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The Role of Alliances in the First World War

The origins of the First World War have long been the subject of extensive historical

analysis. Indeed, the widespread consequences of this seminal catastrophe have begged the

question of how it all began. The First World War was the product of numerous interconnected

factors ranging from economic competition to the personalities of individual leaders. Of these

factors, the pre-war system of alliances stands out as particularly important. The formation of

this system of alliances ultimately deepened the existing rivalries between various states, and led

to an adding on of nations into each respective alliance. This had the effect of separating Europe

into two increasingly large adversarial camps that widened the scope of a potential conflict. This

deepening of rivalries led directly to two specific aspects of the increasingly militaristic

alliances: the creation and expansion of military obligations of each member power and

increasingly tense diplomatic relations when dealing with members of an opposing alliance. The

fear and expectation of war that emerged from these rivalries led to the creation of military

obligations within each respective alliance which heightened the possibility of war.

Furthermore, the existence of seemingly rival and opposed alliances also created diplomatic

tensions that made peaceful cooperation difficult and escalated minor and far flung disputes into

pretensions for war. In analyzing the conditions created by the alliance system, I intend to focus

primarily on the rivalry between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

In understanding the expansion of military obligations and the increasingly tense

diplomacy created by these alliances, one must first contextualize the rivalries that both led to

and were intensified by the alliance system. Bitter rivalry was nothing new to the European states

of the late 19th and early 20th century. The longstanding and traditional rivalry between France

and Germany, which was further agitated by the peace terms of the Franco-Prussian War, was

one of many factors that led to the formation of the first of the mentioned alliances. The Triple
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Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy originated with the dual alliance of 1879

between the German and Austo-Hungarian Empires. This alliance, crafted by German chancellor

Otto Von Bismarck, was designed as a defensive instrument against both Russia and a vengeful

France inevitably seeking to regain the provinces it had lost in the Franco-Prussian War. This

alliance was part of a greater scheme by Bismarck to not only isolate France but to also secure

links between the German Empire and other European states.1 The historical record corroborates

the success of this strategy while Bismarck was in power. With his dismissal however, the stage

was set for the release of France from her isolation. By 1893, three years after Bismarcks

dismissal, France had concluded a series of agreements with the Russian Empire that amounted

to a diplomatic rapprochement and a military alliance. The terms of the treaty, while too lengthy

to list here, were specifically directed at potential aggression by the Triple Alliance. The terms

even included the specific number of troops that either power would direct at Germany should

she seek war, stating that The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the

part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men. 2

With the existence of two seemingly opposed alliances now a reality, both sides sought to

interpret the new situation. While a number of possibilities could have emerged, what ultimately

resulted was an intensification of the already existent rivalries between the states of each

alliance. Author James Joll summarizes this deepening rivalry succinctly with the following: the

fact of their (the alliances) existence led other countries to frame their policies in accordance

with what seemed to be the permanent alignments with which they might be confronted in a war.

Thus both political expectations and military plans were conditioned by the existence of the

1
Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962), 43.

2
Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), 118.
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alliance system and strengthened the divisions which the alliances themselves tended to

produce.3 With both sides more wary than ever of the other, each sought to add additional

countries to their respective line ups so as to gain leverage over the opposing alliance. Joll

corroborates this assertion with the following: Once the governments of Europe came to believe

that they were aligned in two rival camps, then the winning of an additional small state to their

side seemed to be of great importance, while the wooing of partners in an alliance whose

allegiance seemed doubtful or wavering, such as Italy, came to be a major objective of

diplomacy.4 Indeed, this adding on of powers was also a strategy employed by the French with

regard to the British. Professor Sidney Bradshaw Fay notes that On the French side the motives

were in part somewhat the samethey hoped to secure England as a friend or possibly as an

ally, in order to build up a combination of Powers equal to, or stronger than, the Triple

Alliance.5 The mere existence of the two opposed alliances clearly motivated each side to gain

an upper hand over the other. In doing so, both sides were party to the deepening rivalry that

would eventually lead to war.

In attempting to gain leverage over their opponents, the members of each respective

alliance agreed to certain military obligations as enshrined in the terms of their alliances. These

military obligations essentially bound the members of the alliance to action under certain

scenarios. The terms of the Dual Alliance between the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires

for example, promised support if either was attacked by Russia. The Franco-Russian Alliance,

which was constructed off a foundation of rivalry against and fear of the Dual Alliance, also had

3
James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 1984), 37.

4
Joll, The Origins of the First World War, 55.
5
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 167.
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its specific military obligations. As quoted directly from the treaty, If France is attacked by

Germany or by Italy supported by Germany; Russia shall employ all her available forces to fight

Germany.6 As evidenced by these terms, the rivalry fostered by the alliance system essentially

created the conditions for a general war by committing multiple powers in the event of a conflict.

Indeed, the French responded to the perceived threat of the Triple Alliance by forming their own

alliance with Russia which was based almost entirely on military considerations. These

considerations translated into binding military obligations.7 The scope of these obligations

would later be expanded when the British began their military conversations with the French in

1905.

While the military obligations that composed each treaty did well to expand the scope of

potential conflicts, there existed another element that made them particularly dangerous. The

initiation of so called military conversations and the striking amount of detail and specificity

that went into these plans was what made the obligations of this period unique from the military

obligations of past treaties.8 In describing the Anglo-French military conversations from 1905 to

1912, Fay states that British and French Staff Officers thoroughly reconnoitered the ground

upon which their armies were to fight in Belgium and in France. Sir Henry Wilson, Director of

Military Operations, spent his holidays going all over it on his bicycle. The whole wall of his

London office was covered by a gigantic map of Belgium, indicating the practicable roads which

armies might follow.9 With regard to the military conversations between France and Russia

6
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 118.
7
Joll, The Origins of the First World War, 38.

8
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 192-194.
9
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 213.
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which formed the basis of their formal alliance, Fay states the following: the French and

Russian Staffs were perfectly in accord on the point that the defeat of the German armies

continues to be, whatever the circumstances, the first and principal objective of the allied

armies.10 These statements attest to the fact that the specific military plans and objectives that

underpinned the alliance system effectively strengthened the possibility of war. Indeed, Fay

states again that These (military conversations) came to involve mutual obligations which were

virtually as entangling as a formal alliance. It is always dangerous to allow the military

authorities of two countries to develop inter-dependent strategic plans. They come to make

arrangements which by their very nature, necessarily involve obligations which are virtually

binding upon the political authorities.11 We see as such, that the increased rivalry that resulted

from the formation of the Dual and Triple Alliance led to the formation of an opposing alliance

by France and Russia and eventually Britain. Both the rivalries and the alliances in turn, led to

the solidification of military obligations and specific plans within each alliance that further drove

the two parties down the path towards war. The connection between the two factors of alliance

and military obligations and planning is best summarized by Joll who states that The existence

of the alliance system above all conditioned expectations about the form a war would take if it

broke out. These expectations laid down the broad lines of strategic planning, so that the general

staffs were taking decisions which often committed them to irreversible military action if war

threatened; and consequently in a crisis the freedom of action of the civilian ministers was often

more circumscribed than they themselves realized.12

10
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 121.
11
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 192-193.
12
Joll, The Origins of the First World War, 56.
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Along with encouraging the creation of military obligations, the alliance system helped to

correspondingly produce the crises which would lead to such irreversible military action. The

mere existence of these alliances and the rivalries they engendered made it more likely that

parties from either side would interpret the actions of the opposing side in a hostile manner.

Historian Norman Rich summarizes this assertion with the following: In contrast to Bismarcks

alliance system, which had enmeshed all the European powers in a network of defensive

agreements that made unilateral aggressive action on the part of any one of them

impossiblethe alliances in existence in 1907 were confrontationalThe result was a new

succession of crises that threatened the peace of Europe as a whole.13 Such was the case in

Morocco in 1905, an event that followed the establishment of the Triple and Franco-Russian

Alliances. The crisis had its roots in the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain which

essentially gave France a free hand in Morocco and the British a free hand in Egypt. Germany,

seeing that her commercial rights might be threatened by a French protectorate in Morocco,

decided to act to secure her own interests in Morocco. This was done by sending the Kaiser on a

public trip to Morocco to deal independently with the Sultan and as such, to reaffirm the

independence of the Moroccan Sultanate. The sultan, spurred on by the visit of the Kaiser,

decided to convene a conference in Algeciras to advise him on future action. What followed was

nothing short of preparations for war by both Germany and France with both sides readying

reserve forces. These heightened tensions continued right up until the Algeciras conference. The

agreement that emerged from the Conference was a win in principle for Germany which

13
Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, 408.
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reaffirmed Moroccan independence but for all practical purposes was a French victory since the

French maintained control of Moroccan political and financial affairs. 14

Despite the heightened tensions created by the crisis, war was ultimately avoided since

neither side was truly prepared for it. Germany was inclined to back down due to Britains

support of France during the crisis. The French on the other hand, realized that they couldnt

count on their recently defeated ally Russia and also could not gain any guarantee of British

military support.15 It was not till after the crisis that Britain and France initiated their military

conversations. However, the avoidance of war masks the fact that this crisis, created by alliance

tensions, only worsened the rivalries and fears that initiated the crisis in the first place. Rich

corroborates this by stating that The long-range importance of the Morocco crisis was not

Germanys defeat but the crystallization of the anti-German alignments that were to prevail in

World War I.16 The confrontational nature of the alliance system led to the aggravation of minor

incidents into full blown crises that were bound to end in a further deepening of divisions and as

such, more confrontation. The attitude of the German political secretary Friedrich von Holstein

during the crisis illustrates this confrontational nature: If we let our toes be trodden upon in

Morocco without saying a word, we encourage others to do the same thing elsewhere.17 Thus

we see that the alliance system engendered a zero sum attitude in the minds of diplomats and

politicians on both sides. For both the French and the Germans, escalation of this rather minor

incident was inevitable; a gain for one side was a loss for the other. Rich furthers this assertion

14
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 191-192.
15
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 190.
16
Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, 404.
17
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 180.
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by noting that The immediate purpose of German policy (in Morocco) was to prevent France

from gaining any benefit from its entente with Britain.18 Despite their successful results, even

the French left the incident feeling like they had lost something. Fay states that The incident

made a painful impression on the French. It contributed not a little to the ultimate revival of a

new determination on the part of some of her leading men that they would rather risk war than

accept another such humiliation.19

It would be a remarkably short period of time before another incident similar to, but more

fatal than Morocco sprouted in the European political arena. This time however, the dispute

would be between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of France and Germany. The July Crisis

of 1914 that sparked the Great War reflected the same issues that had emerged in previous crises.

It was viewed in the lens of a zero sum game with Austria unwilling to back down for fear of

humiliation in the Balkans and Russia, the self-proclaimed protector of the Slavic peoples,

committed to defending Serbia for fear of loss of prestige.20 Moreover, both sides had military

obligations and plans that were specific and readily deployable if a dispute turned into a war.

These plans were bound by timelines and mobilization procedures that were almost irreversible

once initiated. Tying all of this together was the political context of alliance rivalries which had

created these issues to begin with. The alliance system had engendered and deepened a series of

pre-existing divisions and rivalries that ultimately came to head in the summer of 1914. Fear of

the Triple Alliance and its military commitments had led to the formation of the even bigger

Triple Entente and its series of even more complicated and specific military plans. The mere

18
Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, 399.
19
Fay, The Origins of the World War, 192.
20
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: The Macmillan Press, 1973), 133-134.
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existence of these two power blocs and the rivalry they provoked led inevitably to the tense

diplomatic encounters exemplified by Morocco in 1905 and 1911. Both sides saw these

encounters as situations where they could gain an upper hand against their rivals. A gain for one

side was seen as a loss for the other, thus dooming both sides to an endless cycle of tense

diplomatic sparring.21 In retrospect, we know that the combination of these two conditions was a

recipe for disaster. When viewed from this context of rival alliances, we see that the Great War

was the result of a badly managed encounter coupled with a predisposition for war. Despite the

seemingly inevitable conditions for war that the alliance system created, we must remember that

the final steps that drove the world to war in 1914 were the result of subjective individual

decisions. As A.J.P Taylor stated succinctly, no war is inevitable until it breaks out

21
Blainey, The Causes of War, 155.
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Works Cited

Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962), 32-86

Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: The Macmillan Press, 1973), 127-157

James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 1984), 34-58

Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1992), 396-420

Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: The Macmillan Company,

1938), 50-346