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OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PLEA BARGAINING UNDER THE TEXAS
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
EDWARD CHIP WILKINSON, Fort Worth

Tarrant County D.As Office
State Bar of Texas

th
34 ANNUAL ADVANCED CRIMINAL LAW COURSE
July 28-31, 2008
San Antonio
CHAPTER 3
EDWARD L. WILKINSON
LEGAL EXPERIENCE:
Employment:
TARRANT COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 1990 -present Fort Worth, Texas
Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Appellate Division
Assistant Chief, Appellate Division 1996-present
Chief of Post-Conviction Writs 1995-1996
SHANNON, GRACEY, RATLIFF & MILLER 1988-1990 Fort Worth, Texas

Associate Attorney
Publications or CLE presentations:

CLE Presentations:
State Bar of Texas, American Bar Association, Albany Law School, Texas District and County
Attorneys Association, Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Tarrant County Bar
Association, Denton County Bar Association, Tarrant County Criminal Defense Lawyers Association,
Tarrant County District Attorney Office, Dallas County District Attorneys Office, Denton County
District Attorneys Office, Grayson County District Attorneys Office, Texas Department of Public
Safety
Publications:
Texas District and County Attorneys Association (two books), St. Marys Law Journal, Baylor Law
Review, State Bar Journal, Texas Criminal Appellate Law Manual, The Texas Prosecutor, American
Bar Association Litigation Newsletter, State Bar of Texas Criminal Justice Section Newsletter
Honors and Awards:

Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization
1994-1995 Appellate Award for Outstanding Advocacy in Capital Cases,
Association of Government Attorneys in Capital Litigation
Member:
National Center for Prosecution Ethics
Ad Hoc Committee on Revision of Prosecution Standards
Tarrant County Bar Association
Brown Bag CLE Committee, 2003-present
Professionalism Award Committee, 2002-present
Tarrant County Bar Association -- Appellate Section
Chairman, 1997-98
Vice-Chairman, 1996-97
Secretary, 1995-96
Texas District and County Attorneys Association
Discovery Working Group
Editorial Board, 1997-present
Habeas Corpus Committee, 1996-present
State Bar Grievance Committee Local Panel,
District 07A, 2004-present
College of the State Bar of Texas
EDUCATION:
The UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW
Austin, Texas
J.D., 1988.
The UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA at CHAPEL HILL
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
M.A., English Literature, 1983
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C.
A.B., cum laude, 1981
Outline Of Ethical Plea Bargaining Under The Texas Disciplinary Rules Of Professional Conduct Chapter 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEA BARGAINING ............................................................................................ 1

A. The Following Plea Bargain Situations Are Not Unconstitutional: ................................................................... 1
B. There Are Constitutional Limits to Plea Bargaining .......................................................................................... 1
II. CHARGING AS PART OF THE PLEA BARGAIN PROCESS .............................................................................. 2

A. Overcharging .................................................................................................................................................. 2
B. Undercharging................................................................................................................................................. 2
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND VINDICTIVENESS IN PLEA BARGAINING .......................... 3

A. Prosecutorial Discrimination in Plea Bargaining ............................................................................................ 3
B. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in Plea Bargaining............................................................................................. 4
III. COMMUNICATION .............................................................................................................................................. 6

A. Communication between prosecution and defendant the no-contact rule .................................................... 6
B. Communicating with a Pro-Se Defendant ....................................................................................................... 7
IV. BARGAINING ...................................................................................................................................................... 8

A. Representations to the opposing party as part of negotiations ........................................................................ 8
B. Plea bargaining criminal and civil cases together ........................................................................................... 8
V. A PROSECUTORS DUTY TO DISCLOSE ......................................................................................................... 9

A. A Prosecutor Is Not Required to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Before Plea Bargaining.......................... 9
B. A Prosecutor May Be Required to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Before Entering Into a Plea Bargain ..... 9
VI. PLEA BARGAINING AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .................................................................................... 9

A. Constitutional conflicts of interest................................................................................................................... 9
B. Conflicts of interest under the StateBar Rules............................................................................................... 13
VII. DUTY TO CONVEY AND EXPLAIN A PLEA BARGAIN OFFER ................................................................. 14

A. Defense Counsels Constitutional Duty to Convey a Plea Offer to the Defendant ....................................... 14
B. Defense Counsels Constitutional Duty to Advise the Defendant About a Plea Offer ................................. 14
C. Defense Counsels Duty to Inform and Advise Under the Rules of Professional Conduct .......................... 15
VIII. CLIENTS RIGHT TO DECIDE .......................................................................................................................... 16

A. Client Possesses Constitutional and Statutory Right to Decide Whether to Waive a Jury and Whether to
Testify............................................................................................................................................................ 16
B. Rule 1.02 and Clients Right to Decide......................................................................................................... 16
i
OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PLEA 5. A plea is not constitutionally invalid merely

because the defendant may have made a bad
BARGAINING UNDER THE TEXAS bargain.5
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT B. There Are Constitutional Limits to Plea
Bargaining
NOTE: This outline is based upon a much more 1. A defendant is entitled to the assistance of
detailed analysis soon to be published by the St Marys counsel during plea negotiations.6
Law Journal. For a more thorough discussion, and 2. A plea must not be the result of actual or
additional case citations, see Edward L. Wilkinson, threatened physical harm or mental coercion
Ethical Plea Bargaining Under the Texas Disciplinary overbearing the will of the defendant. A plea
Rules of Professional Conduct, ST. MARYS L. J. must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice
(2008). among alternative courses of action.7
3. The record must reflect that the plea was
knowingly and voluntarily made.8
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEA 4. A prosecutor must keep his plea-bargained
BARGAINING promise.9
A. The Following Plea Bargain Situations Are Not 5. A defendant enjoys the right to have any plea
Unconstitutional: bargain offer from the State conveyed and
explained to him by his attorney.10
1. Threatening a defendant with a greater charge in 6. A defendant has the constitutional and statutory
the course of plea bargaining does not violate due right to accept or reject any plea offer made by the
process.1 State.11
2. A plea bargain to avoid a more severe punishment 5
does not violate the Fifth Amendment.2 See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, ___, 125 S.Ct.
3. A prosecutor does not have an obligation under 2398, 2407 (2005).
the Due Process Clause to forego a plea bargain if 6
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758, 90 S.Ct. at 1474.
the defendant pleads guilty but simultaneously
attests his innocence.3 7
See id. at 750, 90 S.Ct. at 1470; see also Alford, 400 U.S.
4. Defense counsels incorrect assessment of the at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 164.
strength of the case against the defendant will not
invalidate an otherwise proper plea.4 8
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
9
See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct.
495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); see also Gibson v. State,
803 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
10
Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex. Crim. App.
1
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65, 98 2000); Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Tex. Crim.
S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). App. 1987)(counsel has duty under the Sixth Amendment to
convey plea bargain offer from the State); State v. Williams,
2
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 83 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002, no
1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); see also Gaither v. pet.)(failure to fully explain offer of deferred adjudication
State, 479 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)(a plea is fell below the objective standard of reasonableness).
not rendered involuntary because it was induced as a result
11
of a plea bargain situation). See Bitterman v. State, 180 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005)(observing that defendants waiver of rights
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. pursuant to plea bargain must be voluntary); TEX. CODE
160, 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); but see Davis v. State, CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a)(Vernon 2005)(defendant may
686 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] only waive jury trial in person by the defendant); TEX.
1985, no pet.)(plea involuntary where court suggested that it CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(Vernon Supp.
would not order a p.s.i unless defendant pleaded nolo 2007)(court must admonish defendant personally before
contendere and defendant continued to maintain his accepting plea as part of a plea bargain agreement); see also
innocence during punishment phase). TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.02(a)(3)(a lawyer
shall abide by a clients decision in a criminal case, after
4 consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 797-98, 90
S.Ct. 1458, 1462-63, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970) whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will
testify).
1
II. CHARGING AS PART OF THE PLEA 2. The practice of including unsupported allegations
BARGAIN PROCESS in an otherwise valid indictment or information
might also violate Rule 3.03(a)(1).15
A. Overcharging
1. Rule 3.09(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct B. Undercharging
requires that a prosecutor refrain from 1. A prosecutor should not plead a case down to a
prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge charge that is not consistent with the known facts,
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by even if the plea benefits the defendant, or she risks
probable cause, and thus prohibits violating Rule 3.09(a).16
overcharging in its simplest and most direct 2. A prosecutor and defense counsel who submit a
form.12 plea to the court that does not conform to the
known facts violate Rule 3.03(a)(1).17
(a) The Court of Criminal Appeals has suggested
that under the rule a prosecutor is not free to
put unfounded allegations in an indictment in the
hope that a plenitude of accusations will make
the defendant look like a criminal has been
applied in Texas to prohibit the inclusion of
unsupported allegations in an indictment, a
practice which might be characterized as
overcharging.13
(b) The thrust of the courts conclusion is plain: a
prosecutor may not add allegations he cannot
prove to an otherwise valid indictment or
information simply in order to gain an advantage
in the resolution of the primary charge.14
12
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(a)
13 15
Lehman v. State, 792 S.W.2d 82, 85 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.03(a)(1)(A
1990); cf. People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 106-07 lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement to a
(1984)(prosecution should not have proceeded on, and tribunal); see also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd v. Turgeon, 210
defendant should not have been permitted to plead guilty to W.Va. 181, 185, 557 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2000), cert. denied,
indictment where prosecutor was aware that sole witness 534 U.S. 841, 122 L.Ed.2d 99, 151 L.Ed.2d 59
before grand jury who had linked the defendant to (2001)(lawyers sidebar reference to witnesss purported
possession of drugs had explained that he had misunderstood polygraph examination, where witness had never submitted
question put to him during grand jury appearance and denied to polygraph, violated rule against making a false statement
that defendant had possessed the contraband ). of material fact).
14 16
See Lehman, 792 S.W.2d at 85 n.2; compare State v. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(a)(A
Korum, 141 P.3d 13, 19-20 (Wash. 2006)(overturning lower prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from
courts conclusion that prosecutor had overcharged prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that the
defendant and holding that additional charges were based prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause); see
upon the evidence and strengthened the States primary also Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.
charge); Roehl v. State, 77 Wis.2d 398, 410-12, 253 N.W.2d Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Iowa 2005)(city attorney
210, 215-16 (1977)(no evidence that prosecutor brought violated DR 7-103(A) in permitting assistants to plea down
additional charges only for the purpose of obtaining a plea misdemeanor offenses to non-moving traffic violations for
bargain). which there was no factual basis); Iowa Supreme Court
Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360,
370-71 (Iowa 2005)(assistant city prosecutor violated rules
of ethics in allowing misdemeanor defendants to plea to non-
moving traffic violations for which there was no factual
basis)
17
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.03(a)(1).
2
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND 2. A presumption of regularity supports States

VINDICTIVENESS IN PLEA BARGAINING counsels decisions to prosecute cases -- and by
A. Prosecutorial Discrimination in Plea extension, plea bargains and in the absence of
Bargaining clear evidence to the contrary, the courts presume
that they have properly discharged their duties.20
1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the exercise of (a) Thus, in order to succeed in a claim of abuse
prosecutorial discretion based upon an of prosecutorial discretion, a defendant must
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or present exceptionally clear proof of
other arbitrary classification such as the exercise purposeful discrimination that had a
of free speech.18 discriminatory effect on him.21
(a) The refusal to engage in bargaining, or an (b) The defendant must also establish that the
offer that is grossly disproportionate to offers decision makers in his case acted with
made to similarly situated defendants, based discriminatory purpose,22 unless the
solely upon the defendants race, religion, or selective prosecution allegation is based on
some other arbitrary basis, violates the Equal an overtly discriminatory classification.23
Protection Clause.19
3. Discriminatory purpose implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker
... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least because of, and not merely in
spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group or individual.24
4. As well as violating a defendants equal
18
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. protection rights, discrimination in plea
1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)(quoting Oyler v. Boles, bargaining based upon an arbitrary or invidious
368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 505, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962);
County v. State, 812 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App.
20
1989); see also Falls v. Town of Dyer, 875 F.2d 146, 148-49 United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1,
(7th Cir. 1989) (prosecution selective because statute 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926); Garcia v. State,
enforced only against defendant, even though defendant 172 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex. App. El Paso 2005, no pet. h.);
chosen at random, rather than on improper basis such as Hall v. State, 137 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. App. Houston
race, because statutory classification applicable to only a [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. refd).
single individual is irrational).
21
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct.
19 1756, 1767, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (quoting Wayte, 470
See Gray v. State, 650 P.2d 880, 882-84 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982)(applying equal protection analysis to U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d
prosecutors refusal to negotiate plea); United States v. 92, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200,
Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1995)(applying 117 S.Ct. 1561, 137 L.Ed.2d 707 (1997); County, 812
equal protection analysis to defendants claim that he was S.W.2d at 308; Nelloms v. State, 63 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex.
not provided as much time as similarly situated defendants App. Fort Worth 2001, pet. refd).
to consider governments plea bargain offer); Moody v.
22
State, 716 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1998)(holding that McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292, 107 S.Ct. at 1767 (emphasis
prosecutors practice of requiring defendants to agree to fine in original); see also United States v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d
as condition of dismissal of bad check charge violated equal 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1093, 120
protection rights of indigent defendants); see also S.Ct. 836, 145 L.Ed.2d 703 (2000)(disparate treatment of co-
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, defendants not selective prosecution where defendant failed
668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(the conscious exercise of some to allege or prove any particular animus by prosecutor).
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
23
constitutional violation so long as the selection was not Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 n.10, 105 S.Ct. at n.10; Garcia v.
deliberately based upon an unjustificable standard such as State, 172 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex. App. El Paso 2005, no
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification)(quoting pet. h.); Hall v. State, 137 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. App.
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. refd).
L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).
24
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 298, 107 S.Ct. at 1770 (quoting
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)).
3
classification would subject counsel to discipline 3. Since the prohibition against vindictive
under Rule 5.08(a) of the Rules of Professional prosecution seeks to prevent defendants from
Conduct.25 being punished for exercising their rights, no
presumption arises in situations where the
B. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in Plea defendant has not affirmatively exercised
Bargaining constitutional rights:
1. Generally, due process prohibits the State from
increasing the severity of the charges against a (a) There is no prosecutorial vindictiveness
defendant who has exercised a procedural right.26 when additional charges are filed after a
2. A presumption of vindictiveness will arise if mistrial or an acquittal, and a plea bargain
circumstances create a realistic likelihood of offer thus increased.29
vindictiveness.27 (b) Prosecution for the same offense by two
separate entities does not raise the
(a) Vindictiveness will be presumed only in rare presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
instances, principally where a prosecutor Thus, prosecution by a second entity after the
increases the charges against a defendant defendant has refused a plea offer from the
after the defendant has successfully appealed first entity is not unconstitutional.30
his conviction for a lesser crime.28
1996) (no presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor
sought deadly weapon finding after defendant successfully
25
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 5.08(a)(A appealed his conviction for murder); Godsey v. State, 989
lawyer shall not willfully, in connection with an adjudicatory S.W.2d 482, 494-95 (Tex. App. Waco 1999, pet. refd)
proceeding . . . manifest, by words or conduct, bias or (no presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor re-files
prejudice based on race, color, national origin, religion, after the defendant successfully appeals negotiated plea to
disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation towards any person lesser charge); Cover v. State, 913 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.
involved in that proceeding in any capacity). App. Tyler 1995, pet. refd) (no presumption of
vindictiveness where prosecutor pursues charge of
26
See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28-29, 94 S.Ct. at 2103. retaliation against defendant after the defendant filed post-
trial writs of habeas corpus accusing the prosecutor of
27
See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381-82, 102 suborning perjury where victim and sheriffs office were
S.Ct. 2485, 2493, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Blackledge, 417 responsible for the charge); Watson v. State, 760 S.W.2d
U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 2102; Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 756, 758-59 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1988, pet. refd) (no
173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Watson v. State, 760 S.W.2d presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor increases
756, 759 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1988, pet. refd); cf. charge after the defendant successfully withdraws from a
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-27, 93 S.Ct. 1977, plea agreement on a motion for new trial).
1983-84, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (likelihood of
29
vindictiveness de minimis where defendant re-sentenced by See United States v. King, 126 F.3d 394, 400 (2d Cir.
a second jury after successful appeal of the first jury 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 118 S.Ct. 1308, 140
verdict). L.Ed.2d 472 (1998)(no presumption of vindictiveness after
mistrial); United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1263-
28
Compare Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 31-32, 194 64 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 839, 118 S.Ct.
S.Ct. 2919-20, 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (vindictiveness 116, 139 L.Ed.2d 68 (1997)(no presumption after mistrial);
presumed where defendant charged with felony United States v. McAllister, 29 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir.
manslaughter after appealing misdemeanor DWI conviction, 1994)(no presumption after mistrial); but see United States
despite involvement with two separate prosecutorial v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 187-89 (9th Cir. 1981)
agencies); Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102- (presumption of vindictiveness when enhanced charges
03 (vindictive prosecution presumed where prosecutor added after mistrial declared over governments objection);
increased charge after defendant appealed misdemeanor United States v. Sattar, 314 F.Supp.2d 279, 311-12
conviction to a trial de novo); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d (S.D.N.Y. 2004)(no presumption of vindictiveness nor
543, 546-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (presumption of evidence of actual vindictiveness where defendant
prosecutorial vindictiveness where prosecutor added habitual successfully moved to quash charges and prosecution re-
enhancement to indictment after defendant successfully filed, adding additional counts).
appealed first conviction); Doherty v. State, 892 S.W.2d 13,
30
15-16 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. refd) See United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1042 (10th
(prosecutor charged defendant with capital murder after he Cir. 1991)(no presumption of vindictiveness even where the
successfully appealed his conviction for murder); with prosecutor was the same in both state and federal actions);
Borenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65, 98 S.Ct. 663, United States v. Schenk, 299 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1195-96 (D.
668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(no presumption of vindictive Kan. 2003)(no presumption of vindictiveness where
prosecution where prosecutor re-indicted case after defendant rejected plea offer from state prosecutor and was
defendant refused a plea bargain offer for lower charge); later prosecuted by federal authorities).
Lopez v. State, 928 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Tex. Crim. App.
4
charge or enhancement had been omitted

(c) There is no presumption of vindictiveness through mistake or oversight.34
where a prosecutor increased the charges (b) A prosecutor may also establish that events
against a defendant after he refused a plea occurring since the time of the original
bargain offer.31 charge decision altered that initial exercise of
(1) The only exception to the general rule the prosecutors discretion.35
that increasing a charge after a
defendant has rejected a plea offer does 5. In the absence of a presumption of vindictiveness,
not constitute vindictiveness occurs a defendant must prove actual vindictiveness in
when a defendant pleads guilty to a order to prevail on a claim of vindictive
charge, successfully attacks the guilty prosecution.36
plea on the basis that the terms of the
plea have not been kept, and the (a) In proving actual vindictiveness, a defendant
prosecutor subsequently increases the need not establish that the prosecutor acted in
charge or enhancement.32 bad faith or maliciously.37
(b) In order to establish actual vindictiveness,
4. The presumption of vindictiveness is not absolute, however, a defendant must show that the
and may be overcome by objective evidence prosecutors charging decision was a direct
justifying the prosecutors action.33 and unjustifiable penalty that resulted
(a) Sufficient circumstances to justify the

prosecutors decision may include a showing 34
See Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2103
that the greater charges could not have been n.7, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (discussing Diaz v. United
pursued from the outset, or that the greater States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49, 32 S.Ct. 250, 251, 56 L.Ed.
500 (1912), where defendant initially pled guilty to
misdemeanor assault, and later was found guilty of murder
31
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378-79, 102 after the victim died); Hood, 185 S.W.3d at 450 (mistake or
S.Ct. 2485, 2492, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Bordenkircher v. oversight sufficient objective explanation for adding
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d enhancements after initial conviction was reversed); Byrd v.
604 (1978); Christensen v. State, 575 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1984) (intervening
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)(rejecting presumption change in Texas Penal Code that equalize penalties under
of vindictiveness where prosecutor re-indicted case after original and subsequent charge sufficiently objective reason
defendant refused plea bargain offer); Cowan v. State, 562 for change as to overcome presumption of vindictiveness);
S.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)(rejecting see also Hardwicke v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir.
presumption of vindictiveness where following defendants 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049, 98 S.Ct. 897, 54 L.Ed.2d
rejection of plea prosecutor added enhancements to 801 (1978)(.
indictment); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Tex.
35
Crim. App. 1978); Sterling v. State, 791 S.W.2d 274, 278 See United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360,
(Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1990, pet. refd)(rejecting 1365 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Raetzch v. State, 709 S.W.2d
presumption of vindictiveness based upon prosecutors 39, 41 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1986, pet.
motion to stack sentences after defendant successfully refd)(prosecutor rebutted presumption of vindictiveness by
withdrew from an agreed plea bargain). explaining that new enhancement was based upon States
receipt of defendants pen-packet, which it had not had in its
32
See Palm v. State, 656 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. possession at the time of the first trial); cf. McCullough, 475
[Panel Op.] 1981); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543, 547 U.S. at 143-44, 106 S.Ct. at (no judicial vindictiveness
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). where additional evidence discovered after first trial); but
see United States v. King, 126 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 1997),
33
See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 376 n.8, 102 cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 118 S.Ct. 1308, 140 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct. 2485, 2490 n.8, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)(observing that 472 (1998)(presumption of vindictiveness may be rebutted
presumption of vindictiveness may be overcome by with a showing of legitimate, articulable, objective reasons
objective evidence justifying the prosecutors action); Hood for [the] superseding indictment, and not just upon showing
v. State, 185 S.W.3d 445, 449-50 (Tex. Crim. App. of subsequent intervening events).
2006)(examining difference between objective and
36
subjective explanations to presumed vindictiveness); Neal v. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384; Neal v. State, 150
State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 173-74 (Tex. Crim. App. S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
2004)(requiring objective evidence to rebut presumption of
37
vindictiveness); cf. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102;
141, 106 S.Ct. 976, 980, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) Doherty v. State, 892 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Tex. App.
(presumption of judicial vindictiveness may be rebutted). Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. refd).
5
solely from the defendants exercise of a III. COMMUNICATION

protected legal right.38 A. Communication between prosecution and
defendant the no-contact rule
(1) The defendant shoulders the burden of 1. The basic rule governing communication with a
production and persuasion when person represented by counsel, Rule 4.02, is
raising a claim of actual vindictiveness, straightforward: a lawyer shall not communicate
and is not afforded the aid of any legal or cause or encourage another to communicate
presumption.39 about the subject of the representation with a
person, organization, or entity of government the
6. Once a defendant carries his burden of proof, the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
prosecution may respond with evidence of a lack regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has the
of animus.40 consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
law to do so.43
(a) In the context of plea bargaining, such
explanations might include a mistake in (a) A defendant may not waive an attorneys
drafting the original charge, the discovery of obligation to notify opposing counsel under
additional evidence, or a defendants refusal Rule 4.02(a).44
to comply with the terms of the original plea (b) If a defendant discharges her attorney and
bargain.41 represents herself pro se, a lawyer is not
(b) If a defendant is unable to carry his burden of obligated under Rule 4.02 to confirm that the
proof of actual vindictiveness or a realistic defendant has in fact terminated counsels
likelihood of vindictiveness, the trial court representation where the lawyer has no
need not reach the issue of the prosecutions reason to disbelieve a defendants assurance
justification.42 that she has discharged counsel, though it
may be a sensible course to do so in many
instances.45
43
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.02(a).
38
See Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 174 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S.
at 384 n.19, 102 S.Ct. at 2494 n.19). 44
See In re News America Pub., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 103
(Tex. App. San Antonio 1998)(orig. proceeding); see also
39
See Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 174; United States v. Sarracino, United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993);
340 F.3d 1148, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.), cert.
U.S. 1131, 124 S.Ct. 1105, 157 L.Ed.2d 935 (2004); United denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Batchelor, 484
States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1998). U.S. 812, 813); Suarez v. State, 481 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2908, 90
40
See id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, L.Ed.2d 994 (1986); In re Conduct of Burrows, 291 Or. 135,
140-41 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Amberslie, 312 144, 629 P.2d 820, 825 (1981); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
F.Supp.2d 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
41 45
See Hood v. State, 185 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. In re Users System Services, Inc, 22 S.W.3d 331, 334-36
2006)(mistake or oversight sufficient objective (Tex. 1999); see also In re Capper, 757 N.Ed.2d 138, 139-40
explanation to rebut claim of vindictiveness); Castleberry v. (Ind. 2001)(attorney reprimanded for relying upon clients
State, 704 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. representation that opposing party (clients ex-wife) was not
1986)(defendants withdrawal from plea sufficient represented by counsel and contacting the opposing party
explanation for increased punishment); Sterling v. State, 791 without notifying opposing counsel); but see Gentry v. State,
S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1990, pet. 770 S.W.2d 780, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied,
refd)(discovery of additional evidence, particularly 490 U.S. 1102, 109 S.Ct. 2458, 104 L.Ed.2d 1013
additional offenses defendant had committed, sufficient to (1989)(even though defendant without a doubt terminated
rebut vindictiveness allegation); see also United States v. defense counsel, prosecutor violated Rule 4.02 by not
Schenk, 299 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1195-96 (D. Kan. contacting defense attorney when defendant informed him
2003)(transfer of case to federal court after defendant that he no longer wished to be represented by counsel and
rejected plea bargain offer in state court could have been then confessed, but violation of the rule did not warrant
prompted by lack of resources to pursue case in state court, reversal of defendants conviction); In re News America
thus defendant had failed to prove actual vindictiveness); Pub., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Tex. App. San Antonio
United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 142 (10th Cir. 1998)(orig. proceeding)(attorney violated Rule 4.02(a) when
1991)(same). he failed to contact plaintiffs lawyer after plaintiff informed
him that he had discharged his attorney and then negotiated
42
Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 175. a settlement and counsel had not filed a notice of withdrawal
in the case); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
6
(c) By its wording, Rule 4.02 does not prohibit (b) A defendant may waive his Sixth
communications with a represented person Amendment right.50
concerning subjects other than the subject of (c) A defendant whose Sixth Amendment right
representation.46 has attached and who is represented by an
attorney cannot, as a matter of constitutional
(1) A prosecutor may not manipulate this law, unilaterally waive his Sixth Amendment
exception, however, by negotiating a right to counsel if the State has initiated the
plea bargain under the guise of interrogation, however.51
investigating other cases or criminal
activity in general.47 B. Communicating with a Pro-Se Defendant
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly
2. Communications with an accused after prohibits states counsel in any adversary judicial
indictment regarding the charged offense also proceeding that may result in punishment by
implicates the Sixth Amendment.48 confinement from communicating with a
defendant who has requested the appointment of
(a) Under the Court of Criminal Appeals counsel unless the court has denied the request on
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, once the grounds that the defendant is not indigent and
the Sixth Amendment right has attached and the defendant has either failed to retain counsel
the accused is represented by counsel, police after being given a reasonable opportunity to do
and other authorities may only initiate so or he has waived the opportunity.52
interrogation through notice to defense
counsel.49 (a) Counsel is also prohibited from initiating or
encouraging any attempts to obtain from a
defendant who is not represented by counsel
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995)(counsel should a waiver of the right to counsel.53
not communicate with a person represented by counsel until
50
the persons lawyer has withdrawn her appearance in the See Gentry v. State, 770 S.W.2d 780, 790 (Tex. Crim.
case); State v. Yatman, 320 So.2d 355, 403 (Fla. App. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102, 109 S.Ct. 2459,
1975)(while prosecutor may not have known defendant was 104 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1989) see also Lawyer Disciplinary
represented by counsel, it would behoove one in his Board v. Jarrell, 206 W.Va. 236, 239-40, 523 S.E.2d 552,
position to make some reasonable inquiry to find out). 555-56 (1999)(prosecutor violated prohibition against
communicating with defendant, who was represented by
46
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.02(a)(In counsel, when prosecutor discussed possibly of plea bargain
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate . . . with defendant after defendants counsel failed to appear for
about the subject of the representation with a person, a hearing); In the Matter of Howes, 123 N.M. 311, 319, 940
organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be P.2d 159, 167 (1997)(AUSA disciplined for
represented by another lawyer regarding the subject, unless communicating with defendant who was represented by
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer to do so). counsel after prosecutor, who was contacted by defendant,
accepted defendants phone calls and listened to defendants
47
See In the Matter of Dumke, 171 Wis.2d 47, 53-54, 489 statements, though he refrained from asking defendant
N.W.2d 919, 922 (1992); In re Conduct of Burrows, 291 Or. questions).
135, 144, 629 P.3d 820, 825 (1981)
51
See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636, 106 S.Ct.
48
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.159, 180 (1985); United 1404, 1411, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); Upton, 853 S.W.2d at
States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 364, 364 (1981); United States 553.
v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
52
Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Vickery TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f-1)(2)(Vernon
v. Commn for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 260 (Tex. Supp. 2007).
App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)(communications
53
with plaintiff without her attorneys knowledge or TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f-1)(1)(Vernon
permission violated Rule 4.02). Law enforcement can Supp. 2007). Section (f-2) of the statue further provides that
constitutionally communicate with defendant regarding a court may not direct or encourage a defendant to
unrelated offenses, however, as the Sixth Amendment right communicate with the attorney representing the state until
to counsel is offense specific. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 after the court has advised the defendant of his right to
U.S. 162, 168-69, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1341-42, 149 L.Ed.2d 131 counsel and the procedure for the appointment of counsel
(2001). and the court has denied the appointment of counsel and
provided the defendant the opportunity to secure counsel or
49
See Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Tex. Crim. the defendant has waived his right to counsel. TEX. CODE
App. 1993). CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f-2)(Vernon Supp. 2007).
7
2. Rule 3.09(c) admonishes prosecutors not to act or knowingly assisting a fraudulent act
initiate or encourage efforts to obtain from an perpetrated by a client.61
unrepresented accused a waiver of important pre-
trial, trial, or post-trial rights.54 B. Plea bargaining criminal and civil cases
together
(a) The comment to the rule explains that it does 1. Rule 4.04(b) requires that a lawyer not present,
not apply to any person who has knowingly, participate in presenting, or threaten to present a
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his criminal or disciplinary charge solely to gain an
rights in open court.55 advantage in a civil suit.62
(b) The comment adds that the rule does not
apply to any person appearing pro se with (a) Subsection (2) of the rule also prohibits a
the approval of the tribunal.56 lawyer from threatening civil, criminal, or
disciplinary charges against a complainant,
(1) Thus, a prosecutor may, within the a witness, or a potential witness in a bar
bounds of ethics, discuss waiving disciplinary hearing solely to prevent the
certain rights during plea negotiations persons participation in the disciplinary
with a pro se defendant.57 action.63
3. A prosecutor should ensure during negotiations 2. The rule does not directly bar defense counsel
that the pro se defendant understands the from threatening civil action to gain advantage in
prosecutors role in the proceedings.58 a criminal law matter.
IV. BARGAINING (a) In light of the prohibition in Subsection (a) of

A. Representations to the opposing party as part the rule, however, that a lawyer shall not use
of negotiations means that have no substantial purpose other
1. Rule 4.01 declares that in the course of than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
representing a client a lawyer shall not person, a threat of civil action which would
knowingly . . . make a false statement of material have no basis or that would be brought
fact or law to a third person.59 merely to harass or embarrass a prosecutor
would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of
(a) As the comment explains, a lawyer violates the rule.64
the provision either by making a false 61
statement of law or material fact or by TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.01(b).
incorporating or affirming such a statement 62
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.04(b)(1); see
made by another person.60
also Vickery v. Commn for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d
(b) Rule 4.01 also admonishes lawyers not to 241, 261 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1999, no pet.)(lawyer
knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to violated rule against threatening criminal action to gain
a third person when disclosure is necessary to advantage in civil matter when he informed opposing party
avoid making the lawyer a party to a criminal that he suspected that she had broken into his apartment and
assured her that he would not report the break-in if the
lawsuit could be settled); see also; In re Lantz, 420 N.E.2d
54
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(c). 1236, 1237 (Ind. 1981)(prosecutor reprimanded for filing
bad check charges on behalf of a client, giving appearance
55 that public office was being used to collect private debts);
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(c) cmt. 4.
People ex rel Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 525-26, 608
56 P.2d 335, 339 (1979)(special prosecutor disciplined for
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(c) cmt. 4.
threatening criminal action in an effort to gain settlement in
57 civil case); People v. Attorneys Respondent, 162 Colo. 174,
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(c).
177, 427 P.2d 330, 331 (1967)(district attorney reprimanded
58 for filing criminal charges and extraditing woman in an
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.03 (in dealing effort to collect a debt for a client); In re LaPinska, 72 Ill.2d
. . . with a person who is not represented by counsel, a 461, 473, 381 N.E.2d 700, 705 (1978)(city attorney
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is suspended for using leverage and power of his position to
disinterested). gain favorable settlement for client).
59
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.01(a). 63
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.04(b)(2).
60
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.01(a). 64
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 4.04(a).
8
(b) Furthermore, if there were no basis for the (b) Several pre-Ruiz decisions, on the other
civil action, a lawyers mere threat could hand, have suggested that there is no duty to
violate Rule 3.01 (a lawyer shall not bring disclose before a plea,68 and the reasoning the
or defend a proceeding, or assert or Supreme Court applied to its rejection of a
controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer duty to disclose impeachment evidence is
reasonably believes that there is a basis for applicable to exculpatory evidence as well.69
doing so that is not frivolous) and Rule 3.02
(in the course of litigation, a lawyer shall 2. Rule 3.09(d) requires a prosecutor to make
not take a position that unreasonably timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
increases the costs or other burdens of the information known to the prosecutor that tends to
case or that unreasonably delays resolution of negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
the matter).65 offense.70
V. A PROSECUTORS DUTY TO DISCLOSE (a) Neither the rule nor the comments cast light
A. A Prosecutor Is Not Required to Disclose on what constitutes timely disclosure.
Impeachment Evidence Before Plea Bargaining
1. A prosecutor is not constitutionally obligated to VI. PLEA BARGAINING AND CONFLICTS OF
disclose impeachment evidence in her possession INTEREST
prior to entering into a plea bargain with a A. Constitutional conflicts of interest
defendant, although the prosecutor would be 1. Although multiple representation of co-defendants
obligated to turn over such evidence before the does not per se violate either the Sixth
case went to trial.66 Amendment,71 or the Rules of Professional
Conduct,72 a plea bargain offer to one client at the
B. A Prosecutor May Be Required to Disclose expense of another could create a conflict which
Exculpatory Evidence Before Entering Into a violates counsels duty to both.73
Plea Bargain
1. It is unclear whether a prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to disclose material, 68
See Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.
exculpatory evidence as opposed to
2000)(The duty articulated in Brady, however, was
impeachment evidence before entering into a expressly premised on the defendants right to a fair trial, a
plea bargain. concern that does not animate a guilty plea); Campbell v.
Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 1985)(There is no
(a) At least two Texas cases suggest that authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of
prosecutors have a duty to disclose Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due
exculpatory evidence before entering a plea process(emphasis in original)); see also White v. United
bargain, but as they can be distinguished, States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988)(quoting Campbell).
they do not resolve the issue.67 69
Compare Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628-34, 122 S.Ct. at 2454-
65
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.01; TEX. 2456 with Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360-362.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.02. 70
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.09(d).
66
See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. at 2457. 71
See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718; James v.
67
See Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Tex. Crim. State, 763 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
App. 1979)(prosecutors failure to reveal letter from 72
psychiatrist suggesting defendant was incompetent to stand See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06(b).
trial violated due process). A close reading of Ex parte 73
Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173,
which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that double 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)(as the Supreme Court has
jeopardy bars a third re-trial of a defendant following a noted, multiple representation may prevent an attorney
declaration of mistrial during the first trial and a subsequent from exploring possible plea negotiations and the
mistrial during a proceeding on the defendants plea of nolo possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution for
contendere, reveals that the court focused on the States at least one of the defendants); Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence before the first trial, 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102
rather than on the second plea hearing, thus leaving open the S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1982)(plea bargains are
question of whether the prosecution has a duty to disclose perhaps the most obvious example of the manifest effects of
prior to entering into a plea bargain. [a] conflict of interest).
9
(a) Though they have been quick to Situations in which a conflict may not
acknowledge that the mere failure to obtain a adversely affect the plea bargaining process
plea bargain is not ipso facto evidence of a include cases:
Sixth Amendment violation,74 the courts have
concluded that counsels failure to seek a (1) in which the State refuses to plea
plea bargain offer, or his recommendation to bargain;77
refuse one, when representing multiple (2) in which the defendant has nothing to
defendants will violate the Sixth Amendment offer as part of a bargain or refuses to
when done under circumstances in which the testify for the prosecution,78
pursuit of a plea bargain would have (3) in which the State has no need for the
constituted sound pre-trial strategy.75 defendants testimony.79
(b) Even if the defendant can establish that his
lawyer labored under a conflict of interest 2. Representation of one client whose fees are paid
between multiple defendants, he still must by a third party might create an unconstitutional
show that the conflict adversely affected conflict of interest.80
counsels ability to secure a plea bargain.76
(a) Although the mere fact that a third party pays
74
counsels fees is not enough to support the
See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785-86, 107 S.Ct. conclusion that an actual conflict of interest
3114, 3121, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)(even if there had been a exists,81 an unconstitutional conflict will exist
conflict of interest, conflict did not harm counsels advocacy
where:
where record showed the prosecution refused to plea
bargain); Eisemann v. Herbert, 401 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir.
2005)(even if counsel had a conflict, the record indicates (1) there is evidence that the third party
that the defendant had nothing to bargain with, and hence, instructed counsel not to pursue a plea
plea bargaining was not remotely a plausible defense bargain, or
strategy). (2) counsel has manipulated negotiations to
the third partys advantage at the
75
See Hammon v. Ward, 466 F.3d 919, 930-31(10th Cir. expense of his client.82
2006)(finding an actual conflict of interest where counsel
represented two brothers who had agreed on a joint defense,
77
then negotiated a plea bargain for one brother, preventing See id., 107 S.Ct. at 3121.
him from testifying as part of the defense, but never told the
78
other brother until after trial had started, thus keeping the See Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, No. 04-2419, 2006 WL
second brother from accepting a pre-trial plea offer); United 3230286, at *13 (6th Cir. November 9, 2006); Eiseman v.
States v. Salado, 339 F.3d 285, 291-92 (5th Cir. Herbert, 401 F.3d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2005); Smith v.
2003)(remanding for determination of whether there was an Newsome, 876 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1989); Guaraldi v.
actual conflict of interest, where counsels failure to Cunningham, 819 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1987); Abernathy v.
negotiate a plea agreement for the defendant, while at the State, 278 Ga.App. 574, 585, 630 S.E.2d 421, 433-34
same time negotiating one for co-defendant whom counsel (2006).
also represented); Edens v. Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109, 1117
79
(10th Cir. 1996)(counsel labored under actual conflict of See Eiseman, 401 F.3d at 110.
interest that adversely affected his representation where
80
counsel insisted on discussing only joint plea deal for co- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 269, 101 S.Ct. 1097,
defendants, and refused to negotiate separate plea offer for 1102, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)(Courts and commentators
defendant); Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 481-82 (6th Cir. have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d criminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid
149 (1987)(attorney suffered actual conflict of interest that by a third party, particularly where the third party is the
violated defendants Sixth Amendment rights where operator of the alleged criminal enterprise. One risk is that
prosecution offered an all or nothing plea agreement to the lawyer will keep his client from obtaining leniency by
three co-defendants and third defendant refused to plead preventing him from offering testimony against the [leader]
until after pressured by counsel); Ford v. Ford, 749 F.2d or from taking other actions contrary to the [leaders]
681, 682 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909, 106 interest).
S.Ct. 278, 88 L.Ed.2d (1985)(attorney acted under actual
81
conflict of interest where he represented two brothers See Cabello v. United States, 188 F.3d 871, 878 (7th Cir.
offered a both or nothing plea bargain offer and one 1990); United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 575 (5th Cir.
brother wished to plead and the other refused). 1997); United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1497, 1503
(9th Cir. 1987).
76
See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785-86, 107 S.Ct.
82
3114, 3121, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). See Wood, 450 U.S. at 269, 101 S.Ct. at 1102 (suggesting
that counsel had arranged fine as part of defendants plea
10
3. Counsel also may be compromised by personal 5. An attorneys simultaneous representation of the

conflicts which might cause him to urge a client to defendant and the county entity or the attorney
accept or reject a plea bargain for his own prosecuting him has also been held to constitute a
personal reasons rather than the clients best conflict of interest that adversely affects counsels
interest, though the courts are split as to the ability to negotiate a plea bargain.86
appropriate test to employ in assessing the 6. Counsel who is being investigated by the
constitutionality of the conflict.83 government may labor under an impermissible
4. Representing a defendant on a contingent fee conflict of interest if he believes that his
basis a practice which violates the Texas Rules manipulation of plea negotiations could benefit
of Professional Conduct84 creates a conflict of him personally at the expense of his client.87
interest because it might prompt counsel to
recommend or discourage a plea bargain in order
to increase his fee.85
538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 810, 119
bargain knowing that defendant could not pay and that third S.Ct. 40, 142 L.Ed.2d 31 (1998)(no actual conflict of interest
party would not pay); Lipson v. United States, 233 F.3d 942, where defendant failed to prove that attorney had agreed to
947-48 (7th Cir. 2000)(remanding for evidentiary hearing on contingency fee of 40% of seized cash returned as a result of
grounds that counsel, whose fees were paid by co-defendant, plea bargain agreement).
did not seek plea bargain when other co-defendants had
86
successfully obtained plea in exchange for testimony against State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150, 153-54, 612 S.E.2d 449,
co-defendant); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 450-51 (2005)(actual conflict of interest that violated Sixth
1136-37 (9th Cir. 1994)(remanding for evidentiary hearing Amendment where counsel simultaneously represented
on basis that counsel, who was being paid by defendants defendant against criminal charges and the assistant solicitor
drug supplier, recommended that defendant reject a assigned to prosecute the defendant in her divorce action);
favorable plea bargain offer that required defendant to People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 945 (Colo.
cooperate in prosecution of drug supplier). 1983)(representation of district attorney on criminal charges
of overspending office budget while at same time
83
Compare Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265-66 (5th Cir. representing defendant on charge of murder created conflict
1995)(en banc)(two-pronged Strickland test should be used of interest that violated Sixth Amendment); Zuck v.
in evaluating whether conflict violated defendants Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
constitutional right to counsel) with Winkler Keane, 7 F.3d 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979)(actual
304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1022, 114 conflict of interest rendered trial fundamentally unfair
S.Ct. 1407, 128 L.Ed.2d 79 (1994)(defendant must establish where same law firm represented defendant in criminal case
that attorneys and the defendants interests diverged with and the prosecutor in an unrelated civil action); Westbrook
respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983), overruled on
action and that defendant suffered an actual lapse of other grounds, Peek v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
representation); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 1986))(actual conflict of interest that violated Sixth
174, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1245, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 Amendment right to counsel where counsel represented
(2002)(suggesting, but not deciding, that test in Cyler v. county in a lawsuit challenging the composition of the
Sullivan not appropriate to conflicts of interest other than county jury lists while simultaneously representing
simultaneous multiple representation); see also EDWARD L. defendant in capital murder case)
WILKINSON, LEGAL ETHICS AND TEXAS CRIMINAL LAW:
87
PROSECUTION & DEFENSE, at 161-65 (TDCAA See United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463-64
2006)(examining differences between the Strickland and (11th Cir. 1987)(Sixth Amendment violation where lawyer
Winkler tests); Edward L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in was to be indicted on unrelated matter at conclusion of the
Texas Criminal Cases, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 171, 208-213 case because counsel had incentive to delay proceedings, as
(2002)(same). reflected by his half-hearted plea bargaining); but see United
States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1999)(no
84
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.04(e)(A actual conflict of interest where lawyer did not read note
lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or from one co-defendant to another demanding payment in
collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a exchange for favorable testimony and no evidence that
criminal case). representation was adversely affected); Thompkins v.
Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992)(no impermissible
85
See Winkler Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. conflict of interest where there was no evidence that
denied, 511 U.S. 1022, 114 S.Ct. 1407, 128 L.Ed.2d 79 indictment and later guilty plea by counsel on unrelated
(1994)(Without doubt, trial counsels acceptance of the charges had adverse affect on representation); Roach v.
contingency fee arrangement for representing a criminal Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
defendant is highly unethical and deserves the strongest 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985)(no
condemnation, but no Sixth Amendment violation where actual conflict of interest when attorney was being
defendant refused to permit counsel to enter into plea investigated by state bar while representing defendant).
negotiations); see also Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530,
11
7. Any other conflict which might tempt counsel to (b) an overwhelming personal animus toward the
refuse to explore the possibility of a plea defendant,90 or
negotiation or to recommend the acceptance or (c) some other factor that might prompt a
rejection of a plea bargain for personal gain prosecutor to fail to consider a plea bargain
instead of the clients welfare could violate the for reason other than the merits of the case
Sixth Amendment. 88 itself.91
8. Prosecutors must avoid conflicts of interest which
would so impair their ability to fairly plea bargain
as to constitute a violation of due process, such as: 951, 952 (N.M 1932)(district attorney disciplined for
participating in civil and criminal cases); In re Williams, 50
P.2d 729, 732 (Okla. 1935)(county attorney disciplined for
(a) a financial interest in a related civil action 89
participating in civil and criminal actions); In re Wilmarth,
172 N.W. 921, 926 (S.D. 1919)(states attorney censured);
88
See United States v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130-32 (9th In re Schull, 127 N.W. 541, 542-53 (S.D. 1910) modified on
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068, 115 S.Ct. 1702, 131 rehearing on other grounds, 128 N.E. 321 (S.D.
L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)(appeal dismissed without prejudice for 1910)(district attorney suspended); cf. In re Snyder, 559
further fact-finding on issue of whether attorney was having P.2d 1273, 1275 (Or. 1976)(district attorney disciplined for
sex with defendants wife and therefore had incentive to violating statutes prohibiting concurrent practice of civil
make sure defendant was found guilty and sentenced to law). For extended examination of the constitutional scope
prison); Hernandez v. State, 750 So.2d 50, 55 (Fla. of the disinterested prosecutor, see EDWARD L.
1999)(rejecting claim of ineffective assistance where WILKINSON, LEGAL ETHICS AND TEXAS CRIMINAL LAW:
defendant failed to show a lapse in the conduct of the PROSECUTION & DEFENSE , at 127-135 (TDCAA 2006)
defense due to counsels sexual relationship with
90
defendants wife); United States v. Babbitt, 26 M.J. 157, 159 See Wright, 732 F.2d at 1056 (finding bias where
(C.M.J. 1988)(rejecting per se rule of conflict and holding prosecutors wife had had numerous political and legal
that counsels sexual affair with his client did not create confrontations with defendant, because a prosecutor is not
conflict of interest where counsel actively defended client); disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of others
United States v. Cain, 57 M.J. 733, 737-38 (A.r. Ct. Crim. who have, an axe to grind against the defendant); United
App. 2002)(rejecting per se rule of conflict where counsel States v. Terry, 806 F.Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
and client had sexual relations, even where counsels sexual affd, 17 F.3d 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946, 115
conduct could have subjected him to court-marshal, and S.Ct. 355, 130 L.Ed.2d 310 (1994)(neither prosecutors
finding no actual conflict where defendant failed to show personal comment to the defendant nor his later use of the
lapses in representation); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d prosecution in political ads established that the prosecutor
656, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1991)(remanding for evidentiary had a personal axe to grind); see also Gallego v.
hearing on whether lawyer, due to personal conflict of McDaniel, 124 F.2d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
interest, had advised defendant to plead guilty to perjury 524 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 2299, 141 L.Ed.2d 159
charge in order to protect himself from being implicated in (1998)(defendant failed to establish prejudice where
perjury); United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 871 (2d prosecutor entered into book deal after the case was tried).
Cir. 1984)(counsel had actual conflict of interest that
91
adversely affected his advice whether to engage in plea See People v. Vasquez, 39 Cal.4th 47, 70, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d
negotiations where, unbeknownst to defendant, counsel had 372, 389, 137 P.3d 199, 214 (2006)(though not established
engaged in same insurance fraud scheme and may have in the record of the case, a prosecutors refusal to plea
feared plea bargain and defendants subsequent cooperation bargain, based on her fear that the office might appear to be
would have revealed lawyers involvement); Commonwealth favoring defendant who was the child of a former employee,
v. Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 274-77, 733 N.E.2d 1005, 1012- could constitute such prejudice as to violate due process);
14 (2000)(remanding for further fact-finding on issue of People v. Connor, 666 P.2d 5, 9 (Cal. 1983)(disqualifying
whether defense attorney had a conflict of interest between entire district attorneys office after one of the attorneys had
defendant and his live-in girlfriend, whom he later married, been shot at by the defendant and the victim had spoken to
who was an attorney with the district attorneys office); see his colleagues about his harrowing experience); People v.
also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT Gentile, 511 N.Y.S. 901, 904 (1987)(prosecutors admittedly
1.08(c)(prohibiting counsel from contracting for media close personal relationship to victim and deep emotional
rights related to matter of representation). involvement in case deprived defendant of fair trial);
People v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1164, 1174 (Cal.
89
See Granger v. Payton, 379 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1977)(prosecutor properly disqualified where mother of the
1967)(prosecutor who also represented victim in ancillary homicide victim employed in district attorneys office and
civil suit had conflict of interest that rose to level of due involved in custody dispute with defendant, the victims ex-
process violation because financial interest in civil suit wife, over victims child); State v. Jones, 268 S.W. 83, 85
influenced plea bargain offer); Ky Bar Assn v. Lovelace, (Mo. 1924)(prosecutor disqualified where he was the victim
778 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Ky. 1989)(prosecutor suspended for of defendants alleged DWI); People v. Cline, 44 Mich. 290,
participating in civil and criminal actions arising from same 296, 6 N.W. 671, 672-73 (1880)(victim was prosecutors
facts); In re Jolly, 239 S.E.2d 490, 491 (S.C. 1977)(per brother).
curiam)(circuit solicitor reprimanded); In re Truder, 17 P.2d
12
9. Mere personal animus,92 however, or the political reasonably appears to be or become[s]

concerns or aspirations of a prosecutor,93 standing adversely limited by the lawyers . . .
alone, are not enough to warrant disqualification. responsibilities to another client or to a third
person.97
B. Conflicts of interest under the StateBar Rules
(1) Comment 4 to Rule 1.06 indirectly
1. Rule 1.06(b)(1) addresses the simultaneous recognizes how a personal conflict or
representation of parties whose interests are not duty to a former client might affect plea
directly adverse, but where the potential for bargaining by paraphrasing it: loyalty
conflict exists, such as co-defendants in a criminal to a client is impaired . . . in any
case.94 situation when lawyer may not be able
to consider, recommend, or carry out an
(a) The rule states that a lawyer shall not appropriate course of action for one
represent a person if the representation client because of the lawyers . . .
involves a substantially related matter in responsibilities to others.98
which the persons interests are materially (2) The thrust of the rule is easily grasped: a
and directly adverse to the interests of lawyer must decline or withdraw from
another client of the lawyer or the lawyers representation if his own or another
law firm.95 clients interests might impede either the
lawyers judgment or his ability or
(1) The comment to the rule expresses willingness to consider, recommend, or
grave concern over the conflict of carry out an appropriate course of
interest involved in representing co- action, including plea bargaining.99
defendants in a case, and advises that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to
represent more than one co-
defendant.96
(b) Rule 1.06(b)(2) prohibits a lawyer from

representing a person if the representation
92
Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.2d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 1997), 97
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06(b)(2).
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 2299, 141 L.Ed.2d 159
(1998)(defendant failed to establish prejudice where 98
Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06
prosecutor entered into book deal after the case was tried); cmt 4 (Loyalty to a client is impaired not only by the
see also United States v. Terry, 17 F.3d 575, 579 (2d Cir. representation of opposing parties in situations within
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) but also in any situation when a
L.Ed.2d 310 (1994); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, lawyer may not be able to consider, recommend or carry out
460 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 939, 113 S.Ct. an appropriate course of action for one client because of the
2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); Wright v. United States, 732 lawyers own interests or responsibilities to others) with
S.W.2d 1048, 1056 n.8 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06 cmt 6
1106, 105 S.Ct. 779, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985). (representation of one client is directly adverse to the
representation of another client if the lawyers independent
93
See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 460 (2d Cir. judgment on behalf of the client or the lawyers ability or
1991); Wright v. United States, 732 S.W.2d 1048, 1055 (2d willingness to consider, recommend, or carry out a course of
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Dick v. action will be or is reasonably likely to be adversely affected
Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 196 (6th Cir. 1989); Azzone v. by the lawyers representation of, or responsibilities to,
United States, 341 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. another client).
denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965); United States v. Terry, 806
F.Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 17 F.3d 575 (2d 99
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06 cmt. 4;
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 see TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT preamble 3
L.Ed.2d 310 (1994). (In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously
pursue clients interests within the bounds of the law); see
94
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06 cmt. 2. also See United States v. Phillips, 952 F.Supp. 480, 481,
484 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 1996)(lawyer prohibited from
95
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06(b)(1). representing defendant where representation might require
cross-examination and impeachment of another client of
96
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.06(b) cmt 3. firm).
13
VII. DUTY TO CONVEY AND EXPLAIN A PLEA

BARGAIN OFFER (1) The failure to inform a client of
A. Defense Counsels Constitutional Duty to negotiations that do not rise to the level
Convey a Plea Offer to the Defendant of a genuine offer does not constitute
deficient conduct.105
1. Failure of defense counsel to inform a criminal (2) Counsels decision to break off
defendant of plea offers made by the State is an negotiations over issues that the accused
omission that falls below an objective standard of has declared non-negotiable represents
professional reasonableness, and thus may reasonable strategy.106
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.100
B. Defense Counsels Constitutional Duty to
(a) The failure to sufficiently or fully explain the Advise the Defendant About a Plea Offer
terms of plea offers may also fall below the 1. In order to render effective assistance of counsel,
standard of reasonableness as well.101 a defense attorney must sufficiently advise his
(b) Counsels failure to convey a deadline client regarding the ramifications of a plea of
attached to a plea offer also falls below the guilty or nolo contendere.107
objective standard of reasonableness, even
where he has informed his client of all other (a) Counsel is not obligated to inform a
aspects of the proposed agreement.102 defendant of the collateral consequences to a
(c) The failure of defense counsel to inform a plea.108
defendant of plea offers made by the State (1) A consequence is collateral if it is not a
has generally been held to be an omission definite, practical consequence of a
that falls below an objective standard of defendants plea.109
professional reasonableness.104 (A) A consequence is definite if it
flows from the plea.110
2. The two-pronged test for constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel may be applied
to an attorneys failure to convey a plea bargain 105
offer: a defendant must prove that her counsel See Harvey, 97 S.W.3d at 167; Hernandez v. State, 28
S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2000, pet.
failed to convey a plea bargain offer and that she
refd).
would have accepted the offer had it been relayed
to her.103 106
See Harvey, 97 S.W.3d at 167-68.
(a) There are a number of exceptions to this 107

See Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Crim. App.
general rule: 1991)(counsels conduct was below reasonable standard
where he advised defendant that he would receive probation
after nolo contendere plea when the defendant was actually
100
See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex. Crim. ineligible for probation); see also Ex parte Moody, 991
App. 2000); Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Tex. S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)(attorney who has
Crim. App. 1987)(counsel has duty under the Sixth improperly advised his client that his sentence would be
Amendment to convey plea bargain offer from the State). served concurrently with a federal offense, rendered
ineffective assistance); Jackson v. State, 139 S.W.3d 7, 19
101
See State v. Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. App. (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.)(lawyer improperly
Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)(failure to fully explain offer of failed to advise his client about the consequences of her
deferred adjudication fell below the objective standard of guilty plea on her pending capital case); Champion v. State,
reasonableness). 126 S.W.3d 686, 696-97 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2004, no
pet.)(defendant failed to establish that counsel had assured
102
See Turner v. State, 49 S.W.3d 461, 464-65 (Tex. App. him of probation where evidence was conflicting);
Fort Worth 2001), pet. dismissd, improvidently granted,
108
118 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 530, 536.
104 109
See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d at 795; Harvey v. State, See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536; see also
97 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App.
pet. refd). 2004)(defense counsel is obligated to advise an accused of
any plea consequence that is definite and largely or
103
See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Tex. Crim. completely automatic).
App. 2000); Dickerson v. State, 87 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Tex.
110
App. San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Id.
14
(B) A consequence is automatic if

there are no exceptions, no wiggle (1) This responsibility includes informing
room, no condition which relieve the client of communications from
[the defendant] of the obligation, another party and taking other
such as judicial discretion.111 reasonable steps to permit the client to
(C) A consequence is practical if it is make a decision regarding a serious
logically connected to the plea.112 offer from another party.117
(2) In extreme circumstances a lawyer may
(b) Even if a consequence is direct, a be required to act for a client without
lawyer may not render ineffective assistance prior consultation.118
in failing to advise his client of the
consequence if it is remedial and civil rather (b) Under certain circumstances, a lawyer may be
than punitive.113 justified in delaying transmission of
information when the lawyer reasonably
2. A defendant must also show that, but for the believes the client would likely react
erroneous advice, he would not have pleaded imprudently to an immediate
guilty and would have insisted on going to communication.119
trial.114 (c) Counsel is not required by the rule to convey
information to the client which he is
(a) Courts have viewed with skepticism bare prohibited by law or a court ruling from
claims that the accused would not have disclosing.120
pleaded guilty, unaccompanied by special
circumstances that might support the 2. The duty to promptly comply with requests for
conclusion that he placed particular information
emphasis on the advice of which he later (a) The second responsibility of communicating
complains.115 with the client is to promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information from the
C. Defense Counsels Duty to Inform and Advise client.121
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct
1. The duty to convey
(a) Under Rule 1.03(a) a lawyer must keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of 117
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 1; see
a matter.116 also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd v. Turgeon, 210 W.Va. 181,
185, 557 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 841,
111
Id.; see also Jackson v. State, 139 S.W.3d 7, 19 (Tex. 122 L.Ed.2d 99, 151 L.Ed.2d 59 (2001)(counsels failure to
App. Fort Worth 2007, pet. refd). convey plea offer violated disciplinary rules).
112 118
Mitschke, 129 S.W.3d at 135. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 2.
113 119
Id. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 4.
114 120
Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d at 857-58 (quoting Ex parte See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 4;
Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 3.04(d)(A lawyer
U.S. 52, 60,106 S.Ct. 366, 371, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); shall not . . . knowingly disobey, or advise the client to
Jackson, 139 S.W.3d 7, 20 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004, disobey, an obligation under the standing rules of or a ruling
no pet. h.). by a tribunal except for an open refusal based either on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists or on the clients
115
Hill, 474 U.S. at 60, 106 S.Ct. at 371; Jackson, 139 willingness to accept any sanctions arising from such
S.W.3d at 12 n.11; cf. Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, disobedience); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 35.29
1206 (6th Cir. 1989)(rejecting defendants self-subjective, (Vernon Supp. 2004)(counsel shall not disclose juror
serving, and . . . insufficient testimony that he would have information except upon showing of good cause to the
accepted a plea bargain and relying instead on objective court); Saur v. State, 918 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App. San
evidence that provided an independent reason to believe Antonio 1996, no pet.)(in cases where protection of jurors is
that there was a significant probability that had counsels an issue, it may be appropriate to take up the juror
advice been reasonable, the defendant would have accepted information sheets at the conclusion of trial and instruct
plea bargain offer). counsel about non-disclosure).
116 121
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03(a). TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03(a).
15
(1) Circumstances will obviously dictate VIII. CLIENTS RIGHT TO DECIDE

what may constitute a prompt A. Client Possesses Constitutional and Statutory
response to a reasonable request.122 Right to Decide Whether to Waive a Jury and
Whether to Testify
3. The duty to inform 1. The right to waive a jury and the right to decide
whether to testify are provided for under the
(a) Under Rule 1.03(b), a lawyer shall explain a United States Constitution and the Code of
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to Criminal Procedure.127
permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.123 B. Rule 1.02 and Clients Right to Decide
(1) Since a client should have the sufficient 1. Under Rule 1.02(a) a lawyer shall abide by a
information to participate intelligently in clients decisions: (1) concerning the objectives
decisions concerning the objectives of and general methods of representation; (2)
representation and the means by which whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
they are to be pursued,124 counsel has matter, except as otherwise authorized by law; and
the responsibility to explain a matter (3) in a criminal case, after consultation with the
sufficiently for the client to make lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
informed decisions on his own behalf.125 waive a jury trial, and whether the client will
testify.128
(b) The adequacy of communication depends in
part on the kind of advice or assistance (a) Under the rule, both the lawyer and the client
involved.126 have authority and responsibility in the
objectives and means of representation.129
(b) The client bears the ultimate authority to
determine the objectives to be served by legal
representation, within the limits of the law,
the lawyers ethical responsibilities, and the
agreed scope of the representation.130
(c) Within these broad limits, the lawyer bears
the responsibility of determining the means
by which the clients objectives may be
furthered, while consulting with the client
about the general methods to be used in
122
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 2. pursuing those objectives.131
123
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03(b); see
also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT terminology
(Consult or Consultation denotes communication of
information and advice reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
127
question). See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 107 S.Ct. 2704,
2707, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)(right to testify rests on Fifth,
124
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 1; see Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Nix v. Whiteside, 475
also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.02(a)(1)(a U.S. 157, 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, 997, 89 L.Ed.2d 123
lawyer shall generally abide by a clients decisions . . . (1986)(defendant has a right to decide to testify, but not to
concerning the objectives and general methods of testify falsely); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
representation). 1.13(a)(defendant may waive right to jury trial only in
person by the defendant in writing).
125
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03(b).
128
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.02(a)(1)-
126 (3).
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT 1.03 cmt 2.
129
130
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROFL CONDUCT cmt 1.
131
16
(1) In essence, the lawyer has the discretion

to determine technical and legal tactics,
but only within the framework of the
strategic goals determined by the client,
including concerns such as the expense
to be incurred and the concern for third
parties who might be adversely affected
by the lawyers pursuit of certain
tactics.132
132
17

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OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PLEA BARGAINING UNDER THE TEXAS

DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

EDWARD CHIP WILKINSON, Fort Worth

State Bar of Texas

SHANNON, GRACEY, RATLIFF & MILLER 1988-1990 Fort Worth, Texas

Publications or CLE presentations:

Honors and Awards:

I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEA BARGAINING ............................................................................................ 1

II. CHARGING AS PART OF THE PLEA BARGAIN PROCESS .............................................................................. 2

III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND VINDICTIVENESS IN PLEA BARGAINING .......................... 3

III. COMMUNICATION .............................................................................................................................................. 6

IV. BARGAINING ...................................................................................................................................................... 8

V. A PROSECUTORS DUTY TO DISCLOSE ......................................................................................................... 9

VI. PLEA BARGAINING AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .................................................................................... 9

VII. DUTY TO CONVEY AND EXPLAIN A PLEA BARGAIN OFFER ................................................................. 14

VIII. CLIENTS RIGHT TO DECIDE .......................................................................................................................... 16

OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PLEA 5. A plea is not constitutionally invalid merely

III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND 2. A presumption of regularity supports States

charge or enhancement had been omitted

(a) Sufficient circumstances to justify the

solely from the defendants exercise of a III. COMMUNICATION

IV. BARGAINING (a) In light of the prohibition in Subsection (a) of

3. Counsel also may be compromised by personal 5. An attorneys simultaneous representation of the

9. Mere personal animus,92 however, or the political reasonably appears to be or become[s]

(b) Rule 1.06(b)(2) prohibits a lawyer from

VII. DUTY TO CONVEY AND EXPLAIN A PLEA

(a) There are a number of exceptions to this 107

(B) A consequence is automatic if

(1) Circumstances will obviously dictate VIII. CLIENTS RIGHT TO DECIDE

(1) In essence, the lawyer has the discretion

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