Tyranny of the Majority:

Islamists Ambivalence towards

Human Rights

Moataz El Fegiery *

The Arab revolutions have not yet led to the emergence of democracies
founded upon respect for human rights and individual freedoms. Islamists
took power through the ballot boxes in Tunisia and Egypt, but their
ambivalent approach to human rights has subverted or delayed these rights.
This paper evaluates the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and
its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the Salafist Nour Party in Egypt, and the
Ennahda Party in Tunisia by analyzing the positions, programs, and practices
of these Islamist parties in light of international human rights standards. 1

*
Moataz El Fegiery is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS), University of London and member of the board of directors of the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies. This chapter is adapted from a book published in October 2012 by
FRIDE, a think tank based in Spain.
1
For the purpose of this study, I will identify theoretical and practical positions using official
platforms, pamphlets, statements, parliamentary records and intellectual contributions of the
main ideologues and scholars of the three parties: the Freedom and Justice Party, the Ennahda
Party, and the Nour Party. In talking about Ennahda, I will make use of the writings of
Rached Al-Ghannouchi, who was recently re-elected president of the movement and whose
book on public liberties is acknowledged by Ennahda as one of its official documents.

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Since the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, Islamists have engaged actively in
the transitional processes in Egypt and Tunisia, succeeding in coming to
power in these two countries. The FJP and Ennahda are currently the largest
political parties in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively, and the Nour Party
became the second-largest political bloc following the first parliamentary
elections held in Egypt after the revolution. These Islamist parties, which are
under study in this paper, have led the processes of drafting the new
constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia.
In their programs, statements, and literature, Islamists have been keen to
show that their beliefs are not incompatible with international human rights
standards. However, the evidence shows that, in fact, universal human rights
will be endangered under the rule of these parties due to their ambivalent
conception of rights. Islamists vary in their opinions on specific rights,
ranging from hardline positions to reformist attitudes, and thus they have
failed to develop a coherent and consistent approach to human rights.
Islamists have not abandoned the objective of establishing Islamic states
based on adopting Shariah (Islamic law) as the legal framework for the
state. They reject the civil or secular state that is neutral towards all
religions and based on citizenship and equality before the law. Limiting
democracy to the holding of elections - without safeguards for individual
human rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers - will not prevent
the emergence of new majoritarian tyrannies and their rise to power through
the ballot box, at the expense of the rights of minorities. This is certainly not
what the Arab revolutionaries aspired to.

A number of key questions are relevant in assessing the human rights record
of Islamist parties. What is the status of human rights in Islamic law in
general? What commitments did Islamist parties make regarding
fundamental human rights before the elections? To what degree are their
visions of fundamental human rights in line with international human rights
standards? How have Islamist parties in government performed in terms of
respect for human rights? And finally, what does the ambivalence of Islamist
parties towards human rights mean for the future of Arab societies and for
their relations with their international partners?

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Islamists in Power: A Distorted View of Democracy
Islamism, or political Islam, refers to the reassertion of the role of Islam in
both public and private life.2 The Islamist movements and parties
considered here are those political organisations that mobilise and agitate in
the political sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic
traditions.3 Islamist movements are diverse in their strategies and
interpretations of Islamic legal traditions. These differences can be attributed
to the historical and organisational evolution of these movements, as well as
to the changing socio-political contexts in which they operate. 4 Bassam Tibi
differentiates between jihadist Islamists, who use violence to achieve their
political objectives, and institutional Islamists, who pursue their goals
through non-violent means and engage in formal political processes and
institutions.5
Institutional Islamists are influential political actors in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) today, having gained the largest number of seats in
the parliamentary elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in 2011 and
2012. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is also a key player in the Syrian
opposition. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhoods candidate, Mohammed
Morsi, recently became the countrys first civilian elected president. In
Libya, Islamists have failed to achieve the same electoral success as their
peers in Tunisia and Egypt, yet they remain influential.

The increasing political clout of Islamist parties across the region has stirred
up serious domestic and external concerns over the depth of their practical
commitment to international human rights standards. Long before the Arab
revolutions, many observers were suspicious of Islamists commitment to
human rights and liberal democracy. 6 These concerns were bolstered by
previous experiences of Islamic governance and the application of Shariah
law in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Northern Nigeria and

2
M. Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East (Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.2.
3
S. Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (New York: I.B
Tauris, 2006), p.2.
4
M. Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 14-17.
5
B. Tibi, Islam and Islamism (New York: Yale University Press, 2010), p.10.
6
See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London:
Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 2002), pp.192-198; B. Lewis, Freedom and Justice in the
Modern Middle East, Foreign Affairs, 36(2002), pp. 48-50; B. Tibi, Why They Cant Be
Democratic, Journal of Democracy, 19(3) (2008), pp. 43-48.

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Afghanistan.7 Given the popularity of Islamist parties in many Muslim
states, other analysts advocated for the integration of peaceful Islamists into
political processes as a tool of de-radicalization and moderation.8

Before the revolutions, Islamist parties were outlawed in Egypt and Tunisia.
However, they remained active in the political opposition to varying degrees.
In Egypt after 1984, the Mubarak regime intermittently tolerated the political
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and MB members were
represented in the parliaments of 1984 and 1987 as independents; they also
dominated professional syndicates and student unions. The group was
subjected to a security crackdown during the 1990s, yet in 2000 and 2005,
the MB emerged once again as a powerful oppositional bloc in the
parliament. In Tunisia, Ennahda, known before 1989 as al-Itijah al-Islami,
was a major political player during 1980s, yet it was systematically banned
and repressed in Tunisia after 1989. Many of the top leaders of Ennahda
lived in exile. After the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali, the Muslim
Brotherhood and Ennahda have flourished in the political scenes of their
respective countries.

Other Islamist actors have emerged as well. In Egypt, Salafists, as well as

former violent jihadist movements such as al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, have
formed political parties. After decades of staying away from formal politics,
Salafists decided to make use of the free political space in the post-Mubarak
era and to participate in politics. The main social base of the Nour Party is
the Salafist Call Association in Alexandria, a major organisational umbrella
group for Salafists in Egypt.9 Tunisian Salafists have also become visible in
public life, but unlike their Egyptian counterparts, they have not yet
participated in post-revolution elections. On March 30, 2012, the first

7
See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2004) Fourth edition, pp. 36-46; P. Marshall, Introduction: The Rise of Extreme
Sharia, in P. Marshall (ed.) Radical Islams Rules: the Worldwide Spread of Extreme
Sharia Law (Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 1-17.
8
K. Kausch, Plus Ca Change: Europes Engagement with Moderate Islamists, FRIDEs
Working Paper 75, 2009, available at: www.fride.org/publications/563/europes-engagement-
with-moderate-islamists (Accessed 15 February 2012); K. Roth, Time to Abandon the
Autocrats and Embrace Rights: the International Response to the Arab Spring, in Human
Rights Watch World Report 2012 (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2012), pp. 1-21. In the
introduction of the 2012 world report of the Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, the
executive director of the organisation, states that Islamic movements are hardly monolithic or
implacably opposed to rights. Yet rather than engage with them to demand respect for rights,
Western governments have often treated them as untouchable.
9
U. Abdul Latif, Salafists and Politics in Egypt, Arab Center for Research and Policy
Studies, 2012, available at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/508a64a4-3f6e-4958-8e1b-
e0c9d6288d67, p. 11.

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Tunisian Salafist party was established, with a view to competing in the
parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2013. 10
Th experience of Islamists in power so far demonstrates that their conception
of democracy is limited to competition at the ballot box, with less
appreciation for ensuring the rights of minorities, individual liberties, the
separation of powers, and the independence of public institutions, including
the judiciary. If this trend continues, Islamist-led regimes in the wake of the
revolutions will entrench a tyranny of the majority rather than true
democracies, as envisaged by the revolutions.
After coming to power, Egyptian Islamists have been far more concerned
with securing a dominant position in the emerging regime than with working
with other political forces to consolidate the transition to democracy. Many
of their actions have raised doubts about the genuineness of their
commitment to democracy and the rule of law. Although Ennahda showed a
liberal and consensus-driven mindset at times throughout the transition in
Tunisia, its recent political behaviour and its stance on certain human rights
are cause for concern. Having obtained the majority of seats in the
parliament in Egypt, Islamists dominated the Constituent Assembly as
well,11 and they refused to develop a set of supra-constitutional principles
regarding human rights, citizenship, and democratic governance. The FJP
and the Nour Party firmly maintain that the elected parliament should have
exclusive authority to oversee the drafting process of the new constitution.
They have refused to give universal human rights a privileged status in the
constitution, arguing that these rights reflect western values. 12
President Morsi has succeeded in asserting his power over the military, 13 but
no reforms have yet been undertaken to prevent the politicization of the
army. The Muslim Brotherhood has dominated state-owned media and used
Mubaraks press law to silence journalists.
President Morsi has also broken his electoral promise to restructure the
membership of the Constituent Assembly to reflect Egypts political

10
The Reform Front Party was officially established on 30 March 2012. See S. Ajmi, Reform
Front Party: Tunisias First Salafist Party, Tunisia Live, 11 May 2012, available at:
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/05/11/reform-front-party-tunisias-first-salafist-party/ .
11
See M. Ottoway, The Death of the Constituent Assembly, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2012, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/13/egypt-
death-of-constituent-assembly/brzn.
12
See A Statement by the Freedom and Justice Party, 6 September 2011, available at:
http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=2308.
13
See M. El Fegiery, Crunch Time for Egypts Civil-Military Relations, FRIDE Policy
Brief, 14 August 2012, available at: http://www.fride.org/publication/1054/crunch-time-for-
egypts-civil-military-relations.

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diversity, and he failed to deliver on his promise of an inclusive cabinet.
Islamists imprint on public institutions was obvious in the formation of the
National Council for Human Rights, some members of which are known for
their outright hostility to human rights.14 One member was previously
involved in a flagrant incitement to hatred and violence against Shiite
Muslims.15
President Morsi and his Islamist allies consider that their success at the
ballot box allows them to infringe on the independence of the judiciary and
to subordinate the judiciary to their political agenda. Indeed, the Egyptian
judiciary has been subjected to flagrant attempts to control its supervisory
role over the executive and the legislature. President Morsi has confronted
the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and circumvented its judgment on
the dissolution of the parliament. He unilaterally adopted a Constitutional
Declaration on November 21, 2012 to immunize his actions from the judicial
oversight. This declaration allowed him to dismiss the attorney general and
to appoint a new one of his own choosing. When the SCC refused to submit
to the president, Islamists besieged the headquarters of the SCC and
prevented its judges from entering in an attempt to prevent potential
judgments on the constitutionality of the upper house of parliament and of
the law regulating the Constituent Assembly. One of the stated objectives of
President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has been to stifle the powers of
the SCC in the name of reforming the judiciary. 16 The SCC does need
reforms to ensure its full independence, but these reforms must not serve as a
pretext to weaken the court. Islamists used the new constitution as an
opportunity to achieve this goal. Article 233 reduced the number of judges in
the court from 17 to 11. Accordingly, its newest six members were removed
from the bench. Article 176 provides that both judicial and non-judicial
organs can nominate judges to serve on the SCC and that their appointment
takes place by presidential decree. Before the adoption of the constitution,
the general assembly of the SCC was charged with appointing its members
and president. The new appointment system will allow the government to
restructure the membership of the court in the near future. Moreover, a new
law being prepared to regulate the court is likely to limit its jurisdiction. This
attack on the judiciary is not an attempt at judicial reform, as claimed by the

14
See Political Groups, Figures Concerned over Politicised Human Rights Council, Ahram
Online, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/52100/Egypt/Politics-
/Political-groups,-figures-concerned-over-politicis.aspx, accessed 6 May 2012.
15
See the statement of Safwat Hegaz, a leading Islamist who is a close ally of the Muslim
Brotherhood, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_3m10LZ4mU, accessed 6
May 2012.
16
See the statement of the leftist al-Tagammuh Party on 8 August 2012, available at:
http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/35934.

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president and his supporters. Rather, the president and his allies have taken
these actions to enable their use of the judiciary in the future in order to
serve their political goals.
In the early months of Tunisias transition, Ennahda tended to seek political
compromise with secular parties, even when the concessions involved came
at the expense of important elements of the party's ideological
underpinnings. It confirmed its willingness to share power with other
Tunisian political forces and to draft an inclusive constitution. It also
declared its respect for the rights of women as enshrined in family law. One
major step was Ennahdas agreement with other political forces to refer to
Islam as the official religion of the state in the first section of the
constitution, rather than citing Shariah as the main source of legislation.
This move did not signal an abandonment of Ennahdas Islamist agenda.
Rather, it reflected a new organisational and political reality that is different
from the situation of Islamists in Egypt.
Ennahda has chosen to defer controversial political issues likely to divide
Tunisian society so as to successfully steer the country through the fragile
political transition. Unlike their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisian Islamists
face a strong secular opposition and feminist movement. These actors
pressure the Islamist movement and its political leadership to emphasize
their reformist understanding of Islamic law. Ennahda has not rejected the
doctrine of supremacy of Shariah and the traditional methods of Islamic
law, yet this does not contradict with the development of its comparatively
progressive views on human rights. Tensions remain between its Islamist
agenda and international human rights standards, but in comparison to the
thought and practice of Islamists in Egypt, Ennahda has thus far introduced a
relatively soft version of Islamism. Even before the revolution, political
leaders of Ennahda had engaged in dialogue with secular Tunisian political
forces and reached agreements with them on many sensitive issues. 17
Nevertheless, this consensus has recently been threatened amid accusations
by its political partners that Ennahda is attempting to monopolize power and
to restrict media freedoms and gender equality. 18 Ennahda has been also

17
See L. Hajji, The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia, Arab Reform
Initiative, February 2007, available at: http://www.arab-reform.net/18-october-coalition-
rights-and-freedoms-tunisia.
18
Tunisia President Launches Attack against Ruling Islamists, AFP, available at:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5icOQzez62kG3rLP2EptGS3vbTT-
Q?docId=CNG.6ecabf95f500747be87b57255a70d2e9.7b1.

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criticised for being too lenient with hardline Salafists who have committed
violence against intellectuals and against artistic activities.19
Recently, the Tunisian government arbitrarily dismissed 75 judges from their
posts, claiming to be purging the judiciary. This action represents an
inappropriate interference in the judiciary, as the government has not
adopted a transparent and impartial mechanism to review the records of
judges.20 Moreover, the independence of the judiciary and of constitutional
monitoring bodies remains questionable under the current draft of the
constitution,21 which provides for the establishment of a new Constitutional
Court that would be charged with interpreting the constitution and
overseeing the constitutionality of future laws. However, the parliament
would be charged with selecting the judges of this Constitutional Court
based on nominations from the president, the prime minister, the speaker of
the parliament and the Supreme Judicial Council, thus subjecting the court to
the dominant political groups in the parliament. The parliament would also
be charged with appointing the members of the High Elections Commission,
the National Human Rights Council, and other monitoring bodies. No
criteria are suggested in the draft constitution to ensure that political
considerations do not influence the selection process and, thus, the
independence of these bodies.

Ideological Underpinnings and Political Practice

Examining the ideological and programmatic deliberations of the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Nour Party, and Ennahda can provide
insight into these groups posture towards human rights and their
views regarding the relationship between religion and the state. This
section also addresses the relevant constitutional, legal, and political
positions taken by these parties after coming to power. Issues that are
particularly important to discussions regarding Islamists commitment
to human rights and democracy include the role and nature of the
state, the definition of human rights, the relationship between Shariah
and pluralism, equality between men and women, limits of religious
freedom, the rights of non-Muslim citizens, and restrictions on the
freedom of expression.

19
N. Dalaa, Is the Ennahda Government Soft on Salafists?, Al-Monitor, 24 May 2012,
available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/05/tunisian-media-and-political-
ana.html.
20
Human Rights Watch, Tunisia: Mass Firings a Blow to Judicial Independence, available
at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/29/tunisia-mass-firings-blow-judicial-independence .
21
In this paper, I refer to the draft Tunisian constitution published on 14 December 2012.

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The Civil State with an Islamic Reference
Islamists have argued that their conception of Shariah as the legal
framework of the state is compatible with that of a constitutional democratic
state. Many have pointed out that they seek to establish not a theocracy but a
civil state with an Islamic reference. At the same time, the distinction made
by many Islamists between a theocratic state and an Islamic civil state fails
to address the fears expressed by non-Muslims, liberals, and the human
rights community.
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda consider themselves to be part
of a centrist, moderate Islamism. In its platform, Tunisias Ennahda
underlines the movements enlightened understanding of Islam. It has
expressed its readiness to let its doctrine benefit from modern human and
civilizational achievements through ijtihad (independent juristic
reasoning).22 The FJP and Ennahda say that very few rulings in Shariah are
fixed and unamenable to change, having been derived from provisions of the
Quran or Sunna that are of indisputable meaning and authenticity. All other
rulings are established through ijtihad, guided by the overarching legal
principles of Islamic jurisprudence, the intent of Shariah, and the principle
of seeking the public interest.23
This approach to Shariah leaves open a wide space for human reasoning,
but it does not provide a sufficient basis for reforming religion. Many of the
so-called fixed rulings in the Quran and Sunna are not compatible with
fundamental human rights such as gender equality, the rights of non-
Muslims, and the prohibition of cruel forms of punishment. Moreover, this
approach leaves many loopholes open for the issuance of arbitrary rulings
based on the positions and values of the bodies tasked with interpreting
Shariah as the legal framework of the state.
Like the FJP and Ennahda, the Salafist Nour Party shares the view that Islam
offers comprehensive guidance for the political, economic, social, and
cultural spheres, and as such it believes in the supremacy of Shariah.24
Generally, Salafism refers to the Islamist trend that aims to purify Islamic
belief and practices by returning to the origins of Islam as practiced by the
Prophet and his companions. This definition can be applied to many

22
Parnmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html,
p.3.
23
Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-Adallah, Parnmij al-Hizb (2011), p.28. See also Al-Nahdah
Movement, al-Riyyah al-Fikriyyah wa al-Manhaj al-sl (2011), available at:
http://www.ennahdha.tn/-.
24
See Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.

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Islamists, including Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century, as well as
the Muslim Brotherhood. However, today the term Salafism is usually used
to refer to Islamists influenced by Wahabism and Zahirism, which are
characterized by their emphasis on strict and literal interpretations of Quran
and Sunna.25 Since the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood has been exposed to
increasing Salafist influence, and many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood
are also part of Salafist associations in Egypt.26
The MB states that it aims to establish a civil state with an Islamic
reference.27 The MB insists that this model differs fundamentally from the
theocracies of medieval Europe, claiming that in an Islamic state, no special
privileges would be given to clergy in the name of God, the source of
authority would be the people, and democratic institutions would be
entrusted with protecting the teachings of Islam. 28 The constitution would be
based on the principles of Shariah, and the function of shura (consultation)
would be performed through an elected parliament whose decisions are
binding on the ruler. The parliament would legislate in accordance with the
principles of Shariah, and the Supreme Constitutional Court would oversee
the compatibility of laws with these principles. 29
The Nour Party generally agrees with the FJP on the structure and nature of
the Islamic version of democracy ruled by Shariah, but it rejects the term
civil state, fearing that this idea could undermine the application of Islamic
law.30 Like the FJP, the Nour Party rejects both the theocratic and the secular
state. It affirms its belief in an Islamic, modern, constitutional state where
representative democracy is practiced in accordance with Shariah. This
state, according to the Nour Party, would be based on the separation of
powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the respect of human rights
and public liberties.31
The concept of a civil state with an Islamic reference poses many dangers for
the future of human rights and constitutionalism. Fundamental human rights,

25
G. Denoeux, (2011) The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam, in Volpi, F., (ed.)
Political Islam: a Critical Reader. New York: Routledge.pp. 59-60.
26
See H. Tammm, Tassaluf al-Ikhwan (Alexandria: Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2010); J.
Brown, Salafists and Sufis in Egypt. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2011),
available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/salafis_sufis.pdf, p.5.
27
I Al-Iryn, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-ilm
al-arabi, 2011).
28
Ibid., pp. 30-31.
29
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
30
Hizb al-Nour: Narfud al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah, available at:
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=567760.
31
Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.

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such as freedom of religion, could be restricted in the name of Shariah,
unless clear safeguards are included in the constitution to protect citizens
from arbitrary interpretations of Islamic law. Moreover, including a
constitutional clause stating that Islamic law is a fundamental element of the
political system limits the scope of other articles in the constitution. The
legislative process under such a constitution would lack clarity and
transparency, as interpreting Shariah would be left to the majority in
parliament and to the judiciary and every political actor would seek to
establish its understanding of Shariah as the truest representation of Islam.
Article 81 of the new Egyptian constitution states: Rights and freedoms
shall be exercised in a manner not conflicting with the principles pertaining
to the elements of the state and society in the Constitution. This means that
Islamic law (Article 2), other vague criteria pertaining to public morals
(Articles 10 and 11), the cultural and civilizational foundations of society
(Article 12), and national unity (Article 5) will determine the scope of
constitutional rights. The states adherence to international human rights
treaties will be also subject to these vague qualifications (Article 145).
State interference in certain areas of public and private life in the name of
public order and public morals can go far beyond the acceptable limits under
international human rights law. For this reason, the UN Human Rights
Committee stated in its General Comment No. 22: The fact that a religion is
recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional
or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result
in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. The Committee also
stated that the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical,
and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest
a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on
principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.
Islamists assert that in their model of an Islamic state, no one would be able
to monopolize the interpretation of Shariah and that ijtihad is open to all
Muslims. In practice, however, it would appear that this would not be the
case, as ijtihad is only considered permissible when based on human-made
approaches and principles of jurisprudence and Islamists insist that there are
fixed rulings in Shariah that cannot be open to change. This view is
supported by many institutions in Egypt, including the Supreme
Constitutional Court and al-Azhar. While there is no definite list of these
fixed rulings, a Muslim jurist who practices ijtihad in any of these areas can
be declared an apostate, as he or she would be considered to be denying an
Islamic fact. Thus, under the model of the Islamic state, one specific
understanding of Islam would be institutionalized and adopted by the state as

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authentic. Consequently, any religious belief that differs from the
mainstream understanding of ijtihad and Shariah would be denounced as
heresy.
Islamists consolidated the status of Shariah in the new Egyptian
constitution, which establishes a consultative role for religious scholars in
the law-making process. Article 4 states: Al-Azhar Association of Senior
Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law. The
platform of the Freedom and Justice Party affirms that the Supreme
Constitutional Court is the competent body to interpret Islamic law, yet the
draft political platform of the Muslim Brotherhood from 2007 mentions
granting authority to Muslim scholars for the interpretation of Islamic law.
Many scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood since Hassan al-Banna have also
upheld this proposal. Moreover, the former presidential candidate of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater, promised during his electoral
campaign to form a committee of Muslim jurists to assist him in applying
Islamic law.32 Further, the inclusion of Article 4 in the Constitution has been
seen as a concession made by the Muslim Brotherhood to satisfy its Salafist
allies. Nonetheless, Article 4 has provoked outrage from a wide range of
liberals and human rights activists. They consider this move a bold step
towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars intervene in the
work of the elected bodies.33 Even though the opinions of the Association of
Senior Scholars are not binding, the scholars represent a powerful moral and
religious authority over elected parliamentarians.
Furthermore, Article 219 of the Constitution provides an explanation of
Islamic Shariah which is now binding on all judicial and political bodies in
Egypt. Even though this explanatory article refers to the traditional sources,
methods, and principles of Sunni Islamic law, it remains very broad and
vague and leaves the door open to the whole range of Sunni juristic choices,
from moderate to hardline opinions. Article 219 is broader than the previous
interpretation of the principles of Islamic Shariah introduced by the
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in the1990s, when the SCC pointed out
that the legislator should not override fixed rulings of Shariah derived from
the Quran and certain texts in Sunna. This interpretation emphasized the
role of ijtihad in all other cases in order to accommodate changing realities
in ensuring the public interest. Article 219 of the new constitution provides
the executive, legislature, and the Association of Senior Scholars with broad
discretionary powers to determine the scope of Islamic law, which will result

32
See Al-Masry Al-Youm, 4 April 2012, available at:
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/751541.
33
See the statement by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights on 16 July 2012, available
at: http://www.eipr.org/pressrelease/2012/07/16/1453.

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in a lack of legal certainty and transparency in the law-making process.
Thus, the new constitution will likely lead to political struggles between
different actors over how to interpret Shariah. Article 219 also establishes
that the Sunni Islam is the only recognized Islamic doctrine in Egypt,
thereby excluding Egyptian Muslims who belong to other non-Sunni
doctrines.
In contrast, Ennahda has avoided explicit reference to Shariah as the legal
framework for the state in its political platform, maintaining only that Islam
is the official religion of the state. It considers Islam to be its supreme
reference and says that its program is in its entirety committed to Islamic
values. Contrary to its Islamist peers, Ennahda and its leaders have openly
used the term the secular state, albeit with some refinement to make it fit
their Islamist approach. Ennahdas leader, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, has argued
that Islam is reconcilable with procedural secularism, under which
constitutional safeguards on religious freedoms and freedom of expression
can be established to ensure the states neutrality towards different religions.
Since the state refrains from intervening in the religious way of life of its
citizens, the coercive apparatus of the state would not be used to impose
religious habits or practices.34 In the sphere of politics, according to
Ghannouchi, the state is Islamic insofar that it assures its actions are in
accordance with Islams values without being subjected to the tutelage of
any religious institution, and the parliament conducts peaceful management
of diverse interpretations of Islam. 35
However, Ghannouchis theory aims to maintain two irreconcilable ideas:
the religious neutrality of the state and Islam as the supreme source of law
for the state. In the words of An-Naim, The rationale and purpose of public
policy or legislation is based on the sort of reasoning that the generality of
citizens can accept or reject, which cannot happen when such matters are
demanded as categorical religious mandate. 36

34
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Secularism and Relations between Religion and the State from the
Perspective of al-Nahdah Party, a lecture organised by the Centre for the Study of Islam and
Democracy, 2 March 2012. The video of the lecture is available at:
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20827717?utm_source=Transcript+of+Rached+Ghannouchi
%27s+lecture+on+Secularism++March+2%2C+2012&utm_campaign=Tunisia+Democracy+
Rached+Ghannouchi+Transition+Center+for+the+Study+of+Islam+and+Democracy+%28CS
ID%29&utm_medium=email. The full transcript is available in English at: http://blog.sami-
aldeeb.com/2012/03/09/full-transcript-of-rached-ghannouchis-lecture-on-secularism-march-2-
2012/.
35
Ibid.
36
A. An-Naim, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of
Islamic Law and State Law, The Modern Law Review, 73 (1) (2010), p. 3.

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 Ennahda has had different political priorities during the transitional period
in Tunisia than those of its counterparts in Egypt. Ennahdas official party
platform does not call for the application of Shariah, and al-Ghannouchi has
stated that his party is not concerned at this stage with implementing
Shariah or including it in the constitution. Despite pressure from Tunisian
Salafists and hardliners among Ennahdas ranks, Ennahda agreed to liberal
demands that Shariah not be mentioned in the new constitution. Instead, it
contented itself with keeping Islam in the constitution as the official religion
of the state.37 This represented a significant move in reducing tensions
between secularists and Islamists. Al-Ghannouchi says that his movements
priority is to consolidate freedom and democratic transition in Tunisia,
which he claims is in any case a central part of Shariah.38 However, on
different occasions, Ennahda leaders have stated that reference to Islam as
the official religion of the state allows the party to adopt Islamic laws and
nullifies any laws that are not consistent with Shariah.39 Indeed, Ennahdas
longer-term aspiration to implement the rule of Shariah has not been fully
abandoned. The issue has been set aside to be addressed at a later stage,
when the movement is better established socially and politically.
The draft constitution in Tunisia would allow Islamist parties to gradually
impose their agendas, as it includes several references which guarantee that
the state favor Islam in its public policies. The preamble of the draft
constitution refers to the centrality of the foundations and objectives of Islam
in the society, although it does emphasize a moderate and flexible
understanding of Islam. Article 4 establishes the role of the state in
safeguarding religion and protecting sanctuaries, and the reference to Islam
as the official religion of the state is considered to be a non-amendable
constitutional provision.

37
K. Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law, New York Times, 28
March 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/africa/tunisia-says-
constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html.
38
Al-Assad Ben Ahmad, We Fought for Freedom, Not Sharia Law, Al-Ahram Weekly, 5
April 2012, available at:
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1092/re4.htm.
39
See interview with al-Ghannouchi, Mijalat Al-Mujtama, 7 April 2012, available at:
http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137.

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The Concept of Human Rights
All three parties under study acknowledge the value of human rights and
international human rights treaties in theory. The protection of human rights
as a basic function of the Islamic state has been repeatedly addressed in the
literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda over the last three
decades.40 The Nour Party has also shown openness towards human rights. 41
The rights proposed and advocated by Islamists do intersect with many
universal human rights, yet some important conceptual differences remain.
These differences give rise to tensions, especially in the areas of gender
equality, the rights of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, freedom of
expression, political pluralism, religious freedoms, and the prohibition of
inhumane and cruel punishment.
The conception of human rights adopted by many Islamists establishes
religious texts and Shariah as the foundation for human rights, with less
appreciation for reason and the human experience in understanding these
religious texts. This conception contradicts the rationale behind universal
human rights. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) affirms that each individual regardless of his or her religion can
claim human rights by appealing to human reason and conscience. Although
religion can form a conceptual basis for human rights, religious
interpretations exist which contradict international human rights norms.
The FJP says that it is committed to universal human rights, provided that
they are not inconsistent with Shariah.42 The electoral platform of President
Morsi mentioned the protection of human rights as stipulated in Shariah and
fundamental religious values. 43 The Nour Party says that public liberties and

40
M. Al-Ghazzali, Huqq al-Insan Bayn Talym al-Islam wa Iln al-mm al-Mutahidah.
4th edn. (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2005); Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Bayn Li al-Nss, in A Al-
Shamkh, Dallak Ila Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra, 2011) pp. 315-320;
M.M. El-Hodaiby, The Principles of Politics in Islam (Cairo: Islamic INC, 1997); R. Al-
Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-Ammah F al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 and 2 (2011).
41
In an Amnesty International survey on the positions of Egyptian political parties on
international human rights, al Nour Party agreed to all pledges with the exception of the
abolition of the death penalty and protection of womens rights. See Amnesty International,
Egypt: Survey of Political Parties Views Reveals Disturbing Opposition to Women's
Rights, 2011, available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19911,
accessed 23 August 2012.
42
Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-Adallah, Parnmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 29.
43
Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-Adallah, al-Parnmij al-Ris li Mohammad Morsi (2012), p.8.

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fundamental rights should be protected in accordance with Islamic Shariah
and the foundational values of the nation (thawabit al-ummah).44
In many Arab countries, vague references to Shariah and the respect of
religious values have often been misused by both secular governments and
Islamists to erode the guarantees provided by international human rights law.
Of the three parties under study, only Ennahda does not condition human
rights based on the limitations of Shariah. It states in its platform that
international human rights treaties are generally consistent with the
objectives and values of Islam.45 However, on other occasions, al-
Ghannouchi and other party representatives have expressed their support for
the reservations on the CEDAW46 previously expressed by the Tunisian
state.47

Shariah and Political Pluralism

Before the 2011 uprisings, Islamist movements such the MB and Ennahda
focused largely on political rights. Working in a repressive environment for
decades, Islamists could only survive and engage in the political system by
demanding their political rights. Islamists argue that political pluralism in
modern democracies is similar to the pluralism between the various schools
of Islamic law. The MB and the Nour Party state that political pluralism in
the Islamic state exists within the supremacy of Shariah.48 This means that
any party or association that differs from their version of Islamic could be
subjected to restrictions or dissolution, since Shariah constitutes the public
order of the Islamic state and neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can
challenge it. Ennahda and its chief thinker, al-Ghannouchi, have asserted that
all kinds of parties and associations can exist in an Islamic state, including
those with secular or atheist orientations.49 In practice, however, this
assertion seems dubious, since Ennahda aims to criminalise certain forms of
expression in the name of protecting religious sanctities. This argument

44
See Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
45
Parnmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html,
p.7.
46
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.
47
See interview with al-Ghannouchi, Mijalat Al-Mujtama, 7 April 2012, available at:
http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137.
48
I. Al-Iryn, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-ilm
al-arabi, 2011); Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
49
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-Ammah F al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 2 (2011), pp.
147-150.

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could easily be turned into a tool to silence liberal Muslim and secular
voices.

Gender Equality
The most controversial area in the debate on Islamism and human rights is
the rights of women. In general, none of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nour
Party, or Ennahda believes in the concept of gender equality as stipulated in
international human rights treaties. Members and leaders of the MB have
usually been critical of the concept of gender equality as established in the
CEDAW, arguing that the international approach to womens rights corrupts
Islamic social values and morals.50 Instead, Islamists advocate the concept of
complementary roles for men and women.51 In reality, this means that not all
the rights enjoyed by men are granted to women. This understanding is
reflected in the discriminatory positions held by many Islamists on marriage,
divorce, and the political rights of women.
The three parties under study agree on some legal aspects of the relationship
between men and women in Islamic law, including the responsibility of men
to provide for their wives financially according to the doctrine of
Qawammah, in exchange for advantages for men in the institution of
marriage. They also agree that women should inherit half of the share of
inheritance allocated to their male siblings, and they think that the marriage
of Muslim women to non-Muslim men should be prohibited. These legal
opinions are common among scholars of Islamic law, since they are directly
derived from clear stipulations in the Quran and Sunna. Therefore, even
reformist Islamists, such as al-Ghannouchi, have not departed from these
views.

There are remarkable differences between the three parties in the

understanding of many other aspects of womens rights. Ennahda, for
example, is much more progressive than Egyptian Islamists on many
controversial areas of womens rights. For instance, Ennahda does not
oppose restricting the practice of polygamy, although it adopts the view that

50
See interview with Makarim al-Dir, 11 August 2012, available at:
http://ikhwanonline.com/ramadan/Pageview.aspx?ID=2333&SectionID=9.
51
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Wathqat al-Marah wa al-Shrah, in A Al-Shamkh, Dallak
Ila Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra, 2011), p. 307. The same meaning is also
clear in the program of FJP, Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-Adallah, Parnmij al-Hizb (2011), pp.
112-113 and p. 31; Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_social; and R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-
Ammah F al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), p. 90.

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polygamy should not be outright abolished.52 Most Egyptian Islamists, by
contrast, maintain that polygamy is permissible in Islam and cannot be
subjected to legal restrictions, as long as men are committed to just and fair
treatment of their wives.53
Human rights activists in Egypt fear that the new constitution could lead to
changes to the Personal Status Law.54 Female leaders of the Freedom and
Justice Party have stated on many occasions that family law should be
amended to be consistent with Shariah. They have also said that
international treaties on the rights of women have been destructive to the
values of the Muslim family. Members of the Nour Party have proposed
draft laws in the post-revolution parliament that are inconsistent with the
rights of women. One of these proposals aimed to reduce the age of marriage
for girls to 12 years old. During his electoral campaign, President Morsi said
that early marriage should be legalised. The Nour Party has also proposed
decriminalisation of the practice of female genital mutilation. This is
consistent with the position of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes that
this practice should be left to the discretion of families but that it must be
performed by doctors.55 In 2008, the parliamentary bloc of the Muslim
Brotherhood opposed the criminalisation of female genital mutilation and
resisted raising the age of marriage to 18 years old. 56
Protections for gender equality and the rights of women are severely lacking
in the new Egyptian constitution, which endorses the patriarchal view of
gender relations in the society and reinforces a conservative interpretation of
Islamic Shariah on the matter. Women are mentioned in the constitution as
mothers and sisters but not as citizens that enjoy full equality with men.
Article 33 states: All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal
public rights and duties without discrimination. However, the reference to
the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, religion, ethnicity and any
other basis was omitted in the last version of the constitution, leaving the
52
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Marah bayn al-Quran wa Waq al-Muslimn, 3rd edn. (London:
Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), p.98 and p. 104.
53
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists have traditionally opposed the
restriction of polygamy in the amendments to the family law in 1979. See S. Al-Bahnas w,
Qawnn al-Ussrah Bayn Ajz al-Nissa wa daf al-Ulam (Kuwait: Dr al-Qalam, 1984)
pp. 144-146; S. Al-Bahnasw, Hurriyyat al-Rai: al-Waqi wa al-thawabit (Al-Mansurah:
Dr al-Wafa, 2003) p. 115.
54
H. Badran, The Arab Spring Represents a Leap Backward for Women. The Daily Star. 27
August 2012, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Aug-
27/185770-the-arab-spring-represents-a-leap-backward-for-women.ashx#axzz24mOSmBKj.
55
Ibid.
56
See Al-Markaz al-Ilm Lil Ikwan al-Muslimun, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun f Parlamn
2005, Al-Mawsah al-Tarikhiyyah al-Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan, 2008, available at:
http://bit.ly/O99T9U, accessed 23 August 2012.

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constitution without any explicit provision on gender equality. Article 10
opens the door for discriminatory policies against women within the family
and in workplaces. Using vague language, this article entrusts the state and
society with maintaining the authentic character of the Egyptian family and
ensuring its moral and religious values. According to the same article, the
state guarantees that women can reconcile between their duties towards
their families and their participation in public life.
After the fall of Ben Ali, Ennahda was keen to assure Tunisian women that
their rights under family law would not be repealed. The party accepted the
electoral law that stipulated allocating an equal number of seats to men and
women in the electoral lists of parties. However, Ennahda has come under
attack as a result of its proposal to use the expression complementarity of
roles between men and women in the constitution. This proposal has
triggered outrage particularly among secularists and human rights advocates,
who fear that it could be used to justify a future retreat from the protection of
women in Tunisian law.57 Tunisian Islamists withdrew this controversial
proposal, and the Tunisian draft constitution recognizes the rights of women
in many provisions. It refers to gender equality (Article 5) and the rights of
women and the protection of any progress achieved previously in Tunisia in
this area (Article7). It also protects equal opportunities for men and women
and refers to the states responsibility to end all forms of violence against
women (Article 37). However, it remains unclear how this progressive
language will play out in light of other constitutional provisions establishing
Islam as the official religion of the state (Article 1) and the vague reference
to the states responsibility to protect the family and its cohesion (Article 8),
as certain interpretations of these provisions could obstruct full equality
between men and women. Tellingly, when the Tunisian government lifted its
reservations on CEDAW in August 2011, it made an ambiguous declaration
saying that the implementation of the treaty should not violate Islam as the
official religion of the state.58
On the political rights of women, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained
that Shariah allows women to run in parliamentary elections and to occupy
any public post except for the presidency of the state. 59 Prior to 2011,

57
H. Mcrobie, Will the Tunisian Constitution Erode the gains of Women in the Arab Spring
New Statesman, 15 August 2012, available at:
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/will-tunisian-constitution-erode-gains-
women-arab-spring.
58
See Human Rights Watch, Tunisia: Government Lifts Restrictions on Womens Rights
Treaty, 7 September 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/06/tunisia-
government-lifts-restrictions-women-s-rights-treaty.
59
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Wathqat al-Marah wa al-Shrah, in A Al-Shamkh, Dallak
Ila Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra, 2011), p. 310.

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Egyptian Salafists were of the view that women should not be allowed to run
for seats in parliament.60 Following the revolution, leading scholars of
Salafism reviewed this position, yet it is clear from a legal opinion by
leading Salafist Yasser al-Borhami that Salafists have been forced to retract
their previous position in order to conform to the Egyptian electoral law
requiring all parties to nominate at least one female candidate in their
electoral lists. Al-Borhami says that the nomination of women in the
parliamentary elections is in principle not permitted. However, he goes on to
say that this position can be altered to prevent moral corruption, or the
corruption that could be caused if secularists who refuse the rule of Shariah
were to dominate elected bodies.61 During the parliamentary elections of
2011, the Nour Party did not publish the photos of their female candidates in
the electoral lists, instead replacing them with pictures of flowers or photos
of the candidates husbands. Ennahdas al-Ghannouchi, by contrast, stated in
his book on public liberties in the Islamic state that Islam does not prohibit
women from being nominated for all public posts, including positions in the
judiciary and the presidency.62

Freedom of Religion
The political platforms of all three Islamist parties under study state that
freedom of religion is a key right in Islam. However, Islamists conceive of
religious freedom differently than it is envisioned in international human
rights law. The prevailing opinion in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour
Party in Egypt is that conversion from Islam is prohibited and can be
punishable by the death penalty.63 Converts from Islam can be deprived of
their rights in marriage, inheritance, and custody of children. Some Egyptian
jurists, such as Yousef al-Qaradawi and Salim al-Awa, have argued that the
punishment of apostasy is a discretionary punishment and that it is not part
of the fixed punishments in Islam. However, many Islamists think that
apostasy is a serious crime that should be punished in the Islamic state. The

60
Y. Al-Borhami, Fatwa Tarashuh al-Marah li Majlis al-Shab, 2010, available at:
http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=4821.
61
Y. Al-Borhami, Hukm Musharakat al-Marah f al-Majalis al-Niyabiyyah, 2011, available
at: http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=5710.
62
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Marah bayn al-Quran wa Waq al-Muslimn. 3rd edn. (London:
Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), pp. 115-128.
63
See the legal opinion (fatwa) published on the official web site of the Department of Dawa
at the Muslim Brotherhood on 27 March 2012, available at: http://www.manaratweb.com/e-
print.php?id=1608. Similar fatwas have previously been published and are available on the
web site. See also the opinion of the leading Salafist scholar Yasser al-Borham on apostasy in
Islam, 12 May 2012, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lL3AhugZ_5E.

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MB and the Salafists contend that Islam is the system of belief in the Islamic
state and that apostasy represents a rebellion against this system. 64 During
his electoral campaign, President Mohamed Morsi was asked about his
position on apostasy, to which he responded that people can change their
religion in private but that they are not allowed to display their conversion
from Islam in public.65

In contrast, Ennahdas al-Ghannouchi says that freedom of religion,

including apostasy, is absolutely protected in Islam.66 He, too, fails to
address the consequences of apostasy on the civil status of apostates,
however. Without ending the civil punishment of apostates, allowing
conversion is a hollow concession.

The Rights of Non-Muslim Citizens

The majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. Christians make up the
largest religious minority, while other religious communities include
Bahais, Jews, Shiites, Ahmadiyas, Quranists and Jehovahs Witnesses.
Religious minorities have lately become deeply concerned about their future
rights under Islamist rule. 67 Over the last two decades, the Muslim
Brotherhood has on numerous occasions stressed its respect for the principle
of citizenship and equality between all Egyptians, yet the status of the rights
of religious minorities in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood remains
problematic.
The MBs Reform Initiative of 2004 stated that religious freedom is
guaranteed for the recognized heavenly religions (in addition to Islam, these
are Christianity and Judaism, whose followers are often referred to as
people of the book).68 A similar restriction can be found in the FJPs
platform, which only refers to the states duty to protect the heavenly
religions.69 MB leaders have stated that non-Muslim citizens who are not
people of the book have the right to live in Egypt but are not allowed to

64
Ibid.
65
See the electoral debate Mawid Ma al-Ras, al-Nahar TV 18 May 2012, available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ReJFzuKONk.
66
R. Al-GhannouchiAl-Hurriyyat al-Ammah F al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp.
72-77.
67
See O. Halawa, Egyptian Religious Minorities Fear Rise of Islamists, Egyptian
Independent, 3 June 2011, available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/462243,
accessed 20 March 2012.
68
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Mubadarat al-Ikhwan Lil-Isl , in A. Al-Shamkh, Dallak Ila
Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. (Cairo: Iqra, 2004) p. 324.
69
Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-Adallah, Parnmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 154.

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publicly express their religious beliefs or to build their own places of
worship.70 The platform of the Nour Party names Christianity as the only
non-Muslim minority in Egypt whose religious freedom is protected. 71 In
contrast, Ennahdas al-Ghannouchi has supported the opinion of many
Muslim jurists that religions of those not belonging to the people of the
book should also be protected in the Islamic state.72
The FJP and the Nour Party state in their platforms that non-Muslims should
apply their own religious regulations in their family and religious affairs.
They agree that in all other areas, however, state laws, i.e. Islamic law,
should be applied equally to Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly,
Ennahdas chief ideologue, al-Ghannouchi, also says that all Islamic
regulations related to public order should be applicable to Muslims and non-
Muslims alike.73 Non-Muslims in Egypt have expressed their refusal to be
governed by Islamic law, particularly with reference to Islamic corporal
penalties (hudud).
On political rights for non-Muslims, the official documents published by the
FJP and the MB after the revolution avoid discussing the right of non-
Muslims to be nominated for the presidency. By contrast, in its draft political
platform of 2007, the MB unequivocally excluded non-Muslims from
running for the positions of president and prime minister. These positions of
grand leadership (willayah uzmah), they said, must be occupied by male
Muslims.74 Following the revolution, MB leaders stated that the group would
not nominate non-Muslim or female candidates to the presidency but that
they would not object if other parties did so.75 In the ideological literature of
the Muslim Brotherhood, it is explicitly stipulated that non-Muslims and
women are excluded from positions of grand leadership.76 In Tunisia, al-
Ghannouchi states that the Muslim faith is a requirement for the presidency,
although he goes on to say that in some exceptional cases, such as to

70
See R. Scott, The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State
(California: Stanford University Press, 2010); M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in
Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012).
71
See Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
72
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Huquq al-Muwatanah. 3rd edn. (Virginia: Al-Mahad al-Alm li al-
Fikr al-Islami, 1993) pp. 56-57.
73
Ibid., p. 105
74
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Parnmij Hizb al-Ikhwan, Al-Mawsah al-Tarikhiyyah al-
Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan, 2007, available at: http://bit.ly/e2JXBE, accessed 15 May 2012.
75
M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012).
76
M. Ghuzln, al-Islam Huwa al-Hal (Cairo: Dr al-Tawz wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyyah,
2006).

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preserve the national unity in multi-religious societies, this requirement may
be lifted.77
Discrimination against non-Muslims in political rights is enshrined in
Tunisias draft constitution, Article 67 of which stipulates that the president
of the republic must be a Muslim citizen. This condition is inconsistent with
another constitutional provision that guarantees equality and non-
discrimination among Tunisian citizens (Article 5). This condition was
copied from the former Tunisian Constitution despite opposition from
Tunisian human rights defenders and other political forces. The leaders of
the Nour Party have made it clear that non-Muslims are not allowed to
occupy positions of grand leadership in the Islamic state. For them, this
also includes the position of vice president. 78
Undoubtedly, the rights of religious minorities under the new Egyptian
constitution are in peril. The practice of religious freedom will only be
guaranteed to the followers of the monotheistic heavenly religions (namely
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). This means that other religious minorities,
such as Bahais, will be deprived of their religious rights. Indeed, the
parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood was outspoken against the
recognition of the Bahai religious minority in the parliament of 2005,
considering Bahaism a heretical belief that should not be protected in a
Muslim society.
The new constitution in Egypt recognises the rights of non-Muslims to apply
their own religious regulations within their family and religious affairs.
Some observers have viewed this article as a step forward for the rights of
non-Muslims, since it represents the first time that a constitution has
recognised the existence of other religions in Egypt. However, this article
entrenches the sectarian regulation of family matters in Egypt, rather than
having one civil law for all citizens regardless of their religion. Many
Christians suffer from the strict regulations on divorce applied by the
Orthodox and Catholic Churches, which have forced some Christians to
convert to Islam. 79 Applying sectarian religious family laws means that
members of each religious community will be subject to discriminatory
religious regulations that are not in line with human rights.
The rights of the Christian minority in Egypt have not improved after the
revolution. Rather, the intolerant religious climate aggravated by Islamists

77
R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-Ammah F al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp.
235-241.
78
See statements of Yasser al-Borham, 4 July 2012, available at:
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=722750&.
79
See Protesting for the Right to Divorce, Ahram Weekly, 28 July 2011.

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political dominance has deepened the fears of Christians. Egypt has
witnessed a series of sectarian clashes over the past year, yet these instances
have been dealt with as a security issue rather than by tackling the root
causes of the injustice felt by religious minorities. Rather than addressing the
legitimate rights of Christians to equality and non-discrimination, the
Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi have repeated the mistakes of the
former regime. One fundamental demand of Christians in Egypt has been to
remove legal restrictions on building and maintaining churches. In June
2011, the transitional government headed by Essam Sharaf presented a draft
law with unified procedures on building places of worship. Many Christians
opposed the law, considering it restrictive and below their expectations. The
Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party have been firm that any regulations
must be proportional to the number of Christians and their exact needs. They
therefore oppose having a unified law on places of worship.80
The appointment of non-Muslims and women to senior political positions is
contentious for Islamists in Egypt. In his electoral campaign, President
Morsi vowed to appoint a Christian and a woman as vice presidents. This
proposal was opposed by Salafists, who considered that the position of vice
president, who may assume the role of the president under certain
conditions, should only be occupied by a Muslim male. President Morsi gave
in to this pressure, appointing a woman and a Christian as presidential
assistants and naming a prominent Muslim, male judge as his vice president.

Freedom of Expression
The definition and scope of freedom of expression and its relation to religion
and morality is problematic in Islamist agendas. The programs of the FJP
and the Nour Party are full of vague, broad formulations that allow for
limitations on freedom of expression. For example, the FJP says that it is
committed to freedom of expression provided that it respects the
fundamental values of the society. 81 The FJP also establishes a direct
connection between freedom of artistic creativity and respect for the morals,
values, and traditions of society. 82 The party platform includes a special
section on media reform, where it says that the press is free and it is not
subject to any form of censorship except the censorship of the professional
conscience, the values of the society, and the law. It adds that the freedom

80
See al-Wafd Newspaper, 16 May 2012, available at: http://www.alwafd.org/-
/471--/210983-------, and al Masry al-
Youm, 21 March 2012, available at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/725126.
81
Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-Adallah, Parnmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 31.
82
Ibid., p. 140.

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to publish newspapers, magazines, or any other printed or electronic outlets
is guaranteed without any legal or administrative obstacles, as long as the
outlet respects the constitution and the law as well as public morals.83
Similarly, the party program ensures the right to establish private TV
channels and radio stations, provided that they respect the values of the
society and public morals, and emphasises that media must respect the
heavenly religions.84 These references to the values of society and respect
for religions leave the door wide open for arbitrary interference in the media
on religious grounds. Moreover, the FJP fails to define what kinds of
restrictions can be imposed by the law and on what grounds. The program
does not include a commitment to amend the penal code to abolish the prison
sentences for journalists, which has been a serious concern in Egypt for
decades. In Egypt, where state-owned media were frequently used by the
Mubarak regime for repressive purposes, the FJPs platform vows to
restructure the ownership of the state-owned print and broadcast media to
ensure their independence, yet it again fails to establish how this will be
carried out.
Freedom of expression on the Internet also faces restrictions. The FJP aims
to establish a specialised council for new media, tasked with drawing up
guidelines for electronic media so that their work is guided by the spirit of
Islam and the values and morals of the Egyptian civilizational project. 85
While the exact tasks of this council are not clearly defined, the proposal
raises concerns that restrictions might be imposed on the use of the Internet.
The FJP also pledged to adopt a new law on Internet offenses related to
intellectual property rights, piracy, and the protection of public morals. This
kind of law is common in many other states, yet the vague reference to the
protection of public morals could be used to restrict and block certain
websites.
The Nour Party has stated that freedom of expression and media freedoms
should be consistent with Shariah, the fundamental values of society, and
the maintenance of public order. The party points out that the government
and its institutions, including the ministry of information, should promote
Islamic identity and culture. This position does not reflect the religious and
cultural pluralism of Egyptian society, and it raises concerns that a Salafist-
led government could systematically use the state media as a tool to boost
Islamic religious education and promote Islamic values. In addition, the

83
Ibid., pp. 153-158.
84
Ibid., p. 154.
85
Ibid., p. 157.

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Salafist partys program does not mention the freedom of artistic creativity at
all.86
Egypts President Morsi has vowed to respect the right to artistic creativity
and freedom of expression, yet Islamists bleak record in this area in practice
casts doubt on the official positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Salafists. Since the 1990s, Islamist activists have pressured the Mubarak
regime to restrict certain types of expression that are protected under
international human rights. Numerous parliamentary interrogations were
presented by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including President
Morsi himself, against publications released by the ministry of culture and
the ministry of information that were deemed offensive to Islam. Prominent
leaders of the MB recently supported positions taken by al-Azhar and the
government against academic freedoms and freedom of expression and
artistic creativity, stating that freedom of expression should respect the
values and morals of the society. 87
In response, a group of Egyptian intellectuals, actors, artists, and novelists
have formed Egypts Creativity Front to protect the right to artistic
creativity and freedom of expression. These artists were alarmed by a series
of cases filed against Egyptian artists by Islamist lawyers who accused them
of offending Islam and its symbols. The Front has vowed to combat any
attempts to impose censorship on cultural activities by Islamists. 88
President Morsi has taken no legal measures to ensure that artists are
protected from this kind of lawsuit. Rather, the new constitution includes an
article that prohibits the defamation of all prophets and messengers of God.
This article was presented by al-Azhar and backed by Islamists and other
political forces;89 it could be used to prosecute Muslims deemed heretics
under the dominant Sunni perspective, such as Shiites. It will have a far-
reaching negative impact on freedom of expression and religious freedom in
Egypts emerging political order. Trials of persons, including non-Muslims,
charged with blasphemy against Islam increased over the last four months of

86
Parnmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at:
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
87
See the statements of Abd al-Rahmman al-Barr to al-Hurrah TV on 13 January 2012, Taqrr
Khas, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXOG6c9WNkI.
88
A. Mohsen, Dark Comedy: Is Adel Imams Sentence the Start of a Worrying Trend?,
Egypt Independent, 25 May 2012, available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/dark-
comedy-adel-imams-prison-sentence-start-worrying-trend.
89
See Makhawif Ala Huriyyah al-Aqiddah F Misr, August 2012, available at:
http://almarayanews.com/new/permalink/5501.html.

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2012. Some of the defendants received prison sentences,90 and in one of the
famous blasphemy cases, the defendants were sentenced to death in
absentia.91
President Morsi and his government have also taken tough stances against
media in recent months. An increasing number of lawsuits have been filed
against journalists on charges of insulting the president. At the same time,
President Morsi and his government have tolerated the discriminatory
discourse of Salafist media and some Islamists. Instead of working to
reconstruct the ownership of the state-owned media as promised in its
platform, the Muslim Brotherhood has used its political power and laws of
the former regime to appoint media professionals with close ties to them to
positions of influence including as editors and administrative officials in
state-owned newspapers.92
Ennahda states in its program that freedom of expression is guaranteed,
without naming any explicit restrictions. It also asserts that freedom of
artistic creativity is protected and the state should issue laws to guarantee its
practice. On media, the program generally refers to the development of
media in order to enrich the cultural sphere. However, it fails to explain
exactly how public and private media are to be reformed. 93
The prosecution of journalists in Tunisia over the last few months has given
rise to doubts about the commitment of Ennahda to freedom of expression.
Ennahda also proposed criminalising offenses against the sanctity of Islam in
the future constitution. Secularists and human rights defenders resisted this
proposal until it was withdrawn from the draft constitution. However,
another sentence was added to Article 4 that maintains the same meaning,
ambiguously stating that the state protects sanctities. Some observers
argue that the movement did this as a concession to the demands of
Salafists.94 In the meantime, it has failed to deter hardline Islamists who
threaten public liberties and freedom of artistic creativity.

90
Amnesty International, Egypt: Outrageous Guilty Verdict in Blasphemy Case an Assault
on Free Expression, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-outrageous-guilty-
verdict-blasphemy-case-assault-free-expression-2012-12-12.
91
Ahram Online, Six Expat Copts Receive Death Penalty Sentence for Anti-Islam Film,
available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/59363/Egypt/Politics-/Six-expat-
Copts-receive-death-penalty-sentence-for.aspx.
92
See the Joint Statement by Egyptian Rights Groups on 9 August 2012, The Muslim
Brotherhood Following Mubaraks Footsteps, available at:
http://www.cihrs.org/?p=3773&lang=en.
93
Parnmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html.
94
See Amnesty International, Tunisian Journalist Faces Public Morals Charge after
Criticizing Government, 8 August 2012, available at:

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In summary, the theoretical and practical positions of all three groups on key
human rights issues are extremely worrying. While Ennahda adopts more
progressive positions in many instances, it remains ambiguous in others. The
visions of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party on several
fundamental universal human rights are flagrantly restrictive.

Islamism, Human Rights, and Islamic Reformation

Any future introduction of Islamic law as interpreted by Islamists into the
legal frameworks in Tunisia and Egypt will undermine international human
rights standards. A recent comparative study of the incorporation of Islamic
law in the legal systems of Muslim states revealed that a number of
violations are directly related to norms and practices based in Islamic legal
traditions.95 Liberal Muslims maintain that international human rights law
and modern constitutionalism cannot be put into practice in the context of
the Islamic state unless Muslim scholars engage in drastic reformation of
traditional Islamic law. The Sudanese scholar Abdullahi An-Naim argues
that there is nothing divine in Islamic law, and as such its content and
methods of implementation are a product of human interpretation of Islamic
sacred sources. Thus, Muslims can review it at any time in light of their
changing circumstances.96 Moreover, many Muslim scholars reject the idea
of using Shariah as the legal framework for the state. For instance, the
Egyptian judge Muhammad Sad Al-Ashmw argues that Shariah in the
Quran means the way of God or of Islam but that the term was changed by
Muslim jurists in the second century of Islam to apply mostly to legal
matters.97
An-Naim contends that the secular state is necessary in Islam. He explains
that Islamists overlook the significant differences between the modern nation
state and the pre-modern Islamic community. Historically, Islamic law was
by and large interpreted and applied by independent Muslim jurists and
judges, rather than as part of the central authority. Early Muslims committed

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/tunisian-journalist-faces-public-morals-charge-after-
criticizing-government-2012-08-07; A. Guellali, Tunisias Setback in Freedom of
Expression. Human Rights Watch, 2012, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/24/tunisia-s-setback-freedom-expression .
95
J. Otto, Towards Comparative Conclusions, in J. Otto (ed.), Sharia Incorporated. A
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present
(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), pp. 618.
96
See A. An-Naim, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and
International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).
97
E.W. Shepard, Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi and the Application of Sharia in Egypt,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28 (1) (1996), p. 43.

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themselves voluntarily to Shariah in accordance with their convictions,
without any need for coercion. According to An-Naim, any law applied by
the central authority will always be secular and cannot be described as
Islamic, because Muslims will always disagree on the exact interpretations
of Shariah.98
Respect for international human rights norms through creating inclusive,
equal citizenship will be essential to guarantee the peaceful co-existence of
the multiple religious, ethnic, and cultural communities in Arab societies. It
is mistaken to consider demands for universal human rights an imposition of
alien values on Muslims. Muslims do not all hold one monolithic view on
the place they assign to religion in the public domain, and many Muslim
scholars and human rights actors increasingly support international human
rights norms, Islamic reformation, and a secular state. 99 A document
produced by a coalition of Egyptian and Arab human rights NGOs in 2004
affirms that international human rights is a product of the interaction
between cultures and civilizations throughout history. The document warns
against invoking conservative interpretations of Islamic sources that
undermine the universality of human rights.100

98
A. An-Naim, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of
Islamic Law and State Law, The Modern Law Review 73 (1) (2010).
99
See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2004) Fourth edition; see also the analysis of the work of some liberal reformers in W.
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunn usl Al-Fiqh
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 207-254.
100
The Second Independence: Towards an Initiative for Political Reform in the Arab World.
This is a joint declaration adopted by the first civil society forum organized by the Cairo
Institute for Human Rights Studies in collaboration with the Association for Defending Rights
and Freedoms, a Palestinian Human Rights Organization. The forum gathered 52 NGOs from
13 Arab States (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 2004). The same view has been
expressed on many other occasions over the last two decades by Egyptian and Arab human
rights NGOs.

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Moreover, the popular uprisings that swept the Arab region in 2011 have
shown the popular impetus for democracy and human rights values. These
developments challenge the assumptions that universal human rights have no
basis in Arab societies and that conservative Islamist forces are the sole
political alternative in the region. Although Islamists have consolidated their
political influence as a result of the political transitions that occurred in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the political and intellectual diversity of these
societies is obvious. In Egypt, new political parties emerged in 2011 which
clearly advocate international human rights norms and embrace liberal and
progressive understandings of Islamic sources. 101

Conclusion
Scrutinizing the human rights records of Islamists is very important at this
critical stage of the political transitions in the Arab region. Islamists are not
the only actors who are hostile to human rights, yet the Arab revolutions
have shown that the political culture of Muslims is not monolithic and that
support for universal human rights is on the rise. However, Islamists impact
on religious discourse is immense. The political rise of Islamists in a country
like Egypt since the 1970s prompted Sadat and Mubarak to adopt both
repressive measure and religious policies to appease Islamists. Islamists
ascendancy has influenced the society as a whole, and their ideology has
infiltrated cultural, media, educational, and religious institutions, reinforcing
cultural relativism and conservatism in society.
There has been no expectation that Islamists will positively transform the
human rights landscape in the region upon coming to power. Islamists have
so far failed to offer a coherent and consistent theory and practices
harmonizing their Islamist agenda with international human rights standards.
The positions of Ennahda can be considered more progressive than those of
Egyptian Islamists, yet there are deep-seated tensions between fundamental
human rights and the positions and actions of all three of the Islamist parties
under study.
A promising factor in both Tunisia and Egypt is the increasing constituency
backing universal human rights among liberals, young activists, and civil
society. Without a doubt, liberals are potential competitors of Islamists. If
they strengthened their organizational and communications capacities, they

101
For instance, see the political platforms of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, available
at: http://www.egysdp.com/docs/party_pro.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2011); the Platform of the
Egyptian Liberals Party, available at: http://almasreyeenalahrrar.org/PartyProgram.aspx
(Accessed: 10 April 2011); the Platform of Freedom Egypt Party, available at:
http://www.masralhureyya.org/about-party/program (Accessed: 10 April 2012).

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could well achieve electoral success in future elections. Human rights
defenders have also been outspoken about Islamists performance after
coming to power, insisting that they must abide by international human
rights standards. Yet human rights defenders and liberals should not leave
religion to be distorted by Islamists. Islamic reform and rooting universal
human rights in Islamic discourse should be a strategic objective. The
international community should make sure that current governments in the
region effectively respect the freedoms of expression and association. The
ability to exercise human rights can ensure that a vibrant debate on the future
of universal human rights and religion takes place in an environment free
from intimidation.
Beyond the domestic context, Islamists ambivalence about human rights
can be expected also to have an impact in the regional and global contexts.
Arab governments led by Islamists will likely attempt to trigger a debate on
cultural specificities in international human rights institutions. Issues such as
gender equality and defamation of religions can be expected to come to the
fore both globally and regionally. Universal human rights in bilateral and
multi-lateral cooperative frameworks between the EU and Southern-
Mediterranean will be contested on cultural grounds. After a long history of
suspicion of Islamists, the United States and Europe have recently become
supportive of the inclusion of Islamists in political processes, but this policy
shift should not come at the expense of the respect of international human
rights norms in Arab states. It should also avoid overshadowing the long
struggle of liberal Muslims and the human rights community to find
common ground between Islamic traditions and universal human rights. The
United States and Europe should prioritize political and moral support for
liberal Muslims and human rights defenders who share common universal
values. Universal human rights, and particularly gender equality, non-
discrimination, and freedom of expression, must continue to be the frame of
reference between the European Union and its Arab partners. The European
Union can draw on the diverse experiences of Muslim states in establishing
respect for human rights and refer to best practices to encourage Islamist
parties to develop their legal positions on international human rights treaties.

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