The Logic of Migration
The Logic of Migration
The Logic of Migration
Catherine Barber
This background paper was written as a contribution to the development of From Poverty
to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World, Oxfam
International 2008. It is published in order to share widely the results of commissioned
research and programme experience. The views it expresses are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of Oxfam International or its affiliate organisations.
Why do people move? The academic literature on voluntary migration offers numerous explanations,
but the simplest one is this: people perceive opportunities economic, social and political that are
not available to them in their place of origin, and they move towards them.
Inequalities in economic opportunities across nations are particularly stark. Wages in rich countries
are around one hundred times higher than in the poorest countries; the industrial wage in the US is
around $13 an hour; in Viet Nam, just 13 cents an hour. 1 Yet, while characteristics such as education,
work experience and health explain variations between individuals wages within countries well, they
explain only a tiny fraction of the variations amongst them. Nearly all of the differences in wages of
individuals are explained by their national locations rather than their personal characteristics.
Data on actual migrants illustrate this dramatically. When people move, their wages in the receiving
country are almost identical to those of local workers and bear little relation to those of workers in
their country of origin. A Salvadorian man with a secondary education who works in the US receives
the same wage as the average for an American man with the same education. This wage is almost nine
times higher than the wage received by his equivalent in El Salvador.
The difference in opportunities between countries has been widening over time. A study by
Bourguignon and Morrison estimates that in 1820, only one tenth of the difference in incomes among
all individuals in the world was due to differences in average incomes across countries. Today, 60 per
cent of global inequality is attributable to differences in incomes across countries. 2 Borders matter
more today than ever before.
Curiously, even in the face of huge global inequalities and incentives for cross-country mobility, we
wrongly assume that nation states and their populations are fixed. This is historically inaccurate. In
the early 20th century there were around 40 sovereign nations. Today there is around 200, as a result of
which labour markets are more local and more segmented than at any time in recent history.
The absolute and relative sizes of countries have also changed radically as a consequence of migration.
The peak population of Ireland in the 19th century was over 8 million; by 1901 the population had
fallen to 4.5 million. In the mid 19th century Canadas population was less than half of that of Ireland,
while today it is around five times higher. Our era of globalisation has far greater obstacles to
movement than existed in the corresponding 19th and early 20th century eras.
Migration offers opportunities not only for individuals but also their extended families. The most
striking evidence of this comes from international remittances. In 2004, developing countries received
an estimated $126 billion in official remittances. 3 At a national level, remittances are second only to
foreign direct investment as a source of external funding for developing countries, and are several
times higher than international aid flows. They are particularly important for low-income countries,
standing at 3.3 per cent of GDP compared to 1.3 per cent for middle income countries. They are also
significantly more stable than private capital flows.
In short, economic migration is a livelihood strategy for both individuals and families, which has huge
potential payoffs for them and their countries.
1
Statistics on cross-country income inequalities and historical movements are drawn from Pritchett (2003), see references.
Wage comparisons do not adjust for purchasing power; the discrepancies would remain great (though reduced) under
adjustment.
2
Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002.
3
Statistics in this paragraph from Ratha and Maimbo, eds., 2005. The total figure for remittances to developing countries -
including unofficial flows - is thought to be closer to $200 billion.
Migrants wouldnt move if they knew how hard the experience would be
It is certainly true that migrants have imperfect information about their places of destination, and their
rights, and it is sometimes argued that they would not migrate if they knew how poor labour
standards were in their host countries. Yet even when migrants do know how poor the labour
standards are in certain countries for example in the Gulf States many of them choose to return
repeatedly as migrant workers. The fact that people move despite extreme personal hardships may be
one of the most compelling reasons for promoting increased legal labour mobility. 4 Whether or not
information is limited, people know and respond to the basics: the differences in wages across
countries are dramatic. In Cambodia, the average income is $310; in neighbouring Thailand $2,190. In
Lesotho, the average income is $500; in South Africa, $2,780. 5 Judging migrants decisions as ill-
informed in the face of such dramatic incentives to move runs contrary to the well-established
development tradition of respecting individuals livelihood decisions.
One view is that children of migrant parents are so traumatised by their parents emigration that this
outweighs any other considerations. However, some interesting research from the Philippines - one of
the major sources of migrant labour - suggests that that these childrens psychological and health
outcomes are on average similar to those of their peers, while their socio-economic outcomes are
significantly better. 6
4
I am unaware of any survey that shows that the majority of migrants in any destination country regret having moved there.
5
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004.
6
Scalabrini Migration Center 2004.
7
Ratha and Maimbo, eds. 2005, p 32.
8
Taiwan is a notable example. See ONeill 2003.
In either case, the existence of winners and losers from immigration should not be a reason to oppose
it. Applying the same logic that we use in trade debates, if there are net gains from migration and
most economic analyses suggest this strongly 13 - then redistributive policies in receiving countries can
mitigate any pre-tax effect on inequality. The counter-argument may be made that governments in
fact wont make redistributive transfers, but, as Rodrik notes, that would constitute a reason to oppose
imports of labour-intensive goods just as strongly as immigration. This clearly does not happen. 14
9
See the UN (2005) Human Development Report 2005 and the World Bank (2006) World Development Report 2006 for
illustrations of this debate.
10
This may either be because the skill composition of immigrants is similar to that of the native population, or because
production patterns change to reflect the new skill mix. For example, agricultural production is generally accepted to be higher in
the UK than it would be without the presence of migrant workers. This does not mean that native workers are displaced from
these jobs, but rather that the jobs exist where they otherwise would not. Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston and Wadsworth 2003, The
Local Labour Market Effects of Immigration in the UK, Home Office Online Report 06/03.
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.pdf
11
Preston, Ian and Christian Dustmann (2007) based on evidence from the European Social Attitudes Survey). Cultural
protectionism is determined by responses to statements such as This country would be better if it were more white or if it were
more Christian.
12
Borjas 1999.
13
See for example Winters 2002, who finds that there would be a $150 billion increase in global income if rich countries allowed
immigration to increase their labour forces by 3 per cent.
14
Rodrik 2002.
There is some political space for this suggestion. GATS talks at the WTO include liberalisation of
Mode 4 service provision (movement of natural persons), and, though rich countries offers have
been very limited to date, bringing labour mobility into trade talks does at least give developing
countries some bargaining power. Accordingly, they have pushed rich countries to lift obstacles to
Mode 4 provision of services by introducing GATS visas, clarifying and simplifying the application of
Economic Needs Tests, recognising international qualifications, and extending commitments to semi-
skilled or low-skilled categories. 16 Some of these issues are sufficiently technical (e.g. recognition of
qualifications) that it is possible to discuss them without becoming embroiled in heated political
debates about immigration.
Temporary migration schemes have their critics. Schemes from the 1960s and 1970s experienced fairly
high leakage as temporary workers became permanent residents of their host countries. However,
contemporary proponents of temporary schemes argue that earlier schemes were poorly designed and
provided migrants with few incentives to return to their country of origin. Rodrik suggests a quota
system of temporary workers under which a sending countrys access to rich country labour markets
would depend on its success in attracting the previous years workers home. 17 This would generate
internal political pressure in developing countries to put in place favourable conditions for returning
migrants (for example, support for investment projects, information about employment
opportunities). Such a rotation scheme would have the advantage of attracting skilled workers back to
their countries of origin, extending the opportunity to move to a wide number of people, and
improving the investment and employment environments in sending countries. 18
More fundamental than any technical policy change is a change in attitudes to migrants in rich
countries. Hostile attitudes are widespread, but often founded on misconceptions or prejudice. 19
There is little respect for the hardships that migrants endure in order to improve circumstances for
themselves and their families. Challenging these attitudes will be fundamental both for achieving
support for a pro-migration agenda and for protecting the rights of workers when they do move.
References
Barber, C., R. Black and P. Tenaglia (2005) Making Migration Development Friendly: Temporary Worker
Schemes in the UK, Sussex University Working Paper T10.
15
See, for example, World Bank (2006), Global Economic Prospects 2006.
16
Zambia, speaking recently for LDCs, suggested that members should open their markets to all categories of natural persons
from LDCs, particularly unskilled and semi-skilled persons without applying a so-called economics needs test. (Bridges 2003).
17
Rodrik 2002.
18
For a discussion of how temporary worker scheme experiences can be made more development-friendly, see Ruhs and H J
Chang 2004 and Barber, Black and Tenaglia 2005.
19
For example, in 2004 polls revealed a widespread belief that immigrants from new EU member states would scrounge UK
benefits. In fact, 99 per cent of the applications for UK National Insurance numbers made by EU accession country citizens
since 2004 have been employment-related; only one per cent were made in order to obtain benefits. UK Home Office (2005),
Accession Monitoring Report May 2004 September 2005, available online.
Bourguignon, F. and Morrison (2002) Inequality among world citizens, American Economic Review,
September 2002.
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest. Vol 18.7 (May 21 2003), http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-05-
21/story3.htm, Last checked 22 May 2008.
Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri, I. Preston and J. Wadsworth (2003) The Local Labour Market Effects of
Immigration in the UK, London: Home Office Online Report June 2003,
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.pdf
Dustmann, C. & I. Preston (2007) Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration, Advances
in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1655-1655.
ONeill, K. (2003) Brain Drain and Gain: The Case of Taiwan, Migration Policy Institute, September.
http://migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=155, Last checked 18 May 2008.
Ratha, D. and S. Maimbo (eds.) (2005) Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects,
Washington DC: World Bank.
Ruhs, M. and H. J. Chang (2004) The ethics of labor immigration policy, International Organization
58(1): 69-102.
Scalabrini Migration Center. (2004) Hearts Apart: Migration in the Eyes of Filipino Children, Manila.
UNDP. (2005) Human Development Report 2005, New York: United Nations.
Winters, A. (2002) The Economic Implications of Liberalising Mode 4 Trade, paper presented at the Joint
WTO-World Bank Symposium on the Movement of Natural Persons, Geneva, 11-12 April 2002.
World Bank (2004) World Development Indicators 2004, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2005) Global Economic Prospects 2006, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2006) World Development Report 2006, Washington DC: World Bank.
Annotated Bibliography
The following publications reflect the current state of migration and development policy debates.
House of Commons International Development Committee. (2004) Migration and Development: How to
make migration work for poverty reduction. Sixth Report of Session 2003-04, London: The Stationary Office.
A good general summary of current debates.
World Bank (2005) Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Migration and Remittances,
Washington DC: World Bank. Argues for an increase in labour mobility, so somewhat more risqu
than the others. Very good summary of evidence on effects of remittances.
The following papers/books are recommended for originality and plain good writing. They are well worth
reading.
Pritchett, Lant (2003) The Future of Migration: Irresistible Forces meet Immovable Ideas, paper presented at
a conference at Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 10 October 2003.
Ehrenreich, Barbara and Russell Hochschild (eds.) (2003) Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex
Workers in the New Economy London: Granta Books.
Caouette, Therese (2001) Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along The
Borders of Chinga, Myanmar and Thailand, London: Save the Children (UK). A possibly unique instance
of an international NGO doing in-depth programme work and research on economic migration.
This paper was written by Catherine Barber in December 2005. It is one of a series
written to inform the development of the Oxfam International publication From
Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World,
Oxfam International 2008.
Catherine Barber was formerly Economic Policy Adviser to Oxfam GB. She has
taught at Harvard and Oxford Universities.
The paper may be used free of charge for the purposes of education and research,
provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that
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adaptation, permission must be secured. Email [email protected]
For further information on the issues raised in this paper, please email
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