1

Samuel Molotsky
Dr. Anthony Scotti
History 235
19 April 2017
The Battle of Midway
The innate foundation of warfare is chaos. Combat is unpredictable, and the location,

time, and strength of the next enemy attack is the focus of almost all military intelligence

operations. Throughout history, it has been seen that battles have been won against

overwhelming odds, against all explanation. Indeed, it may be believed that divine intervention

has a hand in the successes and failures of combat. In practical terms, however, it can be argued

that it is the men the enlisted, the officers, the logistic crew and all others that find

themselves at the nexus of a moment in history that have the true bearing of the outcome. It is

through their actions and their abilities that the result of a battle is decided, perhaps with some

luck or chance in the mix. The battle of Midway is one such example. The battle itself would

take place between June 4th and 7th, 1942, near Midway Atoll, which is where the battle gets its

name. Occurring 6 months after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the result of the engagement would be

irreparable for the Imperial Japanese Navy and would eliminate the capability of Japanese forces

mounting any significant offensive naval action in the Pacific for the remainder of the war. The

United States use of codebreaking technology, tactics and decision-making leading up to the

battle would serve as the foundation for its ultimate success over the Japanese.

The Battle of Midway occurred in 1942, at the height of the Second World War. The

battle took place only six months after the United States declared war on Germany and Japan

after the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by the Japanese Navy. The attack was aimed at

crippling the U.S Pacific fleet, namely its aircraft carriers, but was unsuccessful in that regard.
 2

Unbeknownst to Japanese forces, the aircraft carriers were not in port at Pearl Harbor on

December 7th, when the attack took place. This would have severe repercussions for the Japanese

as those same ships were later used at the Battle of the Coral Sea and subsequently the Battle of

Midway.

Economic warfare engaged by the United States against Japan in response to its

aggressive expansion into China and the Pacific is what prompted the Japanese attacks on Pearl

Harbor. Japan, an island nation, was incredibly dependent on international trade to sustain itself

materially. This was the main reason for its vast expansion throughout the Pacific after the end of

the First World War. After Japan pressured France into allowing the stationing of Japanese

troops in French Indo-China, the United States met this latest series of aggressive moves with a

steadily escalating campaign of economic sanctions, so that by late summer of 1941 Japan was

no longer able to purchase any materials from the United States (NEH). This act of aggressive

economic warfare prompted the Japanese to strike at the United States first, to cripple their

offensive capabilities in the Pacific for long enough that Japan could prepare and fend off any

American response.

After the attack at Pearl Harbor, America no longer saw the war as a distant conflict

being fought by Europeans, but rather as an American conflict. The devastation after the

Japanese assault left many in shock, but ultimately it woke the American public to the reality of

the war being waged around the globe. American values are centered around justice and the idea

of freedom and liberty, core constructs to all individuals that were being stripped away by Nazi

Germany and Imperial Japan. This, coupled with an extreme sense of duty and service seen after

Pearl Harbor brought America into the war quickly, and with a fresh fighting force ready to sail

into the Pacific and Europe. This fresh force was not, however, available to the United States at
 3

the time during which the Battle of Midway would take place. Admiral Nimitz, appointed

Commander in Chief in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor, was given a battleship fleet that rested on

the bottom of Pearl Harbor, three carriers with a theoretical capacity of 264 airplanes, a handful

of cruisers and destroyers, and a submarine fleet whose torpedoes did not work (Symonds 23).

Realistically speaking, the American forces in the Pacific were working with inadequate

resources for the fight they were being told to engage in.

Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was less than pleased at

the results of Pearl Harbor. He remained frustrated with his counterpart, Chichi Nagumo

commander of the First Air Fleet, which lead the air raid on Pearl Harbor because he had not

remained in the area long enough to wreck the base or to find and sink the American carriers

because Nagumo saw the American battle fleet as his most important target (Symonds 99).

This failure in Yamamotos eyes meant that the United States was capable of launching raids on

Japanese shipping through the Pacific, and is the direct reason to which Yamamoto decided to

attack the Midway Atoll. Midway itself, at first glance, was an unlikely target. Though a part of

the Hawaiian Islands chain, it lies 1,135 miles from Pearl Harbor and another 1,185 miles from

Wake Island. What made the atoll strategically important not only for the Japanese but the

United States as the establishment of an air base on Eastern Island.

Yamamoto believed that the Midway Atoll was strategically important enough to lure the

United States into a decisive naval engagement where he could destroy the American carrier fleet

and allow Japanese naval forces to roam the Pacific undisturbed. The Japanese saw the seizure of

Midway as an avenue to end the consternation raised by the Doolittle raid on Japan by ex-

tending the Homeland warning distance, depriving the United States of a forward base for

submarines, and provide a stepping stone for the capture of Oahu by the end of 1942 (Polmar
 4

223). The United States understood the necessity of keeping control over Midway, providing

them with early warning on a future Japanese attack and the ability to raid Japanese shipping all

the way up to the coast of Japan.

The Battle of Midway is often portrayed as a somewhat David and Goliath story. The

Japanese Combined Fleet is largely seen as an overwhelming force, utilizing four of the Imperial

Navys six aircraft carriers for the assault on Midway (Appendix A). Comparatively, the United

States have Task Force 16 and 17 at their disposal, which has only three aircraft carriers

(Appendix B). As highlighted by Dallas Isom, the numbers were much closer:

Opposing the 229 operational carrier aircraft and 16 cruiser- and battleship-based

reconnaissance boat planes of the Mobile Force were the 221 operational planes on

Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown and 111 planes based at Midway (which can be

regarded as a fourth, albeit fixed, aircraft carrier). Thus, in raw numbers, the Americans

outnumbered Nagumos Mobile Force in air-craft [sic] by around 332 to 245 (Isom

100).1

The planned attack by Admiral Yamamoto would begin on 5 June and involve an air

attack to destroy Midways defenses and air wings. The attack, officially called Operation MI,

involved the seizure of Kure Island, some 60 miles northwest of Midway, as a staging base for

Japanese sea planes (Polmar 226). It was planned that on 7 June, Admiral Kondos task force of

roughly 5,000 men would land on Midway to hold the island for up to three months without

reinforcement (Polmar 226). These actions were undertaken by the Japanese in a calculated

1
Isom notes in Midway Inquest that the exact numbers for Japanese aircraft may not be entirely accurate, as records
for the attack did not survive the battle. He goes on to explain, however, that it is possible to deduce the number and
types of aircraft used by the Japanese based on After Action Reports and from the official Japanese history of
WWII, Senshi Sosho (page 100).
 5

maneuver to overwhelm U.S forces at Midway and prevent any reinforcements, such as their

aircraft carriers, from gaining a significant tactical advantage during the fighting. The importance

of Japanese ground troops having enough supplies to last them three months is obvious: The

Navy and Army werent fully optimistic that, even if they could land the troops, they could keep

the American fleet from cutting them off. Having enough manpower and resources to sustain a

foothold on Midway until reinforcements could arrive to further secure the island was critical to

the overall success of the Japanese campaign to take it.

At the same time, American cryptoanalysts were monitoring Japanese radio

communications in the Pacific. On 13 March 1942, U.S Navy cryptoanalysts broke JN-25, the

Japanese Navys General Purpose Code. After this, though the scope of the attack would remain

somewhat hidden to allied forces until the actual engagement, it became clear that a Japanese

attack [Rear Admiral Edwin T.] Layton advised Admiral Nimitz and officials in Washington

that a Japanese offensive in the Aleutian chain seems possible in late May, (Parker 43). The

interception of Japanese radio communications in the lead-up to the battle of Midway was

crucial. Though they caused large confusion inside U.S Naval and War Department commands2,

they also provided excellent specific detail about locations of Japanese attack. Interceptions of

Japanese Communications included Two additional translations of possibly the same message

from different originators were also published the same day by Melbourne and Hawaii. They

contained mother vital detail: Japanese planes would be Lunched fay miles northwest of AF

(Parker 48-49). This information proved accurate to Yamamotos plans for Operation MI, and

2
Parker highlights how there was confusion between the OP-20-G and the War Plans Staff regarding the Japanese
plans for Midway and the attack on the Aleutian Islands, including its time and precise location. He highlights
through internal correspondence between Nimitz and CINPAC that analysts in Washington believed that the strong
enemy force deploying from Japan the last week in May 1942 was related to an offensive against northeast
Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji, between 15 and 20 June" (Parker 47).
 6

was trusted by Nimitz enough that he redirected submarine search activity off Midway to an

area fifty miles northwest of the island (Parker 49). This only goes to show how accurate and

reliable the intelligence being collected on the Japanese truly was.

The realities of the United States having knowledge of the Japanese plans and their

preparations for the attack on Midway did not go unnoticed by the Japanese. Japans own

intelligence operations were intercepting U.S communications, and noted that 72 of 180

messages from Pearl Harbor were labeled Urgent (Parker 56). Additionally, and what should

have been the most concerning to the Japanese Midway Strike Force and Admiral Yamamoto

was an intercepted message from a U.S submarine just ahead of the Transport Group that had

left Saipan on the 28th [and] had sent a long urgent message to Midway on the 30th suggesting

that the transports had been discovered (Parker 56). Despite this, Yamamoto withheld this

information from the rest of the Midway Strike Force, and he proceeded with Operation MI as

planned. In preparation for the attack on Midway, Admiral Nimitz ordered an additional hundred

fighters to Eastern Island, composed of patrol planes, scout bombers, torpedo planes, Marine

fighters, and twenty-three U.S. Army bombers, including nineteen B-17 Flying Fortresses

(Symonds 185). Nimitz understood that he was at a disadvantage in the number of aircraft

carriers he had available to him, but he also understood that by using Midway as a pseudo-

carrier, it would even the fight and give him an unsinkable advantage.

The Japanese Combined Fleet fought their way through rough seas as they made their

way eastward to Midway on June 2nd. The fog was so thick that the ships had to use searchlights

to find one another in formation (Symonds 211). This, though unfortunate for Japanese

navigation, served to protect the fleet from American scout aircraft who were already in the area

looking for them. The first sighting of Japanese ships would come from a Midway-launched
 7

PBY at 9:00am on June 3rd. Ensign Charles R. Eaton, who was piloting the PBY, reported

seeing two Japanese cargo vessels that fired on him with antiaircraft fire (Symonds 212).

Minutes later, at 9:05am, Ensign Jewell Reid sent the message: Sighted main body.

(Symonds 212). B-17 bombers from Midway took off and headed for the sighting, with Nimitz

already knowing that it was not as Reid reported the main force, but rather the landing force.

Dropping their ordnance from 10,000 feet, 11 tons of 600-pound bombs fell on the Japanese

ships. The pilots, untrained in anti-ship warfare, reported five hits, one probable hit, and four

near misses against two battleships and two large transports (Symonds 215). Then, the attack on

Midway began.

At 4:30am on June 4th, Vice Admiral Nagumo ordered his four carriers to begin

launching aircraft. The first air attack was led by Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, and consisted of

107 aircraft (Polmar 232). At 5:25am, a PBY launched from Midway made what Nimitz later

called the most important contact of the battle (Polmar 232). The pilot reported seeing carrier

planes roughly 150 miles from Midway. At 5:53am, Midways radar began tracking the

approaching Japanese planes and the entirety of the Midway air wing was launched. The

Japanese bomber group was protected by the fighter escort of Japanese Zero fighters that flew

circles around the U.S aircraft at that time. Around 6:30am, the Japanese bombers began

targeting Midway and by 7:00am the last of them had turned back towards the Japanese fleet

(Polmar 232). A torpedo attack launched by Nimitz against the Japanese carriers was easily

repelled by the Japanese Zeros flying as escorts for the ships, but it led Admiral Nagumo into a

series of critical decisions.

At 7:15am, Admiral Nagumo gave the order to rearm his torpedo planes with land

bombs for a second strike on Midway (Isom 104). This was the first of three critical decisions
 8

Nagumo made that morning that lead to the destruction of his aircraft carriers3. The decision was

made, largely, because Nagumo had received a report around 7:05am, a mere ten minutes before

he gave the order, that a second strike on Midway was necessary. The reason this order was so

difficult and critical to the battle is because It would contravene Yamamotos standing order to

keep half his torpedo planes in a state of readiness to attack any American carriers that might

show up (Isom 112). Let us not forget that the entire purpose of the engagement of U.S forces at

Midway on Japans terms was to lure out and destroy the American Pacific carrier fleet. Even

still, Nagumo calculated that the invasion of Midway could not take place until the island was

neutralized, which would require a second bombing strike. A half hour later, however, Nagumo

would receive disturbing news.

A search plane from the cruiser Tone, which had been launched a half hour later earlier in

the day, sent a report back to the fleet stating: Sight what appears to be ten enemy surface units,

in position bearing ten degrees [almost due north], distant 240 miles from Midway (Symonds

236). In an effort to digest and debate the new information with his staff, Nagumo suspended the

armament of bombs onto the aircraft instead of torpedoes. Then, he ordered thirty-six Val

bombers on the Hiry and Sry to prepare to carry out attacks on enemy fleet units (Symonds

240). Around 9:20am, the last of the aircraft that had conducted the first strike on Midway had

returned and landed on the aircraft carriers and were in the hangars for rearming and refueling. It

was around this time that a U.S torpedo strike of three squadrons, roughly 41 aircraft, attempted

to engage the Japanese carriers. Only four aircraft survived the massacre, and none of the

torpedoes hit their mark (Polmar 238). It was just after this that the conditions were ripe for the

3
See Appendix C for the Japanese attack on Midway and the American counterattack from 7:00am to 9:00am,
covering the critical hours of Nagumos decision-making and the destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet.
 9

destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet. Nagumo ordered fighter aircraft to be launched to repel

any further American attacks, but the rearmament he had previously ordered and the stacking of

bombs on the flight deck to expedite the rearmament meant that there was not much space to

launch the necessary fighters. At 9:55am, a squadron of American dive bombers found the

Japanese carriers.

At 10:25, the first bomb hit the Akagi. The bomb hit the middle of the aircraft carrier,

igniting the ship and destroying the 60-odd aircraft on the Akagis hangar deck (Polmar 239),

which were armed, fueled, and ready for launch. Additionally, the Kaga was smothered by at

least four direct hits and five near misses (Polmar 239). Bombers from the Yorktown then

targeted the Japanese Sry carrier, with the first bomb struck that flattop at 10:25. Within

minutes two more bombs scoredThe Sry was soon wrapped in flames and 20 minutes after

the first bomb hit she was ordered abandoned (Polmar 239). It is incredible to see how effective

the United States is at not only general anti-ship operations, but specifically carrier-based naval

warfare. The critical use of dive bombers against Japanese carriers is shown here to be incredibly

effective, crippling in the span of a half hour three of Japans five aircraft carriers. This type of

tactical victory does not only serve the immediate goal of fending off the Midway invasion, but

the long-term success of the United States Pacific campaign.

Even with this victory, the Japanese were not entirely out of the fight. Nagumo

immediately ordered a counter-strike against American ships. Bombers launched from the deck

of the Hiry, under the command of Lieutenant Michio Kobayashi, flew towards the American

ships position and engaged the Yorktown. Polmar overviews the attack on the Yorktown by the

Hiry strike group:

Only eight Vals, each carrying a 551-pound armor-piercing bomb, got through to the

carrier. Two were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The six surviving dive bombers pushed

on to hit the Yorktown, which was maneuvering at 30.5 knots. Another Val was hit over

the Yorktown, but its bomb tumbled down and exploded on the carriers deck, starting

fires. Another bomb exploded in the ships funnel, starting more fires, rupturing the

boiler uptakes, knocking out two boilers, and putting out fires in most of the ships seven

other boilers. A third bomb exploded on the fourth deck near the ships magazines and

fuel tanks, starting still more fires (Polmar 241).

Ultimately, four Japanese aircraft carriers would sink because of the battle of Midway,

and the Yorktown, though at first having been given multiple destroyers and other ships to tow

her to save the ship, would ultimately sink after it was spotted by a Japanese submarine and

targeted. Indeed, Admiral Nagumo boarded the Nagara from the Nowake and promptly sent

two radio dispatchesthe first advised the Commander in Chief of the crippling damage to the

three carriers, of Nagumos transfer to the Nagara, and of his plan to seek a decisive surface

engagement (Hone 55). The result of the battle was an overwhelming American victory, having

successfully repelled the Japanese invasion of Midway and ending in the destruction of four of

the Imperial Japanese Navys aircraft carriers. The Battle of Midway would secure American

naval dominance in the Pacific for the rest of the war, and Japan would not have the resources

necessary to rebuild its carrier fleet. The Battle of Midway not only served as a tactical American

victory, it also showed the full offensive potential of aircraft carriers, and secured their place in

the United States arsenal even to this day.

Communication and the confusion surrounding what American ships were in the area and

where those ships were contributed greatly to the failure of the Japanese. This can otherwise be
 11

referred to as the fog of war, and it is due to this lapse in communication and information that

Admiral Nagumo made his fateful decision to rearm his aircraft for a land attack instead of

leaving them prepared for a naval strike. The principles of war became muddied for the Japanese

in this engagement. They had a clear and concise objective, which was to take Midway and

engage the American carrier fleet and destroy it. This objective became impossible, however,

due to the loss of the element of surprise on the part of the Japanese (unbeknownst to them,

however), as well as the failure of economy of force. All, instead of some, of his aircraft were

unavailable at the point of decision due to his previous command to rearm his forces. Nagumo

failed to take the initiative when it mattered most and it resulted in a confused and inadequate

reaction force to an American strike.

Appendix A

Table 13-1: An organizational chart outlining the command structure and force composition of
the Japanese Imperial Navy Combined Fleet engaged in Operation MI, Yamamotos attack of the
Midway Atoll (Polmar 225).
 13

Appendix B

Table 13-2: An organizational chart outlining the command structure and force composition of
the United States Navy Carrier Striking Force engaged in the defense of the Midway Atoll
against Imperial Japanese Naval forces in June, 1942 (Polmar 228).
 14

Appendix C

Appendix C: This map outlines the Japanese air attack on the Midway Atoll and the American
counterattack against the Japanese Combined Fleet from 7:00am to 9:00am on June 4th
(Symonds 233).
 15

Works Cited

Hone, Thomas C. The Battle of Midway: The Naval Institute Guide to the U.S. Navy's Greatest

Victory. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2016. Print.

Isom, Dallas Woodbury. Midway Inquest Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway.

Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2007. Print.

Parker, Frederick D. A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the

Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians. Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for

Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2011. Print.

Polmar, Norman and Minoru Genda. Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its

Influence on World Events. vol. 2nd ed, University of Nebraska Press, 2006.

Symonds, Craig L. The Battle of Midway. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. Print.

"The Road to Pearl Harbor: The United States and East Asia, 19151941." EDSITEment! The

Best of the Humanities on the Web. National Endowment for the Humanities, n.d. Web.

11 Apr. 2017. <https://edsitement.neh.gov/curriculum-unit/road-pearl-harbor-united-

states-and-east-asia-1915-1941>.