Cebu Institute of Technology (Cit) Vs Hon. Blas Oplegr No. L-58870 December 18, 1987

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Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT)

Vs
Hon. Blas OpleGR No. L-58870 December 18, 1987

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of six cases involving various private schools as well
as the then Minister of Labor and Employment in order to dispose uniformly
the common legal issue raised namely the allocation of the incremental
proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in
section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 451, and thereafter, under the
Education Act of 1982 (Batas Pambansa , Blg. 232).

3(a) of Pres. Decree No. 451 which states:

SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or


other charges as well as the new fees or charges authorized under the
next preceding section shall be subject to the following conditions;

(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be


approved unless sixty (60%) per centum of the proceeds is
allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the
faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the
balance for institutional development, student assistance and
extension services, and return to investments: Provided That in no
case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per
centum of the incremental proceeds;

This case originated from a Complaint filed with the Regional Office No. VII of
the Ministry of Labor against petitioner Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) by
private respondents, Panfilo Caete, et al., teachers of CIT, for non-payment
of: a) cost of living allowances (COLA) b) thirteenth (13th) month pay
differentials and c) service incentive leave.

CIT contended that it had paid the allowances mandated by various decrees
but the same had been integrated in the teachers hourly rate. It alleged that
the payment of COLA by way of salary increases is in line with Pres. Dec.
No.451. It also claimed in its position paper that it had paid thirteenth month
pay to its employees and that it was exempt from the payment of service
incentive leave to its teachers who were employed on contract basis.

Minister of Labor and Employment held that the basic hourly rate designated
in the Teachers Program is regarded as the basic hourly rate of teachers
exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be taken from the 60%
incremental proceeds of the approved increase in tuition fee.
Petitioner assails the aforesaid Order in this Special Civil Action of certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. The Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on December 7, 1981 against the enforcement
of the questioned Order of the Minister of Labor and Employment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the alleged implementing rules and regulations


promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that allowances and other
benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the proceeds of
tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451
were issued ultra vires, and therefore not binding upon this Court.

NO.

2. Whether or not the questioned rules and regulations contravene the


statutory authority granted to the Minister of Education as a valid
exercise of rule-making authority.

NO.

RULING:

1. Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is
to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what the correct rule is
in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to
look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by
the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy
every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if
that were necessary in the premises. However, as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Courts function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine
itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.

The alleged implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the


then MECS to the effect that allowances and other benefits may be charged
against the 60% portion of the proceeds of tuition fee increases provided for
in Section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451, suffice it to say that these were issued
ultra vires, and therefore not binding upon this Court.
The rule-making authority granted by Pres. Dec. No. 451 is confined to
the implementation of the Decree and to the imposition of limitations upon
the approval of tuition fee increases, to wit:

SEC. 4. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Education and


Culture is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to issue the
requisite rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this
Decree. He may, in addition to the requirements and limitations
provided for under Sections 2 and 3 hereof, impose other requirements
and limitations, as he may deem proper and reasonable.

The power does not allow the inclusion of other items in addition
to those for which 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases are
allocated under Section 3(a) of the Decree.

Rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the power


conferred by law would have the force and effect of law if the same
are germane to the subjects of the legislation and if they conform to
the standards prescribed by the same. Since the implementing rules
and regulations cited by the private schools adds allowances and other
benefits to the items included in the allocation of 60% of the proceeds
of tuition fee increases expressly provided for by law, the same were
issued in excess of the rule-making authority of said agency, and
therefore without binding effect upon the courts. At best the same
may be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and as
such, they may be set aside by this Court in the final determination of
what the law means.

2. The petitioners insistence that the questioned rules and regulations


contravene with the statutory authority granted to the Minister of
Education, the Court finds that there was a valid exercise of the rule-
making authority.

The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies


like the Secretary of Education is a valid exception to the rule on non-
delegation of legislative power provided two conditions concur,
namely: 1) the statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to
be executed by the agency, and 2) said statute fixes a standard to
which the latter must conform.

The Education Act of 1982 is "an act providing for the establishment and
maintenance of an integrated system for education " with the following basic
policy:
It is the policy of the State to establish and maintain a complete,
adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of
national development. Toward this end, the government shall ensure,
within the context of a free and democratic system, maximum
contribution of the educational system to the attainment of the
following national development goals:

With the foregoing basic policy as well as, specific policies clearly set forth in
its various provisions, the Act is complete in itself and does not leave any
part of the policy-making, a strictly legislative function, to any administrative
agency.

Coming now to the presence or absence of standards to guide the Minister of


Education in the exercise of rule-making power, the pronouncement in Edu
vs Ericta [G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 497] is
relevant :

The standard may be either expressed or implied. The former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang vs
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads."

The policies and objectives on the welfare and interests of the various
members of the educational community are found in section 5 of B.P. Blg.
232, which states:

SEC. 5. Declaration of Policy and Objectives.

xxx

3. Promote the social and economic status of a school personnel,


uphold their rights, define their obligations, and improve their living
and working conditions and career prospects.

xxx

Given the abovementioned policies and objectives , there are sufficient


standards to guide the Minister of Education in promulgating rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the Education Act of 1982, As in
the Ericta and Tablarin cases, there is sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
Administrative agencies are not strictly bound by the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, formal investigative and arbitration proceedings need not
be conducted. With a day in court is a matter of right in administrative
proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles.

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