Richard Carey & another v. New England Organ Bank & others involved a dispute over the harvesting of organs and tissues from the plaintiffs' deceased son, Adam Carey. The Organ Bank representative completed the consent form to donate Adam's tissues but made mistakes, including indicating consent for organs the father did not agree to and purposes of use he disagreed with. The tissues were found unsuitable for transplantation and discarded. The Court ruled the Organ Bank was entitled to immunity under the good faith provision of the statute as their acts did not clearly violate the statute and appeared to be mistakes rather than lack of good faith.
Richard Carey & another v. New England Organ Bank & others involved a dispute over the harvesting of organs and tissues from the plaintiffs' deceased son, Adam Carey. The Organ Bank representative completed the consent form to donate Adam's tissues but made mistakes, including indicating consent for organs the father did not agree to and purposes of use he disagreed with. The tissues were found unsuitable for transplantation and discarded. The Court ruled the Organ Bank was entitled to immunity under the good faith provision of the statute as their acts did not clearly violate the statute and appeared to be mistakes rather than lack of good faith.
Richard Carey & another v. New England Organ Bank & others involved a dispute over the harvesting of organs and tissues from the plaintiffs' deceased son, Adam Carey. The Organ Bank representative completed the consent form to donate Adam's tissues but made mistakes, including indicating consent for organs the father did not agree to and purposes of use he disagreed with. The tissues were found unsuitable for transplantation and discarded. The Court ruled the Organ Bank was entitled to immunity under the good faith provision of the statute as their acts did not clearly violate the statute and appeared to be mistakes rather than lack of good faith.
Richard Carey & another v. New England Organ Bank & others involved a dispute over the harvesting of organs and tissues from the plaintiffs' deceased son, Adam Carey. The Organ Bank representative completed the consent form to donate Adam's tissues but made mistakes, including indicating consent for organs the father did not agree to and purposes of use he disagreed with. The tissues were found unsuitable for transplantation and discarded. The Court ruled the Organ Bank was entitled to immunity under the good faith provision of the statute as their acts did not clearly violate the statute and appeared to be mistakes rather than lack of good faith.
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Richard Carey & another v.
New England Organ
Bank & others
FACTS:
Plaintiffs son, Adam Carey was mortally injured
in a vehicle accident. Adam was rushed to the hospital but died. The plaintiffs agreed to an anatomical donation and then contacted the Organ Bank. Jorge Duran, the Organ Banks representative, spoke with Adam Careys father by telephone to accomplish the consent form. Moreover, federal regulations in effect at the time prohibited transplantation of organs and tissue if so much saline had been infused into the donor that the resulting dilution of blood would significantly affect testing for infectious diseases, and no pre-infusion sample was available for testing. Before Duran completed the consent form, a nurse at the hospital reported to Duran that Adam had received substantial infusions of saline during emergency treatment, and that no pre-infusion samples of his blood were available for testing. Consequently, Duran had sufficient information to determine, had he performed the necessary calculation, that Adams tissues would not be suitable for human transplantation. Instead of telling Adams father that Adam might be ineligible to be a transplant donor, Duran completed the consent form. Further, Adams father made a gift of only Adams skin, blood vessels, eyes, and certain other tissues for transplant or therapy. However, Duran indicated in the consent form that Adams father also donated Adams heart for valves, brain, or a specific blood vessel. Also, Adams father disagreed to permitting the use of the tissues and organs for medical research if not usable for transplantation or therapy. Nonetheless, Duran wrote the opposite. Then, the Organ Bank proceeded to harvest Adams tissues, including the vessel which Adams father refused to consent. Consequently, the defendants noted that the tissues were unsuitable for transplantation and were then discarded, and no anatomical gifts were used for those purposes of for medical education. Notwithstanding, the defendants reported to the plaintiffs that they had successfully transplanted the tissues. Then, the defendants reported to the plaintiffs the truth and the latter requested for the return of the tissues, but the same were not done since the tissues have already been discarded.
Lastly, the defendants are organized to promote,
coordinate, and implement the recovery, preservation, and distribution of organs for charitable purposes. However, the defendants realized financial benefits from transactions involving anatomical gifts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are provided with
immunity by the good faith provision of the statute
HELD:
Yes. The Court rules that the defendants are
covered by the immunity in accordance with the good faith provision of the statute. To determine if the acts of the defendants were covered by the good faith provision; a two-step analysis is required. First, would be to assess if the acts were in accordance with the technical requirements of the statute. Second, if the acts were not in accordance, but they were nevertheless in good faith. The statute provides that a hospital or its designated representative inform the concerned individuals of their opportunity to donate gifts for transplantation. The hospital would only be required to inform, if consent would yield a gift appropriate for the purpose. The Court held that there was nothing in the records, which would indicate that the defendants were the designated representatives of the hospital within the meaning provided by the statute. The hospital informed the plaintiffs of their opportunity, and subsequently referred them to the Organ Bank. The Court held that the statute placed the burden on the hospital, and not to the Organ Bank. The Court further concluded that if the requirements were to apply to the defendants, there was still nothing in the statute that explicitly or implicitly prohibited what happened.
The Court also discussed that the good faith
immunity in the statute is provided for situations where because of confusion, an organ is removed without genuine consent. The few mistakes in the consent form provide no lack of good faith on the part of the defendants, so the immunity extends to them.