Director of Forestry Vs Villareal

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G.R. No.

L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner


vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, Respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for


respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of
mangrove swamps, ormanglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands,
they may be acquired under private ownership. The private
respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these
criteria.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove


swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks
that the registration be reversed. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the
private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is
no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares.The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue
before us is legal, not factual. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the


Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in
the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit,
agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification
was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of
1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands
to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other
categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with
substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4 chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in


force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to
be alienated. 5Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No.
141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private
ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands
and so released for alienation. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular


Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which
grows various kindred plants which will not live except when
watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and
casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute
the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which
are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the
useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are
literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so
regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited
or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be
disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

xxx chanroble s virtual law lib rary

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the


law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands
into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty
constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a
public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so
susceptible of private ownership. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared,


despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of
the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year,
thus:

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this
chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the


Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years
later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish


translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We
think there is an error in this translation and that a better
translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never
be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only
bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called
'timber land. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa
swamps does not change the general character of the land
from manglare to timber land.

More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section


1820, the Court declared:

'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175),
this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under
the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the
public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or
agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral
lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the


Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior
to its enactment. chanroblesv irtualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court
should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established
by Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de


Centenera v. Obias, 8promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land
covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in
his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided
that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.

No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely


based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above
ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with
Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were
agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the
statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow,


where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in
character. They do not form part of the public domain.

Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing


Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11reiterated the ruling in the Mapa
case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a
line of decisions holding the contrary view. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural


Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands
are still classified as forest lands. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of


Forestry, 13the Court was more positive when it held, again through
Justice Gutierrez:

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with
Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code
as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove
swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib ra ry

The petition is without merit. chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'

The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate


Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's
submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp
mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not
registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De
Porkan case. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a


need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and
for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural
lands or forest lands. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to


the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain
(and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public
lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the
executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with
the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the
picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or,
assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being
correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the
objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of
our natural resources. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President


of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of
public lands, thus:

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into: chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

(a) Alienable or disposable, chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

(b) Lumber, and chanrob les vi rtual law libra ry

(c) Mineral lands, chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of


alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the


same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of


the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined,
as follows: chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

(a) Agricultural; chanrob les vi rtual law libra ry

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive


purposes; chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and chanrobles virtual law library

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public


uses.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and
in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states


as follows:

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of


same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with
the approval of the Department Head, the President of the
Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and
he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves
and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves
shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the
same manner as public forest. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation


alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to
time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation
such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as
though such proclamation had never been made. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib ra ry

Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. -


Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion: chanroble s vi rtual law lib rary

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised


within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own
discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming
the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That determination having been
made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we
have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our


agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative
Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be
retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be
violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of
the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which
a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It
could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and
consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support
of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be
released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant
to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section
1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove
swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land
is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence
of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is
ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands
was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law,
it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine
whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and
release for private ownership. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the


public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau
of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose
of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or
other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization. chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and


dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the
public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.

The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest


land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after
the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into
private property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in


nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the
original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied.
Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been
inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private
respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established
with definite proof, which is lacking in this case. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent


were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held
in countless cases.18 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his
right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly,
the petition must be granted. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative


definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution
and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land. chanroble svi rt ualawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and


the application for registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,


Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
Fernan, C.J., took no part.

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