Sales - Villamar Vs Mangaoil

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Estelita Villamar vs.

Balbino Mangaoil
G.R. No. 188661, April 11, 2012

Facts:

Estelita Villamar sold a property in San Francisco, Manuel, Isabela,


with Balbino Mangaoil. Their deed of sale indicated that 185,000
of the total price will be paid to the loan secured with Rural Bank
of Cauyan for the payment of the mortgages in favor of Romeo
Lacaden and Florante Parangan. Villamor failed to give the title to
Mangaoil; the latter also informed the former that he was backing
out from the sale agreed, giving as one of the reasons that the
area was not yet fully cleared by encumbrances as there are
tenants who are not willing to vacate the land without giving them
back the amount that they mortgaged the land. Mangaoil
demanded refund of his 185,000.00 down payment, but Villamar
refused. Hence, Mangaoil filed a complaint of rescission of
contract against Villamar. The latter argued that the execution of
public instrument amounted to delivery. RTC ruled in favour of
Mangaoil. Dissatisfied, Villamar appealed but it CA ruled also in
favour of Mangaoil.

Issue:

Whether or not Villamars failure to deliver to the respondent the


physical possession of the property amount to substantial breach.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 1498 of the NCC generally considers the execution of


a public instrument as constructive delivery by the seller to the
buyer of the property subject of a contract of sale. The case at
bar, however, falls among the exceptions to the foregoing rule
since a mere presumptive and not conclusive delivery is created
as the respondent failed to take material possession of the
subject property.
Further, even if we were to assume for argument's sake that the
agreement entered into by the contending parties does not
require the delivery of the physical possession of the subject
property from the mortgagors to the respondent, still, the
petitioner's claim that her execution of an absolute deed of sale
was already sufficient as it already amounted to a constructive
delivery of the thing sold which

Article 1498 of the NCC allows, cannot stand.


In Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. The Auditor
General,29 we held:

When the sale of real property is made in a public


instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing object of the contract, if from the deed
the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred.1wphi1
In other words, there is symbolic delivery of the property
subject of the sale by the execution of the public instrument,
unless from the express terms of the instrument, or by clear
inference therefrom, this was not the intention of the parties.
Such would be the case, for instance, x x x where the vendor
has no control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale,
and, therefore, its material delivery could not have been
made.

Stated differently, as a general rule, the execution of a public


instrument amounts to a constructive delivery of the thing subject
of a contract of sale. However, exceptions exist, among which is
when mere presumptive and not conclusive delivery is created in
cases where the buyer fails to take material possession of the
subject of sale. A person who does not have actual possession of
the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the
execution and delivery of a public instrument.
In the case at bar, the RTC and the CA found that the petitioner
failed to deliver to the respondent the possession of the subject
property due to the continued presence and occupation of
Parangan and Lacaden. We find no ample reason to reverse the
said findings. Considered in the light of either the agreement
entered into by the parties or the pertinent provisions of law, the
petitioner failed in her undertaking to deliver the subject property
to the respondent.

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