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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.205926July22,2015

ALVINCOMERCIANTEyGONZALES,Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.

DECISION

PERLASBERNABE,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution
3
dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the
Judgment4datedJuly28,2009oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMandaluyongCity,Branch213(RTC)inCrim.Case
No. MC037242D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal
PossessionofDangerousDrugsdefinedandpenalizedunderSection11,ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.(RA)9165,
5
otherwiseknownastheComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002.

TheFacts

OnJuly31,2003,anInformationwasfiledbeforetheRTCchargingComercianteofviolationofSection11,Article
IIofRA9165,towit:

Thatonoraboutthe30thdayofJuly2003,intheCityofMandaluyong,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession,
custodyandcontrolTwo(2)heatsealedtransparentplasticsachet(sic)eachcontaining0.15gram(sic)and0.28
gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for
MethamphetamineHydrochloridecommonlyknownas"shabu",adangerousdrug.

CONTRARYTOLAW.6

Accordingtotheprosecution,ataround10o'clockintheeveningofJuly30,2003,AgentEduardoRadan(Agent
Radan)oftheNARCOTICSgroupandP03BienvyCalagII(P03Calag)wereaboardamotorcycle,patrollingthe
areawhileontheirwaytovisitafriendatPrivateRoad,BarangayHulo,MandaluyongCity.Cruisingataspeedof
30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men later
identifiedasComercianteandacertainErickDasilla 7(Dasilla)standingandshowing"improperandunpleasant
movements,"withoneofthemhandingplasticsachetstotheother.Thinkingthatthesachetsmaycontainshabu,
theyimmediatelystoppedandapproachedComercianteandDasillaAtadistanceofaroundfive(5)meters,P03
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachetscontainedmethamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu.8

Aftertheprosecutionresteditscase,Dasillafiledademurrertoevidence,whichwasgrantedbytheRTC,thushis
acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his
righttodosowaivedandorderedhimtopresenthisevidence.9

Inhisdefense,ComercianteaverredthatP03Calagwaslookingforacertain"Barok",whowasanotoriousdrug
pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private
Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal
drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the
demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were
chargedwithillegalpossessionofdangerousdrugs.10
 TheRTCRuling

In.aJudgment11datedJuly28,2009,theRTCfoundComercianteguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofviolationof
Section11,ArticleIIofRA9165,andaccordingly,sentencedhimtosufferthepenaltyofimprisonmentfortwelve
(12)yearsandone(1)daytotwenty(20)years,andorderedhimtopayafineintheamountofP300,000.00.12

The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two (2)
plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause to justify the
warrantlessarrest,consideringthatP03Calagsaw,inplainview,thatComerciantewascarryingthesaidsachets
whenhedecidedtoapproachandapprehendthelatter.Further,theRTCfoundthatabsentanyproofofintent
thatP03Calagwasimpelledbyanymaliciousmotive,hemustbepresumedtohaveproperlyperformedhisduty
whenhearrestedComerciante.13

Aggrieved,ComercianteappealedtotheCA.

TheCARuling

In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03 Calag had
probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in
flagrante delicto and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the
CA,thiswasenoughtodrawareasonablesuspicionthatthosesachetsmightbeshabu,andthus,P03Calaghad
everyreasontoinquireonthematterrightthenandthere.15

Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a Resolution 17 dated
February19,2013.Hence,thispetition.18

TheIssuebeforetheCourt

ThecoreissuefortheCourt'sresolutioniswhetherornottheCAcorrectlyaffirmedComerciante'sconvictionfor
violationofSection11,ArticleIIofRA9165.

Inhispetition,ComercianteessentiallycontendsthatP03Caragdidnoteffectavalidwarrantlessarrestonhim.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets
containingshabushouldberenderedinadmissible,necessarilyresultinginhisacquittal.19

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
maintainsthatComerciante'swarrantlessarrestwasvalidlymadepursuanttothe"stopandfrisk"rule,especially
consideringthathewascaughtinflagrantedelictoinpossessionofillegaldrugs.20

TheCourt'sRuling

Thepetitionismeritorious.

Section2,ArticleIII 21oftheConstitutionmandatesthatasearchandseizuremustbecarriedoutthroughoron
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause in the absence of such
warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutionalprovision.Toprotectpeoplefromunreasonablesearchesandseizures,Section3(2),ArticleIII22of
the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasionofsuchunreasonablesearchesandseizuresaredeemedtaintedandshouldbeexcludedforbeingthe
proverbialfruitofapoisonoustree.Inotherwords,evidenceobtainedfromunreasonablesearchesandseizures
shallbeinadmissibleinevidenceforanypurposeinanyproceeding.23

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions
establishedbyjurisprudenceisasearchincidenttoalawfularrest. 24Inthisinstance,thelawrequiresthatthere
firstbealawfularrestbeforeasearchcanbemadetheprocesscannotbereversed. 25Section5,Rule113of
theRevisedRulesonCriminalProcedurelaysdowntherulesonlawfulwarrantlessarrests,asfollows:

SEC.5.Arrestwithoutwarrantwhenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arresta
person:

(a)When,inhispresence,thepersontobearrestedhascommitted,isactuallycommitting,orisattempting
tocommitanoffense

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledgeoffactsorcircumstancesthatthepersontobearrestedhascommitteditand

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
 whilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
deliveredtothenearestpolicestationorjailandshallbeproceededagainstinaccordancewithSection7ofRule
112.

The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed(c)arrestofaprisonerwhohasescapedfromcustodyservingfinaljudgmentortemporarilyconfined
duringthependencyofhiscaseorhasescapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.26

ForawarrantlessarrestunderSection5(a)tooperate,two(2)elementsmustconcur,namely:(a)thepersonto
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitacrimeand(b)suchovertactisdoneinthepresenceorwithintheviewofthearresting
officer.27Ontheotherhand,Section5(b)requiresforitsapplicationthatatthetimeofthearrest,anoffensehad
infactjustbeencommittedandthearrestingofficerhadpersonalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthattheaccused
hadcommittedit.28

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required.UnderSection5(a),theofficerhimselfwitnessesthecrimewhileinSection(b),heknowsforafactthat
acrimehasjustbeencommitted.29

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantlessarrestmadeonComerciante.P03Calaghimselfadmittedthathewasaboardamotorcyclecruising
ataspeedofaround30kilometersperhourwhenhesawComercianteandDasillastandingaroundandshowing
"improperandunpleasantmovements,"withoneofthemhandingplasticsachetstotheother.Onthebasisofthe
foregoing,hedecidedtoeffectanarrest.P03Calag'stestimonyondirectexaminationisrevelatory:

Pros.Silao:

Q:NowonJuly30,2003around10:00o'clockintheevening,kindlytellthecourtwherewereyou?

A:Wewerethenconductingourpatrolonamotorbikema'am.

xxxx

Q:Andwhowerewithyouwhileyouwerepatrolling?

A:EduardoRadan,Ma'am.

Q:AndwhoisthisEduardoRadan?

A:HeisanagentoftheNarcoticsGroup,ma'am.

Q:WhileyouwerealongPrivateRoad,Hulo,MandaluyongCity,whatunusualincidentthathappenedifany?

A:Wespottedsomebodywhowasthenasifhandingaplasticsachettosomeone.

xxxx

Q:Nowhowfarwereyouwhenyousawthisincidentfromthesetwomalepersonsyoualreadyidentified?

A:Aboutten(10)metersawayma'am.

Q:Whatweretheirpositionsinrelationtoyouwhenyousawtheminthatparticularact?

A:Theywerequitefacingmethen.

0:WhatwasthespeedofyourmotorcyclewhenyouweretraversingthisPrivateRoad,Hulo,MandaluyongCity?

A:Aboutthirty(30)kilometersperhour,ma'am.

Q:Andwhowasdrivingthemotorcycle?

A:EduardoRadan,ma'am.

Q:Whenyouspottedthemasifhandingsomethingtoeachother,whatdidyoudo?
A:Westoppedma'am.

Q:Andhowfarwereyoufromthemwhenyoustopped,moreorless?

A:Wepassedbythemforashortdistancebeforewestoppedma'am.

Q:Andafteryoupassedbythemandyousaidyoustopped,whatwasthereactionofthesetwomalepersons?

A:Theyweresurprised,ma'am.

xxxx

Q:Andwhatwastheirreactionwhenyousaidyouintroducedyourselfaspoliceofficer?

A:Theyweresurprised.

Q:Whenyousay"nabigla"whatwastheirreactionthatmadeyousaythattheyweresurprised?

A:Theywerestunned.

Q:Aftertheywerestunned,whatdidyoudonext,policeofficer?

A:Iarrestedthem,ma'am.Iinvitedthem.

Q:Whatdidyousaytothem?Howdidyouinvitethem?Inshort,napakasimpleLangngtanongkosayoeh.Did
yousayanything?

Court:

Mr.Witness,stopmakingunnecessarymovements,justlistens.

Pros.Silao:Areyoufittotestify?Maysakitkabaowala?Witness:Walapo.

Pros.Silao:Eh,bakitdikamakapagsalita?

Court:Youkeeptouchingyoureyes.Justrelax.Answerthequestion,anosinabimosakanila?

Pros.Silao:Areyoufittotestify?Walakabangsakit?

Witness:Walapo.

xxxx

Q:Fromwhatportionofhisbody,IamreferringtoAlvinComerciantedidyourecovertheplasticsachet?

A:Fromhishandma'am.

Q:Leftorrighthand?

Pros.Silao:Youcannotrecall?Hindimomatandaan.SabihinmoKungHindimomatandaan,noproblem.Kaliwa,
kananoryoucannotrecall?30

(Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)

Onthebasisofsuchtestimony,theCourtfindsithighlyimplausiblethatP03Calag,evenassumingthathehas
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10
meters,andwhileaboardamotorcyclecruisingataspeedof30kilometersperhourminisculeamountsofwhite
crystallinesubstanceinsidetwo(2)verysmallplasticsachetsheldbyComerciante.TheCourtalsonotesthatno
otherovertactcouldbeproperlyattributedtoComercianteastorousesuspicioninthemindofP03Calagthat
the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing
aroundwithacompanionandhandingoversomethingtothelattercannotinanywaybeconsideredcriminalacts.
Infact,evenifComercianteandhiscompanionwereshowing"improperandunpleasantmovements"asputby
P03Calag,thesamewouldnothavebeensufficientinordertoeffectalawfulwarrantlessarrestunderSection5
(a),Rule113oftheRevisedRulesonCriminalProcedure. 31Thathisreasonablesuspicionbolsteredby(a)the
factthathehadseenhisfellowofficersarrestpersonsinpossessionofshabuand(b)histrainingsandseminars
on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedlysawinComerciantewasindeedshabu.32
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have
been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledgeoffactsindicatingthattheaccusedhadcommittedit.Asalreadydiscussed,thefactualbackdropofthe
instantcasefailedtoshowthatP03Calaghadpersonalknowledgethatacrimehadbeenindisputablycommitted
by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the
accusedhadjustcommittedacrimeacrimemust,infact,havebeencommittedfirst,whichdoesnotobtainin
thiscase.33

In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comercianteuntenable.InPeoplev.Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and
frisk"searches:

"Stopandfrisk"searches(sometimesreferredtoasTerrysearches)arenecessaryforlawenforcement. Thatis, 1 a \^/p h i1

lawenforcersshouldbegiventhelegalarsenaltopreventthecommissionofoffenses.However,thisshouldbe
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
Thismaybeundoubtedlybasedontheexperienceofthepoliceofficer.Experiencedpoliceofficershavepersonal
experiencedealingwithcriminalsandcriminalbehavior.Hence,theyshouldhavetheabilitytodiscernbasedon
facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterionwouldbethatthepoliceofficer,withhisorherpersonalknowledge,mustobservethefactsleadingtothe
suspicionofanillicitact.

xxxx

Normally,"stopandfrisk"searchesdonotgivethelawenforceranopportunitytoconferwithajudgetodetermine
probablecause.InPosadasv.CourtofAppeals,oneoftheearliestcasesadoptingthe"stopandfrisk"doctrinein
Philippinejurisprudence,thiscourtapproximatedthesuspiciouscircumstancesasprobablecause:

Theprobablecauseisthatwhenthepetitioneractedsuspiciouslyandattemptedtofleewiththeburibagthere
was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
policeofficerstoinspectthesame.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstancessufficientlystronginthemselvestowarrantacautiousmantobelievethatthepersonaccusedis
guiltyoftheoffensewithwhichheischarged.

Malacatv.CourtofAppealsclarifiestherequirementfurther.Itdoesnothavetobeprobablecause,butitcannot
bemeresuspicion.Ithastobeagenuinereasontoservethepurposesofthe"stopandfrisk"exception:

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detainedhasweaponsconcealedabouthim.

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
suspiciouscircumstance.Thereshouldbe"presenceofmorethanoneseeminglyinnocentactivity,which,taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "umeasonable
searchesandseizures."Certainly,relianceononlyonesuspiciouscircumstanceornoneatallwillnotresultina
reasonablesearch.[35]](Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)

Inthiscase,theCourtreiteratesthatComerciante'sactsofstandingaroundwithacompanionandhandingover
something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a
1 w p h i1

reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a
"stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be
deemedunlawful.

Insum,therewasneitheravalidwarrantlessarrestnoravalid"stopandfrisk"searchmadeonComerciante.As
such,theshabupurportedlyseizedfromhimisrenderedinadmissibleinevidenceforbeingtheproverbialfruitof
thepoisonoustree.Sincetheconfiscatedshabuistheverycorpusdelictiofthecrimecharged,Comerciantemust
necessarilybeacquittedandexoneratedfromallcriminalliability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution
dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating
Section11,ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.9165.TheDirectoroftheBureauofCorrectionsisorderedtocausehis
immediaterelease,unlessheisbeinglawfullyheldforanyotherreason.

SOORDERED.

ESTELAMPERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

DIOSDADOM.PERALTA*
AssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMIN** JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

MARVICM.V.F.LEONEN***
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
ActingChairperson

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheActingDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,Icertify
thattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothe
writeroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
ActingChiefJustice

Footnotes
*
DesignatedActingMemberperSpecialOrderNo.2103datedJuly13,2015.
**
PerSpecialOrderNo.2102datedJuly13,2015.
***
DesignatedActingMemberperSpecialOrderNo.2108datedJuly13,2015.
1
Rollo,pp.930.
2
Id. at 3449. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Ricardo R.Rosario and
LeonciaR.Dimagibaconcurring.
3
Id.at6972.
4
PromulgatedonSeptember4,2009andpennedbyJudgeCarlosA.Valenzuelaid.at8194.
5
Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,
REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
1972,ASAMENDED,PROVIDINGFUNDSTHEREFOR,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES"(approvedJune7,
2002).
6
Rollo,p.78.
7
Variesthroughouttherecords.Thevariationsare"ErickDasillo"and"ErickDacillo."Seerol/o,pp.13,84,
85,86,129,and130.
8
Id.at3637.
9
Id.at37.
 10
Id.at38.Seealsoid.at8587.
11
Id.at8194.
12
Id.at93.
13
Id.at8793.
14
Id.at3449.
15
Id.at4048.
16
SeeUrgentMotionforReconsiderationdatedNovember10,2011id.at5067.
17
Id.at6972.
18
Id.at932.
19
SeePetitionid.at1629.
20
SeeCommentid.at133137.
21
Section2,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionstates:

Section2.Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainst
unreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsor
thingstobeseized.
22
Section3(2),ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionstates:

Section3.xxxx

(2)Anyevidenceobtainedinviolationofthisortheprecedingsectionshallbeinadmissibleforany
purposeinanyproceeding.
23
SeeAmbrev.People,692Phil.681,693(2012).
24
Id.,citingPeoplev.DelosReyes,672Phil.77,108109(2011).
25
Malacatv.CA,347Phil.462,480(1997)citationsomitted.
26
Seeid.at479.
27
Peoplev.Villareal,G.R.No.201363,March18,2013,693SCRA549,556,citingValdezv.People,563
Phil.934,947(2007).
28
Id.at556,citingPeoplev.Cuizon,326Phil.345(1996).
29
Id.at557.
30
Rollo,pp.1720.
31
See People v. Villareal, supra note, 27. See also Malacat v. CA, supra note, 25, where the Court
invalidated a warrantless arrest made to the accused who, according to police officers, "were acting
suspiciouslywith'[t]heireyes...movingveryfast."'
32
Seeid.
33
Seeid.at558559.
34
SeeG.R.No.200334,July30,2014.
35
Seeid.citationsomitted.

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