Murray, Black Mirror Reflections PDF

Philosophy Now ISSUE 97 July/Aug 2013
Philosophy Now, EDITORIAL & NEWS

43a Jerningham Road, 4 Self, Self, Self! Rick Lewis
Telegraph Hill,
London SE14 5NQ 5 News in Brief
United Kingdom
Tel. 020 7639 7314 THE SELF
[email protected] 6 A Philosophical Identity Crisis
http://philosophynow.org
Chris Durante looks at different views of personal identity
Editor-in-Chief Rick Lewis 9 The Illusion of the Self
Editors Anja Steinbauer, Grant Bartley
Digital Editor Bora Dogan
Sam Woolfe says that theres no reality to the sense of self
Editorial Assistant Katie Javanaud 10 Is the Buddhist No Self Compatible with Nirvana?
Graphic Design Katie Javanaud, Grant Katie Javanaud asks whether there is a contradiction at
Bartley, Anja Steinbauer
Film Editor Thomas Wartenberg the heart of Buddhism
Book Reviews Charles Echelbarger, 14 How Old Is The Self?
Heidi Pintschovius
Marketing Manager Sue Roberts Frank S. Robinson disagrees with a fashionable view that the
Administration Ewa Stacey, Heidi self is a very recent development
THE SELF
Pintschovius
Advertising Team
17 Focusing On The Brain, Ignoring The Body
Jay Sanders, Ellen Stevens Alessandro Colarossi on Merleau-Ponty & Artificial Intelligence
[email protected]
UK Editorial Board pages 6-19 and page 47 OTHER ARTICLES
Rick Lewis, Anja Steinbauer, 20 Bertrand Russell Stalks the Nazis
Bora Dogan, Grant Bartley
Thomas Akehurst says Russell blamed German philosophy
PORTRAIT OF MACHIAVELLI DARREN MCANDREW 2013
US Editorial Board
Dr Timothy J. Madigan (St John Fisher 23 Moral Relativism is Incoherent
College), Prof. Charles Echelbarger
(SUNY), Prof. Raymond Pfeiffer (Delta Julien Beillard says that moral relativists dont make sense
College), Prof. Jonathan Adler (CUNY) 25 One Law to Rule Them All
Contributing Editors
Alexander Razin (Moscow State Univ.) Tim Wilkinson is consistent about non-contradiction
UK Editorial Advisors 29 Good News from Neurology
Piers Benn, Chris Bloor, Gordon Giles,
Paul Gregory, John Heawood, Kate Leech
Francis Fallon tells us why brain scans cannot be mind scans
US Editorial Advisors 31 Trying Herder
Prof. Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Toni Dale DeBakcsy on one of the greatest 18th Century thinkers
Vogel Carey, Prof. Rosalind Ekman
Ladd, Prof. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, REVIEWS
Prof. Harvey Siegel
Cover Portrait Niccol Machiavelli 42 Television: Black Mirror Reflections
by Santi di Tito (16th Century) Terri Murray looks at Marcuse through her TV set
Printed by Graspo CZ, a.s.,
Machiavelli 45 Book: Anti-Fragile by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Pod Sternberkem 324, 76302 Zlin, Hes been misunderstood... reviewed by Eleni Panagiotarakou
Czech Republic
pages 34 and 36 47 Book: The Self and Self-Knowledge ed. by Annalisa Coliva
UK newstrade distribution through: reviewed by Richard Baron
Comag Specialist Division,
Tavistock Works, Tavistock Rd, REGULARS
West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX 34 Brief Lives: Niccol Machiavelli
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Graeme Garrard reconsiders the infamous political theorist
U.S. & Canadian bookstores through: 36 Food For Thought: I Gave Them A Sword
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695 Westney Road S., Unit 14, Tim Madigan on Richard Nixons admiration for Machiavelli
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Tel. (905) 619 6565
50 Tallis in Wonderland: Does The Universe Give A Toss?
The opinions expressed in this magazine Raymond Tallis on coin tossing and quantum probabilities
do not necessarily reflect the views of 52 Ethical Episodes: This Ones For You
the editor or editorial board of
Philosophy Now. Joel Marks reviews his own amoral book trilogy
Philosophy Now is published by POETRY & FICTION

Anja Publications Ltd
ISSN 0961-5970
I LL U S I O N S & 19 Poem: That Which I Am
Ivan Searle poetically questions our knowledge of our selves
Back Issues p.48
CONTRADICTIONS 53 Dialogue: Sartre & The Waiter
Subscriptions p.49
pages 9, 23, 25 Frank OCarroll on liberty and coffee
and throughout!
July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 3
Editorial Self, Self, Self!
M
any of us enjoy talking about ourselves, perhaps too Frank Robinson examines and takes issue with Julian Jayness
much sometimes. But in this issue well be talking famous theory that our sense of self is a recent historical
about our selves, which maybe is a bit different. development; dating back only some three thousand years.
In Platos dialogues, Socrates often urges his fellow And Alessandro Colarossi argues, with the help of his friend
Athenians to Know Thyself, which was a popular maxim Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that Artificial Intelligence research
inscribed in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. There seems a will hit a dead end because of a failure to appreciate that
widespread consensus among philosophers, psychoanalysts consciousness must be embodied to be complete; just building
and suchlike folk that striving to understand yourself better is a complex electronic brain on a laboratory bench wont be
a good idea. Why should that be the case? If you fret too good enough.
much about the details of your self, you might become self- This year sees the 500th anniversary of The Prince, Niccol
conscious, and this can impede the effectiveness of your di Machiavellis notorious masterpiece of political theory /
dealings with others. Nevertheless, Ren Descartes kicked off handbook for aspiring dictators. To mark the anniversary we
modern philosophy with introspection and the self as his have two articles on the wily Florentine diplomat whose name
starting point. He mused that however comprehensively gave the English language a verb (Machiavellian) and a
deluded his thinking might be, he was at least definitely synonym for the Devil (Old Nick). Machiavelli was a
having thoughts, and if he was thinking, that must mean that pessimist about human nature, believing that most people
he existed. From that small foothold he went on to deduce the tend to be lazy and unambitious, and arent greatly interested
existence of a benevolent God and of the external world and, in developing virtue in themselves although they admire it in
for better or worse, set the whole adventure of Western others. He was the first to openly conceptualise a split
philosophy on a new path. between ethics and politics; earlier writers assumed that being
Philosophers have been self-obsessed ever since, and our virtuous is important for a political leader, but Machiavelli
contributors this month deal with some of the central philo- flatly denies this. If you want to be a ruler it is useful to appear
sophical problems of the self. Chris Durante asks about virtuous, as virtue is admired, but actually being virtuous is not
personal identity: given that over the course of your whole life helpful and can be a hindrance. What is important is how you
from when you first became self-aware, you have changed relate to the people. Being liked is fine, but it is not as stable a
dramatically in terms of physical appearance, experiences, bond as that created by fear, because people easily transfer
capabilities and in many other ways, what exactly is the their positive likings to others but fear isnt transferrable in
constant thread that makes you the same person, rather than a this way; they will always fear you. So you should aim to be
succession of different people? Sam Woolfe looks at some feared, but you shouldnt allow yourself to become hated
competing conceptions of the self and discusses the idea that a because hatred is destructive and breeds rebellion. You can use
unitary self is an illusion, perhaps arising because we arrange violence but dont be excessive as that will create hatred.... The
our different experiences so as to make a coherent narrative in Prince is a ruthlessly practical book, illustrated with examples
ways that are biologically advantageous. Some think the drawn from Machiavellis wide experience as a diplomat and
existence of the self is self-evident, and attempts to disprove it courtier. No wonder his reputation is sulphurous.
are self-contradictory. David Hume is perhaps the best-known Our contributors give a good sketch of Old Nicks life and
Western philosopher to have doubted whether the self existed ideas, and both suggest that he was no more immoral than
(see box on p8), but the Buddha too taught that there was no other political schemers of his time (and since) and that his
self. In her article, Katie Javanaud examines whether this near-demonic reputation is mainly a result of him simply
doctrine is logically compatible with another Buddhist being far more candid than his peers. Almost everything about
doctrine, that people can achieve liberation from the cycle of Machiavelli is controversial, even including whether the
death and rebirth. This requires a careful examination of what articles about him in this issue should be part of our section
is meant by self; one of the striking things about Javanauds on the self. After all, in some ways he seems a philosopher of
article is how much the logical approach and core concerns of ruthless self-interest. However, along with his unabashed
ancient Buddhist and Hindu writers have in common with advocacy of treachery, deception, and murder in the pursuit of
debates about the self in modern Western philosophy. power, he also argued that such actions could be justified only
Perhaps this shows that the concerns of philosophy are if they resulted in a better outcome for society at large, and
universal, and that logic is logic everywhere, in all ages, rather not otherwise. In sixteenth century terms, that made him
than being relative to different cultures or belief systems. practically a saint!
4 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

Emotions correlate with brain activity
Athens braces for World Congress of
News
Philosophy APA to launch its own journal
News reports by Sue Roberts.
Emotions and the Brain World Congress in Athens standing of the age-old battle between
Recent neurological research at The 23rd World Congress of Philos- philosophy and painting using a hundred
Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, ophy will be held in Athens from 4-10 ancient and contemporary artifacts. In a
Pennsylvania, suggests that each emotion August 2013. The theme will be Philos- series of short black and white videos,
humans experience has a distinctive signa- ophy as inquiry and way of life. The filmed by Lvy, contemporary artists read
ture on fMRI (functional Magnetic Reso- organisers are the International Federation directly to camera from their choice of
nance Imaging) scans. The scans tend to of Philosophical Societies (FISP) and the works by philosophers including Plato,
look the same whenever a particular indi- Greek Philosophical Society, under the Hegel and Schelling.
vidual has a particular feeling, and look Later in the summer, in Northern
Congress venue
broadly similar even in the brains of under construction
Ireland, the world premiere of The
different people experiencing a similar Conquest of Happiness will be staged at
emotion. This effect can be obscured by The Venue 2013 in Derry/Londonderry
distractions and researchers found that the on 21-22 September. The production is
clearest results could be obtained by scan- inspired by Bertrand Russells book of the
ning the brains of trained method actors same name, and by a question he asked:
from the universitys drama school. As ten how can people deserve happiness? It will
actors each made themselves experience be a multi-artform event featuring actors,
nine different feelings, researchers were musicians and dancers from Northern
able to identify distinctive patterns of Ireland, the Republic of Ireland,
mental activity linked to each emotional auspices of Unesco and the President of BosniaHerzegovina and Slovenia,
state. Following this, the scientists found a Greece. The World Congress is held in a directed by Haris Paovic of the East West
computerised method of predicting how different city every five years and is always Theatre Company in Sarajevo.
the actors were feeling from a fresh set of a massive organisational undertaking. Over
brain scans. The computer was 84% accu- 2,000 philosophers from 105 countries will Philosophy Now Festival
rate at guessing their emotions based on be gathering in Athens, and the provisional 8th September 2013
their own previous results and 70% accu- timetable lists well over 500 events. The The 2nd Philosophy Now Festival
rate when basing its judgment on patterns conference committee have also announced will be held in Londons Conway Hall
of activity seen in brain scans of other special sessions to be held at four locations all day on 8th September. It will include
participants. Some reflections on earlier of particular interest in the history of talks, debates, workshops, events for
uses of fMRI to investigate human mental philosophy: the sites of Platos Academy children, a round table on Surveillance
activity can be found in Francis Fallons and Aristotles Lyceum, the Pnyx (the hill and Privacy (which we will be secretly
article on page 29. on which the democratic assembly of filming), another
ancient Athens was always held) and the round table on
APA JAPA, Do! location in which Platos Phaedrus dialogue Zombies and Philos-
The American Philosophical Associa- is set. ophy and much
tion (APA) is planning to launch its very A team from Philosophy Now magazine more. There will be
own scholarly journal in partnership with will be attending the World Congress and a best-dressed
Cambridge University Press in 2015. The organising a round table discussion there zombie contest.
imaginatively-named Journal of the Amer- on Philosophy in the Public Sphere. Stephen Law will
ican Philosophical Association (JAPA) will give the PFA George
appear quarterly and will include various Art and Philosophy Ross Memorial
discussion topics in the diverse subfields of It seems that the summer has caused Lecture and this
philosophy as well as contribute to the artists to seek inspiration from philosophy, magazines own columnist Professor
disciplines continued growth and global and vice versa. In the medieval town of St Raymond Tallis will give a lecture
impact. The APA, based at the University Paul de Vence, in South West France, the about whether science has killed philos-
of Delaware, is one of the worlds largest Maeght Foundation is staging a major ophy. (Plot spoiler alert: he thinks it
philosophical societies with a membership exhibition which gives a free reign to hasnt.) All are welcome. For more
of over 10,000 professional philosophers philosopher, writer and media superstar details please visit:
and 90 affiliated groups, so their new Bernard-Henri Lvy (pronounced BHL philosophynow.org/festival
journal might become quite influential. in French). His aim is to increase under-

A Philosophical Identity Crisis
Chris Durante asks himself just what make him the person he used to be.
S
tepping into a park I had frequented as a little boy, mem- Many philosophers have attempted to tackle the issue of
ories of my childhood began to flood my mind, each one personal identity, generating a number of distinct theories. I
a rich story of a distant past. As I continued to reminisce, shall provide a synopsis of the two major accounts, mentioning
each story flowed into the next, and I began to witness the some of the major players, and proceed to reconcile these
development of an intricate character whom I refer to as me. opposing views with a hybrid account of what constitutes a per-
All these stories that I had authored in my experience flowed sonal identity which persists over time as a numerically identi-
together to give me a unique history. Yet reflecting on all the cal individual, or in other words, what makes a single person.
experiences, goals, traits, and values that Ive had, it dawned on The two major and rival accounts of personal identity in
me that my identity seemed more elusive than one might usu- philosophy have been physical or body-based theories, and psy-
ally believe. Ruminating over these strands of my past, at times chological theories of persistent identity. The dominant of the
it was as if I could watch my traits develop, values evolve, my two are those theories which adhere to some form of psychol-
goals be accomplished and recreated; but other moments I rec- ogy-based criterion of continuing personal identity. Yet before
ollected appeared in my mind as if they were foreign elements delving into this account I would like to summarize the physi-
in my mental landscape. Some of the stories seemed to be inte- calist approach.
gral aspects of who I am, while other memories seemed very The bodily continuity criterion for personal identity states that
distant, almost as if the main character was a different person. for a person at a particular time (t1) and a person at a later time
Contemplating further, I began to wonder if there was (t2) to be numerically identical (meaning, retaining a single iden-
more to my identity than common sense or intuition could tity which has persisted over time), the person at t1 (P1) and the
account for. What struck me was the fact that I considered person at t2 (P2) must possess the same body. If it can be said
myself to be a single person with a single identity, yet viewing that the body in question is indeed the same body despite any
myself as always having been me left something unresolved. changes in regard to its individual parts or particular material
The little boy, who shares my name and appears in my stories, composition, then P2 is indeed the same person as P1.
seems to be so different from the person I am today, yet I tend The Ship of Theseus:
to incorporate him into my identity as a single person. What is a famous paradox
it exactly that makes me a single human person persisting of physical
through time with a single identity? Could it be my body continuity
that I am and have been a single biological organism? Or, is it
my mind that my psychological states interconnect so that
they constitute a single continuum? I also began to wonder,
At what point in my life did I begin to be a person? When
did I attain personhood? This got me thinking about a
whole new series of questions: Is that little boy truly the same
person as I am today?; If I became severely demented, could
I still be considered to be the same person as I was before?
Suddenly my pondering had led me to very serious metaphysi-
cal and philosophical problems. A dark storm of confusion and This view focuses upon a body in its entirety: a single
lightning-quick thoughts set in, only to give rise to a spectacu- human body which may be said to be the same physical thing
lar rainbow of insight in my psychic sky. as a previous body regardless of differences in some descriptive
characteristics. Hence, if we follow the existence of the physical
Distinct Identity Theories body which received the name Greg at birth to the same
We usually intuitively believe that our identities remain grown body called Greg at age twenty-five, then despite many
constant over long periods of time. We acknowledge changes differing physical traits, it may be said that this is indeed the
in character traits, etc., yet maintain a belief in the singularity same individual to whom the name Greg was given in infancy.
of peoples actual identities. If your good friend Greg were to Therefore, on this theory, what matters for continuing per-
claim that he was not the same person he was five years ago, sonal identity is the continuing existence of a single physical
we would not usually assume that Greg was now a numerically entity. (More complex and elaborate versions of this theory
distinct person, we would take it as a figure of speech denoting have been put forth by David Wiggins and Eric Olsen.)
that Greg has undergone some major event in his life, or that By contrast, psychological theories assert that the criterion for
he has undergone some drastic change in his personality traits. the persistence of personal identity over time is the intertwined
Yet when asked Just what is it that makes a person persist as relations of an individuals psychological states. Initially, this
the same person over time? can we really say what it is that theory was postulated by John Locke (1632-1704), often deemed
gives human beings the unique personal identities we assume the father of the personal identity problem. He employed
them to have? memory as the sole criterion for identity. Later the theory was

revised, by Lockeans and others, to include a plethora of psy- Noonan writes (p.55). That is, while powerful in its time, this
chological factors, not solely memories, as means of accounting objection fails to be an adequate objection to contemporary
for ones singular personal identity over time. These more theories of psychological continuity, which say that as long as
sophisticated theories focus primarily on either psychological conti- there is a continuous set of links of memories between the
nuity or psychological connectedness, or on a fusion of the two, and child and the old man, they may be said to be the same person.
often rely on the idea of person-stages (a person at t1 is a So (for example) as long as the old man can remember being
person-stage, at t2 is another person-stage, etc). the young man, and the young man can remember being the
The psychological continuity theory typically states that in child, then the old man is the same person as the child.
order for P1 at t1 to be identical to P2 at t2, some continuity One influential argument in favour of psychological rather
of memory and personality must be recognizable between P1 than physical theories of identity has been put forward by Derek
and P2. The psychological connectedness theory, closely Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984). It goes as follows. An indi-
related to the psychological continuity theory, maintains that vidual enters a teleport machine on Earth, loses consciousness,
some type of psychological connectedness is necessary between and awakes in the teleport on Mars. The machine on Earth is
person-stages for the two to have a single identity over time; the scanner and the one on Mars is the replicator. Once the
but unlike memory-based theories of identity, the entirety of scanner has scanned the precise states of each molecule of the
the contents of psychological states may be analysed and persons body, it beams that information to the replicator on
utilised to ascribe identity. To borrow a concise summary of Mars and simultaneously completely destroys the body on
Harold Noonans from his book Personal Identity (1989): Earth. Out of entirely new matter, the replicator on Mars cre-
ates a body which is an exact replica of the previous one. The
One such connection is that which holds between an intention and the person then steps out of the replicator with no thought that he is
later act in which this intention is carried out. Other such direct psycho- not continuous with the person on Earth, and thus he may be
logical connections are those which hold when a belief, desire, or any considered the same person. So this person has psychological
other psychological feature, persistsIn general any causal links between but not bodily continuity with the person on Earth.
past factors and present psychological traits [not merely memories] can be Despite their dominance in philosophy, there are objections
subsumed under the notion of psychological connectedness. (pp.10-11). to psychological theories of personal identity. One such objec-
tion might be called the duplication problem. It is conceiv-
Objections and Persons able that one day there will exist a machine which will be able
A classic refutation of Lockes simple memory criterion for to record everything about ones psychological states and
personal identity has been made by Thomas Reid (1710-96). transfer this information into a new body, or even into more
His Paradox of the Brave Officer essentially goes as follows. than one body. This case is akin to a variation on Parfits tele-
Consider a child who grows into a young man, and then into portation thought experiment, in which the replicator mal-
an old man. Based on a simple memory criterion alone, one functions and produces a number of exact replicas of the body
could assert that the child is psychologically connected to the being transported. In either case, more than one individual will
young man if the young man has a good portion of the memo- be in possession of precisely the same psychological states, all
ries of the child; and the young man is psychologically con- of which are continuous and connected with one previous
nected to the old man insofar as the old man has sufficient person. According to this critique, the psychological criteria
memories of being the young man. However, the old man may for identity must therefore fail, for we shall be left with two or
nevertheless be said to be psychologically discontinuous with, more embodied people who according to the psychological
that is, unconnected with, the child, due to the fact that the old criteria may rightfully be considered continuous with the same
man has no memories of being the child. Yet, how is it possible person. Intuitively, this seems rather absurd.
for the child to be the young man, and the young man to be
the old man, but for the child to be a different person from the Another Story of Identity
old man? Obviously, these objections hit their target [the While the defenders of the psychological criteria and the
simple Lockean memory criterion], but they do not go deep advocates of the bodily criteria continue to duel, concocting
Thomas Reids Paradox of the Brave Officer

amusing and intriguing science-fiction-inspired thought- streams, while yet others maintain a more existential position,
experiments, neither group has successfully managed to take viewing the self as a constant becoming, evolving as we interact
down their opponent. with our environments and reflect on our lives. Pre-eminent
Each camp of theorists has attempted to capture something defenders of narrative identity include Daniel Dennett, Alasdair
of what makes a human being a person retaining a single iden- MacIntyre, and Paul Ricoeur. Although they differ in their
tity. However, neither position seems to capture another inte- approaches, they all attempt to capture features of the human
gral element of our lived existences, namely, that we tend to condition which previous theorizing has ultimately left out,
define ourselves through the telling of stories. We get to know namely the importance of our life histories, story-telling, cul-
one another by learning about each others life histories, and we tural immersion, goal-directedness, and self-creation.
relate to others, identifying with them, based on their values,
ideologies, beliefs, personalities, etc, all of which are transmit- Back To Life
ted via narratives, verbal, written, or otherwise. Hence, an While these theories of what make you continue to be you
alternative response to the philosophical identity crisis has been may seem obscure or abstract, they do indeed hold some bear-
the proposal that a human self gains its identity through narra- ing on human life and the concerns which arise on a daily basis
tion. This is often referred to as Narrative Identity Theory. especially in medical settings, where we are faced with issues
All Narrative Identity Theorists maintain in some form or relating to brain death, permanent vegetative states, comas,
another that the identities of persons are self-created narratives advance directives and living wills, and many psychiatric
claiming that narration, or story-telling, is the mode in which dilemmas. All of these in one way or another evoke questions
we represent ourselves to ourselves, present ourselves to touching on the various theories presented.
others, and represent others around us. The narrative theorist Retiring from my sojourn in the park, having pondered the
is attempting to capture that element of experience in which great mysteries of the human condition, I asked myself,
we say, Hey, tell me your story, or I know you, Ive heard Could it not be that I am at once dependent upon my psycho-
stories about you. logical connectedness, my biological persistence, and my life
On this account, who one is (and is not) is contingent upon history, for my identity? Although I did not accomplish a
the stories of ones past, and the stories of who one wishes to miraculous philosophical breakthrough during my stroll, I
become; the goals one possesses and the actions taken to arrive hope I have provided some food for thought with this prcis of
at those ends; the values inherited narratively or arrived at positions on the Philosophical Identity Crisis.
through reflection and self-story-telling; and ones emplotment DR CHRIS DURANTE 2013
as a character in the story of ones life, interacting with the sto- Chris Durante has a PhD in Ethics, MA in Religious Studies, and
ries of others. The narrative theorist thus takes human linguistic MSc in Philosophy of Mental Disorder. His interests in theories of
abilities and goal-orientation to play a major role in someones identity and personhood span a variety of fields, including bioethics,
acquisition of a unique identity as a person. Some theorists have philosophy, comparative religion and sociopolitical theory. He teaches
maintained that the personal self is the product of an interactive at McGill University in Montral, and also at Marymount Man-
unified narrative, others the virtual center of multiple narrative hattan College and St Johns University, both in New York City.
David Humes Theory of Personal Identity

In section 1.4.6 of A Treatise Of Human Nature (1739), Scottish philosopher David Hume presents his analysis of personal identity,
in which he concludes that the entire notion of the self is founded on a mistake, and is nothing but a confusion of ideas.
From the outset of the Treatise, Hume has argued that all our ideas are derived from our impressions: it is not until we
have tasted pineapple (had an impression of it) that we can have an idea of how pineapple tastes. Likewise, one cannot
describe the colour red in such a way that a man blind from birth could have any idea of redness, because he is inca-
pable of having an impression of red. Using this argument (a form of radical empiricism), Hume asserts that since nobody
has any distinct impression of the self as something independent of an array of perceptions, nobody can have any idea
of self. He writes: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time
without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. Since his only impressions are of fleeting percep-
tions and never of a constant self who is the putative subject of such experiences, this leads him to conclude that he is no more than a
bundle of perceptions. He even goes so far as to say that if he does not experience any perception while hes sleeping, he cannot prop-
erly be said even to exist at that moment. Hume accounts for our belief in a permanent and enduring self by referring to the fact that
where small changes occur gradually we are apt not to treat them as important enough to signify a change in identity. In philosophical
terms, however, failure to recognize even small changes as a change in identity is an error, he says.
In the Appendix of his Treatise, Hume acknowledged the central defect in his account of personal identity: if there is merely a bun-
dle of perceptions, and no enduring self that is the subject of these perceptions (i.e. a perceiver), then the entire project of the Trea-
tise is invalidated, as skepticism about the self leads ultimately to an irreversible wholesale skepticism, since without the self we are
not able to ground our knowledge. Hume also realised his account is guilty of raising perceptions to the status of substances (sub-
stance being another notion which Hume had rejected in the Treatise). So, Hume eventually writes in the Appendix: of the section
concerning personal identity, I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former
opinions, nor how to render them consistent. Katie Javanaud

The I l l u s i o n of the Self
Sam Woolfe says that were deluding our selves.
I
n our day-to-day lives, it always appears that there is an I describes patients who suffer some damage to a memory region
who is thinking, perceiving, and interacting with the of their brain, and they literally lose a part of themselves. In Dr
world. Even the language we use assumes that there is a Sacks best-known book, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a
self a distinct conscious entity: when we talk to each other we Hat (1985), he describes a patient known as Jimmy G who has
say, I think..., You are... etc. However, appearances can be lost the ability to form new memories and constantly forgets what
deceptive. The cognitive scientist Bruce Hood defines an illu- he is doing from one minute to the next. (In the film Memento,
sion as an experience of something that is not what it seems. the protagonist suffers from the same condition.) Due to this
He uses this definition in his book, The Self Illusion: How The condition, however, Jimmy has also almost lost his sense of self,
Social Brain Creates Identity (2012), arguing that the self is since he cannot form a coherent narrative of his life. This loss
an illusion and he admits that everyone experi- of narrative is deeply troubling, and means Jimmy strug-
ences a sense of self a feeling that we have an iden- gles to find meaning, satisfaction, and happiness. Cases
tity, and that this identity does our thinking and like this show not only that the sense of self depends on
perceiving but he says that beyond the experience, a multitude of brain regions and processes, but that our
there is nothing we can identify as the self. happiness depends on the illusion of self.
In The Principles of Psychology (1890), William Other evidence from neuroscience supports the claim
James said that we can think of there being that the brain is a narrative-creating machine. Dr
two kinds of self. There is the Sacks reports many different patients
self which is consciously aware of who make up stories to explain their
the present moment we repre- impairments. The neuroscientist V.S.
sent this self by using the pronoun Ramachandran also recounts patients
I; then theres also the self we who are paralysed but who deny that
recognise as being our personal iden- they have a problem. The brain is deter-
tity who we think we are which mined to make up stories even in the face
we represent by using the of obvious and compelling evidence
term me. According to (e.g. that an arm will not move).
Hood, both of these This does not mean that
selves are generated by the illusion of the self is
our brain in order to pointless. It is the most
make sense of our powerful and consistent
thoughts and the out- illusion we experience, so
side world: both I there must be some purpose
and me can be thought of as a to it. And in evolutionary
narrative or a way to connect our experiences terms, it is indeed useful to think of ourselves as
together so that we can behave in an biologically advantageous distinct and personal. There is more of an incentive to survive
way in the world. and reproduce if it is for my survival, and my genes remain in the
A helpful way to understand how the brain creates the illu- gene pool. After all, how can you be selfish without a sense of
sion of the self is to think about perceptual illusions such as the self? If we had no sense of self, and we perceived everything as
Kanizsa triangle [see illustration]. In this illusion we see a trian- one or interconnected, what would be the point of competi-
gle even though no triangle has been drawn, due to the sur- tion? Perhaps then some important moral lessons can be drawn
rounding lines and shapes giving the impression of there being a from the fact that the self is artificial, a construct.
triangle. Our brain essentially fills in the gaps. Hood states that The idea that the self is an illusion is not new. David Hume
our sense of a self is similarly a hallucination created through made a similar point, saying the self is merely a collection of
the combination of parts. We perceive the self as a result of dif- experiences [see box opposite]. And in early Buddhist texts the
ferent regions in our brain trying to combine our experiences, Buddha uses the term anatta, which means not-self or the
thoughts, and behaviours into a narrative, and in this sense the illusion of the self. Thus Buddhism contrasts to, for example,
self is artificial. Cartesianism, which says that there is a conscious entity behind
Hood's argument is that our brain naturally create narratives all of our thoughts. The Buddha taught his followers that
in order to make sense of the world. Essentially, our brains are things are perceived by the senses, but not by an I or me.
always thinking in terms of stories: what the main character is Things such as material wealth cannot belong to me if there is
doing, who they are speaking to, and where the beginning, no me, therefore we should not cling to them or crave them.
middle, and end is; and our self is a fabrication which emerges SAM WOOLFE 2013
out of the story-telling powers of our brain. Sam Woolfe is a philosophy graduate from Durham University. He is a
This belief has been backed up by case studies in neurology. writer and editor at The Backbencher magazine (backbencher.co.uk)
For example, in many of his books, neurologist Oliver Sacks and blogs at www.samwoolfe.com. He lives in London.

Is The Buddhist No-Self Doctrine
Compatible With Pursuing Nirvana?
Katie Javanaud asks whether there is a contradiction at the heart of Buddhism.
T
wo of the most fundamental doctrines of Buddhism What would result from the discovery of either the compati-
are firstly that the self is illusory, and secondly that we bility or the incompatibility of the two doctrines? Even if we
can achieve liberation from the cycle of death and discover that the Nirvana/no-self combination lacks cogency,
rebirth to reach a state of peace called Nirvana. From the per- does it follow that the theory of no-self is no longer valuable
spective of Western philosophy, it may appear inconsistent to for that theory supports the doctrine of non-attachment, which
claim both that there is no self and that Nirvana can nonethe- grounds the Buddhist ethic of universal compassion? Alterna-
less be attained, for who or what attains liberation if there is no tively, if we discover that Buddhists can hold the two claims
self in need of liberation? simultaneously without contradiction, this in itself neither
Although this is a common objection to Buddhism, to con- shows that the no-self doctrine is actually true, nor that the lay
sider its validity we must explore the concept of Nirvana more person would be compelled to accept that the self is an illusion.
fully in order to understand the liberation it offers. We will According to Buddhism, the central characteristics of exis-
also need to examine the notion that there is no self, a notion tence are impermanence, suffering and no-self. The Buddhas
which is inherently difficult to accept, but has been held by a view of life as suffering might give rise to the notion that Bud-
number of philosophers, notably David Hume. The doctrine is dhism is essentially pessimistic. However, as I argue, in offering
certainly asserted by Buddhism, and was strongly implied by a complete liberation from suffering, Buddhism is highly opti-
sermons of the Buddha himself (see verse 7 of the Dhamma- mistic. Understanding that the cause of suffering is craving (the
pada, or the Alagaddupama-Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya). Buddhas Second Noble Truth) enables us to eradicate suffer-
When examining the compatibility between the Buddhist ing by removing the cause which is achieved by following the
claims of no-self and the Buddhist project of liberation, the Eightfold Path in order to be freed from the cycle of re-birth
pursuit of Nirvana, as we will do in this article, we will have to and the accumulation of karma. To attain liberation from the
remember that many profound thinkers have found a way to cycle of re-birth and the accumulation of karma, among other
hold the two doctrines simultaneously. However, as we shall things, one must relinquish the belief in an enduring self
see, one difficulty with this stance is that it seems to require retaining identity over time and performing the executive func-
those who hold it to abandon the demands of reason for a tion of controller. Abandoning a belief in an enduring self is a
position which is defended without recourse to the usual natural step for any Buddhist paying close attention to the con-
methods of philosophical enquiry. stant flux occurring in the world. So our starting point will be
an examination of the no-self doctrine. We will then examine
various definitions of liberation, attempting to construct a defi-
nition that renders this liberation compatible with no-self. I
shall in fact offer two answers to the title question; which one
we accept will depend on our attitude towards the claims of
logic. For textual sources, I will focus primarily on the Abhid-
harma forms of Buddhism, as it is impossible here to cover all
branches/schools of Buddhism.
The Self That Buddhism Denies

What is the nature of the self that Buddhists deny, and how
can they justify this claim?
It is necessary firstly to understand the Buddhist distinction
between persons and the self, which is legitimised by differ-
entiating between conventional and ultimate truths:
A statement is conventionally true if and only if it is acceptable to

common sense and consistently leads to successful practice A statement
is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and neither
asserts nor presupposes the existence of any conceptual fictions.
(Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 2007)
Buddhists argue that it is only conventionally, not ulti-

mately, true that we are persons: that is, our conception of our-
selves as persons does not correspond with reality. As it says in
the Mahayana-Sutralankara, A person should be mentioned as
existing only in designation but not in reality [or substance,

Ancient Buddhist
site of Ayutthaya
in Thailand
dravya]. Buddhists say that we consider ourselves persons there is no such thing. I is commonly used to refer to the
because, through experience, we learn that we are constituted mind/body integration of the five skandhas, but when we exam-
of five skandhas or aspects: body (rupa), feelings (vedana), per- ine these, we discover that in none alone are the necessary cri-
ceptions (samjna), volitions (samskaras), and consciousness (vij- teria for self met, and as weve seen, the combination of them is
nana). But the word person becomes merely a convenient a convenient fiction. So, could there be something outside the
designator for the fiction we accept when we believe that a skandhas that constitutes the self? Siderits observes: in order
person is something over and above these component parts. for the Buddhas strategy to work, he will have to show that the
Buddhists therefore accept what Buddhism scholar Mark doctrine of the five skandhas gives an exhaustive analysis of the
Siderits calls a mereological reductionism about persons: they parts of the person (Buddhism as Philosophy, p.37). This exhaus-
claim that the parts exist, but the supposed whole does not. tiveness claim amounts to asserting that every element or aspect
This position is discussed in the Milindapanha or Questions of of a person is accounted for by the five skandhas.
King Milinda (c.100 BCE). Milinda is shocked to hear the Objectors to the exhaustiveness claim often argue that for
monk Nagasena deny the existence of a self, and asks whether discovering the self the Buddhist commitment to empirical
each of the bodily parts of Nagasena and then each of his means is mistaken. True, we cannot discover the self in the five
mental constituents constitute his self. To each question skandhas, precisely because the self is that which is beyond or
Nagasena replies negatively. Initially this leads Milinda to view distinct from the five skandhas. Whereas Buddhists deny the
the term Nagasena as an empty sound even a lie. Nagasena self on grounds that, if it were there, we would be able to point
then scrutinises Milindas claim that he arrived by chariot in it out, opponents of this view, including Sankara of the Hindu
the same terms, asking whether chariot refers to the axle, Advaita Vedanta school, are not at all surprised that we cannot
pole, seat etc., or whether chariot refers simply to the unity of point out the self; for the self is that which does the pointing
these parts. To each of these Milinda too replies negatively. rather than that which is pointed at. Buddha defended his
During this interrogation Milindas view of the self as a conve- commitment to the empirical method on grounds that, with-
nient designator or conceptual fiction is transformed from out it, one abandons the pursuit of knowledge in favour of
the idea of it being a mere empty sound into his understand- speculation. In the Alagaddupama-Sutta (= Snake Simile Dis-
ing that the term chariot or Nagasena or any other compos- course), Buddha says O monks, when neither self nor any-
ite entity is but a way of counting, term, appellation, conve- thing pertaining to self can truly and really be found, this spec-
nient designation, mere name He acknowledges that the ulative view The universe is that Atman (Soul); I shall be that
belief is conventionally true, but of persons in the absolute after death, permanent, abiding, ever-lasting, unchanging and I
sense there is no ego to be found (Radhakrishnan & Moore, shall exist as such for eternity, is it not wholly and completely
A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, p.284). foolish? (W.S. Rahula, What The Buddha Taught, p58).
When Buddhists assert the doctrine of no-self, they have a
clear conception of what a self would be. The self Buddhists The Argument from Impermanence
deny would have to meet the following criteria: it would (i) Buddhism presents two further arguments for the doctrine of
retain identity over time, (ii) be permanent (that is, enduring), no-self: the argument from impermanence and the argument
and (iii) have controlling powers over the parts of a person. from control. The argument from impermanence relies on the
Yet through empirical investigation, Buddhists conclude that exhaustiveness claim, whose validity is implicit in the premises of

the argument. The argument can be summarized thus: satisfies us, we try to change it. This concept presupposes that
the self is the type of thing that can perform a controlling func-
1. The five skandhas are impermanent. tion on parts of the person. However, the executive functioning
2. If there was a self, it would be permanent. of the self is undermined by the Principle of Irreflexivity, which
3. A person is no more than the five skandhas (this is the asserts that an entity cannot operate upon itself. The truth of
exhaustiveness claim). this principle is established by observation, in keeping with Bud-
4. Therefore there is no self. dhist empiricism. To support the claim, Buddhists appeal to the
following evidence: a knife cannot cut itself, a finger cannot
This argument is logically sound. However, the truth of the point to itself, etc. It follows that if the self performed the exec-
conclusion depends on premise 3. Could there be something tran- utive function, it could perform that function on other parts of
scending the five skandhas which should be recognized as a self? the person, but not on itself. This means that I could never find
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, a follower of the Hindu school of myself dissatisfied with and wanting to change myself, which in
Advaita-Vedanta, thinks that there must be. More controversially, turn means that any part of me that I can find myself wanting to
he argues that the Buddha too thought there must be some self change could not be myself (Buddhism as Philosophy, p.47).
beyond the five skandhas. Radhakrishnan (an Oxford philoso- Sankaras principle of consciousness bears some of the same
pher and later President of India) appeals to Udana 8.3, where properties (such as numerical identity over time and perma-
the Buddha states, There is an unborn, an unoriginated, an nence) as the self which Buddhists deny. Unlike the Buddhist
unmade, an uncompounded; were there not there would be notion of self, however, the Advaita Vedanta school does not
no escape from the world of the born, the originated, the made say the self would be a controller or performer of executive
and the compounded (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol.1, functions, only an experiencer of perceptions and thoughts.
p.320). However, what Buddha meant by his assertions about According to Sankara, the self is a universal transcendental
the unborn in Udana 8.3 is unclear. There are at least two pos- entity unconnected with the physical world of appearances. In
sible interpretations: (i) To assert that x is unborn is to say that both philosophical systems the question of the relationship
it does not come into existence at a particular time because it between this somewhat abstract self and the individual one
never has a beginning, i.e., it is eternal. In this case, being takes as oneself arises, for the transcendental and experien-
unborn would be predicated of some eternal entity; (ii) Alter- tial self do not seem identical. Consequently, when we talk of
natively to posit that x is unborn may be to assert the absence the self which the Buddhist denies but other schools accept, we
of xs birth i.e. it is not-born. On this interpretation we would are not talking of persons or individuals in their usual senses.
simply be denying the existence of the entity in question, saying In characterizing what a self would be if it were instantiated,
either that the being in question had not been born yet or that it Buddhists have claimed three main properties: permanence,
never would be born (although in either case, particularly the control and numerical identity. We have looked at two argu-
latter, it would not make much sense to refer to it as a being). ments advancing the no-self doctrine, which draw on the idea of
Given the divergent interpretations of the Buddhas meaning of a self as permanent or controlling respectively. These arguments
unborn here, we cannot assume that the Buddha intended to provide some support for the doctrine of no-self. However, our
posit an eternal entity which is unborn in the first sense. initial protest against the doctrine remains. Knowledge, suffer-
Instead, and more in keeping with the rest of Buddhist thought, ing, rebirth (all key Buddhist ideas), arise only if we can assume
Udana 8.3 could be an expression of the absence of an eternal the existence of a subject to whom these things apply. For
entity. So, when Buddha says there is an unborn rather than an instance, our ability to analyse the arguments for no-self, and
eternal changeless entity, he could simply be asserting that there our acknowledging that the skandhas are in a constant state of
is no such entity. And even if Buddha is asserting the existence of arising and dissolving, presupposes that there is a self which has
some unoriginated entity, why should we designate this entity as the capacity to analyse and to observe change. This leads us
the self? What Buddhism is precisely denying is that the entity again to ask: how can the concept of liberation remain coherent
we commonly call self meets the criteria for selfhood (namely unless we can identify one who is liberated? Would it be philo-
permanence, control and numerical identity over time). sophically justifiable to accept the Buddhas suggestion that
The idea of permanence is closely related to that of numeri- these problems are not in need of urgent address?
cal identity. Buddhists deny that a person can remain numeri-
cally identical with him or herself over time on that grounds The Concept of Nirvana
that time itself necessarily implies numerical change. This The definition of Nirvana is crucial to determining whether
doctrine of momentariness entails that at every moment, the the no-self doctrine and the Buddhist project of liberation are
five skandhas arise, are destroyed and are succeeded by other compatible. Nirvana is literally translated from the Sanskrit as
numerically distinct (if similar) skandhas. Indeed, observation extinction/snuffed out. This liberation from continual rebirth
of mental states does reveal that our feelings, volitions and and suffering is the result of enlightenment, which occurs when
objects of consciousness are constantly changing. our ignorance about the nature of existence and the false belief in
a self is eradicated. It is important to qualify that what is extin-
The Argument from Control guished is suffering (ultimately caused by ignorance): the self is not
On the conventional view of a person as accepted in common extinguished, for there never was a self, only the illusion of one.
discourse, we believe we can alter aspects of ourselves, and that If we define Nirvana in negative terms, as annihilation, extinc-
it is we who do this. If there is an aspect of our self which dis- tion or nothingness, then since true nothingness plausibly implies

that nobody experiences it, the Buddhists could plausibly assert since Buddhism defines Nirvana as that which is radically differ-
the compatibility of no-self with this concept of liberation. ent from anything which we now experience. But given that the
However, if we do characterise Nirvana as nothingness, there are Buddha made quite scathing remarks about the foolishness of
at least two different things we could mean by this, and both are speculation not based on experience, how can we talk about
questionable. If by nothingness we mean an absolute void, then the nature of liberation? As A.K. Warder correctly observes of
although this may be compatible with the doctrine of no-self, the Buddhist methodology What was first picked up as a piece of
question arises as to whether we could rightly describe this as information will not be fully understood until the trainee sees
liberation. Rather, this definition of Nirvana forces the conclu- the truth himself through his own experience. He must not just
sion that Buddhism is essentially nihilistic which Buddhists believe it, he must verify it (Indian Buddhism, p.102).
would deny. Alternatively, we could interpret the nothingness of There are two other major problems with experience here:
Nirvana to mean an undifferentiated continuum. This defini- (i) If experience is suffering, how could the experience of
tion too has its difficulties: could we be describing nothingness if enlightenment result in liberation? (ii) A central cause of suf-
we are providing an idea of what it is like? Wouldnt this be a fering, according to Buddhism, is psychological attachment to
refutation of its actual nothingness? And again, in what sense the self. This is one of the main hindrances to liberation; and
would this be liberation? It remains the case that the notion of yet in the very process of relinquishing this attachment, in
liberation is meaningful only if we can identify who is liberated. order to attain it one must personally experience liberation.
Alternatively, we could characterize Nirvana in positive terms, This seems to be putting the cart before the horse, only imme-
describing it as a blissful state although once again, this would diately afterwards to put the horse back in front of the cart.
seem to necessitate a self for whom it is blissful. The paradox of liberation, meanwhile, trots on! Given these
Buddha himself said little about the state of beings who attain problems, we must be careful not simply to appeal to mysti-
liberation, or what happens to them after death. In a dialogue cism, or to the ineffable quality of Nirvana. Although from
with his disciple Vaccha, Buddha says of the Enlightened One: this side of liberation (that is, from our position of ignorance)
to say that he is reborn would not fit the case to say that he is it may be tempting to speculate about Nirvana, doing so could
not reborn would not fit the case to say that he is both reborn itself be a form of ignorance, and thus a barrier to the very
and not reborn would not fit the case to say that he is neither thing we seek. For perhaps Nirvana is nothing positive in its
reborn nor not reborn would not fit the case (A Sourcebook in own right, but simply a cessation of suffering and ignorance.
Indian Philosophy, p.290). The tetralemma indicates that when we
ask what the state of liberation is like for the one who has Conclusion
attained it, the question has been misconceived. In conclusion, the best we can offer by way of an answer to
Although logically it must be the case that the Enlightened our title question is itself a question: does logic invariably
One is either reborn or not reborn (either continues to experi- reflect ultimate reality, or is it possible that the logically impos-
ence after death or does not), Buddha is here asserting that sible could in fact be instantiated? Would the logical incom-
none of the four possibilities are actualized. What this suggests patibility of the two doctrines of no-self and self-liberation
is that to define Nirvana in either negative or positive terms is necessarily have to result in the falsehood of at least one of the
to misunderstand it, limiting it according to our present state doctrines? What Buddhists have attempted to do in postulat-
of ignorance. As Siderits writes, Since logic suggests that one ing Nirvana is to clear away all obstacles including reason
of the four possibilities would have to be true, the conclusion itself that stood in the way of the realization of the reality
seems inescapable that the Buddha is calling Nirvana some- that transcended ordinary phenomenal existence [Buddhists]
thing that transcends all rational discourse (Buddhism as Phi- rejected all reasons and positions not because [they are] pes-
losophy, p.72). Nirvana could be that which transcends all simists or nihilists but because reality was inaccessible to
normal human experience (and for the Buddhist must neces- reason and ordinary perception (B.A. Elman, Nietzsche and
sarily do so, since normal human existence entails suffering Buddhism; Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.44, 1983, p.683).
and is characterized by becoming). To attempt to speak ratio- When Buddhists claim that Nirvana is blissful, they could be
nally of the condition of those who attain Nirvana, or about describing it as a positive state of pleasure or happiness, but
the nature of Nirvana itself, is to misunderstand the topic this interpretation is unwarranted given their commitment to
under discussion: Nirvana is ineffable. As D.T. Suzuki, an the view that human experience invariably brings with it exis-
adherent of Zen Buddhism, puts it: As long as we stay at the tential angst and suffering. The alternative we are left with is
level of relativity or intellectualization, we shall have all kinds that Nirvana is blissful in the sense that it is a state free from
of disagreement and have to keep up a series of hot discus- all pain and suffering, but it is otherwise not something about
sions (The Field of Zen, p.36); and as long as Buddhism which we can speak meaningfully from this side of liberation.
appeals to language to express itself, it inevitably becomes the Perhaps we may have glimpses in our lifetime of what Nirvana
victim of all the inconveniences, all the restrictions, and all the is like, but whenever we attempt to capture what it is, we
contradictions which are inherent in language (p.28). Yet as immediately loose sight of it: Nirvana is by nature indescrib-
radically other from anything we experience, Nirvana is in a able, and therefore we cannot make the final pronouncement
category of its own. However, from this conception of Nir- on whether no-self is compatible with it.
vana, it is impossible to decide whether it is logically compati- KATIE JAVANAUD 2013
ble with the doctrine of no-self. Katie Javanaud has a degree in philosophy and theology from Oxford,
Appeals to the ineffable quality of Nirvana may be legitimate, and is studying for an MA in History of Philosophy at Kings, London.

How Old is the Self?
Frank S. Robinson takes issue with Julian Jaynes argument about the self.
R
ichard Dawkins called Julian Jayness 1976 book, The spection. For example, look at the series X O X O X O....
Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral What comes next? Did you think your way to answering, X?
Mind either complete rubbish or a work of consum- Jaynes says no; you simply saw the answer, and if you try to
mate genius (The God Delusion, 2006). I first encountered its explain how, youre just making up a story for what youre
theories discussed in an article in an ancient coin magazine in guessing must have happened.
2001, and found it so outrageous I had to write to the maga- This argument is aimed at making plausible the existence of
zine. Since then Ive seen the theory discsussed widely, cited human beings behaving much as we do, but without being
widely, and taken seriously, so I finally decided to read the book conscious. But its hardly a revelation that a lot of our mental
itself. functioning is more or less unconscious. It has to be; you
Jaynes (1920-97) was a psychology professor who argued in wouldnt be able to walk if you had to think out each muscle
his book that consciousness as we know it emerged only a mere movement. We can even perform complex tasks, like driving,
3,000 years ago. Thats right: the builders of the pyramids were in a zoned-out state without conscious attentiveness. Yet we do
not conscious in our sense: they didnt understand that their consciously think about some things. And importantly, we dont
thoughts were their own, but considered them voices of gods. only think about the physical world, we think about our
Jaynes calls this a bicameral mind, where the voices generated thoughts. Thats what the self does; and this type of thinking
by the right brain hemisphere appear as detached hallucina- differs from the unconscious functioning Jaynes discusses, and
tions rather than as the inner narrative we now think of as our- which a computer could do, without self-awareness.
selves thinking. By consciousness, Jaynes doesnt mean mere sen- Understanding our sense of self remains, of course, a deep
tience or perception, then, but rather a sense of self a sense problem. David Hume said that no amount of introspection
that theres a me in here, running the show. Thats what he says could enable him to catch hold of his self. But the trouble was
people lacked until around 1000 BC. According to Jaynes, the that he was using the self to look for the self. (Jaynes recog-
change to modern consciousness around 1000 BC was occa- nizes this difficulty; he makes the analogy of using a flashlight
sioned by societal and geopolitical upheavals, making bicamer- to look for darkness.) However, it is fairly certain that the self
alism no longer good enough for people to get by with. is not found in a localized brain module, but is rather an emer-
Jaynes recognized that this theory is surprising; he even gent property of the system as a whole. It doesnt arise in com-
labeled it preposterous. But his book is so strongly argued puters because their complexity is still actually orders of mag-
that many have been persuaded by it, so its worth examining. nitude below ours. Jaynes is nevertheless arguing that our level
of complex mental functioning could exist without the emer-
gent property of self; an argument thats contradicted by our
own example. You might say a single example is weak evi-
dence. However, its actually seven billion examples. Complex-
ity of mental functioning obviously varies greatly among
humans; many dont read philosophy magazines, but even
those people have some sense of self virtually every single
one, and some of them as dumb as boards. This is powerful
evidence that functioning complexity above a certain level
must induce consciousness, and rebuts Jayness thesis that ear-
lier people could have had the former without the latter.
Ancient Voices
To justify his theory, Jaynes devotes much attention to The
Iliad (c.769-710 BC), composed during the supposed transition
time. In this epic poem about the Trojan War, he says, charac-
ters are never portrayed with inner lives or deciding anything,
but instead always manipulated by gods. The war, Jaynes
declares, was directed by hallucinations. And the soldiers who
were so directed were not at all like us. They were noble
Expression of self-consciousness through art?
automatons who knew not what they did.
Whenever the ancients talk about gods speaking, as in The
A Sense Of Self Iliad, Jaynes takes this to mean the hearers actually hallucinated
Jaynes starts by discussing what consciousness is and delim- voices. He uses the word hallucinated repeatedly, invoking the
iting the concept in various ways, relegating vast realms of our hallucinated voices heard by schizophrenics and other mentally
mental activity to unconscious processes unavailable to intro- ill people as models. These phenomena he sees as a throwback

to, or vestige of, the bicameral mind. Or in other words, people were a product of intelligent design, perhaps we could expect it
before 1000 BC were all schizophrenic, all the time, hearing to be more robust and impervious to the kinds of malfunctions
voices continually. Jaynes similarly explains the bicameral mind at issue, but thats not how evolution works. It develops new
as resembling the hypnotized mind, with our susceptibility to adaptations by modifying what already exists, and is often inel-
hypnosis being another alleged vestige of bicameralism. egant in its solutions as with our eyes, which are actually
A lot of what Jaynes marshals as evidence for a fundamental quite suboptimal compared to what an intelligently designed
change in mental function is really just normal cultural evolu- visual system would be like. So too our consciousness, and
tion. In assessing his interpretations of all things ancient, we hence its vulnerable to glitches like schizophrenia. But that
must remember (as he seemingly does not) that civilization was hardly implies that we evolved from a race of schizophrenics.
an invention, and that Rome wasnt built in a day: it took time While its true that normal minds can hold delusions (as in
to develop the panoply of behaviors, adaptations and practices religious beliefs), mass pervasive hallucination simply is not
were familiar with. But that doesnt mean the early and neces- part of human experience. Likewise, though many believe God
sarily primitive stages signified a fundamentally different con- directs their lives in some way, thats a far cry from being the
sciousness. If civilization were stripped from you and you had to veritable puppets of gods that Jaynesian bicamerals would have
reinvent it from scratch, how fast would you get up to speed? considered themselves. And while some people can be hypno-
Thus The Iliad was written the way it tized, outside of a zombie film its
was because that was the convention of absurd to envisage entire popula-
the time for how tales were told. Liter- tions going about in that manner.
ature had to evolve a lot before arriving Bizarrely, Jaynes speculates that
at Proust. The idea of portraying a schizophrenia itself is an evolution-
characters inner life is actually an ary adaptation, conferring certain
advanced literary technique whose alleged advantages on sufferers. But
absence in the earliest works would be from a survival and reproductive
entirely expected. standpoint, surely its more advanta-
But even on its own terms, Jayness geous to see the real world rather
take on The Iliad seems wrong. He than a hallucinated one?
stresses how Achilles vacillated over Moreover, Jaynes is wrong to talk
killing Agamemnon until the goddess in terms of hallucinations. His
Athena ordered him to. But what was ancients hearing voices were hearing
this vacillation if not the working of their own thoughts, which were real;
his own mind? Or perhaps Achilles and thats very different from halluci-
was vacillating because a god told him nating voices seeming to come from
to vacillate? Jaynes says the vacillating outside (although, obviously, the hal-
is depicted physiologically gut churning etc. rather than lucinations also originate within the persons mind). Possibly
mentally, but I think the Greeks understood such imagery as one could imagine a voices of the gods notion concerning
conveying something ultimately mental. I dont see Achilles in inner voices which arrive suddenly, out of the blue, after a life-
The Iliad portrayed as lacking a self. time of silence (as it is with the hallucinated voices of many
A perhaps better example: Jaynes makes much of how the schizophrenics). But in contrast, people become aware of their
early cuneiform messages of the Babyonians were written as own thoughts in early childhood, as soon as they learn language.
though addressed to the clay tablet itself, asking it to pass the And, from such an early age, when we talk to ourselves, we
message along to the recipient. Only later (post-bicameral) know who is doing the talking and do not ascribe the interior
letters were addressed directly to recipients. But surely this was chatter to the gods. Certainly humans were capable of such
a mere change of cultural convention. Written language had minimal mental sophistication long before 1000 BC. Jaynesian
only just been invented; letter writing too had to be invented, bicameralism would have had to start with a childs earliest
and the concept evolved. The early concept was perfectly logi- thinking, which would bespeak a rather severe form of mental
cal, and understandable to us. My mother treats phone mes- disorder for which there is no present-day parallel.
sages as equivalent to letters and thus signs off, Love, Mom. Even if Jaynes were right about all the classical hallucinating
Thats not common practice, but its understandable, and it he postulates, he fails to explain why that would have been
doesnt show she lacks a self! inconsistent with these people also having consciousness as we
know it. While he does put much weight on deficits in the sense
Normal States of self that schizophrenics often report, they dont lack that
As to schizophrenia and other delusional states, normal sense entirely; even auditory hallucinators are self-conscious and
human consciousness is a phenomenon of such subtle com- introspective to a considerable degree. Jayness hypothesis, how-
plexity that its a wonder we can sustain it so stably through ever, has hallucination substituting for a sense of self.
life, and its easy to envision it being disrupted or going on the Notice that Jayness bicameral model lacks a crucial inter-
fritz. Its akin to a computer program getting corrupted; and connection between the god voices, supposedly directing
that possibility doesnt tell us that the program evolved from a action, and the muscles carrying the action out. That is,
state of primordial corruptedness. If human consciousness thered have to be an intermediary between hearing the gods

voice and the brain transmitting the command heard to the areas. As for how the Chinese, Africans, and many other peo-
muscles: the human being deciding to obey the voice. In other ples became conscious, Jaynes has no answer. Certainly his
words, whats really the difference between a gods voice arguments invoking social upheavals 3000 years ago would not
instantiating action through the nervous system via a decision necessarily be applicable to regions with very different histo-
to obey it, and a thought doing essentially the same thing? ries. Even his discussion of historical upheavals in his own
Either way, theres a decision; and who is the decider? It still has to region of concern is cursory. He does cite some particulars,
be a self, even if a self thats heeding gods voices. Jaynes thus like the volcanic explosion of Thera (Santorini) around 1600
fails to banish the self after all: in his model, youd still have BC. Yes, that must have been devastating; likewise wars and
had a self that obeys the voice of the god, only you didnt know invasions; but life in ancient times was pervasively tumultuous,
you had one. Thats even more implausible than the idea of not difficult, and much more violent than we are accustomed to.
having a sense of self at all. I think people would have been Jaynes fails to make a case that there was something so
smart enough to figure this out pretty fast. uniquely unsettling about the times around 1000 BC that it
To say that you have a theory of mind often refers to your wrenched human minds into a whole new functionality.
inferring that because Joe behaves somewhat like you, he must Jaynes further asserts that introspective consciousness is
be experiencing something like your sense of self. But Jaynes something we learned at that juncture; thus it was not even bio-
holds that this actually has it backwards as regards the origin of logically evolved. Hes probably forced into this position
consciousness: when people first began to be conscious, youd because its implausible that biological evolution could have hap-
look at Joe and infer that if hes got it, then you must have it pened so fast, even with a punctuated equilibrium scenario.
too. You didnt know you had a self till you saw it in others. But it makes far more sense to see our consciousness as a bio-
But whos in there to make such a deduction, if not your self? logical adaptation occurring far earlier and over a much longer
period of time. Intelligence and consciousness are useful adap-
Without The Gods tations, evolved in many creatures to some degree at least, and
Jaynes seems to say that bicameral minds, with their halluci- Homo sapiens is simply the most extreme example of these
nations of god-talk, actually emerged at the beginnings of civi- adaptations. A sense of self helps too, because it makes the
lization around 10,000 years ago, as a form of social control animal care what happens to it, and act accordingly. So it
when communities became larger than tribal bands, with the seems likely that we evolved our especially big brains to facili-
god-voices evolving from the actual voices of kings, and then of tate the complex social cooperation that was so important for
dead kings, who became gods. This begs the question of what survival for our early forebears. In other words, we obtained
sort of mental life preceded bicameralism, and on this Jaynes is our minds in order to cope with a terribly hostile, danger-
remarkably silent. If people had selves before bicameralism, is it filled, stressful environment long, long before 1000 BC. Its
reasonable to suppose theyd give up those selves and their ludicrous to think that life was a breeze till then.
understanding that their inner voices were their own? And if so, Perhaps most insufferable of all is Jayness suggestion that a
then obviously Jaynes cant claim a later origin for introspective human sense of morality could not have predated the first mil-
consciousness. One is left to infer that before the beginning of lennium BC, with the true beginning of personal responsibil-
civilization, people were not even bicameral, with consciousness ity. Hes off by a factor of hundreds. There is ample evidence
even more impoverished than that. Yet archaeological evidence that instincts for morality, justice, and even altruism are deeply
shows that pre-civilization and even pre-agricultural humans led wired into us by evolution, as an adaptive response to the envi-
quite sophisticated lives, with plenty of technology, art, and arti- ronment faced by our earliest ancestors, where such traits
sanship. Language also goes back tens of thousands of years, and would have been advantageous for group survival. Indeed,
its hard to imagine that the people who developed and used it rudimentary moral sense is found even in non-human animals.
didnt know when they were talking to themselves. Weve also Anyone who studies deeply the earliest civilizations must
found jewelry 80,000 years old, and its hard to understand such come to realize that far more unites us with them than differ-
adornment if wearers had no sense of self. entiates us. These ancestors of ours, only a few hundred gener-
The absurdity becomes further evident when Jaynes discusses ations past, who first figured out how to plant and harvest
the breakdown of the bicameral mind when the voices of gods crops, domesticate animals, build villages and then cities,
went away. He describes people as then searching about for create writing and literature and music and art, invent govern-
alternative sources of godly instruction divination, oracles, ment and law, launch great architecture, exploration, trade and
casting lots, horoscopes, etc. In fact, he thinks this search for our conquest, and lay the foundations of science and mathematics,
lost god voices remains a key to the human psyche to the pre- could not possibly have done all this with minds that func-
sent day. But who were these people undergoing the breakdown tioned in the primitive manner Jaynes postulates. His theory
of the divine link inside their own heads? Robots denied instruc- belittles those people and their stupendous achievements. All
tions dont agonize about what to do. Conversely, if people did our subsequent accomplishments build upon theirs; they
agonise, they couldnt have been without self-consciousness. themselves did not have the benefit of following trailblazers
Wondering what to do is something a self does. they had to build from scratch. Its inconceivable that they
Apart from a throw-away speculation that the Spaniards so knew not what they did. One might even say preposterous.
easily conquered the Incas because the latter were still non- FRANK S. ROBINSON 2013
conscious bicamerals, Jaynes is also conspicuously silent about Frank S. Robinson is the author of five books, including The Case
human communities outside the Near East and Mediterranean for Rational Optimism. He blogs at rationaloptimist.wordpress.com.

Focusing On The Brain,
Ignoring the Body
Alessandro Colarossi says that Artificial Intelligence is in danger of a dead end.
F
rench phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908- body, specifically the eye, that is geared toward the colour. In the
1961) claimed that to understand eyes case, specific colour-sensitive cells are stimulated in the
human awareness we need to focus retina: an interaction. With further regard to our sense experience
on the lived body and its relationship and its relationship to the world, Merleau-Ponty writes that the
to the world. In brief, the idea is that objective world being given, it is assumed that it passes on to the
rather than encountering the world sense-organs messages which must be registered, then deci-
in the form of raw sensations, phered in such a way as to reproduce in us the original text
human beings see objects as repre- (PoP, p.7). According to Merleau-Ponty, then, there is a consis-
sentations perceived specifically tant connection between the original stimulus of the external
though our bodies as they interact world and our elementary perceptual experience of it.
with the world. In this article I will What about our perception of others? Merleau-Ponty writes,
explore Merleau-Pontys concept of other consciousness can be deduced only if the emotional
the lived body specifically with the aim expressions of others are compared and identified with, and pre-
of understanding what it suggests for cise correlations recognized between my physical behaviour and
artificial intelligence a discipline whose my psychic events (PoP, p.410). So we recognise the minds of
primary focus is on developing com- Maurice Merleau-Ponty other people by recognising our own behaviour in them. In fact,
puter systems capable of performing tasks that would otherwise for Merleau-Ponty, the interaction with the Other allows for
require the mental facility of a human being. According to the development of the self. Elaborating on the connection, he
Merleau-Pontys understanding of the lived body and the writes that what we have learned in individual perception [is]
mechanisms of perception, artificial intelligence is doomed to not to conceive our perspective views as independent of each
failure for two fundamental reasons. First, a simulation cannot other; we know that they slip into each other (ibid).
have the same type of meaningful interaction with the world
that an embodied conscious being can have, and the absence of Everybody Needs Some Body
such interactions amounts to a fundamental absence of intelli- Merleau-Pontys perspective is shared and reinforced by
gence. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a reductionist cognitive scientists such as Sandra and
account of the mind such as is common in artificial intelligence Matthew Blakeslee, who write
research simply does not paint an accurate picture of what is that meaning is rooted in
perceived, experienced and felt by a mind encapsulated within a agency (the ability to
lived body. Thus, artificial intelligence cannot be developed by act and choose), and
just reverse engineering the brain, nor could it operate in a dis- agency depends on
embodied environment, as we shall see. embodiment. In
fact, this is a hard-
Merleau-Pontys Lived Body won lesson that
The lived body is a relationship between the body and the the artificial
external world by which we are capable of being both intelli- intelligence
gent and reflective. Merleau-Ponty states that the lived body is community
aware of a world that contains data to be interpreted, such as has finally
immediate patterns and direct meanings. One aspect of the begun to
lived body that Merleau-Ponty analyses is the role of sense grasp after
experience, beginning with the truism that our thought is a decades of
product of the bodys interaction with the world it inhabits. frustration:
CIRCUIT-BOARD WOMAN ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/TONISPAN
More specifically, he states that the subject of perception pre- Nothing truly
sents itself with the world ready made, as the setting of every intelligent is going
possible event, and treats perception as one of these events to develop in a
(Phenomenology of Perception, 1962, p.240). bodiless mainframe.
Merleau-Ponty begins his exploration of the concept of the In real life there is no
lived body by reminding us that perception is the key compo- such thing as disem-
nent of our life in the world; but its how we perceive that is bodied consciousness
important. For him, the external world is encountered, inter- (The Body Has A
preted and perceived by the body, through various forms of Mind Of Its
immersive awareness through action. For instance, colour quality Own, 2008,
is revealed to experience by a specific type of behaviour by the p.12).

Without embodied access to the environment, the cat cannot
develop its nervous system with regard to proper responses to
external stimuli. If correct, this suggests that the prospects for
artificial intelligence in a strong sense (i.e. the creation of a com-
puter simulation or algorithm so sophisticated that it would be
conscious) are severely limited for two principle reasons.
The first reason is that artificial intelligence, if we mean the
intelligence of an advanced computer simulation, does not
possess the faculties needed for constructive interaction. That
is, although a human being may interact with such a computer,
it is not the case that the human is thereby helping the simula-
tion progress intellectually. The popular video game The Sims
illustrates what I mean by this. The player of the game con-
structs a small world that simulated people inhabit, who par-
take of a variety of different interactions with each other;
appear to sleep, to eat, and to even have goals and go to work.
Nevertheless, it would be perverse to argue that such a simula-
tion could count as an actual instantiation of a world. In play-
ing the game, it becomes quickly apparent that the little Sims
are just going through the motions, and all appearance of
their intentionality and goal-directed behaviour is just appear-
ance. More specifically, there is no interaction within the game
other than having the characters execute the steps with which
they have been programmed. The program does not learn
from any interactions with the world. Like the cat held captive,
there is no chance for the characters to learn. Therefore,
behind the surface of the simulation, there is nothing no
inner life, no thoughts, and no consciousness.
The second reason why artificial intelligence will never
achieve consciousness is that it cannot replicate perception;
PLEASE VISIT SIMONANDFINN.COM
And it does not and will not have the capacity for replicating
this without a body that encompasses inner subjective experi-
ence. Visual experience, for example, is more than just the
mechanistic process of recording photon impacts. Human
beings know what its like to see a color like red in a context
something that simulated-intelligence algorithms cannot achieve.
SIMON + FINN CARTOON MELISSA FELDER 2013
Philosophers such as Patricia Churchland and Daniel C.

Dennett raise objections to this line of thinking, arguing that if
an intelligence has knowledge of all the physical facts, then it
would thereby know what the color red is like, for example. In
other words, there is nothing to conscious awareness over and
above knowledge of facts and their representation in some kind
of symbol-manipulating system. In responding to this view,
phenomenologist Arthur Melnick says that Churchlands and
Dennetts perspective depends on there being a phenomeno-
logical [experiential] characterization that a physical process can
They present the following thought experiment to illustrate get at or align itself with (Phenomenology and the Physical Reality
the importance of Merleau-Pontys lived body: of Consciousness, 2011, p.108), further stating that if what red is
like is phenomenologically ineffable (has no intrinsic phenome-
If you were to carry around a young mammal such as a kitten during its nological characterization other than [our] having the experi-
critical early months of brain development, allowing it to see everything in ence and its being like that), then no matter how complete [a
its environment but never permitting it to move around on its own, the persons] knowledge of physics might be, [they] cannot tell at all
unlucky creature would turn out to be effectively blind for life. While it what red is like (ibid). In other words, hes claiming that one
would still be able to perceive levels of light, color, and shadow the most will never know about the experiential nature of something like
basic, hardwired abilities of the visual system its depth perception and red without actually experiencing it: a knowledge of, say, the
object recognition would be abysmal. Its eyes and optic nerves would be facts about wavelengths, is not enough, because you cant
perfectly normal and intact, yet its higher visual system would be next to reduce what its like to have the experience to any sort of
useless. (pp.12-13) description of facts. Therefore the phenomenological qualities

of embodied consciousness cannot be replicated in an artificial
form just by programming a computer with facts.
Summary
The aim of this article is not to discredit the ever-growing
field of computer science and artificial intelligence. On the
contrary, researchers have made impressive breakthroughs,
such as writing programs that can defeat grandmasters at chess,
or developing search algorithms that allow for lighting-fast data
retrieval, and other tasks useful to humanity. What I did hope
to indicate, however, is that if Merleau-Ponty is right that
embodiment is a key feature of developing meaningful experi-
CHRISMADDEN.CO.UK
ence, then the discipline of artificial intelligence can never hope
to replicate consciousness solely through the elaboration of
algorithms. We could say that since our intelligence, even our
very experience, is not just a product of our brain, but is also a
result of the action of our bodies in a physical world. Artificial
CHRIS MADDEN 2013

intelligence is doomed to fail as an attempt to mimic human
intelligence insofar as it lacks elements that correspond to the
lived body. The first and perhaps the most significant reason
that artificial intelligence is doomed to fail was illustrated as the
lack of human-like interaction. Algorithms embedded in com-
puter hardware can
be so complex as to That Which I Am
create the appear-
ance of intelligent That which I am I know
behaviour (as seen That which I seem you know
in the video game Therefore he who knows me
example) without Walks not with me but is me.
the concomitant
experiential data of That which you see is what I seem
true consciousness That what you cant see, that I am
which allows That which I say is what I seem
human mental That which I dont say, that I am.
interaction to
develop. This sug- Do you search for the mystery of life?
gests that actual It can be seen, but not with the eye
intelligence and It can be heard, but not with the ear
simulated intelli- The ego plays games to lead you afar
gence belong to Lose it and all will come clear.
fundamentally dif-
ferent categories. Simulated intelligence simply follows its pro- Seek reality not with the eye
gramming, and unlike actual intelligence, does not have an That which is real cannot be seen
inner voice. So it cannot reason, and it cannot accept meaning- Forms of the mind lead you astray
ful (ie conscious) feedback from interaction between the world Intuition is the key you must use.
and a body.
There is much more to mimicking human intelligence than Of Truth what can be said?
just trying to copy the physical processes of the brain. At its For he who knows does not speak
best, artificial intelligence could mimic the appearance of If you understand this then you will know
human behaviour so well that a person will not be able to tell A blank piece of paper is all that can be shown.
the difference between a human and a computer. However, it You might not see, but of this I am sure:
will not be able to replicate the phenomenological experiences It's only when you know it, all becomes clear.
of the lived human body, and any attempt to do so will just be
another simulation. IVAN SEARLE 2013
ALESSANDRO COLAROSSI 2013 Ivan Searle lives in Whangarei, New Zealand. Hes married to Anna,
Alessandro Colarossi is a web developer from Toronto. He has a BA in has two sons and three grandchildren, is an electronic technician, and
Philosophy from York University, and an Advanced Diploma in has always been interested in philosophy.
Systems Analysis from Sheridan College, Toronto.

Bertrand Russell
Stalks The Nazis
B
Thomas Akehurst on why Russell blamed German fascism on German philosophy.
ertrand Russell in German nationalist philosophies of the nineteenth century,
(1872-1970) is best most particularly in Hegel. Friedrich Nietzsche was the other
known for his popular target. A bookseller on the Strand in London
activities at the very announced in his window that this was The Euro-Nietzschean
beginning and at the very War, and urged passers-by to Read the Devil, in order to
end of his working life. fight him the better. (Quoted in Nicholas Martin, Fighting a
His philosophical reputa- Philosophy: The Figure of Nietzsche in British Propaganda of
tion was made by his pio- the First World War, The Modern Language Review 98, no.2,
neering insights into logic 2003, p.372.)
in the first decade of the Russell was a witness to the peculiar spectacle of the British
twentieth century, and he public turning on German philosophy during World War I,
cut his political teeth but did not make any moves to join the general condemnation.
through his pacifist oppo- All of this changed in the early 1930s, when in an article called
sition to World War I an The Ancestry of Fascism in his In Praise of Idleness (1935) he
Bertrand Russell opposition which saw him resurrected the argument that German philosophy lay behind
jailed for spreading German political aggression. Following the lead set by Hob-
rumours harmful to the alliance between Britain and America. house and others in the First World War, Russell argued that
Forty years later, as an old man, he helped found the Cam- while Nazism could be accounted for partially through political
paign for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950s. These facts, and economic factors, at its heart lay a philosophy that
plus his brief flirtation with polyamory, which scandalized con- emerged from trends in nineteenth century thought. Although
servative elements in Britain and America, tend to be what we during the First World War there had been principally two vil-
know about him. What is less well known is that in the 1930s lains, Hegel and Nietzsche, Russell managed to find a whole
and 1940s Russells attention turned to the idea that the origins family tree of Nazisms ancestors: Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
of Nazism were primarily philosophical. I want to argue that Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Johann Gotlieb Fichte,
this account of the origins of Nazism helped to shape the hos- Giuseppe Mazzini, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche,
tility to continental philosophy which ran, and in some quar- Heinrich Von Treitschke, Thomas Carlyle, William James and
ters still runs, through analytic (Anglo-Saxon) philosophy. John Dewey! This rogues gallery of philosophical forebears of
the Nazis is a fairly diverse one, encompassing two Americans
The Philosophical Tide Turns (James and Dewey), a Swiss (Rousseau), an Italian (Mazzini),
The story of Russells philosophical account of the evils of and an Englishman (Carlyle); but by far the largest grouping
German politics starts with the chaotic jingoism of the First are the Germans. Russell was convinced that the concentration
World War. Prior to 1914, German scholarship had been widely of this (allegedly) proto-fascist philosophy in Germany was no
respected in Britain. However, as nationalist rhetoric intensified, mere historical accident, since Germany was always more sus-
and German Shepherd dogs were shot in British streets, German ceptible to Romanticism than any other country, and so more
philosophy too came under increasing fire. In his The Metaphysi- likely to provide a governmental outlet for this kind of anti-
cal Theory of the State published in 1918, L.T. Hobhouse wrote rational philosophy (see p.752 of Russells A History of Western
this about witnessing a Zeppelin raid on London: Philosophy, 1946). So the appearance of the National Socialist
movement in Germany rather than elsewhere was for Russell
Presently three white specks could be seen dimly through the light of the entirely predictable, since to him the Germans had a psycho-
haze overhead, and we watched their course from the field. The raid was logical weakness for this kind of philosophy. The Brits by com-
soon over As I went back to my Hegel my mood was one of self-satire. parison appear relatively immune only Carlyle makes it onto
Was this a time for theorizing or for destroying theories, when the world Russells list of the philosophical precursors of fascism; and he,
was tumbling about our ears? In the bombing of London I had just wit- Russell points out, belongs in the German tradition, being a
nessed the visible and tangible outcome of the false and wicked doctrine, disciple of Fichte.
the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me.
(Quoted in Thomas Baldwin, Interlude: Philosophy and the First World Bad Philosophy
War in The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945, 2003, p.367.) What were all these men guilty of according to Russell?
They all espoused philosophies that promoted proto-fascist
Hobhouse was not alone. Many British philosophers politics. Russell suggested that, for instance, Hegels concep-
thought that they saw the root causes of the First World War tion of freedom means the right to obey the police and it

means nothing else at all (ibid) and so is perfectly attuned to whereas the cult of the great man always has as its minor
totalitarian politics. Meanwhile, Hegels doctrine of the state, premise the assertion I am a great man (History, p.757). Rus-
if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external sells claim here is that to believe, as Nietzsche did, that only a
aggression that can possibly be imagined (History, pp.768-9). small number of humans are of any value must imply that you
Furthermore, Nietzsches aristocratic ethics led to a moral case believe yourself to be one of those humans. But, Russell
for the eugenic eradication of the bungled and botched claims, this is a failed argument, because the assumption
non-noble people, to whom no value therefore attaches. Rus- involved, that I am a great man, may well be wrong, and in
sell also saw Nietzsche contributing to the store of ideas his any case, has not been arrived at in an impartial way.
loathing for democracy and his gleeful prophecy of future It is a striking feature of Russells attempts to show that
wars (History, p.791). But Russell was not content to just con- these philosophical ancestors of fascism cant make good argu-
demn the apparent politics of his rogues gallery; he wanted to ments that in the course of doing so he makes so many poor
make clear that this bad politics emerges from bad philosophy. arguments himself. This argument against Nietzsche is a clear
This claim is well summed-up in A History of Western Philosophy: example: there is absolutely no reason why someone who
A man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to believes that only a few people are of value must believe that
reach conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing they themselves are amongst those people. Many who believe
from logic in order to be free to advocate crimes (p.769). This in the aristocratic ethics may include themselves among the
comment is aimed at Hegel, but it is precisely what Russell elect; but there is no reason why this must follow. In fact, the
accuses many of the supposed ancestors of Nazism of doing of very notion of hero worship implies a veneration for someone
leaving behind good argument in order to promote barbarity. else for their having heroic qualities we do not possess.
This view sits slightly uncomfortably with a rival interpreta- Matters become more surreal yet in A History of Western Phi-
tion Russell offers of the argumentative failings of the proto- losophy, as, reaching around for a more telling argument against
Nazis. Sometimes he seems to imply that they do not deliber- Nietzsches ethics, Russell has the Buddha condemn Nietzsche
ately make bad arguments, but rather that they are so philo- for being a bad man. The anachronistic dialogue between
sophically inept that they cannot help but make bad argu- Nietzsche and the Buddha is rounded off by Nietzsche
ments. So Russell also says of Hegel, for example, that in order claiming that the Buddhas world of peace would cause us all
to arrive at his philosophy you would require a lack of interest to die of boredom. You might, the Buddha replies, because
you love pain, and your love of life is a sham. But those of us
who really love life would be happy as no-one can be happy in
the world as it is. (History, p.800.) As we can see, this dialogue
ends with the Buddha rather implausibly insulting Nietzsches
character. The Buddhas line of argument against Nietzsche
here is remarkably similar to Russells own: elsewhere Russell
accuses Nietzsche of being insane, megalomaniac, and possibly
having an unnatural relationship with his sister.
Condemned Without Evidence

There are several peculiarities in Russells characterisation
of the supposed ancestors of fascism. We have seen some of his
rather desperate attempts to prove that these ancestors are
philosophically incompetent attempts which often leave the
reader more concerned about Russells argumentative stan-
dards than those of his opponent. But the story gets stranger.
In his writings on this subject, Russell offers no evidence what-
soever that there is any historical relationship between the
ideas of his lengthy canon of proto-fascist philosophers, and
those of any actual fascists. For example, no evidence is offered
that Hitler read Hegel. Nor is there any analysis offered of the
Nazi state that would demonstrate that it at all corresponded
in facts, and considerable ignorance (p.762). He also claims to Hegels ideas. What kinds of ancestors of fascism are these
that almost all Hegels doctrines are false (p.757). thinkers, then, if there is no apparent relationship between
Whether the diagnosis is incompetence or deception, the them and the fascists? Yet this lack of evidence doesnt prevent
force of Russells critique of these thinkers is that their philo- Russell from freely asserting very definite claims, such as,
sophical contributions are of a painfully low quality. Some- Hitlers ideals come mainly from Nietzsche (Religion and Sci-
times Russell is content simply to assert this; at other times he ence, 1935, p.210) and The Nazis upheld German idealism,
seeks to provide arguments demonstrating the absurdity of though the degree of allegiance given to Kant, Fichte or Hegel
their views. This is an early attempt to dismiss Nietzsches respectively was not clearly laid down (from Unpopular Essays,
ethics: There is [in Nietzsches argument] a natural connec- 1950, p.10). Worse, throughout his investigations into the
tion with irrationality since reason demands impartiality, ancestry of fascism, Russell continued to use the strongest pos-

Imperfect Philosophers
Why were such strong yet unsupported criticisms of fellow
philosophers allowed to circulate as unquestioned fact within
British analytic philosophy? Several factors seem to have been
in play. There was the heightened nationalism caused by the
war a nationalism to which the philosophers turned out to be
PHILOSOPHY CLASSES OF THE HIGHEST

no more immune than non-philosophical citizens. There was
QUALITY FOR THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE IN

the pervasive idea of the guilt of German philosophy, which
THE LONDON AREA!

was a legacy of World War I. There was also the belief,
common amongst Russell and his analytic colleagues, that
The London School of Philosophy

these continental philosophers were philosophically hopeless.
Hegel, the wellspring of much of nineteenth-century philoso-
2013-14 programme of courses

phy, had, they believed, been decisively refuted by Russells
close colleague G.E. Moore in the first decade of the century.
is now out
So none of Russells analytic colleagues had anything invested
in looking again at these condemned philosophers. This rich
combination of philosophical and cultural factors were suffi-
Including our new module

cient for them to simply accept that the German philosophical
Introduction to Philosophy
tradition was fascist. Thus Russells at-best eccentric condem-
nation of German philosophy was perpetuated both by many
can be taken as part of a

of his influential followers and through his best-selling A His-
certificate/diploma/BA
tory of Western Philosophy. Shortly after the war, Russells intel-
lectual disciples gained a powerful grip on the discipline of
philosophy in Britain. So began an active process of forget-
Please visit our website:

ting and exclusion as David West writes in The Contribution
londonschoolofphilosophy.org
of Continental Philosophy in A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy (ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit,
1995, p.39). This process saw thinkers in what Russell identi-
fied as the proto-Nazi tradition excluded from philosophical
consideration in Anglo-American universities. And although
thinkers like Nietzsche and Hegel have subsequently made
something of a comeback, the continued hostility among some
sible terms of condemnation: the tenor of his work on Nazism analytic philosophers to so-called continental philosophy is in
is that philosophers like Nietzsche and Hegel were bad people part the legacy of Russells tarring of the originators of this tra-
who wanted bad things to happen, and would be generally dition with the brush of totalitarianism.
pretty pleased with the Nazis performance. Rarely does he This lost episode in the recent history of analytic philoso-
concede the possibility that if the Nazis were influenced by phy raises again the old question of the value of philosophical
these thinkers, it was the result of misreading or distortion. He education. Russell made his own views on this very clear at the
is content to allow the full blame fall on the shoulders of the end of A History of Western Philosophy:
philosophers.
So we have a blanket condemnation of a host of nineteenth The habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical
century philosophers as originators of Nazism, based on what method can be extended to the whole sphere of human activity, producing,
appears to be no evidence. Given such a slap-dash approach to wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism with an increasing capacity of
the history of political thought, one would be justified in think- sympathy and mutual understanding. In abandoning a part of its dogmatic
ing that Russells colleagues would offer some sharp words of pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and inspire a way of life.
rebuke, or at the very least ignore his accusations. Instead, his (A History of Western Philosophy, p.864.)
accusations against his major targets were straightforwardly
accepted by people who would go on to shape analytic philoso- Yet Russell and his followers readiness to condemn their
phy for the rest of the twentieth century. Many of the most fellow philosophers for proto-fascism seems to rather under-
notable mid-twentieth-century British philosophers A.J. Ayer, mine his claims for the salutary power of his own philosophical
Isaiah Berlin and Gilbert Ryle, for example lined up to agree tradition. He and his highly trained, and in some cases bril-
that nineteenth century German philosophy was corrupt, totali- liant, colleagues appear to have been no more immune to the
tarian in its predilections, and in some way responsible for nationalist atmosphere of the day than their fellow citizens.
Nazism. Isaiah Berlin in his review in Mind even called Russells DR THOMAS AKEHURST 2013
treatment of Nietzsche in A History of Western Philosophy with Thomas Akehurst teaches political philosophy for the Open University
insulting Buddha and all a distinguished essay (Mind 56, no. and the University of Sussex. His book The Cultural Politics of
222, 1947, p.165). But they had no more evidence of the guilt Analytic Philosophy: Britishness and the Spectre of Europe
of these philosophers than did Russell. (2010) is available from Continuum.

Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
T
he diversity of beliefs and ways of life is a striking fact Self-Defeat?
about our species. What Mormons find right and rea- The argument for moral relativism from moral diversity is
sonable may be abhorrent to Marxists or Maoris. The not especially convincing as it stands. If the mere fact that
Aztecs practiced human sacrifice for reasons we find totally people or groups disagree over some idea were enough to show
unconvincing, and no doubt future people may be similarly that that idea has no objective truth value, there would be no
objective truth about the age of the universe or the causes of
Aztecs
autism. Hoping to ward off that counter-argument, relativists
performing a
usually claim that these other disagreements are unlike moral
human sacrifice
disagreements in some relevant way. For instance, writing in
this magazine (in Issue 82), Jesse Prinz claimed that scientific
disagreements can be settled by better observations or measure-
ments, and that when presented with the same body of evidence
or reasons, scientists come to agree, but the same cannot be said
of thinkers operating with different moral codes.
Even if we grant this distinction, however, it is still doubtful
that moral disagreement is a good reason for accepting moral
relativism. After all, there is deep and apparently irresolvable dis-
agreements in philosophy as well as morality. For instance, some
philosophers think mental states such as pain or desire are just
physical states; others deny this, and yet both camps are familiar
with the evidence and reasons taken to support the opposing
point of view. Should we say, then, that there is no objective
truth about how mental states are related to the physical world?
That seems deeply implausible. For that matter, many philoso-
phers deny the moral relativists claim that moral truth is relative
to what a given society believes. Does it follow that there is only
relative truth and no objective truth about moral relativism itself
that moral relativism is true relative to the outlook of Jesse Prinz,
perplexed or repulsed by some of our practices. For such rea- say, and anti-relativism no less true relative to mine?
sons, some conclude that there is no objective truth about I suspect that few moral relativists would be willing to
morality. They say moral disagreement is best explained by the accept this higher kind of relativism. They think that even
idea that there are many different and incompatible relative though many benighted philosophers disagree with them,
moral truths, which are in some way determined by the beliefs moral truth just is relative to a given society that it is an
of a given society; and that this is the only kind of moral truth objective fact about reality that there are no objective moral
there is. So for the Aztecs it was true that human sacrifice is facts but merely relative ones. But this would be a distressingly
morally permissible, although it is false for us. Generally then, unstable position, if relativists believe their relativism on the
a moral statement M is relatively true provided that it is basis of an argument that depends on the principle that if there
believed by the members of a society S. (The same basic idea is a certain kind of disagreement over some topic T, there is no
may be developed somewhat differently. Some relativists may objective truth about T. If that principle is true, the fact that
say, for example, that M is relatively true provided it is implied there is such disagreement about their relativist conclusion
by the standards of S, regardless of whether members of S implies that that conclusion is itself not objectively true, but
actually believe it. I will ignore these details because they make only relatively so. So if this relativists argument is good, then
no difference to the point Im going to make.) by his own standards he should not believe its conclusion is
In this article I will discuss this argument from moral dis- objectively true; or if he is entitled to believe its conclusion, it
agreement and present what I think is the most serious prob- follows that the argument is not good.
lem for moral relativism: that we cannot understand what it Need it be self-defeating to hold that moral truth is relative,
could mean for moral truths to be relative. And since we have and that that truth about moral truth is itself merely relatively
no idea what it could mean, moral relativism cannot be a good true too? Happily, we do not need to consider this question with
explanation of the fact of deep and enduring moral disagree- much care, since I think the core problem with moral relativism
ment nor can moral relativism be supported by any other is not that it is false, implausible or self-defeating, but simply
kind of reasoning. So if moral disagreement is evidence against that it is unintelligible. I mean by this that there is no intelligible
the objectivity of moral truth, it can only be evidence for moral concept of truth that can be used to frame the thesis that moral
nihilism: the idea that there are no moral truths. truth is relative to the standards or beliefs of a given society.

Truth & Belief not moral disagreement!)
Let me try to clarify this objection by introducing some tru- So there is the familiar kind of truth dependent on how
isms about truth. First, a statement is true only if it represents reality is apart from peoples beliefs or perceptions, and a
things as they really are. The statement that Im wearing blue socks bogus kind that is nothing more than belief. The relativists
is true only if I really am wearing socks, and they really are blue. theory of moral truth explicitly denies that moral statements
The same general principle surely holds for moral statements. are ever true (or false) in the familiar sense; but if it is inter-
Suppose I say that suicide is immoral, yet that in objective reality preted in the second way, relativism collapses into absurdity or
there is no such thing as moral wrongness. That is, suppose that triviality. The relativist needs a third kind of truth, midway
nothing that anyone does really is morally wrong, although between the familiar and the bogus: not just an appearance of
some actions seem wrong truth, but not a truth that depends on objective reality. But there
to us. Then my assertion of is no such thing. At least, I am unable to imagine what this
immorality is simply false, special kind of truth would be, and relativists are strangely
for it attributes to certain silent on this core issue.
acts a property that nothing
has. It is like an assertion No Third Way
that my socks were made Remember that moral relativism has two ingredients: there
by Santas niece. Nothing is the denial of any objective moral truth, and the assertion of
has the property of being some other kind of moral truth. Suppose that moral disagree-
made by Santas neice, and ment does raise doubts about the objective truth of any moral
any statement that repre- code. Does it follow that moral codes are true in some other
sents my socks as having it sense? No, for perhaps it means that no moral statements are
is therefore false. true in any sense. Perhaps people disagree here because they
Those attracted to moral have been acculturated in different moral cultures, but all the
relativism might object moral beliefs or standards of all cultures are simply false. So
that I am simply presup- the argument from disagreement might be an argument for
Herodotus famously noted the posing an objectivist con- moral nihilism rather than for moral relativism.
difference in burial rites across
cept of truth: a concept How do relativists hope to establish their positive thesis,
Greek and Persian cultures
that relates what is said or that moral statements are sometimes true without being objec-
thought about the world to tively true? I am not aware of any compelling arguments for
the way that the world really is, independent of these thoughts. that idea. On the contrary, relativists tend instead to argue in
What they have in mind instead is a different concept of truth great detail for the negative thesis, that morality is not objec-
one that does not involve any such relation between subjec- tively true, as if that alone were sufficient for their relativistic
tive points of view or representations and something indepen- conclusion. Thus Prinz says that moral judgments are based
dent of those points of view. on emotions, that reason cannot tell us which values to
I admit that I am presupposing an objectivist conception of adopt, and that even if there is such a thing as human nature,
truth, but whats the alternative? Do we have any concept of that would be of no use, since the mere fact that we have a cer-
truth that does not involve that kind of relation? To be sure, tain nature leaves it an open question whether what is natural
people sometimes say that a statement is true for one person is morally good. Let us grant all of this, and grant for the sake
but not another meaning that the statement seems true to the of argument that it does raise a real doubt about the objective
first person but does not seem true to the second. But just as truth of moral beliefs. In the absence of any account of the
seeming gold is not a kind of gold, seeming truth is not a kind special kind of truth that is supposed to lie somewhere
of truth. What is meant by this way of speaking (if anything), is between mere belief and accurate representation of objective
simply belief. To say that it is true for some children that Santa reality, why then should we think of moral judgments as truths
Claus lives in the North Pole, if that means merely that to of any kind? Why not simply say that all moral codes are false?
some children it seems true that he does, is really just a way of It would seem reasonable for a philosopher who thinks of
saying that they believe it. But believing doesnt make it so. moral reasoning in this way to view moral beliefs in the same
Similarly, if moral relativism is just the claim that what seems way that atheists view religious ones as false.
true of morality to some people (what they believe about I suspect the reason few philosophers have been willing to
morality) seems false to others, this is true but philosophically draw this nihilistic conclusion is simply that, like most people,
trivial, and consistent with objectivism about moral truth. It is they have some strongly-held moral beliefs of their own. They
also worth noting that, interpreted in this trivial way, moral think that it is morally wrong to rape children, for example,
relativism could not be supported by the argument from dis- and so they do not want to say that that belief is false. For how
agreement. The gist of that argument was that moral relativism could they continue to believe it, while also believing that what
is a good explanation of the moral disagreements we observe. they believe is not true? This unhappy compromise is not ten-
Yet the claim that some moral statements seem true to some able. If there is no objective moral truth, there cant be some
people and false to others merely restates the fact of moral dis- other kind of moral truth.
agreement that is supposedly explained by relativism, it cannot JULIEN BEILLARD 2013
explain that fact. (Perhaps some things are self-explanatory, but Julien Beillard teaches philosophy at Ryerson University, Ontario.

One Law to Rule Them All
Tim Wilkinson tries to chart our quest for consistency without contradicting himself.
C
onsistency doesnt guarantee truth, but as ancient Indian of this paradox, favoured by Ren Descartes, is to say that
and Greek philosophers realised, it helps. Socrates, both Gods omnipotence gives Him such power that He can make a
in person and in his incarnation as the main character in stone too heavy for Him to lift, and He can also lift it.
many of Platos dialogues, was famous for his trademark method If you think Descartes answer seems a bit suspect, youre in
of posing questions to his interlocutors in order to tease out good company: over the years the majority of theologians and
contradictions in their thinking; but it was in one of Platos stu- philosophers have preferred the solution provided by St
dents Aristotle that consistency found its champion. Thomas Aquinas, who held that omnipotence cannot confer the
power to do logically incoherent things, such as draw square
Aristotle & Barbara circles, or make rocks too heavy for omnipotent beings to lift.
Aristotle (384-322 BC) identified a number of rules of rea-
soning he termed syllogisms, which were later given charming
names by medieval philosophers. It would take too long to
describe them all, but heres an example called Barbara:
Premise 1: All mammals are vertebrates.

Premise 2: All cats are mammals.
Conclusion: Therefore all cats are vertebrates.
Barbara has nothing to do with the taxonomic classification

of living things. If we replace the first premise with all mam- Could an
mals are aeroplanes the conclusion would be that all cats are omnipotent
aeroplanes. This is not true, but only because the new premise God create
is false; theres nothing wrong with the logic of the argument. a stone
too heavy
Consistency for Him to lift?
Underpinning Aristotles logic was the Principle (sometimes
Law) of Non-Contradiction two contradictory statements In the philosophy of science, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
cannot simultaneously be true and the similar, but rather (1646-1716) applied PNC to the laws of physics, and concluded
more contentious, Law of the Excluded Middle two contradic- that even God couldnt create a world where nature contradicts
tory statements cannot simultaneously be false. In Aristotles itself. Today, experiments in quantum mechanics routinely pro-
own words: It is impossible for the same property to belong duce completely different outcomes depending only on how
and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in measurements are made; but it is telling that no matter how
the same respect (Metaphysics, IV). To Aristotle, the principle baffling such observations become, there is no contradiction. So
of non-contradiction (PNC) was not only self-evident, it was even quantum mechanics is only paradoxical in the sense of
the foundation of all other self-evident truths, since without it being counterintuitive. Our common sense may be offended,
we wouldnt be able to demarcate one idea from another, or in but Leibnizs self-consistent universe survives intact.
fact positively assert anything about anything making ratio- For a full-blown contradiction in physics, consider time-
nal discourse impossible. travel. Relativistic time dilation, which facilitates travel to the
My favourite justification of PNCs special status in logic future by slowing down time for the traveller, is well established
comes from the philosopher and polymath Avicenna (c. 980- by experiment, and introduces no danger of inconsistency. But
1037), who had this to say about PNC sceptics in his own travel to the past, or to the present from the future, opens the
Metaphysics: As for the obstinate, he must be plunged into door to a number of nasty paradoxes a classic example being
fire, since fire and non-fire are identical. Let him be beaten, that if you kill your past self at a time before you stepped into
since suffering and not suffering are the same. Let him be the time machine, you will not be alive to travel back in time
deprived of food and drink, since eating and drinking are iden- and pull the trigger. Having dodged the bullet, you do survive
tical to abstaining. to travel back in time and kill yourself and so on.
Much ink has been expended analysing such situations, and
Non-Contradiction in Practice since backward time-travel doesnt necessarily result in contradic-
The famous Paradox of the Stone asks whether God could tions, there may be some possible worlds in which it is achiev-
create a stone so heavy that He couldnt lift it. If God is all- able. Nevertheless, taking Leibniz and Aristotle as our guides,
powerful, then He should be able to do anything; but either backward time-travel is inconsistent with self-aware creatures
He cannot create such a stone, or else having created it, He capable of freely interacting with their surroundings. If you
cannot lift it; either way we seem to have discovered some- believe the universe contains the latter, you cannot also believe
thing He cannot do, so He is not all-powerful. One resolution in the travel backwards in time and remain consistent. (Here

free interaction presupposes no controversial philosophical Not only is this one of the most famous results in mathe-
notions such as strong versions of free will; it requires only that I matics, its also an excellent illustration of the method of proof
could locate my past self and kill him.) Although solutions to known as reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity), where
the equations of general relativity that appear to allow travel to one temporarily assumes the opposite of what one is trying to
the past have been found (coincidentally, some of them were prove, then shows by rigorous deduction that this assumption
found by Kurt Gdel, of whom more later), in this case Aristotle leads to a contradiction. So important is the reductio method
trumps Einstein. Solutions to mathematical equations cannot to mathematics that G. H. Hardy (1877-1947) was moved to
be realised if they pave the way to internally-inconsistent config- write that reductio is a far finer gambit than any chess play: a
urations of reality. Consistency for time-travellers can be chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece,
restored by placing absurd restrictions on free interaction, pos- but a mathematician offers the game (from A Mathematicians
tulating parallel timelines or other sci-fi contrivances, but time- Apology) that is, the validity of such proofs rests on the con-
travel as commonly understood, namely visiting our own actual sistency of mathematics as a whole. We shall briefly return to
past and freely interacting with people who really are our own Hardy later, but for now, notice that without PNC, not only
past selves or our ancestors, is out of the question. Stephen would the proof about prime numbers not work, it wouldnt
Hawking has gone as far as to propose a Chronology Protection even make sense to discuss the matter, since the finite and the
Conjecture, to the effect that physics cant allow travel to the non-finite (infinite) would be the same.
past except in special cases incapable of generating paradoxes.
Considering that Hawking has also recently written that philos- Danger of Explosion
ophy is dead (see Hawking Contra Philosophy, Philosophy Now In the centuries that followed Aristotle, statements includ-
issue 82), its refreshing to note that, like omnipotence, even ing and, or and if then were incorporated into logical
physics must yield to logic. theory, and by medieval times we had something recognisable
as the precursor to what is today called propositional logic this
Consistency in Ethics being the study of how true propositions can validly be com-
How should we treat each other, and why? Many different bined to produce new ones. Upon developing propositional
ways of tackling this problem have been advanced. The differ- logic, medieval logicians noticed something interesting: if they
ent approaches sometimes result in agreement on what is good, allowed themselves just one contradiction, they seemed to be
and sometimes not, but within any given theory consistency is able to arrive at any conclusion whatever.
crucial. Consistency in ethics is perhaps most evident in the Writers on logic often refer to this notion that anything
principle of the Golden Rule the idea that we should treat follows from a falsehood but rarely explain why this is the
others as we would consent to be treated in similar circum- case. Heres a modern version of the medieval idea: suppose we
stances. The Golden Rule has to be wielded carefully since would like to prove the proposition that Bugs Bunny is an
nave application can easily lead to absurdities. Properly under- alien. First, notice that if A is any true statement, and B is
stood however, its consistency criterion is an incredibly powerful any other statement, whether true or false, then the combined
ethical tool, even though it doesnt actually tell us anything
about what is right or wrong; we have to work that out for our-
selves by applying the rule in conjunction with other considera-
tions, such as ideas of how people might like to be treated.
Consistency in Mathematics
Around 300 BC, Euclid of Alexandria wrote his Elements, one
of the most influential works in the history of mathematics. The
Elements is usually remembered for its rich geometry, but it also
contains a proof of the fact that there are infinitely many prime
numbers a theorem which ranked third in a poll ran by the
journal The Mathematical Intelligencer to discover the most beau-
tiful results in mathematics. (Incredibly, the top two results, and
three of the top five, were the work of the same mathematician,
Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), but thats another story.) The
proof that there are infinitely many primes usually given today is
not quite the one in the Elements, but the idea is the same.
Roughly speaking, todays proof involves assuming that there are
only a finite number of primes, then considering what happens
if theyre all multiplied together and one added to the result.
Either this new number is prime, or if not, it must be divisible
by a prime number not on the original list. Both outcomes con-
tradict the original supposition that it is possible to produce a Euclid by
finite list of all the primes. So the original supposition that there Raphael
are only a finite number of primes must therefore be incorrect.

statement either A is true or B is true is true, because A is symbolic statements which can be said to be true or false. In
true. Second, if we know that either A is true or B is true and his 1929 doctoral thesis, Kurt Gdel (1906-1978) showed that
we discover that A is false, then B must be true. These rules of when bundled together with a formal language and axioms
propositional logic are known as disjunction introduction and dis- (premises) in certain types of formal systems, first-order logic is
junction elimination respectively. Suppose next that the Earth is complete in the technical sense of being sufficiently powerful to
flat, and also that it isnt flat (a contradiction). Since the Earth deduce all the logical consequences of the axioms. Of particu-
is flat, the statement Either the Earth is flat or Bugs Bunny is lar interest is the formal system known as Peano Arithmetic,
an alien is true, by disjunction introduction. But if Either the named after the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858-
Earth is flat or Bugs Bunny is an alien is true, since we also 1932), which can be thought of as a formalisation of elemen-
know the Earth is not flat, then Bugs must be an alien, by dis- tary arithmetic, and which we discuss a little below. But
junction elimination. We can also prove Bugs is not an alien Gdels completeness theorem applies to many other impor-
by a similar argument. Allowing a single contradiction thus tant mathematical systems as well.
results in logical Armageddon, where everything is true and
everything is false an idea that came to be called the principle
of explosion or ex falso quodlibet, anything follows from a false-
hood (strictly, from a contradiction).
If its not possible for two contradictory statements to be
simultaneously true, theres no need to worry about a truth
explosion. But the explosion seems entirely contrary to intu-
ition anyway: the geometry of the Earth surely has no bearing
on whether Elmer Fudds nemesis is of extraterrestrial origin,
for instance. Indeed, if you dont suffer from the handicap of
having studied classical logic, you might say that to assert that
anything follows from a falsehood is positively illogical, because
it opens the door to fallacious arguments where the premises
are totally irrelevant to the conclusion.
Consider the self-contradictory statement known as the Liar
Paradox: This statement is false. On the face of it, the Liar
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Paradox appears to be false if its true, and true if its false. Per-
haps then its both? If so, how do we avoid explosion?
In order to deal with this kind of problem, twentieth century
philosophers developed so-called paraconsistent logics; for exam-
ple, by forbidding use of the rules of inference that lead to the
explosion, or by introducing relevancy conditions that prevent
conclusions being drawn from irrelevant premises. It is impor-
tant to stress that the development of paraconsistent logics has
not led to a disintegration of the distinction between true and
false. Quite the reverse: paraconsistent logics prevent harmless
contradictions from resulting in logical explosion into areas
where they are not relevant, and as such these logics are useful Consistency and Incompleteness
in circumstances where some philosophers think there is good Gdels completeness theorem was impressive enough, but
reason to relax PNC slightly and regard certain special types of there was better to come, in the form of his incompleteness theo-
statement, such as the Liar Paradox, as being both true and rems, in which confusingly the meaning of the term com-
false a minority philosophical position known as dialetheism. plete is quite different. The completeness theorem shows that
in certain systems, all logical consequences of the systems
Modern Logic axioms can be deduced using first-order logic. Gdels incom-
Impressive as Aristotles logic was, his syllogistic rules were pleteness theorems talk about incompleteness in the sense that
insufficient to capture the arguments in Euclids Elements, let formal systems sometimes contain statements that cannot be
alone in the rest of mathematics, science and philosophy. Leib- proved, or disproved, from their axioms at all.
niz realised the inadequacy of Aristotelian and medieval logic, One important aspect of the incompleteness theorems that
and began to construct a more comprehensive framework. is often neglected is that they act as a bridge between consis-
Leibnizs project finally reached fruition two hundred years tency and completeness. The incompleteness theorems can be
later with the development, chiefly by Gottlob Frege (1848- formulated in many ways, but to make the connection with
1925), of a symbolic notation for logic generally, of which an consistency explicit, consider the following versions:
important special case is known as first-order logic.
First-order logic can be thought of as an enhanced version 1.) Given a formal system F containing a certain amount of
of propositional logic, expanded to include quantifiers such as arithmetic, there exists a true sentence of F that is not provable
there exists and for all, and capable of creating complex in F, if and only if F is consistent.

2.) For any formal system F satisfying certain conditions, the about how computers compare to the human mind?
consistency of F cannot be established within F itself if and only The philosopher John Lucas has written a number of fasci-
if F is consistent. nating papers exploring such ideas , starting with Minds,
Machines and Gdel (Philosophy, XXXVI, 1961), and summarised
Gdels incompleteness theorems are widely misunder- in his book The Freedom of the Will (1970). Unfortunately,
stood, and their consistency conditions often overlooked. As a although Lucas has responded carefully to criticisms of his
result, one frequently finds them being deployed well outside argument, he has not yet managed to produce a version that
the confines of mathematical logic, where almost invariably has convinced a majority of philosophers.
the result is utter nonsense. For examples of the myriad ways The mathematician and physicist Sir Roger Penrose has
in which Gdels theorems are misapplied, I recommend the written several books expanding on Lucass theme, and has
reader to the wonderful book by Torkel Franzn (1950-2006), suggested that it might be better to apply Gdels theorems to
Gdels Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to its Use and Abuse (2005). the human mind indirectly. Gdel noted that his incomplete-
One of Franzns targets is a claim one reads with depressing ness theorems show that no fixed-axiom structure can com-
regularity, to the effect that all logical systems will generate pletely codify all mathematical truths. Of course, no human
propositions that they cannot prove, but which humans can can know all mathematical truths either if only because we
see to be true. Maybe this is so, maybe not; but it doesnt dont live long enough but neither do we seem to be con-
follow from Gdels theorems, because it ignores the consis- strained by a fixed set of axioms. In fact, most of the time
tency condition. To emphasise, Gdel showed that certain human mathematicians dont pay any attention to axioms at all,
formal systems contain true statements they cannot prove if and when I know something, I certainly dont seem to be
they are consistent. For the common claim to follow from the merely manipulating axioms in a formal system. So it is
first incompleteness theorem, humans would need to be able unclear how far Gdels theorems apply to the workings of the
to see, or better still prove, the consistency of any given human mind, even when the humans are doing mathematics.
system. But how do we know whether formal systems are con- These are deep and important philosophical waters, but
sistent or not? Consider Peano Arithmetic: there are several regrettably it would take us too far from our discussion of con-
proofs of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic that mathemati- sistency to navigate them further. Personally, I hope and
cians find compelling, but such proofs are highly technical, expect we will one day show that the human mind does exceed
and have to take place within some sort of framework (which computer logic in many important respects. Unfortunately,
cannot be Peano Arithmetic itself, in view of Gdels second no-one has yet found a way to translate Gdels theorems into
incompleteness theorem), the consistency of which can itself a slam-dunk demonstration that mind exceeds machine,
be called into question However, as an alternative to formal despite the sterling efforts of Lucas and Penrose.
proof, it is relatively easy to convince oneself of the consis-
tency of Peano Arithmetic by merely reflecting on its axioms Consistency of Mathematics Revisited
and rules of inference. Where does all this leave the consistency of mathematics?
While this approach does have some merit, it can lead to It is undeniable that we cannot prove the consistency of math-
problems. Nobody expected to find a contradiction in set ematics to everyones satisfaction; but to my mind, to attempt
theory, until Bertrand Russell famously discovered the one to do so is to put the cart before the horse. Consistent mathe-
that now bears his name (Is the set of all sets which are not matics seems to be the most useful and interesting kind, so,
members of themselves a member of itself?). In the light of armed with the PNC, thats what mathematicians have been
Russells Paradox, set theory had to be hastily patched up to searching for these past 2,500 years. Hardys quotation about
banish contradictions; and to Freges dismay, Russells Paradox offering the game almost makes proof by reductio sound risky,
also demolished some of his work on logic and arithmetic. but in fact theres no real danger in gambling the whole of
Even if we take the consistency of Peano Arithmetic as mathematics on its own consistency, because pruning away the
beyond doubt, it is only one, very simple, system. There is no inconsistencies is one of the objectives of mathematicians in
reason whatever for supposing that humans can know the con- the first place. Is there a risk that if all the inconsistencies were
sistency of every formal system no matter how complicated. to be removed, then nothing would be left? Only the same
Yet merely saying that humans know that formal systems can risk that one equals zero; and if thats the case, then anything
state truths they cant prove if they are consistent amounts to no you can think of is true; and false; and neither; and both.
more than a repetition of the first incompleteness theorem, and Far beneath the surface layers of mathematics, philosophy,
not to a convincing demonstration that humans can always and science, lies logical bedrock, where the word Aristotle is
recognise truths that formal systems cannot prove. carved into the stone. We live in the shadow of Aristotle and
Gdel, striving for consistency, and believing reason will guide
Consistency and Minds us to the most irrefutable truths we will ever know. As Mark
Following the work of the brilliant Alan Turing (1912-1954), Knopfler of Dire Straits sang: if two men say theyre Jesus, at
it became clear that consistency, completeness, and other proper- least one of them must be wrong. You just cant argue with
ties of formal (logical) systems are closely connected with the logic like that.
capabilities of computers. Since Gdels theorems say something DR TIM WILKINSON 2013
about the limitations of formal systems, and hence of computers, Tim Wilkinson used to teach mathematics at the University of Newcastle
perhaps this paves the way for them to say something significant -upon-Tyne, and is now a writer in the North East of England.

Good News from Neurology
But Dont Get The Wrong Idea
Francis Fallon thinks about the difficulty of deciphering thought in the brain.
I
n November, news broke concerning an exciting develop- thoughts sentences such as I am not in pain into Routleys
ment in neurology. Via fMRI (a brain scanning technol- neural activities, this would however favour the presupposition
ogy), a vegetative patient , who suffered serious brain that thoughts take place in explicit mentalese. The connection
damage in a car collision years ago communicated to doctors between the brain and thought is not so straightforward.
that he is not in pain. Scott Routleys vegetative state meant he
had emerged from a coma, and appeared to be awake, but he Not Reading Your Mind
showed no signs of awareness. However, a new technique pio- A thought experiment used by neuroscientists and philoso-
neered by Prof. Adrian Owen and others, at the MRC Cogni- phers illustrates how even the most comprehensive knowledge
tion and Brain Sciences Unit at Cambridge and the Brain and of a brain would not translate to an understanding of that brains
Mind Institute at the University of Western Ontario, has thought. Imagine a cerebroscope, a device capable of reading
allowed Routley to convey significant information. all neural activity, both at the level of the neuron, and at the level
Before analysing these findings, lets not forget whats most of systematic groupings of neuronal activity. Unfortunately, if
important here: Scott Routley is not in pain, and Prof. Owens we try to imagine a device that could also then translate the
technique will allow more vegetative patients to help doctors care cerebroscopes data back into what is being experienced, faith-
for them. I wont call any of this into question. However, the fully reporting the experience of, for example, an oncoming red
reporting of Routleys communication has, perhaps inevitably, bus, our fantasy runs into problems. For a start, contingent fac-
taken a misleading form, and stands in need of a bit of philo- tors influence the associations of neurons, so that one persons
sophical clarification to dispel the seductive notion that neurol- coding for the image of a bus will be not be another persons. It
ogists can discern specific thoughts by examining brain states. is true that different brain regions specialise in different things;
Casual followers of Routleys story can be forgiven for a it for this reason that doctors have been able to treat Routleys
number of misapprehensions. News papers have run headlines communication as genuine. Even this regionalisation, however,
announcing that Routley has said Im not in pain. Only in the only holds contingently. Damaged brains can rewire themselves
loosest sense is this true. Of course, Routley does not have the dramatically, resulting in an organisation radically different from
ability to vocalise his thoughts, but this is not the point . Rather, normal brains. Function is not tied to a particular brain struc-
Routleys communication involved no vocabulary or syntax at ture. It follows that any given thought has multiple possible
all. Instead, Routley was instructed to think about playing tennis structural realisations. For example, the thought I am reading
when he wanted to convey no, and to think about walking this article will have one physical instantiation in your brain,
around his house when he wanted to convey yes. This distinc- and another, perhaps quite different, in someone elses. So how
tion is relevant for understanding the nature of the achievement. can we translate from data to experience?
Patients such as Routley can only answer questions with a very
limited number of responses. Happily, when Prof. Owen asked
Routley if he was in pain, the fMRI scan matched earlier
instances of Routley thinking about playing tennis: the part of
the brain typically involved in such thought, the supplementary
motor area, was shown by the scan as being active. This result
corresponded to a 'no' response.
The distinction between saying and indicating is relevant
for understanding the nature of how brain activity relates to
thought and language. Some philosophers and cognitive scien-
tists believe that all human thought comes in the form of men-
talese, an internal mental language, which consists of explicit
structures that bear linguistic-type meaning. (Jerry Fodor, for
example, has pioneered this position.) Others question the
necessity for representational systems of thought to have lin- What about a device that could read our neural activity
guistic properties. Languages themselves rely on beliefs that from birth? It might seem that this would suffice for providing
do not have any explicit structure: brains do not code most for the translation of its data into thought, but this does not
trivial beliefs, such as There are more than four-hundred follow. A cerebroscope that read all neural activity from birth
people in the world, yet still we speak meaningfully. So, per- onwards could report the activation of structural systems that,
haps meaningful thought takes place without explicit coding of for example, enable thought about an oncoming red bus. It
everything that makes the belief meaningful. If one were under could not however, convey the content of that thought, which
the misapprehension that doctors read complete propositional depends on connections and associations based on an inher-

ently idiosyncratic encounter with the world. though, this language assumes things that philosophers and
Sticking with the example of the oncoming red bus, imagine cognitive scientists question. The notion of mind-reading
that the cerebroscope has been implanted in the brain of a busy implicitly relies on mentalese, which we have seen is controver-
London pedestrian. She regularly experiences looming buses, sial. Even the commonplace phrase mental imagery becomes
and she consistently reacts with a reflex to navigate to safety controversial under scrutiny. Some philosophers and cognitive
without inconveniencing others. Let us say for the sake of argu- scientists cite our inability to report details from our mental
ment that her experience of the bus always correlates to Brain images as evidence of their metaphorical rather than their lit-
State X, and her response always correlates to Brain State Y. eral existence. To treat images as simply inside the brain pre-
Even granting this oversimplification, the cerebroscope only sumes a viewer inside the brain. The idea of a movie-in-the-
measures brain states, and therefore never infers beyond them mind poses the same problem. Both expressions evoke a
to their content. So in our idealised example, the best the cere- Cartesian theatre a place in the brain where images flow
broscope could do would be to give reports taking the form past a homunculus (a little man) who watches them. This
Brain State X tends to be followed by Brain State Y. But the account is famously problematic, largely because it seems to
nature of the experience of looming buses associated with Brain lead to infinite regress. (If the little man or his equivalent in
State X is a matter of contingency, an historical fact totally your brain sees an image, then to account for him seeing that
unavailable to the cerebroscope. For example, if the pedestrian image, an even littler man in his brain would have to see it, and
always had a particular fear response before moving to safety so on.) Nothing in Gallants experiment says anything about
(which includes a Brain State F occurring at the same time as any of these debates. Instead, the experiment finds and exploits
X) the cerebroscope could not distinguish the two types of a statistical regularity in the individuals primary visual cortexs
experience according to content. Even given the most futuristic responses to types of visual stimuli. Perhaps not the stuff of
science, this kind of mind reading remains impossible. headlines, but at least this description has accuracy on its side.
Movies In The Mind? Lessons For Thinkers

Another moment of scientific progress has received mislead- These distinctions may strike some as needlessly theoreti-
ing press in much the same way as Routleys communication. In cal, but such a criticism cannot attach to evaluating Routleys
September 2011, Prof. Jack Gallant of UC Berkeley ran a star- mind. Owen and his colleagues have taken care to include
tling and impressive experiment. The steps proceeded as fol- controls based on previous work. Only patients who respond
lows: (1) Subjects watched movie trailers while an fMRI to the instruction think of tennis differently from the way
recorded their brains responses. (2) A computer organised the they respond to the neutral she played tennis are taken to
findings, creating a model for each subjects brain responses to show genuine responsiveness. Routleys communication most
images. (They vary.) (3) Subjects watched more movie trailers. likely is not the product of chance, but this does not necessar-
(4) The computer was given the fMRI results of the latest view- ily mean that he is conscious in the normal sense of the word
ings. (5) From these fMRI results the computer reconstructed (whatever that may be). Owen claims that Routley chooses to
the images that subjects had seen using a database of footage answer the questions, for example, and that he knows who and
drawn from the internet. The images match, if a little crudely. where he is, but the evidence for this is indirect. Even if we
grant this, it does not tell us about the richness of Routleys
experience. If consciousness were an all-or-nothing affair, then
to interpret the fMRIs of patients like Routley as evidence of
consciousness would indeed be simplest and best, as Owen
STILL PICTURE FROM FANTASTIC PLANET ARGOS FILMS, 1973
claims. But consciousness may not be an all-or-nothing affair.

People in trances, sleepwalkers, and the heavily medicated, can
respond to linguistic prompts without enjoying full conscious-
ness. The fact of Routleys communication does not support the
assumption of his conscious awareness in the normal sense.
The positive lessons to take from exciting advances in neu-
rosciences are often clear enough. Scott Routley has communi-
cated to doctors via a new fMRI technique that he is not in
pain, and he may be able to communicate still more informa-
tion. The negative lessons are more difficult. Routleys com-
munication did not rely on his use of language, nor on reading
his neural activity as a form of language. Moreover, the kind of
communication involved in Routleys case does not necessarily
A Xenunculus
even indicate full awareness. Consciousness does not work so
simply. The lesson here is that we should not let learning about
Headlines announced this as Mind-Reading and Looking developments in the field of neurology stand in the way of our
Inside The Brain; articles reported it as Recreating Images In understanding the relationship between thought and the brain.
The Brain. Gallant himself discussed internal imagery and FRANCIS FALLON 2013
movies within the mind with interviewers. Once again, Francis Fallon was at Lancaster University at the time of writing.

Trying Herder
Dale DeBakcsy listens to the lost voice of the Eighteenth Centurys greatest
Twenty-First-Century thinker.
O
f all the crimes a promising up-and-comer by the name of Immanuel Kant.
late eighteenth Herders first writings were in the field of literary criticism,
century German and flew in the face of pretty much every major school of
cultural thinker could thought at the time setting a life-long precedent of rubbing
commit, none carried a the philosophical establishment the wrong way. While
stiffer sentence than Not Enlightenment thinkers were seeking to find universal laws for
Being Goethe. Klopstock, drama and aesthetics, Herder came out hard for evaluating
Mser, Sssmilch, each work against the historical standards and practices of its
Reimarus, Herder... all time and culture. Rather than denigrating Shakespeare for not
names blasted out of our being Voltaire, he argued, oughtnt we consider what his work
common cultural memory means in the context of Elizabethan society and concerns?
by their proximity to the Common sense now, perhaps; but revolutionary stuff for the
towering poet of Weimar. Enlightenment with its mania for universal systems.
J.G.Herder Yet while there probably More astounding still are the thoughts he put to paper in
isnt anybody weeping torrents over the loss of Sssmilch, the response to a Berlin Academy essay competition of 1769. The
obscurity of Johannes Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is actually theme was the origin of language, a topic up to that time dom-
rather tragic. Consistently two centuries ahead of his time, his inated by two warring camps: the first held firmly to the idea
ideas about linguistics and comparative history had to wait that language must be of divine origin, while the other held
until the twentieth century for a rebirth, while his reflections that it is already present in animals, evident in the growl of the
on cognition are shockingly prescient of developments in lowliest town mutt. Herders argument ran counter to both
modern neuroscience. How was it that such an original and these schools, and in the process very nearly created modern
deep thinker became so utterly lost to us?
The real problem is that he wasnt so much lost as dismem-
bered. The whole Herder is a creature hardly seen in nature
before it is set upon and harvested for organs by whatever aca-
demic faction happens to be hungry for provenance at the
time. The Romantics took his stance against Pure Reason,
chopped it up into a few ringing phrases, and used it as a part
of their more general campaign against the Enlightenment.
And so the nineteenth century came to see Herder as a great
irrationalist, in spite of his many writings praising reason and
science as crucial paths to the self-realization of humanity. The
twentieth century, when it bothered to notice him at all, saw
only his comments about the cultural specificity of language,
and heralded them as precursors of Quinean relativism, conve-
niently ignoring the parts of his work which stress the unifying
nature of human cognitive processes. What has come down to
CARTOON BILL STOTT 2013 FOR MORE, PLEASE VISIT WWW.BILLSTOTT.CO.UK
us, then, have been a series of partial Herders hitched to the

wagons of fleeting philosophical and cultural movements
caricatures so broadly drawn that they understandably failed to
outlive their revivers. Here I want to sketch an image of
Herder worth remembering.
Man Manifest
Johannes Herder was born in Mohrungen, East Prussia (now
in Poland), a town of about a thousand souls, known for the pro-
duction of cattle and theologians. Shaking the dust of that small
town from his boots, he ended up, at the tender age of eighteen,
in Knigsberg. Knigsberg was the place to be for a budding
thinker, offering the chance to study not only under the great
champion of holism, Johann Georg Hamann, but also under a

How did language neuroscience is just now showing us that the possession of a
emerge? prefrontal cortex in primates is what allows working memory to
function holding an idea and considering its connections to
other ideas without being externally stimulated to do so and
that, further, this area of the brain is where our linguistic pro-
cessing modules are found.
Positing working memory rather than pure reason as the
root of human language and even humanity was a stroke of
genius too far ahead of its time to succeed; but Herder didnt
stop there. Facing an intellectual culture that was trying to
split human thought and action into the purely reasonable or
the purely emotional, Herder replied that, If we have grouped
certain activities of the soul under certain major designations,
such as wit, perspicacity, fantasy, reason, this does not mean
that a single act of mind is ever possible in which only wit or
only reason is at work; it means no more than that we discern
in that act a prevailing share of the abstraction we call wit or
reason (Origin of Language). It took humanity two and a half
centuries to come back to the truth that you cant wall off parts
of the mind from each other. As weve since come to discover,
even our simplest thoughts or actions require the networking
of multiple brain centers and functions in exquisite unison,
ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/SASHKINW
crafted by the neural connections determined by genetics and

experience.
The Flow of Language

The influence of experience was a theme to which Herder
would return to repeatedly in his historical and linguistic work.
MAZE OF LETTERS
In a move that anticipated Julia Kristevas semiotic theory, he

argued strongly that words must not be considered purely
from the point of view of their logical structure, but also in
linguistic and neural theory in eighteenth century Prussia. terms of their rhythmic, emotional, and other experiential ele-
For Herder, language was a distinctly human phenomenon, ments. As he rather fancifully put it, This weary breath half
born from mans unique cognitive practices: language is in the a sigh which dies away so movingly on pain-distorted lips,
very structure of how we approach and perceive the world. isolate it from its living helpmeets, and it is an empty draft of
Moreover, in a move that anticipated discoveries in neuro- air (Origin of Language, Section One). The sound and rhythm
science made only within the last half century, Herder identi- of language, which hold so much of the meaning of words in
fied reflection, networking, and plastic association as the hallmarks their spoken contexts, are largely left behind on the printed
of human cognitive life. What separates man from animals, page. And as we lose touch with the situation in which our
Herder believed, is mans capacity for reconsidering ideas words were originally formed, so do our words taste increas-
(reflection), for using multiple parts of his mind in evaluating a ingly artificial on our lips. They become the worn-beyond-
passing idea (networking), and for holding onto an idea while recognition coins that Nietzsche would make famous a century
considering its relation to other facts of the world (plastic asso- later. This was particularly a problem, Herder saw, for his own
ciation). Some poetic turns of phrase aside, Herders focus on profession as a preacher: The most meaningful sacred sym-
the centrality of reflection belongs solidly in the twenty-first bols of every people, no matter how well-adapted to the cli-
century: Man manifests reflection when the force of his soul mate and nation, frequently lose their meaning within a few
acts in such freedom that, in the vast ocean of sensations which generations. This should come as no surprise, for this is bound
permeates it through all the channels of the senses, it can single to happen to every language and to every institution that has
out one wave, arrest it, concentrate its attention on it, and be arbitrary signs as soon as these signs are not frequently com-
conscious of being attentive. He manifests reflection when, pared to their objects through active use... as soon as [priests]
confronted with the vast hovering dream of images which pass lost the meaning of the symbols, they had to become either the
by his senses, he can collect himself into a moment of wakeful- silent servants of idolatry or the loquacious liars of supersti-
ness and dwell at will on one image, can observe it clearly and tion. They did become this almost everywhere, not out of any
more calmly (Essay on the Origin of Language, 1772). Herder particular propensity to deception, but out of the natural
found the root of language in these uniquely human capacities, course of things (Ideas Towards a Philosophy of History, 1784).
and in doing so, somewhat astoundingly, described for us the Such considerations of the particularity of linguistic and cul-
functions of the lateral prefrontal cortex before it had even tural practice made Herder a fierce champion of the right of
been discovered. Fast forward two hundred and fifty years, and each nation to find happiness through its own means, to be

evaluated on its own terms, and to hold with whatever religious
notions make sense in its own language and tradition. He
despised colonialism and the forcible conversion of native
people. He would have none of any system of classification
which attempted to posit a scale of perfection with modern
humanity sitting regally at the top. Just as Shakespeare was not
Eurpides Done Wrong, neither is India merely Ancient Greece
Done Wrong. To posit a happiest or best civilization is to
establish a scale of comparison, whereas in fact there are just
people working after whatever satisfaction their situation can
afford them. No one in the world feels the weakness of gener-
alizing more than I... Who has noticed how inexpressible the
individuality of one human being is how impossible it is to
express distinctly an individuals distinctive characteristics?
Since this is the case, how can one possibly survey the ocean of
entire peoples, times, and countries, and capture them in one
glance, one feeling, or one word? What a lifeless, incomplete
phantom of a word it would be! You must first enter the spirit
of a nation in order to empathize completely with even one of
its thoughts or deeds (Another Philosophy of History, 1774). And
lest his contemporaries believe they had a real chance to fully
understand and therefore judge a culture by reading about it in
an open and empathetic spirit, Herder gleefully yanked the rug
away by pointing out the utter hopelessness of genuine transla-
tion: Those varied significations of one root that are to be
traced and reduced to their origin in its genealogical tree are
interrelated by no more than vague feelings, transient side asso-
ciations, and perceptional echoes which arise from the depth of
Church at Bckeburg where Herder preached
the soul and can hardly be covered by rules. Furthermore, their
interrelations are so specifically national, so much in confor-
mity with the manner of thinking and seeing of the people, of notations arise of a sudden in their dark majesty from the grave of the soul:
the inventor, in a particular country, in a particular time, under They obscure inside the word the pure limpid concept that could be
particular circumstances, that it is exceedingly difficult for a grasped only in their absence. (Origin of Language, Section One).
Northerner and Westerner to strike them right (Origin of Lan-
guage, Section Three). You will always miss something, and This is politics as the art of using tone and rhythm to recall
there is no way of knowing whether that something was primal past experiences and therefore elicit the desired present
insignificant, or was, after all, the most important part of the emotions quite irrespective of the actual content of the words
concept you were trying to nail down. being spoken. Somehow, sitting in an autocratic Prussian state
Which brings us to George Orwell. Because, not content almost devoid of mature political institutions, Herder man-
with establishing a network theory of cognition, a semiotic aged to piece together the notion of subliminal messaging and
theory of language, and a comparative approach to historiog- its potential use in mass media politicking.
raphy and literature centuries before their time, Herder, like This isnt to say that Herder was always so prescient or rev-
Orwell, also analyzed the role of linguistic association in mass olutionary. His explanation of suffering is little different from
politics before mass politics really even existed. Take a look the colossally unconvincing argument St Augustine trotted out
at this, written in 1772: thirteen centuries earlier. But these half-hearted gestures pale
next to the monumental leaps of imagination with which he
What is it that works miracles in the assemblies of people, that pierces enriched the late eighteenth century, and, if we are willing,
hearts, and upsets souls? Is it intellectual speech and metaphysics? Is it sim- with which he will enrich our own. Many of his ideas we have
iles and figures of speech? Is it art and coldly convincing reason? If there is since rediscovered, but loaded down with such onerous and
to be more than blind frenzy, much must happen through these; but every- generally unenlightening jargon (Im looking at you, Carl
thing? And precisely this highest moment of blind frenzy, through what did Jung) that the scope and profundity of these ideas have been
it come about? Through a wholly different force! These tones, these ges- drastically and tragically narrowed. A return to the source is in
tures, those simple melodious continuities, this sudden turn, this dawning order the whole Herder: often fanciful, sometimes deli-
voice what more do I know? They all... accomplish a thousand times ciously nave, but never more relevant than at present.
more than truth itself... The words, the tone, the turn of this gruesome DALE DEBAKCSY 2013
ballad or the like touched our souls when we heard it for the first time in Dale DeBakcsy is a contributor to The New Humanist and The
our childhood with I know not what host of connotations of shuddering, Freethinker and is the co-writer of the twice-weekly history and philos-
awe, fear, fright, joy. Speak the word, and like a throng of ghosts those con- ophy webcomic Frederick the Great: A Most Lamentable Comedy.

Brief Lives
Niccol Machiavelli (1469-1527)
Graeme Garrard on one of the few writers whose name has become an adjective.
F
ive centuries ago this year, at the height of the Italian living on the dark side of the moon. Although he enjoyed a
Renaissance, an unemployed former civil servant sat in partial rehabilitation near the end of his life, when he was again
the study of his modest country farm in the tiny village working at the Palazzo Vecchio, it was in the very limited role
of SantAndrea just south of Florence, pouring everything he of secretary of the Overseers of the Walls of the City, responsi-
knew about the art of governing into a long pamphlet. He ble for rebuilding and reinforcing Florences defences.
hoped that by making a gift of it to Lorenzo de Medici, the In a letter written shortly before his death he signed himself
new ruler of Florence, it would win him back the job he pas- Niccol Machiavelli, Historian, Comic Author and Tragic
sionately loved. But it was ungraciously brushed aside by a Author. According to a popular legend, he had a dream while
prince who had little interest in the musings of an obscure, on his deathbed in which he chose to remain in Hell discussing
exiled bureaucrat on the principles of statecraft. The pamphlet politics with the great pagan thinkers and rulers of antiquity
was eventually published in 1532, five years after Niccol rather than suffering the tedium of Heaven.
Machiavellis death, as Il Principe (The Prince).
Machiavellis Ethics
Machiavellis Devotion Machiavelli was not a philosopher in the narrow sense of the
For fourteen years Machiavelli had worked tirelessly and word, or even a particularly systematic thinker, and The Prince,
with utter devotion for his native city of Florence as a diplomat which was written hastily, is not a rigorous philosophical trea-
and public official, travelling constantly on its behalf to the tise. Yet because of its many penetrating insights into the
courts and chancelleries of Europe, where he met Popes, nature of political life in general, and the striking boldness and
princes and potentates. He witnessed the political life of the originality of Machiavellis thoughts on, for example, the
Italian Renaissance first-hand and up-close. It was an age of nature of power or the relationship between ethics and politics,
very high culture and very low politics, of Michelangelo and it has long enjoyed an exalted place in the small canon of great
Cesare Borgia both of whom Machiavelli knew personally. works in the history of political philosophy.
An intensely patriotic Florentine, he spurned an offer to The popular image of Machiavelli is of a brutal realist who
become an advisor to a wealthy and powerful Roman noble- counseled rulers to cast aside ethics in the ruthless pursuit of
man at the generous salary of 200 gold ducats because he power. This view is not without some basis in The Prince,
wanted to serve his native city. He had recently worked as which condones murder, deceit and repression as essential
Head of the second chancery, Chancellor of the Nine (the means for rulers to retain their grip on power. Machiavelli says
body that oversaw Florences militia), and Secretary to the Ten repeatedly that given that men are ungrateful, fickle, liars and
that supervised the citys foreign policy. Not that this made any deceivers, fearful of danger and greedy for gain, a ruler is
difference to the Medici family, who in 1512 had overthrown often obliged not to be good. So it is vital for statesmen not
the Florentine republic Machiavelli had so loyally served. only to learn how not to be good but also to know when it is
Machiavelli was promptly dismissed, arrested, tortured, and and when it is not necessary to use this knowledge. History is
exiled from his native city. The torture, six drops on the strap- littered with failed politicians, statesmen and rulers who lost
pado in which he was raised high above the ground by his tied power either because they did not appreciate this hard fact of
arms, dislocating his joints he took admirably well, even writ- political life, or were unwilling to act on it when they did. For
ing some amusing sonnets about it. He only narrowly escaped Machiavelli, being insufficiently cruel is a sure path to eventual
execution; then a general amnesty was granted after Lorenzos political defeat which in Renaissance Italy was often the path
uncle was elected Pope Leo X in March 1513. to an early grave as well. What was shocking about The Prince
Machiavelli appeared to hold few grudges. Being tortured was not the deeds he recommended, which were common
was fair play in Renaissance politics, and he would advocate far enough in the politics of the day, but the brazen directness with
worse in The Prince. But being forced out of the life of politics which Machiavelli advocated expedients such as, for example,
that enthralled him, and banished from the city he loved more wiping out the entire family of a ruler.
than my own soul was almost more than he could bear. He However, Machiavelli does not simply argue that political
confessed to his nephew that, although physically well, he was expediency requires that ethics be set aside. Rather than being
ill in every other respect because he was separated from his amoral or immoral, as commonly assumed, Machiavelli was an
beloved native city, and he complained to a friend that I am ethical consequentialist, who thought that the end justifies the
rotting away in exile. He desperately missed the excitement, means. He argued that, in the normally brutal world of real pol-
risks and stimulation of city life, and was bored senseless by the itics, rulers are often forced to choose between two evils, rather
dreary routines of domestic life. To fend off the monotony he than between two goods or between a good and an evil. This is
spent his days reading and writing, chasing thrushes, and play- the classic dilemma of political ethics that is often referred to as
ing backgammon with the local inn-keeper. Although living the problem of dirty hands, in which politicians are often con-
only a tantalizingly short distance from the hub of Florentine fronted with situations in which all of the options available to
government, the great Palazzo Vecchio (where a bust of them are morally repugnant. In such tragic circumstances,
Machiavelli stands today), Machiavelli might as well have been choosing the lesser evil over the greater evil, however cruel and

Brief Lives
Renaissance than any other single work of classical Latin
prose. Cicero argued that rulers are successful only when they
are morally good by which he meant adhering to the four
cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, restraint and courage, as
well as being honest. For Cicero, the belief that self-interest
or expediency conflicts with ethical goodness is not only mis-
taken but deeply corrosive of public life and morals. In
Renaissance Europe this idealistic view of politics was rein-
forced by the Christian belief in divine retribution in the after-
life for the injustices committed in this life, and the cardinal
virtues were supplemented by the three theological virtues of
PORTRAIT OF MACHIAVELLI DARREN MCANDREW 2013
faith, hope and charity.

Machiavelli believed that the ethical outlooks of both Cicero
and Christianity were rigid and unrealistic, and actually cause
more harm than they prevent. In the imperfect world of poli-
tics, populated as it is by wolves, a sheepish adherence to that
kind of morality would be disastrous. A ruler must be flexible
about the means he employs if he is going to be effective, just as
the virtue of a general on the battlefield is a matter of how well
he adapts to ever-changing circumstances. Machiavelli asserts
in The Prince that a ruler cannot conform to all those rules that
men who are thought good are expected to respect, for he is
often obliged, in order to hold on to power, to break his word,
repugnant in itself, is the ethically right thing to do. In his Dis- to be uncharitable, inhumane, and irreligious. So he must be
course on Livy, written shortly after The Prince, Machiavelli states mentally prepared to act as circumstances and changes in for-
this problem and his attitude towards it very succinctly: if his tune require. As I have said, he should do what is right if he
deed accuses him, its consequences excuse him. When the con- can; but he must be prepared to do what is wrong if necessary.
sequences are good, as were the consequences of Romuluss act, By doing wrong, he means in the conventional sense of the
then he will always be excused. Indeed, a hard-nosed ruler word but, in reality, it is right, even obligatory, sometimes to
who is willing to commit evil acts (deception, torture, murder, commit acts that, while morally repellent themselves, are
for example) in order to prevent even greater evil may deserve nonetheless good in their consequences because they prevent
moral admiration and respect. The truth of this was made greater evil. That is why Machiavelli calls cruelty well-used
apparent to Machiavelli when he visited the town of Pistoia in by rulers when it is applied judiciously in order to prevent even
Tuscany in the opening years of the sixteenth century, which greater cruelty. Such preventive cruelty is the compassion of
visit he recounts in The Prince. The town was torn between two princes the cruelty that saves from cruelty.
rival families, the Cancellieri and the Panciatichi, and the con- Machiavellian virtue is harsh and realistic, appropriate for
flict risked escalating into a bloody civil war, so the Florentines the kinds of rapacious, predatory creatures who populate the
sent Machiavelli in to broker a settlement. When he reported political world as Machiavelli saw it. It is also masculine, just
back to Florence that things had gone too far and that they as fortune is feminine (lady luck), and usually fairly benign.
should step in forcefully, his advice was ignored for fear that it However, in Machiavellis hands she becomes a fickle and
would lead to a reputation for brutality. Machiavellis fears malevolent goddess who delights in upsetting the plans of men
were soon realised when further talks failed and Pistoia degen- and leading them into chaos and misery. However, whereas
erated into chaos, causing much more violence and destruction Christianity preached resignation to the whims of fortune,
than if the Florentines had taken his advice and intervened Machiavelli argued that a virtuous ruler could impose his will
harshly, which would have been the lesser evil. As the philoso- on it, at least to some degree. The Prince notoriously depicts
pher Kai Nielsen has put it, where the only choice is between fortune as a woman whom the vir, the man of true manliness,
evil and evil, it can never be wrong, and it will always be right, must forcibly subdue if he is to impose his will on events.
to choose the lesser evil. Machiavelli was one of the first writers in the West openly
to state that dirty hands are an unavoidable part of politics, and
Machiavellis Princely Virtues to accept the troubling ethical implications of this hard truth
One of Machiavellis most important innovations in The without flinching. Politicians who deny it are not only unreal-
Prince is his redefinition of virtue, which he equates with the istic, but are likely to lead citizens down a path to greater evil
qualities necessary for political success including ruthless- and misery than is necessary. That is why we ought to think
ness, guile, deceit, and a willingness to occasionally commit twice before condemning them when they sanction acts that
acts that would be deemed evil by conventional standards. may be wrong in a perfect world. A perfect world is not, and
The classical ideal of virtue Machiavelli rejected was never will be, the world of politics.
expressed by Cicero (106-43 BCE), whose De officiis (On DR GRAEME GARRARD 2013
Duties) was read and copied more frequently during the Graeme Garrard is Reader in Politics at Cardiff University.

Food for I Gave Them A Sword
Thought Tim Madigan asks how Machiavellian Richard Nixon really was.
I gave them a sword and they stuck it in and they twisted it with relish. I who go after Machiavelli obviously have never held a goddamned office or
guess if Id been in their position, Id have done the same thing. tried to run a country. Machiavelli was a diplomat, and he had the experi-
Richard Nixon to David Frost, 1977 ence to write about what he knew. International politics hasnt changed one
iota since he wrote in the early sixteenth century. Not one iota. Sure, the
T he year 2013 marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of

Richard Milhous Nixon. Yet, unlike other such anniver-
saries for former U.S. Presidents, this one has not been much
players have changed, but the rules of the game are exactly the same. So,
considering that, what the hell is wrong with what he argued? Nixon
asked, counting his next points on his fingers.
commemorated. No doubt this is due to the fact that, almost He says that leaders should act decisively as soon as they detect a threat; he
twenty years after his death, Nixon remains a controversial says that they should be capable of using cruel and inhumane methods to
figure, with a rather tainted legacy (to say the least), being the maintain the state, which we disagree with now, but back then that was neces-
only occupant of the Oval Office to have resigned in disgrace. sary to hold the goddamned places together; and he says that appearances are
Nixon spent the two decades after his resignation in an odd whats most important. Machiavelli must have foreseen the importance of televi-
sort of netherworld, trying to gain back public respect by travel- sion! He would have been the first to call [media strategist Roger] Ailes! (p.346).
ing, lecturing and authoring a myriad of books and articles.
(Luckily for him, having been pardoned by his successor Gerald There is a certain aptness in Nixons advocacy, for 2013
Ford for any offenses against the United States which he may coincidentally also marks the 500th anniversary of Machiavellis
have committed during his time in office, he didnt have to hide writing The Prince.
out from the sheriff.) One of Nixons last personal assistants, Nixons fascination with The Prince does seem quite fitting.
Monica Crowley, wrote a book describing the final four years of Indeed, during his long political career, from serving in the
this strange mans private life, entitled Nixon in Winter: His Final U.S. Congress as both a Congressman and Senator, to his eight
Revelations about Diplomacy, Watergate, and Life Out of the Arena years as Vice President under Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his
(Random House, 1998). In it, she reveals that Nixon was a vora- own tortured term in office as President himself, Nixon was
cious reader (and that he had a lot of time to devote to reading often referred to as Machiavellian, and not in a complimen-
since he often had no visitors), and that he dedicated a good deal tary way. But it may be that this was inaccurate, for, while he
of attention to classic philosophers. He read and reread these certainly seemed to have a good grasp of Machiavellis views on
works, she writes, usually by sectioning them according to foreign policy, Nixon does not appear to have really under-
theme and by underlining important phrases that he could com- stood, or at least did not follow, the main point of The Prince:
pare with his own political thinking (p.340). Given the fact that how to gain and keep political power. Machiavelli, who himself
it was Nixons abuses of power that led to his downfall, I found fell from power when the Medici family took over the govern-
this particular passage in Crowleys book quite fascinating: ment of Florence in 1512 (but who, unlike Nixon, ended up
spending time in prison after his loss), wrote The Prince in part
I decided to reread some of Machiavellis stuff because he is by far one of at least to try to get into the good graces of the Medicis by
the more interesting philosophers. As we sat in his office on January 14, giving them sage advice on how to maintain the power that
1993, Nixon picked up his briefcase and removed a small volume. The they had achieved through force. It would have behooved
Prince, he said, waving it in the air. The ends justify the means thats Nixon to have more carefully read this work before he gained
all most people see in Machiavelli. Ill bet thats pretty much all most the Presidency rather than after resigning from that office, for
people are taught about him. That line is, of course, central to his argu- it is chock-full of practical strategies for holding onto ones
ments, but his stuff is far more complex than that one thing... position of power regardless of the forces allied against you.
To be sure, Nixon was certainly good at Machiavellis first
In fairness to Machiavelli, I should add that it is debatable topic, how to gain power, and he had an almost uncanny ability
whether or not he ever really wrote (or intimated) the end to pop back up just when you thought he was out for good. As
justifies the means; but no doubt the former President is cor- Jeffrey Franks new book Ike and Dick: Portrait of a Strange Politi-
rect in his assertion that that principle is probably what most cal Marriage (Simon and Schuster, 2013) points out, Nixon was
people would identify with the author of The Prince. Crowley nearly kicked off the ticket as Eisenhowers running mate in
goes on to say of Nixon that: 1952 when a secret fund by his supporters was discovered, but
he managed to remain on it by going on television and revealing
He viewed The Prince both as a handbook for statesmen and as an analytic his complete financial history (as well as immortalizing his dog
work relevant to the modern world. Its lessons clearly resonated with Checkers in the process). After his defeats in the 1960 Presiden-
Nixon, who defended even its morally ambiguous assertions. The critics tial election and the 1962 Gubernatorial election in California,
36 Philosophy Now l July/August 2013

his political career seemed over, but he managed to come back tences because they had unwittingly incriminated themselves
in triumph in the 1968 Presidential election, and won a on tape. This was a very un-Machiavellian maneuver. As
resounding landslide re-election in 1972. It was never wise to Nixon so memorably phrased it in the opening quote, he gave
consider him down for the count. In one of the most memo- his enemies the sword they used to destroy him. Surely, above
rable sketches in Saturday Night Lives history, Death to all else, Machiavelli let alone Roger Ailes would have
Watergate, Christopher Lee portrayed a vampire hunter who advised him to never tape yourself committing a crime, espe-
attempts to drive a stake through the heart of Richard Nixons cially when you dont have ultimate control over those tapes.
memoirs. But Nixon, in Dan Aykroyds over-the-top perfor- Always anticipate what your enemies are likely to do and fore-
mance, simply starts writing the book again from scratch. The stall them, Machiavelli stresses: dont ever give them the upper
chilling message is that Nixon is the beast that would not die. hand or a sword, for that matter.
Whenever I teach a course on Political Philosophy I usually
Hatred, Lies & Audiotape have my friend Richard M. Rosenbaum come to lecture to my
It was with the second principle of The Prince concerned class. Its good, I tell my students, to have someone talk to them
with how to keep power that Nixon could have used Machi- who (unlike me) actually knows what goes on behind the
avellis help. For instance, although Machiavelli famously stated scenes in the world of politics. A long-time advisor and confi-
in Chapter XVII that it is better for a Prince to be feared than dant to such Republican stalwarts as Nelson Rockefeller (for
to be loved, he clearly held that, all things considered, its best whom he served as right-hand man and chief political advisor
to be both feared and loved. Nixon, however, was one of the during his time as Governor of New York and Vice President of
most unlovable public figures of recent times. Some argued that the United States), Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George
even his own dog didnt particularly care for him. His public H.W. Bush, Rosenbaum has also served in many political capac-
persona became so reviled that even before the revelations of ities and branches of power, including State Supreme Court
the Watergate scandal, he often spent much of his time hidden Justice, and Chairman of the New York State Republican Party.
in the White House or his other residences to avoid being He knew Richard Nixon and respected his intelligence, but not
jeered at or booed. It is imperative, Machiavelli stresses over his astuteness.
and over, for a leader to avoid being hated. To be brief, he Dick has written
writes in Chapter XIX, a Prince has little to fear from conspir- his own primer
acies when his subjects are well disposed towards him, but when for politicians,
they are hostile and hold him in detestation, he has then reason entitled No Room
to fear everything and every one. Hatred provides a strong for Democracy: The
motivating force to unite ones enemies against you, and will Triumph of Ego
likely lead to attempts to overthrow you. So by constantly pro- Over Common
voking his old enemies and creating new ones through his Sense (RIT Press,
secretiveness and seeming disregard for niceties, Nixon com- 2008), in which
mitted one of Machiavellis cardinal sins, by creating a mass of he gives what he
critics dedicated to removing him from power. calls Advice from Nixon and
Rosenbaum
In Chapter XVIII, Machiavelli advises the Prince to always an Old Lion
be thought of as honest and trustworthy. While of course its (Who Still Has His Teeth), including this time-honored
often expedient not to actually be so, you should never encour- maxim: Never write when a word will suffice. Never speak
age a reputation for being duplicitous, since then your every when a nod will suffice (p.256). He might have added,
word will be scrutinized, and you will not be generally NEVER tape yourself doing anything incriminating.
respected. The man who became known early in his career as Although Richard Nixon was not a very successful Machi-
Tricky Dick, and for whom the admonition Would You Buy avellian, surely there was an associate of his who both under-
a Used Car from This Man? stuck to him like glue, never stood and put into practice much of the Florentines wisdom.
managed this. And one can only imagine what Machiavelli Henry Kissinger, Nixons National Security Advisor and Sec-
would have thought of a leader who publically announces I retary of State, not only survived the whirlwind of Watergate,
am not a crook. Talk about damning yourself! he emerged even stronger from the debacle of the Nixon res-
Unable to get people to love him, Nixon isolated himself ignation, and has remained near the seat of power ever since.
and surrounded himself with aides who catered to his darkest Ninety years old and still going strong, Henry Kissinger, the
wishes. Beware flatterers and sycophants, Machiavelli warns, astute courtier and diplomat, deserves the appellation the
for they will likely only tell you what you want to hear, not Modern Machiavelli much more than does his fallen Prince,
what you need to know. Nixon, instead, spent hours with Richard Nixon.
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Colson and Dean, rambling DR TIMOTHY J. MADIGAN 2013
on about his bigoted views on race, religion, gender and other Tim Madigan is a U.S. Editor of Philosophy Now. He teaches
matters, as well as discussing illegal operations, expecting Philosophy at St John Fisher College, Rochester, New York.
them to fervently agree on every point. As if thats not bad
enough, he surreptitiously taped their conversations, thus Tim would like to thank Bob Sansone, who studied Political Philosophy
leading to many of them (unlike himself) serving prison sen- with him this year, for pointing out the dual anniversaries mentioned above.
July/August 2013 l Philosophy Now 37

Letters
When inspiration strikes, dont bottle it up!
Write to me at: Philosophy Now
43a Jerningham Road London SE14 5NQ, U.K.
or email [email protected]
Keep them short and keep them coming!
Philosophical Zombification down to consciousness being nothing ing sensations without consciousness also
DEAR EDITOR: There is a flaw in Philip more than some vastly complex interac- seems to be impossible, unless there is
Goffs analysis of the zombie threat to a tion of brain-states: having the brain- some kind of zombie use of the five
science of mind in the last issue. The states is equivalent to being conscious, senses which does lack sensation. Perhaps
flaw comes from thinking within a con- and there is nothing added to the collec- with his knowledge of zombies Dr Goff
ceptual model that implies determinism tion of brain-states that is consciousness. could throw some light on this. How-
but then neglects deterministic logic. If zombies are conceivable, goes the ever, if the philosophical zombie lacks
Let me explain what I mean by that. argument, then we can infer that con- the five senses, then it is not an exact
Goffs analysis requires determinism, sciousness must be additional to brain- replica of me, even if it mimics my
because admitting free will rules his states, and cannot be reduced to them in behaviour perfectly. If the criterion for
whole argument out of court. Suppose I the way heaps of sand can be reduced to being a philosophical zombie is that it
had my own philosophical zombie whose the grains composing them (Chalmers resembles me even down to having
behaviour was identical to my own but uses most of the book to make this case). senses, then it must have consciousness,
who lacked consciousness, and therefore Chalmers argument is well made, and I and so it ceases to be a zombie.
lacked free will. Then the effect of my am not a mind-brain identity advocate, SHEILA LOCKHART, INVERNESS
free will on my behaviour is clearly but I simply do not understand the value
nonexistent, as the zombie is behaving of a counter-example whose possibility is A Theory of Animal Justice
identically without it, and a free will that one of the very things at issue in the the- DEAR EDITOR: I enjoyed Ziyad Hayatlis
has no effect is paradoxical. sis being refuted. The mind-brain iden- witty review of John Rawlss A Theory of
So philosophical zombies cannot be tity theorist must surely hold that if there Justice: The Musical! in issue 96, alarmed
discussed without the assumption of is a duplicate me who has all my brain- though I was to see Nozick and Rand
determinism. But the logic of determin- states (duplicating mine moment by sharing a dance. Another thing that
ism demands that everything that hap- moment), then that subject will actually struck me was the description of Rawls
pens has to happen, and it is not possible be conscious, just as I am. His propensity veil of ignorance, behind which individ-
for anything to happen if it does not to report consciousness will not be an uals did not know who they would be
happen. So on this logic, if there are in empty behavior, but indicative of real (male or female, an animal, someone
fact no philosophical zombies, there is consciousness: every bit as real as mine. poor, part of the upper class, etc)
no possibility of there being philosophi- Whether this would be the case or not is (emphasis mine). A major problem with
cal zombies, otherwise, there theyd be! the very issue in question. The mind-brain Rawls work is that non-human animals
In a deterministic universe the project of identity view is precisely the view that zombie are noticeably absent from his account.
physicalism is to explain what is happen- exact duplicates are not conceivable: if the Martha Nussbaums impressive Frontiers
ing, not to explain what might have hap- lights are on, somebody will, of necessity, of Justice (2007) considers this problem
pened but didnt. be home. For the mind-brain identity at length, attempting to address three
In short, Philip Goff is discussing the advocate, the zombie counter-example issues that create difficulties for Rawl-
implication of alternative possibilities can have no more force on our world sian philosophy disability, nationality,
within a model that logically excludes than the conceivability of a green swan and species membership. I suspect that
alternative possibilities. I believe the would have to a proposition about the she will not have the last word on the
physicalists may proceed with their work actual color of swans. matter, and that we will see non-
undisheartened. MATTHEW RAPAPORT, BY EMAIL humans considered in discussions of
DAVE MANGNALL political justice more and more in years
WILMSLOW, CHESHIRE DEAR EDITOR: Call me a physicalist if to come. So I suspect Rawls work will
you like, but Im struggling to imagine be ever more readily challenged for its
DEAR EDITOR: Regarding the last issue, I how a philosophical zombie can use its apparent failure.
first encountered zombies while reading five senses to negotiate the world around JOSH MILBURN, LANCASTER
David Chalmers The Character of Con- it just as I do, yet lack consciousness.
sciousness, where, as in Philip Goffs arti- How can it use its sense of sight yet not Afflicted by Science
cle, philosophical zombies (from here on have the sensation of seeing, use its sense DEAR EDITOR: Once a scientist, always
called zombies) are proposed as a of taste yet not taste the brains, etc? a scientist seems to be an affliction I
counter-example to the mind-brain iden- Using the senses without sensation would suffer from. Although I have recently
tity thesis. This famous thesis comes appear to be a logical impossibility. Hav- gained a number of postgraduate quali-

Letters
fications in Philosophy, it seems that my duced by irreversible chemical changes in theless, the lie treats Mother Teresa as an
initial training as a biochemist has the film emulsion, caused by the light object of deceit and (very slight) manipu-
embedded a pragmatism that ruins my reflected from the object. A digital image, lation, rather than as a person deserving
ability to think more philosophically. A on the other hand, is a matrix of numeri- an honest exchange that reflects the
great recent example came whilst reading cal values for colour and brightness at a respect due a rational and autonomous
Peter Bensons article The Ontology of large array of points. These may have soul. I suspect a simple, forthright state-
Photography in Issue 95. I found myself been accurately measured by a digital ment (e.g., Im very glad for the audi-
intrigued and fascinated as I pondering camera, but could equally have been set ence, but I really dont know what to say
the difference between analogue and dig- blind by a computer program. My claim to you!) would have elicited a more
ital pictures before my scientist head is that this matrix of numbers, once meaningful exchange.
kicked in. More specifically the part of recorded and stored, is cut off from its DON E. SCHEID,
me that processes X-ray diffraction origin and retains no trace of its cause. ARLINGTON, MINNESOTA
images collected on CCD detectors. Finally, it is ironic that Mr Moore should
Here I regularly find myself analyzing draw attention to the dangers of binary Pragmatism In Practice
the distribution of pixels in order to dis- either/or thinking. Digitalisation per- DEAR EDITOR: In Issue 95, Tibor Machan
tinguish between background levels and forms exactly such a reduction of every- makes an unconvincing argument about
the intensity peaks that represent my thing to binary, coding the whole world the impracticality of pragmatism. Gener-
data. As soon as you start performing as zeros and ones. ally, it is in the larger sphere of human
analyses at this level, you quickly dis- PETER BENSON, LONDON affairs that pragmatism is practical, such as
cover distributions of pixels in real digi- in open societies or democracies. Those
tal images that would be extremely diffi- DEAR EDITOR: I am astounded at some pragmatic institutions, where long held
cult, if not impossible, to fake, even with of the views expressed by Pamela Irvin principles dont necessarily have to be
the best Photoshop skills. So although Lazorko in her article Science and Non- abandoned but can coexist, are hard to
Peter Benson may not be able to distin- Science, published in your last issue, argue against. Machan focuses on ethical
guish a good fake digital photograph containing highly critical comments pragmatism, saying that in practise it
from a real one with his eyes, Im pretty against numerous people who have a wouldnt work. In doing so he is tossing
convinced I could distinguish it rather God-given gift of being able to gen- out the enhancing qualities of pragma-
easily using a couple of histograms. uinely assist others by means of clairvoy- tism, like giving a second chance, or not
Here we have what I perceive to be a ance and/or astrology. Her deductions destroying someone for the sake of a sin-
problem with philosophy, especially onto- are simply predicated on personal state- gle indiscretion. In former times one
logical arguments. Philosophers come up ments that there can be no independent would have been thrown in jail for life, on
with some great ideas that catch the imag- test of their validity and the vagueness principle, for stealing a loaf of bread to
ination; however, a weekend with a sci- of predictions avoids falsification pre- feed a family, or have had ones life
ence textbook often seems to deflate such cisely because they are ambiguous. I destroyed by a foolish sexual encounter.
arguments rather depressingly. Its one of suggest that her personal experiences in Pragmatism takes into account extenuat-
the reasons I have moved into ethics, these fields have been extremely limited ing circumstances. And because pragma-
because here at least philosophical think- and that she should now, with an open tism deals with dilemmas and contradic-
ing can occupy its own space without mind, seek wider knowledge and direct tions, it opens up issues for debate. The
making claims that can be ruined by participation in the presence of experts, alternative attitude shuts discussion down.
some simple mathematics or inconve- in order that she may test validity and Machan didnt consider one ethical
nient observations that everyone except ambiguity in a reasoned manner. I have issue that is currently receiving the prag-
the philosophers seems to know about. no doubt that her views are likely to matic treatment and is responding well
SIMON KOLSTOE, BOTLEY change considerably. gay rights and same-sex marriage. Amer-
MICHAEL HARRIS, EASTBOURNE ica for one has become more pragmatic
DEAR EDITOR: I would like to thank and open about gay issues. This has not
Anthony Moore (letters, Issue 96) for his Deceived About Deception necessarily come from a moral shift or an
response to my article on photography in DEAR EDITOR: In Lying to Mother abandonment of core values: it has come
Issue 95. He puts his finger on the central Teresa (Philosophy Now, Issue 95), Derek from a greater sense of fairness and inclu-
question, which is whether the difference Harrison convinces himself that his sion. More importantly, this pragmatism
between analogue and digital photogra- diplomatic lie to Mother Teresa was born of economic sense. Gays and les-
phy is one of degree (as he believes) or of harmed no one and was an act of good bians are good for business: they are cre-
kind (as I contend). However, I would will that may have achieved some benefit ative, responsible, and make ideal con-
like to emphasize that my argument is in the connectivity it provided for her. I sumers. Data also shows that people who
not primarily based on any claim that am no Kantian on the issue of lying, but live together in a union and share benefits
analogue images are less malleable than why gratuitously lie when nothing of as a couple (which same-sex marriages
digital, nor that they represent reality great moment depends on it? This is not would extend) are healthier and less of a
more precisely. My concern is with the a case like lying to Nazi soldiers as to the burden on the rest of society. This eco-
nature of the relation (both causal and whereabouts of Anne Frank. On balance, nomic argument may sounds crass, but it
ontological) between reality and its the consequences may have been all to does make pragmatic sense.
images. An analogue photograph is pro- the good, as Harrison suggests; never- DAVID AIRTH, TORONTO

Letters
DEAR EDITOR: If Pragmatism is imprac- anti-Nazi deans as Sir Alistair asserts. In then, Heidegger was still consorting with
tical, as argued by Tibor Machan in issue fact, Heidegger quit over the fallout leading Nazis three years after his elec-
95, what about the evidence of evolu- from his appointment of Erik Wolf as tion as rector of Freiburg University and
tion? This has worked for thousands of Dean of the Faculty of Law. Wolf, a rad- even after promulgation of the Nurem-
millions of years, developing practical ical Nazi, was a disciple and friend of berg Laws. When these facts are set
solutions without rules, and so Pragmati- Heideggers. Wolfs appointment as alongside Heideggers long-term party
cally. Or have I missed something? Dean and his subsequent political membership, his refusal to recant his
DR MARTIN WHEATMAN, BY EMAIL activism were opposed by other faculty Nazism, and his silence over the Holo-
members. The faculty opposition, and caust, it is clear that Heidegger was a rad-
DEAR EDITOR: I was disappointed in the alarm this caused within the local ical Nazi, not a reluctant one.
Impractical Pragmatism, Issue 95. It is Karlsruhe government, caused Heideg- DAVID CLARKE, HOBART, TASMANIA
astonishing to me this made it into your ger to resign. In other words, Heidegger
publication. That pragmatism means resigned because the university was not Hi Literacy
one thing to the lay public, and another radical enough and was resisting his DEAR EDITOR: I was quite pleased to read,
to (most) philosophers, is well known, enforcement of the Gleichschaltung. I Re-Read, Therefore I Understand by
and pretty basic. But theres no compre- Sir Alistair states that by autumn 1944 Kimberly Blessing in Issue 94. As I am not
hension of this difference in Impractical Heidegger had fallen so far from favour a student of philosophy, I was pleased to
Pragmatism, and it makes his whole with the Nazi hierarchy that he was find that within Descartes Principles of
argument implausible. Is there anyone in humiliatingly drafted into the Volkssturm Philosophy the steps one should take when
their right mind who thinks William (a sort of Nazi Home Guard)... This reading philosophy are exactly what I have
James would be stumped if presented also is misleading. In October 1944, been doing: To read philosophy articles,
with this critique of Pragmatism? James Hitler ordered the call-up of all men published journals and philosophers writ-
would be astonished at the notion that aged between 16 and 60 who were capa- ings over and over until they become
he, as a pragmatist, had to deny the value ble of physical labour. Heidegger was clear. Little did I know I was following
of basic principals and axioms! Absurd. drafted along with myriad others. Unlike the advice of such a great philosopher as
Further, that Pragmatism is not a tool the others, however, a letter for Heideg- Descartes. Seemed like common sense to
for all uses was a point made by William gers release from these duties was sent me. Descartes approach to reaching
James. But we dont say a hammer is not on his behalf by Eugen Fischer, Ger- everyone has indeed reached me. If I can
of value because it fails as a saw. manys leading eugenicist. Further, it is eventually get it, there is, without doubt,
DAVID WRIGHT, SACTO, CA worth noting that as late as mid-1943, hope for everyone.
Heidegger remained so much in favour The author of this article rightly says
Heidegger Cant Hide with the hierarchy that the Ministry of Its not an easy, passive activity. I have
DEAR EDITOR: Sir Alistair MacFarlanes Education sanctioned a delivery of paper taken up reading philosophy because it is
Brief Life of Martin Heidegger (issue 94) to publish some of his lectures, and later difficult. Somehow it helps organize my
is informative, but contains important that year, even authorised him to travel brain; and then I apply this better focus
errors of historical fact. to Strasbourg on vacation. to all sorts of reading, accomplished
Sir Alistair states that Heidegger Sir Alistair states about Heideggers through extreme concentration. And I
joined the Nazi Party to allow him to be involvement with Nazism that he have a whole new vocabulary and a list of
put forward for the rectorship of the realised he had made a terrible choice philosophers primary texts I enjoy
University of Freiburg. This suggests [and] tried to recover from the conse- reading. Philosophy Now has turned out to
that Heidegger was reluctant to join the quences. This is nonsense. In May 1934 be my personal tutorial.
Party and did so only to become rector. shortly after Heideggers resignation as CHERYL ANDERSON, KENILWORTH, IL
In fact, Heidegger became rector and, in rector the Commission for the Philoso-
a grand public ceremony, joined the phy of Law was established by Hans Low Literacy
Nazi Party shortly thereafter. The point Frank. Members of the commission were DEAR EDITOR: Reading Thomas Rod-
is that Heidegger was a vociferous sup- chosen by Frank and included Heideg- hams views on Jane Austens ethics in
porter of Hitler and National Socialism ger, Julius Streicher and Alfred Rosen- Issue 94 was mostly interesting. I did
before he became rector, or even joined berg. Frank, Streicher and Rosenberg however cavil at his view that Austen
the Party. Indeed, the inscription under were all leading Nazis, and all were exe- doesnt meet contemporary literary
his official rectorial portrait helpfully cuted in 1946 for war crimes. Heidegger standards as her characters do not have
supplies the reason for his election: Im loathed Streicher, as did many Nazis, but the subtle psychological realism of mod-
Zuge der allgemeinen Gleichschaltung [As he remained a member of the commis- ern novelists. If this were true, neither
part of the general bringing into line]. sion until at least 1936. It is further probably do those of Tolstoy or Virginia
The Gleichschaltung was a movement to worth noting that Heidegger remained a Woolf. Its a familiar modern moan, that
bring all state institutions into line with member of the Party after promulgation only todays standards have real value,
the requirements and ethos of National of the Nuremberg Laws of September often translated as the Simpsons are
Socialism, and Heidegger was among its and November 1935. These laws institu- more reflective of, and so more relevant
most enthusiastic prosecutors. Neither tionalised antisemitism and effected the to modern life, than Shakespeare. But
did Heidegger resign as rector because he complete disenfranchisement of Jews even more off the mark is Rodhams
refused to support the removal of two from German citizenship. In summary, belief that plot in real/modern novels is

Letters
driven by the characters. Even if true in observations of changes of condition: dictated, one might say, by consumerism
some modern novels, this omits one of lightning, rain, puddles evaporating, sun- in general. That is what Hirsts art/phe-
the cornerstones of real life, namely, the rise a host of different forms. Some nomena represents. In particular, the
vagaries of chance that even fully events pendulums, springs, atomic cultural trends of today (and perhaps of
expressed modern characters must some- vibrations we assume repeat invariably. any era) are sponsored and so imposed
times put up with, even when they think This fact provides us with the means to by the wealthy, who, having plenty of
they are driving the plot forward. compare all types of changes in units money, can decide what goes on paper,
HOWARD DEWHIRST, accurately standardised to the distance in books, into exhibitions, on TV, and so
BURLEIGH HEADS, AUSTRALIA light travels in them, although they on. This happens while those who do not
themselves derive from the nearly-regular have money and time at their disposal
Tallis Through The Looking Glass Earth cycles of rotation and orbit. watch opportunities to develop their tal-
DEAR EDITOR: As Raymond Tallis dis- We detect our surroundings using ent disappear behind their day-to-day
cusses in Draining the River and Quiv- sensory information. A clock bell chimes jobs, behind their struggle to survive. In
ering the Arrow, Issue 95, in order to across the meadow but is heard signifi- fact, the latter will have few possibilities
measure the flow of time we need some- cantly after the hammer strikes. The fur- to do things against a culture that doesnt
thing not caught up in that flow. The ther away, the more delay. Visually, this represent them properly. But I guess that
paradox is that to measure time, we need applies to the clock face also, in nanosec- everybody reading this would agree that
a device outside of time itself. Clocks are onds. We each have a unique Tempo- not everyone who writes best-selling
our attempt to achieve this, and they rama surrounding us: the further we look, books, for instance, are the best artists in
work using cyclical processes (the cycle the longer ago. What we view now is a their field. At the same time, not all
of the planets, mechanical movements of stream of light-data about events else- those who do not influence culture,
pendulums, or the oscillations of atoms) where, providing no certain knowledge of because of not having enough money
whose repetitions are largely unaffected the when of any event, unless we know and/or time, lack the talent to make good
by the everyday flux of events. how far away it occurred. art. In fact their ideas may be better than
If we now consider our subjective Astronauts radio messages from the those promoted by the rich. This is the
experience of time, we also need a com- Moon took just over a second to reach paradox of human culture: sometimes
ponent of our being unchanged by the Earth: reception of our replies was simi- those who have the teeth do not have the
flux of events processed by our minds. I larly delayed. Doesnt such symmetry bread, and vice versa. But hey, perhaps
only perceive the flow of time because I suggest a common Now for both Earth this is just the sad reality: the wealthy are
am not part of it. Or, what T.S. Eliot and Moon? Doesnt this also imply a the ones who will impose culture, unless
describes as the still point of the turning Cosmos-wide Now? And if far-off galax- one is ready to fight cultural battles with
world is the essential rock of psycholog- ies shine anciently from their positions at little support. So I cannot really under-
ical stability about which the flux of the time their light we now see set out, in stand why Tallis is puzzled by Hirsts
events ebb and flow. This timeless being a Cosmic Now, what is happening to success, when such an artist clearly
is not of course eternal, since eventually them Now (and where)? adapts to, and is sponsored by, the whim-
we are overwhelmed by the flux. How- ARTHUR MORRIS, EASTBOURNE driven rich. Its all part of the cultural
ever, while it is present, we have this sta- milieu of our times.
ble timeless (and using similar argu- DEAR EDITOR: I would like to respond to FABIO COPPONI, LONDON
ments, spaceless) entity I call myself. the article Raymond Tallis wrote on
When the passage of time is derived Damien Hirst in Issue 93. I can under- More Fallacies
from this perspective, the philosophical stand his frustration with Hirsts art, and DEAR EDITOR: Oscar Pearsons letter on
errors causing the issues described by with the market such art is benefiting the moral responsibility of individual
Tallis are exposed. They have occurred from. However, it looks to me as if Tallis versus collective carbon emissions in
because we have misplaced the actual misses the most important point which is Issue 95 begs correction. His argument is
source of time to an object called a clock, that fine art, as indeed literature, music, a variation of the fallacy of composition.
when the real source is me. Clock time and any other form of expression, is the This fallacy is inferring that, since an
now takes its subservient place as a pro- child of its culture. Thus in our History of individual component on its own is not a
jection of our interior timeless state onto Visual Culture we say that in the period problem, then it isnt part of a problem
the temporal world. The practical advan- from the end of the Roman Empire to the when all components are added together.
tage of clocks is we can all coordinate our early Renaissance, for instance, human Kudos to Pearson for pointing out an
actions for our mutual benefit. The beings did not lose the ability to do art like environmental obstacle invisible to
philosophical error occurs when we try the Greeks or the Romans; rather they BBCs Total Wipeout producers in award-
to derive our subjective experience of were not concerned in making art like ing him a free trans-Atlantic trip. But
time from what that is merely a socially that, as they were under different cultural will St Peter deduct points for his accept-
useful projection of that experience. influences. However, in Renaissance times ing the trip, leaving him to ponder eter-
DR STEVE BREWER, ST IVES, CORNWALL Classical culture re-emerged, for various nally the harm to future generations of
cultural reasons. carbon dioxides long tail, to which tail
DEAR EDITOR: Regarding Raymond Similarly, to me the art of today he has contributed by flying, even if his
Talliss column on time in Issue 95: should be analysed as being a product of contribution is insignificant?
Time is a notion conceived from our the culture of today. Ours is a culture PETER SHEPHERD, TORONTO

BLACK MIRROR
REFLECTIONS
Terri Murray illustrates Marcuses critique of
Television technologised society using an episode of the

British TV series Black Mirror.
I
n One Dimensional Man (1964) and and public existence, and between indi- feelings of love or intimacy (see Herbert
Repressive Tolerance (1965), German vidual and social needs. It shapes the entire Marcuses critique of happy conscious-
philosopher and political theorist universe of discourse and action, of intel- ness and consumer society, Janske
Herbert Marcuse claimed that developing lectual and material culture. Hermens, 2009, p.7, from the net). Sexu-
technology institutes new, more effective, To make matters worse, in Black ality has been reduced to a commodity
and more pleasant Mirror, Bings watching is rewarded in where it is for sale. It is controllable, and it
forms of social direct proportion to the exploitative insidi- functions as an instrument to suppress
control and ousness of the content viewed. Not possible revolt against the establishment. In
social cohe- watching pornography incurs penalties. this way pornography supplies the needs of
sion, Gaming which involves obscene virtual the dominant system.
making violence against the yellow-clad working Marcuse recognized that sublimated
totali- class is another popular way to earn forms of traditional sexuality like marriage
tarian points. Marcuse argued that pornography were repressive, in that property was passed
control is a tool in the dominant economic through male heirs, and marriage provided
through systems arsenal of repression, allowing free domestic labour and sexual release for
terrorisa- people a release mechanism for their frus- men, ensuring that they had just enough
tion unnec- tration with the system, thereby comfort to remain productive, while
essary. preventing them from directing their keeping women economically dependent
Rather, pent-up energies against it. It also reduces and confined to conventionally feminine
advanced sexuality to another commodity a roles such as childcare and housework. But
industrial society product that can be bought and sold. he also believed that the apparently greater
Herbert Marcuse creates false needs Marcuse contrasted the desublimation liberty offered by desublimated forms of
(1898-1979) which integrate offered by sexual release through pornog- sexual expression like pornography worked
individuals into the existing system of raphy to Freuds sublimation. For Freud, in for rather than against the status quo of
production and consumption via mass for example Civilization and its Discontents general repression: now sex is integrated
media, advertising, and industrial manage- (1930), civilized society requires the indi- into all aspects of life and is thus made
ment. 15 Million Merits, the second vidual to sublimate his or her most basic more susceptible to being an instrument of
episode of British TV series Black Mirror sexual urges repress them by channeling control. Moreover, it is gratifying to the
(Channel 4, 2011), co-written by Charlie them into socially acceptable romantic or individuals being managed in this way,
Brooker and Konnie Huq, presents a elevated forms. By contrast, Marcuse since it is fun, which ensures their volun-
perfect platform for exploring some of argues that pornographic desublimation tary compliance, and creates a harmony
Marcuses most prophetic observations. pulls the instincts down and directs them between the individuals needs and socially-
towards an artificial and dehumanized satis- required desires and aspirations (see One
Sex and the System faction, fostering a kind of sexu- Dimensional Man: Studies in the
The tragic hero of this episode is Bing, ality that is Ideology of the Advanced
a man whose very name is an onomatopoeia completely Industrial Society,
for something popping up on a screen. detached 1964, p.75).
Bing inhabits a dystopic future (or allegor- from Thus
ical present?) in which life has literally
been reduced to a vicious cycle of mean-
ingless drudgery, as the alienated masses
BLACK MIRROR STILLS ZEPPOTRON PRODUCTIONS 2011
churn out their days on exercise bikes

which power the ubiquitous flat screens
whose contents are both products of this
endless labor and rewards for it. The
stream of images invades even the private
lives of Bing and his fellow drones, filling
the walls of their tiny sleeping compart-
ments. Similarly, Marcuse observed that
The
the modern apparatus of production and entertainment
distribution creates a total system that industry
obliterates the opposition between private

this system of sexual freedom incorporates As Marcuse points out, in advanced
sex into the system of commodity produc- industrial society the individual reproduces
tion and exchange in a way which makes us and so perpetuates the controls exercised
happy to submit and unlikely to protest. by her society. Moreover, the dominant
system no longer needs to introject its
Momentary Reality
Bing manages to avoid the more abusive
forms of controlled release for his sexual
and aggressive urges, and finally accumu-
lates a healthy 15,000,000 merits for his
values into the individual from without,
since that implies the existence of an inner
dimension or conscience apart from, and
antagonistic to, the external pressures of
public opinion and behaviour. Today,
Television
judges, All you see is not people, just
hours of mind-numbing, soul-destroying however, this private space has been fodder fake fodder! Here Charlie
screen pedalling. Then one day his toil is invaded and eroded through technology. Brooker is evidently putting his own
suddenly interrupted by something that Advanced industrial society silences and protests about society on Bings lips: all we
seems to transcend the system. Bing hears reconciles the opposition, transforming know anymore is fake fodder, and the only
kinds of dreams we have are consumer
dreams buying a new app for our own
screen, for example. We also are becoming
too numb for anything free and real and
beautiful. Bing tells the judges, When you
find any wonder whatsoever you dole it out
in meager portions, where its augmented
and packaged and pumped through ten
thousand pre-assigned filters, til its nothing
more than a meaningless series of lights,
while we ride, day-in and day-out. Going
where? Powering what? All tiny cells and
tiny screens and bigger cells and bigger
screens and f**k you! F**k you for sitting
there and slowly making things worse!
Bing watching After a pregnant pause, the Simon
Abi gyrate Cowell-like Judge Hope (Rupert Everett)
delivers his solemn verdict. That was, he
says, without a doubt... the most heartfelt
thing Ive seen on this stage since Hot Shots
the voice of fellow drone, Abi, beautifully reason into submission. The result is began. The crowd cheers. Bing, some-
singing to herself in the unisex toilets at mimesis: an immediate identification of the what bewildered by this tolerance, is being
work. Starved of all real human interaction, individual with her society. And so Abi is softened up for integration into the domi-
Bing wants nothing more than to give his indeed still there for them but this nant order of things. His anger, which
15,000,000 merits to Abi so that she can means for the system whose all-pervasive simultaneously expresses the repressed
achieve the only ambition conceivable artificiality had made her voice stand out anger of viewers and provides a nice, safe,
within this totalitarian technocracy appear as something real. Now her entire identity commercially-viable medium for its
on Hot Shots, an X-Factor-like talent show. has been occupied and formed from within catharsis, will be given a slot on one of
The lyrics of the song she sings on Hot the dominant system, with its constant Judge Hopes streams. As such, his anger
Shots foreshadow her fate. She sings, You advertisements and manufactured shared will be managed, controlled and trans-
can blame me, try to shame me, and still Ill desires and beliefs. Her inner dimension formed into a commodity. Bings rejection
care for you. You can run around, even put has been eradicated, replaced by the social of the system fits perfectly into the supply-
me down, still Ill be there for you. The needs and public uses for her body and and-demand economy, and any threat it
judges recognize Abis talent but only as mind. Soon Bing is forced to watch Abis might pose is absorbed into the dominant
more fodder for their oppressive machine. semi-nude body filling the screens in system. Bings revolt is thus put to work
They politely explain to Abi that she has pornographic poses while her voice is all for the Establishment, and its popular
only one chance to make it she can only but silenced. appeal will produce revenues to sustain it.
save herself from the endless hamster wheel After all, as the Judge explains, Authen-
by transforming herself into a hyper-sexual- The Recuperation of Rage ticity is in woefully short supply.
ized object. In a sinister twist, the judges Bing is the only person who can see how In Repressive Tolerance (1964), Marcuse
turn her lyrics back on her and do try to perverted it all is. He plots his revenge, explained that what is proclaimed as toler-
shame Abi by pointing out that the millions patiently churning out another 15,000,000 ance is often merely serving the cause of
of consumers out there who are pedalling in merits to buy his way onto Hot Shots in oppression. New language and ideas may
order to watch her sing deserve to have the order to confront the panel of judges. Once be spoken and heard, but they are immedi-
chance for success that only she has been on stage during the live broadcast, he holds ately evaluated in terms of public language
offered. Abis only reasonable option is to a shard of glass to his own neck and begins a language that has determined before-
submit to their desires. to rage against the machine, telling the hand the direction in which thought-

processes will move. Bings attempts to
persuade viewers to an opposing viewpoint
is bound to fail because the avenues are
closed to ideas other than the established
ones. As Judge Hope explains to Bing,
people dont fully comprehend what it is
that Bing is saying about the whole situa-
tion, they just feel it; and since it feels
good, its the perfect product to sell back to
BLACK MIRROR STILL ZEPPOTRON PRODUCTIONS 2011

the people not as a danger to the estab-
lished order, but as yet more fuel for its
preservation. Thus the satisfaction of the
individuals need for protest has been
perfectly incorporated into the system that
keeps them oppressed.
The commercial and political method
used, Marcuse says, is to unify opposites Bing and Abi reflect on
into a single dimension. So the media of their situation
the established order exhibit anything that
contradicts that order as a token of its altering environmental variables generates important things to say about how tech-
truth, closing down any discourse that is unfree, but happy, citizens. The character nology shapes the universe of human
not on its own terms. The efficacy of the Frazie describes the determinants of human discourse and action how it institutes
system, says Marcuse, is that it blunts the behaviour to Castle, who foolishly believes new, more effective, and ever-more-
individuals recognition that it broadcasts free will still exists. He says Castles pleasing forms of social control. The title
no facts that communicate its repressive mistake is to imagine that physical of the series is a reference to blank TV and
power. The concept of alienation seems to restraint, handcuffs, iron bars and force computer screens. But Brookers black
become questionable when the individuals exhaust the means of controlling human mirror cannot fully reflect back to us the
identify themselves with the existence behaviour. Force or threat is a poor way of terrifying image of what we have become
which is imposed upon them he writes in controlling human behaviour, he explains, and how helpless we are against the totali-
Repressive Tolerance. since the controllee knows he is being tarian media manipulation of our needs and
coerced and doesnt feel free, therefore he is desires by vested interests. This is because
Freedom is Control not loyal to his masters. Frazie further the institutions he critiques have already
Some might protest that surely this is explains that positive reinforcement exerts assimilated his message. In fact, what is so
scaremongering that vastly overestimates a subtler and more powerful control over remarkable (and depressing) about Black
the indoctrinating power of the media. the individual. When an individual behaves Mirror is that these hour-long television
Marcuse would say that this objection as the masters want him to behave, the episodes constantly reference their own
misses the point. The mass distribution of masters allow him to create a situation he impotence and obsolescence: they are
radio and television and the centralization likes, or remove one he doesnt like. This about how the system absorbs the very
of their control is not the beginning of the way the controllee feels as though he is energies that oppose it, eviscerating and
indoctrination: rather, it expresses and doing exactly what he wants to do. And precluding any intelligent rejection, or
perpetuates power relationships and class since the masters control the motives, the even widespread recognition, of its mind-
distinctions that already exist only it desires, the wishes of citizens, although numbing, sense-deadening cycle of oppres-
makes them invisible by flattening out the theyre more controlled than ever before, sion. But Black Mirrors inability to tran-
conflicts that exist between satisfied and the controlled nevertheless feel free. This scend the dominant industrial forces to
unsatisfied needs. If everyone reads the being so, the question of their freedom which he calls our attention is not some
same newspapers, watches the same TV never arises. They dont revolt against the failure on Brookers part. On the contrary,
programs and tweets in the same social very things that make them act the way his genius is to show us why the mirror he
networks, this is not indicative of the eradi- they do. They do not even have a vocabu- holds up to our society cannot reflect
cation of class differences, but of the extent lary of freedom concerning what they want anything. The very fact that his project is
to which the individual has been persuaded to do, since men only feel unfree when they just another TV show, assimilated as
to identify the needs of the technologised are up against police and jails. Frazie says, another enjoyable escapist product that we
establishment as his own. The technical What is emerging at this critical stage in want to consume another entertaining,
controls appear to be the very embodiment the evolution of society is a behavioural and pleasant instrument of our systematic
of Reason for the benefit of all social cultural technology based on positive rein- repression and pacification makes his
groups and interests, to such an extent that forcement alone. Since positive reinforce- mirror absorb all the light it might other-
all non-compliance seems irrational, ment (reward) works and the negative rein- wise shed on our reality.
neurotic or impotent. forcement (punishment) of the past doesnt, DR TERRI MURRAY 2013
In 1948, the behavioural psychologist explains Frazie, cultural design is now more Terri Murray is a philosopher, author and
B.F. Skinner published a sci-fi novel called successful than ever before. nerd. She has taught philosophy and film
Walden Two, which envisages a socially- Charlie Brooker, who is a newspaper studies at Hampstead College of Fine Arts in
engineered society in which systematically columnist as well as a scriptwriter, has London since 2002.

Eleni Panagiotarakou benefits from Nassim Nicholas
Talebs attack on the follies of over-cautiousness, while
Richard Baron inspects different ideas of the self. Books
Antifragile, by strength with each blow. Organic systems tradition. This is anathema for Taleb
Nassim Nicholas Taleb are seen by Taleb as inherently antifragile. because not only does he reject the Enlight-
Subject bones to (limited) strain and they enment premise that the world is knowable
ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT become stronger; deprive bones from all (much less malleable according to human
Gain from Disorder (2012), stress and they become fragile. This is the desires), he is also sympathetic to ancestral
alongside Fooled by Ran- principle of hormesis: even if theyre harmful traditions and religions on account of their
domness: The Hidden Role of in large doses, small doses of stressors stimu- useful heuristics [rules of thumb] and social
Chance in Life and in the Markets (2005) and late an organism to increase its resistance. codes heuristics and social codes, one
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly By contrast, artificial, man-made systems are should add, that often elude our under-
Improbable (2007) completes Nassim seen as inherently fragile. standing. An example of this validation of
Nicholas Talebs trilogy on disorder. According to Taleb, one of the follies of the enigmatic is found in the section Via
Whereas Fooled by Randomness focused on modernity is the deliberate repression of dis- Negativa. After disparaging three-times-a-
our underestimation of chance, and The ruption in natural and non-natural systems day meal regimes, Taleb points out that
Black Swan on rare events and our failure to alike. The policy of wildfire suppression is recent medical studies hailing the beneficial
predict them, the focus of Antifragile is on invoked as an example in the case of natural effects of caloric restriction and intermittent
things that gain from the disorder cluster, systems. Until recently, all wildfires were fasting for longevity and protection against
which includes elements such as random- considered destructive to forest ecology and diseases, are validating ancient religious
ness, volatility, uncertainty, disturbances, were quickly extinguished. The folly of this fasting interdicts (p.361). Talebs fondness
and stressors in other words, antifragile policy is becoming more apparent with the for complex ancestral heuristics mirrors that
things are things that positively benefit publication of new ecological studies docu- of Michael Oakeshott, for whom, as Taleb
from being subject to a little chaos. menting the previously-unknown beneficial says, traditions provide an aggregation of
One of Talebs starting arguments here effects of small wildfires for fire-adapted filtered collective knowledge (p.258).
is the idea that we live in a world which, due species. In the absence of frequent, small, Ironically, Talebs caustic critique of the
to its complexity, not only we do not under- beneficial fires, that have been prevented by Enlightenment with its over-focus on ratio-
stand, but could not possibly hope to human beings, flammable materials accumu- nalism, traces its source back to the ancient
understand. Rather than despair at this late on the forest floor, paving the way for figure of Socrates. I write ironically
truth, Taleb proposes that we accept, love, the rare but ultimately inevitable large fires, because Taleb holds a deep reverence for
and learn to thrive in it: amor fati. This sen- which are catastrophic. In other words, ancient Mediterranean thinkers. Nonethe-
timent is captured in the Prologue, How to extinguishing naturally-occurring small fires less, Taleb invokes Nietzsches acerbic
Love the Wind, where one reads the rous- in a system which has evolved symbiotic attack on (Platos) Socrates in The Birth of
ing poetic call: Wind extinguishes a candle relationships with small fires over the span Tragedy (1872), where Nietzsche makes the
and energizes fire. Likewise with random- of millennia is not good stewardship: it is accusation that Socrates disrupted the deli-
ness, uncertainty, chaos: you want to use humanity under the influence of modern cate balance between the rational, self-
them, not hide from them. You want to be arrogance dressed up as reason. restrained, intellectual Apollonian forces
the fire and wish for the wind. (p.3). This Talebs arguments in such seemingly dis- and the irrational, chaotic, passionate
demand for the revaluation of the random- parate areas as banking, education, Dionysian forces that characterized Hel-
ness of life is based on his classification of medicine, nutrition and politics (to mention lenic culture (pp.249-256). The ensuing
things into three categories: Fragile, Robust but a few) are best understood within his ascendency of the Apollonian spirit saw its
and Antifragile. Fragile is what is harmed by overall critique of modern
Damocles
exposure to disturbances; robust is what rationalising, and by impli- dining
remains the same; and antifragile (a neolo- cation, of the Enlighten- dangerously
gism), as mentioned, is what benefits from ment. (To be sure, if we
an exposure to disruption. The legendary were to classify ways of
Damocles, who dined with a sword over his thinking, modern reason-
head hanging by a single thread of hair, ing would be assigned to
represents the ultimate fragile figure any the fragile category,
minute could have meant his death. The Medieval European in the
mythological Phoenix, who was reborn robust, and Ancient
from his ashes, is depicted as a robust Mediterranean thinking in
figure, remaining the same through each the antifragile category.)
cataclysm. Hydra, the many-headed serpent As we know, in embracing
who grew two heads to replace every one the authority of reason,
that was cut off by Hercules, is seen as the the Enlightenment
ultimate antifragile creature, gaining rejected the authority of
Book Reviews July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 45

Books
zenith in the Enlightenment during the sev- instability result in higher degrees of distur- nion, this flneur, himself a former financial
enteenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. bance later. The lesson is that imposing sta- trader, argues that the asymmetric nature of
bility for stabilitys sake often only worsens bonuses consisting of incentives for suc-
The Complacency of Rationalism a complex situation. Instead, long-term sta- cess without a corresponding disincentive
One of Nietzsches projects was the bility in complex systems is best attained via for failure results in the build-up of
recuperation of the Dionysian spirit. This frequent, small-scale volatility. In the world hidden risks in the financial system which
also appears to be one of the unstated of finance and corporations, the message is eventually leads to catastrophes. Bonuses
objectives of Antifragile. I am not suggest- that bigger is not necessarily better or, as invite bankers to play the system by hiding
ing that Taleb is rejecting rationalism Taleb puts it, Size makes you fragile. The the risks of rare and hard-to-predict but
quite the contrary. His discourse on non- same argument is applied to the realm of consequential blow-ups. The 2007 melt-
linearity and the principles of convexity political governance, where Taleb (who down of the subprime mortgage market in
(pp.263-300), along with the Appendix identifies himself as a deontic libertarian) the United States, which in turn caused the
(pp.435-480), which contains enough argues for smaller-scale, decentralized gov- global financial crisis, is given as an example
ernment. The model of of such a blow-up. Turning his gaze to the
Trading
floor ancient city-states is wisdom of the ancients, Taleb finds the
seen as superior to that antidote in Babylonian and Roman practices
of modern nation-states. and laws that demanded accountability. For
Behemoth states like the example, the Romans used to oblige engi-
former USSR are seen neers to sleep underneath their newly-built
as something to be bridges a rather good accountability strat-
avoided, not emulated. egy, according to this author.
Their top-down models Talebs ethical cri de coeur against
are seen as devoid of the bankers and others with no skin in the
hunger for trial and game culminates in his Naming Names
error from which the section, where we see him verbally lashing
tinkering with and prominent politicians, academics, and
improving of complex economists. He labels many of these fig-
systems stems (p.226). ures Fragilistas, due to their tendency to
graphs and technical discussions to trigger fragilize our society by depriving variabil-
an anxiety attack in a mathphobe, is imbued The Wrath of Taleb ity-loving systems of variability through
with the Apollonian qualities of razor-sharp Taleb offers numerous suggestions for their nave rationalism (p.427). But public
concision and rigorous analysis. If the book making our world a less fragile place. He figures are not the only ones on the receiv-
reads in a non-boring, enjoyable fashion, argues that less is more: that, instead of ing end of his scolding. Neurotically over-
the reader should not be fooled into think- introducing thousands of pages of regula- protective parents (soccer moms) are like-
ing that this is a simple, shallow, unrational tion to institutions, we should instead be wise castigated for sucking volatility and so
book; Taleb makes Herculean efforts to adapting basic anti-fragile principles and challenge out of their childrens lives
communicate clearly otherwise complex concepts. One such concept is the so-called (pp.242-243). Prison-like structured sched-
theories. Rather, what he rejects here is skin in the game an expression alleged to ules for children, and medication for some
nave rationalism namely, the idea that have been coined by Warren Buffett to refer modern paediatric disorders such as
everything is understandable, and so con- to a situation where executives use their own ADHD, often administered in complicity
trollable, by our limited minds. This same resources to buy stock in the company with doctors and teachers, are cited as
nave rationalism, which holds that our theyre administering. Such involved inter- examples of damaging Procrustean-like
world is understandable and hence manipu- est leads to greater levels of responsibility. actions depriving children of exposure to
lable, has led to large-scale domination of Moreover, Taleb calls the absence of skin in risk, and so the chance to grow.
the environment, the systemic smoothing the game the largest fragilizer for our soci- Talebs prose is discursive and flows in a
of the worlds jaggedness, and the stifling of ety, due to the ever-increasingly-opaque clear and pleasing manner. Taleb also
volatility and stressors (p.108) which is environment in which players operate. He offers his readers plenty of nuggets of
neither good nor desirable. As mentioned, argues that we have reached a point in his- wisdom gained from Mother Nature,
in the case of natural systems the suppres- tory where people in power exert control empirical science, and his own life experi-
sion of small wildfires leads eventually to over situations where they can, and do, ences as an ex-trader. Lin Yutang once
destructive infernos. In the area of interna- bring great harm to others while they escape wrote: The wise man reads both books
tional relations, support for despotic, unsta- unscathed themselves or worse, derive and life itself. Antifragile is a product of
ble regimes in the Middle East equally pro- benefits from the chaos. Culprits include such wise reading.
vides only short-term stability. When the armchair warmongering journalists or DR ELENI PANAGIOTARAKOU 2013
inevitable revolutions finally take place, politicians with no relatives in war zones, Eleni Panagiotarakou is an Assistant Professor
theyre marked by a high degree of vio- bureaucrats, CEOs, and bankers. Bankers, at Concordia University, Montreal, where she
lence, as the unfolding events in Syria now who privatize their gains but socialize their teaches Political Theory.
demonstrate. Likewise, in the banking losses by transferring the downside to share-
sector, support for near-collapsing, near- holders and/or taxpayers, are singled out to Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, by
insolvent banks eventually leads to blow- receive the bulk of Talebs ethical wrath. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Random House, 2012,
ups. Higher degrees of suppression of Prompted, as it were, by his Socratic daimo- 560 pages, $33.00, ISBN: 978-1846141560.
46 Philosophy Now July/August 2013 Book Reviews

Books
The Self and Self-
Self-Knowledge within twenty miles of it.
Knowledge, edited
Moving on to our knowledge of our- Jane Heal opens the discussion of self-
by Annalisa Coliva selves, there are several possibilities. One is knowledge by setting out some underlying
WHAT COUNTS AS A that we work out our beliefs, desires and structures that might explain its special fea-
person? We think we sensations by observing ourselves. Another tures. We might reveal ourselves to our-
know our own beliefs, is that our beliefs, desires and sensations are selves through how we perceive the world.
desires and sensations, automatically presented to us, so that we Alternatively, our expressions of our internal
but what kind of knowledge is that? And know we have them without our needing to states might be aspects of those states.
how secure is that knowledge? deliberately observe or work anything out. Annalisa Coliva and Akeel Bilgrami develop
These are big philosophical questions, So if you believe that Sacramento is the cap- the bold line that when someone expresses
and this collection of essays by eleven lead- her beliefs as things to which she is commit-
ing philosophers shows just how much our ted, those expressions have to be correct.
thinking about them has advanced in recent That is, they make an inviolable connection
years. Unfortunately, I only have space to between sincerely expressing a belief and
mention some of the contributors here. commitment to it. This connection reflects
If there is a theme through this book, it norms of rationality, and does not leave the
is that to understand the self we need to expression secondary to the belief.
interweave several strands in our thinking: Lucy OBrien considers our knowledge
for instance, that the concept of the self of our actions. She shows how problems
STILL PICTURE FROM FANTASTIC PLANET ARGOS FILMS, 1973

has an ethical dimension, or that concepts arise for the ideas that each action is pre-
of rationality have special roles to play, or ceded by trying to act and that this trying
that you only have beliefs and feelings if grounds our knowledge of our action. She
you are disposed to state them. generalises from this to discuss how a
The first of these strands is visible in mechanism that we construct to solve a
Carol Rovanes essay, in which she makes philosophical problem may bring more
use of her ethical criterion of personhood. problems in its wake a lesson worth heed-
For her, a person is not necessarily a bio- ing. Another valuable lesson is taught by
logical organism: a person is an entity that Paul Snowdons discussion of claims like I
pursues its own coherent projects as a sin- am in pain or This image (presented by
gle entity, with one set of thoughts. A an optician) seems to me to be more
group of people who all think individually, blurred than that one. Discussions of self-
and who might disagree, does not count as knowledge often assume that the speaker
a person on this criterion. But a tightly- ital of California, or if you desire chocolate, must know the truth of such claims.
knit team of people who thought and acted or if you have a headache, you just know that Snowdon challenges this assumption. The
as one, could count as a person. One aspect you have that belief, or that desire, or that general lesson is that widespread assump-
of the ethical dimension is that we should headache, without having to make any tions are worth challenging.
respect peoples projects. observations of yourself. A third possibility is The views expressed in this book are
It is pretty radical for Rovane not to that if you sincerely express a belief or wide-ranging, and some authors disagree
start with the biological body as the basic desire, that means you have a belief or with others. Overall, the book gives a good
criterion of personhood. One reason why desire. If I ask you about the shape of the idea of what analytic philosophy is like these
it is so radical is that thoughts are in the Earth, and you sincerely say I believe that days. There are lots of carefully-defined
heads of individual bodies. Moreover, we the Earth is round, then you have that views, and disagreements keep on emerging;
naturally think of persons as individual belief. All of these possibilities, and more, sometimes in ways, and for reasons, that one
bodies. But does that prove anything, or are considered in this book, although the would not expect, for example, when
could we just be making a mistake in our idea that we look at ourselves and then work Christopher Peacocke argues that fear is not
natural intuitions? out what we believe, desire or feel, gets short made up of an awareness of danger plus
Christopher Peacocke says that our shrift. The range of options reflects the need some attitude, like anxiety about danger.
thoughts really ought to prove something. to accommodate several points. We seem to The reader who is already immersed in the
He makes the point that how we think of have rock-solid knowledge of our own states topic will recognize many of the views, and
ourselves as ourselves ought to give us a of mind: you may not know the right answer will spot new moves in the debate. The
good general guide to what it is to be a to some factual question, or what you ought reader who is new to the field will have to
self. He reflects on how we file and inte- to want, but you must know what you think work hard to map out the different views
grate our experiences, then goes on to rescue is the right answer, or what you do want. and the common themes, but that itself will
the self from David Humes famous chal- And it would be very odd to ask someone be a most rewarding mental exercise.
lenge to the whole concept. Hume claimed how she knew that she was in pain; so that RICHARD BARON 2013
in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) that kind of knowledge seems to be immediate Richard Baron is a philosopher in London. His
when he looked within himself, he could find and incontrovertible. On the other hand, we website is www.rbphilo.com
only perceptions, not a self. Peacocke argues can sincerely say we think one thing, but act
that the self can exist as the subject of con- as if we think something else. Someone can The Self and Self-Knowledge edited by Annalisa
scious states without itself being an object of sincerely say they believe that a volcano will Coliva, Oxford University Press, 2012, 304 pages,
perception. never erupt again, but always avoid going 45 hb, ISBN 978-0-19-959065-0
Book Reviews July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 47

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Could The Universe
allis Give A Toss?
T in
Wonderland Raymond Tallis thinks about probability and the frozen
world of quantum mechanics.
T
he other week at the Hay Festival of 100 Hs raise our suspicion of a bent or ber of Hs: a history of coin-tosses is not in
in Wales, I gave a talk Has Physics even two-headed coin? itself an event, even less a cause. Random
Killed Philosophy?, arguing that Let us look a bit closer at the properties sequences do not have the kind of reality,
physicists need philosophers. Afterwards, I of a genuinely random sequence. As we even less the causal efficacy, that individual
had a conversation with a remarkable man, extend the series of tosses, the number of events have. A sequence, in short, is neither
Raja Panjwani, who, in addition to being possible patterns increases enormously, an event nor a cause that can influence
trained in physics and philosophy, is an but the proportion of those that are signifi- what follows it. This may seem counter-
international chess champion. We got to cant runs of Hs or Ts are vanishingly intuitive, but its true, because 50/50
talking about one of the most striking and small. There is a 1:4 chance of HH (the equipoise or symmetry is an intrinsic prop-
disconcerting features of quantum physics: other possibilities being HT, TH, and erty of the (idealised) coin, and thats not
the replacement of causation by probability. TT), but 25 Hs in succession would be something affected by its history.
At the sub-atomic level, the last vestige of expected to occur by chance only once in What makes a sequence seem like a
A causes B is replaced by patterns of events 33,554,432 throws. The longer any run of cause is our subjective expectation, which
whose statistics can be predicted with stun- Hs or Ts, the less frequently it will occur; turns a lengthening run of Hs into the idea
ning precision, although outside of the so the most likely outcomes will be those of a kind of pressure to produce a T. Our
many worlds interpretation of quantum expectation is, however, in no sense a force
mechanics, in which everything happens in out there. Rather, as David Hume
some world or other no particular quan- pointed out, our habits of expectation
tum event is obliged to occur. However, often translate how things usually pan out
there is a constraint on the frequency of into how they are obliged to pan out.
certain outcomes within a given range of While it is clear that our subjective
values over large numbers of events, this assessment of probability is not out there,
frequency being what the most famous we still retain the idea of there being
quantum equations predict. Raja, perhaps objective probabilities out there based on
sensing that I was getting out of my depth, the expected relative frequencies of certain
turned the conversation to the staple of kinds of events or sequences of events.
probability theorists the tossing of a However, even probability understood in
coin which subsequently provoked the this way cannot entirely shake off their
thoughts that follow. The confusions, I am mental dependence. This is because a
confident, are mine, not his. sequence of events is not out there.
Firstly, it is only by remembering past
Imposing Patterns on Events tosses, and gathering them up into a series,
When you toss a coin, there are two that we are able to place actual sequences
possible outcomes heads (H) or tails (T). in which runs of Hs or Ts are soon broken into a fraction with a denominator corre-
No outcome should influence its succes- up. This is how we reconcile the 50/50 sponding to the sum total of possible
sor: there is no causal pressure exerted by chance of getting H on a particular toss, sequences a 1 in 33,554,432 chance of 25
Toss 1 on Toss 2, as there is, say, from irrespective of what has gone before, with tosses all turning up heads, for instance.
the movement of the thumb to the move- the growing suspicion that appropriately (Moreover, collecting tosses for the
ment of the coin, so the chances of H on a greets a very long series of Hs and the sequence will require ring-fencing of the
particular occasion are the same irrespec- mounting expectation of a T. population we are drawing from: the series
tive of whether its predecessor was H or T. This is all basic stuff; but let us dig a lit- we have just started, or all the tosses in the
Improbable sequences such as 100 tle deeper. Well start by focussing on the history of the world, or something in
straight Hs do not defy or even bend the expectation that has been the ruin of many between.) It is the gathering together of
laws of mechanics. But if the outcome of a gambler. The key point relates to the his- tosses that tells us that certain combina-
Toss 1 does not influence the outcome of tory-so-far of Hs. It is this history that tions ought to be common or rare, so that
Toss 2, such that there is no gathering makes us feel that the coin sooner or later we should expect them to occur frequently
causal pressure for a T to follow a long run will feel obliged to come up T. We must or infrequently. But the present existence
of Hs, why dont we easily accept that the not, however, see the history-so-far as a of no-longer-existent tosses is entirely
series H, H, H could be extended indefi- kind of pressure bringing about affirmative mental. They are not even present by
nitely? Why would an unbroken sequence action for Ts, so that they match the num- proxy as a cause of a present state of affairs,

because, as we have said, Toss 1 does not had a 50/50 chance of happening, then each
have any influence on Toss 2. events individual probability would be 1 in
21,000,000, the denominator being a num-
Immaterial Logic ber greater than that of the number of
Whats more, coin tosses have had to be atoms in the universe. And there is in prin-
shorn of their material features and classi-
fied simply as H or T in order to be gath-
ered up into a sequence that feeds the cal-
ciple no limit to the grain of the descrip-
tion, as no description captures an actual
event completely. However, this uniqueness
T allis
in
culations of probability of what we think is
going to happen in future. Importantly,
those future possibilities have to be
defined as the branches of a fork, as the
mere instantiation of the logical alterna-
and improbability applies equally to all Hs
and all Ts any actual H is as unlikely as
any actual T which is why H and T are
equally likely to occur. In short, probabili-
ties apply not to specific actual events but to
Wonderland
When causation is replaced entirely by
tives H or T. This crash-dieting of a types of events reduced, in the cases of probability, defined logically or mathemati-
physical event to one of its characteristics tosses, to the dichotomous possibilities H cally, there is no obligation for anything in
also warrants further examination. or T. The mathematics of Either H or T particular to happen, because actual events
Any actual coin-toss must have numer- applies only to a future reduced to branch- macroscopic, real events like real coin-
ous features additional to, and irrelevant to, ing logical possibilities: a material future tosses are beyond the reach of probabil-
the dichotomy H or T: when the coin reduced to a logical one. ity. A 50/50 probability of an event such as
lands head up it does so via a unique trajec- While the probability of 50/50 Hs and H is not a 50/50 probability of any real,
tory, and is propelled by a unique force to a Ts is built into the job description of coin- messy, fat event. Real events are necessarily
particular height, to land on the ground, all tossing, its realisation and the apparent more than logically defined possibilities
courtesy of a particular individual whom I pressure for it to be realised is in events (though they can be logically reduced to
will refrain from calling a tosser. None of that are in possible futures reduced to either them), and they do not exist in sequences
these additional elements are criteria for H H or T. In addition, the past also has to be that encompass past and present.
or T. But in order for there to be an H, a present in the gathering up of these strictly Many physicists trying to unite proba-
toss has to occur, and in order to occur, it bilistic quantum mechanics with general
has to be more than H. Without these relativity lose time and change altogether,
additional features, the coin couldnt land instead envisaging a frozen 4D universe in
either H or T, in fact. Furthermore, for the which nothing happens. Physicist Carlo
coin to fall either H or T, something has to Rovelli has even welcomed the possibility
be bent in order to break the 50/50 that quantum mechanics will become a
equipoise or symmetry between H and T: theory of the relations between variables,
not necessarily a bent coin, but necessarily rather than the theory of the evolution of
a bent event. (Since nobody knows how to variables in time (Forget Time, FQXi
bend the event, no caller has an advantage, Essay, 24th August 2008): in short, a the-
so the ethics are not bent: contingent influ- ory of the eternal relations between kinds
ences are inescapable, but thats OK if of possibilities rather than between actual
theyre hidden and cannot be manipulated.) events in time. If this were true, we would
But this only highlights the fact that be justified in concluding not only that the
describing any particular toss as H or T is Particle trails in universe couldnt give a toss about us, but
to strip it of numerous features necessary Large Hadron that it couldnt give an actual toss. The
for the full-blown event to happen to be Collider at CERN lack of contamination by actual events is
an H or a T. More broadly, material events the necessary condition of the purity of a
in a material world cannot be reduced to stand-alone events into a (retrospective) mathematical vision of the world based
forking branches of possible outcomes; just series pointing to this prospective future. upon probabilities. As mentioned, a
as a victory for a football team like Arsenal The mobilisation of all three tenses of time minority of physicists invoke a many
is not just a featureless V(ictory) as which do not have a foothold on the worlds version of quantum mechanics, in
opposed to a featureless D(efeat). material world itself betrays that with which every fork of possibility is taken.
Any specific toss that instantiates H or probabilities we are a long way from the This seems a very expensive way of melt-
T will have a vanishingly small probability material world. Material events are what ing a universe frozen as a consequence of
of occurring as that specific event. Actual they are, and not what they were or will be. replacing causation with probability. This
events, specified precisely in advance, are may be why a few physicists now think
highly improbable. The circumstances that Improbable Realities physics need philosophy; although many
produce a real event, even a little one like a In short, the mathematical logic of prob- more would add like a hole in the head.
coin falling H, are in fact unique, because ability deals with events slimmed down to PROF. RAYMOND TALLIS 2013
each event has unique characteristics. The forks of logical branches, and draws on ret- Raymond Talliss new books are Reflections
more fine-grained the description of an rospective and prospective views that have of a Metaphysical Flaneur (Acumen), and
event, the more the improbability of that no place in the material world. Could this (edited with Jacky Davis), NHS SOS: How
event increases. If events had a million be a source of some of the problems quan- the NHS Was Betrayed and How We Can
either/or features, and each of the features tum mechanics has with time and change? Save It (One World).

ETHICAL EPISODES
& other
PORTRAIT OF JOEL MARKS HUIBING HE 2010

by Joel Marks
This Ones For You

T here is no such thing as right or wrong! Three years ago
I made my constant readers heads spin when I first made
that claim in An Amoral Manifesto, in Issues 80 and 81 of
out Morals. Because this one was a scholarly monograph, I was
able to find a publisher for it. That book appeared in print one
year ago.
Philosophy Now. This was startling coming from me, not only However, Ethics without Morals far from exhausted the con-
because the statement is startling in itself, but especially tent of my earlier manuscript. For in the main Bad Faith had
because, for an entire decade, I had been writing a regular been not so much a treatise as a memoir. I believed I had a
column for this magazine called Moral Moments, in which I compelling story to tell about what it actually feels like to
pressed home the importance of moral reasoning in all facets undergo such a radical transformation of ones worldview.
of life. Now, suddenly, that was down the tubes! Furthermore, and more urgently, I believed I had a compelling
Well, not really suddenly. For at that point it was already idea to share with others not only fellow academics but also
three years since I had had my original anti-epiphany, realiz- the general public. I especially wanted to offer something to
ing that my commitment to morality was, despite my avowed the many Philosophy Now readers who had been asking me for a
atheism, itself a kind of theism. I had only been a soft atheist more extensive discussion of amorality than the occasional
who, like most New Atheists, embraced Socrates idea (from column permitted. Ethics without Morals did not fit that bill for
Platos Euthyphro dialogue) that morality was independent of all of them, partly because of its specialist orientation, but
religion. Socrates argued that even to acknowledge God as good mainly because of its very high price (due to the publishers
and just implies our ability to know what these qualities are marketing it to research libraries).
prior to and independent of knowing God. But now I realized Therefore I sat down to write yet another book, this one
that so-called secular morality is also a religion, which is, if called Its Just a Feeling: The Philosophy of Desirism. Written for a
anything, on less secure ground than traditional theism, nonspecialist audience, this serves as a kind of primer of
because it purports to issue commands (moral obligations, pro- amorality, with some theory but with emphasis on how actu-
hibitions, and permissions) without a commander (God). Thus ally to live an amoral life. And in order to get it out as quickly
I became a hard atheist, in the sense of denying the existence of as possible, I simply published it myself at CreateSpace/
both God and morality, or in a word, an amoralist. Amazon. This also made it possible to price the book to be
The three-year silence preceding my public announcement within easy reach of anyone who wanted to read it. It is now
was due to my having to rethink absolutely everything about available everywhere as a paperback, and also as an eBook for
my most fundamental ethical assumptions, both as a profes- Kindle.
sional philosopher and as a person. I was not only struck dumb Finally, Ive also brought out, again with CreateSpace/
by massive uncertainty about how to proceed, but also, frankly, Amazon, the latest incarnation of Bad Faith, now duly pared
scared to utter some of my new thoughts. The only way for me down to a more truly memoir form, although of necessity still
to work it all out was to write. And write I did. In a matter of containing the kind of dialectical arguing that was raging in
months I had composed a 100,000-word manuscript, whose my mind during that initial period.
working title was Bad Faith: A Philosophical Memoir. By the time So I have written what has turned out to be a trilogy of
I had finished that I was well on my way to finding my amorality: a monograph (Ethics without Morals), a memoir/pre-
amorality legs. quel (Bad Faith), and a primer/sequel (Its Just a Feeling). One
However, the resulting manuscript turned out to be unpub- way to think about their complementarity is to conceive Bad
lishable, and for two reasons. One was that the work combined Faith as my effort to persuade myself of amoralitys viability
autobiography with analytic philosophizing, thereby falling and virtues, Ethics without Morals as my effort to persuade my
between two stools. The other reason was that my philoso- professional colleagues, and Its Just a Feeling as my effort to
phizing had been done in blissful ignorance of an existing pro- persuade everybody else. I hope that I have now satisfied (if
fessional literature. It was only when I came up for air after my not sated!) everyone who has been intrigued by my recent per-
months-long immersion in figuring it all out for myself that I sonal experience or the thesis I have been defending. And of
noticed others who had written on the same subject, and in course I will continue to devote the occasional Ethical Episode
particular Richard Garner, who is my soulmate in this regard. to further amoral ramblings.
So I started all over again. I felt that it made obvious sense PROF. JOEL MARKS 2013
to begin by thoroughly acquainting myself with the on-going Joel Marks is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of
discussion in my field. This led me eventually to refine my New Haven and a Bioethics Center Scholar at Yale University. His
original philosophizing in a new manuscript, called Ethics with- website is www.docsoc.com

Sartre & The Waiter
Frank OCarroll observes a liberating encounter in a French caf.
Waiter: Good evening, and heartiest congratulations Sartre: Odd as it may seem, I enjoyed it perhaps too much.
Monsieur Sartre! But youre right. The work-load was punishing. Perhaps my
Sartre: So youve heard about the little periodical me and my post as Editor of Les Temps Modernes will give me more time
friends are starting? for my philosophy.
Waiter: All Paris must have heard by now. Since the news Waiter: Indeed monsieur. Still, Im sure it wasnt an easy
broke, the patrons of Les Deux Magots have been asking me to decision.
give you their good wishes. Sartre: Ill admit it cost me some sleepless nights. On the
Sartre: (Smiles sardonically) Im sure there are many whod other hand, had I stayed put, Id live to regret it. (Raises the
gladly send me their ill wishes, for having rattled their cages. brandy glass.) So, heres to an exciting new venture.
Waiter: Oh not at all monsieur. They may not agree with you Waiter: And to success!
at times, but they do respect you. (Roberto clinks a glass of water with Sartres cognac.)
Sartre: Hmm! Ive seen them all too often cross to the other Sartre: So what does the future hold for you, Roberto?
side of the street from me. Waiter: The usual. Nothing very spectacular.
Waiter: Nevertheless, why do you think we have so many Sartre: And youve no desire to move on, to progress?
visitors here? Ill tell you why. To catch a glimpse of Jean-Paul Waiter: Absolutely none. This is all Ive ever expected.
Sartre, Frances most famous philosopher! Sartre: So will it be Les Deux Magots til youre carried out
Sartre: Tut tut Roberto. What they glimpse is not me, but a feet first?
figment of their own fabrication. Besides, theres Camus and Waiter: Hopefully. When I die, let it be on my feet, here in
Merleau-Ponty. And next year there will be a new flavour of my ancestral habitat, where, according to a Buddhist patron, I
the month. may well have been a waiter in a previous existence.
Waiter: But none like the legendary spokesman for France, Sartre: There are worse ways of dying, admittedly. But there
for the workers, for the Resistance, for freedom! That is what have to be better ways of living.
they come to glimpse. Waiter: (Shrugs, then shakes his head.) Not for me, monsieur. I
Sartre: Thank you Roberto. Now Ill have that coffee while live to work here as much as I work to live here.
Im waiting for madame to join me. Sartre: And youve never thought of doing anything else?
Waiter: Sure monsieur. And perhaps a little cognac on the Waiter: Never. Waitering is in my blood!
house to celebrate? Sartre: Really? (Smiling) When did it become infected?
Sartre: Just coffee will do fine. Waiter: My father was a waiter, and his father before him. For
Waiter: I insist monsieur. After all, it is a special occasion. me to do anything other than be a waiter would be
Sartre: Okay. But just un peu. Ill need my wits when the unthinkable. Its my destiny.
reporters arrive to grill me. Sartre: (Frowns) Not necessarily. Maybe you do not have a
(Waiter nods, disappears, then returns with tray containing a coffee destiny.
and a cognac.) Waiter: No?
Waiter: You did right, monsieur, to leave teaching. Its Sartre: Highly unlikely. Id prefer to think that you simply
energy-sapping. stepped into your fathers shoes.
Waiter: And whats so wrong about following in his footsteps?
Sartre: Figuratively speaking, his shoes are many sizes too
small for you.
Waiter: (Laughs) So far I havent suffered any discomfort in
them.
Sartre: Id suggest you cast off those old shoes if you want to
grow. You need bigger shoes, Roberto.
Waiter: Im a waiter, not a shareholder. As for growing pains,
Ive had my share of them.
Sartre: Theres no growing without them. And if breaking the
cycle of your inherited immobility means having to go
barefoot till you get on your feet, then so be it.
Waiter: Barefoot! Do you want my girlfriend soon to be my
wife to show me a clean pair of heels?
Sartre: I cant very well see her objecting to you blazing an
exciting new trail.
Waiter: So what are you proposing, Monsieur Sartre?
Sartre: To put it bluntly, youre capable of a more creative
July August 2013 Philosophy Now 53

career than waitering. It will only be a matter of time before famous caf that attracts the stunning belles of Paris, who have
you go to seed in this comfort zone. Bright people like you me dancing like Fred Astaire to their rapturous attention. Not
need to be intellectually challenged in order to flower. to mention the appreciation of celebrities of the theatre and
Waiter: Merci for your concern, but am I not blossoming now? cinema, who tip me royally and give me free tickets for shows
Sartre: Youre smart Roberto. Youve read my novels. You go on my nights off.
to the cinema. You converse intelligently with foreigners, day- Sartre: But arent there also those winter evenings when the
in, day-out. Being the bright boy of your class that you were, tourists have gone, when things get a bit stale, when you feel
you have a duty to fulfil your talents. the need for new pastures? If you take a leaf from my book
Waiter: The trades thats where my family come from. and change your life, you might well become a celebrity
Survival was their priority, not fulfilment. Id much prefer to yourself. Remember that Ive taken one of the biggest gambles
flourish in Les Deux Magots like a song bird in captivity, than in my life by packing in a well-paid, highly respectable job, to
risk failure as a freebooting intellectual. This is why I carry edit a radical magazine.
around this tray contentedly and (smiling) also for my sins. Waiter: But that is what youve always wanted. And you have
Sartre: You mustnt mistake Les Deux Magots for a cage, or forget what it takes for the task.
that to be what you are not, you must not be what you are. Sartre: I hope so. Time will tell.
Waiter: But why should I not be what I am, when Im Waiter: Time will confirm that you are the man for the job,
comfortable with it? After all, I am what I do. Im certain of it.
Sartre: You are not. You are a lot more than that. Sartre: How about this for a suggestion for you? Suppose I
Waiter: But youll agree Im good at it. start you off with a monthly column in the magazine? All going
Sartre: Much too good. In fact, that tray you carry around well, I can then arrange for you to write for one of the dailies.
like the world on the shoulders of Atlas is like an extension of Waiter: Will I have to give up waitering?
you. You give one the impression that if you were to drop it, Sartre: Not initially. But you may be able to dispense with
the laws of gravity would collapse. your tray when you eventually become a famous food critic.
Waiter: On the other hand Monsieur Sartre, it wouldnt do if (Pause.) So, are you prepared to step out of your fathers shoes
I were to drop its contents on that expensive new dress you and have an article ready for me by the end of the month?
bought Mademoiselle de Beauvoir last week. Waiter: Ill think about it. I only hope the proprietor of Les
Sartre: However, a robot could do it as well as you, and may Deux Magots doesnt think Im using the job for my own ends,
well do so in the future. should I decide to take on your offer.
Waiter: Ah but Monsieur, a robot cannot chat to the people Sartre: He doesnt own you! In any case, a celebrity waiter
who come here to escape from their loneliness, their can only be good for business. Then in time you can shake the
unrequited loves, their misadventures, the sense of loss from dust of Les Deux Magots from your shoes, and tour the cafs of
the death of a loved one. And there are others who feel the Europe as a writer. So, are you prepared to take a risk?
need to have their hunger for gossip fed by waiters like me, or Waiter: I can give it a try. Though taking up your footloose
to off-load their problems to a sympathetic ear. Les Deux agenda is going to put me through a huge bout of angst.
Magots is many things to many people. Rest assured, its not all Sartre: Good. Now youre being true to your authentic self.
about carrying around trays of food to the bourgeois of Paris or So, let us drink to that.
to rich Americans. Besides, where else could I hope to wait (Signals the other waiter for two more cognacs.)
upon the illustrious Monsieur and Madame night after night Sartre: To freedom!
and then brag about it to my friends? Waiter: To freedom!
Sartre: Satisfying though your vicarious life may seem to you, FRANK OCARROLL 2013
theres no denying that youre selling yourself short. In fact, I Frank OCarroll, a retired teacher, is an ongoing extramural
see no reason why you couldnt be a journalist, and use your philosophy student at Trinity College, Dublin. He has three books of
knowledge of food and caf life to write a column for some short stories published, as well as some poetry.
Parisian paper. You have the inside story.
Waiter: I may have the gift of the gab, but I dont know if I
have the gift of ink. Quite frankly, you over-rate me,
Monsieur Sartre.
Sartre: Not as much as you under-rate yourself. Youve got to
be prepared to reinvent yourself from time to time. Otherwise,
youll atrophy from routine, and, perhaps worse, youll be lying
to yourself about who you are and who you could be.
Waiter: As long as I wake up tomorrow the same person as I
am today, Ill be happy.
Sartre: Have you forgotten, Roberto, that for us
Existentialists, existence precedes essence? This means that
tomorrow calls for a new self.
Waiter: (Shakes his head.) Im afraid youre looking at a
finished product. I already have what I want: a decent job in a

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Philosophy Now ISSUE 97 July/Aug 2013

Philosophy Now, EDITORIAL & NEWS

Philosophy Now is published by POETRY & FICTION

4 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 5

6 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

Thomas Reids Paradox of the Brave Officer

David Humes Theory of Personal Identity

8 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 9

The Self That Buddhism Denies

A statement is conventionally true if and only if it is acceptable to

Buddhists argue that it is only conventionally, not ulti-

10 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 11

12 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 13

14 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 15

16 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 17

Philosophers such as Patricia Churchland and Daniel C.

18 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

CHRIS MADDEN 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 19

20 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

Condemned Without Evidence

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 21

PHILOSOPHY CLASSES OF THE HIGHEST

QUALITY FOR THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE IN

THE LONDON AREA!

The London School of Philosophy

2013-14 programme of courses

Including our new module

can be taken as part of a

Please visit our website:

22 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 23

24 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

Premise 1: All mammals are vertebrates.

Barbara has nothing to do with the taxonomic classification

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 25

26 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

COG HEAD PICTURE ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/WILDPIXEL

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 27

28 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 29

Movies In The Mind? Lessons For Thinkers

claims. But consciousness may not be an all-or-nothing affair.

30 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

us, then, have been a series of partial Herders hitched to the

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 31

crafted by the neural connections determined by genetics and

The Flow of Language

In a move that anticipated Julia Kristevas semiotic theory, he

32 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

July/August 2013 Philosophy Now 33

34 Philosophy Now July/August 2013

faith, hope and charity.