Ortañez Vs CA PDF

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ORTAEZ VS CA

G.R. 107372
PAROL EVIDENCE

FACTS: Private Respondent Innocentes sold 2 parcels of registered land to Petitioner Ortanez. Two separate
deed of absolute sale were executed by Private Respondent Innocentes and Petitioner Ortanez. Private
Respondent received the payments for the subject lots but failed to deliver the titles to Petitioner. Thus, Ortanez
filed a suit for specific performance in RTC. In their Answer, the Private Respondents merely alleged the
existence of the 4 conditions such as the segregation of the right of way, submission of the plan for segregation,
putting up a wall between the properties of the petitioner and private respondents. These conditions were
orally agreed upon by the parties but did not reflect in the 2 deeds of absolute sale. On trial, private Respondent
orally testified that the sale was subject to the said conditions but were not incorporated in the deed of absolute
sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was
barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the 4 conditions verbally agreed upon prior to the execution of the deed of sale but were
not included in the deed are admissible as evidence?

HELD: No.

The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively
on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language.

Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130[10] of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.[11] Considering that the written deeds
of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived
and abandoned by the parties.[12] Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale
was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties

We disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of
the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:

"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties
cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject
matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances
surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
interpretation of the instrument."

We are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents
did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the
buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." Private
respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial
by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned
in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only
repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and
former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected to know
the consequences" of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds,
he would have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

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