EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21520. December 11, 1967.]

PLARIDEL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

Gil R. Carlos & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. INCOME TAX; DEDUCTIONS; LOSS. Loss is deductible only in the taxable

year it actually happens or is sustained. However, if the loss is compensable
otherwise than by insurance, deduction for the loss suered is postponed to a
subsequent year, which to be precise, is that year in which it appears that no
compensation at all can be had, or that there is a remaining or net loss, i.e., no
full compensation. The rule is that loss deduction will be denied if there is a
measurable right to compensation for the loss, with ultimate collection
reasonably clear. So where there is reasonable ground for reimbursement, the
taxpayer must seek his redress and may not secure a loss deduction until he
establishes that no recovery may be had. In other words, the taxpayer must rst
exhaust his remedies to recover or reduce his loss. Where the evidence on record
reveals that petitioner had not exhausted its remedies, then it was too
premature for petitioner to claim a loss deduction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF CHARGE-OFF ESSENTIAL; CASE AT BAR. Assuming
that there was no reasonable expectation of recovery of the loss sustained by
petitioner, still no loss deduction can be had. Sec. 30(d)(2) of the Tax Code
requires a charge o as one of the conditions for loss deduction, However,
petitioner, who had the burden of proof, failed to adduce evidence that there was
a charge-o in connection with the P44,490.00 or P30,600.00 which it paid
to Galang Machinery.
3. ID.; ID.; INTEREST; PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; CASE AT BAR. In
connection with the claimed interest deduction of P10,000.00, the Solicitor
General correctly points out that this question was never raised before the Tax
Court. The alleged interest deduction not having been properly litigated as an
issue before the Tax Court, it is now too late to raise and assert it before this
Court.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J : p

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 Petitioner Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the bonding business. On November 9, 1950, petitioner, as surety, and
Constancio San Jose, as principal, solidarily executed a performance bond in the
penal sum of P30,600.00 in favor of the P.L. Galang Machinery Co., Inc., to secure
the performance of San Jose's contractual obligation to produce and supply logs
to the latter.
To aord itself adequate protection against loss or damage on the performance
bond, petitioner required San Jose and one Ramon Cuervo to execute an
indemnity agreement obligating themselves, solidarily, to indemnify petitioner
for whatever liability it may incur by reason of said performance bond.
Accordingly, San Jose constituted a chattel mortgage on logging machineries and
other movables in petitioner's favor 1 while Ramon Cuervo executed a real estate
mortgage. 2
San Jose later failed to deliver the logs to Galang Machinery 3 and the latter sued
on the performance bond. On October 1, 1952, the Court of First Instance
adjudged San Jose and petitioner liable; it also directed San Jose and Cuervo to
reimburse petitioner for whatever amount it would pay Galang Machinery. The
Court of Appeals, on June 17, 1955 armed the judgment of the lower court.
The same judgment was likewise armed by this Court 4 on January 11, 1957
except for a slight modication apropos the award of attorney's fees.
On February 19 and March 20, 1957, petitioner eected payment in favor of
Galang Machinery in the total sum of P44,490.00 pursuant to the nal decision.
In its income tax return for the year 1957, petitioner claimed the said amount of
P44,490.00 as deductible loss from its gross income and, accordingly, paid the
amount of P136.00 as its income tax for 1957.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the claimed deduction of
P44,490.00 and assessed against petitioner the sum of P8,898.00, plus interest,
as deciency income tax for the year 1957. Petitioner led its protest which was
denied. Whereupon, appeal was taken to the Tax Court, petitioner insisting that
the P44,490.00 which it paid to Galang Machinery was a deductible loss.
The Tax Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that petitioner was duly compensated
for otherwise than by insurance thru the mortgages in its favor executed by
San Jose and Cuervo and it had not yet exhausted all its available remedies,
especially as against Cuervo, to minimize its loss. When its motion to reconsider
was denied, petitioner elevated the present appeal.
Of the sum of P44,490.00, the amount of P30,600.00 which is the principal
sum stipulated in the performance bond is being claimed as loss deduction
under Sec. 30(d)(2) of the Tax Code and P10,000.00 which is the interest that
had accrued on the principal sum is now being claimed as interest deduction
under Sec. 30(b)(1).
Loss is deductible only in the taxable year it actually happens or is sustained.
However, if it is compensable by insurance or otherwise, deduction for the loss
suered is postponed to a subsequent year, which, to be precise, is that year in
which it appears that no compensation at all can be had, or that there is a
remaining or net loss, i.e., no full compensation. 5
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 There is no question that the year in which the petitioner Insurance Co. eected
payment to Galang Machinery pursuant to a nal decision occurred in 1957.
However, under the same court decision, San Jose and Cuervo were obligated to
reimburse petitioner for whatever payments it would make to Galang Machinery.
Clearly, petitioner's loss is compensable otherwise (than by insurance). It should
follow, then, that the loss deduction can not be claimed in 1957.
Now, petitioner's submission is that its case is an exception. Citing Cu Unjieng
Sons, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 6 and American cases also, petitioner argues
that even if there is a right to compensation by insurance or otherwise, the
deduction can be taken in the year of actual loss where the possibility of recovery
is remote. The pronouncement, however, to this eect in the Cu Unjieng case is
not as authoritative as petitioner would have it since it was there found that the
taxpayer had no legal right to compensation either by insurance or otherwise. 7
And the American cases cited 8 are not in point. None of them involved a
taxpayer who had, as in the present case, obtained a nal judgment against third
persons for reimbursement of payments made. In those cases, there was either
no legally enforceable right at all or such claimed right was still to be, or being,
litigated.
On the other hand, the rule is that loss deduction will be denied if there is a
measurable right to compensation for the loss, with ultimate collection
reasonably clear. So where there is reasonable ground for reimbursement, the
taxpayer must seek his redress and may not secure a loss deduction until he
establishes that no recovery may be had. 9 In other words, as the Tax Court put
it, the taxpayer (petitioner) must exhaust his remedies rst to recover or reduce
his loss. It is on record that petitioner had not exhausted its remedies, especially
against Ramon Cuervo who was solidarily liable with San Jose for reimbursement
to it. Upon being prodded by the Tax Court to go after Cuervo, Hermogenes
Dimaguiba, president of petitioner corporation, said that they would 10 but no
evidence was submitted that anything was really done on the matter. Moreover,
petitioner's evidence on remote possibility of recovery is fatally wanting. Its
right to reimbursement is not only secured by the mortgages executed by San
Jose and Cuervo but also by a nal and executory judgment in the civil case itself.
Thus, other properties of San Jose and Cuervo were subject to levy and
execution. But no writ of execution, satised or unsatised, was ever submitted.
Neither has it been established that Cuervo was insolvent. The only evidence on
record on the point is Dimaguiba's testimony that he does not really know if
Cuervo has other properties. 11 This is not substantial proof of insolvency. Thus, it
was too premature for petitioner to claim a loss deduction.
But assuming that there was no reasonable expectation of recovery, still no loss
deduction can be had. Sec. 30(d)(2) of the Tax Code requires a charge-o as one
of the conditions for loss deduction:
"In the case of a corporation, all losses actually sustained and charged-
o within the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise." (Stress supplied)

Mertens 12 states only four (4) requisites because the United States Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 13 has no charge-o requirement. Sec. 23(f) thereof
provides merely:
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 "In the case of a corporation, losses sustained during the taxable year
and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."

Petitioner, who had the burden of proof 14 failed to adduce evidence that there
was a charge-o in connection with the P44,490.00 or P30,600.00 which it
paid to Galang Machinery.
In connection with the claimed interest deduction of P10,000.00, the Solicitor
General correctly points out that this question was never raised before the Tax
Court. Petitioner, thru counsel, had admitted before said court 15 and in the
memorandum it led 16 that the only issue in the case was whether the entire
P44,490.00 paid by it was or was not a deductible loss under Sec. 30(d)(2) of the
Tax Code. Even in petitioner's return, the P44,490.00 was claimed wholly as
losses on its bonds. 17 The alleged interest deduction not having been properly
litigated as an issue before the Tax Court, it is now too late to raise and assert it
before this Court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is, as it is hereby, armed. Costs against
petitioner Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Exh. K, C.T.A. Records, pp. 71-72.

2. Exh. L, C.T.A. Records, pp. 74-76.

3. Short for P.L. Galang Machinery Co. Inc.

4. Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. P.L Galang Machinery Co., Inc., 100 Phil.
679.
5. See: Sec. 30(d)(2), Int. Rev. Code; Rev. Regulations No. 2, Secs. 94 & 96; Cu
Unjieng Sons, Inc. vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 1.
6. Supra, Note 5.

7. 100 Phil. 1, at 15-19, 23.

8. Petitioner's brief, p. 18.

9. 5 Mertens (1956 ed.), Chap. 28, pp. 19, 21.

10. Session of Sept. 18, 1962, T.S.N., pp. 49-51.
11. Ibid. T.S.N., pp. 52-53.

12. 5 Mertens (1956 ed.), Chap. 28, p. 9.

13. 26 U.S.C.A. 10.

14. Mertens (1956 ed.), Chap. 28, pp. 7-8.

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 15. Session of Sept. 17, 1962, T.S.N., p. 2.

16. C.T.A. Records, p. 83.

17. See B.I.R. Records, pp. 5, 8, 14-16, 20, 22.

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