Dela Cruz vs.

Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838

Facts:

On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned
to the Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an order
mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and
apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said
mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest.
They left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The
operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their
way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. As a result, on
August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However,
while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on January
16, 1981, vesting in court martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed
Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty.

Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:

In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59,
dated June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under
General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD.
1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted
before the commission of the crime. The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to the
case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.
 People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640

Facts:

February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a
Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial
Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were
subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in
Manila. Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term without the consent
of the mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and
encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on the
ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

An essential element common to the two acts punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is
that the property removed or repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or
pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties
mortgaged to the bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile. On the evidence
presented, there is no showing that properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties
mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile).
With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila still has
jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent
amendment or stipulation.
 Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC)
and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of
the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of
Buayas account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was
charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming
that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the
same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case
against petitioner Buaya

HELD:

The allegations in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases.
14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of
1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has
no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit. Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction
since the respondents principal place of business is in Manila and Buayas failure to remit the premiums
caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may
be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.

Petition is DISMISSED.
 People vs. Magallanes
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

FACTS:

In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col.
Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police
Inspector Abetos cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis,
civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino
Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with
evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the victims in a
makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were
consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented
Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution
rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was
suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles
voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the
transmittal of the records to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction because the information do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of
evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49
of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to
transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the
petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from
proceeding with the trial of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers

HELD:

The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. When the information in the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00. If the penalty for the offense
charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of taking advantage of his position is not
sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of offenses committed in relation to public office. It
is considered merely as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its
jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains
jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade
27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade
27 or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in rank among the accused, only has a rank classified as
Grade 18. Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the
subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to officers whose
rank is Grade 27 or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Hence,
cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only
referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the
challenged orders are AFFIRMED.
 PEOPLE v LAGON
185 SCRA 442 FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

FACTS:

On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas charging Lagon with estafa for
allegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment for goods knowing she had insufficient funds. However on
Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty
prescribed by law for estafa was beyond the courts authority to impose. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case

HELD: NO

It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by the law
in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the
time of the commission of the offense charged.

Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged
with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed
prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both.

At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well
within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818 had
increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period.

The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule against
retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction
is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender in after trial but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the
information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense
which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.

In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a
more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try
and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before
effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of
the City Court) should be imposed.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition