[A.C. NO.

6288 : June 16, 2006]

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER

RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the

practice of law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They
allege that respondent sold them a piece of property over which he has no
right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them the amount they
have paid him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in

Cannes, France, together with her minor children, Alexander and Jon
Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of

Assignment.1 For the price ofP1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the
complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot, located
at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent also
obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook to
have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor
of the complainants.

Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the

Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid by complainants in four
equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued
in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount ofP187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999. 2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that

respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse at the time he
executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to
complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to
stop payment on the second check she issued to respondent in the amount
of P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent,

informing him that they were still willing to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the townhouse on the condition that respondent work on Crown
Asia's execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the alternative,
complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal
interest, within ten days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 represents
the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly installment
of P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants, 4 respondent

claimed that he was "working now on a private project which hopefully will
be realized not long from now," and requested for "a period of twenty days
from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or
return the money at your (complainants') option." The period lapsed but
respondent did not make good his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return
the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants' counsel sent respondent a second

letter5 demanding the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal
interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The demand was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his
oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
he ought to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.

San Juan, to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for
investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No.
XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as
used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer's
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases 7 that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when
he entered into a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the
rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he
failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that
it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no
legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He
did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of
the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell,
transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to
Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00),
despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Respondent's adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the

money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino
Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations,
respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

Respondent's culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from

complainants' counsel demanding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the complainants, or, in the alternative, the return of the money
paid by complainants. In reply to said letter, respondent acknowledged his
obligation, and promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

xxx

I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not

long from now but I need a little time to fix some things over. May I please
request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to
either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your option.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over

the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet to completely pay Crown
Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia over the subject unit, which would show the extent
of his right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his

obligation. It was only after almost two years had passed, after respondent
promised to pay Crown Asia or return to complainants the amount they paid
him, that complainants sent respondent a second letter 8demanding solely
the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this
time, it was indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform his end
of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of
good moral character.9The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing.10 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all
times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, 11 and
a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants' prayer that respondent be

directed to return the money he received from them in the amount
of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a
trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of
one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings
is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount
of money that should be returned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest

FACTS:
Atty. Homobono t. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment for the
price of P1.5M in favor of Marili C. Ronquillo, a Filipino citizen residing in
Cannes, France his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot and
obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer.

Respondent received P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of

Assignment and was able to encash the first check of P187,500.00.

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that

respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse and he also failed
to deliver a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia. Complainant ordered stop payment on the second check of
P187,500.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Homobono T. Cezar should be disbarred or

suspended for deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

HELD:

YES, he should be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of

3 YEARS.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the
price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to
sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed
of Assignment.

Respondents adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo

the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas
Filipino Worker for 10 years, is morally reprehensible.
 Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required
by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,

whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession whether or not
the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar;
cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned

[A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000]

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O.

ALOVERA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, Branch 17, faces disbarment for having penned a
Decision[1] dated January 30, 1995 long after his retirement from the Judiciary
on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested complainant Victoria V.
Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on
April 21, 1997,[3] complainant sought the disbarment of respondent
enumerating the following particulars to support her contention that the
questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the retirement of
respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his
retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-Roxas
City, with the initial of the one who received it for filing with the
court-record except the Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records)
admitting, and the Decision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-
93, ibid.).
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the
retirement were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except
the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and
these two (2) documents appear to have been type-written on the
same type-[writer].
 c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their
evidence one year after the last witness was presented last
December 10, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence but it
took them one (1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple pleading. It
goes against the normal human experience when plaintiffs who are allowed
to present evidence ex-parte are usually very quick in having things done
because there is no opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs a while to
formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr.
Alovera. This timing is highly suspect.

d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It

was not received by the trial court. Page 67 shows this clearly. It
would not be surprising if the same was also inserted into the
records on a much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be
made to explain this too.

It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax Receipt
(PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on
January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the records.

e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87)
admitting the formal offer was even received by a Court staff for
filing with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93)
which was allegedly decided five (5) days after the Order admitting
the evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued. What a swift action from
a retiring judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the
plaintiffs but is shown to have been received by one of the plaintiffs
only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as
Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in the locality and who is in Court
almost everyday that he will not follow up if there is already a
decision rendered in a case where he was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte or even be told about it.
i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera
bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received them
for filing in the court records.
Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely speculative
and not based on personal knowledge, the respondent, in his
Comment[4] dated August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply self-serving
complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful scrutiny of the
expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186 would reveal that respondent observed
due process when he resolved the said case against complainant. [5] It was
only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City,
annulled, through a resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision,
which ostensibly having become final was also executed, did the matter get
out of hand.[6] His said decision, respondent argued, may only be impeached,
annulled or otherwise set aside under three (3) modes,[7] all of which were
either not availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to
annul the judgment, though still available, should not have been filed in the
same court, which rendered the questioned decision, but should have been
filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals. [8] As to the absence of stamp
"RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame to the
then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending that
after the decision was rendered on January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and
he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive and record the
decision, might have lost it "momentarily." [9]
In a Resolution[10] dated October 22, 1997, this Court referred the instant
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation. While in the process of investigation, three (3) incidents
occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter,
approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 on December 17, 1997,
questioning the order, dated November 28, 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the suspension from
the practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997,
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No.
131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L.
Abela," ordering the respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from enforcing and/or implementing his questioned order dated
November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which ordered the
suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-Radjaie
and Judge Julius L. Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the
time was still pending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997
which ordered respondent's suspension from the practice of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation [11] by the Office of the Bar
Confidant on January 27, 1998, inquiring from the Court whether to proceed
with the investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned incidents.
 On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant
to proceed with the investigation of the instant case.[12]
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon,
court stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and
special proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa
Dapat, court stenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the
complainant herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who
merely testified on the January 10, 1993 proceedings inside his
chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any other
witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum on
Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to appear at the
investigation. In lieu of their oral testimonies, respondent offered and
presented their respective affidavits.[13] Complainant chose not to object
thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine
them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17,
1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant, are as follows:

On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres,
Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter
"Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action
for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria
V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The
action sought, among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-24150 in the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with
an area of 215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the
declaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the
Borres heirs.

On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled,
declared herein complainant in default and ordered the Borres heirs to
present their evidence on July 30, 1993.[14]

It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs were able to
start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1993. For lack of
material time, however, the presentation of evidence was again reset to
November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and reset to December 10,
1993.[15]

On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions
scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 in the morning, before
Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186, which was listed number four in the
court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing and Teresita V.
Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of the
Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in a criminal
case[16] before Br. 17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and
resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the hearing of criminal cases was
through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was called at about 11:55 in the morning, but
the plaintiffs as well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside the
courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the morning without Civil
Case No. V-6186 being heard.[17]

At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruz approached
Rosa Dapat, who was the court stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15,
Roxas City, while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that Judge
Alovera was requesting her to assist in the proceedings of Civil Case No. V-
6186. At first she was hesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its
own court stenographer. She relented though when told that Br. 17 as well as
the other branches had no available court stenographer. She then went to Br.
17 and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the chambers of Judge
Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned her to enter the chambers, which is separate
from the courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera
behind his desk and other people whom she did not know. Upon being told
that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty. Villaruz
to start the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by Atty. Villaruz,
a witness, whom she later recognized to be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was
called. At that instant Judge Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just
continue," and then went out of the chambers. [18] Judge Alovera would
occasionally return to the chambers in the course of the proceedings, but he
would just sit down and listen while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his direct
examination of the witness and presenting documentary evidence. [19] The
proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making
only two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he made at the end
when he ordered the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on
January 20, 1994.[20]

From this point on, complainant would establish how the January 30, 1995
decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came about.

Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on January
5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to
be the OIC Branch Clerk of Court.[21] As part of her functions as such OIC, all
decisions, orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would first be received by her from
the judge, and would stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of
receipt as well as her initial or signature. [22]This is in accordance with Sec. 1,
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.[23]
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of
Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-
6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it, Judge
Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With this
assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a
duplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating it.[24]

On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired Judge Alovera came
to Br. 17, with a man and a woman, later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. V-6186, behind him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he
uttered to the latter, "Receive this, receive this, " referring to the questioned
January 30, 1995 decision, which he was holding. As he spread the decision
on her table, he continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza
Miranda. And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at
his back.[25] Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not receive
it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not argue with him
anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her former superior. [26] She
then went out of the office while retired Judge Alovera, as well as the two
plaintiffs were still inside.[27]At about the same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar,
another employee of Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special
proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while trying
to have her co-employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody,
however, received the same because it was already seven (7) months after
his retirement.[28] A little later, she found the questioned decision, together
with the formal offer of exhibits of January 20, 1995 and the order of January
25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although she noticed that these records
were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, she went on to
attach the said records to the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186.[29] She
even gave a copy of the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo
Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was received for him by Ireneo Borres.
[30]
After keeping the expediente, she then entered the questioned decision in
her logbook.[31]

The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decision executed

when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property, which is the subject
matter of Civil Case No. V-6186, surrendered possession of the said property
in favor of the Borres heirs,[32] Said transfer of possession was made pursuant
to the writ of execution issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding
Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of Court Susan
Mendoza Arce.[33]

Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan together with his
husband who is employed at the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of
what happened to her property in Panay, Capiz.[34] She was thus prompted to
come back to the Philippines, which resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition for Relief from
Order, questioning the January 30, 1995 decision and the January 19, 1996
Writ of Execution.[35] She also prayed "that disciplinary and contempt
proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to
tamper with the administration of justice."[36]

Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the
acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for
relief from order.[37] In the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed that
the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres
heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while the PTR of their counsel, Atty.
Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January 31, 1995. He concluded then that the
said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995. When he asked
Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused to answer and just kept quiet. [38] He
likewise observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting
the same for decision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on
December 10, 1993 during the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers,
where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of exhibits.
[39]
Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes during the said proceedings and
who was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on
the records as the official stenographer in the course thereof. [40] Thus, in his
resolution of September 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the petition for relief
filed by complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession
of the property in question. In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the
January 30, 1995 decision null and void, the same not being filed with the
clerk of court and not properly rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule
36, Rules of Court.[41]

Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings, coupled with

the prayer of complainant in her petition for relief "that disciplinary and
contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious
anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice," Judge Abela
conducted an investigation into the said anomaly. [42] After considering the
testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the
investigation, together with the documentary evidence presented, he
concluded, thus:

From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are
established that:

1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What
transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of
Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and
Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were
present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present
 as there was actual court session in open court going on at that
time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O.
Alovera and remained with him even after his retirement on
January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion
Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs.
Alcazar together with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated
January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting
the exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings of
having been received by the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30,
1995, was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge
Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his
submission was refused.

- CONCLUSIONS -

The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995
bears signature and PTR No. issued on January 31, 1995. This simply
means that the pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz
to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or any date prior to its issuance.
The Offer of Exhibits could have been made only on January 31, 1995 or
later. Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is
also ante dated and could have been made only on a date beyond the filing
of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge Alovera
dated January 30, 1995.

xxx xxx xxx

The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge.

The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit,
malpractice, serious and grave misconduct as lawyer justifying their
suspension from the practice of law and ultimately their disbarment. [43]

Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the

disbarment of respondent, declaring that it found more than sufficient
evidence to sustain complainant's charge against respondent that, indeed,
the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186, which divested
complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent after
his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.
 This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be well-taken. Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is
morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity
of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge
as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and
I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to

dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law[44] to be forgotten afterwards nor is it mere words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep
inviolable at all times.[45] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are
applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. When respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession,
he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. [46] In this covenant,
respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion
Alcazar were all quite telling on how respondent acted in a grossly
reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision dated January 30,
1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting the
complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship
with his former staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a
judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court,
who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or pervert the
administration of justice to all and sundry. [47] In so doing, he made a mockery
of the judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character from members of the Bar. By swearing the
lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as
demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court
as the disciplining authority[48] for there is perhaps no profession after that of
the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than
that of law.[49]
Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial
defense to refute the charges against him, he failed neither to do so nor to
offer a valid explanation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof
that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.[50]
 Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court
finds as appropriate the recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar
Confidant in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the respondent brings
intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls for the severance of
respondents privilege to practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. The
Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of
which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening
event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both
for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred
on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato
City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson,
their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because
the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that
actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word Attorney as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC
disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in
his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What
matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds
to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes
him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of
the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may
have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law,

the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling
knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar
Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render
a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take

the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes
the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in
the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the
OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This
renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is
ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a
matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law. [9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the
2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not
been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or
accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal
that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.
 The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant
would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the
applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal
cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character
and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member
of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he
is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11]the
Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title
Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of
the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the
4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into
by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as
Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that
those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest
official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything
short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and
constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public
trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and
suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition
of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to
prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll
of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,

vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C.
Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.

The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought
the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman
Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and
volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal
experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the termination of the
divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to
profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial
relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was
living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent
convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman
and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married
under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the
complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the
respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a
marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the
respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they
should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed
upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being
together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy
was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the
complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the
respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in
the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that
upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and
merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having
deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no
other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine
Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the
complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D.
Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the
complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty.
Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days
thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October
30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which
letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the
complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the
hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity,
the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked
help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the
wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he could not Identify his
assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant
requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of
abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the
Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the
complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her
mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for
disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of
her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig,
Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped
the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the
complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that
the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil
marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the
respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in
the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and
wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 3

After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and
recommendation containing the following findings:

The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may
properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between
complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether
respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe that
notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could
legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she
consented to go to bed with him.

Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she
was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the
U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18,
1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she
was informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the
marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).

Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the
representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she
is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that
notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous
marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married
ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the
Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical
engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different
schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked
into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late
twenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding
indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's
proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the
serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them.
She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own
neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife
testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to
converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant
could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal
effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage
brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever
doubts she had in her mind.

The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a
lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little
significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf
because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were
themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler
categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not
recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same
admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the
complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one
point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp.
33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under cross-
examination:

Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive?

A Yes.

Q Up to the present?

A Yes.

Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?

 A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce.

Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize
divorce?

A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.

Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:

Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that
divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an
impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone?

A Yes.

Q Did you inform her so?

A She knows about that.

(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)

Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal
bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere
realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being still have was
enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could
have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent
was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or,
perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's
personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's
help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the
Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November
18, 1971).

What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either
complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's
blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his
marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too
much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise
Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that
reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of
innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no
other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy
with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit
relations by legal union.

The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of

love and actually made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was, the
evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had
evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing
respondent's sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported
documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent
 tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation,
however, staggers human credulity considering that the supposed documents were
vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous that she would easily Dart with
the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it
may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that
complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer but
for the gratification of her mundane human longings.

The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between complainant and
respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as
husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses that
took place in THE TOWER HOTEL and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo
Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in
Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower
Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A'
and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said
guest cards was a 'good-time' woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell
us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on
those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there.
On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced
to establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place once in
the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated,
when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the
relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No.
389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence
of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and
overthrown by respondent. 4

Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a
resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding
complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised
Rules of Court. 5

On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C.
Paz praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice
of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with more severely.

Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief
Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious
activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the respondent, David
D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the
complainant stated in her verified complaint the following.

6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present
because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact, our
relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple.

7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the
tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for
 the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is
immoral and illegal.

8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not
revenge for his deception. 6

The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant.

In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the
aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the
respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like any engaged
couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent
got from her and not for revenge for his deception.

It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution
because of its serious consequences. 7 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case
against a respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8

In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:

The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by
convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib
vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M.
de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated.
Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of
a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68
Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court
likewise held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any
unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him
should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA
418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action
against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little
room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong
committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully
aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own
private consciences."

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, A.C. No. 8390

INC., Complainant, [Formerly CBD 06-1641]

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:

July 2, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
 Before us is a Complaint [1] dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc.,
represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22) and non-payment of debt.

On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing

corporation, granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00.
To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated
check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the
amount: P50,000.00.[2] However, upon presentation at the bank for payment on its
maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing
of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio
failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation.

Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty.
Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was
scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due notice.
[3]
Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest[4] was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no
bail. On November 22, 2004, complainant sent a letter[5] to Atty. Valerio calling
her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her
to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter was
received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return cards.
[6]
Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide.

On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against

Atty. Valerio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26,
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to
file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a
letter[7] dated March 16, 2006, respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs.
Valerio), explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus,
could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio
undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation.
 On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear
before the mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the
conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP ordered
the parties to submit their position papers. No position paper was submitted by
Atty. Valerio.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the
IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct.

The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty.

Valerios mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD
hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued the
same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court
processes, more particularly her failure to appear at her arraignment despite due
notice and to surrender to the Court despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit to be
a member of the bar.[8]

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio
was instead ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.

Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side,

the Court, in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or
her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical certificate issued by a duly licensed
physician and/or certified copies of medical records to support the claim
of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of

[9]
notice to comply with the said Resolution, no medical certificate or medical
records were submitted to this Court by either respondent and/or her mother. Thus,
this resolution.
 We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[10] we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of

worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the

laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation
despite respondents failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the
complaint. Prior to the filing of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of
making partial payments of the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there
is an obligation to pay on her part. Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise,
acknowledged her daughters obligation.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her
daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia,
which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her.
Indeed, we cannot take the medical certificate on its face, considering Mrs.
Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician
who issued it.
 Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also
a matter of serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite
due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also
ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the
complaint against her and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and
notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes
upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty.
Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Ngayan v. Tugade,[11] we ruled that [a lawyers] failure to answer the

complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of
his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency
for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,[12] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same
sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,[13] having
found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of
property, the title to which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed

by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years,[14] because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to
pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders
in the course of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11,

2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2)
years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-
Santiago,
Sandoval-
Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-
Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
and
 Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25,
2006
x--------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the

disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant
alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the
circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon
1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
[2]
and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
 Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his
Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and
that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,
2004.[4]
 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he
was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint
and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him
to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6]
Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J.

Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which
was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March
12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that

respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of
the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondents conviction were

summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota

Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife.
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven
by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he
had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was
under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed
the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at
[the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also
stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his
shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his
door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked
elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up.
But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately
and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the
latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell
down a second time, got up again and was about to box the
taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The accused went
back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the
handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them
up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused
so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
 It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who
came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid
artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received
timely medical assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part
of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated

November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent
filed an application for probation, which was granted by
the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court
in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted statements of

complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to
the Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner

Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not

only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based
on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his

car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault

Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;

3. Complainant having been able to ward off his

attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and
shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply

pushed him out and fled;

5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming

evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;

6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he

claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant
and two unidentified persons; and,

7. Although he has been placed on probation,

Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant.[12]
 On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its
final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of

Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,

conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction,
a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of
good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent
has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction
has already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be determined
are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his
guilt warrants disbarment.
 Moral turpitude has been defined as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]

The question of whether the crime of homicide

involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a
labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed
on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering
the particular circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime, this Court rejected the employers
contention and held that homicide in that case did not
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have
been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations
and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer
made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it
was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a
crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to
the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral

turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
 but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did

not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding
of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI

employee] was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released
his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of
self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence
of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral
or unjust.[17]
 The present case is totally different. As the IBP
correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the
moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to
practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he

pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent
will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and
his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery

as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not
in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the
unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly
shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped
the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to
leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
 The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted.
Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness,
which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual,
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he
pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a
person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority
and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously

transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.[19]
 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed
the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both
in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the
land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident

that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And
yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to
settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance,
as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good
health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
begrudges complainant the measly amount that could
never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may

relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character. [22] Where
their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is
so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and
unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent

displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into
the practice of law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed

dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent
concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainants family that had sought a conference with
him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on

to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been
mauled by complainant and two other persons. [27] The
trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than
three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not
support his allegation that three people including the
complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him.
The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three
people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries
sustain the complainants version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the
chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral

qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court
or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance

public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is
a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually,
 academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not

merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed,
we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to

protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent,
honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. [32] Thus, whenever a clear
case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital
yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be

exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should
never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,
the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
duties to society and his profession. We are convinced
that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is

a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated

homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact
of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to
remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the
appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as
a member of the bar.
 WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar;
and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., A.C. No. 5303

in behalf of PENTA RESORTS
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-
Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,
Complainant, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

June 15, 2006

x---------------------------------------- x
 RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.

Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment

against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000. [2] On
February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the
said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases
earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:

1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v.

Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa;
2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni
v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.

In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court

considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated.
[3]
On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in
Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:

(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27,

2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the
case against respondent for lack of merit; and

(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant

praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that
proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.[4]
 No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in
Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records. The Court is
now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case
(A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
The complaint read:

AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

- II -

That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental Chapter. That sometime on September 19, 1997,
Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before
RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs.
Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal services of
herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on
October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot A.
Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence
of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A.
Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost
trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate
and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances
of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was
provided with all the necessary information relative to the property
in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation
(PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel
Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs
of the corporation/hotel.

- III -
 That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire
proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and]
presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally
resting his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without
due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion
to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on
April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished
to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. No
doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic)
irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since
the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the
untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused
irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a
highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered]
unexpected defeat.

- IV -

That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal

as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained
counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga,
Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the
counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from
the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is
the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest
daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other directors/officers of
PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining
children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her
wishes, with the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only
daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC, obviously,
being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent
further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G.
Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City
Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged
retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He]
likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin
when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April
06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to respondents filing of his
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.,
respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor
OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that
effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis
G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the
Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them.
Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already
appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis
Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite
being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni
[holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs
shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the same,
notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client
in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent
opposing clients at the same time. The corporations complaint
for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and
Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente
Delfin. Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of
desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath regarding
fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our
laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the
Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against
them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before
the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis
and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art.
183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181
and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J.
Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and
various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and
Carmen Jalbuena).
AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

-I-

xxx xxx xxx

 There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire
vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts
and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A.
Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and information was
acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between
respondent and his clients. Using the said classified information
which should have been closely guarded respondent did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and
confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in
concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his
former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela
J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of
Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the
corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein
respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board
meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other
things]. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and
lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his
conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A.
Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.

- II -

Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately

withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the
Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his untimely
unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from
[his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the
indispensability of said documents particularly the marked
exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was
continually impressed upon the new counsel by the court,
respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the
turnover of said documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no
other alternative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued
Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was
duly received by respondents office on the same date. Such
 dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the
case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an
adverse decision against [her].

Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the

notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which
extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper
appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert
Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party
opponent of defendant who is even outside the family
circle. During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999,
while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case file of
his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly
positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of
plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC,
coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of
said client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff
starting from the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire
first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent.
The entire incident was personally witnessed by herein
complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them
during the hearing. However, the particular portion showing the
said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the
court stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed
recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This
prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to
complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching
Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said corrections were only
effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which
[transpired] on said pre-trial.[5] (emphasis ours)

In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also

pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the
Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his
influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected
the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of
respondent.[6]
 In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent
claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000
because, in his verification, Lim stated:

3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against

Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are alltrue
and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and belief.
[7]
(emphasis ours)

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified
or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has

read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains

verification based on information and belief or upon
knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As
amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)

While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces

no legal effect,[8] the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to
mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. [9] We find that Lim
was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of
the Rules.
 In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent,
reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:

[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the
Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by
the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file
this complaint against [him]. Neither [was Lim] a proper party to
file this complaint. This fact is an additional ground to have his
case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever
authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the
Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the
complainants.[10]

To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was

unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his
defense:

FACTS OF THE CASE

xxx xxx xxx

That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis

G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and
Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her
daughter, Cristina J. Lim.

That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation

namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned
almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality,
Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to
Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as
above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the
effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed
by the Cabiles family.
 That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited
(Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the
sisters.
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis
and Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses
to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against them.

II.

That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for

Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an
Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of
Preliminary Injunction.

That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of

the sisters totally rest on public documents (the various titles
issued to the land in question because of the series [of changes]
in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual occupation
and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the

above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s
penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since the
defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is
based onPUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential
matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly
entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in
paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all
transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring
to? Whatever transactions the corporation may have been
involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial
and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.

There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of

the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were]
discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he]
reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that the
whole world knows about them.
 That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted
allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in]
theentire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself attested that
[he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26,
1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How
then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for
[the] entireproceedings of the case?

Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the
important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by
the trial court because of the possibility of a conflict of
interest. xxx xxx xxx. [11]

Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately

withheld the records of the cited civil case. He insisted that it took
him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of
the case to Lim.[12] While he admitted an oversight in addressing
the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap
Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he
maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs.
Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw [13] since Mrs.
Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by
PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent
also argued that no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni
because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza
from the first hearing date.[14] In fact, respondent contended, it was
he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]

As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:

 That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni
Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr.
conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property together
with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs.
Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION
(Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so now. [He] cannot
find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for
services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]

In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:

the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr.

Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family
[in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to
reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing
of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and
the UNDERTAKING of the members.[17]

On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following
report and recommendation:

xxx xxx xxx

After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the

parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a
case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on, complainant
had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were
related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by
the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had
allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case
No. 97-9865.
 Being the husband of one of the complainants which
respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon
Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the
representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative
complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys].

From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had

a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the latter
[was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the
latter were sued by complainants representative.

We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for

some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and
trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the
successful defense of their cases.

Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the

Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client
Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting
interests in violation of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility.

As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but

to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt
hereof.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the

recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved to
dismiss the case on August 3, 2002. [19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a
motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board
denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and
resolve a matter already endorsed
to this Court.[20]

Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to

address some preliminary matters.

Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the

special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto
did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.
[21]
Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:

[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing

of the same, cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party
to any third person unless expressly authorized by law.

We must note, however, the following:

SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits or persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
a may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon

referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
orat the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against any erring attorneys.[22] (emphasis ours)
 Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to
preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private
vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts
constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a
verified complaint with the Court or the IBP. [23] Corollary to the
public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:

SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer,

or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors,
upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has
resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the Board shall take such remedial action as the
circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire
proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)

Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims

complaint was defective in form and substance, and that
entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the
same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of
a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or
comment.[25]

The core issues before us now are:

1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the

cases represented and handled by respondent, and
2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services
as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing

conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and
deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To
effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into
the cases involved.

In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A.

Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was a case for the
recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel
owned by PRC.

In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis

and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and the
spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued the
spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by
PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate
records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and
Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que
of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid
balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:

11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took

advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos.
0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee,
date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any
officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the
delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena,
 who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and
received the proceeds of the same checks (as evidenced by his
signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said
checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of
respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch
Head of UCPB.[28]

Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:

There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time,

or one month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs.
Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through
his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S.
Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis
and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S.
Case No. 99-2192.[29]

Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-

2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against
PRCs interests.

And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC,

Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of
respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel. [30]

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the
dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly
provides:
 Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full

disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client;
otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.[31]Conflict of interest may be determined in this
manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance
of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.[32] (emphasis ours)

The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which

confidential communications have been confided but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [33]

Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the

acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule
refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients
either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the
second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against
whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which
is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.
[34]
(emphasis ours)
 The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the
parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.
Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the
cases mentioned.

An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being

retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot,
without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his
client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with
that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition
stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it
material that the intention and motive of the attorney may
have been honest.[35] (emphasis ours)

The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the

absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full
disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. [36]

Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing

controversy among the family members[37]was improper because the
written consent of all concerned was still required. [38] A lawyer who
acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the
parties to it.[39]

WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865

 The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents
withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-
9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the spouses
Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the
Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192). In his December 1,
2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not
notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that
case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of
Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.

The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be

summarized as follows:

The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client,

by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances
beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of
the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of
the client and his lawyer.[40]

Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to

withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is
considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:

Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good

cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written

consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice
and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. [41] A lawyer who
desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his
client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. [42] He must serve a
copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least
three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may
treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43] Respondent
made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on
April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the
court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only
presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty.
Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without

cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter
his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to
change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain
another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a
lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed.
Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to

substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. [45] Mrs.
Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as
counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship
of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records
of this case.
 Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to
withdraw as counsel[46] would be granted by the court. Yet, he
stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28,
1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to
have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order
dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:

When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza
appeared for the defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor
Villarosa has already withdrawn his appearance in this case
which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the
conformity of the defendants.[47] (emphasis ours)

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas

professional engagement on her behalf despite respondents
withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests
already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal
from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of a conflict
of interest.[48]

Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that

respondent improperly collected P5,000 from
petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services
to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the
documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld.
The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients
documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come
into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees
and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established. [49]

Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use

of his wifes community tax certificate number in his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.[50] This is not, however, the forum to
discuss this lapse.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby foundGUILTY of violating Canon 15
and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective
upon receipt of this decision, with aSTERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of

respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., A.C. No. 8243

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 24, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case stems from an administrative complaint [1] filed by Rolando

Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant
violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[2]
Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of
interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all
the money and properties received by her from complainant.
 On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel
Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).[3]

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand

letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment
schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the
assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed
as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited
at Real Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened

to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where
complainant and his wife were also active members. From then on, complainant
and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his
involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel.
Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client
relationship was established between him and respondent although no formal
document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement [4] dated
January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign
the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection
of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,[5] a telecommunications company
based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not
within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter

from respondent[8] asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds
invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted
respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so
that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing
something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry
about.[9]
 Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding
the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these
occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with
officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportations (BID),[10] and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also
convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect
to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to
divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him
by Multitel.[12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping
to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her
an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself.
[13]
Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said
amounts were all part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds which
complainant held as assignee of the companys properties.[15]

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several

messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short
messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the
Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that
complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed investment system.
Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had
been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages
from respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and
promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can
closely work with in order to clear complainants name. [16] In two separate e-mail
messages,[17] respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which
was handed by complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes
Hospital after giving birth,[18] and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the
NBI.[19]

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal

problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to
execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve
178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainants
house and inside a warehouse.[20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing
respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his
legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer.
When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to
do it as your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all
the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same,
i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds
were provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is

willing to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny
Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting
of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones, every
employees and directors[] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and
whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as
DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.

I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the
trust given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by
you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco
Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I
have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be
highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the
expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and
discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I
have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign
as your lawyer although I will do all the work.He can help with all his
connections. Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of
 organized crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law
partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it
covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate
the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your
trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this
agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val. The funds with
Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as
attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to
work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children
who (sic) the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to
make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not
want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But

if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your
case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this
will happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the
phones will stand by you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will
stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You
have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind
up there. You will be ok!

Candy[22]

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to

the country. On the eve of his departure from theUnited States, respondent called
up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the
NBI and the BID.[23]

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and

his wife and told them that she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in
appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his
help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved,
complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her
mind and told complainant that she would instead invest the P2,000,000.00 on his
behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent
that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he
was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her
promise.[24]
 Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she
was able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order
issued against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend complainant
in the said cases.[25]

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading

him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainants call or would abruptly
terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for
several months.[26] In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an
update on the collection of Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent
had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very
busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance

and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full
accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter.
[27]
Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004.
[28]
When complainant found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a
latter expressing his confusion about the accounting.[29] Complainant repeated his
request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.
[30]
Respondent replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to
her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim
documents clearing complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied,
complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint [33] against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
seeking the disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer

for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed between
her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by
providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him,
since they both belonged to the same religious organization.[35]
 Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel
and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against
the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement between both
parties were fully documented and accounted for.[36] Respondent believes that her
act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical
standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[37]

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted
that a complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes
H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.[38] Respondent argued that on this basis
alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the

electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly
sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and should be
excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence
(A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued

a Report and Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written
contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated
her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash
and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended her disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors

issued a Recommendation[42] denying the motion and adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.
 We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste [43] and,
more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including its weak and
strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. [44] It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[46]

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to
complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations, [47] precisely
because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already
privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
[48]

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by

arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged
between her and complainant.[49] This argument all the more reveals respondents
patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards
expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
 The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding
that there was a professional relationship between the
parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to
his profession.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent
should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of
another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist
from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to
double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of

interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent

interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.[52]
 Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation,
initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and
properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she
had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to
him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also
doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against
Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with
Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latters help,
she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her
appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.
[53]
Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[54] but also toyed with decency and
good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever
complained of respondents unethical behavior.[55]This remark indubitably displays
respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of
the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against
any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu
proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP
Chapter[56] even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and

recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by
complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of

Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross
misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath, has been rendered moot
and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she
had been placed under the Department of Justices Witness Protection Program.
[57]
Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the
integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this
administrative case against her.
 The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is
necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to
complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by
respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of
the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions.[58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly,
if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be
conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of
membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is
imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership
is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof
exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is

hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a

member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1372. June 27, 2002]

SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D.

RABANAL, complainants, vs. ATTY. FAUSTINO F.
TUGADE,respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and

Lirio Rabanal against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as
counsel for complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellants brief in the
Court of Appeals, as a result of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and
the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final
and executory.
It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one of the accused-appellants
in Criminal Case No. CCC-I-150, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelino
Rabanal y Ibaez, et al., of the Criminal Circuit Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. [1] He
was found guilty of homicide and the case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Complainant terminated the services of his previous counsel and engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the
appeal.[2] However, despite the extension of time granted to him totalling 60 days, Atty.
Tugade failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.
[3]
Cayetano filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
[4]
Complainants alleged that they paid P1,000.00 to respondent as attorneys fees and,
in addition, the amount of P1,400.00 for the preparation of the appellants brief.
[5]
Complainants sought the suspension from the practice of law or the disbarment of
respondent attorney.[6]
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent said he did not want to accept
complainants case due to his busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed
upon by the latter, who is his kababayan, to sign the appellants brief to be filed in
the case.[7] Cayetano gave the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining to the
case to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 as litigation expenses, after which
respondent asked another lawyer to prepare the appellants brief. However, on May
11, 1974, Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of Appeals had dismissed his
appeal for failure of counsel to file an appellants brief. Respondent alleged he then
entered his appearance as counsel for Cayetano and filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Court of Appeals, for which he was paid P800.00.[8] The motion was,
however, denied and Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979, when he was
released on conditional pardon.[9]
In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Court referred the administrative
case against respondent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.[10] The OSG conducted hearings on February 5, 1976 and
November 27, 1976, during which the spouses Rabanal testified in support of their
complaint.[11] On January 24, 1979, Cayetano was released from the New Bilibid
Prisons on conditional pardon.[12] A few years later, the Committee on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) assumed jurisdiction over the
administrative case.[13] After each of the complainants had testified, the IBP
Commissioner set the hearing for reception of respondents evidence on June 26, 1992
with warning that the case would be considered submitted for resolution if respondent
failed to present his evidence. [14] Three notices of the hearing sent by registered mail to
respondent were, however, returned unclaimed. [15] Accordingly, the IBP Hearing
Commissioner, upon motion of complainant Lirio Rabanal, considered the case
submitted for resolution.[16] On May 8, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Court the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
at least one (1) year.[17]
On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the records
of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Later, however, the transcripts
of stenographic notes (TSN) were lost. [18] In any case, on May 20, 2002, the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) adopted the findings of the IBP and recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year.[19]
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds no basis for reversing
the findings and recommendation of the IBP and the OBC. Their recommendation is
affirmed with the modification that the penalty imposed is reduced from one (1) year
to six (6) months.
Respondent claims that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal
prior to the filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he
could not be held responsible for the dismissal of complainants appeal for failure of
counsel to file the appellants brief. We disagree.
The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorneys fees for professional services
rendered. A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. [20] Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,[21] the Court held that
the admission of respondent lawyer that he received payment from complainant is
sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. In this case, complainant
sought and received legal advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he
agreed to sign the appellants brief to be filed and that he receivedP600.00 from
complainant spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed
between the two.
It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assisted Cayetano in the case as a mere
friend or kababayan of the latter. In Junio v. Grupo,[22] respondent also denied the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship, stating that complainant was a close personal
friend whom he helped in a personal capacity. Nonetheless, it was held:

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for: neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as
established. . . .

In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade in his professional capacity in

order to obtain advice concerning his appeal. Respondent agreed, as shown by his
acceptance of the payment to him, his receipt of the TSNs of the case, and the fact that
he signed the appellants brief. His claim that he merely accepted payment but that he
asked another lawyer to prepare the brief is an obvious subterfuge. He has not even
named the lawyer assuming that the latter is real. It is hard to see why respondent
should personally accept payment and the transcripts of stenographic notes from
complainant if he did not intend to prepare the appellants brief. Moreover, the fact
that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after the dismissal of the appeal
only confirms that he was indeed Cayetanos lawyer.
The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was remiss in
the performance of his duties as counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was
given by the Court of Appeals an extension of time totalling 60 days within which to
file the appellants brief, but he failed to file the same. He thus violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

What this Court said in another case is fitting:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.[23]

Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He should be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him, remembering always that his actions or
omissions are binding on his clients. In this case, the failure of respondent to file the
appellants brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. As a consequence, the
decision in the trial court finding complainant guilty of homicide became final and
executory and he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. As has been held:

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file
brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People
vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the
duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid
in the speedy administration of justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs.
Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).[24]

It should likewise be noted that respondent failed to notify the IBP of his change
of address, thus delaying the resolution of this case. Service of notice and other
pleadings, which must be furnished to the parties, must be made at the last address on
record. If the parties are represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to
the counsels last given address on record in the absence of a proper and adequate
notice of a change of address, unless service upon the party himself is ordered. [25]
 In Resurreccion v. Sayson,[26] the Court attributed the delay in the resolution of an
administrative case to respondent lawyer, after finding that The 27-year delay in the
resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the
Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a
failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought
against him. Similarly, respondent Tugade likewise showed a disregard of the charge
against him, and the IBP properly made its recommendation solely on the basis of
complainants testimonies and the documentary evidence.
In Galen v. Paguirigan,[27] the Court, taking into account that it was a first offense,
suspended for a period of six (6) months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty.
Faustino Tugade showed lack of due care for his clients interest and willful neglect of
his duties as an officer of the court, thus warranting the imposition of the same penalty
on him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality
hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this
complaint will be dealt with even more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5280. March 30, 2004]

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L.

GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty.

Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client
relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to
prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After
confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted
to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his
(complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain
amount from him other than what they had previously agreed
upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said
petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing
the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a
letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of Public
Documents.[1] The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances
pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the
petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-
complaint read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino,

married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9 th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the
aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a
resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at
A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land

consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated
at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in
the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122,
covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his
name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid
land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy,
wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and
residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are
minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus
placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured
the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure
from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165
(Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of
Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without
the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C.
Gonzales was already dead ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud
undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full
payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time
the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred
in the name of his children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as
evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and
continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return
and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned. [2]
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a
lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his
client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he
refused to grant respondents request for additional
compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation and social standing.
[3]

In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,

[4]
respondent filed his Comment narrating his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9
hectare-property situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered
by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from his
(respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he
paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-
33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he
gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to
deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period,
he went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the
execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him
photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant
explained that he had already transferred the title of the property, covered by
TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-
5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate
it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to
get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his
assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all
necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for transportation
and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To
these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the
lost title ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to
complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs
funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at
the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that
complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the
filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted
him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the
petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition.
 Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to
complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between
the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public
document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for
falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[6]
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear
on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear
despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent received the notice
for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset toMay 28, 2003.[8]
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from
one Atty. Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client,
William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty.
Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report
and recommendation, portions of which read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the
filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had
confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant
thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated. Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship
between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as
early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated
complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty to
maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but
permanent. It is in effect perpetual for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon
37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has
been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients confidences and secrets remains
effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
provides that A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty.
Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging
that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the
same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings
of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16
SCRA 623, the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest
or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to

have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended
that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from
the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.[10]

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws
and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. [11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the

manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive
bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
 This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant
or his withdrawal of the charges.[12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience.[13] While it is true that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein
respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of
the records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent
stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between them rather than
the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only
because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased
from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid
complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its title and
execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss
of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely
transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance
so as to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost
one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in
respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of
obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client
should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any
retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply
to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against
complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of
the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the
property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was
no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS

OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of

the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or

associates or by judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his

affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant
were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a
redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein
complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant
to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a
case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the
administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C.
No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.