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442 Phil. 442

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002 ]

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROSARIO

TORRECAMPO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF CAMARINES SUR,
BRANCH 33 AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution
dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn)[2] of the
1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:

That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in
Barangay Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted himself in
a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene
petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is located,
during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room
in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.[3]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise
known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as
maximum.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which

eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final
and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.

On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.

During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the

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presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his
bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.

Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion
to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the
penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration
thereof was likewise denied.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant
of arrest and motion for reconsideration.

On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed
before us.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty
imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The
Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial
legislation when it added the phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence
thereto, so petitioner claims.

Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did
not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.

In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:

Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final
sentence prescribed as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the
penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:

Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of

prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and
it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up,

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be captured, should go to some foreign country with which his

Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit
another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.

The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.

The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the
1978 Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of
penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the provision of the
Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory
character when it provides that:

Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under

special laws are not subject to the provision of this code. This
code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.

The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under

Article 25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a
correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.

The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the
accused did not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been
apprehended.

The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on

October 24, 1996.

The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner
has prescribed.

The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as
follows:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.

2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by

escaping during the term of his sentence.

3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given
himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with
which we have no extradition treaty or committed another
crime.

4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of

time form the date of the evasion of the service of the
sentence by the convict.

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(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)

From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not
prescribed because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to
satisfy the second element, to wit That the convict evaded the service
of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a
matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his
sentence.

The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this
Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription
of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape
during the term of such imprisonment.

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to
deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the
felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code,
evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life
of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is
therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and
applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription
never started to run in his favor.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

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[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Salome A. Montoya and Ruben T. Reyes, of the Seventh Division.

[2]Any person who, in the presence or within the hearing of the election committee
or the board of canvassers during any of its meetings, conducts himself in such a
disorderly manner as to interrupt or disrupt the work or proceedings to the end of
preventing either body from performing its functions, either partly or totally.

[3] Rollo, p. 13.

[4] 19 SCRA 564 [1967].

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

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