Laurel vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990 - HI-LITE

Today is Tuesday, November 09, 2010
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN
RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the
PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and
agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306
Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the
prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in
G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully
disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi
property inspire of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively
prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on
March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the
respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution dated February 22, 1990.
The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in
the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion
for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second
motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third
motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time
which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of
time the petitions have been pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No.
92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to decide the
two (2) cases.
I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area
of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72
square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking
lot for the consulate staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses
in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable
in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and
development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector
and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine.
Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No.
300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure
of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped
since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to

Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese
firm - Kajima Corporation which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1)
building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the
buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other
building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the
lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment)
The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and
ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and
Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-
A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens
or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in
the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi
lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first
bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has
not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his
Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R.
No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in
G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine
government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions
have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop
the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the
government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
296 in making the property available for sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities. He also
questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine
Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-
owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots
were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and
consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi
property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of
the Civil Code (See infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public
service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no
ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related
properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and
other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they
continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an
opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the
commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use
of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of
public dominion so long as the government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any
measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located.
They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21,
Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in
explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has
become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the
intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four
government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment
by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10,
1988 which contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine
properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but
which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date;
thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi
property from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the
petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second
bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court
dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the
constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of
the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth
Act 141).itc-asl
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern
(Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by
Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections
2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the bidding
for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days
before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance to comply with
Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum
price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of
the floor price would still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site
and the three related properties were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned
to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under
the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is
not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in
Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code
as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because
the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA
481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating

a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if
the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a
lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in
Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government
funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of
government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way
signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a
provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for
the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the properties lost their public
character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep.
Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred
(100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease
or any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino
citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and
the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated,
Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private
sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to
end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision
which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government
in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public
dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which
are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore,
does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates
possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund
created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man
cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to
insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine
law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to
its provision is not presented to the Court It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or
Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that
Japanese law would allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and
effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed.,
pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its
sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex
situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured
through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who
are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which
should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos
is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should
we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by

the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the
approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative
powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in

which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other
instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in
excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the
necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly
vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in
behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the
President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any
political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its
sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the
Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on
Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not
uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that
"[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the
Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the
Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of
Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor
did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be
patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national
economic development projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed
1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the
issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from
public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the
property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner
Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213
U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people
in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese
military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and
kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo
properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an
invader; like the monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect
economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments?
Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to
the countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not
think of selling them. For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement

for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation
and economic devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its significance
today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the
passage of 32 years since the property passed on to the Philippine government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos
veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually
be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of

prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi
property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the
following observations only for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the President's legal authority to sell the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor General
was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this was not his fault. The fact is that
there is -no such authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that statutory permission out of
thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No.
55 was a mere request for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi property, possibly
to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the said property
may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
where every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled against her,
the President of the Philippines has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress that lays
down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies determined by
Congress are embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved by the President to
become law. The President, of course, recommends to Congress the approval of policies but, in
the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy - determining branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing such
laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the reparations
agreement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement, this
property was acquired by the Philippine government for a specific purpose, namely, to serve as
the site of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, Roppongi is a property of
public dominion and intended for public service, squarely falling within that class of property
under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the property is
first transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of the
state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state patrimonial property involves, to
my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which can decide and declare the
conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress
has made no such decision or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state patrimonial
property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or
dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The record is
likewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi thru
public bidding or otherwise.
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a
public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the President to
sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order earlier issued by this Court.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost its
nature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the State. I
understand that the parties are agreed that it was property intended for "public service" within the
contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and accordingly, land of State
dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone issue is, in the light of supervening
developments, that is non-user thereof by the National Government (for diplomatic purposes) for
the last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No. 296 making it available for sale to any
interested buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, making available for the program's financing, State assets sold; the approval by the
President of the recommendation of the investigating committee formed to study the property's
utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the Philippine Senate requesting for the
deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the public dominion, and if it is not,
how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a
question our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the
public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof for
purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it has been
held that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion upon its donation to the
town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases,
the character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to
which it is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is
no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be
part of the public [dominion], not available for private expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it
was ruled that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under its
charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the
sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act executive
or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative
decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by earlier
interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on the
manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic
purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.
I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of this Court, among other things,
that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary;
8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the public dominion unless
and until reclassified by the Executive Branch of the Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources,
under the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting
With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306 Roppongi,
5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be
characterized as property of public dominion, within the meaning of Article 420 (2) of the Civil
Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for
public use property "intended for some public service" and property intended "for the
development of the national wealth") all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
whether found within the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located within the territory of
another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property intended
for public use can scarcely be properly applied to property belonging to the Republic but found
within the territory of another State. The third item of the classification property intended for the
development of the national wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign State are rarely, if
ever, found within the territorial base of another sovereign State. The task of examining in detail
the applicability of the classification set out in Article 420 of our Civil Code to property that the
Philippines happens to own outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
present time, before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the
Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the Roppongi property has been
converted into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and (b)
assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal authority to dispose of the
Roppongi property.
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some public
service, into property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the Civil Code
does not address the question of who has authority to effect such conversion. Neither does the
Civil Code set out or refer to any procedure for such conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit pronouncements on this point, as Justice
Sarmiento has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands (108 Phils.
335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed part of the public domain,
the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for public use or public
purposes and which would, therefore, have become disposable and available for private
ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the government shall declare it to
be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We
believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and
the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service.
If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain. (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y
Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the
Law of Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through
the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer
needed for coast-guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of
the public domain not available for private appropriation or ownership. (108 Phil. at 338-339;
emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No
particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified either in statute law or in case law.
Article 422 of the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately imposable is
that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear from a consideration of the acts or acts of the
Executive Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to have effected such
conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion
belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property of
such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council of
Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned road, "the
same not being included in the city development plan". Subsequently, by another resolution, the
City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through public bidding.
Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of conversion of property for public use into
patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and
unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used
or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale
to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in question. (66
SCRA at 484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his separate opinion, in the case of property
owned by municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to
some use other than "public use" or some "public service", was sufficient legally to convert such
property into patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 [1906]- Municipality of
Hinunganan v. Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of' property of municipal
corporations but also in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on Article
341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over verbatim into our Civil Code by
Article 422 thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el momento en que los bienes
de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la autoridad competente legislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se trata
naturalmente la dificultad queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida
cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no
haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin embargo, cesar de hecho el
destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este caso, y para los efectos juridicos que resultan
de entrar la cosa en el comercio de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha verificado la conversion
de los bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo italiano, por la afirmativa, y por
nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende tanto de
una declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con
respecto de determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio publico. Si una
fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se abandona tambien
por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes
especiales mas o memos administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p.
128 [7a ed.; 1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property of
the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that cumulative effect of
the executive acts here involved was to convert property originally intended for and devoted to
public service into patrimonial property of the State, that is, property susceptible of disposition to
and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if not each individual
act, make crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department to effect such conversion. These
executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed of
officials of the Executive Department: the Executive Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to
Japan; and representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Asset Privatization Trust.
On 19 September 1988, the Committee recommended to the President the sale of one of the lots
(the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, the President
approved the recommendation of the Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic note informed the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The
Japanese Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no
objection to such disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the President and the Committee
informed the leaders of the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the Philippines of the
proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming
that the majority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize
the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with respect that Executive Order No. 296
is more than sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the property previously devoted to public
service into patrimonial property that is capable of being sold or otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically convert
the property into patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that prolonged non-use, conjoined with
the other factors here listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial
property of the State. Actually, as already pointed out, case law involving property of municipal
corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to
some use other than public use or public service, was sufficient to convert such property into
patrimonial property of the local governmental entity concerned. Also as pointed out above,
Manresa reached the same conclusion in respect of conversion of property of the public domain
of the State into property of the private domain of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and indubitable
will but to lack of financial support to repair and improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13).
With respect, it may be stressed that there is no abandonment involved here, certainly no
abandonment of property or of property rights. What is involved is the charge of the classification
of the property from property of the public domain into property of the private domain of the State.
Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever funds
were necessary to maintain the property in Roppongi in a condition suitable for diplomatic
representation purposes, such circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a
manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the Executive Department for the
sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly does
not argue against an intent to convert the property involved into property that is disposable by
bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a whole,
show at least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the
Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into patrimonial property that is
susceptible of being sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first issue, it is necessary to address
the second issue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of the
Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which
reads as follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in
Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis
supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, has
been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present
Administrative Code refers to is authorization by law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not
purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the Government.
For Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to execute and sign on behalf of the
Government the deed of conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for disposition of
real property of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in the
form of (a) a general, standing authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the
Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the disposition of particular pieces of the
Government's patrimonial property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the Philippines
is provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9 March 1922. The full text of this statute is
as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of the
Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private
domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons,
corporations or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
and seventy-four, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land Act,
entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is
agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and
six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be classified differently, in conformity with the
provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public
service shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural lands of the private domain of
the State, it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now
Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) and that
both statutes refer to: "any tract of land of the public domain which being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial or industrial
purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied).itc-asl In other words, the statute covers
the sale or lease or residential, commercial or industrial land of the private domain of the State.
Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out of the provisions of Act No.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, respectively:
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the
Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of Lands of
Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in
effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the State
is illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April
1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the Government from the
Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof or to other persons. In
Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were held to be private and
patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914, authorized the
sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of Manila, which had also been purchased by
the Government from the Roman Catholic Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act
No. 2360 by including therein all lands and buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of
San Lazaro theretofor leased by private persons, and which were also acquired by the Philippine
Government.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only one
statute authorizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is
Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government
to the National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of
professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It appears relevant to note
that Republic Act No. 905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property involved- it
provided for reversion of the property to the National Government in case the National Press Club
stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really a
donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative
authorization for disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted into
patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to lands of the private domain of
the State located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the Philippines,
may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such position is not any more unusual
or strange than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies not only to property of
the Republic located within Philippine territory but also to property found outside the boundaries
of the Republic.
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads of Executive Departments are
alter egos of the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of
the constitutional power of control exercised by the President over department heads (Article VII,
Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself may carry out the function or duty that is
specifically lodged in the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains the power to
approve or disapprove the exercise of that function or duty when done by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to the
austere question of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability either of the proposed disposition
itself or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated proceeds of the property involved. These
latter types of considerations He within the sphere of responsibility of the political departments of
government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013 and
92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the
following observations only for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the President's legal authority to sell the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor General
was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this was not his fault. The fact is that
there is -no such authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that statutory permission out of
thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No.
55 was a mere request for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi property, possibly
to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the said property
may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
where every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled against her,
the President of the Philippines has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress that lays
down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies determined by
Congress are embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved by the President to
become law. The President, of course, recommends to Congress the approval of policies but, in
the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy - determining branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing such
laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the reparations
agreement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement, this
property was acquired by the Philippine government for a specific purpose, namely, to serve as
the site of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, Roppongi is a property of
public dominion and intended for public service, squarely falling within that class of property
under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the property is
first transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of the
state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state patrimonial property involves, to
my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which can decide and declare the
conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress
has made no such decision or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state patrimonial
property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or
dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The record is
likewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi thru
public bidding or otherwise.
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a
public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the President to
sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order earlier issued by this Court.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost its
nature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the State. I
understand that the parties are agreed that it was property intended for "public service" within the
contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and accordingly, land of State
dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone issue is, in the light of supervening
developments, that is non-user thereof by the National Government (for diplomatic purposes) for
the last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No. 296 making it available for sale to any
interested buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, making available for the program's financing, State assets sold; the approval by the
President of the recommendation of the investigating committee formed to study the property's
utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the Philippine Senate requesting for the
deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the public dominion, and if it is not,
how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a
question our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the
public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof for
purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it has been
held that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion upon its donation to the
town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases,
the character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to
which it is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is
no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be
part of the public [dominion], not available for private expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it
was ruled that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under its
charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the
sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act executive
or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative
decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by earlier
interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on the
manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic
purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.
I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of this Court, among other things,
that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary;
8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the public dominion unless
and until reclassified by the Executive Branch of the Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources,
under the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting
With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306 Roppongi,
5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be
characterized as property of public dominion, within the meaning of Article 420 (2) of the Civil
Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for
public use property "intended for some public service" and property intended "for the
development of the national wealth") all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
whether found within the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located within the territory of
another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property intended
for public use can scarcely be properly applied to property belonging to the Republic but found
within the territory of another State. The third item of the classification property intended for the
development of the national wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign State are rarely, if
ever, found within the territorial base of another sovereign State. The task of examining in detail
the applicability of the classification set out in Article 420 of our Civil Code to property that the
Philippines happens to own outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
present time, before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the
Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the Roppongi property has been
converted into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and (b)
assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal authority to dispose of the
Roppongi property.
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some public
service, into property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the Civil Code
does not address the question of who has authority to effect such conversion. Neither does the
Civil Code set out or refer to any procedure for such conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit pronouncements on this point, as Justice
Sarmiento has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands (108 Phils.
335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed part of the public domain,
the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for public use or public
purposes and which would, therefore, have become disposable and available for private
ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the government shall declare it to
be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We
believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and
the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service.
If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain. (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y
Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the
Law of Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through
the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer
needed for coast-guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of
the public domain not available for private appropriation or ownership. (108 Phil. at 338-339;
emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No
particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified either in statute law or in case law.
Article 422 of the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately imposable is
that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear from a consideration of the acts or acts of the
Executive Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to have effected such
conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion
belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property of
such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council of
Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned road, "the
same not being included in the city development plan". Subsequently, by another resolution, the
City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through public bidding.
Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of conversion of property for public use into
patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and
unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used
or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale
to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in question. (66
SCRA at 484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his separate opinion, in the case of property
owned by municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to
some use other than "public use" or some "public service", was sufficient legally to convert such
property into patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 [1906]- Municipality of
Hinunganan v. Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of' property of municipal
corporations but also in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on Article
341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over verbatim into our Civil Code by
Article 422 thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el momento en que los bienes
de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la autoridad competente legislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se trata
naturalmente la dificultad queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida
cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no
haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin embargo, cesar de hecho el
destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este caso, y para los efectos juridicos que resultan
de entrar la cosa en el comercio de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha verificado la conversion
de los bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo italiano, por la afirmativa, y por
nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende tanto de
una declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con
respecto de determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio publico. Si una
fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se abandona tambien
por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes
especiales mas o memos administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p.
128 [7a ed.; 1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property of
the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that cumulative effect of
the executive acts here involved was to convert property originally intended for and devoted to
public service into patrimonial property of the State, that is, property susceptible of disposition to
and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if not each individual
act, make crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department to effect such conversion. These
executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed of
officials of the Executive Department: the Executive Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to
Japan; and representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Asset Privatization Trust.
On 19 September 1988, the Committee recommended to the President the sale of one of the lots
(the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, the President
approved the recommendation of the Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic note informed the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The
Japanese Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no
objection to such disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the President and the Committee
informed the leaders of the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the Philippines of the
proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming
that the majority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize
the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with respect that Executive Order No. 296
is more than sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the property previously devoted to public
service into patrimonial property that is capable of being sold or otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically convert
the property into patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that prolonged non-use, conjoined with
the other factors here listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial
property of the State. Actually, as already pointed out, case law involving property of municipal
corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to
some use other than public use or public service, was sufficient to convert such property into
patrimonial property of the local governmental entity concerned. Also as pointed out above,
Manresa reached the same conclusion in respect of conversion of property of the public domain
of the State into property of the private domain of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and indubitable
will but to lack of financial support to repair and improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13).
With respect, it may be stressed that there is no abandonment involved here, certainly no
abandonment of property or of property rights. What is involved is the charge of the classification
of the property from property of the public domain into property of the private domain of the State.
Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever funds
were necessary to maintain the property in Roppongi in a condition suitable for diplomatic
representation purposes, such circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a
manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the Executive Department for the
sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly does
not argue against an intent to convert the property involved into property that is disposable by
bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a whole,
show at least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the
Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into patrimonial property that is
susceptible of being sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first issue, it is necessary to address
the second issue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of the
Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which
reads as follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in
Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis
supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, has
been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present
Administrative Code refers to is authorization by law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not
purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the Government.
For Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to execute and sign on behalf of the
Government the deed of conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for disposition of
real property of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in the
form of (a) a general, standing authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the
Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the disposition of particular pieces of the
Government's patrimonial property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the Philippines
is provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9 March 1922. The full text of this statute is
as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of the
Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private
domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons,
corporations or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
and seventy-four, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land Act,
entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is
agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and
six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be classified differently, in conformity with the
provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public
service shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural lands of the private domain of
the State, it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now
Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) and that
both statutes refer to: "any tract of land of the public domain which being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial or industrial
purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the sale
or lease or residential, commercial or industrial land of the private domain of the State.
Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out of the provisions of Act No.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, respectively:
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the
Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of Lands of
Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in
effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the State
is illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April
1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the Government from the
Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof or to other persons. In
Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were held to be private and
patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914, authorized the
sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of Manila, which had also been purchased by
the Government from the Roman Catholic Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act
No. 2360 by including therein all lands and buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of
San Lazaro theretofor leased by private persons, and which were also acquired by the Philippine
Government.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only one
statute authorizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is
Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government
to the National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of
professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It appears relevant to note
that Republic Act No. 905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property involved- it
provided for reversion of the property to the National Government in case the National Press Club
stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really a
donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative
authorization for disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted into
patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to lands of the private domain of
the State located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the Philippines,
may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such position is not any more unusual
or strange than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies not only to property of
the Republic located within Philippine territory but also to property found outside the boundaries
of the Republic.
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads of Executive Departments are
alter egos of the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of
the constitutional power of control exercised by the President over department heads (Article VII,
Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself may carry out the function or duty that is
specifically lodged in the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains the power to
approve or disapprove the exercise of that function or duty when done by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to the
austere question of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability either of the proposed disposition
itself or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated proceeds of the property involved. These
latter types of considerations He within the sphere of responsibility of the political departments of
government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013 and
92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.
Footnotes
Padilla, J.
1 Art. 422 of the Civil Code provides:
"Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Sarmiento, J.
1 Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 (1906).
2 Municipality of Hinunangan v. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 124 (11913). The property involved
here was a fortress.
3 Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152 (1909).
4 See also II TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 39 (1972 ed.), citing 3
Manresa III. See also Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, No. L-24440,
March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334.
5 Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 339 (1960).

6 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles, No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
481.
7 G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, 21.
8 Salas v. Jarencio, No. L-29788, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 734; Rabuco v. Villegas, No.
L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658.
9 See Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA
80.
10 CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.
Feliciano, J.
1 We are orally advised by the Office of the Director of Lands that Act No. 3038 is very much in
effect and that the Bureau of Lands continues to date to act under it. See also, in this connection,
Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 477, enacted 9 June 1950 and as last amended by B.P. Blg
233. This statute government the disposition of lands of the public domain and of the private
domain of the State, including lands previously vested in the United States Alien Property
Custodian and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.
2 Since Act No. 3038 established certain qualifications for applicants for purchase or lease of
land of private domain of the government, it is relevant to note that Executive Order No. 296,
promulgated at a time when the President was still exercising legislative authority, provides as
follows:
"Sec. 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws, to the
contrary notwithstanding, the above mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease
or any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens." (Emphasis supplied)
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Today is Tuesday, November 09, 2010

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,

G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990

DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by

There is no law authorizing its conveyance.

Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides

Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in

Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement

Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

PADILLA, J., concurring:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting

xxx xxx xxx

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

PADILLA, J., concurring:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting

xxx xxx xxx

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.

1 Art. 422 of the Civil Code provides:

1 Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 (1906).

3 Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152 (1909).

5 Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 339 (1960).

7 G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, 21.

10 CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.

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