII.B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born
to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-
born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose." 211
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with

Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be
taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate
to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law
and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human
rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further,
this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987

Constitution require the state to enhance children's well-being and to protect
them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory
conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that
hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II
State Policies
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
ARTICLE XV
The Family
211
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
I
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and

nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born

citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following
offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:
212
(1) President;
213
(2) Vice-President;
(3) Senator; 214
215
(4) Member of the House ofRepresentatives;
216
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;
(6) Chairper:son and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission- 217
'
212
CONST., art. VII, sec. 2 provides:
ARTICLE VIL Executive Department
213
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
I
CONST., art. VII, sec. 3.
214
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
215
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
216
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1) provides:
ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at
least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
217
CONST., art. IX-B, sec. 1(1) provides:
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions
B. The Civil Service Commission

SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed
of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on

Elections; 218
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit- 219
(9)
'
Ombudsman and his or her deputies; 220
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 221 and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. 222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born

. . . 1u de, among oth ers, city
citizens me . fiisca1s, 223 assistant

city fiisca1s,224
I
218
CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 1(1) provides:
C. The Commission on Elections

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
219
CONST., art. IX-D, sec. 1(1) provides:
D. Commission on Audit
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not less than ten years
of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding tlieir appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to
the same profession.
22
CONST., art. XI, sec.8 provides:
ARTICLE XI. Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at
the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
221
CONST., art. XII, sec. 20 provides:
ARTICLE XII. National Economy and Patrimony
SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of
whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and
patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such
other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy
direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of
banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance
companies and other institutions performing similar functions.
222
CONST., art. XIII, sec. 17(2) provides:
ARTICLE XIII. Social Justice and Human Rights
Human Rights
SECTION 17....
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term ofoffice and
other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
223
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Four hundred nine,
as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three
thousand ten, is further amended to read as follows:
Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other

public offices. 225 Certain professions are also limited to natural-born
227
citizens, 226 as are other legally established benefits and incentives.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is

tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens.
They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible
capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such
as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of
their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the
Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged
proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that
inferiority through no fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal

access to opportunities for public service:
ARTICLE II
State Policies
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Sec. 38. The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals. - There shall be in the Office of the City Fiscal
one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the rank, salary and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
1
First Instance, an assistant chief to be known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second assistant city
fiscals who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven assistant fiscals, who shall discharge their
duties under the general supervision of the Secretary of Justice. To be eligible for appointment as City
Fiscal one must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law in the
Philippines for a period of not less than ten years or held during a like period of an office in the
Philippine Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. To be
eligible for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and
must have practiced law for at least five years prior to his appointment or held during a like period an
office in the Philippine Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite. (Emphasis supplied)
224
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963).
225
Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River Basin, the Board Member of the Energy
Regulatory Commission, and the National Youth Commissioner, among others.
226
Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast Guard, among others.
227
Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain investment rights.
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of

measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under

like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in
terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee
against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or oppression of inequality. "'228
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial

distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino
parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection
from the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune.in failing to identify
the parents who abandoned them-an inability arising from no fault of their
own--cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness
or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much
benefits and protection from the state as those who know their parents.
Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It
condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were
abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ,

mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the
well-being and development of children. It is not our business to reify
discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines,

foundlings are human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a
civilized nation, respect. Thus:
j
228
Sameerv. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 22, 57 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
229
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division].
ARTICLE II
State Policies
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees/ull respect/or human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the

confines of constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-
bom citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign
citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution
with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines,
as well as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil
Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings

are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the
constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified
treaties that put this mandate into effect.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of2006, provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall

be observed at all times:
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through
measures that will ensure the observance of international
standards of child protection, especially those to which the
Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which
allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely.
The participation of children in the program and policy
formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of
the child" as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are
I
most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the

child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and
emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations

Convention on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-
parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and
nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against
discrimination on account of their birth status. 231 Pertinent portions of the
Convention read:
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the

Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the
dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights,
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United

Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and
assistance,
Have agreed as follows:
Article2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or
her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language,
/
230
Ratified on August 21, 1990.
231
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child
<https://treaties. un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no= IV-
I 1&chapter=4&clang=_en> (visited March 7, 2016).
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social

origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that

the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public

or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection

and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into
account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians,
or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this
end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative
measures.
Article 7
1. The child. shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in

accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration
after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against
discrimination:
Article 24 ....
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,

colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth,
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
232
Ratified on October 23, 1986.
I
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis
supplied)
Treaties are "international agreement[ s] concluded between states in

written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation." 233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they become
binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and

binding by transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute
enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines v. Duque III, et al. :234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation

pursuant to Article VIL Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that
"[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. "
Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conjlicts. 235 (Emphasis
233
supplied)
See Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Banc], citing the Vienna
Convention on the Laws of Treaties.
J
234
561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
235
Id. at 397-398.
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or

otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government-including
the judiciary-is duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the
maxim pacta sunt servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be

the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered
and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them
of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them,
discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the
constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting
them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the
intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic

Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules
and Policies on Dorp.estic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other
Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection
and assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who is
neglected, orphaned, or abandoned." 236
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by

Republic Act No. 8552: 237
236
Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), sec. 2(b) provides:
Section 2 (b ). In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall
I
be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
abandoned.
237
See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), An Act Requiring the Certification of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to Declare a "Child Legally Available for Adoption" as a
Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings, Amending for this Purpose Certain Provision of Rep. Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to implement the
provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority to issue the certification declaring a child
legally available for adoption.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose
parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous months, which includes a
foundling.
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). - I t shall be the duty of the

Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody
of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological
parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as afoundling
and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall
be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the

Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it
expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted:
SECTION 8. Wh9 May Be Adopted. - Only a legally free child may be

the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be
considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to
the Board:
a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death

certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in

lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the
issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a

certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of
his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the
applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In
case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043,
the following, shall be required:
a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child,

the Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of the child.
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the

DSWD. f
238
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. (Emphasis
supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings'

Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without
having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to
complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-
born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive

organs have recognized her natural-born status. This status was never
questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear
that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this,
as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private
respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through
various official public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and

benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006,
she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6,
2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB
239
Chairperson-an office that requires natural-born citizenship.
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar

to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to
benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship
238
DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No. 8239 (1997), Philippine
Passport Act.
239
Pres. Decree No. 1986, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Composition; qualifications; benefits. - The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a
Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of
one ( 1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That they shall be
eligible for re-appointment after the expiration of their term. If the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman or
any member of the BOARD fails to complete his term, any person appointed to fill the vacancy shall
serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of the BOARD member whom he succeeds.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, not
less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral character and standing in the community;
Provided, That in the selection of the members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such
qualifications as would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas of
motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members of the BOARD shall be
members of the Philippine Bar. Provided, finally That at least fifteen (15) members of the BOARD
may come from the movie and television industry to be nominated by legitimate associations
representing the various sectors of said industry.
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall be entitled to
transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in no case exceed FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) per month.
when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she

complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII.A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner

provided by law." 24 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when
private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18,
2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an
American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. 241
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 242 and
Republic Act No. 81 71 243 specifically "to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. " 244
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is

designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship." 245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung v.
Commission on Elections: 246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natuq1l-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. " 24 7
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent

and immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To
effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
24

241
CONST. art. IV, sec. 3.
Rollo, pp. 685-686.
f
242
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or Reacquired.
243
An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women who have Lost their Philippine Citizenship
by Marriage to Aliens and Natural-born Filipinos.
244
See Calilung v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil 110, 117-18 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]
in which this Court stated that this was the clear intent of the legislature when it enacted Republic Act
No. 9225.
245
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
246
551 Phil 110 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
247
Id at 118.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to

the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I , solemnly swear (or

affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of

this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens

who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign
countries "retain," tI?.at is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the
effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and
capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath
of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of
another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire"
their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities,
also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with
Section 2' s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a
mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost
at all.
VIII. B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of

natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and
political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities." 248
However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. -Those who retain or re-
I
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
248
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5.
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must

meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, othel'Wise known as
"the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall

meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
tif1!e of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and

swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the

Philippines . shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any

public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public

office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or non-

commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and

wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following
requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the
retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino. 249 This
also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
solemnities recited in. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. 250
249 )
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003 , sec. 3, par. 2:
/
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - ...
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
250
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution, 251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate
the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in
elections. 252
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath." 253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements
under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
254
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, this
required sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section
18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State
and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law." 255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed
forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to public office in
the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
f
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
251
CONST., art. V, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
252
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(1) provides:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of2003" and other existing laws;
253
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(2) provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
254
692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
255
Id. at 428.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First,

on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. 256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter
257
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. This evidences her compliance with
Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within
the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overs.eas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship. 258 This was complemented by her
execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
2011, 260 which was; in tum, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011 261 and
the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department
of State, on February 3, 2012. 262
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-

born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for
eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII.D
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to

comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather
than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance
with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect
citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of

permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume
that a natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an
irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.
256 Rollo, p. 10.

251 Id. at 687.
25s Id.
259 Id. at 229.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
status quo ante that one returns. "Re" -acquiring can only mean a reversion
to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
investiture of an entit,:ely new status, it should not have used a word such as
"reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make
new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of
compliance with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled

that repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of
one's original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. 263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was

in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225's policy of
permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." 264 In
Bengs on' s words, the once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back
to his or her natural-born status. There may have been an interruption in the
recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized
elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this
intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only
from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized,
de Jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may
have consequences de facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to
taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional
solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to
citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship
itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no
singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must
comply.
IX
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is

not only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an #
accomplice to injustice. /(
263
Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633, 649 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan,
En Banc].
264
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
265
Rollo, p. 35.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and

social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the
unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those who
gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a
disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly
remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we can

never tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater
misfortune because their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be
rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed
against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command
us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution

that we must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation
edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and
civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its
constitutional competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-
bom citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to
petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision
and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public

respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born

Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

/ Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERF.NO

Chief Justice
No part
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITER<YJ. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Justice
No part No part
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO . PERALTA
Associat Justice
(_ - . ,. .JI
T:i(IARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
(
IA?,& ("M.C.(. 4
MENDOZA :), VENIDO L. REYES


fJh-rJ.N- N.A- 11'(,M.Ar-
ESTELA
/"r NJ"'f(f-
S. CAGUIOA
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
CE.RT!F!i.:Ci XEROX COPY:
CU:'.RK Of cu:JRT, EN BANC

COURT

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l\epublic of tbe tlbilippines

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, G.R. No. 221538

The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to

Decision 2 G.R. No. 221538

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling

Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate

Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH

On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro

On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a

become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the

I, Marv Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and

A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the

In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America

Departures Flight No.

Arrivals Flight No.

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed

I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age,

The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN ko ngayong ika-21

Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. 73 On

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed

Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion to

On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued

Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its

We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-

Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo

SO ORDERED. 100 (Citations omitted)

On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. 101 The

Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified

The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11

SO ORDERED. 105 (Emphasis in the original)

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was

On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral

This case held in abeyance pending the resolution of the