FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTAL

STATE: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA

By

Solomon Goshu Shiferaw

At the School of Law, Addis Ababa University

30 November 2015

i
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Laws (LLM in Public and Constitutional Law) to the
School of Law of Addis Ababa University

By

Solomon Goshu Shiferaw

Prepared under the supervision of

Elias Nour (PhD)

At the School of Law, Addis Ababa University

30 November 2015

ii
 Declaration

I, Solomon Goshu Shiferaw, hereby declare that this dissertation is original and has never been
submitted before for any degree or examination in any other institution. I also declare that all the
sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and duly acknowledged as complete
references.

Solomon Goshu Shiferaw

Signature: ___________________

Date: ___________________

This dissertation has been submitted with my permission as a supervisor.

Elias Nour (PhD)

Signature: _____________________

Date: _____________________

Board of Examiners

We testify that the comments and corrections suggested in the defense are incorporated in this
final edition:

Name of Examiners Signature

1. Mizane Abate (PhD) ________________

2. Yonas Tesfa ________________

iii
 Acknowledgments

This type of work cannot be done without the help and engagement of many persons. I would
like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Elias Nour for his thorough, insightful and engaging
comments and corrections throughout my work on this research.

My special thanks also goes to my friends and colleagues for their continued support during the
course of my studies. In particular, my dear friend Mesganaw Mulugeta, for his guidance,
material and moral support; my dear friend Yenehun Birle, for his moral, material and
intellectual support throughout my academic years; so both cannot be thanked enough. My
friends Endalik, Dr. Gedion, Zerubabel, Woubishet, Bruh and Asrat deserve heartfelt gratitude
for making my life easier by sharing good and bad times.

Finally, I am truly grateful for everyone who in one way or another contributed to this study and
to me personally in diverse aspects of life.

i
 List of abbreviations

DS Developmental State

EA East Asia

EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front

FE Freedom of Expression

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

RD Revolutionary Democracy

WWII Second World War

ii
 Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................... i
List of abbreviations ...............................................................................................................ii
Table of contents .................................................................................................................. iii
Abstract

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background of the study .................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Problem statement and relevance of the study ................................................................. 3
1.3 Research questions ....................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Methodology .................................................................................................................... 5
1.5 Scope of the study ............................................................................................................ 5
1.6 Organization of the chapters: ........................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER TWO: Fundamentals of Developmental State and Freedom of Expression .......... 7

2.1 Fundamentals of Developmental State ............................................................................. 7
2.1.1 The Concept of Developmental State............................................................................ 7
2.1.2 Basic Features of the Developmental State ................................................................... 8
2.2 Fundamentals of Freedom of Expression ....................................................................... 13

CHAPTER THREE: Freedom of Expression in the Context of Developmental State: The Case of
Ethiopia .................................................................................................................................... 17
3.1 Aspirational Developmental State in Ethiopia ............................................................... 17
3.2 Illiberal Measures? ........................................................................................................ 21
3.2.1 Instrumental value of freedom of expression.................................................................. 30
3.2.2 Prioritizing socio-economic rights ....................................................................... 33
3.2.3 Ideological hegemony .......................................................................................... 37
3.2.4 Pushing the private media aside and imposing development journalism ............ 41
3.3 Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia: Rhetoric or Reality? .......................... 48

CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................ 54

iii
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 57

iv
Abstract

Both policy-makers and scholars have turned their attention to the Developmental State model as
a means for alleviating poverty in developing countries. Both theoretical analysis and the
empirical track record of the East Asian Development States point to the models ability to
achieve growth and development in a very short period of time. However, these Developmental
States were not right-friendly. Particularly, their treatment of civil and political rights
including freedom of expression has been criticized for not being in conformity with
international standards they subscribed to. The constitutional democracy that Ethiopia has
introduced through the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution has provided the
ideals of democracy. Thus, democratic process is a precondition to every activity of the
government. Consequently, Ethiopia has pledged to adopt Democratic Developmental State
rather than the mainstream Developmental State. The paper attempts to explore the status of
freedom of expression in line with the recent political and legal history after the Developmental
State model is introduced in Ethiopia. Given the history of gross and systematic human rights
violation in Ethiopia, the adoption of the Developmental State model is feared for having a
negative effect on the status of freedom of expression in the country. The paper argues that most
of the signs are indicative of the materialization of this fear. And, given its diversity and
plurality, Ethiopia cannot afford to delay the full application of freedom of expression
indefinitely. The adoption of the Developmental State model was necessitated by the urgency
and intensity of the need to address the countrys chronic poverty. However, without building
democracy and its necessary components, including the freedom of expression, the development
cannot be sustainable

Key words
Developmental state, freedom of expression, revolutionary democracy, civil and political rights,
socio-economic rights, instrument to development, Ethiopia

v
 Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Background of the study
Freedom of expression illustrates the justifying point of basic individual rights. The
powerful do not welcome public criticism. In their eyes, the costs of speech generally
outweigh the costs of suppression. On the other hand, the absence of public deliberation
would mean that unexamined preferences of officials would be imposed on the public
even in the face of foreseeable harm or failure. To guarantee political speech, laws must
permit dissent.1

These appealing words on freedom of expression (FE) were uttered by Professor Andreas Eshete
in 1993 when Ethiopians and foreigners were having a thorough discussion on the future of the
country. After 22 years, Professor Andreas early warning has emerged as a source of
controversy when scholars attempts to explain the treatment of FE and evaluate the records of
the Ethiopian government led by Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
since then. Some argue that the EPRDF government does not welcome public criticism and there
is a little tolerance for alternatives in the current political settlement.2 It is also contended that
threats to EPRDF are all too easily seen as threats to government or to the public good.3

Ethiopia is a constitutional democracy since 1995. The Federal Democratic Republic of

Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1995.4 Though it is
the fourth written Constitution in the countrys history, in terms of guaranteeing all types of
rights and liberties, it is the most liberal one. In terms of substance, the current Constitution is by
far better than its predecessors in laying the foundations for democracy, pluralism and the

1
Andreas Eshete, Implementing Human Rights and a Democratic Constitution in Ethiopia, 21 A JOURNAL OF
OPINION 8, 9 (1993).
2
Berhanu Gutema Balcha, Constitutionalism in the Horn of Africa: Lesson from the New Constitution of Ethiopia,
15 DIIPER RESEARCH SERIES WORKING PAPER 1, 15 (2009).
3
Jean-Nicolas Bach, Abyotawi Democracy: Neither Revolutionary nor Democratic, a Critical Review of EPRDFs
Conception of Revolutionary Democracy in Post-1991 Ethiopia, 5 (4) JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN
STUDIES 641-663 (2011).
4
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution Proclamation no 1/1995.
1
protection of basic human rights.5 The enumerated fundamental rights and freedoms in the FDRE
Constitution are progressive and impressive.6 The explicit recognition of the whole range of
human rights set in international human rights conventions in a chapter that deals with
fundamental rights and freedoms which constitutes one-third of the constitution shows the
interest in establishing a democratic order informed and rooted in international standards.7

Notwithstanding such normative advances, in terms of enforcement, serious obstacles have been
observed in the Ethiopian constitutional order. A constitutional state is by definition a state
where the powers and policy choices of political organs are limited by constitutional
requirements.8 A democratic constitution should compel government to be responsive and
answerable to citizens.9 A constitutional democracy must allow fair and robust rivalry for
political office.10 In this context, it is argued that the practice in Ethiopia shows that the dominant
political force is dictating its terms without any limitation and rivalry. 11 Some even go to the
extent of arguing that: With the adoption of the FDRE Constitution, one might have reasonably
hoped for the dawn of a democratic era and constitutional rule in Ethiopia. Political
developments in Ethiopia since the adoption of the Constitution have dashed such hopes. At the
moment, Ethiopia cannot be called a constitutional democracy by any stretch of the
imagination.12

It is within this context that Ethiopia has introduced the developmental state (DS) model of
governance to accelerate development in 2005. In fact, modern states of the world have designed

5
Adem Kassie Abebe, From the TPLF Constitution to the Constitution of the People of Ethiopia:
Constitutionalism and Proposals for Constitutional Reform, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 85,
(Morris Kiwinda Mbondenyi and Tom Ojienda ed., Pretoria University Law Press, South Africa, 2013).
6
Chi Mgbako et al, Silencing the Ethiopian Courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional Review and Its Impact on Human
Rights, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 259, 260-261 (2008).
7
Sehen Bekele & Tsegaye Regassa, Democratization in a Developmental State: The Case of Ethiopia, 1 UNDP
ETHIOPIA REPORT 1, 18 (2012).
8
Adem Kassie Abebe, A Constitution without a Guardian: Is the Ethiopian Constitution Really Supreme?, 5
ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SERIES 9, 11 (2013).
9
Andreas, supra note 1 at 8.
10
Ibid.
11
Sarah Vaughan, Revolutionary Democratic State-building: Party, State and People in the EPRDF's Ethiopia, 5 (4)
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 619-640 (2011).
12
Gedion Timotheows, Tackling the Imperial Premiership and Abuse of Incumbency: Ideas for Constitutional
Reform in Ethiopia, 6 ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES 162, 210 (2014).
2
and implemented different approaches they deemed best to achieve development. 13 How to
address national development problems is a fundamental agenda common to most of the
countries, even if there is a debate with regard to the what and how of development. The quest
for designing better system and the kind of implementation process that should take place from
among the available dominant approaches (development paths) can inform the discourse on the
most effective development model.

Since Second World War (WWII) there has been a major debate about the role of the state in the
development process. Of course, it is asserted that the general consensus has emerged in recent
times that the state has a crucial/vital role to play in socio-economic development.14 The
consensus as regards the indispensable role of the state in development is however not matched
by a consensus as regards the type or nature of the state most likely to fulfill this vital
developmental role. This question is important in the Ethiopian context because it is now firmly
established in the literature that the government of Ethiopia has come up with a policy which
identifies the state as an effective instrument for development.

That being said, some are doubtful if the constitutional democracy prescribed and sanctioned by
the liberal multiculturalist Constitution of Ethiopia could accommodate the DS model.15 The
main focus of this paper is to examine the place of FE in the DS model in the context of
Ethiopia.

1.2 Problem Statement and relevance of the study

The struggle for better respect for FE has had a long history. This struggle basically compounded
within the content of the international human rights instruments and the jurisprudence developed
by domestic courts. However, since WWII ideology seems to dictate the shape of freedom of
expression. While the liberal West still insists that the ideals of freedom of expression should be

13
See generally MICHAEL P. TODARO & STEPHEN C. SMITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (11th ed.,
Addison-Wesley, Boston, 2012), and WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH, (The MIT
Press, Cambridge, 2001).
14
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, Governing Development in Africa: The Role of the State in
Economic Transformation, 75-94 (2011).
15
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 15.
3
fully implemented under all circumstances, the developing countries following the DS model
particularly the East Asian DSs gave priority to socioeconomic rights. To a certain extent, they
even accept impediments on freedom of expression as collateral damage as long as the rate of
economic growth and development is satisfactory.16

The concept of Democratic Developmental State (DDS) has evolved to ensure the continuous
use of human rights including FE. The impacts of the DS model on democracy including FE has
been the subject of ongoing debates and a growing field of literature among scholars of
economics, law and political science. The body of literature seems to be shifting from a focus on
the absence of democracy to the possibility of realizing democracy under such a model. Where
one group argues that in the 20th century DSs, democracy was scarce, another group contends
that 21st century DSs have no option but to subscribe to the ideals of democracy including FE
for different reasons.17

The Ethiopian DS model argues that a DS can and must be democratic. As such Ethiopia took an
initiative to establish DDS model which tries to accommodate all generations of rights and is in
accordance with the FDRE Constitution. However, with introduction of legislations that restrict
rights than expand them, with very limited political space and strong criticism of authoritarian
tendencies, one cannot avoid but ask if in fact the Ethiopian DS model is in line with the FDRE
Constitution, with a particular emphasis on FE.

The number of scholarly writings in this area particularly the context of the Ethiopian DS is very
limited. As most of the existing scholarships portray DS and FE as incongruous trying to find a
working space is not unavoidable. This research hopefully contributes to clarifying the issues and
hopefully brings forward some thought to filling the gap. It could be used as a knowledge base
for students and could initiate further research for academics and researchers. It could inform the
decisions of policy makers and political thinkers in the future.

16
Tsun Hang Tey, Confining the Freedom of the Press in Singapore: A "Pragmatic" Press for "Nation-Building"?,
30 (4) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 876-905 (2008).
17 Richard Child Hill, Bae-Gyoon Park & Asato Saito, Introduction: Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia, in
LOCATING NEOLIBERALISM IN EAST ASIA: NEOLIBERALIZING SPACES IN DEVELOPMENTAL
STATES 1, 16 (Bae-Gyoon Park, Richard Child Hill, & Asato Saito, ed., Blackwell Publishing, West Sussex, 2012).
4
1.3 Research Questions

This thesis endeavours to answer one main question, i.e., have the adoption of the DS model
impacted the situation of FE in Ethiopia as recognized by the FDRE Constitution? Within the
embrace of this broad question, the following specific questions are addressed: What is the
scope and content of FE in the Ethiopian DS model? What are the points of debate in relation to
the Ethiopian DS model and constitutionalism? And how has it all translated into the exercise of
the right?

1.4 Methodology

The thesis primarily relies on desk research of relevant materials on the subject. It will review
and analyze primary sources (interviews and observation and secondary sources (books, journal
articles). The few individuals selected for the interview are believed to offer insight on the
topic on account of their position and year of exposure to the media industry and governance.
Documentations, including official reports and policy documents, newspaper accounts, and
existing literature or formal studies are also used. Comparative reviews, particularly with DS
models in South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Botswana will be made when relevant.

1.5 Scope of the study

The study focuses on FE as a case study to show the overall impact the DS model of governance
brings on the protection of rights in Ethiopia. The research emphasizes on the law and policy and
as such does not look into actual events in all aspects of FE due to lack of comprehensive
information, although scanty reference is made.

1.6 Organization of chapters

The thesis is organized into four chapters. This chapter introduces the research, with the
background and research questions. It informs the reader of the research area, the research
problem, and the methods of analysis. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework of the
thesis. It addresses the concept and purpose of FE and DS emphasizing on their particular
importance to developing countries. Thus, the policies and experiences of Japan, Singapore and
5
Botswana are also examined. Chapter three examines the relationship between FE and DS and
tries to identify the outcomes of the Ethiopian experience. An attempt will be made to show the
impacts of the DS model on FE in Ethiopia in this chapter. The conclusion and recommendations
complete the thesis in chapter four.

6
 Chapter Two

Fundamentals of Developmental State and Freedom of Expression

This chapter deals with the theoretical perspectives of the DS and FE, and their implementation
in different contexts particularly in developing countries. It generally introduces the concept and
basic characteristics of the DS and its challenges, and briefs on the basic principles of FE.

2.1 Fundamentals of Developmental State

2.1.1 The Concept of Developmental State

The term DS is not clearly defined, but was coined by Chalmers Johnson to identify a state-led
development model when he published his book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle in 1982.18 The
term has been used to refer to state-led economic planning as experienced in the countries of East
Asia (EA) and some other countries who won the label since the 1970s.19 That is why the term
DS was initially and is still, frequently used to describe countries such as Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore and Viet Nam, which have experienced rapid economic growth through state-
led policies or interventions.20

However, for Johnson, the critical element of the DS was not its economic policy, but its ability
to mobilize a nation around economic development.21 For him, DS is defined as the seamless
web of political, bureaucratic and moneyed influences that structures economic life.22 Johnson
explains the state constructed under the DS model as neither socialist, nor free market.23

Similar to Johnson, Fritz and Menocal defined a DS as a state that possesses the vision,
leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed

18
Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development, in
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1, 1-2 (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999).
19
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 3.
20
Laura Routley, Developmental States: A Review of the Literature, 3 ESID WORKING PAPER 3, 4 (2012).
21
Cited in Woo-Cumings, supra note 18 at 6-7.
22
Andrzej Bolesta, China as a Developmental State, 5 MONTENEGRIN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 105, 105
(2007).
23
Woo-Cumings, supra note 18 at 1-2.
7
period of time.24 They observe that through the expansion of public services such as education,
health care and agricultural extension DSs enhance opportunities to participate in the modern
economy.25 In the context of EA in the late twentieth century, it is argued that DS manifested
itself as the phenomenon of state macroeconomic planning that supports and coordinates the
developmental efforts of all relevant actors towards their common interest.26

The nature of the DS is seen in two components: ideological and structural. According to
Mkandawire, economic growth is the center of the ideological aspect of DS:27
In terms of ideology, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideological
underpinning is developmentalist in that it conceives its mission as that of ensuring
economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and
industrialization. At the ideational level, the elite must be able to establish an ideological
hegemony, so that its developmental project becomes a hegemonic project to which
key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily.

The structural component gives the state the capacity to effectively implement policy. Such
capacity is a result of political, institutional, and technical factors resulting from the autonomy of
the state.28 Such factors enable the state to execute national development, through steady high
rates of economic growth and structural change.

2.1.2 Basic Features of the Developmental State

There are fundamentally different variants of the DS. Even in the EA context the characteristics
of the DSs is not the same. However, many scholars agree that there are some crucial and
commonly held features that define the DS.29 Among these key features of DSs, state-led
development is the key one. How states should intervene in the market, and what role the state

24
Verena Fritz & Alina Rocha Menocal, Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for
a New Aid Agenda, 25 (5) DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW 531, 533 (2007).
25
Ibid.
26
Bolesta, supra note 22 at 106.
27
Thandika Mkandawire, Thinking about Developmental States in Africa, 25 (3) CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 289, 290 (2001).
28
Ibid.
29
Those who argue that DS is only a governance model or growth path and deny its ideological component presents
this lack of commonly held features as evidence to support their argument.
8
should play in development has remained a controversial topic.30 The set of neoliberal policies
advocated by academics, policy makers, and political elites, which eventually converged in what
came to be known as the Washington Consensus, which primarily aim at reducing the state
involvement in the economy, has dominated the international economic and political arena since
the early 90s. Rather than seeing the state as the agent which could act to produce growth, these
neo-liberal approaches saw the state as part of the problem and pushed to reduce its size and
influence in order for development to take off.31 The Washington Consensus had three big ideas:
a market economy, openness to the world, and macroeconomic discipline.32 More generally, the
Washington Consensus has come to be associated with market fundamentalism, the view that
markets solve most, if not all, economic problems by themselves.33

As opposed to the Washington Consensus, the DSs justify their active involvement in the
economy with the presence of market failures in the developing countries. The belief that market
failure is a pervasive feature of the underdeveloped economy led the state to have an important
role to play in correcting it.34 The assumption in DSs is that developing economies are
surrounded with imperfections in information, limitations in competition, and incomplete
markets.35

In the DS model, the state is expected to play a leading role in terms of planning, investments,
and directives.36 Particularly in developing countries, the model encourages the active role of the
state in the early stages to successfully achieve economic growth. The EA governments pursued
a series of policies, including tariff protection, subsidies, and other types of controls aimed at
developing selected productive sectors of economic activity.37 The superior economic

30
Routley, supra note 20 at 4-5.
31
Ibid.
32
Narcs Serra, Shari Spiegel, & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction: From the Washington Consensus Towards a New
Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED-TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 3, 3 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).
33
Ibid.
34
Ziya ni, The Logic of the Developmental State, 24 (1) COMPARATIVE POLITICS 109, 109 (1991).
35
Serra, Spiegel, & Stiglitz, supra note 32 at 3-4.
36
Hugo Radice, The Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism, 29 (6) THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY
1153, 1154 (2008). See also ni, supra note 34 at 110.
37 Esteban Prez Caldentey, The Concept and Evolution of the Developmental State, 37 (3) INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 27, 27 (2008).
9
performance of the EA economies is to a large extent the consequence of very high levels of
investment by the state.38 Of course, more investment was channeled to certain key industries
than wouldnt have occurred in the absence of government intervention, and they were exposed
to international competition in foreign markets by design.39

Another characteristic of DSs is the emphasis and achievements on accelerated economic growth
and development. In the DS model, economic development defined in terms of growth,
productivity, and competitiveness, constitutes the single-minded priority of state action.40 In
some quarters, rather than seeing growth as part of development, the terms development and
growth are used interchangeably. In recent times, however, developmental economists show that
the two terms do not have the same meaning even if they are closely related.41 Commonly
economic development is measured by using rates of growth of income per capita or per capita
Gross National Product (GNP) to take into account the ability of a nation to expand its output at
a rate faster than the growth rate of its population, without taking into consideration the living
conditions of people.42

Amartya Sen aptly argues that economic growth cannot be sensibly treated as an end in itself;
development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we
enjoy.43 He argued:

In the people centered development the focus is on the reduction or elimination of

poverty, inequality, and unemployment as well as improvement in the quality of life
(higher incomes, better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, greater
individual freedom, and a richer cultural life) reflected through gains in literacy,
schooling, health conditions and services, and provision of housing.44

38
ni, supra note 34 at 111-112.
39
Ibid.
40
Id, 111.
41
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 3.
42
Ibid.
43
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14-15, (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1999).
44
Ibid.
10
The autonomy of the bureaucracy is another feature of the DSs. In the DSs, the bureaucracy is
given sufficient scope to take initiatives and operate effectively. This is true particularly in the
EA DSs. They established a specialized bureaucratic apparatus that had ample powers and
coordinated the developmental efforts, at least in their initial stages.45

In EA, the bureaucrats discharge their key responsibility under the umbrella of state agencies that
created an alliance between politics and the economy where the objective of the political elite is
to legitimize the actions of the elite bureaucratic agencies and make space for the latter's
actions.46 As the bureaucrats were expected to keep constant contacts with the politicians and the
society to make an informed decision on matters that fall under their jurisdiction, they served as
a bridge between the political leadership and the society.47

The major challenge the bureaucrats faced in EA was avoiding pressures from both the sides of
politicians and the business people.48 One way they used to avoid such an unhealthy pressure
was establishing close institutionalized links between the elite bureaucracy and private business
for consultation and cooperation.49 These organizational and institutional links were crucial in
generating a consensus on goals, as well as in exchanging information, both of which constitute
essential components of the process of policy formulation and implementation.50

In this context, the professionalism of the bureaucracy is important in the DS to protect itself
from the arbitrary interference of the political elites. Of course, the bureaucracy needs to protect
itself from the undue interference and pressure while at the same time maintaining its
connections with the society. In other words, the autonomy has to be embedded. Peter Evans
term embedded autonomy describes this double move of the bureaucracy not being adversely
influenced by interest groups but remaining connected enough to society in order to act to ensure

45 Caldentey, supra note 37 at 27.

46
ni, supra note 34 at 111.
47
Ibid. This is what nodal agencies or pilot organizations like the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the South Korean Economic Planning Bureau (EPB) did. See for details Caldentey, supra note
37 at 28-29. Vivek Chibber, Building a Developmental State: The Korean Case Reconsidered, 27 (3) POLITICS &
SOCIETY 309, 313 (1999).
48
ni, supra note 34 at 111.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
11
growth and (to an extent) redistribution.51 This embedded autonomy is seen not only to be a
condition which enables the emergence of DSs but rather it is seen by many to be one of the
factors which necessarily has to be present for a state to be considered developmental.52

Developmental structures or state capacity is another feature for the DSs. To completely
transform a state to DS, the political will to follow developmental policies should be supported
by the institutional, technical, administrative and political capacity to implement these policies.53
The capacity of the EA states to implement effective and coherent development strategies both
institutionally and socio-politically is well recognized.54

Successful DSs, within the bureaucracy, require enhanced capacity of its agencies and
institutions formulate and implement policies. One way to enhance their capacity and the means
to do that is through securing their internal cohesiveness.55 The most important means for the
state to secure internal coherence is for it to be endowed with an effective, rule-following
bureaucracy.56

The capacity of DSs will be enhanced in the presence of development-oriented leaders. DSs need
a committed leadership that is embedded in the right context of demands.57 They are usually
characterized by a leadership which is strongly committed to developmental goals, and which
places national development ahead of personal enrichment and/or short-term political gains.58

Committed and development-oriented leadership usually creates national consensus by forging

different interests of the society and pointing them to the same direction. It is submitted that the

51
John L. Campbell, Book Review: Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 27 THEORY AND SOCIETY, 103-146 (1998).
52
Routley, supra note 20 at 20-21.
53
Mkandawire, supra note 27 at 290.
54 ni, supra note 34 at 110-111.
55
Vivek Chibber, Bureaucratic Rationality and the Developmental State, 107 (4) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY 951, 951-952 (2002).
56
Id, 952.
57
Fritz & Menocal, supra note 24 at 534-535.
58
Ibid.
12
absence of national consensus will hinder the success of developmental states.59 State capacities
generally cannot increase if a developmental commitment among the state elite is missing or
insufficiently resolute.60 It is usually necessary for the elite to expound a vision that connects the
state and society in a mutually binding way, through some form of shared national project.61

2.2 Fundamentals of Freedom of Expression

It is difficult to define the concept of freedom of expression (FE). FE refers to a bundle of rights
including, but not limited to, the right to impart, seek, and receive information and ideas without
any barrier. In other words, FE is the liberty to freely say what one pleases, as well as the co-
related liberty to hear what others have stated.62 In this context, it is important to note that there
exists very little difference between FE, right to FE, freedom of speech, freedom of information,
and freedom of the press.63

FE covers all forms of expression including television, radio, newspaper, magazine, book,
motion picture, and electronic documents on computer network.64 In some contexts, freedom of
speech could specifically refer to communications through the medium of the broadcasting
media while freedom of the press is related with the print media. The freedom comprises, within
its content, three other freedoms: freedom of opinion, freedom of information and freedom of the
press, these three liberties being interdependent and unable to manifest one in the absence of the
other.65 Freedom of opinion refers to the rights of the individual to hold and impart opinions of
his/her choice. To put it differently, freedom of opinion involves both an 'inner' (holding
personal views) and an 'outer' element (expressing personal views).66 The expression aspect of it

59
Id, 535.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Elisabeth Zoller, The United States Supreme Court and the Freedom of Expression, 84 INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL 885, 887-888 (2009).
63
Daniela Valeria Iancu, Freedom of the Press - A Component of Freedom of Expression, 1 ACTA
UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS JURIDICA 57, 58 (2010).
64
7 THE WORLD BOOK OF ENCYCLOPEDIA 506, (2001).
65
Iancu, supra note 63 at 59.
66
Daniel Overgaauw, The Paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom of Speech (Re-) Considered, 2 (1) AMSTERDAM
LAW FORUM 25, 25 (2010).
13
consists of the right to speak out privately or publicly.67 The later part of freedom of expression
encompasses the right to dissent and the right to disagree.68

Freedom of information is related with the right to have access to information and not to be
subjected to censorship. It also embraces the right to distribute literatures and necessarily
protects the right to receive literatures which is distributed. It is said that liberty in circulating is
an essential to the freedom as a liberty of publishing since publication without circulation would
be little value.

Access to means of expression is in many cases a necessary condition for participation in the
political process of any nation, and therefore something to which citizens have an independent
right.69 The state has to ensure that the principal means of expression in the society do not fall
under the control of any particular segment of the community.70

Freedom of the press is mostly understood in the context of the institutional aspect of FE.
Individual citizens may lack the resources to compile and assess the relevant information by
themselves.71 Rather they rely on the media outlets to serve them as a principal instrument by
accomplishing the necessary fact-finding mission.72 In other words, freedom of the press is the
right of the media institutions and the individuals exercising their FE through them.

FE is one of the basic human rights recognized under all major international and regional human
rights instruments. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 73 which
Ethiopia ratified on 11 June 1993, imposes formal legal obligations on State Parties to respect its
provisions, and guarantees in Article 19 the right to FE in the following terms:

67
THE WORLD BOOK OF ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 64 at 506.
68
Zoller, supra note 62 at 887-888.
69
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 (2) PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 204, 223
(1972).
70
Ibid.
71
Anthea J. Jeffery, Free Speech and Press: An Absolute Right?, 8 (2) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 197, 197
(1986).
72
Ibid.
73
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16th, 1966, and entered into force on March 23rd, 1976.
14
 (1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of opinion.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.

Regional human rights instruments, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights (ACHPR),74 for which Ethiopia is a party since 15 June 1998, also protect FE in terms
that are generally similar to the ICCPR.

The human rights instruments noted above, as well as the jurisprudence of international judicial
bodies and of courts in many democratic jurisdictions, affirm the fundamental importance of FE
as a key human right underpinning democracy and levy upon states the responsibility to respect,
protect and fulfill the right of freedom of expression.75

Like many other rights the right to FE is not formulated as an absolute right. Those who establish
the inalienable nature of FE have tried their best to widen the scope of the right. On the other
hand, those whose focus is on the damages or bad consequences of FE find ways of restricting it.
However, determining the proper limits of FE is one of the most difficult and challenging of
tasks.76

Reasonable restraints on FE as may be required for the general good is acceptable in most
cases.77 As a matter of principle, the government must show strong grounds for interference.78 In
all probability, it is argued that the government should not prohibit the expression of an idea

74
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and
Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), at their 18 th Ordinary Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya
June 26th 1981, OAU-Document CAB./LEG/673 Rev. 5, which came into force on 21 st October 1986.
75
ARTICLE 19, The Legal Framework for Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia 1, 7 (2003). See also The Human
Rights Committee Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev.1) Civil and Political Rights.
76
Jeffery, supra note 71 at 198.
77
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 1-2 (The
University of Chicago Press, London, 2008).
78
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005).
15
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 79 In this context, Barendt
rightly states: [i]t would be inconsistent with any free speech principle, worthy of the name, if a
publication could be stopped on the ground merely that it is offensive to some people, or could
be penalized because it contributes to disorder or lowers the governments authority or
reputation.80

Similarly, all international and regional human rights treaties of the twentieth century, including
ICCPR, recognize that limitations can be placed on FE under certain conditions.81 Article 19(3)
of the ICCPR lays down the conditions which any restriction on FE must meet, and state that any
restriction on FE must meet a strict three-part test. This test, which is considered to be a high
standard that any interference must overcome, requires that any restriction on FE shall be
prescribed by law, must be imposed to serve a legitimate aim, such as protection of national
security, public morals, public order, and public health and should be necessary in a democratic
society. 82

79
Feldman, supra note 77 at 2.
80
Barendt, supra note 78 at 7.
81
Elisabeth Zoller, Freedom of Expression: Precious Right in Europe, Sacred Right in the United States?, 84
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 803, 804-805 (2009).
82
ARTICLE 19, supra note 75 at 12.
16
 Chapter Three

Freedom of Expression in the Context of Developmental State: The Case of

Ethiopia

3.1 Aspirational Developmental State in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the term DS is increasingly being used only in recent times.83 It is argued that
identifying DSs prior to their attainment of successful growth is an extremely difficult task.84 As
a result, one writer used the phrase aspirational DS to refer to the Ethiopian case while stating
the fact that the political actors are stating an intention to create a DS since 2012.85 This is of
course in line with the view that DS does not necessarily develop as long as the stuff of
ambition or the moral ambition to develop is available.86

Despite being in the pipeline since 2001, it is only after 2005 that Ethiopia has officially
endorsed the DS path.87 Particularly, it is asserted that the controversial 2005 general election has
given a big boost for the emergence of the policy of developmentalism.88 In 2006, the then Prime
Minister, Meles Zenawi, produced a paper entitled African Development: Dead Ends and New
Beginnings, and in his 2012 article States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case
for a Developmental State, he explained the model of DS and the prerequisites of the state
required to successfully implement it. Meles declaimed that the views expressed in both writings
is personal and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Government of Ethiopia.
However, subsequent party and government documents on DS seem to be revisions of these
papers. Moreover, upon his death, in the official obituary, the party has acknowledged that all the

83
Fana Hagos Berhane, Law and Development Paradigm, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, AND LEGAL
PLURALISM IN ETHIOPIA 17, 28 (Elias N. Stebek and Muradu Abdo, ed., JLSRI, Addis Ababa, 2013).
84
Fritz & Menocal, supra note 24 at 534.
85
Routley, supra note 20 at 12.
86
Woo-Cumings, supra note 18 at 4.
87
Alex de Waal, Ethiopia: Is State-Building Still Possible?, in THE REAL POLITICS OF THE HORN OF
AFRICA: MONEY, WAR AND THE BUSINESS OF POWER 155, 167-168 (Alex de Waal ed. 2015).
88
Asnake Kefale Narratives of Developmentalism and Development in Ethiopia: Some Preliminary Explorations
(2010), http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?url=http://aegis-eu.org/archive/ecas4/ecas-4/panels/41-60/panel-
57/Asnake-Kefale-Full-paper.pdf&hl=en&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm1n4kkTDWmYGuZ-
18wLoBur4_cb7g&nossl=1&oi=scholarr/ (last visited June 23, 2015).
17
major policies and strategies of the government particularly those explaining the DS model are
designed by the late Prime Minister.89

In these two papers, Meles argued that the DS resolves both political and socioeconomic
problems of a developing country. First and for most, Meles argued that the purpose of DS for
developing countries is rectifying pervasive market failure that is inherent and to some extent
definitional to a development deficit in these countries. For Meles, the existing market in these
countries is not guiding resources to growth inducing sector and largely the market is not
providing enough incentive for a benevolent private sector investment on growth accruing
sector.90

Meles contended that as the African states are naturally composed of group of people who
responds and maximizes both individual and collective interests, it is possible to have a state
clean of all rent seeking tendencies.91 Generally, he admitted that African states have a history
of rent seeking and predatory but not because of the size of the state. He noted that rent seeking
and patrimonial states are not about the size of the government.92

To the contrary, Meles was of the opinion that if the state is in position to create the proper blend
of norms, values and rules to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, no matter what the size of
the government accelerated growth and development will be achieved.93 The creation of such
social values and norms is called social development or social capital accumulation. For Meles,
social development is thus not only an essential element of development but also a critical
instrument of accelerated economic growth.94

The works of Meles and the official documents of the government show that the Ethiopian DS
model gives emphasis to phased structural transformation that began with agricultural
development and later spilled over into industry. Recent publications of the ruling party explain

89
For this reason, in this thesis whenever the idea of Meles is referred, it can be considered the official stance of the
government as well.
90
Meles Zenawi, States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a Developmental State, in GOOD
GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 140, 142-143
(Akbar Noman et al ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
91
Id, 143-144.
92
Ibid.
93
Id, 146-147.
94
Ibid.
18
in detail how economic transformation is at work in the country.95 The documents contend that
the economic successes that the country witnessed in the last decade or so should be credited to
the democratic developmental strategies and practices.

On the other hand, almost all of the opposition political parties accuse the regime of using
development as an instrument of consolidating its grip on power by undermining constitutional
democracy. Temesgen Zewdie, one of the influential leaders of Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD aka Kinjit) and former MP, maintains that in the name of economic
development the ruling elites are using the model so as they would not face the challenges of
democratic dissent and preserve their illegitimate and unconstitutional authority to misrule
without the democratic consent of the people.96 In the same way, it is argued that the DS model
is an attempt to justify a heavy hand in the Ethiopian economy by the government.97 According
to Messay Kebede, the recourse to the DS model has a purpose of creating the conditions for a
long-term rule of EPRDF by siphoning off popular support from opposition parties to the point
of making them irrelevant.98

Despite such criticism, EPRDF contends that the adoption of DS is a well weighed response to
the existing bad conditions in the country. In fact, when the ruling party came to power in 1991
Ethiopia was still suffering from two decades of civil wars, famine, ethnic conflicts, military
dictatorship, the lowest level of development, and a weakly construct state.99 As a result, the
countrys economy was deteriorating leading to drought, poverty, unemployment, very poor
human development indicators, and the government did not have adequate financial resources at
its disposal to provide essential public services.100 Thus, it is argued that the new government of

95
Six publications on different topics including the GTP evaluation were distributed in the partys 9 th Annual
Conference in Bahir Dar on March 2013. But the publication entitled Seketamawi Ye Tehadiso Guzuachin Ena
Mechiw Bruh Tesfachin (March 2013) details the successes of developmental state in Ethiopia, see pp. 43-87.
96
Temesgen Zewdie, EPRDFs Way of Denying the Inalienable (08 February 2016),
http://addisfortune.net/columns/eprdfs-way-of-denying-the-inalienable/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
97
Tsehai Alemayehu, The Ethiopian Developmental State: Requirements And Perquisites, 7 (8) JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH 11, 16 (2009).
98 Messay Kebede, The Fallacy of TPLFs Developmental State (2011),
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33340/ (last visited June 11, 2015).
99
THE WORLD BANK (2013), Building the Developmental State A Review and Assessment of the Ethiopian
Approach to Public Sector Reform, (Report No: ACS3695), ii.
100
Ibid.
19
Ethiopia embarked upon a long term strategy of state transformation that ultimately found
expression in the political leaderships vision of a DS.101 As will be explained below, some
argue that in the years between 1991 and 2005 EPRDF was preparing the country for take-off
through the Revolutionary Democracy (RD) ideology.

As it is common in DS, now, the Ethiopian government actively involves and intervenes in the
market or the economy. Accordingly, Ethiopias DS model has given power and authority to the
government bureaucracy to plan, supervise, and implement the developmental processes of the
country.102 In fact, it is indicated that the DS model gives due attention to priority industries such
as garments and textiles, agro-processing, meat processing, leather and leather products, and
construction.103 The ruling partys political leaders argued that the decision for the state to
actively lead the development process is fruitful.104

For Elias Nour, in the context of Ethiopia, institutional capabilities which are conditions for
effective developmental pursuits and for the corresponding rise in standards of living include
the requisite knowledge base, work ethic, level of trust in the society, the culture of saving and
investment, conducive laws and policies, good governance, and meritocratic job assignments.105

However, compared with the EA countries there is great gap between the situation in Ethiopia
and the EA DSs on the creation of autonomous bureaucracy. While the traditional EA DS model
relies on an independent state bureaucracy committed to economic growth and transformation,
within the Ethiopian approach the ruling party overlaps with state administration at all layers.106

101
Ibid.
102
Asayehgn Desta, The Effects of Rent-seeking in Dissipating Developmental Efforts: The Ethiopian Experience, 2
(1) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT TOMORROW 1, 2 (2012).
103
ARKEBE OQUBAY, MADE IN AFRICA: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN ETHIOPIA 79 (Oxford University Press,
Oxford , 2015).
104
Alex de Waal, The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi, AFRICAN AFFAIRS 148, 152 (2012).
105
Elias N. Stebek, Ambiguities and Inconsistencies in the Prescriptions toward Development, 6 MIZAN LAW
REVIEW 311, 332 (2012).
106
Emanuele Fantini, Developmental State, Economic Transformation and Social Diversification in Ethiopia, ISPI
1, 4 (Report No. 163, 2013).
20
As a result, the civil service in Ethiopia is not immune from politics 107 and the public sector has
not been able to either to retain or attract capable people.108

Assefa notes that, in some institutions, EPRDFs reform agenda has been used as a means to
avoid unwanted technocrats and replace them by political loyalists.109 He writes: Instead of
insulating this sector from politics, EPRDF indeed attempts to swell its size by increasing its
members in the civil service. It is widely believed that recruitment, retention and promotion to
higher positions within the civil service are very much influenced by membership in the ruling
political party and political affiliation.110

In any country, the amount and types of FE will vary with the form of government, the degree of
political stability, the level of wealth, the state of technology, the general level of education, the
culture, and the structure of the news media and other media of expression and communication,
and numerous other factors.111 No doubt, these factors are of significant importance for Ethiopia
as well. However, the primary emphasis lies only on the model of governance. The focus of this
thesis is therefore, examining the impact of the model of governance, if there is any, on FE in
Ethiopia.

3.2 Illiberal measures?

Generally speaking, in Ethiopia, the tradition of suppression reigns over the tradition of dissent
when it comes to using FE for political purposes.112 However, the FDRE Constitution and the
legal framework governing FE have provided a powerful means to change this deeply rooted
culture in the country. In fact, FE and freedom of the press were some of the many fundamental
rights recognized by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) under the leadership of

107
Recently the government has engaged in massive indoctrination program in the civil service and the higher
learning institutions.
108
Assefa defines civil service as experts that implement policies and whose tenure is not dependent on elections but
on merit and efficient delivery of services. See Assefa Fiseha, Development with or without Freedom?, in
REFLECTIONS ON DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA: NEW TRENDS, SUSTAINABILITY AND
CHALLENGES 69, 73 (Desalegn Rahmato et al, ed., Forum for Social Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Addis
Ababa, 2014).
109
Id, 76.
110
Ibid.
111
LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?, 186 (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2005).
112
STUDY ON THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFRICA: ETHIOPIA CASE STUDY 286 (Costantinos Berhe
et al eds., Global Coalition for Africa Centre for Human Environment, Washington D.C, 1994).
21
EPRDF. Moreover, the transitional government has made commitments to promote civil liberties
and pledged to support FE.113 Indeed, after many decades of total government control over the
mass media, the decision to abolish formal censorship bodies that existed for many decades
during the previous regimes was a fundamental change.114 Except during brief spells of turmoil
in central government, the country never enjoyed an uncensored press before.115 In addition,
private press was allowed in the Transitional Charter.116 Then, when a Press Law was
promulgated in October 1992, details were sorted out.117 These measures led to an unprecedented
proliferation of privately run newspapers and magazines.118

At the beginning of the transitional period, the government has tolerated numerous critical and
sometimes misinforming or abusive articles and cartoons, which were published in the private
press.119 In fact, it is indicated that many of the publications were almost unanimously hostile to
the government that makes way for their existence, and all too eager to find fault.120 The
governments patience and tolerance was withdrawn in final phases of the transition where the
authorities took strong measures against the private press on many occasions, particularly over
articles that dispute the government policies.121

Then the 1995 FDRE Constitution comes into effect, which in Article 29 provides a
comprehensive guarantee for FE. The international and regional human rights instruments which
clearly guarantee FE are expressly incorporated into the Constitution.122 Sub-Article 1 and 2 of
Article 29 provides the basic principles of FE with similar words to that of the ICCPR. Likewise,
the Constitution under Article 29 (3) (a) prohibits any form of censorship. Furthermore, in Art.

113
Berhane G. Mariam, The Ethiopian Freedom of Mass Media Has Been Disregarded and Still Remains in an
Uncertain Future, 4 NORD-SUD AKTUELL 641, 642 (2002).
114
Ibid.
115
Andreas, supra note 1 at 10.
116
The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazzeta, No. 1, 22nd July, 1991, Art. 1.
117
Proclamation 34/1992, published on 21 October 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 52nd year, No. 8.
118
Shimelis Bonsa, The State of the Private Press in Ethiopia, in ETHIOPIA: THE CHALLENGE OF
DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW 184, 184 (Bahru Zewde & Siegfried Pausewang ed., Nordiska Afrikainstitutet,
Uppsala and Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa, 2002).
119
Berhane, supra note 113 at 642.
120
SARAH VAUGHAN & KJETIL TRONVOLL, THE CULTURE OF POWER IN CONTEMPORARY
ETHIOPIAN POLITICAL LIFE 72 (Sida Studies No. 10, 2003).
121
Berhane, supra note 113 at 642.
122
Article 9 (4) of the FDRE Constitution.
22
29(3) (b) it guarantees access to information of public interest. Sub-article 4 and 5 of the
article require the state as well as the private media to be operationally autonomous and to
entertain diversity of opinion.

One has to be aware that a constitution only reflects commitment to a general concept of FE. 123
But the particular understandings or conceptions of that freedom in a specific country are best
elucidated by subordinate laws and examination of the practice. Thus, it is important to highlight
how the general concepts of FE as enshrined under the Constitution have been treated in the
subordinate legislations and practiced upon the countrys political scene.

It was still early for FE to be conceptualized and applied when the government was speculating
to switch its growth model to DS at the end of 2005. In this respect, Gedion Timothewos writes
that the constitutional guarantee of FE is not effective in fostering political dissent and freedom
of the press as there is hardly any free press or freedom for political dissent on the ground despite
what the Constitution provides.124

Unexpectedly, in the run up to the 2005 elections, both government media and the private press
enjoyed extensive freedom during the campaign period and on voting day. Back then, Bereket
Simon, the former Minister of Information, said [w]e wanted the people to feel free, to believe
in themselves. To see that governments can be criticized if its well founded, to show that
governments are accountable to the public and that they are bound to be criticized if they make
mistakes. We wanted to show we were a tolerant government.125

But the situation took a dramatic turn in the aftermath of the election. Fifteen journalists were
among the more than 100 opposition party leaders and civil society leaders that were arrested
and tried in the aftermath of the election.126 The journalists were primarily charged with crimes
of treason or as conspirators of the opposition who were accused of attempted

123
Barendt, supra note 78 at 3-4.
124
Gedion Timothewos, Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia: The Jurisprudential Dearth, 4 (2) MIZAN LAW
REVIEW 201, 205 (2010).
125
Quoted in Nicole Stremlau, The Press and the Political Restructuring of Ethiopia, 5 (4) JOURNAL OF
EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 716, 724 (2011).
126
Id, 716-717.
23
genocide, armed rebellion and "outrage against the constitution and the constitutional
order." They were also accused of trying to stage a conspiracy to overthrow the government.127
Only a few journalists were charged with violations of the press law.128

After 2005, different laws have been enacted by the Ethiopian parliament which challenges
liberal understanding of civic and political rights, and narrow political space. The mass media
and access to information proclamation, the broadcasting proclamation, the anti terrorism
proclamation, and the charities and societies proclamation are some illustrations of that.

Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation 590/2008 under part III
introduced freedom of information law. Indeed, this law on the right of access to information is
the first of its kind in the country.129 Under this law, constitutional and legislative safeguards for
access to information in Ethiopia are provided. Consequently, it is pointed out that this is a clear
departure from the past and one step forward in the right direction in the field of information.130

However, areas of public and official activity that are excluded from press scrutiny and inquiry
or deemed secret under Proc. 590/2008 which include protection of public peace and security,
security of individuals, property and witnesses, protection of impartiality of judicial process and
criminal investigation, protection of national security, defense, cabinet security, protection of
international relations, protection of unlimited and open discussions between ministers and civil
servants and protection of impartiality of decisions, and protection of law enforcement
operations without obstruction, are highly criticized for being vague and ambiguous.131 In
addition, as the lists of limitations are so broad, it seems that the principle of access to
information is guaranteed in exceptional circumstances.

127
Tracy J. Ross, A Test of Democracy: Ethiopia's Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 1047, 1052-1053 (2010).
128
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 716-717.
129
Derbew Temesgen, Legal Safeguards for Freedom of Information in Ethiopia, 1 ETHIOPIAN BAR REVIEW
125, 128 (2010).
130
Id, 129.
131
Ross, supra note 127 at 1055.
24
Some commentators argue that these limitations are not even in conformity with the
Constitution. For one researcher, such prohibited matters are broad enough to make the
governments intention of creating an open and transparent government to be ideal.132 Concerns
have been raised locally and internationally that the law is designed to safeguard government
information rather than facilitate transparency and public debate.133 It is contended that the law is
intended to curb criticism of government leaders and policies, and aims to fortify government
officials and institutions with a shield of secrecy impregnable to the prying eyes of the press.134

Even under the Constitution, there are a number of questions that need to be addressed when one
comes to limitations imposed on FE through duly enacted laws. Sub-Article 6 and 7 of Article 29
of the Constitution provide limitation grounds on FE. As indicated earlier, the three-part criteria
to limit FE includes prescribed by law, serving legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic
society. Taking into account this international principle of human rights, which the Constitution
makes the benchmark for the interpretation of its bill of rights, the limitation criteria outlined in
the Constitution seem to have some gaps.

Article 29 (6) states that limitations of FE can only be made through laws. Thus, it fulfills the
first criteria. Under the international instruments, in addition to being prescribed by law,
limitations on FE must be necessary in a democratic society to advance the general welfare or the
rights and freedoms of others, public health, public moral, safety, order or national security in
order to be considered legitimate. Similarly, Article 29 (6) provides the kinds of limitations on
FE.

However, the list of grounds is not in conformity to the international instruments. In fact,
although the list appears to be exhaustive, it leaves out some grounds of limitation that are
usually considered as legitimate grounds of limiting free speech such as national security, public
order, public health and the need to uphold the integrity of the judicial process and the fair trial

132
Id, 1058-1062.
133
T. S. Skjerdal, Between Journalism Universals and Cultural Particulars: Challenges Facing the Development
of a Journalism Programme in an East African Context, 1 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN MEDIA STUDIES 23, 25
(2009).
134
Ross, supra note 127 at 1058-1062.
25
rights of individuals.135 For this reason, the list of grounds for limiting freedom of expression,
expressly mentioned in the Constitution cannot be taken as an exhaustive list. The danger of this
implication is that it seems to invite additions of other reasonable grounds of limitation which
might ultimately result in a very long list that would jeopardize FE.136

Moreover, Article 29 (7) stipulates that Any citizen who violates any legal limitations on the
exercise of these rights may be held liable under the law. It seems Art. 29 (7), in the absence of
Art. 29 (6), only provided the first requirement of the limitation. In relation to this issue, Gedion
writes: If read by itself without taking sub-Article 6 into account, this article might be
understood as saying that so long as a limitation of the right has a legal or statutory basis, it is
acceptable.137 Perhaps the same reason has tempted one researcher to conclude that the country
is turning into governance of rule by law rather than rule of law while emphasizing that post-
2005 legislations have not taken the legitimate aim and democratic necessity into
consideration.138

Similar concern is raised on Article 43 (7) of the proclamation which provides that defamation
and false accusation against "constitutionally mandated legislators, executives and judiciaries"
will be prosecutable "even if the person against whom they were committed chooses not to press
charge[s]." The provision is also viewed as intending to insulate officials from the
embarrassment that accompanies a decision to lodge a complaint.139

The other important legislation on FE is Broadcasting Service Proclamation No. 533/2007 which
amended Broadcasting Proclamation No. 178/1999. According to Article 23, bodies not to be
issued with licenses include foreigners and political parties. Article 30 (4) lists grounds for
limitations on broadcasting media which include undermining the belief of others; committing a

135
Gedion, supra note 124 at 219-220. See also, Yonas Birmeta, Freedom of Expression and Crimes against Honor
under Ethiopian Law: An Assessment of their Compatibility, 2 ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SERIES 99,
103 (2008).
136
Gedion, supra note 124 at 219-220.
137
Id, 213-214.
138
Adem Kassie, Rule by Law in Ethiopia: Rendering Constitutional Limits on Government Power Nonsensical,
CGHR WORKING PAPER 1-17 (University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, Cambridge,
2012).
139
Id, 8.
26
criminal offense against the security of the State, the constitutionally established government
administration or the defense force of the country; maliciously accusing or defaming
nation/nationalities, or peoples; and causing dissension among nationalities. As pointed out
earlier, in addition to being vague and ambiguous, the proclamation introduces blasphemy and
national security as limitation grounds which are clearly absent from the Constitution.140

Article 43 of the Broadcasting Proclamation imposes obligation, not only on the state but also on
private broadcasting outlets, to allocate free air-time to political parties. However, this right is
limited to election times. It is doubtful if these limitations are consistent with the Constitutions
stipulations that the state media should be operationally independent from the government and
that it should entertain diversity of opinion in the interest of the effective functioning of
democracy.141

In practice, there is a strong claim that the situation facing human rights defenders and journalists
has continued to deteriorate since the passing in 2009 of the Proclamation on Charities and
Societies and the Proclamation on Anti terrorism.142 For instance, under Article 6 of the Anti-
terrorism proclamation, journalists are punished with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years
when they publish or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by
some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an
act of terrorism. Moreover, Articles 12 and 14 of the proclamation give the national security
intelligence services unfettered powers to search and impound broadcast equipment and force
journalists to reveal sources of their stories. The proclamation has been used to threaten with
prosecution human rights activists and journalists for any acts deemed to be terrorism under the

140
There is another alternative argument which says that since the FDRE Constitution is interpreted in light of
international instruments, and national security is recognized as a limitation ground, it does not mean it is
deliberately excluded.
141
Andargachew Tiruneh, The State Media in Ethiopia: An Investigation into Whether or not it is a Public Service
Media, 11 ALEMAYEHU HAILE MEMORIAL FOUNDATIONS BULLETIN 50, 62-63 (2013).
142
Agns Callamard, Accountability, Transparency, and Freedom of Expression in Africa, 77 (4) SOCIAL
RESEARCH 1211, 1229-1230 (2010).
27
law's vague definition of the term.143 Particularly, the government is continuously accused of
using the anti-terrorism proclamation to squash freedom of the press, as well as dissent.

Abusing the anti-terrorism proclamation to attack critical minds is best exemplified with the case
of Zone 9 bloggers. On 25 and 26 April 2014, six Zone 9 bloggers Atnaf Berahane, Mahlet
Fantahun, Natnael Feleke, Befeqadu Hailu, Zelalem Kiberet, Abel Wabela) and three journalists
(Tesfalem Waldyes, Asmamaw Hailegeorgis, and Edom Kassaye) were arrested by Ethiopia's
government. The arrest led to widespread outcry even among those generally supportive of the
ruling party's policies.144 Friends and readers portray the Zone 9 bloggers as young and
principled activists pressuring Ethiopia's government to respect the country's liberal 1995
constitution.145 Before their arrest, they were engaged in advocating freedom of expression.146

Initially, the authorities suspect that the bloggers were working with foreign advocacy groups to
try to create unrest using social media. Later on, the bloggers including Soliana Shimelis (in
absentia) were charged with terrorism. What is frustrating for many is the fact that, after
spending a jail term of more than a year they were proved innocent on October 16, 2015. The
decision seems to justify the observations of some commentators which accuse the Ethiopian
government of failing to balance the essential right of free speech with national security
interests.147

In May 2012, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (the African
Commission), in its report entitled Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia states that it is gravely alarmed by the arrests and prosecutions of
journalists and political opposition members, charged with terrorism and other offences
including treason, for exercising their peaceful and legitimate rights to freedom of expression
and freedom of association. It also calls on the Government of Ethiopia to remove restrictions on

143
Ibid.
144
William Davison, Arrests headline Ethiopia press freedom fears (01 May 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/arrests-headline-ethiopia-press-freedom-fears-
201443012294640663.html/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
145
Ibid.
146
Ibid.
147
Lindsay Church, Striking the Balance: Combating Terrorism and Preserving the Freedom of Expression in
Ethiopia (January 26, 2016), http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/01/striking-the-balance-combating-terrorism-and-
preserving-the-freedom-of-expression-in-ethiopia// (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
28
freedom of expression imposed on the Mass Media by the Access to Information Proclamation
and the Anti-terrorism Proclamation that do not conform to rights of freedom of expression
provided in international human rights law.

These legal and administrative measures coupled with the practice have substantially changed
the state of FE in Ethiopia after 2005. It is noted that the adoption of the DS model in Ethiopia
heralded the digression on FE. Tamrat Gebregiorgis, managing editor of the private business
weekly Fortune, notes that after the adoption of the DS drastic regression from the Constitution
based on the laws and the politics is observed. He says:148
The FDRE Constitution is a liberal document. But over the years I see regression on the
Ethiopian political landscape, and particularly from the side of the ruling party in eroding
freedom of expression. Since 2005 EPRDF has come to believe that its outlook and view
has to prevail over all others. This has resulted in a regression of allowing dissent to be
expressed in public.

Another indicator of the impact of the DS model on FE is the fact that after 2005, the number of
private newspapers and magazines has greatly reduced.149 After the 2005 violence, the majority
of the newspapers that were opposed to the government were closed either because their editors
and journalists had been arrested, fled the country or due to the printing presses refusing to print
their papers.150 As a result, the impact of the private press is significantly weaker than what it
was prior to 2005.151

The Ethiopian DS model also shares some features with other DSs on how to handle FE. These
include instrumental value of FE, prioritizing socio-economic rights, ideological hegemony, and
pushing the private media aside and imposing development journalism.

148
Interview with Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Managing Editor of Fortune, in Addis Ababa, (May 27, 2014).
149
Terje S. Skjerdal & Charles Muiru Ngugi, Institutional and Governmental Challenges for Journalism Education
in East Africa, 28 AFRICAN JOURNALISM STUDIES 176, 177 (2007).
150
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 717.
151
Ibid.
29
3.2.1 Instrumental value of freedom of expression

As noted above, FE has both intrinsic and instrumental values.152 As the primary emphasis of
DSs is to achieve development in a very short period of time, in the initial stages of the DSs, the
intrinsic value of FE is not recognized. Rather, FE is suppressed unless its instrumental value is
recognized.153

Similarly, Ethiopia seems to narrow the scope of FE as it can be inferred from the great deal of
emphasis on its use as an instrument of development. The government perceives FE as part of its
political project.154 Against the basic assumption of the federal normative framework of the
Constitution which empowers local administrations to participate in the decision-making
process, the government directs policies from the centre. In this context, even if FE is utilized to
consult the masses, the federal government usually do not change its policy afterwards.155 To
the contrary, freedom of discussion and criticism by its members will not change the intended
outcome as the democratic centralism principle of the ruling party helps to maintain unity of
action.156 Thus, EPRDF considers the instrumental value of FE and uses it only when beneficial
for consolidating power and making better policies.157 As a result, the government limits the use
of FE to the discussion on the issues of development, rather than broadly enforcing it to reach a
consensus on the major issues defining the system such as constitution, issues of succession,
federalism, and land reform.158 Consequently, the state media outlets are allegedly operating with
similar philosophy and working procedures to that of the EPRDF.

In the context of using FE as an instrument of development by DSs, its facilitative role for the
creation of national consensus and in ensuring accountability on the development project can be

152
Yvonne M Burns, Freedom of Expression under the New Constitution, 30 (3) THE COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 264, 266 (1997).
153
For instance, the DS of Singapore has attracted persistent criticisms from international organizations for being
suppressive of freedom of expression. It is argued that freedom of expression serves the executive's narrow political
interests rather than promoting independent reporting. As a result, the press control regime has turned the press into
an established political institution in Singapore, playing a role of maintaining the status quo. See Tey, supra note 16
at 876-878.
154
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 717.
155
Ibid.
156
Ibid.
157
Id, 728.
158
Ibid.
30
mentioned. The presumption is that, unless national consensus is created on the core values and
goals of the society, development will be impeded.159 While emphasizing on the need to establish
broad-based national consensus and warning against exclusion and suppression, Anthea J.
Jeffery argues that suppression can only confer a false sense of temporary security; whereas
freedom of utterance, even though it is rebellious, constitutes a safety valve that gives timely
warning of dangerous pressures in the society.160

Of course, it is not important and even impossible for any state to attain 100% consensus in
general. But at least there is a need to have consensus on some major issues like on the basic
rules of the game. How to create national consensus which outlines ways of conducting
developmental roles and how to sustain it is rather a complicated matter in the newly emerging
DSs such as Ethiopia. This is where observers witness a delink between a model of a DS and the
aspiration of the government in going towards a DS and the practice on the ground. Even those
sympathetic to the ruling party question if it is possible to create a common mindset of value in
a country as vast and diverse as Ethiopia in a short period of time.161 Similarly, it is submitted
that, without first creating consensus and the needed (political) elite coalition around the
developmental agenda, shifting towards the DS model may be problematic for Ethiopia.162 The
ruling party also insists that national consensus is important if Ethiopia is going to achieve the
desired transformation. For Meles, building consensus on the rules of the game is not only
consistent with the requirements of a DS but may also reinforce and consolidate it.163

However, those in the opposition camp contend that against its continuous pledge to work on the
creation of national consensus, the government is preventing its realization in practice. For
instance, Merera Gudina164 highlights that the ruling partys hegemonic aspiration is what is

159
Jeffery, supra note 71 at 210-211.
160
Id, 205-206.
161
Alex de Waal, supra note 104 at 154.
162
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 14.
163
Meles Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginning (August 2006),
africanidea.org/m_zenawi_aug_9_2006.pdf/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
164
Merara Gudina is a renowned politician and a political scientist active in the Ethiopian politics since 1960s
student movement.
31
preventing the creation of national consensus.165 He also points out that even if the constitutional
framework allows the operation of independent press which can facilitate national consensus, in
practice; it has been working under very precarious conditions.166 One of the major criticisms
against the ruling party is related with the fact that the EPRDFs contribution to facilitate
dialogue or advance broad-based democratic development is minimal.167

In the context of achieving national consensus on core agendas, the role of FE particularly the
media is crucial. Free exchange of ideas is considered the best way to identify point of
differences and bargain over them. However, in Ethiopia, the tendency of the media is either
taking sides and aggravating the problem or merely reflecting on the views and attitudes of the
existing polarized and divided societies in the country without trying to reconcile differing
perspectives on the present and future of the Ethiopian state.168 This is probably why Simon
Gebremedihen argued that the contents in both the private and the government mass media
institutions are not suited to creating national consensus.169 In relation to this, Stremlau writes:
The emphasis on the developmental state, and the use of the media for such ends, has ignored
the latters potentially powerful role as a space for elite negotiation and reconciliation.170

On the other hand, it is asserted that creating a national consensus is not a primary value for the
press, rather it is incidental. For instance, Tamrat says: Our job is to reflect the reality on the
ground. Our job is to help people make an informed decision by informing them timely,
accurately, and credibly. If that does not promote consensus, then that is it. And if it does, that is
a byproduct. 171

The instrumental value of FE is also vital to ensure accountability. It is obvious that, just like any
other projects, those who are responsible for the development projects need to be accountable for

165
Merera Gudina, The Elite and the Quest for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Ethiopia: Lessons to be
Learnt, 10 NORTHEAST AFRICAN STUDIES 160 (2003).
166
Id, 153-154.
167
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 727-728.
168
Ibid.
169
Cited in BIRHANU OLANA DIRBABA, JOURNALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIAN MASS
MEDIA: ESSAYS, RESEARCHES AND REFLECTIONS 45 (Addis Ababa, 2009).
170
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 729.
171
Interview with Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Managing Editor of Fortune, in Addis Ababa, (May 27, 2014).
32
their actions. This starts with systematic pre-evaluations to ensure that all the required
components for development are present.172 Furthermore, beginning with the design, such a
process requires thorough testing until all its contributors and participants can stand behind it and
are willing to be accountable for the end product or products.173

In relation to the Ethiopian DS model, Assefa notes that the high economic growth that has been
registered for a number of years is overshadowed by corruption.174 It is also contended that, to
build a DS in Ethiopia, rent seeking and patronage, which are closely related with corruption,
within the ruling party needed to be thoroughly tackled first.175 FE particularly investigative
reporting can help reduce these problems by ensuring accountability.

3.2.2 Prioritizing socio-economic rights

DSs argue that progress in the areas of social and economic areas is the necessary and sufficient
condition for full-fledged practice of FE as outlined in the international human rights
instruments.176 In other words, economic growth and development must first be firmly realized
before individuals fully enjoy their civil and political rights including FE. 177 The greater
emphasis on development activities in these countries led at times to restrictions upon the
exercise of certain human rights, particularly civil and political rights.178

172
J. Paul Martin, Development and Rights Revisited: Lessons from Africa, 3 (4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 91-92 (2006).
173
Id, 92.
174
Assefa, supra note 108 at 79.
175
Alex de Waal, supra note 104 at 151-152.
176
It is interesting to note that classical EA DSs like Japan, Korea and Vietnam were not signatories to the
international human rights instruments before they successfully transform their economies. Japan, Korea and
Vietnam signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1979, 1981, and 1982, respectively. Singapore is still not a signatory to
both agreements.
177
Roland Burke, Some Rights Are More Equal than Others: The Third World and the Transformation of Economic
and Social Rights, 3 (3) AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIANISM, AND
DEVELOPMENT 427, 427-428 (2012).
178
Id, 436. For instance, in Singapore, the enjoyment of civil and political rights was contingent on cultural and
economic particularities, viewing any overemphasis on individual rights as impeding development objectives. See
also Li-ann Thio, Singapore: Regulating Political Speech and the Commitment to Build a Democratic Society, 1
(3) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 516, 522-523 (2003).
33
Official reports of the Ethiopian government indicate that the country has achieved encouraging
development results, maintaining an economic growth rate of around 11 % for the last decade.179
Even if the disagreement between international financial institutions and the government of
Ethiopia on the rate of growth is rather obvious, the former still confirms that the countrys
economic growth is one of the highest in Africa.180 The peculiarity of the Ethiopian case lies in
the fact that the process of economic growth is not driven by natural resources extraction.181

As a result of strong economic growth, the government of Ethiopia is bringing the poverty rate
down.182 The expansion of public services such as education, health care and transportation is the
primary objectives of the DS of Ethiopia and its investment in infrastructure is the highest in the
African continent.183 In fact, there has also been significant improvement in infrastructure such as
roads and telephone services.184 Access to health centers also improved reducing child mortality
significantly.185 Moreover, export has risen sharply and series of hydroelectric dams have
boosted the economy.186

In line with these successes in the socio-economic areas, Ethiopia seems to push the place of FE
from its holistic purpose to that of accelerating these specific priority areas. Ideally, even as an
instrument of development, FE could help to ensure the fair distribution of the wealth created as
an outcome of the development projects. However, in the Ethiopian context, the role of FE in
adjusting the fair distribution of wealth is insignificant as the great majority of the media outlets
are owned by the state and the government is not making it an agenda. Despite this, in the
literature, it is claimed that there is disaffection regarding the division and sharing of power,
resources, and social opportunities.187 Moreover, even in the presence of high rate of economic

179
Among many official publications of the government and the ruling party, See Seketamawi Ye Tehadiso
Guzuachin Ena Mechiw Bruh Tesfachin (March 2013), at 43-87 and Tir-Yekatit 2004 E.C. issue of Addis Raey, at
34-46.
180
THE WORLD BANK (2015), Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014, (Report No. AUS6744). See also THE
WORLD BANK (2015), Ethiopias Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It, (Report No. 99399-
ET).
181
Fantini, supra note 106 at 2.
182
For instance, between 2004/2005 and 2010/2011 the poverty rate decreased from 38.7 to 29.6%. See THE
WORLD BANK (2012), Economic Update.
183
Assefa, supra note 108 at 79-80.
184
Ibid.
185
Ibid.
186
Ibid.
187
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 15.
34
growth in the country, it is claimed that DS policy of the government has further widened the gap
between the few rich who get richer and the millions of poor who continue to go hungry as the
majority of Ethiopians have failed to share the benefits of this economic growth.188 Similarly,
Elias argues that even if there are commendable achievements in infrastructure, economic
growth and integration with the global economy, the success is well short of the real yardsticks
when it comes to sustainable development and in social wellbeing with a broader mass-base
rather than elite affluence.189 These crucial issues are yet to be the main agendas in the private as
well as public media in the country.

As opposed to this, the government maintains that income distribution is one of the key
ingredients of the DS model. In fact, much of the growth in the past five years is in agriculture
which employees more than 70 million Ethiopians. This has been provided as evidence that the
DS model is indeed broad-based and sharing the benefits fairly and equitably is the utmost
priority to the government.190

In addition, the Ethiopian government argues that it recognizes no hierarchy of importance

between civil liberties and the right to social and economic development. Rather it affirms the
interdependence of the two set of rights as neither can yield the desired result independent of the
other.191 On the other hand, the practice implies that emphasis is given to social and economic
rights as is common in other DSs. It is argued that the ideological shift towards the DS gives priority to
the socio-economic sector than civil rights and political freedoms.192 The government also asserts that
in the absence of equal access to the means of economic development and fair distribution of
income, exercise of civil liberties is bound to remain the preserve of the fortunate few, inviting
mass discontent and political polarity.193

188
Asayehgn, supra note 102 at 2.
189
Elias, supra note 105 at 331.
190
While the draft document of GTPII evaluates the performance of agriculture in the last five years, it explains its
distributive nature. See at 19-22.
191
FDRE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AFFAIRS OFFICE (2015), The Ethiopian Human Rights
Landscape in the Context of Right-Based Approach to Development, Addis Ababa, at 47-48.
192
Assefa, supra note 108 at 68.
193
FDRE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AFFAIRS OFFICE, supra note 191 at 32-33.
35
As was the case in the earlier stages of EA DSs, in Ethiopia as well, it is believed that as the
economy develops, the other rights will progress in time.194 Meles argued that liberal civil and
political rights have no meaning in a context of abject poverty or political chaos.195 Thus,
development and a strong state were prerequisites for human rights, and Ethiopia needed to
establish these first.196 Similarly, Assefa is of the view that improvement in the socio-economic
sector has the potential to create a middle class that will show less tolerance towards the
authoritarian state in the long run.197 Consecutive economic growth, expansion of infrastructure,
improved access to education and health and pro poor policies are given the highest national
priority by the Ethiopian government. In Assefas terms If it succeeds in achieving this, it
produces an educated, informed and demanding middle class, the very forces that put pressure
for change and political liberalization.198 This is what actually transpired in the DSs of EA.199

Similarly, it is argued that Meles was of the opinion that the full exercise of FE should be
delayed for the sake of solidifying the DS.200 He argued that the new economic structures and
institutions required their own political organization such as a hegemonic party; and free press

194
T.S. Twibell, Ethiopian Constitutional Law: The Structure of the Ethiopian Government and the New
Constitutions Ability to Overcome Ethiopias Problems, 21 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L.J. 399, 466 (1999).
195
Cited in Alex de Waal, supra note 104 at 155.
196
Ibid.
197
Assefa, supra note 108 at 68.
198
Id, 85-86.
199
In fact, the East Asian DSs died after successfully transforming the nation using the economic development and
growth. See Robert Pekkanen, After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan, 4 JOURNAL OF EAST
ASIAN STUDIES 363, 363 (2004). For instance, in South Korea, the private sector challenged the state's ability to
perform services and demands to provide them itself as the development brought wealth and power to new classes
and social groups, who use their newly acquired status to press for more independence. See Eun Mee Kim,
Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case, 40 (2)
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 228, 232 (1993). In addition to the private sector, South Korea faced new demands from
middle class groups demanding more democracy and from working classes no longer content with rapid but very
inequitable economic growth. See JOHN MINNS, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENTALISM: THE MIDAS
STATES OF MEXICO, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN 2 (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006). As a result,
the country has broadened and deepened its democratic credentials. See also Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Sun Woo
Lee, and Won Kyung Chang, Participatory Governance in South Korea: Legal Infrastructure, Economic
Development, and Dispute Resolution, 19 GLOBAL BUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL 375,
376 (2006). This democratization has had many positive effects on Korean politics and society, such as human rights
improvement, a better reflection of public opinion in policymaking, fair elections, as well as freedom of speech. See
Uk Heo, Houngcheul Jeon, Hayam Kim and Okjin Kim, The Political Economy of South Korea: Economic Growth,
Democratization, and Financial Crisis, 1 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 1, 2-3 (2008).
200
Quoted in Medhane Tadesse. Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian State, (2012),
http://aigaforum.com/articles/medhaneye-on-meles-zenawi-and-power.pdf (last visited May 17, 2015).
36
distracts such agendas of the DS particularly in its formative stage.201 Similarly, the Ethiopian
government recently states: Indigenization of universal human rights principle in a closed
tradition-bound society could never be realized in a space of a decade or two. It will even take
longer to fulfill human rights in poverty-stricken Ethiopia.202

Despite this emphasis on the socio-economic rights, the Constitution places equal weight on all
generations of rights. The Ethiopian Constitution recognizes democracy, human rights and
individual liberties alongside socio-economic rights. Thus, in Ethiopia, the governments
determination of putting economic growth first and rights/democracy next is not only
problematic but also contradicts with the spirit of the Constitution.203

3.2.3 Ideological hegemony

There appears to be a correspondence between the media in the West and the liberal or neoliberal
ideology. In fact, in the literature, it is argued that, globally, multinationals, including those
which own the giant media corporations, are more effective deliverers of a uniform neo-liberal
world view.204 Thus, the media in the West, it is argued, by promoting the liberal or neoliberal
ideology ensures the reach of the West beyond its borders.205

On the other hand, DSs contend that the ideology of the West is not suitable for developing
countries.206 In fact, during the 1990s, the rapid development of many Asian economies led to
claims for the superiority of a so-called Asian model of democracy as an alternative to the

201
Ibid.
202
FDRE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AFFAIRS OFFICE, supra note 191 at 30.
203
Assefa, supra note 108 at 68.
204
Anita Franklin & Roy Love, Whose News?: Control of the Media in Africa, 25 REVIEW OF AFRICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 545, 545-546 (1998).
205
EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA xviii (Pantheon Books, New York, 2002).
206
For instance, Lee Kwan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, preferred Asian values which mainly
focuses on the need to sacrifice individual freedoms in favor of the collective good which is defined by the rulers of
the day, to provide better solutions. See Hill, Park, and Saito, supra note 17 at 9-10. Even if such emphasis is
criticized for eventually compromising the essential character of the rights themselves, taking them from freedoms
focused on the individual to more collective and state-centric measures, it defined the Asian society. See also Burke,
supra note 177 at 428.
37
Western liberal model.207 Emphasizing on the strength of Asian culture and values such as
family solidarity and community discipline in contrast to the perceived social decay of the West
in general and the United States in particular, the Asian model proponents argued for the
virtues of semi-democratic or soft-authoritarian political models which privileged hierarchy and
order over individualism and competition.208 Similarly, it has often been argued that the
emphasis on political freedom, liberties and democracy is a specifically Western" priority,
which goes, in particular, against these "Asian values.209

In Ethiopia, the sort of democracy that the Constitution seems to accept is the liberal one. Most
importantly, the inherent and universal values of democracy itself such as freedom, human
rights, empowerment, and participation are the cardinal principles of the Constitution that need
to be considered in designing any development model in the country.210 However, liberalism has
became a target from 2006 onward, when thinkers identified capitalist rent-seeking systems and
rent collectors as antidemocratic and antidevelopment forces against which the Ethiopian
government had to struggle.211

As opposed to this, the EPRDF claims that the sort of democracy developing in Ethiopia is home
grown and unique. In the vernacular of the EPRDF this new variant of democracy was/is called
Revolutionary Democracy (RD). Officially, the RD has served as the ideology of the ruling
party until 2005. However, of late EPRDF seems to have shifted from the more ambiguous
ideology of RD to that of DS.212

The ideology of the RD seems to have provided a foundation to the DS model of growth. It is
generally characterized by state control of the economy, and restricts the ideology of the liberal
West. Under this ideology, citizens enjoyment of freedom of speech and the press is highly
restricted.213 The main reason for such restriction is the strong belief of the ruling party on

207
BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY: POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC 194 (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006).
208
Ibid.
209
Sen, supra note 43 at 149.
210
Fana, supra note 83 at 29.
211
Bach, supra note 3 at 650.
212
Assefa, supra note 108 at 69-70.
213
Bach, supra note 3 at 641.
38
democratic centralism which is key for the success of the social revolution that is expected to
be led by a vanguard party without any internal difference.214 It is clear from the foregoing that
FE is considered a distraction against the fulfillment of such grand project. Furthermore, one
commentator observes that RD propagates for a state apparatus that exercises effective control
over the political, economic and social activities of society.215 The party-in-government became
a significant employer, the owner of substantial property, a large bureaucracy, and an institution
from which millions of members and their families acquired a certain social status.216

Generally, in line with the above characteristics, RD is incompatible with FE, or at least its
intrinsic value. For instance, it is indicated that even if the Constitution espouses the liberal
ideals of FE, the ruling party under the guidance of RD has not properly accepted a watch-dog
press.217 Moreover, the fact that the ideology works under the culture of democratic centralism
based on a vanguard party is against the basic tenets of FE.218 As opposed to serving as a forum
for all stakeholders, under RD, FE serves the ruling party as an important discursive tool of
legitimation as well as fighting tool against internal and external opponents or critics.219

When one compares the ideology of the RD and the key features of the DS model, it is easy to
identify certain common characteristics. Both the DS model and the ideology of RD operate
under the top-bottom decision making process, i.e. they apply centralization. They give
preference to the right to basic needs such as food and shelter over FE.220 They also prioritizes
the so-called rights of the masses over the ruling classes or elites.221 It is also observed
that both suppress individual freedom in expectation of a future society to be liberated from
poverty and backwardness.222

214
Ibid.
215
Adem, supra note 138 at 12.
216
THEODORE M. VESTAL, ETHIOPIA: A POST-COLD WAR AFRICAN STATE 186-187 (Praeger Publishers,
Westport, 1999).
217
Id, 187.
218
Bach, supra note 3 at 642-643.
219
Id, 643-644.
220
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 728.
221
Ibid.
222
Vestal, supra note 216 at 186.
39
International rights groups have always contested the treatment of FE in Ethiopia under the
ideology of RD and of late under the DS model. In fact, it is not uncommon to see and hear
International NGOs observing press freedom like Article 19, Freedom House, International Press
Institute, and Reporters Without Borders give dismal ratings for Ethiopia when it comes to
respecting the constitutional right of FE. And Ethiopias rank in the Worldwide Press Freedom
Index has never been good. Moreover, accusations by various human rights activists and
champions of FE in relation to deliberate acts of stifling FE through unconstitutional and illegal
means are vehemently denied by the Ethiopian government. For the Ethiopian government,
behind the negative campaign against Ethiopias treatment of FE lies the liberal ideology which
is accused of promoting the vested interest of the West.223 It is argued that the missions of these
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and Think Tanks around the non-western
world are largely funded by powerful corporations with self-serving global agenda.224

In addition, the government contends that even if the private press is struggling with structural
and administrative problems, the fact that it is, in the majority of instances, subservient to the
neoliberal ideology is aggravating its condition.225 In his exclusive interview with state owned
magazine, Zemen, the former Head of the Government Communications Affairs Office, Redwan
Hussien, points out that the curriculums of the journalism Schools in Ethiopia are oriented with
the liberal ideology and hence amendment has to be incorporated to fine tune their thinking in
the framework of development journalism.226

For the government of Ethiopia, every culture will have its distinctive ways of formulating and
supporting FE and that is exactly what the country is doing.227 In relation to the issue, Arkebe
states: There seems to be disagreement among external observers about whether, for instance,
the ruling coalition is really in favor of neoliberalism, but what is clearer is that, for good or ill,
the coalition does not neatly meet the typical criteria for good governance.228

223
FDRE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AFFAIRS OFFICE, supra note 191 at 3.
224
Ibid.
225
THE FDRE DEVELOPMENTAL AND DEMOCRATIC MASS MEDIA DRAFT POLICY AND STRATEGY
15 (Addis Ababa: Government Communications Affairs Bureau, 2015).
226
ZEMEN MAGAZINE, June 2014 Issue, 6.
227
FDRE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AFFAIRS OFFICE, supra note 191 at 21-22.
228
Arkebe, supra note 103 at 73.
40
Hegemonic leadership over a society occurs when people unite around the material interest and
cultural outlook of a dominant group in such a way that the advance of the dominant group is
perceived as the advance of the society as a whole.229 The ruling party in Ethiopia is developing
such a tendency of I know it all for you!. Those who do not adhere and comply with official
development policies and guidelines are considered as traitors.230 The discourse about economic
development and the fight against poverty become therefore a vector of access or exclusion from
the resources controlled by the state.231 In this context, Tamrat says:232

When there is a choice to be made between ideological preferences and respecting the
law, I dont know where the loyalty for such people who advance ideological hegemony
lies to. The regime allows the existence of dissent and it plays its game within the bounds
of the rule. We have opposition political parties, civil society organizations, publications
not controlled by the state. Some of the publications are even as loud as calling for the
overthrow of the government by popular revolt. Yet, whatever they do, it is very much
controlled and monitored. However, the ruling party may aspire for hegemonic status. As
a result, it may want to push the media it controls through the state to promote that. I see
that they are pushing right and left and closing in on every leftover here and there.

3.2.4 Pushing the private media aside and imposing development journalism

DSs insist that the private media do not promote government or public interest. For this reason,
Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) or Public Service Publisher (PSP) is preferred as opposed to
private media.233 DSs perceive the giant media corporations in the West promoting the interest of
the few liberal economic elites. In fact, the media in the West play a key role to advance the
interests of the few economic elites and propagandize on their behalf as the later control and
finance them.234

229
Hill, Park, and Saito, supra note 17 at 4.
230
Fantini, supra note 106 at 5.
231
Ibid.
232
Interview with Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Managing Editor of Fortune, in Addis Ababa, (May 27, 2014).
233
In Singapore under Lee, almost all of the domestic news media were owned by the government, and all foreign
news media were subject to strict regulation. See WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE
UNIVERSAL?. 39 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
234
Herman & Chomsky, supra note 205 at xi.
41
In principle, the private media can help the government perform better by putting direct and
indirect pressures through its own scrutiny, assessment and evaluation.235 In practice, however,
the contribution of the private media in Ethiopia is insignificant. In fact, the records of the
private press in Ethiopia are low in terms of creating an informed public or exposing the deeds
and misdeeds of the government.236 Private media is usually associated with newspapers and
magazines. Unlike the print media, the broadcasting media seems to be a government monopoly.
Despite the fact that the Broadcasting Proclamation 533/2007 allows commercial stations, the
government has been extremely cautious in granting licenses for private radio stations. In
February 2006, the first private licenses were granted to two local commercial FM stations.237
Even these two companies are allegedly led by journalists seen as sympathetic or aligned to the
ruling party.238 Similarly, the non-governmental Radio Fana is considered as the de facto
establishment of the ruling party.239

According to the FDRE Developmental and Democratic Mass Media draft Policy and Strategy,
the government relies on the services of the public media while the document without any
distinction speaks of the dangers of the private media.240 It is also the assessment of the draft
Policy that the private media in general and the print one in particular is following a direction
which is destructive and stick with a rent seeking behavior. In the earlier policies, the ruling
party also underlines that, if not controlled effectively, the private media may threaten the well
being of the system.241 EPRDF believes that the political parties and the business people with
rent-seeking behavior are behind the operations of the private media industry.242

235
Zekarias Kena, Media and Development in Ethiopia, 9 ECONOMIC FOCUS 24, 35 (2005).
236
Terje S. Skjerdal & Hallelujah Lule, Uneven Performances by the Private Press in Ethiopia: An Analysis of 18
Years of Press Freedom, 3 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION & LANGUAGE ARTS 44, 46 (2009).
237
Skjerdal, supra note 133 at 24.
238
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 721. Of course, even if from what transpires from the content and position of the
broadcasting Zami looks to demonstrate such a claim, Sheger seems to be relatively well balanced. Obviously,
Sheger highly concentrates on soft social issues and avoid hard core politics in the majority of its air time.
Continuing with this tradition, recently licensed station Bisrat has exclusively devoted its airtime to entertainment.
239
Vaughan & Tronvoll, supra note 120 at 72.
240
Deliberations on the draft policy and strategy are ongoing since August 2015.
241
YE DEMOCRACY SEREAT GENBATA TIGEL ENA ABYOTAWI DEMOCRACY (STRUGGLES ON
BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY), (Addis Ababa: Ministry of
Information, 2007), 84. (Amharic, translation mine)
242
Id, 85.
42
Obviously, the fact that the private media are seen as a voice for the opposition is not
contested.243 It is pointed out that, in the majority of instances, the private media concentrated on
entertaining sensational and inaccurate stories, and attack and distort the motivation of
government officials, while championing the interests of particular groups.244 Speaking about the
private press, Meles Zenawi once told reporters that he had seen or heard of no improvement in
the quality of the press products, which still dwell on destructive and war-inciting false
propaganda.245

On the other hand, it is submitted that unlike the public media, the private media allows a space
for literate elites to engage in political debates.246 Particularly, the opposition parties, civil
society and citizens access the private press and share their views on diverse matters where in the
majority of instances alternative ideas are provided.247

Under these conditions, the government has put its faith on public or state-controlled media to
resolve all the problems of the private media. It is argued by the government that the public
media is free from these weaknesses. It is implicit in Art. 29 (5) of the Constitution that the
government will continue to own and control media outlets. It is argued that while the provision
may appear to be about promoting diversity of views, the indirect constitutional legitimization of
the states control over the media is contrary to the principle that state broadcasters must be
transformed into public service broadcasters.248 This principle is clearly affirmed by Principle 6
of the African Commission Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, which
states: State and government controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service
broadcasters, accountable to the public through the legislature rather than the government.

As can be observed from its policies and practice, having the key media outlets at its disposal,
the Ethiopian government has shaped its media policy around the concept of development

243
Skjerdal & Ngugi, supra note 149 at 183.
244
Paul B. Henze, Reflections on Development in Ethiopia, 10 (2) NORTHEAST AFRICAN STUDIES 189, 199
(2003).
245
Cited in Berhane, supra note 113 at 643-644.
246
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 716.
247
Andargachew, supra note 141 at 60.
248
ARTICLE 19, supra note 75 at 17-18.
43
journalism.249 The Ethiopian state media have made development journalism a key concept in
official policy documents after the adoption of the DS model.250 The key concern that frames the
Ethiopian development journalism policy is economic poverty as all societal forces, including
the media, are expected to take part in the process of leveling Ethiopia among middle-income
countries within 20-30 years.251

During the 1970s, development journalism was used to promote particular development
strategies to solve a developing nations problems.252 Generally, the principal arguments in
favor of development journalism include the following:253 during the initial period of growth in
developing countries, stability and unity must be sought; criticism must be minimized and the
public faith in governmental institutions and policies must be encouraged; the duty of the media
is to promote the satisfaction of immediate material needs of a developing nation such as food,
shelter, energy, and health by reporting positively on steps taken in the process; in a society in
which the great majority of the population has no formal education, the publication of conflicting
policies or of criticism of existing policies is confusing to the people and hinders the attainment
of development goals; and unlike state-owned media privately owned media cannot be trusted to
serve the interests of the public as they are owned by a wealthy few, who by their very nature,
present only commercial, sectional or foreign interests.

For this reason, development journalism became popular with DSs in the 1970s and 1980s as a
way to utilize the media for social and national growth.254 These DSs willingly adopted the
model and adjusted it to their system of governance.255 For instance, 'development journalism
has been used to investigate problems of the developing countries.256 However, later on the
process, the notion of development journalism was associated with the fact that "bad"

249
Terje S. Skjerdal, Development Journalism Revived: The Case of Ethiopia, 32 (2) AFRICAN JOURNALISM
STUDIES 58, 58 (2011).
250
Id, 59.
251
Id, 65.
252
Jeffery, supra note 71 at 212.
253
Id, 212-214.
254
Skjerdal, supra note 249 at 58.
255
Ibid.
256
Rolf Annas, News Flow out of Africa: Are Western Media Striving for Excellence in Communication Standards?,
18 (2) AFRICAN JOURNALISM STUDIES 196, 198 (1997).
44
development news (including criticism of government development strategies) should not be
reported at all.257 As a result, it has faced strong criticism from the West.258

Now, the consensus is that development journalism without constructive criticism of the
government and its leaders is meaningless. For Xu, development journalism reports on
achievements and shortcomings in development; focuses on long-term development; stays
independent from government and critiques its leaders; focuses on development issues while
working constructively with the government in nation-building; and empowers ordinary
people.259

However, the Ethiopian way seems to deviate from such an approach. In fact, the government is
always accused of using the state media for propaganda.260 Moreover, the main focus of the
development journalism is on the positive promotion of development efforts, rather than critical
investigation.261 In the majority of instances, the state-controlled media neglects critical stories,
avoid oppositional voices, and hide information from the public.262 For these reasons, EPRDFs
development-oriented state-owned media is heavily criticized.

Art. 29 (4) and (5) of the Constitution require the state media to be operationally autonomous
and to entertain diversity of opinion. In practice, however, the state controlled media is accused
of serving the ruling party only.263 Absolute control of the public media is one manifestation of
abuse of incumbency in the context of using government institutions and resources to the
advantage of the ruling party.264 Now, it is noted that the media policy has resulted in a very
partisan state media which is a propaganda machine for the ruling party.265 Rather than using the

257
Jeffery, supra note 71 at 212.
258
Id, 214.
259
Cited in Skjerdal, supra note 249 at 63.
260
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 716.
261
Skjerdal, supra note 249 at 66. Even in Singapore, it is allowed to report mistakes, corruption, and be critical of
some policies. It is, however, not allowed to ridicule or lampoon the political leadership. See Tey, supra note 16 at
882.
262
Skjerdal, supra note 249 at 69-70.
263
Andargachew, supra note 141 at 62-63.
264
For further information See Gedion Timotheows, Tackling the Imperial Premiership and Abuse of Incumbency:
Ideas for Constitutional Reform in Ethiopia, 6 ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES 162-210 (2014).
265
Id, 207-208.
45
state-run media to create a forum where all stakeholders in the spirit of democracy engage in
constructive exchange of ideas and views, the government has adopted a policy of using media to
discredit its opponents and reassert its leadership.266

Of course, in principle, EPRDF admits that the state or public media should not restrict itself in
explaining government policies and programs and state government activities but it should
include the publics comments and serve as a medium for discussion on these issues. 267 It is not
clear whether EPRDF is recognizing merely the right of expression on behalf of the mass
population or opening its door for all sorts of discussion to the extent of letting its decision-
making process be influenced with the outcomes of these free discussions.

Similarly, the educative role of the media is particularly essential in many developing states
following the DS model. In fact, the media plays a key role to assimilate the changes in the
political, economic, and social structures to the society to resolve the problems of
underdevelopment.268 Furthermore, the media can articulate the advantages and disadvantages of
different development strategies help to relieve the pressure on strained formal educational
facilities, warn of the dangers of overpopulation and the need to conserve resources, and stress
the common humanity which underlies ethnic and cultural differences.269

In the same way, in a country where the teachings of religious establishments gave primacy to
religious, moral, social and cultural pursuits rather than economic endeavours, the media plays a
greater role to instill the developmental thinking in Ethiopia.270 For instance, the state can use the
media to guide and lead the private sector from its preference (rent seeking) to its long-term
interest (value creation).271

All of the journalists working in private newspapers this writer talked to are against development
journalism. For instance, Tamrat Gebregiorgis explains that development journalism is not

266
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 722.
267
YE DEMOCRACY SEREAT GENBATA TIGEL ENA ABYOTAWI DEMOCRACY, supra note 237 at 88.
268
Jeffery, supra note 71 at 198.
269
Ibid.
270
Elias, supra note 105 at 329.
271
Alex de Waal, supra note 104 at 153.
46
something his newspaper is interested in. Tamrat says: I dont understand what exactly
development journalism embodies. The newsroom and the publisher will decide on the content
of every publication to promote values it is established for. For example, in the sense of culture,
economy, and politics, Fortune is a deeply liberal publication. It does not mean that we are
against the developmental project. But we promote a kind of state that is very small but very
effective.272

Melaku Demissie, managing editor of the bi-weekly Amharic newspaper Reporter, while
admitting that the private media has its own problems, he opines that the DS model has further
distanced the private media from engaging in the core issues of the country. 273 Even if Melaku
accuses EPRDF of violating constitutionally enshrined protections for freedom of expression, he
expresses that most of the private media practitioners forget that the press is a platform to
exchange diverse views and opinions. He explains that rather than preparing the media platform
to suit the market place of ideas, and to report the opinions, ideas, feelings, and needs of
citizens, journalists in the private media provide themselves as change agents and serve as
instruments of political activists and propagandists. Melaku also observes that
professionalism, ethics, responsibility, independence are lacking in the private press despite
encouraging improvements after 2005.

In similar vein, Bruh Yihunbelay, managing editor of the English weekly The Reporter, notes
that the government or the ruling party cannot escape blame for the unhealthy state of affairs
between the government and the private press as the efforts to change the situation is close to
nil.274 Bruh indicates that the DS model has pushed and polarized the private media which are
trying to build credibility in the public together with the press the government regarded as a
threat to public order.

Muluken Yewendwesson, editor-in-chief of the English business oriented weekly Capital,

indicates that even if the main purpose of both the government and the media is to serve the best

272
Interview with Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Managing Editor of Fortune, in Addis Ababa, (May 27, 2014).
273
Interview with Melaku Demissie, Managing Editor of Reporter, in Addis Ababa, (May 21, 2014).
274
Interview with Bruh Yihunbelay, Managing Editor of The Reporter, in Addis Ababa, (May 26, 2014).
47
interest of the public, since the government considers itself alone as guardians of the public
interest, it presumes bad motive of the private press.275 He argues that this is the main reason
why the interaction between the government and the private press is not going well.

Messay Wondimeneh, Deputy Chief Producer of FM 97.1, a station operating under the
Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), states that the implementation of the philosophy and
basic principles of development journalism in state-controlled media like EBC has huge gaps and
it is only in the process.276 He attributes these gaps to three basic reasons: One, lack of
understanding the concept of development journalism; Two, the concept is new to the industry
and some of the journalists are resisting it; Three, lack of cooperation from relevant bodies
including government officials and opposition party leaders.

Messay also defends the criticism that claims state-owned media outlets have bias and
partisanship towards the ruling party. He states:277

Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation is a public media so we serve the public not the
government or the ruling party. We offer constructive criticism on the government as
well through our special programs. My hope is it will get better in the future. The legal
framework and our editorial policy guarantee our independence. The fact that we have
become a corporation will help as do better as there are changes in terms of
administration, accountability, and finance. Differentiating editing from censorship is one
of the challenging tasks for journalists. As a result, some mistakes might happen.
However, we always try to be fair and balanced for everyone.

3.3 Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia: Rhetoric or Reality?

Ethiopia does not just adopt the DS model; rather, to give primacy to its democratic ideals, its
DS is called Democratic Developmental State (DDS). Thus, at least in theory, the Ethiopian
model upholds the ideals of democracy including FE. According to official government reports
and party reports, the government of Ethiopia is determined to accelerate and maintain
275
Interview with Muluken Yewendwesson, editor-in-chief of Capital, in Addis Ababa, (February 17, 2014).
276
Interview with Messay Wondimeneh, Deputy Chief Producer of FM 97.1, in Addis Ababa, (March 28, 2015).
277
Ibid.
48
development while strengthening its democratic agenda.278 Meles argued that a DS can be a
democratic state, and indeed that a DDS is likely to be more successful in its development efforts
than others.279 He even argued that democracy is so important that if the price to be paid for
having it is a limited reduction in growth, it is not too much of a price. 280 He also stated: [I]f a
developmental state were to also be democratic, the "hegemonic" nature of its development
project would be achieved faster and held more deeply because it would emerge from free debate
and dialogue.281

The supreme law of the land, the Constitution, obliges the Ethiopian state to be democratic. As
such, it is normal to expect an environment of governance in Ethiopia where the civil society, the
current government, the various opposition groups, and the population in general advance their
enlightened self-interests.282 Moreover, independent scholars, civil society, and opposition
groups can discharge their responsibilities by providing critical input and offer alternative
suggestions on important matters of public policy including development in Ethiopia using such
a forum.283

Obviously, in the presence of democracy FE flourishes. In the other direction, FE plays a key
role in establishing, consolidating, and maintaining democracy. As a matter of principle, the
people must be able to discuss political issues openly, without fear of governmental punishment,
or democracy cannot exist.284 In the West, democracy is almost always assumed to bring
economic development, social harmony, enhancement of human rights, etc.285 It is also
submitted that the chances of achieving broad-based and participatory development and popular
mobilization increases in the presence of democracy.286

278
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 1.
279
Meles, supra note 163 at 2.
280
Id, 10.
281
Id, 14.
282
Sisay Asefa, Developing Democratic Institutions in Ethiopia: The Challenge of Building Enabling Institutions for
Economic Growth and Development, 10 NORTHEAST AFRICAN STUDIES 67, 67-68 (2003).
283
Id, 107-108.
284
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 1 (The
University of Chicago Press, London, 2008).
285
SYLVIA CHAN, LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004).
286
Gordon White, Towards a Democratic Developmental State, 37 (4) INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES BULLETIN 60, 61 (2006).
49
The democratic participation theory of FE submits that FE must prevail in any system that claims
to uphold democratic values as it is almost universally recognized that FE is central to
democracy.287 The three common requisites of democracy are: a well-informed citizenry,
freedom to participation in the decision-making process and ensuring the accountability to the
government officials who are exercising power on behalf of citizens.288 FE facilitates free
political debate which is necessary to enable people to make informed choices and the function
of a democratic system depends upon the maintenance and protection of FE.289

As opposed to this, the history of the most successful DSs indicates that their governance was
fundamentally incompatible with pluralistic forms of democracy and appeared to be
authoritarian.290 In DSs like Taiwan, the phenomenal economic development was achieved under
an authoritarian regime that extended strong control over society, where laws and state
institutions mainly served the development driven authoritarian government rather than
constraining it.291 In the same way, in classic developmental states, single ruling parties often
played a prominent role and did not allow the opposition to have the required space to influence
the political economy of the state.292

The justification provided by these states is that they need not be democratic if the primary goal
is economic transformation. They argue that DSs need to be authoritarian states to be
autonomous from class interests and the demands of pluralized groups, and also to possess the
required force to implement its policies.293 They observe that the authoritarian character of the
state ensures that competing interests based on class, class fraction or sectors are subordinated to

287
Gilbert Marcus, Freedom of Expression under the Constitution, 10 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 140, 140 (1994).
288
Stanley Naribo Opuamie-Ngoa, Functional Democracy and Mass Media: A Critique, 4 (2) GLOBAL MEDIA
JOURNAL 1, 1 (2010).
289
Marcus, supra note 287 at 141.
290
Vicky Randall, Political Parties and Democratic Developmental States, 25 (5) DEVELOPMENT POLICY
REVIEW 633, 633 (2007).
291
Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Democracy-Driven Transformation to Regulatory State: The Case of Taiwan, NATIONAL
TAIWAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 31, 33 (2008).
292
Randall, supra note 290 at 649.
293
Kim, supra note 199 at 229.
50
the states goals.294 They note that as democracy has an inherent tendency to disperse power and
slow down decision-making processes, it exposes the state to different and contradictory societal
demands.295 Democracy is also regarded as a potential impediment at the early stages of
development and a luxury which poor societies can ill afford.296 In order to follow a strict
developmental path, it is argued, one needs to limit societys ability to counteract the states
efforts, mentioning the difficulty to sustain the DS in a fully democratic system in which people
enjoy extensive rights.297

For Johnson, democracy has never been the source of legitimacy for the DSs. Rather, the
legitimacy of DSs come from the overarching social projects their societies endorsed and they
carried out or the states achievements, not from the way it came to power.298

Despite constitutional safeguards, some argue that the democratization process in Ethiopia has a
high ingredient of rhetoric not backed by practice.299 EPRDF uses democracy as a tool to reach
development, rather than an objective in itself.300 In this context EPRDF states that democracy is
a key instrument in promoting the struggle of putting in place the developmental political
economy, and removing the rent seeking political economy.301

As a result, the ruling party is accused of imprisoning the leaders and supporters of the
opposition, and cracked down on pro-democracy militants, the press, and human-rights activists
in the past two decades.302 One commentator argues that if democracy is the way for extricating
Ethiopians from the present abyss, then one must take democracy seriously-which means going

294
Hugo Radice, The Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism, 29 (6) THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY
1153, 1154 (2008).
295
Fritz & Menocal, supra note 24 at 536-537.
296
White, supra note 286 at 61.
297
Bolesta, supra note 22 at 107-108.
298
Chalmers Johnson, The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 32,
52-53 (Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., Cornell University Press, Cornell, CA, 1999).
299
J. Abbink, Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath, 105 (419)
AFRICAN AFFAIRS 173, 174 (2006).
300
Bach, supra note 3 at 649-650.
301
See the 2006 EPRDF Congress Report.
302
Maimire Mennasemay, A Millennium Democratic Goal for Ethiopia: Some Conceptual Issues, 55 (1) AFRICA
TODAY 3, 3 (2008).
51
beyond the ritual of elections and tackling the political, social, and economic totality of the
Ethiopian experience of destitution.303

One can observe from the practice of the Ethiopian DS model that priority is given to socio-
economic rights at the expense of civil and political rights. The suppression of opposition
members and their leaders, civic organizations, independent media, trade unions, and critics
could be presented as evidence.304 Particularly, EPRDF is accused of tolerating elite opposition
voices and parties as long as they are not a serious distraction to its rule.305 Making it more like
the classical DSs than what it promises to be.

Some fear that constructing the DS in Ethiopia will further elongate the agenda of democratic
transitions, a process which has taken long already.306 For instance, the last two national
elections have resulted in the EPRDF absolutely dominating the parliament. In the current
parliament there is no single seat for the opposition. Setting aside the weaknesses of the
opposition camp, the DS model seems to give the EPRDF extra courage to delay the
democratization process. In this context, Assefa argues that, among other things, the relatively
improved service delivery at grass roots level coupled with controlled freedom to the fragmented
opposition (due to lack of clear and coherent alternative policy, owing to pressure from outside,
lack of internal democratic practice and power rivalry within itself) yielded in one party
dominated electoral outcome.307

It is pointed out that democracy in the DSs is different from the ideals of democracy as known in
the liberal West. Kenichi Ohno, a senior researcher at GRIPS, defined Democratic
Developmentalism (DD) as a political regime in which a developmental party remains in power
for a long time by consecutively winning free elections which permit multiple parties, under
which policies that punish rent seeking and encourage productive investment are implemented

303
Id, 4.
304
Melakou Tegegn, The EPRDF visvis Ethiopia's Development Challenges, 6 (4) AFRICAN IDENTITIES 445,
448 (2008).
305
Stremlau, supra note 125 at 728.
306
Sehen & Tsegaye, supra note 7 at 15.
307
Assefa, supra note 108 at 84-85.
52
with a strong state guidance.308 For Ohno while full democracy realizes popular participation,
political competition, and policy debate in the true sense, DD can be construed as a variation of
democracy which is realistic, manageable and consistent with the national goal of a poor country
that faces many constraints and problems.309 In democracy, the possibility of power change is a
real one, and it is highly unthinkable that one party will consistently keep winning elections for a
number of decades.310 By contrast, the DD has a hidden mechanism which effectively prevents
the opposition from winning such as the distribution of benefits, social and economic
organizations which support the incumbent government, regulation of activities by opposition
parties and anti-government organizations, and so on.311

Many non-state actors including opposition parties complain that the ideology of the ruling party
exclude them from contributing for the betterment of Ethiopia. Mushe Semu, former President of
the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), argues that EPRDF cannot claim to be democratic as it
has developed a sense of exclusivity and consider itself the only body with a divine
responsibility to extricate Ethiopia from abject poverty.312 He said:313

EPRDF does not like to win over the ideas of those individuals outside of its sphere of
influence in a peaceful way. Rather it attacks organs and individuals who hold different
ideas. The former requires skill and capacity, time, money and knowledge. EPRDF
prefers the easier route by applying force to resolve every problem.

In a nutshell, one can conclude the way the Ethiopian government is treating FE has serious
constitutional implications. For one, due to restrictions in freedom of expression democratic
culture has lagged behind. In addition, constitutionalism and rights-based development remains
very weak. Moreover, pluralism, multi party democracy and other principles in the Constitution
are compromised by the application of DS.

308
Kenichi Ohno, Ethiopia: Political Regime and Development Policies, THE NATIONAL GRADUATE
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES 1, 4 (2009).
309
Id, 5.
310
Id, 5-6.
311
Ibid.
312
Interview with Mushe Semu, former President of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), Addis Ababa, (July 24,
2014).
313
Ibid.
53
 Chapter 4

Conclusions and Recommendations

The thesis concludes that the adoption of the DS model have had an impact on the place of
freedom of expression in Ethiopia as recognized by the FDRE Constitution. The Constitution
provides for a sound legal framework to advance the ideals of freedom of expression that helps
the countrys governance in many fronts.

However, these constitutional ideals have not always been put in practice and in Ethiopia
deliberately so. After 2005 the legal and administrative measures and attitude of the government
have raised questions about constitutionalism in the country. These measures are particularly
triggered by the countrys adoption of the DS model. Mainly, this is manifested in the illiberal
laws such as the Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation, the
Broadcasting Proclamation, the Anti-terrorism Proclamation, and the Civil Societies
Proclamation.

Even though the political culture of Ethiopia has been very intolerant of dissent and criticism in
public even before the DS model, the shift in governance has exacerbated such culture. The
number of media outlets substantially declined, the impacts of civil society and political parties
which serve as alternative power source become insignificant. Consequently, to challenge or
criticize of decisions (or policies), or questioning the competence of those in power has remained
to be a rare phenomenon. This makes freedom of expression very fragile in Ethiopia.

The development journalism introduced after 2005 has reduced the public media to a propaganda
machine instead of critical reporting. This is a complete contrast to the Constitution that provides
for transparency and accountability as working principles of government operation, such
emphasis impedes public access on the affairs of the government. This practical role of the
public media doesnt go along with the constitutional stipulation that the public media should
entertain diversity of opinions. Developmental journalism also excludes the private media which
are critical of the government from getting access to state information.

54
While the government is trying to push the economy using the DS model, the space left for
freedom of expression is very restricted as a result. After the adoption of the DS, the
propagandist nature of the media is intensified more than ever, and the status of civil and
political rights is deteriorating. The model is also a threat to the emergence of independent civil
society in Ethiopia as the hegemonic aspiration of the ruling party intends to dictate all walks of
life in the country as it wishes.

Yet, even in such a context, freedom of expression should be considered comprehensively with
particular emphasis on processes and outcome evaluation of development. Freedom of
expression can play a key role in Ethiopias pursuit of achieving accelerated development.
Experiences from democratic countries show that, mass media can change politics and culture,
support democracy and market developments by facilitating the free flows of information that
help citizens to share diverse ideas in order to develop their economic and social affairs.

Dialogue is a very important step towards successful realization of the DS model. Relevant
stakeholders need to understand and appreciate why such a policy is indeed enacted. The
government needs to be open enough to clarify the justifications behind the policy. In the
presence of exclusion and discrimination against some portion of the public the government
cannot claim to be a democratic developmental state. In line with the relative success in the
socio-economic areas, the government should listen and include the ideas of stakeholders as
much as possible.

However, to be able to achieve broad-based participation, revisiting the conformity of some of

the illiberal proclamation having a negative impact on freedom of expression and democracy
with the Constitution is vital. For instance, provisions dealing with vague and ambiguous
restrictions like national security, defamation of public officials, and due process of law under
Procs. 590/2008 and 533/2007 and the Anti-terrorism law should be amended. Moreover, access
to information law that creates bureaucratic hurdles should be eased.

Human right being very critical to Ethiopia, and being an end in its own right must mean policies
and strategies of governments must respect it as that is why it is in the Constitution. In the
55
absence of full-fledged protection for freedom of expression, in the long run the political space
will diminish and it might result in the collapse of the state. Although it seems successful now,
the state should consider the emerging dynamics in the system. Let alone the principles of the
Constitution the rhetorical narratives of a democratic DS is not being respected. Urban educated
population, globalization, youth influence, social media and the like would call for truly applying
the Constitution and the democratic developmental state not in paper but in practice.

56
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Proclamation No. 590/2008, Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information
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Proclamation No. 621/2009, Charities and Societies Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 15th
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Proclamation No. 652/2009, Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 15th Year,
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Interviews
Interview with Bruh Yihunbelay, Managing Editor of The Reporter, in Addis Ababa, (May 26,
2014).

Interview with Melaku Demissie, Managing Editor of Reporter, in Addis Ababa, (May 21,
2014).

Interview with Messay Wondimeneh, Deputy Chief Producer of FM 97.1, in Addis Ababa,
(March 28, 2015).

Interview with Muluken Yewendwesson, editor-in-chief of Capital, in Addis Ababa, (February

17, 2014).

Interview with Mushe Semu, former President of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), Addis
Ababa, (July 24, 2014).

Interview with Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Managing Editor of Fortune, in Addis Ababa, (May 27,
2014).

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