Can the Colour Revolutions in Georgia and

Ukraine be classified as true revolutions?

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Student Number: 908206
Candidate Number: YCFX5
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Contents

3..... Introduction

7..... What is a Revolution?

16... The Rose and Orange Revolutions as Revolutionary

Situations

26... The Rose and Orange Revolutions in terms of their

Revolutionary Outcomes

34... Conclusion

Declaration of authorship (example)

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing that
is the outcome of work done in collaboration. I have been made aware of
the UCL policy on plagiarism (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-
students/guidelines/plagiarism )
 Introduction

The Colour Revolutions that swept through Eastern Europe in the first

decade of the 21st century were a number of non-violent protests that

succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes (White & Bryce 2010:

XVI). Beginning in Serbia in 2000, the wave spread to Georgia in 2003,

Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 with attempts in Belarus,

Armenia and Azerbaijan that though unsuccessful have also been

grouped into the Colour bracket.

The November 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia took place over 20 days

in which an allegedly stolen parliamentary election by the party of the

incumbent president, Eduard Shevardnadze, eventually resulted in his

removal from office in place of the younger, charismatic member of the

eventual victorious bloc from the contested elections, Mikheil

Saakashvili. Following the publishing of the fraudulent election results,

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over 100,000 Georgian members of the public took to the streets of the

capital Tbilisi demanding Shevardnadzes resignation. Despite the

presidents desire to disperse the revolts, the armed forces failed to take

up arms, leaving Shevardnadze with little choice to resign. Saakashvili,

the former Justice Minister under Shevardnadzes government would

eventually be elected as president with 96% of the vote just over six

weeks following Shevardnadzes resignation. Three months later,

Saakashvilis position was consolidated by the 67% majority obtained in

a parliamentary vote.

Coming almost exactly a year after the Rose Revolution, Ukraines

Orange Revolution, described by McFaul as a seminal moment in

Ukraines history (2010: 189), followed a similar trajectory to its

Georgian counterpart though key differences remain. The fraudulent

election that sparked the crisis took place at executive level via a

presidential election, rather than a legislative vote while the revolution

did not see the incumbent government replaced, with Leonid Kuchmas

two terms as president coming to an end before the 2004 presidential

election. Rather, the culmination of the revolution in January 2005 saw

Viktor Yanukovych, the favoured candidate of Kuchma and the

fraudulently announced winner of the November vote, lose the

presidency to Viktor Yuschenko, himself a former prime minister under

the previous government, after a month of widespread public protests

across Ukraine, the largest being in the capital Kiev where as many as

500,000 people were estimated to have gathered. In another key

difference, Yuschenkos parliamentary bloc had already secured a

significant foothold in the legislature, having secured the most votes at

the 2002 parliamentary elections.

However, the relative rollbacks in democracy and apparent demise of the

revolutionary promises made in both Georgia and Ukraine in the years

since has led to doubts over their true revolutionary nature. Indeed

Mitchell notes calling these events revolutions implies that the changes

were dramatic and substantial, although in many respects this

assumption is debatable (2012: 8). Despite a mass reformist programme,

the post-Shevardnadze Georgia was said to have undoubtedly

modernised but not necessarily democratised (De Waal 2011: 20) as the

new government, led by Saakashvili, would monopolise power at both

executive and parliamentary level with all authority centralised with the

presidency. In Ukraine, despite the eventual election of Yushchenko as

president, political instability only seemed to intensify amidst increasing

regional splits and just over a year after Yushchenkos inauguration, the

Party of Regions emerged as the strongest parliamentary bloc at the

2006 parliamentary elections while its leader, the beaten candidate in

the 2004 presidential election, Yanukovych, would later be elected as

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president in 2010. Such moves have led to the question: was the Orange

Revolution a revolution at all? (Copsey 2010: 30).

This paper will look to examine that very point, discussing whether the

Rose and Orange Revolutions can adequately and effectively be

described as true revolutions. The analysis will take on a qualitative

form and will begin by discussing the concept of a revolution itself, one

which has been a prominent field of study for decades. With a

conceptual foundation provided by the works of Huntingdon (1968), Hay

(2002), Giddens (1989), Skocpol (1979), this paper will ultimately elect

the two-tiered theory of revolution provided by Charles Tilly (1978), which

broadens the analysis into revolutionary situations and revolutionary

outcomes rather than simply focusing on outcomes as more traditional

theories do. The examination of Georgia and Ukraine as revolutionary

situations however hastens the need to establish the causalities of the

protests in the months and years preceding them, a mode of analysis

that has the paper drawing on theories of structure and agency best

elucidated by Hay (2002).

Having examined Tillys concept, his revolutionary framework forms the

basis of analysis in sections two and three. The second section attempts

to place the Rose and Orange revolutions as revolutionary situations,

most prominently through Tillys idealised revolutionary sequence (1978).

More general works on the Colour Revolutions from Mitchell (2012), Way

(2008), Beissinger (2007) as well as a more abstract study on

overcoming authoritarianism in the post-communist era by Bunce and

Wolchik (2011) provide the backbone for analysis. Those will also provide

the foundation for the initial analysis of section three, which focuses on

the degree of revolutionality in the outcomes of both the Rose and

Orange Revolution, thus continuing to adhere to Tillys framework.

As sections two and three of this paper will be primarily investigating

the Rose and Orange Revolutions, individual literature and studies on the

two will form a key part of this papers work. For the Rose Revolution,

the European Stability Initiative (2010) produced a series of reports

focusing on events in Georgia, both previous to and after November

2003, falling perfectly into the remit this papers discussion point. Welt

(2010) and Companjen (2010) will also be key to the development of this

papers argument, particularly in section two while in section three,

Kupatadze (2012), De Waal (2011) and MacFarlanes (2011) studies on the

failure of Saakashvilis post-Rose Revolution regime to implement the

promises of democracy and freedom will prove vital in attempting to

locate a revolutionary outcome from the Rose Revolution. Similarly, for

the Orange Revolution, individual studies by Wilson (2006) Copsey (2010),

McFaul (2010) and DAnieri (2011) will be investigated while Flikke (2008)

Haran (2011), Riabchuk (2012) and Sutela (2012) offer an in-depth focus
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into the fall back into authoritarianism via Yanukovych and the Party of

Regions following the events of late 2004.

This papers conclusion will draw on the generic studies of the Colour

Revolutions mentioned earlier while also drawing on Tudoriou (2007),

who tellingly, described the Rose and Orange events as failed revolutions

years before the reversal back into authoritarianism in both Georgia and

Ukraine. The final part of this paper will also look back to its origins and

the true meaning of a revolution. Indeed, despite the revolutionary

aspects of the revolts in Georgia and Ukraine, do their ambiguous and

somewhat questionable outcomes, which are still in a process of flux

and change render the attempted shifts towards democracy as

evolutionary rather than revolutionary? The concept of evolutionary and

transitionary change will take this paper to the works of Hay (2002),

Somit and Peterson (1989) and the Colliers (1991) and more recently,

McFaul (2012).

Section One

What is a revolution?
So often has the term revolution been used, either to describe historical

events or in academic study that Zimmerman (1983) has argued that it

has lost its original meaning. Indeed, noting the contested nature of the

concept of revolution, Tudoroiu declares it an outdated concept (2007:

317), while Paige offers that current concepts of revolution may well be

obsolete (2003: 19). The traditional notion of a revolution appears to be

best summarised by Huntingdon, who elucidates a rapid, fundamental

and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and

government activity and policies (1968: 264). Huntingdons assertions

thus prioritise the outcomes of a revolution, rather than the process

itself. While this may be useful when studying a particular type of

revolution, such as the French Revolution, it narrows further scope for

study, particularly into the Colour Revolutions. Similarly, Hay describes a

cathartic process that refers to the abrupt - in some accounts near-

instantaneous - process of institutional/systemic change in which the

defining features of the social and political system are significantly

recast (2002: 151) while Giddens notes a seizure of state power

through violent means, where that power is subsequently used to initiate

major processes of social reforms (1989: 605). Skocpol veers away from

violence when describing a revolution as a rapid, basic transformation

of a societys state and class structure (1979: 4). However, much like

Huntingdons, these theories tend to view revolutions too narrowly,

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focusing solely on their outcomes. Under such terms, the Colour

Revolutions, particularly those in Georgia and Ukraine, with their

somewhat ambiguous democratic outcomes, are dismissed out of hand

as true revolutions a little too easily. Therefore, for the purposes of this

paper, a broader concept of revolution shall be used as the framework of

analysis.

Indeed, noting the propensity to describe many revolts as revolutions,

Goldstone avoids the term, instead focusing on the causalities of what

he splits into state crises and state breakdown (1991: 8). With an

interesting marker to the failure of the replacement governments

following the Colour events in Georgia and Ukraine to truly embrace

democracy, Goldstone offers that the fall of the old regime and its

replacement by a new government should not be expected to end a

period of social difficulties (1991: XXIV). Rather, the sheer magnitude of

the task facing the new government ensure that only further conflict is

likely to arise. Certainly, for the Orange Revolution, mass structural

difficulties, politically, regionally and economically ensured that the

success of Viktor Yushchenkos campaign was never truly likely to push

through the democratic reprieve the country had been promised.

Goldstone goes further by removing the mode of thought that revolutions

lie as battles between good and evil, instead promoting the vagaries and

incompatibilities between human institutions (1991: XXIV). This

particularly resonates with both the Rose and Orange Revolutions, where

the main good protagonists such as Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor

Yushchenko were actually members of the previous governments while

in Ukraines case, the bad candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, was eventually

democratically elected by the Ukrainian populace as President in 2010.

Goldstone does indeed offer a broader concept of revolutions with his

splitting into state crises and state breakdowns. The crisis, coming

before the breakdown, is said to describe a shift in elite or popular

attitudes towards the state, where they consider the central state to

be....ineffective, unjust or obsolete (1991: 8), a relevant description for

this papers study of the Rose and Orange Revolution, which ultimately

arose due to the inefficiency and unpopularity of the incumbent

governments, emphasised by the fraudulent elections which denied the

opposition victory in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004. Indeed, the

elections echo Goldstones claims of a situation where in the eyes of a

large number of ordinary people and influential elites, the state is failing

to perform the expected tasks of governance (1991: 9). However, where

Goldstones argument falls down in terms of the Colour Revolutions is his

belef that revolutions only occur following state breakdown, where what

follows is substantial changes in political and social institutions and in

the ideology used to justify those institutions (1991:10). Thus, though

Goldstones bracketed concept of revolution does offer greater scope for

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analysis, his ultimate view does not seem to differ too greatly from the

likes of Huntingdon, Hay, Giddens and Skocpol.

Echoing Tucker, this paper identifies that the use of the word

revolution is not meant to imply any long-term consequences of these

events (2007: 536). Thus, a revolution should not only be judged by its

consequences; particularly the Colour Revolution, where the

consequences are ever-changing even as we speak. In the words of

Todoroiu, a medium-term perspective should be adopted (2007: 319),

one in which not only consequences are analysed but causes and the

events of the revolution in general. Such a perspective and one that

will provide a framework for analysis of the events in Georgia and

Ukraine as realistic revolutions is perhaps best elucidated by Charles

Tilly. Kupatadze (2012: 7) notes that Tillys definition of a revolution is

one that can be most associated with the Colour Revolutions, while

Goldstone offers that Tilly challenged general theories of revolution and

associations of violence. Fundamentally, the Colour Revolutions in

Georgia and Ukraine do not follow the outcome-based definitions of

revolution as they were devoid of violence, (Huntingdon, Hay), lacked

distinct social class identity (Skocpol) and did not lead to any

fundamental changes in either the political institutions or ideology

(Huntingdon, Hay, Giddens and Goldstone). Instead, Tillys concept that a

revolution is a forcible transfer of power over a state (where) two or

more blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the

state, with each bloc receiving some popular support (2006: 159)

appears to provide a more suitable framework for analysis of the Rose

and Orange events as revolutions.

Tilly argues that first and foremost, revolutionary reality is complex

(1978: 189) though the basic premise remains that a revolutionary

outcome is the displacement of one set of power holders by another

(1978: 193). This is an argument of great significance to the Colour

Revolutions, which are often described as political processes or regime

transitions (Kupatadze 2012: 7). However, importantly, Tilly argues that

the outcome, particularly if achieved through violence transfers of power,

eliminates many instances in which competing observers see

something revolutionary (1978: 1990), such as the Industrial Revolution

or indeed the Colour Revolutions. Thus for Tilly and this paper, the

revolutionary outcome is not the sole marker for the revolution itself.

Rather, a revolution amalgamates both the outcome and the

revolutionary situation that precedes it. The concept of a revolutionary

situation builds on Trotsky, who speaks of the dual power in every

revolution (1965: 224) and indeed offers that it begins when a

government previously under the control of a single polity becomes the

object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of

two or more distinct polities (Tilly 1978: 191). The similarities with the
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Rose and Orange Revolutions here are evident, which this paper will

subsequently look at in further depth, not least in its identifiable

features, such as the fragmentation of an existing polity into two or

more blocs (and) the emergence of coalitions between established

members of the polity and mobilising non-members (Tilly 1978: 192) and

the incapacity of incumbent rulers to suppress the alternative coalition)

(Kupatadze 2012: 154), whether that be through defections or through

diminishing control of areas of the state apparatus. However, perhaps the

key differentiating feature of Tillys analysis however is that the

revolutionary situation remains revolutionary, regardless of the outcome.

The reference point of the revolution is not the outcome, leaving the

case that a a revolutionary situation can occur without a revolutionary

outcome (1978: 193). Therefore, as this paper will highlight, the events

in Ukraine in 2004 could still be described as revolutionary despite the

fact that by 2010, Orange promises had failed to materialise and Viktor

Yanukovych, the beaten candidate in 2004, was elected as President.

This represents a similarity to Tillys view that a revolutionary situation

can still represent a revolution despite the fact that the existing

members of the polity (in this case Yanukovych) beat down their

challengers after a period of effective, competing, mutually exclusive

claims (1978: 193).

When analysing a revolution however, no matter which concept provides

the basis for analysis, it is important to evaluate its causalities. Certainly

if Tillys bracketing of situations and outcomes are to provide the

guiding structure for this paper, then in order to define the Colour

Revolutions as potential revolutionary situations, we must identify just

what contributes to the making of one.

The causes of a revolution, as can any discussion of a social, political or

economic causality, can be situated using the structure v agency

debate. Power and the transfer of it one of the identifiable features of

any concept of revolution and Hay even goes further, suggesting that

every constructed notion of a social, political or economic causality

appeals to ideas of structure and agency (2002: 189). Structure is said to

mean the context or setting whereby social, political and economic

events occur while Structuralists tend to advocate the predominance of

such contexts over agency, which refers to the ability of an actor to act

consciously, free of structural constraints and in full realisation of their

ability to act differently if they so desired (Hay 2002: 94). This paper will

not attempt to highlight the much discussed problems of the structure

and agency debate but it accepts that in order to understand the

causalities of a revolution, an analysis of the structural and agential

aspects of said causalities must be examined. Indeed, scholars on

revolution have tended to point to structure and agency when discussing

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revolution causalities. For instance, Goldstone appears to signal his

preference for structural causes when arguing that a revolution is only

likely to occur in the midst of three simultaneous difficulties: a state

financial crisis, elite divisions that create social polarisation and

increasing potential for mobilising popular revolt groups due to rising

social grievances and patterns (Goldstone 1991: XXIII). Indeed, with a

nod to the democratic problems faced by Georgia in 2003 for example,

where a failing economy allied with social disconnect and widespread

corruption both at high and low levels eventually sparked the Rose

events, Goldstone offers that the due to the multitude of problems that

cause revolutions, no quick resolution can be obtained simply by a

change of government (1991: XXIV).

Hay on the other hand takes a more agential view, offering that a

revolutions occurrence is not dependent on matters such as the

economy but more on the ability of actors to mobilise support for radical

change - actors in short, make a difference (2002: 166). Skocpol appears

to combine both structure and agency, offering that revolutions arise not

only from structural forces such as international state and institutional

movements but also from the decisions of social actors who both

precipitate and manipulate the pace of the revolution (Skocpol 1979: 19).
Focusing on the Colour Revolutions as a whole before honing in on

Georgia and Ukraine, it is perhaps no surprise considering the complex,

interwoven nature of the structure v agency debate that scholars range

between the two when attempting to locate causalities. Mitchell for

instance does identify the Colour events as revolutions that brought an

end to governments that had tried to steal one too many elections

(2012: 1). Such an explanation appears to draw on the agency of the

incumbent government, though it could also easily be argued that their

capacity to manipulate the election process hints at an inherent

structural weakness in either the political system or more socially. Thus,

institutions, or the rules of the game determine the agency and

behaviour of the actors, which then produce political outcomes (Tsebelis

1990: 4). Similarly, in noting the Colour events as evidence of a fourth

wave of democratic breakthroughs, Lucan Way points to inherent details,

such as a lack of democratic history, a weak civil society, a weak rule of

law and relative international isolation post Soviet independence (2005:

231), factors which are all pertinent to the revolts in Georgia and

Ukraine. Way puts stress on the post-Cold War and post-Soviet collapse

environment, which created fundamentally new challenges (2005: 236)

for incumbent governments in dealing with the promise of newly

democratic elections and more fundamentally, opposition to failing

policies. However, in an interesting nod to the consequences of the

Colour events in Georgia and Ukraine that this paper will examine in
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detail, once victorious, the opposition finds itself up against many of the

same problems of opposition mobilization faced by the previous

incumbent (Way 2005: 240). Though Ways causality primarily stresses

structural weakness, there is a nod to agency with the suggestion that

for example, the absence of strong, organised political parties and

movements historically in the countries of the Colour Revolutions

increased opportunism, whereby politicians consciously and

methodologically changed political sides with the incumbent government

at a point of weakness to suit their own vested interests (Way 2005:

236). Such explanations appear poignant when discussing the issues

Ukraine faced following the culmination of the Orange activities in

2004, where by 2012, the victorious Orange Our Ukraine party could

only muster 1.1% of the vote for the 2012 Parliamentary Elections, just

two years after incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko was defeated in

the Presidential Elections, with a tally of only 5.45% after eight years of

political squabbles, strife and desertions (none more important that

Yushchenkos main partner in the Orange coalition, Yulia Tymoshenko).

As this paper will elucidate, not only did such structural elements

constrain Yuschenkos attempt to engrain a democratic foothold

following the Orange revolts but they fostered the agential factors that

led to the Presidents party being stripped of almost all democratic

authority by 2010.
Indeed, the example of Ukraine embodies Tudorious rather agency-based

causalities for the Colour Revolutions, describing the events as the

expression of a struggle for power within the ruling elite (2007: 316).

This not only removes the concept of a revolution from the Colour revolts

but also appears to highlight them as agential processes, based on

individual desires for authority. Indeed, O Beachain and Polese similarly

offer domestic forces as the decisive causality, hinting at agency when

speaking of the common people, whose ability to unite is affected by

the presence of charismatic leaders able to rouse the population and

give concrete shape to popular discontent (2010: P.8). Certainly in the

case of Ukraine, the strength of Yushchenkos unifying, modern, forward-

thinking personality appeared to act as a galvanising force on the

Orange campaigners, just as in Georgia with the youth, vibrancy and

aggressive reformist programme of Saakashvili. Farhi (2003: 31) also

embodies such suggestions, but instead combines such agential forces

with wider structural instruments, such as calculated pleas to world

public opinion through the use of electronic media.

As this paper will make no attempt to solve or analyse the complexities

of structure and agency, it would be thus be naive to declare the

causalities or indeed the consequences of the Colour revolts in Georgia

and Ukraine as either structurally or agency-based given the interwoven

nature of them in their causalities, processes and consequences. Thus,

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in analysing whether the Rose and Orange Revolutions can truly be

classified as revolutions, it is useful that this papers framework for that

investigation, that of Tillys revolutionary situation and revolutionary

outcome embodies both structural and agential factors when

determining the causalities of a revolution. A revolutionary situation is

said to be caused by exclusive alternative claims power from groups

other than the incumbent government, significant support for such

claims from the population and finally, the inability of the incumbent

governments to fully pacify the alternative movements (Tilly, 1978: 200).

Tilly appropriates government actions, such as a failure to adhere to the

values and obligations of the subject population and a rapid increase in

the governments demand of population resources, to the creation of a

revolutionary situation (Tilly, 1978: 205). However, that is not to say that

the actions are intentional on behalf of the incumbent government.

Indeed, as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, where this paper will

argue revolutionary situations were present, though the actions and

policies of the incumbent government undoubtedly worked against the

public interests, it would be wrong to categorise them as fully-conscious,

agential movements. Rather, this paper will illustrate that neither

structure nor agency has the primacy as Giddens would argue

structure has (1989: 2). Rather, it is a conflation between the two that

leads to the revolutionary situations both Georgia and Ukraine found

themselves in the midst of.

 Section Two

The Rose and Orange Revolutions as Revolutionary Situations

This paper will split Tillys idealised revolutionary sequence (1978: 218)

into three groups. The first two groups of two steps each focus on

attempting to place the Rose and Orange revolts as revolutionary

situations, while the third group, assessing the final step of Tillys

recipe will investigate just how revolutionary the revolts outcomes

were. This framework chooses to ignore the middle two steps of the

sequence, which predominantly focus on the events of the revolutions

themselves. By using Tillys framework, this paper removes focus on the

revolution itself, which being almost completely non-violent, do not fit

the more traditional theories of revolution. Rather, in order to understand

whether the Georgian and Ukrainian revolts were truly revolutionary,

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what must be understood is the process of them; analysing not just the

outcomes but the situations preceding the revolt.

Beginning with the first group encompassing the initial two steps, a

revolutionary situation is said to begin with the gradual mobilisation of

contenders making exclusive claims to governmental control and a

rapid increase in the number of people accepting those (opposition)

claims (1978: 217). Though Saakashvili and Yuschenko would eventually

emerge as opposition forces presenting themselves as a significant

break from the immediate past (Mitchell 2012: 9), they arguably

represented a culmination of rising opposition and government

unpopularity. Thus, in order to identify Georgia and Ukraine within the

first two steps, it is the causalities and the past that must be analysed.

The Rose and Orange Revolutions certainly did not come as a complete

surprise, though the appearances of Saakashvili and Yuschenko as

credible alternatives was no overnight sensation. Rather, in tune with

Tillys idealised steps, a gradual mobilisation of opposition forces arose

after years of structural economic and social difficulties, whose impact

would slowly increase popular support for change. Indeed, Way notes

that authoritarian breakdown in Georgia and Ukraine had been

predicted years before (2008: 57), while Beissinger points to structural

advantages facilitating democratic revolution (2007: 272).

By the time of their respective revolutions, the incumbent governments

in both Georgia and Ukraine found themselves beset by years of

instability, controversy and corruption. For instance, by the 2003

Parliamentary Election that sparked Shevardnadzes departure, the

presidents ruling Citizens Union of Georgia party had disintegrated.

Described as a patronage machine for Shevardnadze loyalists (that)

lacked any obvious ideology (Way 2008: 63), the partys public support

and legitimacy would be undermined by a number of fatal structural

issues. Firstly, Georgia faced constant regional rebellion throughout the

1990s, eventually descending into a civil war that resulted in the

secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, losses that weakened the

coercive potential of the state and Shevardnadzes authority with the

people. Indeed, Shevardnadze would face continual opposition

throughout his reign from the nationalist region of Western Georgia,

where he enjoyed little support. Secondly, an already poor economy

found any real economic recovery elusive (European Stability Initiative

2010: 5) under Shevardnadze with Companjen noting that economic

conditions were terrible for a majority of people (2010: 17). Significantly,

particularly after major trade partner Russia encountered its own

financial difficulties in 1998, Shevardnadze was unable to deliver much

in the way of public services to the population (Bunce & Wolchick 2011:

153) with electricity generation low, education infrastructure suffering

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as well as healthcare to the extent that development reached lower

rates than low-income African countries (ESI 210: 8)

The gradual rise of opposition and the public support of it in Ukraine by

late 2004 also had similar structural routes in regional disputes and

economic difficulties. DAnieri notes that regional divisions in Ukraine,

primarily between the more Euro-centric West and the Russia-centric

East, provided a formidable obstacle to the consolidation of political

power (with) a large opposition virtually guaranteed (2011: 30-31), an

opinion shared by Way (2005). Consequently, Kuchmas previous links to

Russia, and Russias support of Yanukovych as his successor was seen

by the West as an Eastern (or Russian) take over, igniting a sense of

regional antagonism that has always been a strong factor influencing

collaboration in Ukraine (DAnieri 2011: 31). As in Georgia, economic

problems also contributed to rising levels of popular opposition but

interestingly not due to any widespread failure, as Kuchmas economic

reforms of the 1990s actually increased macroeconomic stability

(Copsey 2010: 34). However, as general living standards improved, so

increased the public demands for further progress in more sensitive

government areas of media freedom and political representation,

echoing de Tocquevilles (1856) theory of the disharmony caused by

prosperity. Additionally, extensive privatisation weakened the

government by empowering certain individuals who would reap the

benefits of such independence and establish themselves in positions of

not only extreme wealth but also influence due to their control over

sectors of the economy. This group, the oligarchy, helped the path

towards a revolutionary situation in two ways. Namely, their wealth and

power established a disconnect with the countrys general population so

much so that the Orange Revolution has been described as an anti-

oligarchy revolution (Wilson, 2006). Additionally, though the emergence

of the oligarchy initially appeared to strengthen Kuchmas government

through a symbiotic relationship (Bunce & Wolchik 2011: 117) of

twinned reliance in pursuit of economic privatisation and political

influence on both sides, Way notes that the relationship highlighted the

absence of strong pro-presidential political organisation (2005: 250) as

the independence of the oligarchy only served to catalyse the

revolutionary situation. Thus by 2004, Kuchmas political and public

credibility had fallen to the extent that in order to protect their positions,

many oligarchs abandoned the incumbent government and instead

pledged allegiances to the opposition and in particular, Viktor

Yushchenko. Indeed, Yushchenkos campaign for the 2004 presidential

election was aided by an estimated more than $100 million from the

oligarchy (Way 2008: 65).

However, though economic problems and regional divisions do provide an

insight into growing popular and political discontent, moving onto the
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next group of steps from Tillys idealised revolutionary sequence, they

only partly explain unsuccessful efforts by the government to suppress

the alternative coalition and the establishment by the alternative

coalition of effective control over some portion of government (1978:

217). Regional divisions and economic problems may be factors in the

growth of opposition and its groundswell of support but both had been

prevalent issues in Georgia and Ukraine since independence without any

real opposition breakthrough electorally. Indeed, Copsey notes that in

Ukraine, the public were well aware of the (electoral) manipulation and

were increasingly tolerant of it (2010: 41). Consequently, in terms of the

next two steps of Tillys sequence, revolutionary situations in Georgia

and Ukraine can be explained via agential aspects such as poor political

decisions, particularly involving endemic corruption at both the highest

levels of government as well as lower public levels that stripped both

Shevardnadze and Kuchma of all credibility, authority and legitimacy and

ultimately rendering their efforts to halt the rise of opposition toothless.

Having been led by Shevardnadze since he became president of the

independent Georgian state in 1995, Welt notes that by the 2003 the

regimes most visible sign of vulnerability was the implosion of the ruling

party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (2010: 157) with defections

between 2000 and 2003 of Justice Minister Saakashvili, Parliament Chair

Zurab Zhvania, and successor Nino Burjadze, who subsequently acted in

unison to overthrow Shevardnadze, as well as the resignation of the

president himself from his rapidly disintegrating party. Similarly, Mitchell

notes that Kuchmas regime had little internal stability (2012: 48) with

seven prime ministers, including the eventual Orange leader

(Yushchenko) in less than 10 years. Indeed, that internal strife, coupled

with public political controversies damaged Kuchmas credibility to the

extent that by the 2002 parliamentary elections, Kuchmas approval

rating with the general population had fallen to single-digits (Way 2008:

57).

Perhaps the biggest theme that rendered any government efforts to

suppress rising opposition and its establishment of official political

authority was a common feature that combined both structure and

agency across the Coloured Revolutions; mass corruption. Indeed,

Georgia, where nepotism and corruption were omnipresent (ESI 2010:

6), ranked 124th out of 133 countries in the 2003 Transparency

International Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International:

2003) while Ukraine, where corruption became an increasingly salient

feature of political and economic life (Bunce & Wolchick 2011), ranked

joint 122nd out of 145 in the indexs 2004 edition (TI 2004).

The popularity of President Shevardnadze became increasingly damaged

by very evident claims and cases of corruption, not just at high political
 Word Count: 10,320

levels but amongst lower sectors, specifically in areas that impacted on

the every day lives of Georgians. For instance, the police and traffic

police forces became synonymous for vice as a self-financing, mafia-

type organisation (ESI 2010: 7) as petty extractions from ordinary

members of the public became a primary source of income.

Fundamentally, the plague of corruption as well as the regimes inability

to develop them, handed key institutions a sense of quasi-independence

that would eventually play a key part in Shevardnadzes weakness in the

face of popular alternative movements. For instance, the security organs

of the police and military, having for years been paid poorly and

consistently not at all, lacked loyalty to the regime once the Rose

Revolution had begun, failing to stand guard as Saakashvili stormed the

parliament building, before then ignoring Shevardnadzes subsequent

order for a state of emergency. Additionally, public contempt increased

with the regimes apparent compliance and at times facilitation of

corruption, at times to the detriment of their own people. For instance,

for an already struggling economy that depended highly on taxes, the

government drew criticism as very few rich Georgians (paid) any income

tax whatsoever (ESI 2010: 6), while firms with connections to certain

high political levels were also afforded the opportunity to forego

payments.
Additionally, Shevardnadzes anti-corruption measures appeared half-

hearted and it was this unwillingness to tackle corruption that led to the

International Monetary Funds suspension of its Poverty Reduction and

Growth Facility programmes, blocking Georgias access to much-needed

funding and leverage (ESI 2010: 11). Compounded with the governments

inability to rouse the economy themselves, the country found itself left

with the inevitable result (of) a highly ineffective public administration

in pretty much any sphere of its operations (ESI 2010: 8). In another

example, the 2001 Rustavi 2 crisis saw the television station, one of the

largest in Georgia and a consistent investigator into the regimes

corruption links subjected to a failed government raid, on Shevardnadzes

instruction, to bring it under centralised control. The crisis appeared to

mark a tipping point for Shevardnadzes credibility and popularity,

facilitating opposition, both internally within the CUG and externally

through mass public protests. Significantly, Justice Minister Saakashvili

resigned within days of the raid, citing an inability to make a dent in

Georgias political culture of corruption (Welt 2010: 158), along with

another prominent member of the future Rose Revolution, Zurab Zhvania,

the chair of the Georgian Parliament. The Rustavi 2 crisis also marked a

change in public attitudes. Companjen notes that since independence,

the Georgian people had been reluctant to take to the streets for any

kind of action (2010: 14). However, the public outcry following the

Rustavi 2 raid not only led to positive opposition results in the 2001
 Word Count: 10,320

municipal elections but also the disintegration of the governing party

after the resignations of Saakashvili and Zhvania were followed by that

of Shevardnadze himself. Though the fall of the government was

tempered by the creation of virtually identical cabinet, the process

opened eyes to the power of the people and the power of an

independent TV station (Companjen 2010: 20). Consequently,

Shevardnadzes hold on power belied an inherent weakness that only

added to the momentum of alternative coalitions and their popular

support and left the president struggling to counter against it,

particularly without the a loyal security apparatus or a reform process

that might placate the masses. Significantly, building on the independent

work of Rustavi 2, independent Civil Society came to the fore, with up to

5000 Non-governmental Organisations emerging by 2003 (Companjen

2010: 20), many of which were highly politicised following the 2001

protests. According to Tudoriou, these helped promote democratic

values and largely contributed to the mass mobilisation that overthrew

Shevardnadze (2007: 323). Indeed, it was through NGOs funded by the

West that saw Saakashvili come to prominence. Thus via Tillys

revolutionary sequence, a potent combination of government failings as

well as a rising motivation to protest allied with a rapidly developing

civic movement to give credence to the already large popular discontent,

simply made it difficult for Shevardnadzes government to suppress

opposition by 2002. Indeed, at that years local elections, the CUG

obtained only 14% of total seats and not a single one in the populous

capital city, Tbilisi (Welt 2010: 159), establishing the opposition as

credible political alternatives.

Corruption was also key to the political struggles faced by Kuchmas

government in Ukraine, as well as the potential Yanukovych premiership

in attempting to stem opposition success. As in Georgia, what began to

anger both the public and fellow politicians was Kuchmas unwillingness

to fight corruption, said by McFaul to be a central factor driving his

unpopularity (2010: 193). Again much like Georgia, a series of political

crises led to a tide of public protests, political defections and a rise in

popular opposition that proved difficult to stop at electoral level, locally

in 2002 or presidentially in 2004.

Ultimately, Kuchmas decision to pursue what McFaul described as

managed democracy, formal democratic practices but informal control

of all political institutions (2010: 1912), backfired. In encouraging

political pluralism and competition, a culture of opposition developed.

Significantly however, despite such democratic advances, the state

appeared willing to engage in authoritarian and often violent methods to

preserve their power, which allied with the culture of opposition, saw the

mobilisation against Kuchma became a hugely attractive and

unstoppable one. Gongadzegate, which saw the president caught on

 Word Count: 10,320

tape admitting his part in the kidnapping and murder of the corruption

investigator and founder of prominent independent NGO Ukrayinska

Pravda, in much the same way as the Rustavi 2 crisis in Georgia, acted

as a catalyst unifying a range of factors and focusing discontent into

mass protest. Though the subsequent Ukraine without Kuchma

campaign would also ultimately end in failure, it sparked a revolutionary

situation in various ways. Firstly, it fatally undermined Kuchmas

credibility (Copsey 2010: 34), leaving the public and potential alternative

forces with no confidence in the presidents ability, integrity and

decision-making. For instance, Kuchmas known preference for

Yanukovych as his successor did as much to destroy the latters

popularity with the public as his manifesto did. Secondly, it inspired a

wave of further opposition, setting a precedent for successful future

revolts in the unification of a very wide range of individuals who felt

that Kuchma had overstepped the limits of what was acceptable in a

political leader (Copsey 2010: 39), these being either politicians,

ordinary members of the public and burgeoning Civil Society groups

which would later play a critical role (in) helping to mobilise popular

opposition to the regime. (McFaul 2010: 206). Thirdly, the protests

appeared to strike fear into the state, leading to a number of poor

agential political decisions. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister Yulia

Tymoshenko was imprisoned while Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko was

dismissed, decisions which alienated the formers links to the powerful

oligarchy and the latters Our Ukraine party, which would then be

subjected to state harassment. Additionally, the focus on countering

political opposition left Kuchma and Yanukovych unable to prevent the

rise of a key area of opposition: civil society. With 30,000 NGOs by 2003,

driven politically-underground opposition movements such as Our

Ukraine, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were forced into allying with

grass-roots level groups (Copsey 2010: 35) such as Pora, a

collaboration that had the dual impact of giving Yushchenko and Our

Ukraine public legitimacy and authority, as well as granting civic groups

greater insight into the intricacies of Ukrainian politics. Subsequently,

public apathy began to rise, with 71% of Ukrainian people very or

somewhat dissatisfied with the political situation by the 2004

presidential election (Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 126). Indeed, this was

emphasised by the 2002 parliamentary election results, which saw the

opposition secure over half the seats available, with Our Ukraine the

most successful, securing domination over key areas of infrastructure

such as electricity and water as well as in a prominent position to begin

building links to the military that would become key in the neutrality of

the security apparatus during the Orange revolts. These factors made it

simply impossible for Kuchmas government to suppress what McFaul

described as the essential ingredient of a revolutionary situation: two

sets of political forces each claiming sovereign authority over the same

territory (2010: 212).

Word Count: 10,320
 Section Three

The Rose and Orange Revolutions in terms of their Revolutionary

Outcomes

In this papers third and final stage of analysis, the focus moves towards

potential revolutionary outcomes following the Rose and Orange revolts.

As with Tillys entire conceptual framework, a revolutionary outcome

broadens traditional outcomes of fundamental political or social

changes, simply reading as the displacement of one set of power

holders by another (1978: 193). Thus, only some minimum combination

of revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome qualifies an event

as a revolution (Tilly 1978: 198).

Perhaps the biggest problem in attempting to judge how revolutionary

the outcomes of the Rose and Orange Revolutions are is that the

consequences of them remain ambiguous and in flux. Initially, hope

abound though before too long, Mitchell notes that the democratic

promise of the revolutions dissipated or at the very least stagnated

relatively quickly (2012: 116). Thus perhaps the best way of analysing
 Word Count: 10,320

the degree of revolutionality is by looking at whether the new

governments sufficiently remedied the issues that had led to the Colour

revolts in the first place.

Having inherited what he would describe himself as a failed state

(2004), upon his election as president Saakashvili promised a

generational change project (ESI 2010: 5) that would tackle the core

problems of electoral fraud, mass corruption, a failing economy and the

poor condition of public services, the success of which would all amount

to a revolutionary outcome. Certainly in regards to the levels of

corruption, Saakashvilis aggressive brand of libertarianism has been

described as a set of policies that can be described as revolutionary

(Mitchell 2012: 9). With the help of the civic groups that had aided his

arrival into power, examples include the dissolution of the infamous

traffic police as well as the streamlining and improvement of the civil

police force while judicial reform saw petty corruption treated like a

serious crime (ESI 2010: 16). This willingness to tackle graft, a

weakness which heavily contributed to Shevardnadzes unpopularity,

continued at higher levels with around 1000 public officials facing

charges of corruption between 2003 and 2010 (Kupatadze 2012: 23).

Many of the guilty would reimburse stolen funds into the economy,

meaning that a budget that had been unable to boost key public services

under Shevardnadze swelled by over 2 million Lari within months of

Saakashvilis inauguration (ESI 2010: 14). The economy was also boosted

by Saakashvilis revolutionary free market policies with an emphasis on

privatisation and in order to help cultivate a culture of business,

particularly internationally revolutionary license reform that

dramatically simplified licensing procedures (ESI 2010: 22), while the

notoriously corrupt customs was overhauled. Indeed, Saakashvilis

Georgia rose to 9th in the 2013 Ease of Doing Business Index, a

remarkable rise of 126 places in eight years (World Bank/IFC 2013).

However, the period subsequent to the power displacements in both

Georgia and Ukraine can also be seen as merely a cosmetic

revolutionary outcome with economic progress tainted by a lack of real

development, promises for regional integration never realised and most

significantly, political backslides into authoritarianism.

In Georgia, De Waal argues the benefits of economic reform were

spread unevenly in society (2011: 6), leaving previous problems of

unemployment, poverty and inequalities between urban and rural areas

very much present. Moreover, an already struggling agriculture became

crippled by the governments disinterest in it, with cultivated land

dropping 43% from 2002 to 2009 (De Waal 2011: 17). Additionally, the

reliance on foreign investment trade gave the economy an increasing

sense of vulnerability. For instance, after the war with Russia over South
 Word Count: 10,320

Ossetia in 2008 severely hindered foreign investment levels, the

government and economy found itself reliant on an economy with an

exhausted budget and fundamentally unable to support itself. Indeed, the

South Ossetia conflict is another hint at the non-revolutionary outcome

of the Rose Revolution as the region, as well as Abkhazia remain outside

central state control following armed conflicts despite Saakashvilis

pledge upon his inauguration to bring the breakaway regions back into

Georgia.

In Ukraine, the far from revolutionary Orange outcomes can be traced to

the the political polarisation and structural instability that continued to

plague Ukraine after 2004. Firstly, Swiecicki (2011: 65) notes that

despite Orange promises, after two decades of transition, Ukraine is

still far behind in its attitudes to economic reform. In part this was due

to the worldwide economic crisis that hit in late 2008 and saw a decline

in the countrys GDP, consumption, imports and experts though

Ukraines lack of sound domestic economic structures and debt

accumulation made (the crisis) especially difficult for the country

(Sutela 2012: 12) after years of political chaos had seen opportunities

missed by Yushchenko his three Prime Ministers to implement much

needed reforms. Any positive growth observed in the years after 2004

was not based on government-led reforms but on transient factors

(Sutela 2012: 5), most prominently Foreign Direct Investment, which

much like Georgia went mainly to closed-sector services, leaving public

investment low and leaving the economy vulnerable to external factors

such as the global financial crisis. In another similarity to Georgia,

Ukraines regional divides remained stubborn and nearly unchanging

(DAnieri 2011: 28) which DAnieri believes lay at the heart of the post-

2004 political inertia as Yushchenkos position as a Western Ukrainian

coupled with pro-European integration policies alienated Eastern

Ukrainians, who continued to identify themselves with Russia and as a

consequence, the Party of Regions and Yanukovych. Tymoshenko did

bring the potential to bridge regional divisions considering her in-

between status though tellingly, her efforts as Prime Minister were

hampered by the protracted elite struggle in government institutions

(Flikke 2008: 375).

Mitchell notes that Yushchenko inherited a broad range of political and

economic problems but did not come into power with a mandate

comparable to that enjoyed by Saakashvili (Mitchell 2012: 176).

Structurally, Ukraines political institutions did Yushchenko little favours

as in an attempt to help bring together a divided country politically and

regionally, a compromise constitution was agreed in 2004 that delegated

much power to the Prime Minister who would be chosen by the

legislature and then given the mandate to form a government. However,

very quickly after the Orange victory, the coalition that Yushchenko
 Word Count: 10,320

championed would collapse to the extent that less than year after the

Orange Revolution, the colour was now fading (from orange) into shades

of grey (Flikke 2008: 383). Indeed, in another mark against true Orange

revolutionary progress, the parliamentary elections held in both 2006

and 2007 against the backdrop of political splits helped showcase the

loss of public confidence in the Orange forces and particularly

Yushchenko, who had already legitimised the return of Yanukovych and

his Party of Regions to the political arena. Thus in an interesting

contrast to Georgia, it was arguably Yushchenkos structural inability to

create a strong-man authoritarian state apparatus that was both a

facilitator and limiting factor for Ukraines democratic development

(Mitchell 2012: 118) following the Orange Revolution.

Contrastingly but ultimately leading to similiar reversals of revolutionary

promise, despite the success of Saakashvilis reforms, De Waal notes

that the government became stronger but not noticeably more open or

tolerant (2011: 20) while Kupatadze opined that the reform process was

pursued with little concern for democratic principles such as

contestation and citizen input (2012: 20) and that significantly, tackling

graft was simply a concerted attempt to ensure legitimacy and mask the

governments growing stranglehold on the main instruments of power, a

far cry from a revolutionary outcome. Freedom House noted that by

2010, Georgias scores for political and civil liberties had not improved
from the initial year of Saakashvilis presidency (Freedom House 2010).

Additionally, once in power, the policy of bringing prominent civic groups

under direct state control weakened civil societys capacity to act as a

critic of the state (Macfarlane 2011: 8) as independent media and

television stations quickly became immersed into government activity,

ensuring Saakashvili and his party were able to command the political

debate (De Waal 2011: 21) and carry out a number of undemocratic

policies that railed against the revolutionary Rose spirit without facing

accountability. For instance, the governments zero-tolerance on crime

following the Rose Revolution saw police officials wield power that

(made) them politically unaccountable (De Waal 2011: 24).

Fundamentally, behind the veneer of reform, Georgia slipped away from

the early democratic promise of the Rose Revolution (Mitchell 2012: 6).

Judicial reform may have reduced crime levels but judges would remain

nominated and appointed by President Saakashvili while the cultivation

of business only seemed to facilitate Elite Corruption by encouraging

development in business of interest to or controlled by government

officials. More significantly, Saakashvilis reaction to the mass protests

against his regime and policies, particularly the 2007 revolts described

as bigger and more non-violent than the ones which brought Saakashvili

to power (Mitchell 2012: 129), indicated his unwillingness to yield power

as the protests were ended with the force that Shevardnadze failed to

muster in 2003. Following 2007, known political opponents were targeted

 Word Count: 10,320

such as Bidzina Ivanishvili, who would be deprived of his national

citizenship shortly after announcing his intention to form a political party

to challenge Saakashvilis monopoly while subsequent elections at

presidential (2008), parliamentary (2008) and local (2010) level showed

numerous shortcomings concerning the elections legal framework, the

unlevel playing field in finance and media coverage and in vote counting

and reporting (OSCE/ODIHR 2010). In reaction to the growing domestic

and international criticism of the consecration of power in Georgia, a

new constitution was issued that would hand more power to the Prime

Minister, who would be elected by the legislature, though the fear was

that given the overwhelming authority of the UNM in parliament,

Saakashvili would be elected as the prime minister following the

expiration of his two presidential terms in 2013. As noted by Mitchell,

both Saakashvilis and Shevardandzes respective regimes were

characterised by one-party dominance, few ideological differences, a

weak legislature, a highly personalised and informal style of governance

and a dependence on foreign assistance (2012: 190). Far from a truly

revolutionary outcome, the post-Rose Revolution government was said

to be neither democratic nor authoritarian but somewhere in between

(Mitchell 2012: 135) and arguably only created a managed form of

democracy Ukraine embodied before the Orange Revolution under

Kuchma.
It has been argued that the inherent structural weaknesses in Ukraines

political system amounted to a revolutionary democratic breakthrough

due to the fact it injected accountability (politically) that did not exist in

Georgia. However, the fair election of Yanukovych as president in 2010

would ultimately signal the end of the Orange Revolution as he would

take advantage of the supine institutions in the way Yushchenko could

not, implementing a swift and bold takeover of state institutions

effectively subordinating all branches of government to the presidency

(Riabchuk 2012: 11). Very quickly, the 2004 constitution was disbanded in

a return to a more authoritarian version of Kuchmas 1996 document,

significantly arming Yanukovych with greater authority to change

parliamentary law and allow individual deputies, rather than entire blocs,

to either join or as it transpired, be hand-picked by Yanukovych for the

governing coalition, essentially rendering parliament as a rubber stamp

for the executive (Haran 2012: 97). Subsequently, rollbacks into

authoritarianism all but consigned even the revolutionary aspects of the

Orange Revolution to history. For instance NGO activity had dropped to

only 10% engaging only 6% of the population by March 2013 (United

Nations Development Program Ukraine 2013) with Yanukovych

mistrustful of civic groups due to their participation in the Orange

Revolution. Moreover, independent media regressed under Yanukovych,

where according to Freedom House 2012 the politicized state media

remain unreformed and continue to serve the interests of senior

 Word Count: 10,320

politicians and the state bureaucracy (Freedom House 2012), while with

the courts also under the presidents wing, the Yanukoyvch government

continued to fight corruption only on paper (Haran 2012: 103), with a

National Anti-Corruption Committee failing to yet yield any positive

results according by May 2012 according to Transparency International

(Transparency International: 2012), while Yulia Tymoshenko, who lost out

to Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential elections, has since been jailed

on tenuous allegations of graft.

The final step of Tillys idealised revolutionary sequence offers that a

revolution effectively ends with the reimposition of routine

governmental control throughout the subject population (1978: 217).

Quite clearly, in order to fit either the outcomes of the Rose and Orange

Revolutions into this culminating step, the question of what is routine

governmental control must be asked. The Colour Revolutions were

ultimately carried out in the name of democracy, particularly at

elections and in this sense, routine government control has been

established in both Georgia and Ukraine. Elections in Georgia have in the

main been carried out fairly and democratically since 2003 despite fears

that the systems and habits around organising elections had clearly not

changed (Waters 2005: 21), while Saakashvili and his partys dominance

over Georgian politics may simply be explained by their supreme political

skills which continued to have the confidence of the people. Indeed,

though Saakashvilis policies eventually may have deteriorated into

quasi-authoritarianism, routine government was arguably highlighted

by the free and fair way the Georgian Dream coalition, led by the

previously harrassed Bidzina Ivanishvili, secured a majority of seats in

the 2012 parliamentary elections, eventually resulting in his selection as

Prime Minister. In Ukraine perhaps, routine government control was a

little more difficult to accomplish, particularly due to the structural

issues of weak political institutions and a polarised country divided both

politically and regionally leaving little opportunity for any of the post-

Revolution Orange governments to put in place any routine processes

of government. However, as already mentioned, this failure at least

placed levels of accountability into the Ukrainian political system while

elections at both parliamentary and local level in the years up until 2010

were carried out without any evidence of substantial fraud. That they

resulted in the arrival of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions back into

mainstream politics does not necessarily indicate a failure to establish

routine politics, more a failure of Yuschenko, Tymoshenko and the rest

of the Orange forces to establish true revolutionary progress from the

events of 2004. In Western societies seen as the beacons of democracy,

unpopular or failed government policies often bring mass criticism and

public protests that in subsequent elections result in a switch of support

to opposition parties, as indicated in Georgia in 2012 and Ukraine from

2006-2010. Thus, though the failure to deliver on the promises made

 Word Count: 10,320

following the displacements of power point at outcomes that are far from

revolutionary in both Georgia and Ukraine, routine government does

appear to have emerged, leaving a qualified completion of Tillys

idealised revolutionary sequence, with the revolutionary outcome not

quite certain.

Conclusion

Quite clearly, the Colour Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine cannot be

easily categorised as true revolutions and do not neatly fit into to any

of the concepts exampled in this paper. As Kupatadze (2012: 153) notes,

the Rose and Orange Revolutions violent free nature coupled with the

absence of fundamental changes in political, economic and social

structures distance them from the revolution theories of Huntingdon,

Hay and Skocpol, while even the broader concept of Goldstone does not

sit too comfortably due his clarification for substantial change,

particularly ideologically. In reference to the cosmetic displacements of

power noted in section three, Georgias apparent ideological shift

towards libertarianism under Saakashvili did not prevent the

establishment of a regime just as, if not more, authoritarian and

intolerant of opposition than Shevardnadzes had been.

The use of Tillys framework of revolutionary situations and outcomes

through his idealised sequence appeared in theory to provide the

foundations for judging the Rose and Orange Revolutions as revolutions,

with the concept disregarding the need for traditional revolutionary

markers such as violence or an outcome that involved

substantial/ideological change. As this paper has indicated, the

revolutionary causalities of the situations in Georgia and Ukraine do not

appear to fully align with the revolutionary outcomes which Tilly

appreciates by noting only some minimum combination of a

revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome qualifies an event as a

revolution (1978: 198). Consequently, the fact that the revolutions were

not the paradigm shifting events they seemed to be at first (Mitchell

2012: 2), does not immediately rule out classifying them events as

revolutions. Similarly, Tillys loosened notion of a revolutionary outcome

as a mere displacement of power, be it violent or otherwise, also fits the

cases of Georgia and Orange best. Though their democratic outcomes

may be in question, there can be no doubt that significant shifts in power

from one distinct group to another did take place in November 2003 and

December 2004 respectively.

 Word Count: 10,320

However, questions do still remain. Firstly, Tillys concept of a

revolutionary situation speaks of a tension release (1978: 218) that

appears to hint at a subsequent restabilisation of the political system.

Though the Rose Revolution would bring relative political serenity due to

the mass support enjoyed by Saakashvili and the UNM, this tranquility

was belied from 2007 onwards by crackdowns on mass public protests

as well as moves against opposition and independent media, while in

Ukraine, the political system seemed to find anything but stability after

the Orange Revolution. Additionally, these outcomes do not fit into any of

the four that Tilly himself elucidates as revolutionary outcomes - politics

as usual, coups, silent revolutions or great revolutions (1978: 195).

Speaking of higher-cost splits but resulting in little displacement of

existing (government) members (1978: 195), a coup appears to be the

most identifiable outcome in Georgia and Ukraine due to the presence of

Saakashvili and Yushchenko in the previous regimes of Shevardnadze

and Kuchma. However, should these coups be judged to be revolutionary,

whether they fall into Tillys framework or not, now that both Saakashvili

(in part) and Yushchenko (completely) have since lost their grip on

power?

There are those who offer explanations against viewing the Rose and

Orange revolts as true revolutions. For instance, Mitchell holds that the

Colour Revolutions were to a great extent, neither colours nor

revolutions (2012: 8) while Tudoroiu believes that the revolutions had

become hijacked (and) despite appearances, were in fact the expression

of a struggle for power within the ruling elite (2007: 316). Thus, rather

than revolution, the outcomes to the revolts in Georgia and Ukraine seem

to speak of transitionary or evolutionary change, defined by Hay as a

more gradual, long-term and yet cumulative and directional process of

change (2002: 151). The focus thus lies on incremental rather than rapid

and fundamental revolutionary change. Indeed, contemporary

evolutionary theory, where change is conceived as both path-dependent

and contingent (Hay 2002: 159) appears to aptly sum up both the lead

up to change and the outcomes to it in Georgia and Ukraine, where

structural issues were allied together with the agency and decisions,

good or bad, taken by individuals such as Saakashvili and Yushchenko.

However, the Rose and Orange Revolutions do not quite imply gradual

change considering the power displacements occurred through very

sharp definitive events which sparked major public protest. Indeed, this

appears to refer to the notion of punctuated equilibriums, a combination

of revolutionary and evolutionary change and appropriated by Somit and

Peterson (1998b: 1) as evolutionary change that occurs in rapid bursts

over short periods of time with relative stasis after the punctuational

burst. Though this appears to resonate in Georgia where Saakashvilis

government enjoyed broad support from the people as it pursued its

 Word Count: 10,320

agenda of state building, economic and political reform (Mitchell 2012:

129), it certainly cannot explain Ukraines post-Orange path of political

chaos, bickering and unexpected elections before a return to

authoritarianism in 2010. Thus, Ukraine appear to better fit the critical

junctures concept of evolutionary change (Collier and Collier 1991)

which holds that logical conditions open up occasional opportunities for

contingent decisions to be made that alter the trajectory of political

change. Thus, the juncture is not part of a linear cycle of change but

rather, is continually changing and evolving in different directions. It can

be argued that the decision Yushchenko took to agree to the constitution

of 2004 as a logical attempt to help bridge the regional and political

polarisation in the country represents a critical juncture in the way it

severely handicapped and altered what could have been at that high of

Orange success, a highly promising future.

Furthermore, McFaul (2002) speaks of the fourth wave of regime change

created in the transition following decommunisation, a form of

evolutionary change that can thus hold the Rose and Orange Revolutions

as either part of a new fifth wave, or more logically, simply a

continuation of the fourth wave transition following the fall of the Soviet

Union and independence. Thus, the Rose and Orange Revolutions may

be best understood as components of the countries ongoing post-

communist transitions (Mitchell 2012: 8), rather than as revolutions.

In conclusion, though this paper has established the ability to place the

Rose and Orange Revolutions as potential revolutions, particularly

through the framework of Charles Tilly, there is perhaps a sense that the

need to almost justify why they are revolutions ultimately leaves them

far from true revolutions. With all the differing definitions of revolution

and evolution, perhaps what needs to be established is the definition of a

true revolution before judging whether the Rose or Orange Revolutions

can be defined as one.

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