Greg Barton - Abdurrahman Wahid

• Wahid pics 2/7/02 9:33 AM Page 1
Abdurrahman, 1979
(Kompas)
—
—
Above: Abu Hasan, Idham Chalid and Abdurrahman (Antara)
Below: Abdurrahman and Kiai Achmad Siddiq (Antara)
—
Below: Abdurrahman and Nuriyah on a visit to the Middle East in the early 1990s
(family album)
—
—
Above: Abdurrahman and family in the Netherlands in the late 1980s
(family album)
Below: Traditional family portrait, July 1999 (family album)
—
Abdurrahman and
Soeharto shake
hands in the early
1990s,
observed by
Solichah,
Abdurrahman’s
mother
(family album)
—
Abdurrahman shakes hands with Soeharto on 19 May 1998, when the group
of nine ulama met with the president two days before his resignation.
Al Zastron stands behind him.
(family album)
—
—
Above: Abdurrahman and Soeharto in November 1999, shortly after
Abdurrahman was elected president
(Presidential Archives)
Below: Abdurrahman and General Benny Murdani in the early 1990s
(Kompas)
—
—
Above: The ‘four leaders of the reform movement’ after their long-awaited meeting
in Ciganjur, 10 November 1998. Left to right: Hamengkubowono X (the Sultan of
Yogyakarta), Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais
(Kompas)
Below: Abdurrahman addresses a crowd of PKB supporters in May 1999
(author)
—
Abdurrahman,
assisted by Yenny,
casting his vote for
president,
20 October 2000
(Kompas)
—
Abdurrahman being sworn in as president (Kompas)

—
Above: Abdurrahman —
kitted out in navy jacket and
beret — addresses officers of
the Indonesian Navy in 2000
(Presidential Archive)
—
Right: Abdurrahman and

East Timorese leader
Xanana Gusmao meet in
Jakarta in March 2000
—
Abdurrahman,
flanked by Flalba,
his police adjutant,
and a smiling
General Wiranto in
early 2000
(Presidential
Archive)
—
Abdurrahman with
Sukirno, his air-
force adjutant, and
friends during his
regular morning
walk, July 2000
(author)
—
—
Above: Abdurrahman Wahid, accompanied by Yenny, talks with Akbar Tanjung dur-
ing the annual session of the MPR in August 2000 (Presidential Archive)
Below: President Abdurrahman Wahid and B.J. Habibie in conversation; Yenny,
Alwi Shihab and Bondan Gunawan walk behind them (Presidential Archive)
—
Abdurrahman checks the time on the

talking watch given to him by
Megawati, who is at his side
—
Abdurrahman’s four daughters: Anita, Inayah, Alissa and Yenny

—
Abdurrahman addresses a national Boy Scout jamboree in August 2000, flanked by

Navy adjutant Room on left of photograph and Police adjutant Halloa on right
(author)
—
Assembly members leave the chamber at the end of the annual session of the MPR,
August 2000 (author)
—
—
Above: Abdurrahman relaxes with friends, including Djohan Effendi (left) and
Wimar Witoelar (right) during the first week of the MPR session
in August 2000 (author)
Below: Abdurrahman with friends, including (left to right) Djohan Effendi,
Mohammad Sobary, the author, Marsillam Simanjuntak and Yenny, at his suite at
the Hilton during the first week of the annual session of the MPR (author)
—
Abdurrahman standing between his mother and father, and behind his siblings
and a friend of the family, circa 1952 (family album)
—
• Wahid text 2/6/02 1:29 PM Page i
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GREG BARTON is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Arts at Deakin

University, Geelong, Victoria. Since the late 1980s he has researched the
influence of Islamic liberalism in Indonesia and its contribution to the
development of civil society and democracy. One of the central figures in his
research has been Abdurrahman Wahid, whom Barton has come to know
better than perhaps any other researcher.
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A view from the inside
Greg Barton
UNSW
PRESS
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For
Siew Mee and Hannah
and
in memory of Herb Feith
A UNSW Press book
Published by
University of New South Wales Press Ltd
University of New South Wales
UNSW Sydney NSW 2052
AUSTRALIA
www.unswpress.com.au
© Greg Barton 2002

First published 2002
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for purposes of private study, research,
criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by
any process without written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publisher.
National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:
Barton, Greg, 1962– .
Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim democrat, Indonesian president.
Bibliography.
Includes index.
ISBN 0 86840 405 5.
Wahid, Abdurrahman, 1940– . 2. Presidents — Indonesia — Biography.
3. Indonesia — Politics and government — 1998– . I. Title.
321.0092
Printer Kyodo Printing, Singapore
• Wahid text 2/6/02 1:29 PM Page v
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~
Preface 1
Acknowledgments 5
Glossary and Abbreviations 9
Prologue 18
PART 1 PESANTREN AND FAMILY

1 Growing up in pesantren and politics, 1940–1963 37
2 Islam in Indonesia: modernists and traditionalists 62
PART 2 THE MAKING OF AN INTELLECTUAL

3 Cairo, Baghdad and Europe, 1963–1971 83
4 The pesantren and reform, 1971–1982 102
PART 3 ISLAM AND MODERNITY

5 Abdurrahman and liberal Islam 119
6 On the brink of change, 1982–1984 132
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PART 4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND ISLAM

7 Reform and controversy, 1984–1990 147
8 Pushing the limits, 1990–1994 179
PART 5 POLITICS, REFORM AND THE PRESIDENCY

9 Contending with Soeharto, 1994–1998 209
10 Islam, politics and elections, 1998–1999 245
11 A brief honeymoon, 1999–2000 285
12 Regime change and the fight for survival, 1999–2001 330
Epilogue 359
Conclusion 366
Notes 386
References and Further Reading 400
Index 404
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~
Few biographers like to imagine that their own subject is anything less
than unusual and interesting. I certainly feel the same way about the
focus of this biography for the most subjective of reasons, but I also
believe that there are objective reasons for regarding Abdurrahman
Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is known affectionately by tens of millions, as
representing a most remarkable subject. I am also well aware that I have
written a rather unusual biography.
By the conventions of the genre, a serious biography is generally
hammered out in long sessions examining archives or interviewing
dozens of people who knew the subject, all of which is documented in
extensive footnotes. The approach that I have taken is somewhat dif-
ferent, for while this biography does benefit from extensive reading and
research and from numerous interviews with a wide range of individu-
als, it deliberately focuses on the subject’s own account. The reason is
simple: I had a unique opportunity to observe and interact with
Abdurrahman during a critical period of his life and was therefore in a
position to give a firsthand account. I was privileged to be given
remarkable access to Abdurrahman throughout his political campaign
after the fall of Suharto and throughout his presidency; I spent hun-
dreds of hours with him during this period, having already come to
know him very well since first meeting him in the late 1980s. During
his 21-month presidency I spent about seven months as his guest, ris-
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ing most mornings at 4.30 am to spend the first three hours of the day
with him. I was also able to travel with him around Indonesia, and
occasionally abroad, and observe him at work as president.
It seemed to me that, because both Abdurrahman and his world of
traditionalist Islam are frequently misunderstood, even within
Indonesia, an account that attempted to understand the man and his
world empathetically from his point of view would have significant
value, especially if it drew on firsthand observation.
This does not mean that the approach I have taken is uncritical. On
the contrary, I have wrestled with this material over many years and in
the later chapters in particular this has led me to make a series of crit-
ical observations. This is made easier for me because the bulk of this
book focuses on the period since I have come to know Abdurrahman
and was able to observe many of the key developments described here.
What this means, of course, is that this is a very personal and subjec-
tive account. This is both its strength and its weakness, but in this it is
not so different from other biographies as might first appear. All biog-
raphies are essentially interpretations of an individual’s life, and none is
entirely objective in an absolute sense. Some benefit from decades —
even centuries — of critical distance and vast bodies of earlier scholar-
ship; others from direct access to more immediate sources. There are
advantages and disadvantages with each. Consequently, although I
believe that it is important that future biographers of Abdurrahman
Wahid draw on material other than what I have used here, I don’t
believe that the approach taken here is any less valid.
Another defining characteristic of this account is that it is deliber-
ately written to be accessible to as broad a readership as possible. As a
professional academic I have found it the most challenging piece of
writing that I have ever undertaken. I have spent years wrestling with
trying to understand Abdurrahman and attempting to establish a
coherent interpretation, so far as it is possible, of his convictions and
behaviour. It seemed to me that there was little benefit in burdening the
reader with an account of my struggles. Instead, I have tried to present
the results of my research as straightforwardly as possible while also
tying my reading of events into what I hope is a reasonably vivid nar-
rative account.
I owe a great debt to many people with whom I have talked about
Abdurrahman over the years; only a small number of them are mentioned
by name in the acknowledgements that follow. Many of these conver-
3%.4!0.
sations took the form of formal interviews, a number of which were
recorded; others took the form of conversations of a kind that it did not
seem appropriate to record. Indeed many of these conversations were so
intimate that even to refer to them in footnotes was not appropriate. In
recent years I have often had opportunity to meet with government
ministers, religious leaders, intellectuals, activists, military generals, and
other members of the Indonesian elite and have enjoyed many fruitful
conversations. Few of these are referred to directly in this volume but
all of them contributed, in some way or other, to my understanding of
events. I have also been in the fortunate position of being able to
accompany Abdurrahman and witness many of the events described
here. Frequently I have found my observations of what I saw are at vari-
ance with contemporary accounts in the media. This does not mean, of
course, that my recollection of events is always correct, or that it is
always superior to media accounts. I have gained valuable insight both
from reading accounts in the press and also from speaking directly with
journalists. Nevertheless, I have oriented my account very much to
what I have observed, in the hope that it communicates something to
the reader that a secondhand account cannot do.
During the process of researching this volume I have experienced
tremendous emotional pressure. I have seen Abdurrahman’s strengths
and weaknesses as few outside his immediate family have done. I have
experienced extreme frustration and despair when he has made grave
mistakes, as often happened during his presidency, and I have also seen
something of the vision that drives him on. He has been a remarkably
generous friend and has opened himself to me in a way in which few
people would to a biographer. And while this account draws heavily, and
therefore depends greatly, on firsthand observation and Abdurrahman’s
own recollections, there is no sense in which I have been directed to
write anything at all. At no point has he, or anyone around him,
attempted to influence what I was writing. Naturally, this degree of
trust, combined with my own sense of what is fair and ethical, has left
me with a sense of where it is reasonable for this biography to go. There
are certain areas that, it seemed to me, because of their personal nature,
that I had no good reason to investigate in this book at this time. There
were other matters, such as the affairs of Abdurrahman’s party, PKB,
that I felt to be beyond the scope of this study, important though they
no doubt are — this book is already too long as it is.
For all of my affection and respect for Abdurrahman, which has not
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
been in the least diminished by his all too predictable failures in the
political arena, I have tried to present what I understand to be the truth.
Where there are doubts about historicity, such as the account of his
early life, I have indicated this by acknowledging that what is being pre-
sented is his recollection or understanding of events. I am well aware
that some of these recollections may later be shown to be at variance
with what actually happened, but I regard them as being of value in
attempting to understand Abdurrahman’s life from his point of view.
Although this work is shaped by its attempt to be an empathetic
account, I have, as far as possible under the circumstances, tried to
arrive at the truth as I wrestled with synthesising the masses of complex
data before me. Those whose nature it is to think in an intuitive fash-
ion will understand what I am saying. To those whose personal
approach to analysis is less intuitive than the approach taken here, I can
only say that I have done my best, in all sincerity, to arrive at what I am
persuaded is the truth. It goes without saying that this has been done
imperfectly; but if this book serves to provoke others into further
research, I will feel that I have achieved something of value.
Greg Barton
Jakarta
!09(/*-.#:'.(1,
~
There are many people who have helped in the writing of this book but
only some can be named here. Whether named or unnamed, I am
deeply grateful to the multitude of people whose friendship, hospitali-
ty, advice and help I have experienced over the years.
The person to whom I owe the single greatest debt of gratitude is my
wife, Siew Mee. She has patiently encouraged and endured not only
during the years that went directly into the making of this book but also
in the decade that came before, during which I undertook the research
that forms the foundation of this book. I am deeply grateful, too, to our
daughter, Hannah, for her stoic acceptance of the demands that my
ongoing research has placed upon our family. Hannah’s earliest memo-
ries include a seemingly endless series of rushed goodbyes in the mid-
dle of the night as I once again sped off to Jakarta, leaving her for weeks
at a time. For years on end, all that she and Siew Mee knew of family
holidays was joining me for whatever left over pieces of time they could
grab during inter-semester fieldwork trips to Java. Even when I was
physically at home with them, my mind was often elsewhere or I was
locked in the study, making them as much as me prisoners of the
demands of my chosen career. Consequently, it is no polite exaggeration
to say that this book would not have been possible without their patient
forbearance and generous sacrifice.
I am also deeply grateful to my parents, Jim and Edie Barton, whose

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
support went well beyond kindly words of encouragement and finally

became for me an affirmation that I really did have something worth-
while to contribute.
Alongside my own nuclear and extended family there is another fam-
ily that has patiently bore my often unreasonable demands and repaid
them with friendship and understanding and the gracious inclusion of
me into their world and their lives. I am deeply thankful to Abdurrahman
and Nuriyah and to their daughters Alissa, Yenny, Anita and Inayah. For
years, Abdurrahman has responded to my clumsy probing into his per-
sonal affairs with patience and generous friendship. And Yenny, in par-
ticular, has gone out of her way more times than I can now remember to
see that I had the access that I needed. That this continued unchanged
even during the difficult months of his presidency is something that I still
find remarkable. I also find it remarkable, and feel compelled to note it
here, that at no time did Abdurrahman or Yenny or anyone else in the
Wahid family ever try, directly or indirectly, to influence my account.
Instead, they simply extended to me unfettered access and genuine
friendship. To say that I could not ask for more helpful and trusting sub-
jects falls well short of the mark — I could not ask for better friends.
There are many other friends in Indonesia, more than I can list here,
to whom I owe a debt of gratitude to for their help, encouragement and
friendship over the years. They include Munib Huda, Ratih Hardjono,
Djohan Effendi, Mohamed Sobary, Henry and Martha Tong, Andy
and Diena Trigg and Greg and Sarah Moriarty. I am also grateful for
the professional help of Rohim Ghazali, Ahmad Suaedy and friends
from Paramadina, NU and elsewhere who have helped me with my
research over many years. In more recent times I have been extraordi-
narily helped and encouraged by friends such as Wimar Witoelar, Mark
Hanusz and Dian Wirjawan and I am deeply grateful to them for their
advice and understanding help.
Back in Australia, I am very grateful for the encouragement and sup-
port of many people who believed in me when my own confidence had
long begun to waver. I particularly wish to thank Peter Browne, for-
merly from UNSW Press, for his wise counsel, his enormously helpful
feedback and his unfailing encouragement. I am grateful too, to Janet
Mackenzie for skillfully helping turn my prolix prose into something a
little easier to read and to Felicity Raeburn and Edie Barton for their
patient help with developing and refining my manuscript.
<
I also owe special debt of gratitude to Greg Fealy, Hamish
!09(/*-.#:'.(1,
MacDonald and Ed Aspinall for their careful work in pointing out the
many flaws in my manuscript and their fearless advice to me. This book
would be very much poorer without their contribution and I am grate-
ful to them for saving me from going to print with a multitude of gaffs
and mistakes. No doubt there will still be many things about this book
with which they will take issue, some arising from difference in aca-
demic opinion and some from the limitations arising from this book’s
scope and focus; such is the nature of academic books, especially biog-
raphies. I am deeply appreciative of their patient scholarship and all
that they have done to try and help me and this account. Needless to
say, however, I take full responsibility for all errors, flaws and failings
within this book.
This book was largely written in 2000, with several final chapters
being added in 2001. The research, however, began in earnest in 1997
and over the past five years I have made numerous field trips to
Indonesia which have directly and indirectly contributed to this book.
This broader research would not have been possible without the sup-
port of the Australian Research Council (ARC) and my employer,
Deakin University. I received two three-year research grants from the
ARC to study ‘The influence of Islamic liberalism’ and ‘Islam and civil
society in Indonesia’, and this book represents one of the direct out-
comes of those research projects. I am also very grateful to Deakin
University, and the Faculty of Arts and the School of Social Inquiry
within it, for the understanding and flexibility that has been extended
to me, allowing me to spend months each year away from campus on
field work. I am particularly appreciative of the Dean’s publication sup-
port scheme which made it possible for me to spend the first half of
2000 focusing almost exclusively on hammering out a manuscript.
I am also grateful for the permission from several parties for me to
use material in this book. I thank the photographers at the Presidential
Palace, Antara news agency, Kompas newspaper and the Wahid family
for the use of some of their photographs. I also thank the Age and the
Sydney Morning Herald for allowing me to use in the epilogue material
that I earlier wrote for publication in their pages on 28 July 2001.
Similarly, I am also thankful to Carfax Publishing for allowing me to
use a revised version of an article I wrote for Pacifica Review (Vol. 13,
No. 3, October 2001) in the conclusion of this book.
I also owe a debt of gratitute to the tireless, anonymous angel who
runs the Joyo news service, without whose hourly deliveries to my

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‘Inbox’ I would have been so much less well informed.

One of the somewhat unexpected pleasures of researching, writing
about, and venturing to comment on contemporary developments in
Indonesia has been the support and encouragement that I have received
from colleagues. I am particularly grateful for the support that I have
received from my colleagues in the Religious Studies/Comparative
Studies program at Deakin — Ian Weeks, Barry Butcher and Peter
Fenner. Not only have they covered for me when, often at short notice,
I have had to make a trip to Indonesia during the semester, they have
been unfailingly encouraging, as have Bryan Turner and Sue Kenny and
many other colleagues at Deakin.
Outside my own university, I am thankful for the advice, assistance
and friendship I have received from fellow Indonesianists and scholars
of Islam, such as Robert Hefner, Arief Budiman, Abdullah Saeed,
Andree Feillard, Martin van Bruinessen and Johan Meuleman. Each in
their own way has significantly shaped my thinking about the issues
covered in this book. A less direct, but still significant influence has
come from other Indonesianists, especially those at Monash University,
such as Barbara Hatley, Cyril Skinner, Paul Tickell, David Hill, John
Legge, Merle Ricklefs and Herb Feith.
The sad news of Herb’s untimely death on 15 November 2001 came
just as I was preparing these comments. I cannot claim that Herb’s
scholarship shaped my own in any direct manner that I can easily delin-
eate. I can say, however, that his very personality had an influence on me
and many other scholars of Indonesia that was as profound as it was sub-
tle. Herb was the model for us all of passionate, concerned, engaged
scholarship. He was a mensch, an intellectual not afraid of actively engag-
ing with his subject and with society. Only now am I aware of just how
much he influenced me and this book. Thank you Herb. Selamat jalan.
:-/,,!%> !(# !""%.?+!1+/(,

~
abangan Muslims whose cultural and religious outlook is, to greatly

varying extents, a syncretic amalgam of indigenous, animist,
Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic elements. In the rural areas of Central
and East Java a large proportion of the broader Islamic population
is abangan.
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed
Forces). This name was changed to TNI in May 1999 when
POLRI, the police force, was split off from the military.
adat Customary law and practice which varies across the Indonesian
archipelago and predates the coming of Islam.
Ansor A very large national organisation for young men affiliated with
NU.
asas tunggal Literally ‘sole foundation’, in the early 1980s the phrase
came to refer to the recognition of Pancasila as the underlying, fun-
damental ideological basis for all social, political and religious
organisations in Indonesian society.
banser The uniformed activists of Ansor who guard congresses and
other important occasions.
BI Bank Indonesia.
BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia (People’s Bank of Indonesia).
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (State Logistics Agency).
@A
CIDES Centre for Information and Development Studies.

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CPDS Centre for Policy and Development Studies.

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic
Preaching Council). A radical Islamist organisation established in
the late 1960s. Commonly referred to simply as Dewan Dakwah.
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council).
Indonesia’s 500-member parliament.
dwifungsi The important military doctrine of ‘dual function’, used to
justify the military’s role in politics during Soeharto’s New Order.
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence.
Fordem Forum Demokrasi (Democracy Forum). Established in March
1991 under the chairmanship of Abdurrahman Wahid, a high-pro-
file ginger-group of forty-five intellectuals and activists drawn from
across the spectrum of Indonesian society.
FPI Front Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Front). A small but
vocal radical Islamist group established in 1999.
Fraksi Reformasi (Reform Faction). The parliamentary faction repre-
senting PAN.
GESTAPU Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (The September
Thirtieth Movement). The group alleged to have been behind a
communist coup attempt in 1965.
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). The state political party
that was Soeharto’s political vehicle during the New Order. After
dominating Indonesian politics for three decades, Golkar’s share of
the vote dropped to about 22 per cent in the June 1999 elections.
GPM Geraja Protestan Maluku (Protestant Church of Maluku).
hadith (hadis) Sometimes referred to as the ‘traditions’ of the Prophet
Muhammad, the hadith are important anecdotal sources for deter-
mining the Prophet’s sunnah or personal history and pattern of liv-
ing. The Sunnah augments the Qur’an as source of Islamic
teaching.
haj The obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca that takes place at a set season
each year.
haji Someone who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
halal A category of things or actions (generally concerning food) which
are unreservedly deemed permissible for a Muslim to consume, use
or do.
halaqah Islamic study circle or discussion group.
@@
haram The opposite of halal, refers to things expressly forbidden in
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Islam.
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association of Muslim Students).
Indonesia’s most important modernist student group; its alumni
network KAHMI is also highly influential.
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negara (State Islamic Institute).
ibadah Act or ritual of worship.
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency.
ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals).
ijtihad The individual exercise of powers of reasoning, interpretation
and contextualised application of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, as
opposed to simply accepting the consensus of earlier scholars.
IMF International Monetary Fund.
Interfet International Force East Timor. An Australia-led internation-
al peace-keeping force under UN auspices sent to East Timor on 20
September 1999 in the wake of violence following the self-determi-
nation referendum on 30 August.
IPS Institute for Policy Studies.
Islamism A radical political ideology arguing that Islam is inherently
political and that there should be no separation between ‘church and
state’.
Jakarta Charter The short preamble to the 1945 constitution, contain-
ing the much contested phrase that ‘the carrying out of Syari’ah is
an obligation of all Muslims’.
jihad Striving, or struggling, for the purposes of God, either in the
sense of a spiritual or moral struggle or in the sense of a just war.
jilbab Traditional Islamic woman’s head scarf worn tightly so as to
completely cover the wearer’s neck and hair, much like the wimple
of a Catholic nun.
KAHMI Korps Alumni HMI (HMI Alumni Corps). See HMI.
kiai A Javanese term applied to religious scholars (ulama), generally in
the context of leadership within pesantren society.
Khittah 1926 Charter of 1926. A reform program spearheaded by
Abdurrahman Wahid and Achmad Siddiq in the early 1980s,
intended to restore NU in accordance with the vision of its found-
ing fathers.
KISDI Komiti Indonesia Solidaritias Dunia Islam (Committee for
World Islamic Solidarity). An alliance of the most radical elements
from DDII with other hard-line Islamists.
@6
KKN korupsi, kolusi, nepotism (corruption, collusion and nepotism).

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Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak-hak Asasi Manusia (National

Human Rights Commission).
KOPASSUS Military special forces.
KOSTRAD Army Strategic Reserve Command.
LP3ES Lembaga Pengkajian Pengetahuan, Pendidikan, Ekonomi dan
Social (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and
Information).
madrasah Islamic schools. In Indonesia madrasah generally differ from
pesantren in being day schools (not taking boarders) and offering a
broad syllabus with a greater secular content. Previously, madrasah
were identified with Muhammadiyah modernists and pesantren with
NU traditionalists, but this distinction is blurring (though modernist
pesantren remain rare) as many pesantren contain madrasah.
Masyumi Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of
Indonesia Muslims). The peak modernist Islamic political party in
the 1950s.
Mazhab One of four orthodox Sunni schools of Islamic legal interpre-
tation.
MIAI Majlisul Islamil a’laa Indonesia (Indonesian Supreme Islamic
Council). A federation of Islamic organisations, including
Muhammadiyah and NU, established in 1937.
Media Dakwah The official magazine of DDII.
modernism Islamic modernism refers to the movement in Islamic
thought beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, led
by thinkers such as Muhammad ’Abduh of Al Azhar University in
Cairo, which argued for ‘opening the gates of ijtihad’. Besides insist-
ing that the umat return to the Qur’an and direct ijtihad rather than
‘blindly following’ the classical commentaries, the modernist move-
ment was also concerned with bringing about the reform of Islamic
practice and thought, through educational reform. Having arisen
partly as a response to the challenges of modernity, it also took the
position that the Islamic world should not dismiss the achievements
of Western civilisation but should rather ‘take that which is good
and reject that which is bad’. In this paradigm traditionalists are
those in the Islamic world who opposed, or at least did not wish to
be a part of, Islamic modernism. In practice the distinction usually
shows in education, with the nature of an individual’s education
determining their intellectual outlook for life. Unlike traditionalists,
@7
modernists, ostensibly at least, do not define their doctrinal position
:-/,,!%>)!(#)!""%.?+!1+/(,
by reference to the four Mazhab and generally do not study the texts
of classical Islamic scholarship. They also tend to be wary of mysti-
cism and cultural beliefs and practices that suggest syncretism.
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative
Assembly). A super-parliament comprised of the DPR plus 200
appointees. Under Soeharto it was a rubber-stamp body that met
once every five years. It now meets annually. The MPR elects the
president and has constitutional authority over the president.
Muhammadiyah Founded in 1912, Indonesia’s peak modernist Islamic
organisation and one of the most successful modernist organisations
anywhere in the world. It is said to have around 30 million mem-
bers.
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama). A
small and highly political body sponsored by Soeharto in the 1990s.
muktamar congress. The five-yearly muktamar, or NU national con-
gress, is the highest decision-making forum within NU.
munas musyawarah nasional (national consultation). The NU munas are
held every five years, mid-way between muktamar, as a forum for
ulama to deliberate on religious matters.
Muslimat The influential national women’s organisation affiliated NU,
founded in 1946.
neomodernism A progressive movement of Islamic thought arising
after Islamic modernism but also deeply interested in traditional
scholarship. Neomodernism argues for a holistic approach to ijti-
had, informed by both classical scholarship and modern Western
critical thought, in order to discern the overarching message of the
Qur’an, and its application to modern society. It argues for a liber-
al, progressive understanding of Islam that accepts the pluralism of
modern society, and seeks to make society more Islamic through
education rather than through party-political initiatives, such as
attempts to introduce legislative recognition of the Syari’ah, or even
the establishment of an Islamic state.
New Order The name given to the Soeharto regime after it replaced
the ‘old order’ of the Sukarno regime.
NGOs Non-governmental organisations.
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (The Awakening of the Ulama) Founded in
1926, Indonesia’s peak traditionalist Islamic organisation; it is said
to have 30–40 million members.
@8
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). Led by

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
Amien Rais, PAN gained around 7 per cent of the vote in the June
1999 election, where it styled itself as a pluralist party with links to
modernist Islam.
Pancasila A Sanskrit-derived neologism, literally ‘the five principles’.
Formulated during the Sukarno era but only championed with
vigour after Soeharto came to power in the mid-1960s, Pancasila
represents the core philosophy of the Indonesian state. The five
principles are: (1) belief in one God Almighty; (2) humanity that is
just and civilised; (3) Indonesian unity; (4) democracy guided by the
wisdom of representative deliberation; (5) social justice for all
Indonesians. In practice Pancasila functions as a political compro-
mise that recognises the theistic convictions of the majority of
Indonesians but delivers a modern secular (i.e. non-partisan with
respect to the major faiths) model of the state. Often dismissed,
particularly by Western commentators, as a collection of mother-
hood statements, Pancasila represents an important compromise in
providing a critical ideological basis for Indonesia’s plural society.
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party). A small Islamist
party, it gained around 2 per cent of the vote in the June 1999 elec-
tions.
PBNU Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama. The national leadership and
headquarters of NU.
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Democratic Party of Indonesia).
Together with PPP, it was one of the two opposition parties per-
mitted under Soeharto following the ‘rationalisation’ of parties in
1973.
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan Perjuangan
(Democratic Party of Indonesia of the Struggle). The ‘new PDI’
formed in 1998 and led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, it is a secular,
nationalist party. It gained almost 34 per cent of the vote in 1999,
well ahead of Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN.
pembaruan Reform, renewal. The pembaruan movement associated
with Nurcholish Madjid in the early 1970s introduced neomod-
ernist thought to Indonesia.
pesantren Boarding schools which emphasise Islamic education.
Originally almost all pesantren had a rural base and provided a tra-
ditionalist Islamic education in traditional fashion. Over the past
two decades, however, a number of urban and modernist pesantren
@B
have been established, and most pesantren today teach a mixed cur-
:-/,,!%>)!(#)!""%.?+!1+/(,
riculum comprising secular as well as religious and Arabic-language
subjects, delivered by methods similar to those of secular schools.
PK Partai Keadilan ( Justice Party). A small Islamist party built on stu-
dent support, it gained around 1 per cent of the vote in the June
1999 elections.
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party). The
party of Abdurrahman Wahid. Although a pluralist party, PKB gets
almost all of its support from NU members, and it gained around
12 per cent of the vote in the June 1999 elections.
PKI Partai Komunist Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PMII Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim
Students Movement). Founded in 1960, PMII is the tertiary stu-
dents’ organisation of NU.
PNI Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Nationalist Party of Indonesia). A
Sukarno-era party, PNI was close to the president himself.
POLRI Polisi Republik Indonesia (The Indonesian Police Force).
Poros Tengah Central Axis. A coalition comprising PPP and the small
Islamist parties plus PAN, and, for a while, PKB.
PPP Partai Pembangunan Persatuan (United Development Party). A
largely moderate Islamist party, with PDI it was one of the two
opposition parties permitted under Soeharto following the ‘ratio-
nalisation’ of parties in 1973. It gained around 10 per cent of the
vote in the June 1999 elections.
PRD Partai Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s Democratic Party). A leftist
party appealing chiefly to students and younger people, PRD is the
favourite scapegoat of conservatives.
priyayi Javanese Muslims with aristocratic connections whose person-
al faith and religious practice is a combination of abangan belief and
courtly high culture.
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusi Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of Indonesia).
Rapat Akbar Great Rally. The term is sometimes used for NU rallies,
such as the one on 1 March 1992 called to mark NU’s sixty-sixth
anniversary and to send a message to Soeharto.
RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (South Maluku Republic).
salat ritual prayer, to be performed at five set times each day.
santri Indonesian Muslims who are pious and orthodox in their devo-
tional practice. Originally the term referred simply to students of
@;
the pesantren. The term’s modern usage reflects the widespread

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usage of the paradigm of santri and abangan popularised by the

American anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his influential book
The Religion of Java.
Sekneg Sekretariat Negara (State Secretariat). Under Soeharto, a pow-
erful super-ministry.
Semar The wise demigod of wayang kulit mythology who takes the
form of a vulgar, flatulent, buffooning court-jester. Abdurrahman
Wahid is often likened to Semar.
Shia The Shia understanding of Islam holds that Ali, the son-in-law
of the Prophet, and his successors have a divinely inherited right to
rule the Islamic umat. Followed by significant minority populations
in modern Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the vast
majority of those in Iran, but not, historically, in Indonesia. Shi’ites
represent less than 10 per cent of the world’s Muslims. See Sunni.
suksesi succession. Used in the late 1980s and 1990s to denote the tran-
sition that was to come at the end of Soeharto’s New Order.
Sufism Traditional Islamic mysticism.
sunnah Literally ‘path’ or ‘way’; used to refer to ‘the way’ or life of the
Prophet Muhammad (as portrayed in the Qur’an and the hadith
collections).
Sunni Literally ‘the followers of the sunnah’, used to mean all Muslims
who are not Shi’ites. More than 90 per cent of Muslims around the
world are Sunnites (or Sunni Muslims), as are almost all Indonesian
Muslims. See Shia.
Syari’ah Islamic law.
Tanfidziah The name given to the executive boards of religious organ-
isations such as NU.
tarekat Traditional Sufi brotherhood. See Sufism.
tassawuf The teachings of Sufism.
tauhid The doctrine that God is one and is unique.
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army). It
replaced ABRI in 1999 as a collective term for the three wings of
the Indonesian military — army, navy and airforce — but excludes
the police, who were part of ABRI
traditionalism See modernism.
ulama religious scholars; in Indonesian also used instead of the Arabic
singular alim.
umat (ummah, ummat) Literally ‘community’ in Arabic, in Indonesia
@<
the term is used most often to refer to religious communities, espe-
:-/,,!%>)!(#)!""%.?+!1+/(,
cially the Muslim community.
wali A holy man, an Islamic scholar or saint with extraordinary spiri-
tual powers.
wayang kulit The Indonesian shadow theatre. Centuries old and draw-
ing on predominantly Hindu imagery and mythology from the
Ramayana and Mahabrata, it continues to be popular in rural Java.
3%/-/:$.
~
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Late on the evening of Tuesday, 19 October 1999, a small group of offi-
cials, most smartly dressed in military uniforms, were going through an
elaborate rehearsal for the swearing-in of Indonesia’s fourth president. The
ceremony the next day was to take place just a few hours after the mem-
bers of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat — MPR) had cast their vote to elect the president.
Earlier that evening the parliamentary building had been bustling
with life as dozens of local and international television crews jostled for
space in the balconies on each side of the Assembly hall. The hall itself
had been filled with almost seven hundred Assembly members, numer-
ous officials, and a large crowd of journalists and spectators who had
packed the large rear balcony to overflowing. They had witnessed a sur-
prising turn of events as the Assembly had effectively moved a vote of
no-confidence in the embattled interim president B.J. Habibie by
rejecting his end-of-term accountability speech.
While the city, and indeed the whole nation, wrestled with the
news and wondered what it meant, the small group who had gathered
in the auditorium late that evening went through the motions of the
rehearsal seemingly unaffected by the remarkable events of several
@D
hours earlier. First came a practice run in case Megawati
3%/-/:$.
Soekarnoputri was elected. Those who would serve as her adjutants
stood each side of her proxy, walked down the central aisle of the
auditorium, and then positioned themselves on the podium as they
would for the swearing-in ceremony. Next came the rehearsal for
Habibie. Eager to get home, the small group was preparing to leave
when one of the presidential adjutants, a recent appointee, asked an
obvious question: ‘Well, what about if it is Gus Dur?’ After all,
Abdurrahman Wahid was the third candidate. The only answer he got
to his question, though, was a short round of laughter as the group
left the hall.1 No one could imagine that Abdurrahman Wahid, or
Gus Dur as he is popularly known, could possibly get the numbers to
become president. After all, in the June general elections, Megawati’s
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan — PDI-P) party had won more than one-third
of the votes. Abdurrahman’s own party National Awakening Party
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa — PKB) had gained less than 13 per
cent, scarcely more than half that gained by Habibie’s Golkar.
Moreover, Abdurrahman was virtually blind, appeared decidedly
ungainly on his feet, and had only recently recovered from the stroke
that had almost killed him the previous year. There seemed little point
in rehearsing for a Wahid victory.
Less than twelve hours later, the auditorium was once again buzzing
with life. Tuesday’s vote had produced an upset result, but what took
place on Wednesday really caught everyone by surprise. In the early
hours of Wednesday morning Habibie had announced that he was
withdrawing from the race. Unexpectedly bereft of a candidate only
hours before voting, Golkar was unable to produce a replacement. This
left only Abdurrahman and Megawati to contest the presidency. Hours
later, as vote counting commenced, most assumed that Megawati would
cruise to victory. She did seize an early lead, but as the count settled
down voting remained surprisingly close. Each had around 250 votes
two-thirds of the way through the count. At this point, however,
Abdurrahman opened up a small lead, which then accelerated. The ten-
sion of the previous evening returned in double measure. When count-
ing closed, Abdurrahman had polled sixty more votes than Megawati.
Megawati walked over to her old friend and placed her hand on his
shoulder. Largely impassive, she appeared gracious in defeat; only a
slight quiver at the corners of her lips and the moisture gathering in her
6A
eyes revealed something of her deep shock. In the midst of a gaggle of

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
television crews Abdurrahman appeared calm and at ease. His wife Siti
Nuriyah and daughter Yenny stood calmly beside Megawati, their faces
barely betraying the shock that they felt. Amid a roar of applause and
shouts of jubilation Abdurrahman was helped to his feet and escorted
to the podium. Two days later his face was on the cover of the Economist
beside bold yellow headlines declaring: ‘Goodness it’s Gus Dur:
Indonesia’s surprising new president.’
!()$(3%.1.(1+/$,)-.!#.%
When I first met Abdurrahman in 1989 I was a rather gauche post-
graduate student just starting on a PhD thesis examining liberal Islam.
My Chinese Christian hosts in Jakarta thought this an odd topic, but
when I mentioned Gus Dur’s name they gave approving nods.
Nevertheless, they were surprised when I declared that I was off the
next day to meet with Gus Dur. It never occurred to me that an
unknown foreign postgraduate student should have any doubts about
walking in off the street and asking to meet with Abdurrahman Wahid.
I was naive but, as it turned out, my confidence was not misplaced.
From the first Abdurrahman was warm and generous with his time and
showed little sign of impatience with my clumsy questions. He seemed
as unpretentious as his surroundings, the dilapidated headquarters of
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Located on a busy central Jakarta arterial road
even more noisy and polluted than most, the building, both inside and
outside, looked as if it belonged in some far-flung, impoverished rural
backwater rather than in the nation’s capital. It was the complete
antithesis of the smart white tile-clad office block that was
Muhammadiyah’s national headquarters. A visit to the offices of the
two organisations made it clear that the differences between them par-
took of the divide between city and village. The so-called ‘modernist’
Muslims of Muhammadiyah tend to be urban traders and white-collar
professionals, and their straightforward, rational approach to their faith
reflects an urbanity born of their environment. NU’s ‘traditionalist’
Muslims, however, tend to be mystical by nature, and display a folk-
religion approach to Islam that appears at one with their rustic milieu.
And a more rusticated setting than NU’s Jakarta office it was hard to
imagine.
None of this appeared to deter visitors. There was a steady stream of
visiting kiai (religious leaders) and santri (devout Muslims). It almost
6@
seemed as if the rundown and nondescript nature of PBNU (Pemimpin
3%/-/:$.
Besar Nahdlatul Ulama), as the organisation’s national leadership and
headquarters were known, was intended to make such visitors feel at
home. Abdurrahman’s office had been created by cheaply partitioning a
large nondescript room. He sat behind a large desk that was invariably
overflowing with books and papers; behind him stood a bookshelf filled
with more books and papers. The titles of the books were often inter-
esting: many of them were works of Western literature, including titles
such as Salman Rushdie’s The Moor’s Last Sigh; others were recent stud-
ies on Islam or Indonesian politics.
From our first meeting he seemed to have no reserve about speaking
with an unknown Australian postgraduate student and quickly opened
up to talk about what he was doing and what he was trying to achieve.
He appeared completely at ease and nonchalant, although it was clear
from the number of phone calls and interruptions, together with the
queue of guests waiting outside, that his schedule was, in fact, hectic.
He was chubby — indeed, more than chubby; his Buddha-like
tummy was barely contained by the bursting buttons of his cheap batik
shirt. In the late 1980s he wore clumsy, thick-rimmed, black spectacles.
His left eye was almost closed over, and obviously the vision in his right
eye was none too good either. He certainly could not be said to be pho-
togenic. His teeth were crooked and somewhat yellowed and his hair a
black wavy mess. Over the years I have taken many dozens, perhaps
hundreds, of photographs of Abdurrahman, but few seem to do him
justice. There is something about his magnetic presence that is rarely
captured on film. The best photographs are those taken when he is
laughing. For, despite his modest appearance, his presence commanded
attention. It was not that he was imposing — the opposite was true –
but his relaxed warmth and animated manner combined with his ready
flow of wit and good humour made it impossible for me not to like him.
I was clearly not alone in these impressions. His office saw a steady
stream of diplomats, often of ambassadorial or first-secretary level, as
well as numerous teams of journalists from around the world. Almost
always there were local journalist and activists from non-government
organisations (NGOs) waiting for him in one of the front rooms, and
the office seemed to be a hive of activity.
Despite Abdurrahman’s relaxed and unassuming manner, the swirl of
activities surrounding him, and the reaction of people whenever they
met him, conveyed the impression that he was a very important man in
66
Indonesian society. Indeed, in 1990 the well-regarded weekly news

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
magazine Editor named him their ‘Man of the Year’. Their issue of 22
December that year ran fifteen pages about Abdurrahman. The sub-
heading on the cover read ‘The year of Islam’s stirring in Indonesia’.
The heading on the lead story read ‘A mosaic whose name is
Abdurrahman Wahid’; the subheading was ‘Gus Dur, man of the year
1990, often controversial and not afraid to be independent’. This was a
special issue of Editor, but it was hardly the first time that
Abdurrahman’s face had graced the cover.
By now Abdurrahman was already well known and his visage, usual-
ly laughing, frequently appeared on the covers of Indonesian news mag-
azines such as Editor and Tempo. Even before becoming chairman of
Nahdlatul Ulama he had been very much in the news, but the final
years of the 1980s saw his prominence steadily increase. He was great-
ly admired for his outspokenness and frequently quoted because he
would say things journalists themselves would never dare say. For exam-
ple, in an interview with American journalist Adam Swartz in April
1991, Abdurrahman said, ‘It is futile to argue with the government.
There is no dialogue. They talk and talk. It is just a series of mono-
logues. It’s the rigidity of government policies which is what causes
repression and this in turn causes sectarianism’.2
1&.)'!()".&+(#)1&.)3.%,/(!
If there is a cardinal rule to understanding Abdurrahman, it is not to
take him at face value. It is generally unwise to underestimate him for
there is always more to him than meets the eye. It is equally unwise,
however, to read him too literally. What he says is often not so much
what he knows to be true as what he wants to be true. At best, this
makes him an irrepressible optimist. At worst, he sometimes comes
across as either disingenuous or deluded, or both. Having wrestled with
understanding him for some years now, I have come to the conclusion
that he is rarely as deluded as people imagine him to be, nor is he par-
ticularly disingenuous. Rather, his tendency to downplay the problems
facing him in his statements, I am convinced, represents the extrovert
workings of his habit of psyching himself up to meet completely intim-
idating challenges.
Whether this is good or bad I do not know. I do know that it is one
trait that his friends would most dearly like to change, if only they could.
As president it was frequently his undoing, giving rise as it does to the
67
perception that either he does not understand or he does not care about
3%/-/:$.
the dire circumstances that he finds himself in. On the other hand, he is
a survivor par excellence. Levels of intimidation and enormous chal-
lenges that would have broken other men have failed to break him. If,
then, his projection of exaggerated self-confidence is essential for him to
stay the course and not give in, its virtue outweighs the annoyance it
causes. In any case, it seems to me that it is intrinsic to his ‘rough dia-
mond’ nature. In Javanese terms he is more kasar (rough) than he is halus
(refined). For better or worse, that is simply the way that he is.
Every now and then the vulnerable and very human Gus Dur behind
the ever-confident public persona reveals itself. One such occasion
came in November 1994, at a time when he was fighting for his life as
leader of NU against the concerted strength of Soeharto’s nefarious
regime. At 3 am on Tuesday, 5 September, his future as leader of NU
hung on the result of a ballot count that was nearing its conclusion.
Concerned about what might happen if Abdurrahman were not re-
elected, I left the main Assembly hall used for the plenary sessions of
the NU national congress, and sat under the canvas awning that filled
the large square outside. There I ran into Yenny. I asked her about her
father and remarked that when I had seen him earlier in the evening he
had shrugged off concern about his situation and said that there was
nothing to worry about, declaring that he was perfectly relaxed. Yenny’s
response indicated that this was not entirely the case. She explained
that just minutes earlier she had been with her father, and as she had
laid her head on his chest she had been surprised to hear how furious-
ly his heart was pounding. Clearly, despite all his protestations, he too
was feeling more than a little anxious about the outcome.
Another occasion when the vulnerable Gus Dur was on display
occurred a little over three years after his victory at the NU congress. In
January 1998 he was again fighting for his life, only this time the stakes
were much higher and the challenges even greater. Days earlier he had
suffered a stroke that very nearly killed him. When I went into his hos-
pital room, I was not surprised to see him lying in bed, head shaven,
and tubes in his arms. He was not yet out of the critical zone and was
not really supposed to be having visitors.
His physical appearance was of course unsettling but what was real-
ly surprising was his presence of mind. Looking beyond the oddly help-
less figure under the shaven head I found that he seemed to be the same
man I had always known. I told him how a friend in Paris, Andrée
68
Feillard, had emailed me saying that she had heard the news of the
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
stroke and, thinking that he had died, rushed into a cathedral that she
was passing in the street and knelt at the altar to pray. I said, ‘You know
how unusual this is. Andrée after all is a French intellectual — they
don’t go to church, much less pray’. His reply came without hesitation
and with a slight chuckle in his voice: ‘In France all the best people are
like that.’
From this and the exchanges that followed, it was clear that he had
lost none of his droll wit. He did say, however, that he couldn’t focus
and that his eyesight was gone. It had not been good before the stroke,
but now he now said that he couldn’t recognise faces, and that he could
see nothing but blurry patches of light and dark. Nevertheless, he was,
as ever, characteristically upbeat. In circumstances such as these, it
occurred to me, it would have been wrong to deny him his optimism.
He needed every resource of strength and willpower that was available
to him. A rational surrendering to circumstances is not necessarily a
virtue when you are fighting for your life.
A third occasion when the ‘vulnerable Gus Dur’ was revealed
occurred on the second day of the August 2000 session of MPR. Once
again Abdurrahman was fighting for his life. He made an excellent
address on the first day of the session, but on the second had to endure
a full day of angry responses from the Assembly’s eleven factions. The
final speech before the dinner break was the most difficult one for
Abdurrahman to sit through. It was the speech from the Reform
Faction, which consisted of Amien Rais’s National Mandate Party
(Partai Amanat Nasional — PAN) and a series of small Islamist parties.
In the language of the Qur’an, he was denounced as a hypocrite and an
evil tyrant in an emotional speech that built to an hysterical conclusion.
Immediately the speech was over, we drove back to the Hilton Hotel.
Abdurrahman had been ready for harsh criticism but the speech had
gone beyond all expectations. Yenny asked me to go in and talk with
him. ‘You know my dad, he’s a proud man after all and this sort of thing
is really hurtful, he must be very upset’, she said.
When I went in, Abdurrahman was sitting quietly in his suite. When
asked, he simply remarked that the speech was ‘nothing’. The tone of
his voice and his posture, however, told a different story. It seemed as if
a great weight was bearing down on his hunched shoulders and he was
fighting to hold back a flood of emotion. As I reached out to grasp his
hand across the table, something of what he had dammed up inside
6B
himself during those long hours seated on the podium began to trickle
3%/-/:$.
out. ‘You know for three hours I was doing my best to stop from get-
ting angry, but it was very hard during that last speech.’ Having can-
didly confessed to the depth of his emotion, his mood began to change
as we joked about the afternoon. Looking for a way to get him laugh-
ing, I joked that the speech from the Reform Faction suffered from
three major deficits. Firstly, it was irrational; secondly, it was immature;
and thirdly, it was immoral (a play on words that sounds much funnier
in Indonesian than it does in English: ada tiga yang kurang: kurang
rasional, kurang dewasa, dan kurang ajar). Hearing the joke
Abdurrahman roared with laughter and, as the conversation broke into
jokes and banter, his anger and frustration appeared to lift; by the time
he was eating dinner and preparing to return to the Assembly, he was
calm and in good spirits.
By chance I had lunch that day with Seth Mydans, the Southeast
Asia correspondent with the New York Times. He reminded me of my
comment the previous month, saying that Abdurrahman should not be
underestimated and likening him to the ‘drunken master’ hero figure of
kung fu lore, the apparently maladroit but surprisingly able character of
film and fiction, that Abdurrahman had grown up with. I was deeply
anxious about what might unfold over the next week and pointed out
to Seth that my quote might well prove to be prescient but at this stage
it could go quite the other way. I was not at all confident that the
‘drunken master’ could repeat his earlier success.
That evening Abdurrahman’s old friend Marsillam Simanjuntak read
out the second speech. From the outset it was clear that Abdurrahman
was sticking to his policy of self-restraint and contrition. The speech
began by accepting that the points of criticism from the previous day
had been invaluable and that there was little to be gained in responding
to them one by one, particularly some of the more angry points.
Monday’s speech had been surprising for its brilliance; Wednesday’s
was even better. It was exactly the right speech to make in response to
the criticisms of the previous day. It repeated the tone of contrition
from the first speech, acknowledged the need to learn from past mis-
takes, gently pointed out it was not fair to blame one person for every
ill event in this culture, and then spoke positively and convincingly
about the future.
As we drove back to Hilton I felt an immense sense of relief, which
all those in the entourage around me seemed to share. The consensus
6;
was that the speech was even better than we thought possible and
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exactly the right response. I went into Abdurrahman’s suite at the

Hilton and he was in high spirits and obviously happy with the way
things had turned out. On a morning walk several days earlier we had
talked about my ‘drunken master’ comment, which Seth had written up
in the New York Times, and this was clearly on his mind now. He turned
to me and said, ‘Well, it looks like the drunken master wins again’, and
chuckled.
%$((+(:)4/%)3%.,+#.(15)!)4//-+,&)!'"+1+/(E
When I approached him in the mid-1990s about writing his biography
it naturally never occurred to me that Abdurrahman would ever become
president. I felt sure that he would play an important role in civil soci-
ety in the transition from the Soeharto era, but it seemed patently
ridiculous to imagine him as president. The fall of Soeharto in May
1998, and the unexpectedly rapid transition to democracy — or at least
to free and fair elections — only a little over twelve months later, did
change things of course, but only by degrees.
When questioned about whether he had any chance of becoming
president, Abdurrahman would typically reply in an ambiguous fash-
ion. As early as July 1998 he told me, jokingly, or so it seemed at the
time, that if there was no one else to do the job he might be prepared
to do it. At the time I dismissed such talk as being somehow associat-
ed with his illness, his frustration at his loss of eyesight and struggle for
recovery. While I could detect no major signs of personality change
after his January stroke, it seemed to me that talk about becoming pres-
ident might indeed represent precisely the sort of wishful thinking that
many took to be a sign of deterioration in his mental health following
his illness.
Even a month before the MPR was due to vote for Indonesia’s first
democratically elected president, however, the idea of ‘President Wahid’
seemed like a crazy long shot. By this stage Alwi Shihab,
Abdurrahman’s old friend and architect of his presidential bid, was feel-
ing confident that they had the numbers to get Abdurrahman elected,
but it did not seem likely to me. And if the truth were known, even
Alwi was not completely certain.
On 29 September we were chatting in Abdurrahman’s hotel suite
when Alwi asked me to step outside in the corridor for a friendly chat.
‘Frankly,’ he said, ‘what do you think our chances are? Do you think
6<
that the Central Axis will really back Abdurrahman and that he could
3%/-/:$.
really be president?’ Alwi seemed deadly serious in his question and I
didn’t know how to reply. I said that I hoped that the Central Axis
would remain true to their word but I was not very confident. ‘The
important thing,’ I said, ‘is to work on building a good relationship
with Megawati just in case the Central Axis support fails to secure
Abdurrahman’s victory.’
It seemed to me that Abdurrahman was setting himself up for a dev-
astating fall. He seemed to be convinced that he would be president in
October and yet it seemed so unlikely. After all, the alliance of forces
from the former regime and the Islamic right that he was relying upon
to back him were by no means his natural allies or friends. He had a
long history of mutual antipathy with most of the key players. What
made him feel that he could rely upon them now? Talking with Yenny
and with Ratih Hardjono, a close friend of the family, I realised I was
not alone in my concerns. Even Munib Huda, Abdurrahman’s person-
al assistant, the epitome of the untiring, faithful servant, was privately
expressing concern. ‘Do you think he is doing the right thing?’ he asked
on several occasions. ‘Do you think he can really make it? Does it make
sense?’ Yenny likewise was worried that everything might fall in a heap.
But it was Ratih, perhaps most of all, who was worried about where
Abdurrahman was heading. We sat talking over dinner on Friday, 1
October. I wanted to check some things for the biography, and Ratih
was keen to talk. We were both in a similar frame of mind, deeply con-
cerned about what was about to happen to our friend. Ratih ran
through the various challenges and problems facing him and the rea-
sons why it seemed almost certain that he would not become president.
The situation seemed hopeless.
My hope was that he would win the position of Speaker of the MPR
and at least be left with a consolation prize. When I spoke with friends
around town, including newspaper editors and prominent intellectuals,
many shared the same concern. There was deep respect and affection
for Abdurrahman and a genuine fear that, when the MPR disbanded,
he would be left with nothing.
The next day I was to fly home again. The MPR was to elect the
Speaker of the Assembly. The proceedings ran over time, as they often
did, and I had to go to the airport before the decision came through.
From the airport I phoned Munib, only to learn that Amien Rais had
been successful in winning the position. I was crestfallen. ‘Don’t worry,’
6=
explained Munib. ‘That is what he wanted. He endorsed Amien.’ ‘But

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
why? What’s he doing?’ I asked. The answer should have been obvious
enough.
When next I met with Abdurrahman it was 16 October, just four
days before the presidential election. Despite my fears, Abdurrahman
was in great spirits and completely confident that he would be presi-
dent. On the night of Sunday, 7 October, the long-awaited meeting of
senior kiai took place. As I sat with Munib outside the meeting, he
again questioned me, ‘Do you think he’s really doing the right thing?
Can he pull this one off?’ The kiai warned Abdurrahman about the
risks in proceeding but grudgingly gave him their support. For
Abdurrahman that was enough.
The next day he invited me to join him on a visit to see Amien. As
we walked into Amien’s expansive ‘presidential suite’, given to him on
account of his election as Speaker, he greeted us warmly. ‘Greg, Gus
Dur is the only one who can do it. He is the only one who can bring
Muslims and non-Muslims and everyone together. Everything depends
on him. He is our only hope.’ Amien said the words with what seemed
to be true conviction. Alwi had been working furiously behind the
scenes and it seemed certain now that the whole of the Central Axis
force would back Gus Dur’s candidature.
As it happened, after we had spoken for a while, Amien received
some official visitors. They were members of a Dutch parliamentary
delegation, many of them born in the Maluku Islands, and were in
Jakarta trying to raise support to combat the violence that continued
unabated in Ambon. Abdurrahman turned to Amien and invited him
to respond to the questions. ‘You know all about it, you know what to
say,’ he said. And indeed Amien did. Amien spoke as if he were a pro-
tégé of Abdurrahman. He talked about the difference between reli-
gious sentiment and so-called religious violence and argued cogently
and persuasively for tolerance, understanding and patience. It really
did now seem as if Amien was on Abdurrahman’s side, and as if
Abdurrahman was going to be president. On the drive back to the
Nahdlatul Ulama headquarters my mobile phone rang. It was my wife.
I briefly told her what had been going on and passed the phone to
Abdurrahman. He explained in detail and with great delight what had
occurred, laughing out loud at the irony of the situation. ‘Don’t forget,’
he said, ‘you are to come back and visit us and stay at the palace.’ ‘Will
you really be president?’ she asked. ‘Oh yes, yes,’ he said. ‘It’s all fixed.’
6D
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3%/-/:$.
When Abdurrahman was elected president on Wednesday, 20 October,
he and his family were taken away under a tight security cordon and
escorted to the palace complex. Given that he had to negotiate the for-
mation of a new cabinet and do one or two other things, I thought it
best to wait a couple of days before trying to make contact. By Sunday
evening I felt it might be time to contact Abdurrahman who was, by
then, ensconced in the State guesthouse in the palace complex. (The
palace had not been used as a residence during the Soeharto and brief
Habibie presidencies and therefore was not ready for occupation.) Just
how one contacted a president, however, I was not at all sure. Neither
Yenny nor Ratih was answering the phone, and I could not imagine
presidential security being impressed by my line about being a friend of
the president.
I called Mohamad Sobary, an old friend of Abdurrahman, and sug-
gested that we just turn up at the palace complex early the following
morning, saying that the president had asked to see us. When we
approached the front gates we repeated our story and were ushered in.
Downstairs, after passing through the outer line of security, we repeat-
ed the same falsehood, asking them to pass on to the president the
information that we had arrived. With any other president this would
have been an arrogantly bold approach but with Abdurrahman it
seemed strangely appropriate. Indeed, before too long, we were ushered
upstairs into the grand apartments previously occupied by Habibie and
by visiting heads of state.
My apprehension about losing an old friend proved false. Despite the
evident pressures of office that had already begun with the difficult task
of selecting a new cabinet, Abdurrahman appeared as relaxed and jovial
as ever. He seemed glad to see us and I was reminded of his words over
lunch the previous Monday, though it felt as if a decade rather than a
week had passed since that modest meal. He had made a point then of
explaining seriously that when he became president — he was by this
stage taking it for granted that he would be president — his schedule
would be difficult, with protocol much heavier than anything in the past
but that he wanted to continue to maintain contact with old friends. He
proved true to his word. There’s something about Abdurrahman’s per-
sonality which means that contact is not just a blessing to his friends, but
also necessary for his own stability and good health.
7A
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3%.,+#.(1+!-)#%.!',
In the first weeks of his presidency the one thing that struck almost
everyone who met with him was just how relaxed and comfortable
Abdurrahman appeared. There was no question that the challenges he
was facing were enormous, and he was not deluding himself about the
scale of the task before him, nor was he worrying about things he could
not change. Instead, he seemed positively excited about those things
that he might be able to change. At one point I said to him, ‘You are
enjoying this aren’t you?’ He laughed and said, ‘Of course!’ I continued,
‘It seems to me that the chance to put in place all those things you’ve
long dreamed and talked about is really exciting’. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘now is
the chance to really do something.’ He was of course greatly con-
strained in what he could do, but he did know the direction that he
wanted to take. The area of foreign policy was part of this vision. Much
more than many of his peers, Abdurrahman was at home in a wide vari-
ety of cultural and social contexts. One of his immediate priorities was
to promote Indonesia to the West. He wanted to gain the confidence
of the West, together with important Middle Eastern and Asian pow-
ers, in the new and democratic Indonesia. One of the factors driving
this was his concern about Aceh. Recognising the potential for the
shipment of funds and even arms from sympathetic elements in the
Middle East, and elsewhere in Asia, he made a point of seeking to per-
suade key parties to support him in his efforts to negotiate a solution to
the conflict in Aceh, rather than fanning further militant activity.
One of the dreams that Abdurrahman brought with him to the pres-
idency was of healing the rift that had torn apart Indonesian society in
the mid-1960s when ordinary citizens, including NU youth, joined
with the army in hunting down communists and killing them in cold
blood. This was brought home to me on the second Saturday after his
election. I returned to visit him, again with Mohamad Sobary and also
with an old friend from Paris, Andrée Feillard, who has written exten-
sively about Nahdlatul Ulama and Abdurrahman. A few days earlier,
when asked where she was staying, Andrée had explained she was at the
home of Hardoyo, a well-known dissident who had been jailed for eight
years early in the Soeharto regime. Abdurrahman’s response was, ‘Well,
please ask him to come along, please bring him with you next time.’
When driving with us to the palace complex, Hardoyo drew our atten-
tion to a vacant block of land about two kilometres from the palace and
7@
quietly explained that this was the location of the military prison in
3%/-/:$.
which, under Soeharto, he had been kept for eight years.
On arriving at the palace complex, Hardoyo was clearly overcome
with emotion. ‘I haven’t been here for years, not since 1964,’ he said. ‘I
used to come here and listen to Sukarno speak. Since that time it has
been impossible to ever imagine coming back.’ His warm reception by
the new president, complete with an invitation to stay for lunch, over-
whelmed Hardoyo.
Understandably, he was also delighted to have snapshots taken as we
sat and talked with Abdurrahman. Immediately afterwards, I had the
roll of film processed and handed him the prints. He was delighted, and
as he held up a photograph of himself and the new president he said,
‘I’m going to enlarge this and put it on the wall of my front room. Just
let any of those army people try and cause any trouble now. I’ll point to
this photograph and then they’ll see’.
Over the following weeks Abdurrahman made a point of inviting a
succession of former dissidents and political prisoners to meet with
him at the palace complex. It was as if he wished to emphasise that this
was a new era and that past wrongs had to be owned up to and
addressed.
!)3!%!#/F+0!-)3%.,+#.(1
It is easy to enumerate the many paradoxes that make up Abdurrahman
Wahid. What follows are but a few. Firstly, he is a figure greatly under-
estimated, but also extremely well respected and enormously popular. In
recent years he has also acquired the new label of ‘frail and half-blind’,
but the stamina that he displays in cruising through an unrelenting
schedule of travel and meetings, the same restless energy that he has
displayed all of his life, suggests that he has the constitution of an ox.
Although his eyesight has all but failed, his sparkling rhetorical per-
formances testify to a sharp intellect and prodigious memory that go a
long way in compensation. As a traditionalist Javanese ulama, or Islamic
scholar, there is a side to Abdurrahman that is parochial. However, he
is also fluent in four languages and can read in another three, and has a
wide understanding of their related cultures. Linked to this is the par-
adoxical reality that Abdurrahman is both deeply ecumenical and pas-
sionate about Islam. He speaks of respect for all faiths but was for
fifteen years head of the world’s largest Islamic organisation, and was
regarded by its tens of millions of rustic peasant members as a living
76
saint. How deep then is his cosmopolitanism and to what extent does
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
he live out the pluralism that he preaches?

The paradoxes continue. As an individual, Abdurrahman is by any
measure physically plain. Yet those who spend time in his company
remark on how seductively charismatic and magnetic he can be.
Physical appearances aside, his is clearly a mind of rare agility and
sharpness. Partly because of this. and also because of his supreme sense
of destiny, many say that he is more than a little egocentric. Those who
know him well, however, argue that he is remarkably humble and gen-
uinely unpretentious. To what extent is his strong drive to be in the cen-
tre of political change simply an egocentric lust for power and to what
extent is he a genuine idealist?
One trait which annoys people, perhaps more than anything else,
about Abdurrahman, is his tendency to shoot from the hip. He is given
to recklessness and often appears careless in his approach to making
public statements. Yet, when it matters most, he is also capable of being
extremely canny and careful in what he says. Similarly, he often gives
the impression of flying by the seat of his pants, and of not working to
a clear plan or method. Nevertheless, when one reviews his career in
public life, including the first year of his presidency, it seems that he
does have a long-term vision about what he wants to achieve. What
sort of visionary is he?
Given the complexity of his personality, it is not surprising that
observers frequently differ widely in their assessment of his behaviour
and capability. Whereas in the late 1990s some saw him as a leader in
decline, a man who was once great but was now living on past glories,
others saw him as one of Indonesia’s most powerful leaders. Even as he
prepared to face the biggest test of his public career, the special session
of the MPR on 1 August 2000 that would determine his political fate,
he refused to give up hope of negotiating a deal that would save his
presidency. His enemies, publicly at least, dismissed his determination
as mere delusion. Others, more out of compassion than malice, simply
wondered aloud why he did not simply give up. For Abdurrahman him-
self, however, giving up was never an option. He saw himself locked in
mortal combat with the forces of the former regime, both civilian and
military, who he felt were determined to do anything to stop the
onward process of reform. If one was to believe his enemies he was, at
best, a tragic, quixotic has-been who saw dragons where sane men saw
windmills.
77
So what should we make of Abdurrahman Wahid? Was his victory
3%/-/:$.
simply the freak outcome of unusual circumstances, or was it a master-
ful political play? It is too early yet to form a definitive judgment of
Abdurrahman’s performance as president, although it is clear that for all
concerned his presidency proved to be deeply disappointing. It is equal-
ly clear, however, that he is in many respects a remarkable leader and a
deep and complex individual. There is much more here than meets the
eye.

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It is unlikely that the crowd of friends and family who joined
Abdurrahman to celebrate his sixtieth birthday at the Bogor Palace on
Friday, 4 August 2000, realised that he was not, in fact, born on 4
August, even though he always celebrated his birthday on that date. As
with so many aspects of his life and person, things are not quite what
they seem. Abdurrahman was indeed born on the fourth day of the
eighth month. But the month in which he was born was Syaban, the
eighth month of the Islamic calendar.1 In fact the fourth of Syaban
1940 was actually 7 September.2 Abdurrahman was born in Denanyar,
near the city of Jombang, East Java, in the pesantren home of his mater-
nal grandfather Kiai Bisri Syansuri.
A pesantren is a religious boarding school run on a communal basis.
Most are located in rural settings and service poor farming communi-
ties. The pesantren are led by ulama, or religious scholars, also known as
kiai in Java. Because the approach to Islam in the pesantren is essential-
ly that traditional in Java for centuries past and emphasises Sufism, or
Islamic mysticism, the kiai are accorded considerable respect as spiritu-
al teachers and guides. Since the formation of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
7=
in 1926, the vast majority of pesantren have been affiliated in a loose

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
network under it. Nahdlatul Ulama (the name means the ‘revival of the
ulama’) is a traditionalist Islamic organisation that is strongest among
ethnic Javanese, both within Java and in areas where they have settled
outside Java, such as South Sumatra and Central Kalimantan. NU’s
greatest strength is East Java, especially the East Java town of Jombang,
the home of both sides of Abdurrahman’s family.
9+!+)"+,%+),>!(,$%+)!(#)9+!+)&!,>+')!,>C!%+
Abdurrahman’s grandfathers, Kiai Bisri Syansuri and Kiai Hasyim
Asy’ari, are held in great reverence in NU circles, both because of the
role that they played in founding NU and because of their standing as
ulama. Uncharacteristically for traditionalist ulama, Kiai Hasyim
Asy’ari, and more so his son Kiai Wahid Hasyim, who was Minister for
Religious Affairs under Sukarno, were respected within urban, middle-
class society because of their close involvement with the nationalist
movement that led the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch fol-
lowing the end of the Second World War. Because of this, both men are
remembered officially as ‘Pahlawan Nasional’, or National Heroes.
Their names, together with those of the other National Heroes, are
commemorated in street names in central Jakarta.
Abdurrahman’s paternal grandfather, Kiai Haji Hasyim Asy’ari, was
born in Jombang in February 1871 and died in Jombang in July 1947.
He was one of the founders of NU in 1926. He was much respected as
an Islamic leader in traditional, rural society where he was known to be
an inspirational teacher and learned scholar, but he was also a commit-
ted nationalist. He numbered among his friends many of the leading
figures from the pre-war nationalist movement.3
Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari’s family proudly claim descent from the six-
teenth-century Javanese King Brawijaya VI, who in popular belief is
regarded as one of the last kings of the great Hindu-Buddhist Javanese
kingdom of Majapahit. More importantly, the legendary Jaka Tingkir,
the son of Brawijaya VI, is believed to have introduced Islam to the
northeast coastal region of Java while his son, Prince Banawa, is
remembered as a recluse who turned his back on the court to teach
Sufism. This lineage is regarded as immensely auspicious in traditional
Javanese society, where modern academic quibbles about the veracity of
this history, and of Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari’s links to it, are less important
than the perception of authority that it confers.
7D
After studying in his family’s pesantren until the age of fourteen, and
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then spending a further seven years moving from one pesantren to
another across East Java and Madura, Hasyim went to Mecca in 1892.
There he became an expert in studies of the Hadith, the anecdotal
accounts of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and teaching. He was even-
tually to conclude his studies in Mecca under the famous West
Sumatran teacher, Syaikh Ahmad Chatib Minangkabau. Many of
Syaikh Chatib’s students, who included Kiai Bisri Syansuri, went on to
become ulama of great standing in Indonesia. After seven years study-
ing in Mecca, Hasyim returned to Jombang with the aim of establish-
ing his own pesantren. For this he chose the village of Tebuireng, then
some distance from the city of Jombang, which eventually swallowed it
up.
Despite the advice of friends not to choose Tebuireng, then a hamlet
where brothels and bars prospered on the wealth generated by the local
sugar mill, Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari persisted, arguing that pesantren should
play a role in transforming the surrounding society and encouraging
piety in those to whom Islam had been alien. His pesantren was opened
in 1899 and soon achieved a reputation as a centre of learning. Hasyim
Asy’ari introduced a number of innovations to pesantren teaching which
were subsequently widely copied, including structured classes, system-
atically tiered learning, and critical discussion within class. The cur-
riculum at Pesantren Tebuireng was steadily developed and by the
1920s came to include instruction in modern languages, including
Malay and Dutch, and classes in mathematics and science. At the same
time Hasyim Asy’ari’s reputation grew steadily greater as a reformer of
Islamic thought and practice. After the formation of NU, he was made
Rais Akbar, which literally means Great President, as head of the
organisation’s Religious Advisory Council. After his death the title was
never used again; his successors were known instead by the title of Rais
Aam, or General President. He was also accorded the rare honour of
being titled Hadhratusysyaikh, or the Great Teacher. Many people out-
side the pesantren world remember him better, though, as a nationalist
and a staunch critic of Dutch colonialism.
Abdurrahman’s maternal grandfather, Kiai Haji Bisri Syansuri,
although less well known in secular urban society than Kiai Hasyim
Asy’ari, was also active in the nationalist movement.4 Bisri Syansuri was
born in September 1886 on the northern coast of Central Java, an area
rich with pesantren as a result of its early conversion to Islam before the
8A
Hindu-Buddhist interior of the island. Along with Hasyim Asy’ari, he

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
was regarded as one of the key figures in the establishment of NU. In

1917 he introduced the pesantren world’s first class for female students
at his fledgling pesantren in the village of Denanyar, outside Jombang.
After studying under Kiai Hasyim at Pesantren Tebuireng for six years
and then in Mecca for two years, he served an apprenticeship in
Pesantren Tambakberas for two years, and then established his own
pesantren in Jombang. In time Pesantren Denanyar was to become as
well known as Pesantren Tambakberas and Pesantren Tebuireng,
although varying from them in style as it reflected the personality of its
kiai. Like Hasyim Asy’ari before him, Bisri Syansuri took an expanse of
land barren in every sense, and over time turned it into a thriving com-
munity of farming, learning and spiritual development. Bisri Syansuri
had proved himself to be not only an expert scholar of fiqh, or Islamic
jurisprudence, and a gifted educational administrator but also an able
agriculturalist. His pesantren in Denanyar became known for its disci-
plined, ordered approach to scholarship and communal life.
9+!+)*!&!")0&!,"$--!&
Another key figure who was to have much influence in Abdurrahman’s
life was Kiai Wahab Chasbullah.5 Born in Tambakberas in 1883,
Wahab Chasbullah was a second cousin and former student of Hasyim
Asy’ari. Like Hasyim Asy’ari and Bisri Syansuri he had studied in
Mecca under the famous Syaikh Chatib Minangkabau, and before that
with the equally well-known Kiai Cholil in Bangkalan on the island of
Madura, across the strait from Surabaya. It was at Kiai Cholil’s
pesantren that Wahab Chasbullah first met Hasyim Asy’ari, who was a
generation older. Wahab Chasbullah came from Jombang, where his
father, Kiai Chasbullah, ran Pesantren Tambakberas. Despite their very
different personalities, Wahab Chasbullah and Bisri Syansuri, who were
only a few years apart in age, quickly struck up a lasting friendship.
Instructed by Kiai Cholil to study in Jombang under his former student
Hasyim Asy’ari, Wahab moved from Bangkalan to Tebuireng, where he
joined Bisri Syansuri again for four years. In 1912, with their pesantren
studies completed, Wahab Chasbullah and Bisri Syansuri were ready to
make the haj pilgrimage. The two men, now in their late twenties, trav-
elled to Mecca together. After completing the pilgrimage they stayed
on, as was the custom of pesantren graduates, for a further two years of
study, mostly under teachers from the East Indies including Syeikh
8@
Chotib. During this time Wahab Chasbullah’s younger sister, Chadijah,
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made the pilgrimage to Mecca with her mother. Sensing an attraction
between his old friend Bisri Syansuri and his favourite sister, Wahab
did his best to encourage what he considered to be an ideal union.
Fortunately his mother shared his judgment of the pairing: Bisri
Syansuri and Chadijah were married in Mecca before returning to
Jombang together, leaving Wahab Chasbullah to carry on his studies
alone for a final few months.
Returning to Java in 1914, Wahab Chasbullah chose to make a base
for himself in the cosmopolitan port city of Surabaya. There he suc-
cessfully conducted a range of businesses, became wealthy and mixed
widely, befriending many within the nationalist movement. In many
circles Wahab is remembered for his flamboyant and eccentric lifestyle.
Short, wiry and dark-skinned, he was full of energy and radiated
charismatic charm, amplified by a quick wit and a finely tuned sense of
humour. He had more than a dozen wives, perhaps even more than
twenty (though never more than four at once!) and rode around East
Java on a Harley-Davidson motorcycle, the tail of his trademark white
turban dancing behind him in the wind. Although a broad-minded
thinker more inclined to the spirit of the law than the letter of the law
in interpreting Islam, he was greatly respected as a religious scholar. He
was accepted as a liberal and eccentric thinker given to emphasising the
principles rather than the detail of Islamic legal thinking, just as Bisri
Syansuri was respected for his strict approach to personal piety and his
renowned jurisprudential and administrative skills.
9+!+)*!&+#)&!,>+'
Abdurrahman’s father, Wahid Hasyim, was born in Tebuireng,
Jombang, in June 1914.6 The first son born to his parents, he was the
fifth of ten children. According to Abdurrahman, while carrying him
his mother became seriously ill and vowed that if her pregnancy was
successful she would take the child to Kiai Cholil in Madura. Her
health returned, her son Wahid Hasyim was born without any difficul-
ties, and she duly took him to Madura to get the blessing of his father’s
old teacher. The incident was seen by many as portending greatness for
the child. Born into the pesantren home of one of Java’s most famous
kiai, Wahid Hasyim had no need to travel far to study. His father was
a highly regarded teacher who took learning seriously, but he was also
democratic in disposition and gave his children considerable freedom in
86
determining their course of study. As a small child Wahid Hasyim

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
learnt to read the Qur’an aloud, and by the age of seven had read it from
beginning to end (although, of course, not yet understanding the clas-
sical Arabic in which it was written).
Wahid Hasyim studied in his father’s madrasah (in Indonesia a
madrasah is a religious day school, often located within a pesantren). By
the age of twelve he had completed his formal madrasah studies with
sufficient mastery to assist his father in teaching other students. He was
gifted with a prodigious memory and made a hobby of memorising
classical Arabic poetry. At the age of thirteen he left Tebuireng to trav-
el from pesantren to pesantren, as was customary. Somewhat unusually,
however, he stayed just days rather than months or years at each of the
pesantren he visited.7 Staying just long enough in each pesantren to
secure the blessing of the kiai, he quickly returned home to Tebuireng
and, with his father’s approval, spent the next four years in private study.
His father Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, atypically for a kiai, had married a
daughter of the Javanese aristocracy. Thus Wahid Hasyim grew up in a
home in which his mother was determined to ensure that her offspring
were equipped to take their part in elite urban society rather than
remain confined to the rural world of the pesantren. She arranged for
her son to be given tuition in English and Dutch by the European
manager of a local sugar mill. At the age of eighteen he sailed to Mecca
and studied there for two years.
Returning home to Tebuireng in 1934, he began to teach in his
father’s pesantren and to develop his ideas regarding what had become
for him a passion: how to marry modern education with classical
Islamic learning. This took concrete form when he established his own
modern madrasah within Tebuireng. By 1938, keen to become politi-
cally active and participate in the nationalist movement, he searched for
an organisation to attach himself to. After much consideration, he
decide to channel his energies into NU. Previously he had despaired of
the traditionalist organisation, saying: ‘NU represents an association of
old men who are slow to act, they neither feel nor act in a revolution-
ary way.’8 Nevertheless, after considering the alternatives, he eventual-
ly concluded: ‘Those internal factors, that previously I regarded as being
obstacles to progress, may in fact be the reverse, aiding progress.’9 He
had come to the conclusion that, for all its failings, its lack of modern
intellectuals and revolutionary spirit, NU with its vast grassroots net-
work had great potential. Choosing a political party or organisation to
87
become involved with was, he wrote: ‘Like choosing a life-partner, the
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one who could satisfy absolutely in all areas, in beauty, in intelligence,
in housekeeping, in companionship, in deportment, and so on and so
forth, is certainly not obtainable in this world.’10
*!&+#)&!,>+')!(#),/-+0&!&
According to Abdurrahman, in the late 1930s Wahid Hasyim was
regarded as one of Jombang’s most eligible bachelors. Good-looking
and bright, Wahid Hasyim had to deal with numerous offers of mar-
riage made to him by fathers from leading families on behalf of their
daughters. For several years he rejected all offers. Then one day in 1939,
Wahid, now twenty-five, attended the wedding ceremony of a relative,
and noticed a young girl dressed in ordinary work clothing carrying a
bucket of water to wash dishes in the kitchen behind the festivities.
This was Solichah, daughter of Kiai Bisri Syansuri. By all accounts she
was not a classic beauty, and yet there was something about her that
attracted his attention. The next day he went to Kiai Bisri and asked for
his permission to marry his daughter Solichah. Although not yet six-
teen, she was, by the standards of the day, just coming of age and ready
for marriage, especially to such a desirable husband. Kiai Bisri gladly
gave his permission and they were married that year.11
By all accounts Wahid Hasyim and Solichah fell deeply in love.
Within a year they had their first child. When she married, Solichah
was too young to have been extensively educated but she possessed a
natural curiosity, an agile mind and a strong will. She had been educat-
ed in her father’s school, but like many madrasah students first learnt to
read and write in the Arab script, which was then used for Malay as
well as Arabic. Wahid Hasyim taught her to read the Latin script, the
medium for Dutch and Indonesian, the local Malay dialect chosen by
the nationalist to become the language of the new nation.12
Like most Javanese santri, or orthodox practising Muslims (the
majority of Indonesian Muslims, who are to varying degrees nominal in
their practice of Islam are referred to as abangan), Abdurrahman took
his father’s name at the end of his own. Following Arab practice, he is
Abdurrahman ‘son of ’ Wahid, just as his father was Wahid ‘son of ’
Hasyim. But as with most of his peers, his official birth name is differ-
ent again. ( Just as many Westerners are reluctant to use their middle
names, the official birth names of many Javanese Muslims often remain
little known outside their immediate families. This is, in part, because
88
these names are often elaborate and essentially symbolic in intent and
!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
not intended for daily use. Indonesians habitually refer to people by one
name only and often prefer a simple contraction or sobriquet.) Perhaps
Wahid Hasyim, as an excited first-time father, was filled with the first
flush of paternal optimism, or perhaps he was indeed preternaturally
prescient. In any case the name he gave his first-born, Abdurrahman
Ad Dhakil, was a heavy name for any child to bear. Taken from a hero-
ic figure from the Umayyad dynasty, Ad Dhakil literally means ‘the
conqueror’. The original Ad Dhakil established Islam in Spain and set
up a civilisation that would last for centuries.
Wahid and Solichah wasted no time in building a family. Within
weeks of Abdurrahman Ad Dhakil’s birth, Solichah was pregnant
again. Abdurrahman’s sister Aishah was born in June 1941, and she was
soon followed by another boy, Salahuddin, born in September 1942.
By the time that Salahuddin was born, the Japanese had over-run the
Dutch East Indies and interned the European population. In some
areas the nationalists seized the opportunity to push forward with their
own revolutionary ambitions, but the Japanese had no time for such
diversions. They wanted a compliant, obedient and above all productive
population to serve their war-time interests. In enforcing their rule they
arrested a number of nationalist activists, including Kiai Hasyim
Asy’ari. Abdurrahman recalls that, because his grandfather refused to
bow in the direction of the rising sun or worship the emperor, he was
beaten so severely by the Japanese that he eventually lost the use of his
right arm.13 Later, however, they realised that arresting the popular kiai
had been a mistake. In attempting to develop lines of control over the
civilian population, they had decided that Islam was one of the key ele-
ments of society untainted by Dutch colonialism. Traditionalist Islam
in particular, with its network of pesantren across Java, represented, for
the Japanese, an invaluable social network. Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari was
recognised as a key figure in this network and the Japanese sought to
make amends, releasing him from captivity.
H!9!%1!
In March 1942 the Japanese had established Shumubu, the Office for
Religious Affairs. By way of compensation to Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari for
his imprisonment, they asked him to take charge of Shumubu. This
presented him with a dilemma. To refuse the Japanese would be to risk
inflaming suspicion; to accept would smack of accommodation, both for
8B
himself as a senior kiai and for NU. Hasyim Asy’ari came up with a
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clever solution. Arguing that he was needed in Jombang and that to
commute between Jakarta and Jombang would be too arduous for his
aged frame (he was, after all, in his seventies and he had never recovered
full movement in his right hand), he proposed that his oldest son, Wahid
Hasyim, be allowed to act as his proxy. Wahid Hasyim was already a
prominent nationalist. In 1939 he had become involved in the Supreme
Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI) and had pioneered the develop-
ment of the Hizbullah, a military wing training young men for the com-
ing revolutionary struggle. Suggesting that the Japanese draft him to
head Shumubu was an elegant solution. It allowed Wahid Hasyim to
operate in Jakarta together with the other ‘above-ground’ nationalists
like Sukarno and Hatta without arousing Japanese suspicions.
So, in late 1944, when Abdurrahman was just four years old, he
accompanied his father to Jakarta. Abdurrahman’s brother Umar had
been born in January of that year and Wahid Hasyim elected to leave
his young family behind in Jombang while he went ahead with his old-
est child and set up in Jakarta. During this time Wahid Hasyim and
Abdurrahman lived in Menteng, the central Jakarta suburb favoured by
leading businessmen, professionals and politicians.
Living there put them in the centre of things; when, for example,
they prayed at the nearby Matraman mosque, they would regularly
meet nationalist leaders such as Mohammad Hatta. It was also conven-
ient for people to meet with Wahid Hasyim. Abdurrahman recalls that
at this time he would often answer a knock on the door at around eight
o’clock in the evening and find a strange man dressed in dark peasant
garb who would ask whether he could come in and talk to his father.
The visitor and Wahid Hasyim would often talk for hours. At his
request, Abdurrahman called him Uncle Hussein. Only years later did
he come to know the identity of his father’s old friend. He was Tan
Malaka, the famous Communist leader. Even though Wahid Hasyim
was effectively leading the largest Islamic organisation in the country,
he made a habit of maintaining good relations with all sections of soci-
ety, including Tan Malaka and other Communists.
In October 1943 the Japanese abolished the Supreme Islamic
Council of Indonesia and replaced it with an umbrella body that they
named Masyumi. As with Shumubu they asked Hasyim Asy’ari to head
this organisation, but once again he asked that his son, Wahid Hasyim,
deputise for him. While in Jakarta Wahid Hasyim developed Masyumi
8;
into a credible component of the nationalist movement and in doing so

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
met regularly with Sukarno and Hatta and other leading nationalists.
He became involved in the formulation of the Nationalists’ 1945 con-
stitution and, Abdurrahman believes, with the development of the state
philosophy of Pancasila.
1&.)%.?/-$1+/(
Following the Japanese surrender, father and son moved back to
Jombang where Abdurrahman stayed for the duration of the revolution.
During the revolutionary struggle Wahid Hasyim visited Jombang
periodically but spent much of his time in hiding. He was also kept
busy by his work as an adviser to the revolutionary leader, General
Sudirman. Abdurrahman recalls his father returning regularly to the
family home late at night after having been in hiding for a week or two,
and remembers dressing the recurring sores that plagued his father at
the time. The young Abdurrahman would be instructed by his mother
to boil up a lotion made from frog skins and apply it to his father’s
weeping sores. By morning his father would be gone again.
For many Indonesians the period of the nationalist revolution
between 1945 and 1949 was time of considerable hardship and insta-
bility. For Abdurrahman, however, life in the pesantren in Jombang was
far from unpleasant. His mother may have been privately fretting about
Wahid Hasyim and his friends, but Abdurrahman was too young and
too far from the conflict to see the revolution as anything but an adven-
ture. Nevertheless he recalls that, with her husband largely absent,
Solichah faced considerable difficulty in supporting the family through
this time. To make a little money to buy necessities, she sold sweetmeats
and snacks from a small cart in front of her house.
While Wahid Hasyim spent most of this period hiding from the
Dutch, his aged father refused to be bothered by the threat of the
Dutch targeting nationalist kiai such as himself. At one point early in
the struggle, a delegation was sent from the nationalist leaders in the
field to ask Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari to withdraw from Jombang for fear
that he might be targeted by the Dutch. His response was to call his
son Yusuf and ask for instruction in firing Yusuf ’s old pistol. ‘Who
knows?’ he said, ‘I should be able to knock off at least one or two
Dutchmen with this pistol if they try to come into this compound.’14
As it happened, Kiai Hasyim, now in his mid-seventies, was ailing and
passed away in July 1947.
8<
%.1$%()1/)H!9!%1!
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In March 1948 when Abdurrahman’s sister Chodiyah (Lily) was born,
their father was away still busy in the struggle. Finally, when a lasting
peace was signed with the Dutch, Wahid Hasyim was able to rejoin
his family. His involvement with the new government now made it
necessary for the entire family to relocate to Jakarta. In December
1949 Wahid Hasyim and Abdurrahman moved back to Jakarta to set
up house in advance of the rest of the family. Wahid Hasyim had been
appointed Minister for Religious Affairs and went on to serve in this
capacity in four other cabinets before finally stepping aside in April
1952.
Wahid Hasyim and Abdurrahman spent the first few months staying
at a hotel in Menteng. Abdurrahman recalls that in the mornings his
father made a point of walking him to his nearby primary school rather
than leaving this task to the household servants. Wahid Hasyim was an
easygoing and unassuming man. His friends knew him as someone who
loved to joke and make light of difficulties. As a father he was affec-
tionate but often quiet and to the young Abdurrahman seemed serious.
Nevertheless, Abdurrahman recalls his father playing football with him
in the backyard, and it appears that he enjoyed having his company in
Jakarta. Typical of Javanese fathers of his generation, Wahid Hasyim
remained a benign but somewhat distant figure to his son.
It seems that Wahid Hasyim was also a patient father, especially
when it came to dealing with his firstborn. Abdurrahman’s older rela-
tives recall him being an exuberant and irrepressible child — which is
to say, he was frequently naughty. They recall him, on occasion, being
bound by rope to a flagpole in the front yard as punishment for a prac-
tical joke gone too far or some other misdemeanour. Before he was
twelve he had twice broken an arm, on both occasions as a result of his
penchant for climbing whatever tree was in sight. On the first occasion
the branch on which he had perched himself broke under his weight.
The second incident saw him come close to losing his hand. He had
taken some food from the kitchen and retreated with it to the comfort-
able seclusion of a fork between two large branches high up in the
canopy of a large tree. After making himself comfortable, he fell asleep
and rolled out of his perch. He recalls that the fracture that resulted was
so severe; leaving bone protruding from the arm, that the first doctor
his father took him to feared that he might lose his hand. Fortunately,
8=
some deft manipulation and a large splint enabled the break to mend.
!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
The experience appears to have done little to mend his ways, however,
for he continued to be reckless and impulsive.
During this period in Jakarta, Wahid Hasyim exerted considerable
influence over student leaders and other figures around him. This could
be seen in the fact that a group of ten met regularly at his house, includ-
ing an earnest young man by the name of Munawir Sjadzali. Some
indication that Wahid Hasyim was less serious than he appeared and
not lacking in a sense of humour comes from his instruction to the
young Abdurrahman not only to serve tea and biscuits to this regular
group of young cadres but also to lace together the shoes of those whom
he observed to have fallen asleep.
Given his background and the circles in which he moved, Wahid
Hasyim had a deep appreciation of traditional Islamic culture. Even so,
he had a broad circle of friends; the household was full of an eclectic
mix of regular guests, including a number of Europeans. Such inter-
course was helped by the fact that, as a result of his mother’s efforts,
Wahid Hasyim was fluent in English and Dutch.
A good friend of Wahid Hasyim’s in Jakarta was a German convert
to Islam by the name of Williem Iskandar Bueller. Wahid Hasyim
often arranged for Abdurrahman to spend afternoons after school at
Bueller’s house and it was through Bueller that Abdurrahman first
gained his love of classical music, the works of Beethoven in particu-
lar. From the first day that Abdurrahman heard Beethoven’s music
played on Bueller’s gramophone, he was enraptured. Although
Abdurrahman’s father was a cosmopolitan and a polyglot who filled
his house with books and magazines, his taste in music was confined
to traditional Islamic songs and Qur’anic recitation. Wahid Hasyim
never came to share Bueller’s taste in music, but he was more than
happy for Bueller to teach his son to love the classical European com-
posers. Although it was well known that Bueller was homosexual,
Wahid Hasyim either did not know or did not care. In any case,
Abdurrahman was not about to repeat to his father the dark mutter-
ings of his driver about his father’s German friend. Bueller, and his
gramophone recordings, had opened a new world of music to him and
he did not want to lose it.
Although his father was a government minister and well known in
Jakarta circles, Abdurrahman never attended any of the elite schools
usually attended by children of government officers. His father gave
8D
him the choice to do so but Abdurrahman preferred to attend ordinary
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schools, saying that the elite schools made him feel uncomfortable. He
began his school life studying at the nearby KRIS Primary School in
central Jakarta. He spent two years in third and fourth grade at this
school before shifting to the Matraman Perwari Primary School, close
to the new family home in Matraman, central Jakarta.
At this stage his education was entirely secular. He had, of course,
learnt some Arabic as a child, sufficient at least to read the Qur’an
aloud, but it was not until his teenage years that he started on a sys-
tematic study of Arabic. He and his siblings fondly recall the family
home in Matraman, not only for its many interesting guests speaking
assorted languages but also for its abundance of books, newspapers
and magazines. Indonesian society, even middle-class society, did not
have a library culture. Unlike, say, the middle class in India, most
urban Indonesians did not read widely, and it was relatively rare to
find large personal libraries even in the homes of well-known Jakartan
families. Wahid Hasyim’s Matraman home, however was an excep-
tion. Similarly, where many santri households would not think of sub-
scribing to Catholic-owned or other non-Muslim newspapers, the
house of Wahid Hasyim was different. The children were encouraged
to read whatever they wished and to openly discuss their ideas. Wahid
Hasyim was constantly frustrated by the small horizons of many
santri and strove to ensure that his children would grow up to become
different.
*!&+#)&!,>+'
Wahid Hasyim clearly loved his community, but he often despaired of
the small-mindedness that held it back. As Minister for Religious
Affairs he was troubled by what he saw to be a growing attitude of
dependency on the department, of being manja, behaving like spoilt
children. Nevertheless, he was not, by nature, inclined to let himself be
troubled by things that were out of his power to control. In 1952, hav-
ing survived five cabinets, Wahid Hasyim lost his position in one of the
frequent reshuffles that occurred during this period. As minister he had
been ultimately responsible for organising the 1951 haj pilgrimage.
Unfortunately arrangements for the Indonesian pilgrims that year went
badly wrong and several thousand were unable to get to Mecca. The
debacle gave rise to no-confidence motions against Wahid Hasyim in
the parliament and generally did nothing to advance his reputation. As
BA
a result he was happy to step aside from the ministry for a time.15 Many
!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
of his friends were upset that he was no longer in the cabinet. Wahid
Hasyim, however, was characteristically sanguine. ‘We are disappoint-
ed that Gus Wahid is no longer sitting in cabinet’, one group of friends
said. ‘No point being disappointed,’ Wahid Hasyim replied. ‘I can still
sit in my house. I have got quite a few chairs and a nice long couch. It’s
just a question of choosing.’ ‘Yes, but we are disappointed that the gov-
ernment is no longer making use of our leader …’ ‘Well, if the govern-
ment is not getting any benefit from me then let me get the benefit
myself …’16
In these years in Jakarta Abdurrahman spent a lot of time with his
father, often accompanying him to meetings and witnessing the rich
world in which he lived and the easygoing and unpretentious way that
Wahid Hasyim moved through it. Wahid Hasyim made a point of hav-
ing Abdurrahman with him when he could, both because he enjoyed
his company and because he saw this as an important part of
Abdurrahman’s education. And so it was that on Saturday, 18 April
1953, Abdurrahman was with his father as they were being driven to an
NU meeting in the town of Sumedang, several hours southeast of
Jakarta on the Bandung road, which runs through the range of volcanic
mountains that constitute the spine of Java. Wahid Hasyim was in the
back of his big white Chevrolet with his friend the publisher, Argo
Sutjipto, while Abdurrahman sat in front with the driver.
Between Cimahi and Bandung they met rain and the busy single-
lane mountain road became slick. Their driver was hurrying trying to
make up for lost time but, as they rounded a gentle bend at speed, the
big white car skidded. Struggling to regain control, the driver, unaccus-
tomed to the powerful American car, repeatedly overcorrected. A truck
coming up the mountain road towards them saw what was happening
and pulled up on the shoulder of the road to give them space.
Unfortunately, as the Chevrolet drew close, it spun and slammed rear
first into the stationary truck. It hit with such force that Wahid Hasyim
and Argo Sutjipto were thrown from the car. Abdurrahman and the
driver were unhurt but climbed out of the car to find both of their com-
panions badly injured and unconscious. Wahid Hasyim had suffered
serious head injuries and his forehead, one side of his face and his neck
were lacerated and bruised. The accident had occurred at around 1 pm
but it was not until around 4 pm that the ambulance from Bandung
arrived. Abdurrahman sat for hours on the side of the road watching
B@
over his father’s inert form. After they were eventually picked up and
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taken into the hospital in Bandung, Abdurrahman spent the night at
his father’s bedside. Late that night his mother joined him in the sad
vigil. At 10.30 on Sunday morning, Wahid Hasyim succumbed to his
injuries; his friend Argo Sutjipto followed him several hours later.
Wahid Hasyim, the hope of so many in Indonesia, was gone. He was
thirty-eight years old. Abdurrahman was just twelve.
Although in shock after the accident, Abdurrahman retained a cer-
tain presence of mind. As he sat beside his unconscious father by the
car, he recalled that his father had earlier told him that he had hidden
a large amount of cash in a small cushion on the back seat.
Remembering this, he retrieved the cushion from the car and clung
onto it tightly. Hours later in the hospital he refused all requests to let
go of it; those around him assumed that he clung to it out of grief. Only
when his mother arrived did he release his grip.
As he was growing up Abdurrahman knew that his father was a pop-
ular and influential man, but it is hard for a child to put such things in
perspective. The extent of the respect and affection in which Wahid
Hasyim was held only became clear to him as they began their sorry
journey back to Jakarta with his father’s body. As the procession drove
through the streets of Bandung and out onto the highway,
Abdurrahman was amazed to see large crowds of people lining the
streets to pay tribute to Wahid Hasyim. In every town and hamlet, the
streets were lined with mourners who had waited patiently in the hot
sun to witness the man that they had loved make his last journey home.
The story was repeated the next day when the funeral procession
departed from the family home in Matraman and slowly made its way
to Halim airport. Abdurrahman recalls seeing the streets of Jakarta
packed with people come to witness Wahid Hasyim’s final pilgrimage
to East Java. In Surabaya he recalls the crowds along the roadside being
even more packed than they had been in the national capital, as they
were also in every little village and settlement all along the eighty-kilo-
metre drive to Jombang. To the grieving twelve-year-old, their patient
presence by the roadside spoke volumes about their love for his father.
Almost half a century later Abdurrahman describes being overwhelmed
by the realisation that they had loved his father so. He recalls wrestling
with what it meant and thinking: ‘What could one man do that the
people would love him so? Was there any finer achievement in life than
this?’ The bitter-sweet memory was never to leave him.17
B6
!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
,/-+0&!&)1!9.,)0&!%:.
Solichah was three months pregnant with Hasyim, their sixth child,
when she bowed grieving over the body of her husband, the kind and
gentle man who had seemed so full of promise. When the last of the
official visitors had left, when the kiai had done with their mourning
and the period of state grieving was over, Solichah, who was twenty-
nine years old, was left to fend for the children and herself, as well as
pay the upkeep on the substantial residence in Matraman purchased
when her husband was a minister. To continue living in the family
home meant working hard to look after her family. She had no profes-
sion or career to fall back upon and six children to support, one at her
breast. Nevertheless, as the widow of Kiai Wahid Hasyim she was
unlikely to be neglected and had a strong social network to fall back on.
Moreover, she was a determined and resourceful woman. Making use of
her extensive connections within East Java and Jakarta, she set herself
up in the business of trading rice and was able to secure a number of
government contracts.
Solichah may not have been the natural intellectual that Wahid
Hasyim had been but nor was she an ordinary housewife. She may have
married young with little schooling, and her days may have been cen-
tred on her young family, but she had also been Wahid Hasyim’s clos-
est friend and confidant. By all accounts their partnership of fourteen
years had seen her grow and develop in ways beyond her peers back in
East Java. She had developed a passion for reading and had become
accustomed to keeping abreast of current affairs. She was an active part-
ner in her husband’s career and increasingly began to play a modest role
herself, especially within NU circles. Following his death her influence
steadily increased, and she became an important figure within her com-
munity. At home she continued to encourage in the children the sort of
free and spirited debate about issues that Wahid Hasyim had stimulat-
ed. They were made to feel that that they could and should engage with
the many visitors who continued to come to the house and were
encouraged to read the papers and the books that were scattered
throughout the home.
By this stage Abdurrahman was addicted to reading and seldom went
anywhere without a volume in his hand. When he could not find what
he was looking for in the household library, he was allowed to scour
Jakarta’s second hand bookshops to feed his habit. The many friends of
B7
the family were also a useful resource when it came to chasing reading
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material.
Solichah was the sort of woman who automatically inspired respect,
not least from her eldest child. Outside the family her sense of bearing
and quiet confidence, reinforced by the charisma of her late husband,
elicited respectful treatment. Within the family, and especially from
Abdurrahman, there was simply no question of going against her, at
least not in her presence. For Abdurrahman, Solichah’s authority had an
added dimension. He was the eldest son of Kiai Wahid Hasyim, Kiai
Hasyim Asy’ari’s eldest son. Not only was he his father’s heir; he was
the hope of his family. According to the culture of traditionalist Islamic
society, the eldest son was expected to follow in his father’s footsteps.
For the son of Kiai Haji Wahid Hasyim, and grandson of the
Hadhratusysyaikh, the Great Syaikh, there was never any doubt that
Abdurrahman Ad Dhakil would study in the pesantren and then study
further in the Middle East, and there was every hope that he would live
up to his name. Salahuddin, Umar and Hasyim could make their own
choices, preferably becoming professionals, but Abdurrahman was to
follow in the footsteps of his father as a religious scholar and leader of
his people.
In the eyes of Solichah, Wahid Hasyim had been the perfect man.
His death in April 1953 led her to transfer all of her ambition and her
aspirations to Abdurrahman. For her it was natural that Abdurrahman
should work out the labour earlier commenced by his father and fulfil
what, for her, was a certain course of destiny. Wahid Hasyim was held
up to the young Abdurrahman as the example of the man he must
become and his life as an example of the path that Abdurrahman must
follow. Abdurrahman for his part, although he had a reputation for
being playful and disobedient, was always respectful and obedient to his
mother, at least in her presence.
!"#$%%!&'!()-.!?.,)&/'.
In the short term Abdurrahman did not prove himself to be an out-
standing student. In 1954, the year after he had graduated from pri-
mary school and moved to junior high school, or SMEP, he was forced
to repeat his first year because he failed to prove himself in class tests.
This early failure was apparently the result of spending too much time
watching football and not enough time doing his homework. Bright
enough to succeed but prone to laziness, Abdurrahman had never had
B8
to study hard for anything up until this point. He soon became bored
!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
in class when he found what was being taught insufficiently challeng-

ing to engage his attention. He was still grieving for his father, but he
was not the sort of child to show this; instead he filled the void with his
dual passions of watching football and losing himself in the world of
books.
Today, when asked how the death of his father affected him,
Abdurrahman denies any link between his poor performance in school
the following year and his struggle to come to terms with his father’s
death. He simply says that he was lazy and distracted by football and
movies and failed to apply himself to his studies. As an adult he seldom,
if ever, acknowledges having suffered self-doubt or depression at any
time in his life. Even so, there are clues that the death of his father,
whom he was closer to than any of his younger siblings, was an enor-
mous blow. Certainly, although never anything more than down-to-
earth in his description of him, he always speaks of his father with the
deepest admiration and affection.
In 1954, with his mother struggling to look after six children by her-
self and Abdurrahman doing poorly in school, he was sent off to
Yogyakarta to continue his studies at junior high school. While there he
stayed in the home of a friend of his father’s, Kiai Haji Junaidi.
Interestingly, Kiai Junaidi was one of the relatively few ulama, or reli-
gious scholars, involved in Muhammadiyah during this period and, sig-
nificantly, was a member of the Majelis Tarjih, or Religious Advisory
Board of Muhammadiyah. This might seem unremarkable, but at that
time, and even more so in the decades that followed, there was relatively
little mixing between Muhammadiyah modernists and NU traditional-
ists. Just as NU was, and is, the main organisation representing Islamic
traditionalism in Indonesia, so almost all modernist Muslims are linked
to Muhammadiyah. The modernists differ from the traditionalists in
their approach to interpreting the Qur’an, in their attitude to mystical
practices and beliefs, and in their cultural integration into modern
urban life.
Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta in 1912, as a result of
the rise of the modernist movement in the Middle East, with a vision
of reforming and modernising Islamic thought and practice. It was
successful as an organisation and as the guiding force in a cultural
and educational movement. The traditionalist ulama, or kiai, who ran
the pesantren eventually came to recognise that if they did not organ-
BB
ise themselves in a similar fashion then their culture and approach to
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Islam, and particular their pesantren, would quickly lose public sup-
port. Consequently, in 1926 NU was formed. The traditionalists
within NU were concerned that the success of Islamic modernism
might see their approach to understanding Islam, with its heavy
reliance on classical scholarship and deep appreciation for Sufism,
gradually lose influence within Indonesian society, but they were not
completely opposed to the ideas of Islamic modernism. And, in time,
many of the key elements of modernism reform were picked up and
incorporated into NU circles. This was particularly the case with the
modernist approach to education, with its strong emphasis on a
modern, secular curriculum, in their successful, and rapidly expand-
ing, network of day schools. The traditionalists were keen to preserve
the pesantren system of religious boarding schools, with their com-
munal way of life and commitment to Sufism, but they established
modernist-style madrasah, or secular day schools, within the
pesantren, that were strongly influenced by the modernist approach
to education.
Many Muhammadiyah and NU leaders had good personal relations,
and a good deal of co-operation occurred between the two organisa-
tions. Many from both organisations were active in the nationalist
movement. During the Japanese occupation, the two were forced to
function together under the rubric of an organisation that eventually
came to be called Masyumi; after the occupation ended, they continued
to work together in politics. NU and Masyumi leaders co-operated
under Masyumi, which now became the major political party repre-
senting Muslim interests.
NU abruptly broke away from Masyumi in 1952 because of growing
antipathy between the two organisations, which came to a head over
negotiations for cabinet positions in March that year. Members of the
traditionalist NU generally felt that the modernists within
Muhammadiyah and elsewhere looked down on them as ‘country
bumpkins’ or unsophisticated villagers. It was remarkable that the son
of the former leader of NU should stay in the home of one of the lead-
ing figures in Muhammadiyah. This early experience, itself the legacy
of his father’s catholic outlook, was to prove formative for
Abdurrahman. Pak Junaidi’s house was located in the Kauman, the
santri Muslim quarter of Yogyakarta, close to the royal palace, the
birthplace of Muhammadiyah.
B;
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!)3.,!(1%.().#$0!1+/(
To round out Abdurrahman’s education it was arranged that he would
travel three times a week to Pesantren Al-Munawwir in Krapyak, just
outside Yogyakarta, to study Arabic with Kiai Haji Ali Ma’shum. Kiai
Ali Ma’shum was born in March 1915, one year after Kiai Wahid
Hasyim, and was famous for his egalitarian ethos.18 On the one hand
he gave no special treatment to the sons of prominent kiai who were
entrusted into his care — indeed, just the reverse. On the other hand
he mixed freely with his students and was in the habit of dropping by
their quarters at mealtimes to check on their cooking, occasionally sam-
pling it uninvited. He also kept a wide circle of friends, mixing freely
with Muhammadiyah leaders, government officials and the Yogyakarta
royal family. Until he came to Jakarta, Abdurrahman’s Arabic had been
largely passive. He already spoke good English, however, and could
read Dutch. It was in Yogyakarta that his reading really took off and he
read with a voracious appetite. By the mid-1950s Yogyakarta’s charac-
ter as a university city was already well defined, and for a bibliophile
like Abdurrahman the city’s second-hand bookshops were rewarding
centres of pilgrimage.
When he completed Junior Economic High School in Yogyakarta in
1957 Abdurrahman commenced formal full-time pesantren studies at
Pesantren Tegalrejo in Magelang, an hour’s drive north of Yogyakarta,
remaining there until mid-1959. The kiai in charge of his studies there
was Kiai Khudori, another of NU’s grand old men. At the same time
Abdurrahman also undertook part-time studies at Pesantren Denanyar
in Jombang under his maternal grandfather, Kiai Bisri Syansuri.
Abdurrahman confirmed his reputation as a gifted student by com-
pleting in his two years at Pesantren Tegalrejo a course of study under
Kiai Khudori that most students would have required four years for,
even though he had spent most of his time outside class reading
Western books.19
In 1959 he moved to Jombang full-time where, until 1963, he stud-
ied at Pesantren Tambakberas under Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, as well as
remaining in regular contact with Kiai Bisri Syansuri. During his first
year at Tambakberas he was encouraged to begin teaching; he went on
to teach at the modern madrasah established within pesantren complex
and also became its headmaster. Throughout this period he continued
to make regular trips back to Krapyak, where he would stay in the house
B<
of Kiai Ali Ma’shum. It was during this period from the late 1950s
:%/*+(:)$3)+( !"#$%&'"% !(#)3/-+1+0,2)@D8AG@D;7

through to 1963 that Abdurrahman’s formal studies in Islam and clas-
sical Arabic literature were consolidated. In pesantren circles he was
regarded as a remarkable student. His studies, which drew heavily on
powers of memory, presented relatively few challenges for
Abdurrahman who, although inclined to be lazy and ill-disciplined in
his studies, possessed a near photographic memory.
At this time he combined his intellectual pursuit of Islamic learning
with a very different approach to knowledge and insight. By now he
was deeply drawn to the Sufistic, mystical side of traditionalist Islamic
culture and had formed the habit of making regular pilgrimages to
graveyards and tomb sites to pray and meditate, usually in the middle
of the night. Sometimes the two approaches to learning overlapped. In
Jombang, for example, he was successful in committing to memory a
standard classical book on Arabic grammar. Even though the string of
verses that he memorised contained no outstanding religious insights,
such was the importance of Arabic and the memorisation of Arabic
texts that for a student to master such a book was considered to be of
great religious merit. When setting himself the task of memorising this
text Abdurrahman had vowed to make a pilgrimage, on foot, to various
tomb sites south of Jombang, culminating in a site on the rugged,
sparsely populated, south coast of Java. Success duly came and he set
out on his personal pilgrimage, heading south via back roads lest he
should be recognised and given a lift. The journey to the coast by foot
was well over one hundred kilometres and took him many days. It was
uncomfortably beyond the natural limits of his less than athletic
physique, but his stubborn determination ensured that he made it.
Nevertheless, when early in the return trip he was recognised by the
occupants of a passing car, he gladly accepted the offer of a ride back to
Jombang.
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Because pesantren studies came so easily to him, and indeed because he
rarely had to apply himself with great effort to anything he studied,
Abdurrahman always had plenty of time to read. Not all his reading or
cultural pursuits were religious. It was while in Yogyakarta that he first
began to be a ‘serious student’ of the cinema. In fact for much of the
year he was at the movies almost every day, not exactly the sort of
behaviour expected from one who might follow in the footsteps of some
B=
of Indonesia’s most revered religious leaders. Recognising this,

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
Abdurrahman attempted a hopelessly transparent ploy. When his reg-

ular movie-buddy called for him outside his room in Kiai Junaidi’s
house, it was agreed that they should talk loudly of being late for a
meeting of Ansor (the NU youth wing). While he was later to develop
a serious appreciation of cinema culture, at this stage Abdurrahman
simply watched almost every film that came through Yogyakarta with
little discretion. Nevertheless, even as a teenager with a gluttonous
appetite for new movies, Abdurrahman’s appreciation of film was a
more serious affair than that of most of his peers’.
It was also in Yogyakarta that he first began to take an interest in
wayang kulit, the traditional Javanese shadow puppet theatre that was
frequently performed in and around Yogyakarta but rarely performed in
the national capital. While in Yogyakarta and Magelang he sought out
wayang kulit performances and was generally able to see one every two
or three weeks, often travelling a considerable distance to do so.
Like many other teenagers, Abdurrahman had a lively interest in
what might be regarded as pulp literature, but for him even this read-
ing often had a serious element. He developed an enduring passion for
cerita silat, stories about martial arts warriors either written by
Indonesian Chinese writers or translated into Indonesian from the
writings of overseas Chinese. Cerita silat are generally published in
short novella format and run in series through fifteen or more slim vol-
umes. It’s difficult to make an argument for regarding them as serious
literature, but it is interesting that, in reflecting upon his early passion
for cerita silat, Abdurrahman describes the extent to which the elements
of Chinese philosophy that pervade the stories were influential in his
thinking.
A key theme that runs through cerita silat is that of the loyalty of a
student for his master. In the stories the students learn as much from
their masters in terms of spiritual development and character formation
as they do in terms of physical martial arts skills. In the world of cerita
silat, fidelity to one’s master and pursuit of the good is frequently test-
ed but is ultimately rewarded. In many respects the world of cerita silat,
while thoroughly Chinese in nature, parallels the world of the pesantren
where fidelity and respect for one’s kiai, or spiritual master, is of the
utmost importance and where the formation of character is part of the
core business of education.
As a teenager Abdurrahman also developed a keen interest in stories
BD
relating to the Second World War. Some of these stories he read in seri-
:%/*+(:)$3)+( !"#$%&'"% !(#)3/-+1+0,2)@D8AG@D;7

alised form in local newspapers, syndicated from Western papers, oth-
ers in magazines and books where he would study with interest the
great battles of the recent war and the personalities who shaped those
battles. He was also drawn to battles of a different kind and from this
point on developed an interest in American politics. He liked biogra-
phies of American presidents and found their tales of personal struggle
in development and maturation absorbing. His favourite American
president was, and remains, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he admired
for his drive and social vision, but he also has an abiding respect for the
unpretentious Harry Truman.
%.!#+(:
As Abdurrahman moved from Yogyakarta to Magelang, and then
Jombang, and from childhood to youth he began to enter more seri-
ously into two realms of reading that were henceforth to occupy his
attention: European social thought; and the great English, French and
Russian novels. When he was in Magelang he began to read the writ-
ings of Europe’s leading social theorists, mostly in Indonesian and
English but not infrequently in French and sometimes in Dutch and
German. He read whatever he could get his hands on, sometimes
bringing back books from his father’s library in Jakarta, or being given
them by friends of the family who knew well his appetite for reading.
He was also able to find interesting titles in the Yogyakarta bookshops
catering for students at Gadjah Mada University. As a teenager he
began to grapple with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, important
thinkers for medieval Islamic scholars. At the same time he wrestled
with Marx’s Das Kapital and Lenin’s What is to be done?, readily avail-
able in Indonesia when the Indonesian Communist Party was making
great advances. He was also much intrigued by the ideas of radical
social engagement advanced in Lenin’s Infantile Communism and Mao’s
Little Red Book.
For Abdurrahman, the most engaging topic of study, though, was not
politics or philosophy studied in some abstract fashion but the nature of
being human. Then, and throughout his life, he has had a deep passion
for understanding the complexities of human nature. Just as he learnt
in the wayang kulit stories to value ambivalence, so too in the great lit-
erature of the European novelists he learnt to value the complexities
and shades of grey that make up human nature.
;A
This love of humanity, which he nurtured through his reading of lit-

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
erary classics, was complemented by his passion for film. Such was his
love of literature and learning generally, and his powers of memory, he
continued to read throughout his pesantren years, finding it easy to read
many books, reading some in a single night, without noticeably dis-
turbing his formal studies.
Given this voracious appetite for new ideas and wide-ranging curios-
ity, it is hardly surprising that at a certain point in his development
Abdurrahman was forced to grapple with his own religious identity and
place in the world. What is surprising, given his deep interest in liber-
al Western social theory, is that in his early twenties he dabbled with,
as he later put it, Islamic fundamentalism. His reading had persuaded
him that the problems besetting humanity required a comprehensive
response. He found much in Marxist thought that was persuasive but
was troubled by Marxism’s antagonism towards religion. Although he
was wary of the simplistic and ill-informed social analysis that was pop-
ular among politically active Muslims in Indonesia during the 1960s, he
nevertheless hoped to find in Islam an answer to the problems of injus-
tice, poverty and oppression. He began to read the works of the post-
war Islamists in the hope of finding a comprehensive and coherent
political vision. He read Said Qutb, Said Ramadan, Hasan Bana and
explored the ideas behind the Arab world’s leading Islamist organisa-
tion, Al Ikwan Al Muslimun, or the Islamic Brotherhood.
In early 1962 his mother’s younger brother Haziz Bisri, who was an
admirer of Al Ikwan, encouraged Abdurrahman to establish a branch
of Al Ikwan. Abdurrahman toyed with the idea, but this venture into
fundamentalist thought was soon interrupted by his move to Cairo to
undertake further studies in November 1963. By then he had begun to
grow bored with most Islamist titles, finding them repetitive and super-
ficial. He soon started rejecting all expressions of Islamism or funda-
mentalism, seeing them as contrary to the true spirit of Islam, but not
before he had dallied with these ideas while in Jombang and in Cairo,
and worked out his own position on them.
($%+>!&
In Jombang Abdurrahman had an encounter that was to prove more
consequential than any of his literary encounters with the famous writ-
ers whose work he was so voraciously devouring. As a teenager
Abdurrahman had never had the time, or the personal inclination, for
;@
romance. Though he liked to watch football and go to the cinema, he
:%/*+(:)$3)+( !"#$%&'"% !(#)3/-+1+0,2)@D8AG@D;7

was ever the spectator and he remained a bookish youth. Moreover, he
lived in a religious world that actively discouraged its brightest sons
from entering into teenage romance. Consequently, even as a young
man in his twenties he had never dated, much less had a girlfriend. In
a way, any spirit of youthful rebellion on Abdurrahman’s part was chan-
nelled into his brief flirtation with radical Islamism.
Until this point the only women that Abdurrahman had fallen for
were those who had stared down at him with a smouldering gaze from
the silver screen. When he began teaching at the madrasah in
Tambakberas in the early 1960s, however, he was drawn to a young stu-
dent called Nuriyah. One of the most attractive girls in her class,
Nuriyah was also sharp and independently minded and drew the atten-
tion of more than a few young men in the pesantren community. So it
was surprising that she should take any interest at all in this bookish
and somewhat awkward teacher, already chubby and burdened with
‘coke-bottle bottom’ glasses.
Nevertheless, Nuriyah was a product of the pesantren community
herself and a child of Jombang: it was not easy for her to reject out of
hand the advances of the son of Kiai Wahid Hasyim and grandson of
Kiai Bisri Syansuri and Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari. Nor did she find
Abdurrahman wholly unattractive. His intellect and sense of purpose
caught her attention early on. But he was certainly no film star and he
had to work hard for some years yet to secure her affection. In
November 1963, he left for Cairo, Egypt. He had a scholarship from
the department of religious affairs to attend the famous thousand-year-
old university of Al Azhar in Cairo.
1*/
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When Abdurrahman was elected president in October 1999 the watch-
ing world did not know what to make of the news that Indonesia’s first
democratically elected president was a ‘Muslim cleric’. The result had
been no more expected than had Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary vic-
tory over the Shah of Iran in 1979. The parallel, or course, went no fur-
ther than that. Those who knew of Abdurrahman knew him to be a
committed liberal, just as they knew the religious scene in Indonesia was
very different to that in Iran. Nevertheless, the unexpected ascendancy of
this ‘Muslim cleric’ to the helm of the world’s third-largest democracy
was a reminder of how little attention had been paid by political analysts
to Islam in Indonesia. This should alert us to the fact that to understand
Abdurrahman we need to know something about the religious world that
he inhabits. Before following Abdurrahman on his journey to the Middle
East, then, we would do well to spend some time coming to an under-
standing of the world of Indonesian Islam. There is an unhelpful ten-
dency in the West to see the Muslim world as a monolith, but as with
Christianity, Islam exhibits great diversity, and regional culture plays a
great role in shaping religious expression, behaviours and attitudes.
;7
,!(1%+)!(#)!"!(:!(
+,-!')+()+(#/(.,+!5)'/#.%(+,1,)!(#)1%!#+1+/(!-+,1,
Indonesia is a majority Muslim nation, the world’s largest. With
approximately 85 per cent of its total population of 220 million con-
fessing to be Muslims, Indonesia is home to around 190 million
Muslims. But being Muslim in Indonesia means different things to dif-
ferent people. In Indonesia a broad distinction is generally made
between santri and non-santri Muslims. This follows the usage made
famous by Clifford Geertz, though originally the term santri simply
referred to a student of a pesantren.1 Santri Muslims are those who
uphold ‘the five pillars of Islam’. Not only do they, like all Muslims,
confess that ‘there is no god but God and Muhammad is His prophet’,
but they also pray regularly, fast during Ramadan (the Muslim fasting
month), pay zakat, or tithes, and aspire to one day make the haj pil-
grimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In short santri
Muslims are orthodox in their practice of Islam. Non-santri Muslims
— sometimes referred to as abangan Muslims — on the other hand,
although they may aspire to one day become more pious and regular in
their devotions, are regarded, at least by many santri, as being nominal
Muslims. A third, much smaller grouping, the priyayi (descendants of
the aristocracy of the old courts), are much like the abangan in their
adherence to elements of Hindu-Buddhist belief, but they differ in two
main ways from the abangan. Firstly, their mystical worldview is over-
laid with both the burden and the refinement of their class. Secondly,
their modern culture was shaped by their long association with the
Dutch and their urbane preference for modern Western education and
white-collar work. Not that many years ago the abangan and priyayi
probably significantly outnumbered the santri, especially in cities. Since
the late 1970s, however, there has been a broad revival of interest in
Islam and the ratio appears to have altered significantly as many aban-
gan and priyayi became santri in the 1980s and 1990s. Until recently,
Arabic names distinguished the santri from the abangan and priyayi.
Now santri are to be found even behind the long and imposing
Sanskrit-derived names of those who previously identified as priyayi.
1&.)+,-!'+,!1+/()/4)+(#/(.,+!
Islam is a relative latecomer to the archipelago and the recentness of its
arrival shapes its expression there. Indonesia is a place in which we par-
adoxically know little about the process of conversion but in which the
;8
memory of conversion, particularly in the interior of Java, belongs to

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
the not too distant past. Indeed, it can be argued that Indonesian soci-
ety is still in the process of Islamisation. This view is frequently
expressed by traditionalists and modernists alike. Certainly it is an
important part of the ethos of the world of traditionalist Islam.
Many of today’s pesantren, such as the two founded by
Abdurrahman’s grandfathers outside Jombang, were deliberately estab-
lished in areas reputed to be irreligious and dangerous. As the pesantren
grew in numbers, previously nominal Muslim, or abangan, villagers
were persuaded of the benefits of a more pious lifestyle. Jombang is
located in the interior of East Java, equidistant between the Indian or
Southern Ocean and the shallow Java Sea to the north that for over a
thousand years has functioned as a maritime freeway; it links Java with
Sulawesi, Borneo, the Malay peninsula, Sumatra, and the world
beyond. It was in the busy seaports of that northern coast, one or two
hundred kilometres northwest of Jombang, that Islam first took root in
Java. In the farming towns and villages of the interior, however, the
Islamisation of Java was, during the lifetimes of Abdurrahman’s grand-
fathers at least, unfinished business. When Bisri Syansuri, as a boy from
the solidly Islamic northern coast, married into the Jombang family of
his friend Wahab Chasbullah, and eventually established his own
pesantren on the outskirts of Jombang, he was conforming to a genera-
tions-old pattern. Such unions, whereby bright young ulama from the
Islamic heartlands of the northern coast were encouraged to strike out
as pioneering kiai, building new pesantren in the interior, was one of the
mechanisms by which the interior of Java was Islamised.
Stories such as Kiai Bisri Syansuri’s pick up a theme found in the
tales of the Wali Songo, the fabled nine saints or apostles who are said
to have spearheaded the conversion of Java several centuries ago. The
theme, of course, is as old as religion itself. It is also one that is felt to
apply to modern Indonesia. Modernists and traditionalists alike
describe this phenomenon as the santri-fication of Indonesian society.
When did Islam first come to the archipelago?2 The simple answer is
that we really don’t know. Tombstones with Arabic inscriptions dating
back more than seven centuries have been found in several places across
the western half of the archipelago, but it is not clear whether these were
signs of the early emergence of Islamic settlement or simply mark the
final resting place of foreign Muslims. It is even possible that they repre-
sent nothing more than the discarded ballast of passing trade vessels,
;B
which carried heavy items such as tombstones for ballast on their outward
+,-!')+()+(#/(.,+!5)'/#.%(+,1,)!(#)1%!#+1+/(!-+,1,
journeys. In any case, we do know that one of the first major Islamic
kingdoms to emerge in the archipelago was the Sultanate of Melaka.
According to one of the oldest existing Malay books, the Sejarah Melayu
(Malay Chronicles), the first King of Melaka converted to Islam early in
the fifteenth century, as the result of a dream. He was also said to have
been mysteriously circumcised in his sleep, and thus delivered from one
of the major stumbling-blocks to conversion! Whatever the historicity of
this account, it is clear that early in the fifteenth century a sultanate cen-
tred on the port city of Melaka quickly grew to exert power, not just over
much of the Malaysian peninsula, but also over parts of the East
Sumatran coast, the island of Borneo, and possibly even parts of Java.
From this stepping-stone Islam spread along natural trade routes to the
coastal cities of northeast Java and Sumatra. Large parts of inland Java,
however, were not completely or substantially Islamised until well into
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in some cases much later.
Consolidation continued into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In
comparison with most of the Islamic world (with the exception of sub-
Saharan Africa) Islam came but recently to Indonesia.
More important, perhaps, Islam appears to have come by largely
peaceful means. We will never know the details of this history and the
precise mechanisms by which the peoples and societies of archipelagic
Southeast Asia converted to Islam because too little archaeological evi-
dence remains. It is a monsoonal region straddling the equator, domi-
nated by port cities in which the principal structures were wooden
buildings, and these frequently built on stilts over muddy estuaries; pre-
cious little survives to satisfy the inquiring minds of archaeologists and
historians. It is commonly thought that one of the major mechanisms
for conversion that occurred was friendly contact with traders sailing to
the archipelago via India. Some of these traders originated from the
Arab world or from Persia, but many others came from India. As there
is much evidence in India to suggest that Islam there was strongly influ-
enced by Persian Sufi thought, it is likely that many of the merchants
and travellers who introduced Islam to Southeast Asia were Sufis.3 This
probably played an important part in the appeal of Islam to the Malays,
Javanese and others who converted to Islam in the fourteenth, fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. Conversion to Islam, for many people, may
have been understood as ‘upgrading’ their faith, linking up with a high-
er civilisation and a spiritually more potent form of religion.
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Within the santri community a distinction is made between mod-
ernists, most of whom belong to the organisation Muhammadiyah, and
traditionalists, the vast majority of whom belong to NU. On Java the
traditionalists outnumber the modernists, particularly outside the big
cities, but on other islands the situation is very different. In most of
Sumatra and in southern Sulawesi the modernists easily outnumber the
traditionalists. Confusing matters further, on Java the students of the
pesantren are called santri. This probably reflects the pre-twentieth-cen-
tury origin of the term santri and the missionary role of the pesantren
in Islamising Java.
In many respects the terms ‘Islamic modernism’ and ‘Islamic tradi-
tionalism’ are confusing and unhelpful. When Islamic modernism first
came to Indonesia at the beginning of the twentieth century it was a
progressive and reformist movement, but by mid-way through the cen-
tury there were signs that parts of the modernist movement were
becoming conservative. In other words, modernism started as a move-
ment to change the behaviour and thinking of Muslims so that they
would be better able to deal with the modern world as well as becom-
ing better Muslims. In time, however, the movement became focused
on preserving the distinctiveness of its people and their practices
against the influences of an increasingly secular world. By the end of
the century the modernists were divided into a moderate, but quiescent,
majority and a conservative and outspoken minority. At the same time,
although rural traditionalists continued to be culturally conservative,
many of their sons and daughters, having graduated from pesantren and
gone on to higher studies, were at the forefront of progressive thought
and religious reform. There are many social and political reasons for this
partial reversal of roles but the single most important reason is educa-
tion. The pesantren and State Islamic Institutes (Institut Agama Islam
Negara — IAIN) maintained education in classical Islamic scholarship,
including Sufism, while introducing theologically literate students to
critical Western thought in a way that encouraged a synthesis of the
two intellectual traditions. The great majority of the modernists, how-
ever, grew up with limited theological literacy, not learning Arabic or
studying the classical texts, and therefore not able to participate in the
critical re-examination of Islam that was taking place in the IAIN, the
tertiary-level colleges that sought to marry modern critical thinking
;<
and Islamic scholarship, and NU non-governmental organisations. At
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the same time Soeharto’s attempts to win the political support of con-
servative modernists during the 1990s provided ideal conditions for the
dissemination of sectarian political thought.
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The traditional expression of Islam as found in NU melds a mystical
Javanese worldview, an abangan and priyayi worldview, with the core
teachings, doctrines and practices of Islam.4 We can conceive of a con-
tinuum in which abangan and priyayi mysticism, involving as it does
elements of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist belief and the local Javanese
religion, merges, by stages, into the Sufistic mysticism of orthodox or
santri Muslims. Nevertheless, an important distinction is made in the
minds of Islamic thinkers such as Abdurrahman Wahid, between the
pantheism inherent in the least Islamic forms of abangan and priyayi
mysticism and the monotheism found in traditionalist Islamic Sufism.
Even so, there is a recognition on the part of many traditionalist
Muslims, and certainly on the part of intellectuals like Abdurrahman,
that even in pre-Islamic belief, shot through as it is with pantheism,
there are important elements of truth. This is perhaps the most funda-
mental difference between modernist and traditionalist approaches to
Indonesian culture.
Liberal Islamic intellectuals such as Abdurrahman and most NU
ulama are open to learning from other traditions, including those tradi-
tions which were at the heart of Javanese and Southeast Asian spiritu-
ality before the arrival of Islam. This is congruent with a conviction
widely held in traditionalist circles: that unless something is expressly
proscribed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah then it is permissible as long
as it is consistent with the principles and values laid down in the Qur’an
and the Sunnah. Whereas, for many conservative intellectuals from a
modernist background, if something is not referred to in the Qur’an or
the Sunnah, then it should be regarded with caution. If it contains ele-
ments which are at odds with Islamic monotheism then it is to be
avoided at all costs. Consequently, modernists avoid anything sugges-
tive of communication with the dead. Similarly, they are wary of spec-
ulation about any spiritual entities save for God alone.
It is for this reason that, when the modernist movement began to
make inroads into Indonesia in the early part of the twentieth century,
many aspects of traditional Islam were regarded as contrary to the true
;=
doctrine of Islam. The modernists took particular issue with the tradi-
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tional practices of ziarah and of prayers to departed saints. Ziarah

means to make a pilgrimage, normally to the tomb sites of dead saints,
in order to pray and worship in the hope of gaining particular power,
blessing, guidance or insight, or simply to repay a vow. Related to this
are a host of meditative practices that involve reciting sections of the
Qur’an or special prayers in graveyards or beside tombs, often at night.
The modernists argued (and as a consequence so too did many
Orientalist writers, or Western scholars of Islam and Muslim society,
who relied upon them as informants), that such practices were hetero-
dox. Such an approach to Islam represented, they asserted, a dangerous
syncretic mixture of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist and animist belief
with Islamic ideas. This argument was often made in ignorance of the
fact that practices such as ziarah are to be found throughout the Islamic
world, even in places where Islam has been the dominant religion for
more than thirteen centuries. The modernists, both in Indonesia and
elsewhere, were, among other things, effectively championing a textu-
ally based understanding of Islam that set itself against ‘folk Islam’ —
the more mystically inclined Islam of peasant farmers.
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Islamic modernism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. For Indonesian modernists the single most important reformist
thinker was the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh, who at the
beginning of the twentieth century taught at the University of Al Azhar
(the university in Cairo where Abdurrahman studied for two and a half
years). Muhammad Abduh argued that one of the principal reasons
that Muslim societies had been so easily conquered by Western colonial
powers was the stagnation of thought that had, for centuries, held back
the development of Muslim society. The traditionalist approach to the-
ology and jurisprudence in the Arab world, he asserted, was funda-
mentally opposed to innovation and new ideas. Instead of encouraging
creative thinking it stressed the importance of intellectual submission to
collective authority, or taqlid. Among the traditionalists this took the
form of adherence to one of the four orthodox mazhab, or schools of
Islamic jurisprudence. This position, Abduh argued, was antithetical to
the development of modern thought. It is time, he argued, for the ‘gates
of ijtihad’, or personal interpretation, to be opened once again. Ijtihad,
together with fresh and creative approaches to problem-solving, rather
;D
than taqlid, and the simple, unquestioning acceptance of established
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opinion, was to be the foundation for modern Islamic thought. Allied
with this was a general emphasis upon rationality and, specifically, the
importance of taking a rational approach to applying the core ideas of
Islam to modern life. Abduh’s discourse about taqlid and ijtihad was
primarily concerned with theological or jurisprudential thought.
Nevertheless, he saw intuitively that this was the root of the matter that
affected every branch of intellectual endeavour. He argued that if
Muslims were to study Western science and Western thought as a
whole, with special attention to science, technology and medicine, then
Muslim society would make rapid gains. To ignore such areas of mod-
ern thought was, he asserted, to risk stagnation and give up the chance
of ever escaping the cycle of poverty and general backwardness that
gripped most of the Islamic world.
In the early twentieth century Abduh also argued vigorously in
favour of a more modern approach to education. At one level this
meant modern educational methods, including such radical innova-
tions, as they were then regarded, as using blackboards, chairs and
desks. All these things were in sharp contrast to the traditional
madrasah (as religious schools were known throughout the Islamic
world). In Indonesia the term generally denotes Modernist day schools
or schools within pesantren. In the Dutch East Indies, where the colo-
nial powers of the day cared little about encouraging modern education,
the traditional pesantren or madrasah were the chief means of education
available to peasant farming communities, who were the majority of the
population. Only a small elite were able to avail themselves of modern
secular education, for the Dutch - unlike, say, the British in India —
were not interested in building up a vast civil service of educated clerks,
and established relatively few schools.
The message of Abduh was taken up with enthusiasm in Indonesia
and quickly took organisational form. In fact, in some parts of the
archipelago, such as West Sumatra, there had been some significant
antecedents to twentieth-century modernism. When the ideas of
Islamic modernism were brought to the main island of Java, they quick-
ly found a home. But initially they were not accepted in the major
urban centres like Jakarta and Surabaya, which were predominantly sec-
ular and Westernised in important respects, because they were the
domain of the minor aristocracy, or the priyayi, who had come to dom-
inate white-collar work, nor in the rural areas where traditional Islam
<A
still held sway, but in the domain of the petite bourgeoisie, the small
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traders.
In particular it was in Yogyakarta, a small city in Central Java, where
modernism really took off. In 1912 Kiai Haji Ahmed Dachlan found-
ed a new organisation which he called Muhammadiyah, meaning those
who follow Mohammad. The ideas of Muhammadiyah and of mod-
ernism generally were quickly and popularly received. Many ulama
regarded them with favour and saw that much was to be gained by
learning from them. In part, however, the popularity and rapid spread
of modernism through the growth of Muhammadiyah ultimately
alarmed many of the traditional ulama. Their concern was that the day
might soon come when the pesantren no longer had sufficient power of
attraction to draw in new generations of students, and as a result, future
education might be dominated by modern Muhammadiyah-style
schools and modern, essentially secular, madrasah. Nevertheless, the
early modernists enjoyed good relations with many of the traditionalist
ulama, which is not so surprising when it is remembered that they came
from similar backgrounds.5
1%!#+1+/(!-+,')!(#)1&.),/0+/-/:+0!-)#+?+#.
While the initial differences between modernism and traditionalism
centred on matters of doctrine and religious practice, particularly con-
cerning practices that the modernists regarded as syncretistic and het-
erodox, in the long run the main distinction became a sociological one.
In the first half of the twentieth century priyayi, white-collar workers,
and abangan, labourers, servants and factory workers, dominated the
cities. In the cities santri Islam was something of a scarcity: the santri
themselves were regarded as rural and backward looking, and certainly
not middle-class. In due course Islamic modernism made serious
inroads into the urban centres, presenting a more urbane and acceptable
expression of santri Islam.
For these and other reasons, the pesantren had developed histori-
cally as essentially rural institutions. Over time the small towns and
villages to which they had attached themselves became caught up in
the creeping spread of urbanisation. East Java is still one of most
densely populated rural areas in the world, and during the twentieth
century population growth in villages, regional towns and cities saw
many settlements merge. Towns such as Jombang, for example,
steadily spread to the point where villages like Tebuireng, which had
<@
previously been well outside the town limits, became incorporated
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into the town proper. Consequently, many pesantren that had previ-
ously identified with a village community came to be physically locat-
ed within a larger urban complex. Still, the cultural milieu of these
pesantren, and even the surrounding small and middle-sized urban
centres that they inhabited, remained steadfastly rural. When
Abdurrahman was a student, Jombang was a country town rather
than an aspirant city. One of the reasons why the pesantren were so
closely identified with village life was that a majority of santri were
children of peasant farmers. These students could not afford to attend
one of the growing number of madrasah run by Muhammadiyah, or
one of the few Dutch schools established during the colonial period
for sons of the priyayi.
For poor subsistence farmers with little money to pay for the educa-
tional needs of their sons and daughters, there was almost always the
option of the pesantren. In the pesantren those who could not find the
cash for fees could generally negotiate some other form of exchange.
Even those who had nothing to give might still find a pesantren that
would take their children. In the pesantren world a culture of philan-
thropy prevailed and most pesantren carried their share of students
whose parents could not afford to pay the fees and living expenses.
When they could, even these very poor families would bring farm
goods. Other members of the village also contributed to pesantren when
they could, for the pesantren were important social institutions and con-
tributing to them was a religious duty.
The pesantren themselves were not entirely without resources. Many
of the kiai who ran the pesantren, as well as many others who were
associated with them, were engaged in small-scale business. They were
able to take advantage of a complex web of trading relationships that
stretched across rural Java from Surabaya to Jakarta. Moreover, where
sufficient land was available it was possible for a pesantren to be almost
entirely self-sufficient, growing rice and other food crops like vegeta-
bles and spices, and raising ducks, chickens, goats and other livestock.
Often a large pesantren was able to accumulate considerable wealth
over the years. Ostensibly this wealth was concentrated around the
family of the kiai, but in practice the kiai thought of himself as a stew-
ard, and in most cases the wealth was reinvested in the pesantren com-
munity. In practice some kiai were much better stewards than others,
just as some were clearly more selfless than others. Those that were
<6
poor managers struggled to grow their pesantren. Those that were

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skilled in trade and business, on the other hand, came to command

impressive financial empires, and for some these became ends in them-
selves. Even for the more noble and selfless among the kiai there was
no doubt that material expansion was a sign of God’s blessing, and few
kiai were indifferent to opportunities for growth and accumulation of
wealth. Underlying this is a cultural framework of patron–client rela-
tions that has been a dominant feature of Southeast Asian society for
centuries, if not millennia. Political independence and the emergence
of national political structures served to tie traditional, local-level
patron–client relations into the fabric of national politics, and in this
NU came to play an important role in determining the division of
resources.
As money became available, endless building programs transformed
pesantren from their initial pondok or ‘hut’ status to the point where the
larger pesantren had three- and four-storey buildings, modern class-
rooms, large mosques and well-equipped study complexes. But,
whether they were large complexes with thousands of students and
extensive campuses, or the humblest of pesantren with just a few hun-
dred students, almost all pesantren were linked to village life. Even those
few dozen pesantren located in large cities such as Jakarta, Bandung or
Surabaya continued to have a rural feel to them.
If the pesantren, and by extension the world of NU and traditional
Islam, partook of village life and a rural cultural milieu, it was increas-
ingly the opposite case for Muhammadiyah and Islamic modernism.
Muhammadiyah, as we noted above, began in the Kauman, or santri
quarter, of Yogyakarta, in 1912. By the middle of the century
Yogyakarta was a university town, filled with tens of thousands of stu-
dents drawn from all over the archipelago. It was also home to one of
the few remaining sultanates from the pre-independence period, and
consequently was a cultural centre for Javanese life. It therefore reflect-
ed more the culture of abangan and priyayi urbanites than it did the cul-
ture of rural Java.
Although many Muhammadiyah members were upwardly mobile
and striving to enter the professions, to their credit when they did
achieve high income they saw to it that Muhammadiyah was well sup-
ported in its charitable programs. As result, Muhammadiyah was able
to develop a remarkable network of health clinics, hospitals, schools
and orphanages spanning the archipelago.
<7
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Abdurrahman’s father Wahid Hasyim was exceptional in that he had a
wide range of non-NU friends, including many non-santri and non-
Muslim friends. Unlike most of his peers in NU, he felt at home in the
national capital and moved easily in Jakarta’s elite circles. Consequently,
Wahid Hasyim was well suited to his role as senior nationalist leader,
and then government minister. Prior to the departure of NU from
Masyumi in 1952, Wahid Hasyim had played a key role in maintaining
good relations between modernists and traditionalists. Perhaps, had
there been more kiai like Wahid Hasyim, a modern, integrated Islamic
identity, neither wholly modernist nor wholly traditionalist, such as
began to appear at the end of the twentieth century, might have devel-
oped more quickly. As it was, however, they were straddling a gap that
only widened during the bitter political struggles of the 1950s and
1960s.
For several decades after NU was founded in 1926, relations between
modernists and traditionalists were reasonably good, especially at the
level of national leadership. As we have observed, NU was founded not
so much to compete with the modernists as to protect the pesantren sys-
tem and traditional Islamic culture, including particularly those Sufistic
aspects of traditional Islam which the modernists dismissed. Because
many of the early leaders in Muhammadiyah were pesantren-trained, a
natural affinity existed between NU ulama and their counterparts with-
in Muhammadiyah.
When the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies in 1942 they
looked to santri nationalists as people they could work with in the
administration of the territory. The Japanese reasoned that those who
were trained in Dutch schools, whether church or secular, were likely
to harbour sympathies to the Netherlands and Europe in general. To
find reliable partners, they turned to the santri. In October 1943 they
established an umbrella organisation for all Muslim groups that they
called Masyumi. It replaced the Supreme Islamic Council of
Indonesia, an organisation established in 1937, and headed by Wahid
Hasyim, to provide a common forum of discussion for modernists and
traditionalists. During the Japanese occupation the NU and
Muhammadiyah nationalists worked side-by-side so well that they felt
it good to maintain their relationship by turning Masyumi into a polit-
ical party for all santri.
<8
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The Japanese surrender presented the nationalists with a brief interreg-
num in which they were free to act before the Dutch returned to
reclaim their colony. Needing to move quickly, the nationalists hastily
cobbled together a draft constitution. The ‘1945 constitution’ which
resulted from this scramble to prepare for independence is a brief and
vague document that ascribes strong powers to the presidency. It was
announced on 18 August 1945, the day after the nationalists declared
independence. Several months later a decree was issued transforming
the system of government to a parliamentary one. Then in 1949, fol-
lowing ceasefire negotiations with the Dutch, a new constitution was
drawn up describing a federal system of government. The foisting of
this federal model of governance on them by the Dutch was resented
by the nationalists. They seized the opportunity the following year to
replace the 1949 constitution with a new temporary parliamentary con-
stitution, based on a unitary republic and a largely ceremonial presi-
dency. In announcing the 1950 constitution it was agreed that an
elected ‘constitutional assembly’ would be formed to draft a permanent
constitution. This body, the Konstituante, was only able to be formed
after the new nation’s first elections, which took place in 1955.
One of the central issues that was discussed in the Konstituante was
the position of Islam in the constitution and the Indonesian state.
Many within Masyumi, though probably still only a small minority,
were strongly in favour of Indonesia being an Islamic state. Others were
prepared to settle for a state in which Islam was recognised as the offi-
cial religion. This option horrified most non-Muslims and abangan.
Even some moderate santri were concerned about the prospect of the
state being given the power to rule on religious matters. It raised the
possibility, they felt, of authoritarian intervention into matters of con-
science. Ever since the declaration of independence in 1945, moderate
nationalists led by Sukarno and Hatta, and including Wahid Hasyim,
argued that Indonesia’s social and religious pluralism meant that it
would be neither wise nor just to set Islam apart from the other reli-
gions observed in Indonesia. This attitude disappointed a small minor-
ity of Islamists, mostly from the modernist community.
As it became clear that the Japanese occupation would shortly end,
and that the nationalists had to prepare for independence, debate about
the guiding principles of the new state intensified. In June 1945, there
<B
were consultations with other nationalist leaders, including, apparently
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some religious leaders (Abdurrahman maintains that his father Wahid
Hasyim was a key contributor, but no written records of the consulta-
tive process are available so it is difficult to know exactly what hap-
pened). Then Sukarno proffered a solution. He announced a doctrine
for the new state which he called Pancasila (Sanskrit for ‘five princi-
ples’); it offered a state philosophy which was neither secular nor sec-
tarian. The five principles of Pancasila were: belief in one supreme
deity; just and civilised humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy
informed by the wisdom of representative deliberation and consensus;
and social justice for all Indonesians.
For many santri, this compromise solution did not sufficiently
acknowledge the special place of Islam. After some weeks of lobbying,
the committee responsible for drafting the new nation’s constitution
agreed to include a seven-word amendment to the first sila, or princi-
ple, of Pancasila so that it read: ‘belief in the one God with the obliga-
tion for all Muslims to carry out the requirements of the Syari’ah’. It
was further agreed that this statement, which became known as the
Jakarta Charter, should be included in the preamble to the new consti-
tution. Sometime between late June and 18 August 1945 when the new
constitution was announced, however, the ‘seven words’, ‘with the obli-
gation for all Muslims to carry out the requirements of the Syari’ah’,
were dropped. Conservative santri were furious with Sukarno for drop-
ping the ‘seven words’ and fought for the next fourteen years to have
them put back.
Although many within NU also argued strongly in favour of retain-
ing the Jakarta Charter, Wahid Hasyim believed that to do so would
open the door to sectarianism in national politics. When Abdurrahman
began his own public career decades later and took a stand opposing
any attempts to link ‘church and state’, he felt that he was carrying on
the work of his father.
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Under Sukarno Wahid Hasyim was appointed Minister for Religious
Affairs. His tenure ended, as we have seen, following a cabinet reshuf-
fle in 1952. At the same time relations between the traditionalists and
modernists within Masyumi, which had long been tense, rapidly wors-
ened. While NU figures like Wahid Hasyim were acknowledged as well
able to work alongside their modernist counterparts and to make an
<;
equal contribution to Masyumi, there was a widespread perception

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
among modernists that men like Wahid Hasyim were the exception
rather than the rule in NU. And the managerial ability of even Wahid
Hasyim had come under a cloud following the disastrous handling of
the 1952 haj pilgrimage during his tenure as minister. They regarded
most traditionalists as unsophisticated rural peasants. Few of the tradi-
tionalists had a Dutch education — or indeed any form of modern edu-
cation — and only a few were comfortable in European languages or in
Jakartan society. The modernists used this to argue that their people
should be given prominent roles in the running of the party and in
future cabinet posts. The traditionalists felt this to be offensive and
erroneous. More particularly, both were concerned that, unless the min-
istry of religious affairs went to one of their own, they had little hope
of exercising influence in the cabinet.
Things came to a head in April 1952 when NU declared that it was
going to break away from Masyumi and establish itself as an independ-
ent political party. Consequently, when the first general elections were
held three years later, the modernists and traditionalists contested the
elections through separate parties. The result was that neither Masyumi
nor NU gained sufficient votes to exercise much power in their own
right, with each party getting around 20 per cent of the vote (20.9 and
18.4 per cent respectively). It’s not hard to see that, if the two commu-
nities had been able to work together, a united Masyumi would have
been easily the largest and most influential party to emerge from the
1955 elections. Despite the best efforts of Wahid Hasyim, who had
worked hard to save the ailing relationship, this was not to be, and once
the two had begun to go their own ways the gap continued to widen.6
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During the late 1950s leading Masyumi figures became increasingly
strident in their protest against Sukarno’s autocratic style of govern-
ment. This steadily worsened when Sukarno, in 1959, announced that
he was dissolving the Konstituante and reverting to the 1945 constitu-
tion in the name of ‘Guided Democracy’, having two years earlier been
encouraged by the military to invoke martial law.
The reaction of the Masyumi politicians to Sukarno’s return to the
1945 constitution was to challenge Sukarno’s legitimacy and boldly
criticise the failures and shortcomings of the Sukarno government. One
of the issues that most upset the more radical elements within Masyumi
<<
was that, with the return to the 1945 constitution and the disbanding
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of the Konstituante they saw no hope of achieving their goal of a con-
stitution which acknowledged the role and authority of Islam within
the state. Ironically it was the traditionalists, instinctively falling back
upon the traditional Sunni quiescent, or pragmatic, approach to poli-
tics, who were to prove much more successful in navigating the difficult
conditions of the late Sukarno period.7 Whereas the modernists were
inclined to take a stand on principle, to draw a line in the sand and
refuse to budge, the traditionalists were willing to bend to the demands
of Sukarno’s government just so long as the interests of their party and
their people were protected, and they survived to fight another day with
NU continuing as a political force.8
Sukarno eventually lost patience with the modernists, and in January
1960 he banned Masyumi. The final straw for Sukarno was that, while
he was on an overseas visit in 1958, several senior Masyumi figures had
travelled to West Sumatra, where many of them had family connec-
tions, and were seen to be offering support to the rebellion there in
favour of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
(Pemerintah Revolusi Republik Indonesia — PRRI). Sometimes
described as a separatist movement, this rebellion was not a genuine
attempt to break away, but an attempt to change the government in
Jakarta with the assistance of local military officers disgruntled with the
commanders in the national capital. The affair was made greatly more
serious, however, by the inept intervention of the CIA, who apparent-
ly sought to use it as an opportunity to topple Sukarno. Not surpris-
ingly, Sukarno denounced the Masyumi leaders as opportunistic and
disloyal, and from that point on they had little scope to influence his
government. The NU politicians were at least able to preserve their
position of influence within his government and, in particular, they
retained the prized religious affairs portfolio.
1&.)!"#$%&'"% (.1*/%9
One reason traditionalist Islam remained largely outside the domain of
elite politics and elite life was the essentially rural nature of the
pesantren network. It was not just that the pesantren were geographical-
ly located in rural areas; culturally their orientation was towards reli-
gious society and peasant communities. This cultural orientation was
both reflected in, and a product of, the pesantren curriculum. The
pesantren were remarkably successful in preserving classical Islamic
<=
learning throughout the turbulent changes of the twentieth century. For

!"#$%&'"% !(#)4!'+->
too many years, however, the downside of this was that pesantren grad-
uates had too few choices for further education and employment.
Traditionally the pesantren graduates either went on to work in the
pesantren themselves or engaged in small-scale trading or farming while
carrying out religious duties on a part-time basis.
Another aspect of traditional Islamic culture which served to limit
the role of pesantren graduates in elite society was the way in which NU
negotiated political engagement. Throughout the 1950s much of the
full-time work of party politics was carried out by professional politi-
cians, many of whom did not have a pesantren background but who
nevertheless were accepted, for reasons of expediency, as representing
the ulama. Originally this was necessary because it was difficult to find
people with suitable linguistic and other skills to function as profes-
sional politicians in Jakarta. Later the role of professional politicians
had become entrenched. To a certain extent it has been reflected in the
bipartite division of general national leadership between the Syuriah, or
Supreme Religious Advisory Council, and the Tanfidziyah, the
Executive Board, although in practice the details have been rather more
complex than suggested by that division. Very few ulama, even within
the political wing of NU, have been able to engage successfully in elite
society in Indonesia over a long period of time.
Reinforcing this is a cultural orientation influenced by centuries of
Sunni Islamic political thought. In this respect at least, traditional Islam
in NU is typical of Sunni Islam around the world. In Sunni thought,
being too close to power was often regarded as dangerous, and yet it
was necessary to negotiate a position with the power of the day in order
to protect the community. Here the emphasis was on the minimisation
of harm and the avoidance of danger. In other matters the emphasis
sometimes shifted to the maximisation of benefits for the community.
This pragmatic outlook reflects the experience of traditional ulama in
all corners of the Muslim world. Democracy is a recent arrival in most
nations of the world, particularly Muslim nations, and it has made lit-
tle sense to stubbornly take a stand in the political arena on a point of
principle. Better to negotiate access to power and exploit whatever
leverage is available to look after the interests of the community. In
Indonesia, this has meant that NU ulama have been content to leave
politicking to the professional politicians paid to represent them.
Some sense of this thinking can be found in the famous response of
<D
Kiai Wahab Chasbullah when challenged in the early 1950s by the
+,-!')+()+(#/(.,+!5)'/#.%(+,1,)!(#)1%!#+1+/(!-+,1,
modernists about the capacity of NU to engage in practical politics.
Asked whether NU had the human resources to succeed in national
politics, Wahab Chasbullah is said to have replied: ‘If I buy a new car
the car salesman doesn’t ask “Sir, can you drive?” Such a question is
unnecessary because if I can’t drive a car I can post an advertisement:
Driver Wanted. Without doubt there will soon be a queue of candidates
in front of my door.’9
Ironically, even half a century later NU finds itself better at winning
votes than it is at filling positions of leadership. One of the dilemmas
confronting Abdurrahman Wahid as president was that he found few
within NU’s still predominantly rural constituency who are well
equipped to contribute to national politics. And, although he had bet-
ter grassroots support than most politicians, he had to struggle to pre-
vent his emotional rural supporters from appearing to be a dangerous
rabble.

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Mecca may be the city of pilgrimage, but Cairo, one of the great cities
in the Arab world, was in the 1960s the city of learning for Indonesian
Muslims. For centuries many have travelled to the Middle East both to
make the haj pilgrimage and to undertake study. Although small cen-
tres of learning, led by Indonesian-born ulama, sprang up in Mecca,
Medina and throughout the Middle East, Cairo increasingly became
the city of choice for many Indonesian students.
For these students the magnet was the thousand-year-old University
of Al Azhar, the oldest university in the world, centuries older than
Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne and the other ancient universities of
Europe. It was also the centre of some of the Islamic world’s most mod-
ern ideas and, under Muhammad Abduh, one of the pioneering centres
of the modernist movement. It was through students studying at Al
Azhar that Islamic modernism was introduced to Indonesia, and it is
from the generations of Indonesian students studying at Al Azhar that
many of Indonesia’s best Islamic intellectuals have come.
Although Abdurrahman looked forward to his studies there with
great eagerness, he was to be bitterly disappointed. The golden age of
=8
Al Azhar had peaked decades earlier and by the mid-1960s first-year

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
undergraduate classes at the old university did not have a lot to offer
that was new or fresh for a bright graduate of some of Indonesia’s bet-
ter pesantren.
Abdurrahman relates the story that when he arrived at Al Azhar he
was informed by university officials that he must join a remedial Arabic
class.1 From his studies in Jombang in 1960 he had certificates show-
ing that he had passed studies in Islamic jurisprudence, theology and
related subjects, all of which required an expert knowledge of Arabic,
but he had no papers to show that he had passed basic Arabic language.
As a result he was consigned to a class of raw beginners, many of whom
were students newly arrived from Africa, scarcely knowing the Arabic
alphabet let alone able to engage in conversation. Abdurrahman’s
response was simply to avoid the classes. As a consequence he recalls
that he spent most of 1964 doing everything else but formal studies,
succumbing to the attractions of Cairo’s numerous football matches,
large libraries, French cinemas and lively café discussions. If Al Azhar
proved a disappointment for Abdurrahman, the same cannot be said for
Cairo. It was a big, ancient city and he was enthralled.
!().F0+1+(:)(.*)*/%-#
Cairo under Nasser in the mid-1960s was enjoying something of a
golden age. For all its pollution and bustle, it was still a scenic city with
a feel and mood quite unlike any Indonesian city. Even in the student
quarter of old Cairo where Abdurrahman lived, many of the stone
buildings that lined the narrow laneways were centuries old. Numerous
small mosques and prayer houses, built during a golden age of Islam
before the European renaissance, could be found throughout the heart
of the old city. Java has no ancient stone cities in whose streets one
could walk and feel somehow linked to generations past, but it does
have numerous small ruins and even more numerous graves. As a
pesantren student, much given to ziarah, or pilgrimages to gravesites,
Abdurrahman had developed a strong sense of connection to historical
sites and believed intuitively in the enduring presence of those who had
once lived there. Even for a Western tourist a visit to Cairo can be an
emotional experience. For a naturally curious young Muslim student
from Java with a Sufi sensitivity for the past, Cairo was a wonderfully
rich city in which to live.
In Cairo in his mid-twenties, Abdurrahman felt free. As a teenager
=B
in Yogyakarta his life had been relatively carefree, but as the oldest son
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
of the late Kiai Wahid Hasyim his every move was watched, including
his surreptitious visits to the cinema. As a pesantren student in
Magelang and Jombang, he felt even tighter social constraints .
Although Al Azhar had proved disappointing, it was in a strange way a
liberating experience because it gave him the freedom to spend his time
the way he wanted, unhindered by tight schedules or the watchful eyes
of small-town Javanese society.
In Cairo Abdurrahman found that he could watch the best of French
cinema, although he had to wait for the new releases from Europe. Besides
enjoying European, English and American movies, Abdurrahman spent
much of his time in Cairo at the American University library, a library
greater than any he had ever seen. Even though he had grown up in a
home full of books, and his unusual network of family and friends had
allowed him much better access to varied reading material than most of
his peers, obtaining the books that he wanted had often been a struggle.
Cairo was a different world; its libraries were filled with more books than
he had ever seen before. When not reading at the American University
library, he was often at the Cairo University library or at the French
library. He recalls reading compulsively, even when walking around the
house or to the bus stop. In the absence of a book, a scrap of newspaper or
an old magazine was enough to completely absorb his attention. He had
always been a fast reader, and even as a pesantren student in Java he had
found time to read. In Cairo his relative freedom and his uncluttered
schedule, thanks to his delinquent approach to university classes, enabled
him to read as much as he wished.
Presented with a vast array of books that he had never seen before,
he recalls that his reading tastes expanded with each new discovery. In
Cairo, for example, he read most of William Faulkner’s oeuvre. Perhaps
Faulkner’s attraction for him was the appeal of exotica, for the America
of Faulkner was a world away from the pesantren of Java. He also read
and enjoyed the novels of Ernest Hemingway. During his pesantren
years he had developed a love of Arabic poetry, but his preference in
European literature was mostly for prose. Nevertheless he read both the
prose and poetry of Edgar Allan Poe, and the poems of John Donne,
committing to memory large parts of ‘No Man Is an Island’. He also
began to read the work of André Gide and Kafka, and previously unob-
tainable titles by Tolstoy, Pushkin, and the other European novelists
whose work he had started to read when still in Java.
=;
He explains that he had taken with him to Cairo some of his most
1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
prized books, including works by Marx and Lenin, which he reread and
discussed with fellow students and intellectuals in the cafés of the great
city. He found Cairo alive with literature, learning and new ideas. The
government of Nasser provided an optimistic and relatively open intel-
lectual environment. Abdurrahman may not have been studying in the
universities of Europe, as he had longed to do, but his time in Cairo did
bring him into contact with the world of European thought, and he was
able to exchange ideas on a scale not possible in Indonesia.
When Abdurrahman was not reading and taking part in café discus-
sions, he spent the hours that he should have spent in class organising
Indonesian student affairs. Soon after arriving in Cairo he was elected
chairman of the Association of Indonesian Students, which linked stu-
dents across the Middle East. He recalls spending a great deal of time
travelling and meeting with Indonesian students in the region and
involving himself in student affairs. Like virtually all Indonesian stu-
dents in Cairo he lived in a student residence in a section of the student
quarter known as ‘the Indonesian Village’. Not all Indonesian students
were entirely comfortable speaking Arabic and mixing in Arab society
without a break, and returning home at night to a ‘little Indonesia’,
replete with familiar sounds and smells, was an essential part of the sur-
vival mechanism of most students. For students from Southeast Asia
such communal living had for centuries been an important part of the
experience of studying in the Arab world. Abdurrahman’s grandfathers,
for example, had lived in the Malay-Javanese quarter while in Mecca
and had spent much of their time there studying under famous teach-
ers from Java and Sumatra.
In 1964 Abdurrahman and a friend, Mustofa Bisri, established a
magazine for the Association of Indonesian Students. Abdurrahman
wrote regularly for the new magazine, just as he had been in the habit
of writing for magazines such as Horizon and Majalah Budaya Jaya
when living in Jombang during the previous three years. He also reg-
ularly addressed meetings of Indonesian students and quickly estab-
lished a reputation as a witty and provocative speaker and essayist. His
favourite essay topics were Indonesian politics, the future of Indonesia,
and Islam and modernity. Like his father before him he spent his stu-
dent years in the Middle East feeling extremely ambivalent about NU.
There was no question that he had a strong affection for the pesantren
world, but many aspects of traditional Islamic society in Indonesia
=<
troubled him deeply. In some ways his earlier misgivings about the
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
limited thinking of many ulama found reinforcement in Cairo. He was
also worried by signs that Indonesian society was becoming danger-
ously polarised. President Sukarno was increasingly leaning to the left
and aligning himself with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
while conservative elements in Indonesian society, including NU, were
moving to the right.
Along with all this intellectual activity, Abdurrahman was able to
indulge another great love, soccer. Typically, though, he endlessly
studied, analysed and dissected the movement of play, the strengths
and weaknesses of teams and their strategies. He was the sort of soc-
cer fan for whom strategy and game play was the real attraction. In
soccer-mad Egypt he had plenty to feed his passion. He recalls that
he had ready access to extensive newspaper and radio coverage of
regional and European league matches as well as plenty of local games
to watch.
Abdurrahman may not have attended many of his Arabic classes, but
he did have the good sense to show up for the final examinations. Not
that he bothered studying for these exams; he could not see any point.
Not only was he fluent in spoken Arabic and had strong reading skills
but he had also years before memorised the grammar primers that set
down the complex rules for writing Classical Arabic. Ironically, his
many hours spent in smoky cafés instead of class had provided the per-
fect finishing school for his language development. Any previous weak-
nesses in his active Arabic-language skills had now been largely cured.
When university officials read his Arabic examination papers they
acknowledged that a mistake had been made and that he should never
have been relegated to the remedial class. At last he was able to enter
the university’s Higher Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies.
'/%.)#+,!33/+(1'.(1)!1)!-)!J&!%
Having waited so long to begin his studies, he was soon disappointed
again. The Higher Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies, he felt,
failed to live up to its name. He was forced once more to study many of
the classical texts, the kitab kuning or yellow books as they were known
in Java, that he had already studied in Jombang and Magelang. Not
only that, the approach to studying these texts was essentially rote
learning. These classes were, once again, too boring to hold
Abdurrahman’s attention and he continued to roam. Had he come to
==
Al Azhar as a graduate student he might have had a different experi-

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
ence. Al Azhar was still home to some of the Muslim world’s best reli-
gious scholars, and guided reading and research under the right
supervisor might well have served to engage Abdurrahman. The under-
graduate curriculum certainly did not. A more conscientious student
would still, no doubt, have reaped some benefit from undergraduate
studies at Al Azhar, as in fact many other Indonesian students had
proved. But the approach taken there was certainly not to
Abdurrahman’s taste and could not hold his interest, especially when
the world outside the ancient university held so many distractions. Al
Azhar was quintessentially an Islamic university and was fiercely proud
of its long history. It was not inclined to incorporate elements of mod-
ern Western learning into its teaching program. Instead it proudly
taught classical subjects much as they had been taught for centuries,
giving priority to memorisation over analysis. While Abdurrahman had
excellent powers of memory, rote learning itself held no appeal for him.
!)H/")!1)1&.).'"!,,>
After a year or so in Cairo, Abdurrahman found regular employment in
the Indonesian Embassy. As a bright young student leader with good
language skills he was useful to the embassy. The fact that he came from
a well-known family may also have had something to do with his
appointment. He settled into a steady routine of working every morn-
ing at the embassy. The position was a great boon for Abdurrahman: it
supplemented his scholarship and ensured that he had plenty of pock-
et money for the cinema and the bookshops. Work in the embassy also
satisfied his desire to socialise, providing a natural opportunity to mix
with a wide variety of people, to exchange ideas and to keep up with the
latest news from Indonesia.
Towards the end of 1965, work in the embassy was to present him
with unexpected challenges and some trauma. By the middle of that
year, Abdurrahman recalls, he confided in Mustofa Bisri that he feared
that tensions between the left and the right in Indonesia would lead to
violent confrontation and large-scale loss of life. The Indonesian stu-
dents in Cairo followed events from home as best they could, but their
information was limited to what could be gleaned over the short-wave
services or picked up from visitors. Abdurrahman, however, was in a
unique position to monitor events. The Indonesian Embassy in Cairo,
the main Indonesian diplomatic post in the Middle East, received a
=D
regular stream of telex messages and reports from Jakarta.
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
Abdurrahman explains that from time to time he was called upon to
translate these reports into Arabic or English and, as a result, he had
ready access to the latest information from home.
After the alleged Communist coup attempt took place on the
evening of 30 September 1965, a relatively little-known officer, Major-
General Soeharto, appeared with exquisite timing, and more than a lit-
tle help from the CIA, to ‘save President Sukarno and the Indonesian
nation from the threat of Communism’. What followed was a night-
mare, one of the twentieth century’s great human tragedies. General
Soeharto’s deft victory over the ‘coup leaders’ marked the beginning of
a crackdown on the PKI, and alleged Communist sympathisers and fel-
low travellers throughout the country. In the pogrom that followed
numerous personal vendettas were carried out, often neighbour against
neighbour, in the name of crushing Communism. As many as half a
million people died, perhaps many more, and many of these at the
hands of people whom they knew well. The pattern of killings varied
from region to region, with local issues clearly playing an important
part. In East Java, the heartland of NU, one of the key issues was the
Communist demand for accelerated land reform. This demand threat-
ened the viability of many pesantren and the personal wealth of not a
few kiai and NU families. In the hysteria following the alleged coup
attempt, the anti-Communist pogrom was justified as a pre-emptive
strike in self-defence. That the Communists were largely passive vic-
tims who seldom attempted to fight back did not seem to be acknowl-
edged. With assistance from the military, whose appearance in a district
was generally taken as providing authorisation to act, gangs of youths
rounded up suspects and killed them en masse. In East Java and other
NU areas these gangs were often part of the NU youth movement
Ansor.
In the weeks following the alleged coup attempt, the Indonesian
Embassy in Cairo ordered Abdurrahman to begin preparing reports on
fellow students. The embassy had instructions from Jakarta to assess all
Indonesian students studying in the Middle East in order to determine
their political leanings. The purpose was clear; the Indonesian military
under General Soeharto wanted to root out Communists and their fel-
low travellers and prevent them ‘re-infecting’ Indonesia. Abdurrahman
was assigned the onerous task of writing detailed reports on Indonesian
students throughout the Middle East. He was selected for this, he
DA
explains now, because he was judged to be reliable and well-qualified,

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
having an extensive knowledge of Indonesian students in the region

through his work with the Association of Indonesian Students. He also
had strong writing skills and was known to have read the works of
Marx.
In Indonesia the majority of the alleged Communists involved with
the PKI were unfamiliar with all but the most basic ideas of
Communism. They had picked up whatever conceptions they had of
the movement secondhand from popular speakers and pamphlets.
Abdurrahman admired the utopian vision of Indonesian Communists
and their concern for social justice, but rejected Communism as being
romantically naive. He also admired Sukarno and was deeply impressed
by his concern for the rakyat, the common people. In this he recalls that
he was influenced by his uncle from Jombang, Wahab Chasbullah, who
was a devoted supporter of Indonesia’s first president.
Although by no means a Communist himself, Abdurrahman under-
stood and respected Marxist thought and, he acknowledges, this put
him in an unique position to assess his fellow students. It also present-
ed him with a crisis of conscience. Even though the news reaching the
students in Cairo was distorted by the disturbed political situation in
Indonesia and the considerable limitations on foreign news services,
Abdurrahman’s position in the embassy gave him access to up-to-date
and reasonably complete reports. This included much that was not
made public at the time and often information which disturbed him.
He was well aware that his own organisation, NU, and especially Ansor,
in which he had previously been active, were involved in numerous bru-
tal killings and in the massacre of innocents. He also knew that he was
expected to deliver on the embassy’s request and that failure to produce
the reports would put him under suspicion.
During this violent period he was required to write dozens of reports
on fellow students. He says now that he was able to clear the names of
many students who had been under a cloud by pointing out that their
interests in Marxist thought were academic rather than indicative of
ideological commitment. By his own account he was fortunate that he
was living in Cairo and writing about students studying in the Middle
East, for it was not too difficult to argue that santri students of Islam in
the Middle East were not likely to have an active political interest in
Communism. After all, most of the Indonesian students in the Middle
East at the time came from a NU pesantren background, and NU as an
D@
organisation, and Ansor in particular, was energetically engaged in
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
crushing Communism, as was Muhammadiyah. Consequently,
Abdurrahman recalls, it was relatively easy to argue that none of the
students under investigation represented a threat to Indonesian society.
In some few cases it was necessary to stress the santri credentials of the
minority of students undertaking secular, rather than religious, studies
but, Abdurrahman maintains, he was never placed in a position where
he could not defend the student he was reporting on.2 Nevertheless, as
he talks about it three and half decades later, it is clear that the exercise
was disturbing and stressful for him.
'/%.)#+,!33/+(1'.(1
Abdurrahman’s easy success with his Arabic-language exams in late
1964 left him with a dangerous sense of confidence about his ability to
dispense with the ordinary disciplines of university study. As a conse-
quence, when he found undergraduate Islamic studies at Al Azhar to be
almost as tedious as the basic Arabic course, he fully expected to be able
to repeat his pattern of work without difficulty. His life was full enough
anyway without having to sit through first-year classes, and he figured
that some perfunctory revision at the end of the academic year would
be enough to secure passes in the final exams. In this he badly miscal-
culated. For one thing, the university authorities who administered his
scholarship were unimpressed with his attendance record. Secondly, he
underestimated the amount of preparation required to pass the end-of-
year exams. Moreover, if he had commenced his first-year studies in
mid-1965 somewhat preoccupied, he concluded them in mid-1966
totally distracted by the pressing developments that followed the 30
September ‘coup’ in 1965. A more disciplined student might have been
able to redeem the situation, but Abdurrahman’s efforts were too little
and too late. He failed one of his two core units and was told that he
would have to repeat the year, and very likely without a scholarship.
At this stage he had been in the Middle East for two and a half years
but had little to show for his time. He recalls that he was also feeling
depressed about what had been taking place in Indonesia during his
absence. The involvement of NU and Ansor saddened and disturbed
him; he despaired that his community would ever be mature enough to
leave behind its primordialism and unhealthy self-righteousness. At the
same time he was feeling stressed by his work with the Indonesian
Embassy and fearful that, no matter how carefully he had written his
D6
reports on his fellow students, they might still be used for purposes of
1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
persecution and oppression.

He recalls that at this time he was also beginning to wonder about
the troubled relationship between religion and the state. His experience
in Egypt gave him further grounds for despairing that Muslim society
could successfully avoid polarisation and extremism. And if Egypt
could not manage this, then what hope had the rest of the Arab world?
He had followed the Egyptian state’s treatment of Islamist thinker
Sayyid Qutb with interest. By this time Abdurrahman had tried the
Islamist writers and ultimately found Islamist thought to be extremist
and naive. He had studied the works of Hasan al-Banna (who had
founded Al Ikhwan Al Muslimun, the Islamic Brotherhood, in Egypt
in 1928 under the banner of ‘returning to the Qur’an and the Hadith’
to solve society’s ills), Ali Shari’ati (the radical Iranian writer whose
ideas were a source of inspiration for the Iranian revolution) Sayyid
Qutb and other Islamist writers. One of the things that he found hard-
est to accept was their lack of openness to truth from any source other
than those they defined as allowable. As we have seen, Abdurrahman’s
father Wahid Hasyim had been a pluralist and his mother had contin-
ued to maintain an open intellectual and social atmosphere in the fam-
ily home after her husband’s death in 1953. Abdurrahman had grown
up believing that, while the Qur’an and Hadith were the ultimate
sources and reference points for ‘religious truth’, there was much truth,
including religious truth, to be found across the spectrum of human
cultural production, whether in the stories of the wayang kulit or in the
novels of Dostoyevsky. To have embraced Islamism would have meant
radically questioning his epistemology and his entire worldview.
Moreover, having examined the writings of the Islamists he was uncon-
vinced that their plan to transform society was a workable and as desir-
able as they maintained it to be. For Abdurrahman Islamism, like
Communism, failed to offer a comprehensive and humane answer to
society’s problems, no matter how sincere its proponents.
Abdurrahman recalls that soon after arriving in Egypt he became
convinced that Sayyid Qutb was fundamentally mistaken in his views.
Nevertheless, he admired the man for his moral courage in the face of
overwhelming opposition. He was also repelled by the brutality of the
Nasser government in its suppression of Sayyid Qutb’s colleagues in the
Islamic Brotherhood. He says that for this reason he made a point of
joining with the hundreds of other students who gathered to pray out-
D7
side Sayyid Qutb’s prison on the day that the Egyptian state hanged its
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‘troublesome cleric’.
To Abdurrahman, Al Azhar seemed mired in the past. Sayyid Qutb
and the other Islamists were obsessed with religious extremism, and the
government of Nasser seemed equally obsessed with nationalist extrem-
ism. Meanwhile, back in Java, NU had allowed itself to descend into the
sort of hatred and hysteria that turned civilised men into cold-blooded
murderers. He recalls that for a while he toyed with the idea of return-
ing to Java and becoming a human rights activist. He recognised, how-
ever, that without a university degree he would always be limited in
what he could do in Indonesia and he had seen enough of Cairo to
know that there was much that he could learn in the Middle East.
($%+>!&
Throughout these years in Cairo, Abdurrahman recalls, he kept up a
steady stream of correspondence with Nuriyah. He interpreted the reg-
ular arrival of her letters as meaning that at least she had not totally
rejected his interest in her. She was an able and witty correspondent and
over several years a relationship developed that was far deeper and more
substantial than the uncertain friendship that they had known in
Jombang, when Nuriyah had often rejected the gifts of books that he
presented to her. Despite its hesitant start, the relationship deepened
through their correspondence and by 1966 the pair were certain that
they wanted to get married. Or, more accurately, Nuriyah had accepted
that Abdurrahman really was to be her partner in life. She recalls that
at one stage she had even consulted a fortune-teller to inquire whether
the chubby, bespectacled, bookish Abdurrahman was really the man for
her or whether she should look elsewhere.3 The fortune-teller’s
response had been clear. ‘Don’t bother looking anywhere else; this one
is your soulmate.’ The response had unsettled Nuriyah as she was
uncertain about her feelings for Abdurrahman. But his letters did much
to turn that around, as did her own development and reflection on what
it was that she was really looking for. She was under considerable social
pressure to accept that Abdurrahman would be a good husband.
Although rural families often facilitated marriages, this was not an
arranged marriage: it was up to Nuriyah to accept Abdurrahman’s
advances or reject them and look elsewhere. She was an attractive and
vivacious young woman and had no shortage of suitors. Abdurrahman
was hardly the most handsome man she knew, but the gentle personal-
D8
ity and sharp mind so evident in his letters began increasingly to endear
1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
themselves to Nuriyah.
Finally, in the middle of 1966 he wrote to her and asked: ‘Well, what
about it: will you marry me?’ Nuriyah’s initial response was ambiguous
and ambivalent. She wrote: ‘Finding a partner is like life and death.
God alone knows what will be.’ Abdurrahman was not deterred and
persisted in his correspondence, pouring out to Nuriyah his feelings of
despair at the way things had turned out for him in Egypt. For a man
who seldom admits to feelings of doubt, much less depression, it was
significant that he wrote so frankly about his anxiety. Upon receiving
his end-of-year examination results in the middle of 1966, he recalls, he
wrote of his feelings of failure to Nuriyah. This time there was some
good news. Nuriyah wrote back immediately with encouraging words:
‘Why should somebody have to fail in everything? If you fail in your
studies you might at least succeed in romance.’ Abdurrahman immedi-
ately dashed off a letter to his mother asking her to formally approach
Nuriyah’s father for her hand in marriage.
!)4%.,&),1!%1)+()"!:&#!#
Abdurrahman had some other good news as well: he was offered a
scholarship at the University of Baghdad. It was a welcome opportuni-
ty to make a fresh start. Abdurrahman says nothing about why he was
offered a second scholarship in the Arab world, but there is no doubt
that he was fortunate to obtain one after having performed so dismally
at Al Azhar. No doubt his membership of one of Indonesia’s most
prominent ulama clans helped his case, as did the efforts of his mother
in Jakarta as a well-connected and spirited advocate. Perhaps, too, his
reputation at the embassy in Cairo, and his work with Association of
Indonesian Students around the region, helped in his application for a
second scholarship.
Although Abdurrahman had been disappointed with his formal
studies in Cairo, he had benefited greatly from the social and intellec-
tual environment. Nevertheless, he says that one of the reasons that he
was not reluctant to leave Cairo for Baghdad was that he was becom-
ing disenchanted with Nasser’s autocratic style and was feeling less at
home. Indonesian students studying in Baghdad spoke of it as a cos-
mopolitan city, charged with a vitality that was felt both in the sciences
and in the arts. It was said that intellectuals there enjoyed considerable
freedom to exchange ideas openly and debate matters of philosophy and
DB
religion. This time Abdurrahman was not disappointed: he found
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
Baghdad to be a rich centre of intellectual endeavour and learning. .
The University of Baghdad had been established as an Islamic uni-
versity but, unlike Al Azhar, by the mid-1960s it had begun to be trans-
formed into a European-style university. The university benefited from
the presence of many of the Arab world’s best academics. Ironically,
many of Abdurrahman’s favourite lecturers were Egyptians from Cairo
who found that Baghdad offered greater academic freedom and better
rates of remuneration. Many were graduates of European universities
and they sought to impose European standards on their students at the
University of Baghdad. In this they were by no means entirely success-
ful, but the intellectual atmosphere and expectations of students dif-
fered vastly from what Abdurrahman had experienced in Al Azhar.
Critical thinking and extensive reading was expected in students and in
their class papers. The result for Abdurrahman was genuine intellectu-
al stimulation in place of rote learning, with a more rigorous work rou-
tine than he had ever known.
The University of Baghdad was eventually to prove an environment
in which Abdurrahman thrived, but not before being rudely wakened
from his old habits. He recalls that at first he thought he might just
sample classes rather than commit himself to regular attendance. He
was soon dissuaded from this approach and told that class attendance
was monitored and was regarded as compulsory. Even at Al Azhar
Abdurrahman’s freelance approach to learning had led to the threat of
his scholarship being withdrawn. Now in Baghdad it was made clear to
him that he would not be able to pass his subjects without a satisfacto-
ry attendance record. In his first year at the university he befriended
Mahfudz Ridwan, a boy from Salatiga, Central Java, who had earlier
completed high school studies in Mecca. Mahfudz became a trusted
and valuable friend, just as Mahfudz’s lecture notes became valuable
guides whenever test time rolled around!
Once he had buckled down to his studies in Baghdad,
Abdurrahman’s daily routine became much fuller and more rigid than
it had been in Cairo. No longer was he free to wander the city at will.
Nevertheless, he recalls that he still found time for the cinema, re-
watching many of the French films he had seen in Cairo, and he still
read constantly, often into the small hours of the morning. Most morn-
ings he awoke sleepy from having read half the night but had no choice
but to follow Mahfudz and his other housemates off to class.
D;
From 11 am until 2 pm each day he would report for work at the

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
office of Ar-Rahmadani, cloth merchants. Ar-Rahmadani was a small

firm specialising in importing textiles from Europe and America.
Abdurrahman’s skills as a writer and translator saw him remain com-
fortably employed with the cloth merchants for the next three and a
half years. Each afternoon Abdurrahman would be busy in the univer-
sity library. Most of the subjects he undertook at university required
regular and often lengthy class papers, generally with specific require-
ments regarding the number of reference works to be consulted. As a
result, he says, he found he had to spend several hours working in the
library each afternoon if he was to keep up his studies. He also contin-
ued to write regular essays for newspapers and magazines in Indonesia
and remained actively involved in the leadership of the Association of
Indonesian Students. In the evenings, though, there was still time for
drinking coffee down by the banks of the Tigris River. Drinking coffee
at the riverside cafés in the evening was a popular social pastime in
Baghdad, and it gave Abdurrahman an opportunity for the sort of intel-
lectual discussion he had previously found in the coffee shops of Cairo.
For three years in Baghdad he also undertook private studies in
French at the French cultural centre in Baghdad. He explains that by
chance he had met the centre’s French lecturer at a party and decided
to take up her invitation to join her class the next day. He found her
classes to be unusually engaging because of her modern approach to
language instruction and her passion for French culture, and soon
became a regular student. When he commenced his studies with her he
had spoken French reasonably well and had good reading ability, but
had no formal study of French, being entirely self-taught. In Cairo his
roommate, Mustofa Bisri, had made an earnest but entirely unsuccess-
ful attempt to learn French. Much to Mustofa’s annoyance, his failure,
despite endless repetitions of the recorded exercises, was accompanied
by Abdurrahman’s rapid advances in spoken French as he parroted the
recordings.
While his schedule didn’t allow as much time for café discussions as
had been the case in Cairo, such discussions were still very much a part
of Arab intellectual life, particularly during the ‘golden age’ of intellec-
tual activity in Baghdad during the late 1960s. Besides evenings in the
cafés by the river, there was also time to talk with classmates at the uni-
versity. Attached to the university library was a coffee and teashop and
he recalls taking regular breaks from his studies in the library to drink
D<
tea and talk with friends. His classmates came from across the Arab
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
world and beyond, including Indonesia and Malaysia, and many were
later to rise to positions of prominence in their own countries. Most
were bright students studying in Baghdad on Iraqi government schol-
arships and were good company.
Much like Cairo, the ancient city of Baghdad had enjoyed great
prominence throughout Islamic history and held other attractions for
Abdurrahman. In Baghdad and Iraq he found a city and a nation home
to some of the most important historic tombs in the Islamic world.
When he had time, which was generally on the weekends, he made a
point of visiting these tomb sites and he recalls that on a number of
occasions he stayed behind to pray through the night. With its rich his-
tory of Shiite and Sufi saints, Baghdad, even more than Cairo, was for
Abdurrahman a magical place, and he filled his free hours seeking out
new sites to visit.
,1$#.(1)-+4.
During his first three years Abdurrahman lived with fellow Indonesian
students. He and nineteen others rented a large villa in Baghdad and set
up house there. Scholarship conditions and the availability of part-time
work meant that they were reasonably well off and their large villa was
comfortable, especially by student standards. The student house was
characterised by a pleasant communal atmosphere and lively, mostly
good-natured, exchanges. The students contributed to a pool of money
for running household affairs, paying for maintenance and other
expenses along with rent.
Once every twenty days each student took his turn to cook for the
household. Abdurrahman’s specialty was fish-head curry, a welcome
delicacy for Indonesians a long way from home. Abdurrahman confess-
es that the choice was not entirely accidental. Early in his stay in
Baghdad he had discovered a fish shop a short walk from the student
house. He soon noticed that the Iraqis never ate the heads of fish, but
threw them away or gave them to their pets. So one day he approached
the owner of the fish shop and asked if he could have twenty heads
from the large fish that were being cut up and prepared behind the
counter. ‘Why do you need so many fish-heads?’ asked the surprised
proprietor. ‘Well it’s because I have a lot of dogs.’ ‘How many dogs do
you have?’ ‘Twenty,’ said Abdurrahman holding back a laugh. A deal
was done, and once every twenty days Abdurrahman returned to the
D=
fish shop and collected twenty large fish-heads. In token exchange he

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
would give the shop owner a few coins, return home, and cook a deli-
cious curry. The meal cost him next to nothing and he says that his
housemates enjoyed it greatly. This went on for more than a year and
was as near as possible to an ideal arrangement. And then one day, he
recalls, the students had official guests from Indonesia. The Indonesian
Embassy had proposed a special festive meal to be held at the student
house. The students, in inimitable Indonesian fashion, formed a com-
mittee and set about preparations. One of Abdurrahman’s friends was
put in charge of the cooking and decided to prepare a fish dish to
accompany the lamb and beef ones that had already been planned. He
went down to the fish shop frequented by Abdurrahman. The propri-
etor recognised him and chuckling remarked: ‘Your friend is a very
strange man.’ ‘Why do you say that?’ ‘Because he keeps so many large
dogs. Twenty dogs, just imagine that!’ The friend returned home and
was furious with Abdurrahman. ‘How can you call us dogs?’ he
demanded.
Although it gave Abdurrahman great pleasure to turn the virtually
worthless waste of a Baghdad fish shop into a prized meal, he explains
that he was not primarily motivated by a desire to save money. His
Iraqi scholarship, together with his wages from Ar-Rahmadani and his
regular earnings from his essays and other writings made him compar-
atively well off. And in any case money held no intrinsic appeal for
him. Provided that he had enough for books and the cinema, he cared
little about money. In fact he says that he relied upon Mahfudz to
manage his money for him. That Mahfudz saw fit to occasionally use
his money to help out some of the poorer students did not worry him.
He was more concerned about finding time to read than about money.
Arrangements in the student house suited him perfectly. His good
friend Mahfudz took care of day-to-day matters, his turn to cook came
but once every three weeks, and he was left with plenty of time to him-
self to continue reading.
Abdurrahman enjoyed good fellowship with his housemates and
with the other Indonesian students in Baghdad, and he also had a wide
circle of non-Indonesian friends, including many other foreign stu-
dents and local Iraqis. Abdurrahman enjoyed the cosmopolitan atmos-
phere that prevailed at the university and, being endlessly curious, he
enjoyed cross-examining those who seemed to have an interesting
story to tell.
DD
!()$($,$!-)4%+.(#,&+3
0!+%/2)"!:&#!#)!(#).$%/3.2)@D;7G@D<@
One of his closest friends was a colleague by the name of Ramin.
Ramin worked with Abdurrahman at Ar-Rahmadani, writing and
translating correspondence for the firm. Ramin came from the small
Iraqi Jewish community in Baghdad. He was a naturally liberal and
open-minded thinker and a keen student of the Cabbala, the Jewish
mystical tradition. Ramin and Abdurrahman regularly found time to sit
in a quiet corner discussing religion, philosophy and politics. One of
their favourite haunts was the market beside the Hanging Gardens,
where they could be sure of finding a quiet place to talk, undisturbed
and unmonitored. It was from Ramin that Abdurrahman first learned
about Judaism and the experience of the Jewish people. Ramin talked
extensively about the experience of the Jewish Diaspora and particular-
ly about the tribulations then being experienced by Jews living in
Russia. He also talked of his own family history and how it was that his
family came to be trapped in Iraq. From Ramin, Abdurrahman says, he
learned respect for Judaism and also came to understand Jewish reli-
gious outlooks and the political and social concerns of Jews living in the
Diaspora as a frequently persecuted minority.
!()$($,$!-)*.##+(:
Throughout his time in Baghdad Abdurrahman, as chairman of the
Association of Indonesian Students, continued to correspond with and
occasionally visit Indonesian students throughout the Middle East.
They were worried about political developments at home. Like their
fellow students back in Indonesia they initially welcomed the new sta-
bility that Soeharto brought to Indonesia. They were concerned, how-
ever, about the dominance of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan
Bersenjata Republic Indonesia — ABRI), and what it would mean for
the future of democracy in the country. Abdurrahman occasionally
expressed such concerns in his essays for the Indonesian press.
In mid-1968 Nuriyah, who by now had been formally engaged to
Abdurrahman for almost two years, graduated from Pesantren Tambak-
beras in Jombang and was about to enter tertiary studies at IAIN Sunan
Kalijaga, the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta. Unusually, for the
time, she was offered a place in the faculty of Syari’ah or Islamic law,
regarded as the most academically rigorous of all the IAIN faculties.
For this reason, in the IAIN female students had earlier not been per-
@AA
mitted to study in the Faculty of Syari’ah. (Abdurrahman is quick to

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
point out that it was Wahid Hasyim as Minister for Religious Affairs
who, in the process of establishing the institutions that would become
the IAIN, decreed that female students should have equal access to all
faculties along with male students.) When Nuriyah was studying in
Yogyakarta most of the students in her faculty were male; she was one
of a significant early group of female students. She had begun her stud-
ies at Sunan Kalijaga in 1967 after she completed her high school stud-
ies at Pesantren Tambakberas in Jombang in 1967.
Nuriyah’s parents had decided that, before she went to live and study
in Yogyakarta by herself, it would be best if she and Abdurrahman were
formally married. However, there was a minor problem. Abdurrahman
was eight thousand miles away in Iraq, and being mid-way through his
studies he had neither the time nor the money to return for the wed-
ding. A solution was found and the wedding proceeded in September
that year. The solution led to unfortunate speculation on the part of
those unfamiliar with the arrangements. Since he could not be present
in person, Abdurrahman was represented by his grandfather, Kiai Bisri
Syansuri. The sight of the 81-year-old kiai standing beside the young
bride reportedly caused quite a stir. Although technically Abdurrahman
and Nuriyah were now married, they regarded the arrangement as
being more like a betrothal; they accepted that it would only be after
they had both finished their studies that they could be together.
In his final year in Baghdad, Abdurrahman moved out of the large
student house into a smaller house together with Mahfudz and anoth-
er friend. The arrival of new Indonesian students in Baghdad had pre-
cipitated the move, and Abdurrahman’s comfortable financial
circumstances made it possible. For Abdurrahman the real advantage,
he recalls, was that he had more time to read. In order to save time they
continued to meet with the other students in the student house for
evening meals, leaving Abdurrahman with uninterrupted time in the
evening.
During his final two years in Baghdad Abdurrahman focused on
researching the history of Islam in Indonesia. His lecturers had given
him permission to write extensively on the topic of Indonesian Islam.
He read all of the Orientalist sources that he could find as well as the
local Indonesian accounts. Drawing on the surprisingly extensive
resources of the University of Baghdad library, he became something of
an authority on the subject.
@A@
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In the middle of 1970 Abdurrahman had finished his four-year course
at the University of Baghdad and moved from there to Europe, settling
first in the Netherlands in order to search for an opportunity for further
studies. He was hopeful, he says, of an opportunity to undertake post-
graduate studies in the field of comparative religion and inquired ini-
tially at Leiden University. He had hoped that he would be able to
secure a place for further studies and then bring Nuriyah with him to
Europe. He was disappointed when he found that not only at Leiden
but throughout Europe there was little recognition of his studies at the
University of Baghdad. The European universities all laid down pre-
requisites that would require him to repeat his undergraduate studies.
He was to spend almost twelve months in Europe, returning home in
the middle of 1971 effectively empty-handed.
Although Abdurrahman had gained no formal qualifications from
his studies in Europe it was an experience that he had been working
towards for many years. Since his time in Yogyakarta he had made a
study of Western thought. In Cairo he continued his studies. Similarly,
in Baghdad, he was able to delve more deeply into critical Western
social science and Western thought more generally, and his sojourn in
Europe completed the experience. He felt his stay had afforded him a
chance to study at firsthand the nature of society in the Netherlands,
Germany and France and to engage in numerous conversations and dis-
cussions about society and thought in Europe itself.
Abdurrahman was to spend a total of six months in the Netherlands.
Much of this time was taken in investigating openings at Leiden and in
universities in nearby cities in both the Netherlands and Germany.
During this period he sustained himself by working at a Chinese laun-
dromat, learning to iron and fold clothes with industrial efficiency,
helped in part by the music of Janis Joplin! From the Netherlands he
moved to Germany for a further four months. He then spent two
months in France before returning home.
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Abdurrahman returned home to Java on 4 May 1971. He confesses that
he was disappointed that his attempts to pursue higher education in
Europe had failed so completely. He comforted himself with the
thought that he had a good chance of being accepted in the respected
Islamic studies program at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He
was clearly a bright student and it was not difficult for him to find ref-
erees and mentors to vouch for his suitability for postgraduate study. At
the same time his family connections provided easy access to the
Minister for Religious Affairs, so he was confident about obtaining a
scholarship. McGill had a long-standing arrangement in which it
received young Indonesian intellectuals who had been chosen to join
the faculty of the State Islamic Institute system and guided them
through a program of postgraduate research that drew on their knowl-
edge of classical Islamic texts. Where the European institutions had
hesitated to recognise his studies in Baghdad, McGill, he felt sure,
would have no such qualms.
Once settled back in his mother’s house in Matraman, near the
centre of Jakarta, Abdurrahman was anxious to find out what had
@A7
happened during his absence. It would be at least a year before he could
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
go to McGill so he had plenty of time to tour the pesantren of Central
and East Java. With Nuriyah completing her bachelor’s degree at the
State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta, it would be September before
they could host their wedding reception and properly start their mar-
ried life, so he had time on his hands. Nuriyah joined him in Jakarta
when she could, and he also travelled with her to Yogyakarta. As her
classes finished she was busy preparing for final exams, but at least her
schedule was more flexible and she was able to join him in many of his
activities, including regular trips to Jombang.
Abdurrahman had not lived in Jakarta since he was a boy, and he
recalls that he was eager to use the opportunity of being back in
Matraman to get to know the city’s intellectual communities. After sev-
eral months he was invited to participate in the work of the Institute for
Economic and Social Research, Education and Information (Lembaga
Pengkajian Pengetahuan, Pendidikan, Ekonomi dan Social — LP3ES),
one of the more promising non-government organisations to emerge in
the 1970s. LP3ES was initially funded by the German Neumann
Institute, and later received help from the Ford Foundation; it was
intended to build up a centre for social research and critical thought in
Indonesia. It attracted some of the country’s best young intellectuals,
mainly from social-democrat and progressive Islam circles, such as
Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono, Aswab Mahasin and Abdurrahman
Wahid. One of its main achievements was publishing Prisma, for many
years Indonesia’s premier social science journal, to which Abdurrahman
was a regular contributor.1 A further attraction for Abdurrahman was
that it showed a strong interest in the pesantren world and sought to
combine it with community development. He recalls that he felt very
encouraged by the considerable respect and recognition from the lead-
ership at LP3ES for what he could contribute to the organisation. It
was arranged for him to visit LP3ES once a fortnight, spending two to
four days working in the Jakarta office. Abdurrahman provided LP3ES
with an understanding of the pesantren world and traditional Islam,
while they educated him in the practical and critical aspects of com-
munity development. The combination, Abdurrahman explains, suited
him perfectly. When not working in the Jakarta office, he was free to
tour Java. Abdurrahman’s love of people was conveniently combined
with a general interest in visiting new sites and in making regular pil-
grimages to favourite old sites.
@A8
After their wedding reception in September 1971, Abdurrahman and

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
Nuriyah settled down in Jombang and Abdurrahman continued to tour

Java. He commuted regularly to Jakarta, spending several days each
fortnight in the office of LP3ES. He was beginning to revise his earli-
er plans about studying at McGill. As he toured the pesantren he was
struck by the extent to which their traditional value system was under
attack. Many within the pesantren felt it to be imperative that the
pesantren implement madrasah school programs with a state syllabus.
Abdurrahman welcomed moves to reform the pesantren, but he was
troubled by the extent to which traditional elements of learning were
being neglected. He did not oppose the adoption of the state curricu-
lum, but he was concerned that unthinking modernisation and rapid
change, driven by the desire to secure state funding, might irreversibly
damage the traditional values of the pesantren. He was also struck by
the level of poverty in many of the small communities surrounding NU
pesantren.
,/.&!%1/C,)(.*)/%#.%)!(#)1&.)@D<@).-.01+/(,
The Indonesian economy had been near collapse when Abdurrahman
had left Java for Egypt in 1963. Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’
approach to economic and social management had contributed to the
rapid disintegration of the economy. Things had deteriorated consider-
ably in the lead-up to the September 1965 ‘coup’ and under the effec-
tual regime that followed. By the late 1960s, the new Soeharto
government had made considerable progress in re-establishing order
and laying down the foundations for economic growth. Nevertheless, in
the early 1970s, the rural world of East and Central Java saw significant
poverty and few obvious opportunities for development. Abdurrahman,
now increasingly thoughtful about developmental issues through his
discussions at LP3ES, saw potential for using the pesantren network
and communities for community development. There were already
worrying signs that the Soeharto government might prove excessively
authoritarian, but in the early 1970s there was considerable intellectual
and press freedom; with economic recovery and with Soeharto so evi-
dently concerned about rural development, many were feeling opti-
mistic about what could be achieved.
At the same time there was a confident mood within NU about the
organisation’s political profile and its ability to negotiate with the
Soeharto government based on the results of the 1971 elections. These
@AB
elections were the first held since the nation’s only other elections in
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
1955. Not surprisingly, Soeharto’s new political vehicle (the army did
not like the idea of being associated with a ‘party’), Golkar, had domi-
nated the 1971 election results, gaining 63 per cent of the vote. By any
ordinary measure the result would have been surprising, but Golkar’s
clean sweep was the product of a carefully organised campaign spear-
headed by Ali Murtopo’s Opsus, or Special Operations unit. Ali
Murtopo was one of Soeharto’s small clique of powerful personal
staffers (staff pribadi, or spri), who wielded more power than most gov-
ernment ministers. It was Ali Murtopo’s brief to handle ‘political
affairs’. The other key member of Soeharto’s personal staff was Sudjono
Humardhani, assistant for economic affairs. In the early 1970s Ali
Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani worked together to establish the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). It quickly
became a key research centre and was widely seen as the originator of
many of the key policy initiatives in the early part of Soeharto’s New
Order regime. At this time both men were seen as having Soeharto’s ear
and being able to do more or less whatever they wanted to do. Not sur-
prisingly, they were viewed with suspicion by many army generals.
By 1967 Soeharto had already moved to consolidate his power by
making a series of institutional changes. The election scheduled for
1968 was postponed until 1971. The government announced that it
would henceforth have the right to appoint one-third of the represen-
tatives to the People’s Consultative Assembly, or MPR, the body
charged with electing a president, and more than one-fifth of the sit-
ting members of the DPR, or parliament. In that same year irresistible
pressure was placed on the PNI, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia to
replace its leaders with people who met with the government’s
approval. Similarly, Parmusi, the successor to Masyumi, was told that
all of the senior Masyumi leaders would be barred from holding office
in Parmusi. At the same time the government introduced the concept
of golongan karya, or functional groups representing every sector of
society, including the military, and explained that it was setting up an
umbrella organisation of the same name, Golongan Karya, or Golkar,
to channel the aspirations of every group in society. In other words, it
was making Golkar the dominant political body in the nation. In the-
ory Golkar would have to contest elections in the same way as any ordi-
nary political party, but in practice it had unparalleled resources with
which to coerce voter support. Not the least of these was the military’s
@A;
hierarchical network of surveillance and control, inspired by territorial

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
warfare, which mirrored the civil bureaucracy from village level all the
way up and operated like a fantastical Neighbourhood Watch.
Ali Murtopo’s Opsus group intervened heavily in the run-up to the
1971 elections, using inducements and intimidation to ensure that
every village and district head achieved their ‘quota’ of Golkar votes and
hence earned the promised reward of extra development funding.
Public servants were obliged to support the government by voting for
Golkar, and the ever-present military representatives did their best to
see that the communities which they supervised did ‘the right thing’.
The PNI and the modernists in Parmusi, both heavily discredited as a
result of government meddling in their leadership ranks, saw their vote
plummet in the 1971 election, with Parmusi gaining less than 6 per cent
compared to Masyumi’s 21 per cent in 1955. In contrast, NU’s vote
continued to hold up. NU gained around 18 per cent of the national
vote in 1971, an almost identical result to its result in 1955, and in its
East Java heartland it won 35 per cent of all votes cast. The 1971 results
suggested that NU represented the largest political power outside
Golkar. Now that it was in a position to directly challenge Golkar, it felt
confident that the government would have to take it seriously.2
It was widely believed that Ali Murtopo was behind the govern-
ment’s 1973 push to collapse the nine opposition parties that had con-
tested the 1971 elections down to two new putative opposition parties:
the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI), representing the former PNI
and other non-santri parties, and the United Development Party
(PPP), representing NU, Parmusi, and the two smaller santri parties.
3.,!(1%.()!(#)0/''$(+1>)#.?.-/3'.(1
In the early 1970s Mukti Ali, the new Minister for Religious Affairs,
called for the rejuvenation of the pesantren value system and for the
pesantren to act as change agents in Indonesian society in order to facil-
itate community development. In explaining his vision Mukti Ali, who
was known to be a reasonably progressive thinker and a gracious men-
tor of young intellectuals, was fond of invoking the Qur’anic injunction,
‘be among you a group which will do good deeds and carry out the obli-
gations of religion and observe that which is prohibited in religion’.
Mukti Ali took this text to indicate that small committed groups of
religious visionaries could play catalytic roles in society and that this
was part of the mission of Islam. Encouraged by the opportunities
@A<
opening up in Indonesia, Abdurrahman explains, he decided to put off
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
further studies and for the next few years concentrate on building up
the pesantren.3
In 1972 Abdurrahman began giving regular lectures and seminars
around Java. He also wrote columns for national news magazines like
Tempo and feature articles for Kompas, the leading daily newspaper
owned by Catholic Chinese interests.4 His columns in Tempo and
Kompas were well received, and he quickly came to be regarded as an
up-and-coming social commentator. As we have seen, he also wrote for
Prisma, which had been established in the early 1970s to promote crit-
ical social thinking in Indonesia. His articles for Prisma and the semi-
nar papers he gave at academic conferences allowed him to explore his
ideas further.
,1!%1+(:)/$1
As the first-born son of Kiai Wahid Hasyim and the grandson of Kiai
Hasyim Asy’ari and Kiai Bisri Syansuri, Abdurrahman was closely
watched by the senior kiai of Nahdlatul Ulama. His promotion through
the ranks of NU, however, was by no means automatic. His heritage
gave him a position of prominence and meant that much would be
expected of him, but he still needed to prove himself. Abdurrahman
was also becoming noticed in secular intellectual circles in Jakarta, but
this was not necessarily of benefit to his reputation and standing with-
in NU. Indeed, his interest in the arts and his friendships with actors
and writers in Jakarta raised eyebrows back in Jombang. In the 1970s
pesantren graduates seldom ventured into the ‘dangerous’, ‘secular’
domain of film and literature.
Life for Abdurrahman and Nuriyah in 1973 was good: their modest
new home in Kiai Bisri’s pesantren complex had been completed, and
their first child Alissa had just been born. Abdurrahman enjoyed his
work with LP3ES and was happy shuttling between Jombang and
Jakarta, moving comfortably in both worlds and never staying too long
in either. He also enjoyed the regular circuit of seminars and lectures
that had become part of his life. Nevertheless, he and Nuriyah had to
work hard to make ends meet. The honoraria that Abdurrahman
received for his articles and public lectures did not provide sufficient
money to meet the young family’s expenses.
Short of money, Nuriyah recalls, she decided that she would have to
do something to bridge the gap. She thought of preparing snack food
@A=
at home to be sold each day to the thousands of students studying in

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
Jombang. She chose kacang tayamum (sand-roasted peanuts), prepared

by stirring peanuts through sand in hot wok. Every evening she and
Abdurrahman sat at the kitchen table preparing the kacang tayamum for
the next day. He filled small plastic bags, about twenty-five peanuts to
the bag, and she sealed them by running the tops of the bags through
the flame of a candle. This done, they would then prepare es lilin or ‘ice
candles’. Abdurrahman’s mother had given him a Vespa motor scooter,
which he used daily to deliver fifteen thermos flasks packed with the ice
confectioneries to strategic points around town. The es lilin proved pop-
ular and quickly became known as ‘Es Lilin Gus Dur’. Nuriyah’s snack
business was modest but successful and the steady income proved suf-
ficient for them to keep their heads above water. In 1974 their second
child, Zannuba Arifah Chafsoh, soon nicknamed Yenny, was born. The
little family was not at all well off, even by the standards of the day
when few people had much money, but they were surrounded by their
extended families in Jombang, Abdurrahman was respected in the com-
munity, and they were happy.5
Abdurrahman recalls that the family finances improved later that
year after Kiai Sobary, one of the senior kiai from Jombang who had
attended the meeting at Kiai Bisri’s garage the previous year, invited
Abdurrahman to his house to talk. Kiai Sobary began by saying words
to the effect of:
Gus, your grandfather entrusted to me the Madrasah Alia and because

of that I now want to ask you to teach Kaidah Fiqh [the elements of
Islamic jurisprudence] because I know that you know much about
Kaidah Fiqh. I did not realise it before but books I’ve never seen you
have read and understood. I also understand that you have memorised
the famous 54 legal maxims of Kaidah Fiqh. Please come and teach.
Abdurrahman countered by arguing that he was not qualified to teach

Kaidah Fiqh, or the rules of Islamic jurisprudence. In the day schools
within the pesantren, the madrasah alia, a teacher was allowed to teach
only those subjects for which he had been awarded an ijazah, or
certificate of competency, by a senior kiai. Kiai Sobary quickly respond-
ed: ‘I’ll give you the ijazah, I know that you are capable.’ With this
Abdurrahman embarked upon a teaching career at Pesantren
Tambakberas that was to last for as long as he was living in Jombang.
@AD
Abdurrahman soon made his mark as an able teacher of Islamic law,
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
his quick, dry wit making him a favourite with students. He recalls that
the following year Kiai Sobary again approached him and said: ‘You
have succeeded in teaching Kaidah Fiqh, now teach Kitab Al Hikam.’
Al Hikam is one of the classical Islamic texts on Sufism (Tasawuf ).
Again, says Abdurrahman, he declined to accept the old kiai’s offer and
again Kiai Sobary persisted. The old man added to his insistence that
Abdurrahman teach the Sufi text one further command. He made him
promise that every thirty-five days he would visit his father’s grave to
pray and recite certain passages from the Qur’an.6 This he dutifully did
for many years, though few knew that he did so as such rituals are nor-
mally done in the middle of the night, sometimes continuing until
dawn. Although in latter years such graveyards in Jombang attracted
increasing numbers of pilgrims, in the 1970s he says that he rarely
encountered others praying at the graveyard where his father was
buried.
By 1977, when their third child Anita was born, Abdurrahman and
Nuriyah had a settled and comfortable routine. Nuriyah was close to
her family and friends and busy raising her three young children. Even
though Abdurrahman’s teaching provided a more reliable income, they
were still continually short of cash. He recalls that this did not seem to
matter so much in the communal environment of their pesantren home
in Jombang. Abdurrahman enjoyed increasing respect both in Jakarta
and Jombang and was in demand as a speaker and writer, but, at this
point, not so much so that he was short of time for his family. This was
just as well; they could not afford much household help and
Abdurrahman had to assist Nuriyah in household chores. Because of
the climate in Jombang, which was well known for being oven-hot and
dusty, and because the overweight Abdurrahman had a poor tolerance
for heat, Nuriyah explains that he was assigned tasks such as doing the
laundry by hand, washing the dishes and mopping the floor, anything
which involved water and afforded some chance to cool down.7 In later
years they were to have more money, but never again would
Abdurrahman have so much time to spend with Nuriyah or the chil-
dren as during the first five years of their married life in Jombang.
In 1977 he was approached to become Dean of the Faculty of
Usuluddin at the University of Hasyim Asy’ari in Jombang, a position
he gladly accepted. The university was an Islamic college named after
Abdurrahman’s grandfather. It had been established by a consortium of
@@A
pesantren to provide tertiary education for pesantren graduates. One of

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
its faculties was located in Pesantren Denanyar, another in Pesantren

Tebuireng, and a further one in the city centre. It was no competitor for
the state universities but, drawing on the strength of Jombang’s
pesantren, it built a reputation as an institution providing sound higher-
level instruction to graduates of pesantren. Abdurrahman began to lec-
ture in Tarbiyah, or pedagogy, and Usuluddin, or Islamic belief and
practice. He explains that some at the university wanted him to teach
other subjects, but this did not happen because he fell foul of universi-
ty politics. He was stopped from teaching Syari’ah, or Islamic law, and
Dakwah, or missiology, by the University Secretary who Abdurrahman
felt seemed concerned to check the rise of this popular young teacher.
It was, he recalls, his first major experience of having to battle unhelp-
ful bureaucrats. The experience did not trouble him greatly. Blasé as
ever, he ignored the slight and simply concentrated on what was at
hand. At the same time he was also invited to teach one day a week in
the madrasah at Tambakberas. Now thirty-seven, he had a steadily ris-
ing profile and his comfortable, easygoing life was rapidly becoming
very busy.
A popular speaker, Abdurrahman frequently gave religious addresses
on significant Islamic dates. Each Ramadan (the Islamic fasting
month), for example, from 1973 until 1978, he addressed large assem-
blies of students in the Jombang area. He recalls that by 1978 several
thousand people were gathering to hear his address each evening of the
fasting month. That year his text year was Tafsir Djalalin, one of the
famous medieval commentaries on the Qur’an. The book was conve-
niently divided into thirty juz (sections), and each evening he expound-
ed on one. By the eve of Idul Fitri, the day of feasting that marks the
end of Ramadan, he had arrived at Juz no. 27. That evening the local
train from Jombang was forced to wait at the station because several
hundred of the regular passengers were still listening intently to
Abdurrahman as he concluded his instruction. Because there were three
juz remaining, he promised to return at a later date and complete the
series. Years later people were still asking when he would come back
and fulfil his promise.
!),'!--)!00+#.(12)!()/(:/+(:)3%/"-.'
That same year, while casually turning into the grounds of Pesantren
Denanyar on his Vespa motor scooter Abdurrahman was struck by a
@@@
car. Although he did not suffer any broken bones, the impact was severe
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
enough to detach the retina in his left eye. Specialists in Jakarta advised
that with sufficient rest the retina might re-adhere. Unfortunately,
Abdurrahman was not good at staying still and before long he was up
reading books, writing, and giving seminar papers. As a result the reti-
na failed to re-adhere properly and he was forced to commence a cycle
of regular specialist intervention and check-ups. Partly for this reason
he began to make more frequent trips to Jakarta and also began think-
ing about the wisdom of relocating to the national capital. He under-
went an operation on his eye, intended to help it heal and encourage the
loose flap of retina to re-adhere to the back of the eyeball, and he had
to go to Jakarta regularly to consult the specialists who were treating
him. He recalls that later that year something else occurred, which sug-
gested to him that the time might have come to leave Jombang and set-
tle in Jakarta.
H!9!%1!)".09/(,
Kiai Bisri Syansuri approached Abdurrahman and invited him once
again to consider joining NU’s national Syuriah or Religious Advisory
Council. This was Kiai Bisri’s third request to Abdurrahman to join the
national leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama. Abdurrahman had declined
the previous requests on the grounds that he was not yet ready to take
on that sort of work. He recalls feeling apprehensive about becoming
caught up in NU national politics and being saddled with organisa-
tional responsibilities. He told his close friends that his ambition was to
continue to develop as a public intellectual and not become tied to NU’s
organisational structure. But he became increasingly aware that he was
unlikely to be able to pursue this desire, as he was expected to play a for-
mal role in NU. The realisation was not, of course, a new one: his moth-
er had impressed upon him from the time of his father’s death in 1953
that one day he would have to take up his father’s mantle and carry on
his work. Although she did not make it clear what work it was that she
expected Abdurrahman to take up, it seemed likely that it would
involve a formal role in NU’s national leadership.
Following Kiai Bisri’s third invitation, Abdurrahman went to discuss
the matter with his mother. Abdurrahman was well known for being
headstrong and impetuous. His steady loss of eyesight in his left eye
following his failure to take sufficient rest after the accident in 1978 is
a clear example of the high costs of this stubbornness. Nevertheless,
@@6
there was one person whom he rarely disobeyed and certainly never in
1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
her presence, and that was his mother. She had continued to exert a
strong influence in his life even as he was developing his own career in
Jakarta and Jombang. It was common for him to consult with his moth-
er in Jakarta and ask her advice whenever he was faced with difficult
decisions. When he raised this matter with her, he recalls that her
response was quick and to the point: ‘Grandfather has asked you twice.
He is not the sort of man to ask anyone to do something twice, now if
he asks you a third time, don’t refuse him. It is your duty to do whatev-
er he asks you to do.’
Abdurrahman complied with his grandfather’s request and joined
NU’s central Syuriah. This meant that he had to be regularly in Jakarta
for meetings of the Syuriah and for consultation with his fellow board
members. As we have seen, he was writing for Tempo magazine and
involved with other intellectual endeavours in the national capital. At
the same time his eye specialists were struggling to recover some of the
lost vision in his left eye, and he had regular consultations as they
attempted different forms of treatment. For over a year he shuttled back
and forth between Jombang and Jakarta on a regular basis.
($2)333)!(#)(!1+/(!-)3/-+1+0,
Abdurrahman served on NU’s Syuriah for several years under his
grandfather Kiai Bisri Syansuri, who was Rais Aam, or head of the
Syuriah. This experience served to reinforce in his own mind the scope
and nature of the issues confronting Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as
cementing his reputation as a promising young leader.
In 1980 Kiai Bisri died, and a large part of the reason for
Abdurrahman remaining in Jombang went with him. The family
decided to move permanently to Ciganjur, a suburb far to the south of
Jakarta that merged into the rural hinterland surrounding the nation-
al capital.
The house where Abdurrahman, Nuriyah and their three daughters
settled in Ciganjur was modest even by village standards. There were no
other houses for some distance around it, and it was located in the mid-
dle of a large field that regularly flooded. During the monsoon season
the house was permanently surrounded by mud inches deep. Making
matters worse, it was very small, but it was all that they could afford.
The move to Jakarta ended Abdurrahman’s salary from teaching in
Jombang, and his involvement with the Syuriah cut into the time that
@@7
he could spend speaking and writing and further reduced his income.
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
Moreover the cost of living in Jakarta was much higher than in
Jombang. On the other hand, he was able to strengthen his contacts
with Jakarta intellectual circles. The death of Kiai Bisri in April 1980
represented a significant loss to the organisation. For some years the
Tanfidziyah, or the National Executive Board, which in theory operat-
ed under the authority of the Syuriah, had been the subject of intense
criticism from many of the NU kiai and ulama. They felt that the
Tanfidziyah was dominated by NU politicians and had for many years
neglected the organisation’s social and religious activities. The national
head of the Tanfidziyah, or executive chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama,
was Idham Chalid, who had occupied this position since 1956. In many
respects Idham, working closely with the politically astute Wahab
Chasbullah, had been successful in navigating NU through some
extremely trying circumstances, particularly during the change of
regime from Sukarno to Soeharto in the mid-1960s. By the late 1970s
many felt that Idham’s leadership, which by then seemed set to contin-
ue indefinitely, represented a significant liability to the organisation. He
had been president of PPP since its formation in 1973, and many felt
that he paid more attention to party political matters than he did to NU
social and religious aspirations. The national structure of the organisa-
tion had deteriorated, and many felt that a change of leadership was
needed to inject new vision into the organisation and facilitate the sort
of reforms that were required to adapt NU to the modern era.8
In the eyes of many ulama, Kiai Bisri Syansuri’s leadership of the
Syuriah had helped to balance what they felt to be the lack of appro-
priate leadership being displayed by Idham Chalid in the
Tanfidziyah. Bisri Syansuri had become head of the Syuriah in 1971,
following the death of his friend and brother-in-law Wahab
Chasbullah. It was only after significant persuasion and urging that
Bisri Syansuri was willing to take on the mantle of Rais Aam. Having
done so, however, he worked solidly attending to the religious inter-
ests of the organisation. He lacked Wahab’s finely tuned political
instinct, but was the equal of any in dogged tenacity. Moreover,
unlike Wahab Chasbullah and his protégé Idham Chalid, Kiai Bisri
did not believe in a ‘pragmatic’ approach to politics. Like most NU
ulama he was reluctant to be involved in confrontation with the gov-
ernment, but unlike many of the NU politicians he did not believe in
backing down on matters of principle.
@@8
Apart from tackling the government over its proposed ‘secularisation’

1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
of the marriage law in 1973, Kiai Bisri also did much to secure a strong
result for PPP in the 1977 election. As head of the PPP Syuriah (the
Islamic party’s religious advisory council) he was determined to stop the
‘Golkarisation’ of NU ulama. Though some were still induced to back
the government’s party, most who did experienced a marked loss of
support within NU. Kiai Bisri even went as far as issuing a fatwah
declaring that it was the religious duty of all Muslims to vote for PPP.
The party went on to poll strongly in the 1977 elections, even out-
polling Golkar in the national capital (43.5 per cent to Golkar’s 39.3).
The following year NU and PPP had a further opportunity to demon-
strate their political independence. Kiai Bisri was angered by two issues
that had come before parliament that year. The first was a proposal that
Kebatinan and other forms of indigenous spiritualism be officially
recognised alongside the mainstream religions. The second was the
government’s plan to commence a comprehensive program of indoctri-
nation built around Pancasila.
Pancasila, the state’s central philosophy, is in essence an essentially
benign doctrine that offers a non-secular but non-sectarian ‘civil reli-
gion’ alternative to an Islamic state. During Sukarno’s Old Order,
Pancasila was accepted by many moderate santri Muslims as represent-
ing a political compromise that was not only acceptable but also desir-
able in comparison with the alternatives. Under Soeharto, however,
Pancasila was used by the regime to enforce hegemony, with dissenting
ideas or ‘aberrant’ behaviour being quickly labelled contrary to
Pancasila. In time the regime began describe its approach to governance
and elections as Pancasila Democracy, the inference being that it repre-
sented an approach peculiarly appropriate to Indonesian, or even Asian,
values.
The NU ulama were upset with both initiatives in 1978 because they
saw them as designed to undermine the status of Islam, bringing God’s
revelation down to the level of political doctrine and traditional spiri-
tualism. When it came to expressing their displeasure, however, they
had few options. Golkar’s overwhelming majority in the parliament,
reinforced by the presence of military and other appointees, made it
pointless to vote against the proposals, despite PPP’s strong showing in
the 1977 elections. Moreover, the political climate had changed con-
siderably since their victory in addressing the proposed marriage law
amendments five years earlier. By 1978 articulating dissent was both
@@B
difficult and dangerous, with the regime keeping the press on a short
1&.)!"#$%&'"% !(#)%.4/%'2)@D<@G@D=6
leash and brooking no sign of public protest. Frustrated and angry, the
NU PPP parliamentarians, followed by members of other PPP factions,
led a walkout from parliament. It was a symbolic victory of sorts, but it
came at a price. Soeharto responded by engineering a declaration by
Djaelani ( Johnny) Naro, an Ali Murtopo crony, that he was replacing
Mintaredja as PPP’s chairman. Not surprisingly, Naro’s declaration
went unchallenged, and despite the lack of any formal process PPP had
a new chairman.9
In 1980 NU again staged a parliamentary walkout, although this time
Naro ensured that the other factions did not walk out with them. This
walkout was not a protest over any religious issues but rather a protest
against the government’s refusal to enact any legislative guarantees that
in conducting elections it would act in an impartial and non-partisan
manner. NU was not alone in concerns about Soeharto’s declining com-
mitment to democracy and reform. The PDI parliamentarians were also
unhappy, but did not go as far as walking out, and outside the parliament
members of the Indonesian elite were also protesting. In 1979 and 1980
a group of fifty senior civilians and retired military officers, known as the
Petition of Fifty, made a series of outspoken statements about Golkar’s
behaviour and particularly its use of the military for political purposes.
Soeharto moved quickly to ensure that the media did not print their
demands for reform or even their photographs.
Following the 1978 walkout and the accession of Naro to the leader-
ship of PPP, NU began to experience increased pressure from the gov-
ernment and suffer an erosion of its position within the party. Much
more than Idham Chalid, who was widely seen to be a political oppor-
tunist, Kiai Bisri was defiant in defending what he saw to be matters of
principle, but by 1980 his health had seriously declined and he died that
year, as we have seen. Many within NU, particularly within the ulama-
dominated Syuriah, were unhappy with Idham’s performance as chair of
the organisation’s executive, so the choice of a new leader of the religious
advisory council was a matter of considerable strategic importance
By now much of Abdurrahman’s time was taken up with work for the
Syuriah, but he also regularly accepted invitations to talk at a variety of
gatherings. Early in 1981 he was invited to join a team working on the
government’s Five-Year Plan. His team was assigned the responsibility
of developing details relating to co-operatives. The following year
Abdurrahman, who by now was well known among liberal intellectuals,
@@;
writers and artists in Jakarta and respected for his essays and his knowl-
1&.)'!9+(:)/4)!()+(1.--.01$!-
edge of film and literature, was asked to become chairman of the Jakarta
Arts Council. This was an unusual position for anyone from a pesantren
background, let alone somebody in the national leadership of Nahdlatul
Ulama.
+(!>!&
In the same year their fourth child, Inayah, was born. She was to be
their last child. Abdurrahman says that he was keen to have more chil-
dren, Nuriyah decided that four was plenty. It was well known within
NU that Abdurrahman’s own father, Wahid Hasyim, was the fifth
child after four girls. Consequently friends often teased him, saying
‘You must have more than four’. Abdurrahman’s standard response was
‘Please tell that to my wife’. Every time he broached the topic of hav-
ing more children, he was met with a sharp reaction from Nuriyah.
This was hardly surprising: by this time his work commitments were
such that Nuriyah was left to do almost all the housework herself (they
could not afford to employ domestic help for more than a few hours
each week). In Jombang Abdurrahman had helped in caring for the
girls, but by the time they made the shift to Jakarta his schedule was
too busy to allow him to spend much time assisting his wife.
Fortunately, not too long after Inayah was born they were able to shift
several kilometres north to the suburb of Cilandak, where they rented
a larger and more comfortable house that could accommodate a fami-
ly with four young children.10
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When Abdurrahman left Jombang to study abroad, he was a youth
wrestling with the question of how Islam could make a difference in the
world; on the threshold of adulthood, he flirted with radical Islamism.
Seven years later he returned home from his studies a man deeply com-
mitted to a liberal understanding of Islam. The influences that shaped
his liberalism are not difficult to identify, and it is not surprising that
the allure of the certainty and surety that radical Islamism promised
was short-lived. The first influence was his family, where both nature
and nurture shaped in him an open-minded and questioning intelli-
gence. Secondly, he grew up immersed in the tolerant Sufistic world of
Indonesia’s traditional Islam. Thirdly, he was influenced by the cultural
orientation of modern Indonesian society towards pluralism and egali-
tarianism.1 Finally, he was deeply influenced by his reading and his
studies in which he sought to synthesise modern Western thought with
Islam. He was not alone in doing this, and when he returned home to
Indonesia he joined forces with a small group of pioneering young
thinkers who were wrestling with how to renew Islamic thought. To
properly understand this journey to liberalism, it is important to under-
stand something of the world in which Abdurrahman lived.
@6A
+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
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Abdurrahman grew up in an enchanted universe in which the spiritual
was as real as the material. It was not just that God and the hereafter
were the beacons for life: that much is true for all Muslims. In
Abdurrahman’s pesantren world, the world of traditionalist Javanese
Islam, the spiritual was not confined to the life to come; it was also part
of the here and now. Coursing through both were those who had never
lived and would never die, beings that, though they might find a place
in the taxonomy of orthodox Islamic cosmology, were also known by
other names, names from a pre-Islamic Java. Many would regard
Abdurrahman’s understanding of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, as a
young Javanese Muslim, as a uniquely Indonesian amalgam of Hindu-
Buddhist thought and Javanese ‘animism’, with a late overlay of Islam.
But not only is this a simplistic view of traditionalist Islam in
Indonesia, it also obscures the distinctiveness of Abdurrahman’s posi-
tion. Not all traditionalists grew up so conscious of the spiritual realm
around them as Abdurrahman. In part this is because of the influence
of his pesantren schooling. His five younger siblings didn’t undertake
pesantren studies, and only Hasyim, the youngest, shares the same mys-
tical orientation as Abdurrahman. Even so, many pesantren graduates
are less mystically inclined than is Abdurrahman. From an early age he
became intensely interested in the spiritual world as it is presented in
the Sufistic traditions of Java. As a teenager and young man he studied
not only the Qur’an and the Sunnah, but also Javanese mythology. And
while still a teenager he regularly prayed and meditated in graveyards in
the middle of the night and made long and often arduous pilgrimages
to pray at the tombs of Sufi saints. At the same time he displayed an
openness to all manner of sages, seers and mystics that indicated a par-
ticularly deep interest in the unseen world.
As a traditionalist Muslim, Abdurrahman was inclined to embrace
indigenous cultural expressions of religiosity. This was apparent in his
attitude to the wayang kulit, or shadow theatre, which came from the
pre-Islamic world of Hindu Southeast Asia. Abdurrahman respected it
not only for its art but also for its spiritual content. The characters por-
trayed in the Javanese shadow theatre are drawn from the Mahabharata,
the Hindu classic describing conflict between two clans of brothers, and
from the Ramayana. The two groups of brothers in the Mahabharata-
based wayang kulit stories are in many respects very similar. The major
point of difference between the Pandavas, the heroes, and their mili-
@6@
taristic cousins the Kuravas, is that they have developed spiritual insight
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
and understanding, fostering in them a benevolent maturity not yet
obtained by their opponents. Growing up in Central Java
Abdurrahman came to identify strongly with the corpulent clown fig-
ure of Semar, the crude but wise buffoon from the wayang kulit. Semar
is a demi-god who takes the form of a ribald, obese, razor-sharp court
jester. Interestingly, both Sukarno and Soeharto, as abangan Javanese,
grew up with the wayang kulit, and both identified strongly with this
unlikely hero, who became for them a totemic figure. The name
Ramayana means the story of Rama; the text describes the epic mission
of Rama, an incarnation of Vishnu and one part of the triune Hindu
godhead, to rescue his wife Sita from Lanka, the island stronghold of
the demon king Ravana; he is assisted by his brother Laksamana and
his friend the monkey god Hanuman.
In the world of the wayang kulit, conflict is not between good and
evil, cast in absolute shades of black and white, but between the more
good and the less good or, better still, between the spiritually developed
and the spiritually undeveloped. For Abdurrahman the world of the
wayang kulit stimulated an appreciation of the need for ambivalence
and tolerance, and corresponded with the graduated and ambivalent
understanding of spiritual development which underlined the philoso-
phy of pesantren education. Abdurrahman considered the classic form
of the wayang kulit tableau, in which the spiritually immature came
face-to-face with the enlightened, as being parallel to pesantren educa-
tion where the students sit in neat lines facing the kiai, their teacher.
The aim of pesantren education was the moulding of raw spiritual mate-
rial into something of maturity and consequence.
Abdurrahman’s intellectual development was shaped by both classi-
cal Islamic scholarship and modern Western learning. These factors set
the preconditions for him to develop his liberal ideas. As he travelled,
read and debated ideas, Abdurrahman synthesised these two worlds of
learning. He may have done this more completely than the majority of
Islamic intellectuals in Indonesia, but he was not alone. Although he
did not realise it at the time, he was to become a part of a new move-
ment of Islamic thought in Indonesia.
($%0&/-+,&)'!#H+#5)!)9+(#%.#),3+%+1
Abdurrahman Wahid was not the only prominent Islamic intellectual
to be born in Jombang in the twilight of Dutch colonialism. Eighteen
@66
months prior to Abdurrahman’s birth in his grandfather’s house in

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
Pesantren Denanyar, Abdul Madjid, a Jombang madrasah teacher and

farmer welcomed the birth of his first son, Nurcholish. As young men
in the 1970s, and then as Indonesia’s leading Islamic intellectuals in the
decades that followed, Abdurrahman and Nurcholish developed their
thought along similar lines, and the pair became known as Indonesia’s
leading exponents of Islamic liberalism. Understanding something of
Nurcholish’s life and thought is of great help in understanding
Abdurrahman.
Though Abdurrahman and Nurcholish did not meet as children, their
fathers were close friends and came to be related through marriage. Not
only was Nurcholish’s father, Abdul Madjid, a close friend of Wahid
Hasyim, but he had also been a student of Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari at
Pesantren Tebuireng. As a pesantren graduate, Abdul Madjid was a tradi-
tionalist by background even though he was not formally a member of
NU. As a successful farmer he used his prosperity to found a small
madrasah run along traditionalist lines but influenced by modernist ideas.
It is a mark of Abdul Madjid’s respect for Wahid Hasyim that he
remained in Masyumi even after NU had split to form its own party in
1952. He did this, he said, because he believed that it was what Wahid
Hasyim would have wanted. He knew that Wahid Hasyim had been dis-
appointed by the breakdown in relations between modernists and tradi-
tionalists. Abdul Madjid’s decision to support Masyumi resulted in a
great deal of pain and suffering for him. He often returned from his rice
fields in Jombang with tears in his eyes, as a result of accusations levelled
against him both by the modernists who dominated Masyumi, and by the
traditionalists who questioned why he did not want to become a member
of NU. This did not deter Abdul Madjid from staying true to what he
understood to be Wahid Hasyim’s vision of uniting traditionalism and
modernism. For this reason he was keen that his son Nurcholish would
have an education that brought together the best of both elements.2
After studying in his father’s madrasah, Nurcholish was sent to com-
plete his studies at Pesantren Modern Gontor in Ponorogo East Java.
Pesantren Modern Gontor was established with the aim of mod-
ernising pesantren education and was affiliated with neither
Muhammadiyah nor NU. Gontor became famous for its insistence on
high academic standards and scholarship, reflected in a standing rule
that conversations among students could take place in either English or
Arabic but not in Indonesian or Javanese. Gontor prided itself on its
@67
ability to produce well-grounded students equally at home in the tradi-
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
tional world of Islam and in modern Western society.3
Many Gontor graduates have gone on to make their mark in
Indonesian society but perhaps none so successfully as Nurcholish
Madjid. Nurcholish and Abdurrahman only got to know each other
when Nurcholish visited the Middle East in 1969 following a visit to
America sponsored by the US State Department. Nurcholish had been
chosen for the trip to America as part of a US government scheme to
encourage young Muslims to adopt a more open-minded attitude to
the West and to America in particular. In Nurcholish’s case the scheme
was a great success as his visit marked the beginning of a lifelong love
affair with the United States.
On his way home to Indonesia, Nurcholish took the opportunity to
stop over in the Middle East. Unlike many of his friends from Jombang
he had not had an opportunity to visit the Arab world, even though he
had learnt to speak fluent Arabic. He visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Syria and then decided to cross from Damascus to Baghdad. His father
had often talked about Wahid Hasyim’s son Abdurrahman and suggest-
ed to Nurcholish that he take the opportunity to visit him in Baghdad.
Much to the consternation of Indonesian Embassy officials in Damascus,
Nurcholish, whose travel funds were all but exhausted, boarded a desert
caravan bound for Baghdad. In the 1960s travel from Damascus to
Baghdad for those on a tight budget was a hazardous affair using a mech-
anised equivalent of the Bedouin camel caravans. The driver of the agri-
cultural tractor that pulled the train of carriages across the desert sands
was a Bedouin who relied on his local knowledge to navigate a partly
unmarked path through inhospitable wastes. When Nurcholish’s caravan
pulled into Baghdad, he was greeted by a welcoming committee headed
by Abdurrahman. This first meeting, which had been much anticipated
by both men, was the beginning of a long friendship.
Even at that stage Nurcholish enjoyed a high profile among young
Indonesian intellectuals. He was national chairman of the influential,
and largely modernist, HMI, the first chairman to be an IAIN student
and come from a pesantren background. Nurcholish began his first
three-year term as chair while studying at the IAIN Syarif Hidyatullah
in Ciputat, South Jakarta. When he returned from his Middle East
visit, he was re-elected for a second three-year term. However, months
later, he was to find himself in the middle of controversy. Throughout
his student days Nurcholish had been widely acclaimed as a spiritual
@68
successor to Mohammad Natsir, the influential Masyumi leader from

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
the 1950s. In fact he was frequently dubbed ‘the young Natsir’, and was
even regarded as a protégé by Natsir himself. Overnight he went from
being respectable to controversial as many of his erstwhile supporters
declared that his ideas were dangerous and ill-informed.
1&.)'/?.'.(1)4/%)1&.)%.(.*!-)/4)+,-!'+0)1&/$:&1
The reason for Nurcholish’s sudden descent into controversy was a
speech he delivered at an end-of-Ramadan gathering of students in
Jakarta in January 1970. In what he assumed to be a closed-door stu-
dent gathering, Nurcholish read from a carefully prepared paper in
which he argued strongly for greater boldness and risk-taking on the
part of young intellectuals. He asserted that many young Indonesian
intellectuals were heartily sick of the wistful, backward-looking obses-
sion with party politics prevalent among many of the Masyumi gener-
ation of modernists. What young Muslims really wanted, he claimed,
was Islam, not Islamic politics. He argued that Muslim society in
Indonesia, the intellectual leadership in particular, was at a crossroads.
To continue to give priority to the unity of the umat would be to per-
petuate stagnation and intellectual decline. The alternative, he argued,
was to risk criticism, and even division, in order to promote new ideas
and stimulate fresh thought within Islamic society.
If Islamic organisations represent the vehicles for Islamic ideas, why
is it, Nurcholish asked, that people are not attracted to Islamic organi-
sations? The reasons, he argued, are obvious. Islamic organisations are
no longer attracting the kind of mass support that they once did, first-
ly, because the very nature of the thought that these organisations rep-
resent and actively disseminate has become stale. And secondly, because
Islamic parties and their leaders have lost credibility in the eyes of the
public. Summing up what he felt to be the feelings of the Islamic pub-
lic, Nurcholish wrote:
The answer to the above questions might be found by putting down

the next question: to what extent were they attracted to Islamic par-
ties and organisations? Except for a few, it is clear that they were not
attracted to Islamic parties or organisations. Their attitude might be
formulated thus, more or less: ‘Islam yes, Islamic party no!’ So if
Islamic parties constitute a receptacle of ideas which are going to be
@6B
fought for on the basis of Islam, then it is obvious that those ideas are
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
now unattractive. In other words, those ideas and Islamic thinking
are now becoming fossilised and obsolete, devoid of dynamism.
Moreover these Islamic parties have failed to build a positive and
sympathetic image; in fact they have an image that is just the oppo-
site. (The reputation of a section of the umat with respect to corrup-
tion, for example, is mounting as time passes.)4
This speech marked the beginning of a movement that came to be

known as Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam, or the Movement for
the Renewal of Islamic Thought. Over the next few years Nurcholish
produced a series of papers elaborating on this theme, as he and a group
of young intellectuals met regularly in Jakarta to discuss new Islamic
thought. Although he knew that what he was doing was controversial,
Nurcholish had not expected his ideas to be seen as provocative as they
were interpreted to be by many of the older generation of modernists.
His erstwhile mentor Mohammad Natsir angrily expressed extreme
disappointment with his young protégé, as did many of the other sen-
ior figures in modernist circles. Nurcholish became something of a cause
célèbre within HMI. Some championed him as an emerging new
thinker who would lead Islamic thought in Indonesia into a new era.
Others saw him as having sold out, both to Westernisation and to the
Soeharto regime. Indeed, among his critics he was quickly categorised
as an ‘accommodationist’, as his call to forget party politics was inter-
preted as representing support for the Soeharto regime and betrayal of
the modernist cause.5
Nurcholish was not by nature a radical. He found the criticism from
his former mentor deeply painful. Several years later he wrote that he
regretted that he had not stuck to his original strategy of ‘smuggling in’
new ideas and seeking to promote reform in an evolutionary fashion
rather than confronting things head-on.6 Whether the avoidance of
controversy would even then have been possible is not clear, but
Nurcholish’s January 1970 paper was a bombshell that served to launch
a new movement.7 Throughout the early 1970s Nurcholish and his
peers fleshed out the essentials of this new thought.
1&.)>/:>!9!%1!)0+%0-.
At the time that Nurcholish was travelling across the Syrian desert to
meet Abdurrahman, unknown to them both, a small group from HMI
@6;
was meeting quietly in Yogyakarta to talk freely about the renewal of

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
Islamic thought.8 This group met in the home of Mukti Ali, a senior
academic at the Sunan Kalijaga IAIN in Yogyakarta, who played a
mentoring role among progressive student intellectuals in the city. The
small group met regularly at his house for discussion, and Mukti Ali
encouraged his young friends to speak freely on whatever topic they
chose. Leading lights in the discussion group were Djohan Effendi and
Ahmad Wahib. Djohan came from a traditionalist madrasah back-
ground in South Kalimantan (he had learnt Arabic and studied the
classical texts), and was also a student at the IAIN were he was study-
ing in preparation for a career in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
Ahmad Wahib was not a theological student; he studied at the
University of Gadjah Mada. Nevertheless, he too had learnt Arabic as
a teenager in his devoutly Islamic family in Madura, the island adjoin-
ing Surabaya known as a stronghold of traditionalist Islam.
Djohan and Wahib were also active within HMI and took local lead-
ership positions in the Yogyakarta branch where they ran training
courses. They were keen to see the transformation of Islamic thought
and the opening of a way for that reform, unfettered by what they saw
to be the obsession of the former Masyumi leaders with party politics.
At first they, like Nurcholish, tried to work underground to promote
critical reflection without overtly challenging the prevailing orthodoxy.
In time, however, they found themselves at odds with the central Java
leadership of HMI Students. Things came to a head late in 1969 when
both men decided, independently, to formally resign from HMI.
Having tendered their resignations, they were pleasantly surprised to
receive an encouraging letter from HMI national chairman Nurcholish
Madjid praising them for the stance that they had taken.
In 1971, after graduating from IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta,
Djohan Effendi and Ahmad Wahib moved to Jakarta. Djohan went to
work for the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta; he and Ahmad
Wahib became active in Jakarta intellectual circles, where they came to
know Abdurrahman and Nurcholish. Tragically in 1973, Ahmad
Wahib, who had just commenced his career as a journalist with the
weekly news magazine Tempo, was knocked down by a motorcycle and
killed as he left his office one afternoon. In the early 1970s Mukti Ali
was made Minister for Religious Affairs. He immediately began to
work with Harun Nasution, the head of Syarif Hidayatullah IAIN in
Jakarta, to launch a campaign of reforms within the IAIN. By the 1980s
@6<
these reforms had produced significant changes in the culture of learn-
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
ing within the IAIN. The process of reform was greatly aided by the
drafting of Nurcholish Madjid and several other young progressive
intellectuals on to the faculty. This resulted in IAIN Syarif
Hidayatullah in Jakarta, and to a somewhat lesser extent Sunan Kalijaga
IAIN, leading the way to the reform of Islamic thought in Indonesia.
It is significant that the leading figures in this movement came from
traditionalist homes, and as a result had been educated in pesantren and
madrasah to the point where they could read Arabic and study the clas-
sical texts of Islamic learning. This enabled them to marry classical
Islamic thought with modern Western thought to produce a creative
synthesis. It was this same synthesis of thought which drove forward the
process of reform within the IAIN and within the growing circle of
young reformists in Jakarta led by Nurcholish and Abdurrahman. At the
same time as these ideas were being propagated through discussion
groups, seminars and conferences, these young intellectuals were also
putting their ideas in print through essays in newspapers and magazines.
4!J-$%)%!&'!()!(#)(./G'/#.%(+,'
The movement of thought that Abdurrahman, Nurcholish and Djohan
were involved in was of intellectual significance, though few recognised
it at the time. Because almost everything written by Indonesian intel-
lectuals was written in Indonesian, rather than English or Arabic, few
outside Indonesia were aware of the momentous innovations in Islamic
thought that were being pioneered there. As it happened, the rethink-
ing in Indonesia paralleled developments taking place elsewhere in the
Islamic world. A largely unique aspect of the Indonesian situation,
however, was that its proponents were not subject to political oppres-
sion in the manner of similar movements in Pakistan and Egypt, or
even Malaysia. Ironically, it was in part because the New Order regime
was so authoritarian that Islamic liberalism had an opportunity to
develop freely in Indonesia. The aversion of Soeharto and the
Indonesian military to political Islam caused them to look favourably
on young liberal Islamic intellectuals such as Abdurrahman and
Nurcholish. Like-minded intellectuals in many other Muslim societies
were often forced to flee their homelands and relocate in Western coun-
tries if they wanted to continue writing about rethinking Islamic
thought. This reality was brought home to the young Indonesian
thinkers when they encountered a pioneering Islamic writer from
@6=
Chicago. The contact was to provide not just encouragement and

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
opportunities for further education but also a new paradigm with which
to understand the historical context, and significance, of what they were
doing.
In 1976 Nurcholish Madjid was given an opportunity to spend nine
months in a research seminar program at the University of Chicago; as
a result of that visit, he returned to Chicago in 1978 to undertake doc-
toral studies there. The opportunity arose because of the visit to Jakarta
by University of Chicago academics Fazlur Rahman and Leonard
Binder. Fazlur Rahman was a Pakistani intellectual forced to flee his
homeland in 1969 because of political hostility to his progressive ideas.
In Chicago Rahman was free to develop his thought, and he evolved a
paradigm of Islamic reform in which he argued that neither tradition-
alism nor modernism offered a way forward for the development of
Islamic thought in Muslim society. Instead, Rahman argued that a
combination of modernism and traditionalism was needed to lead the
way.
Rahman argued that the intellectual vitality of early Islam was lost as
Islamic thought ossified through being institutionalised.9 As Islam had
spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean, across northern Africa
and eastwards into Iran and West Asia, Islamic civilisation and thought
were opened to new ideas and influences. The expansion and flourish-
ing of Islamic thought ground to a halt towards the end of the thir-
teenth century, primarily because individual interpretation or ijtihad
was regarded as being dangerous and best avoided. Instead, the ulama
advocated that the correct way of finding the truth was to confine one-
self to the limits of the four orthodox mazhab or jurisprudential schools
which, by this stage, had been integrated into well-documented posi-
tions. The result, in Rahman’s estimation, was disastrous. The gates of
ijtihad were closed, and creative and vital learning largely ceased.
Islamic thought entered a period of stagnation.
The first signs of challenge to this stagnation, Rahman suggested,
occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The
revivalist movements of the Wahabi in Arabia and Sanusi in North-
West Africa marked the beginning of a serious rethinking of the way
Islam was practised. These revivalist movements, however, were essen-
tially concerned with reformation only in the sense of going back to an
earlier, ‘more pristine’, period of thought and civilisation. In other
words, they were not concerned with the reinterpretation of Islamic
@6D
thought so much as its purification. The revivalists warned against
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
moral decay on the one hand and against the syncretistic melding of
Islamic thought with local superstitious practice and belief on the other
hand. In this sense they were fundamentally conservative, and even
reactionary, in that they wanted to return Islamic society to an earlier
golden age.
Next came modernism. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
modernism, Rahman argued, marked the beginning of a genuine intel-
lectual revival within the Islamic world. With modernism came the
reappraisal of ijtihad and a conscious effort to reopen the gates of ijti-
had and personal interpretation. Modernism was also inspired, as the
name suggests, by the growth of modern thought and technology and
its application in society to avert disease, to harness the powers of
nature for human good, and to generally improve society. Modernism
began as an essentially progressive movement: it was forward-looking
and desired to see society become steadily better. It was a movement
that was concerned about returning to some of the original purity of the
world of earlier times. It was primarily concerned with creating a future
that was different to and better than all that had come before. In time,
however, the creative dynamism of modernism came to a halt also. By
the middle of the century, as the modernists failed to attend to theo-
logical education and to reproduce new generations of intellectuals
capable of engaging in ijtihad, and as they became absorbed in party
politics and political change, the movement began to regress.
Rahman, writing about the Islamic world as a whole, argued that the
intellectual decline of modernism in the second half of the century fed
directly into the re-emergence of revivalism. To distinguish this revival-
ism of the early to mid-twentieth century from the revivalism of one
and a half centuries earlier, Rahman applied the label neo-revivalism. It
differed significantly from these earlier movements in that it was linked
organically to the modernist movement. Neo-revivalism grew out of a
decaying modernism and it merged elements of modernist concern
with technology and science for the betterment of society with the
wistful, backward-looking nature of the earlier, more puritan revivalist
movements. The chief flaw in neo-revivalism was that it soon stagnat-
ed intellectually.
Thinkers such as Maulana Maududi, a Pakistani layman turned pop-
ular preacher, did much to accommodate this new form of revivalist
thought. Maududi’s ideas differed greatly from those of his compatriot,
@7A
the famous modernist intellectual Mohammed Iqbal. Rahman argues

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
that, whereas Iqbal’s thought was characterised by original insight and

the reapplication of Islamic concepts, Maududi’s thought tended
towards reductionism and the simplistic application of narrowly con-
ceived Islamic concepts to an ailing society.
Rahman only mentioned Indonesia in passing and did not discuss
developments there in detail. Nevertheless, following Rahman’s line of
analysis, it could be argued that in Indonesia the former Masyumi
leader Mohammad Natsir increasingly adopted a position similar to
that taken by Maududi and other neo-revivalist figures. In the 1950s
he was regarded as a reasonably progressive thinker, but by the 1970s
was a much more conservative figure. Even more conservative were
many of the younger intellectuals who joined Natsir in Dewan
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Preaching
Council), a non-government organisation that he founded in the late
1960s out of frustration with the Soeharto regime’s suppression of
political Islam.
It was with thinkers such as Maududi that the Islamist movement
properly began. In most respects Islamism coincides neatly with what
Rahman defines as neo-revivalism. Neo-revivalism is concerned about
improving society by taking it back to an earlier and purer form of Islam.
It sustains itself on the optimistic hope that making society more Islamic
will cause all of the social problems of modern life to drop away. At the
same time it recognises the need to exploit and benefit from modern
technology. It is not surprising that the majority of neo-revivalist and
Islamist thinkers of the twentieth century were not theologically trained,
but instead had studied applied sciences such as engineering. They had
learnt to apply reductionistic modelling to complex real-world problems
and as a result tended to believe that the complex ills of twentieth-
century society could be reduced to a handful of spiritual ailments that
could be easily remedied by applying formulaic prescriptions.
Rahman did not believe that neo-revivalism or Islamism represented
a satisfactory answer to the challenges facing Muslim society. While he
was ready to acknowledge the moral courage and dedication of many of
the neo-revivalists, he felt that intellectually neo-revivalism represented
a cul-de-sac. The movement sustained itself on the optimistic hope
that, as soon as the appropriate Islamic solution was formulated and
implemented, society would begin to improve. After many decades of
this experiment failing to produce lasting results, however, many
@7@
Islamic intellectuals began to believe that perhaps something more was
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)-+".%!-)+,-!'
required.
That something more, in Fazlur Rahman’s view, involved returning
to classical Islamic learning and combining this with the best of mod-
ernism so as to produce a synthesis between classical Islamic learning
and modern Western thought. In that way, Rahman argued, the core
truths of Islam could be appreciated afresh and applied flexibly and cre-
atively to modern society, generating a more profound and sophisticat-
ed spirituality and a more compassionate and tolerant Islam. He coined
the term neo-modernism for this movement.
By the late 1970s, some commentators were beginning to apply the
label neo-modernism to the Renewal of Islamic Thought movement in
Indonesia.10 The new movement of thought that emerged with
Nurcholish, Djohan and Abdurrahman was indeed essentially a syn-
thesis of classical Islamic learning and modern Western thought. They
sought to combine the best of modernism and traditionalism to pro-
duce something new, something that would exceed the boundaries
inherent in both traditionalism and modernism.11
,+F
~
/()1&.)"%+(9)
/4)0&!(:.2)
@D=6G@D=8
!&'!#),+##+K2)333)!(#)1&.)@D=6).-.01+/(,
By 1982 Abdurrahman was working closely with Achmad Siddiq, a
reform-minded senior kiai. The two men worked well together and
enjoyed considerable influence within the Syuriah. Kiai Achmad Siddiq
was twenty-four years older than Abdurrahman and became something
of a father figure to the younger man. Like Abdurrahman, Achmad
Siddiq had thought much about the need for reform within NU. He
was one of the first NU kiai to talk openly about the necessity of ijti-
had or personal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. He too
was something of a cultural broker. He was able to translate modern
ideas into the language of traditional Islam and express them in a fash-
ion that could be received by more conservative ulama. Together he and
Abdurrahman formed an impressive team, and there was a growing
expectation that they would take charge of the organisation in future.
Abdurrahman was encouraged in his endeavours by a number of
young friends who had studied in pesantren at the same time as him and
were now emerging as young kiai active in both the regional and
national leadership. Some of them were Middle East graduates he had
known during his studies in Cairo and Baghdad. At the same time
@77
several influential older kiai began to ask Abdurrahman to speak at
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
their pesantren on the topic of renewal within NU.
In the run-up to the May 1982 national elections, Abdurrahman
became busy campaigning for PPP. He was not particularly enamoured
with PPP, but reasoned that in a system that permitted only three par-
ties (apart from Soeharto’s Golkar there was PPP and PDI), it was
important to strengthen the two small opposition parties if some mod-
icum of democracy was to emerge. Nurcholish Madjid had used the
same argument in the lead-up to the 1977 election when he employed
the analogy of a becak or trishaw — ‘If one tire was flat on one of these
three-wheeled pedicabs’, he argued, ‘you could go nowhere until the flat
tire was fixed’. ‘We must pump up the flat tyre’, Nurcholish exclaimed
by way of explaining his support for PPP in 1977.
While Nurcholish’s support for PPP the 1977 campaign was not
particularly surprising, Abdurrahman’s support for the party in the
1982 campaign is more curious. After Djaelani Naro assumed the
leadership of PPP in 1978, things had begun to go badly for NU
politicians within the party. This was just as Soeharto intended, for
after the infamous walkout of PPP politicians from parliament in 1978
he decided that it was time to begin to rein in the party, and particu-
larly its outspoken NU figures. In the run-up to the 1982 election
Naro was instructed to ensure that the total proportion of PPP seats
assigned to NU was substantially cut back and to see that the more
vocal NU politicians were given unwinnable positions on the party’s
card.1 The regime’s heavy-handed intervention in the affairs of PPP
meant that there was little reason for NU to continue to support the
party. Nevertheless, Abdurrahman fell back on Nurcholish’s argument
about the need to ensure that Golkar was presented with substantial
opposition at each election to explain his support for PPP during the
1982 campaign.
".((>)'$%#!(+
Abdurrahman says that while campaigning for PPP he was detained
many times by the police, who were under orders to obstruct opposition
party meetings. He explains that each time he was taken into overnight
detention he asked friends to inform ABRI headquarters that he had
been detained. Each time this sufficed to secure his immediate release.
By this stage Abdurrahman had achieved such stature as a moderate
Islamic intellectual that certain officers in the military looked upon him
@78
with favour and saw in him a hope for developing a moderate Islam.
+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
They also recognised that he was likely to play a future leadership role
in NU and sought to cultivate his friendship. The most important of
these officers was General Benny Murdani. Benny, as he was widely
known, was a protégé of Ali Murtopo and head of military intelligence.
He had assisted Ali Murtopo in orchestrating the Indonesian invasion
of East Timor in 1975 and worked with him closely on other Opsus
projects. He was regarded as a tough soldier who felt little compunction
in spilling blood when he felt violent means were called for, but he was
also seen to be personally austere and professional. As a military intel-
ligence czar and a Catholic general in an officer corps that was pro-
foundly suspicious of militant Islam, he was deeply distrusted by most
Muslim leaders, especially among the urban modernists. Abdurrahman
did not shy from contact with Benny, although he has consistently
maintained that he did not fully trust him and that the relationship was
one of mutual convenience rather than real friendship.2 It was to be an
important relationship, all the same, for the following year Benny was
appointed head of the armed forces. For Benny the relationship pro-
vided an entry into the Byzantine world of NU politics via a popular
young intellectual who seemed to share many of the concerns of the
military about militant Islamism. For Abdurrahman, ‘friendship’ with
Benny made it possible to shape elite perceptions of NU and of him-
self, and to negotiate the regime’s response to political developments. In
a society as tightly controlled as Soeharto’s Indonesia had become in
the 1980s, a modicum of support from one of the ruling elite’s several
factions was not merely useful but essential if one wanted to play a role
of any significance.
The regular police detentions failed to deter Abdurrahman from
campaigning for PPP in 1982, but following the election he became
increasingly disillusioned with the party and vowed never to campaign
for it again. Abdurrahman focused on preparations for the upcoming
munas, or national congress of ulama, planned for the following year.
Moves were under way to bring about change within NU’s national
leadership. Idham Chalid, NU’s executive chairman, had been greeted
with hostility when he addressed the national congress of NU in
Semarang in 1979. On that occasion Idham’s profuse and eloquent
apology and request for forgiveness was enough to ensure that he was
re-elected as executive chairman. Events since, most notably Djaelani
Naro’s government-backed moves to emasculate the organisation with-
@7B
in PPP and the failure of Idham to defend NU’s interests within the
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
party, had intensified the resentment that had been steadily building to
Idham’s leadership throughout the 1970s.3
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On 2 May 1982, two days before the national election, a group of four
senior kiai from the Syuriah gathered in Jakarta and proceeded to
Idham Chalid’s house in the suburb of Cipete. Three of them were
founding members of NU and as such commanded enormous authori-
ty. They were Abdurrahman’s old teacher Rais Aam Kiai Machrus Aly,
Kiai As’ad Arifin Syamsul, Kiai Ali Ma’sum and Kiai Masykur. When
they met with Idham they asked him to step down ‘because of poor
health’. They were convinced that NU was in danger of becoming mori-
bund and that a change of leadership was necessary if the organisation
was to move forward. For too long, they felt, the politicians and tech-
nocrats within the Tanfidziyah had dominated NU, marginalising the
ulama in the Syuriah. Idham, naturally enough, did not share their view
and did not appreciate being pressured into stepping down. The request
from the kiai was most irregular. But while it found no place in NU’s
constitution, their action was not at odds with the spirit of the consti-
tution, which enshrined the principle that the Tanfidziyah was subject
to the Syuriah.
As a result of discussions between Abdurrahman and Achmad
Siddiq and other kiai from the Syuriah, the Syuriah established a forum
of reform-minded kiai and younger intellectuals to wrestle with the
many issues facing the ailing organisation. This forum of two dozen,
which included many of NU’s brightest minds (along with a few others
who had political axes to grind, or at least patronage interests to pro-
tect) came to be called the Council of 24. It met on several occasions
before finally deciding to appoint a smaller group of its members to
work closely together to spearhead the reform effort. Seven men,
including Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq, were chosen and charged
with mapping out a plan for the reform of NU.
The news of Idham Chalid’s resignation finally broke on 6 May.
Abdurrahman and Dr Fahmi Saifuddin, another member of the so-
called Team of Seven, the group charged with formulating reform with-
in NU, decided to pay a courtesy call on Idham to try to defuse his
anger towards the Syuriah. Abdurrahman recalls that he began by say-
ing, ‘Pak Idham; the matter of you stepping down as proposed by the
@7;
kiai two days ago is not strictly constitutional’. Idham replied, ‘Yes but
+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
I couldn’t refuse those kiai, they are the biggest kiai in NU and the
Tanfidziyah has always to listen to the Syuriah. What could I say in my
defence to these kiai from the Syuriah?’ To which Abdurrahman
responded, ‘Okay but that does not make it constitutional, and I believe
in doing things constitutionally’. ‘Thank you, thank you,’ Idham said.
Abdurrahman continued: ‘Pak Idham, please understand that I am in
the Syuriah and as a student of the kiai senior to me in the Syuriah I
must follow their lead and cannot oppose them.’4
Both Abdurrahman and Idham recognised that they faced an
impasse. Idham was not willing to simply relinquish his authority with-
in NU, and yet the Syuriah kiai who had met with him were commit-
ted to proceeding with an interim collective leadership team until a new
chairman could be elected at the next national congress of NU, in two
years’ time. Abdurrahman suggested a compromise arrangement that
would permit the two camps to co-operate in the leadership of NU dur-
ing the interregnum. Idham indicated that he agreed, and
Abdurrahman concluded by saying: ‘Okay, I will represent the kiai and
you appoint Chalid Marwadi as your representative, and I will maintain
communication with him from now until the congress.’
Henceforth Abdurrahman and Fahmi met regularly with Marwadi
in order to co-ordinate the functioning of the national leadership of
NU. Their efforts were only partly successful, however, and for the
next two and a half years NU’s national leadership was curiously bifur-
cated. Idham continued to act as national chairman despite his earlier
acceptance of the need to resign when confronted by the four kiai, and
on 14 May he issued a statement cancelling his earlier statement about
resigning. This left the masses of NU confused and divided and the
leaders split into two camps. Both camps maintained that they repre-
sented the official leadership of NU and handled correspondence
simultaneously from two separate offices. The camp backed by the
majority of ulama in the Syuriah was nominally led by the much-
feared Kiai As’ad Arifin Syamsul. The two camps came to be identi-
fied as the ‘Cipete camp’ after the Jakarta suburb in which Idham
Chalid lived, and the ‘Situbondo camp’ after the East Java home of
Kiai As’ad. The Team of Seven was instrumental in brokering peace
between the two camps. They were assisted in this by Abdurrahman’s
mother, Solichah, who used her formidable authority to persuade the
two camps to co-operate.
@7<
3!(0!,+-!)!(#)!,!,)1$(::!-
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
During this period Abdurrahman continued to tour the country. Always
an inveterate traveller, he had become even more active in visiting
pesantren across Java after joining the Syuriah. In 1983 he made visits to
NU strongholds in Java, in Sumatra, and in Kalimantan. He explains that
he felt there to be a degree of urgency about visiting regional NU branch-
es because he was aware of considerable confusion and anxiety about the
ructions within the national leadership. He moved from pesantren to
pesantren and met with NU branch leaders around the country, explain-
ing the need for reform and urging them to recognise it.
At the same time Abdurrahman began to work with Achmad Siddiq
on formulating a response to the issue of Pancasila. By 1983 Soeharto
had begun to make it clear that he was pushing for the widespread
acceptance of Pancasila as the asas tunggal, or sole basis, of all organi-
sations. In early 1983, following the five-yearly meeting of the MPR
which re-elected him president, Soeharto gave a speech in Riau in
which he urged acceptance of Pancasila as asas tunggal by all groups in
society, including religious organisations. Abdurrahman had intelli-
gence from Benny Murdani that those organisations that resisted
acknowledging Pancasila as their ‘sole basis’ would ultimately face ‘irre-
sistible pressure’ from the government to yield.
Abdurrahman had for a long time been persuaded that Pancasila rep-
resented the best compromise to resolving the thorny issue of the rela-
tionship between ‘church and state’. Throughout the 1970s and early
1980s he articulated his ideas in a series of essays and long articles,
arguing that a constitution that formally legislated a role for Islam in
the state would be bound to result in unpleasantness not just for non-
Muslims and abangan Muslims but also for those santri Muslims who
disagreed with the official religious line taken by the state. To involve
the state in arbitrating on religious matters, he reasoned, would
inevitably result in the state trampling on the freedom of conscience of
many of its citizens. It was far better, he argued, for the state to keep its
distance from religious matters and allow religious organisations to
manage their own affairs. At the same time he acknowledged that it
was inconceivable that, in the world’s largest Muslim society, people
would readily accept a constitution that failed to acknowledge the con-
tribution of religion to society, especially in the wake of the 1965–66
crackdown on communism, with all the consequent emotion and pho-
@7=
bia about atheism. This meant, Abdurrahman maintained, that

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
Pancasila provided for the state to be non-sectarian but also non-secu-

lar, and consequently represented the best compromise possible.
In response to Soeharto’s Pancasila speech in Riau, Abdurrahman
met with Kiai Ali Ma’sum, by now Rais Aam, and proposed that the
Syuriah should form a committee to discuss the position of NU and
Pancasila. A committee was formed with Kiai Achmad Siddiq as chair-
man and Abdurrahman as secretary. They began meeting in June 1983
and met regularly until October that year, by which time they had fin-
ished their proposal. A special meeting was held at the Menteng home
of Kiai Masykur, one of the committee members, in order to present the
proposal. Over the five or so months they had carefully examined mate-
rial from the Qur’an and the Sunnah and the Kitab Kuning in order to
find support for accepting Pancasila as NU’s asas tunggal. Their final
formulation read: ‘Islam is pluralistic and because of this implementa-
tion of Islamic teachings should be pluralistic, and this is in accordance
with the tradition of NU.’ This they saw as providing more than
enough space to allow the adoption of Pancasila without it in any way
being seen as a sell-out to the government.5
3-$%!-+,'2)3!(0!,+-!)!(#)3!%1>)3/-+1+0,
The reformists led by Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq, and backed
by their friends in the Team of Seven and the Council of 24, also argued
that NU should withdraw from party politics and return to its original
vision as enshrined in its khittah, or charter, of 1926, of being a social-
religious organisation. The phrase ‘return to the khittah of 1926’ sound-
ed grand and venerable. In reality Achmad Siddiq had first coined the
phrase as recently as 1979. The withdrawal from party politics was
based in part on a concern that NU’s political activities had distracted
it from its core business of education and religious activity. Certainly,
many argued that the politicians and technocrats loyal to Idham Chalid
paid far too little attention to these matters. But it was also based on the
realisation that, after the regime’s intervention into the affairs of PPP
via Djaelani Naro, NU had become so marginalised that it made little
sense to remain in the party. Abdurrahman and some other reformists
within the Council of 24, harking back to Nurcholish’s famous state-
ment from 1970 — ‘Islam yes, party-political Islam no!’ — also believed
that, in principle, a direct linkage between a religious organisation and
a political party was unhealthy.
@7D
In response to this proposal, Abdurrahman recollects, Kiai Masykur,
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
one of the grand old kiai from the founding generation, recounted a
story about Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari in the early days of NU.6 Kiai Masykur
explained how Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari had written an article in the mag-
azine Suara Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, several months after the forma-
tion of the organisation. In it he argued that because the kentungan (the
split cylinder struck like a gong and used in some pesantren to announce
prayer time) was not mentioned in the Hadis of the Prophet, it was
therefore haram or prohibited and should not be used to signal the time
of prayer. Like many kiai, Kiai Hasyim argued that in matters of wor-
ship traditions should be preserved and innovation confined to matters
of the social application of teaching, not basic modes of worship. Not
everyone agreed with Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, however, as even in the early
days of NU a tradition of pluralism was strong. One month later after
Kiai Hasyim’s article had been published, another senior kiai, Kiai
Fakhi, wrote an article to rebut it. He argued that Kiai Hasyim was
mistaken because the principle that was being employed in this matter
was that of qias, or reasoning and inference based on established prin-
ciples. On this basis the Southeast Asian kentungan was okay as it ful-
filled the function of drum in announcing prayer. In response to this,
Kiai Hasyim invited the ulama of Jombang to meet him at his house
and then he asked for both articles to be read aloud. When this was
done he announced to the assembly, ‘You are free to follow either opin-
ion, because both are right, but I insist that in my pesantren the kentun-
gan is not to be used’. Several months later Kiai Hasyim was invited to
attend the celebrations of Maulid Nabi, the Prophet’s birthday, in the
coastal city of Gresik. Three days before he arrived, Kiai Fakhi, who was
senior kiai in the Gresik district, distributed a letter to all the mosques
and prayer houses asking them to take down their kentungan out of
respect for Kiai Hasyim and to refrain from using them during his visit.
Kiai Maksyur suggested to the assembly gathered in his house that
this was a perfect illustration of NU’s pluralism: ‘So in NU it is usual to
have different views, and this is reflected in Pancasila, so we have to
accept Pancasila.’ Another kiai responded by saying ‘How then could
we explain why, when NU became a political party in 1953, it did not
take Pancasila as its asas tunggal?’ ‘We should then trace matters back
to the beginning and show that NU has always been pluralistic. For
example Kiai Hasyim and Kiai Wahab were constantly quarrelling.’
The reformists prevailed and decided that henceforth NU would
@8A
adopt Pancasila as its asas tunggal. They also decided that NU would no
+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
longer be a party-political organisation and that it would withdraw

from the PPP and instead return to its basic charter or khittah. They
labelled this new policy ‘return to the khittah of 1926’.
1&.),+1$"/(#/)'$(!,)!(#)!00.31!(0.)/4)3!(0!,+-!
One month later the munas or national congress of ulama was held in
the pesantren of Kiai As’ad Arifin Syamsul in Situbondo, and the pro-
posal regarding Pancasila was introduced to the broader NU communi-
ty. The munas congresses were generally held every five years, just like
the muktamar or national congresses of the entire organisation, but were
regarded as subordinate to the muktamar because they involved only the
ulama from the various religious councils throughout the NU branches
and not the organisation’s executives. Nevertheless, the munas were
generally seen as undertaking important preparatory work for the larg-
er muktamar. This was especially the case in 1983 when the ulama were
mobilising support, both for their move against Idham Chalid and the
technocrats who supported him and for their vision of reform.
Abdurrahman recalls that Kiai Tolkhah Mansur from Yogyakarta, who
had not participated in the Jakarta meetings, took the floor to address
the munas assembly saying: ‘I have my own view, I differ on this point.’7
Abdurrahman immediately walked up to him and said in Arabic, ‘Kiai,
please use Arabic rather than Indonesian’. ‘But why in Arabic?’ ‘Please
just do it.’ Abdurrahman was aware that military intelligence agents
from Bakin (a central intelligence agency run by the military) were
attending the meeting and carefully following every point of the dis-
cussion. He was concerned that if Kiai Tolkhah Mansur launched into
a long critique of Pancasila it might lead to negative reports being filed
about him. Fortunately, they could be quite confident that if they
employed Arabic none of the intelligence agents (who were generally,
at that time, recruited from among abangan and non-Muslims and cer-
tainly had not received a pesantren education) could follow their discus-
sion. Abdurrahman recalls that they launched into an earnest but polite
debate that ran from 10 o’clock that evening until 4 o’clock the follow-
ing morning, when finally Kiai Tolkhah said, ‘Okay, I can accept that,
you’ve proved it to me’. Abdurrahman had been arguing that because
Pancasila reflected the basic principles of Islam there was no need to
have an Islamic state. Kiai Tolkhah replied, ‘As Islam is more complete
than Pancasila, of course Islam covers both the hereafter as well as this
@8@
world’. Abdurrahman responded: ‘Exactly, Pancasila is only concerned
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
with this world.’ He says that he had in mind the idea of Pancasila act-
ing as a kind of civil religion but did not dare use the term because he
knew that it would certainly be misunderstood by the assembled ulama.
Once Kiai Tolkhah had accepted Abdurrahman’s point of view, he
recalls, the assembly quickly came to a point of consensus about accept-
ing Pancasila. Abdurrahman took the initiative and explained that,
according to Kiai Masykur, in 1945 Kiai Wahid Hasyim had invited sev-
enty ulama to meet at Pesantren Tebuireng to discuss the formulation of
the constitution. They listed seventy principles and presented them to
Sukarno, who used these principles and others to formulate Pancasila.8
‘So on this basis we have to accept that there will be no end to discussions
about these things. This might be the way of religious discussions but it
is no way to run a state.’ It was nearly 4 am when the discussion con-
cluded, and the assembled ulama proceeded directly with the Subuh
prayer. Abdurrahman and Kiai Tolkhah embraced each other warmly in
front of the assembly. There was a sense of relief and euphoria that this
difficult question had finally been dealt with and that the organisation
was now moving forward. There was also a sense of relief that a possible
confrontation with the government had been avoided and that the ulama
had been able to resolve matters without compromising their principles.
After the discussion, Abdurrahman recalls, one old and influential
kiai approached Abdurrahman and said, ‘Ah, we remember Kiai Wahid
and Kiai Bisri. You remind us of these two’. Abdurrahman politely
asked, ‘Did you understand what we were debating?’ ‘Yes, well, about
half of it. But in any case it is good to have these things debated because
for a long time we have been stagnant and have not been able to talk
about important things while under the leadership of Idham Chalid.
This is not the way to conduct an organisation. You should be the next
chairman.’ Abdurrahman responded, ‘No don’t ask me to do that. I’m
happy with my life the way it is’. ‘Yes but this can be arranged.’ In the
following months the senior kiai lobbied for Abdurrahman to be made
national chairman. Kiai Achmad Siddiq, who had been Kiai Wahid
Hasyim’s secretary until the time of his death in 1953, had followed the
debate with some apprehension. After it was all over he embraced
Abdurrahman and, overcome with emotion, said: ‘You know,
Durrahman, in my view you are like your father. I knew your father for
a long time, I knew the way he thought, what he thought about NU,
and I think you are right, you are like him in so many ways.’
@86
Part of the reason for the relief of the kiai at formulating a response
+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
to Pancasila was that they were no longer on a collision course with a

government that was steadily ratcheting up pressure against Islamic ele-
ments that it judged to be recalcitrant. In September 1984 the military
savagely put down a protest in the Jakarta port district of Tanjung
Priok. The Muslim protest was, in part, directed against Chinese busi-
ness activity in the port district and appears to have been fuelled by a
resentment based on socio-economic differences. It allegedly started
after soldiers rudely entered a local mosque without stopping to remove
their shoes. Information about the incident was suppressed, but critics
of the government believed that as many as several hundred people had
been killed. Those killed were said to be members of extremist Islamic
cell groups and were labelled as being dangerous radicals. There is good
reason for believing that in fact the military had provoked the con-
frontation and fomented the violence in order to make an example of
the Tanjung Priok group and to warn other Islamic groups not to resist
the government.
Abdurrahman recalls that, shortly after the Tanjung Priok violence,
Benny Murdani approached him and spoke about his anxiety about
Islamic extremism. Abdurrahman was struck by the fact that General
Murdani had contacted him and not other, more senior, kiai, and inter-
preted this as a sign that the government was backing him to become a
future leader of NU. Even though he was close to Kiai Achmad Siddiq,
he did not tell him about this encounter and kept the matter to him-
self.9 Over the next twelve months Abdurrahman’s standing in NU
went from strength to strength. By late 1984, in the run-up to the
national congress of NU in Situbondo, he had become something of a
celebrity and he was invited to speak throughout Java, Sumatra and
Sulawesi.
As the much anticipated congress drew near, Mahmud Djunaidi, an
influential reformist and member of the Team of Seven, approached
Gus Dur and said: ‘We will make you chairman of NU.’ Abdurrahman
recalls that he replied: ‘Okay, but I would like the liberty to choose my
own leadership team — just elect the Rais Aam and myself.’ But when
the congress came, Kiai As’ad Arifin Syamsul, in whose pesantren they
were meeting, said that he would form a commission composed of him-
self and six others who would decide on the composition of the new
leadership group. In suggesting this he was invoking the historical
example of the election of Islam’s third Caliph twelve centuries before,
@87
an image that sat well with NU ulama fed up with the reign of tech-
/()1&.)"%+(9)/4)0&!(:.2)@D=6G@D=8
nocrats. Abdurrahman agreed, thinking, he explains, that it would be a
mere formality, and gave him his list of preferred members for the cen-
tral leadership of NU. The list was then signed by Idham on the left
corner, by Munawir Sjadzali in the middle and by Abdurrahman on the
right corner. After the list had been through such a process,
Abdurrahman expected that it would go forward unchanged.
Very early on the last day of the muktamar, after the assembly had
formally adopted the decision of the munas regarding Pancasila and
NU’s return to its khittah of 1926, Abdurrahman drove to the town of
Pasir Putih, fifty kilometres away, to meet with Idham Chalid in his
hotel. He arrived shortly before dawn in order to have one final meet-
ing with Idham and asked him whether there were any alterations that
he wanted to make to the list. ‘Please write any alterations on this and
sign it.’ Idham wrote in a new name, for the treasurer’s post, and signed
the paper again. Abdurrahman returned to Situbondo at around 10 am,
stopping to talk with Kiai As’ad in his room where he gave him the
countersigned list that was to guide the electoral college in formulating
the new leadership team. Abdurrahman returned to his room and slept.
At 1 pm he was awakened in time to join the plenary meeting under
the great canvas pavilion erected for the muktamar. Kiai As’ad had
already met with the six other members of the commission. After half
an hour of waiting they appeared before the assembly. Kiai As’ad asked
someone to read the names of NU’s new central leadership. It was a
completely different set of names from the list that Abdurrahman had
signed. Virtually all of Idham’s men had been excluded and replaced
with men of Kiai As’ad’s choosing. Abdurrahman stood up to protest,
but Mahmud Djunaidi said: ‘Please sit down, please accept it, otherwise
it will be a real fight, a bitter fight.’ Abdurrahman replied, ‘Okay, but
you had better have a talk with Idham’. Idham was phoned; he was
already in Surabaya. He said, ‘Please tell Abdurrahman not to worry.
We won’t do anything to contradict him openly, and there will be no
fight’.10
In leaving matters to Kiai As’ad, Abdurrahman had clearly made a
major political blunder. As expected, the prickly kiai, who had for the
past two years led the fight against Idham Chalid’s leadership, did
back Abdurrahman, but his last-minute changes to the leadership
list were unnecessarily antagonistic to Idham, since virtually no one
from Idham’s group was included in the new team. In a culture where
@88
confrontation is studiously avoided wherever possible and compromise

+,-!')!(#)'/#.%(+1>
is the cornerstone of politics, Kiai As’ad’s vindictive treatment of his old

foe was clearly as unwise as it was unnecessary. As he was soon to dis-
cover, Kiai As’ad’s wilfulness wiped out, in one move, all of
Abdurrahman’s careful efforts in fence-mending with Idham, making
the difficult task of reforming NU that much more difficult.
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The ascension of the duo of Abdurrahman Wahid and Achmad Siddiq
to the national leadership of NU was warmly welcomed by many with-
in NU, some of whom would have agreed on little else. Many pesantren
students and young graduates were concerned that NU and its pesantren
system risked being left behind by modern society to eventually become
quaintly antiquarian and anachronistic.
Critics of the former executive chairman, Idham Chalid, felt that
under his leadership the core activities of the organisation had been neg-
lected while at the same time little had been done to check the erosion
of its political interests within PPP. They rejected the people around
Idham as being urban politicians little interested in NU’s social, educa-
tional and religious activities. After all, they argued, NU, whose name
meant the awakening of the ulama, was supposed to be a jamiah diniyah,
a religious organisation — run ‘by the ulama and for the ulama’. At the
same time, Idham’s apparent unwillingness to stand up to the calculated
marginalisation of NU by PPP chairman Djaelani Naro incensed many
ulama, not least those, like Kiai As’ad Syamsul Arifin, whose patrimoni-
al prestige and power depended on political connections.
@8=
For many of the pesantren students and young graduates, however,

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
these concerns were outweighed by the concern that NU and its

pesantren system risked being left behind by modern society – much
like America’s Amish and Shaker communities. Unlike most of their
seniors before them, this generation had the choice of matriculating
from the pesantren to modern tertiary studies and careers in the cities
and turning their backs on meaningful involvement within NU. If NU
was in a terminal state of decay, they reasoned, what incentive was there
to follow in the footsteps of their fathers and grandfathers and invest in
an organisation without an exciting future? For many young people
within NU in the 1970s it was easy to believe that the process of decay
was running swiftly within the organisation and that within a genera-
tion NU would be reduced to an ineffectual curiosity on the periphery
of modern Indonesian society. For such youth it was only the growing
influence in the early 1980s of reformist younger ulama, led by
Abdurrahman and Siddiq, that held out any hope that the organisation
might once again play a central role in Indonesian life. Consequently,
for those who looked for reform, and a creative and meaningful
response to the challenges of modernity within NU, the 1984 mukta-
mar marked the beginning of a new era.
It was not just those interested in intellectual and cultural reform,
however, who welcomed the new leaders. The political pragmatists and
many of the more intellectually conservative ulama who had been fear-
ful of confrontation with the government were relieved that the
reformists had succeeding in formulating a response to Pancasila that
saw NU accepting the non-sectarian state philosophy without feeling
that it was compromising its religious principles. They were relieved
when President Soeharto and his government welcomed NU’s new
leadership team and felt comforted that the organisation appeared set
to enter into a period of peaceful coexistence with the military-backed
and Islam-phobic regime.
For many within NU, the decision to back the reformers at the 1983
munas and the 1984 muktamar at the expense of Idham Chalid and
NU’s involvement with PPP was also motivated by another desire: to
have revenge on the people within PPP, both modernist politicians and
some of NU’s own people, including Idham, who were seen to have
undermined NU’s interests within the party. Some NU ulama were
angry with what they saw to be the domination of NU by the non-
ulama technocrats and politicians on the Tanfidziyah. For others the
@8D
motivation to support the reformists was more a desire to recapture the
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
support of the regime so that they could once again enjoy the business
benefits that flowed from good relations with the government. There
was also a realisation that continued opposition from the regime was
having a detrimental impact on the organisation’s enrolments and that
NU had already suffered from steady erosion of its mass base. For NU’s
younger and more reform-minded members, exiting from PPP and
breaking with party politics was essential if NU was to regain its vital-
ity and its vision for social, educational and religious activity.1
Abdurrahman was convinced that it was important for NU to break
with PPP for two related reasons. Firstly he felt that, given the regime’s
treatment of NU within PPP and its determination to block all politi-
cal dissent, it was pointless for NU to remain within the party. It was
far better, he felt, for NU to focus its energies on its civil society activ-
ities. Secondly, Abdurrahman was convinced that it was unhealthy to
have direct links between religious associations and political parties. It
was not that Islam (or any of Indonesia’s other religions) should not
seek to influence political developments; rather, direct involvement of
religious bodies in party politics threatened to limit the freedom of con-
science of their members and to encourage sectarianism within politics.
He was mindful of the deleterious effects of the debate over the ‘seven
words’ of the Jakarta Charter in the 1950s and 1970s, and of the obses-
sion of many conservatives, both modernists and traditionalists, with
making the state ‘more Islamic’ (or demanding that the state ‘make’ its
citizens better Muslims). He was also painfully aware that NU antago-
nism to PKI in the political sphere had spilled over into unspeakable
violence during the anti-communist pogrom of 1965-66.2
Many influential individuals and groups within NU were, at best,
ambivalent about new leaders; one such person was Kiai As’ad Arifin
Syamsul. Although he had led a charge on behalf of the ulama in the
Syuriah against former chairman Idham Chalid, he was not so moti-
vated by reformist ideals as by self-interest. He was concerned that
Idham had caused the stagnation of the organisation, but he was even
more concerned that Idham had not directed towards Pesantren
Situbondo and Kiai As’ad the amount of government largesse that
As’ad felt that he, as one of NU’s most senior ulama, rightly deserved.
Kiai As’ad’s vision was not the same as that of the progressives whose
campaign against Idham Chalid he had backed. At the eleventh hour
As’ad had broken faith with both Abdurrahman and Idham by direct-
@BA
ing the electoral college to ignore the earlier negotiated leadership list.
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
In replacing all of Idham’s men with men of his own choosing it may
have seemed that he had advantaged Abdurrahman. Nothing could be
further from the truth: not only did the switch leave the former chair-
man doubly antagonistic towards Abdurrahman, but it also left
Abdurrahman with a deeply flawed and fundamentally divided leader-
ship team.
Abdurrahman’s response was simply to work outside his leadership
team. This suited his independent and, some would say, stubborn frame
of mind. Nevertheless, he found the experience of working with a par-
tially antagonistic central board, which was divided in both the
Tanfidziyah and the Syuriah between supporters and critics, to be
fatiguing and discouraging. To compound matters, within a few months
of the muktamar concluding, Idham Chalid, aggrieved by his lack of
representation on the new board, launched into a low-key but unre-
lenting campaign against Abdurrahman.
Relations within NU’s new central leadership may have been frac-
tious, but at least the organisation was now enjoying a period of open-
ness and good relations with the Soeharto regime.
1&.)(.*)/%#.%)%.:+'.),$33/%1,)!"#$%%!&'!(
In 1984 the government, and even more so the military that backed it,
was deeply sceptical of political Islam. In the 1960s and early 1970s the
regime had tended to overlook NU, which it regarded as moderate and
pragmatic, and had focused its critical attention on the modernists who
were seeking to revive Masyumi in a new guise. In fact during the early
years of the New Order the military had tended to see NU as an ally.
By the early 1980s, however, the regime was defensive and on edge and
more anxious than ever about the potential for Islam to channel dissent,
and it regarded even NU with suspicion. There were several reasons for
this. One was that Indonesian society was experiencing the beginnings
of a revival of interest in Islam, and students, frustrated with a decade
of government repression of political dissent on the campuses, were
increasingly turning to mosques and Islamic study cells as forums for
political discussion and activism. Another was that the PPP, in which
NU played a major role, had performed strongly in the 1977 and 1982
elections. Although Golkar’s position was never in doubt, when the
PPP gained 28 per cent of the overall vote in 1982 — only a slight
decrease in the 29 per cent it had gained in 1977, despite increased
@B@
intimidation and intervention — it was clear that political Islam repre-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
sented its greatest threat. The New Order regime had watched the
development of progressive, liberal Islamic thought by young intellec-
tuals like Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid with great
interest. It welcomed the emergence of this new expression of Islam
with its emphasis on pluralism and its deep ideological commitment to
separating ‘church and state’, especially when it began to make inroads
into NU. Consequently, after the victories of the reformists at the 1983
munas and the 1984 muktamar, that saw the adoption of Pancasila as
NU’s asas tunggal and the withdrawal of NU from party politics, the
Soeharto regime welcomed the new Abdurrahman–Siddiq leadership.
By the 1980s the authoritarian character of the Soeharto regime was
firmly established. The Malari riots of 1974 marked a turning-point
from an ambiguous semi-liberalism to an authoritarian regime with
totalitarian aspirations. Full-blown totalitarianism was never attempt-
ed, much less achieved, for a number of reasons: the fundamental ori-
entation of the regime was pragmatic, focused on maximising
rent-seeking ‘business’ opportunities; the civilian and military elite were
fractured into numerous competing elements; and incompetence
(including ‘intentional incompetence’) often got the better of the con-
spiratorial ambitions of the security apparatus. Nevertheless, without
the co-operation of elements within the regime’s ruling elite it was sim-
ply not possible to operate on a national level. With perhaps as many as
35 million ‘members’, NU (followed by Muhammadiyah) possessed the
most extensive social network outside the Indonesian military. Soeharto
knew that the organisation’s sheer size could make it, if sufficiently
antagonised, impossible to control, even with his considerable
resources. Consequently, heavy-handed intervention into NU affairs by
the regime, of the sort that had worked so well in PPP and PDI, was
risky. At the same time the political potential of the organisation was a
continuing source of worry to a regime which was becoming steadily
more intolerant of any expressions of dissent and which saw militant
Islamism as its greatest threat.
The success of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid and their
Team of Seven at the 1983 munas was a matter of great interest to the
regime. Especially interesting were two decisions: the recommendation
that NU officials no longer be permitted to hold office within political
parties, which in effect withdrew NU from practical politics; and the
adoption by NU of Pancasila as its asas tunggal, or sole foundation. To
@B6
Benny Murdani and his colleagues it seemed that, if the reformers

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
could prove as successful at the following year’s muktamar as they had

been at the munas, the regime’s greatest anxieties about NU would be
resolved overnight.
It was not that Idham Chalid’s loyalty was in question — he had
proved a faithful friend of the New Order regime from before its incep-
tion, and even in the 1980s continued to demonstrate his support by
allowing PPP leader Djaelani Naro to ride roughshod over NU’s inter-
ests. By 1982, however, it was clear to people such as Benny Murdani
that Idham’s declining popularity meant that he was rapidly approach-
ing the end of his usefulness to the regime. Consequently, Benny and
his colleagues in the security apparatus did their best to facilitate the
rise of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid. It is impossible to
quantify the degree to which the security apparatus was able to influ-
ence the leadership vote at the 1984 muktamar. There is little doubt,
however, that the perception that the regime was supportive of Achmad
Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid was significant in shaping attitudes
within NU.
+,-!'+0)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)#.3!%1'.(1)/4)%.-+:+/$,
!44!+%,
A number of substantial advantages flowed from NU’s improved rela-
tions with the regime. Not least was a return to close co-operation with
the Department of Religious Affairs. NU had long regarded the
department proprietarily, and not simply because it wanted to retain
control of official culture. The department was an important source of
employment for the largely NU graduates of the pesantren and State
Islamic Institutes. Such mundane concerns continued to prevail within
NU, but for the reformists control of the Department of Religious
Affairs also meant the ability to influence the State Islamic Institutes
and secure a space for progressive intellectuals to write and teach unim-
peded. In this they had the regime’s support. It had actively encouraged
the development of liberal Islamic thought when Mukti Ali was min-
ister in the 1970s and had seen plenty to persuade it that fostering this
sort of tolerant non-party-political Islam was its interests. Now, with
the liberals on the ascendancy within NU, it was more than happy to
facilitate their influence.
In 1983, not long before Abdurrahman became executive chairman
of NU, a new Minister for Religious Affairs was installed. The reform-
@B7
minded pesantren graduate, Munawir Sjadzali, was a welcome appoint-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
ment. In the late 1940s he had been one of the group of young men
who had been mentored by Wahid Hasyim, often attending the meet-
ings in Wahid Hasyim’s Jakarta home where a young Abdurrahman had
been called upon by his father to serve tea. (And occasionally to tie up
the shoelaces of those who had nodded off to sleep — at their first for-
mal meeting in their new roles, Munawir reminded Abdurrahman that
he had once been one of his victims.) Munawir Sjadzali was ideally
suited for the post of religious affairs minister. He was by nature mod-
erate and liberal, and a strong advocate of tolerance and inclusiveness.
Although a modernist, he was familiar with the pesantren world and
with classical Islamic scholarship. He was also an admirer of the neo-
modernist ideas of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid and
supported the progressive stance taken by Rector Harun Nasution of
IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah. After becoming minister he moved quickly
to encourage the sending of promising young IAIN staff (many of
whom were educated in NU pesantren) to undertake postgraduate
research degrees in Western universities, preferably in the social sci-
ences. He was a strong advocate for one of the central concerns of neo-
modernism, namely contextualised ijtihad, an interpretive approach to
the Qur’an that was mindful of the unique cultural circumstances that
prevailed during the Prophet’s time, and the consequent need to make
appropriate adjustments when applying Qur’anic teaching to contem-
porary society.3
Munawir Sjadzali directed his energies towards the reform of the
State Islamic Institute system. Such reform directly benefited NU
because the institutes offered the main opportunity of tertiary educa-
tion for pesantren graduates. Many of these graduates, in turn, went on
to play decisive roles within NU. In fact, many of the young reformers
who had been part of the Council of 24 and the Team of Seven who
had backed Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq were graduates of State
Islamic Institutes. And now eleven of them were serving in NU’s new
central leadership team.
3!(0!,+-!
In January 1985, following Abdurrahman’s December 1984 muktamar
victory, Soeharto had indicated his support for Abdurrahman by mak-
ing him an official indoctrinator of Pancasila, a Mangala Nasional. In
practice this meant that Abdurrahman was drafted onto the national
@B8
board responsible for formulating the state position on Pancasila and

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
the education of Indonesian schoolchildren about Pancasila. Like many

aspects of Abdurrahman’s relationship with the state, this appointment
was strategically important but problematic for both parties. The sup-
port of Abdurrahman Wahid, son of Wahid Hasyim and grandson of
Hasyim Asy’ari, and now chair of NU, would boost the legitimacy of
Soeharto’s Pancasila initiatives in the eyes of the Islamic community. At
the same time, however, this appointment further advanced
Abdurrahman’s push to influence the Pancasila discourse and empha-
sise the tolerance and acceptance of social pluralism inherent in
Pancasila. Prior to the entry of NU liberals the state enjoyed virtually
total control of the discourse. Now Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq
were able to turn the debate to their own advantage, reinterpreting
Pancasila for their own purposes. In Abdurrahman’s hands Pancasila
came to represent a kind of civil religion that simultaneously promoted
enlightenment values, including democracy and accountable gover-
nance, and protected freedom of belief for the individual.
NU’s improved relationship with the government was complement-
ed by an increasingly good relationship with the Indonesian armed
forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia — ABRI). ABRI,
more than any other element in the regime, was cautious of political
Islam and worried about the potential for extremism to erupt into
widespread disorder. By Abdurrahman’s own account, even before
becoming chairman he had enjoyed a good working relationship with
the military intelligence chief Benny Murdani. For Abdurrahman the
relationship was not just a means of influencing thinking within the
military, and occasionally trouble-shooting when problems arose at the
local level. It also provide useful feedback, enabling him to gauge how
far he could go in his criticism of the regime before risking confronta-
tion. This was to prove particularly useful as the decade advanced.
Abdurrahman sought to engage with Soeharto while simultaneously
maintaining a critical stand on social issues. For example, Abdurrahman
was outspoken in his criticism of the government’s handling of the con-
troversial Kedung Ombo dam project in Central Java, funded by the
World Bank. He was also a vigorous defender of Indonesia’s ethnic and
religious minorities. Nevertheless, he was also at pains to maintain good
relations with the president. Initially this approach of constructive
engagement worked well, and Soeharto appeared to welcome many of
Abdurrahman’s initiatives.
@BB
In the lead-up to the 1987 general elections Abdurrahman became
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
increasingly critical of PPP, which was now dominated by modernists.
This earned him the ire of many conservatives within NU who regret-
ted NU’s withdrawal from the party, but probably did much to cement
his good relations with Soeharto. Indeed, following the 1987 elections
Abdurrahman was appointed to the MPR by Golkar. Given that the
MPR, which met only once every five years, was little more than a rub-
ber stamp, the appointment was essentially symbolic, but the symbol-
ism was important.
4!'+->)-+4.
In 1987 Abdurrahman and Nuriyah shifted house again. Their new
home was still a modest rented property and it was still a long drive
from central Jakarta and the NU headquarters, but it did offer more
room to raise four girls. By then Inayah was getting ready for school
and there was no longer a baby in the house. Alissa and Yenny had
already commenced high school, while Anita was nearing the end of
her primary school years. They were, in many respects, a close family,
but neither the girls nor Nuriyah saw as much of Abdurrahman as
they would have liked.
With Abdurrahman’s promotion to the chair of NU, life had become
steadily more comfortable. The position did not attract a formal
stipend, and the responsibilities that went with the job left little time
for earning money through speaking or writing, but the family had
begun to benefit from the philanthropic assistance of patrons and were
able to settle down to a less precarious existence. Even though some of
his backers included wealthy Chinese businessmen, the family still lived
relatively modestly. Support from Chinese and other businessmen was
mostly channelled into NU and pesantren projects. Abdurrahman had
little interest in money and no great desire to improve his standard of
living; it was not uncommon for him to give money away as soon as it
was given to him. Indeed, when donations were given to him for the
work of NU he often passed them to his aides to disburse without stop-
ping to count what had been given, much less record the transaction.
Unfortunately, for someone who could be a sharp judge of character
and discerning observer when he put his mind to it, Abdurrahman was
often surprisingly quick to trust those who sought his attention.
Whether this was a negligent approach to management on his part,
or a generosity of spirit that would give anyone a chance (and even a
@B;
second or third chance) to prove themselves, the result was often that
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
his trust in those around him was betrayed.

Since moving to Jakarta he had become busy with speaking engage-
ments and NU business. After becoming chairman of NU he was busier
than ever, often coming home late at night after meetings and travel-
ling outside Java as often as twice a week. Even when he was home,
much of his time was taken up with an endless stream of visitors. At
some stage most of the major figures in national life — cabinet minis-
ters, politicians, army generals, religious leaders of all persuasions, intel-
lectuals, journalists, diplomats — made the long trip south to talk with
Abdurrahman in his front room. Many were frequent visitors. But it
was not just the power-brokers and opinion-shapers who made their
way to his house. Almost every week a late-night knock on the door
would announce someone seeking something, an ordinary Indonesian
whom he had never met before, perhaps a peasant farmer or poor
widow who had travelled across Java by train and bus to see him.
Sometimes, not infrequently, they needed money, perhaps for them-
selves or perhaps to complete a new village mosque. Sometimes they
wanted advice. Sometimes they wanted an auspicious name for their
new-born child. Seldom were they turned away.
It was hardly surprising that Nuriyah and the girls looked for more
from Abdurrahman than they were getting. But it was not just his busy
schedule that was the problem. Abdurrahman, the extroverted rhetori-
cian and gregarious joker, found it difficult to express his love to those
close to him. While he was no distant patriarch or stern disciplinarian,
he was uncomfortable expressing his feelings to his wife or daughters.
There was no doubt that he enjoyed their company, but he did not do
as much to demonstrate it as he could have. It is possible that his own
experience growing up had not equipped him to express his feelings.
While Abdurrahman had enjoyed a close relationship with his father,
his father had been a man of his time and had trouble displaying affec-
tion and intimacy with his son. The two spent a lot of time with each
other but Wahid Hasyim spoke little to his son of his feeling for him.
At the age of twelve, Abdurrahman had suffered the loss of his father;
the following year he had left home and moved to Yogyakarta and then
Magelang and Jombang to study. Consequently, as a teenager he had
grown up more or less independently. He remained forever beholden to
his mother, but his relationships with his siblings were more distant.
Even his relationship with Nuriyah had developed mostly through
@B<
correspondence, with little occasion for intimacy until after they had
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
known each other for over a decade. And even after they were married
Abdurrahman still found it easier to express himself to Nuriyah by
writing her letters. Invariably, if they had an argument or misunder-
standing the resolution would come through an exchange of notes.
When he wanted to apologise or tell Nuriyah how he felt, he would pen
a letter and tuck it under her pillow.4 All of this had left him ill-pre-
pared for fatherhood. It was not that he was a bad father; in fact as
Alissa and Yenny were growing up in the early days in Jombang he had
been very involved with home and family. He had helped Nuriyah with
household work and changed and fed the children, things that many of
his peers would never have thought of doing. Nevertheless, by the time
Yenny was in high school she began to feel that there was something
missing in her relationship with her father, although she knew it was
not a lack of affection by either of them.
When still in early high school Yenny wrote a long essay about her
admiration and love for her father. She placed this essay in an envelope
and left it on the table near the telephone so that he would find it. One
day she decided to take the initiative and try to draw him out. She sat
beside him on a couch in the family room and awkwardly reached out
her hand to place it in his. He responded with a great degree of initial
reserve but seemed to understand what she was trying to do, and indeed
from that point on he began to try to display his affection for his fam-
ily more than he had done in the past. Yenny and Alissa and Anita per-
sisted in trying to get him to become more demonstrative by giving him
cuddles and hugs, and over time he did become more open in his dis-
play of affection for them. By the time Inayah was in school, he was
much more comfortable showing his feelings. He was no less busy,
though, and the girls still resented the fact that the entire world, or so
it seemed, had more call on his time than they did.5
0/(1%/?.%,>
Until she had gone to high school Yenny had not really stopped to
think about what it was her father did, or who he was. Upon entering
high school in Jakarta she began to understand, partly because of the
strangely respectful way in which fellow students and teachers received
her, that as Chairman-General of NU her father was an important pub-
lic figure. Also, at about this time he began to confide in Yenny and her
sisters that his public role entailed a degree of risk and that there existed
@B=
a real possibility of his being incarcerated. He told them that they

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
should be prepared for whatever might happen. He had been arrested

many times during the campaign for the 1982 general elections, as we
have seen, but was only ever kept overnight. Now he had reason to
believe that he might face much more significant opposition.
When Abdurrahman became chair of NU he had enjoyed a signifi-
cant honeymoon period with the Soeharto regime, but he knew that it
would not last. Before his first five-year term was over his critical
stance on many social and political issues would see Soeharto’s
patience wearing thin. Nevertheless, he calculated that Soeharto would
be reluctant to turn against him for fear of provoking a harsh response
from NU’s millions of members. In theory at least, Soeharto controlled
every aspect of Indonesian society. The military’s territorial warfare
system was intended to ensure that scarcely a single village or neigh-
bourhood in Indonesia was free from monitoring and control through
a comprehensive network of surveillance and intimidation. Even
though the system seldom worked quite as comprehensively as theory
suggested, there was little doubt about the regime’s ability to crush dis-
sent. The territorial warfare system was ramshackle in places and not
nearly as well-resourced as the military would have liked, but it still
represented an unparalleled social network enveloping virtually the
entire archipelago. The only entities able to rival this system were the
mass-based Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah. NU, with
its organic network of pesantren and ulama based in the villages, and its
tens of millions of members, was beyond even ABRI’s capacity to con-
trol. Abdurrahman also believed that Soeharto would be reluctant to
move against him for fear of having to deal with a less moderate
replacement. Soeharto was unhappy with Abdurrahman’s dissident
views but seems to have recognised that in most respects he was a
moderate and was opposed to revolutionary methods. In that sense
they shared a common desire to avoid social unrest and a common
aversion to Islamism.
From the outset of his tenure as executive chairman of NU,
Abdurrahman was often involved in open criticism of the regime’s poli-
cies. He used his public profile to help other activists (most of them less
known and more vulnerable to government intimidation and repres-
sion) to bring the message to the government that it needed to rethink
its callous approach to compensating villagers displaced by the con-
struction of the Kedung Ombo dam. The project was widely criticised
@BD
on a number of grounds. Some held that it was environmentally unten-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
able. Others argued that the confiscation of the land of peasant farm-
ers was unjust and improper, particularly as they had not been
successfully rehoused. The use of part of the confiscated land to build a
luxury golf course was seen as further evidence of the self-serving
nature of the Soeharto regime. Abdurrahman suggested to some friends
in NGOs that they write to the World Bank outlining their concerns
and asking the World Bank to be more responsible in its management
of such projects.6 Although the letter was Abdurrahman’s initiative, its
final form was somewhat different from what he envisaged, being
strongly worded and personally critical of Soeharto. Soeharto demand-
ed, and received, an apology from Abdurrahman after he had confront-
ed him over the letter. Nevertheless, the incident left many of
Abdurrahman’s critics within NU openly wondering about
Abdurrahman’s potential to be a loose cannon endangering the safety
of all within the organisation.
At the 1987 munas, several groups initiated moves to unseat
Abdurrahman at the upcoming muktamar. Many NU politicians were
angry at his attempts to undermine PPP in the 1987 government elec-
tions. Soon after this another incident occurred which was to be used
repeatedly to question his commitment, not just to NU, but to Islam
itself. According to Abdurrahman, an abangan NGO activist friend asked
his advice on how he should address public gatherings as he had trouble
in pronouncing the standard Islamic greeting, assalamu alaykum.
Abdurrahman told his friend not to feel under pressure but instead to use
the Indonesian expression selamat pagi, ‘good morning’. He explained
that the root of selamat was the same as that of the Arab word salaam and
selamat pagi conveyed the same sense as assalamu alaykum, ‘peace be upon
you’. This exchange was overheard by a journalist, who wrote it up in a
national newspaper the following day. It was then blown up by his crit-
ics, who asserted that he had advocated the dropping of assalamu
alaykum, an important identity marker for santri Muslims, replacing it
with the secular Indonesian selamat pagi. At the same time, others began
to openly question his piety on the grounds that they rarely saw him pray
or perform other ritual aspects of worship. Abdurrahman’s refusal to
defend himself emboldened his critics. Leading the charge against him
was Kiai As’ad Arifin Syamsul, who, although helping get Abdurrahman
elected in 1984, soon realised that Abdurrahman was not nearly as mal-
leable as he had hoped when he helped him replace Idham Chalid.
@;A
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
($2)(:/,)!(#)0%+1+0!-),/0+!-)!(!->,+,
Abdurrahman’s tenure at the helm of NU coincided with dramatic
changes within the organisation. It is difficult to quantify the extent
to which Abdurrahman’s leadership contributed to these changes,
but there is no doubting that many within NU believed that his
greatest contribution was in helping change the culture of tradition-
alist Islam in Indonesia.
Although Abdurrahman was, in most respects, a poor manager
and did little to reform the administration of the organisation, he did
make a great contribution to transforming its intellectual culture.
Perhaps his greatest contribution was to give people within NU, par-
ticularly young people, the confidence to explore new ideas and ini-
tiate new ventures. Despite his popularity among the organisation’s
youth, Abdurrahman avoided building direct mentor–protégé links
between himself and younger leaders. Instead, he appears to have
deliberately created an environment for them to engage in critical
discussion, without directly seeking to guide their thoughts and
actions. The younger generation, for their part, looked up to him as
a charismatic and inspirational figure who gave them a licence to try
new things and explore new ideas.
Following the accession of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman to
the leadership of NU, a variety of new and largely autonomous
NGOs sprang up within the NU community. These new organisa-
tions were mostly the work of students and recent graduates, and
they emerged more or less spontaneously across Java. It would appear
that, in this respect at least, Abdurrahman’s failure to introduce a
professional style of management across the NU network was not
entirely a bad thing. In comparison with NU, Muhammadiyah, for
example, was run along more modern lines and this, together with
Muhammadiyah’s membership largely of urban-based professionals,
civil servants and business people with relatively good incomes, saw
it make progress in the area of community development.
Muhammadiyah members are rightly proud of the many schools,
orphanages, health clinics and hospitals that it has established. But
in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when so much NGO
activity was occurring in NU circles, Muhammadiyah produced vir-
tually no new NGOs. Muhammadiyah leaders acknowledge that the
spontaneous emergence of NGOs would never happen within
@;@
Muhammadiyah, where everything is centrally planned and closely
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
vetted by a central board. The absence of strongly centralised organ-
isational structure within NU seems to have encouraged initiative
and creativity.
Most of the NGOs started by young pesantren graduates, often with
the assistance of progressive ulama, were not formally linked with NU,
but they played a significant role in transforming the culture of the
organisation. Leading the way were the NGOs: P3M, Lakpesdam and
LKPSM in Jakarta, and LKiS in Yogyakarta.7 With the exception of
P3M, these were all initiated in the second half of the 1980s during the
first term of Abdurrahman’s leadership of NU. In the 1990s NU youth
set up more NGOs in cities across Java, such as eLSAD in Surabaya. In
some cases Abdurrahman was directly involved in the establishment of
these NGOs, but many sprang up without any assistance from NU’s
central board.
One NGO that Abdurrahman helped to form was P3M.
Abdurrahman, along with a number of colleagues, decided to establish
an organisation outside NU to encourage key young members to reflect
critically on the role of pesantren and community development. This
approach, they felt, would more effectively encourage initiative and
independent thinking than if NU tried to do it itself. To a significant
extent their approach succeeded.
After P3M’s foundation, Masdar Farid Mas’udi, a promising young
scholar, was selected to manage its day-to-day affairs.8 He wrote a
book which argued that zakat, the giving of alms and tithes, did not
necessarily have to take place in the manner assumed by Muslim soci-
ety. Masdar’s radical suggestion was that a modern taxation system in
a welfare state might be able to replace zakat. In other words, if
Muslims paid their taxes and those taxes were responsibly used for
welfare, the paying of taxes could be considered a religious duty and
fulfilment of zakat. In a society in which the paying of taxes was fre-
quently avoided, this proposal was not without merit. Nevertheless, it
was widely criticised.9
P3M was one of only a few NGOs with which Abdurrahman had
direct links, and over time, his day-to-day links with even this NGO
were reduced. He often remarked that his distance from NU youth
was a deliberate ploy to encourage them to think independently. This
was a convenient excuse for somebody who, at the best of times, was
neither inclined towards teamwork nor given to maintaining
@;6
relationships in an organised and carefully planned fashion.

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
Whatever the cause, it appeared that NU youth, more than almost

any other group of Indonesian youth, demonstrated a high degree of
independent and critical thinking. And this critical thinking certain-
ly did not exclude sharp and rigorous criticism of their much-loved
and admired chairman.
Abdurrahman’s writing and public addresses were studied closely by
NU youth. Abdurrahman’s work, together with that of progressive
thinkers like Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi, seemed to allow
them fresh licence to engage in critical approaches to re-examining
Islamic thought in Indonesia.
Major reform of the pesantren system had begun in the 1970s and
continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms focused on
transforming the culture of teaching and learning within the pesantren,
through changes both to the curriculum and to teaching styles. These
efforts were broadly successful in closing the gap between the quality of
education on offer in the best pesantren and that available in good sec-
ular schools, to the point that students in the more progressive pesantren
were often not only more disciplined than their secular school peers but
also more capable of independent thought. To a significant extent these
reforms were encouraged, or accelerated, by Abdurrahman’s leadership
within NU. One of the practical results of these reforms was that many
young members were able to graduate from pesantren and proceed
directly to university studies. Many others entered the IAIN, and con-
siderable numbers proceeded from there to undertake higher degree
studies in Western universities. Making this possible was the quality
and nature of education in the IAIN; although variable from campus to
campus, it was often better than that available at equivalent Islamic
institutions elsewhere in the Islamic world. Certainly, under Harun
Nasution the postgraduate program of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in
Jakarta, which drew many of the best IAIN students from across the
archipelago, was one of the best such programs in any Muslim country.
The 1980s and 1990s saw many promising young intellectuals
emerge.10 It is not accidental that the majority of new liberal Islamic
thinkers come from the ranks of pesantren graduates. Although many
modernist thinkers have emerged in Indonesia over the past two
decades, few are fluent in Arabic and hence few have intimate knowl-
edge of classical Islamic sources. Thus they are unable to make signifi-
cant, innovative contributions to Islamic thought and instead
@;7
concentrate on economics and the social sciences. Younger pesantren
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
graduates, those born in the 1960s and later, tend to strongly identify
with the progressive ideas of Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish
Madjid. Some have taken upon themselves the label of neo-modernist
or at least see themselves as representing a new approach to Islamic
thought that is neither modernist nor traditionalist.
This would be interesting in itself if it were confined to theological
thought. What has made it significant, however, is that these young lib-
eral thinkers have moved from the re-examination of Islamic thought
to examining a broader range of social issues. In short, many of these
young people have become key players in Indonesia’s developing civil
society.
LKiS and several of the other progressive Islamic NGOs became
active in writing and publishing. By the beginning of the 1990s a sur-
prisingly diverse and extensive array of critical texts could be found in
Indonesian bookshops. Besides a broad range of translations of seminal
Arabic and Western thinkers, there emerged an increasing number of
texts categorised as belonging to ‘the Islamic left’, as the Islamic pro-
gressives were sometimes styled. Interestingly, these texts not only dis-
played a progressive approach to religious thought but they also married
this with critical analysis of political and social affairs.
Central to the emergence of this new generation of intellectuals was
reform of the IAIN. The graduate faculties at the IAIN Syarif
Hidyatullah in Jakarta and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, in par-
ticular, became incubators of innovative and progressive new thought.
Interestingly, these young intellectuals did not simply become religious
functionaries, as did previous generations of graduates, but many also
became involved in the media, in teaching and in the civil service. By
the late 1990s a significant number of Indonesia’s leading journalists
and academics were pesantren graduates.
*$+$($* #+,0$,,+/():%/$3,)!(#)1&.)%.(.*!-)/4
+,-!'+0)1&/$:&1
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these changes can be directly
linked with Abdurrahman’s leadership, but there is no question that, in
the perception of many of the young people involved, his leadership was
a key factor. They point to his leadership of NU as playing a critical role
in generating an open atmosphere for progressive thought. Nevertheless,
Abdurrahman’s personal attitude to renewal of Islamic thought needs to
@;8
be placed in its historical context. He was hardly the first traditionalist

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
thinker to support the idea of tajdid, or renewal. For a long time it was
assumed that only the modernists were interested in tajdid, and that NU
was opposed to the Islamic modernist movement on principle. In fact,
many key NU leaders championed tajdid. This was particularly evident
in the first generation of leaders where Abdurrahman’s uncle Kiai
Wahab Chasbullah and his friend Kiai Mahfudz Siddiq (chairman of
NU in the 1940s and elder brother of Achmad Siddiq) were early advo-
cates of the need for renewal of Islamic thought.11 NU’s seminal thinkers
were not so much opposed to tajdid as they were concerned with defend-
ing classical Islamic scholarship and culture.
The key source of learning and guidance for traditionalist Islam,
apart from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, were the Kitab Kuning. The
Kitab Kuning is a diverse collection of texts thought essential to a basic
Islamic education. It contains books on such mundane matters as
Arabic grammar; it also includes the standard medieval commentaries
on the Qur’an and classic texts on Tasawuf, or mysticism, as well as
guides to ibadah, or ritual, and a whole range of other matters. A sec-
tion of the Kitab Kuning ‘canon’ is concerned with social matters. A dis-
tinction was normally made between the religious books dealing with
Islamic law, biographies of the Prophet Muhammad, Tasawuf, morali-
ty and the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and those deal-
ing with the so-called instrumental sciences such as astronomy, biology,
mathematics and logic.
Many of these texts were written by leading Arabic or Middle
Eastern figures in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and earlier.
Some of the writers, however, were Malay and Javanese. The texts that
related to Islamic jurisprudence and the interpretation of the Qur’an
and the Sunnah generally came from the so-called Syafi’i school or
mazhab. Of the four orthodox mazhab, the Syafi’i school was the most
influential within Indonesia. But there was a general understanding
that the work of scholars from any one of the four schools could be
profitably studied and often was. Each pesantren had its own range of
specialist expertise and the kiai were known as much for their scholar-
ship in certain texts and disciplines as they were for their personality
and other attributes. This was one of the reasons why students typical-
ly wandered from pesantren to pesantren to complete their studies.
What was interesting about the traditionalist approach to tajdid or
renewal was that it was more diverse and extensive than commonly
@;B
understood by modernists. Many modernists believed that the tradi-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
tionalists were opposed to ijtihad, or individual interpretations of the
Qur’an. To a large extent this is a misunderstanding of traditionalist
thought. It is true that many traditionalist or ulama were conservative
in their approach to ijtihad, but it is not true that they were all com-
pletely opposed to it. The misunderstanding arose partly as a result of a
preference in terminology. Many traditionalist scholars preferred to
speak of ‘making inferences’ rather than ‘developing new interpreta-
tions’, because this suggests a less radical activity. But some scholars,
including Abdurrahman’s mentor and former Rais Aam of the Syuriah,
Achmad Siddiq, spoke openly of the importance of ijtihad, as did his
brother Mahfudz Siddiq and Wahab Chasbullah before him.
Throughout the period of Abdurrahman’s leadership ijtihad was
increasingly discussed; there was a general feeling that it was a topic
that could be investigated and debated openly. Younger thinkers, in par-
ticular, were keen to discuss approaches to ijtihad.
Until the late 1980s the general approach of traditionalist ulama was
to talk of collective ijtihad. By this they meant that religious scholars
would get together and discuss critical issues in order to arrive at con-
sensus on a way forward. This approach was shaped by a general under-
standing that ijtihad was most useful and most applicable when it
related to new social phenomenon and new issues to which previous
generations of scholars had not been exposed; they therefore could not
be relied upon for guidance. Consequently, there was much discussion
about Islamic approaches to contraception, in vitro fertilisation, the
AIDS epidemic, drug-taking, sexual practices and other modern issues.
It was generally accepted that elements of these issues were wholly con-
temporary and unprecedented and therefore that developing an appro-
priate response to them required fresh initiatives in interpretation of the
Qur’an and the Sunnah.
In 1987 Masdar Mas’udi and his colleagues in P3M, together with
Abdurrahman, Achmad Siddiq and other progressive thinkers, were
instrumental in encouraging a symposium at a pesantren in
Probolinggo, East Java. This meeting was intended to provide a forum
for like-minded ulama to get together and engage in collective ijtihad.
The symposium was described as being a halakah meeting. The Arabic
word halakah means ‘circle’ and therefore implies discussion. This was
intended to invoke earlier efforts at collective ijtihad that were called
bahts al-masa’il, or ‘a discussion of books’. As it happened, this halakah
@;;
was the first of a cycle of five major halakah marking a new approach to
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
Islamic thought within NU. This development has recently been

described in detail by Djohan Effendi, who sees it as playing a central
role in driving renewal of thought within NU.12
One year later a second halakah headed by leading kiai from across
Java, including Abdurrahman, was held in Semarang in Central Java.
The theme was ‘epistemology and the nature of traditional knowledge
in pesantren’. At first glance this might seem like an esoteric topic but
it was really a bold choice, for it involved critically examining the very
basis of traditionalist knowledge and belief. Another halakah was held
in Central Java in 1989, which focused on understanding and inter-
preting the Kitab Kuning. One of the main theological innovations of
the neo-modernist movement was, as Munawir Sjadzali put it, contex-
tualised ijtihad: the development of an appreciation of the need to take
into account the historical, social and cultural contexts in which the
classical texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah were written, as well as the
current social cultural context in which the principles would be applied.
By January 1990 six halakah had been held, covering such issues as the
cultural interpretation of classical Islamic texts (Kitab Kuning) within
the context of modern Indonesian society, and the question of adher-
ence to mazhab or orthodox jurisprudential schools in a contemporary
context. These meetings resulted in the acceptance that NU scholars
would be encouraged to use the methodology of the mazhab and apply
it to new problems. This might not appear like a breakthrough, but in
effect it opened the doors for fresh approaches to interpreting the
Qur’an and the Sunnah within NU.
Throughout the 1990s the halakah meetings continued, effectively
giving birth to a new tradition within NU: meeting in halakah sympo-
siums to engage in scholarly but robust discussions about key issues, so
that the group engaged in critical reinterpretation, or ijtihad.
In all these matters it is difficult to quantify or delineate the direct
influence of Abdurrahman Wahid. There is no doubt, however, that his
leadership afforded a licence for frank and probing discussion and
served to inspire many within the organisation who now felt that they
could openly discuss and talk about critical new ideas. The effect on
younger thinkers in particular was remarkable.
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)%.(.*!-
Throughout its early history NU and the pesantren-based traditionalists
@;<
continued to produce a steady stream of interesting ulama, although
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
few of them could also be regarded as modern intellectuals. Clearly,
men such as Kiai Wahid Hasyim, Kiai Mahfudz Siddiq and Kiai
Wahab Chasbullah were significant exceptions in their day, but there
were few other traditionalist ulama who were as conversant in
European languages and ideas. Nor were there many who felt as confi-
dent in the elite circles of Jakarta society as did Wahid Hasyim. Is
Abdurrahman Wahid, then, like his father before him, simply an inter-
esting exception to the rule, or is there something in his development
which indicates that he is part of broader social change? Certainly there
was nothing unusual about a pesantren graduate being sent to the
Middle East to undertake higher studies. What was unusual about
Abdurrahman was that he approached his studies in the Middle East
in such a way as to also gain a genuine education in Western thought.
As we’ve seen in earlier chapters, this was largely the result of his own
initiative and his own strong passion to explore new ideas, whether in
religion, social science or literature.
The efflorescence of NGOs established by pesantren graduates since
the mid-1980s and the bold rethinking of Islamic thought seen in the
halakah gatherings strongly indicate change. Some identify the cause of
change as being Abdurrahman himself, that as chairman he exerted sig-
nificant influence over NU, particularly in the changing of its intellec-
tual culture. Others contend that, however intellectual Abdurrahman
may have been, his influence must be understood as part of a broader
social movement. Certainly, looking back from the vantage point of the
21st century it does appear as if Abdurrahman’s generation marked a
turning-point. His was the first generation of pesantren graduates who,
through formal or informal education, sought to synthesise traditional
Islamic learning with modern Western thought. It is also difficult to
conceive of the sort of intellectual vitality, creativity and freedom that
flourished in NU under Abdurrahman emerging in anything like the
same form or extent without his presence as its leader.
".((>2)1%>)!(#),/.&!%1/C,)+,-!'+0)1$%(
During 1987 Soeharto began to revise his previous antagonism towards
political Islam, and the modernists in particular. By 1988, speculation was
increasing about the presidential succession. Soeharto, worried about the
extent of support within the military for his re-election, began to court
other allies. He began to emphasise his ‘Muhammadiyah background’,
@;=
pointing out in speeches that he had been a teacher at a Muhammadiyah

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
school and had been raised as an adopted son in a santri household.

In 1988 General Benny Murdani was made Minister for Defence, a
‘promotion’ that effectively diminished his hold on the military by tak-
ing him out of the direct chain of command. He had enjoyed a long
twilight of power, but his relationship with Soeharto had been on the
wane for several years. Benny had angered Soeharto by criticising the
corrupt business practices of the avaricious Soeharto children and call-
ing for greater openness in political management. Until Soeharto ele-
vated him out of the post of armed forces commander, the charismatic
general had been seen as a kingmaker because of his extensive contacts
across the archipelago, and the strong degree of support for him with-
in the armed forces. A protégé of General Ali Murtopo, he rose steadi-
ly to power during the 1970s on the basis of on his commanding
influence within military intelligence circles, an influence that was to
last well into the 1990s. Nevertheless, many modernist Muslims hated
Benny because of his involvement in nefarious military intelligence
operations carried out at Soeharto’s bidding to subdue and intimidate
militant Muslims. The most significant incident was the rioting in
Tanjung Priok, the impoverished port district of Jakarta, in September
1984. Many believed that the real death toll from military intervention
numbered in the hundreds and that Benny’s intelligence operatives
had engineered the rioting in order to intimidate radical Islamic
groups.
Just as the modernists were delighted to see Soeharto break with the
Catholic general whom many had regarded as their nemesis, they also
welcomed his appointment of General Try Sutrisno to replace Benny as
head of ABRI. They were quick to interpret the switch as indicating a
sea-change within Indonesia’s political elite. The appointment of Try
marked the first time ABRI was led by a santri Muslim. What was
more, where Benny had been a behind-the-scenes shadowy manipulator
easily cast as a villain, Try had a friendly personality and boyish good
looks that made it easier for his admirers to cast him as a hero of Islam.
Whether Try was as intelligent as Benny was quite another matter, but
it is likely that his relative naivety and straightforwardness lent him
favour in the eyes of Soeharto, who by this stage was increasingly con-
cerned about dissent within the military and challenges to his authority.
In 1989 the regime passed two bills that won considerable praise
from conservative Muslims. One involved making family law ‘more
@;D
Islamic’ and strengthening the role of the religious law courts in fam-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
ily law matters. The other opened the way for religious instruction to
move into the curriculum of mainstream schools. These and other
developments were signs that Soeharto, after having repressed the
modernists for the past two decades, was now courting them. He was
seeking to shore up his power base by looking for allies outside the
armed forces. The question of the presidential succession was now
being more or less openly discussed and Soeharto was looking to
enlist the support of the modernists in order to check the power of the
military.
!"#$%%!&'!()!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>
The end of 1989 marked the end of Abdurrahman’s first five-year term
as NU chair, and a muktamar was planned for November that year to
determine NU’s leadership team for the next five years. Earlier, it had
seemed automatic that Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq would be re-
elected. Many saw them as a perfect combination. Most of the conser-
vative ulama respected Kiai Achmad Siddiq’s strict piety and religious
learning, while many younger and more progressive ulama and most
pesantren students appreciated his willingness to champion new ideas,
just as they welcomed the intellectual vitality and boldness that
Abdurrahman brought to the organisation.
Even those who had little interest in such things were glad to see NU
begin to reassert its position within Indonesian society. They might not
have understood why the world was paying so much attention to their
chairman, but they welcomed the attention all the same. After so many
years of being regarded as peripheral and unimportant, the sense that
NU was once more being taken seriously was in itself appealing. NU
branch heads and other leaders welcomed the new sense of dynamism
at the top of the organisation, and they were impressed when
Abdurrahman came all the way from Jakarta to meet with them. The
administration of the organisation might still have been in shambles
and its chairman an enigmatic and perplexing figure, but at least there
was a sense that the executive chairman and Rais Aam in Jakarta cared
about what was happening in their branch.
For others, the changes brought more immediate and tangible bene-
fits. Construction contractors, traders and other businessmen could see
the effects of improved relations with the government and more posi-
tive community sentiment regarding NU — particularly on the part of
@<A
the Chinese community — in their cash flows and contract books.

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
Nevertheless, the final two years of Abdurrahman’s first term saw

him become an increasingly controversial figure. In particular, his reck-
less approach to commenting on disputed social and political issues had
the effect of annoying, if not alienating, many within NU. But to some
extent the controversy was also fuelled by elements close to Soeharto,
who wanted to put Abdurrahman on notice that he owed his power to
the president and that he should rein in his critical stance against
Soeharto.
Paradoxically, whereas some in NU were angry with him because
they saw him as being too close to the regime, others thought that he
was not close enough. At the time of the 1987 general elections many
were outraged that he had been so critical of PPP, and had conse-
quently benefited Soeharto’s Golkar. But others, in fact sometimes the
same people, saw him as being too antagonistic towards the Soeharto
regime in his stance on issues such as the Kedung Ombo dam, and
consequently as needlessly endangering NU’s good relations with the
government.
Politics may have been at the root of anti-Abdurrahman sentiment
within NU but it was not the only area in which he could be faulted.
Some suggested that he cared more about his inter-faith dialogue ini-
tiatives and his friendships with Christians than he did about support-
ing Islam. At the same time his record as NU’s chief executive officer
left much to be desired. When he became chairman in 1984 he inher-
ited a ramshackle and broken-down organisation, the reform of which
would have challenged even the most skilful manager. Abdurrahman
was not the most skilful of managers, and even after five years he had
done little to repair the organisational structure within NU. By 1989 it
was not at all clear that Abdurrahman would be re-elected.
1&.)@D=D),-(&$,$' G)!"#$%%!&'!()4!0.,)&+,)0%+1+0,
The venue for both the 1983 munas and the 1984 muktamar had been
Kiai As’ad Syamsul Arifin’s pesantren in Situbondo in rural East Java.
As’ad had his own agenda in promoting reformers, and he had obtained
a decided advantage by having both the munas and the muktamar on his
home ground. But by 1989 most of Kiai As’ad’s influence had been
exhausted; even though he was increasingly outspoken in his criticism
of Abdurrahman, he had little means of striking back at the chairman
he had helped elect. As’ad let it be known that he wanted the mukta-
@<@
mar to be held in Situbondo once again, but Abdurrahman and
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
Achmad Siddiq were not at all keen on returning there. Instead they
lobbied for Krapyak, and the pesantren of Abdurrahman’s former
teacher Kiai Ali Ma’sum, to be the venue. Both Ali Ma’sum and As’ad
were highly respected as founding members of NU, but there was little
doubt that it was Kiai Ali Ma’sum who was held in higher esteem
because of his scholarship and charismatic authority as a religious
teacher. Moreover, Ali Ma’sum was known to be ailing, and it was
agreed that holding the muktamar at his pesantren in Krapyak would be
an appropriate way to honour one of NU’s last remaining founders.
The Dutch anthropologist and long-time observer of NU, Martin
van Bruinessen, witnessed the 1989 muktamar and wrote a vivid first-
hand account.13 He explains that the choice of Krapyak gave
Abdurrahman and Achmad Siddiq a distinct advantage. Kiai Ali
Ma’sum could be relied upon to defend his former student, and this
would make it much harder for critics to argue that Abdurrahman did-
n’t have the backing of senior kiai. Abdurrahman had fallen out briefly
with Kiai Ali Ma’sum over the incident concerning the greetings sela-
mat pagi and assalamu alaykum. But after Abdurrahman wrote to Kiai
Ali Ma’sum asking his forgiveness and apologising for the misunder-
standing, he had been quick to forgive him, and their relationship
remained strong. Kiai As’ad had also complained about his comments
regarding the Islamic greeting but Abdurrahman had not bothered
writing to him.
Prior to the 1989 muktamar Abdurrahman stepped up the tempo of
his visits to pesantren. From his first months in office he had made a
habit of regularly touring Central and East Java as well as NU branch-
es in South Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok and elsewhere.
Rarely a week went by when he was not on the road, at the very least
across town or in the immediate environs of West Java. In the months
leading up to the muktamar he was busier than ever, and he made a
point of focusing on the outer island branches. He was aware of their
dissatisfaction with the central leadership of NU and was keen to
demonstrate that he was listening to their concerns and sympathetic to
their grievances.
In the final days before the muktamar, Abdurrahman slipped away
quietly on a quick trip to Mecca. Van Bruinessen observes that news-
paper reports noted that in Mecca Abdurrahman had called upon the
great West Sumatran-born sheik, Muhammad Yasin or ‘Syeikh
@<6
Minangkabau’ as he was sometimes known.14 Sheikh Muhammad

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
Yasin was regarded by most kiai within NU, including the most con-
servative, as their supreme religious authority. When Abdurrahman was
speaking at the muktamar he made no mention of his trip to Mecca,
much less of his meeting with Sheikh Yasin. He had no need to discuss
it because it had already been widely covered in the press. Nor did he
have any need to reinforce the impression that Sheik Yasin had given
his blessings to Abdurrahman in seeking a second term of office.
Even though, by November 1989, relations between Abdurrahman
and President Soeharto were beginning to sour, Soeharto was still keen
to seek support within NU for his bid for re-election in 1992. There is
good reason to believe that Soeharto was also keen to remind
Abdurrahman who held ultimate power in Indonesia; for that reason he
was probably not unhappy that Abdurrahman was facing fierce criti-
cism at the muktamar, even if he did not actively back Abdurrahman’s
critics. Ironically, some of the covert opposition to Abdurrahman’s bid
for re-election appears to have arisen precisely because of concern that
Abdurrahman was too much in favour with Soeharto. The American
anthropologist and scholar of Indonesian Islam, Robert Hefner, argues
that Benny Murdani ‘secretly supported those opposing Wahid’s re-
election, on the grounds that Wahid was too close to Soeharto. These
were the years, of course, when Murdani was locked in a bitter struggle
with the president, and Soeharto’s triumph was not yet assured’.15
So it seems that the 1989 NU national congress was not simply the
private affair of a rustic, rural-based religious organisation. The election
of the leaders of one of the few mass national organisations outside the
direct control of the Soeharto regime was not something that anyone in
the ruling elite took lightly. Consequently, NU’s 1989 muktamar was a
grand affair. The organising committee had received considerable
amounts of sponsorship and assistance from a variety of business and
community sources as well as from the president himself. President
Soeharto was there to open the congress. This was significant in itself,
but even more significant was the symbolism of his method.
A large traditional drum, or bedung, of the kind used to announce the
call to prayers in rural mosques, was placed in the centre of the stage. It
was made known that this particular bedung, which was exceptionally
large and well made, had belonged to the family in which Soeharto had
been raised as an adopted son. The drum was much better than the one
the pesantren itself owned. When the time came to formally open pro-
@<7
ceedings, Soeharto stepped up to the bedung, seized the padded mallet,
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
and struck the drum with the distinctive rhythm that only somebody
who had been raised in a religious home could have learned. The effect
was not wasted; the audience erupted into cheers and applause, togeth-
er with choruses of prayers and thanks to God. Now at last, it seemed,
Indonesia had a president who was taking Islam and NU seriously.
The importance of the muktamar was signalled not only by President
Soeharto officiating at the opening, but also by the attendance of high-
level government ministers. Interior Minister Rudini, the Secretary of
State Moerdiono, Minister for Defence Benny Murdani and Armed
Forces Chief Try Sutrisno all gave long speeches. Several days earlier
Vice- President Soedharmono had opened a pre-muktamar congress for
NU-affiliated tarekat, or traditional Sufi brotherhoods, and the NU sis-
ter organisation responsible for co-ordinating tarekat affairs. Since his
demise as chairman of NU, Idham Chalid had spent his time leading
the tarekat union. The symbolism of the vice-president opening the
much smaller tarekat was also significant. All of these senior ministers
had vested interests in the outcome of the muktamar, but three in par-
ticular were keen to see their men go forward. Rudini, Benny and Try
were known to be backing certain candidates.
As the first santri Muslim ever to command the armed forces, Try’s
address was greeted with loud applause and clapping of hands. His
speech did not disappoint; it was appropriately peppered with Arabic
phrases and quotations from the Qur’an and the hadith. (As Try fin-
ished speaking, the assembly spontaneously broke into a rousing recital
of the Shalawal Badar, a martial prayer sung before going into battle,
much as stirring Christian hymns are sung by Welsh football fans
before a rugby match. As the assembly broke into the Shalawal Badar
hundreds surged forward to embrace Try or to shake his hand.)
When given a chance to speak on the second day of the muktamar,
the regional representatives were reminded that it was to be a forum for
serious discussion and not a speech-giving contest. Van Bruinessen
observes, however, that the majority of speakers gave long addresses
rich with rhetorical flourishes in an attempt to impress the crowd.
Perhaps surprisingly, many of them were greeted with boos and jeers,
and young men yelled out comments like ‘Hey, it’s not supposed to be
a Friday sermon’ and ‘Get to the point’. Many young people within NU
had become fanatical supporters of Abdurrahman and his fellow
reformers, and they appeared to sense, in many of these long-winded
@<8
speeches, unfair, or empty, criticism of Abdurrahman.16

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
The young reformists and supporters of Abdurrahman had formu-

lated a position paper to be put forward to the assembly at a special ses-
sion held for NGOs and development activists within NU. The initial
draft, however, was regarded as too provocative, so Abdurrahman and
others toned it down. Nevertheless, the substantive points of ‘working
for the benefit of community’ and ‘avoiding social harm’ remained hid-
den among traditional-sounding phrases. When accepted and passed,
this paper committed the new leadership of NU to initiate the points
listed, which included direct foreign funding of pesantren-based com-
munity development projects and the development of a community
banking network. This gave the green light for community develop-
ment activists to pursue foreign support for their programs and to
encourage local kiai to be co-operative.
Amidst the normal rumblings about the central board in Jakarta not
paying attention to rural concerns and their problems, there were accu-
sations that Abdurrahman had sympathies with Shiite Islam and that
he supported the ideas of those influenced by medieval Mu’tazilite
rationalist philosophy. These criticisms were not without foundation.
Abdurrahman was never a crypto-Shiite but he was sympathetic to the
small group of Indonesian intellectuals who emerged in the late 1980s,
the most prominent of whom was Jalaluddin Rakhmat, who had
become Shiites or at least were exploring Shiite thought. Abdurrahman
even went as far as allowing the Shiites to use ‘his mosque’ in Ciganjur
(built in front of his plot of land as part of Soeharto’s large-scale
mosque building program that commenced in the late 1980s). There
were at least four reasons why Abdurrahman was supportive of the
Shiites. Firstly, he is inclined by nature to help persecuted and down-
trodden minorities. Secondly, and related to this, he is against anything
that impinges on freedom of belief and freedom of conscience. Thirdly,
he sees Shia scholarship, with its ongoing tradition of ijtihad and its
openness to metaphysical speculation, as representing a rich vein of
learning that can be profitably mined by all Islamic intellectuals.
Finally, he argues that many aspects of NU worship (ibadah) and
approaches to mysticism (Tasawuf) have their origin in Persian Shia
Islam, and that NU scholars should understand Shia Islam if only in
order to understand Sunni Indonesian Islamic traditionalism.
Moreover, Abdurrahman is also an admirer of Mu’tazilite rationalist
philosophy; even if he is critical of the Mu’tazilite philosophers on some
@<B
points, there is little doubt that their rationalism does influence his
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
thinking. He was also criticised for arguing in his writings that
Indonesian Islam should become more Indonesian and less Arab.
One of the substantive points of criticism was his promotion of the
halakah discussion groups. These upset many of the older conservative
kiai, particularly those who felt that their traditional authority would be
undermined by questioning the Kitab Kuning. In the past it had been
the kiai who had taught the Kitab Kuning and young santri who sat lis-
tening and memorising the texts. Authority rested with the kiai and the
texts and none with the young students. Now the old kiai felt that, with
the younger men critically discussing the Kitab Kuning, there would be
an erosion of authority and respect for the older generation and for the
traditions.
When finally, at the conclusion of the congress, Abdurrahman was
given an opportunity to reply to his critics, he responded coolly and
rationally. He did not seek to evade the criticism that had been brought
against him, acknowledging that in many ways he had failed to achieve
what he had promised five years earlier. To some extent, he suggested,
this was because he had been given a leadership team that was deeply
divided and in some cases strongly antagonistic towards him. He did
not mention any names, nor did he have to; everyone knew he was
referring to his Secretary-General and other appointees of Kiai As’ad.
He also, quite realistically, acknowledged that he was not a good
administrator and that the process of reforming the central administra-
tive structure of NU had been beyond his capacity to achieve in the first
term. In responding to criticisms about his openness to Mu’tazilah-like
rationality and the Indonesianisation of Indonesian Islam, he was frank
and bold, just as he was in talking about the critical re-examination of
the Kitab Kuning discussion groups. He put before the assembly his
opinion that they had no choice but to wrestle with these issues if NU
was to find a place in the modern world. To fail to do so, he suggested,
was to risk further stagnation and the eventual collapse of both the
institutions and the traditions of which NU was so proud.
Abdurrahman argued that the pesantren could no longer rely upon rote
learning and the uncritical acceptance of the classical texts. Young peo-
ple naturally wanted to do more than that, and if their needs were not
addressed they would go elsewhere.
Van Bruinessen recounts that Abdurrahman’s address was peppered
with witty references and good humour, so that even though he was
@<;
often critical, the assembly became increasingly responsive and appre-

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
ciative. He spoke of NU as being like a car in which some passengers

were constantly trying to step on the brake pedal. If the car was to con-
tinue motoring forward, he argued, then somebody had to step on the
accelerator. That, he said, was his task and it was one that he was not
shying away from. It was a brilliant speech, so rhetorically well con-
structed, skilfully delivered and cleverly leavened with humour and
good grace that few could argue against it. Abdurrahman stepped down
from the podium to rousing applause.
When the time came for choosing the national leadership team for
the next five years, Abdurrahman and Siddiq both faced fierce compe-
tition led by As’ad Arifin Syamsul, Idham Chalid and Yusuf Hasyim. If
their supporters were to be believed, Abdurrahman and Siddiq were
deeply unpopular and the voting would be close run. The reality proved
otherwise. In the contest for Rais Aam, Achmad Siddiq defeated
Idham Chalid by 188 votes to 116. Abdurrahman’s main competitor for
the post of Ketua Umum was his uncle, Yusuf Hasyim. But in the end
Yusuf Hasyim failed to gain the requisite 40 branch votes needed to
contest the post and Abdurrahman was returned unopposed by accla-
mation from the floor.
The muktamar had been a testing time for Abdurrahman, but in the
end he had come through strengthened in his position. He now had a
leadership team more of his own choosing, and his authority within the
organisation was strongly reinforced by the testing of his position at
Krapyak. Moreover, the agreements that were passed on the floor of the
assembly strongly supported his initiatives, particularly in the area of
community development.
The 1990s began with Abdurrahman looking and feeling very com-
fortable. He now had a central board at both Syuriah and Tanfidziyah
levels that he could rely upon and was surrounded by like-minded pro-
gressives in official positions so that he could count on his orders being
followed through. Evidence of the degree of support for the organisa-
tion within broader Indonesian society was seen in the opening of a
small-scale credit branch and a bank branch in the industrial town of
Sidoarjo, outside Surabaya. For many years Abdurrahman had dreamt
of establishing a small-scale rural banking network, along the lines of
Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, to provide credit to those with whom
conventional banks would not deal. The bank was backed by the
Chinese-owned Bank Summa and offered conventional interest-bear-
@<<
ing accounts. Abdurrahman and fellow progressives rejected the opin-
%.4/%')!(#)0/(1%/?.%,>2)@D=8G@DDA
ion of many conservative Muslims that modern bank interest was
equivalent to riba, usury, something that was prohibited in the Qur’an.
Abdurrahman had been consistently outspoken in his defence of
Indonesian Chinese and Indonesian Christians, both Protestant and
Catholic, and as a result many Indonesian Chinese were prepared to
support his initiatives. Many observers at the time praised the alliance
between NU and Bank Summa. Former Minister for Religious Affairs
Munawir Sjadzali declared warmly, ‘It’s something that should have
been done much earlier’. Echoing those thoughts, Dorodjatun
Kuntjorojakti, Dean of the School of Economics at the University of
Indonesia, stated: ‘The NU-Summa venture is a magnificent idea. I
wish that they had done it fifteen years ago.’17 Soeharto said nothing
publicly about the deal, but according to senior government officials he
was deeply unhappy about it. Apparently it troubled him to see the
Chinese Christian Soeryadjaya family, who owned Bank Summa,
developing a close relationship with the traditional Muslim communi-
ty, just as it had troubled him to see NU, under Abdurrahman, spread-
ing its social role and influence.
#+!".1.,)!(#)-/,,)/4).>.,+:&1
Physically Abdurrahman appeared to be in robust good health with
seemingly endless energy. He was travelling constantly both around
Jakarta and across Central and East Java and not infrequently interna-
tionally, to speak at conferences and seminars. He was probably thirty
kilograms overweight, sufficient to make certain things, such as kneel-
ing in prayer, somewhat uncomfortable, but this did not seem to have
any great effect on his health. Nevertheless, he was, by this stage,
already feeling the effects of Type II diabetes, although he remarked lit-
tle on it. Indeed, the diabetes was unremarkable because most of his
peers in Jakarta, men in their fifties in stressful positions, carrying more
weight than they should and getting less exercise than they needed, suf-
fered from a similar condition. Tragically for Abdurrahman, however,
the disease was already beginning to make inroads on his eyesight. He
had already effectively lost the sight in his left eye after his scooter acci-
dent in 1978 when the retina failed to re-adhere. Now his right eye was
gradually losing vision through the effects of diabetes and glaucoma. By
the time of his fiftieth birthday the glaucoma had begun to cloud his
peripheral vision.
@<=
For a man who loved reading as much as he did, this was a worrying
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
development, though he showed no signs of trying to prevent its

progress by changing his lifestyle. One indication that he may have
been concerned about his health was his frequent remark that his father
and grandfather had died young and he expected that he might not live
long either. The comment was generally made, not so much as a reflec-
tion on impending mortality, as an explanation of his bold, even reck-
less, approach to political engagement. Abdurrahman threw himself
enthusiastically into every aspect of his position, with the significant
exception of administration and general management.
He had come through the 1989 muktamar, surviving considerable
pressure from Soeharto and indeed improving and strengthening his
position; the outcome had left him optimistic. The dark clouds gather-
ing on the horizon in the form of mounting opposition from Soeharto
did not seem to him a cause for concern, but rather a challenge and a
spur to action.
.+:&1
~
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2
@DDAG@DD8
1&.)-+'+1,)/4)/3.((.,,
By the late 1980s President Soeharto’s grip on power was being ques-
tioned more openly than at any time since the Malari riots of 1974. The
image of the avuncular leader whose sage visage endlessly graced the
nightly television news was being challenged. The sober ‘Father of
Development’ who unfailingly delivered wise speeches, the patient
adviser to peasant farmers who tirelessly stood in the paddy fields talk-
ing to the little people, was being asked to listen. In some ways he was
the victim of his own success. Two decades of steady growth had creat-
ed so many islands of wealth in a sea of poverty that people in every
corner of Indonesian society could see before them the evidence that
life could be very much better than their experience of it. Few of the
nation’s then 180 million citizens lived in booming Jakarta, but the
steadily rising levels of literacy and general education, coupled with the
rapid expansion of both print and electronic media, informed even sim-
ple peasants in remote villages that the elite in Jakarta lived in a very
different world to their own.
By the late 1980s many of Soeharto’s most trusted advisers were
no longer by his side. Ali Murtopo had died of a heart attack in 1984,
@=A
others had retired and others still, such as Benny Murdani, had fallen
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
out with ‘the old man’ — as the Jakarta elite had taken to calling him.
Abdurrahman continued to enjoy positive relations with the increas-
ingly taciturn president, but it was an uncomfortable relationship.
Benny’s estrangement from Soeharto meant that Abdurrahman lost his
most powerful point of contact with the mind of the president. At the
same time, Abdurrahman’s activism and outspokenness in civil society
meant that Soeharto saw him as troublesome and unreliable. In partic-
ular, with the question of succession now preoccupying the Jakarta elite,
Abdurrahman’s pointed refusal to publicly endorse Soeharto’s candida-
ture for the presidency in the lead-up to the general elections and ensu-
ing five-yearly sessions of the MPR was an irritant to a leader
accustomed to having his will prevail. Consequently, there was little
surprise in 1988 that Abdurrahman was not invited to sit in the assem-
bly for a second time.
+0'+5),/.&!%1/C,)+,-!'+0)1$%()+,)+(,1+1$1+/(!-+,.#
Shortly after his seventieth birthday in the middle of 1991, President
Soeharto travelled to Mecca to make the haj pilgrimage. This was the
first time that he had done so. Until then Soeharto had been under-
stood to be an abangan Muslim — not irreligious, but more inclined to
mystical Javanese beliefs than orthodox Islam. When Soeharto
returned from the haj, in addition to the title Haji he adopted the name
Muhammad as an indication that he was applying himself more seri-
ously to the task of being a Muslim. Many commentators accepted the
claim that as Soeharto was growing older he was naturally becoming
more religious. After all, many people in Indonesia become more pious
as they approach the end of their life. Other, more cynical, observers
suggested that Soeharto’s completion of the pilgrimage was a political
move designed to convey to conservative santri Muslims that he was
now someone they could trust and work with. As the decade pro-
gressed, it became increasingly clear that this second interpretation was
closer to the truth. Soeharto was, after all, a cynical political operator
par excellence — it was no accident that his grip on power was without
effective challenge for over three decades.
In fact, several years before Haji Muhammad Soeharto returned
from Mecca there had already been indications that he was toying with
the idea of co-opting conservative Muslims to balance the power of the
military. Following the 1987 general elections Soeharto began to
@=@
change his approach to dealing with conservative Muslims. In the run-
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
up to the 1982 general elections Soeharto’s regime had sought to intim-
idate those campaigning for PPP and had intervened heavily in the
party to emasculate NU’s political strength. Then in 1983–84 Soeharto
had upset Muslim groups with his insistence that Pancasila become the
asas tunggal, or sole basis, of all organisations, even religious ones. It was
also assumed that Soeharto had ordered Benny Murdani and his mili-
tary intelligence operatives to violently repress Islamist study cells in
Tanjung Priok in September 1984. At the same time it was clear that
he had ordered Benny to be supportive of NU’s new liberal leadership
aspirants, Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid, and that he was
generally supportive of liberal Muslim figures. In 1986, for example,
Nurcholish Madjid, having returned from PhD studies under Fazlur
Rahman at the University of Chicago several months earlier, encoun-
tered little trouble in establishing his socio-educational NGO called
Paramadina, designed to promote a sophisticated and tolerant under-
standing of Islam among middle-class Jakarta’s increasing numbers of
‘new-santri’.1 By 1988, however, when Soeharto sought the input of
Islamic intellectuals into proposed new laws (to be passed the following
year) dealing with Islamic law courts and Islamic education, he snubbed
Abdurrahman and NU and turned instead to conservative intellectuals
opposed to Abdurrahman and his liberal approach to Islamic thought.2
Worse was to come.
In October 1990 something happened that served as an ominous
warning that a serious shift in the regime’s policy towards Islam had
occurred. It involved the popular magazine Monitor. This magazine had
links with the elite broadsheets, Kompas and The Jakarta Post through
its Catholic Chinese backers. Monitor had run an opinion poll asking
readers to indicate who they felt to be the most important people who
had ever lived. Perhaps it was not surprising that President Soeharto
polled number one. What was of concern to santri Muslims, however,
was that the Prophet Muhammad came in at number eleven, behind
not just the president but also Arswendo, the Catholic editor of
Monitor. The provocative poll produced a sizable jump in circulation for
Monitor, and Arswendo initially regarded it as a marketing triumph. He
quickly revised this opinion when an angry mob turned up at the office
of the Monitor, stoned the windows, and called for Arswendo’s arrest.
Arswendo was subsequently charged, taken to court and sentenced to
five years’ jail (of which he served four years) and Harmoko, Minister
@=6
for Information and one of Soeharto’s most sycophantic loyalists, with-

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
drew Monitor’s licence to publish. Neither the unrestrained mob nor the
hefty jail sentence for Arswendo would have occurred without
Soeharto’s express approval, though there was also no doubt that
Arswendo had violated a taboo and caused genuine offence. Even lib-
eral figures such as Nurcholish lamented Arswendo’s callous indiffer-
ence to santri opinion and his cynical, commercial disregard for
religious feelings for something as trivial as an attempt to improve a
magazine’s circulation.3
One of the few public figures who spoke out in defence of Arswendo
was Abdurrahman. Arswendo, he wrote, had been foolish and wrong in
running his poll, but the appropriate response was not to arrest or jail
him, but simply to boycott his magazine. After all, if Indonesia was seri-
ous about free speech it was difficult to put forward a compelling argu-
ment for the jailing of a magazine editor for what appeared to have been
essentially a non-malicious error of judgment, albeit an irresponsible and
indulgent one. Abdurrahman also expressed his disappointment with
Nurcholish and other liberals for not defending more vigorously the
principles of free speech. Abdurrahman had taken a similar stance the
year before when he had spoken out against the fatwa declared in Iran
against Salman Rushdie following the publication of his novel Satanic
Verses (an act of bravery that provided further ammunition for his critics
opposing his re-election at the muktamar at the end of the year).
Final proof of a sea-change in Soeharto’s approach to conservative
Islam came in December 1990 when the Indonesian Association of
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) was launched. Five years earlier it would
have been hard to imagine such an organisation being formed. This
association promised to be a nation-wide network linking all university-
educated Muslims, or at least those active in public life. It styled itself as
being non-political, and no doubt some of those behind it hoped that it
would remain so, but from the very outset it was enmeshed in politics.
In the months prior to its official launch Soeharto had made clear his
willingness to sponsor the organisation. As a result ICMI, from its birth,
became closely identified with Soeharto’s Golkar. Not only did Soeharto
back it with considerable financial support; he also appointed his own
protégé and senior minister, B. J. Habibie, to be its official chairman.
Conservative santri were delighted with Soeharto’s support for
ICMI. Many of the leading lights involved in the push to establish
ICMI had been active in Masyumi or had actively worked for the
@=7
rebirth of Masyumi and had experienced decades of discouragement as
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
the Soeharto regime actively worked against political Islam. Now for-
mer enemies of the state were being welcomed into its very bosom. The
president’s sudden ‘conversion’ to their cause seemed like an answer to
their prayers.4
The emergence of ICMI with the full support of the president had
alarmed Abdurrahman and others, such as Djohan Effendi, who sensed
that Soeharto planned to use conservative santri to back him in his re-
election bid. During 1991 people within the ICMI camp made repeat-
ed approaches to Abdurrahman, urging him and other NU leaders to
join the organisation. Some did join, but the majority declined, follow-
ing the example of Abdurrahman, who was outspoken in his criticism
of ICMI. Abdurrahman was concerned that the very formation of an
elitist association of Islamic intellectuals encouraged sectarian senti-
ment and would therefore play into the hands of the conservatives. He
also argued that Soeharto was cynically manipulating religious senti-
ment for his own purposes, with the potential that things might devel-
op in a way that even Soeharto could not manage. At best, he argued,
the composition of ICMI’s leadership made it unlikely that ICMI
would be able to effect genuine reform: ‘There are so many more career
bureaucrats in ICMI than there are activists that expecting change to
emerge from within these circles is like expecting that roosters will lay
eggs.’5 A year later, in December 1994, he explained:
I have said that the majority of ICMI’s members are good people, I
take my hat off to them for their aspirations. Unfortunately, at a cer-
tain level, there are some members of ICMI who are sectarian. I have
said that from the beginning. Why do I say this? So that they will
understand [he draws out the word for emphasis]. So that they will
take the appropriate steps to correct for this.6
What worried critics of ICMI such as Abdurrahman was not its

moderate intellectuals and activists, many of whom harboured reformist
ideas, or its Habibite technocrats, or even its regimist opportunists.
Rather, it was the small but significant core of radical Islamists who,
after so many years out in the cold, were now in ICMI being warmly
embraced by the regime. After decades of antagonism, Soeharto,
it appeared, was finally holding out an olive branch to the Masyumi
hard-liners.
@=8
Although militant fundamentalism, until recently, had been largely

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
unknown in Indonesian Islam, its more moderate cousin, Islamism,

made substantial advances through Dewan Dakwah and similar bodies.
For many years Islamism of the Dewan Dakwah variety lacked signifi-
cant drawing power in Indonesian society. Nevertheless, it did serve to
blunt the edge of Islamic modernism as a progressive movement of
thought. The effects of this sort of conservative thought extended well
beyond the bounds of those who were formally members of Dewan
Dakwah. It resulted in the emergence from within Muhammadiyah of
a conservative right wing that was increasingly sympathetic to Islamist
ideas. During the second half of the 1990s Amien Rais, as chairman of
Muhammadiyah, remained close to many Islamist figures, giving them
a voice that they would not have had otherwise.
4/%$')#.'/9%!,+
Following the Monitor affair and the launch of ICMI, Abdurrahman
and some like-minded friends concerned about the rising tide of sectar-
ianism decided it was time to form an organisation to speak out in
defence of pluralism and democracy. Early in 1991 forty-five intellectu-
als drawn from across the religious and social communities of Indonesia
launched an organisation they called Forum Demokrasi. The group
chose Abdurrahman as its leader and spokesman because it calculated
that his prominence and influence would draw attention to the small
group and give it credibility, and because his mass base in NU made it
difficult for the regime to silence him. The Forum Demokrasi intellec-
tuals were careful to point out that they were not campaigning on a
party-political basis, nor did they expect to directly influence the politi-
cal processes. Rather, Abdurrahman explained, Forum Demokrasi was
established to provide a countervailing force to institutions such as
ICMI which were encouraging sectarian thinking. Forum Demokrasi,
he said, was campaigning against the political exploitation of sectarian
sentiment. In the 1950s most major parties were formed along religious
or ideological lines, and for a long while it was assumed that this was the
natural course of political development. Such ‘confessional politics’, he
argued, was inherently sectarian and unhealthy and against democracy.
Writing shortly after the formation of Forum Demokrasi,
Abdurrahman explained why he saw the establishment of democracy as
being so important: ‘Unfortunately, the issue of sectarianism is
addressed as if it were the central issue. It is as if it were the cause not
@=B
the effect. In fact the core of the problem is the lack of democracy and
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
freedom.’7
The Forum Demokrasi group was only small, and most of its mem-
bers were not high-profile figures. Few of them were from NU, indeed
few of them were Muslims — many were Catholic or Protestant
Christians, and some had socialist activist backgrounds. Two of the key
figures were Marsillam Simanjuntak, an outspoken social activist, and
Bondan Gunawan, an abangan Javanese also active in civil society.
Some within NU were critical of Abdurrahman for associating with
such elements, arguing that if he wanted to form a ginger group ‘he
should have looked within his own organisation for support’. But
Abdurrahman had always enjoyed a wide circle of friends drawn from
across religious communities and intellectual circles. His association
with Forum Demokrasi and its eclectic membership was deliberate. He
wanted to convey the message that there were other bases apart from
religion and ethnicity on which to organise politically.
Ironically, the more the regime expressed disaffection with Forum
Demokrasi, the more popular it became and the more media coverage
it received. For a group with such a small membership and so little in
the way of formal activities, or even carefully worked out position state-
ments, Forum Demokrasi cut quite a profile. As the June 1992 general
elections approached, the regime became increasingly agitated by the
mere existence of Forum Demokrasi and even small-scale Forum meet-
ings were broken up — generally on the grounds that the organisers did
not possess ‘the appropriate permits’.
In February 1992 the Forum issued a statement setting forth its pol-
icy position. American political scientist Douglas Ramage observed:
Two points in the six-point statement are noteworthy. In addition to

reiterating its commitment to democracy, the Forum noted its con-
cern that people in ‘dominant positions resorted to violence to resolve
problems’. The Forum also stated that it ‘views the succession issue
as an important matter which is inextricably linked to the democra-
tization process’. The Forum added that it was prepared to give ‘spe-
cial attention’ to the problem of succession as one of its ‘short-term
programs’.8
Not surprisingly, both the military and the president were concerned
about Forum Demokrasi and Abdurrahman’s involvement in it.
@=;
Without Abdurrahman as its leader, it would have been relatively easy

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
to silence the Forum — even easier than the silencing of prominent

retirees in the Petition of Fifty a decade earlier. With Abdurrahman,
and NU’s tens of millions, linked to the Forum, it was not so easy for
the regime to take action against the small group, especially when
Abdurrahman was wielding Pancasila as both a sword and a shield.
Forum Demokrasi’s February statement was a severe irritation to the
military, which resented the assertion that there was a need to make
changes to Indonesia’s ‘Pancasila Democracy’, an assertion made all the
more galling by Abdurrahman’s use of Pancasila to justify his call for
change.
1&.):%.!1)!,,.'"->)L'$!$&.$(/$'M
On 1 March 1992 Abdurrahman called a Rapat Akbar (literally a great
assembly) to celebrate the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding of
NU. He explained to the media that the rally was part of his campaign
to steer Indonesian politics aware from sectarianism in the face of
strong pressure from Soeharto to do the reverse. The ostensible aims of
a Rapat Akbar were to declare NU’s loyalty to the Pancasila in the form
of an ikrar, or declaration, and to state NU’s support for a violence-free
general election later that year and a successful meeting of the MPR
early the following year. Abdurrahman had consulted few of his col-
leagues in organising the rally, a move typical of his style. Since the
death of Kiai Achmad Siddiq in 1991, he had run NU almost as a one-
man show, especially when it came to such political actions.
Abdurrahman had been facing serious pressure from Soeharto’s camp
to have NU declare its support for Soeharto’s next term of presidency.
Abdurrahman’s controversial activities, including his outspoken state-
ments in his engagement in inter-faith dialogue and promotion of
reform of Islamic thought, had earned him many enemies within NU.
Many questioned the extent to which he still had the backing of the
organisation. Abdurrahman declared that the Rapat Akbar would be an
occasion when more than one million people would turn up to demon-
strate their support for NU’s acceptance of Pancasila. It would be evi-
dence of the organisation’s overwhelming endorsement of his moderate
and tolerant approach to engagement of Islam in modern society. As it
turned out, only a fraction of that number attended the rally at the
Senayan sports stadium in central Jakarta. The all-important licence to
hold the Rapat Akbar was issued only a day before the assembly was to
@=<
be held. Soeharto was reluctant to issue a direct ban on the NU assem-
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
bly, which after all was being promoted as a show of support for
Pancasila. But to have a million or more people meeting in the nation-
al capital at the invitation of Abdurrahman was intolerable. Acting
under direct instructions from the president, the police intervened to
stop NU members from boarding buses in East Java, and in Jakarta they
turned back busloads of NU members seeking to enter the city. Even
so, the appearance of between 150 000 and 200 000 NU members made
it the biggest non-governmental rally in twenty-five years.9
Abdurrahman declared the rally a modest success, even though the
numbers were nothing like those he had been seeking. He explained
that this was due to the actions of the security forces in preventing
thousands of NU members from attending. Angry with Soeharto for
sabotaging the rally, Abdurrahman sat down later that day and drafted
a letter. In it Abdurrahman told Soeharto that the Rapat Akbar had
achieved its internal goals: to celebrate sixty-six years of NU; to confirm
NU’s commitment to Pancasila and the constitution of 1945; and to
affirm its support for peaceful general elections and for a incident-free
MPR session.10 He went on to add that, although the three internal
goals had been achieved, the external goals had not. NU had not been
given an opportunity to demonstrate mass support for a vision of
Indonesian Islam characterised by openness, fairness and tolerance. To
have done this, he explained, they needed to have between one and two
million people there, and he believed that many had been blocked from
attending by Soeharto’s intervention. As a consequence, Abdurrahman
argued, there remained a threat to the perpetuity of Pancasila and the
Republic of Indonesia:
By preventing Nahdlatul Ulama from obtaining conclusive legitima-

cy for its views, the responsibility for orientating Indonesia’s religious
movement now moves to the government. If the government fails,
then within ten years the strength of those who don’t accept the
national ideology will grow, and they will threaten the Republic of
Indonesia and Pancasila … What is now happening in Algeria will
happen again here … and, if the trend continues, an Islamic state will
replace the state we have now.11
It is hard to think of anyone else who could have written to the

Indonesian president so frankly and boldly. Whether this was sheer
@==
recklessness or moral courage is a matter of dispute (there is good rea-

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
son to say that, reckless or not, Abdurrahman was extraordinarily

courageous in the way that he consistently challenged Soeharto); but
there is no doubt that the mass backing of NU gave Abdurrahman sig-
nificant leverage, which he employed when he felt the need to drive
home the point. Almost anyone else would have been very smartly
crushed for such impertinence; it was difficult, however, to turn openly
on the leader of NU.
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,
In the wake of Forum Demokrasi’s February position statement and
NU’s Rapat Akbar, Soeharto decided that it was time for Abdurrahman
to be reined in. In March Soeharto dispatched his son-in-law Prabowo
Subianto to take a message to Abdurrahman, inviting him to meet with
Prabowo at his battalion headquarters outside Jakarta. Prabowo warned
him to stay out of politics — or else endorse Soeharto’s next term.
Abdurrahman’s simultaneous leadership of two politically significant
bodies — NU with its tens of millions of members and Forum
Demokrasi with its bold agenda calling for change — irritated the mil-
itary. Prabowo put it this way:
Gus Dur, we can understand you leading NU and we can understand

you being interested in Forum Demokrasi, what concerns us is that
you should do both. We think it would be better if you chose one or
the other rather than trying to lead both this NGO group and NU.
Why don’t you consider resigning?
Abdurrahman instantly replied, ‘I would be glad to resign. Forum

Demokrasi, its values and commitment to promoting democracy mean
more to me than even NU and so it’s simple, I’ll resign from NU and
concentrate on Forum Demokrasi’. Several days later the reply came
back to Abdurrahman. ‘Just forget it. You can stay on with both organ-
isations. Don’t worry about it any more.’12
The military was concerned that if Abdurrahman should suddenly
leave NU, the next chairman might be much less open to negotiation
and discussion. They knew Abdurrahman to be a moderate committed
to maintaining communal harmony. He was frequently called upon to
intervene in communal disputes. It was not uncommon for a military
vehicle to arrive in the middle of the night at his house in Ciganjur and
@=D
for Abdurrahman to be driven to an airfield and flown to East Java,
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
Sumatra, or wherever there was unrest, in order to negotiate with the
community groups. Many within the military appreciated his desire to
talk through differences to achieve peace and maintain stability.
Abdurrahman was well aware of the desire of certain officers to use him
and found it to be an irksome relationship. Although he and his mili-
tary contacts held very different political outlooks, they shared a com-
mon desire to prevent social instability and unrest.
Another thing these senior officers appreciated was Abdurrahman’s
opposition to the political exploitation of Islamic sentiment. What they
feared most of all, at least now that the great bogey of Communism was
gone, was political Islam, and the launching of ICMI had made them
anxious. This was no doubt what had been intended. As the military
felt themselves being played off against conservative political Muslims,
they increasingly looked to moderate figures such Abdurrahman to
support their position. Abdurrahman, by this stage, had a good work-
ing relationship not just with Benny Murdani but also with several
other key figures. Privately he expressed extreme distaste for their vio-
lence and ‘their bloody hands’ as he put it, but he also acknowledged
that it was necessary to have good contacts in the military. ‘It is better,’
he would state, ‘for them to come and talk to me before they take action
than simply to start shooting. At least if they include us in discussions
we have a chance of avoiding conflict.’ He explained his position in
terms of his pastoral care for over 30 million people: ‘Whatever else
happens my priority is to keep these people from trouble and to try and
turn their enemies away from hurting them.’13
The next month, in April 1992, Forum Demokrasi organised a Halal
bi Halal, a meeting to mark the end of Ramadan. It was broken up by
police, drawing incredulous responses even from some Golkar politi-
cians.14 A week later Abdurrahman was stopped by police when he
tried to address a PPP rally. Sudomo, the powerful Co-ordinating
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, announced that Soeharto
had asked him to ‘monitor’ the Forum’s activities.15
When interviewed by Ramage in June that year, Abdurrahman
said: ‘Nahdlatul Ulama is in a very good position as the anchor of pol-
itics in Indonesia; PPP, PDI and Golkar all need us, and the Armed
Forces needs us; nearly everyone needs us because of our mass base,
which we utilise very prudently.’ 16 In later interviews with Ramage he
went on to say:
@DA
Without it [Pancasila] we will cease to be a state … Pancasila is a set

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
of principles and it will live forever. It is the idea of the state that we
should have, that we strive for. In this Pancasila I’ll defend with my
own life. Regardless of its being castrated by the Armed Forces or its
being manipulated by the Muslims, or misused by both.17
Abdurrahman was similarly feisty and outspoken when interviewed

by Adam Schwarz in late 1991 and early 1992:
We have to have a socio-economic transformation as a first step in a

long-term process of democratisation. That’s why I am working to
create an awareness of democracy within Nahdlatul Ulama. I’m con-
vinced that the silent majority in Indonesia is pluralistic in attitude.
If we can get the government to loosen its grip on society,
Indonesians will take it in their hands to counteract the sectarians
and maintain the unity of the nation … Given time and legitimacy
[for the neo-modernist approach], we can make Islam a positive
force in Indonesia.18
Articulating his vision for the development of Muslim society and

Indonesia more broadly, Abdurrahman was openly critical of Soeharto’s
ploy of using ICMI for short-term advantage:
For Soeharto, ICMI is a short-term marriage of convenience. He

thinks he can control [ICMI modernists] if they go too far. I’m afraid
the strategy will backfire … Moderate Muslims will win if the sys-
tem is free but the problem is that Soeharto is giving help to the mil-
itants … We need to develop a full religious tolerance based on
freedom of faith. Instead Soeharto is giving an opening to a certain
group of Muslims, most especially to the militants who propose
Islam as the solution to all the problems of modernisation.
Abdurrahman was given to frank commentary. His critics tended
to dismiss his outspokenness as sheer recklessness, and sometimes
they were right. Behind his cavalier façade, however, a shrewd polit-
ical mind was constantly calculating just how far he could push the
limits. Abdurrahman wanted to send a message to Soeharto and,
knowing that many in the military shared his concerns, he reasoned
that he could safely decry the foolishness, as he saw it, of giving hard-
line Islamists sanctuary within ICMI. Even so, he almost went too
@D@
far in his comments to Schwarz in March 1992, published in
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
A Nation in Waiting in mid-1994: ‘In an interview in March 1992,
Wahid was no less forthcoming when I asked him why he thought
his views were being disregarded by Soeharto. Two reasons, he said,
stupidity, and because Soeharto does not want to see anyone he
doesn’t control grow strong.’19
If Abdurrahman was outspoken in his criticism of ICMI and certain

ICMI intellectuals he labelled as sectarian, they for their part were no
less forceful in their criticism of him. Amien Rais said to Schwarz in
1992: ‘I fail to understand why Wahid thinks the way that he does.
Wahid is not only exaggerating differences among Muslims but he is
distorting our positions and sowing disinformation … I believe in Islam
and democracy too, a democracy that allows freedom of religion, press
and speech.’20 Similarly, ICMI activist and well-known conservative Sri
Bintang Pamungkas commented to Schwarz, ‘Why should minorities
be in more need of protection than the majority? The suggestion that
Muslims are opposed to Pancasila is created by those who do not want
Muslims to be great.’21
Late in 1992, as if to confirm Abdurrahman’s warnings about
increasing sectarian tensions, there was a spate of church burnings in
East Java and North Sumatra. Abdurrahman was called upon by Benny
Murdani to intervene and mediate between communities in the trou-
bled district. Ironically, although it would appear that such incidents
were often instigated or engineered by hard-line elements in the mili-
tary, other military officers respected the consistency of Abdurrahman’s
position and appreciated his intervention in time of need.
Abdurrahman saw his working relationship with Benny and Try as
useful. He argued that it was better for himself as leader of NU to be
kept in the loop than out of it. At the very least, his links with them
often enabled him to secure the safety of his members when a con-
frontation with the military was brewing. Nevertheless, Abdurrahman
privately abhorred both Benny and Try for their penchant for cold-
blooded violence. One occasion on which he was unable to help his NU
members occurred in Lampung in 1989. Much like the Tanjung Priok
incident in 1984, when perhaps hundreds of alleged Islamist extremists
were killed at the apparent instigation of Benny, the 1989 Lampung
‘incident’ saw at least a hundred villagers killed. The village that was
attacked had been accused of harbouring Islamist extremists; it later
@D6
became clear that the real issue was land reform. When the military, on
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
Try’s orders, laid siege to the village, the menfolk escaped into the sur-
rounding jungle; the military unmercifully attacked the women and
children who were left behind. Most of the villagers were NU members.
Such incidents did not stop Abdurrahman from maintaining his con-
nection with both Try and Benny, but they weighed heavily on his
mind.22
1&.)H$(.)@DD6).-.01+/(,)!(#),/.&!%1/C,)(.*)0!"+(.1
Abdurrahman was not the only one who felt the pressure from
Soeharto in the lead-up to the sitting of MPR in March 1993. By then
PPP had become stagnant and no longer presented a significant chal-
lenge to Soeharto’s authority. In the 1982 general elections PPP had
polled 28 per cent. Two years later NU withdrew itself from the party,
and in the next election in 1987 the party polled just 16 per cent.
Despite extensive campaigning in the 1992 elections, PPP polled just
over 17 per cent, a disappointingly modest increase. Morale was at an
all-time low; even those within the PPP jokingly referred to it as ‘not
united, not a development and not a party’.23 At the same time Islamist
conservatives who had previously gone beyond PPP to express their
frustration with the Soeharto regime were now being accommodated
within ICMI.
The only serious element opposing Soeharto in Indonesian society
now, apart from Abdurrahman and NU, was PDI. Soeharto was con-
cerned that Abdurrahman might move towards an alliance with PDI.
Abdurrahman had withdrawn NU support from PPP and declared his
opposition to sectarian or professional parties in general, so there was
reason to believe that he might attempt to direct NU support to PDI.
In fact, in the 1992 elections, Abdurrahman had gone out of his way to
lower tensions with the government by directing national support
towards Golkar. At the time many were critical of him, arguing that he
was seeking to spoil the position of PPP out of spite, or in order to
prove his own position right. Others, however, interpreted the move as
being a political ploy to take pressure off himself just when it was reach-
ing a peak. In any case, following the 1992 elections PDI remained
strong and Soeharto continued to be concerned about the possibility of
an alliance between NU and PDI.
In October 1992 the three political parties met to prepare the agen-
da for the MPR session which was to be held the following March.
@D7
PDI activists were exerting strong pressure on party leadership to push
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
for reforms. As a result the party decided not to nominate its presiden-
tial candidate until after its January 1993 national congress, even
though all the other MPR factions had already nominated Soeharto.
Soeryadi, leader of PDI, was under enormous pressure from both
sides. This intensified when Guruh Soekarnoputra, son of the late pres-
ident and a popular party campaigner, offered himself as an alternative
presidential candidate. On 14 January, at the conclusion of the party
congress, Soeryadi announced that the party would be officially nomi-
nating Soeharto. Many observers claimed that Soeryadi had come under
intense pressure from the regime, particularly by way of key military fig-
ures. In July 1993 when, under pressure from ABRI, another party con-
gress was held to elect a new chairman, Soeryadi’s expected nomination
as chairman was blocked and an interim leadership established.24
Several months later, at a second congress in December 1993, there
was a surprise: Megawati Soekarnoputri, an older sister of Guruh, was
elected as the party rode on a surge of Sukarno nostalgia. By this time
Sukarnoism had become a codeword for democratic reform.25 The gov-
ernment and the military were caught offside. Having ousted Soeryadi,
they now had somebody much less to their liking. Initially the govern-
ment refused to acknowledge Megawati, but by the end of the month
conceded it had no choice but to deal with her. Even so, having
acknowledged her, the government manipulated the formation of
Megawati’s board in order to weaken her position.
Across town a similar tussle for reform was going on within Golkar,
where Soeharto, until the late 1980s, had been seen by many as a pop-
ular and respected president. By the 1990s many former supporters and
close colleagues of Soeharto were speaking out against him, arguing
that Golkar needed to be reformed in order to act as a viable political
force and corrective influence upon the government. It generally was
not Soeharto himself but his children and their increasing prominence
in business activities which angered people. Soeharto was criticised for
being indulgent and blind to the ways in which his children’s unfettered
ambitions were undoing years of hard work. At the same time,
reformists such as Akbar Tandjung and Marzuki Darusman argued that
an increasingly well-informed society was now expecting more from its
political leaders than had been delivered in the past, and that Golkar
needed to be transformed into a proper modern political party with all
that that entailed.
@D8
One of the aims of the reformers had been to have former Vice-
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
President Sudharmono elected as party chairman. At the Golkar con-

gress in October 1992 they were blocked by ABRI hard-liners, who
pushed instead for a Soeharto loyalist, Harmoko, to be elected, along
with a new 45-member executive packed with friends, relatives and
other loyalists, including Soeharto’s daughter Tutut as vice-chairman
and son Bambang as treasurer. ‘It’s nepotism on a grand scale,’ said
Marzuki ‘It’s simply no longer realistic to expect Golkar to ever be
independent of Soeharto.’26
On 17 March 1993, following the sitting of the MPR, a new cabinet
was formed and Soeharto was sworn in for his sixth term as president.
Somewhat surprisingly, very few ICMI activists had been rewarded
with positions in Soeharto’s new cabinet and, despite intensive cam-
paigning and lobbying by many within ICMI, Habibie had not become
vice-president. Instead Soeharto swore in Try Sutrisno as his new vice-
president. Some thought that Soeharto might have intended to appoint
former Vice-President Sudharmono to a second term. However,
Sudharmono was unpopular with many within ABRI (his military
background was as a legal officer and he had no combat experience); he
was not considered to be a good ally in cabinet for ABRI. Many inter-
preted Try’s appointment as having been forced by Benny Murdani,
while others argued that Soeharto had possibly been intending to
appoint Try as vice-president all along.
Soeharto also appointed Faisal Tanjung, who was known as one of
the ‘green generals’ with Islamist sympathies, as the new military com-
mander. Faisal Tanjung’s appointment was well accepted by Islamist
conservatives within ICMI. The elevation of General Faisal Tanjung to
head the armed forces was not good news for Abdurrahman, although
Try Sutrisno’s promotion to the vice-presidency, despite his popularity
with conservative Muslims, did not present a problem. Try, who like
most vice-presidents before him, was a former personal adjutant of
Soeharto, had close relations with Benny, and Benny maintained good
relations with Abdurrahman. In 1988 Try had replaced Benny as head
of the armed forces when Benny was effectively demoted to become
Minister for Defence. In 1993 Benny was dropped from the cabinet
line-up altogether — a final confirmation of his fall from grace with
Soeharto. Nevertheless, Benny was far from having lost all influence
and was still widely regarded as a kingmaker. His years of service in
Indonesian military intelligence had secured for him numerous sup-
@DB
porters and friends throughout the military. He was to repeatedly use
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
these to good advantage, even when he had entered into a period of
silent opposition to Soeharto.
!)0/'3-.F)%.-!1+/(,&+3
Following his re-election in March 1993 to his sixth term as president,
Soeharto seemed more relaxed and political tensions began to ease.
Confident once more, Soeharto decided to experiment again with keter-
bukaan, or ‘openness’. As before, the new openness was met with a wave
of student and worker protests and expressions of dissidence, and
Soeharto quickly reassessed his strategy.
At the best of times Soeharto was disinclined to overlook or forget
challenges to his authority. And with protests increasing as quickly as
he relaxed his tight controls, Soeharto was not about to ease up his
pressure on Abdurrahman. The president made it clear that he was
determined to ensure that Abdurrahman would not be re-elected, or
given any major position of authority within NU, even though
Abdurrahman had already indicated that he did not intend to seek re-
election as chairman of NU at the coming 1994 muktamar.27
Abdurrahman’s relationship with Soeharto had always been complex.
In this relationship, as in many others, Soeharto typically played a dou-
ble game. As he was with many who challenged his authority, Soeharto
was polite to Abdurrahman while at the same time working to under-
mine his position.
Early in their relationship Soeharto came to the conclusion that if he
could not easily intimidate Abdurrahman into doing what he wanted
him to do, he might be able to buy his support, or at least get him to
tone down his critical line. In 1992 Abdurrahman’s new house in
Ciganjur was completed. Years earlier the opportunity had arisen for
Abdurrahman to buy a plot large enough to build, not just a house, but
also a pesantren complex. It had been his dream to settle his family into
Ciganjur, and when he stepped down from NU, to run a pesantren. He
poured all of his savings and his inheritance into the purchase of the
land, but even that had been insufficient; he had then been forced to
rely upon the good graces of his brothers and sisters to assist him in the
project. They generously gave him much of their share of their inheri-
tance to help purchase the land in Ciganjur and to assist Abdurrahman
and Nuriyah to move into their own home. Building the house had
been a difficult process. As chairman of NU Abdurrahman did not
@D;
draw a salary or stipend so, apart from his inheritance from his mother
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
and the generosity of his siblings, he had relied upon gifts from a wide
range of friends and well-wishers. This was not considered unusual as
it was typical for pesantren to be built, at least in part, on the basis of
goodwill gifts from well-to-do members of society.
As work on Abdurrahman’s house progressed, he reached a stage
where he had completely exhausted all of his resources. Soeharto, who
had Abdurrahman closely monitored and was aware of the situation,
intervened and offered a gift of money to help complete the project. In
the end Soeharto eventually contributed about one-third of the costs of
the building project, allowing the house to be finished and for work on
the pesantren to be started.28 In the late 1980s, even before the house
was built, Soeharto, who was in the midst of a massive program of
mosque-building across the nation, arranged for a new mosque to be
built in Ciganjur in Abdurrahman’s pesantren complex. As a result a
modern mosque of moderate size was built in the centre of the com-
pound, right in front of Abdurrahman’s house.29 A small plaque inside
the mosque acknowledges that it is one of the hundreds built as part of
the government mosque-building program. No doubt Soeharto had
hoped that these acts of generosity might at least buy a modicum of
support from Abdurrahman. Soeharto was to be bitterly disappointed.
!)%$#.)+(1.%%$31+/(
By 1993 things seemed to have settled down a bit for Abdurrahman
and Nuriyah. They had moved into their new home in Ciganjur and
were enjoying the new setting. Soeharto’s renewed promotion of ‘open-
ness’ suggested that he had become more relaxed following his March
re-election. Abdurrahman was also feeling more relaxed and positive
about the future. He looked forward to 1995 when he could step down
from NU and retire to his pesantren. For the eight years that he had led
NU he’d had little time for writing and he was looking forward to the
opportunity of becoming a public intellectual again.
But something happened that year to disturb Abdurrahman’s sense
of normality and confidence in the future. Abdurrahman’s wife and his
mother were travelling in a mini-van along one of Jakarta’s toll roads
when suddenly, without any warning, the mini-van swerved across the
road and toppled over, rolling several times. A tyre on the mini-van
had blown out and caused the vehicle to lurch violently out of control.
Outside peak hours, traffic on Jakarta’s tollways travels at close to one
@D<
hundred kilometres an hour. The mini-van had been travelling at
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
around this speed when it had rolled, and the damage to the lightly
built vehicle was horrendous. Abdurrahman’s mother was badly
bruised but appeared to have escaped with a broken leg and some other
minor injuries. Nuriyah, however, had suffered serious spinal trauma
and required weeks of hospitalisation, followed by what proved to be
years of therapy. Her doctors said that she would most likely spend the
rest of her life in a wheelchair and would never be able to walk again.
Abdurrahman was badly shaken. Ironically, Nuriyah had always been
worried about his health and Abdurrahman had never given much
thought to hers, which until the accident had always been good. Now
her future — their future — appeared uncertain.
In 1994 Abdurrahman’s mother passed away. She had never really
recovered from injuries sustained in the accident the previous year. In
particular, some minor wounds failed to heal because they had become
infected and proved unresponsive to antibiotics. Her passing affected
Abdurrahman almost as much as Nuriyah’s injuries had. Abdurrahman
had always listened to his mother and respected her. She, along with
Nuriyah, had been a mainstay in his life; now she was gone, and
Nuriyah was undergoing a long and painful course of therapy.
Abdurrahman was devastated.
More controversy erupted when Abdurrahman announced his sup-
port for the previous secretary-general of PPP, Matori Abdul Djalil, to
become the new PPP chair. Abdurrahman was opposed in this view by
both his uncle Yusuf Hasyim and Idham Chalid, NU’s former chair.
Compounding matters was the news that Abdurrahman had been cho-
sen to become an international president of an NGO based in New
York, the World Conference on Religion and Peace. This appointment
received surprisingly wide coverage in the Indonesian press, and many
people were openly critical of his association with such an organisation.
Abdurrahman’s interest in inter-faith dialogue continued unabated
throughout his tenure at the helm of NU. In the late 1980s and early
1990s he sought out opportunities for exchange and dialogue between
Indonesia’s faith communities and leaders of religious communities
around the world. He saw these exchanges as part of the process of edu-
cating Indonesian society about modernity and democracy, as well as
part of his mission as leader of NU to set an example of how Muslim
society should develop. He was proud that Islam in Indonesia was, on
the whole, more liberal and tolerant than many other expressions of
@D=
Islam around the world. When travelling abroad he was keen to

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
encourage greater interest in and more sympathetic understanding of

Islam generally, also seeking to encourage fellow Muslim leaders to
engage in dialogue. In Indonesia his greatest ally was his close friend
Djohan Effendi. Djohan had continued working on inter-faith dia-
logue ever since his student days in the early 1970s, and the two fre-
quently collaborated on projects.
Abdurrahman was widely respected for his liberal ideas and his
championing of tolerance. In 1993 he received an invitation to go to
Manila in August to receive an award recognising his contribution to
inter-faith understanding. This was hardly the first award he had been
given, but it pleased him more than any that he had received so far. The
award that he was invited to the Philippines to receive was the Ramon
Magsaysay Award, widely regarded as being ‘Asia’s Nobel Prize’. The
citation recognised his contribution for ‘guiding Southeast Asia’s largest
Muslim organisation as a force for religious tolerance, fair economic
development and democracy’.
If Abdurrahman’s efforts to promote understanding between reli-
gious communities earned him praise from some quarters, it also earned
him condemnation from others. Many conservative Muslims viewed
his eagerness to engage in dialogue with other faith communities as a
sign that his commitment to Islam was suspect. Even before he became
chairman of NU in 1984, Abdurrahman was regarded by many as
excessively liberal and insufficiently concerned with defending Islam.
For his critics, his activities since becoming chairman only proved that
their initial suspicions about him were well founded. In the 1990s his
constant criticism of Islamists within ICMI, his warnings about the
danger of linking sectarian sentiment with party politics, and his pub-
lic association with non-Muslims through Forum Demokrasi only con-
firmed for many that he was not a true friend of Islam.
Further fuelling controversy was Abdurrahman’s acceptance of an
invitation to visit Israel in October 1994 to witness the signing of
Israel’s new peace treaty with Jordan. After visiting Jerusalem and tour-
ing Israel, accompanied by Djohan Effendi, he returned home and rec-
ommended to the government that it should investigate opening
diplomatic ties with Israel. The condemnation from Islamist conserva-
tives was predictable; perhaps just as predictable was the flurry of criti-
cism that came from conservative elements within NU such as Idham
Chalid and Yusuf Hasyim. Abdurrahman seemed to completely disre-
@DD
gard such criticism, even though he was to report to his members in the
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
muktamar in November that year. Some friends and admirers spoke
warmly of his boldness while others, including many friends, declared
him to be hopelessly reckless.
!"#$%%!&'!()4!0.,)%.G.-.01+/(
Abdurrahman faced considerable uncertainty and unrest when he
returned from Israel. Megawati and PDI were being squeezed harder as
the regime feared more than ever that NU would link up with PDI. It
was clear that Soeharto was personally worried that Abdurrahman
would attempt to stand for a third five-year term at the head of NU,
and that he intended to make sure that this could not happen.
Abdurrahman had talked casually about the possibility of retiring
from the Tanfidziyah and taking up a position on the Syuriah. In
October he floated an idea for abolishing the Tanfidziyah and bringing
all NU control under the one Syuriah; however, this proposal did not
get far.30 He argued that there was a danger that political interests
would once again hijack NU, only this time they would be interests
aligned with the regime. Soeharto was angry with Abdurrahman for
discouraging NU members from becoming active within ICMI.
Through ICMI the president had successfully co-opted his most mili-
tant critics and won over almost half of the Muslim umat. It irritated
him immensely that one man should be able to stymie his best efforts
to win over all of the umat.
Abdurrahman was, of course, aware of this. He also knew that
Soeharto would probably be forced to step aside within the coming five
years and that his demotion would precipitate a turbulent political tran-
sition. Consequently, when Abdurrahman announced, only weeks before
the November muktamar, that he had changed his mind and would stand
for a third term, few were surprised. He sought to justify his eleventh-
hour about-face by saying that he was concerned about what might hap-
pen to NU in the prevailing political climate and about the impending
end of the Soeharto regime. ‘There are stormy waters ahead,’ he reasoned,
‘and more than ever NU needed a seasoned captain at the wheel.’
While many welcomed his change of mind, others, for various rea-
sons, were critical of his decision to stand again. PPP activists and
politicians within NU felt that, for no good reason, Abdurrahman had
thrown away the opportunity for NU to be a potent political force.
Many were also critical of his management style and pointed to the raft
6AA
of projects that had foundered during his tenure. These included a

0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
pineapple cannery, a tapioca plant, a freshwater fish farm, and lastly and
most importantly the joint venture between NU and the Bank
Summa.31 When the latter was launched Abdurrahman had spoken in
grandiose terms of having two thousand branches by the end of the
decade. By 1994 there were only twelve, although, given the rustic
nature of NU, the venture might still be regarded as a moderate success.
In late 1991 Abdurrahman’s venture in promoting the alliance
between the Chinese-backed banks and NU had begun to go awry.
Finally, in late 1992, Bank Summa was forced to close, declaring it had
problems with mismanagement at the head office. In April 1993 Bank
Summa’s shares were purchased by the financial body behind the
Surabaya daily newspaper Jawa Pos. Abdurrahman claimed that in
March of that year he had been told by former Minister for Finance
Johannes Sumarlin that Soeharto had instructed the Finance Ministry
‘to place obstacles in the path of NU–Summa banks’. Most observers of
the time were quick to blame the failure of Abdurrahman’s somewhat
grandiose, if laudable, scheme on traditional NU mismanagement. No
doubt that was a key element in the bank’s failure, but it also seems
plausible that the bank was actively undermined by the Soeharto gov-
ernment.32 Even so, the takeover of the Bank Summa’s shareholding by
the Jawa Pos group had been reasonably successful and to have estab-
lished twelve functioning branches was not a bad achievement, espe-
cially given NU’s poor record of economic management. It might seem
unfair to lay the blame for the failure of the other projects at
Abdurrahman’s feet, but as NU’s chief executive officer he should, at
least, have observed stricter oversight of such ventures. His failure to do
so suggested that he was not a gifted or conscientious administrator.
One of the main reasons given for criticising Abdurrahman’s leader-
ship of the organisation was that he had frequently placed the organi-
sation on a collision course with the Soeharto regime. Through his civil
society activities, which had exploited his mass base within NU, he had
risked making the organisation an enemy of the state. Many questioned
the wisdom of Abdurrahman’s political manoeuvrings and outspoken
criticism of the regime.
Despite all this criticism, it appeared that the majority of the organ-
isation still supported him. Certainly most of the young people, both
the younger kiai and their students, seemed to be firmly on his side.
They contended that, for all his failings, he had brought new life to the
6A@
organisation. Under Abdurrahman the NU once again had become a
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
force both in religious and civil society. Without him, they argued, it
would have continued to sink into stagnation, decline and eventual
death. Few wanted to go back to the NU of Idham Chalid. Under
Abdurrahman the organisation may not have been managed well, but
at least it was no longer moribund or divided. Many of the young peo-
ple felt that the reform of religious thought and practice that
Abdurrahman had encouraged was one of his greatest contributions.
They were concerned that if he was not re-elected such reforms might
be brought to a halt even before they were fully in place.
Abdurrahman’s strongest opposition seemed likely to come from
outside the organisation. In principle, his re-election was an internal
affair; in practice, it seemed likely that the government and the military
would seek to play a major role. After all, in every other comparable
large organisation or political party, the government had always been
able to get its way. Initially, it appeared as if the regime would leave NU
to sort matters out for itself. Initial statements by the government sug-
gested that there might even be moderate support for Abdurrahman.
State Secretary Moerdiono, for example, privately assured NU leaders
that the president had no objections to Abdurrahman’s re-election and
would not interfere with muktamar proceedings.
An anti-Abdurrahman campaign, however, quickly picked up pace in
the weeks prior to the muktamar. It became known as the ABG cam-
paign, the initials standing for asal bukan Gus Dur, literally, ‘so long as
it’s not Gus Dur’. One of the key figures behind the campaign was
Lieutenant-General Hartono, head of the influential ABRI Social and
Political Affairs Section. He was joined in his opposition to
Abdurrahman by Golkar chairman, Harmoko; the Minister for
Religious Affairs, Tamizi Tahir; and B. J. Habibie. There were also clear
signs that Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Tutut, was one of the driving
forces behind the effort to topple Abdurrahman. For his part,
Abdurrahman was cautious in identifying those behind the ABG cam-
paign. Publicly, he blamed ICMI, causing some to dismiss his com-
ments as simply more ‘ICMI bashing’. When speaking in private,
however, his analysis was more sharply drawn. He identified links
between certain elements and individuals in ICMI, such as Adi Sasono,
Din Syamsuddin and Amir Santosa, and ABRI’s so-called green gen-
erals, namely Feisal Tanjung, Hartono, Syarwan Hamid and Prabowo
Subianto, working together with Tutut. Hefner observes:
6A6
In public comments after the congress, Wahid blamed ICMI for the
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
campaign against him. In private he was more specific, saying Din

Syamsuddin and Amir Santosa (both of the CPDS) had joined
forces with Adi Sasono in the campaign to unseat him. Although he
was well aware of the support provided by Feisal Tanjung, Hartono
and Mbak Tutut to Hasan’s initiative, Wahid made a point of not
mentioning their participation. To attack Mbak Tutut would invite
the wrath of the president. To attack Feisal or Hartono would violate
the armed forces’ first commandment: that no matter how great the
tensions between its various factions, military laundry should never
be aired in public. Wahid’s identification of ICMI as the force behind
the campaign to allowed him to fend off his attackers without
degrading his relationship with the president or alienating fence-
sitting members of the armed forces.33
Three alternative candidates were put forward by Abdurrahman’s

critics: former NU board member Fahmi Saifuddin, Chalid Mawardi
and Abu Hasan. Unlike the first two Abu Hasan was relatively
unknown in NU, although he had already established a reputation as a
generous donor and patron. He was a wealthy entrepreneur from Jambi,
Sumatra, who had business links with the president’s family through
shipping, construction and trade. It seemed likely that his strongest
support would come from the outer island branches where such patron-
age was always appreciated. During the course of the muktamar the
other two opponents dropped away and Abu Hasan emerged as the
prime contender. Although, in certain respects an unlikely choice for
NU chairman (he had, for example, none of Abdurrahman’s religious
qualifications), it seemed that he had some backing in the government
and military. Hundreds of thousands of dollars, perhaps more, appeared
to be spread around in support of his campaign.
Was Soeharto playing his usual double game? He had given positive
indications through Moerdiono that he was supporting Abdurrahman;
however, he also seemed to be actively engineering a campaign against
him. The real situation became much clearer when, as usual, Soeharto
was invited to open the muktamar and give the initial speech.
Significantly, this time Abdurrahman was placed three rows from the
front and was not greeted formally by Soeharto. Although clearly a
deliberate snub, it was publicly dismissed as an oversight. Almost half of
the time at the muktamar was taken up with addresses from ministers
6A7
and armed forces personnel. General Faisal Tanjung, the armed forces
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
commander, addressed the assembly along with ten government minis-
ters. The meeting was finally closed by Vice-President Try Sutrisno. By
this time the delegates were heartily sick of speeches from ministers, and
Try received none of the rapturous welcome of five years earlier.
This muktamar in Cipasung, outside the West Java town of
Tasikmalaya, was a busy affair. As usual there were sideshows and stalls
along the main arena, while most of the meetings took place under a
large canvas pavilion erected in the central courtyard of the pesantren.
This time, however, the heavy military presence made a marked differ-
ence. At least fifteen hundred personnel in uniform were deployed,
along with more than one hundred intelligence officers posted to mon-
itor affairs.
Tension rose markedly towards the final day when voting on the
chairmanship was due. Participants attending on that day had to pass
through a military check before entering the muktamar grounds. Once
inside they were virtually sealed in, as the grounds were surrounded by
soldiers and armoured personnel carriers. Ministers and ABRI officials
came and left by military helicopter. On the final night of the mukta-
mar, Abdurrahman jokingly thanked the army for lending extra troops
to Banser, the uniformed ‘troops’ of NU’s youth wing Ansor. It
appeared that many of the fit young men patrolling the muktamar
grounds in Ansor uniform were in fact ABRI personnel.
The ‘anyone but Gus Dur’ forces pulled out all stops. Many NU
branches, particularly those from the outer islands which made up the
great majority of branches, were offered significant financial induce-
ments to support Abu Hasan. These were especially effective because a
large proportion of the board members from outer island branches were
government servants who could be easily intimidated by the threat of
sacking or demotion. Attempts were also made to control the media,
with newspapers favourable to Abdurrahman blocked from entering
Cipasung and the muktamar grounds. There were also many incidents
of misreporting and misquoting of NU supporters by newspapers like
Republika, the daily run by ICMI.
As was expected, Abdurrahman was cross-examined about his sup-
port for controversial policies and issues such as his recent visit to Israel.
With characteristic eloquence he defended his position and appeared to
have generally won over the majority of his critics. This time, however,
he was much less ebullient than normal. Gone were most of his witty
6A8
asides, replaced with a much more sober and serious demeanour. As the
0+?+-),/0+.1>)!(#)+,-!'
level of opposition to him became clear, so the level of tension

increased. In particular the young NU members began to worry des-
perately about the future of the organisation without Abdurrahman at
the helm. A mood of depression descended upon many as they consid-
ered it inevitable that Abdurrahman’s re-election would be blocked by
the efforts of the regime.
In the initial round of voting Abdurrahman received 157 votes, Abu
Hasan 136, Fahmi Saifuddin 17 and Chalid Mawardi 6. This brought
Abu Hasan within striking distance of Abdurrahman. It seemed almost
inevitable that Chalid Mawardi’s six votes would go to Abu Hasan, so
everything hinged on the seventeen delegates who had initially sup-
ported Fahmi Saifuddin. Abdurrahman’s supporters were in disarray.
They had initially expected stiff opposition but nevertheless predicted
that he would gain 65 per cent of the vote; instead, he had not even
achieved 50 per cent in the first round. Old kiai broke down and cried
while the young men paced nervously. Some of the senior kiai closest
to Abdurrahman retired to quietly pray for God’s intervention. It was
well past midnight before counting had begun; it did not conclude until
three hours later.
Everything hinged on these final few hours of the muktamar. If Abu
Hasan was victorious it seemed likely that the government would have
its own way with NU and intellectual vitality would be quashed. For the
younger people, this vote represented a make-or-break point. If
Abdurrahman lost, they would turn their backs on the organisation and
channel their energies elsewhere. Many argued that without
Abdurrahman there was no future for NU.
The final voting took place in the large main assembly hall that, on
this final evening, was jam-packed. The atmosphere was charged.
Throughout the early hours of Tuesday morning no one knew what to
expect; and by 3 am, as the final vote counting approached an end, the
tension was palpable.
A crowd of anxious young members gathered outside the door to the
main auditorium listening to the vote counting over the loud-speaker.
It appeared that anything was possible if the vote went against
Abdurrahman. The compound was surrounded by ABRI personnel and
armoured troop carriers. It would be difficult for Abdurrahman’s sup-
porters to leave the compound, and the prospect of conflict erupting
within it seemed all too real.
6AB
Finally, the result was announced. Abdurrahman had gained 174
3$,&+(:)1&.)-+'+1,2)@DDAG@DD8
votes against Abu Hasan’s 142 votes. A wave of euphoria broke over the
assembly. In the crowd outside the assembly hall young men erupted
into spontaneous yelping and cheers of relief. Dozens formed a circle,
rushing round and round and calling out in English, ‘Soeharto has to
go, Soeharto has to go’.

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Abdurrahman emerged, triumphant but hardly unscathed, from NU’s
muktamar in November 1994, although Soeharto’s regime had mount-
ed strong, intimidating opposition to his re-election as chairman.
Abdurrahman declared he had won ‘a victory over money, slander and
intimidation’. Although this assessment is rather melodramatic, it’s
hard to argue with. He had achieved something unprecedented in
Soeharto’s New Order. He stood up to the full might of Soeharto and
his regime and prevailed despite their best efforts to thwart him.
It was, of course, not clear-cut. Things never were in Soeharto’s New
Order. The regime was obliged to use restraint, or at least work indi-
rectly, in its efforts to block Abdurrahman, for fear of a backlash from
NU’s masses. At a person-to-person level, Soeharto’s snubbing of
Abdurrahman at the opening ceremony of the muktamar was nothing
compared with his cool demeanour towards Abdurrahman for two
years after the muktamar that made it clear he was unhappy with
Abdurrahman’s victory. Although he met with several individual lead-
ers, Soeharto refused to meet with the new NU board and especially
with its chairman.1
6@A
In the final days of the muktamar, the anti-Abdurrahman forces had

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
channelled all of their energies through Abu Hasan (after the other
‘anyone but Gus Dur’ candidates had dropped out of contention). After
the elections Abu Hasan was encouraged to persist in his opposition to
Abdurrahman. His first move was to claim that he had the right to the
deputy’s position on the central board. After all, he argued, he had gar-
nered 45 per cent of the votes, and there was a tradition within NU that
the loser got a consolation prize in the form of the deputy’s position.
Abdurrahman refused Abu Hasan outright, even though Abu Hasan
had been correct in pointing to the NU tradition of being gracious in
defeat and accommodating opponents.2 The nature of Abu Hasan’s
opposition made it almost certain that, given half a chance, he and his
appointees would move to destabilise the central board.
Evidence of the continuing antagonism came during the following
months with efforts to try to organise an extraordinary muktamar.
Ultimately this initiative failed because the new constitution stipulated
that to call an extraordinary muktamar the support of 200 out of 306
branches was required. At the same time, Abu Hasan pursued a strate-
gy of running a rival NU central board which included many of the
figures from the old ‘Cipete group’ close to former NU chairman
Idham Chalid.3 This group received considerable backing from
Abdurrahman’s opponents in the army and government as well as from
ICMI, but ultimately it failed. In the traditional world of NU the rival
board had neither constitutional nor cultural authority, and only a
group of long-time enemies of Abdurrahman took it seriously. Finally
in desperation, in late 1995, Abu Hasan attempted to sue
Abdurrahman. This bid failed and ultimately Abu Hasan was bank-
rupted. Much of the money that had been poured into his campaign
had come from his own pocket. His contract with anti-Abdurrahman
figures within ABRI, such as General Hartono, was based on an under-
standing that he would be repaid handsomely for his campaign against
Abdurrahman. When he sought payment, however, his ABRI backers
refused to reimburse him, arguing that he had been contracted to defeat
Abdurrahman and, having failed, deserved no payment whatsoever.
Several years later a demoralised and broken Abu Hasan sought and
received reconciliation with Abdurrahman, following which Abu
Hasan accompanied Abdurrahman on a tour of several NU districts
and appeared on stage with him at NU rallies. Abdurrahman explained
that he was happy to reconcile with Abu Hasan because this was the
6@@
culturally proper way of handling such disputes in NU; what is more,
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
he argued, Abu Hasan had merely been used as a pawn by others. Even
though the reconciliation did not prove long-lived, Abdurrahman’s
acceptance of Abu Hasan’s request for forgiveness was approved by the
senior kiai and the NU members, who saw it as further proof of
Abdurrahman’s standing as a religious leader.
Although Abu Hasan eventually dropped his campaign against
Abdurrahman, others continued to attack him at every opportunity.
Leading them was Abdurrahman’s uncle, Yusuf Hasyim, together with
former NU chairman Idham Chalid. In September 1995 Yusuf Hasyim
formed the Forum for the Sons and Daughters of NU Founders. This
oddly named organisation was intended to make the most of the
authority that Yusuf Hasyim and his friends had on the basis of their
blood links with the founding generation of NU. As an anti-
Abdurrahman vehicle, however, it ultimately failed. Just like the alter-
native NU central board, no one took it seriously, despite support from
certain figures within ICMI and the army, including General Hartono.
Abdurrahman was unfazed by the continuing opposition to him and
correctly judged that it would soon dissipate of its own accord. Some
interpreted this as justified confidence, some as arrogance; others, in
accordance with traditional Javanese understandings of power, saw it as
a sign of strength.
1&.)!(1+G'.:!*!1+)0!'3!+:()".:+(,
Throughout 1995 and into 1996 Abdurrahman worked closely with
Megawati, and she became dependent upon him for guidance and
encouragement. Megawati had found herself thrown into the leader-
ship of the PDI quite unexpectedly and was uncertain how to marshal
and channel the considerable support that she was receiving. Although
Megawati was not a santri Muslim, her abangan mystical outlook over-
lapped Abdurrahman’s Sufistic approach to the unseen world. Where
many modernists such as Amien Rais could never feel comfortable with
the religiosity of abangan Javanese such as Megawati, Abdurrahman
and many of his fellow traditionalists found it easy to establish a point
of contact.
Megawati was not an intellectual and had no thought-out political
platform or clearly articulated political vision, but she intuitively pur-
sued a path which she saw as supporting her father’s ideals.
Abdurrahman arguably had a much stronger grasp of Sukarno’s political
6@6
philosophy than did Megawati, something which she not only under-
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
stood but also respected. He rejected Sukarno’s leftist excesses, as he

saw them, but clung to the core elements of his philosophy: deep con-
cern for the rakyat, or the ordinary people; nationalism inspired by the
desire to transform society that it might become both richer and fairer;
and the dream of building an Indonesia that was at once united and
comfortable with its plural nature.
Abdurrahman was, in most respects, much less romantic than
Sukarno and certainly more cynical about the practical working out of
Marxist thought than Sukarno had been, but he shared the former
president’s passion for building a just society in which wealth was dis-
tributed equitably. Megawati regularly consulted with Abdurrahman
and he counselled her on the necessity of thinking strategically in con-
fronting the Soeharto regime. He argued that it was vital to recognise
when to push forward and when to pull back. By late 1995, however,
serious differences had began to emerge between the two. Megawati,
excited by the possibilities latent in PDI’s passionate millions, was keen
to maintain pressure on Soeharto. To her, and to many in her party, this
was more than simply a matter of politics. It was bound up with her
desire to avenge her father’s suffering at the hands of Soeharto and his
New Order regime. As a young woman she had seen her father die a
broken man — a sad shell of the larger-than-life extrovert who had
enthralled the nation for decades, a prisoner in his own house.
Abdurrahman, however, was urging restraint and warning Megawati
about the threat of a violent crackdown by the military. Abdurrahman’s
contacts within the military were more extensive than Megawati’s and
he was receiving feedback that hard-line elements in the military would
eventually strike back if Megawati continued to allow herself to be pre-
sented as an immediate threat to Soeharto.
It had never, of course, been Soeharto’s intention for Megawati to
become leader of PDI. Ironically, it was because Soeharto considered
the former leader Soeryadi to be too outspoken that he had ordered his
ousting in 1993, thus opening the way for Megawati’s ascent.4
Although Megawati was deeply introverted and hardly charismatic, it
quickly became clear that she was a popular leader with tremendous
drawing power for PDI. Much as he had done with Abdurrahman over
the previous three years, Soeharto sought to undermine Megawati by
using assorted opportunists, pro-Habibie military officers and elements
of ICMI to engineer dissent within her organisation and slander and
6@7
intimidation from without. Throughout 1994 she was made to contend
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
with rebel local PDI branches, many of which were controlled by the
military and stacked with their appointees. Provincial governors —
most notably in East Java, a heartland of both PDI and NU support —
went so far as to deny her permission to address PDI rallies on the pre-
text that she had to first ‘reconcile’ with her ‘critics’. The regime was
working behind the scenes to orchestrate events that made reconcilia-
tion virtually impossible, while all the time government officials pre-
sented themselves as neutral arbitrators in ‘internal party affairs’.5
Matters came to a head in late December 1994 when a ‘Reshuffled
National PDI Executive’ was formed in competition with PDI’s official
national board, much as Abu Hasan’s NU Central Co-ordinating
Executive was established to rival the official NU Board of
Management. In itself this rival board was unable to dislodge Megawati
from the leadership, but it did allow the regime to claim that Megawati
was incapable of uniting her party’s ‘factions’.
In 1995 the leadership of the rival PDI board embarked on an exten-
sive smear campaign designed to weaken Megawati’s credibility and
suggest that Megawati’s supporters had ties with the Communist Party.
Although the attacks, which continued through 1995 and into 1996,
failed to dislodge Megawati, they did seriously hinder her program of
reform within the party, preventing her from removing Soeharto loyal-
ists planted in the party over many years.
The regime’s efforts to discredit Megawati and Abdurrahman were
bitter and nasty but there were, nevertheless, some funny moments, at
least from Abdurrahman’s point of view. He likes to tell of a rally in
1995 at which General Syarwan Hamid was present. At one point, in
a botched attempt at intimidation, Syarwan got up to address the
audience. ‘I am deeply worried about this apparent alliance with Gus
Dur and Megawati,’ he said. ‘It is not a good thing at all, it’s bad for
society — it’s destabilising and destructive. They think that they are
in the Philippines — it is as if Megawati is Corry Aquino and Gus
Dur is Cardinal Sin — who do these people think they are!’ To which
Abdurrahman replied: ‘Well, Syarwan, if Mbak Mega is Corry
Aquino and I am Cardinal Jamie Sin, then who is Ferdinand
Marcos?!’ At which point Syarwan got up to leave the auditorium and
the audience began chiming in: ‘Ya Wan, Wan, who is Ferdinand
Marcos Wan!’6
When it became clear that the campaign against Megawati was not
6@8
as effective as had been hoped, Golkar undertook secret polling to

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
assess the extent to which Megawati represented a significant threat in

the upcoming general elections scheduled for early 1997. Golkar and
ICMI strategists were horrified to learn that Megawati’s PDI enjoyed
greater popularity among voters in Central and East Java than did
Soeharto’s Golkar.7 It appeared that the regime’s heavy-handed
attempts to destroy Megawati had only made her stronger. Stoic but
quietly confident in the face of a barrage of slander and intimidation,
the ‘non-politician’ leader of PDI was fast becoming a hero in the eyes
of many ordinary Indonesians. Worried by Megawati’s unexpected
climb in popularity, Soeharto ordered that the campaign against her be
intensified; henceforth it would be handled directly by General Feisal
Tandjung and General Syarwan Hamid rather than by ICMI opera-
tives such as Din Syamsuddin and Amir Santosa and their colleagues
in Golkar’s Research and Development Bureau.
Informed of the intensification of efforts to oust Megawati,
Abdurrahman counselled a strategic retreat. Now was the time, he
argued, for Megawati to lie low for a while. In particular it was impor-
tant, he advised, that she announce publicly that she would not allow
herself to be nominated as a presidential candidate to symbolically chal-
lenge Soeharto at the 1997 elections, as some were urging her to do.
Abdurrahman’s call for restraint was at odds with popular sentiment. By
early 1996 there was growing public excitement about the potential of
a partnership between Megawati and Abdurrahman. Many felt it obvi-
ous that the combination of her millions of supporters in the PDI and
his millions in NU would give them the numbers to topple Soeharto.
Young Indonesians, in particular, were keen to confront the regime, and
they saw in Abdurrahman and Megawati the natural leaders of the
reform movement.
At this point in time most modernist Muslims felt that their politi-
cal voice was increasingly heard, either through PPP or through ICMI.
Those involved with ICMI generally had little immediate incentive to
speak out against Soeharto as it seemed that his regime was finally giv-
ing them a voice in the running of the country. Consequently, the only
senior national figures speaking out for reform were the leaders of NU
and PDI, along with Amien Rais; the latter, despite his senior position
within ICMI and his friendships with hardline Islamists, was much
more of a reformist than most of his colleagues in the senior echelons
of ICMI.
6@B
'/$(1+(:)$(.!,.
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
By early 1996 there were ominous signs of impending trouble, espe-
cially after April when Ibu Tien, Soeharto’s wife of more than forty
years, died suddenly. Soeharto had depended heavily upon Tien’s coun-
sel. She was perhaps the one person he really trusted and to whom he
consistently turned for advice. A naturally reclusive and distant man, he
had few friends with whom he was really close, and the loss of his inti-
mate friend and confidant seemed to destabilise him. In the weeks that
followed many commented that the man who had once been a master
strategist and astute manipulator of politics and power was showing
signs of having lost his normally sound judgment. The sense of unease
that prevailed in Indonesia turned to panic several months later when
Soeharto was suddenly rushed to a health spa in Germany for medical
treatment, accompanied by his extended family. The public relations of
his sudden illness and evacuation to Germany was badly handled.
Ministers and senior government officials squabbled in public over
what was to be said about his illness. The markets were shaken up, as
was the international community. As it happened, the health alarm
turned out to be a false one. His problem was merely kidney stones, and
he returned home later that month seemingly in fine health. Even so,
to a jittery community, he seemed a changed man; when he began to
move decisively against Megawati, it was difficult to know how things
would turn out.
Soeharto was deeply troubled by the alliance between Abdurrahman
and Megawati, in particular by their appeal among young Indonesians.
He was well aware that in the following year’s elections a further 20
million voters, or 20 per cent of the total voting population, would be
added to the electoral roll. Indeed 60 per cent of Indonesians at that
time had been born after Soeharto had come to power, and knew no
other president. They had not experienced the tremendous instability of
the mid-1960s, or the horrors of the Communist pogrom that followed
the alleged coup of October 1965. Where older Indonesians were nat-
urally reluctant to risk confrontation which could result in the polarisa-
tion of society, many young Indonesians, particularly students, wanted
change and seemed to have little regard for the risks involved.
Soeharto’s sudden flight to Germany, conspicuously accompanied by
most of his immediate relatives, pushed the succession issue to the top
of the agenda. Most commentators now expected that he would begin
6@;
a seventh term in 1998 following elections in 1997, but would not, in

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
all likelihood, complete it. One way or another, Indonesia seemed set
for change.
In June the government ordered PDI to hold a special congress.
Along with Feisal Tandjung and Syarwan Hamid, several other hard-
line generals seemed to be involved, including the president’s son-in-
law, Prabowo Subianto. Hefner asserts that other players, contributing
much of the financial support required to hold the Medan congress,
were Yusuf Wanandi of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and senior ICMI leader Adi Sasono. Allegedly Yusuf
Wanandi was keen to regain Soeharto’s favour, and Adi Sasono, who
had solid credentials as a community development activist, was brought
in to win over PDI’s Muslim members.8 The intention in calling the
congress was clear, especially after it was announced that neither
Megawati nor her supporters would be allowed to participate. Soeharto
and the hard-liners had had enough of Megawati leading PDI and
thought that it was time for her to go. As was expected, Megawati was
rolled at the congress and former PDI leader Soeryadi installed in her
place. Megawati was further humiliated by being ordered to make her
peace with Soeryadi and accept what happened. Not surprisingly, her
supporters were furious; almost immediately hundreds of young sup-
porters gathered at the Menteng headquarters of the party to protest.
The confident tone of Megawati’s supporters soon produced a carni-
val atmosphere at the protest, although around the edges there were
daily clashes with security forces as tension steadily increased. Each day,
students at the party headquarters would hold ‘freedom forums’ during
which they talked about the need for democratic change and freedom
of speech.9 Initially the government responded by trying to quash the
media coverage, but Soeharto’s handling of the whole affair seemed
much less calm and astute than it had been in the past.
The Soeharto regime was, of course, by no means unaccustomed to
manipulating political processes in mass organisations and parties. It
had for many years exerted a controlling influence within PPP and,
prior to Megawati’s emergence, had little to fear from PDI. The June
special congress of PDI achieved for Soeharto the objective that he had
failed to obtain in the NU muktamar in 1994, namely the toppling of a
populist opponent from the leadership of their organisation. In time,
however, it proved to be a pyrrhic victory. Soeharto had made a martyr
of Megawati.
6@<
When the government’s campaign to limit the media damage relat-
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
ing to the students’ demonstration appeared to be failing, preparations
were made for the use of force in removing the protesters. At 5.30 on
the morning of 27 July several hundred Soeryadi supporters, accompa-
nied by what appeared to be groups of preman (hoodlums or gangsters),
gathered outside the PDI headquarters. With the support of the police
and the military, they stormed the building and drove out the Megawati
loyalists. The whole event was captured on television and broadcast live
to the nation. Almost spontaneously Jakarta erupted into two days of
rioting, the worst that had been seem in the national capital in decades.
The government immediately blamed the radical Peoples Democratic
Party (Partai Demokrasi Rakyat — PRD), which they said represented
‘the new Communists’. An unknown number of people were killed and
124 Megawati loyalists arrested.
Abdurrahman had been urging Megawati to back off and avoid con-
frontation before the inevitable occurred. ‘What point is there,’ he
asked, ‘in pushing the regime so hard that it fights back with bloody
violence and we’re no further advanced in our cause? Better to beat a
strategic retreat and live to fight another day.’ Abdurrahman was right,
but only partly so.
Not content with ousting Megawati from the leadership of her party,
Soeharto was determined to besmirch her reputation and create suspi-
cion about the motives of those supporting her. Working through their
partners in ICMI’s right wing, Soeharto’s green generals set about turn-
ing conservative Muslim opinion against Megawati and her
‘Communist–PRD’ supporters. True to form, Nurcholish Madjid called
for calm; he bravely dismissed talk of a ‘Communist threat’ as being ‘old
language’ and insisted that it was the state’s failure to permit the peace-
ful expression of dissenting political views that lead directly to con-
frontations such as the one that occurred on 27 July.10 Nevertheless,
even moderates within Muhammadiyah, who were generally disgusted
at the regime’s efforts to use religion to stir up emotions, were caught
up in the mounting hysteria about the ‘threat from the left’. Amien
Rais, who was now chairman of Muhammadiyah and who, despite his
senior position within ICMI, had for some years now been outspoken
in his criticism of Soeharto, was goaded into intemperate commentary,
saying of the Megawati supporters who had occupied the Jakarta head-
quarter of PDI: ‘The discovery of Molotov cocktails, explosives, and
gasoline shows that there probably was an intention to destabilise the
6@=
country in a dangerous way.’11 Hard-line Islamists, such as Ahmad

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
Sumargono, leader of KISDI (the Committee for World Islamic

Solidarity, the radical Islamist group born out of Dewan Dakwah), and
Hussein Umar from Dewan Dakwah, had no hesitation in condemning
the violence as being the work of the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), although the party had been comprehensively destroyed three
decades before.12
On 11 August, a fortnight after the attack on Megawati’s supporters,
around 40 000 Muslims attended a rally in Jakarta’s Senayan stadium to
show their support for the government’s stance. Even then, the regime
did not relent, and all Muslim organisations faced strong pressure to
make public statements supporting the government’s position.13 NU
was one of the few large Muslim organisations not to yield, but the
organisation and its members paid a high price in loss of government
business contracts and intimidation by the security apparatus.
Abdurrahman was accused of sympathising with PRD and the
Communists; his enemies within ICMI, Dewan Dakwah and KISDI
revived their campaign of propaganda against him, alleging that he was
lax in his personal devotions and pro-Christian. Incredibly, he was
accused of having links with both Iraq’s socialist Baath party and
Israel’s Mossad!
0/''$(!-)0/(4-+01
Megawati’s people were crushed but, in time, that suffering was to pro-
duce something that even the military regime of Soeharto could not
stop. In the weeks after the July rioting, students and workers around the
country launched campaigns of their own. Most of them were small-
scale but together they represented a significant phenomenon, one that
suggested that even the New Order regime was limited in the extent to
which it was able to control society. Controlling isolated groups of
reformist protesters was one thing, but controlling an entire society that
was unravelling at the edges was quite another. And, unfortunately, it
was not just protesting students that the nation had to worry about.
Indonesia had long prided itself on being a plural nation in which
diverse ethnic groups and religious communities lived side-by-side,
mostly without significant incidents or problems. It was commonly
said that Indonesian culture was essentially tolerant and easy-going.
By the mid-1990s this was beginning to change. The awful events of
the mid-1960s were a reminder that no society is ever completely free
6@D
from the threat of communal violence, however much the preceding
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decades might have given grounds for hope. Thirty years later it was
beginning to look as if Indonesia might once again descend into
sectarian violence.
In October 1996 anti-Christian and anti-Chinese rioting broke out
in the East Java town of Situbondo. The rioting apparently followed the
trial of a man charged with blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad. In
the violence that ensued, twenty churches were burned, along with
scores of Chinese shops, and at least five people killed. Anecdotal
accounts suggested that there was much more to this violence than dis-
putes about the outcome of a court trial and differences between reli-
gious communities. Many local people reported seeing ‘muscular young
men with short haircuts’ speaking with ‘out-of-town’ accents asking for
directions. Most people assumed that provocateurs from outside of the
town had played a decisive role in instigating violence.
Abdurrahman suspected that the incident had been direkayasa, or
‘engineered’ — a previously rare verb which, along with the noun pro-
vokator, was to become widely used in the ensuing years. He had been
warned by contacts in the military intelligence community in August
and September that the regime was planning a new round of attacks
against him. This time, it was said, an incident would be provoked in
order to discredit him by showing him as unable to control the Muslim
community.14 Situbondo, a modest town located towards the eastern
extremity of Java and an easy day’s sailing south of the island of Madura
across the shallow straits, was an ideal location to embarrass the liberal
chairman of NU. Along with a significant Christian minority, it is also
home to tens of thousands of Madurese settlers, who, like most of their
fellow Madurese in Madura and scattered in settlements around East
Java and Kalimantan, are simple, hardy folk — poor, ill-educated, and
with a reputation for a feisty direct manner and for being easily pro-
voked. The Madurese, though regarded as less tolerant and easy-going
than the people of East Java, are also loyal members of NU.
When Abdurrahman went public with his suspicions about the
Situbondo violence, he was scoffed at by his critics in Jakarta but not by
the majority of people in East Java, who were firmly convinced that the
violence had not been spontaneous. Opinion among foreign observers
was divided; many were uncomfortable with anything that smacked of
conspiracy theory. But many seasoned observers, familiar with the tac-
tics of Indonesian military intelligence operations, took seriously the
66A
eyewitness accounts of provocateurs instigating the violence. Hefner,

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
for example, notes:
Reports from the shattered town — confirmed by journalists who

visited Situbondo — indicated that most of the rioters were not local
people but provocateurs ferried in aboard three trucks from outside
town. In crisp black ninja uniforms the rioters moved around town
unimpeded for four hours before security officials finally appeared.
Their leaders blew whistles directing their troops to their targets: a
truck dispensed gasoline for petrol bombs. By the time the police
arrived, the rioters had moved on to neighboring towns, where they
carried out a similarly well-planned program of terror against
Christian churches and schools.15
Shortly after the violence broke out, the military flew Abdurrahman
to Situbondo, a town that was the site of several large pesantren locat-
ed deep in the heart of traditional Muslim territory. Shaken by what
he saw in Situbondo, he made an emotional apology to the Christian
communities there, expressing regret that some of the people who were
involved in the violence had links with NU. Abdurrahman encouraged
the Christian and Muslim communities there to be more diligent
about communicating with each other, to pay more attention to rela-
tions between leaders. He later remarked to Christian and Muslim
leaders in Situbondo, ‘You have lost some beautiful churches but you
gain something much more precious and that is the relationship that
you now have between each other’. Catholic priest and social activist
Romo Mangunwijaya later said that it was only with the Situbondo
church burnings that the church really began to appreciate the need for
inter-faith dialogue and the importance of building good inter-com-
munal relations. ‘Prior to that,’ he said, ‘only a handful of activists in
the church had been calling for this.’ 16 Having witnessed both large-
scale violence and the potential for restoring relations through dia-
logue, the church hierarchy was now awake to the need for better
relations between communities.
It is difficult to assess definitively the extent to which the Situbondo
violence was orchestrated, but many analysts are persuaded by strong
anecdotal evidence that there was a significant level of provocation
from external forces and that the provocateurs were probably linked
with the right-wing, hard-line generals who themselves were aligned
66@
with Islamist extremists. Looking back, the events in Situbondo were a
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
sign of things to come.
!),1%!1.:+0)%.1%.!1
Abdurrahman had managed to stand up to intense pressure from the
Soeharto regime for the two years that followed his re-election to the
chair of NU in November 1994. By late 1996, however, he became
increasingly concerned about the level of tension building in
Indonesian society and the extreme measures the Soeharto forces would
use to get their way. Moreover, the campaign against the NU member-
ship had intensified. It was not simply a matter of NU businessmen
being cut out of government contracts or local leaders being questioned
and intimidated by the military. It was reported that several NU youth
arrested in conjunction with the Situbondo violence were tortured by
the military. One youth was apparently tortured so severely that he died
while in detention. Graphic details of his suffering at the hands of
‘Christian officers’ were revealed in interviews with him secretly taped
in prison.17
The violent attack on Megawati’s supports of 27 July had shaken
Abdurrahman to the core, but it was only after the Situbondo riots that
he realised that he had no choice but to negotiate a truce with Soeharto.
Abdurrahman secretly made contact with Soeharto via State Secretary
Moerdiono and negotiated a meeting. On 2 November 1996
Abdurrahman was attending a national meeting of Rabitah Ma’ahid
Islamiyah (RMI), one of NU’s daughter organisations, at a pesantren in
Probolinggo, East Java. Unannounced, the president appeared at the
entrance to the meeting hall. Abdurrahman, who was already standing
there, reached out his hand to Soeharto and drew him to his side.
Soeharto responded warmly and the two walked hand-in-hand to the
front of the hall. The next day Abdurrahman announced that NU
accepted the fact that Soeharto would serve another term as presi-
dent.18 Many within NU were delighted that the cold war with the
president had finally ended, but most of Abdurrahman’s friends in the
democracy movement were shocked and upset. More was to come.
Several days later Abu Hasan, the bitter rival who, at the regime’s
behest, had spearheaded the campaign against Abdurrahman two years
earlier, met with Abdurrahman to ask his forgiveness, as we have seen.
This was followed two weeks later by a meeting in Situbondo between
Abdurrahman and General Hartono, the general who had master-
666
minded Abu Hasan’s campaign and was known to work closely with
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Tutut, Soeharto’s eldest daughter and presidential aspirant. The hand-

some, independent-minded Madurese general was known as one of the
green generals but he, like Tutut, disliked Habibie and did not trust fel-
low green generals Prabowo Subianto and Feisal Tandjung.
Tutut had apparently wanted to accompany her father to
Probolinggo on 2 November but had been blocked by Abdurrahman.
Even though she had worked closely with Hartono in trying to defeat
Abdurrahman two years earlier, she was now keen to reconcile with
him. Her enthusiasm for rapprochement was driven by her ambition to
prove herself to her father as a worthy heir to the presidency. She knew
that to secure her father’s backing for some future transfer of power she
had first to demonstrate that she could gain the support of the masses.
In recent years she had made a show of her interest in Islam. She always
appeared in public with her hair wrapped in a scarf and dressed mod-
estly in traditional santri outfits. The surest way for her to demonstrate
to her father that she had the necessary modicum of public support to
lead the nation was to secure the backing the Islamic masses. Were she
close to Habibie and Amien Rais, then ICMI and Muhammadiyah
would have provided all that she was looking for. Unfortunately for her
presidential ambitions, however, she loathed Habibie and consequently
was unlikely to have much luck with Amien either, who in any case was
becoming increasingly strident in his criticism of the president and his
children. Consequently, having failed to destroy Abdurrahman in 1994,
she now felt compelled to court his support in 1996.
In most respects, in late 1996 Abdurrahman was the most vulnerable
he had ever been. He well understood Tutut’s dilemma, however, and in
his dealings with her negotiated from a position of strength. Having
shaken hands with Soeharto, then Abu Hasan, and then Hartono, he
was ready to meet with Tutut. But first he wanted to secure some con-
cessions. Hartono and Tutut had been generous patrons to the Centre
for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS) the group of regimist
intellectuals in ICMI led by Din Syamsuddin and Amir Santosa.
CPDS saw itself as a successor to the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), which had long since fallen out of favour
with Soeharto. It was locked in a bitter struggle with another ICMI
thinktank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies
(CIDES), led by Habibie’s lieutenant Adi Sasono. Both CIDES and
CPDS had been involved in the campaigns against Abdurrahman in
667
1994 and Megawati in 1996, but Abdurrahman believed that CPDS
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was the more guilty of the pair. He demanded that Hartono and Tutut
drop their support for CPDS and call off the CPDS attacks on himself,
Megawati and NU. They obliged, as did also Amir Santosa, and CPDS
dropped its campaigns. But the other green generals, Prabowo, Feisal
Tanjung and Syarwan Hamid, who were close to Habibie and did not
have any interest in furthering Tutut’s presidential ambitions, did not
want to make peace with Abdurrahman. They immediately established
yet another thinktank — the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) — and
appointed Din Syamsuddin and Fadli Zon as its directors. Not only
had Abdurrahman successfully negotiated a truce with the regime: he
had also split the Islamist camp.19
With Megawati denied any role in PDI, and PPP dominated by
regimist career politicians, Abdurrahman could see no point in fighting
Golkar at the May 1997 elections. He also said that, given Soeharto’s
state of mind, unless Golkar polled extremely well, civil society groups
would face another round of repression. He also, of course, had person-
al reasons for not wanting either of the pseudo-opposition parties to
poll well in 1997. With Soeharto’s treatment of Megawati reducing the
vote for PDI, it stood to reason that PPP should pick up a big windfall
in May. If this were to happen it would convey the impression that
Indonesians were endorsing the actions of the regimists and Islamists
linked to PPP. At the same time, Abdurrahman felt that he still need-
ed to work hard to ensure that the ceasefire that he and NU were enjoy-
ing with Soeharto did not quickly collapse. He was by now convinced
that Soeharto was unstable and dangerous and liable to overreact to
signs of dissent. For all of these reasons Abdurrahman agreed to accom-
pany Tutut at several NU rallies during the election campaign. At the
rallies he explained that he ‘wanted to formally introduce Mbak Tutut
to the people of NU because she was somebody whom they ought to
get to know’. ‘She was already an important person and may well
become even more important in future’ he explained.
Privately he explained his actions by saying ‘It’s better that Golkar
has a good win in the 1997 elections, because if the numbers drop too
much then Soeharto might panic and lash out again. In any case,’ he
continued, ‘we’re going to be stuck with Soeharto for some years yet, so
now is not the time to push for change — we’d best retreat and consol-
idate.’ He also said that he recognised that he had no choice but to bar-
gain for peace. It was, he said, not just a question of his own safety and
668
security: it was a question of the welfare of tens of millions of his fol-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
lowers. Many of the students and young people, both within and with-
out NU, were shattered by his apparent willingness to ‘make a deal with
the regime’. At the time, however, he argued he had no choice and that
he had driven a very good bargain.
%!33%/0&.'.(1)*+1&)!'+.()
Abdurrahman’s rapprochement with Soeharto gave him and NU some
valuable breathing space. It also happened to precede another rap-
prochement, which was to prove equally important. On 1 December, a
couple of weeks after his much observed handshake with Soeharto,
Abdurrahman met with Amien Rais at the Sunda Kelapa mosque in
Menteng, Central Jakarta. It was a historic public meeting in which
leading modernists and traditionalists came together in a very public
fashion. It was thought that if Amien and Abdurrahman could work
together, they would generate tremendous leverage to push for change.
One of Soeharto’s main objectives with ICMI had been to drive a
wedge between the modernists and the traditionalists and thereby pre-
vent them from joining forces against him. In the early 1990s Amien,
who was by nature outspoken, had not been highly critical of Soeharto.
His position on ICMI’s board of experts more or less guaranteed his
acquiescence. But as he started to become increasingly critical of the
regime, many began to see the possibility of his joining Abdurrahman
and Megawati as a third figure to lead the reform movement. The will-
ingness of Amien and Abdurrahman to meet publicly indicated, at
least, the possibility of their collaboration. At the time of their meeting
Nurcholish Madjid commented, ‘The two of them both share the same
concern regarding justice and both cannot stand to see people who have
pretensions about power’. The road ahead for Abdurrahman and
Amien was, of course, bound to be rocky, but at least a beginning had
been made.
'/%.)0/''$(!-)?+/-.(0.
While some good resulted from the horrible violence in Situbondo, in
that the communities there began, for the first time, to get to know
each other and establish good relations, the violence unfortunately did
not stop. In December that year similar violence broke out in
Tasikmalaya, West Java, near the location of NU’s 1994 congress. Ten
churches were burnt down along with numerous Chinese shops, hous-
66B
es, and Christian schools. At least four people were killed, with blame
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attributed to the local NU community. Local NU members claimed
that they had been deliberately framed and that the violence had, in
fact, been instigated by people from out of town. There was an eerie
parallel to what had happened two months earlier in East Java.
Abdurrahman lashed out at ICMI and the Islamic right and was
quoted in the media as saying that he knew who was involved. He
stopped just short of naming names, but he did say that he thought
one of the figures behind the violence was a man with the initials A.S.
There was no doubt that he was referring to Adi Sasono. Naturally Adi
Sasono and his colleagues in ICMI denied their involvement, and the
evidence against them remained inconclusive. Nevertheless, they faced
a burden of suspicion. There was evidence to suggest that members of
the Islamic right, including some elements in ICMI, had been
involved in earlier confrontations. Moreover, it appeared that they had
been involved in the ‘anti-Gus Dur’ push at the time of NU’s 1994
muktamar.
One figure frequently mentioned in speculation about involvement
of the political elite in instigating the violence was Soeharto’s own son-
in-law, General Prabowo Subianto. Abdurrahman frequently claimed
to have evidence linking Prabowo with the Islamic right and with
ICMI figures like Adi Sasono. His failure to produce this evidence for
public scrutiny was seen by his critics as proof that he was simply speak-
ing out of his own prejudices. Others, particularly his supporters with-
in NU, said that it was understandable that he couldn’t divulge his
sources. Few doubted that one of Abdurrahman’s key sources of infor-
mation was Benny Murdani.
After graduating from the military academy in 1972, Prabowo had
served with the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) up until 1986, and
then with the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) and finally had been
put in charge of Army Special Forces. He had served three terms of
duty in East Timor and some there regarded him as being ‘a borderline
psychopath’. In East Timor he had worked with militia groups, train-
ing and financing many militia members. It was in East Timor that
Prabowo, previously a Benny Murdani protégé, fell out with Benny. In
the mid-1980s Benny recalled him from active service in East Timor,
claiming that he was out of control. Since that time Prabowo came to
hate Benny with a vengeance.
There is clear evidence linking Prabowo with KISDI and other
66;
groups from the Islamic right, and he was very open about his support
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
for conservative Islamists. Ironically, Prabowo came to replace Benny as

one of the key figures in military intelligence command. Many sug-
gested that it was Prabowo’s intelligence people who were behind the
storming of the PDI headquarters in July 1996 and spreading the cam-
paign, in August, against the so-called new Communist People’s
Democratic Party (PRD). When the Army Special Forces were placed
under his command, Prabowo moved, with his father-in-law’s permis-
sion, to increase the size of the force from three to six thousand troops.
This prompted Murdani to say that ‘Prabowo was trying to make the
Special Forces into the Iraqi Secret Service’.
Whatever the truth behind Prabowo’s involvement in inter-commu-
nal riots and unrest, it was clear that ABRI, under its new commander
General Feisal Tandjung, was now dominated by so-called green offi-
cers, who were seen to champion Islamic interests. The ‘red-and-white’
secular-nationalist officers, who for decades had been fearful of militant
Islam, had been marginalised. None of this, of course, was accidental. It
can be largely explained in terms of Soeharto’s deliberate manipulation
of army command structures, playing off the green officers against the
red-and-white ones in order to prevent them uniting and challenging
his authority. This plan dovetailed neatly with Soeharto’s promotion of
radical Islamists more generally and with his sponsorship of ICMI.
,/.&!%1/)-/,.,)1&.)'!(#!1.)/4)&.!?.(
In traditional Southeast Asian literature the state of the natural environ-
ment is often said to be linked to the authority of the ruler. Consequently,
failure in the natural environment, an imbalance or series of disasters,
suggests that there is a problem with the leader. This is certainly the way
that many Indonesians interpreted the disasters that befell them in 1997.
Indonesia was in the grip of its worst drought since independence. Failure
of rain resulted in extensive crop losses and in some parts of the country,
where ordinarily people seldom knew hunger, thousands were forced to
go without food. The lack of rain not only destroyed crops but also had a
disastrous effect on the forest burn-offs that normally signalled the
beginning of the dry season. Forests are burnt both by small-scale slash
and burn agriculturalists and by large plantation companies clearing land.
In the midst of the drought these burn-offs resulted in choking pollution;
most drifted northwards to Singapore and Malaysia but some also blan-
keted parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan.
66<
At the same time Soeharto appeared to be acting more and more irra-
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
tionally. Technocrats and former loyal ministers began to say that he was
refusing to listen to advice, or discuss issues, even with those whom he
trusted most. Further adding to Soeharto’s woes was Amien Rais. Early in
1997 Amien Rais had spoken out over the Freeport copper mine in Irian
Jaya, arguing that ‘90 per cent of profits in the mine were expatriated and
the remaining 10 per cent went largely to one family’. Soeharto was furi-
ous. If there was one taboo in Soeharto’s Indonesia it was to point the fin-
ger at the ‘first family’, particularly if you were a member of his favoured
elite. Immediately after Amien’s outburst, Soeharto called Habibie into his
office and lectured him, saying, ‘Amien is making subversive statements
and is now more dangerous than Abdurrahman Wahid’. Habibie then
confronted Amien and repeated the treatment he had from Soeharto.
Amien was unfazed. He simply packed his bags and left ICMI.
Unfortunately for Soeharto, this left Amien Rais chairman of
Muhammadiyah, but outside ICMI and free of any need for self-cen-
sorship. Amien Rais had been elected to the chair of Muhammadiyah
in 1995; if he had previously been reluctant to speak out too strongly,
he now felt no compulsion about speaking his mind. Soeharto had
made for himself a particularly vexatious enemy.
!"#$%%!&'!()0/(,/-+#!1.,
At that time Abdurrahman and NU were enjoying a period of peace
with the regime. It now appeared to Soeharto that modernists such as
Amien Rais were more difficult to deal with than the generally quies-
cent traditionalists. In any case NU was left largely alone. This didn’t
automatically secure popular support for Abdurrahman. Some mem-
bers, including many young reformists who were previously his
strongest supporters, thought he had sold out to the regime.
Nevertheless, at the munas, or congress of ulama, called in November
1987 on the island of Lombok, it was clear that Abdurrahman had
strengthened his position within the organisation. While many at the
munas were outspokenly critical of him and demanded an explanation
of his reconciliation with Soeharto and his backing of Golkar during
the 1997 campaign, most accepted his explanation and indicated their
support for him. The end of the congress saw the ulama formally
endorse a number of the initiatives and positions being pushed by the
liberal reformists close to Abdurrahman, and it seemed that he had
once more consolidated his position within NU.
66=
At this time many external observers had been inclined to write

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
Abdurrahman off. He was nearing the end of three five-year terms at

the helm of NU, and some argued that he had little to show for it. The
organisation seemed no better run or managed than when he had first
taken charge. Moreover, his dalliance with civil society and his chal-
lenges to Soeharto seemed to have occupied most of his energy and
time, leaving little to contribute to day-to-day management within the
organisation. The Lombok munas, however, suggested that many were
more generous in their interpretation of Abdurrahman’s performance.
Unlike most previous munas or muktamar, this congress was a quiet
affair. Only one government minister addressed the NU masses, the
Minister for Religious Affairs, Tamizi Tahir. Even this was significant
because Tamizi in the past had been critical of Abdurrahman and now
seemed much quieter. No other ministers attended, the NU leadership
explained, because most were busy preparing for the March 1998 ses-
sion of the MPR. After the last muktamar, in which half the time had
been taken up with lengthy speeches from ministers, few seemed to
mind the lack of government presence. This congress was a welcome
change: an air of peace and tranquillity characterised the meeting.
When the munas concluded, four main achievements were evident.
Firstly, it was clear that the progressive line supported by Abdurrahman
had been successful in the face of opposition from conservative and
reactionary elements. This was particularly evident during the discus-
sions about the role of women. After some long and heated discussions,
the reformists gained the upper hand. Secondly, there was general sup-
port for the leadership of the younger ulama who had been encouraged
by Abdurrahman. Thirdly, after some debate regarding Abdurrahman’s
reconciliation with Soeharto, it was generally agreed that he had done
the right thing. And finally, the overall mood of the munas suggested
that Abdurrahman’s authority and leadership in the organisation were
stronger than ever.
%.4/%'+,1),1%!1.:+.,
While Abdurrahman had been quietly consolidating his position and
avoiding antagonising the regime, Amien had been on the move.
Previously closely associated with the Islamic right conservative ele-
ments, he consciously made a move to the centre of the political stage.
By August 1997 he was calling for reform and was one of the first major
public figures to speak out about the need for Soeharto to resign. At the
66D
time his erstwhile colleague, Adi Sasono, dismissed Amien as a foolish
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
romantic. This may have been partly because KISDI and hard-liners
such as Ahmad Soemargono and Fadli Zon continued to support
Soeharto, backed by General Feisal Tandjung and encouraged by
Prabowo. Even so, they also continued to maintain links with Amien.
On the other side Wiranto sent messages of support to
Abdurrahman. Wiranto was generally associated with the red-and-
white nationalist faction within the military and was worried about the
increasing strength of the green generals, particularly General Prabowo.
Abdurrahman was pressed to consolidate the push for reform by
joining with Amien and Megawati to call for Soeharto to resign. When
asked, Abdurrahman explained that he was indeed of the same mind as
Amien and Megawati but there was no formal alliance. On one occa-
sion in December 1997 when asked about the alliance, he explained
that he had recently been approached by a senior general who had
asked, ‘What about the relationship with Amien and Megawati?’ To
which Abdurrahman replied, ‘We work together, we have a similar
vision’. ‘Yes but is there a formal alliance?’ ‘No we have no formal
alliance.’ ‘Well that’s a good thing because if it were formalised I would
have to crush it.’
Of course this may simply have be a convenient pretext for
Abdurrahman to avoid having to work closely with Amien, with whom
he had a long and rocky relationship. But there is also good reason to
believe that a formal alliance between the three main protagonists for
reform would indeed have been crushed by the military, very likely by
the green faction.
Abdurrahman argued at the time that the reformists had no choice
but to be patient because Soeharto was not set to resign in the near
future. ‘There is no point in pushing,’ he argued, ‘until the time is ripe,
and now is not the time.’ In this at least, he turned out to be wrong.
Unbeknownst to Abdurrahman and in fact to most observers, Indonesia
was in the initial stages of what was to prove a truly major crisis.
(')#,0%.1(')#)#.,0%"&"'2
The crisis was triggered by the floating of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997.20
No sooner had the baht been floated than it sank. By August Thailand
had turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help and
received a $17 billion bailout. At the time Indonesia appeared to be
fine; few were worried about it succumbing to Thailand’s problems,
67A
arguing that the underlying structure of the Indonesian economy was

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
much more robust than that of the Thai economy. This was the view of
many expert economists, but no one could have been more wrong.
On 14 August Indonesia removed the trading band that kept the
rupiah at around Rp2400 to the US dollar. The rupiah immediately
began to sink but not nearly as fast as the Thai baht had done. Analysts
remained confident. Just two months later, however, Indonesia, like
Thailand before it, had been forced to turn to the IMF for help. By the
end of October the IMF had promised a $43 billion bailout. At the
same time the United States began to worry about a contagion effect
and was talking about a ‘regional crisis’. Worried by what it saw, the
United States contributed $3 billion directly to Indonesia.
As part of a crisis management plan, Bank Indonesia (BI), the cen-
tral bank, closed down sixteen defunct banks. This unfortunately pro-
voked a run on the remaining banks and at the same time BI raised
interest rates from 18 to 70 per cent.
On 9 December Soeharto suddenly cancelled a planned trip to an
ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and the market really
began to panic. Then, on 6 January 1998, Soeharto unveiled a new
budget that was judged to be wildly unrealistic. Panicked investors
began to sell off rupiah holdings, and in a period of five days the rupi-
ah dropped half its value. A mood of panic settled over Indonesia and
scores of Jakartans rushed the supermarkets to buy up rice, oil and
canned goods, and hoarded food. By 15 January the IMF came up with
a second package. This, however, was immediately undermined by
Soeharto and his family. Finally, in what seemed to be a calculated piece
of stupidity, Soeharto announced that Habibie would be the next vice-
president and would be sworn in in March. Many officers within ABRI
had no admiration for Habibie, but General Feisal Tandjung and
General Prabowo openly backed him. On 22 January the rupiah
collapsed to 17 000 per US dollar.
Many analysts, at the time and since, blamed the IMF for the sud-
den worsening of Indonesia’s financial crisis. The IMF may have been
partly responsible — indeed, it acknowledged that it had miscalculated
in its initial response to the crisis — but there is good reason to point
the finger at the first family. Indeed, looking back, the crisis, although
sudden, had been a long time building. Ever since the 1993 cabinet the
influence of the technocrats who had done so much to make ‘the
Indonesian miracle’ had been in decline. Soeharto’s children, and even
67@
his grandchildren, became increasingly avaricious. A pattern emerged
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
in the 1990s where the children would demand to be given 10 or 15 per
cent equity as a kind of licence fee in any major new project. At the
same time the World Bank acknowledged that Indonesian corruption
was among the worst in the world. At least 20 to 30 per cent of all grant
money from the bank was siphoned off.
Once the IMF could begin its planned rescue package, its reform ini-
tiatives were resisted at every turn, first by Soeharto and then by his
children; where they could not deny outright, they sought to under-
mine. For all this, Soeharto failed to see the need to change anything.
In the past he had always been able to outsmart his opponents even in
the midst of crisis. This time he was badly out of touch.
By this stage Amien was speaking out more stridently than ever
against Soeharto and calling for his immediate resignation. He asked
Abdurrahman and Megawati to join him in a common front against
Soeharto but Abdurrahman declined, saying that ABRI sources had
warned him off, and that bloody confrontation would certainly result if
they were to openly form a front against Soeharto. Privately, he said
that he believed that Prabowo and his thugs along with the Islamist
radicals ‘were capable of anything’.
!"#$%%!&'!(C,)3.%,/(!-)0%+,+,
The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 caught most people, including
Abdurrahman, by surprise. In hindsight it all seems so obvious.
Soeharto had failed to respond not just to the financial crisis of late
1997 and 1998, but also to years of nepotism and a hollowing out of his
administration, so that when it finally came under pressure it collapsed.
But even in mid-January most people did not believe that Soeharto was
going any time soon. The students were on the street anxious for
change. Amien Rais was leading them on, anger and frustration was
rising, but Soeharto had toughed out challenges in the past and it
seemed possible he might tough this one out as well. Abdurrahman said
that it was not clear how long Soeharto would last but it might be much
longer than anyone thought.
Everyone looked to Abdurrahman and Megawati to join the fray,
sensing that if they did there would be an irresistible force for change.
Both of them hung back, Abdurrahman arguing that it was still too
early to push and that elements in the military were actively looking for
opportunities for confrontation, even engineering such opportunities.
676
The attention of millions was focused on Abdurrahman, waiting for

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
him to indicate when they should move.

Abdurrahman seemed as relaxed and confident as ever, but trouble
came suddenly upon him from a quite unexpected quarter. On the
evening of 19 January his youngest brother Hasyim had been waiting for
him at his office when he had began to feel alarmed. Abdurrahman had
gone to the bathroom across the corridor from his office at the NU head-
quarters; a long time had passed and he had still not emerged. Finally,
feeling that he could wait no longer, Hasyim and others pushed the door
down and found Abdurrahman collapsed on the floor. His brother Umar,
a medical doctor, was called and he was rushed to hospital.
Umar began calling friends, and later that evening Indonesia’s best
neurosurgeons gathered to talk with Umar at the hospital. It seemed
almost certain that Abdurrahman was going to die. His blood pressure
had soared to near fatal levels, and his heartbeat and other vital signs
indicated that he was a hair’s breadth from death. The diagnosis was
made that he had suffered a major stroke. The only possible way to deal
with it was risky emergency surgery and the insertion of a ‘shunt’, a
plastic tube to drain fluid from his cranial cavity. But surgery that night
was impossible; his vital signs indicated that any attempt to operate
would kill him. They decided to wait until the morning. When the
morning came, Umar asked the neurosurgeons to operate. They
protested that it was still too risky and the patient would die on the
operating table. Umar responded by saying: ‘We owe it to him to give
him a chance. My brother is somebody who often makes surprising
recoveries from difficult situations. We’ve at least got to give him the
chance; we should go ahead and open him up.’ As the team gathered in
the operating theatre, everyone felt a sense of impending doom, almost
certain that Abdurrahman would not come out of the theatre alive. But
against all expectations, the operation went well. Within hours he was
making a modest recovery
The next day he was able to talk to visitors and appeared to have
come through the stroke and the brain surgery virtually unscathed. But
obviously he was left in a very weakened condition. Almost the entire
Who’s Who of Indonesian elite society visited his hospital room. The
guest book records a most unusual collection of names: every faction,
every side of politics, every religious community from every level of
society. Everyone had their own reasons for worrying that he might die.
For some it was concern about the instability that might follow. Even
677
conservative generals regarded Abdurrahman as an known quantity,
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
somebody who was a voice for moderation, somebody who controlled
the masses, not just within NU but beyond. For others he was a hero or
a close friend.
Ordinarily everyone has something to say about Abdurrahman: even
his close friends are not afraid to speak critically of him. But for a week
all his annoying foibles and faults seemed to be forgotten; quite apart
from political calculations, there was a genuine sense of mourning and
concern.
In the first few weeks it was still not clear whether he would recover
and if so, how much. But he didn’t show any anxiety, and within weeks,
much sooner than expected, he was at home. Over the next couple of
months he steadily regained much of his strength. Initially he saw vis-
itors mostly in his bedroom at the front of the house. Some of his doc-
tors would rather he didn’t have too many guests, arguing that he
needed to preserve his strength. After a while, however, they relented,
conceding that he needed at least some visitors if he was to find the
strength that he needed to recover.
Even when flat on his back fighting for his life, Abdurrahman
remained a thorough extrovert, and without human company he soon
became morose. Before long a steady stream of visitors made their way
to his house in Ciganjur and sat by his bedside, exchanging jokes and
keeping him informed about what was happening. Those who could
not visit phoned instead, and it seemed as if the phone beside his bed
was seldom idle for more than a couple of minutes. Nevertheless, in the
eyes of the general public, Abdurrahman was off the scene. After years
of featuring almost daily in the newspapers, he had disappeared
overnight.
"-!'.)1&.)0&+(.,.
Out on the streets the activity that had begun at the time of
Abdurrahman’s stroke had picked up pace. University students
throughout the country and all the major cities had left their campuses
and were holding protests in the streets. Most of these protests went
without violence, but there was a sense of uncertainty about what might
happen if confrontation should occur between students and troops.
Further adding to this uncertainty was an outbreak of sudden
episodes of violence in small towns in Central and East Java, mostly
directed against the ethnic Chinese.21 Many believed the violence was
678
deliberately engineered and that behind it lay provocateurs with con-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
nections to Prabowo and his Army Special Forces personnel.

In Jakarta the elite began to turn on Chinese business leaders. In
February prominent Chinese businessman Sofyan Wanandi was
accused of being behind a plot with PDI to disrupt the upcoming MPR
in March. Prabowo’s colleague and close friend Syafrie Syamsuddin
interrogated Sofyan for several hours, wanting to know the details of an
alleged bomb plot in which Sofyan was said to be involved. It was clear
from the start that the whole thing was a fabrication. There was no
bomb plot and there was no reason to suspect Sofyan, but he was one
of Indonesia’s leading Chinese. he was linked to CSIS through his
brother Jusuf who was the centre’s director. CSIS in turn was closely
linked with Murdani, who for some years had made his office in its
building and was known as one of its major backers.
Less than twelve months earlier, Abdurrahman had joined the board
of CSIS. It was considered a bold and provocative move. A decade and
a half before, CSIS had been close to Soeharto. Gradually the tech-
nocrats had lost influence, ranks closed around the family, ICMI
became the president’s main political vehicle for social engagement,
and CSIS was marginalised, along with Benny Murdani. Following
Sofyan’s interrogation, CSIS was targeted by Muslim extremist protest-
ers. They crowded around the central Jakarta office holding up placards
emblazoned with slogans like ‘CSIS is a parasite’ and ‘Sofyan Wanandi
is a traitor’. There was strong evidence to suggest that not only Prabowo
but also Soeharto himself was behind the framing of Sofyan
Wanandi.22
,/.&!%1/)4$'"-.,
In the lead-up to the March session of the MPR, Wiranto was made
head of the armed forces and Prabowo was promoted to the rank of
three-star general in command of the Army Strategic Reserve. The
Army Special Forces that he had led was taken over by a close friend,
General Muchdi Purwoprandjono. Soeharto’s moves seemed to be cal-
culated to appease extremist Muslim elements. If so, the strategy
worked. Islamist activist Fadli Zon said, ‘Muslims are very happy with
ABRI now. Prabowo, Syafrie and Muchdi are all sincere and close to
the people. We don’t know yet about Wiranto, he never shows his sin-
cerity to people’.
67B
By placing Prabowo in charge of the 27 000 strong Army Strategic
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
Reserve and surrounding him with close friends linked to Islamist
extremists, Soeharto was aiming to split the military. At the same time
the replacement of Feisal Tandjung by Wiranto as head of the armed
forces placed the secular-nationalist, red-and-white camp opposite the
green faction, and power was evenly balanced in the military. Playing
groups off one against another was a tactic Soeharto had used many
times in his thirty-two years of rule, and there seemed to be no reason
for this reshuffle except that he wanted to set both camps against each
other while securing support from the Islamists.
When Soeharto announced his new cabinet in March, it was met
with cries of disbelief. The cabinet, in the eyes of most commentators,
was completely unrealistic and blatantly provocative, a line-up of
Soeharto’s old friends, cronies, loyalists and family members. His eldest
daughter, Tutut, was given a post, as was his old golfing buddy and
business partner Bob Hasan, the timber tycoon. Bob Hasan’s Chinese
ethnicity meant nothing to the Chinese community, who regarded him
as a traitor to his own people.
Not only did the new cabinet alarm the financial markets: it further
antagonised the students. It now seemed impossible to believe that
Soeharto was in any sense committed to moving towards reform or
change. He seemed to be turning his back upon the whole reformasi
push and instead seeking to tough things out by surrounding himself
with loyalists. From his bed at home in Ciganjur, Abdurrahman urged
the students to show restraint. He argued that there was every reason to
believe that Soeharto was now at his belligerent worst. Moreover, with
Prabowo in charge of the Army Strategic Reserve and Muslim extrem-
ist green generals in other key positions, there was, he argued, a high
likelihood that the hard-liners were spoiling for a fight.
On 11 March, the day that Soeharto was sworn in for his seventh
term, 25 000 students demonstrated at Gadjah Mada University in
Yogyakarta; both modernist Muslim and traditionalist NU students
took part. Calls continued to come for Amien and Abdurrahman to
join forces. Abdurrahman kept urging restraint. Tension mounted
throughout March and April, but Soeharto was still very much in con-
trol. Then on 4 May that control began to disintegrate. That day he
announced a reduction of subsidies on fuel that would cause a 70 per
cent price hike for petrol, in line with IMF prescriptions. The
announcement met a violence response. Large-scale riots broke out in
67;
Medan, North Sumatra, and students began flooding into the streets
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
throughout Java. Once again Amien urged the students to action but
Abdurrahman continued to call for restraint, being more fearful than
ever that a bloody confrontation was looming.
Then on 9 May Soeharto, who seemed by this stage to be com-
pletely out of touch with popular sentiment, left the country on a trip
to Cairo for an economic summit. In his absence the students began
to gather in even larger numbers. On 12 May, six thousand students
at the prestigious private Trisakti University in Jakarta marched on
the parliament complex, located several kilometres south of their
campus along the toll road. Afterwards they were returning to the
campus and most were inside the university grounds when six stu-
dents were shot from a pedestrian overpass that crossed the toll road
in front of the Trisakti campus. Four were fatally wounded. Witnesses
who saw the snipers, including an international television crew that
filmed the incident, said that they were wearing uniforms of the
Mobile Brigade Police. The police chief, however, said his men were
armed only with rubber bullets.
Later forensic analysis revealed that the students had been killed with
fire from Steyr rifles. These were high-powered rifles possessed only by
a handful of uniformed police units. Many pointed the finger towards
Prabowo or the Army Special Forces units. Over time evidence accu-
mulated to suggest that it was not the police but soldiers in police uni-
forms who fired the shots. The attack seemed carefully calculated to
provoke a response.23
On 13 May a funeral was held for the Trisakti students. Following
the service the mood turned ugly, and rioting and looting broke out on
a large-scale throughout Jakarta and Solo. The rioting was worst in
Chinatown and in areas with clusters of Chinese-owned shops and
houses. Soon 150 000 foreigners and ethnic Chinese had fled Jakarta.
Thousands of shops and houses were destroyed and another 1200 peo-
ple killed. Reports began coming in of scores of Chinese women being
raped by gangs of paramilitary thugs.
In hindsight it seems strange that Soeharto should have chosen to
attend an economic summit in Cairo at that time. It was a curious time
to be leaving the country. Clearly Soeharto himself did not feel under
any immediate threat, and he perhaps had good reason for confidence.
Soeharto had weathered numerous storms in the past and come
through, not only unscathed but strengthened. He had also survived
67<
severe economic crises, although nothing on the scale of the one then
0/(1.(#+(:)*+1&),/.&!%1/2)@DD8G@DD=
besetting Indonesia, and the associated bouts of communal unrest.
Abdurrahman, similarly, had no sense that Soeharto’s demise was
imminent. On the contrary, he believed that the ageing president would
continue to fight hard once cornered, and that his departure might be
some years off. Consequently, Abdurrahman continued to urge his peo-
ple to show restraint and avoid placing themselves in the path of the
military. In early May leading figures in the military seemed likewise to
have been persuaded that Soeharto would tough out the current chal-
lenge and emerge victorious to continue as president.
Ironically, Soeharto himself planted the seeds of his demise by falling
back upon his old tactic of dividing the military in order to control it.
He had set up evenly matched power blocs between Prabowo and his
Islamic extremist friends on the one hand and Wiranto and his moder-
ate secular Javanese allies on the other.
3%!"/*/E
At the time of the riots of mid-May, there was widespread speculation
that Prabowo was orchestrating much of the violence. Although much
of the evidence is anecdotal, it seems highly likely that somebody in
ABRI was instrumental in engineering the mob attacks on shopping
centres and the burning of these centres and of Chinese shop-houses.
One of the common features mentioned in eyewitness accounts is the
involvement of well-built young men with hair cropped short, acting
with the quiet determination and discipline of well-trained military
squads. At the least, the leaders of the gangs appeared to be military
officers out of uniform. In some cases it was claimed that the fires
themselves were started with accelerants in a professional fashion.
It was also clear that, along with these military or paramilitary ele-
ments, there were large numbers of so-called preman or semi-organised
criminal thugs. It was well known that Prabowo and other ABRI offi-
cials had trained such preman for use in privately controlled militia
while on duty in East Timor. In many ways what was happening in
Jakarta and Solo in May 1998 mirrored the same kind of military-
organised terrorising of a civilian population that had occurred for
many years in operational zones such as East Timor and Aceh.
One of the most damning pieces of circumstantial evidence against
Prabowo was that when General Wiranto ordered Prabowo’s colleague
and close friend Syafrie to get his men back on the streets on 13 May,
67=
nothing happened. Syafrie was in charge of the Jakarta garrison and his
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
men should have been intervening in the rioting hot spots. Some eye-
witness accounts claim that there was radio contact between Syafrie’s
men and the paramilitary gangs seen to be leading the worst of the
violence.
At the same time neither Kopassus nor Kostrad seemed to be
responding to stop the violence. Vice-President Habibie’s aides
claimed that throughout 13 May the vice-president’s communication
system was consistently jammed. On 14 May Wiranto ordered in
troops from Central and East Java but they did not arrive until the fol-
lowing day. By that afternoon, exasperated by Syafrie’s inaction, he
finally confronted him and demanded that Syafrie get his men onto
the street. Late that day they appeared and began to take control. It
appears that Syafrie, under intense pressure from Wiranto, finally suc-
cumbed and decided to support Wiranto and effectively turn on his
friend Prabowo. The failure of Syafrie’s troops to take to the streets is
one of a most damning pieces of circumstantial evidence against
Prabowo and Syafrie; it shows at the very least a failure to intervene to
stem the violence.
,/.&!%1/C,)#.(/$.'.(1
Late on the evening of 14 May a new organisation, styling itself
Majelis Amanat Rakyat, or the Council of the People’s Trust, called
for Soeharto to step down. It was headed by Amien Rais and several
other outspoken intellectuals. None of this was surprising, but it was
noteworthy that well-known economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
was named on the membership list of Majelis Amanat Rakyat.
Sumitro is Prabowo’s father. Prabowo’s scheme appeared to be run-
ning into serious trouble. Not only had he lost the support of his
friend Syafrie, but even his own father appeared to be calling for
Soeharto’s resignation.
At almost the same moment, Nurcholish Madjid presented a bold
paper demanding political reform, at the army headquarters in South
Jakarta. In it he called for an election to be held before January 1999, to
be followed three months later by a special session of the MPR to
appoint a new government. He also argued that Soeharto should apolo-
gise for his failings and especially for his corrupt gains and make restitu-
tion with his nation by returning his ill-gotten wealth. Leading
reformist General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono supported Nurcholish’s
67D
paper, although he did caution that the last section calling for a public
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apology from Soeharto and remittal of money should probably be
dropped.
The violence of 13 and 14 May appears to have galvanised opposi-
tion to Soeharto and strengthened the hand of those calling for his
immediate resignation. If the violence was in part the work of Prabowo
and his colleagues — presumably designed to strengthen Prabowo’s
standing in the eyes of Soeharto against his arch-rival Wiranto, and to
prove the necessity of a military response — then Prabowo’s military
adventurism had been counter-productive. Rather than strengthening
Soeharto’s position, he had dealt it a fatal blow.
From Cairo, Soeharto made it clear that he was extremely displeased
with Prabowo’s purported behaviour. Early on the morning of the 15
May Prabowo headed south with a small convoy of military vehicles
towards Ciganjur and the home of Abdurrahman Wahid. He arrived
around 2 am and was ushered into Abdurrahman’s bedroom at the front
of the house. He knelt at the foot of the bed and began to massage
Abdurrahman’s feet. Prabowo was known to be a skilful masseur and
Abdurrahman had benefited from massages, though never from such a
masseur, as part of his post-stroke therapy. Nevertheless, when
Abdurrahman awoke to find Prabowo and his personal guard at the end
of his bed one can assume it must have come as a fright. Indeed, any-
one who was visited by Prabowo at such an hour immediately in the
wake of the violence of 13 and 14 May could be forgiven for becoming
rather agitated.
Prabowo immediately launched into a cry of despair, designed to
convince Abdurrahman that he was the victim of slander and was not
involved in the violence despite all of the damning stories already cir-
culating the city. ‘Look what’s happened to our city, what’s going on,
what’s happening to us, Gus?’ Abdurrahman, only moments before
awakened from his slumber, instantly replied, ‘That’s what happens
when people can’t control themselves’ (Begitulah kalau orang nggak bisa
menahan diri). The Indonesian phrase was suitably ambiguous: ‘people’
could refer to Prabowo himself or the masses of the city. Evidently
Prabowo had come to Ciganjur hoping for sympathy from
Abdurrahman or at least hoping that Abdurrahman could be turned
against his old rival Amien Rais. He left Ciganjur, however, with no
such assurance.
Hours later Soeharto flew into Jakarta, having cut short his visit
68A
when he heard of the violence of 13 and 14 May. As his plane

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approached Jakarta, he witnessed the city literally smouldering. Thick

palls of smoke continued to rise from Chinatown in the north and from
scattered shopping malls all around the city.
Throughout his stay in Cairo, Soeharto had been briefed almost
hourly by Wiranto. Wiranto had of course informed him of the stories
circulating about Prabowo’s involvement. Soeharto rebuked Prabowo
and commanded him to ‘stick to the chain of command’. Aware that
the crisis was now much more severe than he had first thought,
Soeharto hurriedly cancelled the earlier cuts to fuel subsidies.
On Saturday, 16 May, Nurcholish held a press conference. He had
been invited to present his paper to Soeharto’s Cabinet Secretary on
Monday. But prior to that he and Amien Rais made a television address
together, urging restraint from the students. Later that Saturday
Nurcholish and Amien met with Soeharto’s Cabinet Secretary, only to
be interrupted when an agitated Prabowo burst into the meeting. He
was furious at the demands that Soeharto hand over his wealth and
suggested that Nurcholish and Amien should call for Habibie to be
made president. Nurcholish responded that ABRI would not support
Habibie’s nomination. Prabowo replied, ‘Don’t worry about that. I will
protect Habibie’, and he went on to suggest that he, Prabowo, should
replace Wiranto in order give him more power to protect Habibie.24
That Saturday evening ABRI spokesman Brigadier-General
Mokodongan read a formal press statement, welcoming the earlier
statement by NU that called upon Soeharto to step down, or lengser
keprabon to use the language of Javanese kings. Prabowo rushed off to
Soeharto with the press release. Soeharto, visibly agitated, called in
Wiranto to explain. Wiranto ducked for cover and suggested that it had
all been a misunderstanding.
That same Saturday afternoon Soeharto had received a delegation
from the parliament to which he declared that he intended to re-estab-
lish the notorious Army Security Command, Kopkamtib, abolished in
1988. Over the course of the weekend he made three decrees to this
effect, but Wiranto refused to endorse the plan. Soeharto also declared
that he was cancelling the fuel price hikes and now formally promised
to reshuffle his cabinet. It was all too late, however; the tide of events
was moving against him. On Sunday, 17 May, General Bambang
Yudhoyono met with Amien at the Muhammadiyah headquarters in
central Jakarta. Later that day Nurcholish went public with his propos-
68@
als that Soeharto step down and that fresh elections be held. The next
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day ICMI joined in and declared that it too wanted Soeharto to step
down. Finally on Monday evening even Harmoko, known as one of
Soeharto’s most loyal and certainly most self-serving senior ministers,
and at the time serving as the Speaker of the House, issued a press
statement in which he said that Soeharto now faced an ultimatum: ‘He
must resign by Friday.’ Even old sycophants like Harmoko could see
that the army was turning against Soeharto.
By Monday, Soeharto, uncharacteristically, was beginning to panic.
He called General Subagyo in and offered him the post of Commander
of Kopkamtib. Evidently Soeharto, even at the eleventh hour, was hop-
ing that he might subvert the tide of sentiment running against him
within the military by splitting ABRI. Subagyo, reportedly close to
tears, refused. An hour later Wiranto met with Soeharto, and then,
whether having been told by Subagyo or by Soeharto himself about the
Kopkamtib offer, proceeded immediately to the military headquarters
for an emergency leadership meeting. On Monday evening Soeharto
asked Nurcholish to meet him at the Presidential Palace. Nurcholish,
characteristically without guile, stated his position plainly: ‘The people’s
understanding of reform is that they want you to resign.’ Soeharto
responded by saying ‘I don’t have a problem with that. I already hinted
at that in Cairo’. Soeharto promised to resign as soon as possible but
gave no timeline.25
He said that, before announcing this on the following day, he want-
ed to meet with leaders from the Muslim community. Nine leaders
were chosen in discussion with Nurcholish. Soeharto was emphatic
about his desire that Abdurrahman should be among them, despite his
ill-health and the need to bring him by wheelchair from his sickbed.
Nurcholish tactfully suggested that Amien also should be among those
in the delegation. Soeharto emphatically rejected the inclusion of
Amien, perhaps because he was angry with him and perhaps because he
was hopeful of splitting the Muslim opposition.
On Tuesday, 19 May, the nine Islamic leaders — four from NU and
five from Muhammadiyah — were ushered into Soeharto’s office.
Clearly Soeharto’s efforts to split the Muslim opposition had not
worked. Earlier Nurcholish had met with Amien at the home of Malik
Fadjar to discuss the meeting. As a consequence the nine presented a
united front. All refused to join Soeharto’s reform committee or accept
places in his proposed cabinet reshuffle. Nurcholish once again
686
addressed Soeharto with polite frankness: ‘You have to end your presi-
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
dency gracefully and honourably, not in a Latin American way. Not a

repeat of our 1965–66 experience.’26 The meeting with the Islamic
leaders was supposed to have lasted thirty minutes; it stretched to two
hours. Throughout it Soeharto appeared relaxed and confident. He lis-
tened politely to what Nurcholish and others had to say to him, but
drew the line firmly at apologising or returning money to the state.
In response to pleas for his immediate resignation, Soeharto replied
that for him to step aside now would mean the elevation of Habibie to
the presidency, and ‘there is a question of whether he was capable’.
Later Soeharto repeated to the media his misgivings about Habibie not
being up to the task. Soeharto pleaded with the nine leaders to at least
show him a modicum of support. When they refused to join either his
reform committee or his reshuffled cabinet, he asked them to stand
behind him while he read his reform agenda proposal to the nation on
a live television broadcast. Recognising that this would suggest their
endorsement, they refused.
Amien Rais was critical of Abdurrahman’s performance in the meet-
ing. Abdurrahman let Nurcholish do much of the talking, and when the
issue of Soeharto’s resignation came up he joked about whether they
were really calling Soeharto to resign. Amien described Abdurrahman’s
behaviour at the time as sycophantic. Abdurrahman himself explained
it in cultural terms. Now that the knife had been thrust deftly into
Soeharto’s side, there was no need to twist it for it to accomplish its
work. A display of graceful civility, he argued, was appropriate under
the circumstances. But this was not the only thing on Abdurrahman’s
mind. He continued to be anxious that Soeharto might renege on his
promise to step aside and was worried that even at this point that
Soeharto might decide to ‘go out fighting’, in which case bloody con-
frontation was likely.
Abdurrahman later explained that in a private conversation with
Soeharto that morning the president had said that his long-standing
anxiety about right-wing Muslim extremism had proved to be well
founded, and that he was now deeply concerned about the forces that
he had unleashed with ICMI and his support for the Islamists. It seems
likely that even now Soeharto was still attempting to split the umat and
turn Abdurrahman against Amien Rais.
When Habibie heard about Soeharto’s statement later that Tuesday,
he was furious. Until this point he’d been unwavering in his loyalty to
687
Soeharto. Soeharto’s public questioning of Habibie’s competency to
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succeed him wounded him deeply and galvanised him into action.
Habibie immediately sat down to draft a four-page handwritten pro-
posal calling for Soeharto’s resignation. Soeharto, not surprisingly,
rejected Habibie’s proposal and personally apologised to him for his
remarks of the previous day.
At the same time Abdurrahman called upon the students to stop
protesting and to get off the streets. Soeharto, he argued, should be
given a chance to implement his promise. Amien was furious, but
Abdurrahman privately argued that it was still too dangerous to con-
tinue pushing Soeharto publicly, and that the students risked a bloody
backlash if Soeharto decided to tough it out rather than going through
with his promise of resignation. At the time long-term Forum
Demokrasi colleague and good friend Marsillam Simanjuntak said
Wahid had ‘no faith in the students who are most effective agents of
change. He abandoned his chance to play a key role of history’.
Amien responded by threatening to bring one million people onto
the streets the next day, Wednesday, 20 May. Only at the last moment
did he back down, and only then after receiving a personal message
from General Kivlan Zein, a close associate of Prabowo, warning him
that there would be indeed a bloody confrontation if he went ahead
with his demonstration.27
That Wednesday dawned with the city in a state of high military
alert. Significantly, it was the marines who were visible on the streets.
They were well known for their moderation and for their loyalty to
Wiranto. The presence of the marines strongly suggested that
Prabowo’s push for confrontation was failing and Wiranto’s more mod-
erate approach was succeeding. The students were disappointed that
the rally had been called off but remained relaxed and could be seen
chatting and joking with the marines. For the time being they were per-
suaded that it was worth waiting to see what Soeharto did next.
Meanwhile Soeharto was desperately trying to put together a reform
committee. He once again approached moderates such as Nurcholish
Madjid, but they all repeatedly refused to join.
By Wednesday even Soeharto’s most conservative and loyal backers
sensed that the tide was running against the president and were looking
desperately for the chance to jump ship. One dramatic development
occurred when Ginanjar Kartasasmita, one of Soeharto’s loyalist-
technocrats and his trusted Minister for Economics gathered together
688
with thirteen fellow cabinet members and issued a joint statement

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announcing their immediate resignation from the Soeharto cabinet.

That evening Soeharto met with Habibie and talked over the possibili-
ty of handing power to Habibie. Soeharto offered to resign in favour of
Habibie, with the proviso that he be allowed to select Habibie’s new cab-
inet. Habibie refused. Annoyed with Soeharto’s public shaming of him
the previous day, Habibie was now resolute in his stance towards his
former mentor.
Harmoko sent word from the parliament explaining that impeach-
ment proceedings would commence on Friday, 22 May, if Soeharto had
not stepped down before then. At eleven o’clock that night Soeharto’s
personal secretary handed to his boss a copy of the letter from Ginanjar
announcing the resignation of fourteen cabinet members. Soeharto
turned to him and asked how the list of prospective members for the
new reform cabinet was going. ‘Who do we have?’ The secretary
replied: ‘We have you and me.’ ‘Is there no one else?’ ‘No, just us.’28
Soeharto recognised that his position was now beyond saving. He
phoned Habibie and asked him to begin work on his acceptance speech
for the following morning. A ceremony would be held, he said, at nine
o’clock in which he would hand over power to Habibie. Habibie’s close
aides worked through the early hours of the morning, hastily crafting
Habibie’s acceptance speech.
At the ceremony the following morning Soeharto spoke little; he
simply asked for forgiveness for his mistakes and announced his imme-
diate resignation, ceding power to his vice-president.
He left the room without speaking with either Habibie or Wiranto.
Wiranto in his speech pledged to support both Habibie as the new
president and to protect Soeharto as the respected former president. In
theory, Soeharto’s New Order was over.
1.(
~
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.-.01+/(,2)
@DD=G@DDD
0!-')!41.%)1&.),1/%'
It was finally over. After decades of waiting, this was to be Indonesia’s
new beginning. But no one could be sure of what was to come. On
Friday, 22 May 1998, the people of Indonesia woke to their first day in
three decades without President Soeharto.
The parliament building was still occupied by students; it was not
clear whether they would be forcefully removed by the military or
would accept Soeharto’s resignation as sufficient cause to move on.
Detachments of marines set up on the corners of the city’s major thor-
oughfares seemed strangely comforting. After all, the marines were
supposed to be the good guys; in the previous weeks it had been they
who had protected the students.
Ironically, the city hotels were as lively as the streets were desolate.
Thousands of Chinese had flown out of Jakarta for temporary safe
haven in Singapore, Perth and Sydney, but many more remained in
Jakarta. They camped in the major city hotels, trusting that the
madness that had threatened their homes would not now engulf these
bastions of civility.
A visit to Glodok, Jakarta’s Chinatown, made it abundantly clear why
68;
so many Chinese huddled in hotels fearing for their lives. Here and in
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other Chinese districts across the city, department stores and entire
shopping malls were gutted by fire. People walked around picking
through the ashes, their faces revealing the shock that they felt even one
week after the nightmare of 13 and 14 May. Locals warned against
entering the gutted shopping malls, explaining that not only were the
burnt-out structures unsafe, but also among the ash lay scores of
charred bodies. The stories circulating Jakarta hinted at the grim hor-
ror of the week before. In many of the shopping malls, it was said, chil-
dren just out from school had joined the looters on 13 May. In some
cases the entrances of the buildings had been locked and the looters
were chased back upstairs by gunfire as the buildings were set alight.
Horrifying stories circulated of mass rapes and unimaginable brutality.
The suggestion that the violence had been, at least in part, planned and
directed made it all the more awful. In whatever manner it had
occurred, it was clear that something evil had happened in the city. And
yet, barely a week later, there seemed to be a sense of hopefulness in the
air. After so many years Soeharto had gone. Most Indonesians had not
even been born when he had come to power.
Early the next morning the normally bustling city was eerily quiet.
The trip south from the city centre to Ciganjur, and the home of
Abdurrahman, normally takes the best part of an hour. On this surreal
Saturday it took little more than twenty minutes.
/()1&.),+#.-+(.,
Located at the front of Abdurrahman’s house, opening off the front
room, was a modest sitting room flanked by a small bedroom that, in
another house, might have been the servant’s quarters. The stacks of
CDs, an eclectic collection of Beethoven, Mozart, dangdut and rock
and roll, testified that it was now Abdurrahman’s room. Abdurrahman
had made considerable progress in his recovery but was still frustrated
by his loss of sight. Although he appeared to be as sharp as ever, he
explained that the effects of the stroke were a continuing source of irri-
tation. Whenever he tried to sit up for more than a few minutes, he was
overwhelmed by nausea, made worse by difficulties in maintaining his
balance. Compounding these difficulties was a lack of energy and over-
powering lethargy. ‘It’s not so bad when I’m lying down,’ he explained.
‘It’s just when I sit up or try to walk. It’s okay in short bursts, but I can’t
go through the day like I used to.’ The most obvious change was the fif-
68<
teen or more kilograms of weight that he had lost, a change which, if
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
anything, made him look fitter and more healthy. These things aside,
talking to him as he lay on his bed he seemed little changed. The
sparkling wit, often droll and ironic, remained as lively as ever, and
there seemed no significant change in his personality.
When asked how he felt about the fall of Soeharto and the prospects
for democracy, he exclaimed, ‘I’m torn between despair and hope’.
Months earlier he had said that he thought the prospects for demo-
cratic change were fifty-fifty; now he was more optimistic but still
somewhat apprehensive. ‘There is still the real chance of confrontation,’
he explained. ‘The military is edgy and they’ll get nervous if large
crowds gather, and once they start shooting who knows what will
happen?’
On the previous evening a confrontation had taken place at the par-
liament building. The pro-reformasi students gathered there had been
confronted, not by the military, but by busloads of Islamic extremists.
Some appeared to be linked to Pemuda Pancasila, the militia semi-offi-
cially established by Soeharto and often used for political intimidation
and crowd control. Fortunately, the marines had intervened and bussed
out the protesting students before major confrontation could take place.
The incident suggested that an uneasy truce existed between rival fac-
tions in the military and competing political blocs.
Over the past several days Prabowo Subianto had twice confronted
Habibie, once on the Thursday that Soeharto resigned and again the
following day, hoping to somehow rescue his career and establish his
position. Finally, in desperation, he had gone to his father-in-law, only
to be rebuked by Soeharto and Tutut who accused him of causing too
much trouble and failing to defend Soeharto. Prabowo exclaimed that
he was flabbergasted that he, ‘the loyal son, was now the one who was
banished’. Tensions between troops loyal to Prabowo and those loyal to
Wiranto had risen sharply. When it was clear that Prabowo’s con-
frontation had badly backfired, Wiranto’s hand had been strengthened
and he had moved quickly to clean out Prabowo’s men from the chain
of command. However, Wiranto’s power was still far from absolute.
This was demonstrated when his move to appoint a new head of the
Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) had to be reversed within hours of
being announced because the appointee was a Christian and unaccept-
able to the Islamic conservatives who supported Habibie.
Abdurrahman was surprisingly sanguine about Habibie’s appoint-
68=
ment as interim president. ‘There really is no alternative,’ he explained.

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
‘There has to be some sort of interim arrangement, and the military will
be most comfortable with what they feel to be in accordance with the
constitution. The important thing is to move towards elections.’ As
always, Abdurrahman argued in favour of evolutionary rather than rev-
olutionary change, and continued to call for restraint. His apparent qui-
escence was an ongoing source of disappointment to the students. They
felt, reasonably enough, that it was their presence on the street that had
given the final push to Soeharto, and Abdurrahman’s reluctance either
to back them directly, or to encourage Megawati to join them in their
protests, was both inexplicable and regrettable. Student anger and dis-
appointment with the Habibie interim government was understand-
able. After all, Habibie’s cabinet consisted of twenty-one members
directly from Soeharto’s previous governments and fifteen new mem-
bers, many of whom were Habibie loyalists from ICMI. It hardly
seemed to be the stuff of which reformation was made.
Shortly after the swearing-in of the new cabinet on Saturday morn-
ing, Abdurrahman was visited by his old friend Djohan Effendi and
their mutual friend Malik Fadjar. Malik Fadjar arrived in his old
Corolla and was dressed in casual clothes, although he had been sworn
in as the new Minister for Religious Affairs only an hour or so earlier.
Malik had been pressured into accepting his post by friends who argued
that it was necessary to have the Department of Religious Affairs con-
trolled by a moderate Islamic intellectual. His own affiliation was with
Muhammadiyah and not NU, which made him uneasy about taking the
job. NU had traditionally regarded the Department of Religious Affairs
as its own territory, and he feared that Abdurrahman might not wel-
come his appointment. He need not have worried. ‘The main thing you
have to work for is to avoid communal violence and elements that want
to use religion for political purposes,’ Abdurrahman explained. Malik’s
nodding assent suggested quiet relief.
Over the next few days Abdurrahman had a steady stream of visitors
and it seemed he regained a little more energy with each new wave of
guests. A week or so later President Habibie himself came, asking for
Abdurrahman’s blessing. Habibie seemed appreciative that
Abdurrahman did not side with the students in pressing for immediate
change but accepted the need for a staged transition. Abdurrahman,
however, was not entirely uncritical of Habibie’s new administration. In
particular he spoke out against half a dozen or so cabinet ministers
68D
whom he accused of being anti-Chinese. He mentioned in particular
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
Adi Sasono. Abdurrahman felt that Adi Sasono and other conservative
intellectuals within the ICMI were linked to some of the violent con-
frontations witnessed around the city. He was also fearful that, as new
political parties were established over the coming months, militant
Islamists would not hesitate to manipulate sectarian sentiment for
party-political purposes.
!"#$%%!&'!(C,)!(F+.1+.,
Wiranto, now simultaneously commander-in-chief of the armed forces
and Minister for Defence in the Habibie administration, seemed to
share Abdurrahman’s concerns about militant Islamists. Nevertheless,
Abdurrahman was reluctant to trust Wiranto too much. He continued
to voice his apprehension about the potential for violence, saying that if
political reform failed ABRI had ‘the potential to turn into a brutal
repressive apparatus along the lines of the Myanmar military’. There
was, he felt, a danger that Wiranto might even use the threat posed by
militant Islamists, alongside the increasingly outspoken demands of the
students, as a justification for imposing stricter controls. Fortunately,
the military’s reputation and morale were at an all-time low and there
was little will to deal harshly with social protest.
In June Habibie moved to sack the incumbent Attorney-General and
replace him with Andi Ghalib, a serving military officer. Most people
interpreted the change as a move to protect Soeharto, and indirectly
Habibie, from too vigorous an investigation. This cynicism later
appeared to be justified as Andi Ghalib’s prosecution of the Soeharto
case failed to go anywhere.
Privately Abdurrahman was extremely critical of Soeharto, in partic-
ular of his manipulation of religious and communal sentiment to bol-
ster his own regime. He interpreted many of the problems that
Indonesia now faced as the direct result of Soeharto’s self-serving
adventures in playing off elements in society against each other.
Nevertheless, Abdurrahman was reluctant to give too high a priority to
the prosecution of Soeharto. ‘Soeharto still has too much power,’ he
explained, ‘and at the very least there are many who acted in Soeharto’s
name, or think they are serving Soeharto, who will not hesitate to act
harshly if they see the prosecution against Soeharto proceeding too rap-
idly.’ He was worried that student concern with prosecution of
Soeharto might become a dangerous obsession that could end up play-
6BA
ing into the hands of reactionary elements of the military. ‘The military
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is now too demoralised to do anything,’ he suggested, ‘but in time they

will become increasingly dangerous. It’s important we don’t press too
hard too fast.’
While some of his fellow reformers, not least Megawati
Soekarnoputri, understood Abdurrahman’s cautious stance, most saw it
as evidence of weakness. For many, Abdurrahman had begun to lose his
touch in politics and public life ever since his victory at the NU con-
gress in November 1994. Certainly, his third term as chairman of NU
was marked by a seeming inattentiveness to day-to-day administration
and organisation. What really upset many of his former supporters,
however, was his failure to add to the momentum of the reformasi push.
Many interpreted his stroke in late January 1998 as a sign that the time
had come for Abdurrahman to fade from the public scene. If they had
been disappointed by his reluctance to join Amien in pushing for
change in late 1997, they were fed up with his continued ‘inaction’ in
the weeks following Soeharto’s fall. The stroke, they argued, had
changed him. The Abdurrahman of old was a jovial, relaxed, easy-going
man; after his stroke, many asserted, he was irritable, grumpy and
lacked the focus and intellectual clarity that he had earlier been
renowned for. Those close to him, however, found him little changed
apart from his obvious physical infirmities. Certainly his quick wit and
mental agility had not left him, nor did he appear to have any trouble
with his memory. He was obviously frustrated by his position but sel-
dom voiced his frustration, much less grumbled about it. The only
thing that he really complained about was not being allowed to eat the
things that he wanted to.1
39")!(#)($
By the middle of June it became increasingly clear that new political
parties, whether permitted by changed legislation or not, would quick-
ly emerge of their own accord. Many groups within NU competed for
Abdurrahman’s patronage. At first Abdurrahman expressed grave con-
cern at the fact that NU groups wanted to form an NU political party
because it seemed to suggest a linking of party politics and religion. By
July his attitude had begun to soften: by then there seemed little doubt
that some sort of NU party would emerge, with or without his blessing.
If he was to make a serious contribution to politics, it would have to be
channelled through a party that drew upon NU’s large membership.
6B@
Some saw this as another warning sign of egocentric behaviour. Was
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
Abdurrahman seriously egocentric? Was his ego so large that it domi-
nated his political and public behaviour? It’s difficult to answer such
questions with any degree of objectivity. His personal style continued to
be modest and self-effacing and his humour self-deprecating. But there
was no doubt that Abdurrahman’s extroverted nature thrived on public
attention. His enduring sense of ‘manifest destiny’ made it natural, in
his mind, that he should welcome the opportunities that providence
delivered him in order that he might play out his role in history.
In the turmoil that followed the collapse of the Soeharto regime, it
was understandable that Habibie’s new administration was slow in
pushing through legislation permitting the formation of political par-
ties. Ever since 1973, when the existing ten parties were compacted into
just three, it had been illegal to form a new political party. In the eupho-
ria following Soeharto’s fall, when all attention was focused on the hope
of fresh elections, illegality was no longer a barrier to the formation of
new parties.
Throughout June Abdurrahman remained uncertain about which
course to take. He was greatly worried that in the post-Soeharto vacu-
um Golkar was well positioned to regroup and mount a professional
campaign for the elections. It was clear that Golkar carried a lot of bag-
gage from its long association with Soeharto, but it was also clear that
it possessed an unparalleled nationwide grassroots network with enor-
mous cash reserves. Golkar was not expected to gain a majority in its
own right, but there were worrying signs that PPP would be willing to
form a coalition with Golkar. Together these two large parties might
get the critical numbers they needed to form government, especially if
joined by some of the numerous new Islamist parties. Not one of these
new parties was expected to win a large share of the vote, but if grouped
together, working in conjunction with Golkar and PPP, they might well
form government.
In July, when a Golkar national congress was held, a fierce contest
emerged between the two camps. Habibie’s ultimately won through,
with their candidate Akbar Tandjung becoming party chairman. This
strengthened the impression that Golkar was a political force to reckon
with. Akbar Tandjung was a formidable politician and had a reputation
as a reformer even during the Soeharto period. His former role in the
leadership of the Association of Muslim Students (Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam — HMI) confirmed his appeal in the eyes of many
6B6
modernist Muslims. At first it seemed as if Akbar Tandjung had no

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
hope of winning the Golkar chair. His main rival Edi Sudrajat was
strongly backed by General Try Sutrisno; the army continued to play a
large role in Golkar and was able to organise considerable voting
strength. In the end it was Try’s public boasting that he was acting on
Soeharto’s behalf that served to swing support behind Akbar Tandjung.
That, and Habibie’s threat to sack Wiranto unless he backed Akbar. In
any case the ascension of Akbar confirmed the view that the ‘new’
Golkar, now styling itself as a reformist party, would not be easily
defeated, even if its stocks in post-Soeharto Indonesia had sunk to an
all-time low.
Abdurrahman had begun to publicly endorse the idea of a NU party.
To defeat Golkar, he explained, he would have to lead a party that
exploited NU’s mass following. He and his colleagues in the central
leadership team of NU nominated as the party of their choice the
National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa — PKB).
Abdurrahman took no formal leadership position in the party. Instead,
Matori Abdul Djalil, a political veteran with many years of experience
in PPP, was chosen as leader. Abdurrahman’s de facto role in PKB as its
spiritual head was still a source of embarrassment for him. He sought
to counter this, and to assuage his own conscience, by strongly arguing
that PKB should be non-sectarian, open to everyone, and that it should
be concerned about representing all sections of society. Nevertheless, it
was clear that as a party it relied almost entirely upon the members of
NU. In justifying his apparent reversal of principle, Abdurrahman
argued that NU had no choice if it were to defeat Golkar. This was, he
argued, an ‘emergency situation’ in which emergency measures were
required.
!'+.()!(#)3!(
Meanwhile Amien Rais was engaged in a personal struggle of his own.
His political experience and natural affections inclined him towards
PPP. By mid-July, he had, in fact, already formally signed a letter prom-
ising to accept the offer extended to him to become the chair of PPP.
He was increasingly aware, however, that he could play a much larger
role in Indonesian society, as a reformist statesman representing all sec-
tions of society. This second choice was emotionally and politically
more risky than the first. It also ultimately proved to be more enticing.
At the eleventh hour, just before he was to announce that he was tak-
6B7
ing up the chair of the United Development Party, he was persuaded by
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
an old friend and moderate Muslim intellectual, Syafi’i Anwar, to join
forces with the new National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional
— PAN). PAN had been put together by a group of largely
Muhammadiyah and modernist figures who had a vision of building an
inclusive non-sectarian party along the lines of Megawati’s PDI and
Abdurrahman’s PKB. Their initial policy drafts and formulations
showed greater sophistication and understanding than found in any
other party. The party’s direction was unambiguously reformist and
democratic. It opposed sectarianism and championed the development
of a modern secular state that was home to all people, groups and faiths.
The chief obstacle for the new party was that it had no historical
roots. Golkar, PPP and PDI could all claim to be old parties, and cer-
tainly they already had a claim on voting preferences. Even PKB, with
its association with NU, had an established voter base. Some of the
visionaries behind the formation of PAN spoke hopefully of it getting
90 per cent of the modernist vote. In reality it was difficult to see this
ever being possible, given that many modernists would continue to vote
for the parties that they has always voted for, either PPP or Golkar, and
that many others might support the new Islamist parties claiming to
represent the spirit of Masyumi. What PAN desperately needed was
somebody with an established national profile who could guarantee
them national attention and credibility. The appointment of Amien
Rais promised precisely that, although given Amien’s record of associ-
ating with the Islamic right, it also meant having to work even harder
to convince voters that PAN was non-sectarian.
Many of the key figures behind the new PAN had previously been
involved with ICMI. One example was Syafi’i Anwar, who was also
editor-in-chief of the weekly investigative news magazine Ummat,
which was self-consciously targeting the so-called new santri urban
modernist community. But figures like Syafi’i Anwar represented the
liberal and progressive wing of ICMI. Another major figure backing
the new party, although not formally a member of its leadership, was
veteran journalist and editor Gunawan Mohammad. Gunawan
explained his support for PAN on the grounds that Indonesia needed a
modern, non-sectarian, democratic party such as PAN to work along-
side Megawati’s PDI and Abdurrahman’s PKB. This would bring
together the three key reform figures, Amien Rais, Abdurrahman
Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri. It could also bring together the
6B8
major groupings of Indonesian society: traditionalist Muslims, mod-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
ernist Muslims and abangan and non-Muslim nationalists. The grow-

ing strength of the new Islamist parties and the professionalism shown
within Golkar, along with the undoubted strength still evident in PPP,
made it all the more important that this three-cornered coalition be
worked out. Without it there was a danger that Golkar would cling on
to power. Nevertheless many analysts argued that a partnership
between modernists and traditionalists would be fundamentally
unworkable, given the mutual antagonism between Amien Rais and
Abdurrahman Wahid, together with the many entrenched social, cul-
tural and historical differences between Muhammadiyah and NU.
Throughout the second half of 1998 Abdurrahman refused to assent
to the formalising of a coalition. Nevertheless, he and Amien continued
to meet, and relations between the two steadily improved, assisted by
intermediaries such as Syafi’i Anwar. Over the previous eighteen
months Syafi’i had developed a friendship with Abdurrahman,
enabling him to serve as a bridge to moderates within ICMI . He and
other like-minded colleagues in ICMI and Muhammadiyah had long
been working to bring Amien and Abdurrahman together. By August
there were signs that some sort of partnership was, indeed, possible. As
chair of PAN, Amien had begun to speak out in support of secular
nationalism, democracy and reform. He even went as far as repudiating
his earlier anti-Chinese and anti-Christian statements, saying that he
had been mistaken in promoting such a narrow understanding of Islam.
&!"+"+.)$(#.%)3%.,,$%.
President Habibie continued to baffle observers. Confounding the low
expectations held for his administration, he instituted a series of
reforms that were hard to argue with. From the beginning there was
greater media freedom under Habibie than had ever existed under
Soeharto, albeit still incomplete and subject to a certain degree of
manipulation. But Habibie himself seemed to act without any political
instincts whatsoever. For example, when awarding Indonesia’s highest
honours in August he gave several to close associates and family mem-
bers and presented the highest honour to his own wife.
More consequential was the military honour council which con-
vened, that same month, to hear evidence regarding Prabowo
Subianto’s alleged involvement in the abduction and torture of pro-
democracy activists earlier that year. The honour council decided to dis-
6BB
charge Prabowo from active duty. Nevertheless, he was allowed to
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
receive full pension benefits and was permitted to leave the country and
relocate to Jordan. Many questioned why Wiranto didn’t push ahead
with a full court-martial, since there seemed to be ample evidence to
justify one. Perhaps two factors held him back from doing this: fear of
what Prabowo would divulge and fear of a Muslim extremist backlash.
Evidence for the latter was to come at the November MPR session,
when over 100 000 ‘civil militiamen’ were organised to protect the
meeting. The militiamen who roamed the streets of Jakarta largely
unchecked, menacingly armed with sharpened bamboo sticks, were
apparently organised by General Feisal Tandjung and General Kivlan
Zein, both linked with the Islamic right. It was assumed that their
objective was to protect Habibie from student groups and others
demanding his resignation. Although their stated aim was to maintain
the peace, they so irritated citizens that many of them were set upon
and attacked.
By October Habibie was feeling increasingly uncomfortable. Not
only was the reformasi movement outspoken in its criticism of him; it
was also able to draw huge numbers. Evidence of this came in October
when Megawati’s National Democratic Party, now known as the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
— Perjuangan, to distinguish itself from the old Indonesian
Democratic Party) held its national congress on the island of Bali. In an
impressive display of strength the new party was able to attract more
than 100 000 supporters to its first congress. Equally impressive was
Megawati’s rousing speech on the final day. Carefully scripted, it pre-
sented the impressive policy platform that had been put together by her
key advisers. Mochtar Buchori, the secretary-general of PDI-P, pre-
sciently stated that even in the most pessimistic scenario the party could
expect to gain a quarter of the votes, and it might gain as much as 40
per cent.
One thing that Habibie didn’t need to fear, however, was a call from
Abdurrahman or his close friend and ally Megawati for his immediate
resignation. To the continued disappointment of the people,
Abdurrahman and Megawati argued for moderation and patience, say-
ing that the focus should be on the 1999 election. Organising an elec-
tion, preparing the parties and campaigning, they pointed out, would
require many months of work, so there was little point in toppling
Habibie at the moment. So long as Habibie continued to move towards
6B;
holding a free and fair election in 1999, they argued, he should be given
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
a chance to fulfil his mandate as interim president.
1&.)0+:!(H$%)'..1+(:
By November the university students, who represented the flesh and
bone of the reformasi movement, were growing impatient with their
reluctant heroes, Amien, Megawati and Abdurrahman. Finally, they
decided to take matters into their own hands. On 10 November, the day
that the four-day Special Session of the MPR began, they arranged a
meeting to which the three reformists were summoned. Out of consid-
eration for Abdurrahman’s health the venue chosen was his home in
Ciganjur. For good measure, also in attendance was the Sultan of
Yogyakarta, who had been quietly supportive of the students active in
the reformasi movement in his university town.
The four senior reformers issued an eight-point statement. Nothing
in it was particularly new, and much of it failed to meet the expectations
of the students. The four were prepared, for example, to allow the mil-
itary six years to fully withdraw from the DPR and a direct role in pol-
itics. They urged Habibie not to allow fresh elections to be delayed any
longer than was strictly necessary, but recognised the legitimacy of his
transitional government. Much more important than the statement,
however, was the agreement of the four leaders, arguably Indonesia’s
most popular reformers, to meet together. It was not exactly a coalition,
or even a partnership, but it was a beginning.
'/%.)?+/-.(0.
Abdurrahman was still concerned about the possibility of violent con-
frontation. Many critics, and indeed many supporters, of
Abdurrahman continued to argue that he was being dramatic and that
now was the time for him to add to, rather than to detract from, the
momentum for reformation. On Friday, 13 November, the final day of
the MPR session, a violent confrontation took place at the Semanggi
flyover in central Jakarta. Whether out of panic at being confronted by
an enormous crowd of potentially angry students, or acting at the
instigation of some who wanted to send a warning to the reform
movements, police and troops opened fire on a large crowd of students,
wounding hundreds and killing fifteen. That day quickly became
known as Black Friday. It was an ominous warning that, even with
6B<
Soeharto gone, there were limits to the pace of reform: the military
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
remained a force to be reckoned with.
By the time the special session of the MPR was over, the students
had distilled their demands down to two. Firstly, there should be an
independent investigation into the wealth of Soeharto and his family;
and secondly, there should be an immediate end to the military’s role in
politics. The students had been scathing of the MPR because the
majority of its members were long-time associates of Soeharto hand-
picked for their loyalty. Abdurrahman and others argued that there was
no other constitutional way of proceeding with reform save that the
Assembly met. In particular, it was vital that the Assembly pass the leg-
islation for holding an election in 1999. When pressured by the stu-
dents to support their demands, Abdurrahman grew irritated. ‘There
was no question of the need to investigate Soeharto’s wealth,’ he said,
‘but we must be realistic in our expectations and methods.’ Similarly, he
argued that the immediate removal of the military from politics was too
much to expect. It was better to work on a six-year plan that began with
them playing a much reduced role in the MPR and ended with them
eventually withdrawing from politics altogether. He pointed to Black
Friday as evidence of the need for moderation.
If the students were angry with Abdurrahman at the time of the
MPR meeting in November, they became furious through December
and January, when he not only failed to support their call for immedi-
ate prosecution of Soeharto, but took the unorthodox step of repeated-
ly meeting with the former president at his home. Abdurrahman
justified his actions by saying that there was a need to negotiate with
elements of the former regime to stop the violence that was breaking
out all over Indonesia.
Throughout the second half of 1998 a particularly cruel and bizarre
form of violence had been occurring in Banyuwangi, East Java. Over
two hundred people were killed, it was said, by black-clad assassins who
came to be styled as ninja. Initially it appeared that the killings were an
attempt to eliminate practitioners of black magic believed to be power-
ful and behind all sorts of misadventure and misfortune. Over time,
however, many NU members, including some ulama, were killed, rais-
ing doubts that this was simply a settling of local issues relating to black
magic. Anecdotal accounts spoke of small, well-organised bands of
individuals who appeared to be trained militiamen, and of carefully
co-ordinated attacks. Abdurrahman immediately pointed the finger at
6B=
elements of the former regime loyal to Soeharto. It was likely, he said,

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
that people acting for Soeharto, or in Soeharto’s name, were involved in

the Banyuwangi killings in an effort to provoke and foment violence.
Abdurrahman travelled to the area and argued passionately against a
response to the violence. ‘These killings,’ he said, ‘are the work of agents
provocateurs who want us to lose our temper and strike back, thereby
plunging the community into violence. Consequently, this is precisely
what we must not do.’ Abdurrahman’s moral leadership was sufficient
to limit the extent of retribution, but he was not able to stop vigilante-
style executions of alleged assassins who were caught and often killed
by locals before the police could intervene. Nevertheless, widespread
communal violence did not occur and it seems likely that it was the dis-
cipline of the NU community that limited the potential damage.
East Java is the heartland of both NU (and by extension, PKB) and
PDI-P. If the Banyuwangi killings were, in fact, the work of agents
provocateurs then it is probable that the intention was to set santri
against abangan, or in other words, Abdurrahman’s supporters against
Megawati’s supporters. 2
Because he felt that it was likely that Soeharto, directly or indirectly,
was involved with the violence, Abdurrahman felt that the only way to
bring it to an end was to confront Soeharto and ask him to call his peo-
ple off. Amidst much controversy, this is precisely what he did. He was
also hoping that Soeharto, now an old man in broken health, might
come to a point of repentance and voluntarily hand over much of his
wealth. The examples of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and the
Shah of Iran suggested that seeking the return of wealth through legal
measures was unlikely to be successful. Instead, suggested
Abdurrahman, ‘If we can get Soeharto to willingly hand over his
wealth, or at least a significant portion of it, we could at least get some-
thing back. In any case Soeharto is simply too dangerous for us to move
against him without fear of grave repercussions’. Some understood
Abdurrahman’s reason for negotiating with Soeharto, others accepted it
out of respect for Abdurrahman, but many rejected it. For many, it was
the final blow to their steadily diminished respect for Abdurrahman as
a reformist leader.
It seems likely that Abdurrahman’s involvement in urging restraint in
Banyuwangi was significant in limiting violence in the district follow-
ing the so-called ninja killings. Unfortunately, he had no similar role to
play in another outbreak of violence that started in North Jakarta on
6BD
22 November. On that day a gathering of several hundred Muslims was
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
informed that Christian youths had been seen throwing stones at a
nearby mosque. The crowd ran wild, bursting into nearby churches,
pulling up pews and setting them alight. They also went looking for the
Ambonese Christian youths who had allegedly thrown the stones.
When they caught those they considered responsible, they paraded
them through the streets and then beat them to death. By the end of
the second day, at least ten Christians were dead and a similar number
of churches destroyed.
Several days later the inevitable retaliation occurred, this time not in
North Jakarta but in West Timor. Christians went on a rampage,
destroying dozens of Muslim houses and mosques, burning them to the
ground and turning on Muslim transmigrants from Sulawesi. Given the
tensions between rival street gangs in North Jakarta, in which
Ambonese youths played the key role, it is possible that the whole inci-
dent was simply a boiling over of frustration and tensions between rival
groups. As usual, there were accounts of young men looking like sol-
diers out of uniform throwing stones at mosques and precipitating the
violence. Abdurrahman again voiced his concerns about what was
going on and the need for moderation in the face of a deliberate
attempt to provoke retaliation.
During December the violence appeared to have calmed down. But
on 19 January 1999 a petty dispute in the eastern province of Maluku
erupted into incessant, large-scale violence. The violence that began in
Ambon that day between Christians and Muslims appears to have
started with a minor dispute between a Christian mini-bus driver and
a Muslim passenger. Some saw a link, however, with the earlier violence
in North Jakarta and suggested that there were attempts to provoke vio-
lence. Whatever the case, the violence increased at a horrifying pace
and continued through the course of the year. Shortly after the violence
broke out, a Muslim labour activist and assistant to Adi Sasono, Eggy
Sudjana, urged Java-based Muslims to get together and act against
those who were persecuting Muslims. He said, ‘that they should launch
a jihad since more and more Muslims are being shot down’. Whether
the conflict was deliberately provoked or simply a spontaneous expres-
sion of frustration, its potential to erupt into a major conflagration was
all too clear. It seemed as if Abdurrahman’s nightmare of sectarian vio-
lence was becoming real. Hefner observes that Adi Sasono, who was
now serving in Habibie’s cabinet as Minister for Co-operatives, made
6;A
no attempt to rebuke his friend and confidant, Eggy Sudjana, and that
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
weeks later he was rewarded for his ‘discretion’ by receiving the

endorsement of KISDI in his campaign for the presidency.3
Ambon was not the only focus of violence. In late 1998 the situation
in Aceh once again began to deteriorate. In August 1998 General
Wiranto visited Aceh and publicly apologised for the military’s past
violation of human rights and pledged to reduce the number of troops
deployed in the province. But Acehenese activists, outraged by years of
violent abuse, and now able for the first time to talk openly about the
terror that had been visited upon them, showed foreign and local jour-
nalists numerous sites of suspected mass graves. Witnesses who had
escaped the violence came forward with tales of kidnappings and tor-
ture at the hands of the soldiers. Human rights groups estimated that
at least two thousand people had been killed. The military acknowl-
edged that many civilians had died but gave the conservative number of
seven hundred. They also asserted that 111 soldiers had been killed.
Matters took a turn for the worse in December 1998, when rebels
linked to the Aceh Freedom Movement dragged seven soldiers off a bus
and killed them. The new year started with ethnic and communal vio-
lence raging out of control in Aceh and Ambon. Abdurrahman was
concerned that the political race for the 1999 elections would exacer-
bate sectarian conflict and also that evidence of the military’s involve-
ment in the violence demonstrated that there were limits to the pace of
reform that the military would accept.
Compounding Indonesia’s many difficulties was the dire state of the
economy. The year 1998 had begun with the rupiah collapsing and,
although it eventually recovered somewhat, continued to be of concern.
By the close of the year the economy had contracted by 14 per cent and
was expected to shrink by as much as 4 per cent in 1999.
Unemployment was at an all-time high. According to some estimates
as many as a hundred million people were living in abject poverty. One
measure of this was the fall in per capita income to US$400 in 1998
from a little over US$1000 two years earlier, a 60 per cent drop. The
economic crisis meant that there were millions of young men angry and
disappointed. The fall of Soeharto had not brought about the sudden
reversal of fortunes that had been hoped for, and they wanted to see the
new government take practical measures to return jobs. Conditions
were ripe for the recruiting of militiamen and the spontaneous emer-
gence of gangs of disgruntled youth.
6;@
In January 1999 another development occurred, which alarmed
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
Abdurrahman because of its potential to produce a violent response
from the Indonesian military and their militia. That month the
Australian government changed its official stance on East Timor. It had
previously been one of the few nations to recognise Indonesia’s annex-
ation of East Timor and its inclusion as the Republic’s twenty-seventh
province. This had always sat uneasily on the Australian conscience on
both sides of politics. In January conservative Prime Minister John
Howard and his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer made the sur-
prising move of writing to President Habibie to explain that, although
Australia continued to recognise East Timor as part of Indonesia, it
urged Jakarta to move towards holding a genuine act of self-determi-
nation as quickly as possible. Few in Canberra anticipated the outcome
of that simple letter. When it arrived, Habibie was annoyed by the
intervention in Indonesian affairs, particularly at a time when he felt
the nation was facing so many other problems. On 27 January he
announced that he was committed to offering ‘greater autonomy’ to
East Timor and that he would hold a referendum offering a choice to
the East Timorese. (It was commonly understood that if the East
Timorese chose to reject the offer of ‘greater autonomy’ they would be
setting out on a course for independence.) What surprised everyone
about Habibie’s response was that he pledged to have the issue resolved
by the end of the year.
Abdurrahman voiced his alarm at Habibie’s haste to ‘be rid of the
East Timor problem’. ‘To hold a referendum in East Timor before
Indonesia had a chance of installing a new government,’ he argued, ‘was
foolhardy.’ While Abdurrahman had long been committed to the strug-
gle for greater human rights, he had not been active regarding East
Timor. He regarded East Timor as a problem only soluble with the fall
of Soeharto and the dismantling of his military-backed authoritarian
regime. Like most intellectuals in Jakarta, he was not as well informed
about what was taking place in East Timor as he might have been.
Thanks to the military, the news that reached Jakarta was limited and
distorted. Nevertheless, he knew that certain officers treated the
province as their personal fiefdom and were accustomed to ruling with
cruelty and violence. Not only did they plunder significant economic
wealth from the benighted province; as a zone of operational duty it
also provided an opportunity for the advancement of many military
careers. Moreover, Abdurrahman was well aware of the reputation of
6;6
former commanders in East Timor, such as Prabowo Subianto, for

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
training and recruiting of militiamen and of their appalling human

rights violations. He was worried that a move towards a referendum
before reform had taken hold in Indonesia would both annoy the
Indonesian military and provide an irresistible opportunity to wreak
mayhem on the people of East Timor.
:$,)#$%)4/%)3%.,+#.(1E
From the foundation of the party in July 1998 many within PKB held
the hope that Abdurrahman would become president. At the very least
they reserved the right to nominate him as their presidential candidate,
but then most parties nominated their own people as presidential can-
didates regardless of their prospects for victory. On 7 February 1999,
party chairman Matori announced that the party would nominate
Abdurrahman and spoke optimistically of the prospects of the party
gaining as much as 30 per cent of the vote. Few political observers,
however, held strong hope for the possibility of Abdurrahman’s election
because they did not expect that the party could do much more than
draw the votes of a proportion of NU members.
In March 1999 Abdurrahman alarmed supporters and enraged his
critics once again. While on a visit to Singapore he said that there was
a problem with Megawati’s candidature for the presidency. He
explained that many conservative kiai and other Muslim leaders felt
uncertain about her, and that many cited her gender as the reason for
questioning her suitability for the presidency. Certainly many did ques-
tion Megawati’s suitability for the presidency although it had more to
do with her own personal attributes than her gender. Why then did
Abdurrahman raise the issue? Some suggested it was a deliberate
attempt to stymie Megawati’s advance and was therefore a premeditat-
ed act of betrayal. Others interpreted it as ‘kite flying’: he was seeking
to draw out a response as to where people stood on the issue. He denied
that he was against Megawati’s candidature on the grounds of her gen-
der and said that he thought those conservative kiai were clearly wrong
to hold such a view.
Even if Abdurrahman was not intending to undermine Megawati’s
position, there is no denying that his comments about her in public were
frequently offensive. For example, on a number of occasions he said
words to the effect that she was ‘honest but stupid’. In private
Abdurrahman often spoke of Megawati with great affection and respect,
6;7
so it is difficult to account for his cavalier attitude to her in public. For
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
her part, Megawati was understandably offended by Abdurrahman’s
comments and their friendship began to show signs of stress.
Why then make such statements? Perhaps it can be explained on the
basis of his habit of thinking aloud; sometimes he simply made a gaffe
while talking without stopping to think about what he is saying.
Perhaps another factor was his blindness. On more than one occasion
his comments have gone to air when he didn’t even realise that a cam-
era was pointed at him and was recording. Not one of these explana-
tions, however, is entirely satisfactory in explaining his comments about
Megawati. Whatever his intention, those statements did have the effect
of stigmatising her candidature. It is possible that Abdurrahman did
have genuine concerns about conservative sentiment within NU circles.
His uncle Yusuf Hasyim and Idham Chalid, the former chairman of
NU (Abdurrahman’s long-time nemesis) had both become involved
with small parties claiming to represent NU (and freely using NU sym-
bols). Both of these men were seeking to garner the support, not just of
traditional enemies of Abdurrahman, but of conservative elements who
were worried about Abdurrahman’s possible alliance with Megawati
and Amien Rais.
Besides these tensions between PKB and the various other parties
that contended for support from NU members, such as the NU Party
and the Awakening of the Ummat Party, there were also considerable
tensions between PKB members and those supporting PPP. Many NU
kiai had continued to be active in PPP long after NU officially with-
drew from the party in 1994. NU’s policy under Abdurrahman had
been to allow involvement in any political party that individuals chose,
with the proviso that NU office-bearers could not simultaneously hold
office in a political party. The creation of PKB came with the expecta-
tion that many of those who had previously belonged to PPP would
return to support the party endorsed by NU’s central board. One exam-
ple of such a shift was Khofifah Indar Parawansa, an impressively out-
spoken member of DPR for PPP, who emerged in the post-Soeharto
era to play a leading role within PKB.
Bad blood remained between elements of PKB and PPP in certain
districts. One such location was the town of Jepara, near Semarang in
Central Java. On 30 April a clash broke out that quickly became violent
and resulted in the death of five people, with six others sustaining seri-
ous injuries. Also destroyed in the violence were two houses, fourteen
6;8
cars and six motorbikes. A week after the outbreak Abdurrahman flew
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
to Jepara in order to hold a large rally, much to the consternation of

local officials who were worried that the violence would recur. The rally
fortunately proved uneventful. Abdurrahman appealed to NU members
to remain calm and to forgive those who hurt them, saying ‘PKB mem-
bers must remain calm and at peace. Some of our people were killed,
but we forgive them’. He explained that in the current murky circum-
stances it was often impossible to know whether people wearing certain
uniforms or insignia were genuine members of the party or group that
they appeared to represent, or were planted there for the purpose of
provoking violence. For this reason, he argued, it was vital that NU
members resist all attempts to incite them to violence. Fortunately the
incident in Jepara proved the worst of such clashes, but discontent
between the PPP supporters and PKB supporters continued to simmer
throughout the campaign.
By late March Abdurrahman’s recovery was largely complete. He still
suffered somewhat from nausea and lethargy, but otherwise there was
surprisingly little sign that, just fourteen months earlier, he had nearly
died from a massive stroke. True enough, to those who did not know
him he looked like a tired old man, a clumsy invalid unable to function
without his ever-attendant helpers. To those who knew him better,
however, and especially to those who were with him daily, he had
almost returned to his former self. It had been many years since
Abdurrahman had looked the picture of health, but anyone who had
ever travelled with him could testify to the stubborn bull-like energy
that lay behind his chubby, world-worn appearance. Ill-accustomed to
blindness, Abdurrahman looked more clumsy than ever, but by May his
robust stamina had returned. When he spoke at rallies in early and
mid-April he addressed the crowds seated in a large armchair. By the
end of month he began to stand, often speaking for more than an hour
at a time.
1.!'):$,)#$%
By this point poor health was no longer a serious impediment to a vig-
orous campaign by Abdurrahman. His main impediment was the same
one that had dogged him throughout his career: a shortage of human
and other resources, exacerbated by his poor administrative ability.
Throughout his chairmanship of NU Abdurrahman had typically acted
as a one-man show. It was not that he couldn’t get along with people or
6;B
build alliances; in fact, when he put his mind to it he could be an
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
extraordinarily skilful and inspirational leader. It was more that, for a
variety of reasons, not least being lack of human resources, he was
accustomed to working alone. This may have served him reasonably
well in leading a cultural and social movement such as NU, but it was
not a good basis for campaigning for the presidency.
Despite his annoying foibles, Abdurrahman inspired great loyalty
and deep affection in those around him. For the 1999 campaign season
he received help from several individuals whose contribution was deci-
sive. The first was Alwi Shihab, an old friend of Abdurrahman’s from
their student days in Cairo. In recent years they had seen little of each
other, largely because Alwi had spent more than a decade studying and
teaching in the United States. Alwi had a PhD in Islamic studies from
Ain Shams University, Egypt, and a second PhD in religious studies
from Temple University in the United States. He then taught at
Hartford seminary and at Harvard University Divinity School. He had
returned to Indonesia in 1998, intending to make a brief visit but, as the
PKB machine gathered momentum, he decided to put aside a couple of
months to see what sort of contribution he could make. By early 1999
Alwi’s original plans of taking several months off to help out at home
had gone out the window. It was largely through Alwi’s intervention
that Abdurrahman was able to achieve harmonious relations with
Amien Rais and to build up good relations with leading modernists,
including many ICMI moderates.
A second person who made a decisive difference to the campaign was
Ratih Hardjono. Ratih had been, for many years, a correspondent for
Kompas, the Catholic-owned national newspaper. She had worked
mostly as a foreign correspondent based in Sydney and Melbourne.
Early in 1999 she decided to take leave without pay for several months
in order to return to Jakarta and help Abdurrahman in his campaign.
She had known Abdurrahman and his family for many years and had
been instrumental in arranging therapy for Nuriyah in Australia fol-
lowing her car accident of 1993. Abdurrahman and Nuriyah frequent-
ly stayed at her home in Sydney and she had proved herself a generous
and loyal friend. When Abdurrahman lost his eyesight in January 1998,
Ratih swung into action to organise the purchase of a reading machine
to enable him to continue reading with the help of a voice synthesiser
and scanner. The project was ultimately unsuccessful, even though
Ratih was able to purchase the machine and transport it to his house,
6;;
simply because Abdurrahman was still in a state of denial about his

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
blindness. Psychologically, he was not ready to learn the coping skills

that those who have accepted their loss finally come to learn. Despite a
long friendship with Abdurrahman’s family and being related to
Abdurrahman through her father, Ratih was largely unfamiliar with the
culture of traditional Islam and NU. Culturally she was much influ-
enced by her father, who followed Kejawaen or Javanese mysticism, and
by her Australian-born mother, who was Catholic.
Intense and passionate by nature, Ratih brought to Abdurrahman’s
campaign a degree of managerial rigour and discipline that had, until
her arrival, been completely foreign to him. Not only did she arrange
travel and press engagements and solicit funds for the campaign, but
she was also a gatekeeper protecting Abdurrahman from a press keen to
capture a quick quote on which to build a controversial story. For this
reason many were fearful of Ratih and her often fiery outbursts, but
there was no question of her loyalty to Abdurrahman.
In day-to-day arrangements Ratih worked closely with
Abdurrahman’s second daughter Yenny, who had known her for many
years. Together the two women organised Abdurrahman’s life. Nuriyah
was occasionally able to join him on his expeditions in the country, but
her need to use a wheelchair to cover more than the shortest of dis-
tances made it hard for her to join his small, poorly equipped entourage,
as did the rigorous and unrelenting nature of his travel regime.
By this point Al Zastrow, Abdurrahman’s personal assistant since the
time of his stroke, had passed the baton to another young pesantren
graduate, Munib. Quiet and unassuming, Munib’s personal style was
very different from that of the flamboyant Zastrow, who had become
something of a media personality, but Munib proved no less effective in
attending to the day-to-day needs of his near-blind master.
The small band that assembled for most of Abdurrahman’s campaign
trips was woefully inadequate and, by any measure, inexperienced. It
was also grossly under-resourced. Frequently it was not known if funds
were available for a trip until hours before, though they could always
rely on local pesantren and friends for hospitality. Despite the ram-
shackle nature of the campaign team, its members were almost invari-
ably in good spirits and engaged in constant banter. Although no one
thought it likely that Abdurrahman would become president, they were
well aware that it was not beyond the bounds of possibility. The sheer
ludicrousness of the notion struck everyone as ironic and amusing. No
6;<
president or prime minister from a democracy of any size could have
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
achieved office with the sort of minimalist campaign that backed this
candidate for the presidency of the world’s third-largest democracy.
Of all the campaign team, Abdurrahman was always the one who
possessed the most energy and seemed least affected by the rigours of
travel. He explained that he welcomed travel precisely because it afford-
ed some opportunities to rest. It was easy for him to switch off for five
or fifty minutes when travelling in a car or plane, and it seemed entire-
ly probable that he did get more rest while on the road than when at
home. More importantly, though, he was clearly re-energised by speak-
ing to people around the country, whether they were ageing kiai, party
faithful, Chinese businessmen, or other friends. It seems likely that the
adrenaline rush of the campaign served to consolidate Abdurrahman’s
final recovery.
Despite the less than polished nature of Abdurrahman’s personal
campaign team, his appearances were invariably dramatic affairs. Police
escorts would guide the ad hoc convoy in from the airport to the site of
the rally. Many of the rallies were very large, involving tens of thou-
sands of people, and as the campaign progressed it become increasing-
ly common to see PKB supporters mingling and working alongside
PDI-P supporters. One of the key elements providing practical assis-
tance on the ground was NU’s youth wing Ansor. Members of Ansor
are organised into uniformed troops known as Banser — a kind of Boy
Scouts movement replete with black, military-style uniforms. Some
find these Banser troops intimidating, but for the most part the Banser
are more like overgrown Boy Scouts than militiamen. It was evident
when Banser troops lined up to welcome Abdurrahman to a rally that
they took great pride in the uniforms, which were mostly paid for
through their own savings, and that they were serious about doing their
job. It was equally obvious that, despite their paramilitary appearance,
theirs was for the most part an amateurish and innocent enthusiasm.
For all of their attempts at seriousness when arrayed in uniform, they
tended to make a comic assembly. It was not uncommon at the rallies
to hear a cry to march left and see the group break off in two directions,
both unsure which was left. All of this added a carnival air to the cam-
paign process. On the one hand the whole campaign was deadly seri-
ous, but on the other the amateurish and limited nature of some
contributions could not help but raise a smile.
The first big rally of the PKB campaign was held on 9 April in
6;=
Jombang. It was preceded by a lesser rally in the town of Mojokerto,

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
half an hour south of Jombang. Ratih had been travelling with the team
for only a few weeks and was still trying desperately to consolidate an
element of professionalism in the campaign. Having covered many
political campaigns as a journalist, Ratih was aware of the importance
of projecting the correct image; she saw it as a high priority that, as far
as possible, Abdurrahman’s presentation should be polished. Part of this
was preventing him from speaking off-the-cuff in a provocative fash-
ion, but a large part was simply a matter of grooming. One small ploy
to improve his appearance was to fit him out with a smart pair of gold-
rimmed spectacles. They were no help at all in enabling him to see, but
they did give him a more dignified appearance.4
A dignified appearance was precisely what Abdurrahman’s dress
sense did not convey. Abdurrahman had never been a snappy dresser,
being deeply averse to pretension and to deliberate display and, it must
be said, lacking any innate sense of what makes for good presentation.
Alwi is exactly the opposite, immaculately turned out and dressed cor-
rectly for every occasion whether formal or informal. If some of Alwi’s
sartorial elegance, if not urbane demeanour, could be transposed onto
Abdurrahman, it was felt he would be better understood both by
domestic and international journalists. After all, how can anyone take
seriously the spiritual leader of a major party and possible future presi-
dent, who goes around in a bright red Hawaian shirt with curry stains
down the front?
,&+41+(:)!--+!(0.,
While Abdurrahman was out on the campaign trail, Alwi was working
hard to improve relations between modernists and traditionalists. He
was helped in this by a growing friendship between Ansor leader
Saifullah Yusuf (Abdurrahman’s nephew and also a PDI-P candidate)
and Imam Ardyaquttni, leader of the Muhammadiyah youth group.
Throughout the campaign period these two young leaders arranged for
Muhammadiyah youth and Ansor to meet in a series of public seminars
and meetings, and by mid-May there was a real sense that many mod-
ernists and traditionalists could work together. It even appeared that
personal relations between Amien and Abdurrahman were steadily
becoming more intimate and warm.
The day 17 May was to prove a turning-point in the campaign. In
many ways it was a typical day of campaigning with Abdurrahman: an
6;D
early-morning start driving to the port of Merak on the western end of
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
Java to board a ferry to Sumatra, and then another two hours of driv-
ing eastwards across the coastal hills of Lampung to the site of the day’s
rally. As usual the rally was preceded by a lunch at the home of a kiai
and a series of private meetings with local elders. Once the rally con-
cluded, a high-speed convoy led by a police escort rushed back through
the hilly terrain of southern Sumatra to the ferry port and then by high-
speed hydrofoil to Java and by road back to Jakarta. For most people
this would be more than enough work for one day. For Abdurrahman
it was but half a day’s work — the other half was to come that evening.
Attending a book launch at a city hotel and having a polite dinner with
intellectuals was but an intermission. The focus of the day was the press
conference that was planned for 10:30 that evening between Amien
Rais, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid to announce
the formation of a common front between their three parties to work
together to overcome Golkar.5
It was not until half an hour or so after midnight that news came
back to the hundreds of journalists jammed into Alwi’s suburban home
that the press conference was about to begin. Into the room minutes
later came a relaxed Abdurrahman and Amien, looking more than ever
like old friends, but there was no sign of Megawati. A whispered com-
ment from Yenny made it clear that the evening had not gone very well
at Megawati’s house. Abdurrahman quickly offered an apology on
Megawati’s behalf, explaining that she was due to travel to Sumatra
tomorrow. He had suggested, he said, that she get an early night and
that he and Amien could handle the press conference alone. Relations
between Amien and Abdurrahman were clearly much better because
they both talked enthusiastically about the possibility of presenting a
common front against Golkar along with Megawati and her party. No
one was using the word coalition — it was felt that such a formal polit-
ical arrangement could not be worked out until after the election — but
it was clear that there was a real possibility of secular nationalists, tra-
ditionalist Muslims and modernist Muslims working side-by-side
against Golkar and its partners.
That meeting on 17 May was to prove ominous. Relations between
the modernists and traditionalists continued to improve during the
period of the campaign, due to the efforts of Alwi and others and also
to Abdurrahman’s realistic acceptance of the need to restore relations
with Amien. But relations between Abdurrahman and Megawati went
6<A
from bad to worse. An increasing frostiness came into their personal

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
relationship and throughout the rest of the campaign period there were
few occasions when they talked at any length about serious matters.
One of the main reasons, evidently, why Megawati had not been keen
to attend the press conference at Alwi’s house on 17 May was that she
was distrustful of Amien.
!)'/,1)$($,$!-)0!'3!+:(
There was no doubt that Abdurrahman was engaged in a serious polit-
ical campaign to raise support for PKB, and to an extent for the alliance
between himself, Megawati and Amien, but there were many aspects of
his campaign that did not add up. It was not just the amateurishness
and the limited resources, it was also a matter of his choice of venues.
Abdurrahman travelled relentlessly across Java, where PKB stood to
make good gains. He also, however, visited a number of other places
where it seemed most unlikely there was anything to be gained from
campaigning.
One such trip occurred in May when he made a visit to Banda Aceh,
the capital of the province of Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra.
There are very few members of NU in Aceh, even though the dominant
expression of Islam in Acehenese has many parallels with the tradition-
al Islam found in NU and rural Java. Abdurrahman had good relations
with the ulama in Aceh and was keen to strengthen them, but there was
no serious expectation that a large number of their supporters would
vote for PKB. Instead, they were inclined to give their votes to PPP,
which had long been their custom. One of the major obstacles to vot-
ing for PKB was its Javanese base. For understandable reasons, the
Acehenese were suspicious of anything coming out of Java.
Nevertheless, Abdurrahman was well received by the ulama and it was
clear that there was a genuine rapport with the religious leadership in
Aceh. The same could not be said for many of the students. While
many students admired him as a reformist who had stood up to
Soeharto, others were just as critical of him and, given his Javanese ori-
gins, suspicious of his intentions.
One of the central points of the campaign was to have been an
address to students in a large sports stadium in Banda Aceh. As we
approached the hall it was clear that the atmosphere was tense. A hand-
ful of youths were in a highly emotional state, waving placards and
shouting abuse at Abdurrahman as his small entourage entered the
6<@
guest room. The next half an hour was spent in the guest room beside
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
the main auditorium evaluating whether or not to proceed with the
meeting as planned. Eventually it was decided to go ahead, but
Abdurrahman, Yenny and Ratih were heavily jostled as they made their
way through the crowd to the podium. From there it seemed that the
vast majority of the several thousand students who were gathered there
were keen to listen, but several hundred, congregated in one corner of
the room, were clearly angry and upset. This group waved large plac-
ards with slogans written both in Indonesian and in English of a nature
rarely seen at gatherings where Abdurrahman was speaking. One plac-
ard consisted simply of the name ‘Dur Rahman’ across which was
stamped a large footprint. Another placard read ‘Abdurrahman is an
evil spirit in a human body’. Clearly there were some people in the
room who were not happy with his visit.
Almost as soon as he began speaking, he was met with sharp heck-
ling from the quarter of the room where the angry placards were evi-
dent. Other students tried to stop the hecklers; they argued that
Abdurrahman should be given a chance to speak since he had been
invited to come. About twenty minutes into the proceedings, things
suddenly went badly wrong. A surge of angry students broke through
the ranks and surrounded the podium. Fajrul Falaak tried valiantly to
negotiate a discussion with them, and for a while it appeared that this
was working. What wrecked everything was Abdurrahman’s response.
For perhaps half an hour he had been trying to negotiate with and
respond to the students, but as they surged forward he lost his cool. As
the shouting students came on three sides to within a metre of the
platform, Abdurrahman began to shout back, saying ‘You invited me
here. If you want me to speak, give me a chance — if not I’ll go’. When
the heckling failed to stop, he abruptly got up and made for the exit.
As a result the main rally planned for later that afternoon was also
called off.
Later that afternoon Abdurrahman contacted the student leaders to
say that he would like to meet with them and explain his position. A
meeting took place in the early hours of the following morning; he
apologised for his outburst, explaining the circumstances for his frus-
tration. That evening he also met with key ulama and members of the
media, but it was clear that there was little to be gained from prolong-
ing the visit in Aceh. The rally planned for the next day, a combined
rally between members of PDI-P and PKB in Medan, 500 kilometres
6<6
to the south, went rather better, but there was no hiding the sense of
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
disappointment that the visit to Aceh had gone so badly wrong.

A similarly ‘non-political’ visit occurred after campaigning had offi-
cially closed on the Friday before the polls on Monday, 7 June. It took
place on the Sunday at Pontianak, West Kalimantan, not far from the
region of Sambas which had seen much violent fighting between Dayak
and Madurese transmigrants. Like the trip to Banda Aceh, this was a
genuine, if perhaps naive, attempt by Abdurrahman to meet with com-
munity leaders and persuade them to be patient in the face of enormous
pressure. The meeting in Pontianak took the form of a post-lunch
address to a large gathering of community leaders. Heads of the various
churches, local Muslim leaders, leaders of Dayak communities and
Madurese communities all gathered. Both Abdurrahman and Alwi
addressed the meeting and both were in excellent form, speaking pas-
sionately of the need for tolerance, and for the disengaging of religious
sentiment from politics.
.F1%!?!:!(1)/31+'+,')
Abdurrahman finished the campaign in high spirits. He told journalists
that he thought that PKB would get more than 30 per cent of the
national vote — perhaps even 40 per cent. There was little basis, of
course, for these wildly optimistic forecasts. His reckless predictions can
perhaps best be seen as ‘locker-room talk’, a deliberate boosting of sen-
timent to maintain team morale ahead of a tough game. Realistically it
seemed that PKB would be doing well to get as much as 16 to 18 per
cent of the vote, and that was only possible if it succeeded in gaining
the votes of almost everyone involved with NU — which was not like-
ly, given that many had maintained strong links to PPP. In the two elec-
tions after NU broke with PPP, the latter’s vote had dropped to around
12 per cent. Unless PKB was successful in attracting non-NU voters in
large numbers — which hardly seemed likely in 1999 — it was itself
heading for a share of the national vote of about 12 per cent.
Abdurrahman was not the only one making wildly optimistic poll
predictions. PPP leader Hamzah Haz, when questioned several weeks
before the election, had said that he thought that his party could get
22 per cent of the vote.6 Similarly Amien Rais, and many within the
PAN, spoke confidently of getting 90 per cent of all modernist votes
and maybe as much as 30 to 40 per cent of the total. Although specu-
lation within PDI-P was much more modest, some voices still spoke
6<7
confidently of achieving a bare majority. Given that no free and fair
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
election had been held since 1955, there was no simple yardstick to
direct expectations about polling results, and consequently the wild
speculations about possible outcomes were understandable in the cir-
cumstances. Even Golkar officials spoke bravely of securing 40 per
cent of the total vote, although in many areas in Java it was hard to
imagine more than a handful of votes going to the party of the
despised former president. In the outer islands, however, the story was
different, for in many areas outside Java the economic crisis had hard-
ly touched people’s welfare. Given their long experience of prosperity
under Golkar, it seemed likely that many would to continue to vote for
the party that had so consistently delivered for them.
1&.)?/1.)+,)+(
Polling day, 7 June, dawned unusually bright and sunny in Jakarta, a city
that on most days was grey and overcast. Abdurrahman woke early and
voted at his local polling booth in Ciganjur before proceeding as usual
to the NU headquarters in central Jakarta. Over lunch he was expansive
and optimistic, not just about the prospects for PKB but also for the
election generally. As usual though, his optimism was tinged with a
streak of sober realism about the prospects for defeating Golkar.
In many districts the whole community come out to gather around
the polling booth and a festive atmosphere prevailed. Everywhere one
went there seemed immense optimism and sheer joy at being able to
vote. This euphoria continued well after voting closed. It was generally
agreed that the vote had been surprisingly free and fair. However, the
excruciatingly slow rate at which results were collated over the follow-
ing days steadily dampened that earlier sense of optimism.
Public scrutiny of vote counting took place in the Media Centre at
the Hyatt Aryaduta hotel in central Jakarta. With the assistance of var-
ious foreign governments, the Committee for Elections had organised,
not just a room filled with computers for the use of journalists, but also
an information-rich website where one could track counting moment
by moment. In the first few days after voting closed, many foreign cor-
respondents along with other observers gathered at the Hyatt Aryaduta
in the early hours of the morning, expecting at any moment a sudden
surge of results that would confirm the overall pattern of voting. The
surge never came: the results trickled in at a painfully slow pace over
several weeks.
6<8
Most major political parties and many of the smaller parties had
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
set up their offices with banks of computers to monitor the results on

the internet site. At the headquarters of NU, however, not a single
computer was to be seen, let alone one with an internet connection.
Indeed, it was difficult to find even a functioning typewriter. For
those gathered in the ‘characterful’ but decrepit rooms of the NU
national headquarters to assess the progress of PKB, the best infor-
mation was gained by crossing to an adjoining building where a tel-
evision set was tuned to the Indosiar private channel, on which the
election results were periodically updated on a ticker-tape display
running across the bottom of the screen. Moreover, in discussions
about the meaning of results, it was clear that no one at NU’s
National Headquarters completely understood exactly how vote
counting and allocation of seats would occur. This was not so sur-
prising given the extraordinarily complex methods for seat alloca-
tions and vote counting.
Whereas the minor Islamist parties had signed a formal ‘Stembus
Accord’ to pool their results, and so maximise their total number of
seats, the idea had not even been raised in PKB, largely because no one
really understood how such an accord would work. As a result, when
the votes began to trickle in, party supporters were not only disap-
pointed with the percentage of the total vote won, they were even more
disappointed with the number of seats. Although PKB did well in
Central and East Java, it made few gains outside this heartland, and as
a result there was a discrepancy between the number of its votes and the
number of its seats.
At the end of counting, PKB had secured a disappointing 12.4 per
cent of the total vote. Even more disappointing was the result secured
by PAN, which managed only a little over 7 per cent. Golkar was still
able to retain 22 per cent, which, given the way in which the electoral
system favoured outer-islands seats, was perhaps to be expected. Many
were surprised by PPP’s result, as much as 10 per cent of the vote, but
then the party did consistently well in outer-island areas and had many
loyal supporters, who for decades had been in the habit of voting for the
official Islamic party. Not surprisingly, PDI-P did best of all, gaining
almost 34 per cent — in line with some of the more sober predictions
of its leaders — and it also did well in the total number of seats that it
secured. It soon became clear that the PKB would be a junior member
of any coalition with Megawati’s party.
6<B
1&.).'.%:.(0.)/4)1&.)0.(1%!-)!F+,
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
For weeks Amien Rais was so crestfallen at the result gained by PAN
that he largely withdrew from political negotiations, but by the end of
June he was talking again with Abdurrahman about the best way to
work together. At the same time relations with Megawati continued to
deteriorate. When the results became clear, Megawati said that the best
that PKB could expect in her new government was ‘one cabinet posi-
tion — no more than that’. This deeply disappointed many PKB mem-
bers who had hoped for at least two or three cabinet places.
Megawati’s coolness extended to her demeanour towards
Abdurrahman. On several occasions in late June and early July when
Abdurrahman had visited Megawati, as a sign of her displeasure she
kept him downstairs in a waiting room for an hour or more — on one
occasion as long as two hours. Megawati was understandably thrilled
with the result of her party and took it as given that she would now ride
this wave of success to the presidency.
On 17 May, several days after the meeting between Abdurrahman
and Amien Rais to announce to the press the formation of their three-
cornered common front with Megawati, Amien had held another meet-
ing of no less consequence. He met with leaders of PPP and the Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan — PK) to explore the possibility of forming a
common grouping of Islamic parties. Many observers wondered
whether Amien was not simply reverting to his old habits of aligning
himself with sectarian forces. By early July it was clear that what had
begun with that meeting had potentially much broader ramifications. At
about this time there was talk of a third force in Indonesian politics that
balanced Golkar and its coalition members against Megawati’s PDI-P.
This third force was dubbed the poros tengah, or central axis, group.
Initially no one was sure what to make of this group, but by late June
it was being treated as a credible third power bloc and the press was
referring to it with capital letters. It had earlier been assumed that after
the poll the balance of power would be divided evenly between a
‘reformist’ push led by PDI-P and the PKB, and a so-called ‘status quo’
coalition led by Golkar and PPP along with the smaller Islamist par-
ties. Now the Central Axis led by Amien appeared to offer the poten-
tial of drawing PPP, the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang —
PBB) and PK away from an otherwise inevitable coalition with Golkar.
At about the same time, Amien, in the name of the Central Axis,
6<;
began to float the idea of nominating Abdurrahman as the presidential

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
candidate. The nomination was explained in terms of seeking to bal-

ance the power of Megawati’s camp against Habibie’s camp and possi-
bly providing an alternative candidate should a deadlock emerge
between the two. Abdurrahman, whose relationship with Megawati
was at this stage showing little sign of recovery, was increasingly criti-
cised for his failure to work harder on the relationship. When he
accepted, without comment, the proposed nomination of himself as
alternative presidential candidate, many were incensed. It seemed to be
the ultimate betrayal of Megawati.
Others argued that what Abdurrahman was doing was a clever ploy
to draw away potential coalition partners from Golkar and towards a
reformist push. Habibie’s long sponsorship of ICMI, it was argued,
gave him the advantage when it came to drawing in parties like PK and
PPP. It was to remain unclear, right up to the eve of the presidential
election, exactly what Abdurrahman’s strategy was. Privately,
Abdurrahman said that he was willing to make a run for the presiden-
cy if Megawati failed to become serious about uniting a coalition
around her party. This placed the leadership of PKB in a difficult posi-
tion. Officially Megawati remained their nominated candidate; unoffi-
cially many party leaders acknowledged that if Abdurrahman were
serious about running for the presidency then his followers in NU, in
other words the members of PKB, would be obliged to support his bid.
By the end of the first week in July Abdurrahman and Amien Rais
were speaking openly about the possibility of a second Ciganjur meet-
ing, dubbed Ciganjur Two. What they meant by this was obvious. They
would seek to restore their three-cornered coalition with Megawati and
start this off with a public meeting with her.
In early July, Alissa, the eldest daughter of Abdurrahman and
Nuriyah, was married. The traditional three-day Javanese wedding cer-
emony was held at the family home in Ciganjur. Significantly,
Megawati attended on every day and played a key role in certain cere-
monial aspects of the wedding. On Sunday, 4 July, a public reception
was held for the wedding. Over three thousand guests attended the
grand ceremony held at a reception house in central Jakarta.
Abdurrahman had worked hard to maintain a working relationship
with Habibie. He regularly called upon him at his home in central Jakarta
to discuss his plans and he visited him ahead of the wedding to explain his
desire for a second Ciganjur meeting. When asked why he bothered to
6<<
liaise with Habibie, Abdurrahman explained that it was proper in a
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
democracy to keep a head of state informed and that this was the best way
of avoiding suspicion and misunderstanding. Habibie appeared to have
genuine respect and affection for Abdurrahman and made a generous
donation to the cost of the wedding. The downside of Habibie’s contribu-
tion to the wedding was the presence of over four hundred security per-
sonnel who exhaustively swept the site for bombs and explosives ahead of
the ceremony and maintained a heavy presence throughout Habibie’s visit.
It is significant that, although both Habibie and Megawati visited that
night, they carefully timed their visits not to overlap. The reception served
as a reminder of Abdurrahman’s power within Jakarta society and showed
that no one was ready to discount his influence.
As July drew to a close, the much-awaited second Ciganjur meeting
failed to materialise. On one occasion it was cancelled at the last minute
because it was said Amien had to accompany his mother to the hospi-
tal. At the same time Abdurrahman was working hard to try and
rebuild the relationship with Megawati. By way of an olive branch he
extended an invitation to join him on a visit to East Java to pray at the
tombs of both their fathers. Megawati declined the invitation, or at
least deferred taking it up, and continued to be cool towards
Abdurrahman. At the same time Amien had become outspoken in this
support for Abdurrahman’s nomination as alternative candidate for the
presidency, saying: ‘There should be an alternative figure, not just
Megawati or Habibie’s groups. The nation’s children should not be led
to believe there is no other presidential candidate in the country.’ When
questioned about the nomination, Abdurrahman said:
It is important to me as it is the first time the Islam-based parties

have agreed to choose a person like me. It carries an important mean-
ing. But, I’ve made my choice. I am supporting Mega although it is
not final. As a good citizen and a good Muslim I’ll always abide by
the ruling of the house, no matter who would be elected.7
!),.%+/$,)0!(#+#!1.E
In his public statements Abdurrahman was careful to maintain a degree
of ambiguity about his position on nomination for president. By early
August he was on record as saying that he accepted the willingness of
the Central Axis forces to nominate him but that he personally contin-
ued to support Megawati. Privately, he was much more frank. He
6<=
explained that if Megawati failed to put together a credible coalition

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
force and to take seriously the need to lobby and build up understand-
ing among different political factions, he was prepared to oppose her
openly. ‘If I contest her,’ he explained, ‘then I will do it seriously. If she
wins, good, then she will have learnt some important lessons about
democracy. If I win then that’s fine also. Either way, once the contest
starts I’ll be serious.’8
As is often the case with Abdurrahman, it was never possible to tell
exactly how much he was joking and how much he was serious. There
seemed no question that a resolve was forming in his mind to make a
serious bid for the presidency, nor was there any question that he
believed in his heart that he could win. It also seemed to be the case,
however, that Abdurrahman and perhaps even Amien Rais were still
waiting for some response from Megawati and still held out the hope
that she might make a serious effort to build a coalition. Abdurrahman
felt that if Megawati failed to seriously consider the interests of
Muslims then, even if she were successful in forming a government, it
would create a serious social and political liability in terms of anger and
upset on the part of those who felt excluded.
On 22 July, after a two-hour meeting with Habibie, Abdurrahman
responded to the waiting press by saying, ‘Mr Amien Rais supports me.
I support Megawati. Mega had better say that she will support Amien.
That is much better than just making a lot of noise’.9 Amien expressed
similar sentiment when interviewed the same day: ‘As a friend and col-
league, I would have greater hope if Megawati could come into public
sight more often to speak about her ideas. That is much better than to
stay quiet.’ In explaining his support for Abdurrahman, Amien said,
‘Out of talks I’ve made regularly, it appears that Gus Dur is trustworthy
and could tackle objections significantly. Resistance against Gus Dur is
minimal’. He explained that minority groups, the military and the inter-
national community would be willing to embrace Abdurrahman. He
went on to explain, ‘Out of that though, Gus Dur is still the strongest
candidate of the middle faction. But we’re still waiting for Megawati,
Akbar Tandjung, and the possible reaction of Habibie’.
4%$,1%!1+/(2)#.3%.,,+/()!(#).!,1)1+'/%
Shortly after this Abdurrahman left for an international tour. His pri-
mary destination was Salt Lake City, Utah, where he had an appoint-
ment at the Mormon General Hospital. He was desperately hoping that
6<D
doctors there would be able to restore his eyesight. His choice of the
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
Mormon hospital seemed odd, given that presumably he could have
chosen any hospital in the world. In fact an American businessman, who
happened to be a Mormon, had offered to pay for his treatment. In the
end there was no hospital in the world that could restore Abdurrahman’s
eyesight. He left for America, as always on such trips, full of hopes that
just one more operation would be required to make a significant differ-
ence. The doctors made some small corrections to his eyelid so that his
eye presented itself better but could do nothing for his sight. Too many
of the vital capillary and nerve connections had been lost.
Abdurrahman is seldom melancholy or morose, but after the doctors’
failure he returned home more depressed than he had been in many
years. Perhaps his mood was also the product of the physical strain he
had placed himself under throughout the campaign period. His ongo-
ing poor relationship with Megawati, although he was quite prepared
to use it for political advantage, troubled him. The impending referen-
dum in East Timor also troubled him. He was deeply worried that a
referendum at the end of August 1999 would provoke a vicious
response from sections of the Indonesian military and the militia. He
believed it would have been much fairer and safer to wait, perhaps for
several years, until there was a stable democratic government in Jakarta.
When conditions continued to deteriorate and violence broke out,
Abdurrahman was upset by what he understood to be the response of
the international community and particularly Australia. He was quoted
on several occasions in the media making strong statements against
Australia, or more specifically, against the conservative government of
John Howard. He felt that the attitude of the Australian government
was overbearing and arrogant and had failed completely to show sym-
pathy or understanding of the plight of reformists like himself.
Indonesia, he argued, was in the midst of tremendous upheaval and at
a critical point in transition, yet there seemed to be no recognition of
what Indonesia was going through, or the inability to control forces on
the ground in East Timor.
At that time some of Abdurrahman’s statements were extreme, but it
seemed to be the season for extreme statements, most of which were
later regretted by both sides. Abdurrahman’s depression and ill-temper
continued through September, as did his anger towards what he saw
as the patronising attitude of Australia regarding Indonesia and the
disastrous violence in East Timor. Making matters worse was
6=A
Abdurrahman’s serious underestimation of the anti-Indonesian senti-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
ment within East Timor. In the months leading up to the poll he had
spoken with concern over the potential for violence because he believed
that both sides would be fairly evenly balanced. As it turned out, an
overwhelming number, almost 80 per cent, of East Timorese voters had
voted against accepting the autonomy package offered to them by the
Indonesian Republic. The result caught Abdurrahman off-guard and
probably contributed to his intemperate tone reported in the media.10
At the same time that Abdurrahman was struggling with coming to
terms with what was happening in East Timor, Yenny was witnessing
it firsthand. When the election campaign in Indonesia finished in June,
Yenny returned to her work as an assistant journalist with the Sydney
Morning Herald and the Age. In mid-August she flew to East Timor
with the papers’ foreign correspondent Lindsay Murdoch and reported
from there until being evacuated to Jakarta in a TNI C130 transport
aircraft in early September. It was a formative time for Yenny, and her
experiences there were later to have a great impact on her father and his
understanding of what had really happened in East Timor. Unusually
for someone of her age and without formal training in journalism, she
was encouraged to file her own copy. Together with her colleagues she
was later given the Walkley Award, Australia’s equivalent of a Pulitzer
Prize, for her reporting from East Timor. One of the many things she
witnessed was the fatal shooting of an East Timorese by an Indonesian
policeman. After spending a week at home in Ciganjur, she boarded an
aircraft chartered by Reuters and flew back to Dili in mid-September.
There she was one of fewer than a dozen Indonesian journalists per-
mitted to stay in East Timor at a time when TNI was refusing to allow
foreign journalists to return. Living in the TNI headquarters in Dili
and surviving on limited military rations for a week before the
Australian-led UN peace-keeping Interfet forces landed in East Timor
on 20 September, she reported on the post-ballot violence perpetrated
by TNI and its militia following the 30 August vote. Before she left at
the end of the month, she witnessed atrocities the like of which she
could not previously have imagined. In particular the death of fellow
journalist Sander Thoenes left her very shaken. She had become close
to Thoenes and was with him shortly before he was last seen alive,
catching a ride on the back of a motorbike.
After returning from East Timor Yenny talked to her father about
what she had seen. Her account of her experiences had a profound
6=@
impact on Abdurrahman and strengthened his resolve over the months
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
that followed to push for the reform of the military.
By mid-September Abdurrahman seemed over the worst of his
depression and ill-temper and was beginning to be more upbeat about
his political circumstances and the prospects for reform in the nation.
He had recently made the long-awaited East Java tour with Megawati
to pray at the tombs of their fathers. It had marked a degree of recon-
ciliation, though not a deep healing of the relationship. Megawati had
slept during most of the journey, and when they had talked it had been
mostly small talk. It seemed there was little chance of a turnaround in
their relationship yet.
Abdurrahman was now resolved to contest the presidency and run a
serious campaign against Megawati. It seemed to many there was every
chance that he would crash and end up with nothing to show for his
efforts and with little public recognition for his contribution to reform.
Others around him were also worried although Alwi, ever cheerful and
optimistic, seemed rather more confident.
Several days later, on 7 October, the reform faction made up of
Central Axis elements and PKB nominated Abdurrahman as their
presidential candidate. The reform faction was an alliance of PAN and
PK, and the fact that it was joined now by the PKB was a sign of how
seriously Abdurrahman’s candidature was being taken. Even at this
stage, however, it was not clear that Abdurrahman was really going to
formally become a candidate for the presidency. Alwi explained it as
being dependent upon gaining the approval of senior NU kiai. The sen-
ior kiai were due to gather with Abdurrahman just days before the vote-
counting later that month. ‘PKB as well as NU will abide by the words
of holy wise men and this applies to Gus Dur as well. At the last
moment the holy men will give their approval or not. That’s what I
meant by at the last moment,’ explained Alwi.11
!),$%3%+,+(:)1$%(
When given a chance to respond to initial criticism of his accountabil-
ity speech, Habibie had replied with a surprisingly confident speech in
which he completely failed to acknowledge genuine concern about his
performance. That night, Tuesday, 19 October, the vote was to be taken
on whether his accountability speech was to be accepted or rejected.
While the constitutional ramifications of the vote were uncertain, it
was generally understood that the result would be a powerful indication
6=6
of whether Habibie was to be supported or rejected. If Habibie failed

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
to win majority support, it was likely that he would back down from the
campaign.
The large assembly hall was packed with people, not only in the body
of the hall, but also on the large back balcony and the two side balconies,
which were filled with dozens of journalists jostling for position. As the
count began, the mood was electric. There was a sense that maybe the
expected support for Habibie would not materialise. By rights Golkar
had the numbers to carry Habibie through. But as the counting pro-
ceeded, it quickly became clear that Habibie’s victory was by no means
assured; in fact, it soon became apparent that Habibie was in trouble.
Evidently Akbar Tandjung’s ‘White Golkar’ faction had decided to vote
as a bloc against Habibie. The final vote made it clear: Habibie had been
rolled. The pressure was on him to withdraw from the presidency, so it
came down to Abdurrahman or Megawati. There was genuine shock,
and also excitement and elation. The vote of no-confidence in Habibie
now made it possible for Akbar Tandjung to be nominated in Habibie’s
place. Indeed there was considerable pressure on Akbar to accept
Golkar’s nomination. In the early hours of the morning of Wednesday,
20 October, Habibie had withdrawn himself from the race, explaining
that he did not have the support even of his own party. Hours later,
under pressure, Akbar yielded and accepted the Golkar nomination
before rejecting it again early the following morning.
It was a long night. Abdurrahman did not get to sleep until napping
briefly at 6.30 in the morning. Outside, the large sitting room of his
hotel suite was packed with friends, relatives and supporters, some of
them very recent. Alwi was clearly elated and confident about the result
the day would bring. Next to Alwi sat Abdurrahman’s brother
Solahuddin, who had actively supported one of the small alternative NU
parties and then in mid-1999 had switched to Golkar and become part
of Habibie’s so-called ‘success team’. His presence in Abdurrahman’s
suite was a sign that he now judged his older brother to be the only
viable candidate. This made sense when it was explained that Akbar had
withdrawn his candidacy earlier that morning, and the contest for the
presidency was now a two-person race. Shortly before 8 am Alwi’s
mobile phone rang. It was Akbar Tandjung. Akbar explained that there
was now no question that his ‘White Golkar’ faction would back
Abdurrahman. ‘In that case,’ responded Alwi, ‘you had better come
across and tell him yourself.’ Five minutes later, Akbar was at the door.
6=7
From Abdurrahman’s point of view, it had all gone perfectly to plan.
+,-!'2)3/-+1+0,)!(#).-.01+/(,2)@DD=G@DDD
As the vote count wound into its second half several hours later that
day, Abdurrahman pulled ahead of Megawati and went on to a
resounding victory. He clearly had received the support of the Central
Axis and Akbar Tandjung’s faction of Golkar. As he was guided to the
podium by adjutants on both sides, looking clumsy and out of place, the
international media announced to the world the news that Indonesia
was now to be led by ‘a frail, half-blind Muslim cleric’.
Megawati was clearly shaken by the result but was nevertheless polite
in her congratulations to Abdurrahman. Even so, that night her sup-
porters were anything but sanguine about the outcome. In the early
evening the tens of thousands of youthful PDI-P faithful gathered in
the city centre had begun to celebrate with exuberant jubilation, mis-
takenly believing that the vote had gone in Megawati’s favour. When
the error was realised things began to turn nasty in central Jakarta. Cars
were overturned and burned; on Bali, where Megawati’s part-Balinese
ancestry contributed to her massive support, violence broke out on a
large scale. That Wednesday evening it seemed that the country might
quickly spiral out of control. Even Megawati, who ordinarily proved
herself surprisingly capable of controlling her people, now seemed
unable to bring herself to say the words to call them back off the streets.
Everything now hinged on the vice-presidency. In the early hours of
Thursday morning several figures came forth vying for the second most
powerful position in post-Soeharto Indonesia. General Wiranto
ardently believed that he could win the vice-presidency and that he had
every right to do so. Only desperate last-minute negotiations persuad-
ed him that it was neither in his, nor the nation’s, interests to oppose
Megawati for the vice-presidency. Persuading Megawati, however, to
contest the position was no easy job. Early in the day she indicated that
she would only be willing to run for the position if she could be voted
in by acclamation. She couldn’t risk, she said, being rejected a second
time. In the end she was persuaded that, as the leader of PDI-P, arriv-
ing at the vice-presidency by means of anything less than an open con-
test for the position would undermine the party’s credibility. Alwi and
others persuaded her that running for the position against PPP leader
Hamzah Haz was the best way to ensure, not only that she became
vice-president, but also that it was seen to be a fair contest.
Sitting on the steps of the parliamentary building during the recess
before the final counting of votes, Alwi looked a little nervous. When
6=8
congratulated on his success in negotiations over the previous twenty-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
four hours he responded by holding up crossed fingers and saying, ‘Let’s

hope it works’. Prompted for an explanation, he confessed that that they
were fairly confident that they had the numbers against Hamzah Haz
but they couldn’t be sure until the votes was counted.
When the recess was over, the atmosphere back in the assembly hall
was tense. Early in the counting it appeared as if Hamzah Haz might
indeed take the vice-presidency. Everyone was well aware of the impli-
cation. If Hamzah Haz — no friend of Abdurrahman but associated
with NU and traditional Islam — were to become vice-president, not
only would Megawati’s supporters be outraged but so too would many
other sections of society. In the end the numbers began to come in on
Megawati’s side and she surged to a comfortable victory. All around the
room there was a genuine sense of relief. Across the nation people came
to terms with the fact that the new vice-president and president repre-
sented perhaps the best combination imaginable. Few had predicted the
outcome even a few days before, but it now seemed to be almost unbe-
lievably good.
.-.?.(
~
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)
@DDDG6AAA
*&>)".0/'.)3%.,+#.(1E
In the lead-up to the presidential election almost all of Abdurrahman’s
close friends and relatives expressed two reasons for grave concerns
about the prospect that he would become president. Firstly, Indonesia’s
fourth president would have to manage a difficult and turbulent transi-
tion, which would certainly include concerted efforts by elements of the
former regime to block and, if possible, topple him. At the same time
the economy was in tatters, social cohesion was beginning to break
down, and people’s expectations about democracy were grossly inflated.
Consequently, the new president would be roundly criticised and his
work little appreciated. The second reason for their concern was that
Abdurrahman was an eccentric and maverick leader. Although he was
a visionary who could inspire and lead as few others could, his idiosyn-
cratic approach to management was certain to draw criticism. In ordi-
nary circumstances it would have made little sense to promote his
candidature for the presidency. However, under the circumstances that
prevailed in Indonesia at the time, there was reason to believe that
negotiating the transition to democracy would require just such an
approach. Abdurrahman was one of very few people who had gone
6=;
head-to-head with Soeharto for more than a decade and had consis-
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
tently come out on top, or at least been able to beat a strategic retreat
and live to fight another day.
!)0/'3%/'+,.#)0!"+(.1
Following the election of Megawati to the vice-presidency on
Thursday, 21 October, Abdurrahman spent all of Friday and the week-
end on what he termed ‘cattle trading’ (dagang sapi). In the run-up to
the election he had talked about the necessity of forming a ‘national
unity’ cabinet composed of members from across the political spectrum.
That idea would have worked, had he been given free rein to choose his
cabinet ministers. The reality was that almost all his cabinet ministers
were imposed upon him.
On Monday morning he spoke hopefully about the cabinet he was
planning, reeling off the names of those he considered the best of its
twenty-five members. Between Monday morning and the public
announcement of the cabinet at noon the next day, it had grown by
ten members, most of whom were people Abdurrahman had not
chosen. By the time of the announcement the cabinet had grown into
an unwieldy amalgam of political interests and personalities, deeply
compromised by the inclusion of political elements that were not
merely diverse but mutually antagonistic. In theory a measure of
accountability and discipline was to be achieved through Akbar,
Megawati and Amien agreeing to act as guarantors for the members
of their party selected for cabinet positions. Even in a mature democ-
racy, this arrangement would have presented many challenges. In
Indonesia, where ‘democracy’ had arrived not so much through the
slow evolution of civil society but through the sudden collapse of a
decadent and decayed regime, it was naive to expect that regime
apparatchiks reborn overnight as democrats would exhibit the self-
lessness, maturity and professionalism needed to make such an
unlikely union work.
Nevertheless, the cabinet was not wholly bereft of potentially good
ministers. It benefited from the inclusion of people such as former
Human Rights Commission chairman Marzuki Darusman as
Attorney-General, and PDI-P’s Kwik Kian Gie, a professional econo-
mist, and Laksamana Sukardi, a respected banker. The inclusion of
PKB’s Alwi Shihab as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Khofifah as
Minister for Women’s Affairs also appeared promising. But this bloat-
6=<
ed cabinet of thirty-five was also saddled with soiled hangovers from
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
the ancien regime and unknowns of uncertain competency.
The live television announcement of the new cabinet line-up was a
revealing event in itself. Abdurrahman began by saying that Megawati
would read out the list, since he was obviously unable to do it himself.
He then added, ‘I probably shouldn’t call the vice-president Mbak (sis-
ter) Mega, but I will, just as everyone will probably keep on calling me
Gus Dur, which is what I want them to do, because that’s how we know
each other and that’s the style we should keep’. He then handed over to
Megawati, who seemed to make heavy going of the straightforward
task of reading the list of names. Afterwards Abdurrahman did some-
thing that would have been unimaginable during the Soeharto period.
He said simply, ‘Are there any questions?’ And then he launched into a
spontaneous press conference. It was evident right from the start that
this was going to be a very different government both in content and in
style.
!)?.%>)#+44.%.(1),1>-.
Abdurrahman returned to Ciganjur on Friday. This time, of course, he
rode in a large black armour-plated Mercedes that rocketed south at the
head of an alarmingly fast motorcade. Abdurrahman’s return as presi-
dent was greeted enthusiastically by the thousands of locals who lined
the streets. There he announced that he was going to follow a pattern
of returning to Ciganjur once a month to say his Friday prayers in the
mosque and then have a question-and-answer session with the people.
He would do the same thing once a month at the palace mosque, and
twice a month he would travel to other mosques in Jakarta or elsewhere
in Indonesia. He was to make frequent use of the Ciganjur home as a
low-key venue for meeting with people outside the formal setting of the
palace. Over the following months he held numerous meetings with
students and religious leaders from Aceh both at the Merdeka palace
and at Ciganjur. Ciganjur was also the place where he often spoke, in
private, with friends, business people and political associates.
The family had intended to settle into the Merdeka Palace, former-
ly the Dutch Governor’s residence, which had been used by Sukarno as
both official residence and as a second office. Preparations took several
weeks because the palace had stood largely unused for so long. Soeharto
had used it only for occasional state functions and had never slept in it,
except once a year. (Even then, it is doubtful he was actually able to
6==
sleep. Soeharto would spend part of the eve of Independence Day on

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
17 August in the palace, but it was clear that he was not at home there
and feared its ghosts, both figurative and literal.)
Before Abdurrahman’s family could move into the palace, they were
stopped on the doorstep and told of the need to negotiate with the spir-
itual occupants of the palace. Those who believed in such things need-
ed little persuading that the palace was haunted. One reminder of this
was a room off the main hall; the light was always on there but it was
entered only once a year, on 17 August, to remove the original nation-
al flag from the display casket in the centre of the room, which stood
between large bronze reliefs of founding fathers Sukarno and Hatta.
Shortly after moving in, Abdurrahman commented matter-of-factly
that the room was believed to be occupied by an invisible presence.
Abdurrahman set up his office on the other side of the main hall, in the
room that Sukarno had used as an office, asking Megawati to help him
reassemble it just as it had been during her father’s time. Megawati
arranged for Sukarno’s old library to be reinstated and the office set up
in the kind of gentlemen’s den style that her father preferred. It was
clear that Abdurrahman felt at home working in Sukarno’s old office.
For day-to-day meetings Abdurrahman met with official guests at Bina
Graha, the venue for cabinet meetings and other official functions
located about three hundred metres from the Merdeka Palace. Bina
Graha has a heavy feel, to the point of being oppressive, as have most
of the Soviet-style buildings in the compound of the State Secretariat
(Sekretariat Negara — SekNeg) that ring the palace complex.
From the beginning of his presidency, Abdurrahman’s days were
filled with official engagements, in addition to a heavy schedule of
unofficial meetings and discussions in the late afternoons and evenings.
He made it clear from the outset that he wanted a very different style
of presidency. In fact, left to his own devices Abdurrahman would have
done away with protocol arrangements altogether. Fortunately he was
not left to his own devices: it soon become clear that protocol inter-
vention was essential, not just for his personal security, but also to make
his schedule functional.
!)*.--G1%!?.--.#)3%.,+#.(1
In November Abdurrahman left for his first major overseas trip. Like
his other overseas trips, this one was organised around a few key meet-
ings that had been set well in advance, together with state visits to fill
6=D
the itinerary. He had agreed in 1997 to give a speech at the interna-
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
tional congress of the World Conference of Religion and Peace, which
was holding its five-yearly meeting in November 1999 in Amman,
Jordan. He was also keen to return to Salt Lake City, still hopeful that
some sort of surgical intervention might help his eyesight. This last
quest, a product of his continuing denial about his permanent blind-
ness, was a driving factor in several international visits the following
year.
Around his itinerary to Amman and Salt Lake City he arranged a
quick tour of the ASEAN states to introduce himself and his new gov-
ernment to his neighbours, capped with visits to Tokyo and
Washington, DC. One reason that he wanted to keep his appointment
in Amman was personal. For a number of years he had been convinced
that until Indonesia ratified and formalised relations with the State of
Israel, Indonesian Muslims would continue to fight an imaginary
enemy. He believed that for Indonesia to mature as a nation it must face
up to such imagined enemies and replace suspicion with friendship and
dialogue. Within days of being sworn in as president, he called a meet-
ing of Arab ambassadors and affirmed to them his ongoing concern for
the cause of the Palestinians. This was a pre-emptive move to ward off
suspicions because he planned to work towards establishing full diplo-
matic relations with Israel as quickly as possible. The appointment of
Alwi Shihab, an ethnic Arab, as Minister for Foreign Affairs was
another important move to build confidence in his administration in
the region. While on the way to Jordan Abdurrahman made a point of
visiting Kuwait and Qatar; in Amman he met with King Abdullah and
his brother Crown Prince Hussein and also with Yasser Arafat, who
made the trip across the Jordan valley to speak with him. Abdurrahman
had earlier been keen to meet with the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud
Barak, and had spoken with some excitement of the possibility of such
a meeting. At the last minute this visit was cancelled. Abdurrahman
initially said he thought that a secret visit by Barak to Amman might
have been impolite to his Jordanian hosts, an explanation which made
little sense in the context of Israeli–Jordanian relations at the time. The
real reason appears to be that he had come under increasing pressure
from right-wing Islamist elements at home and felt the need to back off
until times were more opportune.
Contrary to conventional protocol, Abdurrahman often made use of
meetings overseas to raise issues connected with domestic politics. Like
6DA
Soeharto he travelled with a full entourage of journalists, but unlike

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
Soeharto he regularly gave both formal and informal press conferences.

At one of these he raised the issue of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi and
Nepotism) or corruption, collusion and nepotism, one of the buzz
phrases of the reform movement encapsulating the central sins of the
former regime. In Salt Lake City he alluded to suspicions that three of
his ministers were involved in KKN. One week later the Welfare
Minister and chair of PPP, Hamzah Haz, suddenly resigned. Hamzah
Haz denied that there was any link between his resignation and
Abdurrahman’s statement; even though Abdurrahman spoke no further
about it, most observers were convinced that there was a connection.
Abdurrahman’s second major overseas trip, in mid-December, was to
Beijing. This was also a crucial visit for the new president who,
throughout his public career, had made such an emphasis of defending
Indonesian Chinese. As with all of his visits as president, there was also
an issue of economic concern. He hoped that by visiting Beijing he
would be sending a positive signal, not just to mainland Chinese but
also to the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, that his was a Chinese-
friendly government.
As a gesture of goodwill, the Chinese premier offered to send lead-
ing eye specialists to Jakarta to work with Abdurrahman to restore as
much sight as possible. A team of medical professors arrived later that
month and set to work on Abdurrahman with a regime of acupuncture
and Chinese medicinal herbs in an attempt to improve blood circula-
tion to his right eye.
'!9+(:)!),1!%1)/()%.4/%'
One of Abdurrahman’s first presidential concerns was to build a team
of people whom he trusted to oversee the process of reform and the
management of government. A first official act was to abolish two
government departments. He closed down the Ministry for
Information, arguing that it did more harm than good, both because
of its Stalinist approach to the control of information and because of
its entrenched practice of extorting money from media outlets. His
second, and perhaps more surprising, act was to close down the
Department of Welfare, arguing that the scale of corruption and
entrenched practices of extortion were such that the department was
beyond reform and that its activities should be carried out by other
departments. These closures were controversial, the second much
6D@
more than the first, and made him unpopular in certain circles.
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
Nevertheless, many analysts welcomed the changes and argued that it
was difficult to see what else he could have done. Although con-
strained by the need to work with his coalition partners where he
could, he downsized departments and set in process reforms to grad-
ually bring them into line. He moved quickly to try to reduce the
powers of the State Secretariat, infamous during the Soeharto period
for acting as the government public service within a public service and
controlling aspects of governance far outside its ostensible brief. The
new Minister for Religious Affairs was a competent and trusted NU
academic, formally the rector of the NU University in Malang.
Abdurrahman had high expectations of him, being convinced that the
Department of Religious Affairs needed to radically rethink how it
went about its business. He declared that matters such as the arrange-
ment of haj pilgrimage, one of many activities of the department seen
as corrupt, be handed over to the private sector. Abdurrahman
believed that the department’s sole role should be assisting religious
communities, rather than intervening in religious affairs. He even
proposed that the religious communities should, as soon as possible,
manage their own affairs and that the Department of Religious
Affairs need not keep such close tabs on certain day-to-day matters.
Not surprisingly, Abdurrahman’s reforms ruffled feathers.
On 25 December he called into his office at Istana Merdeka Bondan
Gunawan and Marsillam Simanjuntak, two old friends from Forum
Demokrasi. During a leisurely, frank conversation, he explained that he
wanted them to come and work for him as presidential secretaries. He
told Marsillam that he wanted him as Cabinet Secretary and that he
wanted to create a new secretariat, under Bondan, overseeing the func-
tion of the government. ‘I want you to ride shotgun over this new cab-
inet. I want you to tell me when they’re out of line. I want you to report
to me when things are not being done. I need you as part of a feedback
and control mechanism to try and make this cabinet work.’
Outside the office, Marsillam threw up his hands in desperation. ‘I
don’t want to do to this,’ he said. ‘This cabinet is too much of a com-
promise and his bringing me in here is too much too soon.’
Nevertheless, several weeks later Bondan and Marsillam were sworn in.
Friends in the reform movement had persuaded Marsillam that there
was more to be gained from working within the government than from
standing outside and criticising. Marsillam, in particular, was to prove
6D6
an invaluable aid in Abdurrahman’s attempts to gain control of an

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
unwieldy and seemingly unworkable government.
!0.&)!(#)3!3$!
The list of things to be done and problems to be solved was over-
whelming. One was the heading off of the separatist movement in Irian
Jaya while encouraging indigenous leaders there to enter into dialogue
with the new government. Another was to break the cycle of violence
in Aceh.
As president, Abdurrahman continued to meet with Acehenese com-
munity leaders in an attempt to negotiate a settlement. Unfortunately
for the new president, and tragically for the people of Aceh,
Abdurrahman found it no easier to achieve progress in Aceh after
becoming president than before. Having lost control of East Timor, and
scores of lucrative businesses, TNI was in no mood to lose Aceh,
whether to separatists or to a reformist president. Resolving separatist
conflicts in any part of the world is never easy; it is especially difficult
during the transition from military-backed authoritarianism to full
democracy. Although he talked optimistically about quickly finding a
solution in Aceh, Abdurrahman knew in his heart that he was facing a
long and difficult process. His first priority was to try to persuade the
Acehenese to trust him and to give him time.
Faced with demands for a referendum to be held within weeks,
Abdurrahman stalled for time. In doing so he fell into a pattern of behav-
iour that was to bedevil his presidency. As he had learned to do under
Soeharto, Abdurrahman, now president himself, dodged and weaved; his
behaviour and statements were driven more by the ad hoc demands of
tactical manoeuvring for short-term survival than by strategic planning
for the long term. At the same time, he repeatedly failed to explain what
he was doing. He fudged the issue and spoke of his support for an even-
tual referendum. Privately, he explained that what he had in mind was a
referendum not about independence but about forms of autonomy. His
motive was to try to pull the Acehenese back from the brink of all-out
conflict with the Indonesian military. Unfortunately, his well-intentioned
dancing around the issues only served to undermine his credibility.
Nevertheless, he was able to keep alive the ideal of a negotiated settle-
ment at the same time as frustrating TNI’s desire to launch a large-scale
‘military solution’. None of this saved the dozens being killed each week,
but it may well have prevented many more being tortured and killed.
6D7
Abdurrahman had more success in Irian Jaya, in large measure
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
because the situation there was not yet as bad as in Aceh. In Irian Jaya
the separatist movement was neither as organised nor as radicalised as
in Aceh, and the mere fact that an Indonesian president was willing to
talk with them seriously about their aspirations was enough to encour-
age a cessation of violence.
On the evening of 30 December Abdurrahman travelled to
Jayapura, the capital of Irian Jaya, where he met with community lead-
ers from across Irian Jaya. The meeting had a shaky beginning, with
the leaders complaining that they had to queue for an hour or more to
get through the security to come to the meeting to which they had
been formally invited and even then, there was little chance of dia-
logue. Nevertheless it was a symbolic start. When he had landed in
Jayapura earlier that day, Abdurrahman had been greeted by a noisy
demonstration with protesters waving the banned Morning Star flag
and demanding independence. The protests continued in one form or
another throughout the trip. The president’s willingness to receive
such protests, to acknowledge the need for dialogue, and to talk frankly
about past abuses, went a long way to convince the leaders of Irian Jaya
that he was serious about making changes. That evening he explained
that ‘Irian’ was derived from an Arabic word meaning ‘naked’ and was
an offensive way of describing the people of the province. Henceforth
they were to be known by their own chosen name, ‘Papua’. The presi-
dential declaration ‘this was the name that should be henceforth used’
was well received on that last evening of the twentieth century, even if
it was to take a long time before the new name officially passed
through parliament. Abdurrahman explained to the gathering that he
was prepared to talk about anything; the important thing was to nego-
tiate, to dialogue. The only condition was that there was to be no vio-
lence in support of political ambitions. It was clear that he did not
want Papua to break away from Indonesia. Nevertheless, he said that
independence was one of the allowable topics, arguing that it was only
through communication that progress could be made. The next morn-
ing the president’s group was up early to greet the new dawn high
above Jayapura, welcoming the new millennium with a tangible sense
of optimism about the new Indonesia.
Returning to Jakarta, Abdurrahman set about dealing with the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). He moved decisively
to replace its head, once again amidst much controversy. He argued that
6D8
the previous head had been too close to the former regime and was not
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
pushing for reforms as quickly and decisively as was required. Many

argued that his intervention represented political interference.
Later that month Abdurrahman travelled to Davos, Switzerland, to
attend the World Economic Forum. On the way he took the opportu-
nity to visit Saudi Arabia, hoping to secure greater financial support for
Indonesia’s economic recovery and also to explain his handling of the
situation in Aceh. The following month Abdurrahman set out on his
first major European trip. He travelled to London, Paris, Amsterdam,
Berlin and Rome, returning home via New Delhi, Seoul, Bangkok and
Brunei. The purpose of his trip, he explained, was to try to secure sup-
port within Europe, both economically and politically, for the reforms
to be undertaken in Indonesia. As with most of Abdurrahman’s trips,
the schedule was exhausting for all except Abdurrahman. He was well
received in the major capitals of Europe although it was less clear
whether the economic side of the program was successful. Nevertheless,
he built on the success of his November visit to the United States and
encouraged Western nations to take seriously his commitment to the
building of a new Indonesia. He felt that his visits on the way home to
New Delhi and Seoul were particularly important because — idealisti-
cally, and perhaps naively — he intended to complement continued
support from Europe and the Unites States with fresh ties to New
Delhi and Beijing. It also looked increasingly possible that Seoul might
provide a source of future investment capital. Abdurrahman received a
warm welcome in both India and South Korea and came home pleased
with what had been achieved.
#.!-+(:)*+1&)*+%!(1/
It seemed that something else had also been achieved during
Abdurrahman’s visit that was not apparent at that time. When in
Europe Abdurrahman had commented on domestic affairs and the
prospects for the reform of the military, he had particularly singled out
Feisal Tanjung and Wiranto as being the source of various difficulties
representing obstacles to reform. He suggested that Feisal Tanjung had
been behind the July 1996 attack on Megawati’s supporters in central
Jakarta, and that he was asking Wiranto to step aside. Back in Jakarta,
Defence Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono conveyed this message
to Wiranto, but they agreed to leave it to Abdurrahman to work out
matters directly with Wiranto upon his return.
6DB
Many commentators thought that Abdurrahman’s long-distance
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
handling of his tussle with Wiranto was particularly unusual, if not
foolhardy, and that his reference to Feisal Tanjung while in the midst of
an overseas visit was inexplicable. But Abdurrahman had not been
nearly so gauche as he appeared. In criticising Feisal Tanjung, he was
flying a kite. In the past Feisal had had many supporters in the military
who were quick to defend him. The extent to which the military
defended Feisal against Abdurrahman’s criticisms would be a measure
of the degree of support for the reform process within the military. As
it turned out, no one came out in defence of Feisal Tanjung. This gave
Abdurrahman confidence to proceed with his reforms. Another exer-
cise in kite-flying was his reference to a meeting of senior generals with
Wiranto. He did cite the wrong location for the meeting, whether
deliberately or because he was misinformed, but he was on target about
the existence and nature of the meeting. His intent in referring to the
meeting ahead of his return to Jakarta was to flush out a response.
Wiranto had, in fact, met with other senior generals, and there was
good reason to believe that he was plotting to defend his position
against Abdurrahman.
When Abdurrahman landed in Jakarta early on the morning of
Sunday, 13 February, Wiranto met him at the airport, keen to persuade
Abdurrahman to be patient and wait before demanding his resignation.
Wiranto pleaded with Abdurrahman for more time, saying that it was
not just for himself, but also for his family, as they would be devastated
if he was suddenly forced to resign. Abdurrahman backed off and indi-
cated to Wiranto that he would be prepared to wait for his resignation.
When he arrived back at the palace, however, Abdurrahman called in
several aides and asked them to investigate what Wiranto had been up
to during his absence and to report back to him that afternoon. He then
went to bed and caught up on few hours of sleep. When he woke,
Marsillam told him that they had ascertained that over the past few
weeks Wiranto had been meeting with Habibie and several senior gen-
erals and power-brokers in a manner that strongly suggested that he
was plotting against Abdurrahman. Marsillam was emphatic in his
advice. ‘You must grasp the nettle.’ Abdurrahman asked for Wiranto to
be brought to his office. When Wiranto arrived he explained to him
that he was asking for his immediate resignation. Wiranto was shocked;
he had apparently been gloating around town about his victory. There
was little that Wiranto could do, at least in the short term.
6D;
So, after a tense stand-off, Abdurrahman had won his confrontation

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
with Wiranto. Many analysts had predicted that it would be extremely

difficult, if not impossible, to force Wiranto out of power without pro-
voking an immediate backlash from the military. In the end, however,
no one rushed to Wiranto’s defence, and over the following week he
was left with the slightly comic recourse of appearing on a series of tel-
evision talk shows. Several of these interviews were embarrassingly
lengthy, with the dapper general using PowerPoint demonstrations and
narrated video clips to convince viewers of his loyal service to the mili-
tary and the nation, including his intervention to deliver peace and rec-
onciliation in East Timor. Just up from the parliament building a large
banner was stretched across Jalan Jenderal Gatot Subroto, the main
highway leading out of Jakarta, proclaiming: ‘For the good of the
nation, Indonesians should all support Gus Dur, Megawati and
Wiranto.’ It was generally assumed that Wiranto had spent a large
amount of money on this campaign (even though he claimed to be a
poor retired soldier and attributed his hours of airtime to enlightened
television executives). If that were the case, it would seem that the
money was largely wasted. In the months that followed, Wiranto
turned to more insidious ways of reasserting his influence but, in the
short term, Abdurrahman had won a decisive victory.
!)"%+.4),.!,/()+()1&.),$(
In many ways this time was the high point of Abdurrahman’s presiden-
cy. When he came to power there had been much scepticism about his
ability to serve as an effective president. Certainly his election had come
as a surprise to almost everyone, although within weeks things had set-
tled down and many previously critical commentators observed that the
combination of Gus Dur and Mega did in fact seem to be an ideal part-
nership. By March Abdurrahman seemed to have proved himself wor-
thy of his election to the presidency. He remained, of course, a highly
unusual president, but then these were highly unusual times. With the
uneventful sacking of Wiranto hard on the heels of a successful
European tour, many people became outspoken in their praise for
Abdurrahman. Although critical of his methods, including his long-
distance confrontation with Wiranto, many were prepared to believe
that he was indeed a masterful political operator who might yet be able
to lead Indonesia through a difficult transition.
6D<
Further confirmation of Abdurrahman’s credentials and capacity as a
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
reformist leader came in early March when he made a one-day visit to
East Timor. In Dili he was greeted warmly by Xanana Gusmao and
Jose Ramos-Horta. Indeed the people of Dili, with the exception of a
handful of demonstrators, welcomed the Indonesian president with
great warmth. When Abdurrahman addressed a large crowd gathered
on the foreshore in Dili, he was joined at the rostrum by Xanana
Gusmao. Xanana’s presence beside Abdurrahman spoke volumes about
the warmth between the two men and also seemed to be a deliberate
action by Xanana to protect his friend against any act of violence by
those who might feel tempted to strike out in anger at Indonesia.
Abdurrahman spoke eloquently and powerfully about his personal
regret and sorrow for all the wrongs and violence that had occurred in
East Timor, and he apologised on behalf of his nation for the wrong it
had inflicted. In his visit to Dili, Abdurrahman went further than had
been expected. When he went on to explain the need for Indonesia and
East Timor to form a good relationship and work together as friends,
his comments were warmly received and accepted as genuine. On the
way home he stopped in Kupang, where he addressed gatherings in
refugee camps and later spoke to community leaders. Returning to
Jakarta that night, it really seemed as if Abdurrahman’s presidency was
on track to produce good results.
In April Abdurrahman was travelling again. This time the main
attraction was the International Meeting of the Group of 77, the spir-
itual successor to the Non-Aligned Movement which Sukarno had
championed half a century before. The location for the meeting was
Havana, Cuba. Not surprisingly, the Americans counselled him against
attending the conference. Abdurrahman had initially thought of travel-
ling on to Washington at the conclusion of the conference, but aban-
doned the idea when it received a frosty response from the State
Department. Although the US government was very encouraged by
Abdurrahman’s presidency and keen to be as supportive as possible,
they considered his visit to Havana to be pushing things too far.
Abdurrahman was in no mind to accept such intervention. The Havana
meeting was important, he argued, because the Group of 77 nations
represented the overwhelming majority of the planet’s population. For
the leader of a large developing nation such as Indonesia not to be
involved in such a gathering was, he felt, plainly wrong. For his trou-
bles Abdurrahman was rewarded by a warm reception in Cuba, includ-
6D=
ing a surprise visit by President Fidel Castro to his hotel room. Castro
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
singled him out for a visit because, he said, he was keen to meet per-
sonally with Indonesia’s surprising new president.
On the way to Havana, Abdurrahman had stopped off in
Johannesburg. He had for years been a great admirer of Nelson
Mandela and had some time earlier secured his promise to support a
proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Indonesia. After
the conference in Havana Abdurrahman travelled on to Mexico City
before returning home via Hong Kong, where he lobbied for invest-
ment interest in Indonesia.
The president had good reason to try and drum up investment inter-
est in Indonesia. The national debt stood at US$134 billion or 83 per
cent of its gross domestic product. Fortunately for Indonesia, and for
Abdurrahman, in that month the Paris Club of nineteen sovereign
creditors agreed to reschedule the US$5.8 billion foreign debt, extend-
ing terms to between eleven and twenty years. (The London Club of
private creditors followed suit with similar terms for a further US$340
million which otherwise would have fallen due around March 2002).
At the same time the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
were lending considerable support to Indonesia. Even so,
Abdurrahman had been increasingly criticised for his failure to inter-
vene more decisively in the application of economic policy.
Part of the problem seemed to be the structure of Abdurrahman’s
economic team: there was no clear delineation of responsibilities and
duties between the four different government ministers whose portfo-
lios were concerned with economic affairs. At the same time
Abdurrahman appeared personally uninterested in economics. He
denied this, claiming to be passionately concerned with economic
issues, but there was no doubt that the minutiae of the discussions
bored him.
By this stage he had allowed such a heavy daily schedule to develop
that he was clearly running low on sleep. In late February things
became so bad that one Thursday morning he woke feeling so off-
colour that he cancelled his walk after only half a lap of the palace com-
pound.1
His doctors diagnosed a mild case of flu and immediately sent him
off to bed to rest. His schedule cancelled, he slept for several hours.
During the day word spread around town that he had suffered some
sort of stroke, or other major reversal of health, and the markets
6DD
panicked. Of course, no such thing had happened, but the incident
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
highlighted the nervous nature of the financial markets in Indonesia.
1&.)3%.,,$%.)'/$(1,
Abdurrahman’s forced rest also revealed just how hard he was driving
himself, and also how poorly his public relations were managed. By
then everyone in his team was tired. Munib looked exhausted, and
Yenny was also feeling the strain both emotionally and physically. She
carried a particularly heavy load as a stand-in first lady, personal assis-
tant and confidante. Because Abdurrahman could not read himself,
either Yenny or Munib had to read out documents that were presented
to him through the day, as well as excerpts from the daily newspapers.
When Abdurrahman became president he had made Ratih his pres-
idential secretary. The job was not a blessing. Ratih’s experience showed
the multifarious obstacles to reforming the bureaucracy that existed
after four decades of authoritarian rule. From the outset it was clear
that she would have to reinvent the entire office. Even though she
nominally had a large team of people working under her, only a hand-
ful were able or willing to make a significant contribution. Her office
was located within the State Secretariat and here she met considerable
resistance, at a variety of levels, as she attempted to reform the function
of presidential secretary. No doubt, this resistance was partly a response
to Ratih’s somewhat abrasive and direct style. But she was in a difficult
situation. She was not welcome as an outsider to the State Secretariat,
and many forces were positively opposed to the sort of reforms
Abdurrahman was trying to institute.2
Ratih had achieved various reforms during the political campaign of
1999; in 2000 she tried to change the way in which Abdurrahman func-
tioned as president. Journalists accustomed to easy access to
Abdurrahman became annoyed as she imposed a regime of press con-
ferences and tried to discipline press contact. Although such innova-
tions were unpopular, it was clear that, had she not done this,
Abdurrahman would have been even more worn down by impromptu
interviews. It was also clear that he was vulnerable to underhand tactics
by the less scrupulous members of the media keen to get a good quote.
By this stage Abdurrahman’s political enemies, including elements
aligned with the former regime, were manipulating the media on a
grand scale through money and intimidation.
7AA
By this stage the political pressure against Abdurrahman had become

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
intense. While Wiranto’s initial doubtful media apologies following his

sacking were ineffectual, there was reason to believe that he might
apply himself to some more serious ways of getting back at
Abdurrahman. It now appeared that there were two camps opposing
Abdurrahman: one keen to pressure him into backing off in corruption
investigations and prosecutions, and the other intent upon causing
enough unrest to undermine the credibility of his government. By now
the communal conflict that had started in Ambon in South Maluku
had spread to North Maluku and the island of Halamera. Until early
March it had appeared as if the situation in Maluku might have begun
to recover, but the spread of the conflict marked a downward spiral.
In late February Ratih decided that she had had enough. The job had
proved immensely stressful and remarkably thankless. At the best of
times Ratih is highly strung and passionate about whatever she is doing,
sometimes to the extent of appearing melodramatic. These extraordi-
narily stressful circumstances in which she found herself created unen-
durable pressure. Because she took every aspect of the job seriously, and
probably took upon herself more than was expected, she found that it
was not possible for her to switch off and let things flow over her. In
March she announced that she was tendering her resignation.
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)4!-,.).F3.01!1+/(,
The pressure against Abdurrahman was considerable by late March.
The media, which had never been particularly sympathetic towards
him, was becoming increasingly hostile. There were several reasons for
this; one was that his eccentric style frequently damaged his credibility.
Paradoxically, at his best he could be a masterful communicator but at
worst he often miscommunicated so badly that he undermined his own
position. His habit of thinking aloud was made worse by his blindness;
as mentioned, he was unable to judge the context in which he was talk-
ing because he could not see who was in the room or monitor reactions
to what he said. This tended to work against him with the press.
A more serious reason for increasing frustration with his leadership
was that expectations of his presidency had been grossly inflated. The
nation, including professionals in Jakarta who should have known bet-
ter, looked to Abdurrahman to solve the economic crisis, mend com-
munal relations, reform the military, reform the civil service, reform and
reinvent the traditional legal system, and they felt that it could and
7A@
should all be accomplished in the first six or twelve months of his pres-
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
idency. It was an impossible set of expectations.
A third, and perhaps more significant, factor was that
Abdurrahman’s presidency was subject to the contingencies of regime
change. This he understood well, but few around him acknowledged it
in the media, either domestic or international. He often spoke about
fighting ‘dark forces’ aligned with the former regime, forces loyal to
Soeharto, Wiranto and other, often competing, elements of the ancien
regime. His talk was often dismissed as wild speculation that was dan-
gerously beholden to conspiracy theory. The more cynical of his critics
rejected it as escapism, as shifting the blame, even though the record of
the Soeharto regime was well known. It was no secret that the military
had engaged in systematic terrorism against its own citizens in
provinces such as East Timor, Papua and Aceh. Even in Jakarta and
Yogyakarta students had often ‘disappeared’ Latin American-style, and
torture was a routine technique. More insidious was the use of psycho-
logical warfare techniques and intense intelligence surveillance. There
was no reason to believe that any of this suddenly stopped when
Soeharto stepped down. Rather, there was every reason to believe that
Soeharto, and those loyal to him or to their own interests, would make
use of such methods to destabilise the new government.
Several tactics were used against Abdurrahman in an attempt to
undermine his legitimacy and pressure him into backing off, or perhaps
even to step down. One of the more common tactics was to subvert the
media. This was relatively easy because of an entrenched culture of
encouraging and rewarding journalists with money-filled envelopes. To
some extent this was an understandable cultural practice. The paying of
travel expenses, or per diems, was understandable in a context in which
journalistic salaries were low and journalists had a real need of supple-
mentation. In the Soeharto era almost every profession — except perhaps
the elite end of town, the private sector — suffered such low rates of
remuneration that people had to top up their salaries through other
means. For civil servants this often involved some form of corruption or
bribery. Similarly, the police and the military often took part in business
activities, legitimate and illegitimate. University lecturers were obliged to
find other jobs to make ends meet, and journalists understandably were
happy to take contributions of cash. By the first few months of 2000 this
‘envelope’ culture was showing up in the Indonesian press, and the pro-
foundly distorted reports were repeated in the international media.
7A6
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
,!09+(:)-!9,!'!(!5)!)4!1!-).%%/%
Amid all this pressure, Abdurrahman began to make errors of judg-
ment. On 24 April he made what was probably his most significant
mistake. Under pressure to reform his economic team, he sacked the
Industry and Trade Minister, Yusuf Kalla of the Golkar party, and the
State Enterprises Minister, Laksamana Sukardi. In a closed session
with members of parliament, he said that he was sacking Yusuf Kalla
because of allegations of KKN and that he was sacking Laksamana
Sukardi because of his inability to work with his team members and
also because Abdurrahman was unhappy with his appointments to the
state offices. Unfortunately, the media reported him as saying that both
Yusuf Kalla and Laksamana were tainted with corruption. While he has
denied that he ever said this (it was a closed-door session so no jour-
nalists were present to verify the story), the story quickly spread. This
was particularly unfortunate because Laksamana Sukardi was a
favourite protégé and associate of Megawati and a key figure within
PDI-P. He was regarded, in fact, as the party’s bright shining star
because of his unparalleled record as a professional banker and his rep-
utation for integrity and professionalism.
Ironically, it was, in part, his professionalism and integrity that got
him into trouble. Laksamana had been dogged in his pursuit of cor-
ruption, even when this pursuit went outside the bounds of his portfo-
lio. Abdurrahman tried on a number of occasions to restrain him in his
pursuit of certain figures because of the political consequences of con-
tinuing. Laksamana however, was used to operating alone rather than
as part of a team and was not easily reined in. His single-minded
approach meant that he fell out with a number of his colleagues. In par-
ticular he was actively undermined by Abdurrahman’s old friend from
his days in the leadership of NU, Rozi Munir, who was himself keen to
have Laksamana’s job — which in due course he obtained, albeit not for
very long. Sadly, for Abdurrahman it was a case of ‘With friends like
these, who needs enemies?’
Were it a singular case it would have been bad enough; the tragedy
was that it marked a pattern of behaviour by many within NU and
PKB, which served to spoil whatever good work was being done by
others in both organisations. NU, like most manifestations of tradi-
tional Southeast Asian society, was strongly coloured by patron–client
relations. And when NU ‘came into power’, many saw an opportunity
7A7
to milk their position for all it was worth. Some, no doubt, had rela-
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
tively good intentions and looked to pick up money for productive proj-
ects. Others were more concerned with filling PKB’s war-chest in
preparation for the next election. Many others, however, seem to have
been largely self-serving and greedy, and unconcerned about the dam-
age that their avaricious behaviour was inflicting on NU, PKB and
Abdurrahman’s presidency.
In their defence — though it is a pretty poor defence — it should be
recognised that corruption within NU and PKB was mostly amateurish
and small-scale in comparison with what was occurring in the other
large parties. Unfortunately, the damage inflicted by the self-serving
behaviour of individuals such as Rozi was extensive precisely because it
struck at the Achilles’ heel of the Wahid presidency — the fragility of
the relationship between Abdurrahman and Megawati and between
PKB and PDI-P.
Laksamana’s demise was not, however, entirely the fault of
Abdurrahman’s self-serving ‘friend’. At the same time that he was
under attack from Rozi, Laksamana’s position was also being white-
anted by fellow PDI-P minister Kwik Kian Gie. Between them, Kwik
and Rozi made sure that Abdurrahman was subject to a constant stream
of bitchy complaints about Laksamana.
One of the people that Laksamana fell out with was more than just
another aggrieved colleague: Taufik Kiemas, husband of Megawati and
senior backroom powerbroker within the party. Some of Laksamana’s
corruption inquiries crossed over the business interests of Taufik. The
relationship between Taufik and Megawati was thought to be rocky,
and in a significant power struggle inside the party, Laksamana became
a victim of factional politics. Not that this excuses Abdurrahman’s error
of judgment in sacking Laksamana. Abdurrahman had failed to consult
with Megawati, and when she heard the news she reportedly broke
down in tears and immediately flew to Singapore to recover.
1&.).(#)/4)1&.)&/(.>'//(
The sacking of Laksamana was to prove a turning-point in the first
period of Abdurrahman’s government. It was a move that he quickly
regretted, but the circumstances and the pressure under which he had
made the error were not widely understood. It could hardly have been
said that Abdurrahman was enjoying a honeymoon period — he had
had a turbulent reception ever since becoming president — but up to
7A8
that point he had benefited from the goodwill of many senior intellec-
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
tuals and media figures who admired his idealism and vision. With the
sacking of Laksamana, the honeymoon, such as it was, was over.
Weeks later another scandal broke which was to gravely damage
Abdurrahman. In January he had asked the State Logistics Agency
(Bulog) for information about its cash reserves. It was common for such
agencies to hold significant reserves, and Abdurrahman was finding it
difficult to get even small amounts of cash to carry out projects. He was
keen to send money to Aceh to help community welfare programs to
reinforce his moves to negotiate peace in the troubled province. He
recognised that the community had many concrete needs and had been
badly treated during the Soeharto regime, not just in terms of military
terrorism, but also in terms of basic infrastructure in health, education
and transport. When no money seemed available through any of the
regular government accounts, he explored the possibility of borrowing
from the cash reserves of a government agency such as Bulog. This was
a typical technique, used for decades under Soeharto and continued
under Habibie. He was quickly informed, however, that he would first
need to consult parliament; he therefore decided against it, feeling it to
be too time-consuming and politically difficult.
In early May, Abdurrahman heard, via people working at Bulog, that
a significant sum of money, almost US$4 million, had gone missing
from its cash reserve account; the person to whom it had allegedly been
handed was Suwando, the former masseur of Soeharto, and for a peri-
od, also of Abdurrahman. Apparently Suwando had approached Bulog
and said that he was collecting the money because the president had
sent him as personal envoy. Most of the money was recovered within
months, although Suwando himself went into hiding. There was no
suggestion of any link between Abdurrahman or his family with
Suwando. Nevertheless, Abdurrahman’s political enemies insinuated
that Abdurrahman had been involved in the scam and the resulting
scandal was immensely damaging to Abdurrahman.
At around the same time another scandal broke. When
Abdurrahman had trouble securing liquid funds to use in Aceh, he
sought the help of foreign countries to invest in the province. In late
February he visited Brunei and spoke with its sultan about his concern
for what was happening in Aceh. The Sultan of Brunei gave
Abdurrahman a personal donation of US $2 million . From the sultan’s
point of view it was small change, and he stipulated that he did not
7AB
want his gift to be made public. He said that he had entrusted the
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
money to Abdurrahman as a ulama and religious man and was confi-
dent that he would use it well as he saw fit. Abdurrahman failed to
declare the money and lodge it in a formal government account partly,
he said, because the Sultan of Brunei had asked for it to be kept confi-
dential and partly because he didn’t trust those who had access to such
government accounts.
After the sacking of Laksamana this represented a second major
error of judgment. Although few believed that Abdurrahman was guilty
of personal corruption, it certainly looked foolish and unprofessional.
The sacking of Laksamana, the $4 million taken from Bulog by
Suwando (which became known as the Bulogate scandal) and now the
gift from Brunei (which was quickly dubbed Bruneigate), weighed
heavily upon Abdurrahman’s reputation.
Abdurrahman was also coming under increasing pressure from his
political opponents, many of whom fought behind the scenes. Also, as
the pressure through prosecution from the Attorney-General’s office
intensified on Soeharto and his family, there were signs that his sym-
pathisers and cronies were fighting back.
+,-!'+,1)%!#+0!-+,')!(#)-!,9!%)H+&!#
In April a troubling phenomenon emerged which Abdurrahman
seemed powerless to stop. Earlier in the year Jakarta had been rocked
by a series of rallies calling for a peace in Ambon and Maluku, and
blaming the government and the Christian communities for failing to
work for peace. These rallies were organised by the Islamic right, and
there were strong indications suggestions that they were funded by
Abdurrahman’s political opponents. By April the phenomenon had
been transformed into a more sinister and threatening one where
thousands of so-called Laskar Jihad, or holy war warriors, were trained
in a camp in Bogor just outside Jakarta. For months the camp in Bogor
remained free of intervention or censure from the military or the
police. The three thousand or so young men, mostly from rural Java,
who were in training in the camp held a series of rallies in Jakarta
itself. At some of these rallies they were seen parading around the city
centre with swords and other sharp weapons without being challenged
by either the police or the military. Abdurrahman was initially reluc-
tant to crack down too heavily on the demonstrators for fear of a
violent confrontation.
7A;
At one point angry Laskar Jihad members stormed the presidential

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
compound and demanded an audience with Abdurrahman. He received

them but was so incensed by their militant accusations of a Christian
and PDI-P conspiracy in Maluku that he threw them out of the palace.
A variety of groups aligned with the Islamic right were daily protesting
against Abdurrahman’s presidency, claiming that he failed to defend
Islam and was callously unconcerned about Muslim deaths in Maluku.
The situation took a further turn for the worse when the Laskar
Jihad troops declared they were ready to set sail from Surabaya for
Maluku. Abdurrahman gave orders to the police and the military, and
particularly the navy, to block their departure. Initially they were able to
do this, but in the end the Laskar Jihad forces landed in Maluku.
Although they landed unarmed, they were soon equipped with
weapons, including military-issue assault rifles and other army
weapons. In June and July there were reports that these Laskar Jihad
troops were involved in attacks on Christian villages that had resulted
in hundreds of deaths. Abdurrahman was exasperated; he gave orders
for the military to stop these troops, but elements of the military were
not only turning a blind eye to the Laskar Jihad, it would seem that
they were actually providing them with weapons.
By mid-July the Minister for Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, went pub-
lic and blamed sections of the military for helping the Laskar Jihad and
for also acting in the conflict in Maluku, particularly in Halamera and
Ambon. There had always been a suspicion that the troops had become
partisan as they became caught up in the violence. To counter this,
Abdurrahman appointed a new commander for the region, a respected
and experienced Balinese Hindu officer, and set in process a rotation of
all fourteen hundred military officers serving in the region. On 26 June
he declared a civil state of emergency in Maluku that gave authority to
impose nightly curfews and to check people for weapons. He was reluc-
tant to go for a full-blown military solution because he believed that this
approach had failed in the past; also, he did not completely trust sections
of the military. By mid-July there was talk, even at the level of Defence
Minister, about the involvement of figures like Wiranto and elements
aligned with the former regime. The violence in Maluku, which had pre-
viously appeared to be winding down, had built up in intensity with the
arrival of the last Laskar Jihad troops from May onwards. Abdurrahman’s
failure to bring about a cessation of the violence in the province was used
as another reason to argue that he was failing as president.
7A<
.0/(/'+0)0%+,+,)!(#)$(0&.09.#)0/%%$31+/(
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
Abdurrahman was also facing increasingly sharp criticism for his ‘fail-
ure to fix the economy’. Even members of his own economic team and
former allies such as Jusuf Wanandi, director of CSIS, were now open-
ly critical of him. Key economic advisers revealed that occasionally dur-
ing lengthy meetings, Abdurrahman appeared to nap when economic
matters where being discussed. They accused him of being uninterest-
ed in economics.
This criticism seems unfair; both his private conversations with cab-
inet ministers and other advisers and his public addresses showed that
he was passionately concerned about economic recovery and also con-
cerned that such a recovery help those most in need. Nor was he a com-
plete dilettante in the field, for in big-picture terms he has a
well-thought-out position. Faced with the array of problems that have
been besetting Indonesia, it has not always been clear what he could or
should do. The problem was not so much to find a solution that was
technically advisable, but to find one that would work politically.
Many of his economic advisers were keen for him to prosecute cor-
ruption and immediately crack down on those accused of it.
Abdurrahman has been reluctant to move too quickly in this direction
for several reasons. One was that the legal system was inadequate for
the task and Marzuki Darusman, as Attorney-General, was already
overloaded. Secondly, Abdurrahman was persuaded by lobbyists that
many of these businessmen, while undeniably corrupt, held the key to
economic recovery in the short to medium term; even if they would
have to face justice later, their help was needed immediately to restart
the economy. He explained that to prosecute the head of the giant con-
glomerate Texmaco, for example, would have been to risk the econom-
ic failure of the whole conglomerate.
Thirdly, Abdurrahman was under pressure to abandon his prosecu-
tion of anti-corruption cases of these and other elements who had
strong connections with the former regime. Given the difficult circum-
stances under which he worked, he felt that there was a limit to how far
he could press such cases, and some degree of compromise was involved
in a real political solution, at least during the transitional period that he
was overseeing.
There was another not readily understood reason for Abdurrahman’s
difficulties. Between Abdurrahman and most of his key advisers there
7A=
was a significant cultural gap. He was unconvinced that neo-liberal eco-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
nomic theories held all the answers for Indonesia’s economic recovery.
Many of his advisers believed that if market forces were respected and
their models applied rigorously, recovery would surely follow.
Abdurrahman was sceptical and deeply worried about the social cost of
the cures being pushed by many of his economic team. He was under
enormous pressure and faced expectations that he could not possibly
meet.
!)3%.,+#.(0>)!#%+41E
In mid-June Abdurrahman left on another overseas trip. He was, by
this stage, being widely criticised for travelling so frequently. In one
sense he was following his life-long pattern of frequent travel and reg-
ular consultation with people around the country and around the world.
But there was another factor driving Abdurrahman’s travel that was not
readily understood at the time. His June trip — to Tokyo, Salt Lake
City, St Louis, Washington, Paris, Teheran, Islamabad and Cairo —
was probably primarily driven by his desire to return to Salt Lake City.
Despite a gloomy prognosis from medical specialists there, he contin-
ued to cling to the hope that his eyesight might be restored. The course
of acupuncture and Chinese medicinal herbs he had received from the
team of high-ranking Chinese doctors during February and March had
been partially effective, but Abdurrahman’s basic problem was that he
was psychologically in denial about his blindness. This, according to
experts in such matters, was not unusual; but Abdurrahman was presi-
dent of the world’s third-largest democracy in the midst of an enor-
mously difficult change of regime. Unfortunately, as long as he was in
denial he was unable to learn coping mechanisms for living without
sight.
In Paris Abdurrahman had a more happy event. He had been invit-
ed to Paris by the Sorbonne University to receive an honorary doctor-
ate. He was enormously proud and grateful for this award, having been
a lover of French literature and culture all of his adult life. He greatly
valued the honour and appeared genuinely moved during the award
ceremony.
On this overseas tour he spoke to Indonesian student groups and
others about his plans to reshuffle his cabinet. Amien Rais, among oth-
ers, was critical of Abdurrahman and questioned what a reshuffle would
achieve. On 17 June Amien said, ‘Gus Dur has not yet shown his lead-
7AD
ership’. Abdurrahman’s brother, Hasyim, defended him by saying that
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
lawmakers were exerting pressure to extract privileges from the govern-
ment. ‘Most members of the parliament are extortionists,’ he said.
Whatever the case, when Abdurrahman returned home in late June he
retracted his earlier statement about the reshuffle. Privately, though, he
confided that he was looking to reshuffle the cabinet towards the end
of the year, after the MPR session in August. He also spoke about the
possibility of moving towards the appointment of a ‘first minister’ sys-
tem, in which a first minister would complement the president by run-
ning the day-to-day administration. ‘It could be in some ways,’ he said,
‘like the French system where there is a strong president and also a
strong prime minister.’ He had in mind names of those who might do
this job; he saw the need for somebody with a strong record as a
reformist who would also be able to negotiate with elements of the for-
mer regime, particularly the military.
By late June Abdurrahman had reached an all-time low in the eyes
of both the domestic and international media. Time magazine and
Asiaweek ran cover stories in which they spoke of a president all at sea
and unable to act decisively. The 7 July issue of Asiaweek had
Abdurrahman on the cover, his image manipulated by the artist to show
a man looking morose and lost. Across the bottom left-hand corner of
the cover in yellow type was ‘Adrift: Inside Abdurrahman Wahid’s
Sinking Indonesian Presidency’. The Asian issue of Time for 3 July also
had Abdurrahman on the cover; the image was more complimentary
but the headline was even worse than that of Asiaweek. It had in bold
red letters ‘Wahid’s Woes’ with the sub-heading ‘Visionary one
moment, vague the next, Indonesia’s President may be losing control of
his crippled country’. In these and other stories he was written off as a
man out of his depth, as an amusing and genial eccentric who had lost
his way in a task that was too big for him. His failed management was
explained in terms of his background in the pesantren and his inability
to apply an appropriate management style to the presidency. His state-
ments about the campaign to topple him or undermine his leadership
were treated cynically as an excuse for failure to perform. The critical
line by many economists was that he had failed to give sufficient atten-
tion to the economy. This became a leading element in foreign report-
ing at the time, as did the various scandals like Bulogate and
Bruneigate. There was also the short-term appointment of his youngest
brother, Hasyim, to a consultative post with IBRA — apparently with-
7@A
out Abdurrahman’s knowledge. (Hasyim had welcomed this because he

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
saw himself acting as a debt collector, working with people he under-

stood well and who, he claimed, would not respond to polite requests
to return money.) Such scandals made the Abdurrahman Wahid presi-
dency look hopeless. As if this was not enough, the escalation of vio-
lence in Maluku and the steady decline of the Indonesian rupiah
confirmed the picture. By mid-July the rupiah was bumping towards 10
000 to the US dollar and showing no sign of recovery.
There were signs, however, that some of Abdurrahman’s peers under-
stood his predicament. On Saturday, 1 July, he flew to Bali to attend the
final session of a four-day conference that had been convened to discuss
his presidency and the situation facing the nation. He listened politely
as prominent social commentator Wimar Witoeloar read out the find-
ings of the gathering. Those assembled were the cream of the
Indonesian intelligentsia, leading figures from the media and from aca-
demia, over two hundred influential social commentators and opinion
leaders. Encouragingly for Abdurrahman, their conclusion, although
critical, was not entirely damning; there were signs that they under-
stood his predicament and recognised the context of regime change in
which he had to work. As a report card though, the message was very
clear: ‘Could do better!’
In conversation on the way to the Bali meeting it seemed an encour-
aging sign that Abdurrahman was sanguine about his friends’ motives
in calling this conference to assess his presidency. The three leading fig-
ures behind the conference were Wimar Witoelar, Nurcholish Madjid
and Emil Salim. ‘These people are all good people. They’re very sincere
in what they do and in their intentions,’ Abdurrahman explained.
‘Maybe I won’t agree with what they have to say, but I respect their
right to say it and I’m absolutely confident they mean well.’
&.!#.#)4/%)+'3.!0&'.(1E
By then there was considerable speculation that Abdurrahman might
be toppled in the annual session of the MPR in August, which was
essentially an extension of the DPR. The exact powers of the MPR
were unclear. Under Soeharto the MPR existed only to rubber-stamp
the president’s re-election when it met once every five years following
the general elections. In 1998 it had played a more decisive role with a
special meeting to pass the necessary legislation required for the 1999
elections, and again on 19 October 1999 when it rejected the account-
7@@
ability speech by incumbent President B. J. Habibie — a critical factor
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
in his decision not to contest the presidency. In theory, the MPR could
impeach the president, but most commentators agreed that this was
only realistic and legal if the president could be shown to be guilty of
gross impropriety. In practice, it seemed unlikely that the MPR would
go so far. There was another significant reason why such a step seemed
unlikely, although it still remained a possibility. If Abdurrahman were
toppled, another president would have to be appointed. A reliable opin-
ion poll taken in mid-July showed that 83 per cent of the population
could not conceive of a better president than Abdurrahman, given the
available alternatives.
Abdurrahman felt that, by late June, he had the clear support of
Akbar Tandjung from Golkar, of Amien Rais from PAN, and of
Megawati. Nevertheless, his relationship with Megawati remained
troubled. She was still hurt about Laksamana’s sacking. In mid-July
there were attempts to organise a ‘Ciganjur Group’ meeting of the four
political leaders. Shortly before a meeting scheduled for Wednesday, 12
July, however, Megawati sent word that she would not attend. Instead,
she went to the cinema with Laksamana. This was a deliberate snub by
Megawati, who was hurt that Abdurrahman had not consulted her suf-
ficiently in the previous months. Other attempts to organise a meeting
also failed. Nevertheless, there were good reasons to expect that, when
pushed, Megawati would continue to support Abdurrahman, at least in
the short term.
The first major hurdle he had to face was a meeting, not with the
MPR but with members of parliament. He had been summoned to
explain his actions in the sacking of Yusuf Kalla and Laksamana Sukardi.
Although it was not expected that they could do more than severely rep-
rimand him, nevertheless, there was an element of great uncertainty
about the whole process because there was considerable evidence that
many members of parliament were not responding to party discipline.
Some were guilty of grandstanding, or trying to launch their own politi-
cal careers, by making a name for themselves in parliament. Others
appeared to be following a political agenda which was not the party’s.
Some, for example, spoke out wildly in the commission sessions about
the possibility of foreign powers conspiring to undermine regional secu-
rity in Indonesia. There was a suggestion made by some members of par-
liament that Australia and America were behind the violence in Maluku
or that they wanted to see Irian Jaya break away from the republic.
7@6
In late February Ratih, Yenny and Marsillam had been separately

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summoned to explain to a parliamentary commission allegations

against them of covering up for the president and exercising undue
influence. They gave sterling performances and easily outshone their
critics; nevertheless the charges that were raised were disturbing.
Ratih was accused of being an Australian spy — a ludicrous charge,
given her well-established dislike of the Howard government. Clearly
many such allegations were being put forward by ‘loose cannons’
within parliament. But the existence of such ‘loose cannons’ made the
20 July meeting between the president and the parliament all the
more important.
Even Abdurrahman’s greatest admirers recognised that changes
were needed. The expectation was that, once he got through the
MPR session, Abdurrahman would act to reshuffle his cabinet and
possibly appoint a first minister. Abdurrahman’s openness to the
appointment of a first minister showed that he was aware of the lim-
itations of his own personal abilities. 3 Indeed by late June
Abdurrahman was well aware of the need to make changes. He was
no administrator and found little joy in the minutiae of day-to-day
governance. The idea of delegating the tasks that bored and frustrat-
ed him began to appeal more and more. In theory, of course, the vice-
president was the natural choice for such a position. It’s debatable
whether Abdurrahman ever really gave Megawati a fair chance to
step into the role. Certainly his critics, and especially her friends,
argue that she was never given a real opportunity. Abdurrahman,
however, points to many occasions when Megawati could have done
more but failed to seize the opportunity.
There seemed little doubt that Abdurrahman needed help to run his
administration. Wimar Witoelar, who was often critical in his analysis
but nevertheless admired the president, put it this way:
I don’t think there’s anyone in Indonesian history who is as enlight-

ened as he is in ideas of diversity, pluralism, ethnic tolerance, reli-
gious understanding, and human rights. If he were not the
president, he could get a Nobel Prize for his thoughts. But being
president, he has got to manage, he has to watch the budget, he has
to know which account to put his money in, and he’s flunking in all
these day-to-day government matters, but the man is a very, very
good person.
7@7
!()!33/+(1'.(1)*+1&)3!%-+!'.(1
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
In early July Abdurrahman announced that he was prepared to speak to
the parliament on 20 July. By setting this date for his interpellation (an
appearance before parliament to justify controversial behaviour) only
days before parliament went into recess, he hoped to minimise the
chance for them to do damage. Nevertheless, as the day drew near it
was clear that the next few weeks were going to be difficult for him.
Abdurrahman explained that, if all went well in the MPR session, he
intended to announce his new cabinet by the end of August. There was
a chance he would come out stronger than ever with a trimmed, loyal
cabinet behind him and the interpellation and the MPR response to his
accountability speech resolved. However, there was also a good chance
that things might get worse. Impeachment seemed unlikely — the
Bulogate and Bruneigate affairs provided little justification for such
action. His sacking of two cabinet ministers could not be construed as
a gross abuse of his position. Even so, anything was possible.
Abdurrahman had been working hard on his relationship with
Megawati but she remained diffident, and he was uncertain about how
secure their friendship was. One of the biggest obstacles seemed to be
people close to her who were counselling her not to trust him.
Tragically, Abdurrahman did much himself to damage his relationship
with Megawati by allowing his frustration with her to well up in his
off-the-cuff remarks about her. Abdurrahman seemed not to realise
that virtually everything he said, whatever the forum and whether he
liked it or not, was on the record. He frequently joked about Megawati
in a way that was bound to aggrieve her when his comments found their
way back to her, as they invariably did. In this, as in so many aspects of
his presidency, Abdurrahman played directly into the hands of his
opponents.
Even so, Megawati had not yet given up hope in Abdurrahman. On
Tuesday, 18 July, she urged her supporters to go easy on Gus Dur, say-
ing: ‘I ask PDI Perjuangan members at the house to behave properly
and normally during the hearing.’ Many within PDI-P were still
intensely angry over the sacking of Laksamana and also the sugges-
tion that Abdurrahman had accused him of being corrupt. The depth
of feeling against Abdurrahman was made plain when 332 members
of the 500-member parliament signed a petition calling for the inter-
pellation.
7@8
By then the text of his speech for Thursday, 20 July, had already been
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
crafted. Most of the work had been done by his Cabinet Secretary,
Marsillam Simanjuntak, but the time and direction were set by
Abdurrahman. If the members of parliament were angry with him, the
feeling was mutual. He felt strongly that the use of interpellation over
his dismissal of two cabinet ministers was inappropriate and could only
be explained in the context of a political push to topple him, or at least
undermine his authority. Consequently, the text of his interpellation
speech was angry. Although it had a scholarly tone and the main point
of the argument was objectively true, it left a negative impression. The
night before the speech was to be read, Abdurrahman got cold feet. He
had been pleading with Megawati to read the speech as was expected,
but she refused, unhappy with the content. As the text of the speech
had already gone to the House, it was not possible to cancel it.
On Thursday morning it was agreed that Djohan Effendi, as State
Secretary, would read the speech. There was no prospect now of a last-
minute reprieve from Megawati. Abdurrahman sat motionless on the
podium in the parliamentary building, subjected to several hours of
harsh criticism and tough questioning from the floor. Later many
expressed sympathy for his position; it is probable that if his response
had been more neutral and not so defensive and angry, he might well
have won the day. However, when Djohan read the seventeen-page
speech prepared by Marsillam any sympathy for Abdurrahman evapo-
rated. The text was a new defence of the president’s right to hire and fire
cabinet ministers, combined with sharp criticism of the House for seek-
ing to manipulate the interpellation process for party-political purposes.
That night Djohan described reading the speech as one of the most
difficult things he had ever done. It was completely at odds with
Djohan’s outlook and disposition; he felt deeply that the appropriate
response would have been to simply ask for forgiveness from the
House. Djohan urged Abdurrahman to think carefully about his writ-
ten response to the House the following day. That evening Djohan and
others set to work drafting a conciliatory letter asking for the under-
standing and forbearance of the members of parliament and promising
more thorough explanations of actions in the future. All through
Friday, Djohan and colleagues worked on the response. When
Abdurrahman rang Akbar Tandjung (chairman of the House) and
asked for an extension of the five o’clock deadline, it was granted.
When the letter was finally couriered to the parliamentary offices it
7@B
was examined and received well. Over the weekend three petitions were
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
circulated among members of parliament. The largest, with 252 signa-
tures, said, ‘We accept the President’s apology but insist that he give an
open explanation for firing two economic ministers’. The following
Monday Akbar Tandjung formally announced that the House was
deferring its response to the interpellation, along with further investi-
gation into Bulogate and Bruneigate, ahead of its recess for the annual
MPR session. For the time being, at least, it looked as if Abdurrahman
was safe.
Over the following week Abdurrahman met several times with
Megawati and with Akbar Tandjung and other leading figures in the
MPR. He felt confident that he had their understanding and that he
would be given more time for his government to prove itself. In all like-
lihood none of the power-brokers really wanted to topple him during
the August 2000 annual session. Megawati, who was the person most
likely to replace him, was apprehensive about receiving a poisoned chal-
ice. Moreover, she knew that, if PDI-P sided with Golkar to bring
down the president, there was every likelihood that she would experi-
ence a similar fate before twelve months were out. If Akbar Tandjung
were made vice-president, it would be easy for Golkar to push for
Megawati’s resignation as president and precipitate the automatic
ascension of Akbar Tandjung. Similarly, both Amien and Akbar prob-
ably recognised that, for now, there was no better choice than
Abdurrahman and that their own ambitions would be better served if
they were patient. Nothing, however, was certain.
!)1+'.->)'..1+(:
One encouraging development occurred on Tuesday, 1 August, when
Akbar Tandjung, Megawati and Amien Rais agreed to meet with
Abdurrahman and the Sultan of Yogyakarta at his palace. Ostensibly
the occasion was to celebrate the sultan’s birthday. In the Javanese cal-
endar this particular birthday was an important one and the sultan
explained it was for this reason that he was inviting the nation’s leaders
to his home. There is no doubt that the main aim of the meeting was
to try to consolidate consensus among the four leading political figures
ahead of the annual MPR session and to communicate that consensus
to the public.
Abdurrahman flew down to Yogyakarta early on Tuesday morning
and drove straight to the Yogyakarta palace. There he met Akbar
7@;
Tandjung and Megawati. Curiously, Amien was nowhere to be seen,

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
even though it was known that he had flown in the previous evening.
At noon the party moved a short distance down the road to the kraton
or Sultan’s Palace. An enormous crowd of waiting media was gathered
outside the gates as Abdurrahman’s party entered the palace compound.
The sultan had chosen the so-called Yellow Building as the site for the
meeting. The five leaders were to meet in the back room of the Yellow
Building, a seldom-used venue and one regarded as being of great spir-
itual importance. They were to be seated around a table used by the sul-
tan’s great-grandfather. Shortly after arriving, Abdurrahman,
Megawati, Akbar and the sultan together cut the top off the yellow rice
cone traditionally prepared for such occasions. Each received a portion
and ate together, a powerful symbol of consensus. Amien had not
arrived when the four retired to the special meeting room at the back of
the Yellow Building. Half an hour later he turned up looking anxious
and stern, and went straight into the meeting without comment.
While the five were meeting, news came through of a bomb explosion
in central Jakarta apparently involving the Philippines ambassador.
There was confusion as to who was behind it and exactly where it had
occurred, but it seemed likely that it was connected with Muslim sepa-
ratist activity in Mindanao in the south of the Philippines. While there
was no concrete evidence for this, circumstances encouraged everyone to
hope that that was the answer. The prospect of the bombing having a
local cause was a frightening one with the annual session of the MPR
only days away. An hour later the doors of the Yellow Building opened
and Amien came out, mumbled a brief greeting to those waiting outside,
and walked briskly out of the palace compound. About twenty minutes
later Megawati appeared, looking relaxed but saying little as she walked
to the gates of the kraton. The short conference was over. It was not until
half an hour later that Abdurrahman, Akbar and the Sultan appeared
together, walked leisurely to the gates and paused momentarily to speak
to the assembled media. There had early been an expectation that the
five would appear together (as they had in Ciganjur in November 1998)
at the kraton gates to explain their position to the assembled media, but
with Amien and Mega leaving separately this was not to be.
Abdurrahman later explained that the sultan had told him that the
historic meeting room would be the site of a spiritual contest and the
order in which individuals left would suggest something of their power.
Clearly, he said, Amien and Megawati had been overpowered. Inside
7@<
the kraton’s Yellow Building Amien and Megawati as individuals may
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
have been overpowered, but what it meant in Jakarta’s parliamentary
building was something else altogether.
The problem wasn’t so much with Amien or Megawati; rather, it lay
with those around them. Megawati had been increasingly influenced by
strong personalities who had only recently joined the party. Chief
among them was Arifin Panigoro, previously an active Golkar politician
and known to be a close friend of Ginanjar Kartasasmita. Ginanjar had
been a long-serving minister under Soeharto, regarded as one of
Soeharto’s brightest and most able ministers. He was also said to have
been one of the most corrupt. American academic Jeffrey Winters
accused him of having strong links with the Freeport mine in Papua,
and some believed he had much to hide. Many observers saw links, not
just to Ginanjar and Arifin Panigoro, but also to Fuad Bawazier, direc-
tor of taxation and Minister for Finance in Soeharto’s last cabinet. Fuad
was one of Indonesia’s wealthiest businessmen; since the fall of
Soeharto he had built up strong ties with Amien Rais. Perhaps because
of his Arab ancestry it seemed natural for Fuad to support Amien’s new
party; in any case, he came to be one of PAN’s leading financial back-
ers. By August 2000 Fuad seemed to have established enormous influ-
ence both over Amien and his party. He managed to secure a position
for himself as head of the Reform Faction in the MPR, representing
PAN and Islamist parties such as PBB and PK.
4!0+(:)1&.)'3%
Although they met every two or three days and talked on the phone
every day, the relationship between Abdurrahman and Megawati
remained troubled. Apart from Megawati’s own personal grounds for
annoyance, another destabilising factor was a clique of personalities
within Megawati’s party who were determined to turn her against
Abdurrahman. Even without such factors, however, the relationship
had always been a fraught one. Although there was genuine affection
between the two, communication had never been ideal. Since the mid-
dle of 1999 their meetings had mostly consisted of small talk. Either
Megawati did not know how to make her point to Abdurrahman or she
was uncertain about what she wanted; matters of substance were sel-
dom raised in their meetings. Consequently, although things had been
going reasonably well during July, on the eve of the MPR session
Megawati was still reluctant to read the presidential address.
7@=
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
When the MPR assembled on the morning of 7 August, many of

his supporters were fearful that that Abdurrahman might repeat his
interpellation performance. Instead, he delivered a conciliatory,
exquisitely judged and unscripted speech and then handed over to
Marsillam Simanjuntak, who read the carefully crafted presidential
progress report. The latter was solid, and consequently in places dif-
ficult to digest, but the overall tone was contrite and polite. It was
exactly the sort of speech that should have been delivered to parlia-
ment in July.
Many of the details of the progress report were in a series of appen-
dixes attached to the speech. These had been distributed to all members
of the House, but when the members came to make their response the
following day it was obvious that few had read them. Critics pointed
out that the progress report skipped many of the details, that it was too
broad-brush and visionary in nature. However, it was unlikely that
more could have been included in the body of the report and, in any
case, the appendixes addressed most of the issues raised.
The mood in Jakarta changed as soon as the speech was delivered.
Suddenly the hope of many observers that somehow the beleaguered
president would manage to turn things around seemed realistic. He
seemed to have learnt some important lessons from the experience of
interpellation and was trying hard not to repeat his mistakes at this
more important annual session of the MPR. The next day the eleven
factions in the MPR were allotted half an hour each to make their
responses. Half a dozen factions were scheduled to present the reports
in the afternoon, with the remaining five to be delivered after a two-
hour evening meal break.
Just as the presidential progress report had been some months in
preparation, it is likely that the critical responses to it had been largely
crafted in the weeks leading up to the Assembly. Consequently, the
speeches were expected to be largely critical, referring to the points
raised earlier in the interpellation. The first three or four faction
responses were surprisingly positive. The faction representing PPP, for
example, was critical, as expected, but also acknowledged the tone of
contrition in the president’s speech on the previous day. Similarly, the
faction representing the armed forces and the police made a number of
predictable criticisms, particularly regarding Abdurrahman’s handling
of secessionist movements and communal violence. But the overall tone
of the response was much more positive than had been expected. So too
7@D
was the case with the other reports up to the time when the final
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
response before the evening meal break was to be delivered.
The last report that afternoon was by the Reform Faction. It was
said, with good evidence, that the entire speech had been scripted by
Fuad Bawazier. Over the previous two weeks Fuad had invested con-
siderable time and energy, and very likely other resources, in engaging
with the media in an angry campaign against the president. Fuad did
not however, read the speech to the Assembly. Instead it was read by a
young woman dressed in traditional Islamic jilbab (head scarf ) who
spoke with a firm but pious tone of voice.
From the outset the speech was sharply critical. It was said later that
many members of the Reform Faction were embarrassed by the angry
tone of the speech. The criticism had become increasingly personal dur-
ing the latter section and accused Abdurrahman of being a hypocrite,
failing to live up to his title of Kiai Haji as well as failing as a religious
leader to fulfil the hopes of the people. The final part of the speech was
peppered with texts from the Qur’an and the Hadith referring to tyran-
ny and injustice and accused the president of the worst hypocrisy and
betrayal of his own principles. By the time the speech came to its angry
close, with the speaker virtually yelling, there was a deep sense of dis-
quiet in the Assembly.
The rest of the faction responses that evening followed a predictably
critical line and harangued the president for having failed to turn
Indonesia around over the previous two months. In particular, the
Reform Faction response appeared to have overplayed its hand by being
too personally critical, but the subsequent responses, though less per-
sonal, were also considered to have been unreasonable and unrealistic in
their tone. Taken together, the eleven speeches blamed the president for
almost every mishap and tragedy that had befallen Indonesia over the
previous year. The following morning most commentators agreed that
the criticisms had gone well beyond what was reasonable. Some point-
ed out that the president alone was not responsible for the economic
team; others like Kwik Kian Gie and PDI-P also bore some responsi-
bility, and yet none of this was acknowledged.
The next morning Abdurrahman rose at four o’clock as usual and
went for an early-morning walk. He was in good spirits and joked
about the events of the previous day. The anger and sadness that had
been evident the previous evening had been replaced by his usual non-
chalance and quiet confidence. The previous day he had, unusually,
76A
taken a nap in his hotel suite, from 10 am until 1 pm, a clear sign of the
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
emotional pressure upon him. He had also met with media and with
other senior colleagues that afternoon and had clearly been anxious
about the speeches that were to come. Now, he felt that the worst was
over; whatever happened, things were going to turn for the better.
Throughout the day politicians and others came and went from his
suite as final adjustments were made to the speech for that evening. The
president’s speech on Wednesday evening was to be a reply to the
responses to his Monday accountability speech. In the previous session
of the MPR it was in this speech in particular that former President B.J.
Habibie failed to make a sufficient response to the criticisms levelled
against him. The fact that Habibie then lost the accountability vote was
a reminder of how important it was to get this final speech right.
One of the most surprising elements about the previous night’s
speech, and no doubt the one that had been the focus of all the discus-
sions and comings and goings from the presidential suite over the pre-
vious two days, was a reference to the delegation of daily tasks to the
vice-president. Throughout the eleven faction responses on Tuesday,
the theme of the president’s inability to handle day-to-day administra-
tion — partly because of his blindness and poor health, and partly
because of his personality — was constantly brought up. In his Monday
speech Abdurrahman had mentioned that in his new cabinet, which
was to be formed after the annual session was concluded, he wanted to
hand a lot of day-to-day authority over to a senior minister. Most of the
eleven factional speeches on Tuesday picked up this point, with many
arguing strongly that any significant delegation of duties should be to
the vice-president, rather than a third party. Ironically, most of the
seven hundred members of the House, including many within her own
party, would ordinarily have been critical of Megawati’s ability to han-
dle day-to-day management and sceptical about her capacity to do a
better job than Abdurrahman. The next day, however, in all the speech-
es, she was portrayed as the natural and rightful heir who would of
course be able to make up for the shortcomings of the president.
Many of the factional responses that day alluded to the need to divide
the president’s authority between the vice-president and the president,
some even going as far as to say that the president should henceforth be
a symbolic figure like a university chancellor, with the real power being
wielded by the vice-president. There was a suggestion that such a major
shift should be spelt out in a resolution in the annual session.
76@
Consequently, when Abdurrahman himself referred to the handing of
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
duties to the vice-president, it caught everyone by surprise. This was
the last thing they thought that he would do, given that it had been the
major thrust of substantive attacks upon his authority the previous day.
Not surprisingly then, Thursday, 10 August, saw most of the domestic
and international media in Jakarta in a whirl.
Few understood exactly what the president had meant the previous
night. To those close to him, however, it was perfectly clear. The words
of his speech had been chosen carefully. They spoke of delegating daily
tasks to the vice-president. There was no mention of sharing authority.
It was also spelt out that the vice-president would work closely with
two senior ministers who would be styled as co-ordinating ministers
and together these three would report to the president. While it was not
exactly Abdurrahman’s ‘plan A’, it seemed clear all the same that ‘plan
B’ was not substantially different from his original plan. Given
Megawati’s personality and abilities, it was clear that the work would be
carried by the two co-ordinating ministers. There did not seem to be a
major shift involved at all, since a month earlier Abdurrahman had
spoken privately of the need to involve her on a daily basis in consulta-
tion with these senior ministers and to draw her more into day-to-day
tasks, like running cabinet meetings.
Nevertheless, there was great confusion in the media. Some spoke
erroneously of the president delegating authority to the vice-president;
some saw it is a dangerous move against the presidential nature of the
Indonesian constitution; others welcomed the shift with glee, inter-
preting it to be a final collapse of Abdurrahman’s authority. On
Thursday morning, Abdurrahman flew to Bandung to address an
assembly at the Institute of Technology and then flew northeast to
Banjarmasin in Central Kalimantan. At both venues he hinted at his
intentions in the previous night’s speech stressing that he was not
speaking about the diminution of presidential authority, which, he
pointed out, was against the Indonesian Constitution. By the close of
Thursday the picture seemed a little clearer.
The question now on everyone’s mind was not whether the presi-
dent would be impeached, but whether his enemies within the
Assembly would move to formalise the delegation of tasks to the
vice-president via an official recommendation ratified by the
Assembly. If this arrangement were formalised by the Assembly it
would not automatically block Abdurrahman’s plans, but it would
766
narrow the space in which he had to work. If, however, he succeeded

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
in spelling out the task-sharing with a presidential decree, rather

than with a MPR decree, then it was likely that he would lose very
little authority and the decree could not be used against him in six to
twelve months’ time. There was a real danger that the Assembly’s
decree might have been malevolently crafted in such a way as to serve
as a constitutional trap for the president, particularly if Megawati
failed to live up to the expectations of such a decree and the blame
for her performance could then be sheeted home to the president.
Most of the Assembly members were staying in five-star accommo-
dation at the Hilton or at the Hotel Mulia close to the parliamentary
complex. Abdurrahman preferred to sleep at home in his usual bed-
room in the palace. At Megawati’s request, however, he shifted to the
Hilton on Friday night and stayed there throughout the weekend.
Megawati had argued that it was important for them to be in constant
contact, and with rooms on the same floor it was easy for her and oth-
ers to drop by and talk with him. It was to be a busy weekend with
numerous discussions.
The following day the eleven MPR factions were scheduled to present
their replies to the president’s response. Much of the negativity of the
previous Tuesday was absent; most factions welcomed the president’s
contrition and willingness to learn from past mistakes. Predictably,
although some of the more critical factions, like the Reform Faction and
Golkar, said that the president was on notice, most of the heat seemed to
have gone out of the previous week’s criticism. That evening
Abdurrahman sat in his suite joking with old friends Djohan Effendi,
Mohamad Sobary and Marsillam Simanjuntak and was in good spirits.
Marsillam read him the text of the next day’s State of the Nation
speech. It was solid but lacked the grace and eloquence of the first
speech. As Marsillam was going over the text a final time, news came
through that Megawati was also rehearsing the speech. She had previ-
ously indicated that she was not willing to read the State of the Nation
speech, but now it appeared that she would, and she did so the follow-
ing morning. The language of the address was unfortunately overly
bureaucratic, and in tone reminiscent of speeches from the previous era,
but the substance was regarded as being credible. It spoke of modest
plans for the following twelve months and a vision for the nation’s
recovery. It was well received. No doubt that was partly because, as orig-
inally planned, it was the vice-president who read it.
767
There was a sense now that the worst was over. The MPR session
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
was scheduled to conclude on Friday, but a technical possibility
remained that it could be extended, if need be, into the following week.
The warm response to Megawati’s delivery of the State of the Nation
speech suggested that there would be no further developments at the
annual Assembly, and it was unlikely that an Assembly decree regard-
ing the delegation of tasks between vice-president and president would
be tabled.
/31+'+,')%.1$%(,
The next day, Thursday, 17 August, was a historic one, for it was
Indonesia’s National Day. For weeks extensive preparations had been
made around the city and especially in the Presidential Palace gardens,
where great podiums had been constructed and the garden decked out
in all manner of lights and other curious structures. Also, a vast tempo-
rary veranda had been built onto the section of the palace facing back
towards the Monas square. The scale of these preparations for a one-
day celebration seemed amazing, but members of the presidential staff
pointed out that the National Day had been celebrated with even more
fervour under Soeharto and that the most amazing celebrations had
been held the previous year under President Habibie. Some lamented
the fact that Abdurrahman, concerned about the nation’s economic
position and the cost of such preparations, had asked for a relatively
low-key celebration. Even so, there was a festive and colourful mood
throughout the day at the Presidential Palace, and in the evening when
ambassadors and dignitaries dined with the president inside the palace,
thousands joined in the feast outside in the gardens.
One significant difference between this celebration and those of the
previous three decades was that half of the invited guests were ordinary
people. People from every region of Indonesia had been invited to
attend, with every local agency being asked to send a couple of guests.
Consequently, much like the Lebaran (the fast-breaking day at the
beginning of the year) when the palace had been opened to members of
the public, there was a curious atmosphere around the grounds as
ambassadors and cabinet ministers were joined by citizens from every
walk of life. No doubt the fact that the annual MPR session had gone
far better than anyone had dared hope led to the relaxed and joyous
atmosphere that pervaded the palace grounds that day.
768
Friday, 18 August, saw the closing session of the annual Assembly.

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
Only days before it had looked as if the Assembly might end with a
bang, but it was ending with a whimper. As chairman Amien Rais read
a short speech, there were a few moments of prayer and then, with a tap
of the gavel, the MPR was declared closed until the following year.
!,,.'"-+(:)!)(.*)0!"+(.1
The sound of Amien Rais’ gavel on the heavy wooden desk at the front
of the parliamentary Assembly signalled freedom for Abdurrahman
Wahid. Barring disasters, he would not face the Assembly for another
twelve months, and he now had a chance to go ahead and put together
a cabinet of his own choice. To have come through the Assembly as well
as he did exceeded the expectations of most observers. By its close
Abdurrahman, though chastened, had strengthened his position. All he
had to do now was put together a credible cabinet, while reinforcing the
coalition relationship between his and Megawati’s party, and he would
have the basis of a strong government for at least twelve months. Few
things with Abdurrahman, however, are ever entirely straightforward.
Shortly after the close of the annual session Abdurrahman flew to
Yogyakarta. There it was planned to hold a special ceremony involving
a ruwetan, a special wayang kulit performance intended to secure bless-
ing. The ruwetan had been scheduled to be held several weeks earlier
ahead of the MPR session but for various political reasons it had been
postponed. Many non-Javanese and many modernist Muslims in Java
would be inclined to dismiss the ruwetan as fairly inconsequential. For
those who believed, however, such things were of great importance. The
ruwetan went on late at night on the campus of the University of
Yogyakarta. Abdurrahman sat with his family and the Sultan of
Yogyakarta, together with a number of leading intellectuals from across
the country. The ruwetan wayang kulit ceremony involves a ritual
bathing much like a traditional Javanese wedding. This baptism can be
done directly on the person for whom the ruwetan is being held, as a
way of conferring blessing, or by proxy. In this case it was by proxy.
Eleven people, mostly academics and intellectuals, were to participate
in the ceremony as proxies for Abdurrahman. The ceremony conclud-
ed at around 1 am, when the eleven were richly sprinkled with flower-
scented water. Even those who do not believe in the power of such
rituals to ward off ill recognised that it was significant that the Sultan
of Yogyakarta, a charismatic and popular social leader, had organised
76B
this ruwetan on the president’s behalf. It was perhaps also significant
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
that Megawati did not join in the ceremony.
Abdurrahman returned to Jakarta early Saturday morning and spent
the next two days in discussion and deliberation about the formation of
a cabinet. It might have been thought that he had worked out the cab-
inet well in advance but there was little sign that this was the case.
Indeed, even a week before he had been revising the number of min-
istries and working out exactly how to reduce thirty-five posts to twen-
ty-three. Some aspects had clearly been on his mind for a long time,
even before the involvement of Bambang Yudhoyono and Rizal Ramli
had been thought through. Similarly, the decision to keep many of his
existing ministers who had proved trustworthy and competent was fair-
ly straightforward, although some only had their fate assured at the last
moment.
Most observers, particularly his supporters, expected that he would
work closely with Megawati in forming the new cabinet. The pair did
meet over several days and had a number of conversations about the
cabinet line-up. Nevertheless Abdurrahman said that he found it diffi-
cult to work out exactly what it was that she wanted from the cabinet.
Many from Megawati’s side would say that she experienced difficulty in
persuading the president what she wanted. Some indication of
improved relations came on Sunday when a celebratory dinner was held
in Alwi Shihab’s home to give thanks for the fact that the annual ses-
sion had gone well. Not only did Megawati attend looking relaxed, but
she sat next to Abdurrahman and Amien Rais. She even went so far as
to make an impromptu speech, which for Megawati was a strong indi-
cation that she was feeling comfortable.
If a good credible cabinet could now be secured, the future looked
bright for both of them. Given that the efforts of Abdurrahman’s ene-
mies to turn Megawati against him had largely come to nought, it was
likely that they would now have a period of relative peace in which to
get on with their work. There still remained, however, the question of
economic recovery. An even more important challenge was the reining
in of inter-communal violence that had broken out across the country.
For some time Abdurrahman had been planning to travel to the
regional city of Poso in Central Sulawesi. Although they had received
relatively little attention in the national media, developments in Poso
showed eerie similarities with the outbreak of violence some distance to
the east in the island city of Ambon. Violence had first broken out in
76;
Poso late in 1998. It is difficult to be sure of all the reasons involved,

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
but socio-economic differences and the influx of economic migrants

were contributing factors. The initial violence, however, arose out of an
apparently trivial incident between youths, much as it had in Ambon.
In April 2000 the violence had flared up again, taking on a religious
colour as inhabitants of Poso and surrounding villages aligned them-
selves according to their faith. Numerous churches were destroyed and
Christian homes attacked. The following month a third wave occurred,
which appeared to be Christian revenge on those who had attacked
them in April.
The government formally acknowledged that over two hundred peo-
ple had died in the violence, although some NGOs argue that it may
have been as many as five times that number. Some 23 000 refugees fled
the area. At one point Poso was 90 per cent empty, with around 5000
homes destroyed. Knowing these facts, however, was little preparation
for the impact of arriving in Poso.
The drive in from the airport revealed scenes of destruction much
like those to be found in Dili. The devastation seemed almost total.
Most of the timber homes had been burnt to the ground, leaving only
stumps. Where homes had been made of brick, only the walls were left
standing, on which, more often than not, graffiti had been scrawled in
charcoal.
As the presidential convoy passed a cluster of burned-out houses just
outside the airport, there was time to read an ugly message scored
across one home saying ‘Thanks for your work now just wait for pay-
ment’. Almost every home had similar graffiti often expressing the
same black humour. At the traditional ceremony in Poso that
Abdurrahman had come to witness, various communities pledged their
commitment to work together to solve the violence, and to cement this
declaration a large bull’s head was buried. Ominously, even as the dec-
laration was being read out it was met by loud jeering from off to one
side of the assembly.
The visit was a reminder of the sort of challenges facing
Abdurrahman. How many more Posos would there be? How many
more Ambons? The violence appeared to have come out of nowhere
and yet escalated into a firestorm that was now hard to extinguish.
Few expected that the declaration that day would give any more than
temporary respite. The real solution involved much more difficult
measures.
76<
When he returned home, Abdurrahman had still not finalised his
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
cabinet line-up. The previous day he had cancelled all meetings to con-
centrate on the new cabinet and he seemed wearied by the task.
Relations with Megawati appeared good but nevertheless remained
uncertain.
The next day, Wednesday, 23 August, Abdurrahman decided to make
his cabinet announcement that afternoon. He was due to travel to
Bandung on Thursday and then Surabaya on Friday; consequently he
had to make the announcement either on Wednesday afternoon or on
Saturday. Megawati, being cautious, and not yet entirely comfortable
with the composition of the new cabinet, wanted the announcement
delayed until Saturday. Abdurrahman, however, opted to push ahead on
Wednesday, catching both the domestic and international media off
guard. This, possibly, was a mistake.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Abdurrahman decided to push
ahead in announcing the cabinet, despite Megawati’s clear preference
for delay, was his concern about last-minute pressure and political
lobbying, of the sort which had contributed greatly to the bloating of
the numbers of the previous cabinet in the twenty-four hours preced-
ing the announcement. At around three o’clock on Wednesday,
Megawati arrived at the palace and went to speak to Abdurrahman in
his office, the room used by her late father when he was president. By
this stage a large media throng had assembled at the front of the
palace awaiting a press conference, although it appears many were
caught off guard by the rapidity of developments. At 4.15 pm
Megawati left. The atmosphere was tense. It seemed that
Abdurrahman had a good cabinet line up, but the big uncertainty was
Megawati’s reaction. When Abdurrahman left his office and walked
around the front of the palace to face the media throng, the glaring
absence of Megawati was immediately interpreted as a bad sign. At
short notice Marsillam was drafted to read the new cabinet list as
Megawati left for home. Megawati had felt uncomfortable about
pressing ahead with the announcement and explained that she was
not ready to make a public appearance; she said that she needed to go
home and bathe and change before she faced the media.
Marsillam read out the list of names. The cabinet was not what had
been expected. Besides the president and vice-president, there were
twenty-three names. Fifteen of them were members of the previous
cabinet, and with one or two exceptions most of these were predictable;
76=
eight of them were new. As many analysts later agreed, it was a solid
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
selection. Abdurrahman had said that 60 per cent of the ministers in his
new cabinet would be non-party political professionals, and that
appeared to be the case. Eleven of them had PhDs.
None of the new ministers had strong political affiliations.
Mohammad Mahfud, the new Minister for Defence, a Madurese con-
stitutional law expert from Yogyakarta, had loose connections with
PPP; the new Minister for Culture and Tourism was a member of
Megawati’s party, as was Bungaran Saragih, the new Minister for
Agriculture and Forestry. The initial impression was that Megawati had
no members in the cabinet. Abdurrahman later explained that, apart
from the two ministers just mentioned, Megawati had specifically
expressed her wish for Agum Gumelar to remain as Minister for
Transportation and Telecommunications, evidently because she still
believed that he had helped her in her initial to bid to become head of
PDI-P; she had also requested that Sonny Keraf remain as Minister for
the Environment. However, the perception was that PDI-P had missed
out badly. Later it also became evident that this cabinet was distin-
guished by the elimination of Golkar. All these details were overshad-
owed by Megawati’s absence when the cabinet was announced, which
was interpreted as a sign of disapproval, and by surprise at the appoint-
ment of the Finance Minister, Prijadi.
Most agreed that the appointment of General Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono as Co-ordinating Minister for Political Security and Social
Affairs was a sensible move. Slightly more contentious was the appoint-
ment of Rizal Ramli as Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, but
he also was regarded as credible. The choice of Mahfud as Minister for
Defence was much more criticised on the grounds that it seemed
strange to give that portfolio to someone with no defence experience
and whose expertise lay in legal reform. Abdurrahman explained that
this was exactly the reason for the appointment, because he felt the
main challenge facing the military and police was legal reforms and
sorting out ‘the mare’s nest of tangled’ legal jurisdictions. He intended,
he said, for the new minister to work side-by-side with the Justice
Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra in resolving many of the complicated
legal issues.
This contentious approach in itself could have been accepted, but
the choice of Prijadi Praptosuhadjo gave rise to the call that this was a
crony cabinet. Prijadi had failed the test set by Bank Indonesia to
76D
determine whether he was a ‘fit and proper’ candidate for a post at the
!)"%+.4)&/(.>'//(2)@DDDG6AAA
head of the People’s Bank of Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia —
BRI), where he had spent his career working in the area of rural
finance. Many commentators returned to this point in the days that
followed. Fuad Bawazier, for example, said at a major seminar in
Jakarta that he was worried that a man ‘so lacking in integrity’ was
Finance Minister. Abdurrahman explained that he’d known Priyadi for
sixteen years and was confident that there was no question of his
integrity. Instead, Abdurrahman said, he’d been the victim of political
infighting in the central bank led by Bank Indonesia governor Syahril
Sabirin and his colleagues, all them Soeharto appointees.
Abdurrahman had clearly expected that the new cabinet would be well
received. It was, after all, solid and professional, if lacking in some of
the big-name stars of the previous cabinet, but a cloud hung over it
because of the appointment of Priyadi and Mafud and because of the
perception that Megawati was unhappy with the new line-up.
Having almost miraculously escaped the traps set for him in the
annual session, it seemed to be a small matter for Abdurrahman to go
ahead and appoint a cabinet that was met with broad approval. Instead
he took a high-risk option, choosing people he felt would work as a
team and would be personally loyal to himself. The previous cabinet
had worked poorly, largely because of political infighting, but also
because of contests of egos among the stars who occupied some of the
top positions. If Abdurrahman had chosen a popular figure such as
Feisal Basri or Sri Mulyani as Economics Minister and included sever-
al of Megawati’s senior party officials, then the cabinet would have been
well received. Instead, it was interpreted as a gamble. Compounding
matters was the impromptu press conference which followed the
announcement. When asked why Megawati was not there,
Abdurrahman joked that she had said she wanted to take a bath.
Instead the rupiah took a bath as the currency tumbled by 5 per cent.
Was Abdurrahman being courageous, wily, wilful or just plain reckless?
As with so many questions about Abdurrahman, the right answer
appears to be all of the above.
1*.-?.
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@DDDG6AA@
:.11+(:)/44)1/)!)"!#),1!%1
In many respects Abdurrahman’s new cabinet was a step in the right
direction. Few disagreed that a reshuffle was required, because the first
cabinet had performed poorly. And while there was debate about one or
two of the new cabinet ministers, notably Finance Minister Prijadi and
Minister for Defence Muhammad Mahfud, once things had settled
down there was general agreement that it was a competent and profes-
sional cabinet, albeit one largely of the president’s own choosing. The
problem was not so much the outcome as the process, or rather, the per-
ception of the process. H.S. Dillon, adviser to both President Wahid
and Vice-President Megawati, commented in response to a question
from The Jakarta Post in early September about how he viewed the gen-
esis of the cabinet: ‘Gus Dur possesses superior intelligence. He could
have finessed it, and got what he wanted without ruffling any feathers.
Such rash behaviour does not bode well for the legacy of a great vision-
ary, a true democrat and a real humanist.’1
For the president’s political opponents, however, the perception that
he had ridden roughshod over Megawati was not necessarily a source of
genuine personal concern. Golkar, in particular, saw itself as being in a
77@
win-win situation. If the president failed, it would be to their benefit. If
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
he succeeded, they were in any case in no position to move into power
ahead of the 2004 elections, needing at least that period of time to
begin the process of rehabilitating their reputation. Parliamentary
speaker and Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung put it this way: ‘If the
Cabinet fails to perform well, the Peoples Consultative Assembly will
be firm in evaluating the government in the next annual session.’2
The other controversial aspect of the new cabinet following the
August 2000 MPR session was that the president had agreed to hand
over much of the day-to-day administration of government to his vice-
president. In its 1 September issue The Jakarta Post noted:
Following a statement before the Peoples Consultative Assembly

earlier this month President Abdurrahman Wahid issued a decree
authorising Megawati to run the daily technical affairs of govern-
ment. However the stipulations contained in Decree No. 121 give lit-
tle executive power to the Vice President other than as an
administrator of the Cabinet.
As if further emphasising the overlying authority of the President,
the decree also instructs Megawati to employ the services of the State
Secretariat’s office and other presidential aides to assist her.
Only if necessary can she seek assistance of her own vice presiden-
tial secretariat staff, the decree stipulates.3
The precise details of the agreement to hand over administration to

Megawati were to be all-important because the perception that
Abdurrahman had failed to live up to his end of the bargain became
entrenched over the following months. In fact, days after she become
president Megawati herself testified a little less then twelve months
later in an interview with Time magazine that:
It is important to manage this transition smoothly. I have already

been part of the government as Vice President. After I was given
more responsibility for the handling of daily affairs through last year’s
Presidential Decree 212, I feel that I have gained much experience in
administrative affairs. …
Time: Will you delegate authority to your Vice President under an
arrangement similar to when you were Vice President?
Megawati: There are already regulations which state that the Vice
776
President is supposed to be the President’s assistant. But there will be

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
a difference. The last yearly session of the People’s Consultative

Assembly resulted in a presidential decree that handed more respon-
sibility to the Vice President because of Gus Dur’s shortcomings.
However, we agreed in the Special Session, that that decree is going
to be revoked and those tasks are going to be returned to the hands
of the President.4
Even though The Jakarta Post, for example, had stressed the limited
nature of the transfer when reporting on it at the beginning of
September 2000, it later opined that the president had reneged on the
deal. In fact, the problem was that the deal was flawed in the first place.
It was also unclear how far the vice president availed herself of the
opportunity to play a greater role in day-to-day government. Certainly,
Abdurrahman made matters worse by succumbing to a temptation to
micro-manage, thereby reinforcing the perception that he was not pre-
pared to share power. Whatever the case, the arrangement agreed to
after the August session ultimately proved unsatisfactory on all sides.
/(:/+(:),.01!%+!()?+/-.(0.
From the first days of the Wahid presidency it was clear that one other
major challenge facing democratic Indonesia was the resolution of sec-
tarian and communal conflict. This conflict was to prove a major line of
attack against the embattled president over the coming months. After
all, his critics observed, the president had spent the whole of his public
career campaigning against sectarian violence, so why was he incapable
of resolving it now that he was president? Abdurrahman for his part
was deeply disturbed by the ongoing conflict whether in Maluku,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi or back home in Java. He was concerned because
of a genuine, deeply felt aversion to such divisions. He was also frus-
trated as a political leader because of his conviction that the conflict
was, at least in some cases, artificially engineered as part of a cynical
campaign to discredit his administration.
In Jakarta there were some expressions of sectarianism which were
disturbing but fortunately these had not developed to the point of seri-
ous bloodshed. This was the case with groups such as the Defenders of
Islam Front (Front Pembela Islam — FPI), whose regular attacks on
cafés and bars in Jakarta often caused considerable damage to property
but seldom resulted in serious injury or loss of life.
777
This sort of moral vigilantism took a worrying turn in mid-October
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
2000, when dozens of men clad in green military-style uniforms burst
into several international hotels in the city of Surakarta in central Java;
they demanded that the hotel management bring out any American
guests so that they could be ‘rounded up and expelled from the coun-
try’. The US State Department was alarmed enough to issue a travel
advisory warning for Americans travelling to Indonesia.
While the activity of groups such as FPI in Jakarta and other cities
on Java was essentially symbolic, the violence that was occurring in
Sulawesi and Maluku was of a different nature altogether. Fortunately,
in the city of Poso in Central Sulawesi, the temporary truce that had
been negotiated during Abdurrahman’s visit continued to hold and a
degree of calm began to return to the troubled province. Nevertheless,
periodic eruptions of violence continued and most of the tens of thou-
sands of refugees who had been forced to flee their homes — south-
wards in the case of Christians, northwards in the case of Muslims —
were afraid to return home, leaving the city of 400 000 people largely
deserted. By this point the total number of internally displaced people
in Indonesia was fast approaching one million.
Tragically, the islands of Maluku continued to experience horrific
acts of violence. One particularly awful incident occurred in mid-
January when hundreds of Christians, including pregnant women and
children, were rounded up and barbarically assaulted, being forcibly cir-
cumcised as part of their forced conversion to Islam. Besides the psy-
chological trauma of the violent conversion, there were grave concerns
about infection because the circumcisions, including female genital
mutilation, were performed with unsterilised razors and old knives.
Apparently, local Islamic leaders had been obliged to participate in the
forced conversion of their Christian neighbours by a group of radical
extremists who had come into their village of Kesuai. When the group
of 172 Christians were later evacuated to Ambon, these leaders spoke
of their trauma and their fear that resistance would have resulted in
their immediate execution at the hands of menacing young men wield-
ing large knives and machetes.
-!,9!%)H+&!#
For some months Abdurrahman had been intensely frustrated by his
inability to bring the violence in Maluku to a rapid halt. In September
he declared martial law in the region in an effort to clamp down on the
778
free movement of people across the islands. Despite this the violence
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
dragged on; his many critics pointed an accusing finger at him, saying
that the endless conflict was proof that he did not have what it took to
govern Indonesia at this difficult time. The accusation was particularly
galling because Abdurrahman was convinced that the violence in
Maluku was not purely organic and spontaneous in nature but was
being exacerbated by the presence of external forces such as Laskar
Jihad, who were clearly being aided and abetted by military personnel
and police on the ground. Groups such as Laskar Jihad must have had
some degree of support within the navy; otherwise it is difficult to see
how they could have moved around the archipelago so freely.
There was also strong evidence suggesting that Laskar Jihad was
financed by some of Abdurrahman’s political opponents such as Fuad
Bawazier, something that even Fuad Bawazier did not try to deny.
Moreover, local military personnel, both active and retired, were taking
sides in the violence and in some cases instigating it. Australian-based
scholar George Aditjondro identified retired Brigadier-General
Rustam Kastor of Ambon as the ideological father of the violence in
Maluku. In a book published in 2000, which sold in great numbers not
only in Maluku but also in Java and in Sulawesi, Kastor argued that a
conspiracy existed involving the separatist group the ‘South Maluku
Republic’ (Republik Maluku Selatan — RMS), the Protestant Church
of Maluku (Gereja Protestan Maluku — GPM) and Megawati’s PDI-
P. Aditjondro notes:
This is not where Kastor’s accusations end. He also accuses

Christians of manipulating the student-led Reformasi movement to
destroy the Indonesian economy and thereby promote the Republic’s
disintegration by separating the Christian-dominated provinces in
Eastern Indonesia — including East Timor — which would then
form a new Christian-dominated country with a fantastic natural
resources since it will include West Papua in the current province of
Maluku. The first step in this grand scheme is, according to the
author, the ‘breakaway’ of East Timor from Indonesia.5
Aditjondro goes on to state: ‘Apart from the more ideological inspira-

tion through his book, Kastor has also been personally involved in
sending Islamic vigilantes from Java to Maluku. He was one among the
six representatives of jihad forces who went to see President
77B
Abdurrahman in Merdeka Palace in Jakarta on Thursday, April 6.’
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
Aditjondro argues that parallels between Laskar Jihad and FPI suggest
that military officers such as Wiranto and Djadja Suparman, both
recently sacked by Abdurrahman, might be linked with the violence.
He also alleges that there are links between Laskar Jihad and the small
Islamist Justice Party (Partai Keadilan — PK).
1&.)"%.!9#/*()/4)1&.)'+-+1!%>
Although it is difficult to find conclusive evidence linking groups such
as Laskar Jihad to elements of the military in Maluku, it is clear that
one of the greatest problems facing Abdurrahman and post-Soeharto
Indonesia — perhaps greater even than the problem of communal and
sectarian unrest — was the breakdown of the Indonesian military. This
was tragically illustrated in early September 2000, when three UN aid
workers were stabbed and beaten to death in the town of Atambua in
West Timor, close to the border with East Timor. The incident
prompted Harold Crouch, long-time observer of the Indonesian mili-
tary, to say: ‘The fragmentation of the Indonesian military has reached
the point that they have difficulty controlling the situation in Timor
and elsewhere’, and ‘One likely explanation for what happened on
Wednesday in West Timor is that it was all manipulated from Jakarta.’6
Crouch is normally a conservative commentator not at all given to wild
speculation, so it is significant that he was prepared to suggest a mili-
tary conspiracy. Moreover, Crouch’s position was backed up by state-
ment from no less than the Co-ordinating Minister for Political and
Social Security Affairs, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who said,
‘I would not rule out the possibility of political motives behind this
incident’.7 A number of other military observers joined in, suggesting
that the evidence pointed to a co-ordinated and politically motivated
attempt to embarrass the president. This was certainly the way
Abdurrahman himself saw it. As it happened, at the time of the killings
Abdurrahman was in New York, where he was to address the UN
Millennium Summit. Consequently, he suffered the humiliation of
having the eyes of an unparalleled assembly of heads of state turn in his
direction as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed the United
Nations’ remorse and horror at the murder of its three workers in
Indonesia. Abdurrahman was convinced that the timing of the killings
was not accidental. ‘The timing was precisely selected while I was in
New York. The purpose was to humiliate me,’ he said.8
77;
Several days later former Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono issued

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
a statement warning that militias in West Timor were being funded by

elements linked with former President Soeharto.9 On the same day, a
court in Jakarta heard allegations that General Wiranto had ordered
the illegal printing of money to pay militias active in Timor at the time
of the August 1999 referendum.10
On a lighter note — in October the now retired general embarked on
a new career as a popular singer. Late that month Wiranto sang before
a packed house in a five-star hotel in Jakarta a selection of numbers
from his newly released CD titled ‘For You, My Indonesia’. The fol-
lowing day, addressing a conference in Jakarta, he spoke, apparently
without any trace of irony, about what he saw as ‘the subversion of the
law in Indonesia by political interests’. Wiranto concluded his address
by saying that it was his dream that the legal institutions would be
respectful, independent and legitimate so that people were assured of
justice, adding: ‘I am still doubtful that I will get justice.’11
1&.),/.&!%1/,)!(#)H$,1+0.5)!().F3-/,+?.)0/'"+(!1+/(
In mid-September, a day before the trial of former President Soeharto
was due to resume, a powerful explosion rocked the Jakarta Stock
Exchange. A bomb had exploded in the basement carpark, killing at
least fifteen people and injuring more than thirty. Although conclusive
evidence was not found, the sort of explosive used and the scale and
style of the attack strongly suggested military involvement. It was the
latest, and largest, of a series of bombings in the national capital since
Abdurrahman had become president. (Apart from the bomb attack that
almost claimed the life of the Philippines Ambassador and the attack
on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, there had also been an incident at the
Attorney-General’s Office where a bomb went off in the Attorney-
General’s private bathroom. Another more powerful device was found
before it had a chance to explode. Coincidentally or not, that incident
occurred at a time when Tommy Soeharto was under investigation by
the Attorney-General’s Office.) Political Commentator Wimar
Witoelar observed:
This latest offensive against the Wahid government comes in a sin-

ister double feature with immense public impact: Atambua and now
the shaking of the nation’s financial centres. This terrorism must stop
or the government will lose its hold.
77<
At least, the international community can now see that, as in the
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
Atambua case, the Wahid government in Indonesia’s new society are
the victims, not the perpetrators, of the violence. This the world must
understand before they push this government into a corner.12
The next day Defence Minister Mahfud was quoted by Reuters as sug-
gesting that it might be wise to call off the corruption trial against for-
mer President Soeharto in order to ensure that further violence did not
take place: ‘If we keep meddling with this matter we will not have time
to take care of other problems because we will continue to be harassed
… more terror will keep coming.’13 At the same time, Abdurrahman
issued a statement suggesting that Tommy Soeharto and his friend
Habib Ali Baagil, leader of the FPI, might be linked to the Stock
Exchange bombing. Abdurrahman then issued an order to the police
chief, Rusdihardjo, to arrest Tommy and take him in for questioning
regarding the Stock Exchange bombing. It’s not clear what evidence
Abdurrahman had, but the order was not entirely surprising, especially
since the bombing of the Attorney-General’s Office months earlier had
been linked to Tommy’s personal bodyguards. Habib Ali Baagil imme-
diately retaliated by threatening to sue Abdurrahman for slander and
denying any link with the bombing. Akbar Tandjung expressed his
regret that the president was so quick to point the finger at Tommy
Soeharto and that he had ordered his arrest. Speaking at a seminar in
Singapore, Akbar said, ‘We are now in the new era where the law is
supreme. You cannot arrest somebody if you don’t have evidence’.14
Further angering his opponents, Abdurrahman sacked national
police chief Rusdihardjo when he refused to comply with the request to
arrest Tommy Soeharto. In self-defence Abdurrahman argued that the
proper process of law had been shown to have failed miserably. He said
that the nation was in a Catch-22: unable to get sufficient co-operation
from the police and the military to obtain evidence to secure arrests,
and unable to arrest people because of deliberate obstruction from the
very people who should be obtaining the necessary evidence.
Abdurrahman was convinced that there were links between incidents
such as the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange and his efforts to
prosecute senior members of the former regime, most especially mem-
bers of the first family. Early in September while attending the UN
Millennium Summit in New York, he had said that if Soeharto was
unwilling or unable to appear in court personally he could be tried in
77=
absentia. ‘If he is summoned [again] but he still does not appear before
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
the court then he must be tried in absentia. That is the plan in my mind
and we have decided that as a punishment for him.’15 Days later, how-
ever, lawyers representing the former president defied requests for their
client, who they claimed was too ill to answer questions in a court of
law, to attend the next session of his corruption trial.
Some weeks later the supreme court sentenced Tommy Soeharto to
eighteen months in prison because of his involvement in a US$11 mil-
lion land-exchange scam with the State Logistics Agency, Bulog. This
was not regarded as being in any respect the greatest of Tommy’s
crimes, but the Attorney-General’s Office thought this case offered the
best chance of a successful prosecution. This judgment was proved
right, but Tommy failed to respond to a summons to arrest him and face
imprisonment. In the meantime his lawyers attempted to buy time
through legal manoeuvres over claims that proper paperwork had not
been served for the arrest. Tommy himself made it clear that he want-
ed to seek some sort of suspension or annulment of his sentence.
In a move which many thought represented a gross error of judg-
ment, Abdurrahman agreed to meet with Tommy Soeharto at the five-
star Borobudur Hotel near the Presidential Palace. The meeting was
private but, given the venue, it was hardly secret. The Borobudur Hotel
is run by the military as a business venture and is a popular meeting
spot for Jakarta’s elite. Both Tommy and Abdurrahman were accompa-
nied by modest entourages, which in Abdurrahman’s case consisted of
a collection of senior kiai. When news of the meeting broke,
Abdurrahman’s opponents seized on the opportunity to suggest that he
had tried broker a deal with Tommy. Abdurrahman also said that he
had stressed to Tommy that he should accept the modest jail sentence
and explained that there was no way in which the state could tolerate
his not going to jail. Even so Tommy protested, saying that his life
would be in danger if he went to jail and that the only condition on
which he would accept sentencing was that his personal bodyguards
accompanied him in jail. The next month, his legal avenues exhausted,
Tommy simply went to ground and evaded arrest.
3!1%+/1):!'.,5).$%+0/):$1.%%.,)!%%.,1.#
On 23 September, speaking at the installation ceremony of the new
national police chief, Abdurrahman described as shocking the news
that police had released key suspects in the murder of the three UN aid
77D
workers in Atambua. The police explained the release as having
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
occurred because of a technicality. Several days later the notorious for-
mer East Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres was arrested at a
Jakarta hotel. Although Guterres was suspected of being involved in the
killing of the three UN aid workers, his arrest was for weapons posses-
sion charges; these arose from his order to his men to seize weapons
which they had only minutes earlier handed over to police, during a
visit by Vice-President Megawati to West Timor. The arrest of
Guterres was welcomed in the West, and it also elicited surprising
expressions of sympathy from the Indonesian elite. Amien Rais imme-
diately spoke out in defence of Guterres, saying ‘He is our friend. He’s
the leader of the pro-integration militia and he lost his homeland. If
he’s arrested for the sake of the UN, then what a nasty country that
makes us’. He later added, ‘I think [the arrest] will set a very bad exam-
ple for our brothers in Irian Jaya and Aceh’.16
At the time of Eurico’s arrest, Abdurrahman was locked in a strug-
gle with military leadership over a shake-up of senior command posi-
tions. On 9 October there was a surprise announcement that the
appointment of a new Chief of Staff of Army, Navy and Air Force
would be postponed. At the same time a military spokesman
announced that reformist generals Agus Wirahadikusumah and Saurip
Kadi, who were both known to be close to the president and keen to
support him in reforming the military, were being disciplined for ‘hav-
ing breached the code of ethics of the Indonesian army’.17
'+-+1!%>),/-$1+/(,
One of the main areas of friction between Abdurrahman and senior
military personnel was his approach to handling secessionist move-
ments in provinces such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Abdurrahman’s civilian
opponents were quick to exploit this area of controversy. In early
September unrest erupted in Irian Jaya (parliament had yet to approve
Abdurrahman’s suggested change of name to Papua) as independence
supporters went on a rampage after police cut down flagpoles flying the
Morning Star flag. Akbar Tandjung immediately spoke out, saying
‘The government must be firm toward groups seeking to encourage
separatism. We cannot compromise on such movements’. He went on
to say, ‘Gus Dur should not allow rebels in Irian Jaya to advance their
separatist cause. This is not something we expect from the president.
Instead, he should promote unity and development’.18 On the same day
78A
Megawati spoke out in support of Akbar Tandjung’s statement, effec-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
tively criticising Abdurrahman’s conciliatory approach towards West

Papua independence supporters, which allowed them to fly the
Morning Star flag provided that it was positioned below the national
flag.
The statements by Akbar Tandjung and Megawati cast doubt on the
legality of flying the Morning Star flag, and consequently exposed the
West Papua activists to rough treatment by the local security personnel.
The elders of the Papuan Council Presidium lamented the dual policy
coming from Jakarta, blaming uncertainty about such things as permis-
sion to fly the flag for various bloody incidents, such as the one in which
as many as fifty-eight people were killed in the town of Wamena, 290
kilometres southwest of the capital, Jayapura. Following that incident,
Presidium members went to Jakarta to meet with Abdurrahman to talk
about ways of resolving the issue.
At the same time as Abdurrahman was struggling to impose a clear
policy position in Irian Jaya and seek a compromise between members
of the Presidium and the security apparatus, he was having difficulty
imposing his will on the military in the troubled province of Aceh. The
military commanders were furious with Abdurrahman for persisting in
seeking a negotiated solution when they argued that, given free rein,
they could quickly resolve the problems with a military operation. Even
so, Abdurrahman had more success in prevailing against the military
leadership with respect to Aceh than he did with Irian Jaya, possibly
because there was a greater degree of sympathy within parliament for
the plight of the Acehenese than for the Papuans. In early September
he was successful in temporarily extending a three-month humanitari-
an pause which had been on the point of expiring. Even so, the level of
violence in the province suggested that military personnel on the
ground were disobeying the presidential order for restraint. In fact,
some observers claimed that violence in Aceh was at record levels.
!)I'.,,>),1!1.C2)!().'"!11-.#)3%.,+#.(1
One month after the August annual session of the MPR any fleeting
trace of optimism had been replaced by a return, in double measure, of
the gloom that had prevailed in the run-up to the Assembly meeting.
The ongoing communal clashes, the spate of bombings and the break-
down of control over the military, as was evidenced by the Atambua
incident, and the failure to bring the former first family to heel, com-
78@
bined to paint a picture of an administration, and indeed a nation,
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
hopelessly adrift. In the first week in October, renowned New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman visited Indonesia. Writing in the
Times about his impressions, he had little to say that was positive.
Earlier, he observed, it had appeared that Indonesia was one of those
promising democratising nations, like Poland, Chile and Hungary, that
were emerging from years of military-backed authoritarian rule. Now,
he opined, it appeared as if Indonesia had fallen from that hopeful track
and become simply a ‘messy nation’ like Russia. Indonesia and Russia
were, he observed ‘too big to fail but too messy to work’. That left
Indonesia ahead of failed states like Sierra Leone and Liberia, but that
was scarcely any consolation for the world’s third-largest democracy.
In its editorial of 7 October, The Jakarta Post picked up Freidman’s
theme and declared: ‘Although it would be unfair to put the blame
entirely on President Abdurrahman Wahid, he has been a determinant
in this state of affairs. Likewise, he will be a crucial factor on whether
and when Indonesia will move back from being a messy to a democra-
tising state.’
Although a fiercely independent and professional broadsheet such as
The Jakarta Post still held a glimmer of hope for the Wahid presidency,
his political opponents were now ready to pounce on the embattled
president. On 18 October Amien Rais was quoted as saying that
Abdurrahman ‘has lost the plot on how to govern’. He went on to say,
by way of suggesting an alternative, that ‘Megawati and Akbar have a
broad appeal among legislators, unlike Gus Dur who appears to be los-
ing his grip’.19 Although in the past Amien had been fiercely critical of
Soeharto, and by extension Golkar, he had considerable respect for
Akbar Tandjung, not least because Akbar had at one stage led HMI.
For his part, Akbar, who was probably the nation’s most astute and
careful politician, made a point of downplaying Amien’s suggestion,
saying instead that ‘If Megawati fails as president, it will also reflect
badly with Golkar. It is better for us to remain in opposition until 2004.
Golkar’s target is for the next general election. Then, we will be there
seeking power’. He went on to explain that ‘We lost a lot of votes in the
last election because we were identified with the Soeharto regime. …
The climate then was not too favourable for us. But in 2004, we will
regain lost ground by winning over voters upset with the performance
of the PDI-P and the newer political parties’. As a Batak from North
Sumatra, Akbar might be expected to speak his mind, but in fact he is
786
exceedingly careful in what he says, weighing each word. On this occa-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
sion, however, it appears that he was indeed being perfectly frank. It

wasn’t that he and Golkar had no interest in toppling the Wahid
administration; it was just that, on balance, they had good reasons to be
ambivalent. Nevertheless, he was quoted the following day as saying
that it would be very hard for the beleaguered president to last until the
end of his term, given growing pressures in the MPR to topple him: ‘A
lot of legislators are increasingly frustrated with Gus Dur’s inability to
resolve our political and economic problems.’20
If Akbar Tandjung was hedging his bets, Amien made it perfectly
clear where he stood. Towards the end of October he went on record as
saying ‘I will pay for my sin by remaining in my position as Speaker of
the MPR’, when addressing a seminar organised by KAHMI (Korps
Alumni HMI), the powerful alumni association of HMI. Amien
explained that he was deeply repentant and regretful for having pro-
moted Abdurrahman to the presidency the previous year and spoke of
it as ‘his sin’. He justified his emotional response by saying ‘If Gus Dur
continues to be kept as president despite his failure to achieve political
and economic stability, there is a risk that Indonesia will break up’.21
Fortunately for Abdurrahman, several days later Megawati broke her
characteristic silence to lash out at critics of the government. ‘To all
those critics who frequently say the government is too slow in dealing
problems and not carrying out its duty, I want to ask, what have you
done besides criticising?’ she said, addressing a rally of PDI-P in
Surabaya. She added, ‘The government’s time has been wasted in
preparing for the annual session. [We should] minimise the manoeu-
vring of the political elite and create a working climate which is healthy
and calm for the government’.22
Further support came from an unexpected quarter when Habil
Marati, a parliamentarian from PPP who had been sacked from the
parliamentary committee investigating the Bulogate and Bruneigate
scandals, spoke out about his frustration with party-political oppor-
tunism in the parliament. He declared, ‘The Bulogate committee is a
huge conspiracy which is actually creating chaotic conditions in order
to bring down the president’.23
More support was forthcoming from the deputy head of the
Supreme Advisory Council, Agus Sudono, who declared in the middle
of November that toppling Abdurrahman would not solve the nation’s
problems, and ‘It would make a bad precedent for Indonesian democ-
787
racy because people would not believe in democracy’. He explained:
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
‘Whoever replaces the current government would also face demands to
stand down. Besides, if Gus Dur did stand down, his replacement
would not be as good as him.’ He went on to explain the reason for his
anxiety about the situation: ‘As a result, people will suffer. People will
suffer the consequences of horizontal conflict.’ He concluded: ‘If Gus
Dur did stand down, is there any guarantee that his replacement would
be better? His replacement would probably be forced to stand down. It’s
a joke. One only takes power for a short period, and then is forced to
stand down. We have had this kind of situation during liberal democ-
racy where power shifted so fast.’24
At the end of October Megawati appeared still unwilling to move
against the president. She explained, ‘If I were to choose, I would be
happy to remain chairman [of PDI-P], being a vice-president is tough.
It turns out that managing the country is no easy job’.25
If Megawati was undecided about whether to move against her old
friend and snatch the presidency from him, others were not wasting
time in seeking to ingratiate themselves with her. The military, in par-
ticular, was keen to make an ally of Megawati. It was not so much that
they had decided that Abdurrahman would definitely go — though
their good relationship with Megawati was a valuable insurance policy
should that eventuate — but that by working with Megawati they were
able to exercise leverage on Abdurrahman in a way that they had trou-
ble doing directly themselves.
The military was annoyed with Abdurrahman, not just by what they
saw as his intransigence in blocking military solutions in Aceh and
Irian Jaya, but also by his sympathy for international requests to hold
trials for perpetrators of human rights abuses in East Timor.
At the end of December Megawati attended the anniversary celebra-
tions of the army’s elite Kostrad unit. Photographs were widely circu-
lated of her dressed in a tailored camouflage uniform, topped off with
the green beret of the Kostrad strategic reserve command, riding atop
a Scorpion tank at the Kostrad base in Bandung. The military felt com-
fortable with Megawati, not just because she yielded to their pressure
and manipulation but because there was a natural resonance between
her conservative nationalist instincts and their desire to maintain the
unity of the state. In contrast, the president was described as ‘a man not
of sound mind and health’ because of his clearly irrational objection to
solving communal problems by means of force.26 The military was also
788
angered by the president’s tendency to intervene in what they saw as

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
internal military affairs, and to favour reformist officers in routine rota-

tions of the command chain.
!$,1%!-+!
Although Abdurrahman was able to resist the pressure from both the
legislature and the military, it nevertheless severely limited the options
available to him. He could not afford to fight on too many fronts at
once. One of the areas that suffered because of the unrelenting pressure
from his opponents was his strong desire to rebuild good relations with
Australia. Throughout 2000 half a dozen or more tentative dates for a
visit to Australia were suggested, but in each case the visit was post-
poned.
At the beginning of October Abdurrahman was advised not to visit
Australia before Prime Minister John Howard first visited Jakarta.
Privately he rejected this argument as ridiculous, pointing out that it
had been a quarter of a century since an Indonesian president had vis-
ited Australia, while Australian prime ministers had visited Indonesia
on numerous occasions during that time. Towards the end of the month
he was again hopeful of being able to proceed with an Australian visit,
only to have to postpone it once again. One month later Foreign
Minister Alwi Shihab declared that the president intended to visit
Australia and New Zealand sometime towards the end of the year, or
early in 2001. Before many days had passed, these plans too were scut-
tled on the pretext that a visit at that time would coincide with the fast-
ing month of Ramadan. Further tentative plans were made for a visit in
February and then finally in April 2001, but these also failed. Unlike
previous occasions, planning for the April visit was well advanced and
the trip was only cancelled at the eleventh hour.
:%/$(#,)4/%)+'3.!0&'.(1E
By mid-November anti-Gus Dur activists in parliament were consoli-
dating their numbers in preparation for a final push against the increas-
ingly vulnerable president. Resentful at having been dropped from the
cabinet, Kwik Kian Gie organised what he called ‘an informal meeting
of like-minded parliamentarians’. Remarkably, Kwik’s meeting was
attended by as many as two hundred of the parliament’s five hundred
members. The meeting was intended to discuss a broad range of issues,
78B
but in the end one issue dominated the conversation of the assembled
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
parliamentarians: how and when the president would be toppled.
By the end of November planning for the move against the president
advanced when a group of 151 parliamentarians submitted an official
paper to the Speaker, Akbar Tandjung. The paper listed a variety of rea-
sons that the parliamentarians saw as constituting sufficient grounds for
impeaching the president. Demonstrating the complex nature of
Indonesian politics at the end of the year, the 151 signatories were not
all from one or two parties. Instead 47 were PDI-P members, 37 were
Golkar members, 22 were PPP members and 34 hailed from the
Reform Faction dominated by Amien Rais’s PAN. Among their griev-
ances they listed the president’s willingness to permit the flying of the
Morning Star flag in Irian Jaya, and his proposal to abolish the MPR
decree of 1966 that had outlawed the Indonesian Communist Party and
its doctrine. They also said that the president was found wanting in his
failure to move comprehensively against corruption and nepotism.
Added to these issues was dismay at his sudden sacking of the nation-
al police chief, Rusdihardjo, and, earlier that year, of Ministers Yusuf
Kalla of Golkar and Laksamana Sukardi of PDI-P. They also declared
the president’s intervention in Bank Indonesia (whose board of gover-
nors had been hand-picked by Soeharto) constituted improper inter-
ference in the affairs of the bank. Akbar Tandjung was not one of the
signatories, but the following day he declared: ‘The House will call for
a trial of Gus Dur if the investigation by the special committee indi-
cates that the President is allegedly involved in the scandal. And it is
legitimate to urge the Assembly to hold a special session if the
President is found guilty.’27
Although the grievances of individual parliamentarians against the
president were multifarious, in the end they decided on the single best
mechanism to achieve his downfall: to push ahead with the investiga-
tions of the special parliamentary committee (pansus) examining the
Bulogate and Bruneigate scandals. It was felt that this would provide a
suitable trigger for an impeachment, on the grounds that proof of cor-
ruption constituted gross violation of the constitution. This was the
constitutional requirement for impeaching a sitting president.
When they filed their complaints against the president, the parlia-
mentarians omitted one matter that had drawn fire from his critics.
This was Abdurrahman’s announcement in October that the govern-
ment had decided to delay lawsuits against three of its biggest debtors,
78;
Marimutu Sinivasan, Prajogo Pangestu and Syamsul Nursalim.

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
Abdurrahman justified this unorthodox government response by saying

that he had been advised that action against these three tycoons might
damage Indonesia’s economic recovery, so important was their role in
Indonesian business. He was not suggesting that they should never be
tried for corruption, merely that the trials should be delayed. It appears
that he had come to this position as a result of insistent lobbying by
businessmen on behalf of the tycoons, and in private he repeated his
argument that any move against these men would be risk endangering
the economic recovery. ‘Marimutu Sinivasan of the Texmaco Group,
Prajogo Pangestu of PT Chandra Asri, and Syamsul Nursalim of the
Dipasena Group are key figures in encouraging exports. But when the
time comes, they will also be brought to court,’ he said while visiting
South Korea at the end of the month.28 Sadly, moves such as this fur-
ther undermined Abdurrahman’s credibility. Although there was no
evidence that he was motivated by personal gain, his willingness to ‘go
soft’ on some of Indonesia’s most notoriously corrupt businessmen
made it look as if he were not serious about dealing with corruption.
!()$(0.%1!+()(.*)>.!%
At the end of 2000, as Indonesia approached the festive season, the
mood was anxious. As communities celebrated Christmas, the end of
the fasting month and Chinese New Year, important festivals which fell
close together, new outbreaks of communal violence were feared. For
once, things worked out well, and these three important festivals passed
without any large-scale violence.
Nevertheless, a reminder came that anti-peace forces were at work
when bombs exploded at churches across the national capital on
Christmas Eve, killing fourteen and maiming dozens of people. As
with the other major bombings that occurred in Jakarta in 2000, the
type of plastic explosive used, and the sophisticated manner in which
they were detonated, together pointed strongly to links with the mili-
tary. Mercifully, the bombings failed to provoke a violent response from
the communities involved. They might well have been intended more
as a reminder to the government of the power of those behind the
bombings than as a catalyst for violence. Certainly, the subsequent fail-
ure of the police, once again, to apprehend the masterminds behind the
bombings exposed once again the powerlessness of Abdurrahman’s
government to defend itself against its unseen enemies.
78<
Sadly, the killings continued. In Aceh and in Irian Jaya rumblings of
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
discontent were met with harsh repression by the security apparatus,
but at least in Maluku and Sulawesi the much-feared violence didn’t
erupt. Abdurrahman cancelled all his travel plans throughout the
month of Ramadan, as did the rest of his cabinet. By the middle of
January those within Abdurrahman’s inner circle were beginning to feel
a little more relaxed, and even a touch optimistic about events. The
optimism was to prove misplaced.
,+:(,)/4),1%!+(
Throughout this period Abdurrahman had, as ever, projected an image
of quiet confidence, but he was clearly feeling the strain. There was no
getting away from the fact, too, that everyone around him was preoc-
cupied with the attacks on his government and deeply worried about
the future.
Abdurrahman was frustrated with the inaccuracies and editorial bias
of much of the media coverage of his government, both domestic and
international. Nevertheless, he stuck to his position of refusing to
encroach on the freedom of the press. Understandably, this did not stop
him from occasionally grumbling about the press coverage. All heads of
government, even in stable, mature, democracies, find reason to com-
plain about the media, and few could have more reason to do so than
Indonesia’s embattled president. He found it particularly galling to be
accused of being hostile to the media, pointing out that, even though
many stories published about him were patently false and gave strong
grounds for legal action, he had refrained for fear of poisoning the
media environment and setting a precedent for future intimidatory
action.
It needs to be acknowledged that Abdurrahman’s eccentric and
colourful style made it easy for misunderstandings to occur; statements
which were made in jest, or were essentially hyperbolic in nature, were
taken too literally. The combination of a hostile media composed of ele-
ments that were either opposed to him on ideological grounds, or at
least had lost faith in his peculiar cavalier and intemperate style, was
frequently disastrous.
One such occasion occurred in the last week of January. Addressing
a meeting of university rectors on 27 January, Abdurrahman speculated
about the options that would face his government if it continued its
downward slide and Indonesia descended into anarchy. If worse came
78=
to worst and there was more communal unrest than the security appa-
3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
ratus could handle, and if several provinces simultaneously declared

their independence, then his government would have to look at taking
drastic action, he told the assembled university leaders. He explained
that in a worst-case scenario he might have to think about dissolving
parliament and moving directly to fresh elections as a way of breaking
the impasse and cooling political tensions. He was thinking aloud, but
the mere suggestion that he might dissolve parliament was dynamite.
The meeting was supposed to have been strictly off the record, but as
soon as it closed the president’s comments were widely reported. Making
matters worse, the presidential office botched its response to this public
relations disaster. Officials contacted the state news agency Antara and
explained that the comments were off the record and had not been
intended for circulation. This inept intervention only served to alarm
journalists and social commentators, who began to speculate that the
president was threatening a return to the dark old days of government
intimidation and censorship of the press. The next morning
Abdurrahman had a breakfast meeting with the heads of the army, navy
and air force to discuss security arrangements ahead of parliament’s
February sitting, which was scheduled to begin with a vote on issuing a
second memorandum of censure to the president. The breakfast crockery
had hardly been cleared away when it was being reported that the presi-
dent had attempted to persuade the leaders of the military to declare
martial law. Witnesses to the meeting testify that there had, in fact, been
no discussion whatsoever about dissolving parliament and declaring mar-
tial law, but Abdurrahman’s widely reported comments from the previous
day’s meeting with university rectors gave life to the rumour.
The tide now turned quickly against the president. Several days later
Abdurrahman had a meeting with the head of the state television serv-
ice, TVRI, to discuss funding and other administrative matters.
Following the meeting it was reported that he had requested favourable
coverage from TVRI and threatened retaliatory action if he did not
receive it. Once again witnesses to the discussion testify that no such
threats were made, and that in fact the issue of control over TVRI
reporting was never even mentioned.
!),.%+/$,)"-/*
With the DPR due to commence its next sitting on 1 February
following its January recess, tensions were running high: it was widely
78D
expected that it would vote to issue a memorandum against the presi-
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
dent. Nevertheless, Abdurrahman was quietly confident that the mili-
tary–police faction (TNI–POLRI) and PDI-P would not move against
him. He had received a promise, he said, from Taufik Kiemas,
Megawati’s husband, that his camp within PDI-P would support him.
Similarly, Abdurrahman was confident that the military would not turn
against him. As it happened, on 1 February ten of the eleven parlia-
mentary factions voted against him, the only exception being PKB.
Angry with the tone of discussion, PKB walked out of the chamber in
protest. The vote went 394 votes to 4 in favour of issuing a memoran-
dum. Things could not have looked worse.
Although, for all of his positive talk, Abdurrahman had half-expect-
ed the vote to go against him, it was a heavy blow. He later told friends
that he believed that there had been a scare campaign to turn the mil-
itary against him just as parliament was about to sit, giving him no time
to correct misunderstandings and repair the damage before the vote
went ahead. According to his analysis, once the military — alarmed by
a pernicious rumour campaign that he intended to shake up senior staff
positions — had been panicked into supporting the censure motion, it
was difficult for Megawati to resist calls from within her party to fol-
low suit. Whatever the veracity of this speculation, the story in the
media was almost wholly negative.
‘Alone and dangerous’ screamed orange headlines across a black
background on the 15 February issue of the respected news magazine
Far Eastern Economic Review. On the cover Abdurrahman was shown
head down and facing slightly away from the camera, looking desolate
and forlorn as he rubbed his head with his right hand, although in all
likelihood he was just adjusting his peci (the traditional Indonesian
brimless hat worn on formal occasions). The headlines conveyed an
impression of a man who was possibly not in his right mind or was at
least seriously deluded. The text reinforced this impression. The lead
story opened evocatively:
Cloistered in his stuccoed palace President Abdurrahman Wahid

likes to insist he has popular and political backing, but the first week
of February saw his parliamentary support collapse in concert with
the first mass demonstrations calling for his resignation. Wahid’s
desperate reaction was to reach for the tools of authoritarian rule. He
first suggested to the local media that he might freeze parliament.
7BA
Then, behind closed doors, he asked the military to support a state

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of emergency. The army turned him down. Later, all 38 military rep-
resentatives stood up in parliament to endorse a memorandum of
censure. …
A senior cabinet minister paints a picture of the president ‘living in
a world of his own,’ where document protocol is often ignored and
legal accountability tenuous. The President, frequently wearing slip-
pers and looking dishevelled, is surrounded by a shrinking inner cir-
cle of family members and bizarre camp followers — Muslim seers,
shady fixers, even a failed meatball manufacturer. During important
meetings he falls asleep, and when people dare to criticize him he
walks out. At one cabinet meeting in the first week of February, a
cabinet member relates, Justice Minister Yusril Mahendra offered
Wahid a piece of unwanted legal advice: resign.29
The story had a clear bias; and sadly it was reflecting a widely held sen-
timent among the Jakarta elite and expatriate community that ‘Wahid
was washed up and finished’.
The Economist, although tough, was kinder. This was the magazine
that had run on its cover in October 1999 a large picture of
Abdurrahman, with Yenny at his side, beneath the headlines
‘Goodness, it’s Gus Dur, Indonesia’s surprising new President’.30 In the
sixteen months that followed, The Economist was consistently sharp-
edged in its reporting on the Wahid administration, but it was general-
ly fair and often acknowledged the difficulties of transitional
government and the sincerity of the president. In mid-February 2001
The Economist reported that the situation in Indonesia had gone from
difficult to disastrous.31 In typically dry-witted fashion it ran across its
cover a photograph of Abdurrahman sitting side-by-side in conversa-
tion with Megawati, whose outstretched fingers suggest that she was in
the middle of explaining something to her companion; in bold letters
across the top of the pair is the headline ‘Would one of you please start
to govern Indonesia?’ The Economist’s lead story sought to canvass all
sides, while acknowledging the difficult situation that faced
Abdurrahman. Its concluding paragraphs spoke hopefully of the possi-
bility of a compromise deal with Megawati, but concluded by acknowl-
edging: ‘But such a deal is getting harder to imagine. Even Gus Dur’s
confidants admit that he would rather drive a train over a cliff than
admit to his old friend that he had been wrong.’32
7B@
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%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
The following week saw a development that eroded the credibility of a
president who was already being portrayed as cantankerous and desper-
ate. In several large cities across East Java, tens of thousands of NU
youth came out on to the streets en masse. They were, they said, out-
raged that the forces of the former Soeharto regime were seeking to
topple Abdurrahman. In their view it was not just a question of losing
their president but of losing their democracy. The street demonstra-
tions, although much larger than any of the anti-Gus Dur demonstra-
tions that had been seen in Jakarta, were for the most part remarkably
peaceful; what terrified all onlookers was the actions of small groups of
demonstrators who broke into the compounds of regional Golkar
offices in several East Java cities, defacing the buildings by removing
Golkar insignia and trashing offices. Some observers wondered aloud
how it was that the supposedly heavily guarded offices were so easily
attacked; it was even suggested that the people carrying out the attacks
might not have been NU members at all. The military was suspicious-
ly quick to denounce the violence as the work of PRD and other
‘Communist’ elements who, they said, had infiltrated NU youth.
Golkar was rightly horrified at the damage to its offices but also glad
of the opportunity to shift its status from bad guy to underdog. In
Jakarta the elite were quick to protest against the ‘fanatical supporters’
of the embattled president, who they feared would tip the country into
chaos. Among opinion-makers in Jakarta it was common to argue that
the president was secretly encouraging the protests. Inside the palace,
however, it was clear that the reverse was true. Abdurrahman and those
close to him, such as his nephew and chairman of Ansor, Saifullah
Yusuf, and NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi, tried desperately to persuade
regional leaders not to hold demonstrations and especially to discour-
age the demonstrators from coming to Jakarta.
On Friday, 16 February, Abdurrahman travelled to the regional city of
Pasuruan in order to address his angry supporters and encourage them
to get off the streets. Much like a labour politician trying to talk round
former colleagues at a union picket line, Abdurrahman reasoned with
the thousands of assembled protesters, arguing that ‘Now was not a time
to become emotional and give a chance for other parties to manipulate
circumstances to their benefit’. He added, ‘We have things under con-
trol in Jakarta, but your protests on the streets here only undermine all
7B6
of the good work we are doing’. He concluded by saying: ‘I understand

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your feelings but please make sure that you keep your heads cool when
your hearts are hot … now please go back home and pray for us — that
way you will do the most good.’ Back in Jakarta it was reported that the
president had made ‘token efforts to calm down his fanatical followers’
and that he was secretly glad to see them expressing his mass support.
There was no question that by this stage Abdurrahman and everyone
around him knew that every effort had to be made to cool emotions in
NU and stop the protests. They understood all too well that the sight of
supporters protesting in their tens of thousands afforded his opponents
a field day in the media and made him look all the more desperate and
willing to take extreme measures.
4->+(:)+(1/)1%/$"-.
In the fourth week of February Abdurrahman and an entourage of
eighty boarded a leased Garuda aircraft to fly to northern Africa and on
to the Middle East to complete the haj pilgrimage. Just as
Abdurrahman was leaving the country, violence broke out in the
Central Kalimantan town of Sampit. Initially it looked as if the fight-
ing between ethnic Madurese transmigrants and local Dayak was
small-scale and would be easily controlled. When Abdurrahman
arrived in Africa, he consulted by phone with Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, Megawati and other senior ministers; they assured him
that they were on top of the situation and urged him to continue with
his trip. Because the trip was organised around the haj pilgrimage,
which occurs a fixed time each year, Abdurrahman was loath to call it
off. His Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security also pointed
out forcefully to him that, if he were to cancel the rest of the trip and
return to Jakarta, it would be seen as expressing a lack of confidence in
Megawati and his senior ministers.
Tragically, the violence rapidly worsened. Abdurrahman had been
informed by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and other senior military and
police officials that the disturbances were of a limited nature and that
they would soon have them under control. When questioned at his next
press conference, Abdurrahman foolishly relayed this information
to the press; he was unaware that as he was speaking hundreds of peo-
ple were being killed in unstoppable violence. In the end at least 400
people, most of them Madurese settlers, were killed, and some claimed
the actual death toll was much higher.33 In the weeks that followed
7B7
more than 20 000 Madurese left Central Kalimantan by boat to return
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to East Java and Madura, and a further 30 000 waited in temporary
refugee camps, in appalling conditions, to be relocated.
The news that reached Jakarta and the outside world of events in
Central Kalimantan was horrible almost beyond belief. The Dayak were
enraged at the Madurese newcomers, whom they saw as tipping the
social balance against them; they expressed the anger in the manner of
traditional head-hunters of earlier generations by slaughtering their
hapless victims most cruelly, sometimes ripping out and eating their
hearts and livers.
One of the most serious questions about the whole incident was why
the police and military were so slow to respond. Local police were
reported to have sat in their stations while the Dayak rampaged
unchecked through Sampit. They claim in their defence to have been
so hopelessly outnumbered that they dared not stand up to the flood
without reinforcements. This begs the question, however, as to why the
military failed to come quickly to the aid of their colleagues. Part of the
answer might be the military’s desire to show the police up as inade-
quate to the task of maintaining order, which was delegated to them
when they were officially split from TNI in early 1999. Also pertinent
is the fact that the military traditionally does not post its best and
brightest to sleepy provinces such as Central Kalimantan; those who are
given a command post on Borneo’s wild frontier generally focus on
maximising ‘business opportunities’. Whatever the case, it is difficult
not to see a fair degree of cover-up and denial in the information that
was being relayed to the president.
Because of his comments at the start of the violence and because
of his failure to call off his trip and return home, Abdurrahman was
portrayed in the media as being uncaring about the tragic fate of the
Madurese settlers. Significantly, none of the news reports mentioned
that most Madurese are members of NU. A few reports in the
Indonesian internet media did note Abdurrahman’s anguish at the
plight of the Madurese and, for the brief few hours that it was post-
ed, one even noted that he had given a sizable personal donation to
the refugees, but none of this information made its way into the
international media.34
On 1 March, two weeks after the violence broke out, Megawati
accompanied by Akbar Tandjung travelled to Sampit, where she met
with some of the thousands of terrified refugees jammed into camps
7B8
under horrible conditions. On that day, The Economist editorialised

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under the headline ‘Wahid wanders while Borneo burns’: ‘Indonesia

seems fated never to have a good week: no matter how many things go
right, the country is too big, too dispersed and too troubled for that.’ It
might have added that ‘Indonesia’s president seems fated never to have
a good week’, for by now scarcely a day passed without more bad news
Abdurrahman.
In mid-March Abdurrahman moved to sack a further two cabinet
ministers, which did his credibility no good, however justifiable his
actions. Justice Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra was sacked for making
repeated public calls for the president to resign. So was Nurmahmudi
Ismail, the Forestry Minister, who had previously been the leader of the
small, Islamist PK, or Justice Party. As it turned out, Yusril’s sacking
and his replacement with the well-regarded Baharuddin Lopa did not
carry enormous political liability, but the sacking of Nurmahmudi
Ismail was much harder to explain. Privately there was talk that he was
working to undermine the president and even, some said, siphoning off
departmental funds towards those protesting against Abdurrahman. He
was also regarded generally as having done a poor job in reforming the
notoriously corrupt timber industry. Officially the reason for
Nurmahmudi Ismail’s dismissal was a difference of vision with the pres-
ident with respect to forestry management. Unfortunately, his replace-
ment was not as universally popular as the replacement for the Justice
Minister. Some of Abdurrahman’s friends who supported his sacking of
Nurmahmudi privately lamented that Abdurrahman had failed to seize
the opportunity to draft a fresh, younger candidate with reformist cre-
dentials. Significantly, when Marzuki Usman was sworn into the cabi-
net, Megawati was conspicuously absent, adding to the sense that she
was gradually pulling herself away from the president.
*+1&)4%+.(#,)-+9.)1&.,.)
Abdurrahman had for some time believed that he was facing a concert-
ed campaign in the media to slander him and to destroy his image and
standing. Given that all of the private television stations are owned
either by members of the former first family (Tutut alone has signifi-
cant interests in several stations) or their close associates, and that many
of the daily newspapers and weekly magazines also have links to promi-
nent figures from the former regime, this is readily understandable. But
there is no denying that Abdurrahman’s frank and frequently reckless
7BB
style was often the cause of his undoing. Often overlooked are the cul-
%.:+'.)0&!(:.)!(#)1&.)4+:&1)4/%),$%?+?!-2)@DDDG6AA@
tural differences that set the rural-based NU apart from urbane elite
society, which caused innocent misunderstandings as well as providing
convenient ammunition for Abdurrahman’s political enemies. This was
especially the case in April, when Abdurrahman faced a series of
embarrassing setbacks as enthusiastic members of NU came to the fore
to defend their beleaguered president. In the eyes of most of NU’s poor
and rural members, as we have seen, the attack on Abdurrahman was
also an attempt by the former regime to reassert itself at the expense of
democracy. They feared that, if Megawati were to become president,
she would be manipulated and controlled by the military and by
Golkar, or if she resisted she would be easily dismissed in the same way
that Abdurrahman was. In Jakarta these enthusiastic and spontaneous
responses were interpreted as cynical sabre-rattling by the president.
Abdurrahman’s claims that he was doing his best to restrain his people,
and that the senior leaders of NU and Ansor were trying desperately to
apply the brakes to a juggernaut fuelled by grassroots anger, fell on deaf
ears.
In early April there was a debate within NU about whether moves to
topple a democratically elected president were tantamount to treason
and therefore could justifiably be met with force. The NU leadership,
mindful of the emotional state of many of its members, handled the
matter deftly by justifying its position in terms of traditional Islamic
jurisprudence in order to win over the rank-and-file of the organisation.
The situation, they argued, was in no way comparable with a civil war
involving treasonous action, and consequently it was completely wrong
to use force to put down attacks on the government. On 4 April
Abdurrahman publicly condemned NU supporters who used the lan-
guage of jihad, or holy war, against those who were seeking to impeach
him. ‘The President disagrees completely with the extreme ways that
some people are calling for in his defence,’ said his spokesman Adhi
Massardi.35
Throughout April Abdurrahman, Hasyim Muzadi and Saifullah
Yusuf worked hard to soothe and turn around NU’s emotional mem-
bership. Nevertheless, further developments occurred with fatal effects
for Abdurrahman’s credibility. In early April a group in Surabaya, with-
out formal connections to NU but made up largely of NU members,
claimed that it had list of more than 20 000 people who were ‘ready to
die’ for the president. Several other groups also sprang up to defend
7B;
Abdurrahman in what appeared to be spontaneous grassroots respons-

3/-+1+0,2)%.4/%')!(#)1&.)3%.,+#.(0>
es to elite politics in Jakarta.

As 30 April, the day set for parliament to vote on a second memo-
randum of censure, drew close, the noisy threats from tens of thousands
of NU members to descend upon the capital in defence of the president
only exacerbated Abdurrahman’s credibility problem. His repeated
rebukes of the protesters, as well as his work behind the scenes to stop
them coming to Jakarta, did not save him from continuous criticism, in
both the national and international press, for his claimed willingness to
resort to violence and undemocratic means to support his position.
NU did not shy away from supporting Abdurrahman but did not see
itself as blindly fanatical in doing so. NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi
explained: ‘If Gus Dur is removed via a constitutional process, I think
there would be no resistance from the grass-roots but, NU’s kiais feel
that Gus Dur is being “ousted” by force and by unfair means. So, the
kiais think that they have to defend the President, not because he is Gus
Dur, but as part of the effort to fight tyranny.’36
After the issuing of the first memorandum against him on 1
February, Abdurrahman promised to redouble his efforts to fight cor-
ruption. He was caught, however, in a classic bind — it was a case of
‘dammed if he does and dammed if he doesn’t’. The arrest of prominent
Golkar politician and Soeharto confidant Ginanjar Kartasasmita on
corruption charges set tongues wagging around the city, arguing that
the president was simply targeting his political enemies. Then in the
middle of April came the arrest of Syamsul Nursalim, one of the three
major tycoons whom Abdurrahman had said the government was pre-
pared to go easy on, negotiating with them and delaying prosecution.
When he was arrested on a long-standing swindling charge, the busi-
ness and political community rallied to his defence claiming that the
recent round of arrests was politically motivated.
While Abdurrahman worked hard behind the scenes to calm his sup-
porters, he often negated his efforts by the manner in which he commu-
nicated with the public. For example, on Friday, 20 April, Abdurrahman
addressed a major international conference at the Bogor Palace. With a
Who’s Who of the Indonesian elite as speakers and several hundred nation-
al and international businessmen in the audience, he spoke of his fear that
violence would follow his dismissal from office. ‘There are 400 000 peo-
ple who are ready to descend upon Jakarta,’ he said, in a manner which
suggested that he supported their presence in the national capital.
7B<
The incident that most concerned the media in the final days before
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parliament’s meeting to issue its second memorandum on 30 April was
a massive istigosah, or public prayer meeting cum rally, planned for
Sunday the 29th. Reflecting the mood of the Jakarta elite, The Jakarta
Post editorialised:
As noble as the intentions may have been, the Istigosah was nothing
more than a political tool of the President and his supporters in the
ongoing power struggle against his adversaries. It is no wonder that
most other political leaders turned down the invitation to attend the
mass prayers. Abdurrahman’s Cabinet’s repeated warnings that vio-
lence would erupt if the House tried to impeach the President
sounded more like political blackmail than advice.37
In the end, Sunday’s istigosah proceeded peacefully; after listening to

calls for restraint, the NU masses dispersed peacefully. Whether
because the initial estimates of an attendance of 400 000 were never
realistic, or because the NU leaders had succeeded in their efforts to
scale down the event, the final attendance was considerably below what
had been anticipated. How much below, however, is a matter of some
debate. Reuters reported a crowd of only 20 000, but reliable eyewit-
nesses said that many more had attended.38
In a live television address to the nation on the evening of 27 April
via a carefully scripted speech read out by Wimar Witoelar,
Abdurrahman spoke warmly of his admiration for Megawati, of his
gratitude for her patient support, and of the need to move ahead and
work together. He explained his own poor performance as president in
the context of regime change and the immense difficulties facing him.
If the same sort of conciliatory speech had been made several months,
or even several weeks, earlier, it might have been more effective, but at
least it did serve to cool things down. Many saw it as ‘too little, too late’,
however, and were in no mood to give him any praise. Besides,
Megawati had once again been conspicuous by her absence.
As expected, on Monday, 30 April, parliament debated the motion
on issuing a second memorandum late into the night before finally
passing it. The TNI–POLRI and PKB factions both abstained, leaving
an overwhelming consensus to issue the second memorandum. There
were 363 votes in favour, indicating considerable agreement that the
president had to be reprimanded. There was no unanimity, however, on
7B=
what the second memorandum meant. Many, of course, hoped and

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expected that it would lead to the eventual impeachment of the presi-

dent at a special session of the MPR. Others, continued to hope that a
way out might yet be found, and that some sort of compromise between
the president and vice-president might avert the need for impeach-
ment. After all, apart from anything else, there was a serious technical
problem with the impeachment process. Whereas the first memoran-
dum had been about alleged corruption involving Bulogate and
Bruneigate, the second memorandum was essentially about alleged
incompetence, as it was widely recognised that the corruption allega-
tions lacked compelling evidence. This was officially confirmed by the
Attorney-General the following month, when the case against
Abdurrahman was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence, just as it
had been dismissed by the police for the same reason the previous
October.
With no need to attend parliament and no official meetings sched-
uled, Abdurrahman spent the day at home listening to Beethoven. He
met the next day with his senior ministers, and two days later addressed
the nation, once again on TVRI. He personally delivered a short
unscripted address calling on the nation for calm. He politely thanked
the parliament for carrying out its work — and suggested that, with
160 unpassed bills before it, it had rather a lot of work to get back to.
Clearly he was not about to give up. Expectations remained, at least
among those who retained a modicum of goodwill towards him, that
some sort of compromise might be hammered out which would yet
avert the awful precedent of impeaching Indonesia’s first democratical-
ly elected president on the grounds of political unpopularity.
.3+-/:$.
~
As tragic as Abdurrahman Wahid’s downfall was, his final three days at

the Freedom Palace were marked by a strangely festive atmosphere.
From just after dawn until late at night the road through the leafy
grounds of his presidential home pulsated with wave after wave of well-
wishers arriving to call on the ousted leader. People from all walks of
life flooded into the compound, often waiting for hours in line, just to
shake his hand and deliver words of support. As news of the ‘open
house’ spread, many of the journalists, intellectuals and activists who
had been most vocal in criticising the beleaguered president descended
on the palace to express their sorrow at his ousting and to ask for his
forgiveness. And amidst the silken finery of Jakarta’s elite stood little
throngs of ordinary Indonesians, many who had travelled hundreds of
kilometres to be there, clad in their best cotton shirts and wearing the
sort of smiles that money cannot buy.
Although those last days saw plenty of tears and moments of melan-
choly, the final hours were punctuated by explosions of laughter from
within Abdurrahman’s book-lined office where he sat talking to his
guests. And as family and friends busied themselves with the task of
packing boxes and clearing shelves and cupboards, the mood was more
of an end-of-year class break-up than a time of mourning.
7;A
In truth Abdurrahman and Nuriyah and their four daughters had

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
never felt entirely at home under the twenty-foot ceilings of the former
Dutch governor’s mansion. The ever-present security and protocol offi-
cers clutching their two-way radios and notebooks made the austere
white building more a five-star prison than a family home; after twen-
ty-one months of living in a goldfish bowl, they looked forward to
returning to their modest home on Jakarta’s southern fringes.
But despite the generally upbeat atmosphere, there was no escaping
the sense of tragic loss that marked the end of the Wahid presidency.
Although the sad end had loomed for many months, it still hit with a
horrible jolt, the jarring made worse by the suddenness of the final col-
lision. Since the middle of 2000, a mere nine months after
Abdurrahman came to office, his administration had resembled an ail-
ing hot air balloon: its canopy rent and its burner intermittently failing,
it struggled to maintain altitude, the final collision seeming imminent
with each successive range of hills that loomed up before it. As it slow-
ly sank ever closer to the ground, every effort to repair the damage and
regain altitude was met by a fresh wave of hostile fire from below, and
all the while new obstacles appeared.
Even so, there still remained hope of compromise until Friday, 20
July. It was dashed by the announcement by MPR chair Amien Rais
that the Assembly was to go into an accelerated special session the fol-
lowing Monday, bringing forward its impeachment hearing from the 1
August date set by constitutional requirements.
By this stage, however, the best hope of compromise had come and
gone with the parliament’s vote on 30 May to proceed with the special
session on 1 August (after the requisite sixty days had passed). In the
week before this vote Abdurrahman, finally fully recognising the dire
nature of his predicament, offered to hand over all executive authority
to Megawati in return for being allowed to remain in office as an essen-
tially symbolic head of state. Understandably, there were concerns about
how this might have been implemented, but the details could have been
determined in the special session of the MPR, which effectively has
unrestricted powers to innovate and interpret on constitutional issues;
there was no reason why this compromise could not have been made to
work. But the offer to Megawati came too late. She had evidently by
this point set her heart not so much on seizing power as becoming pres-
ident. Megawati rejected Abdurrahman’s offer out of hand and on 30
May led the vote in parliament to proceed with the special session of
7;@
the MPR. It would be interesting to know how individual PDI-P par-
.3+-/:$.
liamentarians, and for that matter other parliamentarians, felt about
impeaching the president, but they were never given a chance to speak.
As with all of the major votes in parliament over the previous eleven
months, voting relating to the impeachment proceedings was never by
secret ballot, though there was a strong precedent for this.
Consequently, when PDI-P leader Arifin Panigoro stood up to lead his
faction in voting, every member of his faction was obliged to follow
suit. Having lost the support of Megawati, Abdurrahman was never
going to gain the support of parliament.
Until the eleventh hour Abdurrahman refused to give up the hope of
striking a compromise deal. If Megawati, his natural ally, was not inter-
ested, he was prepared to talk even with his enemies. On reflection this
was not as strange as it first appeared: although Abdurrahman’s many
enemies in parliament had long plotted his downfall, the prospect of
compromise still appealed to powerful figures such as Akbar Tandjung,
head of Soeharto’s party Golkar. Golkar was above all else concerned
with success in the 2004 election, and consequently was desperate to
regain the trust of the public. To join in the impeachment of Indonesia’s
first democratically elected president, on the tendentious grounds that
his performance was not up to the miracle-working standards required
of him by Indonesia’s self-righteous parliament, was a high-risk
manoeuvre for a party whose credibility was at an all-time low.
Consequently, Akbar had been willing to negotiate with Abdurrahman.
Nor was it odd that Marzuki Darusman, the sacked Attorney-General
and leading Golkar moderate, had the week before accepted
Abdurrahman’s offer to rejoin his team as Cabinet Secretary.
Nevertheless, there remained many powerful individuals who had no
interest in any sort of compromise, even one in which the president
gave up all executive authority to remain as a symbolic head of state.
Most notable among these are the improbably wealthy Ginanjar
Kartasasmita, golden boy of successive Soeharto cabinets, and his long-
time friend and partner Arifin Panigoro, leader of the parliamentary
faction of Megawati’s PDI-P, and who, despite his unpopularity among
old-fashioned democrats in the party, was one of Indonesia’s most pow-
erful politicians. Both of these men were facing imminent arrest by the
Attorney-General’s Office in connection with investigations of their
business dealings under Soeharto.
For months Amien Rais, one of Abdurrahman’s most outspoken crit-
7;6
ics, had threatened to bring forward the special session of the Assembly.
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
With most of the Assembly members already in Jakarta, it looked as if

on Friday, 20 July, Abdurrahman would finally give Amien the trigger
he needed to call a snap session.
In a bid to push party leaders into compromise talks, Abdurrahman
had threatened a presidential decree in which he would freeze parlia-
ment and call fresh elections. He believed that the only way out of the
current impasse, if no compromise could be reached, was fresh elections
that included direct election of a new president. This threat, however,
was all bluff, for he had no desire to attempt anything so radical, espe-
cially as he would be reliant on the military and police, both of which
he had alienated, for the plan to work. Nevertheless, frustrated by the
lack of response from party leaders, he set 6 pm on 20 July as a new
deadline for issuing his decree.
Abdurrahman had also embroiled himself in a conflict with parlia-
ment over his suspension of National Police Chief General Suryoro
Bimantoro, widely regarded as one of the country’s most corrupt police
officers. Abdurrahman had moved against Bimantoro because of police
violence, including the apparently unprovoked shooting of demonstra-
tors in the East Javanese town of Pasuran. He was also deeply disturbed
by Bimantoro’s apparent involvement in the Manulife case, in which a
Canadian firm, Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, had been vic-
tim of a scam when it attempted, in good faith, to purchase shares in its
Indonesian operation held by its defunct local partner. After buying the
shares, it was informed that they had already been sold to a mysterious
third party, Roman Gold, which claimed legal title, having purchased
the shares through a West Samoan company and a Hong Kong-based
shell company (whose documents were later proved to be fraudulent).
The Canadians complained to the police, only to find the investigation
turned back on them, with their Indonesian based vice-president being
arrested and detained for three weeks. Not only did Bimantoro, as
police chief, oversee these arrests, but it also appeared that he had a
vested interest in the case.
When Abdurrahman finally suspended him Bimantoro protested,
pointing out that the president had failed to seek the approval of par-
liament, and threatened to stay in office. He then told the president
that he was prepared to go quietly provided that he was made ambas-
sador to Malaysia, only to change his mind at the last moment and
refuse to hand over power to the Deputy National Police Chief,
7;7
General Chaeruddin Ismail. Angered by what he regarded as
.3+-/:$.
Bimantoro’s insubordination, Abdurrahman announced that he was
proceeding with the swearing-in of Chaeruddin on 20 July. Akbar,
however, warned the president that to do so would trigger a snap spe-
cial session of parliament. In a dangerous play of brinkmanship,
Abdurrahman decided on the compromise of postponing the decree
and swearing in Chaeruddin as ‘acting’ national police chief. Initially
this ploy seemed to have worked, for late on the afternoon of Friday, 20
July, Amien Rais told a Dutch television crew that the president had
‘pulled back from the brink’ and that consequently he was left without
a sufficient reason to call a snap session of the Assembly. Just as the
interview was coming to a close, however, Arifin Panigoro approached
Amien and called him inside for a chat. Fifteen minutes later Amien
reappeared and announced that the Assembly would proceed immedi-
ately with a special session, to commence on Monday. The next day the
Assembly members convened to plan Monday’s impeachment of the
president.
Until Friday’s announcement by Amien of the move to bring forward
the impeachment hearing by ten days, Abdurrahman had remained
confident of striking a deal that would at least leave him with the title
of president. He was utterly convinced that to hand over the presiden-
cy to his deputy, Megawati, who was known to have close links with the
military and conservative views about dealing with unrest in outlying
regions such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, would lead to the unravelling of
the nation at its fringes.
Friday’s announcement of snap impeachment hearings threw
Abdurrahman into a deep depression. His blood pressure soared errat-
ically and there were signs of thrombosis. His doctors were worried that
he might be set to suffer his third stroke.
By Sunday the position of the military could not have been clearer.
The weekend was filled with symbolic shows of force, with 40 000
troops taking up positions in the national capital. The marines set up a
row of Scorpion tanks in front of the Presidential Palace but, lest it be
thought that they were there to protect the president, they were posi-
tioned so that their cannon barrels faced towards the Presidential
Palace. It was pure symbolism, for security around the palace was in fact
comparatively light, in stark contrast to the precinct of the parliament
building, where tens of thousands of soldiers protected the people’s
representatives.
7;8
Over the weekend thousands of ulama, or religious leaders, from

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Nahdlatul Ulama, the traditionalist Muslim organisation with 30 mil-

lion members that Abdurrahman had led for fifteen years, met outside
Jakarta to consider his proposed decree. In a tearful meeting on Sunday
evening they told him that they supported the decree because they
believed it necessary to call fresh elections. Later that evening activists
representing scores of pro-democracy NGOs met with him at the
palace and also urged him to proceed with the decree, even going so far
as helping draft its text. In the early hours of Monday morning, con-
vinced that he was to be impeached within hours and knowing that
there was no chance of either the military or the police supporting his
decree, Abdurrahman decided on one last symbolic gesture. Knowing
that he was signing his political death warrant, he read out his decree
in the hope that in doing so he would call attention to illegitimacy of
the legislature’s move against him.
Later that day a melancholy Abdurrahman sat joking with friends in
his palace office as the Assembly sealed his fate. Clearly in deep shock,
he spoke about refusing to leave the palace as a gesture of defiance. But
remarkably, early the next morning, during his regular early-morning
walk around the place grounds, he told friends that he was ready to move
on and lead the reform movement from outside government. Earlier that
morning, in one of his last walks in the gardens of the Presidential
Palace, he made a point of relating a conversation that he had had late
the previous night with Nuriyah. ‘I am prepared,’ he had told her, ‘to stay
on here whatever they might do — let them cut off the water, let them
cut off the electricity, let them come in and cut me down — I am not
going to budge.’ Nuriyah sagely replied: ‘Well, that is all very well and
good for you, but what about the people? The people are looking for a
leader and as long as you remain here in the palace you can’t help those
waiting for you outside the palace.’ To which Abdurrahman replied:
‘Well, since you put it like that, let’s move out, let’s leave the palace.’
The previous evening, in typical form, the newly sacked president
had done something which struck him as entirely natural but produced
an unexpected level of contempt from the international media. For days
a small crowd of supporters, perhaps no more than a thousand, had ral-
lied in front of the palace. At around 9.30 that evening, the strain of the
day’s events evident on his tired face, at Yenny’s suggestion
Abdurrahman made a brief appearance on his front porch to wave to
the well-wishers. It was one of the lighter and happier moments of the
7;B
day for Abdurrahman, but the waiting journalists seized on his appear-
.3+-/:$.
ance in casual attire, wearing the sort of loose shorts and polo shirt that
he typically wore when exercising or relaxing late at night. As it hap-
pened, he explained the next morning, perplexed as to what all the fuss
had been about, he had just finished exercising on his treadmill when
he decided to appear on the porch and wave to the assembled crowd
before retiring. He was dressed as millions of other ordinary
Indonesians are when relaxing at home. The foreign media, however,
saw it differently. He had ‘appeared to the public in his underwear’, they
declared, and even waved as if nothing were wrong.
By Thursday morning the palace was all packed up and the former
president was ready to leave. Worried about the levels of stress that he
was under and the possibility of another stroke, his doctors had decid-
ed to bring forward a trip planned for mid-August to Johns Hopkins
Hospital in Baltimore for a comprehensive check-up.
Abdurrahman’s final day in the Presidential Palace seemed appropri-
ate. It began with an early-morning visit by saffron-robed Buddhist
priests, the first of a series of visits by religious and community leaders.
As was to be expected, he was later joined by Islamic leaders who
prayed for his welfare. More surprising was a visit by a fervent Christian
lay worker a little later that day. With a voice quivering with emotion,
she read to Abdurrahman from the Bible, then joined him behind his
desk and laid hands on him as she prayed for him and for the nation
before anointing him with oil (actually a perfume appropriately named
‘Eternity’!). Shortly afterwards he went for one last time to sit at the
head of the grand ballroom that runs down the centre of the palace with
his wife and daughters. Hundreds of palace staff formed a queue that
ringed the ballroom four deep to say their farewells. As the tearful
goodbyes concluded, Abdurrahman was ushered into his office to meet
with his old rival Hamzah Haz, who only minutes earlier had been
elected vice-president. Then at four o’clock he settled into the back seat
of his large black Mercedes to be driven through the gates of the palace
for the last time, though this time he went via the rear exit and the car
no longer bore its red ‘Indonesia 1’ plates. Before proceeding to the air-
port for a commercial flight to Washington, he was driven to Freedom
Square across the road from the Presidential Palace. There he addressed
an emotional crowd of thousands belonging to dozens of organisations.
Urging restraint, he vowed to continue the long struggle for reform
from outside the palace. The banners read: Welcome Home.
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By the time that the Indonesian parliament had decided to issue its
second memorandum at the end of April 2001, Abdurrahman’s repu-
tation had bottomed both nationally, at least among the educated
elite, and internationally. While few would disagree that his presiden-
cy proved disappointing, it is hard to assess to what extent this is
because of Abdurrahman’s personal failings and to what extent expec-
tations were unrealistically high, given the difficult nature of
Indonesia’s transition from authoritarian, military-backed govern-
ment to democracy.
I am convinced that in the long run history will judge Abdurrahman
more kindly than did the Indonesian elite and the international media
in the months leading up to his two memorandums of censure from
parliament. As with any public figure, particularly political leaders,
there are many aspects of Abdurrahman’s character that are frustrating
and perplexing. It is difficult to know whether to read him as, essen-
tially, a flawed and disappointing figure who promised much but failed
to deliver, or whether to be more generous and recognise the scale of his
struggles and the hard-won nature of his achievements.
7;<
Natural gifts
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Despite, or maybe because of, the burden of expectations on him,
Abdurrahman was from an early age playful to a point of being mis-
chievous and reckless, and in many respects showed considerable lack
of self-discipline. He always had a passion for food, and given the
opportunity would eat well beyond what was good for him, a tendency
made worse by his preference for deep-fried savoury snacks. And in his
studies, and later in his professional life, he often failed to achieve all
that he could, through lack of discipline or focus. He says himself that
he failed a year of high school while in Jakarta because he spent too
much time watching football and going to the movies. Later, in the
pesantren environment of Yogyakarta and Jombang, he excelled. But
even there, his academic results seemed to be achieved in spite of, rather
than because of, his approach to his studies. Because Abdurrahman is
gifted with an extraordinarily sharp mind combined with an almost
photographic memory, he was able to get through his studies with lit-
tle application. His ability to easily memorise large amounts of infor-
mation served him well in the pesantren world, but when he arrived in
Cairo his failure to attend classes and generally apply himself became
his undoing. After he moved to Baghdad he did much better, both
because the environment forced him to focus and because he found
what he was doing more intellectually challenging and interesting.
One of his key traits is natural curiosity and, provided his curiosity is
sustained, he can focus and apply himself for long periods. If that is not
the case, however, he quickly becomes bored, even when the gravity of
the task before him warrants more effort.
When Abdurrahman was elected president, many sceptics perceived
him as frail and weak (an impression reinforced by the knowledge that
he had suffered two strokes and was legally blind). His friends, howev-
er, knew better. His ox-like constitution, which like his mental gifts he
took for granted and failed to take care of, is combined with tremen-
dous strength of will.
Personality
As already mentioned, one of the dominant features of Abdurrahman’s
personality, at least for those who know him well, is his strong sense of
destiny which produces in him the conviction that he should attempt
great things. He has lived most of his life in an environment in which
he has few intellectual peers with the same breadth of knowledge and
7;=
interests as himself. This has produced in him a sense of confidence that

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many argue is so great as to be dangerous. And yet he is also a remark-

ably humble and genuinely unpretentious individual. As president he
had little time for the protocol of being head of the world’s third-largest
democracy. In his friends, the attributes he prizes above all else are lack
of pretension and genuineness.
Perhaps one of the main reasons why Abdurrahman is frequently
misunderstood and thought to be arrogant is his habit of psyching him-
self up with what might be called ‘locker-room talk’ when facing a great
challenge. He talks himself up as an athlete does before a big match in
order to convince himself that he can succeed. Being highly extrovert-
ed, he tends to do this psyching up aloud, and being extremely gregar-
ious to boot he typically does it in front of whoever happens to be
around. This tendency was intensified by his loss of eyesight in January
1998. Unfortunately, when he became president eighteen months later,
he did little to sharpen his discretion and become more careful about
the way he voiced his thoughts out loud. Many of his most controver-
sial moments have come about because of this unfortunate combination
of habits: talking big to psych himself up, and thinking out loud
thoughts that a wiser person would keep to himself.
All of this is exacerbated by his sense of humour. When things are
going well this makes him a delightful company and has won him many
friends over the years, but when things were going badly it only served
to damage him further. A frequent complaint directed at him after he
became president was that he failed to appreciate the gravity of his sit-
uation. For those close to him this was patently wrong, for he took seri-
ously the issues he was struggling with; but it is his nature to make light
of burdens and to talk up his situation, using wit and natural banter to
alleviate the pressure in an otherwise impossible situation.
H$#:+(:)3%.,+#.(1)*!&+#
From the first months of his administration Abdurrahman faced pres-
sure from a hostile legislature dominated by individuals closely con-
nected to the former regime. As soon as it became clear that he was not
a malleable president in the hands of the unlikely coalition that pushed
him into the presidency ahead of Megawati Soekarnoputri, his rela-
tionship with parliament began to break down. Hostile parliamentarians
accused him of a broad array of misdemeanors and failings. For some time
the accusations against him focused on two cases of alleged corruption.
7;D
When the Attorney-General dismissed both cases for lack of evidence,
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the cries for Abdurrahman’s dismissal did not abate. Instead the cam-
paign against him shifted from claims of corruption to claims of incom-
petence. In truth the central issue was always his alleged incompetence,
or at least parliament’s lack of ‘confidence’ in him, for even among his
staunchest enemies few seriously believed that he was a guilty of any
serious corruption.
On the face of it, the charges of incompetence and mismanagement
seem plausible. President Wahid was a most unlikely president, and his
erratic and amateur approach to administration made it easy to write
him off as simply incompetent and not up to the task. In fact, his clos-
est friends never wanted him to become president. Those who knew
him well understood that he was at heart an NGO activist, not a natu-
ral manager, much less a trained chief executive officer. He was always
a populist, not an elitist: a major failing in a political system that
revolves — at least outside election season — around a tight knot of
several thousand middle-class Jakartans.
Moreover, he had gone brilliantly head-to-head with Soeharto in a
way that few could during the difficult final decade of the military-
backed regime. When the former president seemed prepared to go into
any length to squash his rivals, Abdurrahman was always a tactician,
not a strategist. Although he was brilliant at short-term political plays
— in which his unexpected moves repeatedly caught the Soeharto
administration off guard — he seldom showed any sign of planning for
the long term. Under Soeharto, this was hardly a serious indictment. It
made little sense to think about the long term and risk letting slip what
you were planning, when to do so was to invite trouble from the regime.
Abdurrahman’s tactic of feigning a move to the right only to veer left at
the last moment was a perfect method of dealing with an authoritarian
regime with totalitarian aspirations. Indeed, it could be said that one of
the distinctive features of the Soeharto regime, at least in terms of its
impact on nascent civil society, was that it made everyone reactive
rather than proactive. In the post-Soeharto era (which for old players
like Abdurrahman came much more abruptly than had been expected),
the habits of subterfuge and canny brinkmanship were hard to forget.
For Abdurrahman as president there were many situations — partic-
ularly in building a coalition with Megawati and PDI-P — where
strategic thinking was essential; sadly, on many occasions after becom-
ing president, Abdurrahman followed up a brilliant tactical play with
7<A
poor strategic planning. This is exemplified in his brilliant success at

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the August 2000 annual session of the MPR. Although it was widely
expected that the MPR would issue a decree greatly diminishing the
power of the president, in the end he emerged unscathed, but then
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by forming a cabinet that failed
to consolidate his partnership with Megawati and PDI-P. Even his
power-sharing with Megawati became more a liability than an asset
because of his failure to negotiate a sufficiently robust and substantial
deal. As their personal relationship continued to sour, it was easy for
Megawati in her silence to give the impression that Abdurrahman had
completely reneged on the power-sharing deal; the reality was that the
modest agreement was lived out according to the letter, but without
consolidating the strategically vital partnership to the extent that was
necessary to lift parliamentary pressure from the president.
Abdurrahman compounded his problems with both Megawati and
with parliament by repeatedly hiring and firing cabinet ministers and
senior officials without offering sufficient explanation for his actions.
Were these appointments and dismissals obviously insightful and nec-
essary, he might have been forgiven for his lack of consultation. Sadly,
however, he seemed to get these wrong more often than he got them
right, particularly during the final year of his presidency. Had he, for
example, taken seriously Megawati’s concerns about the appointment
of Finance Minister Prijadi and Defence Minister Mahfud and stayed
his hand, he would have saved himself a great deal of trouble later on.
Similarly, had he not sacked National Police Chief Rusdihardjo and
replaced him with Bimantoro, he could have avoided an enormous
amount of angst and possibly even saved his presidency. Whatever his
concerns about Rusdihardjo and the lack of success by the police in
arresting Tommy Soeharto, it quickly became clear that he had replaced
a moderately good police chief with a quintessentially corrupt one. He
made similar errors also within TNI. After years of being manipulated
by Soeharto, the military resented being accused of human rights abus-
es. In the end it did not matter that Abdurrahman was trying to do the
right thing and push through reform within the military; his lack of
diligence in explaining what he was doing only served to make the vil-
lains appear heroes and the corrupt virtuous. If in this one area of his
presidency Abdurrahman could have shown greater common sense and
restraint, he might well have survived in office with the support of
PDI-P. But, beginning with the sudden sacking of Laksamana, he
7<@
demonstrated a tragic capacity for alienating people through ill-consid-
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ered or poorly explained dismissals and appointments. Moreover, in
these interventions he appeared to be too trusting in accepting the
advice of self-serving ‘friends’. With a good presidential office staffed
by trusted professionals and, most importantly, a strong chief of staff (in
many respects Ratih pointed the way to what was required), he might
have been spared from at least some of these self-inflicted wounds.
Possibly an even worse failing in the eyes of Jakarta elite is that
Abdurrahman is completely unconcerned about appearances. It often
seems as if he simply ‘does not give a damn’. Indeed, he says as much
himself, arguing that in Jakarta too much stock is put in form and not
enough in substance. Such disregard for appearances is engaging in its
idealism and down-to-earth sincerity, but it is mistaken nevertheless
when your day job is being president of a major democracy. As a per-
sonal trait, Abdurrahman’s dislike of all forms of pretension is
admirable and one of his more attractive qualities. It is also a defining
aspect of his personality. In fact much of his mischievousness comes
from his habit of deflating the pretentious. In politics, however, such
disregard for appearances is a serious liability when it prevents commu-
nication of your message — which in Abdurrahman’s case was fre-
quently. All too often, he would make a public statement about
something dear to his heart — the substance of which he assumed was
self-evident — only to sabotage himself by failing to explain what he
was thinking. In this way he left himself open to the charges of his
political opponents that he was erratic and irresponsible. Once again, a
strong presidential office could have made an enormous difference in
the way that he projected himself. (The appointment of Wimar
Witoelar was an excellent start, but it came late in the piece and there
was too little time to consolidate on this foundation.)
One well-known example was his often-repeated proposition that if
nothing could be done to resolve the political deadlock in Indonesia the
best option might be to declare a state of emergency. On several occa-
sions he explained that he meant by this the dissolving of parliament
through the declaration of a state of emergency so that fresh elections
could be held quickly — and that those elections would involve the
direct election of the next president which, under the circumstances, he
would certainly not win. In his more reflective moments he explained
this would be necessary to give the next president of Indonesia a clear
mandate. In principle this argument makes good sense, although many
7<6
constitutional experts point out that it is of dubious legality. His inten-

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tion was sound and born of a sincere desire to avoid a ‘constitutional

coup’ and to avert the subsequent slow disintegration of the state. Talk
of a state of emergency and the dissolving of parliament, however, made
him sound quite the opposite of a democrat. His response to this
quandary was simply to say, ‘It doesn’t matter what people think I know
that what I am doing is right’. Such guileless idealism is admirable in
an activist, but of questionable utility in a president.
Allied to this lack of concern for appearances is his propensity for
commenting on issues that are dear to his heart in a way that makes
him sound not just impassioned but almost authoritarian. For example,
he spoke out often about his disappointment with the Indonesian
media. He occasionally even suggested that it might be necessary to
institute legal action if baseless slander of him was repeated unchecked.
Objectively he had good grounds for his disappointment with the
media, but his talk about suing journalists, like his talk of dissolving
parliament, played into the hands of those who claimed that his twen-
ty months in power impaired his judgment and turned a democrat into
a tyrant. In fact, his record on press freedom was unparalleled. One of
his first actions after becoming president was to dissolve the
Department of Information — the bane of many journalists, local and
foreign alike. And despite his occasional outbursts of irritation with the
press his administration did not once intervene in a substantial way to
limit press freedom. On the contrary, the press enjoyed broad access to
him as president and to his administration, without precedence in mod-
ern Indonesia. Through his openness and candour he went a long way
towards demythologising the presidency. Consequently, it can fairly be
said that ‘his bark is worse than his bite’. But even ‘barking’ represents
a political liability when you don’t take time to explain yourself and
when you are wilfully nonchalant about appearances.
A strong line of argument in his defence against the charge of incip-
ient authoritarianism is that his political weakness was due to his fail-
ure to negotiate ruthlessly and to cut deals with his opponents. For
example, he frequently antagonised the generals when he could easily
have used them to consolidate his hold on power. He made an enemy
when he sacked General Wiranto, who had earlier positioned himself
as an ally of the president’s against Islamist elements within the mili-
tary. Similarly, his rebuking of the military for atrocities committed in
Aceh in November 2000 permanently shifted the balance of power
7<7
against him as the military became impatient with his efforts to limit
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their power. And although human rights abuses continued at an awful
pace in regions like Aceh and to a lesser extent West Timor and Irian
Jaya, there is little doubt that if he had not restrained the military and
the police the abuses would have been very much worse. It would have
been relatively simple to have cut a deal in the early days of his presi-
dency with either General Wiranto or another general with political
ambitions, and to have played the game that Soeharto played so skil-
fully of dividing and conquering the military by pitting one section
against another. Similarly, it would have been fairly straightforward to
negotiate deals with elements within Golkar or PPP to ensure that their
votes could be relied upon in parliament. The only downside, of course,
with such deal-making would have been the price. For Abdurrahman it
was too high a price to be worth paying. It is interesting to speculate
what could have happened had a less liberal-minded individual been
chosen as Indonesia’s first democratically elected president in October
1999. A more ruthless individual could have subverted the vagaries of
the constitution and exploited the capricious, self-serving personalities
of elite politics so as to make his or her position impregnable.
Consequently, the charge that Abdurrahman is guilty of incompe-
tence rings true, at least at this level. As a would-be dictator, he was
hopelessly incapable of putting together the alliances to give him the
power that his detractors accused him of lusting after.
To be fair, at another level the charges of incompetence are justified.
Abdurrahman’s management style was at best erratic and unconven-
tional and at worst seriously wanting. In particular, his frequent reshuf-
fling of cabinet positions in an attempt to find political leverage in his
push for reform, like a football coach reshuffling his line-up to make
inroads against a tough opponent, provided his critics with abundant
ammunition and frustrated his supporters.
Much of the incompetence in his administration had to do with a
dysfunctional bureaucracy inherited from the Soeharto era.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that a more managerially gifted pres-
ident would have made a better job of bringing order out of the chaos
of post-Soeharto Indonesia. It is easy to imagine, for example, that if
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew had been president, by the end of his first
two years in office Indonesia would have become a much more ordered
society than it currently is. A Lee Kuan Yew-style president would, of
course, not have pushed as hard for democratic reform as Abdurrahman
7<8
did, but many in the business community would have been more com-
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
fortable with such a figure. It is important to recognise — and this real-

ity seems to have escaped some observers — that in October 1999 there
was no such figure waiting in the wings, nor is there one now. The
argument in favour of Abdurrahman becoming president was that he
represented the best of a series of poor choices. It was hoped that his
democratic aspirations and liberalism would compensate for his inade-
quacies in management. Whether they did or not is debatable — for
the issues are not as straightforward as many pretend them to be. Still,
the first two years of democracy in Indonesia proved disappointing on
many fronts. It is tempting to assign most of the blame for this to the
nation’s maverick president. In doing so, however, we may fail to appre-
ciate the true nature and magnitude of the problems, and consequently
mislead ourselves about what is to come.
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,/.&!%1/C,)(.*)/%#.%
The simplest way of explaining the scope of the problems facing
President Wahid — while admitting his weak management and erratic
leadership style, together with his propensity for miscommunication —
is that as Indonesia’s first democratically elected president he faced the
difficult task of overseeing the fraught process of regime change.
History suggests that any country that has experienced decades of mil-
itary-backed authoritarian government finds the transition to democra-
cy extremely difficult. At best, the process takes at least a decade before
real improvements can be seen on most fronts. Tragically, at its worst,
such regime change is unsuccessful, and many countries fail to make it
through the transition. The cases of Pakistan and Russia teach us that
there is no guarantee of finding light at the end of the tunnel — in fact
sometimes it is not even certain that the tunnel has an end. Several
aspects of the process of regime change facing Indonesia appear to be
unique, but most would be readily recognised by observers elsewhere in
the world, whether in Latin America, Eastern Europe or East Asia.
Indonesia’s unfortunate distinction is that it began its transition to
democracy in the midst of an enormous financial crisis. But the major
challenge facing it is the one that faces all such transitions: dealing with
the cultural and institutional inheritance of the former regime.
It needs to be stressed that in many important respects the Soeharto
regime continues to live on long after Soeharto made his exit. The impor-
7<B
tant elements that made the regime an effective, if surprisingly ineffi-
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cient, authoritarian force are still largely in place, even if the government
of the day is no longer the government of Soeharto. One illustration of
this truth is what occurred in East Timor in September 1999 — a full
eighteen months after Soeharto had stepped down as president. In a
sense it was the Soeharto regime that razed East Timor to the ground
in the wake of the 31 August referendum vote for independence. It was
the same military machine that was the mainstay of the Soeharto regime
that vindictively reduced East Timor to smouldering ruins. And it has
by no means been pushed from the scene yet. The sad truth behind the
empty myth of authoritarian efficiency is that President Wahid took
charge of smouldering ruins as surely as did the beleaguered Timorese.
The most debilitating gift from the undead regime that fought
Abdurrahman was its insidious cultural legacy, which has eroded the
soil that the seed of democracy needs to take root — at least within elite
society. Sadly, the rent-seeking culture of the Soeharto regime —
which, for all its claims of being developmentalist, was essentially a
franchising system of profit-taking and opportunism — still lives on.
The unpaid bills of the Soeharto regime come in many forms and
show that ‘the Indonesian miracle’, once so widely acclaimed in the
West, was in many respects — at least by the late 1990s — little more
than a scam. Some of these bills take the form of deadly inter-commu-
nal tensions, the product of decades of transmigration. This crude
attempt, albeit perhaps well-intentioned, at social engineering was
unfortunately not accompanied by astute community development to
prevent socio-economic cleavages emerging between communities.
This is most tragically seen in the archipelago of Maluku, where previ-
ously peaceful relations between communities of Christians and
Muslims living side-by-side quickly deteriorated into an awful cycle of
vendetta. There is good reason for believing this violence was exacer-
bated by the deliberate efforts of militias sponsored by the military, and
by the direct actions of the military itself, but there is no denying that,
once the authoritarian lid of the former regime was lifted, countless
unresolved issues boiled over.
This in itself would be a big problem for any new democracy, but in
many respects it was overshadowed by massive debts in the wake of
Indonesian economic meltdown of late 1997. Much of the debt result-
ed from the failure of Indonesia’s numerous private banks, which in
some cases were refinanced not just once but twice before being milked
7<;
of all their assets. This contributed to a crisis of confidence, which made

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economic recovery extremely difficult. It also left a culture of corrupt

practices and deluded mindsets, the reform of which is as difficult as
the restoration of investor confidence.
These challenges that faced President Wahid are obvious, but there
at least a dozen others which are not so commonly acknowledged.
!)#/J.()3%/"-.',)1&!1)3-!:$.#)1&.)*!&+#)3%.,+#.(0>
Apart from his own failings and inadequacies, most of the problems
that plagued Abdurrahman as president can be summed up under the
heading of regime change. These problems are so obvious that they are
often overlooked. Certainly in some of these areas Abdurrahman could
have performed much better, but for the most part these problems
would have beset any new president trying to build a democratic
Indonesia. When they are enumerated, it becomes apparent that
Indonesia’s first democratically elected president faced challenges that
were not only greater but also more insidious than first thought.
Inflated expectations
The expectations of the millions of Indonesians who greeted his presi-
dency with great enthusiasm and goodwill were grossly inflated. This
was partly because under Sukarno and Soeharto the position of presi-
dent had been built up to mythological proportions — borrowing from
the imagery of a traditional Southeast Asia monarch, the president was
the state and the state was the president. Moreover, people’s hopes
about what democracy would bring and how quickly it would bring it
went far beyond what was reasonable. The elections of 7 June 1999, the
first free and fair elections since 1955, went as well as anyone could
have reasonably expected (apart from some strange problems with vote
counting), and this good result reinforced the general air of optimism
about the process of democratisation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Even
though the transitional Habibie administration had shown that many
of the problems, most notably those relating to economic and legal
reform, would require a long time to sort out, there was still the false
expectation that the new president would be free to inaugurate rapid
and substantial change.
It was widely assumed, even by those who should have known better,
that during his first year in office the new president would be able to
bring peace to warring provinces, rebuild investor confidence, roll back
7<<
decades of corrupt practice and legal abuse, rein in the military, restore
0/(0-$,+/(
economic growth, and generally deliver Indonesia into a new period of
prosperity. Consequently, it was inevitable that disillusionment would
quickly replace the euphoria of late 1999.
Formidable opponents
The onset of cynicism and ‘reform fatigue’ were exacerbated by the for-
midable array of opponents facing the new president. Some of them
were belligerent because they regarded Abdurrahman as a rival; others
were desperately afraid that if reform went too far they would be called
to account for the deals that had made them wealthy. At the very least,
many were concerned to slow the course of reform because they saw it
as threatening their interests.
Despite rhetoric about ending KKN, corruption, collusion and nepo-
tism, few people who had enjoyed access to power were keen to see legal
reform and the prosecution of corrupt figures. It was all very well to talk
about bringing Soeharto to justice, but when attention turned to the
dubious business dealings of his associates — many of whom held posi-
tions of influence within parliament — and to the human rights abus-
es committed by the military, Abdurrahman found few allies willing to
support a concerted effort at reform. Moreover, many of these oppo-
nents of reform had enormous personal wealth and the formidable net-
works and resources afforded by decades in power.
Weak civil society

While the opponents of reform were generally well-equipped and well-
organised, the same cannot be said of those on the side of reform. One of
the legacies of the Soeharto authoritarian regime was an enfeebled civil
society. Indeed, according to conventional wisdom, Indonesia was
nowhere near the point where it was ready to make a smooth transition
to democracy. Its middle-class and related civil society were too small to
have the necessary means of socialising democracy and setting up the
institutional and cultural checks and balances essential to ensuring that it
thrived. When the 1999 election went better than had been hoped, this
pessimism about the capacity of civil society to cope with reform looked
to have been overstated. For a while, it seemed as if the transition to
democracy was going to be much easier than had been expected. One
year later, however, civil society in Indonesia was powerless to prevent the
cronies of the former regime blocking moves for reform at every turn.
7<=
A politically charged press

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One of the areas in which the weakness of civil society was most con-
spicuous was the capture of the media by political interests. In many
respects, this was to be expected, given the extent to which capital can
determine editorial policy. It was particularly evident with the private
television stations that are largely owned either by Soeharto’s children
or by their friends and associates. Controlling capital was also a key fac-
tor in the print media and it soon became clear that certain newspapers
would take a party line on key issues. What was more surprising,
though, was the insidious way in which powerful vested interests were
able to influence media output.
This was not the only determining factor, however, for intimidation
and threats of violence were also significant in influencing the line
taken by many publishers and individual journalists. In some cases this
intimidation took the form of attacks by gangs of thugs acting under
the banner of radical Islamism.
On the other hand, there is strong anecdotal evidence of consider-
able financial inducements being offered to run a particular line on
certain stories. The cultural practice of giving journalists an envelope
containing money for their expenses — lunch, transport and so forth
— was established in the Soeharto period, and it was not uncommon
for businesses and individuals to use inducements to seek favourable
press. Sadly, although the press was ostensibly freer than ever before,
the level of inducements appears to have grown significantly as an
inflationary cycle took hold. There was much talk within media circles
of large sums of money being handed out to journalists by politicians
and their associates to ensure favorable coverage, to lock in television
interviews, or to block certain stories from running. None of this is
surprising in hindsight. What was most insidious and most disap-
pointing was that even quality broadsheets seem to have slowly
succumbed to political pressure.
Given the lack of hard evidence, it is impossible to do more than
speculate about why the press became so antagonistic towards the pres-
ident. No doubt to a certain extent it was his own lack of media savvy
that set them against him. Moreover, the quality press was long accus-
tomed to feeling that its role as a social commentator was essentially
concerned with criticising the government of the day. Nevertheless,
there seemed to be much more going on. Given the circumstantial
evidence that the elite of the former regime was desperate to deflect
7<D
criticism from themselves, it is likely that they sought to manipulate the
0/(0-$,+/(
media for their own purposes.
Lack of political capital

From the outset, Abdurrahman’s greatest problems was his lack of
political capital. In itself this is to be expected, but he experienced sur-
prising difficulty in finding a solution. Indeed, one of his greatest mis-
takes as president was his failure to recognise the need to build a
coalition of support.
In the run-up to the 1999 elections, it was widely expected that
defeating Golkar would prove a difficult task. Admittedly by 1999
Golkar’s reputation, at least within Java, was at an all-time low. Even so,
political calculations showed that Golkar had a strong chance of achiev-
ing success in the presidential elections. After all, more than two hun-
dred of the seven hundred seats in the MPR, the electoral college
charged with selecting the president, are non-elected positions, and it
was thought that Golkar would control the majority of these seats.
Golkar was also expected to negotiate a coalition with PPP. In addition,
Golkar was the only party that was well-equipped to handle an election
campaign and the political negotiations that followed. Thirty-two years
of Soeharto had left Indonesia ill-prepared for democracy. When pres-
idential front-runner Megawati refused to co-operate with
Abdurrahman Wahid and with Amien Rais of PAN to form a common
front against Golkar, Abdurrahman began to consider other options. In
the end, against all expectations, he was able to sail into the presidency
through the narrowest of gaps on a rickety temporary coalition of for-
mer rivals and fair-weather friends. It was inevitable that this coalition
would break up within months, leaving him with no natural vehicle.
Tragically, he failed to put together the foundation of a robust coalition
by neglecting links between his party, PKB, with Megawati’s PDI-P.
The need to build political capital became pressing when parliament
began to sit. It was soon obvious that the legislature was determined to
exert its authority over the executive. It is, of course, natural after forty
years of domination by the executive that the legislature should want to
reassert itself. Although on paper the Indonesian constitution describes
a presidential system, in practice a parliamentary system began to
emerge. Unfortunately, however, this embryonic parliamentary system
lacked the checks and balances of a bicameral system. Without the num-
bers in parliament, Abdurrahman was always going to be in trouble.
7=A
A divided reform movement

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At the same time, opponents to reform had succeeded in dividing and

conquering both civil society at large and the political reform move-
ment in particular. Within civil organisations there was considerable
disarray and lack of clarity about the way forward. Many student groups
continued to call for Soeharto to be put on trial and for justice to be
served against those in the security apparatus who had bought so much
pain and suffering on Indonesian citizens. These aspirations were laud-
able, but they were generally not coupled with a sound understanding
of the realpolitik limitations facing the president. It was not long before
many elements of civil society began to turn against the Wahid admin-
istration, arguing that it was going neither far enough nor fast enough
in its program of reform. Many individuals within Abdurrahman’s PKB
party were patently exploiting their connection with the president for
all it was worth, and even his cabinet ministers were not free from such
corruption, further disillusioning many activists. Even when they were
convinced of the president’s integrity, looking in from the outside on his
administration they found it difficult to understand why he was seem-
ingly incapable of controlling his own people.
Even more seriously, the personal relationship between Abdurrahman
Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri broke down. It had been deterio-
rating since May 1999 and nothing that had happened over the follow-
ing twelve months was able to arrest its decline. The relationship went
from bad to worse when Abdurrahman made a series of political errors
and then failed to correct them. The sacking of Megawati’s confidant
Laksamana Sukardi from the first Abdurrahman cabinet in April 2000
is widely seen as the beginning of the end for his political relationship
with Megawati. Then, when he announced a new cabinet line-up four
months later, he was widely viewed as not having consulted Megawati
sufficiently. He can argue that he had given Megawati each of the four
positions she had requested, but this was hardly an answer to his dilem-
ma. Without the support of Megawati and PDI-P in parliament, there
was no way that he could escape constant hounding by the legislature,
much less advance his reform agenda.
Islamists used to spearhead opposition

As the relationship between Abdurrahman and Megawati was moving
from bad to worse, the other main reformist party in parliament, PAN,
began to show signs of division. Amien Rais and A.M. Fatwa began to
7=@
push the party away from its original liberal charter and towards the
0/(0-$,+/(
exclusivist policies of Islamism, much to the annoyance of liberals with-
in the party such as Feisal Basri. Eventually many of the key liberals
abandoned the party, leaving PAN a shadow of its former self.
While the Islamists within PAN were consolidating their position,
Abdurrahman was facing opposition from within the moderately con-
servative PPP along with the small Islamist parties. These forces had
been instrumental in putting him into the presidency, and many
observers wondered aloud how it was that he had so quickly lost their
support. The truth was that he had never really had their support. When
Soeharto encouraged the formation of ICMI in 1990, placing it under
the patronage of his protégé B.J. Habibie, his backing of this major
national organisation marked a significant policy shift. Through ICMI
Soeharto courted Islamists and other conservative Muslims from a mod-
ernist urban background, the very people he had earlier suppressed.
Although he was successful in co-opting some of his staunchest critics,
Soeharto was unable to win over to ICMI the largely rural traditional-
ists represented by NU. In fact Abdurrahman was openly critical of
ICMI, warning that its political sponsorship represented the re-emer-
gence of sectarianism in politics. This fact proved critical in Soeharto’s
growing anger with the outspoken leader of NU, and he encouraged the
ICMI conservatives to turn on Abdurrahman.
The surprise was not that early in his term Abdurrahman began to
face opposition from conservative modernists and Islamists, but that
they had ever supported him at all. They openly rued their ‘mistake’ in
backing him, for a stubborn and non-compliant President Wahid was
soon seen to be even less attractive than a secular nationalist Megawati
— especially when it became clear that getting rid of Megawati would
be much easier than getting rid of Abdurrahman was proved to be.
Elements of the former Soeharto regime may have blocked Habibie’s
election in 1999, but they were more than happy to enlist the support
of his organisation to battle Abdurrahman. Amien Rais and friends
were egged on to skirmish on the front line, at the growing expense of
their own credibility, while Golkar, which was quietly attempting to
rehabilitate its reputation, watched from the sidelines.
The absence of a democratic constitution

The Wahid presidency was marked by the ascendancy of the legislature
over the executive. A vigorous legislature is, of course, essential to the
7=6
functioning of democracy. But a legislature without sufficient constitu-

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
tional checks and balances that, through its effective control of the
MPR, is a law unto itself, is not conducive to the functioning of democ-
racy. It is now apparent that Indonesia’s 1945 constitution, which for
four decades provided sound service to authoritarian presidents, is
unable to ensure that a democratic president is, within reasonable
limits, free to do his or her job.
A belligerent state apparatus

If Indonesia had had a well-established tradition of democracy, partic-
ularly within the machinery of government, the weaknesses and lack of
clarity in the 1945 constitution would not be so significant. The legacy
of the Soeharto regime was a dysfunctional, self-serving bureaucracy
that resisted reform not because of ideological conviction but because
of self-interest. Under Soeharto official wages were low, but so were
workloads, and the opportunities for rent-seeking and profiteering were
great. The result was a public sector in which efficiency and proficien-
cy were at a very low level.
Not only was the work ethic within the public sector poor, but decades
of appointing yesmen had eroded any notion of a meritocracy and left a
state apparatus poorly equipped to carry out its core functions.
A dysfunctional public service was an enormous burden on the new
administration but the problem went further. Under Soeharto all senior
appointments were political, but such arrangements were based on tacit
agreements. President Wahid found it extremely difficult to make polit-
ical appointments because no such tradition was established on paper.
Without loyal personal staff and a strong office, it is impossible for any
democratic leader to function, much less one whose success depends on
reforming the bureaucracy. As a result the president was left without the
protective cloak — the layers of carefully fitted state apparatus and par-
ticularly a personal office — which is essential to the good performance
of any democratic head of government. Without these he stood vulner-
able in the full glare of public scrutiny as a naked president.
A dysfunctional legal system

At the heart of the many problems facing the new administration was
the non-existence of the rule of law for most people most of the time.
Most judges and court officials were corrupt and it was difficult, to say
the least, for honest officials to do their job. So while the legal system
7=7
was not entirely dysfunctional, in many areas it was close to being so.
0/(0-$,+/(
Sadly, the decentralised nature of power in post-Soeharto Indonesia
meant that the nation was probably more lawless than ever before.
Frustrated citizens became accustomed to taking the law into their own
hands, frequently with tragic results. Mob justice and vigilantism may
provide some immediate satisfaction for ordinary people, but the long-
term legacy of such behaviour is to destabilise civilisation itself.
It is widely agreed that rebuilding the court system, even in part, will
take a decade of stable reformist government. The legal system con-
tributed to the failure of Abdurrahman’s administration as the courts
worked hand-in-glove with elements of the former regime, including
senior parliamentarians, desperate to escape prosecution.
A rentier state in partnership with organised crime

The pathetic state of the Indonesian legal system is a reminder the for-
mer regime saw the legal system essentially as a political tool and a
means of maintaining social order. Crime in itself was not seen as a
problem, provided it was under the control of the regime. Indeed the
rent-seeking of the regime extended well beyond ‘legal’ business and
reached into every ‘profitable’ endeavour in society.
At the same time, the grossly underfunded military (which, until
they were separated in 1999, included the police) was forced to make as
much as three-quarters of its operating budget, not to mention the
enormous private wealth of many senior officers, from business activi-
ties. These ventures included, along with illegal forestry and mining,
prostitution, gambling, and the drug trade, requiring partnerships with
organised criminals, so their corrupting influence was profound. The
state and its security apparatus was in partnership with networks of pre-
man or gangsters across the archipelago. Some observers suggest that
the problem was so extensive that the Soeharto regime can be described
as a preman-istic regime.
An antagonistic military
The military’s partnership with organised crime had a corrosive effect
that extended well beyond ordinary criminality. The violence in East
Timor in 1999, and in West Timor since, is a reminder of the extent to
which the military relied upon preman-based militia to do their dirty
work.
If such preman militia were confined to outlying regions such as Irian
7=8
Jaya and Aceh, their existence would be worrying, but there are good
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reasons to believe that they have been employed in ‘dirty tricks’ across
the archipelago. Military intelligence agents were able to employ pre-
man militia to incite violence and destabilise communities; even though
hard-liners in the military were in many ways more powerless than ever
before, they still had the power to change the course of politics and
block reform. Terrorism may be the last resort of the weak, but it is very
effective all the same.
In certain respects Abdurrahman’s ‘taming’ of the military was one of
his greatest successes but he made enemies of powerful officers and
threatened the business interests of many more. His reforms met oppo-
sition from hard-line elements within the military and police.
Moreover, ultra-nationalist military were outraged by his humanitarian
approach to conflict resolution in Aceh and Irian Jaya. It is little won-
der that many saw the naturally conservative and nationalistic
Megawati as an attractive alternative to the president.
0/(0-$,+/(
No one ever imagined that the transition to democracy in Indonesia
would be smooth, but at the outset few reformists, Abdurrahman
Wahid included, fully comprehended the overwhelming scale of the
task. The legacy of the Soeharto years proved to be even worse than had
been imagined. It is reasonable to be disappointed with the Wahid
presidency but, given the circumstances in which Abdurrahman had to
operate, he deserves more credit than he is generally given.
Few people understand the level of pressure on the president of a
large nation in the early stages of transition from authoritarian military
rule to democracy. Most people would collapse under such pressure,
which takes the form of intimidation at every level combined with
impossible expectations and severely limited resources. In this respect
Abdurrahman is well served by an unusual combination of attributes,
rarely found together. He is unquestionably an idealist in terms of what
he aspires to achieve and the values he has espoused consistently
through his life, but he also a realist with a sharp sense of realpolitik. His
conviction that ‘politics is the art of the possible’ was especially apposite
during a transitional period, which by its very nature is messy and can-
not be traversed without constant compromise.
There is no question that, whatever else that can be said about
Abdurrahman, he remains a rough diamond — in the language of Java
7=B
he is kasar rather than halus, he is coarse rather than refined. Indeed he
0/(0-$,+/(
resembles the much-loved wayang figure, Semar — the rough, vulgar
court jester who underneath his deliberately disarming exterior is sharp
and focused. Because I grew up with American television rather than
with wayang kulit and Semar, he reminds me of the Peter Falk charac-
ter Colombo. Falk’s shabbily dressed detective in a raincoat appears to
bumble his way through cases but consistently nails the villains with
evidence that they have revealed to him precisely because they made the
mistake of underestimating him. Some of the time, at least,
Abdurrahman does just that.
There is more to Abdurrahman than meets the eye, but what does
meet the eye is often displeasing. His friends and family did their best
to groom and polish him for his role as president and, to be fair to him,
he too tried hard, but it was only ever an incomplete success.
This aspect of Abdurrahman’s personality cost him dearly, for it
made it all too easy for his enemies to dismiss him as a self-centred and
delusional fool unfit to be trusted with the governance of his country.
Sadly, it also made them look good, if not to most Indonesians then at
least to some of the watching world’s most trusted commentators. In
particular, hard-line elements within the military, men who under a
mature democracy might have faced long prison sentences for their
crimes against humanity, were presented as democracy’s defenders.
(/1.,
~
Prologue
1 The episode was recounted to me by the adjutant involved in December 1999. Most
of the incidents from 1989 onward described in this book, such as the voting at the
1999 People’s Consultative Assembly, I witnessed firsthand; where this is the case, in
order to keep the number of endnotes to a minimum, I have not added notes.
2 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1999, p. 191.
Chapter 1: Growing up in pesantren and politics, 1940–63

1 It did not occur to his young mother (who, during the first years of her marriage, was
literate in the Arabic script, not modern roman characters) that the local registrar
officials in her deeply Islamic rural community would record her eldest child as being
born on 4 August. This account is based on my interviews with Abdurrahman and
his daughters (especially Alissa and Yenny), with whom Solichah often spoke about
her early life. Solichah may well have romanticised aspects of the period up to the
death of her husband Wahid Hasyim in 1953, but her reputation as a confident, no-
nonsense figure would suggest that her recollection is reasonably reliable.
2 There are reasons for doubting this as well. The details of his birth, and those of his
five siblings, were recorded in a family prayer-book, but as this was lost sometime in
the mid-1960s, and official records no longer exist, we may never be completely sure
of the facts.
3 The biographical sketches in this chapter about Abdurrahman Wahid’s grandfathers,
parents and other family members draw upon material gleaned from numerous inter-
views with Abdurrahman and friends and relatives. To avoid voluminous endnotes I
do not make individual reference to these interviews and conversations unless strict-
ly necessary.
7=<
On certain issues Abdurrahman’s understanding of matters of family history can-
(/1.,
not be verified from other sources, and it is certainly not just possible but likely that
on some matters he is mistaken. For example, most historians would view his claims
about family lineage with considerable scepticism. It is important that future schol-
arship should critically examine such matters; in this book, however, I have placed
greater emphasis on seeking to understand how Abdurrahman’s subjective sense of
history has shaped his thinking and behaviour.
Many of the details about the lives of Abdurrahman’s grandfathers and father were
taken from Saifullah Ma’shum (ed.), Karisma Ulama: Kehidupan Ringkas 26 Tokoh NU,
Mizan, Bandung, [1926], 1998. Material on Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari is on pp. 67–83.
4 Material about Bisri Syansuri’s life can be found in Ma’shum, Karisma Ulama, pp.
121–38.
5 An excellent introduction to Wahab Chasbullah’s life and times is to be found in
Greg Fealy, ‘Wahab Chasbullah, Traditionalism and the Political Development of
Nahdlatul Ulama’, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama,
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, Vic.,
1996, pp. 1–41. See also Ma’shum, Karisma Ulama, pp. 139–52. In certain significant
respects, such as Wahab’s date of birth, these two accounts differ and it seems likely
that Fealy’s is the more accurate.
6 See Ma’shum, Karisma Ulama, pp. 297–315.
7 It was not unusual for some wandering pesantren students — santri kelana, as they
were known — to move from pesantren to pesantren seeking not just academic knowl-
edge but also the spiritual blessing of the kiai that they visited. Wahid Hasyim’s quick
tour of the pesantren represents a more extreme case of this practice.
8 Ma’shum, Karisma Ulama, p. 304.
11 This rather romantic recollection of how the two met comes from Abdurrahman,
who grew up hearing the story from his mother (his daughters also recall their
grandmother telling the same story). Abdurrahman’s mother, Solichah, was a formi-
dable woman but she was also deeply in love with her late husband — something
which no doubt shapes her account. In any case, it is likely that Wahid Hasyim knew
Solichah, at least from a distance, prior to the encounter described here.
12 It does seem incredible that the daughter of a senior kiai should not have been able
to read and write in Indonesian at the age of fifteen, but in rural Javanese society
prior to independence Malay/Indonesian was much less commonly used than
Javanese. Moreover, in culturally conservative pesantren, such as Kiai Bisri Syansuri’s
Pesantren Denanyar, learning to read and write in Arabic was considered more
important than learning to write Malay in the roman script, especially when it could
so easily be written using Arabic script. In any case, Abdurrahman recalls that his
mother made a point of telling him that it was his father who taught her to read and
write Indonesian in the roman script and that it was from his father that she devel-
oped a love of reading.
13 This is based on Abdurrahman’s account to me of his grandfather’s treatment at the
hands of the Japanese. Australian scholar of NU and an expert on this period, Greg
Fealy, points out that there is no corroborating evidence for this claim within the NU
literature; given Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari’s standing within NU, this seems a strange
omission. Perhaps Abdurrahman is guilty of gilding the lily in his recollection of his
grandfather, but he certainly seems sure in his own mind that his grandfather brave-
ly resisted pressure from the Japanese to act against his conscience.
7==
15 I am indebted to Greg Fealy for pointing this matter out to me. I subsequently raised
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
it with Abdurrahman, but he had little to say on the issue.

17 On several occasions during the 1990s I discussed his father’s death with
Abdurrahman. While he was never unwilling to discuss the matter, it was clear that
he did not find it easy to talk about it and our conversations never ran long on this
topic. It was only in December 1999, aware of the need to tie up loose ends for this
book, that I spoke about the matter at length with him. Even then, it took several
more interviews over the following seven months to build up the full picture. Few
things that we talked about seemed to move him as deeply as this and yet, typically,
he denies any deep emotion. There is no way of being sure of the accuracy of
Abdurrahman’s recollection of the crowds lining the streets to pay their final respects
to his father. He recalls crowds of many thousands stretching along many kilometres
of roadside. The reality may well have been much more modest, though there seems
little reason to doubt that many people turned out to stand by the road. Whatever
the case, what seems most important is that the event left Abdurrahman deeply
impressed that his father could have earned such love and respect from the people.
18 See Ma’shum, Karisma Ulama, pp. 331–47.
19 Greg Fealy recounts visiting Pesantren Denanyar in the early 1990s and being shown
a prized curio by proud Denanyar locals. It was Abdurrahman’s old cupboard, replete
with the foreign titles that he had read during his two years at Denanyar.
Chapter 2: Islam in Indonesia: modernists and traditionalists

1 It was the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz who first popularised the terms
abangan, santri, and priyayi in his 1960 book The Religion of Java, Free Press, New
York. The paradigm has always been problematic, not least because few abangan
Muslims would choose to describe themselves as abangan, but in the absence of any
better way of describing Muslim society in Indonesia the terms became established
usage. Today the term santri is widely used. An excellent critique of Geertz’s tenden-
cy in The Religion of Java to downplay the Islamic aspects of the abangan and priyayi
traditions is found in Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, pp. 2.551. For a detailed study of the Islamist aspect
of many of the elements of Javanese culture previously rejected as being un-Islamic
see Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate
of Yogyakarta, Association for Asian Studies Monograph No. XLV, University of
Arizona Press, Tucson, 1989.
2 An excellent introduction to the Islamisation of Indonesia is Merle C. Ricklefs, ‘Six
Centuries of Islamization in Indonesia’, in N. Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam,
New York, 1979, pp. 100–128. See also Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since
c. 1300, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2nd edn, 1993.
3 See Anthony H. Johns, ‘Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and
Reconsiderations with Special Reference to the role of Sufism’, Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, June 1993, pp. 43–61.
4 For extensive and insightful exploration of Islam and Javanese culture, see Robert W.
Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1985, and The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretative
History, University of California Press, Calif., 1990.
5 Kiai Ahmed Dachlan, for example, was a pesantren graduate who had studied in
Mecca under the famous West Sumatran scholar Syaikh Ahmad Chatib
Minangkabau, who had also taught Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, Kiai Bisri Syansuri and Kiai
Wahab Chasbullah.
7=D
6 Abdurrahman argues that his father worked hard to try to rebuild the relationship
(/1.,
between the modernists and the traditionalists and, given what we know of Wahid
Hasyim, this makes good sense. Greg Fealy, however, points out that there is no
known documentary evidence to support this but there is documentary evidence
indicating Wahid Hasyim’s annoyance with certain Masyumi modernists following
the separation of 1952.
7 For a very helpful discussion of these issues, see Greg Fealy, ‘Rowing in a Typhoon:
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Decline of Constitutional Democracy’, in David Bourchier
and John Legge (eds), Indonesian Democracy: 1950s and 1990s, Monash Papers on
Southeast Asia No. 31, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University,
Clayton, Vic., 1994, pp. 88–98.
The 1.2 billion Muslims in the world today are divided into a Sunni majority and
a Shia minority. The Shia account for only 10 per cent of all Muslims and are most-
ly to be found in Lebanon, Syria, southern Iraq, Pakistan and Iran, with the latter
having the only Shia majority population. Until very recently all Indonesian Muslims
were Sunni Muslims. One of the main differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims
is their approach to leadership and politics. The Shia support a hierarchical model of
leadership in which it is more natural for leading clerics to play a prominent role in
politics, as was amply demonstrated by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. In the
Sunni world, however, political power has historically rested with secular politicians,
and the ulama became adept at negotiating a stable relationship with leaders that they
might not have liked but whose authority they were in no position to challenge. As
a result the classical Sunni literature is rich in legal maxims about pragmatic
approaches to Realpolitik and limited political engagement, making it easy for NU
ulama to justify their responses to the Sukarno and Soeharto regimes.
8 An excellent account of NU’s engagement in politics during the Sukarno period can be
found in Greg Fealy, ‘Wahab Chasbullah, Traditionalism and the Political Development
of Nahdlatul Ulama’, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama,Traditional
Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, Vic., 1996, pp. 1–41.
9 See Fealy, ‘Wahab Chasbullah’, p. 25.
Chapter 3: Cairo, Baghdad and Europe, 1963–71

1 I have checked some of the material in this chapter against the accounts of
Abdurrahman’s fellow students and family members, but the chapter depends on
Abdurrahman’s own recollection of events as related to me in 1999 and 2000.
2 This account is wholly dependent on Abdurrahman’s own testimony, and the facts are
difficult to verify from other sources. His critics might well argue that his recall on this
matter is selective and that possibly some of his reports on fellow students were not as
defensive of them as he maintains. My own assessment is that his recall of the horror of
the Communist killings and his personal trauma over the involvement of Ansor is
entirely convincing and is consistent with his later actions, including those when he
became president, to speak out against the anti-Communist pogrom of 1965–66 and
sectarian violence in general. I had not known about his reporting activity at the embassy
until he raised it in conversation with me in 1999 and 2000, and it strikes me as signif-
icant that he wanted to make sure that it was included in this biographical account.
3 Interviews with Nuriyah Wahid and Yenny Wahid, December 1999 and January and
February 2000.
Chapter 4: The pesantren and reform, 1971–82

1 Abdurrahman’s contributions to Prisma have been reprinted in M. Saleh Isre (ed.),
Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur, LkiS, Yogyakarta, 1999.
7DA
2 For a good overview of the political changes during this period, see Adam Schwarz,
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1999, pp.
24–33.
3 If there were other reasons for Abdurrahman not proceeding with his original plans
to study at McGill, he does not mention them today.
4 Many of these articles and essays have been reprinted in Abdurrahman Wahid, Gus
Dur Menjawab Perubahan Zaman: Kumpulan Pemikiran K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
Presiden Ke-4 Republik Indonesia, Kompas, Jakarta, 1999.
5 Interviews with Nuriyah and with Abdurrahman in December 1999 and in January
and February 2000.
6 The Javanese calendar is based on a five-day cycle, so every 35 days the five-day
Javanese calendar and the seven-day Western calendar coincide to produce the same
unique combination of Javanese and Western days. Many Javanese regard these com-
binations as spiritually significant.
7 Interviews with Nuriyah and with Abdurrahman in December 1999 and January and
February 2000.
8 See Mitsuo Nakamura, ‘The Radical Traditionalism of Nahdlatul Ulama in
Indonesia: A personal account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang’,
in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and
Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, Vic., 1996, pp. 68–93. See
also Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Traditions for the Future: The reconstruction of tradi-
tionalist discourse within NU’, in the same book, pp. 163–89.
9 See Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisis, Relasi-relasi Kasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru,
LkiS, Yogyakarta, 1994, pp. 101–114.
10 Interviews with Nuriyah and with Abdurrahman in December 1999 and in January
and February 2000.
Chapter 5: Abdurrahman and liberal Islam

1 See ‘Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam in Asia:
Religion, Politics, and Society, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.
2 Interviews with Nurcholish in January 1990, January 1992 and February 1994.
3 For a fascinating portrayal of Pesantren Gontor at around the time that Nurcholish
was there, see Lance Castles, ‘Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor’, Indonesia, No.
1, 1966.
4 Castles, ‘Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor’, p. 205. The English translations of
passages from this article quoted here are taken from the translation of Nurcholish’s
article in the appendices of Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to ‘New
Order’ Modernization in Indonesia, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1982,
pp.187–233.
5 The most complete study of the movement to take this position is Hassan, Muslim
Intellectual Responses to ‘New Order’ Modernisation in Indonesia. This book helpfully
includes translations of four seminal papers by Nurcholish Madjid.
6 In a paper in he wrote while on an academic visit to America in 1976. See Nurcholish
Madjid, ‘The Issue of Modernisation among Muslims in Indonesia: From a partici-
pant’s point of view’, in Gloria Davis, What is Indonesian Culture, Southeast Asia
Series No. 52, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Ohio, 1979, pp.
198–210.
7 For the full, translated text of this paper, see Nurcholish Madjid, ‘The Necessity of
Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat’, in
Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to ‘New Order’ Modernisation in Indonesia,
pp. 187–97.
7D@
8 For an overview of the way in which Djohan Effendi and Ahmad Wahib pushed the
(/1.,
limits of acceptable Islamic thought, beginning with their discussion group in
Yogyakarta, see Anthony H. Johns, ‘An Islamic System of Values? Nucleus of a
debate in contemporary Indonesia’, in William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political
Economy of Meaning, Croom Helm, London, 1987, pp. 254–87.
9 See Fazlur Rahman, ‘Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge’, in Islam:
Challenges and Opportunities, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1979, pp.
315–30, and Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982. See also Rahman, Islam, 2nd edn,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979.
10 For a good summary of Rahman’s paradigm and its application to the Indonesian
scene, see Awad Bahasoan, ‘The Islamic Reform Movement: An interpretation and
criticism’, Prisma, No. 35, March 1985, pp. 131–60.
11 For further discussion of this movement and the contribution made to it by
Abdurrahman and Nurcholish, see Greg Barton, ‘Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and
Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The meeting of Islamic traditionalism
and modernism in neo-modernist thought’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,
Vol. 8, No. 3, Oct 1997, pp. 323–50; Barton, ‘The Origins of Islamic Liberalism in
Indonesia and its Contribution to Democratisation’, in Democracy in Asia, St Martins
Press, New York, 1997; Barton, ‘Neo-modernism: A vital synthesis of traditionalism
and modernism in Indonesian Islam’, Studia Islamika, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, pp. 1–75;
and Barton, ‘The Impact of Islamic Neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic
Thought: The emergence of a new pluralism’, in David Bourchier and John Legge
(eds), Indonesian Democracy: 1950s and 1990s, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia
No. 31, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Vic., 1994,
pp. 143–50.
Chapter 6: On the brink of change, 1982–84

1 See Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisis, Relasi-relasi Kasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru,
Yogyakarta, LkiS, 1994, pp. 110–12.
2 Abdurrahman has often talked with me about Benny Murdani over the dozen or so
years that I have known him and has repeatedly made a point of saying that he does
not trust Benny and was sickened by his willingness to use violent means. He had
justified his contact with Benny on the grounds that it was better for him to be in
communication with such influential military figures and to maintain the possibility
of dialogue with the military than it was to refuse contact and forfeit the opportuni-
ty to explain NU’s position on developments and thereby to influence the military’s
response. It would appear the ‘friendship’, such as it was, was a very knowing one on
both sides. There is also no doubt that the two shared some common concerns, most
notably a concern that militant Islamism would one day threaten Indonesia’s inter-
communal harmony.
3 See Mitsuo Nakamura, ‘The Radical Traditionalism of Nahdlatul Ulama in
Indonesia: A personal account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang’,
and ‘NU’s Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 1980s: From the
1979 Semarang congress to the 1984 Situbondo congress’, in Greg Barton and Greg
Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash
Asia Institute, Clayton, Vic., 1996, pp. 68–109. See also Martin van Bruinessen,
‘Traditions for the Future: The reconstruction of traditionalist discourse within NU’,
in the same book, pp. 163–89.
4 This account is based heavily on Abdurrahman’s recollection of the event as recount-
ed in several interviews with me, in particular one on 11 January 2000. It also,
7D6
however, concurs with the framework outlined by Nakamura in ‘NU’s Leadership

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
Crisis and Search for Identity’, pp. 94–109.

5 Interviews with Abdurrahman, 6, 11 January 2000.
6 Abdurrahman related this incident to me on several occasions in January (6 and 11)
and February 2000 and in February 2001. To many readers the subject matter might
seem more than a little esoteric, but clearly Abdurrahman believes that it illustrates
the sort of basic flexibility of mind and tolerance that he believes has been a part of
the culture of NU for more than half a century.
ed in several discussions with me, in particular an interview on 11 January 2000.
8 Abdurrahman often talks about this incident and about his father’s involvement in
the formulation of Pancasila. Greg Fealy points out that unfortunately no written
evidence is available to corroborate Abdurrahman’s account of his father’s involve-
ment and suggests that this calls into question Abdurrahman’s understanding of
events.
9 Abdurrahman recounted this to me in several interviews and discussions, in particu-
lar an interview on 11 January 2000.
ed in several interviews with me, in particular one on 11 January 2000. It also, how-
ever, concurs with the framework outlined by Nakamura in ‘NU’s Leadership Crisis
and Search for Identity’, pp. 94–109.
Chapter 7: Reform and controversy, 1984–90

1 For discussion of the reasons for NU’s withdrawal from the PPP, see Robert Hefner,
Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2000, pp. 168–69; Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia:
Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 47–48;
Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Traditions for the Future: The reconstruction of traditional-
ist discourse within NU’, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama,
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, Vic.,
1996, pp.182–84; Martin van Bruinessen NU, Tradisis, Relasi-relasi Kasa, Pencarian
Wacana Baru, LKS, Yogyakarta, 1994, pp. 132–44; and Andrée Feillard, Islam et
armée dans l’Indonésie contemporaine, Paris, L’Harmatan, 1995, pp. 213–28.
2 I am persuaded from many hours of conversations with Abdurrahman over the past
twelve years that, along with all of the practical, Realpolitik, reasons for advocating
NU’s withdrawal from PPP, he was also convinced that NU’s direct link with PPP
was wrong in principle because PPP was a sectarian Islamic party.
3 For a discussion of Munawir Sjadzali’s thought and influence, see Bahtiar Effendy,
‘Islam and the State in Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali and the development of a new
theological underpinning of political Islam’, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for
Islamic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995, pp. 97–121. See also Muhamad Wahyuni Nafis
(ed.), Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam: 70 Tahun Prof Dr Munawir Sjadzali MA, Jakarta,
Paramadina, 1995.
4 On a variety of occasions since 1998 both Abdurrahman and Nuriyah, as well as
Yenny, have spoken about this with me.
5 Yenny spoke about this with me in several formal interviews in January and June
2000 as well as in informal conversations in 1999, 2000 and 2001.
6 Interviews with Abdurrahman in January and June 2000.
7 P3M was the first of these NGOs to emerge. It was founded in 1983 with the inten-
tion of providing NU with a co-ordinating agency to manage the increasing number
of community development projects being funded by foreign aid foundations.
7D7
Displaying the Indonesian passion for making acronyms, the organisation’s name
(/1.,
means the Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society (‘Perhimpunan
Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat’ is a mouthful; ‘P3M’, pronounced as pay-
teega-em, is a lot easier to deal with). LKiS stands for Lembaga Kajian ilmu Sosial —
the Institute for the Study of Social knowledge — and was formed in Yogyakarta in
the early 1990s. Lakpesdam and LKPSM are Jakarta-based NU research and devel-
opment bureaus.
8 The official director of P3M is Kiai Yusuf Hasyim but he is not involved in its day-
to-day affairs. Yusuf Hasyim is a younger brother of Wahid Hasyim and as such can
lay claim to a linage almost as impressive as his nephew’s. Partly for this reason the
relationship between the two men is complex and frequently fraught with difficulties.
9 The chief technical reason for the criticism was that the paying of zakat is regarded
as one of the five pillars of Islam and is generally classified under ibadah, or acts of
devotion. There was a general agreement between both modernists and traditional-
ists that acts of devotion and matters of worship were not subject to change through
time, even if other aspects of Islamic teaching were adjusted to suit changed social
circumstances. This is because ibadah is not seen as being culturally determined.
Masdar’s work on zakat exposed just how difficult it was to draw such neat divisions.
10 Masdar Mas’udi has already been mentioned; others, including Jalaluddin Rakhmat,
Komaruddin Hidayat, Muslim Abdurrahman, Fajrul Falaakh and Ulil Abshar
Abdalla also played and continue to play significant roles in encouraging critical pro-
gressive thought.
11 I am grateful to Greg Fealy for pointing out to me that, decades before Kiai Achmad
Siddiq wrote boldly about ijtihad, his eldest brother Mahfudz had already broached
the topic in his writing. Kiai Mahfudz Siddiq served as chairman of the NU
Tanfidziyah alongside his former teacher Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, who was head of the
Syuriah. He was known as a specialist in Islamic logic and reason and was a gifted
debater. Tragically, Kiai Mahfudz died at the age of 38 in 1944.
12 The efforts of progressive, younger ulama within NU to precipitate a renewal of
Islamic thought within the pesantren world is described in detail by Djohan Effendi
in his 2000 PhD dissertation at Deakin University, Australia, entitled Progressive
Traditionalists: The emergence of a new discourse in Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama
during the Abdurrahman Wahid era. In discussing the halakah discussion groups,
this chapter draws heavily upon Djohan Effendi’s account.
13 See Martin van Bruinessen ‘The 28th Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama: Power Struggle
and Social “Concerns”’, in Barton and Fealy (eds) Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam
and Modernity in Indonesia, pp.139–62. The account of the 1989 muktamar in this
chapter draws heavily on van Bruinessen’s article.
14 Van Bruinessen ‘The 28th Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama’, p. 149.
15 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 169.
17 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 188.
Chapter 8: Pushing the limits, 1990–94

1 Nurcholish explained to me on several occasions in the early 1990s that the name
‘Paramadina’ was a combination of the Spanish (he was an admirer of Andalusian
civilisation) para, meaning ‘for’ and the Arabic madina with its connotations of ‘polis’,
‘civil’ and ‘civilisation’. Paramadina quickly became popular with leading members of
Jakartan society, including retired military officers and government officials. This was
not entirely surprising as Paramadina deliberately targeted middle-class Jakartans.
After all, they reasoned, these people were the decision-makers, the opinion-makers;
7D8
if they could be persuaded to take Islam more seriously, with a more liberal and tol-
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
erant approach, then they could become a greater force for good in society.
2 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 161.
3 See Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 161; Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy,
Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 88–89; and Adam
Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1999, pp. 191, 239. There is good reason to believe that Nurcholish’s surprisingly
critical response, as reported in Tempo, was partly the result of his being caught off
guard by the rapidity and violence with which conservative Muslims attacked
Arswendo and Monitor. In conversation with me several months after the incident,
he explained that his initial reaction was disbelief and shock that Arswendo was will-
ing to risk stirring up sectarian anger for such a trivial cause as boosting circulation
of his tabloid magazine. He was, he explained, not so much offended by Arswendo
as he was disappointed with his irresponsible behaviour. Nevertheless, he regretted
the way in which he had articulated this disappointment to the media.
4 A good account of ICMI’s formation and development is to be found in Hefner,
Civil Islam, pp. 128–66.
5 ‘ICMI Jangan Ambil Jalan Pintas’ (an interview with Abdurrahman Wahid), Detik,
3 March 1993, pp. 6–7.
6 Ramage, Politics, p. 157.
7 Abdurrahman Wahid, ‘Forum Demokrasi sebuah pertanggnungjawaban’, Majalah
Demokrasi, pp. 22–24, 1991.
8 Ramage, Politics, pp. 162–63.
9 See Ramage, Politics, pp. 57–58.
10 I telephoned Abdurrahman several hours after the rally was over and found him, as
ever, relaxed and upbeat. He also added that he was about to write to Soeharto
expressing, in the strongest terms, his annoyance at Soeharto’s move to block the
rally. The letter, which he had referred to with typical nonchalance, was drafted that
afternoon and delivered to Soeharto the following day.
11 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, pp. 192–93. See also Ramage, Politics, pp. 66–67; and
Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 162–63.
12 Interviews with Abdurrahman in January 1993. See also Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 169;
and Ramage, Politics, p. 165.
13 Interviews with Abdurrahman in January 1993.
16 Ramage, Politics, pp. 59, 136.
18 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, p. 187.
19 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, p. 188. Adam Schwarz told me that he checked with
Abdurrahman three times to make sure that he was comfortable with his comments
about Soeharto’s ‘stupidity’ being published. When asked, Abdurrahman was, of
course, typically nonchalant but this was probably another occasion when his reck-
less bravado got in the way of his political acumen.
21 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting.
22 In January 1992 Abdurrahman told me of an odd experience that he had recently
had. He would often begin his account of such ‘odd experiences’ by saying something
like: ‘Well, I’m a rational man and I don’t know what to make of this, but this is what
happened.’ This time he recounted how, while being driven to a pesantren in West
Java, he had nodded off, as he often did when travelling. As he was dozing he dreamt
7DB
that the car had stopped outside the pesantren and that he could see the santri play-
(/1.,
ing football in the field across the road. As he sat there two men approached the car.
They were obviously wounded for they were limping and leaning upon each other for
support. He wound the window down, and he could see that the men were dripping
with blood; they had their hands outstretched as if asking for charity. When they
came within several metres of the car he recognised their faces as Benny Murdani and
Try Soetrisno. Suddenly he awoke. It was clear that the whole thing had been a
dream, but as he recounted it the experience weighed heavily upon him. He com-
mented that Benny’s and Try’s hands were indeed bloody and that it was difficult
working with such men.
23 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, p. XX17242.
24 Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, pp. 264–69.
27 See Greg Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid,
Suksesi and the battle for control of NU’, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds),
Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia
Institute, Clayton, Vic., 1996, p. 259.
28 Interviews with Abdurrahman in June and August 2000.
30 Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress’, p. 259.
31 Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress’, pp. 261–62.
32 In Indonesia in the 1990s it was difficult, if not impossible, to do business on a large
scale without some collaboration with, and assistance from, the first family. When
Soeharto decided to oppose a project, its chances of success were virtually nil. Given
the Byzantine (and corrupt) nature of Indonesian bureaucracy at the time, it is easy
to imagine the ways in which Soeharto may have been able to cripple the Bank
Summa venture. Whatever the cause, its ‘failure to thrive’ was widely regarded as a
tragedy because it could have made an important contribution on two fronts. A com-
prehensive network of such banks could have been effective in providing small-scale
credit to the poorest sections of society that most needed it, as well as setting an
example of a modern banking approach without the hype that often surrounded
Islamic banks and their attempt to distinguish themselves from their Western coun-
terparts.
Chapter 9: Contending with Soeharto, 1994–98

1 See Greg Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid,
Suksesi and the battle for control of NU’, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds),
Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia
Institute, Clayton, Vic., 1996, p. p. 275.
2 Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress’, pp. 272–73.
3 With help from his backers in the regime, Abu Hasan established a NU Central
Coordinating Executive (Koodinasi Pengurus Pusat NU — KPPNU) to compete
with Abdurrahman’s NU Central Board of Management (Pengurus Besar NU —
PBNU). Abu Hasan’s board faced serious difficulty achieving credibility, not least
because nine of its named members declared that they had never been consulted
about the board: Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress’, p. 273.
4 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 180–81.
7D;
6 Abdurrahman recounted this incident a number of times in my hearing, each time

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
chuckling heartily and slapping his thighs when he got to the last line.
8 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 183. Hefner notes that Yusuf Wanandi is said to have con-
tributed US$270 000 to finance the Medan congress, and that Adi Sasono was cho-
sen because of his networks among Muslim labour activists and NGOs. Sasono was
ideologically more moderate — a pragmatic Habibie loyalist rather than a militant
Islamist — and therefore likely to enjoy greater creditability among the PDI rank and
file. By this stage Amien Rais had become outspoken in his criticism of Soeharto,
and ICMI activists such as Din Syamsuddin, Amir Santosa and Fadli Zon lacked
extensive networks outside the relatively small Islamist groups such as KISDI and
Dewan Dakwah.
9 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 183–84; see also Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting:
Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999, p. 322.
10 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 186–87.
12 Hefner, Civil Islam, Hefner notes, however, that some of Dewan Dakwah’s younger
members were deeply disturbed by their organisation’s support for the regime,
adding: ‘One member told me that he felt that Mohammad Natsir would never have
engaged in such immoral collaboration’ (p. 188).
15 Hefner, Civil Islam.
16 Interview with Romo Mangunwijaya, January 1997.
19 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 195–96.
20 For an account of Indonesia’s economic crisis see Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting
pp. 337–45.
21 Hilur, Civil Islam, pp. 201–06; Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 345–48.
22 Writing about the Wanandi bombing frame-up, Robert Hefner notes that ‘Wandi
was soon to discover that Soeharto had increased the penalties for defiance’: Civil
Islam, p. 204.
Chapter 10: Islam, politics and elections, 1998–1999

1 My own sense was that he had changed little since I had first met him in early 1989.
True, he now showed flashes of irritability and clearly didn’t have the energy levels
that he had before his stroke. But, in the face of what must have been an extremely
difficult physical and emotional situation, he seemed relaxed and sanguine, and
patiently dealt with the interminable stream of visitors asking his advice. I saw little
of the bouts of irritability which, I imagine, might have had more to do with his psy-
chological struggle with loss of eyesight than with his physical condition. By the
middle of 1998 the physical signs of the stroke had begun to abate. It seemed that
the more he was the centre of attention, received guests, gave media interviews and
made television appearances, the more he regained his zest for life.
7D<
2 There are widely varying views on what was behind the violence in Banyuwangi. For
(/1.,
example, Robert Hefner sees it as possibly representing a calculated initiative aimed
at provoking clashes between santri and abangan: Civil Islam: Muslims and
Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 210.
4 The day before the Jombang rally Ratih was alarmed to see that there was nothing
in the ‘wardrobe’ that Abdurrahman brought suitable for a major public appearance.
We immediately set off to Mojokerto in search of some formal long-sleeved batik
shirts. Finding shirts in Abdurrahman’s size is no easy matter. (Few Indonesian men
have quite the robust proportions of Abdurrahman, and I should know as I was the
proxy model on the buying trip.) There was nothing in his size in Mojokerto and so
we set off for Surabaya, an hour and a half ’s drive away. There a number of suitably
dignified batik shirts were procured. The only challenge remaining was to get
Abdurrahman to wear them. Initially he could not see the importance of being so
concerned about matters of appearance. ‘Why not tell him that its important to look
presidential,’ I suggested to Ratih. The ploy worked and Ratih was able to persuade
him that henceforth he needed to take more care in his appearance. My suggestion
about looking ‘more presidential’ was said not out of any genuine expectation that he
would be president so much as recognition of the need to encourage and motivate
him. With Yenny, an elegant model of cool confidence under pressure, by his side as
de facto first lady, Abdurrahman, in fact, seemed a very credible leader. Always an
impressive speaker when in form and not too tired, Abdurrahman campaigned well.
Helped by Ratih’s innovation of holding regular, formal press conferences, his style
of communicating with the media had also improved. He may have been a long-shot,
but at least he was looking a little more like a serious candidate for the presidency.
5 I arrived at Megawati’s house at 10.30 p.m. and found Yenny, Abdurrahman and
Ratih looking troubled. They were waiting downstairs in Megawati’s waiting room
inside her extensive compound in south Jakarta. ‘It would be better if you went on to
Alwi’s house with the press. There’s probably not room for us all to go together, so
you go first in my car and send it back. I’ll be round shortly,’ Abdurrahman said help-
fully. I should have realised from the sombre atmosphere that ‘shortly’ might mean
quite a while. At Alwi Shihab’s house in the adjoining suburb, over a hundred local
and foreign journalists had gathered and beta cams stood poised on tripods three or
four deep in a tiered arrangement at the back of the large lounge room awaiting the
arrival of Abdurrahman, Amien and Megawati.
6 Brief meeting with Hamzah Haz in the third week of May.
7 Kompas Online, 21 July 1999.
8 Abdurrahman repeated this position on several occasions during private conversation
during the first half of July 1999. On 14 July I had to leave Jakarta again to return to
Australia. When we said goodbye, Abdurrahman was jocular but serious. ‘Next time,’ he
said to my wife, ‘you must come and stay with us. Next time it’ll be at the palace.’
9 Kompas Online, 22 July 1999.
10 It was with some apprehension that I returned to Jakarta in mid-September, unsure of
the reception I would get. Australians, most definitely, were popular then in Jakarta. I
wasn’t even sure of how the firestorm of emotion swirling around the city would affect
my relationship with Abdurrahman. As soon as I met him in his hotel room — where,
as a member of the MPR, he had been placed in the run-up to the Consultative
Assembly meeting — he greeted me warmly and explained to his companions, ‘This is
my old friend Greg, we’re good friends even though he is Australian. It doesn’t matter,
I have lots of Australian friends, I’m just upset with the government. In fact not the gov-
ernment but one or two people in the government that’s all, not with all Australians’.
11 Kompas Online, 8 October 1999.
7D=
Chapter 11: A brief honeymoon, 1999–2000

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
1 It was his habit since becoming president to rise each morning at around 4.00 a.m.
and do a 20-minute spell on a treadmill before undertaking 45 minutes of walking in
the palace compound. Then doctors checked his blood pressure and general health
during the first of several checkups during the day. It was to Abdurrahman’s credit
that he was willing to undertake such a regular schedule of physical exercise. Never
in his entire life had he played sport or taken regular exercise. Although his health
was in reasonable shape and he showed amazing energy keeping up a gruelling
schedule, there were times when exhaustion caught up with him. His schedule was
so packed that it allowed hardly any days off in which he could catch up. Even his
Sundays tended to be busy with meetings, despite the urging of friends and family to
keep the day as a private day of rest.
2 One more indication of the difficulties, both practical and political, that faced the
reform process was that there was a severe shortage of cash to meet day-to-day needs.
Ratih served four months without being paid in the appropriate accounts, partly
because no cash was available to cover her salary.
3 Early in July we were talking in a relaxed fashion about the future when he sudden-
ly began to unfold his plans. ‘I’m going to appoint Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as
first Minister,’ he said. ‘I can rely on him. He is a genuine reformist, maybe not so
visionary, but sincere and he is a good administrator.’ ‘What about Megawati?’ I
asked. ‘Mega will be okay,’ he replied. ‘I’ve talked about it with Bambang. He will
report to her every day and to me just once a week, although of course we will be in
touch by phone all the time.’ ‘Will Mega accept that, though?’ I queried. ‘Yes I think
so, as long as she’s involved.’ Abdurrahman continued, ‘She will do the things that
she doesn’t much like doing either and so it’s good for both of us’. He went on to out-
line some of his vision for the rest of the cabinet. ‘I want a slimmed-down cabinet
who work as a team,’ he explained. ‘They need to be trustworthy. This current cabi-
net is torn apart by party political bickering and ego.’ Abdurrahman seemed to have
a clear vision of the way forward; however, nothing could happen until after the
August MPR session. ‘Everything is on hold,’ he explained, ‘until after August. First
there’s the interpellation, then the MPR session; until that’s through, I can’t even
begin to think of anything else. For now the main thing is to survive.’
Chapter 12: Regime change and the fight for survival,

1999–2001
1 The Jakarta Post Online, Editorial and Opinion section, 4 September 2000.
2 Quoted by the official news agency Antara, while on a visit to New York at the
beginning of September.
3 The Jakarta Post, 1 September 2000.
4 ‘Our Problems Can’t be Solved by Violence: Indonesia’s new president speaks
exclusively to Time’, Time, 30 July 2001.
5 George Aditjondro, ‘Notes on the Jihad Forces in Maluku’, posted on the Joyo News
Service, 4 October 2000.
6 Associated Press, 7 September.
7 Agence France Press, 7 September 2000.
9 The Australian, 14 September 2000.
10 The Australian Financial Review, 14 September 2000.
11 Detikworld, 23 October 2000.
12 Joyo New Service [details of original publication unknown], 14 September 2000.
7DD
13 Reuters, 15 September 2000.
(/1.,
14 Business Times, 9 September 2000.
16 The Indonesian Observer, 6 October 2000.
19 The Straits Times, 18 October 2000.
20 The Straits Times, 20 October 2000
22 Reuters, 29 October 2000.
23 Agence France Press, 30 October 2000.
24 Detikworld, 16 November 2000.
25 The Jakarta Post, 29 October 2000.
26 The Straits Times, 24 November 2000
27 The Jakarta Post, 30 November 2000.
29 The Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 February 2001, p. 16.
30 The Economist, 23–29 October 1999.
31 The Economist, 17–23 February 2001.
32 The Economist, p. 27.
33 An AFP wire service report on 1 March carried the following quote from an anony-
mous local official: ‘Off the record, in reality based on information that I’ve got from
several local Dayak leaders, I’d say it [the real death toll] is about 3000, with most
casualties Madurese.’
34 For several hours Detikcom, one of Indonesia’s leading news and current affairs web
sites, carried the news that, moved by the plight of the refugees, Abdurrahman had
made an immediate and spontaneous gift of approximately US$3000 from his own
savings. I later confirmed the details of this story with Yenny.
35 Associated Press, 4 April 2000.
36 The Jakarta Post, 16 April 2000.
37 The Jakarta Post, 30 April 2000.
38 Whereas on 29 April Reuters reported the lower figure, members of the presidential
security team said that they estimated that at least 200 000 had attended. Given that
the Senayan car park is a venue commonly used for large rallies, it should have been
relatively easy to gauge the scale of the crowd, especially as it was stationary for a long
period of time.
%.4.%.(0., !(# 4$%1&.% %.!#+(:

~
The material listed below represents a selection of some of the most useful and accessi-
ble sources relating to the subject matter of this book. The list is confined to readily
available books published in English, with the exception of a small number of journal
articles of particular significance. It is divided into two sections: one on history and pol-
itics; and one on Islam.
Indonesian history and politics

Anderson, Benedict R.O’G. (1990) Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in
Indonesia. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Budiman, Arief (ed.) (1990) State and Civil Society in Indonesia. Monash Papers on
Southeast Asia No. 22, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University,
Melbourne.
Cribb, Robert (ed.) (1991) The Indonesia Killings 1965–1966: Stories from Java and Bali,
second edn. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No 21, Centre of Southeast Asian
Studies, Monash University, Melbourne.
Crouch, Harold (1988) The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edn. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Emmerson, Donald K. (ed.) (1999) Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society,
Transition. M.E. Sharpe, New York.
Feith, Herbert (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Kingsbury, Damien (1999) The Politics of Indonesia. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
296 pp.
8A@
Kingsbury, Damien and Arief, Budiman (eds) (2001), Indonesia: The Uncertain
%.4.%.(0.,)!(#)4$%1&.%)%.!#+(:
Transition. Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, NSW.
Robert W. Hefner (ed.) (2001) The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and
Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. The University of Hawaii Press,
Hawaii.
Lindsey, Tim (ed.) (2000) Indonesia: The Commercial Court and Law Reform in Indonesia.
Desert Pea Press, Sydney.
Manning, Chris et al. (ed.) (2000) Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and
Crisis. Zed Books, London.
Reeve, David (1985) Golkar of Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance.
Routledge, London.
Schwarz, Adam (1999) A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, second edn.
Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
Schwarz, Adam et al. (eds) (1999) The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia. Council on
Foreign Relations Press, New York.
Siegel, James T. (1998) A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter Revolution Today. Duke
University Press, Durham and London.
Sen, Krishna and David Hill (2000) Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Oxford
University Press, Melbourne.
Tanter, Richard (1990) ‘The totalitarian ambition: Intelligence and security agencies in
Indonesia’. In Arief Budiman (ed.) State and Civil Society in Indonesia. Monash
Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash
University, Melbourne, pp. 215–88.
Islam
Barton, Greg (2001) ‘Islam and politics in the New Indonesia’. In Jason F. Isaacson and
Colin Rubenstein (eds) Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities. AJC and
Transaction Press.
—— (2002) ‘Islam, politics and regime change in Wahid’s Indonesia’. In Julian M.
Weiss (ed.) Tigers’ Roar: Asia’s Recovery and Its Impact. M.E. Sharpe, New York.
—— (2001) ‘A fair measure — assessing President Wahid’s first year as Indonesia embarks
on the long road of regime-change’. In Damien Kingsbury (ed.) The Abdurrahman
Wahid Government’s First Year: An Evaluation. Monash Asia Institute, Melbourne.
—— (2001) ‘The prospects for Islam’. In Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds)
Indonesia Today: Challenges of History. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, pp. 244–55.
—— (2001) ‘President Wahid — a realist-idealist?’. In Damien Kingsbury and Arief
Budiman (eds) Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition. Crawford House Publishing,
Bathurst, NSW.
—— (2001) ‘Evaluating the Wahid presidency: A response to Marcus Mietzner’s eval-
uation’. In Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman (eds) Indonesia: The Uncertain
Transition. Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, NSW.
—— (2000) ‘Political and social change: The case of Indonesia’. In Andrew Vandenberg
(ed.) Politics and Democracy. Macmillan, London.
—— (1997) ‘Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as intellectual
ulama: The meeting of Islamic traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist
thought’. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, Vol 8, No 3, October 1997,
pp. 323–50.
—— (1997) ‘The origins of Islamic liberalism in Indonesia and its contribution to
democratization’. In Michele Schmiegelow (ed.) Democracy in Asia. St Martins
Press, New York.
8A6
—— (1996) ‘The liberal, progressive roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s thought’. In Greg

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) Nahdlatul Ulama: Traditional Islam and Modernity in
Indonesia. Monash Asia Institute, Melbourne, pp. 190–226.
—— (1996) ‘Islam, Pancasila and the Middle Path of Tawassuth: The thought of
Achmad Siddiq’. In Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) Nahdlatul Ulama:
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Monash Asia Institute, Melbourne,
pp. 110–128.
—— (1995) ‘Neo-Modernism: A vital synthesis of Traditionalism and Modernism in
Indonesian Islam’. Studia Islamika, Vol 2, No 3, pp. 1–75.
—— (1994) ‘The impact of Islamic neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic thought:
The emergence of a new pluralism’. In David Bourchier and John Legge (eds)
Indonesian Democracy: 1950s and 1990s. Monash University, Melbourne,
pp. 143–50.
—— (1991) ‘The international context of the emergence of Islamic neo Modernism in
Indonesia’. In M.C. Ricklefs (ed.) Islam in the Indonesian Social Context. Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, pp. 69–82.
Binder, Leonard Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 399–400.
Boland, B.J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague.
Fealy, Greg (2001) ‘Islamic politics: A rising or declining force?’ In Damien Kingsbury
and Arief Budiman (eds) Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition, Crawford House
Publishing, Bathurst, NSW.
Fealy, Greg (1996) ‘The 1994 NU Congress and aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid,
Suksesi and the battle for control of NU’. In Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds)
Nahdlatul Ulama: Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Monash Asia
Institute, Melbourne, pp. 257–77.
—— (1994) ‘Rowing in a typhoon: Nahdlatul Ulama and the decline of constitutional
democracy’. In David Bourchier and John Legge (eds) Indonesian Democracy: 1950s
and 1990s, Monash University, Melbourne, pp. 88–98.
Geertz, Clifford (1960) The Religion of Java. Free Press, New York.
Hassan, Muhammad Kamal (1982) Muslim Intellectual Responses to ‘New Order’
Modernisation in Indonesia. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur.
Hefner, Robert W. (1997) ‘Introduction: Islam in an era of nation states: Politics and
religious renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia’. In Robert W. Hefner and Patricia
Horvatich (eds) Islam in an Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious Revival in
Muslim Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 3–40.
—— (1997b) ‘Islamization and democratization in Indonesia’. In Robert W. Hefner
and Patricia Horvatich (eds) Islam in an Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious
Revival in Muslim Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu,
pp. 75–127.
—— (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Kurzman, Charles (1998) Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. Oxford University Press, New
York.
Liddle, R. William (1988) Politics and Culture in Indonesia. Center for Political Studies
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, pp. 1–55.
Nakamura, Mitsuo (1983) The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town. Gadjah Mada University
Press, Yogyakarta.
—— (1996) ‘The radical traditionalism of Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A personal
account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang’ and ‘NU’s leadership
8A7
crisis and search for identity in the early 1980s: From the 1979 Semarang congress
%.4.%.(0.,)!(#)4$%1&.%)%.!#+(:
to the 1984 Situbondo congress’. In Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) Nahdlatul
Ulama: Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Monash Asia Institute,
Melbourne, pp. 68–109.
Rahman, Fazlur (1982) Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
—— (1979) ‘Islam: Past influence and present challenge’. Islam: Challenges and
Opportunities. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 315–30.
Ramage, Douglas E. (1995) Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of
Tolerance. Routledge, London.
Van Bruinessen, Martin (1996) ‘Traditions for the future: The reconstruction of tradi-
tionalist discourse within NU’. In Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds) Nahdlatul
Ulama: Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Monash Asia Institute,
Melbourne, pp. 163–89.
Van Djik, Kees (2001) A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000. KITLV,
Leiden. 621 pp.
Ward, Ken E. (1977) The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study. Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, Melbourne.
Woodward, Mark R. (ed.) (1996) Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in
Indonesian Islamic Thought. Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State
University, Tempe.
—— (1989) Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.
The Association for Asian Studies Monograph No. XLV, The University of
Arizona Press, Tucson.
+(#.F
~
Note
This index is broken down into three separate index lists: People, General and Places.
The names and terms used generally reflect usage in the text, which in turn reflect
popular usage. This means that in some cases people are listed under their commonly
used names rather than their formal names (for example, Yenny Wahid rather than
Zannuba Chapsoh Arifah). Most Indonesians do not use surnames, so Indonesian
names are listed under their first name (for example, Nurcholish Madjid rather than
Madjid, Nurcholish), while foreign names are listed by surname.
People and Abdurrahman 26, 28, 265,

Abduh, Muhammad 68, 83 268–70, 272, 281–83, 325, 377n
Abdul Madjid 122 and PKB 265
Abdullah (King of Jordan) 289 as Foreign Minister 286, 289, 344
Abu Hasan 210–11, 213, 235, 236, Amien Rais
395n and Abdurrahman 238, 239, 242, 263,
Adi Sasono 103, 239, 249, 259, 376n 265, 272, 275–76, 278, 308, 311,
Aditjondro, George 334, 335, 398n 315, 317, 325, 376n
Agum Gumelar, General 328 and Central Axis 275
Ahmad Chatib Minangkabau, Syeikh and ICMI 214, 231, 236, 241
39, 40, 388n and Islam 211
Ahmad Sumargono 232 and PAN 24, 252–54, 272, 275, 311,
Ahmad Wahib 126, 391n 317
Ahmed Dachlan, Kiai 70, 388n and reform 245, 238, 240, 242
Akbar Tandjung and the MPR 27, 28, 324
and Golkar 193, 271, 331, 337, Amir Santosa 214, 236, 237, 376n
341–42, 361 Andi Ghalib 249
and Irian Jaya 339–40 Anita Wahid 109, 155, 157
as DPR Chairman 314–16, 331, 345, Annan, Kofi 335
353 Aquino, Corry 213
al-Banna, Hasan 92 Arafat, Yasser 289
Ali Ma’shum, Kiai 56 Argo Sutjipto 50, 51
Ali Murtopo, General 105–06, 115, Arifin Panigoro 136, 317, 361, 363
134, 179 Aristotle 59
Alissa Wahid 107, 155, 157, 225, 276, Arswendo 181, 182, 394n
386n As’ad Arifin Syamsul, Kiai 135, 140,
Alwi Shihab 142, 149, 159, 176
8AB
Aswab Mahasin 103 Falk, Peter 385
+(#.F
Fatwa, AM 380
Bachtiar Effendy 392n Faulkner, William 85
Bahasoan, Awad 391n Fazlur Rahman 127, 128, 391n
Barak, Ehud (former prime minister) 289 Fealy, Greg 387n, 388n, 389n, 392n,
Benny Murdani, General 393n, 395n
and Abdurrahman 133–34, 137, 152, Feillard, Andrée 23, 24, 30, 42, 48,
154, 172–73, 189, 191–92, 239, 391n 393n
and Islamism 142, 181, 191–92, 391n Feisal Basri 329, 381
and Prabowo 239–40 Friedman, Thomas 341
and Soeharto 167–68, 180–81, 194, Fuad Bawazier 317, 319, 329, 334
248
Bimantoro, General 362, 363 Geertz, Clifford 63, 388n
Binder, Leonard 128 Ginanjar Kartasasmita, General 243,
Bisri Syansuri, Kiai 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 244
43, 56, 61, 64, 387n, 388n Gunawan Mohammad 253
Bisri, Kiai Mustofa 86, 88, 96 Guruh Soekarnoputra 193
Bob Hasan 235 Gusmao, Xanana 297
Bondan Gunawan 185, 291
Brawijaya VI 4 Habib Ali Baagil 337
Bueller, Willem Iskandar 48 Habibie, BJ (former president)
and Abdurrahman 277–78
Castles, Lance 390n and East Timor 261
Castro, Fidel 278 and Golkar 251–52
Chaeruddin Ismail, General 363 and ICMI 182, 194, 201, 212,
Chalid Marwadi 136 236–37, 241, 259, 276, 381
Chodiyah (Lily) Wahid 47 as President 18, 19, 29, 244, 247–49,
Cholil, Kiai 40, 7 254–56, 281–82, 376
Crouch, Harold 335 as Vice President 244, 238, 242
Hamengkubuono X (Sultan of
Dawam Rahardjo 103 Yogyakarta) 256, 316, 324
Dillon, HS 330 Hamzah Haz 272, 283–84, 377n
Din Syamsuddin 214, 236, 237, 376n Hanuman 121
Djadja Suparman, General 335 Hardoyo 30–31
Djaelani ( Johnny) Naro 115, 133, 134, Harmoko 181, 194, 201, 241, 244
138, 147, 152 Hartono, General 210–11, 235–37
Djohan Effendi 126, 162, 166, 183, Harun Nasution 126, 153, 162
198, 314, 302, 391n, 393n Hashim Wahid (Abdurrahman’s brother)
Donne, John 85 309–10
Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti 177 Hassan, Kamal 390n
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 92 Hasyim Asy’ari, Kiai 38–40, 42, 44–46,
53, 61, 387n
Edi Sudrajat, General 252 Hatta, Mohammad 45
Eggy Sudjana 259, 260 Haziz Bisri 60
Emil Salim 310 Hefner, Robert 172, 230, 234, 388n,
Esposito, John L 390n 392–97n
Hemingway, Ernest 85
Fadli Zon 237, 243, 248, 376n Hodgson, Marshall GS 388n
Fahmi Saifuddin 135, 202, 204 Howard, John (prime minister) 261,
Faisal Tanjung, General 194, 203 279
Fajrul Falaak 393n Hussein (Crown Prince of Jordan) 289
Fakhi, Kiai 139 Hussein Umar 232
8A;
Idham Chalid 113, 115, 147, 148, 149, 281–82, 296, 311–14, 316–17, 302,
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
150, 152, 159, 173, 176, 215, 263 325, 327, 330–31, 340, 350, 354,
Imam Ardyaquttni 268 337, 360–61, 368, 370, 379, 380
Inayah Wahid 116, 155, 157 and Golkar 315, 341, 379
Iqbal, Mohammed 130 and Islam 211, 258, 262, 381
and PDI 193, 199, 211–14, 230–32,
Jalaluddin Rakmat 174, 393n 253
Johns, Anthony H 388n, 391n and PDI-P 255, 254, 302, 328–29,
Joplin, Janis 101 361, 369–70, 379, 380
Junaidi, Kiai 54, 55, 57 and Soekarno 288
Jusuf Kalla 311 and Taufik Kiemas 303, 349
Juwono Sudarsono 306, 336 and TNI 343, 355, 363, 384
as Vice President 284, 286–87, 312,
Kafka, Franz 85 323, 339, 342–43, 352
Kastor 334 Mochtar Buchori 255
Khofifah Indar Parawansa 263 Moerdiono 173, 235
Khomeini, Ayatollah 62 Mokodongan 240
Khudori, Kiai 56 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 246
Kivlan Zein 243, 255 Muchdi Purwoprandjono, General 248
Komaruddin Hidayat 393n Mukti Ali 106, 126, 152
Kwik Kian Gie 286, 303, 319 Munawir Sjadzali 48, 153, 166, 177,
392n
Laksamana Sukardi 286, 302–05, 311, Munib Huda 27, 28, 266, 299
313 Murdoch, Lindsay 280
Lee Kuan Yew (former prime minister) Muslim Abdurrahman 393n
373 Mydans, Seth 25
Lenin, Vladimir 59
Lopa, Baharuddin 354 Nafis, Muhamad Wahyuni 392n
Nakamura, Mitsuo 390n, 391n, 392n
Mahfud MD 328, 330, 337, 370 Nasser (former president) 84, 86, 92,
Mahfudz Ridwan 95, 98, 100 93, 94
Maksyur, Kiai 139 Natsir, Mohammad 124, 125, 130
Malik Fadjar 241, 248 Nurcholish Madjid 121–28, 131, 151,
Mandela, Nelson (former president) 153, 162, 163, 181, 182, 390n, 393n
278 Nuriyah Wahid 20, 60, 61, 103, 104,
Mangungwijaya, Romo 234, 376n 107, 108, 109, 112, 116, 265, 276,
Mao, Tse-tung 59 389n, 390n, 393n
Marcos, Ferdinand (former president) Nurmahmudi Ismail 341, 354
213, 258
Marimutu Sinivasan 346 Plato 59
Marsillam Simanjuntak 25, 185, 227, Poe, Edgar Allan 85
291, 295, 312, 314, 315, 318, 323, Prabowo Subianto, General
328 and Abdurrahman 236–37, 239
Marx, Karl 59, 60 and Habibie 244
Marzuki Darusman 286, 307, 354, 361 and Islamism 239, 243, 245, 248–49
Masdar Farid Mas’udi 161, 165, 393n and PDI 230, 240
Matori Abdul Djalil 252, 262 and Suharto 238–39, 247
Maulana Maududi 129 and violence 236–40, 243, 254–55,
Megawati Sukarnoputri (president) 262
and Abdurrahman 18, 19, 27, 211, Prajogo Pangestu 346
229, 235, 238, 243, 245, 248, 250, Prijadi, Praptosuhadjo 328, 330, 370
256, 258, 262–63, 269–70, 278–79, Pushkin, Alexander 85
8A<
Qutb, Sayyid 92, 93 and Sukarno 89, 113, 121, 287–88, 376
+(#.F
and the 1971 elections 104–05
Ramage, Douglas 185, 392n, 394n and the Chinese 177, 200
Ramin 99 and the New Order regime 23, 29,
Ramos-Horta, Jose 297 30, 31, 125, 130, 134, 151, 159, 179,
Ratih Hardjono 27, 29, 265, 266, 268, 245–46, 254, 260–61, 263, 291, 301,
271, 371, 376–78n 310, 323, 329, 335, 345, 351, 369,
Ravana 121 374, 378–79, 382, 384
Rizal Ramli 325, 328 Soeharto, Tien 229
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (former presi- Soeharto, Tommy 336–38, 370
dent) 59 Soeharto, Tutut 236–37, 235, 354
Rozi Munir 302 Soeryadi 193, 212, 230, 231
Rudini, General 173 Sofyan Wanandi 248
Rusdihardjo, General 337, 345, 370 Solichah 43–44, 46, 52–53, 218, 228,
Rushdie, Salman 21, 182 386n, 387n
Sonny Keraf 328
Saifullah Yusuf 268 Sri Bintang Pamungkas 191
Salahuddin Wahid 10 Sri Mulyani 329
Schwarz, Adam 40, 190, 390n, 393n, Subagyo 241
394n, 395n Sudharmono, General 173, 194
Semar 121, 385 Sudjono Humardhani, General 105
Shari’ati, Ali 92 Sudomo, General 189
Siddiq, Kiai Achmad 132, 393n Sukarno, Ahmad (former president)
Siddiq, Kiai Mahfudz 164–65, 167, 393n and Abdurrahman 90, 212, 287–88,
Sin, Cardinal Jamie 213 297
Sobary, Mohamad 29, 30, 108, 109, 302 and Islam 74, 76–77
Soeharto, Muhammad (former presi- and Megawati 193, 288
dent) and Pancasila 75, 141
and Abdurrahman 148, 153–55, 158, and PKI 87, 89
170, 172, 174, 178, 180, 186, and Soeharto 31, 113, 121, 376
187–88, 191, 195–96, 200–01, 209, and Wahid Hasyim 38, 45–46, 75
229, 235–36, 238, 242–43, 258, 270, Sultan of Brunei 304, 305
286, 290, 292, 369 Sultan of Yogyakarta see
and ABRI 99, 158, 168, 194, 240, Hamengkubuono X
237, 336, 370 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo 238
and corruption 257, 304–05, 317, Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono, General
337, 356, 377, 380, 382 294, 325
and dissent 115, 151, 158, 172, 179, Suwando 304–05
187–89, 191–93, 195, 202, 205, 237, Syafi’i Anwar, Muhammad 253–54
241, 235–36, 248, 377 Syaikh Ahmad Chatib 39, 6
and Golkar 133, 170, 193, 341, 361 Syamsyul Nursalim 346
and Islam 67, 127, 130, 167–69, 174, Syaril Sabirin 329
180–83, 190, 194, 238–40, 243, 248, Syarwan Hamid, General 201, 213–14,
381 230, 237
and Megawati 212–14, 229–32, 237
and NU 148, 150, 170, 172–73, 177, Tamizi Tahir 201, 242
186, 241 Tan Malaka 11
and Pancasila 114, 137–38, 153–54, Taufik Kiemas 303
187 Thoenes, Sander 280
and succession 26, 199, 205, 229, Tolkhah Mansur, Kiai 140–41
243–45, 237–44, 246–47, 249–52, Tolstoy, Leo 85
283, 373, 383 Truman, Harry (former president) 59
8A=
Try Sutrisno, General 167–68, 173, Australian, The 398n

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
191, 192, 194, 203, 252

Bank Indonesia 244
Ulil Abshar Abdalla 393n Bank Rakyat Indonesia 329
Bruneigate 305, 309, 313, 316, 342,
van Bruinessen, Martin 171, 173, 390–93n 345, 358
Buddhist 38, 40, 63, 67, 68, 120, 365
Wahab Chasbullah, Kiai 40, 41, 56, Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik) 304,
386n, 388n 305, 338
Wahid Hasyim, Kiai 38, 41–53, 56, 61, Bulogate 342. 345, 358
73, 74–76, 386n
Wanandi, Yusuf 230, 376n Central Axis 28, 275, 277, 281, 283 see
Wimar Witoelar 310, 312, 336, 337, also Poros Tengah
371 Chandra Asri 346
Winters, Jeffrey 317 Chinese
Wiranto, General 247, 249, 252, 255, and Abdurrahman 20, 177, 267, 290,
260, 283 308, 346
and Amien Rais 254
Yenny Wahid and business 107, 142, 155, 176–77,
and East Timor 280 181, 200, 238–39, 248–49, 245, 267,
and her dad 23, 24, 27, 157, 386n, 290, 346
389n 392n and cerita silat 24
and the election campaign 221, 266, and Christianity 177, 181, 233,
269, 271, 377n 238–39, 346
and the President 20, 29, 299, 312, and mainland China 290, 308
350 and NU 169, 176–77, 200, 233,
and time management 451 238–39
as a child 108, 155 and violence 233–234, 238–39, 247,
Yusril Izha Mahendra 328, 350, 354 236–37, 245–46, 249
Yusuf Hasyim 263, 393n Christian
Yusuf Kalla 302 and Abdurrahman 20, 177, 232–33,
234, 239
Zastrow, Al 266 and Amien Rais 254
and Chinese 20, 177, 233, 254
General and Maluku 259, 305–06, 333–34
abangan and NU 235, 239
and mysticism 67, 121, 180, 211 and Poso 326, 333
and pancasila 74, 137, 140 and TNI 239, 247
and pluralism 185, 254, 258 and violence 233, 235, 239, 259,
and santri identity 64, 159, 180 305–06, 326, 333–34
and urban life 70, 72 CIDES (Centre for Information and
vs. santri 43, 63 Development Studies) 236
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik CPDS (Centre for Policy and
Indonesia) 99, 210, 240, 244, 245, Development Studies) 202, 236, 237
248, 240, 244, see also TNI, military, CSIS (Centre for Strategic and
police International Studies) 105, 230,
Ansor 58, 89, 90, 91, 203, 267, 268, 236, 248, 307
351, 355
army see ABRI, TNI Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia
asas tunggal 136, 137, 138, 139, 151, (DDII) 130, 184, 232, 376n
521 Dipasena 346
Australian Financial Review, The 398n DPR (Dewan Perwakilian Rakyat) 105,
8AD
256, 263, see also Parliament ibadah 164, 174
+(#.F
IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Economist, The 38, 350, 354, 399 Agency) 293, 309
Editor 22 ICMI (Indonesian Association of
Elections Muslim Intellectuals) 210, 211,
1955 74, 76 212, 214, 230, 231, 232, 236, 238,
1971 104–06 239, 240, 241, 248, 241, 242, 381
1977 114–15, 150 ijtihad 69, 128, 129, 132, 153, 164, 165,
1982 132–33, 150, 158, 181, 192 166, 174, 393n
1987 155, 159, 170, 180, 192 IMF (International Monetary Fund)
1992 185, 187, 192 243, 244, 245, 235
1997 214, 230, 237 Indonesian Observer, The 398–99n
1999 251, 256, 260, 272, 310, 376, Interfet (International Force East
379 Timor) 280
2004 331 IPS (Institute for Policy Studies) 237
call for accelerated election 348, 362, Islamism/Islamist 3, 60, 61, 92, 119,
364, 371 130, 134, 151, 181, 184, 191, 192,
194, 198, 232, 235, 237, 246, 235,
fiqh 6 236, 251, 253, 254, 254, 275, 289,
FPI (Front Pembela Islam) 332, 333, 305, 317, 335, 354, 372, 378, 381
335, 337
Jakarta Charter 75, 149
Golkar Jakarta Post, The 181, 330, 331, 332,
and Abdurrahman 155, 170, 189, 341, 337, 398n
192, 201, 237, 241, 276, 283, 302, jihad 259, 334, 355
311, 315, 317, 302, 328, 330–31, Joyo News Service 398n
341–42, 345, 351, 355–56, 361, 373,
381 KAHMI (Korps Alumni HMI) 342
and Habibie 19, 182, 282 kasar 23, 385
and ICMI 182 Khittah 1926 138, 140, 143
and opposition 214, 252, 254, 269, kiai 20, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 52, 54,
273–76, 379 56, 58, 64, 71, 72, 73, 89, 100, 107,
and PPP 114, 133, 170, 251, 253–54 108, 113, 121, 132, 133, 135, 136,
and Soeharto 105, 193–94, 251 139, 141, 142, 143, 164, 166, 171,
and the 1971 elections 106 174, 176, 200, 204, 211, 262, 263,
and the 1977 elections 114 267, 269, 281, 284, 338
and the 1987 elections 155, 170 KISDI (Komiti Indonesia Solidaritas
and the 1992 elections 192 Dunia Islam) 232, 239, 243, 376n
and the 1997 elections 237, 241 KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi & Nepotism)
and the 1999 elections 273–74, 379 290, 302
GPM (Gereja Protestant Maluku) 334 Kompas 107, 181, 265, 377n
Kopassus 239, 238
hadith 5 Kostrad 343
haj 40, 49, 63, 76, 83, 180, 291, 352
halakah 165–67, 175, 393n Lakpesdam 161, 393n
halus 23, 385 Laskar Jihad 305, 306, 333, 334, 335
Hindu 38, 40, 63, 67, 68, 120, 121, 306 LKPSM 161, 393n
HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) LP3ES (Lembaga Pengkajian
123, 125, 126, 251, 342 Pegetahuan, Pendidikan, Ekonomi
dan Sosial) 103, 104, 107
IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negara)
66, 100, 102, 123, 152–53, 162, 163 madrasah 42, 43, 55, 56, 61, 69, 70, 71,
8@A
104, 108, 110, 122, 126, 127 163, 167, 190

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
Masyumi New Order 104, 105, 127, 150, 151,

and conservatism 124, 126, 130, 150, 152, 209, 212, 232, 374
182–83, 253 New York Times, The 25, 26, 43, 44, 341
and Islamic state 74 NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) v, 1, 8, 22, 23,
and NU 45, 55, 73, 75–76, 122 30
and Parmusi 105–06 and Abdurrahman 20, 23, 107,
and Sukarno 76, 77 111–13, 116, 132–44, 147–67,
mazhab 68, 128, 164, 166 169–77, 183–88, 191, 192,
MIAI (Majlisul Islamil a’laa Indonesia) 193,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,1
11 69, 204, 209,176,177,180, 232–39,
modernism/ists, Islamic 20, 55, 66, 68, 241–42, 246–47, 248, 250, 252–54,
69, 70, 72, 83, 122, 127, 128, 129, 257–58, 262–66, 272–76, 281–82,
131, 153, 184 284, 302–03, 351–57, 381
MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) and pesantren 104, 192, 210, 211
and 1966 decree on communism 345 and politics 30, 281–82, 284, 291,
and Abdurrahman 18, 19, 26, 27, 302–03, 351–57
155, 180 and PPP 113–15, 134,158, 199, 270
and government appointees 105, 379 and Soeharto 183–88,158, 193,165,
and Suharto 137 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209, 210,
and the 1993 session 186–87, 192–94 211, 213, 214, 230, 232–39, 241,
and the 1998 session 242, 248, 235, 240–41, 257–58, 381
255–57 and the 1971 elections 106
and the 1999 session 238 and the 1982 elections 134, 181, 192
and the 2000 session 309–10, 312–13,
315–18, 319–20, 323–24, 331, 340, P3M (Pengembangan Pesantren dan
370 Masyarakat) 161, 165, 392n, 393n
and the special session 342, 358, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) 2, 252,
360–63 253, 254, 272, 254, 275, 281, 311,
the authority of 105, 155, 310–11, 317, 345
320, 322, 382 Pancasila 46, 114, 181, 186, 187, 190,
Muhammadiyah 191, 247, 392n
and Abdurrahman 56 Paramadina 181, 393n
and Amien Rais 184, 231, 236, 241, Parliament
254 and Abdurrahman 302, 304, 309,
and communism 91 313–15, 318, 340, 342, 344, 358,
and madrasah 71 368, 370, 373, 379–80
and modernism 20, 54, 66, 70, 72, and censure of President 356–57,
160 360–61, 366
and NU 55, 73, 151, 158, 248, 268 and Golkar 114
and PAN 253 and legislation 293, 339
and Suharto 167, 241 and MPR 105, 310
muktamar/national congress and party discipline 311
1979 Semarang 134 and PKB 263
1984 Situbondo 148, 150–53 and PPP 115, 133
1989 Krapyak 159, 169–73, 176, 178, and Soeharto 240, 244, 377
182 and the military 256, 349–50
1994 Cipasung 195, 199, 201–04, and Wahid Hasyim 49
209–10, 230, 238–39, 242 appearing before 312–14
munas 140, 143, 241, 242 dissolving of 348, 362, 371–72
PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) 275, 317
neomodernism, Islamic 127, 131, 153, PBNU (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul
8@@
Ulama) 20, 28 Cipasung 203
+(#.F
PDI/PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Denanyar 37, 40, 110
Indonesia/ — Perjuangan) Krapyak 171
and Megawati 193, 199, 211–14, Probolinggo 235
230–31, 237, 253, 255, 275, 283, Situbondo 140, 149, 170, 174, 234
302, 313, 315, 334, 342, 343, 349, Tambakberas 40, 99–100, 108, 110
361, 369, 379–80 Tebuireng 39, 40, 42, 141
and NU 258 Tegalrejo 56
and PKB 267, 271 PK (Partai Keadilan) 275, 276, 281, 317
and PPP 133, 151, 189 PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
and Soeharto 193, 212–14, 230–31, and Abdurrahman 19, 253, 263, 270,
237, 240, 248 273, 276, 281, 303, 349, 379–80
and Soeryadi 193, 230–31 and Alwi Shihab 265, 281
and Sukarno 193 and Megawati 276
and the 1992 elections 192 and NU 250, 252, 258, 262, 270, 281,
and the 1999 elections 272 302–03
and the 2004 elections 341 and PDI-P 267, 271, 254–55, 303,
and the cabinet 286, 302–03, 313, 349, 379
319, 328, 342, 345 and PPP 263–64
and the Islamists 306, 334 and the Central Axis 281
and xxv, Abdurrahman 192, 268, 283, and the Parliament 349, 337
345, 349, 361, 369–70, 379–80 PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) 87, 89,
People’s Consultative 90, 232
Assembly/Assembly see MPR PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia) 105,
Pesantren 106
Al-Munawwir 56 Police 133, 134, 187, 189, 231, 234,
and Abdurrahman 46, 53, 57, 60–61, 237, 238, 256, 258, 267, 269, 301,
85–86, 103–04, 109–10, 116, 305, 318, 329, 334, 337, 338, 339,
120–21, 132–33, 137, 171, 175, 345, 346, 349, 352, 353, 337, 358,
195–96, 266, 309, 367, 394n, 395n 362, 363, 364, 370, 373, 383, 384
and IAIN 66 POLRI (Polisi Republik Indonesia) see
and innovations in teaching 39, 84, police
104, 110, 122, 139, 153, 162, Poros Tengah 275, see also Central Axis
164–66, 169, 175 PPP (Partai Pembangunan Persatuan)
and kiai 41, 54, 58, 71, 89, 132–33, and 1982 elections 181
164–66 and 1987 elections 155, 159, 170
and madrasah 42, 55–56, 61, 69–70, and 1992 elections 192
104, 108, 110, 127 and 1997 elections 237
and NGOs 161, 163, 165, 167 and Abdurrahman 147–52, 155, 159,
and NU 38, 72–73, 90, 152, 155, 158, 170, 192, 197, 199, 283, 290, 318,
172 328, 342, 345, 373, 381
and Pancasila 137 and Golkar 251–54, 373, 379
and rural life 70–71, 72, 77, 89, 103, and NU 106, 113–15, 147–52, 189,
105, 147–48 199, 214, 263–64, 270, 272
and santri 63, 64, 66 and Soeharto 230, 237
and secular society 107, 116, 140, and the Central Axis 275–276, 283
147–48 PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokrasi) 231,
and social change 64, 66, 106, 161 232, 240, 351
and social networks 44, 64, 158 priyayi 63, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72
and traditionalist Islam 37, 78, PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusi Republik
120–21, 123, 127 Indonesia) 77
and women 6
8@6
Rapat Akbar 186, 187, 188 zakat 63, 161, 393n

!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) 334

Places
santri Aceh 8, 30, 260, 270, 271, 272
and communism 90–91 Africa 65, 84
and community 55, 72–73, 159, 180, Al Azhar 61, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 93,
182, 253 94, 95
and mysticism 70, 211 Amman 289
and outlook 49 Ambon 6, 28, 259, 260, 300, 305,
and pesantren 66, 71, 175 306, 325, 329, 333, 334 see also
and politics 106, 253 Maluku
and rural life 71 America see United States of America
and social change 64 Australia 261, 265, 279, 397n see also
and Soeharto 180–83, 236 Melbourne, Sydney, Perth
and the military 168, 173
and the state 74–75, 114, 137 Baghdad 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
traditionalists and modernists 66 101, 102, 123, 132, 367
vs. abangan 20, 43, 63, 70, 258 Bali 171, 255, 283, 310
SekNeg (Sekretariat Negara) 288 Bandung 50, 51, 72, 321, 329, 343
Semar 121, 385 Bangkok 294
Shia/Shi’ites 174 Banjarmasin 321
State Secretariat see SekNeg Banyuwangi 257, 258
Straits Times, The 399 Beijing 290, 294
Sufism 66, 67, 109 Berlin 294
Sunnah 67, 120, 132, 138, 164, 165, Borobudur Hotel 338
166 Brunei 294, 304, 305
Sunni 77, 78, 174
Cairo 60, 61, 132, 236, 239, 240, 241,
tarekat 173 265, 308, 367
Tempo 22, 40, 107, 112, 126, 394n Canada 102
Texmaco 307, 346 Canberra 261 see also Australia
Time 309, 398n China see Beijing
TNI 280, 292, 349, 353, 357, 370, see Ciganjur 112, 174, 188, 195, 196, 247,
also ABRI, military 235, 239, 246, 256, 273, 276, 277,
traditionalists/ism 20, 38, 42, 53, 54, 55, 280, 287, 311, 316
57, 64, 67, 68, 70, 73, 77, 120, 122, Cilandak 116
127, 128, 131,126, 163, 164, 165, Cimahi 50
166, 167, 174, 235, 254, 269, 364 Cipasung 203 see also muktamar
Cipete 135, 136, 210
ulama 9, 31 Ciputat 123
and NU 113, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, Cuba 297, 298
142, 147–52, 241–42
and pesantren 37, 38, 54, 64, 70, 148 Damascus 123
and politics 78, 87, 94, 114, 115, 133, Denanyar 37, 40, 56, 387n, 388n see also
158, 257, 270–71, 305, 364 pesantren
and scholarship 31, 39, 67, 73, 83, Dili 280, 297, 326
128, 139, 161, 165–67
umat 124, 125, 199, 242 East Timor 134, 239, 237, 261, 262,
United Nations 280, 335, 337, 338, 339 278, 279, 280, 292, 296, 297, 301,
334, 335, 343, 375, 383 see also Dili
wayang kulit 57, 58, 59, 92, 120, 121, Egypt 61, 87, 92, 94, 104, 123, 127, 265
324, 385 see also Cairo
8@7
France 2, 101 see also Paris, Sorbonne Malang 291
+(#.F
University Malaysia 240, 244, 362
Maluku 28, 259, 300, 306, 310, 311,
Germany 101 see also Berlin 332, 333, 334, 335, 347, 375 see also
Ambon
Halim Airport 51 Manila 198
Havana 297, 298 Matraman 45, 49, 51, 52, 102, 103
Hilton Hotel 2, 3, 4, 24, 25, 322 Mecca 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 83, 86, 95
Hong Kong 298, 362 Medan 230, 236
Medina 63, 83
IAIN Sunan Kalijaga 99, 126, 163 Melbourne 265
IAIN Syarif Hidyatullah 123, 127, 153, Menteng 45, 47, 138, 230, 238
162, 163 Mexico 298
India 49, 65, 69, 294 see also New Delhi Mexico City 298
Iran 62, 128, 182, 258 see also Teheran Middle East 8, 30, 53, 54, 83, 86, 88,
Iraq 97, 99, 100 see also Baghdad 89, 90, 91, 93, 99, 352
Irian Jaya 241, 292, 293, 311, 339, 340, Mojokerto 396–97n
343, 345, 347, 363, 373, 384 see also Mulia, Hotel 322
Papua
Islamabad 308 New Delhi 294
Israel 198, 199, 203, 289 New York 3, 4, 197, 335, 337, 341
Istana Merdeka 291
Pakistan 374
Jalan Gatot Subroto 296 Papua 292, 293, 301, 317 see also Irian
Java 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 50, 51, 52, 57, Jaya
64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 102, 103, Parliament Building 245, 247, 296, 363
104, 106, 107, 120, 121, 122, 126, Paris 23, 30, 294, 298, 308
187, 189, 191, 203, 257, 258, 259, Perth 245
263, 269, 270, 273, 274, 277, 281, Philippines, The 258, 316 see also
332, 333, 334, 351, 353 Manila
Jayapura 340 Pontianak 272
Jombang 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, Poso 325, 326, 333 see also Sulawesi
51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 103, 104, 107,
108, 268 see also Denanyar, Qatar 289
Tambakberas
Jordan 198, 289 Russia 99
Kalimantan 38, 233, 240, 272, 321, 332, St Louis 308

352, 353 see also Pontianak, Sambas, Salatiga 95
Sampit Salt Lake City 278, 289, 290, 308
Kedung Ombo 154, 158, 170 Sambas 272 see also Kalimantan
Krapyak 56, 171, 176 see also pesantren Sampit 352, 353 see also Kalimantan
Kuala Lumpur 244 Saudi Arabia 294 see also Mecca,
Kupang 297 Medina
Kuwait 289 Semanggi 256
Semarang 134, 263
London 294, 298 Seoul 294
Singapore 245, 262, 303, 337
McGill University 102 Sorbonne University 83, 308
Madura 39, 40, 41, 353 South Korea 294, 346
Magelang 56, 58, 59, 156 see also Sulawesi 259, 325, 332, 333, 334, 347
pesantren see also Poso
8@8
Sumatra 38, 269, 270, 341 see also Aceh, United States of America/USA 123,
!"#$%%!&'!()*!&+#5)'$,-+')#.'/0%!12)+(#/(.,+!()3%.,+#.(1
West Sumatra 244, 260, 265, 294, 297, 298, 304,

Surabaya 40, 41, 51, 126, 306, 327, 342, 310, 333, 338 see also New York,
355, 296n Salt Lake City, St Louis,
Switzerland 294 Washington DC
Sydney 245, 265, 280
Syria 123 see also Damascus Washington DC 289, 297, 308, 365
West Sumatra 69, 77
Tambakberas 40, 56, 61 West Timor 259, 335, 336, 339, 373,
Tebuireng 39, 40, 41, 42, 122 383 see also Kupang
Tegalrejo 56
Teheran 308 Yogyakarta 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 70,
Thailand 243, 244 see also Bangkok 72, 85, 99, 100, 101, 103, 125, 126,
Tokyo 289, 308 140, 156, 161, 163, 235, 256, 301,
Trisakti 236 315, 316, 324, 328, 367

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• Wahid pics 2/7/02 9:33 AM Page 1

Abdurrahman being sworn in as president (Kompas)

Right: Abdurrahman and

Abdurrahman checks the time on the

Abdurrahman’s four daughters: Anita, Inayah, Alissa and Yenny

Abdurrahman addresses a national Boy Scout jamboree in August 2000, flanked by

GREG BARTON is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Arts at Deakin

This page intentionally left blank

A view from the inside

A UNSW Press book

© Greg Barton 2002

National Library of Australia

PART 1 PESANTREN AND FAMILY

PART 2 THE MAKING OF AN INTELLECTUAL

PART 3 ISLAM AND MODERNITY

PART 4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND ISLAM

PART 5 POLITICS, REFORM AND THE PRESIDENCY

by name in the acknowledgements that follow. Many of these conver-

I am also deeply grateful to my parents, Jim and Edie Barton, whose

support went well beyond kindly words of encouragement and finally

I also owe special debt of gratitude to Greg Fealy, Hamish

runs the Joyo news service, without whose hourly deliveries to my

‘Inbox’ I would have been so much less well informed.

:-/,,!%> !(# !""%.?+!1+/(,

abangan Muslims whose cultural and religious outlook is, to greatly

CIDES Centre for Information and Development Studies.

CPDS Centre for Policy and Development Studies.

haram The opposite of halal, refers to things expressly forbidden in

KKN korupsi, kolusi, nepotism (corruption, collusion and nepotism).

Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak-hak Asasi Manusia (National

modernists, ostensibly at least, do not define their doctrinal position

PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). Led by

the pesantren. The term’s modern usage reflects the widespread

usage of the paradigm of santri and abangan popularised by the

the term is used most often to refer to religious communities, espe-

hours earlier. First came a practice run in case Megawati

eyes revealed something of her deep shock. In the midst of a gaggle of

seemed as if the rundown and nondescript nature of PBNU (Pemimpin

Indonesian society. Indeed, in 1990 the well-regarded weekly news

exactly the right response. I went into Abdurrahman’s suite at the

explained Munib. ‘That is what he wanted. He endorsed Amien.’ ‘But

he live out the pluralism that he preaches?

So what should we make of Abdurrahman Wahid? Was his victory

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in 1926, the vast majority of pesantren have been affiliated in a loose

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Hindu-Buddhist interior of the island. Along with Hasyim Asy’ari, he

was regarded as one of the key figures in the establishment of NU. In

Chotib. During this time Wahab Chasbullah’s younger sister, Chadijah,

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determining their course of study. As a small child Wahid Hasyim

become involved with was, he wrote: ‘Like choosing a life-partner, the

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into a credible component of the nationalist movement and in doing so

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him the choice to do so but Abdurrahman preferred to attend ordinary

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