G.R No.

187167 August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES,
CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE
DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER,
CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR
RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO,
DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE
TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1(RA 9522) adjusting the
countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This
law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five
decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make
RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. 8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may
be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and
ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for
what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III,
preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the
Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens

1
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of
legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize
petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues
of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other
litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we
have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of
acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the
personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance
of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed
here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign
control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States.
Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. 23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from
which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty
of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines
in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty
of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area. 27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals)
exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of
maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the
Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1

2
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046,
save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply
with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument
branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law.
On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increasedthe Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29
Extent of maritime area
using RA 3046, as Extent of maritime area
amended, taking into using RA 9522, taking
account the Treaty of into account UNCLOS III
Paris delimitation (in (in square nautical miles)
square nautical miles)
Internal or
archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive Economic
Zone 382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the
rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States,
there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is
negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as
"Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he
drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of
UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of
baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas
are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight baseline loped around them
from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic
baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing
of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group
or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition,
to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended
continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer
from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This
exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length,
up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose
an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3
 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of
the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on
low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
"regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable.
Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Actis without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49
[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine
areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with
article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic
waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed
and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent
with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage
is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place
them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of
transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession
by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. 46 Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) 48 must also fail. Our
present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as
well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology
under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII,
Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course
reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic
zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within

4
this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone
beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 54 We have looked at the
relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines
law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is
to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stoodunchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it
and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened onebaseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. Moreso, it has identified the Kalayaan
IslandGroup and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones.The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of
RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectivelyreduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated.
Thepetitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for
foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the states
sovereignty and national security.Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. Italso deferred to
agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they havequestioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within
the rectangular boundaries in the Treatyof Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in theperspective of
international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer forwrits of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
THE COURTS RULING:

The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely
demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the
Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the
Philippines enjoyment of terri
torial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and theScarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the
adoption of theamendments.Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III toprecisely describe the
delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no wayaffecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of
territories.With regard to th
e petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic
waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the
competent security measures and policies that willregulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, italso
believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states.In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III
required the imposition of innocent passage as aconcession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible forarchipelagic
states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against
oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide
whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once
again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the
mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and
the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America"

5
(hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of
said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for
the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers
submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were
not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to
petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith;
and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also
requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and
after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on
August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government,
pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the
extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of
criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of
the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said
documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury
process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts.
In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or
surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing
an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in
Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time
to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:

6
 WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government
for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is
set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or
opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF,I.E., TO DESIST
FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OFMANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY
DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT
SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion,
your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the
extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render
the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the
process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged
entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal
commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral
procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of
the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994,
ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which
involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having
jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law,
sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

7
 (Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty
or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting
documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request
is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the
offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the request had
been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U.
S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State
determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in
form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to
take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional
trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the
prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears
that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to
prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless,
Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and
not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney
having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the
existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall
be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of
Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and
other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the
Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request
and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the
extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.Ipso facto, as expressly provided in
Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or
less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of
thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that
his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice
took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements
laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice
had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition
(tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished
the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to

8
present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's
opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its
own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the
process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition
request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements
of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially
constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but
it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a
technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of
the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article
2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in
contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996
ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming
under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production
of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if
the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether
the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is
thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court.
The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it
sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so
because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation
of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section
20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested
State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his
liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p.
78,Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that
had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p.
135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or
penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the
privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No.
1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings

9
are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970
[1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding
is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature,
although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be
considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in
nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the
case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration
is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the
criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have
the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary
processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition
against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process
requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the
same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more
importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and
impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem,
and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of
due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause
"gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of
the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have
the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil
Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337),
the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health
and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of
the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the
U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution
(Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to
deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their
manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all
the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded
was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the

10
crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are
then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy
of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements
with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of
the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or
judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a
requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the
demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties
(with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an
individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a
provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the
Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that
ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or
magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine
that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for
which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the
country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt
or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and
conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18
U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his
extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who
makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has
the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not
to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial
evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of
Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so
warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights
by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill
of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of
Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the

11
 rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or
the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence
to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not
carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word.
Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be
compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory
requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive
authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the
extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not
forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will
not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and
the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the
official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed
to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates
immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure.
On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his
immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of
Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is
thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of
public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related
rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on
the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing
provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the
distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person,
who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental
process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and
any citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him
some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from
our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a
third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the
extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence
the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern,
because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino
would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition
Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

12
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and
hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations."
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make
such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law
of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical
assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that
the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of
secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any
prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the
arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition
Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its
availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the
extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient
thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC,
273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278
SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested
State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

13
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National
Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other
Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other
purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without
formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him,
and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic
procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The
second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to
present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may
eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since
private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be
true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping
with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of
freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.1
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the
case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition in court and a
preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be dispensed with in this case
results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries
separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings." 2
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner
filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the
Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the
event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the
records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.

14
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 10693 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition
for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the
case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case."
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner
Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the
request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-
settled that a "court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and
requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial
justice."4
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."5 (emphasis supplied) The
preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz:
"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may
have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities
that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to
conclude similar treaties with other interested countries;
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational
crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the
frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be
coddled by any signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the
long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under
evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice
is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of
our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid
that private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its
accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:
"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . .
if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper
that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender."6 (emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as
the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that
while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.7 The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,8 where
we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly
maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.9 This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the
treaty.10 This interpretation by the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to assume that both
governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same interpretation adopted by
the Philippine and US governments. Canadian11 and Hongkong12authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our Department of
Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition
papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous.
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution.
He buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused.13 His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one
whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.14 As held by the US Supreme Court inUnited States v. Galanis:

15
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not
shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty."15
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.16 In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding
allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards.17 In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt for conviction18 while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." 19 Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. 20 The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite.21
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process
required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as
the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."22 The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."23
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty
"which may be more priceless than life."24 The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request for
extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine
Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest
pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the
supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same
remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4
of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, either through the
diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately
secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city
having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition and
the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis supplied)
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending
receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ.
It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested for private respondents provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private
respondents liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.
Nor can the threat to private respondents liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge
that theimmediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be
issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation
stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to
private respondents liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His
plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater
majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law."25The
approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of

16
situation."26 These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the governments promotion of
fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. 27
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt,
procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be
accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also
emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle
of separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the
private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests
espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."28 Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines. 29 Executive power includes, among
others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements.30 The task of safeguarding
that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in the international
arena.31 It is traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the countrys foreign relations. 32 The executive department is
aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the Presidents most comprehensive and most confidential information about the
international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is
also unlimited.33 The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the
cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by
treaties duly entered by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose
activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in
light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to
due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what
process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss."34 We have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As
aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against
him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing
in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balancewhich can be adjusted as
the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into
play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial
of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With
the global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push further
back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations."35 In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity from these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is
REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.
The Decree isfounded on: the Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression ofcrime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped. OnNovember 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of thePhil
ippines, signed in Manila the E
xtradition Treaty between the Government of the Philippines and theGovernment of the U.S.A.

The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for theextradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Mark Jimenez was charged of multiplecrimes ranging from tax
evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted inthe US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested
to have Jimenez be extraditedthere. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA.The DOJ secretary:

17
1.

refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not apreliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such
copies;2.

denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedingsarising out of a request for extradition. Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary (Franklin Drilon). The lower court ruled in favor of
Jimenez.ISSUE:

Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.HELD: The Petition was dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of
theaccused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contractingstate. The duties of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide withits treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a sourceof
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in ourConstitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation
is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in whichthere appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution orstatute of the local state.Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and itssupporting papers, and
to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment withsupporting evidence.
*Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislativeaction is needed to make such rules applicable
in the domestic sphere.*The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which thereappears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT
SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September
19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September
19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440)
located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the
sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale
of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-
B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be
paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money
to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said
assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of
squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private
respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would
undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr.
Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original
purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and
the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another
over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of
Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private
respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent is willing and
able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the
sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the
other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4)
damages.

18
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole
Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of
sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private
respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and
directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on
behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the
outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the
Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and
the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can
be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not
reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the
general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the
complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a
case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the
case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an
American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion"
(O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal
1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the
United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a
Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the
side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels
(Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the
other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of
International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the
Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy
See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries,
and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and
of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some
writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from
that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of

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national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its
size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the
Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and
activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law
160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects
essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International
Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even
without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence
of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The
United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian
Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular
transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of
its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a
sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and
international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government
of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf
at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v.
Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a
cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the
bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The
operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we
have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the
inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute
said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the
use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over
any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending

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state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as
regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it
for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the
admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative
Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm
of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts
(International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the
country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and
in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its
motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge
Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law,
a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private
Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine
government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:
This petition arose from acontroversy over a parcel of landconsisting of 6,000 square meterslocated in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot
wascontiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to RamonLicup. In view of the refusal of thesquatters to vacate the lots sold, adispute arose as
to who of theparties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating therelations of the parties was the saleby petitioner
of the lot of concernto Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immunefrom suit insofar as its businessrelations regarding selling a lot to aprivate entityRULING:As expressed in Section 2 of
ArticleII of the 1987 Constitution, we havea d o p t e d t h e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w . Even without
this affirmation, suchprinciples of Internatio nal L a w are deemed incorporated as part of thelaw of the land as a conditi on
andc o n s e q u e n c e o f o u r a d m i s s i o n i n t h e s o c i e t y o f n a t i o n s . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , i f p e t i t i o n e r
hasb o u g h t a n d s o l d l a n d s i n t h e ordinary course of real estateb u s i n e s s ,
s u r e l y t h e s a i d tra nsaction can be categori zed as a n
act jure gestionis. However,p e t i t i o n e r h a s d e n i e d t h a t t h e a c q u i s i t i o n a n d s u b s e q u e
n t d i s p o s a l o f t h e l o t w e r e m a d e f o r profit but claim ed that it acquired s a i d p r o p e r t y f o r t h e s i t e o f i t s mission or
the Apostolic Nunciaturein the
Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suitf o r t h e a c t o f s e l l i n g t h e l o t o f c o n c e r n i s n o n -
p r o p r i e t a r y i n nature. The lot was acquired
bypetitioner as a donation from theA r c h d i o c e s e o f M a n i l a . T h e d o n a t i o n w a s m a d e n o
t f o r commercial purpose, but for theu s e o f p e t i t i o n e r t o c o n s t r u c t t h e r e o n t h e o f f i c i a
l p l a c e o f residence of the
Papal Nuncio. Thed e c i s i o n t o t r a n s f e r t h e p r o p e r t y a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t d i s p o s a l thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitionerdid not sell the lot for profit or gain.It merely wanted to dispose of thesam e because the
squatters livin g thereon made it almost impossiblef o r p e t i t i o n e r t o u s e i t f o r t h e purpose of the donation.

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