G "-""

Vi ethics

in ethics attempt to assist us by naming the basic virtues. In the

Nicomacbean Ethics, Aristotle gives us eleven different virtues that are
5 necessary for helpful citizens of whatever society we belong to. Friendship,
magnanimity, practical wisdom are some of these. In Part II of the Summa
Virtue ethics Tbeologiae, Thomas Aquinas takes from Plato, Cicero, Ambrose, Gregory
and Augustine the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance
James F, Keenan and fortitude or bravery. Together with these he adds the three theological
virtues. He states that the first four we can acquire through deliberately
willed and enjoyed habitual right action; the latter three are gifts from
God.
If we follow Aquinas's outline then we can say that the fundamental
question is 'Am I just, temperate, brave and prudent?' For centuries we
have recommended that people ask themselves this. More recently, because
we equate ethics with particular major actions, we have forgotten this
question for self-examination. Nonetheless, even in recent times we have
had important writers reminding us of the centrality of these cardinal
Renewed interest in virtue ethics arises from a dissatisfaction with the virtues.'
way we do ethics today. Most discussions about ethics today consider But how can I know how virtuous I am? To answer that question
major controversial actions: abortion, gay marriages, nuclear war, gene Aristotle suggests that we can know ourselves by considering how we act
therapy, and so forth. These discussions basically dominate contemporary in spontaneous situations: we reveal ourselves to ourselves when we act in
ethics. Many writers in this volume, in fact, belong to a variety of different the unplanned world of ordinary life. We may believe that we are
schools of thought that measure whether a controversial human action is particularly brave or cowardly , but that assessment is only correct if it
right or wrong! conforms to how, we actually behave in the unanticipated concrete
Virtue ethicists are different. We are not rimaril situation. Self-knowledge is key, therefore, but a self-knowledge that is
particular actions. We do not ask 'Is this action right?' critical and honest, not one based on wishful thinking.
circumstances around an action?' or 'What are th
action?' e aresim I interested in rsons,
We believe that the real discussion of ethics is not the question 'What Who ought I to become?
should I do?' but 'Who should I become?' In fact, virtue ethicists expand
that question into &ee key, related ones: 'Who am I?' 'Who ought I to The second question embodies a vision of the type of person we ought to
become?' 'How am I to get there?" become. Though we use Thomas's four cardinal virtues to find out how
virtuous we actually are, we should use those same four virtues to
determine who we ought to become. For certainly, if we are honest in
Who am I? answering the first question, then some virtues are not as fully acquired
by us as are others. In fact, for the honest person the virtues are not what
No question is more central for ethics than 'Who am I?' It is the we acquire in life; they are what we pursue.
foundational question." When we know who we are, we know where we We use the virtues, therefore, to set the personal goals that we encourage
need to improve. To the virtue ethicist, the question ethically, then, is the one another to seek. Thomas and others call this goal the end. That is, the
same as 'How virtuous am I?' This is because, as' Thomas Aquinas writes, middle question sets an end that we should seek. That end is a type ot
every moral question can be reduced to the consideration of the virtues." l'erson with the cardinal vjrt!!es
The answer is found by two major considerations. First, 'What standards Setting this end means that the fundamental task of the moral life is to
am I to measure myself against?' Second, 'How will I know whether I am develop a vision and to strive to attain it. Inasmuch as that vision is who
measuring fairly?' For the first question, two of the most important works we ought to become, then, the key insight is that we should always aim

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 James F. Keenan Virtue ethics

to grow. As a person-oriented ethics, virtue ethics insists that without improving ourselves for the betterment of ourselves and others, we are
growth, we cannot become more moral. engaging in virtue ethics.
Setting such an end describes, then, another way that virtue ethicists
are different from other ethicists. Rather than examining actions and
asking whether we should perform them or not, virtue ethicists say that How do I get to the end?
persons ought to set ends for the type of people they wish to become and
e!lrsus: them. In order to et to the end, one needs rudence. For many years prudence
I have always thought that parents think this way. Parents are not has had a terrible reputation, being thought 0 as caution or self-interest.
primarily concerned with what action Johnny is doing. Rather, they want Be prudent meant: Don't get caught. Be extra careful. Watch out!
to understand how Johnny is growing. Certainly there are times when For Aristotle and Thomas prudence is not simply caution. Prudence is
with young children, parents talk like deonrologists: 'Don't ever talk to rather the virtue of a person whose feet ace on the ground and who thinks
strangers', 'Don't ever talk back to another person', 'Don't ever cross the both practically and realisriCllJly Prudence belongs to the person who not
street unless the traffic light says so'. But behind all their judgements is a only sets realistic ends, but sets out to attain them. The prudent person is
more basic concern about how Johnny is turning out. precisely the person who knows how to grow. 7
If Johnny needs to become more sensitive to other people, his parents Being prudent is no easy task. From the medieval period until today,
may pick one neighbourhood to live in with more children rather than we believe that it is easier to get something wrong than to get it right.
another with fewer; if Mary should become more srudious, her parents For today we still assert that if only one component of an action is wrong,
will look for the school that successfully helps srudents to acquire right the whole action is wrong. Think for instance of cooking. In order for
study habits; if Tommy is insecure, his parents will try to find ways that something to come out right, every ingredient has to be measured exactly,
as a family they can help Tommy to grow in confidence. Generally, prepared correctly and cooked properly. How many of us have had a
parents' judgements about their children focus on what type of people terrible meal because it was too salty, overcooked, too spicy or too bland?
their children are becoming and whether they can help their child become Only when everything comes out right can we say that the meal tasted
more fully integrated. That is, parents ask both 'Who is my child?' and well.
'How can he or she grow well?' Prudence is even more complicated when we try to work out the
Likewise, we do well when we parent ourselves. When we begin to appropriate way of becoming more virtuous. It must be attentive to detail,
examine ourselves, we see which weaknesses we can respond to and which anticipate difficulties and measure rightly. Moreover, as anyone who has
strengths we can develop. When we are pro-active and anticipate a variety watched children knows, we are not born with prudence. Actually we
of situations where we can be more open-minded, more generous, more acquir~rough a very long process.
forgiving, more assertive, we are trying to develop the virtues within The~sign of real prudence is finding the right person to give us
~ When I taught at Fordham University in the Bronx, I lived in the
us."
As a matter of fact, we often act this way. For instance, if I were to ask student dorms and noted how often university students went to one
you to take a piece of paper and write down three ethical issues, what another for advice. These students, away from home for the first time,
would you write down? Poverty, war, sexual matters, gender equality, and were looking for advice no longer from their parents, but instead from
so forth. But if I asked you to tum the paper over and write down three their peers. Often they looked to people like themselves for advice; in fact,
things about yourself that you woke up this morning thinking about, I the groups with which they associated collectively were similar to
believe that you would write about bettering a relationship, learning to themselves individually. Studious students stayed together, as did hard
work better, taking better care of your health, or becoming more conscious workers, athletes, snobs, shy people, excessive parry-goers, and so forth.
of your neighbour. Virtue ethicists think of the second side of the paper When they asked for advice they usually were not hearing anything new.
as the real issues of ethics. We believe that when we start thinking that On occasion someone from outside the group might raise a question.
way, then we can address those big controversial issues on the first side For instance, one might say to the excessive drinker that he was drinking
having promoted first a virtuous life for ourselves individually and too much. Inevitably he sought out advice about the charge and went to
communally. his alcoholic drinking buddy to ask if he was drinking too much and his
To the extent that we are examining our lives and seeking ways of buddy would calm his friend's anxiety with denial. After a while, however,

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James F. KeeQ , . -ue ethics
"-'
the drinker would ask someone else, usually someone from the exact desired goals it proffers the virtues for both. Moreover, it invites all people
opposite group, someone who thought drinking was always wrong. What to see that they set the agenda not only of the end, but also of the means
the student was looking for was advice, but he went from one extreme to to accomplish that end. Virtuous actions, like temperate drinking or
the other. courageously facing one's fear of heights, are the prudential means for
Finding prudence is finding the middle point. Unlike the student here, achieving the end of becoming a more virtuous person. And we see those
prudence guides us. to moderation, where we are not at either end of an means as moderate or prudential ones.
extreme. The student who drinks excessively will only get good advice Virtue ethics encompasses one's entire life. It sees every moment as the
when he meets someone who is able to recognize the difference between ossibilitv for acouirinz or develo .
moderate and excessivedrinking. A aid that eve human action is a moral action That is, any
As prudence looks for the moderating advisor, it does so because it action that I knowingly perform is a mor action because it affects me as
realizes that all of prudence is precisely getting to the middle point or the a moral person. Whatever I do makes me become what I do. If I drive to
mean between extremes. As Aquinas says, virtue is the mean. work and use that time to reflect on the day that lies before me, over time
Getting the mean is not always easy. I remember a friend who was I can become a person with a developed sense of foresight. If I drive to
afraid of heights. In order to grow, he needed to face his fear, but he had work both aggressively and speedily, I eventually arrive at my office with
to do it prudentially. That is, he needed to set a realistic goal that he the same manic personality that brought me there. If I correct everyone's
could attain. But that goal had to be the mean between extremes for him. .mistakes at every opportunity, I am becoming more and more of a control
For instance, if he went too high, say if he went to the observation deck freak. And though my corrections may hurt a few around me, they are
of the World Trade Center, he would feel no confidence at all, only basically making me progressively more and more trapped by this
anxiety. But if he only went to the second-storey balcony of an apartment disposition. While others may be affected by some of my actions, I am the
building, he would not feel sufficient tension. Prudence helps then find first person affected by all of my actions.
the mean where there is adequate tension for growth, neither too little nor Thomas saw every human action as an exercise. The way I take
too much. breakfast, the way I leave home, the way I drive to work, the way I greet
That mean is not fixed. For me to get over my fear of heights requires people in the morning are all exercises that affect me. My morning
me to go to the height where I feel sufficient tension, a height that may exercises make me in part the person I will be for the rest of the day. They
not be the same as for another with a similar fear. The mean of virtue then make me become what I do. Though some of us go through life never
is not something set in stone: rather, it is the mean by which only a examining the habits we engage, Thomas suggests to us that we ought to
specific person can grow. This is another reason why prudence is so examine our ways of acting and ask ourselves 'Are these ways making us
difficult: no two means are the same. more just, prudent, temperate and brave?' If they are, they are virtuous
But parents again know this. Though their. children always cry 'Foul' exercises.
or That's unfair' whenever a parent treats one child differently from When we think of exercise we think of athletics. The person who I
another, still if a parent treated each child the same, then only one child exercises by running eventually becomes a runner JUSt as the one who
would grow adequately. Instead, parents appreciate the uniqueness of each dances becomes a dancer. From that insight Thomas, like Aristotle before
child and try to address each child as unique. him, sees that intended, habitual activity in the sportS arena is no different
Finding the mean of the right tension depends on who the person is. from any other arena of life. If we can develop ourselves physically we can
Just as in weight-lifting, one needs to determine what is the right tension develop ourselves morally by intended, habitual activity.
by considering the lifter's abilities, SO too in most matters that pertain to VjrtlJe ethics sees, therefore the ordinary as the terraio 00 which rhe
a person's growth, we cannot give prudential advice unless we have a clear moral life moves. Thus, while most ethics make their considerations about
idea of who the agent is. In a manner of speaking, a virtue ought to fit a rather controversial material (genetics, abortion, war, and so forth), virtue
person the way a glove fits one's hand. There is a certain milor-made feel ethics often engages the commonplace. It is concerned with what we teach
to a virtue, which prompts Aquinas to call virtue one's second nature. out children and how; with the wa we relate with friends, families, and
Virtue ethics is, therefore, a pro-active system of ethics. It invites all neighbours; with the way we live our Ijyes Moreover, It IS concerne not
people to see themselves as they really are, to assess themselves and see only with whether a physician maintains professional ethics, for instance,
who they can actually become. In order both to estimate oneself and to set whether she keeps professional secrets or observes informed consent with

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 Virtue ethics
James F. Keenan

her patients. It is equally concerned with her private life, with whether the possibilities for moral excellence are as unlimited both as the
she knows how to respect her friends' confidences or whether she respects individual is complex and as human experience is original. A discussion of
her family members' privacy. In a word, before the physician is a physician great saints and heroes helps make the point that no single portrait of a
she is a person. It is her life as a person with which virtue ethics is moral saint or hero has ever provided a definitive expression of what a
human person ought to be; St Elizabeth was not Mahatma Gandhi, St
specifically concerned.
As opposed to dilemma-based ethics, virtue ethics is pro-active, John the Baptizer was not the Little Flower. The Christian communiry
50ncerned with the ordinary and all-encompassing. Dilemma-based ethics, sustains this insight: the communion of saints demonstrates the enormous
which captures so much of our time, imagination and energy, presents variety of ways that the holy is incarnated or as Flanagan beautifully puts
ethics as an emergency room in which suddenly a previously unknown it, 'the deep truth that persons find their good in many different ways'.14
person arrives in a catastrophic state: needing an organ transplant, assisted He insists then that people can only become morally excellent persons by
suicide or an abortion. In that made-for-TV ethics, the agent is little more being themselves. The saint has always been an original; never an
imitation.
than a reactor to other people's dilemmas.
Virtue ethics looks ar the world from an entirely different vantage Flanagan rightly warns us that in asking 'Who ought I to become' we
point, moving ahead with less glamour and drama, but always seeing the understand that we are not trying to become clones. Rather we are seeking
agent, not as reactor, but as actor: knowing oneself, setting the agenda of to understand how we as individuals can actually become virtuous. Thus,
personal ends and means in both the ordinary and the professional life. though we may each believe that we should become just and prudent, we
must be sure that we preserve our own identities as we pursue the virtues.
Flanagan is not the only one who warns us that we cannot ask our three
questions in a vacuum. Alasdair MacIntyre reminds US U that our local
Virtue ethics: yesterday, today and tomorrow
communities determine our understanding of the virtues. Justice in
While we are retrieving virtue ethics today we realize that we cannot Aristotle's Athens is not the same as it was in the seventeenth-century
return to the early Athens of Aristotle or the thirteenth-century Italy of pioneering Wild West or the late twentieth-century urban New York.
Thomas. Moreover, we recognize that there are some concerns about virtue Maclnryre's claims concern not only history but also geography. Justice is
ethics being raised by a variety of people. First and foremost is the expressed differently in Congo, Malaysia, France or Brazil. Likewise, what
argument that virtue erhig cannot deal with practical issues' Because constitutes prudence in London, Birmingham, York or Liverpool is
virtue is concerned with persons, some argue, it cannot adequately deal different.
with human action.? Though one can equally ask these objectors how Both writers warn against any artificial designs for answering the
&c:ive their ethical systems have been," or more importantly, whether question of who we ought to become. We each ought to strive to become
their ethical systems for all their clarity have ever helped people to become the person that God made us to be and we each must recognize how our
more ethical,!1 still virtue ethics must show how practical it can be. Here, societies have contributed to our own understanding of what it means to
it is noteworthy that nursing ethics in particular is making great headway be moral. But we should recognize that at least minimally there are some
in showing how a relationally-based concern for agents as persons is a virtues that each of us ought to have, regardless of where or when we live
more constructive ethics than any present rule or code-based erhics." In or who we are.16 We should not say much about the content of each of
fact, the application of virtue to medical ethics has raised several issues these virtues, for history, geography and the individual fill out their
about the delivery of health care that other ethical systems never asked.13 practical meaning. But we can say to every child, adolescent and adult
While virtue ethics is at times introspective, the complaint that it needs there are ways of living about which every virtuous person is rightly
to be more extroverted and practical has prompted a variety of writers to concerned. This was what Plato, Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory,
demonstrate that it can give specific advice, that it can improve our ability Thomas and others meant by the cardinal virtues.
to know the right and to do it, that it can give us new issues to address, We conclude our consideration of the virtues asking then a final
and above all that it can make us better and our actions morally right. question: 'Are the four cardinal virtues that they offered in antiquity
Two other issues prompt us to refine our understanding of virtue. In a adequate for today?' For several reasons, I think they are inadequate and
brillian~k, Owen Flanagan warns against preconceiving of a defini in their place I propose another set of cardinal virtues. 17
V
tively person and imposing that image on others. He argues that First Thomas's cardinal virtues basically describe one ry .f person:
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James F. Keenan
n

V irtue ethics

the just person. Temperance and bravery exist in order to help a person to sustain the specific relationships that we enjoy; as a relational being
be just; they are effectively auxiliary. Likewise prudence functions to uniquely, we are called to self-care that no one else can provide.
determine the concrete mean for justice, temperance and courage. For These three virtues are cardinal. Unlike Thomas's structure, none is
Thomas then the just person is the virtuous person. The other virtues help necessarily always more important than the other: they each have equally
the person to be just. urgent claims and they should be pursued as ends in themselves. Thus we
Today, however, the image of the just person is insufficient. Almost are not called to be faithful and self-caring in order to be just, nor are we
everyone writing on the virtues today recognizes that whereas one must called to be self-caring and just in order to be faithful. None is auxiliary
be 'ust that is, that one must treat everyone uall still one must al;;" to the others. They are distinctive virtues with none being a subset or
attend to the imm late n s 0 riends, family and community. Writers subcategory of the other. They are cardinal.
like Reinhold Niebuhr!8 Margaret Farley'? and Carol Gilligarr'? insist The fourth cardinal virtue is prudence, which determines what consti
that the moral person cannot only be just: the demands to care for a loved tutes the illSr, fa;thfiJ! and self-caring way of life for an individual. It ai;o
one may conflict with the call to be fair to everyone. negotiates how the cardinal virtues should interact and which 0;;" should
Paul Ricoeur adds that it is important that justice is challenged by the override the others in a particular situation, and when and to what degree.
affection we have for another. Rather than reducing the two claims to one, Of course, this is no easy matter, but working this out requires another
he places them in a 'tension between two distinct and sometimes opposed essay.
claims';" This insight that the virtues are distinct and at times opposing
stands in contrast with Thomas' strategy of the cardinal virtues where
justice is supported by fortitude and temperance and none contradicts,
Notes
opposes, or challenges the claims of justice.
Furthermore we recognize another difference with Thomas. Thomas
1 James F. Keenan, 'Virtue ethics: making a case as it comes of age', Thought 67
argues that virtues perfect or make better our own dispositions; each
(1992), pr 115-27; Joseph Korva, The ChriJtian Case for Virtue Ethia (Washing
virtue perfects a particular power in us. Justice perfects our will, prudence ton,DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996); Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory and
our reasoning, courage and temperance perfect particular emotions. But Practiceof Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).
today we think of the person as fundamentally relational. Virtues perfect 2 These questions appear in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral
not individual powers, but rather the ways we relate with one another. 22 Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
3 John Kekes, The Examined Life (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1988).
In this relational light let us call the two competitive demands'iliat we
4 Summa Theologiae, Prologue, II-II, Sic igitur tota materia morali ad amsiderationem
have been discussing, justice and fidelity. If justice urges us to treat all virtutum redact,
people equally, then fideliry makes different claims. Fidelity is the virtue 5 See Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre

s: that nurtures and sustains the bonds of those special relationships that we
enjoy whether by blood, marriage, love or sacrarnj:nt. Fidelity requires
that we treat with special care those who are closer to US. 23 If justice rests
.Dame Press, 1966); Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (Louisville, KY: Westmin
ster, 1990).
6 Along with essays on growth and ordinariness, see my 'Parenting and the virtue
of prudence' in Virtues for Ordinary Christians (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward,
on impartiality and universality" fidelity rests on partiality and 1996).
particularity. 24 7 Daniel Mark Nelson, The Priority of Prudence (University Park, PA: Pennysylvania
But these two are not enough; we also must perfect the unique . State University, 1992).
relationship that we have with ourselves. Thomas, through the order of 8 See my 'Ten reasons why Thomas Aquinas is important for ethics today', New
Biack/riarJ 75(994), pp. 354-63.
charity, demonstrates the virtuous love for selF' Following him, Stephen
9 See for instance, the essays by Tom Beauchamp and Robert Veatch in E. Shelp
POpe26 and Edward Vacek" argue that we have a primary task to take care (ed.), Virtue and Medicine (Boston: Reidel, 1984).
ur ves: affectivel ,mentally, physically, and spiritually. 10 David Solomon, 'Internal objections to virtue ethics' in Peter A. French et al.
For these reasons, then, I conclude y proposIng t at we conceive of (eds), MidweIt Studies in PhiloJophy 13: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue (Notre
ourselves as relational in three ways: generally, specifically and uniquely, Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 428-41.
and each of these relational ways of being demands a cardinal virtue: as a 11 See Leon Kass, 'Practicing ethics: where's the action?', Hastings Center Report 20.1
(990), pp. 5-12.
relational being in general, we are called to justice and to treat all people 12 See Martin Benjamin and Joy Curtis, 'Virtue and the practice of nursing' in Virtue
fairly; as a relational being specifically, we are called to fidelity and to and Medicine, pp. 257-74.