S. HRG.

105383

COUNTERTERRORISM

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46491 cc WASHINGTON : 1998

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 016056204X
 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CONRAD BURNS, Montana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HARRY REID, Nevada
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
STEVEN J. CORTESE, Staff Director
LISA SUTHERLAND, Deputy Staff Director
JAMES H. ENGLISH, Minority Staff Director

(II)
 CONTENTS

Page
Statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
Department of Justice ......................................................................................... 1
Opening statement of Hon. Ted Stevens ............................................................... 1
Statement of Hon. Judd Gregg ............................................................................... 2
Summary statement of Janet Reno ........................................................................ 2
Administrations strategy ........................................................................................ 2
Objectives ................................................................................................................. 3
International cooperation ........................................................................................ 3
Training strategy ..................................................................................................... 4
Prevention of terrorism ........................................................................................... 4
Congressional involvement ..................................................................................... 5
Prepared statement of Janet Reno ......................................................................... 5
Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, De-
partment of Justice .............................................................................................. 8
Reducing vulnerabilities through preparation ...................................................... 9
Source of terrorism .................................................................................................. 10
Domestic terrorism .................................................................................................. 10
FBI roles and responsibilities ................................................................................. 10
Prepared statement of Louis J. Freeh ................................................................... 12
Statement of George J. Tenet, Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency .... 19
Prepared statement of George J. Tenet ................................................................. 22
Working technology ................................................................................................. 23
Communications assistance for law enforcement activity [CALEA] ................... 24
Courts ....................................................................................................................... 24
Coordination and cooperation ................................................................................. 25
Customers ................................................................................................................. 26
Security measures ................................................................................................... 27
Prosecution of crimes ............................................................................................... 28
Olympic lessons learned .......................................................................................... 29
Internet excerpts ...................................................................................................... 29
Internet ..................................................................................................................... 30
Prepared statement of Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, Department
of State .................................................................................................................. 30
Multiple agency coordination .................................................................................. 33
Intelligence collection .............................................................................................. 34
Evidence development ............................................................................................. 35
Translation centers .................................................................................................. 36
Terrorist threat ........................................................................................................ 37
Integrated force training ......................................................................................... 37
Organized crime ....................................................................................................... 38
Defense budget ......................................................................................................... 38
Counterterrorism support ....................................................................................... 40
Standards and guidelines ........................................................................................ 41
Enactment of laws ................................................................................................... 42
Additional committee questions ............................................................................. 43
Federal Bureau of Investigation ...................................................................... 44
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg ................................ 44
Illegal fundraising ..................................................................................... 44
Questions submitted by Senator Harry Reid ................................................. 44
Terrorism threat ........................................................................................ 44
(III)
 COUNTERTERRORISM

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1997

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 1:58 p.m., in room SD192, Dirksen Sen-
ate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Burns, Shelby,
Gregg, Bennett, Campbell, Craig, Hollings, and Reid.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATEMENT OF JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS

Chairman STEVENS. We will break a record and start our hearing

early for a change. Thank you all for coming.
The incident 3 weeks ago at the world headquarters of the Jew-
ish organization Bnai Brith right here in Washington, DC, and the
protracted siege of the residence of the Japanese Ambassador in
Lima, Peru, are troubling signs that extremists are prepared to
take American lives to advance their purposes. We have had a se-
ries of events in our own country that we all know about, the
World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, we
have also had overseas activity such as the Khobar Towers inci-
dent. We could go on with a long list. What we have, however, is
an issue that has tremendous impact here at home, and we believe
that Americans are starting to feel vulnerable, not just from what
is going on around the world but right here in the United States.
In the context of these tragedies, which we are all too familiar
with, our committee is concerned that we do not have an adequate
comprehensive strategy when combating domestic and inter-
national terrorism. Senator Gregg has requested that we hold this
hearing today. We want to ensure that our efforts are given the
highest priority; that they are coordinated with the many partici-
pating domestic agencies and foreign governments, both in terms
of planning and resources, and we would like to be able to move
forward with you to help come to grips with this very critical issue
in our country.
We want to provide the funding that is necessary to combat ter-
rorism, and we appreciate your coming here to be with us today.
Do you have an opening statement, Sir?
(1)
 2

STATEMENT OF HON. JUDD GREGG

Senator GREGG. I would just like to thank the chairman for initi-
ating this hearing. It is, I think, an important hearing. What we
need to address is how we are anticipating potential terrorist
events and whether or not we have adequate coordination between
the various agencies. There are an awful lot of them that are in-
volved in protecting this country from terrorist action. I believe
that this committee has the unique capacity to bring all these
agencies together, having oversight over all of them from the ap-
propriations standpoint, and, therefore, I appreciate the chairmans
being willing to hold this hearing.
Chairman STEVENS. Madam Attorney General, Director Freeh,
and Director Tenet, we are pleased to have you here. We are going
to open this hearing in a public session, and then we would ask
that you go with us to a classified area later to talk about some
things that we would like to make sure of before we handle the ap-
propriations bills this year. We would be pleased to have your
statement.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF JANET RENO

Ms. RENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Gregg. We

very much appreciate this opportunity, and it is my privilege to be
here before you today for the purpose of discussing with you our
efforts to combat terrorism. The protection of our Nation and its
people from acts of terrorism is a matter of the highest priority.
American citizens and interests, both at home and abroad, are tar-
gets of choice of international terrorists. Further, the risk of terror-
ism within our borders does not result solely from grievances im-
ported from overseas as, increasingly, acts of terrorism are per-
petrated by disaffected citizens.
Whatever the origin or misguided motivation of the particular
terrorist, the potential consequences of a single incident can be
enormous. We must never forget the magnitude of human suffering
that flows from acts such as Pan Am 103 and the World Trade
Center. As weapons of mass destruction become more accessible,
we face the potential of even more catastrophic acts.
The challenge that terrorism presents to a free society is that we
must endeavor to hone our skills and techniques sharply enough to
prevent terrorist acts while respecting the individual rights and lib-
erties for which this Nation stands. We have made much progress
in the past several years, successfully preventing a number of po-
tentially deadly terrorist attacks at home and abroad. We have
demonstrated that our commitment is unflagging and our memory
is very long. But more work needs to be done.
ADMINISTRATIONS STRATEGY

The administrations comprehensive strategy for meeting the

challenges presented by terrorism is detailed in the report that I
submitted to you earlier this month. The framework for that strat-
egy is contained in the Presidential decision directive 39, dated
June 21, 1995. The PDD seeks to integrate roles of pertinent Fed-
eral agencies in a comprehensive, proactive program to prevent and
to punish terrorist acts.
 3

The policy of our Government in dealing with acts of terrorism,

both at home and abroad, is straightforward. First, we seek to re-
duce the vulnerabilities at home and abroad. We will do everything
possible to deter and prevent terrorist acts. When acts of terrorism
do occur, we will respond quickly and decisively with the full range
of options that we have available, including apprehension and pros-
ecution. We will develop an effective capability to detect, prevent,
defeat, and manage consequences of nuclear, biological, and chemi-
cal material and weapons used by terrorists.
OBJECTIVES

Let me explain briefly some of the means by which we seek to

accomplish these objectives. We seek to reduce our vulnerabilities
to terrorist attack, both at home and abroad, by assessing the risk
that terrorism poses and by taking steps designed to prevent or
minimize such risk. For example, the FBIs new counterterrorism
center is staffed with representatives of 17 different agencies. With
the integration of the capabilities of these agencies, the FBI can
now conduct real time analysis and processing of information with
the goal of detecting and preventing acts of terrorism.
Additionally, a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection has been created. It brings together key representa-
tives from both Government and the private sector to assess
vulnerabilities and to propose comprehensive national policies and
strategies. As part of this effort, an information protection task
force has been created. It is a multiagency effort to identify and co-
ordinate existing expertise and capability in the Government and
the private sector relative to critical infrastructure protection. Con-
sistent with that effort, the FBI has established a Computer Inves-
tigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center.
The development of effective coordination among counterterror-
ism agencies is a critical aspect of preparation. PDD39 facilitates
such coordination by delineating the appropriate roles of Federal
counterterrorism agencies. Similarly, the FBI has created 14 joint
terrorism task forces which integrate Federal, State, and local law
enforcement authorities in particular localities. Further plans are
underway to involve State and local authorities in the FBIs new
counterterrorism center.
Moreover, I have directed that the FBI implement a comprehen-
sive effort to coordinate with State and local law enforcement, own-
ers and operators of critical infrastructure, and State and local
emergency managers to identify potentially vulnerable facilities,
critical infrastructures, and special events, and to collaborate with
these officials to develop plans to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks. I have asked that clear lines of communication be estab-
lished so that relevant information can be quickly and accurately
exchanged among these individuals.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

U.S. coordination also includes bilateral and multilateral con-

sultations and cooperation with foreign governments that share our
objectives in countering terrorism. Under the leadership of the
State Department we are working closely within the context of the
P8, recently renamed the eight, to improve coordination and to de-
 4

velop tangible measures to assist in terrorism prevention and re-

sponse.
TRAINING STRATEGY

Training is also a key element of the U.S. strategy to reduce this

Nations vulnerability to terrorism, since an effective response to a
terrorist threat requires multiple agencies to interrelate smoothly
under extreme pressure. Federal agencies involved in responding to
acts of terrorism regularly engage in realistic training exercises
which recognize the important role of State and local agencies.
Additionally, six Federal agencies, the FBI, the Department of
Defense, FEMA, the EPA, the Public Health Service, and the De-
partment of Energy are working cooperatively to provide weapons
of mass destruction training to State and local emergency respond-
ers. This initiative will train emergency responders in 120 cities
throughout the United States, with the initial 9 cities to receive
training before the end of the fiscal year.
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM

The United States seeks to deter terrorism through broad dis-

semination of a clear message that we will not allow terrorism to
achieve its objectives; we will not make concessions to terrorists;
we will vigorously apply our criminal statutes to those who commit
acts of terrorism anywhere in the world; and we will endeavor to
apprehend terrorists wherever they seek refuge.
Further, the prevention of terrorism involves the interrelation of
U.S. intelligence and investigative capabilities to detect and react
effectively to incipient terrorist threats. By making effective use of
intelligence product, we seek to involve the FBI in the investigation
of terrorist plots as early in the chain of conspiratorial events as
possible. In this way, the plot cannot only be disrupted but the con-
spirators can also be apprehended, preventing them from recycling
their terrorist plans for use at some unknown future time and
place.
Overseas, U.S. agencies working in coordination with their for-
eign counterparts disrupted a plot to bomb a dozen U.S. commer-
cial jumbo jets flying Asian-Pacific routes. Three of the terrorists
involved in this plot were arrested in distant countries, brought to
the United States, and convicted in Federal court. Within the Unit-
ed States, investigative efforts resulted in the arrest and conviction
of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and a number of his followers before
they could carry out a deadly plot to bomb buildings, tunnels, and
a bridge in Manhattan. Prevention of these two terrorist plots
alone averted the death or serious injury of tens of thousands of
Americans.
While the paramount objective is to prevent terrorist attacks,
this goal cannot always be realized. When such acts occur, the per-
tinent U.S. agencies utilize their painstaking planning and training
in an effort to respond in a coordinated and in an effective manner.
There are separate deployment plans depending on whether the
terrorist act occurs overseas or within the United States. Although
the FBI is the lead Federal investigative agency regardless of the
place where the terrorist act occurs, responsibility for overall man-
agement of the U.S. response to overseas terrorist attacks is vested
 5

in the chief of mission. In contrast, within the United States, the

FBI is in charge of the overall Federal response. In either case, the
resources of all pertinent Federal agencies are available as needed
under plans which are designed to ensure the effective integration
and coordination of these resources.
The objective is to develop sufficient evidence to permit the in-
dictment of the perpetrators and the issuance of warrants for their
arrest. Although efforts to locate international terrorists and obtain
their rendition to the United States are often very protracted, the
passage of time does not diminish the Governments ardor for pur-
suing these international criminals. In one case, for example, cus-
tody of a defendant was obtained and his conviction achieved 19
years after his terrorist acts. In another case, the perpetrator of a
deadly 1985 air piracy in the Middle East was tried and convicted
in the United States in 1996. During these past 4 years, the relent-
less efforts to apprehend such fugitives have resulted in the ren-
dition to the United States of seven individuals on charges relating
to deadly terrorist plots.
The U.S. strategy for combating terrorism is a dynamic one. It
is continually subject to reevaluation and is supplemented as ap-
propriate to address newly identified concerns and circumstances.
It requires the continuing efforts of participating agencies to per-
fect their operations and maintain their readiness.
CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Congress, of course, is an integral part of the dynamic process by

which the counterterrorism program continues to be improved and
perfected. The new counterterrorism funding provided in the final
days of the 104th Congress has permitted the development of a
more comprehensive response to terrorist attacks, including those
involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and we are very
grateful to you.
Much progress has been made during the past few years in pre-
paring the United States to prevent acts of terrorism and to re-
spond to those terrorist threats that do arise. However, many chal-
lenges remain including, most significantly, those relating to weap-
ons of mass destruction and infrastructure protection. Accordingly,
while the PDD39 strategy has placed U.S. counterterrorism ef-
forts on course, we continue to work on a priority basis with the
other components of our Government and with like-minded foreign
governments to maximize our ability to address this area of critical
concern.
PREPARED STATEMENT

We appreciate and thank you for the opportunity to be here with

you today, sir.
Chairman STEVENS. Thank you for joining us. We appreciate it
very much.
[The statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET RENO
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I have submitted a
more detailed, classified statement to the Committee. I will briefly summarize some
of the unclassified portions of that statement, and then would be happy to answer
 6
specific questions. However, since many of the details of our counterterrorism efforts
are classified for security reasons, it will only be possible to address some of your
questions in open session.
It is my privilege to appear before you today for the purpose of discussing with
you our accomplishments over the past several years in the struggle against terror-
ism and the preparations that we are undertaking for combatting that scourge dur-
ing the coming years.
The protection of our nation and its people from acts of domestic and international
terrorism is among the greatest challenges faced by this Administration and one of
the highest priorities of the Department of Justice. Over the past two decades, it
has become clear that American citizens and interests abroad are the targets of
choice of terrorists. More recently, it has become apparent in the wake of the World
Trade Center bombing that we are not immune from international terrorist attacks
on our own soil. Further, the risk of terrorism within our borders does not result
solely from grievances imported from overseas as, increasingly, acts of terrorism are
planned by home-grown groups and perpetrated by disaffected citizens.
Whatever the origin or misguided motivation of the particular terrorist, the poten-
tial consequences of a single incident can be enormous. The magnitude of human
suffering that flows from acts such as the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and the
World Trade Center is incalculable. As weapons of mass destruction become more
accessible, we face the potential of even more catastrophic acts. The nerve gas at-
tack in the Tokyo subway was a grim warning of this potential.
The challenge that terrorism presents to a free society is that we must endeavor
to hone our skills and techniques sharply enough to prevent terrorist acts while
fully respecting the individual rights and liberties for which this nation stands. We
have made much progress in the past several years, successfully preventing a num-
ber of potentially deadly terrorist attacks at home and abroad. We have dem-
onstrated that our commitment is unflagging and our memory is long. But, much
work remains to be done.
The Administrations comprehensive strategy for meeting the challenges pre-
sented by terrorism is detailed in the report that I submitted to you earlier this
month, as well as in my classified statement. The framework for that strategy is
contained in Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD39), dated June 21, 1995. The
PDD seeks to integrate the roles of all pertinent federal agencies in a comprehen-
sive, proactive program to prevent and punish terrorist acts.
The policy of our government in dealing with acts of terrorism, both at home and
abroad, is straightforward. We will do everything possible to deter and prevent ter-
rorist attacks. When acts of terrorism do occur, we will respond quickly and deci-
sively, with the full panoply of options that we have available. We will work with
our friends throughout the world to interdict terrorists and ensure their acts do not
go unpunished.
Let me explain briefly some of the means by which we seek to accomplish these
objectives.
Reducing Vulnerabilities Through Preparation
We seek to reduce our vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, both at home and
abroad, by assessing the risks that terrorism poses to U.S. nationals, employees,
and facilities, and by taking steps designed to prevent or minimize such risks. This
is exemplified by the ongoing efforts of the Presidential Commission on Critical In-
frastructure Protection. The Commission brings together key representatives from
both government and the private sector to assess vulnerabilities and to propose com-
prehensive national policies and strategies. The Commission will complete its work
and make its recommendations this fall.
Similarly, one of the FBIs recent initiatives has been the establishment of a Com-
puter Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center. The purpose of
the Center is to identify the potential threat posed by terrorism to telecommuni-
cations and automated information systems, as well as to critical physical infra-
structures. Working together with state and local authorities and the private sector,
the FBI is endeavoring to develop ways to address those threats. The focus of these
efforts will be refined consistent with the recommendations of the Presidential Com-
mission.
Since terrorism prevention and response require the interaction of numerous
agencies within the United States, effective coordination is critical. PDD39 delin-
eates the appropriate roles of federal agencies involved in addressing terrorism. Ad-
ditionally, pursuant to the PDD, detailed coordination plans have been drafted to
guide the deployment of resources in response to a threatened or actual terrorist
incident. There are separate plans relating to overseas terrorist incidents and do-
mestic terrorist incidents.
 7
In addressing international terrorism, ongoing U.S. coordination efforts include bi-
lateral and multilateral consultations and cooperation with foreign governments
that share our objectives in countering terrorism. For example, we are working
closely within the context of the P8, recently renamed the Eight, to improve coordi-
nation and to develop tangible measures to assist in terrorism prevention and re-
sponse. These measures include the development and submission to the United Na-
tions of a draft convention directed at terrorist bombings of government facilities,
public transportation systems, and places of general public use. Additionally, the
Eight is actively involved in exploring the development of a number of other meas-
ures including tougher international standards for bomb detection and airport secu-
rity, and the means to facilitate lawful government access to encrypted communica-
tions.
Similarly, preparations relating to terrorist threats and acts within the United
States involve the development of effective coordination with state and local authori-
ties. For example, the FBI has created 14 joint terrorism task forces which integrate
the federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities in the particular locality.
Additional task forces are in the planning or developmental stage. Similarly, plans
are underway to involve state and local authorities in the FBIs new
counterterrorism center.
I have directed that the FBI implement a comprehensive effort to coordinate with
state and local law enforcement, owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and
state and local emergency managers, in order to prevent and respond to terrorist
activities. I have asked that clear lines of communication be established so that the
relevant information can quickly and accurately be exchanged among these officials.
I have further directed that the FBI coordinate with these officials to identify poten-
tially vulnerable facilities, critical infrastructures, and special events, and to collabo-
rate with these officials to develop plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
Since the ability to mount an effective response to a terrorist incident requires
multiple agencies to interrelate smoothly under extreme pressure, training is also
a key element of the U.S. strategy to reduce this nations vulnerability to terrorism.
To that end, the federal agencies involved in responding to extraterritorial acts of
terrorism regularly engage in realistic training exercises which include after action
evaluations designed to identify weaknesses and to facilitate their correction. Train-
ing relating to acts of terrorism occurring within the United States recognizes the
important role of state and local agencies.
Current planning and training efforts relating to terrorism focus particular atten-
tion on addressing incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. For example,
the FBI and DOD are spearheading an initiative, in coordination with the Depart-
ment of Energy, FEMA, and other federal agencies, to provide WMD training to
state and local emergency responders. This initiative will train emergency respond-
ers in 120 cities throughout the United States, with the initial nine cities due to
receive training before the end of the current fiscal year. Similarly, the FBI and
DOD are undertaking a three-year initiative which will involve training and assist-
ance to foreign law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges in addressing nu-
clear, chemical, and biological trafficking and proliferation.
Prevention of Terrorist Acts
The U.S. seeks to deter terrorism through broad public dissemination of a clear
message, including that we will not make concessions to terrorists; we will vigor-
ously apply our criminal statutes to those that commit acts of terrorism anywhere
in the world; and we will endeavor to apprehend terrorists wherever they seek ref-
uge. Simply put, we will not allow terrorism to serve as a viable means to fulfill
social or political objectives.
Similarly, the U.S. seeks to prevent terrorist acts by isolating nations which spon-
sor or support terrorism. Pursuant to its legislative authority, the State Department
currently has seven nations designated as sponsors of terrorismIran, Iraq, Libya,
Sudan, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea. Such designations trigger a series of eco-
nomic sanctions.
Further, the prevention of terrorism involves the coordination of U.S. intelligence
and investigative capabilities to detect and react effectively to incipient terrorist
threats. Making effective use of intelligence product, the objective includes involving
the FBI in the investigation of terrorist plots as early in the chain of conspiratorial
events as possible. In this way, the terrorist plot cannot only be disrupted but the
conspirators can also be apprehended, preventing them from recycling their terrorist
plans for use at some unknown future time and place.
Overseas, the integrated efforts of pertinent U.S. agencies, working in coordina-
tion with their foreign counterparts, resulted in the disruption of a plot to bomb a
dozen U.S. commercial jumbo jets flying Asian-Pacific routes, the arrests of three
 8
of the plotters in distant countries, and the conviction of those defendants in U.S.
federal court. Within the United States, investigative efforts resulted in the arrests
of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and a number of his followers before they could carry
out a deadly plot to bomb buildings, tunnels, and a bridge in Manhattan. Prevention
of these two terrorist plots alone averted the death or serious injury of tens of thou-
sands of Americans.
Response to Terrorist Acts
While our paramount objective is to prevent terrorist acts, thereby sparing inno-
cent people from their tragic consequences, it will not always be possible to prevent
terrorist acts. When such acts occur, the pertinent U.S. agencies seek to utilize their
painstaking planning and training to respond in a highly coordinated and effective
manner.
As mentioned previously, there are separate deployment plans depending on
whether the terrorist act occurs overseas or within the United States. Although the
FBI is the lead federal investigative agency regardless of the place where the terror-
ist act occurs, the State Department is the lead agency for overall management of
the U.S. response to terrorism overseas. In contrast, within the U.S., the FBI is in
charge of the overall federal response. In either case, the resources of all pertinent
federal agencies are available as needed under plans which are designed to ensure
the effective integration and coordination of those resources.
All overseas acts of terrorism which significantly impact U.S. persons or property
are the subject of a criminal investigation. The objective is to develop sufficient evi-
dence to permit the indictment of the perpetrators and the issuance of warrants for
their arrest.
Although efforts to locate and obtain the rendition of a defendant to the United
States are often very protracted, the passage of time does not diminish the govern-
ments ardor for pursuing these international outlaws. In one case, for example, cus-
tody of a defendant was obtained, and his conviction achieved, 19 years after his
terrorist acts. In another case, the perpetrator of a deadly 1985 air piracy in the
Middle East was tried and convicted in the United States in 1996. During the past
four years, the relentless efforts to apprehend such fugitives have resulted in the
rendition to the United States of seven individuals on charges relating to highly
deadly terrorist plots.
The U.S. strategy for combatting terrorism is a dynamic one. It is continually sub-
ject to reevaluation and is supplemented as appropriate to address newly-identified
concerns and circumstances. The strategy requires the continuing efforts of partici-
pating agencies to perfect their operations and maintain readiness.
Congress is, of course, an integral part of the dynamic process by which the
counterterrorism program continues to be improved and perfected. The new
counterterrorism funding provided in the final days of the 104th Congress has per-
mitted the development of a more comprehensive response to terrorist attacks in-
cluding those involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
The Committee has provided significant support in our efforts to counter and in-
vestigate acts of terrorism. Your foresight made available $545 million in
counterterrorism resources in the 1995 Oklahoma City Supplemental, the 1996
Counterterrorism Amendment, and the 1997 Counterterrorism Enhancement. These
resources provided over 2,000 new positions, including over 600 additional FBI
Agents and nearly 90 Assistant U.S. Attorneys. A substantial portion of the Depart-
ments 1998 request includes annualization resources critical to fully-fund the im-
portant enhancements initiated in 1997. Our 1998 request also includes a limited
number of enhancements, including funds aimed to bolster the Criminal Division
and U.S. Attorneys investigative and prosecutorial activities.
Much progress has been made during the past few years in preparing the United
States to prevent acts of terrorism and to respond to those terrorist threats that do
arise. However, many challenges remain including, most significantly, those relating
to weapons of mass destruction and infrastructure protection. Accordingly, while the
PDD39 strategy has placed U.S. counterterrorism efforts on course, we continue to
work on a priority basis with the other counterterrorism components of our govern-
ment and with like-minded foreign governments to maximize our ability to address
this area of critical concern.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FREEH, DIRECTOR

Chairman STEVENS. Director Freeh.
 9

Mr. FREEH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure, as al-

ways, to appear before the committee. Let me request that my
longer statement be made part of the record. What I would like to
do in a very few minutes is just give you an overview of what is
contained in there.
Chairman STEVENS. We will print all of your statements in the
record in full. We appreciate your courtesy. Thank you.
Mr. FREEH. Thank you. Let me also begin and echo the Attorney
General in my appreciation for the funding which this committee
has provided, particularly in the counterterrorism area, which is
the subject of this hearing. We now expend approximately $243
million supporting over 2,600 positions dedicated solely to counter-
terrorism threats. That is a threefold increase in that initiative
since I became the FBI Director. We have been able to achieve
many of our initiatives and successes, some alluded to by the Attor-
ney General, because of that substantial funding and the men and
women of law enforcement, particularly in the FBI. We appreciate
very much the support from this committee, particularly Senator
Gregg and Senator Hollings.
REDUCING VULNERABILITIES THROUGH PREPARATION

The U.S. policy on terrorism is actually a very concise one. The

protection of this Nation and its people against terrorist threats,
whether domestic or foreign, is of the highest priority of the U.S.
Government. The cornerstones of this policy are the reduction of
vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism at home and
abroad; other terrorism to be deterred through clear public posi-
tions that our policy will not be affected by terrorist acts; our will-
ingness and ability to respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism
directed against the United States; and to develop the capabilities
to deter, prevent, defeat, and manage consequences of nuclear,
chemical, or biological attacks.
If you look at the FBIs current 10 most wanted fugitives list, it
will give you an indication of the priority that counterterrorism has
in the FBI. This list used to include mobsters and gangsters. We
now have individuals such as Abdel Al-Megrahi and Lamen
Fhimah. They are the two fugitives who have been charged with
the bombing of Pan Am 103. As the Attorney General mentioned,
time is not the issue with respect to the apprehension and prosecu-
tion of those individuals. Also on the list is an individual named
Mir Aimal Kansi, who was responsible for the murders outside the
CIA headquarters, and who remains a fugitive.
The renditions and extraditions which the Attorney General al-
luded to since 1993, emphasize and demonstrate very powerfully
the counterterrorism policy of the United States. The individuals
who are included on that list include Yousef, Walikhan, Najim, Abu
Halimah, individuals charged in the World Trade bombing case
and the Manila air case; an individual responsible for a 1985 hi-
jacking; Rhezak Hakim, who is being charged with the Manila air
conspiracy; and an individual named Zherezaki who is wanted for
a 1986 attack on the United States Embassy in Indonesia. These
cases remain a top priority of both the law enforcement and the in-
telligence communities. All of these renditions and extraditions
were accomplished in close coordination and cooperation with the
 10

Central Intelligence Agency which assisted in the location of some

of these individuals. We are very appreciative of their assistance.
SOURCE OF TERRORISM

The current international terrorist threat comes from several

sources: one such source is the seven foreign governments who
have been publicly identified as sponsors of terrorism. We are con-
cerned about the organized groups both abroad and within the
United States, particularly Hamas and Hizballah and some of the
radical fundamentalist groups. We are concerned also about the
more informal ad hoc conspiracies demonstrated in the World
Trade bombing case, which are harder to anticipate and more dif-
ficult to monitor because of their ad hoc nature and the mobility
of the co-conspirators.
DOMESTIC TERRORISM

With respect to the current domestic terrorism threats, which

you alluded to, Mr. Chairman, there is a long list of current attacks
and problems which have required the FBI to devote vast new re-
sources to address. We are looking within the United States at var-
ious individuals, as well as organizations, who have an ideology
which suspects government, particularly the Federal Government,
of world order conspiracies, and individuals who for various rea-
sons have organized themselves against the United States. We are
not concerned about the association of individuals who espouse
ideologies which are perhaps inconsistent with principles of Federal
Government. All of our investigations in domestic counterterrorism
have to be predicated on an indication of criminal activity. The in-
dividuals and groups who pose a danger to peoples lives and lib-
erties are the subjects of these investigations.
There has been a long list of planned acts of terror which were
interrupted by the coordinated efforts, not just within the Depart-
ment of Justice, but across the Federal, State, and local law en-
forcement communities. Last month on April 22, a group of individ-
uals in Texas, members of a Ku Klux Klan-type organization, were
arrested because they planned, as they are now charged with
doing, a series of attacks which would have included the blowing
up of a natural gas storage facility as a diversionary tactic to an-
other criminal act which they are charged with planning.
Going back over the last few months, individuals as well as orga-
nized groups of individuals, have been arrested. In West Virginia,
a group of individuals planned to blow up the FBI CJIS Finger-
print Center were interrupted by arrest. The Freemen situation
was predicated by the arrest of individuals who were planning to
kidnap and try various State officials in Montana was resolved. All
these cases were predicated on criminal activity.
FBI ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

With respect to the FBIs roles and responsibilities, as the Attor-

ney General stated, they are reaffirmed in the PDD39 document
which members of this committee are familiar with. That document
sets out the responsibilities, not only of the FBI, but emphasizes
 11

the coordination which is required among all Federal agencies to

meet the objectives of Federal policy with respect to terrorism.
There is particular emphasis in that plan for coordination be-
tween the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice
in areas where chemical, nuclear, or biological threats present
themselves. This is an area, combined with the infrastructure
threats, that is adding a new dimension and a new challenge to our
efforts to deal with terrorism, particularly incidents in the United
States.
We have, as I said, appreciated very much the resources that we
receive from the Congress, particularly from this committee. Going
back to 1995, we have been able to double the number of FBI
agents and support employees in the counterterrorism program. We
have done this in coordination with our partners in the CIA. We
have exchanged deputies at a high level between the FBI and the
CIA in the counterterrorism areas. The Deputy Section Chief in the
International Terrorism Section is a CIA officer who has line au-
thority. The Deputy at the CIAs Counterterrorism Center is an
FBI agent. We have conducted joint training, conferencing, and
operational planning with the CIA. I think our counterterrorism
strategies, particularly in the international arena, have been
strengthened by this cooperation. I want to thank George Tenet
personally, who has supervised much of this cooperation.
Our goals are to improve our intelligence and information capa-
bilities. The Attorney General referred to the creation of the
Counterterrorism Center at the FBI, which is up and running. This
center has representatives from 17 other Federal agencies and
which is dedicated to a central collection and analytical point in the
Federal Government for threats, particularly those regarding do-
mestic terrorism.
We have tried to improve our forensic capabilities, particularly
with the establishment of the hazardous material unit in our lab-
oratory. Two weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, this unit responded to the
threat at the Bnai Brith here in Washington, DC. This threat
turned out to be a hoax threat but at the time was taken very seri-
ously. We are developing other infrastructure capabilities and as-
sessments on both an interim and long-term basis. We are striving
in this regard to grow in a coordinated fashion with our State and
local partners. These partners need not only our training, which
this committee has authorized, but the coordination of intelligence
and joint operations when it is appropriate.
PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, both with respect to the traditional terrorism

threats and the new ones which now present themselves, the tre-
mendous support which the Congress, and particularly this com-
mittee has provided is being put to good use, to coordinated use,
and we very much appreciate your support with continuing con-
tributions in this regard.
Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.
[The statement follows:]
 12
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FREEH
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I welcome this op-
portunity to discuss the policy of the administration on counterterrorism, to describe
the threat of terrorism in the United States, and to bring you up-to-date on how
the FBI is using the counterterrorism resources Congress has provided over the past
several years to address this problem.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At the very outset, I want to recognize the early leadership that Senators Gregg
and Hollings, along with the other members of the committee, have exhibited in this
critical area. Their efforts, initially in the Senate mark-up of the 1997 Justice Ap-
propriations Act and then in the conference agreement for the Omnibus Appropria-
tions Act, provided the FBI with $133.9 million in new funding as part of a com-
prehensive counterterrorism initiative.
On behalf of the men and women of the FBI, especially those who work tirelessly
toward protecting the American people against the threat of terrorism, I wish to
thank you for your support. I am confident that our efforts will justify your past
commitment and continued support to this important area of the FBIs responsibil-
ity.
UNITED STATES POLICY ON TERRORISM

The protection of our nation and its people against the threat of terrorism, by in-
dividuals and groups operating from home and abroad, is one of the highest prior-
ities of the administration. As a nation, we must stand firm in our resolve against
terrorism. We must not allow those who would resort to acts of terrorism to succeed
in influencing the policies and actions of our government and tearing apart the very
fabric of American society.
The governments policy to fight terrorism is articulated in Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism. this policy, signed by Presi-
dent Clinton on June 21, 1995, makes it clear that the national policy of the United
States is to regard acts of terrorism as both a threat to national security and a
criminal act, and to respond vigorously to all such acts on our territory or against
our citizens wherever they occur.
The United States is also committed to strengthening the ability of the inter-
national community to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur and to respond
more effectively to acts of terrorism when they do occur.
Just recently, the Attorney General submitted to the House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees the administrations comprehensive counterterrorism strategy
that was requested by Senate Report 104353. This plan builds upon the founda-
tions and responsibilities articulated in PDD39.
FOUR MAJOR CORNERSTONES OF POLICY

There are four major cornerstones through which the governments policy on ter-
rorism is to be implemented. These are: to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United
States to terrorism; to deter terrorist acts before they occur; to respond to terrorist
acts that do occur, including apprehension and punishment of terrorists and man-
agement of the consequences of terrorist acts; and to develop effective capabilities
address the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, or biological materials or weapons.
Within the scope of these four cornerstones, the roles and responsibilities of the
many agencies involved in the governments counterterrorism effort are articulated.
Interagency coordination and cooperation are key factors underlying the principles
upon which the governments policy is built and are the path to its success.
NATURE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT

Based upon this policy of treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule
of law, the United States is one of the most visible and effective forces in identify-
ing, locating, and apprehending terrorists here and overseas. At the same time, this
policy invites the possibility of reprisals. To help put this into perspective, I would
like to discuss the nature of the terrorist threatboth international and domestic
that our nation faces today.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

International terrorism against the United States is that which is foreign based
and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States, or whose activities
 13
transcend national boundaries. The threat posed specifically by foreign terrorists
has increased in the past three years and will continue for the foreseeable future.
The current international terrorist threat to the United States government, its
people, and its interests can be divided into three major categories: (1) state spon-
sors of international terrorism, (2) formalized terrorist groups, and (3) loosely-affili-
ated international Islamic extremists.
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

The first major threat to Americans comes from state sponsors of international
terrorism. State sponsors include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North
Korea. In recent years, terrorist activities by Cuba and North Korea appear to have
declined, due primarily to the deteriorating economic situations in both countries.
However, the activities of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Libya have continued.
These state sponsors continue to view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Past
activities included direct terrorist support and operations by official state agents.
Following successful investigations which have identified the activities of state
agents involved in terrorism, state sponsors now generally seek to conceal their sup-
port of terrorism by relying on surrogates to conduct actual operations.
State sponsors, however, continue to remain engaged in anti-western terrorist ac-
tivities by funding, organizing, networking, and providing other support and instruc-
tion to many extremists. A classic example of state sponsored terrorism was the at-
tack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, which killed 270 people. Two Libyan intel-
ligence operatives, Lamen Fhimah and Abdel Al-Megrahi, were indicted for their
role in the attack.
FORMALIZED EXTREMIST GROUPS

The second major international terrorist threat to the United States is posed by
formalized extremist groups. These autonomous organizations have their own infra-
structures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are able
to plan and mount terrorist campaigns overseas, and support terrorist operations in-
side the United States.
Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyptian Al-Gamat Al-
Islamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas have placed supporters inside the United
States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here. Hizballah is one of
the most dangerous of these groups.
Hizballah has staged numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the
suicide truck-bombing of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine
Corps barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the United States Embassy annex in Leb-
anon in 1984. Elements of the group were also responsible for the kidnaping and
detention of United States hostages in Lebanon.
INTERNATIONAL RADICAL FUNDAMENTALISTS

The final major international terrorist threat to the United States stems from
loosely-affiliated Islamic terrorists, such as the World Trade Center bombers and
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. These extremists are neither surrogates of, nor strongly influ-
enced by, any one nation. They have the ability to tap into a variety of official and
private resource bases in order to facilitate terrorist acts against United States in-
terests.
Loosely-affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent international terrorist
threat to the United States at this time since they are relatively unknown to law
enforcement. They have the ability to travel freely, obtain a variety of identities,
and recruit like-minded sympathizers from various countries and/or factions.
Some of these extremists in the United States are developing or experimenting
with advanced communications, electronic mail, and the internet. For example, sup-
porters of Shayke Omar Abdel Rahman solicited monies for his defense through the
internet during his trial for the planned multiple attacks against New York City
landmarks and United States government facilities.
REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT GROUPS

Revolutionary and insurgent groups continue to operate in South and Central

America and other locations. These groups have been responsible for kidnapings of
American business representatives, religious missionaries, and tourists, as well as
other crimes. However, at this time, it does not appear that these groups represent
a major international terrorist threat to the United States government or its inter-
ests.
 14
DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT

Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which operate entirely
within the United States, or its territories, and whose activities are directed at ele-
ments of the United States government or its civilian population. The threat posed
by domestic terrorist groups has remained significant over the past several years.
Domestic terrorist groups represent interests spanning the full political spectrum,
as well as social issues and concerns. FBI investigations of domestic terrorist groups
are not predicated upon social or political beliefs; rather, they are based upon
planned or actual criminal activity.
The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from right-wing extremist
groups, militia groups, Puerto Rican terrorist groups, and special interest groups.
RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST GROUPS

A basic philosophical tenet of many right-wing extremist groups is a belief in the

superiority of the white race and that blacks, Jews, and other ethnic minorities are
inferior racially, mentally, physically, and spiritually. Much of their philosophy
flows from a racist, anti-semitic religion known as Christian Identity. Christian
Identity teaches that white non-Jews are Gods chosen race and that Jews are the
offspring of satan.
Many right-wing extremist groups also espouse anti-government sentiments.
These groups refer to the federal government as the Zionist Occupation government
and claim that it is controlled by Jewish interests. A number of right-wing groups
also believe that the federal government is bent on stripping constitutional rights
from individual citizens of the United States.
In an attempt to live apart from inferior people, some right-wing groups advo-
cate creating a separate nation from the five states comprising the northwest region
of the United StatesWashington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.
Right-wing extremist groups believe that either an economic and/or social collapse
which will bring about the biblical Armageddon is imminent. Therefore, they rou-
tinely engage in survivalist and/or paramilitary training to ensure the survival of
the white race and/or United States.
Among the right-wing extremist groups operating in the United States are: the
Army of Israel, the Aryan Nations, the Texas Aryan Brotherhood, the California Mi-
litia, the Viper Militia, the Mountaineer Militia, the Republic of Texas, our one su-
preme court, the Texas Constitutional Militia, the Utah Free Militia, the North
Idaho Militia Group, and the Freemen.
MILITIA GROUPS

Since 1992, the United States has experienced an exponential growth of militia
groups. While the majority of militia members are law abiding citizens, there is a
small percentage of members within militia groups who advocate and conspire to
commit violent criminal acts. Of particular concern to the FBI is the potential for
militias to be infiltrated by extremists who seek to exploit militias and their mem-
bers in order to further their own terrorist agendas.
While militia groups are often multi-racial, they are predominately white. They
generally view themselves as sovereign citizens who are exempt from the laws and
regulations of the United States government. Militia members often subscribe to the
theory that the federal government is in a conspiracy with the United Nations that
would result in the creation of a one-nation world government, or new world order.
This one-world government would use foreign troops in the United States to seize
all privately owned weapons and imprison and execute patriotic militia members.
Many militia groups advocate stockpiling weapons and explosives and conducting
paramilitary training as part of their preparation for what they believe will be an
inevitable armed conflict with the government. Some militia groups openly advocate
the overthrow of the federal government.
Militia members and cells are engaged in a wide variety of criminal activity, such
as the illegal sale and purchase of automatic weapons, issuing threats against fed-
eral and elected officials, the illegal transportation of explosives, bombings, destruc-
tion of government property, and the filing of spurious lawsuits designed to harass
law enforcement, elected officials, and others, as well as to disrupt the courts. Some
militia members engage in fraudulent financial schemes to raise funds. Others have
committed armed robberies of banks and armored cars.
I want to emphasize, again, that FBI investigations of militia groups are predi-
cated upon violations of federal law and are not based upon members lawful exer-
cise of their first or second amendment rights.
 15
PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

Although the last terrorist incident involving Puerto Rican terrorist groups was
a bombing in Chicago in December 1992, these groups continue to be of concern.
Between 1982 and 1994, approximately 44 percent of the terrorist incidents commit-
ted in the United States and its territories are attributed to Puerto Rican terrorist
groups. Efforts are continuing to locate fugitives still at large from these incidents.
Further, several incarcerated members of Puerto Rican terrorist groups are due to
be released from prison in 1998.
Puerto Rican terrorist groups believe the liberation of Puerto Rico from the United
States justifies the use of violence to obtain that objective. These groups character-
ize their terrorism activities as acts of war against invading forces and, when ar-
rested, they consider themselves to be prisoners of war who must be treated as
such according to the Geneva Convention. Clandestine behavior and security are of
utmost importance in these groups activities.
Puerto Rican terrorist groups consider any act that brings funds, weapons, and
other supplies into these organizations as justified. Among the acts committed by
these groups are murders, armed robberies of banks and armored carriers, thefts
of weapons, bombings of United States government buildings, and bombings of Unit-
ed States military facilities. These groups also target federal and local government
officials.
The EPB-Macheteros has been the most active and violent of the Puerto Rico-
based terrorist groups since it emerged in 1978. The FALN (Armed Forces for Puer-
to Rican National Liberation) is a clandestine terrorist group based in Chicago
which emerged in the 1970s. The MLN (Movement of National Liberation) is the
above ground support group and political arm of the FALN. The MLN is the major
fundraiser for the FALN. Among the business ventures operated by the MLN are
a bakery and a newspaper.
SPECIAL INTEREST TERRORIST GROUPS

Special interest terrorist groups engage in criminal activity to bring about specific,
narrowly-focused social or political changes. They differ from more traditional do-
mestic terrorist groups which seek more wide-ranging political changes. It is the
willingness to commit criminal acts that separates special interest terrorist groups
from other law-abiding groups that often support the same popular issues. By com-
mitting criminal acts, these terrorists believe that they can force various segments
of society to change attitudes about issues considered important to them.
The existence of these types of groups often does not come to law enforcement at-
tention until after an act is committed and the individual or group leaves a claim
of responsibility. Membership in a group may be limited to a very small number of
co-conspirators or associates. Consequently, acts committed by special interest ter-
rorists present unique challenges to the FBI and other law enforcement. Unfortu-
nately, these types of terrorist acts are growing more prevalent.
An example of special interest terrorist activity is the February 2, 1992, arson of
the mink research facility at Michigan State University. Rodney Coronado, a mem-
ber of the Animal Liberation Front, pled guilty to arson charges on July 3, 1995.
The Animal Liberation Front is a militant animal rights group founded in England
in 1976.
Assessing the capabilities of international and domestic terrorist groups to inflict
harm on American citizens and the United States government is critical to develop-
ing the capabilities and strategies needed to implement the four cornerstones that
are embodied by PDD39.
FBI ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

As I stated earlier, PDD39 establishes the roles and responsibilities for the many
government agencies that are involved in the governments counterterrorism re-
sponse. PDD39 defines these roles and responsibilities within the context of the
four cornerstones through which the governments policy on terrorism is to be imple-
mented. In many instances, PDD39 reaffirmed roles and responsibilities set out in
earlier executive orders and by federal statutes.
PDD39 also established new roles and responsibilities based on the assessment
of the current terrorism threat to the United States, especially in light of the dra-
matic changes resulting from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the
communist bloc. It is within this framework that I would like to talk about the FBIs
counterterrorism roles and responsibilities.
 16
REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES

In general, PDD39 confers upon the heads of all executive branch departments
and agencies the responsibility of ensuring that their personnel and facilities, and
the people and facilities within their jurisdiction, are fully protected against terror-
ism. As lead investigative agency, PDD39 confers upon the FBI responsibility for
reducing vulnerabilities by an expanded counterterrorism program.
PDD39 further directed the Attorney General, in her role as the chief law en-
forcement officer, to chair a Cabinet committee to review the vulnerability to terror-
ism of government facilities in the United States and the nations critical infrastruc-
ture. She was also directed to make recommendations to the President and the ap-
propriate Cabinet member or agency head regarding the findings of the committee.
In response to this tasking, the Attorney General established the critical infra-
structure working group which included representatives from the Department of De-
fense and the intelligence community. The group identified eight national critical in-
frastructures: telecommunications, transportation, emergency services, banking and
finance, electrical power systems, water supply systems, gas/oil storage and trans-
portation, and continuity of government. The group also identified two categories of
threat to these infrastructuresphysical and cyber.
In July 1996, the President issued an executive order on critical infrastructure
protection that established the Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection. The order also established an interim infrastructure protection task
force. The purpose of the task force is to identify and improve coordination of exist-
ing infrastructure protection efforts throughout the government until the completion
or development of a comprehensive national policy and strategy for critical infra-
structure protection. The FBI was selected to chair the task force. The Commission
oversees the work of the task force.
DETERRING TERRORISM

The United States government seeks to deter terrorism through public diplomacy,
by reducing terrorist capabilities at home and abroad, and by seeking the return of
indicted terrorists to the United States for prosecution.
RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

To develop and coordinate the governments response to international and domes-

tic terrorism, the President has established lead agency responsibilities among the
various departments of the executive branch.
The President reaffirmed the Department of Justice as the overall lead agency do-
mestically. In addition to being responsible for the prosecution of terrorists that vio-
late United States law, the department is responsible for the development and im-
plementation of policies addressing domestic terrorism. For foreign incidents, the
Department of State is the lead agency.
The President reaffirmed the FBI as the lead agency for investigating terrorist
acts planned or carried out by foreign or domestic terrorist groups in the United
States or which are directed at United States citizens or institutions abroad.
Effective response and coordination obviously requires good interagency support
coordination. The PDD directed the establishment of rapidly deployable interagency
emergency support teams to respond to terrorist incidents. The Department of State
is given responsibility for leading and managing the foreign emergency support
team in foreign incidents. The FBI is designated as being responsible for the domes-
tic emergency support team in domestic incidents. Both teams are to include mod-
ules for specific types of incidents, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical threats.
Other responsibilities of the FBI, consistent with its existing authorities, are to
collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist groups and activities, and
to disseminate internal threat warnings. Finally, to facilitate intelligence commu-
nity and law enforcement cooperation, the FBI has been directed to establish a do-
mestic counterterrorism center.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The acquisition, proliferation, threatened or actual use of weapons of mass de-

struction by a terrorist group or individuals constitutes one of the gravest threats
to the United States. The governments policy recognizes that there is no higher pri-
ority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability
from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the United States.
The FBI is working closely with the Department of Defense to carry out other au-
thorized weapons of mass destruction programs, such as Nunn-Lugar. We are ac-
 17
tively undertaking initiatives to employ all necessary measures, assets, and re-
sources to achieve these objectives.
During the past year, the FBI has implemented several new initiatives to meet
this challenge. These initiatives are not conducted in a unilateral manner, but with
the FBI working with many other United States government agencies and state and
local agencies to coordinate crisis and consequence management.
These initiatives involve the FBIs role in the interagency community to assist in
the training of law enforcement and emergency responders throughout the United
States; to issue and update contingency plans for FBI field offices and other crisis
management agencies; to participate in interagency exercises; to create the domestic
emergency support team; and to implement the joint Department of Defense/FBI
international training initiative in the former Soviet Union.
SPECIAL EVENTS MANAGEMENT

The FBI plays a major role in the intelligence and security planning for many spe-
cial events occurring within the United States, such as the 1996 Atlanta Olympics,
the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, and Presidential Inaugura-
tion.
These events routinely receive a high degree of visibility both domestically and
internationally. As such, these events represent potential targets for acts of terror-
ism in which the resulting consequences could cause significant harm to either Unit-
ed States national interests or international political stability.
COUNTERTERRORISM RESOURCES

PDD39, as well as other executive orders and federal statutes, has served as the
blueprint for developing the various counterterrorism initiatives and funding pro-
posals that have been generously supported by the committee. In developing these
initiatives, I have sought to address not only counterterrorism investigative require-
ments, but also certain critical infrastructure capabilities of the FBI that allow our
investigators and analysts to perform their jobs. Establishing and maintaining an
effective counterterrorism capability within the FBI requires a careful balance be-
tween investigative resources and related information, technology, and forensic sup-
port services.
1995 COUNTERTERRORISM SUPPLEMENTAL

In the aftermath of the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, the administration submitted a supplemental budget request for the
FBI to enhance domestic terrorism capabilities. Congress responded by enacting a
1995 supplemental appropriation that provided 427 support positions and $77.1 mil-
lion to the FBI. Among the items funded by Congress were several major, multi-
year projects, such as the upgrading of FBI command center capabilities.
The FBI has filled all of these 427 support positions; 425 employees are on board
and 2 have been provided appointment letters. Among these new positions were 190
special surveillance group staff, 25 analysts for the counterterrorism center, 75 in-
telligence research specialists, 50 police officers, 69 technical staff, and 18 field cleri-
cal staff.
We have obligated $54.8 million of the 1995 supplemental funding, as of March
31, 1997. Recently, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees cleared the
FBIs request to use $7.5 million of the remaining unobligated funds for the com-
puter investigation and infrastructure threat assessment center, as well as initia-
tives related to the infrastructure protection task force. The largest amount of unob-
ligated funds is for the renovation and upgrading of the FBI command center, which
is a multi-year project scheduled for completion in 1998.
1996 COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE

Congress provided the FBI with $158.8 million in 1996 for counterterrorism ac-
tivities, including 222 new positions. We have hired 209 individuals, including all
131 agents and 78 of 91 support staff.
Of the $158.8 million provided, $89.5 million has been obligated as of March 31,
1997. The remaining unobligated 1996 counterterrorism amendment funding con-
sists of no-year construction and violent crime reduction funds for several major,
multi-year initiatives, primarily the construction of a new FBI laboratory facility
and the FBI command center.
The FBI has selected a site for the new facility at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia. We expect to begin site preparation later this summer. Funding was also
 18
provided for a multi-year modernization of laboratory equipment and to acquire
equipment for evidence response teams in FBI field offices.
The 1996 appropriation also included the remainder of the funding planned for
the FBI command center project, as well as funding to support FBI digital telephony
and tactical operations programs. These latter two programs are critical to main-
taining our technical capabilities in counterterrorism matters. These are long-term
programs that will allow us to keep pace with changing technologies.
1997 COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE

As I mentioned earlier, Congress provided the FBI with $133.9 million in new
counterterrorism resources in the 1997 appropriations. This funding will allow us
to assign 644 additional agents and 620 support employees to support our counter-
terrorism programs, FBI laboratory, critical incident response group, and service op-
erations.
Most of the new agents and support positions are allowing us to double the shoe-
leather for counterterrorism investigations so that we can address emerging domes-
tic and international terrorist groups, establish an investigative capability for chem-
ical/biological/nuclear incidents, identify key assets and conduct infrastructure vul-
nerability assessments. Each of these areas directly supports the four major corner-
stones of the governments counterterrorism policy.
We are also expanding the number of joint terrorism task forces that have proven
to be extremely valuable in facilitating cooperation among federal, state, and local
law enforcement.
To support our expanded field counterterrorism efforts, Congress also funded im-
provements for FBI information and intelligence capabilities. We are establishing
our computer investigation and infrastructure threat assessment center (CITAC) at
FBI headquarters to serve as a resource for investigations of computer crimes and
attempts to disrupt or disable the national information infrastructure. We are im-
plementing a plan to improve our language translation capabilities, particularly in
the areas of FARSI and Arabic.
We are acquiring computers that will provide us access to classified intelligence
computer networks and databases so that we can exchange information with our
partners and access their data. Efforts are underway to update the database of key
asset information. We are strengthening state and local law enforcement involve-
ment with our counterterrorism center.
To improve forensics and crisis management capabilities, Congress provided fund-
ing to establish a hazardous materials response capability within the FBI laboratory
so that we can fulfill our role in terrorist incidents where chemical or biological
agents or nuclear materials are suspected or involved. Funding was also provided
to upgrade the training provided to federal, state, and local law enforcement, fire-
fighter, and public safety officers through the FBIs hazardous response school at
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. We are developing a capability to exchange forensic in-
formation with other foreign governments so that we can improve our ability to link
terrorist incidents and identify persons responsible for terrorist acts.
We are implementing a crisis management program that provides training to sen-
ior law enforcement managers, including the Attorney General, top Department of
Justice officials, FBI special agents in charge, and others, who are key decision-
makers in the management and resolution of a hostage-taking incident, a terrorist
act, a prison siege, or other crisis situation. Our crisis management program also
assists in the planning and conducting of training exercises that assess the readi-
ness of federal agencies, state and local government, and others in responding to
a chemical and biological incidents or other similar threats.
Finally, to provide a more secure work environment, Congress provided funding
to acquire physical security equipment for FBI offices, such as x-ray machines,
magnetometers, and closed-circuit television systems; to hire contract guard and se-
curity for field offices and the FBI Academy; and to add additional police officers
to protect our new Washington, D.C. field office. These physical security upgrades
are consistent with the measures recommended in the vulnerability assessment of
federal facilities that was mandated after the Oklahoma City bombing.
1998 PRESIDENTS BUDGET

The 1998 budget request to Congress includes $83.3 million to fully fund the new
counterterrorism positions provided by the Congress in the 1997 appropriations act.
Most of this funding is for personnel compensation of agent and support staff.
Additionally, within our technology crimes initiative, an increase of $5.9 million
is proposed to fund the operations of the CITAC. Initial funding for the CITAC was
provided as part of the counterterrorism initiative in the 1997 appropriations act.
 19
CITAC supports both criminal and national security investigations. This additional
funding is needed for contractor support services, technical equipment, training, and
operational travel. The 1998 budget also proposes 56 positions (34 agents) and $5.9
million for computer crime investigations.
The dual threats that the CITAC addresses are among the most challenging and
dynamic problems that the FBI must address in meeting its national security and
criminal missions. Illegal electronic intrusion into computer networks is a rapidly
escalating crime and security problem. In addition to terrorists, white-collar crimi-
nals, economic espionage agents, organized crime groups, and foreign intelligence
agents have been identified as electronic intruders responsible for penetrations of
American computer systems and networks.
The United States government relies upon the national information infrastructure
for the efficient, uninterrupted flow of electronic information for air traffic control,
military communications, energy distribution, public safety, and other essential gov-
ernment programs and services. Intelligence and industry forecasts indicate the
United States is just beginning to realize the potentially damaging effects and ex-
tent of the computer crime problem.
CONCLUSION

The dynamic nature of the counterterrorism threat to the United States is a sig-
nificant challenge to the FBI, as well as all of the other federal, state, and local
agencies involved in combating terrorism. PDD39 clearly articulates the policy of
the United States towards terrorism, identifies the major underpinnings of this pol-
icy, and designates roles for federal agencies.
Consistent with this overall statement of policy, and with the resources you have
provided us, the FBI is developing and implementing a comprehensive counterter-
rorism strategy. Our success in achieving our goals and objectives in thwarting
international and domestic terrorism will depend, in part, upon the continued sup-
port of the Congress. I am hopeful that we will be able to enjoy the continued sup-
port of Congress as we work toward achieving our counterterrorism goals and objec-
tives.
I strongly believe that the American people expect the FBI to do its best to, first
prevent acts of terrorism from happening, and two, to effectively respond to and in-
vestigate those acts of terrorism that are committed so that the persons responsible
for such heinous crimes are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. I know that
with the committees continued support, the FBI will be able to meet the challenge
of terrorism in the United States.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I would like to respond to any questions
at this time.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. TENET, ACTING DIRECTOR
Chairman STEVENS. Mr. Tenet.
Mr. TENET. Mr. Chairman, let me tell you what we face when we
attack this terrorist target. First, terrorists, as we know, guard
their tactics, methods, and objectives more assiduously than any of
the other targets we pursue. Second, international terrorists are
extending their geographic reach around the world, including the
United States. I refer here to operations such as the World Trade
Center bombing, attacks against Israeli targets in South America,
the truck bomb that killed 19 United States service personnel at
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the murder of 2 CIA employ-
ees outside of our own front gates.
Terrorists are developing increasingly complex ways to support
their operations. Frequently they use multiple front companies or
nongovernmental organizations to disguise their operations, and
they have the means to move money, materiel, and manpower
around the world.
Finally, international terrorists are turning to even more sophis-
ticated methods of attack. We saw this in the Aum Shinrikyo use
of nerve gas against commuters in the Tokyo subway 2 years ago.
 20

Potential terrorist use of chemical, biological, or other such weap-

ons on a wider scale must become one of our highest priority con-
cerns.
As this snapshot makes clear, Mr. Chairman, our task is not just
to unveil terrorist secrets, it is to stay a step ahead of the terrorist,
who is constantly on the move and constantly seeking more ad-
vanced methods.
Mr. Chairman, let me review for you some key aspects of our ap-
proach. Counterterrorism has been a subject of concentrated and
focused effort by the intelligence community ever since the DCI
Counterterrorist Center, or CTC, was established in 1986 by DCI
Casey. CTC is not only the center of intelligence work on terrorism,
it also embodies the effective interagency cooperation that is vital
to counterterrorism. It includes personnel from CIA as well as 11
other departments and agencies. The components represented in-
clude intelligence agencies, such as DIA and NSA, law enforce-
ment, such as the FBI and Secret Service, and policymaking agen-
cies such as the Department of State. One of the two deputies, as
Judge Freeh pointed out, of CTC is a senior FBI officer.
By pulling all of these elements together, the Counterterrorist
Center creates a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.
It harnesses all of the operational, analytical, and technical ele-
ments devoted to counterterrorism. The results through the years
point to the soundness of this idea. The successes of this approach
range from the uncovering of Libyas role in the bombing of Pan
Am 103 to the thwarting of Ramzi Yousefs attempt to blow a dozen
United States airliners out of the sky in the Far East during 1995.
Moreover, CTC has worked with the State Department to provide
extensive counterterrorist training to our allies. Over 18,000 indi-
viduals in 50 nations have been trained in counterterrorism over
the past decade.
We are enhancing the capabilities, Mr. Chairman, of CTC and
other intelligence community elements with new counterterrorist
initiatives launched during the past year with your help. They
touch upon each of the things we do in counterterrorism, including
human and technical collection of intelligence, analysis, warning,
and response. We have created a new terrorism warning group
whose sole mission is to make sure civilian and military leaders are
alerted to specific terrorist threats. We have created additional all-
source analytical positions to improve our indepth understanding of
terrorist groups. We have expanded technical collection operations
so that we can stay ahead of the terrorists own improvements in
their communications and use of other technologies. And we are ex-
panding our human intelligence operations, including a substantial
increase in CIA operations officers working overseas against the
terrorism problem.
The intelligence on terrorism, Mr. Chairman, that we provide to
our sister agencies ranges from the warning information I just
mentioned to intelligence on the behavior of state sponsors of ter-
rorism. The latter supports the Department of States diplomatic
efforts to bring the policies of our allies toward certain state spon-
sors of terrorism into harmony with U.S. policy.
We also assess the capabilities and the willingness, where that
is an issue, of other States to combat terrorism. And we collect and
 21

assess information on terrorists tactics and techniques, what they

might use against us in any attack today, and what we are likely
to face from them in the future. In this regard we work very closely
with other agencies, such as the Secret Service and the Federal
Aviation Administration, that are responsible for security counter-
measures designed to protect specific individuals or facilities.
Let me put special emphasis, Mr. Chairman, on our support to
law enforcement, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Intelligence performs three important functions in assisting law en-
forcement agencies in applying the rule of law to international ter-
rorists. Intelligence on individual terrorists has, on numerous occa-
sions, prevented a terrorist from reaching our shores or, upon
reaching it, has enabled the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice to stop the person. Intelligence supports criminal investigations
that determine the culpability for terrorist acts. It does so by using
our foreign intelligence resources to assist the FBI in following up
any lead that points overseas. As I mentioned, it was intelligence
that uncovered Libyas role in the Pan Am 103 bombing, and it was
intelligence from CIA and the FBI that uncovered the Iraqi at-
tempt to assassinate President Bush in Kuwait in 1993.
Finally, intelligence assists the FBI in finding terrorists who are
hiding abroad. No intelligence officer will ever have the direct sat-
isfaction of putting handcuffs on a fugitive, because that is not part
of our charter. But on eight occasions since 1993, CTC has provided
pivotal assistance to law enforcement officials in rendering foreign
terrorists into U.S. hands for prosecution in U.S. courts.
Our assistance to law enforcement, Mr. Chairman, extends not
only to U.S. law enforcement agencies, but to foreign ones as well.
We have numerous counterterrorist partnerships with foreign intel-
ligence, security, and police services. These liaison relationships
are a major source of information and insight to us. In return, we
can assist foreign authorities in bringing a fugitive terrorist to jus-
tice. We have done so five times in the last 3 years.
In all of these activities, Mr. Chairman, we are guided by one
overarching strategic goal, to get at the terrorists activities as
early as possible in the cycle of terrorist planning and preparation.
Ultimately, our goal must be to increase the Presidents options for
dealing with terrorists, to provide not only the intelligence required
to retaliate against them, but also the intelligence needed to pre-
vent and disrupt their operations before danger turns to disaster.
Working in close partnerships with our colleagues in law enforce-
ment and other parts of the Government, we are making steady
progress on these goals.
PREPARED STATEMENT

I would close with a simple statement, Mr. Chairman, one that

the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI I am sure share.
For those who would attack the United States or its people, there
will be no guaranteed safe haven anywhere in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome your questions.
[The statement follows:]
 22
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. TENET
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Committee to discuss the Intel-
ligence Communitys role in the overall U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. In open-
ing let me stress three points: International terrorism is a major and growing na-
tional security concern; meeting that threat requires an integrated response by our
diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies; finally, intelligence
is vital to this effort.
Let me tell you what we face, Mr. Chairman, in attacking the terrorist target.
First, terrorists guard their tactics, methods, and objectives more assiduously
than any of the other targets we pursue.
Second, international terrorists are extending their geographic reach around the
world, including to the United States. I refer here to terrorist operations such as:
The World Trade Center bombing; attacks against Israeli targets in South America
by Lebanese Hizballah; the military training center bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Ara-
bia that killed five U.S. citizens; the truck bomb that killed 19 U.S. service person-
nel at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; and the murder of CIA employees just out-
side our own front gates.
Third, terrorists are developing increasingly complex ways to support their oper-
ations. Frequently, they use multiple front companies or nongovernmental organiza-
tions to disguise their operations, and they have the means to move money, mate-
riel, and manpower around the world.
Finally, international terrorists are turning to ever more sophisticated methods of
attack. We saw this in the Aum Shinrikyo use of nerve gas against commuters in
the Tokyo subway two years ago. Potential terrorist use of chemical, biological, or
other such weapons on a wider scale must be one of our highest priority concerns.
As this snapshot makes clear, Mr. Chairman, our task is not just to unveil terror-
ist secrets; it is to stay a step ahead of the terrorist, who is constantly on the move
and constantly seeking more advanced methods.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me review for you some key aspects of our approach.
Counterterrorism has been a subject of concentrated and focused effort by the Intel-
ligence Community ever since the DCI Counterterrorist Center, or CTC, was estab-
lished in 1986. CTC is not only the center of intelligence work on terrorism; it also
embodies the effective interagency cooperation that is vital in counterterrorism.
CTC includes personnel from CIA as well as eleven other departments and agen-
cies.
The components represented include intelligence agencies, such as DIA and NSA,
law enforcement, such as the FBI and Secret Service, and policy-making agencies
such as the State Department.
One of the two deputy chiefs of CTC is a senior FBI officer.
By pulling all of these elements together, the Counterterrorist Center creates a
whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. It harnesses all of the operational,
analytical, and technical elements devoted to counterterrorism.
The results through the years point to the soundness of this idea.
The successes of this approach range from the uncovering of Libyas role in the
bombing of Pan Am 103 to the thwarting of Ramzi Yousefs attempt to blow a dozen
U.S. airliners out of the sky in the Far East during 1995.
Moreover, CTC has worked with the State Department to provide extensive
counterterrorist training to our allies. Over 18,000 individuals in 50 nations have
been trained in counterterrorism over the past decade.
We are enhancing the capabilities of CTC and of other Intelligence Community
elements with new counterterrorist initiatives launched during the past year. These
initiatives were begun by DCI Deutch and benefited from additional resources the
Congress provided at the outset of the current fiscal year. They touch upon each
of the things we do in counterterrorism, including human and technical collection
of intelligence, analysis, warning, and response.
For example, we have created a new Terrorism Warning Group whose sole mis-
sion is to make sure that civilian and military leaders are alerted to specific terror-
ist threats.
We have created additional all-source analytical positions, to improve our in-depth
understanding of terrorist groups.
We have expanded technical collection operations, so that we can stay ahead of
the terrorists own improvements in their communications and use of other tech-
nologies.
And, we are expanding our human intelligence operations, including a substantial
increase in CIA operations officers working overseas against the terrorism problem.
The intelligence on terrorism that we provide to our sister agencies ranges from
the warning information that I just mentioned to intelligence on the behavior of
 23
state sponsors of terrorism. The latter supports the Department of States diplo-
matic efforts to bring the policies of our allies toward certain state sponsors of ter-
rorism into harmony with U.S. policy.
We also assess the capabilitiesand the willingness, where that is an issueof
other states to combat terrorism.
And, we collect and assess information on terrorists tactics and techniqueswhat
they might use against us in any attack today, and what we are likely to face from
them in the future.
In this regard, we work very closely with other agencies, such as the Secret Serv-
ice and the Federal Aviation Administration, that are responsible for security coun-
termeasures designed to protect specific individuals or facilities.
Let me put special emphasis on our support to law enforcementparticularly the
FBI. Intelligence performs three important functions in assisting law enforcement
agencies in applying the rule of law to international terrorists.
Intelligence on individual terrorists has, on numerous occasions, prevented a ter-
rorist from reaching our shoresor, upon reaching it, has enabled the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to stop the person.
Intelligence supports criminal investigations that determine culpability for terror-
ist acts. It does so by using our foreign intelligence resources to assist the FBI in
following up any lead that points overseas. As I mentioned, it was intelligence that
uncovered Libyas role in the Pan Am 103 bombing. And it was intelligence from
CIA and the FBI that uncovered the Iraqi attempt to assassinate Former President
Bush in Kuwait in 1993.
Finally, intelligence assists the FBI in finding terrorists who are hiding abroad.
No intelligence officer will ever have the direct satisfaction of putting handcuffs on
a fugitive, because that is not part of our charter. But on eight occasions since 1993,
CTC has provided pivotal assistance to law enforcement officials in rendering for-
eign terrorists into U.S. hands, for prosecution in U.S. courts.
Our assistance to law enforcement extends not only to U.S. law enforcement agen-
cies, but to foreign ones as well. We have numerous counterterrorist partnerships
with foreign intelligence, security, and police services. These liaison relationships
are a major source of information and insight to us. In return, we can assist foreign
authorities in bringing a fugitive terrorist to justice; we have done so five times in
the last three years.
In all these activities, we are guided by one overarching strategic goal; to get at
the terrorists activities as early as possible in the cycle of terrorist planning and
preparation. Ultimately, our goal must be to increase the Presidents options for
dealing with terroriststo provide not only the intelligence required to retaliate
against them but also the intelligence needed to prevent and disrupt their oper-
ations before danger turns to disaster. Working in close partnership with our col-
leagues in law enforcement and other parts of the government, we are making
steady progress on these goals.
Let me close with a simple statement that Im sure summarizes the view of my
colleagues here as accurately as it expresses mine: for those who would attack the
United States or its people, there will be no guaranteed safe haven anywhere in the
world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to discuss these topics in greater de-
tail in executive session.
Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. Of course that is what we want
to assure. Gentlemen, could we agree on a length of time? There
are eight of us here, and I am sure that time is not unlimited. We
want to go to our classified room before the afternoon is over. Can
we agree on 5 minutes of questioning apiece before we withdraw?
Would that be acceptable? Very well.
Let me just ask a couple of plain questions here. Madam Attor-
ney General, do you believe we have adequate laws to deal with
terrorism now? Are there any defects that you have found in our
existing laws dealing with our ability to combat terrorism?
WORKING TECHNOLOGY

Ms. RENO. There are some suggestions that can be made, and we
will be happy to furnish those to you. I think the major effort that
we have to undertake is to make sure that we have the expertise
 24

in technology, and with respect to weapons of mass destruction;

that we are able to match wits with the best of the terrorists; that
we constantly work with this committee to ensure that we have the
necessary equipmentand you have been just superb in supporting
us in that effort; that we understand the threats against our infor-
mation infrastructure and understand what the computer and
cyber tools, if you will, can do. This effort is going to require a close
coordination with this committee.
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
[CALEA]

We have got to maintain our ability to pursue electronic surveil-

lance according to the prescribed constitutional standards that we
now adhere to, but we have got to have the wherewithal to keep
up, through the funding of CALEA, with the development in tech-
nology and to adjust our technology to these new developments. We
are going to have to be able to deal with the issue of encryption,
and obviously that will be a major issue before Congress. These are
some of the points that I think are important. Director Freeh might
want to add more.
Mr. FREEH. I think the overall statutory authorities are very
strong and give the FBI the capability that we need. I would sim-
ply echo what the Attorney General has said. Fifty-nine percent of
all of the Federal wiretap orders relate to national security, either
counterterrorism or foreign counterintelligence. In other words, 59
percent of the wiretaps, Federal wiretaps that are authorized, re-
late to national security. Without that capability and coverage, we
would be out of the counterterrorism and counterintelligence busi-
ness, as far as I am concerned.
The CALEA funding is critical. The Congress supported that in
1994. We have asked for additional funding for 1998. We are going
to have to deal with the encryption problem. It is a commercial
issue. It is also a public safety issue. It is a difficult issue. We have
had several hearings on it, but this year by all indications the Con-
gress is going to act on that. If we write law enforcement and na-
tional security out of the encryption legislation, our job will be
made very difficult and quite dangerous.
COURTS

Chairman STEVENS. Do you believe that we need to address the

question of the courts? Are we going to require separate courts to
deal with the terrorist problem as it increases?
Ms. RENO. I do not think you will require separate courts, other
than as we have addressed it through the alien removal court that
was authorized by Congress and that we are in the process of im-
plementing. It is comparable to the FISA court, but I do not think
that you will, in the foreseeable future, need separate courts to ad-
dress the issue of prosecutions of terrorists.
Chairman STEVENS. I will keep the rest of my questions until we
have the classified section.
Senator Gregg.
Senator GREGG. I would like to preface my questions with a com-
ment. First, I want to thank the chairman again, and second I
want to thank the agencies for aggressively pursuing the terrorism
 25

threat. But the issue remains, are we doing enough and are we
well enough coordinated? My question is, to you as a group, how
is it coordinated? We have got two functioning counterterrorism
centers, one at FBI, one at CIA. We have literally thousands of dif-
ferent sources of information, and we have at least four major
agencies that have significant turf responsibility here: State, De-
fense, Justice, and CIA. My sense is that although there is a lot
of work toward coordination at the very most senior levels, but at
the lower levels, there is not necessarily a constant interface for co-
ordination.
For example, Attorney General, I wonder when was the last time
that the President convened the four major agencies to discuss the
terrorism threat, and whether we are doing enough? My question,
therefore, is how is coordination proceeding now, and is there a
need for further coordination, not for the purposes of addressing a
threat which has occurredI believe we are doing well in that area
to the extent that you can do well in that areabut for the pur-
poses of addressing potential threats, such as the Director just
mentioned in his comments?
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Ms. RENO. Based on PDD39, I think that there is excellent co-

ordination underway. I would like to just take you through some
of the steps that have been developed. You make the reference to
the fact that there are two counterterrorism centers, but I would
let both Director Freeh and Director Tenet address that issue. I
think, from my discussions with them and with former Director
Deutch, that this has, in fact, strengthened our capacity to detect
vulnerabilities and to prevent terrorist acts before they occur. By
the CIAs efforts abroad and the FBIs efforts here, we are able to
interrelate these and bring them together. I think it has been an
excellent example of the cooperation that is engaged in, not just in
talk but in actual day-to-day fact. The fact that the FBI now has
its Domestic Terrorism Center up and running with 16 agencies
there, not just the 4, because critical to this cooperative effort is
the Department of Defense with respect to weapons of mass de-
struction. That is underway.
What we are trying to do is reach out, both internationally by
marrying the two centers so that we ensure that we have linked
any information that is relevant, but we are also trying to reach
out to State and local law enforcement across the country in a com-
prehensive way to make sure that we get from them leads and tips
and issues that should be pursued, and that it is again meshed. I
think the Domestic Terrorism Center is doing a really good job of
building that capacity.
At the same time, we have the issue that I have addressed before
and that you have been very responsive to, which is the CITAC,
which goes to the issue of computer crime and how we coordinate
in that area. We have much to do in that area. The whole issue
with respect to cyber crime staggers the imagination. When you
look at our commercial systems that are now computerizedtele-
communications, transportation, banking, and finance, the whole
system with respect to gas and oil structures, we have got so much
to do in terms of developing the capacity with the private sector to
 26

prevent attack by identifying vulnerabilities and working as a part-

ner with the private sector. That is why it is so important that we
support the Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection, because that Commission reaches out to the private sector
as a critical player in this whole effort, to make sure that we are
linked together in what we do to identify the vulnerability and
what we do to prevent the attack.
These are some of the efforts, but then we have developedand
I think again both the FBI and the CIA have a threat warning sys-
tem that permits the CIA to provide appropriate threat warnings
for international concerns and the FBI to provide appropriate
threat warnings for domestic concerns. I think that is working.
Again, we are constantly trying to identify areas of weakness and
build on it, and we would like to work with you in that regard,
should you detect any.
With respect to our response, you mentioned that we respond
fairly well, but we are constantly trying to work on that to make
sure that we are coordinated. The State Department has jurisdic-
tion abroad for the response to a terrorist act affecting a U.S. citi-
zen. The FBI has it domestically. We have developed FEST, which
is the foreign emergency support team, that responds immediately,
such as occurred earlier this year, and then we also have the do-
mestic emergency support team that, for example, responded in At-
lanta prior to the Olympics to prepare in a coordinated way with
all of the agencies involved to address the problem before it hap-
pens, and will be responding in other areas where there are events
or matters that are important and present possible vulnerabilities.
With respect to training, we are doing so much with the Depart-
ment of Defense in trying to develop coordinated training with re-
spect to threats of weapons of mass destruction, again working
with State and local officials. Later on Director Freeh, I think, can
give you more details.
So I see great coordination underway, not just in talk and in con-
cept, but also in actual day-to-day operations, and we have got to
work even harder at it.
Senator GREGG. Director Tenet.
CUSTOMERS

Mr. TENET. Senator, one of the things I would say in response

is the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense are our customers. We have a responsibility
to articulate threats to our customers, particularly overseas. In the
aftermath of Khobar Towers one of the things we have found is,
you are correct, there are thousands of strands of information that
come to us. What we have focused on is articulating and sending
back out that pipe the information in a way that a commander on
the ground can differentiate between information that is actionable
and that which is not actionable. There are real instances in the
last 6 months of either our cooperation with the Department of
State or the FBI where we have averted bombs at two American
Embassies at locations overseas.
So this cooperation is, I think, quite vigorous, and the interaction
of the policymaker with us is also quite vigorous. This community,
this counterterrorism community is as well organized as any com-
 27

munity as exists in our Government in terms of both the policy co-

ordination and the action that flows from it. So in supporting these
customers, they all have different needs. My job is to ensure that
when we get this information it is packaged and disseminated in
a way that they understand its importance and its relevance and
they can act to do something about it, otherwise it is not very rel-
evant to them.
Chairman STEVENS. Senator Campbell.
Senator CAMPBELL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Just maybe a couple
of quick ones. I just day before yesterday visited Colorado Springs
where a fire had been set to the IRS office. It was in a public build-
ing. There were a lot of other rentals in the building too, real es-
tate agencies, a couple of computer companies all in the same
building. I was wondering if you could give me just your insight on
how we better protect Federal buildings if they are not all Federal
in scope. If we make it, like we do here, with electronic devices be-
fore you can go in and out the door, that would certainly inconven-
ience all the other tenants. How should we handle that?
SECURITY MEASURES

Ms. RENO. Following the events in Oklahoma City in April 1995,

we convened a group to assess the vulnerability of Federal struc-
tures and made recommendations to the President. He created a
group to follow through on our recommendations and, as I under-
stand it, they have made a report. I will be happy to provide the
materials to you. There will be follow up now with regard to Fed-
eral agencies that are in buildings with other agencies, with other
private sector agencies and where the Federal Government is not
the principal tenant of the building. With respect to those buildings
where the Government is the principal tenant or GSA owns it, we
have tried to follow through in terms of improving security in those
structures, and we will continue to work with the Presidents group
to follow through.
Senator CAMPBELL. If you could provide at least me, or maybe
the rest of the committee would like to see that, but I certainly
would.
My second question, Mr. Chairman, is maybe rather rhetorical,
but I would like your view on it. If I, as a private citizen, encourage
somebody, incited them to violence against a Federal agency or a
Federal official, then I guess I also could be charged with a crime
for inciting them to commit a crime. Is that right?
Ms. RENO. Generally that would be true, but you have got to be
very careful in terms of hypotheticals as to the what ifs.
Senator CAMPBELL. Well, I am thinking, you know, individuals to
my knowledge can be held accountable if they encourage terrorism
or if they advocate it and a crime happens because of it. If I went
down and bought some ad space on a local radio show and I en-
couraged people to go commit an act of violence, I suppose I could
probably be held accountable for that too. But if a radio show en-
courages violence themselves, apparently they cannot. I know that
there is a first amendment right involved in there, and it is a hypo-
thetical and all that, but I would like your views on that.
I am thinking of onethis is not really an act of violence, it was
a random crime. The man that shot up the White House the year
 28

before last, Duran, he had called our office before he did that and
indicated he was going to do something very similar to that. We got
a whole bunch of calls that same morning from people who were
mad at Government and were really venting their frustrations, so
we did not take it too seriously because we got so many calls. Prob-
ably every Senator here has got calls in his office from people who
are angry at Government and they are going to get their guns and
protect themselves and they are not going to let the new world
order take over, and so on. This guy did it because he was encour-
aged by a radio show he had heard. I know that some radio shows
have even used the words they should go out and shoot a fed right
between the eyes, that kind of thing, but under our system they
are pretty well absolved, are they not, because it is a first amend-
ment right, even if they encourage those acts?
Ms. RENO. Again, to aid and abet terrorism would be against the
law. You would have to look at each case on a case-by-case basis.
I would ask Director Freeh to suggest how the FBI would respond.
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES

Mr. FREEH. A crime can certainly be predicated and prosecuted

if it filled all the necessary elements. The blind sheik, Sheik
Rahman, as you recall, was convicted for, among other things, so-
licitation of criminal sedition. It is an old statute but one which
certainly has viability. There was an individual from Afghanistan,
who encouraged, announced, and stated, as he has on previous oc-
casions, that military targets in Saudi Arabia should be and are
targets for attack, and solicited people to perform those attacks
against our military personnel. That probably meets all of the ele-
ments of a criminal offense, and one which we would look at and
prosecute vigorously, as we have in other cases.
But it would depend on the circumstances. If someone is giving
a speech or a radio announcer is going through a dialog which
might be related to that, it does not mean that they are promoting
criminal activity. However, you are not immunized from prosecu-
tion because you do it in a first amendment context. You cannot
yell fire in a crowded theater. That is a crime. It would depend on
the circumstances whether or not we would investigate and wheth-
er the Department of Justice would prosecute.
Senator CAMPBELL. You cannot yell fire in a theater, but you can
recommend shooting Federal agents. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. Senator Bennett. We are follow-
ing the early bird rule today.
Senator BENNETT. I thought Senator Hollings arrived before me.
Chairman STEVENS. Did he? No; I have kept track.
Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first issue that
comes to mind for a Senator from Utah is clearly the Olympics
scheduled in Utah in 2002. As good as we are, we are clearly not
yet prepared in Utah in terms of our law enforcement and commu-
nications capability to handle the possibility of terrorists targeting
the Olympics for maximum international exposure. So I want to
thank you, Madam Attorney General, for your support in the past,
and I hope by the thanks to stimulate continued support in the fu-
ture, for Justice Department help in seeing that security issues are
addressed at the Olympics. Mr. Chairman, we are going to come to
 29

this committee for appropriations help because the Olympics are a

clear target for people all over the world.
Would you have any comment on that and your attitude toward
the Olympics?
OLYMPIC LESSONS LEARNED

Ms. RENO. Obviously we gained a great understanding of the dif-

ferent roles that can be played through our experience in Atlanta.
We have already had representatives of the Department of Justice
out in Utah meeting with people who are on the scene and develop-
ing long-range plans with the FBI and with the other appropriate
Federal agencies to address the concerns that I think arise in a sit-
uation like that, and we look forward to working with everybody
in that effort.
INTERNET EXCERPTS

Senator BENNETT. We would appreciate that, and do appreciate

your past concern. Mr. Chairman, picking up on what the Senator
from Colorado had to say, my office has taken off of the Internet
information that is currently available. Let me read to you a few
excerpts from this information targeting mink farms.
It says:
Economic sabotage is what they listen to. There are various types of actions that
are very simple, smashing windows, squirting super glue into the locks, spray paint-
ing, filling bell peppers or Christmas ornaments with paint and paint bombing the
building. To be effective, a place should be hit repeatedly. Just be careful and vary
your schedule so that the police are not waiting for you when you go back.
Next page:
Fire is a tool. It can be your friend if you respect its power or your foe if you do
not. Nothing does the amount of damage that fire can. Try doing $1 million damage
with only hand tools. Arson also has no statute of limitations. It is a very serious
crime. If you get caught you could spend the next several years in prison thinking
about what went wrong. Be sure that you follow all the security precautions vigor-
ously. Here is how to build a simple incendiary device that can be used for burning
both buildings and vehicles, followed with very careful instructions. Tip, arson is a
big time felony, so wear gloves and old clothes that you can throw away through
the entire process, and be very careful not to leave a single shred of evidence.
It goes on and on. There is a section on electrically timed incen-
diary devices. The thing that concerns me the most is that at the
end of this document, the following list of targets has been com-
piled from numerous different sources. The majority of the targets
on this list are in my State. I am talking about the Animal Libera-
tion Front that currently takes credit publicly for over 700 acts of
violence against mink farmers and others involved in the legal fur
trade. The Salt Lake newspapers have done a profile on this to de-
scribe how they attack these commercial enterprises and how they
are starting to hire street gangs to do it for them so as to remove
them one step away.
I would like to ask you, Director Freeh, do you see any difference
between bombing a black church or bombing an abortion clinic or
bombing a fur farming operation?
Mr. FREEH. No; I do not. I think anytime someone is achieving
any perceived agenda with bombs and violence, they are clearly
violating Federal laws as well as probably State and local laws.
 30

Senator BENNETT. I would ask you, following up on what the

Senator from Colorado raised on this issue of free speech, to plug
into the Internet and see if there is not some indication that pretty
clear terrorist activity is not only being encouraged but instructed
with this kind of specifics as to how to build a fire bomb, where
to place it for maximum damage, and so on, and then a list of tar-
gets as to where to go to find people that should be subjected to
this kind of thing. I would hope the FBI would focus on that.
Mr. FREEH. Yes, Sir.
INTERNET

Ms. RENO. Senator, in that regard we have submitted a report

as Congress has required with respect to such information on the
Internet, and we would look forward to working with you in terms
of legislation. I will ask that my staff brief you on whatever is ap-
propriate for a briefing with respect to this matter.
Senator BENNETT. I thank you. I almost did not raise it in open
session, keeping it for the closed session, because I do not want to
give any more publicity to it than it has already had. But I decided
that the people that would want it already have it, and maybe the
best thing to do to combat it is to raise it in open session so that
we can have this kind of cooperation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MADELINE ALBRIGHT

Chairman STEVENS. We would all welcome that information,

Madam Attorney General. I state for the record that Secretary of
State Madeline Albright has requested an opportunity to submit
testimony for the record, and we would be pleased to receive her
testimony. We are also willing to receive additional statements
from those who are involved in the intelligence and law enforce-
ment community with regard to this hearing.
[The statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to sub-
mit this Statement for the Record to provide a brief overview of U.S. policy toward
international terrorism and the role of the Department of State in coordinating U.S.
policy and activities to counter the threat.
Although my schedule does not permit me to testify in person today, I want to
emphasize that the struggle against international terrorism is one of our govern-
ments top foreign policy priorities. Terrorism poses a dangerous threat to American
citizens and to our interests in a safe and stable world. Terrorism is a threat that
is not going to go away. We must continue our efforts to deter it, contain it and
encourage other countries to do the same. Coordination within our government and
coordination with other governments is a major part of this effort.
THE TERRORIST THREAT

The continuing threat was outlined to Congress on April 30 when the State De-
partment released its annual survey of international terrorism. The publication,
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 reports that terrorism abroad continues to im-
pose a heavy human, political and economic toll on the foreign policy and security
interests of the United States and many other nations.
Although the number of international terrorist attacks fell to 296 last year, com-
pared with 440 in 1995, the death toll worldwide in 1996 rose to 311, compared with
177 in 1995. Twenty-four Americans were killed. This toll indicates a greater ruth-
lessness by terrorists and a growing pattern of inflicting mass casualties.
 31
The threat of terrorism to American interests was demonstrated in the truck
bombing of the Al Khobar apartment complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which
killed 19 American airman, and suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem where
the casualties included eight American citizens killed or injured.
Identifying, monitoring and defeating international terrorists is a more challeng-
ing task today because of their diverse character, organization, and motivations. In
the past, established secular terrorist groups, revolutionaries, and state sponsors of
terrorism were in the vanguard. Today, some states like Iran are still very active
in terrorism, but involvement by other states has declined, because of growing inter-
national consensus against terrorism, in general, and, in the case of Libya, sanc-
tions. Todays terrorists vary widely from relatively established extremist groups
such as HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to cultist, such as the Aum
Shinrikyo in Japan and apparently ad hoc groups such as the one that attacked the
World Trade Center.
Terrorists also have increasing access to powerful explosives and weapons and are
using technology such as computers, cellular phones and encryption. The threat of
use of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear, by terrorists is
another problem. We are taking extensive measures to detect and deter such
threats.
U.S. POLICIES

To deal effectively with the variety of terrorist threats, U.S. counterterrorism ef-
forts abroad are grounded on these basic policies:
We make no concessions to terrorist demands, recognizing that to do so only in-
vites further terrorism.
We are determined to seek out relentlessly and punish terrorists wherever they
may be, using the combined assets of U.S. law enforcement, diplomacy, intel-
ligence, and, if necessary, our military assets. We have a long memory and
reach when it comes to terrorists who attack Americans.
We insist that terrorism is a crime, whatever its motives or causes, and we pro-
mote the rule of law to criminalize it and bring terrorists to justice.
We designate states which sponsor terrorism, imposing a wide range of U.S.
sanctions against them. And we encourage other nations to do the same.
We seek maximum cooperation from other governments, recognizing that, as
terrorism is increasingly transnational, international cooperation is critical.
COORDINATED INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Effective counterterrorism calls for the skills and resources of many U.S. Govern-
ment agencies. Coordination is essential. The President has designated the Depart-
ment of State, in keeping with its foreign policy responsibilities, as the lead agency
for coordination of our counterterrorism policy and operations abroad. The FBI has
been designated as the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States.
When international terrorist crises arise, an emergency response team, led by S/
CT and including crisis management experts from various agencies, as needed, can
be deployed promptly anywhere in the world. The teams job is to respond to re-
quests from the U.S. Ambassador on the scene and the host government for advice
and assistance in resolving the crisis. Flexibility and responsiveness are the watch-
words of this team.
The Department of State and other agencies also participate in counterterrorism
exercisessometimes with friendly states abroadthat are critical for maintaining
readiness to meet new threats. They range from table top simulations to actual
deployments. Scenarios include terrorist hostage taking, hijackings, and threats or
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.
The Departments of State and Justice and the FBI work closely together on law
enforcement aspects of counterterrorism abroad, and with foreign governments con-
cernedfor example, when the FBI investigates terrorist crimes against U.S. inter-
ests abroad and in cases involving the apprehension and extradition of terrorists
overseas to bring them to trial in the United States. Close coordination between our
Ambassadors and host governments abroad, rapid reaction, and intricate planning
are critical to success in such operations.
The strengthening of international law and increased adherence to the ten inter-
national conventions on terrorism, and expanding extradition treaties have also en-
hanced our efforts against international terrorism. The U.S. has led the way in rati-
fying and bringing into effect these conventions.
The U.S. initiative in the Group of Eight last year led to the introduction of a
new draft treaty on Suppression of Terrorist Bombing that is now being negotiated
at the U.N.
 32
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, CONSULTATIONS

Identifying state sponsors of terrorism, enforcing U.S. sanctions against them, and
attempting to mobilize allied support are important weapons in our foreign policy
arsenal. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, North Korea and Cuba have been des-
ignated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors. Of these, Iran is the most fla-
grant violator, and we have imposed a variety of comprehensive sanctions to change
Iranian behavior. We are also active in working with other states to ensure strict
compliance with United Nations sanctions against Libya, Sudan and Iraq. In the
case of Libya, for example we are determined to bring to justice, in a Scottish or
U.S. court, as mandated by the Security Council, the Libyan government agents who
have been indicted for the bombing of Pan American flight 103 in 1988.
State also organizes regular bilateral consultations with foreign governments
worldwide. Justice, FBI, the intelligence community and DOD form part of the
interagency U.S. Government team which meets with its overseas counterparts, as
we are doing in Spain and Italy this week.
There also are increasing multilateral efforts to combat terrorism. We have
worked in the Group of Seven, plus Russia, for example, to tighten cooperation
among the major industrial states. The twenty-five counterterrorism recommenda-
tions of the G7/P8 Ministerial held in Paris last July are a solid basis for inter-
national cooperation. The United States plans to give this effort further momentum
at the Summit we will host in Denver in June.
We are also working with the European Union and the Organization of American
States on counterterrorism cooperation. A series of conferences last year included
a meeting in March of counterterrorism experts from the Middle East, whose gov-
ernments took part in the Sharm El Sheikh Summit.
The State Department meanwhile supports efforts of Treasury, FBI and Justice
to combat fundraising by foreign terrorist organizations in the U.S. and to encour-
age other governments to take steps against terrorism fund raising. These efforts
are discussed in many of our bilateral meetings.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

We know of members concerns about the threat of terrorism from biological,

chemical and nuclear agents and we share that concern. Improved technology is an
important tool for countering these as well as more conventional terrorist threats.
The U.S. Government has a Technical Support Working Group, known as the TSWG
which is comprised of 50 government agencies and operates a vigorous program of
research, development, and rapid prototyping of antiterrorism and counterterrorism
technologies.
The goal of the TSWG is to develop new technologies which can be used by many
federal, state and local agencies. There is special emphasis on explosives detection
technology and a strong focus on detection of and protection against terrorist use
of materials of mass destruction. The Department of State, through S/CT, provides
policy guidance for the TSWG program, and the Department of Defense is the exec-
utive agent. Both agencies also provide funding. State also leads three bilateral
R&D programs with Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel. They also contribute
funds and expertise, thus creating a strong multiplier effect for the U.S. Govern-
ments investment.
OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Within the Department of State, other bureaus also play important roles and
work with other agencies:
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is part of the intelligence commu-
nity and provides timely, around the clock, intelligence and analysis on terrorism.
INR also compiles and maintains our computerized TIPOFF system, an important
border control mechanism which links visa sections at our missions abroad to a
master data base of names of terrorists, criminals and drug traffickers.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs, charged with the protection of Americans over-
seas, works closely with S/CT and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to provide
warnings to Americans overseas about terrorist and other risks.
The Office of the Legal Adviser provides daily guidance on all legal aspects of
counterterrorism, treaties and extradition issues and works closely with the Depart-
ment of Justice and the FBI.
Finally, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the role of protecting U.S. missions
and diplomats overseas and in the United States. It also implements States
Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) Program which has trained about 18,000
 33
foreign officials, and the State Departments terrorism information rewards pro-
gram.
In sum, there is an aggressive, coherent, well coordinated interagency effort under
the leadership of the Department of State to combat international terrorism and mo-
bilize support from other nations abroad in this campaign.
But good counterterrorism policies and programs cannot do this job alone. The
United States also needs to maintain its leadership in dealing with a host of prob-
lems and conflicts abroad that, if neglected, can lead to terrorism, other forms of
violence, and even war. We must continue to foster strong relationships with na-
tions around the world, whose help we need to pursue terrorists. We cannot do this
alone.
Preserving the leadership of the United States in dealing with a broad range of
threats to our national security also requires adequate resources for Foreign Affairs.
The United States has a proud record of leadership in combating international
terrorism. We are determined to maintain and strengthen our capabilities against
the dynamic and varied threat, to keep terrorists on the defensive, where they be-
long, to bring them to justice, and to minimize the risk they pose to civil society.
Chairman STEVENS. Senator Hollings.
Senator HOLLINGS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
chairman of our subcommittee, Senator Gregg. In the subcommit-
tee and under Senator Greggs leadership, we have increased the
budget for terrorism in the last 4 years some 400 percent. We have
gone from $90 million to $397 million. So counterterrorism has not
been wanting of money in that sense. But on the other hand, Direc-
tor Tenet now says that the most secretive of targets is terrorism,
and all three witnesses here agree that there is superb coordina-
tion.
I have a question for you, General Reno, specifically since you
represent the Immigration Service and they are not at the table.
If you go to 22d Street in New York City, they have these five, six
story buildings that are full of these stores, block upon blocks of
stores, where counterfeit goods for terrorism activities are sold. The
profits are used to finance Hamas, Hizballah, and other terrorist
activities. Now, the FBI was good enough to take my staff there
with some of New Yorks finest, and, of course, the obvious ques-
tion was since we were told that they were mostly illegal aliens in
all of these operations, why did the Immigration Service not come
around and arrest them? Let me ask you that question, Attorney
General Reno. What is the matter? If you are all so coordinated
and so secretive, why is this going on in the wide open on 22d
Street? Go on up there this afternoon.
MULTIPLE AGENCY COORDINATION

Ms. RENO. With respect to the coordination between the INS and
the FBI and known terrorists, I cannot, while we are in open ses-
sion, describe it in very specific detail, but I can tell you that there
has been effective coordination. Director Freeh and Commissioner
Meisner and I have discussed it.
With respect to the deportation of illegal aliens, what we are try-
ing to do with respect to immigration strategy is to focus on illegal
immigration and prevent it at the border. This committee has been
very supportive in terms of the initiative with respect to the Border
Patrol and immigration inspectors on the border. At the same time
we are focused on the deportation of criminal aliens from State
prisons, from Federal prisons, but as well we are trying to develop,
with the resources as you are giving them to us, the capacity for
immigration investigators and inspectors in local areas to work
 34

with the police in identifying illegal aliens who are engaged in

criminal activity. It may be that the police do not have sufficient
information with which to charge them, but it is our hope that we
can develop, as we gain the resources, the capacity to identify them
sufficient to deport them.
Senator HOLLINGS. But the FBI is pointing them out. Here is
where the terrorists make their money, here is where they finance
terrorism. Look at all of the buildings there, block upon block of
these buildings, and most of them are illegal aliens, we were told.
In fact when the staff went there, everything immediately closed
up. I mean, they pled guilty. So there is no doubt in my mind that
the information we received from the FBI was correct, and it is not
so secretive, George. I would say it is wide open, and I think we
have to get onto these things.
Now, another concern I have regarding your coordination is that
I think there is a misplaced coordination with respect to our over-
seas operations. In my experience, and I started with the agency
back in the fifties, you do not have any CIA agents running around
in full cover overseas saying I am a CIA agent, do you? No, sir.
That is right. Because it is quite obvious as a matter of foreign pol-
icy that other countries would resent the idea that you had openly
tried to spy or obtain information, especially with respect to law
enforcement. It is not coordination that the Director of the CIA and
the Director of the FBI are having between themselves, but it is
coordination with the host country.
Right to the point, with the President in Mexico now, I would not
count on a Mexican agent coming up here to enforce the law on
drugs, and why should Mexico in turn count on any DEA agents
or others running around Mexico enforcing laws? It would make
them look like a second-rate country, and it reflects the arrogance
of the United States. I happen to agree with Mexico on that point.
And because you are asking for more money, and this is the sub-
committee that Senator Gregg and I have, we are going to resist
paying for thousands more agents going overseas. I can understand
Saudi Arabia saying look here, we will enforce our own laws. Every
country says that.
So let us get right to the pointwe love the coordination between
the departments, but the primary function of intelligence gathering
overseas is going to be with the Central Intelligence Agency, not
with FBI agents running around. Can an FBI agent run around
with a gun in Paris?
Ms. RENO. Senator
Senator HOLLINGS. Yes, Maam.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Ms. RENO. The prime responsibility for intelligence collection

overseas will be that of the CIA. But the CIA is not trained to col-
lect information that can be admissible in our courts, and we are
facedwhen you just hear the dissertation on what the Internet
can do in terms of bombs and everything else, we are faced with
a world where borders are shrinking and, because of cyber tools,
the borders are nonexistent. We see through, organized crime and
through international crime of so many different sorts, the impact
of crime felt round the world. When a man can sit in his kitchen
 35

in St. Petersburg, Russia, and steal by his computer from a bank

in New York City, we have got to have a law enforcement capacity
that can make sure that those people are apprehended.
Senator HOLLINGS. In St. Petersburgis that your point? We
should have an FBI officer there in St. Petersburg? Let us say he
is standing right in the room and what you say just has occurred.
He has used his computer illegally to mess up bank accounts at
Chase Manhattan, so that is a crime.
Ms. RENO. We have found
Senator HOLLINGS. And you think that we should have an FBI
agent there to arrest him?
Ms. RENO. No; I do not think we should have an FBI agent there
to arrest the man.
Senator HOLLINGS. I am talking about stationingyou see, you
do not have the Secretary of State here at this hearing. The State
Department has the primary responsibility for terrorism overseas.
Period. I am trying to get that coordination clarified, because it
goes right to the heart of the foreign policy of the United States.
We are trying to make friends. We are trying to hold some alli-
ances together, but we are not going to do it if we have that FBI
agent roaming around in St. Petersburg looking for crime.
Ms. RENO. I do not suggest that an FBI agent should be in St.
Petersburg roaming around looking for crime. What we have deter-
mined through the investigation of such crimes is that we need the
capacity to coordinate with foreign law enforcement to develop the
evidence
Senator HOLLINGS. Ah, now you are getting with the program.
With foreign law enforcement. That is my point.
EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT

Ms. RENO [continuing]. To develop the evidence, and to do it in

a procedure that can result in somebody being held accountable.
With respect to foreign terrorism against U.S. officials, the State
Department has the lead, but in the system devised by PDD39 it
is still the FBI that is responsible for trying to develop the evidence
that can result in indictments being returned in the appropriate
venue in this country and these people being brought to justice.
I think you were here when I gave some description of what can
happen. It may take us some time to bring them to justice, but we
can get them extradited, brought to this country, tried, when they
harm or commit terrorist acts against U.S. interests abroad.
Senator HOLLINGS. I know the rationale. Madam Attorney Gen-
eral, are you requesting additional FBI agents for overseas assign-
ment?
Ms. RENO. Not at this point, sir. You have funded us, and you
have been very generous in your funding. Senator, I think you have
approved the plan. Let me have Director Freeh clarify it.
Mr. FREEH. Senator, the eight offices that we seek to open over
the next 2 years are offices which were approved by the two com-
mittees in the FBIs 5-year plan which you asked for and which we
submitted. This plan has the support of the State Department I
would add.
Senator HOLLINGS. I understand. We can get into it in closed ses-
sion.
 36

Chairman STEVENS. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Reno or Direc-
tor Freeh, does our, or does your traditional definition of terrorism
include such things as computer attacks intended to damage our
telecommunications or transportation infrastructure? Director
Freeh?
Mr. FREEH. Yes, sir, it clearly would.
Senator SHELBY. That is included?
Mr. FREEH. That is included. Any threat against the national se-
curity, particularly one directed by a foreign agent or a foreign
power, would clearly be in the category of terrorism.
Senator SHELBY. What about a terrorist group that is an ad hoc
group that is not part of, as far as we knowit would still be cov-
ered?
Mr. FREEH. We would define that as an act of terrorism. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. So you have the legal structure to deal with
this?
Mr. FREEH. Yes; both to investigate it and to prosecute it.
Senator SHELBY. Mr. Freeh and Mr. Tenet, in order to ade-
quately address the security problems that we are having around
the world, what are we doing about language specialists who speak
Arabic and Farsi and so forth? We got into some of this with Mr.
Tenet the other day in the Intelligence Committee, but I would just
like to know about the FBI.
TRANSLATION CENTERS

Mr. FREEH. One of the initiatives which was funded by this Con-
gress and particularly this committee for 1997 was the establish-
ment of translation centers. We have one now which has been es-
tablished in New York City. We are recruiting and testing, and
subjecting to background interviews, people who will staff this cen-
ter. We have about 300 of the 385 linguists on board filling those
positions. We borrow linguist very heavily from the Department of
Defense, who have been very generous in giving us coverage, par-
ticularly with those who speak Farsi and some of the more difficult
languages.
Senator SHELBY. Is this adequate at this point, or are you going
to always continue to strive to get more language specialists?
Mr. FREEH. When we fill all these positions, we feel that with the
supplements that we get from the military, as well as other con-
tract linguists, we will have enough people to do our job, but I see
it increasing over the next few years.
Senator SHELBY. Mr. Tenet.
Mr. TENET. Senator, as you know, we have talked about this at
the Intelligence Committee, but with regard to our hard targets we
are placing an enormous emphasis on language development and
capability. We will not be able to provide the analytical or oper-
ational expertise required unless we go down this road, and we are
going to embark on a major 10-year program.
Senator SHELBY. Is this not a change of some degree from what
you needed in the past?
Mr. TENET. Well, Senator, I think it is fair to say that it is, but
it is not just this target that requires it.
Senator SHELBY. It is all over, is it not?
 37

Mr. TENET. It is the kind of difficult issues we face around the

world that require this language capability, so it will be a major
initiative.
Senator SHELBY. Are you making progress there?
Mr. TENET. Well, Senator, it is slow. You do not get people up
to level 3 or level 4 language capability over night. You have to
also do the work every day as well, so it will be a long-term project
on our part.
TERRORIST THREAT

Senator SHELBY. Ms. Reno, dealing with the terrorist threat and
organizations, some are state sponsored, or at least we have reason
to believe that they are, and some of them are ad hoc groups that
are hard to probably totally connect them to a state-sponsor group.
Do these ad hoc groups constitute a greater or a lesser threat, or
is there any way to measure that?
Ms. RENO. I think Director Freeh can address that. I look at
them all as threats.
Mr. FREEH. I think it varies in scope. If Syria or Iran hypo-
thetically are sponsoring an attack against the United States, they
bring huge resources, operational resources, and capabilities that a
smaller group would not have. On the other hand, a small group,
as we saw in the World Trade Center bombing, acting, as far as
the evidence revealed, without any foreign state sponsorship, was
able to mount enough resources covertly to almost topple one of the
Trade towers. So I think it would vary from situation to situation.
Senator SHELBY. Could we expect in the future perhaps more ad
hoc groups rather than just rogue nations? I know you will have
some of both sponsoring this directly and indirectly.
Mr. FREEH. It certainly appears to be the trend. Of the seven na-
tions who we have identified as sponsors of terrorism, some are
more active than the others. With respect to many of these groups,
even groups such as Hamas and Hizballah which operate with for-
eign state support, there are many, many groups and I see them
proliferating and perhaps becoming a greater threat than the orga-
nized state sponsors themselves.
Senator SHELBY. But it is a heck of a threat, whoever sponsors
it, is it not?
Mr. FREEH. Yes.
Senator SHELBY. It is just how you compete with it.
Mr. FREEH. Absolutely.
Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STEVENS. Senator Reid.
INTEGRATED FORCE TRAINING

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As our military forces

have learned, integrated force training in realistic environments is
the best preparation for operational deployment. We have also
learned that investments in realistic training have been returned
many times over through these operational savings in costs and in
lives. So counterterrorism training, I think, defines operational en-
vironments that are also difficult to meet. We have a large facility
in Nevada that is larger than a number of the States in the Union
that is called the Nevada test site. The Nevada test site, you know,
 38

you can set off high explosives there, have chemical testing facili-
ties that are operational there, there are tunnels, buildings that
have been developed over the years. It seems to me it provides a
secure environment for classified or clandestine training, but also
it has open areas for nonclassified exercises.
You may not want to answer this here, you might want to wait
until our next meeting, but I am wondering why there is not more
done there. We hear a lot of stuff being done in offices, but there
is not a lot of actual training that goes on in areas that I think
we need to look at. I mean, we hear all the time about chemical
weapons that are being placed underground in other countries. We
do not know how to breach those facilities. Again, you may want
to answer this later, but is there anything going on to consider
using this vast area out there which is now underutilized?
Mr. FREEH. Senator, since 1994 we have had 35 governmental-
wide counterterrorism exercises, mostly involving Federal agencies
and almost always involving some State or local components. There
are 25 exercises planned over the next year through 1998. I would
be happy to explore and discuss with you specifically not only the
site you refer to but other sites in terms of the advantages and dis-
advantages for training, but the exercises which are ongoing and
have been ongoing are a central part of our preparedness, and I
would certainly be happy to explore that with you in the other ses-
sion.
ORGANIZED CRIME

Senator REID. In years gone by in the State of Nevada we have

had experience with organized crime from various places around
the country. Has there been any coordination between organized
crime in the United States and any of these terrorist organizations?
Mr. FREEH. There have been indications of organized crime
groups dealing with terrorist groups in very limited or specific mat-
ters, both traditional groups in the United States, Russian mafia
groups more recently, and even some connection with the Italian
traditional organized crime groups. But the connections have been
very specific and not, in my view, suggestive of a combination of
efforts.
Senator REID. Just hire them for a certain job is what you are
saying?
Mr. FREEH. We have seen some intersections with equipment,
weapons, and information.
Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STEVENS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Specter.
DEFENSE BUDGET

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you,

Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I thought when I came in it was
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, but it is not. I believe that
terrorism really has become the form of war in our era, supplanting
warfare. We have a defense budget today which is under $250 bil-
lion. We had a defense budget in the mideighties in excess of $310
billion, which would be about $400 billion today. What I wonder
about is whether we are putting adequate resources into this war
on terrorism. I see the Presidents budget request for the Depart-
 39

ment of Justice counterterrorism is $417 million. That is a lot of

money, and a lot of money has been added, but I wonder if it is
significant.
My own view is that we are not doing nearly enough against ter-
rorism, and that we are really winking at it. I would like to make
a few observations and then ask two questions. Not much time
within 5 minutes.
I am very distressed about what has happened with the inves-
tigation at Dhahran, where the reports which leak out of the De-
partment of Defense suggest that nobody is at fault there, although
the fence was 80 feet away and the car bombs were known to con-
tain 12,000 pound bombs. And yet the Department of Defense is
prosecuting a single woman for having a relationship with a man
who represented himself as single. I do not know quite what inves-
tigation she is supposed to be.
And then we have the green light which Prime Minister
Netanyahu said Arafat gave for the bombing in Israel on March 21,
and the next day President Clinton comes out immediately and
says Netanyahu is wrong and Arafat is a man of peace, and I have
asked the Secretary of State what the facts are, was there a green
light.
And we see this fellow, Marzuk, who was held for almost 2 years
in the detention center in New York, sent back to Jordan on a mili-
tary jet. You wonder what we are doing about terrorism if Marzuk
is let free because he is going to cause too much of a problem if
he is prosecuted. I really never heard the likes of that. If I was to
be concerned as DA of Philadelphia about trouble makers, I would
not have prosecuted most of the people up in the criminal courts.
We are just surrendering to terrorism when that happens.
We have a statement made by the deputy education minister,
Moshe Pelad, that Arafat had prior knowledge of the bomb plot in
the New York Citys World Trade Center. I wrote to you, Attorney
General Reno, about that, and got back a vacuous answer from a
Mr. Andrew Floyce who says that they contacted Israeli intel-
ligence and do not know anything about it. So I called up the dep-
uty education minister, and he appears to have information that he
is reluctant to talk about. If Arafat was involved in the Trade Cen-
ter bombing, he could be extradited to the United States. We went
to a lot of trouble in the mideighties to make extraterritorial juris-
diction a factor there.
The two questions that I have which I would like to address to
the panel generally, I would be interested in Mr. Tenet and the At-
torney General and Director Freeh, is are we devoting enough re-
sources to fight terrorism? Human intelligence is woefully lacking
in the CIA, something that we have all known about for a long pe-
riod of time. What does it take? Because if we are devoting $500
million to terrorism, we are doing more than that, of course, when
the CIA is added in, but nowhere near what our defense budget
would be, are we doing enough?
And with the FBI, are we really able to handle all that has been
given to the FBI? The FBI I think is a marvelous institution, and
you, Director Freeh, I have said this to your face and I have said
this behind your back and I have said it to the television cameras,
I think you are doing a very good job. You have got a very tough
 40

job, and there are a lot of problems over there, with the FBI files
going to the White House and with what has happened with the
Atlanta pipe bombing matter and what is happening at the labora-
tory, and as assistant DA I used to try cases and the FBI labora-
tory was sacrosanct. I think you are doing a good job, but how
much can you do? Do you have enough resources? What does it
take to really do the job?
Because I think that this committee would be prepared to give
you what you need. Senator Stevens is used to appropriating $310
billion for defense when it is necessary. He was the chairman of
the subcommittee, now he is the chairman of the full committee.
He still is chairman of the subcommittee. OK, we will call you Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Chairman.
The specific question I have for you is that just before coming to
the hearing I got some information, Director Freeh, that this man,
Hani Al Sayedh, Khobar Towers bombing suspect, is alleged to
have snuck through INS in Boston, that he had an INS stamp on
his passport before going to Canadalet me ask you that question
specifically, Director Freeh, if there is any substance to that, before
I pose the generalized question to the panel about what would it
really take to have a successful war resource effort?
Mr. FREEH. With respect to your question on Mr. Sayedh, he
transited Boston on the way to Canada. He did not enter the Unit-
ed States, did not pass immigration, but simply transited the air-
port and legally did not enter the United States from an immigra-
tion point of view.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I will pass on my source to you that
there is supposed to be an INS stamp in his passport at Boston.
Mr. FREEH. I will follow that up, sir.
Senator SPECTER. I would be interested to know generally what
it would take to really wage a successful war with humint and
whatever we need to do it.
Chairman STEVENS. Senator, you may not know, we are going
into a classified session in a minute. I think perhaps part of that
is going to be answered on a confidential basis with the committee.
You can ask the question if you would like, but I would prefer to
explore that in the way we had planned.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, to the extent they can an-
swer in an open session, I think it would be useful, because I think
the American people need to know really what it takes, because my
instinct is when they hear it from the Attorney General, the CIA
Acting Director, and the FBI Director, they will appreciate knowing
what it is.
Chairman STEVENS. Well, I agree with you, but I am not sure we
want all those people out there to know how much we really are
putting into it too, the ones that are not on our side.
Senator SPECTER. Well, that leaves it up to the witnesses.
COUNTERTERRORISM SUPPORT

Mr. FREEH. Senator, first of all I appreciate all of your remarks

and your support, particularly in the counterterrorism area which
goes back many, many years. We have grown in 3 years from a $93
million budget to a $243 million budget in counterterrorism. You
and your colleagues were generous enough last year to give the FBI
 41

1,264 new positions. We are hiring these people, we are training

them, we are putting together both the human resources and the
infrastructure to support the counterterrorism effort. We are in two
or three times better condition in 1997 than we were in 1993 to un-
dertake our counterterrorism mission. A mission which, as you
point out, is a huge and growing one. We are in Saudi Arabia, we
are taking fugitives back from Pakistan, we are in many, many
places where we have not been, which is why we need our Legats.
I am sorry Senator Hollings has left.
We are doing everything we can right now to absorb this vast in-
crease in resources. I would rather absorb that growth before we
start another huge influx of resources.
Senator SPECTER. We ought to give the money to the CIA in-
stead?
Mr. FREEH. I am sure they could use some resources.
Mr. TENET. Senator, I would like to respond and just say I think
we are already at war. We have been on a war footing for a number
of years now. I do not think it is a question of money in our case,
I think it is a question of focus, operational tempo, the aggressive-
ness with which we pursue this target. I do not have any doubt
about the level of that effort today, and I would challenge your
premise about the lack of human intelligence against the terrorist
target. I think it is something we should talk about behind closed
doors, because I think that effort is better than it has ever been,
and growing. I think there are successes to prove it in some of the
facts we have laid down in open session.
Chairman STEVENS. Let me call on Senator Cochran, and we will
withdraw here after his 5 minutes are over to our designated room,
which is room 124 just down the hall. Those people who are invited
know who they are.
Senator Cochran.
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I just have two questions. One

is the extent to which our Federal law enforcement agencies which
are represented here today have what they consider to be a good
working standard or guidelines for deciding when the Federal
agencies should become actively involved, and when State and local
law enforcement authorities can just as well do the job. This to me
is a big challenge now. I know that the problem, or the challenge,
has been made bigger by a hyperactive Congress passing a lot of
laws and federalizing a lot of activity that might very well be more
appropriately, more efficiently, even more effectively handled at the
State and local level. That is not something that the Federal agen-
cies like to admit or the Congress likes to acknowledge, but I think
it is really one of the big problems we have now in trying to more
clearly define the dichotomy or the separatism of the Federal-State
relationships.
I started talking after I asked my question, and I should have
stopped. What is the status right now of the Federal-State relation-
ship, and when do you decide to get involved or not to get involved?
You did not get involved, I do not think, in this recent Texas en-
counter, and the State government handled it very well, it seemed
to me, maybe better than the Federal Government has handled
 42

similar situations in the past. Have we learned from some of those

past mistakes, or is this just an indication of restraint that was
well advised?
Mr. FREEH. Senator, you cite a very, very good example, the Re-
public of Texas incident, which was handled very well by the State
authorities. That was a circumstance where at the initiation of that
event there was, first, no Federal violation that we were aware of.
Second, the State authorities did ask for assistance, but very mini-
mal assistance. We provided, during the course of that incident,
hostage negotiators, technical assistance, photographic assistance,
which is what the Texas authorities requested. There was no need,
in the judgment of the Attorney General and myself, to intervene
federally. That decision turned out to be a prudent course. I think
we look at each situation on a case-by-case basis.
The Freemen situation in Montana was quite different. There
were more people in the Freemen compound than the sheriff had
on his law enforcement force. They asked for Federal intervention.
There were clear Federal violations. There were Federal charges.
It was a situation where the State authorities requested Federal
assistance, and we determined it was appropriate to intervene.
But we have great confidence in our State and local partners.
There are over 600,000 State and local officers around the country.
But 50 percent of the police forces have under 10 sworn officers.
It is in those particular areas where, with the addition of Federal
charges, we can bring our resources to bear.
I think you have seen and will see restraint on our part. I think
we have learned from past episodes, but we will not hesitate to in-
tervene federally when it is appropriate to do so.
Senator COCHRAN. Madam Attorney General.
Ms. RENO. You are looking at a former State prosecutor that
sometimes resented the Feds coming in and telling us what to do.
So what we have tried to do, Director Freeh, the Director of the
Marshals Service, Mr. Gonzales, and Administrator Constantine,
and I have reached out to the U.S. attorneys and to the special
agents in charge in the field saying we want to form a partnership
with State and local law enforcement. There will be some things
they do better, some things we do better, sometimes we need to
give them information or provide them expertise or equipment. But
we are not in this to claim credit, we are not in this for the turf.
We are in it to see that it be done the right way consistent with
what is in the best interest of the case and the best interest of the
community.
I think it has been working, both in the examples that Director
Freeh cites and in our whole effort against violence in this country.
In many instances the State and local prosecutors will proceed with
the case with information that we furnished them, because they
can get as good a result. In other instances they will ask us to do
it, but we try to consult with them and do it in a collegial way.
ENACTMENT OF LAWS

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you. My second question is related to

the fact that we tend to pass laws creating Federal crimes out of
State and local crimes. My question is how does this operate to
take away funds, resources, attention from doing the things that is
 43

the subject of this hearing today, which to me seems to be an over-

riding concern in many cases, and only the Federal agencies rep-
resented here are equipped and authorized to really handle?
We just saw the House, for instance, pass this juvenile justice re-
form bill. At first blush it seems to me to make Federal crimes out
of juvenile crimes in areas where it is really arguably not nec-
essary. But we are going to take a look at the bill and see whether
or not it is a positive and constructive act to try to do something
that should be done about juvenile justice, or whether it just adds
another layer of illegality or prohibition at the Federal level that
already exists at the State and local level that could better be han-
dled there.
To what extent do you think you will be required to assign re-
sources, people, and budget dollars that are hard to come by to this
and have it taken away from antiterrorism activities?
Ms. RENO. The way we have tried to approach everything that
we do when there is concurrent jurisdiction is to say who can do
it best, and in many instancesand we consult with the State and
locals in determining who can do it best, if they are equipped to
do itand we recognize that street crime and youth crime is basi-
cally a local function. There will be exceptions.
In the Indian country, we have got to address Federal laws to
make sure that they are appropriately responsive in a balanced,
thoughtful way to address issues of youth crime, because we have
the primary responsibility. But with respect to most of this country
what we say is we can do some things that the locals cannot do,
and they are much more sensitive to so many of the issues and to
many of the witnesses and the sources, and they have some advan-
tages that we do not have. Let us work together.
If it is a crime that cuts across State jurisdictions so that we are
the only ones that can bring the significant enough case to a result
and a penalty that fits the crime, then let us do it, because it cuts
across district lines. If it is something that is intensely local, let
them do it. If it is one sheriff with a terrible crime and he has got
two deputies and no expertise and says please, for heavens sake,
help me, this is a dangerous offender, and we have got jurisdiction,
we want to work with him. But we want to do it consulting with
the State and locals in a partnership to make sure that we do not
duplicate resources, that we use it in the wisest way possible, and
then what is in the best interest of solving the crime and of helping
the community.
Senator COCHRAN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much. We have held this

hearing ahead of the time we are called upon to make our alloca-
tions under the budget resolution we hope will be adopted soon.
Any additional questions we have to ask will be submitted to them.
Thank you very much.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were
submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hear-
ing:]
 44
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

ILLEGAL FUNDRAISING

Question. Several years ago, this subcommittee put additional funding into the
budget to enhance federal efforts to prevent illegal fundraising in the U.S. on behalf
of organizations, such as the ill-famed Hamas organization, that support terror to
undermine the Middle East peace process. The funding was intended to bolster ef-
forts to promote greater enforcement of Executive order 12947, which is listed as
Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East
Peace Process. How are you faring in efforts to crack down on illegal fundraising
in this country?
Answer. The FBI works in concert with the U.S. Department of the Treasurys
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to identify illegal fundraising activity in the
United States. Where possible, the FBI contributes information of a criminal nature
on illegal fundraising to OFAC for specific law enforcement action. We closely mon-
itor international terrorist organizations in the United States through extensive in-
vestigation. The FBI utilizes all of its investigative authorities in our overall strat-
egy to disrupt the criminal activities of international terrorist organizations in the
United States.
Question. Are less funds being raised illegally in this country today than two
years ago? Or more?
Answer. The majority of funds raised in the United States are for benevolent,
charitable, and relief efforts to the needy. The FBI continues to focus on the diver-
sion of such monies to support the military wings of terrorist organizations. The FBI
cannot initiate an investigation on the premise of fund raising alone, unless crimi-
nal activity/intent is present. The FBI has intensified its investigative efforts di-
rected at international terrorism groups to detect all criminal activities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HARRY REID

TERRORISM THREAT

Question. The threat of terrorism from weapons of mass destruction, particularly

those associated with easily produced chemical or biological devices, has increased
in recent years and is now a problem of world wide significance. Even so, the United
States is still not obviously prepared to meet this threat. Please discuss the scope
and status of national preparedness to respond to terrorism and its possible con-
sequences.
Answer. Pursuant to the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of
1996, the National Security Council (NSC) was tasked to generate a report for the
President to transmit to Congress that provides an assessment of the capabilities
of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to domestic terrorist incidents
involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and to support State and local pre-
vention and response efforts. The FBI, in coordination with Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and with input from other crisis/consequence manage-
ment agencies, provided responses to Sections 1411, 1416 and 1443 of the Act. The
President sent the Policy Functions/Operational Roles of Federal Agencies in Coun-
tering the Domestic Chemical/Biological Threat Report to Congress on January 21,
1997. This report describes the respective policy functions and operational roles of
Federal agencies in countering the threat posed by the use or potential use of bio-
logical and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
Question. Studies and expert witnesses testify to lack of readiness on the part of
first responders to manage the full spectrum of threats they might face in the event
of a terrorist attack. Findings indicate the need for national training sites with fa-
cilities to support realistic training and exercises simulating attacks by weapons of
mass destruction. The sites would presumably provide both urban and suburban en-
vironments with permitted releases of dangerous substances or their simulants.
What is being done by the administration to define the facilities, areas, and require-
ments for realistic training and exercises? Is there a comprehensive national review
of existing facilities that could be designated for this task?
Answer. Section 521(b)(2) of Public Law 104132, the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, states that the President shall establish an inter-
agency task force to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing a facil-
ity that recreates both an urban and suburban environments in such a way as to
permit the effective testing, training, and evaluation in such environments of gov-
 45
ernment personnel who are responsible for responding to the use of chemical and
biological weapons in the U.S.
When the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation mandating first responder training
was enacted, it was thought initially that the best approach to meet this need was
through establishment of national training. However, after consultation with a
group of expert first responders from the State and Local police and fire commu-
nities, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice and the other
members of the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group on Terrorism (SICG) have
concluded that the concept of training first responders in 120 localities in the United
States initially should focus on training the trainers, with the ultimate goal of de-
veloping communities to a point where they can train themselves.
By October 1, 1997, the FBI will assist DOD in assessing the training needs of
27 cities, and will provide actual training and course materials to the trainers for
8 of these cities. These trainers will incorporate the materials into the training pro-
vided to the first responders from other communities. The training of the trainers
for the other 19 cities will occur in fiscal year 1998. Assessments of the training
needs of the other 91 cities will also be made in fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year
1999. Appropriate exercises will be conducted to test the effectiveness of such train-
ing. The FBI is also considering distance learning through multiple down link
sites to train hundreds of responders at the same time in an interactive environ-
ment. The current concept of a national training center poses more questions than
answers at this time. Thus, the concept needs much more work before the FBI and
the Department of Justice can support it. The concept of a national training site re-
mains an option. However, the apparent cost effectiveness of training the trainers
either in their respective cities or possibly through distance training makes this
approach a more desirable option to pursue at this time.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Chairman STEVENS. I believe that the rest of the questions we

have to ask of these witnesses are matters that really touch and
concern the national security of this country, therefore, we will
move it to room 124 in this building, the Dirksen Building. It will
be a classified hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., Tuesday, May 13, the hearing was con-
cluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to
the call of the Chair.]