G.R. No.

L-51201 May 29, 1980

Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines
[Give Words in a Statute Their Usual and Commonly Understood Meaning]
FACTS:
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte is the daughter of Filomeno Duterte
and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte, who have been taken care of by Mr.
and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Herein petitioner and her Uncle, Hector Alfon, has
been residing at Yulo Street crner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
for twenty-three years. Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte filed a
verified petition praying that her name be changed to Estrella S. Alfon.
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition: she has
been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; she has been
enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name; she has
continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her
friends and acquiantances know her by this name; and she has exercised her
right of suffrage under the same name. However, the trial court partially
denied invoking Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides that Legitimate
and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition of Estrella S. Alfon, praying for the change of her
name, be allowed
Ruling:
Yes, the lower court should have fully granted the petition. The only reason
why the lower court denied the petitioners prayer is that as legitimate child
of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally used the
surname of her father invoking Article 364 of the Civil Code. The Court held,
albeit that the word principally as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of his mother to which
he is equally entitled. Therefore, there is ample justification to grant fully her
petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary, is based on soldi and
reasonable ground, that is to avoid confusion.
Doctrine:
The words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
G.R. No. 152259 July 29 2004
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
[Give Words in a Statute Their Usual and Commonly Understood Meaning]
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed an information
charging Alfredo T. Romualdez for violation of section 5, Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corruption Law. Herein petitioner is the brother-in-
law of the former president Ferdinand Marcos, hence, a relative by afinity
within the third civil degree. He was accused of intervening in a contract
entered by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a
government-owned and controlled corporation between the Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation majority owned
by the former president Marocs. In 1975, the ownership of NASSCO over all
its assets and facilities at the Engineer Island were sold to BASECO, which
the latter needed in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount
of P5 million. Petitioner filed several motions before the sandiganbayan and
one of its contention is the ambiguity of the term intervene which shall
render Section 5 of R.A. 3019 as void for vaguness.
Issue:
Whether or not the word intervene in Section 5 of R.A. 3019 shall be
deemed void for being vague
Ruling:
No, the term intervene is clear and that the word can easily be understood
through simple statutory construction. As a rule, the absence of a statutory
definition in a statute will not render the law void for vagueness, if the
meaning can be determined through the judicial function of construction.
Elemetary is the principle that words sould be construed in their ordinary and
usual meaning. In the instant case, the term intervene should therefore be
understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to come between. Thus,
the Court held that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any
event, the overbreath and void for vagueness doctrines are not
applicable to this case.
Doctrine:
The words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

G.R. No. L-4712 July 11, 1952

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
[Meaning of Words Varied When Required by Context or Intention]
Facts:
Petitioner is the holder of a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the
Treasurer of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304.
When the action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Coporation, contracted in the total sum of 50, 000.00,
covered by a mortagage on his property, with interest at 4 percent per
annum, of which 47, 335.28 wa still unpaid. In this action he seeks to compel
the defendant corporation to accept payment of the balance of his debt with
his backpay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the ground that the
plaintiffs demand is not only not authorized by section 2 of R.A. 304 but also
contrary to the provisions thereof. On his part, the plaintiff argued that the
provision of R.A. 304 is mandatory because it employs the word shall and
is applicable to institutitions of credit under the control of the Government.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to
Respondent company.
HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is imperative.
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may when
required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, at
not more than two per centum per annum for ten years., the interest to be
charged, that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at
not more but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of
the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the
same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for
discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the
context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or
discount of the certificate is to be subject to the condition of the
availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available
loanable funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted
only if there are loanable funds.
Doctrine:
A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used

G.R. No. 83736 January 15, 1992

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.
[How to Deal with Ambiguities or Imprecise Language in the Law]
Facts:
TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return
for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571, 174.31 and
consequently paying an income tax thereon of 247, 010.00 on May 15, 1981.
TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its
Annual Income Tax Retun for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared
a gross income of P904, 122.00 and total deductions of P7, 060.647.00 or a
net loss of P6, 156, 525.00. TMX Sales, Inc. through its external auditor, filed
a claim for refund in the amound of P247, 010.00 representing the overpaid
income tax. The claim was not acted upon by the CIR, hence, the petitioner
filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner,
in his answer, contended that herein respondent is barred from claiming the
same consdering that more than two years had already elapsed between the
payment of first quarter income tax and the filing of the claim in court. The
Court of Tax Appeals still ordered the Commissioner to refun the amount.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period of two years has already elapsed
Ruling:
No, when tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years
provided in Section 306 of the Revenue Code should be reckoned from the
date of the final payment or last payment. As a rule in the application of tax
laws, there is no payment until the whole or entire tax liability is completely
paid. In this case, the payment of the quarterly income tax by the TMX Sales,
Inc. cannot operate to start the commencement of the statute of limitations
and that the word tax has been uniformly held to refer to the entire tax
and not a portion thereof. Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period shall be
counten from the filing of the Adjustment return on April 15, 1982, by the
TMX Sales, Inc. and the latter is not barred by prescription in seeking for the
refund of the said overpaid income tax.
Doctrine:
Where there is ambiguity, statutes should receive a sensible construction,
such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclucsion.

G.R. No. L-49439 June 29, 1983

National Housing Authority vs. Reyes
[The Law as It Stands Must be Applied]
Facts:
The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of
Agrarian Relations, against private respondents, for the expropriation,
pursuant too Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of
25, 000 suare meters, owned and rgistered in the name of respondent
Quirino Austria, and needed for the expansion of the Dasmarinas
Resettlement Project. The Petitioner was able to secure an order placing the
subject land in its poseession. Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion
to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of P6, 600.00, a sum which is equivalent
to the value of the property assessed for taxation purposes and which was
deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42. The
petitioner argues, however, that the owners declaration of P1, 400.00 which
is lower than the assessors assessment is the just compensation for such
private lands.
Issue:
Whether or not the owners declartion of P1, 400.00, which is lower than the
assessors assessment, is the just compensation for the subject private
lands.
Ruling:
Yes, the Presidential Decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally
ccalls for obedience. As a rule, in determining just compensation, when
private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall
not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. In the instant case, the
owners declartion of the amount of P1, 4000.00 is lower than the assessors
evaluation, hence, the former is deemed just. Therefore, the Court
recognized that the rule introduced by P.D. no. 76 and reiterated in
subsequent decrees does not upset the established concept of justice or the
constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is
allowed to make his own valuation of his property.
Doctrine:
Where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the law as it
stands must be applied

G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987

EPZA v. Dulay
[The Law as It Stands Must be Applied]
Facts:
The President of the Philippines issued a Proclamatioon No. 1911, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu
for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority. The proclamation included four parcels of land
owned and registered in the name of the priavte respondent. The petitioner,
therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of lands in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Section 92 of the Presdiential Decree No. 464, but the
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. The
petitioner filed with the CFI a complaint for expropriation against the private
respodent to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land. The respondent judge
issued an order in favor of the petitioner and appointed commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated. The commissioners recommended the amount of
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just
compensation. The petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that
P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
in the ascertainment of just compensation. The trial court denied the motion.

Issue:

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX v. Palomar
[Doctrine of Associated Words/Noscitur A Sociis]
Facts:
Caltex conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage of its oil products. Denominated by Caltex
Hooded Pum Contests, it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will disperse
during a specified period. For privilege to participate, no fee or consideration
is reqired to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products is reuired to be made.
Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex Station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry
stabs. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorties for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but
was denied citing said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-
mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence,
Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief.

Issue:
W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise
which is banned by the Postal Law.
Ruling:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2)
chance, and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the
provision of the Postal Law making unmailable any lottery, gift, enterprise,
or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind means such enterprise as will require
consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. There
being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is
preserved.
Doctrine:
A word of phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Magtajas v. Pyrce Properties Corporation, Inc.
[Doctrine of Associated Words/Noscitur A Sociis]
Facts:
PAGCOR, a government-owned and controlled corporation, created by P.D.
1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., in
order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic
organizations, religious elements, women and youth groups, and even the
local officials angrily denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod
swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned
casino. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC),
the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by
passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the
harmful effects of gambling. The Pryce assailed the ordinances before the
Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challege succeeded because the Court fo
Appeals declared the questioned oridnances invalid and issued the writ
prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Likewise, reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro are valid.
HELD:
The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under
the LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Since the world
gambling should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. On
the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the LGC, the proper
action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869.
This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance.

G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007

People v. Delantar
[Doctrine of Associated Words/Noscitur A Sociis]
Facts:
G.R. No. 89483 August 30, 1990
Republic of the Philippines v. Migrino
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When Applied]
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When Applied]
Facts:
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When Applied]
Facts:
Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal
of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu.
That same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come
to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case.
When complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to
secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. The lower
court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1of R.A. No.
4200.
ISSUE:
W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec.
1 of RA 4200.
HELD:
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the
Act. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order
to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insurance
Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase device or arrangement in Sec. 1
of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line
of a telephone. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused.

G.R. No. L-5000 March 11, 1909

United States v. Santo Nino
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When not Applied]
Facts:
Respondent, Victor Santo Nino, was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He
was prosecuted under Act No. 1780, which stated that it shall be unlawful
for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris or other deadly weapons. The Act provides that such prohibition
shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a
license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of
this Act. The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the
law will only apply to bladed weapons. The trial court, upon the motion of
herein respondent, sustained the demurrer filed to the complaint.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis.
HELD:
No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is
only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is
clear, the rule must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that
unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not
limited to bladed weapons. Therefore, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and the case is remanded for futher proceedings.
Doctrine:
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty and not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature wpuld
thereby be hindered.

G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commision
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When not Applied]
Facts:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic
Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Archbishop of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that
the term employer as defined in the law should following the principle of
ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on undertakings or
activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for
profit or gain, because the phrase activity of any kind in the definition is
preceded by the words any trade, business, industry, undertaking. However,
the Social Security Commission denied their petition on the ground that there
is a clear indication that the Legislature intented to inlcude charitable
religious institutions within the scipe of the law. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is
not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. In this case, the definition of the term
employer under Republic Act. No. 1161 is sufficiently comprehensive as to
include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for
profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in
which said institutions or entities are not included. Therefore, the religious
and charitable institutions and/or organizations which are directly, wholly, or
partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is not
exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161.
Doctrine:
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty and not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature wpuld
thereby be hindered.
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc, v, Gimenez
[Doctine of Ejusdem Generis: When not Applied]
Facts:
Herein petitioner, Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc., engages in
manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation of
materials including stabilizers and flavor is among those Petitioner imports.
For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines
17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the
cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601 otherwise known
as the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:Foreign
exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges
incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavors
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. The
petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax. The Auditor
of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund
even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange
Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are
not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
ISSUE:
W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavorsare subject to a
17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.
HELD:
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the
items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class,
namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The
stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under
the category of food products. Because such items will be used for
toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption. In
this case, Petitioners arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601
does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though stabilizers and
flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the
following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed,
vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law must be
seen in its entire context, not the parts an categorizations posited by the
respondent.
Doctrine:
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty and not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature wpuld
thereby be hindered.

G.R. No. 148408 July 14, 2006

Parayno v. Jovellanos
[Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis: When not Applied]
Facts: