PERIQUET VS NLRC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
(Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.), respondents.

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart where
the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege
in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, private
respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her
purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was
sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual
reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment
to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the judgment amount" due from the
private respondent. 3 Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On
September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989,
the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment. 5

In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond the
five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she
had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement
and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any
Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator
may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five
 (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to
execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed in Lancita v.
Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been previously withheld in
the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny
motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of
Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the
general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement
of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate
as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the
debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment
executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitation has not been devised
against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but
that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC
on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her
demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her
right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of
her dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on March 16, 1987,
and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of
her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments that transpired during and after
this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in the
compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she
worked from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that business, 8 she received a monthly
compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given
the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of
P1,491.33 monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her by the decision
dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine National Construction
Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back
pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release reading
as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby
acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY
(P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me under the judgment award in
NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment
is in full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily
waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my
present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own
fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all claims by way of unpaid
wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in
connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or right of action of whatever
nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-
2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
(Emphasis supplied.) 12

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal
Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have helped me and my
family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of
P9,544.00 among others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying the position of xerox
machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and other statutory benefits, the
private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own
mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on
the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor,
and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same
judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had
accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was
harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC
under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the
second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person,
or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all
her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that
date the decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still the possibility of its
reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise
agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of
P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this should be limited to three
years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed
unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987
must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was
actually employed during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the private respondent to file a
supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is
an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent
claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor
General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must
unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert
appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
RAMIREZ VS BUHAYANG-MARGALLO

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients.
Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders. The
privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage
the case as if it were their own. The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It
cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was
asked by an acquaintance. The professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for
the acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallos (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the
case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was
dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellants Brief on time. She did not
discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity to
conduct fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and
Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of
Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 5

In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallos
services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.7 The
case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68. 8

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend
of Ramirezs sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she
be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorneys fees. 10 It was also agreed upon
that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.11

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12 Atty.
Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of
Appeals.13

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008. 14 On
December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellants Brief. Ramirez notified
Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.15

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellants Brief. Atty. Margallo
informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.16

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still
no word from the Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. 18 She told him
that the Court of Appeals denial was due to Ramirezs failure to establish his filiation with his alleged
father, which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this
court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for
filing an Appeal had already lapsed.20

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellants Brief was filed on April
13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period. 21

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to
take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had
candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case. 23 She
denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the
land subject of the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez
had begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing
on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that
he had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her clients number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and
accidentally erased all her contacts.26

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty.
Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties
then appeared and were directed to submit their position papers.29

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and
be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.30
This was based on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an
Appellants Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of
exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been
remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of Ramirezs statutory right to seek recourse with the
Court of Appeals.32

In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors
resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the Resolution dated March
21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirezs Motion for Reconsideration and increased the
recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years. 35

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court.36 She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she
had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the
first time a Complaint was filed against her.37

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallos Petition for Review.38 In the
Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirezs Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her
Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This courts ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence.41 Lawyers
are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them.
They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of
their ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a
high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-
paying client or an indigent litigant.42

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to clients request for information.

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr., 43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence
in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution. This was
aggravated by the lawyers failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals,
thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions
amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

. . . .

Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
the cases entrusted to the counsels care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyers negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action . While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that
the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted).

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was
palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire
case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law
ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her
duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to
pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her
client. This is an admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption.
Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirezs interest,
which is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons,
she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or
power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry
between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must
attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are
expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in
relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the
client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their
jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that
receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer
and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is
true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation.
It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery
comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full
costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallos position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it is her first
infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6)
months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice
which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence,
suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a
pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months.
In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and
accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallos neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his
legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her
alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must
actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. 46 Under
the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the
constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.
Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the
infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase
the level of professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need
in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical
standard for its members conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with
her lack of candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND
AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
PESTO VS MILLO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 9612 March 13, 2013

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant,

vs.
MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding the
matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates
his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and diligence.

Antecedents

In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence
in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of
title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon; 1 that Johnny and Abella gave to
Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer of title 2 and P10,000.00 for the adoption case; 3 that Atty. Millo
thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer
of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way back in
1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they
confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the
supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of
Atty. Millos office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume
the liability for the accrued penalties.4

Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo
made him and his wife believe that an interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14, 1995, but
when they arrived at the Tarlac DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been scheduled; that
adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home in Quezon City when he
received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when
they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be found; and that they learned after an hour of waiting in the courthouse in
Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their knowledge. 5

Exasperated by Atty. Millos neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the
refund of P15,643.75 representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00 given
for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent
him during his and his wifes absence from the country.

On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer. 6 Although an extension of the period to file was granted at
his instance,7 he filed no answer in the end.8 He did not also appear at the hearings despite due notice. 9
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were held in abeyance
to await the appropriate motion from Johnnys counsel. 10

The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the President of the
IBP on October 28, 1998. 11 It was only on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
scheduled another hearing on June 29, 2001. 12 At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a representative, and
presented a manifestation/motion, 13 whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella would be
withdrawing the complaint against him.

On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed the case submitted
for resolution.14

On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months. 15

In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011, 16 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to return the
amount of P16,000.00, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount of P16,000.00 to
complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed that Abella had already
caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death; that he had already caused the preparation of the
documents necessary for the transfer of the certificate of title, and had also returned the P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that
the adoption case had been finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost contact with Johnny and Abella who resided
in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abellas brother, could have confirmed that the charge had arisen from a simple
misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the complaint, except that Daquis had meanwhile died in
November 2011.17

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millos motion for reconsideration. 18

Ruling

We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients.1wphi1 He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his engagement as
such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and
exercise ordinary care as his clients interests may require.19

Atty. Millos acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to
complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo
assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge
his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to
do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the
capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial
liability in the form of penalties.

Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
 xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent attorney. Yet,
Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long period of time. Despite
being given several opportunities to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby forfeited his right and
chance to reasonably explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had the complaint been untrue and
unfair, it would have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably. Indeed, a refutation was the requisite
response from any worthy and blameless respondent lawyer. His belated and terse characterization of the charge by
claiming that the charge had emanated from a mere "misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the
charge against him, which omission indicated that the complaint had substance. It mattered little now that he had in the
meantime returned the amount of P14,000.00 to the clients, and that the application for adoption had been eventually
granted by the trial court. Such events, being not only post facto, but also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not
obliterate his liability based on the neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he must
now learn is that he could not ignore without consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the IBP allowed him to
justify his neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients concerns. Towards him the Court now stays its hand of leniency,
lest the Court be unfairly seen as too willing to forego the exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept
as he had been towards his clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges granted to him out of
a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being residents in Canada, would have
already lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed this world and be no longer able
to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the Court is not about to condone such
selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed that an attorney who is made a respondent
in a disbarment proceeding should submit an explanation, and should meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him.20 The obvious reason for the requirement is that an attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained
that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all times.

Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled hearings the IBP had set
for his benefit. His disregard of the IBPs orders requiring his attendance in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but
also constituted utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a
lawyer, because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted authorities. 21Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,22 the Court saw the
respondent attorneys odious practice of repeatedly and apparently deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings
as his means of wiggling out from the duty to explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millos disregard is justified.
Indeed, he thereby manifested evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member of the Legal profession should nurture in
himself.

Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the assurances of Abella that she
would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated
attempt to save the day for himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension
or disbarment based on an attorneys professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the
charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or loss of
interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore the withdrawal of the complaint, and continue
to investigate in order to finally determine whether the charge of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by
the record.23 This approach bespeaks the Courts consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble
calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.

Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants are the plaintiffs and the
respondent attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private grievances.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called to answer for every
misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The complainant or any other person who has brought the attorneys
misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 24

The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months as the penalty to be
imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as
to his misconduct, and could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension
from the practice of law because he had caused material prejudice to the clients interest. 25 He should somehow be taught
to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and Abella, who were innocently too willing
to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should
remember that misconduct has no place in the heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no
man for money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under
the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the condign and commensurate penalty for him.

The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title. Although he ought also to
refund the amount of P15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late payment of the capital gains tax, the Court cannot
order him to refund that amount because it is not a collection agency. 26 The Court may only direct the repayment of
attorneys fees received on the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient service to the client. Consequently,
Atty. Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption case, plus interest of 6% per annum,
reckoned from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the sum
of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty days from notice of this
decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marcelito M. Millo's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
TRIA-SAMONTE VS OBIAS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013

MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant,

vs.
EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit 1 filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte (complainant)
against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice.

The facts

In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent, offered for sale a parcel of
agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and
Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of P2,800,000.00 and payable in installments.2 Respondent, who was to
receive the payment from Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale and
owners copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase price. 3 She further undertook to cause
the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential, and the transfer of the title to the names of Sps. Tria
as part of the package agreement. 4 Respondent received all the installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued
receipts therefor.5 After full payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997, 6 and after giving an additional P115,000.00for
capital gains tax and other expenses,7 Sps. Tria requested from respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the
owners copy of the title to them but respondent failed to comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform
clearance for conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential was taking time. 8 Despite several
subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her undertakings under the package agreement. 9

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died. 10 Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps. Tria, again demanded
from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and the certificate of title of the subject property to
them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps. Jeremias informed complainant that they had received the consideration
of P2,200,000.00 and they had executed and turned-over the sale documents to respondent. 11

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by Sps. Jeremias and notarized
by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on May 26, 1998 for a consideration of P200,000.00.12

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,13 claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997 not to proceed with the
processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another buyer. 14 She further averred that Nestor also
demanded from her the return of the purchase price, and that she complied with the said demand and returned
the P2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor sometime during the latter part of January 1998. 15 However, she did not ask for a
written receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the P115,000.00 intended for capital gains taxes and other
expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorneys fees for the other legal services that she rendered for him. 16

In the Courts Resolution17 dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent, 18 only
the complainant and her witnesses testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondents right to present evidence was
considered waived.19

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (Investigating Commissioner), issued
his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent to have violated her oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the
second sale of the subject property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale of the same property to
Sps.Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent received, and admitted to have received, from Sps.
Tria the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for expenses. He further found the second sale of
the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear indication that respondent: (a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps.
Tria and their family; (b) violated their proprietary rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her. 21 On the
other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondents defense that she returned
the P2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the subject
property in their favor, absent any receipt or documentation to prove the same. 22 As counsel for Sps. Tria, respondent
failed in her obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction and, as such, she was found guilty of grave
misconduct and gross malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).23 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of five years.24

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185 25dated October 19,2007
but reduced the suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.

Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration 26 which were, however, denied in the
IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10, 2012. 27

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively liable for violating Canons 17
and 18 of the Code.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her Comment, already admitted
that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,28 which necessarily gave rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them.
The complete turnaround made by respondent in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of Governors
Resolution No. XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no lawyer-client relationship between her and Sps.
Tria,29 cannot thus be given any credence.

Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat of a real estate broker did
not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal
documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be
deemed removed from the category of legal services. 30 Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 31 Thus, in view of
the fact that Sps. Tria knew respondent to be, and transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral
classification of her own acts as being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the lawyer-
client relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the latters admission that she rendered legal
services to the former. With this relationship having been established, the Court proceeds to apply the ethical principles
pertinent to this case.

It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.32 They are duty-bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and
transactions with their clients. 33 Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of their clients. 34 As enshrined in Canons
17 and 18 of the Code:

Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1wphi1
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions were evidently prejudicial
to her clients interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her
clients, she willfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed
from protecting the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the subject
property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in bringing about the defeat of their rights over the said
property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of
Canons 17and 18 of the Code. To add, by turning against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Lest it be
forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.35These unyielding standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a period of five years to just one year by the IBP
Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of
any explanation showing the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." Verily, the Court frowns on the unexplained change made by the IBP
Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Be that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence reposed in them by their
clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them
guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred them. In Chuav. Mesina, Jr., 36 the Court disbarred the lawyer who, upon his
misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property subject of that case, but instead,
offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott, 37 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the
lawyer who, among others, actively sought to sell the properties subject of that case contrary to the interests of his own
clients. As the infractions in the foregoing cases are akin to those committed by respondent in the case at bar, the Court
deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as herein discussed, respondent committed
deliberate violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with her own clients and advanced the interests of another
against them resulting to their loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment
consistent with existing jurisprudence.

As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include an order for the return of
the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit
the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno, 38 it has been held that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability. 39 Thus, the Court's findings during
administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in
nature -meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement 40 as the same
should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature.

WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is accordingly DISBARRED.
WARRINER VS DUBLIN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013

SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses George Arthur Warriner
(Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants alleged that they secured
the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her
spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case
No. 23,396-95 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that respondent did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare
complainants to have waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent did not oppose or file any comment to
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.s move to dismiss the Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No.
23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In a Resolution 2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file
his Comment to this administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000, 3 respondent requested
for an extension of 30 days which was granted.4

However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet filed his Comment. Thus, we
resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure and to comply with the resolution requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice." 5 Respondent
received our directive but chose to ignore the same. 6 In another Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine
of P1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment and to submit an explanation
on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored this Courts directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we
increased the fine to P2,000.00 but respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions. 8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008,
we resolved to order respondents arrest and detention until he complies with our Resolutions. 9

This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance 10 and Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he
failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and
that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail.

In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that complainant Warriner is an
Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his
services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge; that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriners
criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriners claim that the construction being
undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his property; that Warriner
was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his
suspicion of the veracity of Warriners claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by
Warriner were fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of Warriner; that
he visited Warriners property and saw that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion
prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during
which the latter threatened him with a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that
he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws,
Warriner would only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held
administratively liable for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the
legal profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.

In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondents explanation for failing to comply with our directives not fully
satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we
referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the RTC by filing a motion to
admit the formal exhibits almost three months after the prescribed period; that respondent did not present complainants
Marriage Contract and General Power of Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is
out of the country; that complainants marriage is not for convenience; that complainants have a son out of said marriage;
that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the
prosecution; that the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriners claim was not a fabrication.

In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before the Court that Warriner
was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also presented as
witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
indeed failed to secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not
institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses such as Warriners. He insisted
that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation
in his Comment before this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed
by the developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden which he offered as an
exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.

In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more than eight years have
lapsed, it is possible that Benings Garden relocated to another address but it does not mean that it never existed.

In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty of mishandling Civil Case
No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus recommended respondents suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-442 18 dated August 28, 2010, approved with modification the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from
mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBPs Resolution is not supported by facts. He maintained that his
actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence, although belated, exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were
fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the hope that the same would
be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court. He insisted that defiance of
lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or
file comment to the Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his clients.
Respondent argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to his infractions. He alleged that the
records of this case would show that he did not utterly disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He
claimed that this Court should have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file the same,
and not as defiance of this Courts orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was the
alleged mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he disregarded or was
disrespectful of the Courts orders because he was not given any opportunity to rebut the same.

Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He argued that with his
suspension, the other cases he is handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be disbarred or suspended for
five years from the practice of law. To this, respondent filed his Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner
erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument
with the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He maintained that he had nothing to be
remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being
basic and elementary in any legal procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and
puts the controversy submitted for resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court did not consider respondents failure or omission as having such effects, but such failure cannot be
considered as a contemptuous act x x x."

The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for
Reconsideration)19 insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the administrative case does not constitute defiance
of the Courts directives but is only "a natural human expression of frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this
Court and the IBP entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12, 2013, the IBP
Davao City Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local chapter. He
claims that

x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the [IBP] National Office
condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to the profession but will be praised to the heavens, so to speak, by
the local chapter of the same organization for his invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among
others, is to discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law by serving justice in an orderly and
dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by this local chapter being
logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the personal knowledge of undersigneds personal
character, integrity, uprightness, reputation and sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.

As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting aside of that resolution
adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous,
disproportionate and harsh as it may be. Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the
[IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional organizations in the Philippines
worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of disciplining its members
exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled
by its local chapter to high heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same
organization that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.

Our Ruling

Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to
respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997
lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.

Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the submission of his formal
offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set aside the above Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to
Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it
directed E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Again, respondent
failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As a result, Civil Case No.
23,396-95 was dismissed.

Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:

Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein
complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he
deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was
hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the case.
Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct with the matter he is handling" 20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of
these canons and rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden as a fabrication
as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately, respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden
does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants
refuted this allegation by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than eight
years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case,
respondent has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has ceased to exist.

We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court orders and
processes.1wphi1 Note that we required respondent to submit his Comment to this administrative Complaint as early as
year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his
arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but
an order which should be complied with promptly and completely.22

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions in his effort to exculpate
himself. In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No.
23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as
witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before this
Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a disbarment suit. The
Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly,
respondent claimed in his Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating
Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a
heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner
authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. However, he again contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of the
place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an officer of the
Court, he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." 23 He "shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." 24

Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had him arrested for his
adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, as
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla 25 and Pesto v.
Millo,26 commensurate to respondents infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that "suspension is not primarily
intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal profession." 27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months effective upon receipt of
this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this
Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
TAN VS DIAMANTE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint 1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose
Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyers oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to
keep his client informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services of
respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint 3before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed
by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence. 5 While respondent
was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007, 6complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007
when he visited the formers office. 7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the
payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time,
respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the
filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to
respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal 9 before the RTC.10

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainants appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed
complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the
submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the
notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested
for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was
spurious, as certified by the RTCs Clerk of Court. 13Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of
respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. 14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was complainants failure to timely
produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him,
he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He
also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
courts unfavorable decision.16

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation 17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for
a period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against respondent to be well-founded, observing that
instead of meeting complainants allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the
partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand. 19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondents accusation that the spurious November 9,
2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to
cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainants appeal and make it appear that there is still an
available relief left for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report
and recommendation.21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments
of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latters confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to clients request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he may have
acquired affecting his clients case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the clients interests. 22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his
actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause. 23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of complainants
partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter
only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office. To add insult to injury, respondent was
inexcusably negligent in filing complainants appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period
therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men
of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment. 24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007
Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainants appeal had been given due course,
when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent
clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to
continue his practice of law.26 A lawyers inexcusable neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost diligence and
competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should
never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the
dark and conceal his cases true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the Courts pronouncement in Sebastian v.
Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer.1wphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an
attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 30 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of their respective
cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana, 31 the Court suspended the lawyer
for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same
vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of
the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying documents, the
Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi, 33 the Court disbarred the
lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v.
Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant,
that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file
an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondents acts are so reprehensible, and his
violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of
the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the
totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate
punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
LLUNAR VS RICAFORT

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar
(complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and inexcusable negligence and
serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent to file a
case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly
owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was
transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the
complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption price of the
property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed by
the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that
the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to the complainant. He argued that a
complaint2 for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by
him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the
P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for
handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed
that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed
three (3) years late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant
discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29,
2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected
was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the
respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have gravely abused
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons 15 6 and 17,7 and
Rules 1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not informing his client that
he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these infractions, Commissioner
Villanueva recommended that the respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors agreed with the
Investigating Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but modified the recommended penalty
from indefinite suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent to return to the complainant
the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of the complainant's case to
Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria
P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit 14dated
November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.15chanrobleslaw

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in
engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him
the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First,
the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in
redeeming the complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three
years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-
dallied on the complainant's case and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily
available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for
handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the
amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property
from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the
respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent
who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in court, she
demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The
respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These
facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession" 16 and to "account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client." 17In addition, a lawyer's failure to return
upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client.18chanrobleslaw

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was
under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the
time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer
shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The
respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the
complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on
him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the
penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the
respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these
rules. In Nuez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to
satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22
filed against him by his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty
short of disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in character from his previous
offense - we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely
unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP that the
respondent should return the whole amount of P95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of
whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent been
honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant should not be
burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was hired
to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also,
he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record and furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted on the Supreme Court
website for the information of the general public.

SO ORDERED.
NONATO VS FUDOLIN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10138 June 16, 2015

(Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876)

ROBERTO P. NONATO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

We resolve the administrative complaint 1 filed by Roberto P. Nonato (complainant) charging Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr.
(respondent) with gross neglect of duty.

Factual Background

In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto Nonato
(Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a 479-sq.m. Real property ( property) at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The
property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua ( Anselmo),
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. MTC-
282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represen ted by Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty. Garcia). However, at the pre-
trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the respondent in the present case.

The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no formal retainer
agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid.

The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the complainant, engaged his services on Restitutos
representation that they were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the case on a minimal acceptance fee of P20,000.00
and appearance fee of P1,000.00, and did not execute any formal retainer agreement.

The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the MTC, the respondent failed
to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not contact the respondent
despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other
documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status
of their case.

After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective
position papers. Since neither party complied with the courts directive, the MTC dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim on May 26, 2005.

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. He justified his failure to file the position
paper by arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was al so burdened with numerous other cases. The
MTC denied the motion.

The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging that the ejectment case was a me ritorious
one such that its dismissal would cause injustice to Restituto (the plaintiff). He also filed a supplemental motion, but the
court denied both motions.

On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the complainant among them.
The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suits dismissal as the respondent
had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTCs dismissal order. The complainant also asserts that the respondent did not
inform them about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. The complainant claims that he
only found out that the case had been dismissed when he personally went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and
was informed of the dismissal.

Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to file the position paper could
be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondents intervention, entered into an oral
extrajudicial compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.

On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure to communicate with
him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position paper due to his poor health. He also claimed that he had suffered a
stroke and had become partially blind, which caused the delay in the preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment case. 2

In his Answer3 dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at the time he received the MTCs di rective to
submit a position paper, he was already suffering from "Hypertensi ve Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation,
Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II." The respondent also alleged that further consultations confirmed that he had
an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous months. His health condition led to his loss of
concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case folders, among them the re cords of the ejectment case. The
respondent also claimed that he focused on his health for self-preservation, and underwent vascular laboratory
examinations; thus, he failed to communicate with the late Restituto and the complainant.

The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings was not due to willful
negligence but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients or to the court out of fear
that his disclosure would affect his private practice.

Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suits dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of risking his poor
health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order. Because the dismissal was
purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the position paper did not amount to the
abandonment of his clients case.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and Recommendation, finding the respondent
guilty of both negligence and betrayal of his clients confidence. The Investigating Commissioner found that the
respondents failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise the client of the status of the
case demonstrated his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.

The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondents failure to promptly inform his client s, including the
complainant, of his medical condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of other lawyers. Had he
notified the complainants father of his illness before the case was dismissed, the latter could have engaged the services
of another lawyer, and the case would not have been dismissed on a mere technical ground.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondents suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law.

In a Resolution4 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation after finding it to be fully supported
by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rules.

The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a
resolution5 dated June 21, 2013.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for negligence in the
performance of duty.

The Court's Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.

A lawyer is bound to protect his clients interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. 6 He should serve his
client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he,
himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his clients counsel, a lawyer
impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his
profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. 7 The failure to meet these
standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as Restitutos
counsel.1avvphi1 His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed to file his position paper
despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so. His omission greatly prejudiced his client as the Court in fact
dismissed the ejectment suit.

In addition, the respondent fa iled to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His failure to file the
position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also
amounted to evasion of duty.8 All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting the courts
imposition of disciplinary action. The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.

In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, 9 we considered a lawyers failure to file a brief for his client to be
inexcusable negligence. We held that the lawyers omission amounted to a serious lapse in the duty he owed his client
and in his professional obligation not to delay litigation and to aid the courts in the speedy administration of justice.

Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin,10 we ruled that a lawyers failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client about the
developments in her case fell below the standard and amounted to a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We emphasized the importance of the lawyers duty to keep their clients adequately and fully informed
about the developments in their cases, and held that a client should never be left in the dark, for to do so would be to
destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession as a whole.

We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos1 that the trust and confidence reposed by a client in his lawyer impose a high
standard that includes the appreciation of the lawyers duty to his clients, to the profession, to the courts, and to the public.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.12

Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark; to allow this situation is to
destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession in general. 13

The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required standards. He neglected to file the required
position paper, and did not give his full commitment to maintain and defend his clients interests. Aside from failing to file
the required pleading, the respondent never exerted any effort to inform his client of the dismissal of the ejectment case.

We also find the respondents excuse that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other illnesses
unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous health problems (as
evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the
omission to file the necessary court pleadings. Th e respondent could have requested an extension of time to file the
required position paper, or at the very least, informed his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to
do.
Furthermore, the respondents subsequent filing of successive pleadings (after the ejectment case had been dismissed)
significantly weakens his health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that his physical predicament
forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also indicate that his illnesses (allegedly "Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease,
Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II") were not at all incapacitating.

All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We, however, find the IBPs recommended penalty (one (1)month suspension from the practice of law) to
be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the infractions committed. Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose
the penalty of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the respondent's acts and omissions, as well as the
consequence of his negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon' 18, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this Decision, the date of
his receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this Manifestation to all the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Fudolin's records with the Office of the Bar Confidant and posted on the
Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

SO ORDERED.
CARANZA VS CABANES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR., RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar (complainant) against
Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972, 2 filed by the heirs of one
Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was represented by
respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed to submit a pre-
trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the
case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order 3 dated November 27, 2003. When complainant
confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to worry, assuring her that she will
not lose the case since she had the title to the subject property.

On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision 4 (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to vacate and
turn-over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer
complaint.5 Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTCs ruling and reinstated the MTC
Decision.6 Respondent received a copy of the CAs ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant about
the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did respondent pursue any
further action.7 As such, complainant decided to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking other
available remedies. Due to respondents failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such
other remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, alleging that respondents acts amounted to gross negligence which resulted in her loss. 8

In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the administrative complaint within
ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance 10 dated May 19, 2008, admitting to have agreed to
represent complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the subject property owned by the late
Pelagia Lascano (Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he noticed
a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which
complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct
and separate from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the
suspension of further proceedings and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to
determine the true identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the
manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR
Engineer) for this purpose. In relation, the heirs counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in his office 11 certain
documents which indicated the subject propertys description. Thus, pending the conduct and results of the re-survey, the
preliminary conference was tentatively reset to November 27, 2003. 12
As it turned out, the heirs counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated documents,
notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary conference scheduled on November 27,
2003 would not push through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened to coincide with an important
provincial conference which he was required to attend. As such, he inadvertently missed the hearing. 13 Nonetheless, he
proffered that he duly appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the RTC, 14resulting to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer
complaint, albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the disputed property was
subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 15 filed by Pelagia against
complainants mother, Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents furnished to him by certain DAR
personnel, respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property for a long time and actually tilled the
same in the name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information, respondent was
convinced that Placida and consequently, complainant (who took over the tilling) was indeed entitled to the subject
property. Hence, he advised complainant that it would be best to pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of
contesting the appeal filed by the heirs before the CA. It was respondents calculated legal strategy that in the event the
CA reverses the decision of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution or a motion to quash such writ
may be filed based on the afore-stated reasons, especially if an approved plan and later, an emancipation patent covering
the subject property is issued.16

Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,000
square meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title of
Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice,
and promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainant
accused respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn sour
and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the services of another lawyer. 17

In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 2009 19 and required the parties
to submit their respective position papers.20

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating Commissioner), issued
a Report and Recommendation (Commissioners Report), 21 finding respondent to have been negligent in failing to attend
the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the immediate submission
of the said case for decision and eventual loss of complainants cause.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the
court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push through, considering that the November 27, 2003 setting
was only tentative and the heirs counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact that respondent had to attend
an important provincial conference which coincided with the said setting hardly serves as an excuse since he should have
sent a substitute counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned any legal remedy that he undertook when the
heirs elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not file any comment or opposition to the heirs appeal.
Finally, respondents enumerations of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainants interests were found to be
thought only after the fact.22

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise ordinary diligence
in handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. 23

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners Report in Resolution No. XIX-2011-266 24 dated
May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and in accord with applicable laws and
rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 25 which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-2012-517 26dated
December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free.27 Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential
directives and thus, respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before
any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so.28

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. 29 While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform
the obligations due his client is per se a violation.30

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing in Civil Case No.
1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the said
hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and considering further that he was yet to
confer with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent had an important commitment during that day hardly
exculpates him from his omission since the prudent course of action would have been for him to send a substitute counsel
to appear on his behalf. In fact, he should have been more circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not
have been left unattended in view of its adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendants failure to appear at the
preliminary conference already entitles the plaintiff to a judgment. 31 Indeed, second-guessing the conduct of the
proceedings, much less without any contingent measure, exhibits respondents inexcusable lack of care and diligence in
managing his clients cause.1wphi1

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs appeal before the CA. Records disclose
that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected to inform her about the CA ruling which he had duly
received, thereby precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As regards respondents suggested legal strategy
to pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state that the same does not excuse him from failing to file a
comment or an opposition to an appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably,
these are basic courses of action which every diligent lawyer is expected to make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the above-cited provisions of
the Code.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, 32 a
lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for
decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros,
Sr. v. Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise
suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, 34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for
a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.
BRUNET VS GUAREN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint against
respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot
they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the
delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that
Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration,
original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on
March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave;
that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was
in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they
paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be
deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren
made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu
(MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount
was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00
and P6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his
acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax
declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on
record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have
violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants lot and despite the
acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written
consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the
penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the
lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF MERDEGIA AGAINST VELOSO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

x---------------x

A.C. No.: 10300

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution 1 dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II,
Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,2 we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely performing his duty as
Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza
asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of
immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice
Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request
to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he
should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients case.

Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us of his innocence from
the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself
from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the
alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for
inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice
Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. 3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper
remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled
rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial
remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. 4While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so
within the bounds provided by law.5 He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the
latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. 6

A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint 7 shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always
decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to
the merits and the developments in the case. 8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress
upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial
system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in
acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to strike a balance between
the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the independence and
efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down
to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we
shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide the outcome of their
cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be
punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya
wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when the
complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of thecasethat,when read together with
the administrative complaint heprepared,shows that his complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the administration of
justice. We note Atty. Adazas penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma. Theresa
Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and
second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral
arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso
after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adazas client, disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint than
the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his
predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this
conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus
constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts constitute
an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a member of the
bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern
for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against
Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent
and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal
proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side. 11

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,12 a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a
disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, 13 and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as
contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of
lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in
exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general. 14 Its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of
courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice; 15 thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that
constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature;
hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the
charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition against double
jeopardy bars the appeal of an accuseds acquittal.17

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine
whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the
conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest. 18 Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the
acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the
ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct.19

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of court is governed
by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by
Rules138 and 139 thereof.20

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit
against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of
fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further
similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.
PENILLA VS ALCID

ONG VS UNTO

FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a disbarment[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for
malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty. Unto guilty of
malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law or, at the very least, a
severe reprimand against him.[2]

First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a demand-letter from the
respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondents letter[3] reads:

Dear Mr. Ong:

This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for your only child, Anson
Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two
months that you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and
up to this moment you have not given said financial support.

I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be dragged unnecessarily
to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.

May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to her house her television and betamax
which you got from her house during her absence and without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand,
this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the above address or you may send
your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss
Garganian against you.

I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure or refusal to discuss
these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your absolute refusal really.

Expecting you then.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian

Dumaguete City

WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN

A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the
complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against
the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to
comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondents second letter
reads: [4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):

1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of P1,500.00 should be up to the completion
of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his
college course).

2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her planned business venture to give her a
source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any government position because of her status, having a child without
being lawfully wedded. x x x.

3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian, without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x
x x.

4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my Law Office, through my
cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.

Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be withheld pending the
compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a time.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the complainant
merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant
then did not comply with the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint [5] with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors Office)
of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.

The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta
for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the Bureau of Domestic
Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General. [6] According to the
complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the complainant alleged
that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or extort money
from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used against him in the
aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could
get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.
 In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters of the
respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2)Nemesia Garganians affidavit where she denied any
knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared
by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganians son
illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who
claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent,
with an offer to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To further bolster
the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, [7] citing several
cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties. [8]

The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint lodged against him. [9] He
did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.

It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista,
to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. After denying the respondents third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent was duly
notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the respondents turn to present evidence,
notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office
in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not be located,
although his wife received some of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.

Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them inhibiting from the
investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2 nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the
respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the
investigator recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be
severely reprimanded.

The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. [10] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the
records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper disposition, conformably with adopted policies and
procedures.[11] The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and recommendation in toto.[12]

We affirm with modification.

The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the importance of the legal
profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held:

In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law
profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience,
zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from
and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable
that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects,
some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [14] It mandates lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in
handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with
his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning,
he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find the
respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19,
Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.

The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs
counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding [15] and he shall
not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. [16] In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,[17] we held:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He
must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for
the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses
only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to
the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to
the same;Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.

(emphases ours)

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]

Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the
motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings
against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers
who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind
the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be
reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting
a true officer of the court.

The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month suspension or
reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the respondent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy
thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

SO ORDERED.
DIMAGIBA VS MONTALVO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching to almost a half a
century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba
as the sole heir of all the properties.

The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the Supreme Court, states:

xxx xxx xxx

The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes,
Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946
for annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated
annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.

On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, regarding the same
property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No.
831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who
are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the
Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the decision of
the Lower Court;

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case
No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio
Centeno.

Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs;

That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971;

That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972;

That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for specific performance,
with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its
Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan;

Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same persons mentioned
above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This
case is still pending before said court.
In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am
constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar
attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on may part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They
can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court.

In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action.

xxx xxx xxx 1

In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the respondent Montalvo was
required to file an Answer within ten days from notice.2

In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were done.

xxx xxx xxx

at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed by
the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and careful study and evaluation of
the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always
been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice certainly never for
harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated by
complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated
the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the
passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant
by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to
withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns
exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not
accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased but only a co-owner
with the clients of the undersigned. 3

In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. Nos.
5618 and 5620. 4

As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs
are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had been decided by the Court. 5

Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided by
Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata.

xxx xxx xxx

But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously
litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final judgment. 6

In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other
plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil Case
No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills
inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7
This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the
CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI
Bulacan dismissed the cases.

On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of disciplinary case
against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8

It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No. 1424 involving Ismaela
Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor
General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as found by the
Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action:

1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate but was
subsequently appealed.

2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision was
affirmed.

3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court, upheld
the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the capacity of the
Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.

4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was a
petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.

5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated November
3, 1970 was again dismissed.

6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property left by the
deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again dismissed for failure
to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch 2,
the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the collateral relatives of the deceased De
Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.

8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the outcome, Atty.
Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint for the cancellation of
the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of
title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.

Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and
the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even
summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court.9

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if
any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o
the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs.

A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal system in order
wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o
suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of
justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take
their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any ma
for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust
repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the
ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.

WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high traditions an
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to
DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.

Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal record of respondent
Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.

SO ORDERED.