SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997.]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY , * petitioner,

vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN , respondents.

D. P. Mercado & Associates for petitioner.

AC Estrada & Partner for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; EMPLOYER'S POLICY

OF NOT ACCEPTING FOR WORK ANY WOMAN WORKER WHO CONTRACTS MARRIAGE,
CONTRARY TO LAW, GOOD MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY. In the case at bar,
petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disquali ed from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of
the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and
public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions that they may deem convenient the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it
may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would
encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL; LOSS OF CONFIDENCE, VALID GROUND. While loss of
con dence is a just cause of termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEALMENT OF FEMALE EMPLOYEE OF TRUE NATURE OF
STATUS FOR FEAR OF BEING DISQUALIFIED FROM WORK, NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment
on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not
quali ed for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty. Private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT &
T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In
other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
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 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO REMIT COMPANY FUNDS, NOT AN ADDITIONAL GROUND;
CASE AT BAR. Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private
respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground
to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly,
private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit
some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was
dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of
that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider
petitioner's submissions on this a mere afterthought, just too bolster its supposed
dishonesty as case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor
cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the
amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether
the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private
respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter
was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID., EMPLOYEE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED A FEW DAYS BEFORE COMPLETION OF
HER PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT AND WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY HIRED RELIEVER FOR
SEVERAL TIMES GAINED REGULAR STATUS. Private respondent, it must be observed,
had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking
papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150
days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her
dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly
raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning
security of tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for xed periods, as she
performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of
PT & T. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or
trade of the employer.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS
AND OTHER PRIVILEGES. As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and
as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; PERIOD OF SUSPENSION FOR DISHONESTY DEDUCTED FROM
AMOUNT RECOVERABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. However, as she had undeniably
committed an act of dishonesty, in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of
an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent
NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any
sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally, justi ed. Thus, her entitlement to
back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to
the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by, deducting therefrom the amount
corresponding to her three months suspension.
8. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACT OF LABOR; IMPRESSED WITH
PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT CONTAIN OPPRESSIVE PROVISIONS NOR IMPAIR THE
INTEREST OR CONVENIENCE OF THE PUBLIC; POLICY AGAINST MARRIAGE, A
PROHIBITED PROVISION. Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of
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 labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not
merely, contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same
should yield to the common good. It goes on to intone dust neither capital nor labor
should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of
the public. In the nal reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed
by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and. ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.
That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled
forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but
imperatively required.

DECISION

REGALADO , J : p

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status
and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what
really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage
during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus
claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by
an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, speci cally as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a xed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,
1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1 Under the Reliever Agreement
which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,
1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent' s services as reliever
were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who
went on leave during both periods. 2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever
Agreement, her services were terminated. LibLex

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form that was furnished her to be lled up for the purpose, she indicated in
the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City,
Delia M. O cial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the
company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. 4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
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 aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had
not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5 Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced
by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992, 6 which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between
the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She
then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. 7 All of these took
place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter
being of the rmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing
private respondent was clearly insuf cient, and that it was apparent that she had been
discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent
upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private
respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her
employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modi ed with the
quali cation that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of
the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the
NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of
private respondent in her employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration led by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent
NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the
aforestated decisions. of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial
resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with
love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with
indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has
that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the eld of labor, especially on
the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting,
women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types
of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation
against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, bene ts, promotion and
retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few
of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8 on the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the
State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII 9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the
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 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor
and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section
14 of Article XIII 1 0 mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential
Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 11
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 1 2 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities, Republic Act No. 6955 1 3 which bans the "mail-
order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192, 1 4 also
known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women
equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322
1 5 increasing the maternity bene ts granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act
No. 7877 1 6 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the
education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 1 7 or the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their
rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, 1 8
women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles
130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work
while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards
which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes
of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage
clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article
138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman' s right against discrimination
with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and
this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition
sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ,
to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just
cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one' s labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within
the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of
hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as
well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline,
dismissal, and recall of employees. 1 9 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate,
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 according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from
hiring to ring," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided
by law. 2 0
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disquali ed from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than
the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent
from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties
with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married
women are not quali ed for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by
Delia M. O cial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of
the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women
employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 2 1 Again, in the termination notice sent
to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company' s policy against
marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.") 2 2 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it
was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case
only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking of cers who would otherwise be
solidarily liable with the corporation. 2 3
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In
other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disquali ed from work. While loss of
con dence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
LLphil

In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private

respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does
have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the
consequent loss of con dence in her which justi ed her dismissal. Petitioner would
asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes
umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial
distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that
the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent de ed its policy
against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment
of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it
supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female
employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other bene ts it would
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 consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that
employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee
conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This
line of reasoning does not impress us as re ecting its true management policy or that we
are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the
aspects of quali cation and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her
supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of
private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the
familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent
admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections,
but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because
of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed
defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's
submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case
for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was
no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether
her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence
was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent
execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed
settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about
to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary
employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was
done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. 2 7 On the other hand, her
earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,
even if the same were for xed periods, as she performed activities which were essential
or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T. 2 8 The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity
performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. 2 9
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other bene ts or their
monetary equivalent. 3 0 However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in
concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner,
the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the
impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the
employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act
which was not totally justi ed. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be
computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual
reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her
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 three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted
by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
"ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely
by reason of marriage."

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 148, 3 1 better known as the "Women and Child Labor Law," which amended
paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 3 2 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes." The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No.
3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of
women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to re ect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al.
vs. Philippine Air Lines, 3 3 a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There,
a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective ight attendants must be single
and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was
declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with
regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:
"Of rst impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation
with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that
Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary
occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like ight attendants, is fair and reasonable,
considering the peculiarities of their chosen profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it

knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13,
1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and
Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their
labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain
a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended
paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the
same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1,
1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new
Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore
abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards
that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate
cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum
standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of ight
attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of
respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the rst
paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting ight
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 attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which
are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently
illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work . . ."

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from

employment of ight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable
standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis
has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much
against the continued employment of the ight attendant merely by reason of
marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on ight attendants in the course of their
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been
adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976. cdll

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as

invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the
preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a
basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In
both instances, respondent predicates absence of a ight attendant from her
home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is
pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern
world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to
another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married ight attendants
can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary
occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping
intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is re ected in the
whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the
employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation 3 4 considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the rm to
consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment
they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed
that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services
would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an
example of "discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment
opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down
said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential
Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
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 conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus"
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same
should be evenly applied and must not in ict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group
which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or
restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been
held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal
statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of,
among other things, sex. 3 5
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not
against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. 3 6 Upon the
other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be
justi ed as a "bona de occupational quali cation," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that
nature would be valid provided it re ects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male
and female ight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not
related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 3 7
5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that
by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may
even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as
they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. 40 It
goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the
other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the nal reckoning, the
danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes
at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,
ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 4 2 That it must be effectively
interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner. llcd

SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

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 * The phrase "herein represented by DELIA M. OFICIAL", added hereto in the title of this case as
stated in the petition, has been deleted for being unnecessary and violative of the rules
on pleadings, and is commented upon in the text of this opinion.
1. Rollo, 42; Annex D.
2. Ibid., 44-45; Annexes F and G.

3. Ibid., 46-48; Annexes H and I.

4. Ibid., 49; Annex J.
5. Id., 50; Annex K.
6. Id., 51; Annex L.

7. Id., 53, Annex N.

8. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men (Sec. 14, Art. II).

9. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized or unorganized
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes of settling disputes, including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investment, and to expansion and growth (Sec. 3. Art. XIII).

10. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions,
taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation (Sec. 14, Art. XIII).
11. Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, it is regarded as the most comprehensive
international treaty governing the rights of women. The Philippines became a signatory
thereto a year after its adoption by the UN and in 1981, the country ratified it.

The Philippines had likewise been an active participant in all the four U.N. World Conferences
on Women, namely those held in Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985,
and Beijing in 1995.

Other relevant international laws to which the Philippines adheres as a member of the
international community include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

12. Approved, June 9, 1989.

13. Approved, June 13, 1990.

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 14. Approved, February 12, 1992.

15. Approved, March 30, 1992.

16. Approved, February 14, 1995.

17. Approved, June 7, 1995.

18. Effective August 3, 1988.

19. Caltex Re nery Employees Association (CREA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 102993, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 271; Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 111905, July 31, 1995, 246
SCRA 794; Nuez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107574,
December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 518; San Miguel Corporation vs. Ubaldo, et al., G.R. No.
92859, February 1, 1993, 218 SCRA 293.
20. NAFLU vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 90739, October 3, 1991,
202 SCRA 346.

21. Quoted in the Decision of the Third Division, NLRC, in NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-02-0042-92,
Annex B of petition; Rollo, 35. See also Annex J, supra, Fn. 4.

22. Annex L, id.; Rollo, 51.

23. Art. 289, Labor Code; see AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 69494, June 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 269; Chua vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 81450, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA 353.
24. Mapalo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107940, June 17, 1994,
233 SCRA 266; PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 79182, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 487.

25. San Antonio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100829, November
21, 1995, 250 SCRA 359; Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183.
26. Hospicio de San Jose de Basili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
75997, August 18, 1988, 164 SCRA 516.

27. Cielo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 78693, January 28, 1991,
193 SCRA 410; Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, et al., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990,
181 SCRA 702.

28. Art. 280, Labor Code; see PLDT vs. Montemayor, et al ., G.R. No. 88626 October 12, 1990,
190 SCRA 427.

29. De Leon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 70705, August 21, 1989,
176 SCRA 615.

30. Molave Tours Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al ., G.R. No. 112909,
November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA 325; see Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6715.
31. Promulgated on March 13, 1973.

32. Approved on April 15, 1952. It was later amended by Republic Act No. 1131, which in turn
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 was approved on June 16, 1954.
33. Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977.

34. CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978.

35. 45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, Sec. 506, p. 486.

36. Ibid., id., id.

37. Ibid., id., Sec. 507.

38. Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1979 ed., 235; see Art. 874, Civil Code.

39. Art. 1306, Civil Code.

40. Art. 1700, Civil Code; see Macleod & Co. of the Philippines vs. Progressive Federation of
Labor, 97 Phil. 205 (1955).
41. Art. 1701. Civil Code.

42. The 1987 Constitution provides:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. . . . (Sec. 15, Art. II).

The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development (Sec. 1, Art. XV).

Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State (Sec. 2, Art. XV).

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