De Leon vs Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J

Facts:

In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On
February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed
on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B. Esguerra designating Florentino
Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the same dates
was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon
along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum
null and void and prevent the respondents from taking over their positions in the
Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the
authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a
term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Issue:

Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:

The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO
LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining
respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of petitioners position subject of this
petition.

Ratio

The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was
signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect,
thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory
Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution.

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at
bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President
and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons,
which are fully applicable to the \

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the
prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS
and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved
or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51%
of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also
to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder
shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known
to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political

crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Gonzales vs COMELEC GR No 28196 09 November 1967

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions, (1) increasing the number of seats in the lower house from 120 to 180,
(2) calling for a constitutional convention, and (3) allowing members of the
Congress to run as delegates to the constitutional convention without forfeiting their
seats. Congress passed a bill, which, approved by the President on 17 June 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,

violates the Constitution pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.

Decision: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not

included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. Pursuant to Section 1
Article XV, The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification. The said resolutions are null and
void because the Congress may not avail of both amending and calling a convention
at the same time and the election must be a special election not a general election
for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification.
Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar

Facts:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales,
both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV

of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a
Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of
two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969,
Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending
the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants:
Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates,
who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House
of Representatives, 1 and that any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the
Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation:
Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution. 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act
No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the
particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner
Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

Issue:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;

Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Decision:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a

Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners
are deemed as constitutional.

Ratio:

Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose

amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were
attained by Resolution 2 and 4

Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the

basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is
not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less
population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates
I other provinces with more population.

Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify

members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a
safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow
them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.

Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure
candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual
merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create
discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Fernando I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the
aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and other organizations is
concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an
individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to
engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of
liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast,
its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-34150

APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting

proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing
with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly
by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to
the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.)
The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and
how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with
the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos,
met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to

amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court
held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is
of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of
the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as
well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting
as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority
vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-
fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That
is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the
period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved
by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join

Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator
Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following
Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously
with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that
the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve
only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends
on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results
from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-
005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-
005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six
(6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three
(3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President.
Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th,
respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo
Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only
COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest
number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term
seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-
005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend
that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to
notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate
in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that
because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to
Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to
bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that
COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal
injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.

Held: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in
a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily
sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that
this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of
standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and
Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized
grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not
all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged,
in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition
because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses
of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or
that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand, the
Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give
due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court
has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same treatment
to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they
raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue
raised in the petition is likely to arise again.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714]
En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in
separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976.
Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of
Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President
issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its
"whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision
and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September
1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend
that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M.
Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul
Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the
Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that
"(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of
such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim
National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that
amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National
Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote
of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e.,
period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon
a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention
called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However
the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an
election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly.
In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to
leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace
and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same,
the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the
interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the
plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution
was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National
Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of
whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the
people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm
of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is
not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article
XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is
the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of
an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is
one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES GR# 183591, October 14, 2008

Carpio-Morales, J:

Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This
document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties
and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its
constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by
the Court?

Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into
effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot
be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions,
therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They
no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this
Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an

assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A
justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of
the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of
law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for
settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public
clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court
must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental
principles of constitutional law.

Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The
COMELEC then, upon its approval

set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,

caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general

circulation, and

instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in

establishing signing stations.

On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the foregoing.
Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments
to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term
limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is
therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the
petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court
cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for Peoples Initiative to amend
the constitution specifically to lift term limits of elected officials.

Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative.

Ratio:

Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that . . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. It ought to be so for
this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a consolidation of
House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and
Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution
Passed by the Local Legislative Body. Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not
include peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered
contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153

Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative

petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino
group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution
by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack
of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec
ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed
at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing

Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment
and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with
the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.