Mijares v. Hon. Ranada

56. MIJARES v. HON.
RANADA
G.R. No. 139325, 12 April 2005, (Tinga, J.)
FACTS:
The petitioners are victims of human rights violations who have chosen to do battle with the estate of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. The petitioners brought the case in their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals. The class action suit was allowed and the US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the class a total of
US $ 1,964,005,859.90. On May 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. The Marcos
Estate filed a motion to dismiss raising that the petitioners failed to pay the correct filing fees. Judge Ranada issued the order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice and opined that the foreign judgment was capable of pecuniary estimation since it
involved payments for sums of money. Thus, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will apply and the proper amount of the
filing fees was approximately P472,000,000. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. The petitioners filed a Petition for
Certitorari assailing the twin orders of the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Should the petitioners pay the filing fees required by the Judge?
RULING:
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the
US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where
the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of
the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. In special proceedings involving properties such as
for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the property. The aforecited rules evidently have no
application to petitioners' complaint.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis
of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What
provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment? To resolve this
question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the
foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.[21]
However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party,[22] collusion, fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party aggrieved by the
foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy.[
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action
is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,[29] and clearly an action to enforce a foreign
judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive
evidence of a right."[30] Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of
judgment must be brought before the regular courts.[31] There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of
action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the
foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives
that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates
from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a
complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the
same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
judgment itself. More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to
establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these
factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the
right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for
proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
We are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the
ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant
complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does,
"other actions not involving property."
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect
the reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the
court of one state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the
state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized
within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as
a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to
an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed,
there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property
subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance
with the applicable laws and standards of the forum.[72] The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity of
the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if
the docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory
adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real
property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot
very well require that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined by the standards of
the country where it is located.

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56. MIJARES v. HON.

G.R. No. 139325, 12 April 2005, (Tinga, J.)

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