This case involved a dispute over the sale of property from Estelita Villamar to Balbino Mangaoil. While their deed of sale indicated Mangaoil would pay Villamar ₱185,000, Villamar failed to deliver title to the property to Mangaoil. Mangaoil also informed Villamar that he was backing out of the sale due to tenants still occupying the land. Mangaoil demanded refund of his down payment but Villamar refused. The court ruled that Villamar's failure to deliver physical possession of the property to Mangaoil constituted a substantial breach, as mere execution of the sale agreement did not transfer constructive possession since Villamar did not have actual control over the property. The court affirmed
This case involved a dispute over the sale of property from Estelita Villamar to Balbino Mangaoil. While their deed of sale indicated Mangaoil would pay Villamar ₱185,000, Villamar failed to deliver title to the property to Mangaoil. Mangaoil also informed Villamar that he was backing out of the sale due to tenants still occupying the land. Mangaoil demanded refund of his down payment but Villamar refused. The court ruled that Villamar's failure to deliver physical possession of the property to Mangaoil constituted a substantial breach, as mere execution of the sale agreement did not transfer constructive possession since Villamar did not have actual control over the property. The court affirmed
Original Description:
Villamor vs. Mangaoil - Sales case digest (Consummation of sale)
This case involved a dispute over the sale of property from Estelita Villamar to Balbino Mangaoil. While their deed of sale indicated Mangaoil would pay Villamar ₱185,000, Villamar failed to deliver title to the property to Mangaoil. Mangaoil also informed Villamar that he was backing out of the sale due to tenants still occupying the land. Mangaoil demanded refund of his down payment but Villamar refused. The court ruled that Villamar's failure to deliver physical possession of the property to Mangaoil constituted a substantial breach, as mere execution of the sale agreement did not transfer constructive possession since Villamar did not have actual control over the property. The court affirmed
This case involved a dispute over the sale of property from Estelita Villamar to Balbino Mangaoil. While their deed of sale indicated Mangaoil would pay Villamar ₱185,000, Villamar failed to deliver title to the property to Mangaoil. Mangaoil also informed Villamar that he was backing out of the sale due to tenants still occupying the land. Mangaoil demanded refund of his down payment but Villamar refused. The court ruled that Villamar's failure to deliver physical possession of the property to Mangaoil constituted a substantial breach, as mere execution of the sale agreement did not transfer constructive possession since Villamar did not have actual control over the property. The court affirmed
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Estelita Villamar vs.
Balbino Mangaoil G.R. No. 188661, April 11, 2012
Facts:
Estelita Villamar sold a property in San Francisco, Manuel, Isabela,
with Balbino Mangaoil. Their deed of sale indicated that 185,000 of the total price will be paid to the loan secured with Rural Bank of Cauyan for the payment of the mortgages in favor of Romeo Lacaden and Florante Parangan. Villamor failed to give the title to Mangaoil; the latter also informed the former that he was backing out from the sale agreed, giving as one of the reasons that the area was not yet fully cleared by encumbrances as there are tenants who are not willing to vacate the land without giving them back the amount that they mortgaged the land. Mangaoil demanded refund of his 185,000.00 down payment, but Villamar refused. Hence, Mangaoil filed a complaint of rescission of contract against Villamar. The latter argued that the execution of public instrument amounted to delivery. RTC ruled in favour of Mangaoil. Dissatisfied, Villamar appealed but it CA ruled also in favour of Mangaoil.
Issue:
Whether or not Villamars failure to deliver to the respondent the
physical possession of the property amount to substantial breach.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 1498 of the NCC generally considers the execution of
a public instrument as constructive delivery by the seller to the buyer of the property subject of a contract of sale. The case at bar, however, falls among the exceptions to the foregoing rule since a mere presumptive and not conclusive delivery is created as the respondent failed to take material possession of the subject property. Further, even if we were to assume for argument's sake that the agreement entered into by the contending parties does not require the delivery of the physical possession of the subject property from the mortgagors to the respondent, still, the petitioner's claim that her execution of an absolute deed of sale was already sufficient as it already amounted to a constructive delivery of the thing sold which
Article 1498 of the NCC allows, cannot stand.
In Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. The Auditor General,29 we held:
When the sale of real property is made in a public
instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.1wphi1 In other words, there is symbolic delivery of the property subject of the sale by the execution of the public instrument, unless from the express terms of the instrument, or by clear inference therefrom, this was not the intention of the parties. Such would be the case, for instance, x x x where the vendor has no control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale, and, therefore, its material delivery could not have been made.
Stated differently, as a general rule, the execution of a public
instrument amounts to a constructive delivery of the thing subject of a contract of sale. However, exceptions exist, among which is when mere presumptive and not conclusive delivery is created in cases where the buyer fails to take material possession of the subject of sale. A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. In the case at bar, the RTC and the CA found that the petitioner failed to deliver to the respondent the possession of the subject property due to the continued presence and occupation of Parangan and Lacaden. We find no ample reason to reverse the said findings. Considered in the light of either the agreement entered into by the parties or the pertinent provisions of law, the petitioner failed in her undertaking to deliver the subject property to the respondent.