Renato Cayetano vs Christian

Monsod
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment
was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to
meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC
should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.

3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and
held various positions in various foreign corporations.

4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.

5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is
loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working
day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most
of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in
determining what constitutes practice of law:

1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term practice of law. (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which
are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and giving legal advice, but
he only did so as isolated incidents.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his fathers law office. The
Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and
regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent
and attention during the ten-year period.

What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate,
managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?

There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving
that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
 In Re: Argosino, BM
No. 712
FACTS:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyers
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court.
He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath
and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now
possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he,
together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of
their hazing victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:

YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required
good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath
is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of
the society.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the
good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned.
 AGUIRRE VS RANA

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyers
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as

counsel for a candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a

municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Held: Yes, Rana should be denied Admission to the Bar. The evidences clearly shows
that Rana was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC, filed various pleadings and referred himself as counsel knowing fully
that he was not yet a member of the Bar.

Although Rana passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath, it is the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character. Thus, it can be withheld even from one who
has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.
 Pedro Linsangan vs Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, pirated a
client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty.
Linsangans allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labianos calling card which appears as
follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the
printing of such calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of
Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty.
Linsangans clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
anothers legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his
law office. Through Labianos actions, Atty. Tolentinos law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that Atty.
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance
legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance, was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans
to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal
and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At
any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme
Court for one year.

Alawi vs. Alauya

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya
by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because
Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice
President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauyas letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her
grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of attorney, which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically synonymous
with Counsellors-at-law. a title to which Sharia lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for councilor, konsehal or
the Maranao term consial, connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does
not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
counsellors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 Blandina Hilado vs Jose
Gutierrez David

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against
Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain
Atty. Ohnick.

In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he
thenafter entered his appearance in court.

In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco
to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a
legal opinion letter.

Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no
material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story, Atty.
Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a
copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty.
Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico
Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has
no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty.
Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why
the firm cannot take on Hilados case.

Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latters
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.

Further:

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or

counselor-when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating
his clients cause in open court.

Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not matter
if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is
established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against the client.

Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only
signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was
part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a
law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.

Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed his
entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not a
waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on previous atty-
client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional confidence once
reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
 Mercedes Cobb-Perez and Damaso
Perez vs Judge Gregorio Lantin

A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to
pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The
sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was
opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount
of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier
decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public
sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k.

Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin
the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that
the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for
injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered
petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The
counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such
decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If there was delay, it was
because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers
(which) is not to be condemned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.

HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers
insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty
of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
 Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because
the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately
the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is
a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired
of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened
with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section
32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he
did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as
Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76,
February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of
an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is
fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs.
Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF

THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual
members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already
passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney
and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firms reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
holding property. Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in
law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.