PHILOSOPHY

EARLY
GREEK
THINKING
Martin Heidegger's key essays on the pre-Socratic philosophers not only penetrat~ to
the dawn of the Western philosophy of 8ei113, but also establish a crucial lin~ to
central aspects of Heideger's own thought.
Heide88er has done more than any other philosopher to bri113 alive the uniq ,
k
creative insights of Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and others. Early Gr~ek
Thidmg displays this effort and examines the key words- aJetiHi4, logos, moinz- 4he
early Greeks used to name the enisma of a fundamentally premetaphysical experieife
of Being.
The essays in Early Grlelt Thidi"g connect and clarify the subtle references, e
thematic threads, and the Greek undercurrents that run through Heide88er's o n
philosophical project, from Bei"g atlli Time ( 1927) to On Time atlli Beig ( 196 ).
The translators, to further our understandi1J8 of these influences, include a hel ul
introduction and glossary.
With the penetratif13, poetic insight characteristic of Heideger, Early G
Thit~ltmg is pivotal to an understanding of his later philosophy and indispensable or
a fresh perspective on the thought of the pre-Socratics.
i

Martm HeiMgger ( 1889 1976) remains one of the most influential and import~t
philosophers of the 20th century.
Daflid Fa"e/1 Krell, Ph.D., has translated and edited other works of Heideo.J.r,
including Basic Writit~gs and the multi-volume Nietzsche; he is Senior Lectu;;fin
Philosophy at the University of Essex, England. !
Fratllt A. Cap.zzi, Ph.D . who also translated works of Heidegger included 1in
Basic Writit~gs and Nietzsche, is Director of Creative Services for the Rutl~e
Center Inc., a multimedia production agency.

ISBN 0-06-063842 ~7

HarperSanFrancisco
Cover drsign by Chari~ Furman

JII.IJIII iUI
0385
- - ---

Harper & Row Editions of

MARTIN HEIDEGG E R

Basic Writings
Being and Time
Discourse on Thinking
Early Greek Thinking
The End of Philosophy
Hegel's Concept of Erperience
Identity and Difference
Nietzsche: Volume 1, The Will to Power as Art
Nietzsche: Volume 11, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same
Nietzsche: Volume IV, Nihilism
On the Way to Language
On Time and Being
Poetry, Language, Thought
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays
What Is Called Thinking?
Early Greek Thinking

Martin Heidegger

Translated by
David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzl

..
HarperSanF rancisco
A Division of HarperCollinsPublishers
 CONTENTS
\1''
9412964 B
~ 18 ff
-y. H3 Translators' Preface 1
..0
Introduction by Davkl FarreU KreU 3
"Ocr Spruck des Anaximander" ("The Anax,ima* Fragment") is from Hol~wege, copyright
1950 by Viuorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am M~ edition, 1972). "Logos," " Moira," 1. The Anaximander Fragment .. . . . ... . . .. .. . .... .. . 13
and "Aiethcia," are from lbrlriige und Ausjsiil,ee, copyright 1954 by Verlag Gunther Neske,
Pfullingen (3rd edition, 1967).
2. Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50) . .. . .. . . . . 59 "'fi"l
EARLY GREEK THINKING. Copyright @ 1975, 1984 in the English translation by Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part 3. Moira (Parmenides Vlll, 34-41) ... . .... . . .. . . ... . .. . 79
of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical anicles and reviews. For informa- 4. Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16) . . . ... . ... . . . . . . 102
tion address HarperCollins Publishers. 10 East 53rd Street. New York , NY 10022.

Glossary 125

FIRST HARPER & ROW PAPE RBACK EDITION PUBLISH ED IN 1984

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889- 1976.
Early Greek thinking.
English translations of 4 essays. The Anaximander fragment is the lina.l essay of Holzwcge;
Logos, Moira, and Aletheia make up the third pan of his Vortrage und Aufsiitze.
Includes bibliographical references.
Contents: The Anaximander fragment- Logos (Heraclitus, fragment B 50)-Moira
(Parmenides V III, 34-41 ) -Aietheia (Heraclitus, fragment B 16)
2. Philosophy, Ancient- Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. Tille.
BI 88.H44 1984 182 84-48220
ISBN 0-06-063842-7

93 94 95 CW I 12 II 10 9
Early Greek Thinking
 TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

This book contains English translations of four essays written by

Martin Heidegger between 1943 and 1954 on the matter ofearly Greek
thinking. ''The Anaximander Fragment" is the final essay ofHolzwege,
fourth edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1963), pp.
296-343. "Logos," "Moira," and "Aletheia" make up the third part of
Vortrage und Aufsatze, third edition (PCullingen: Gunther Neske,
1967), pp. 3-78. The German editions offer the following information:
Der Spruch des Anarimander. This piece is taken from a treatise composed in
1946. For criticism of Anaximander's text see also Friedrich Dirlmeier, "Der
Satz des Anaximander v. Milet," Rheinische' Museum fu'r Philologie, Vol. 87
(1938), 376-82. I agree with the delimitation of the text, if not the reasons given
for it.
Logo1. A contribution to the Festschrift fur Hans Jantzen, edited by Kurt
Bauch {Berlin, 1951), pp. 7 If.; presented as a lecture to the Bremen Club on
May 4, 1951; fully discussed in an unpublished lecture course in the summer
semester of 1944 entitled "Logic."
Moira. An undelivered portion of the lecture course published as Wa~ heisst
Den ken? (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), with reference to pp. 146 If.
[Cf. What Is Called Thinking?, translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn
Gray (New York: Harper&: Row, 1968), pp. 240-44.)
Aletheia. A contribution to the Festschrift in honor of the 350th anniversary
celebration of the Humanistic Gymnasium in Constance; first delivered in an
unpublished lecture course on Heraclitus in the summer semester of 1943.
A glossary at the end of the book lists our attempts to translate the
most difficult (usually the most important) terms. While we have
checked one another's work, David Krell is responsible for the transla-
tions of the first two articles, Frank Capuzzi for the last two. Dr. Krell
is responsible for the footnotes.
We would like to thank John Sallis and Reiner Schiirmann of

1
 Heidegger, Anaksimandros fragmannda eviri sorunuyla megul olur. Herhangi
bir eviri yapmadan nce bir fragmann ne sylediini ne dndn bize tercme
EARLY CREEK THINKING etmeliyiz; ilk olarak onun kendi yabanc kysna varmalyz,
Ogygia kysndaki Hermes gibi , kendi dilimizin alanna
Duquesne University, Bruce Foltz, Annabel Learned, Sherry Gray, fragmann baz uyan hatrlar ile dnmeden nce
D.S. Carne-Ross, and the series editors, Joan Stambaugh and J. Glenn dnmeye durmalyz[dnp durmalyz]
Gray, whose efforts have resulted in innumerable substantial im-
provement.s in the translations. Thanks also to M. Salome and Eunice
Farrell Krell for help in preparing the volume. We hope readers will INTRODUCTION
trouble themselves to forward any corrections, suggestions, and com-
ments to us, in care of the publisher. by David Farrell Krell

D . F. K
F. C. In "The Anaximander Fragment" Heidegger remains preoccupied
with the problem of translation. Before we do any actual translating, he
says, we must translate ourselves to what a fragment says, what it is
NOTE TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION thinking; we must first arrive on its foreign shores and, like Hermes on
Ogygia, stop to contemplate before we can return with some fitting
I have taken the opportunity afforded by this new edition to correct memento of it to the land of our own language.
the typographical errors that have come to my attention during the Without philological aids of all kinds Dr. Capuzzi and I could
intervening years-thanks to communications &om careful readers. In never have ventured our own translation. Even with those aids and
addition, a number of phrases have been altered in order to bring the with the unstinting help of learned friends there can be no guarantee
translation closer to the German. that we have made the trip as it ought to be made. Whether our
Frank Capuzzi and I are grateful for the kind reception this book translation thoughtfully brings to the English language what Heidegger
has enjoyed over the past ten years. We hope that the book will continue contemplates on archai<' Greek shores, whether it is hermeneutically
to be of use to the second group of people Nietzsche mentions in a note circumspect, whether it remains receptive of the matter for thinking:
from the years 1868-69: "A small community yet survives of persons these questions give us pause at the end of our labors which only
who, with an artist's contentment, take delight in the world of Creek critical and generous readers can answer. We have tried to be literal,
form s; and an even smaller community persists of persons who have not tried harder to be faithful. We can only gesture toward the glossary at
finished thinking about the thinkers of antiquity- thinkers who them- the end of the book, as though that were apologia enough.
selves have not yet finished thinking."
"The Anaximander Fragment" is the last essay of the book
D . F. K .
Heidegger calls Woodpaths (Holzwege: the French edition translates
Chemins qui menent nulle part). At the beginning of the book the
following lines appear:
"Wood" is an old name for forest. In the wood are paths wbkh mostly wind
along until they end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket.
They are called "wood paths."
Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest. Often it seems as though
one were like another. Yet it only seems so.
2 3
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Introduction

Woodcutters and forest-dwellers are 6uniliar with these paths. They lcnow Thoughtpaths, which are indeed past when one has passed by them-
what it means to be on a woodpath. although for one who has been going on them they persist in coming- wait.
They wait upon the times thinkers go along them. While usual technical-
By the time the reader has arrived at "The Anaximander Frag-
representational thinking, technical in the broadest sense, forever wills to go
ment" he ~.have gone the way of a reflection on art, "The Origin of forward and tears ahead of everything, paths which point out a way occasionally
the Art Work ; on modem science and the Cartesian philosophy, "The open upon a view of a solitary mountain shelter [ein einziges Ge-birg ).
Age of the World View"; on Hegel's Introduction to The Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, "Hegel's Concept of Experience"; on the essence of Without listing the titles of all the lectures and essays which lead
nihilism, "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead"; and on the role of to those on early Greek thinking, we might glance over our shoulders
poets in the epoch of nihilism, "Wozu Dichter?"l Only after a series of along the path already indicated. Heidegger speaks of technology and
reflectio~s on art, poetry, and modem and contemporary philosophy science, about will to power and the overcoming of metaphysics; he
doe~ Hetdegger broach the subject of this early fragment of thinking reflects on Nietzsche's Zarathustra; he asks "What is called thinking?"
ascnbed to Anaximander ofMiletus. Only after these turns in the path and ponders the meaning of building and cultivating, dwelling and
does he attempt a translation to early Greek thinking. thinking, of "things," and of Holderlin's line . . . poetically mao
"Logos," "Moira," and "Aletheia" constitute the third and final dwells... ." Only then do we hear of "Logos," " Moira," "Aletheia." A
part of Heidegger's Lectures and Essays (Vortriige und Aufsiitze: the proper introduction to these three lectures and to the Anaximander
French edition translates Essal8 et Conferences). The Foreword to all essay would be a reflection which had traveled all the earlier stretches
three parts reads: of the path and still could see the forest as well as the trees. It could do
this only by catching a glimpse of the clearing Heidegger calls cku
So long as it lies before us unread, this book is a collection oflectures and
essays. For the reader It might lead to a gathering which would no longer need Selbe, TO auTo, the Same.
to bother about the individual aspects of each piece. The reader might see
himself conducted along a path, preceded by an author who, since he Is an Four fragments of early Greek thinking dominate Heidegger's
auctor, will if all goes well dispense an auglre, an enrichment, and bring thoughts in the present collection. Each is a truncated monument'of
matters to a fruitful outcome. thinking. Like the torso of a river god or the temple. of Poseidon at
In the present case we would do better to toil as much as we ever have so Sounion, eaeh fragment conveys a sense of loss, of tragic withdrawal
that unrelenting efforts may prepare a region for what since ancient time; is and absence; yet each is a remnant of an exhilarating presence. These
to-be-thought but is still unthought. From the open space of such a region a four fragments are ascribed respectively to Anaximander (B 1), Hera-
thinking might try to address what is unthought. clitus (B 50), Parmenides (B VIII, 34-41), and again Heraclitus (B 16).
If he were such a toiler an author would have nothing to express and We can read English versions of the standard German translations by
nothing to communicate. He wouldn't wish to stimulate anyone because those Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz in a minute's time.
who have been stimulated are already sure of what they lcnow:
1. But where beings have their origin there also their passing away occurs,
. Ifeverything turns out for the best, an author on paths of thinking can only according to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to each other
potnt the way (wet&en] without being himself a wise man [ein Weiser] in the for their injustice, according to the assessment of time.
sense of ooc<;.
2. Listening not to me but to the Logos, it Is wise to say, in accordance with
1. The first and Jut appear in M. Heldegger, Poetry, Language Thought trans the Logos: all is one.
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). See also his H~ge(1 cor:ce,t
0
j
~ (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 3. Thinking and the thought "it is" are the same. For without the being in

4 5
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Introduction

relation to wltich it is uttered you cannot find thinking. For there neither is the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the mind of our soul to
~or shall be anything outside ofbeing, since Moira bound it to be whole and things which are by nature most manifest of all" (Met., 993b 9-11).
1m movable. For that reason all these will be mere names which mortal 181"d But who ridicules the bat for his blindness? To whom are the
down,
. convinced that they were true coming-to-be as well as passmgaway,
s npdypota most manifest? Genesis and collapse, necessity and time,
Bemg as well as non-being, and also change of place and variation ofshinin one and many, being and thinking: if these shine like a sun that never
co~~ g
relents, whose brilliance blinds, what are we to see in them?
4. How can one hide himself before that which never sets?' What do the fragments say? Of what do they speak? We have no
trouble with the first question until we take the second seriously. Only
Origin and decay, time and necessity, the word and the One
Being and thinking, a sun that never sets: it will take us more than ~
indirectly do the fragments indicate their subject matter, in the words
toi<; ou01, td ndvta, t!J.Ievm, to edv: things or beings, everything, to
minute to consider what these fragments say or even what they are
be, Being. These merest fragments of thought seem to talk about
talking about, and whether they have anything in common with one
everything, all being, whateverts. We moderns are convinced that this
another and with us. If we find these matters puzzling and impenetra-
ble we are certainly not the first. is nonsense: one cannot talk about everything in general without utter-
ing generalities or even "overgeneralizations." We are astounded by f 1
The men who raised these monuments were already "renowned
the Greeks' presumption. We refuse to talk that way. Being~crasez
and v~nerable" by Plato's time. When in Plato's Ep_htst (24ld 3,5) the
Eleatic Stranger questions the views of "father Parmenides" he takes
l'infamel The history of philosophy becomes a nightmare from which
we, Dedalus-like, are trying to awake. But indignant refusal and con-
care lest his probing transform him into a sort of parricide. If the
signment to oblivion are hardly signs of wakefulness. Besides, we can-
eccen~~ Heraclitus receives a more polemical treatment in Plato's
not entirely shake off the suspicion that this question of Being involves
~a.nds 1t ~s perhaps because the Ephesian's thought is as provocative as
1t 1s elusiVe. Whatever reservations Plato may have made with respect us rather intimately: we who raise the question are among the beings
to his predecessors' views he is always ready to concede that the matt which-for a time-are.
Two forms of the word Being are especially widespread in Greek
of their thinking ts difficult (cf. Sop h., 243a-b). But what is difficult f:
the master can hardly be easy for the pupil. philosophical literature, to ov and td ovto. Both are substantive-
participial forms whose articles suggest respectively the singular and
After surveying the opinions of early thinkers from the point of
plural neuter nominatives. Because of the nominative plural ending
~ew ~f ~is theory of causes, Aristotle (Met. U-a) suggests that
-to, the second, which has been farther declined than the first, seems
mvestigation of the truth is both easy and difficult. Every investigator
more "substantial." However, both devolve from eiJ.I{, elv01 (I am, to
manages to reveal a part of it, while none can grasp the whole. In the
be). s In the Ionian and Aeolian dialects, and therefore in epic usage, to
~arne place Aristotle mentions a second and more serious difficulty,
OV and td OVTO appear as TO eov and t'cdvta. Homer, Alcaeus, Sap-
the cause of which is not in the matter (npdyJ.Iootv) but in us; for as
pho, Heraclitus, and Parmenides are among the many poets and think-
2. See Dlels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der VMtolrraHker, 6th ed. (Berlin: Weid- ers of the eastern Hellenic territories where this form-which retains
mannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 19.51). I. 89, 161, 238, and 155. Cf. the translations b
C. S. Kirk and J. E. Ra~en, The Presocratlc PhlkJsophers: A Critical Hut0111 with : the verbal root epsilon-is employed. The Liddell and Scott Greek-
Se~ctlon ofTexts (Cambndge, Eng.: The University Press, 1966), pp. 117, 188, and 277 English lexicon translates Plato's usage of tO ov and td ovto
(K1rk and Raven do not print Heraclitus 8 16.) Cf. also the translation of Diels-Kranz b
Kathleen Freeman, Ancllla to the Pre-SocraHc Phil<uophers (Cambridge M . H ardy 3. See M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. trans. Ralph Manheim
Univ . "ty p 1966) ass.. arv (Carden City, N.Y.: Doubleday& Co., Anchor Books, 1961). chap. 2, "On the Grammar
th ~rsl k ress, PP 19, 28, 44, and 16. We have offered our own translations of
e ree te~ts. based on those of Die Is- Kranz, t.h roughout this volume. and Etymology of the Word 'Being.' "

6 7
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Introduction

respectively as "Being" and "the world of things," the German lexicons itself a present entity which is variously named if>ea, evt!pye1a, GChu
as Sein (Being) and du Seiende (beings). Of course, Plato's "world of punu, reason, wilL and will to power. Usually th.is figure is called the
things" is neither a world (Kdol.t<><;) nor is it of "things" (npdypata, supreme being, as if by way of consolation; often it is simply called
xprfJ.tata); rather, it is a domain of beings called d5l). These are op- "God." But not in the last case.
posed to non-being or that which is not, J.tr\ dv, and are taken to be that From Being and Time (1927) to Time and Being (1962) Heidegger
which truly is. Td dvta comes to mean "truth" and "reality." has sought to retrieve the meaning of to dv and to think the Same as
Herodotus already uses the word (in its Ionian form) in this way: he the nexus of temporality and Dasein, as the luminous clearing and
says KOtd TO eov, ndv TO eov, and TO eovta ~oyov ~eyelv, meaning concealing of Being, and as the event which engages man to the pres-
- "to tell the whole story in accordance with the way things truly are." encing of whatever is present. From first to last the nexus has been a
But the very first meaning for _!d dvta listed by the lexicon is: "the tragic one. In "The Anaximander Fragment" Heidegger says that the Trc c
things which actually [in the sense of the French actueUement] exist, essence of tragedy can be thought only in relation to the coming-to- ,__;
the present, as opposed to the past and the future." Being is what is (at) presence of beings, since presencfng implies approach and withdrawal,
present. In English, "present" can mean what now is, as opposed to emergence and evanescence, rise and fall. Mortals share in the tragic
what was before or later will be; or it can mean what is here, as opposed essence in a peculiar way. At the end of "M-2!!:.&," ~eath is called thn
to what is somewhere else, hence absent. German says die Gegenwart uttermost possibility of mortal Dasein and the innermost possibility
for the first, die Anwesenheit for the second. The Greek words for which gathers and secures all disclosure of Being. One of the central
Being suggest at once presence in time and place. What is most issues of "Logos" becomes the need for mortals to become fit for their
I thought-provoking for Heidegger is the coming to presence ofwhatever allotment (Moipa) and not to mistake their participation in the .Aoy<><;
presents itself, the Being of beings, the eov of eovta. as some sort of conquest of mortality. For that would be hubris--more
"The Anaximander Fragment" designates Being as presencing and destructive than a holocaust, and sooner to be extinguished. '
introduces the themes which dominate Heidegger's study of the To recapture the tragic essence of early Greek thinJcing is an un-
Creeks: Aoy<><;, the unique gathering of beings which language is; dertaking in which Heidegger joins Nietzsche. Nietzsche's description
Moipa, the fateful apportionment of Being in which the ontological of the "philosopher of tragic insight," the thinker he locates before
difference-the difference between present beings and their Plato, perhaps near the Sgure of Heraclitus, might suit Heidegger
presencing-is obliterated for Western thinking; ~~rf9ela , the uncon- himself. t d \ d.~
l cealment of beings and concealment of Being. The temporary abate- The philosopher of tragic Insight [.Erkenntnta]: He restrains the uncontrolled
ment of the waters of Lethe, the history of Being's fate or destiny ( du drive toward knowledge, but not through a new metaphysics. He does not set
Geschick des Seins), and the decisive role language plays in both, up a new faith. He feels the vanishing of the metaphysical ground u a tragic
indicate what is singular about early Greek thinking, that is, the way in event and cannot find a satisfying compensation for it in the motley spiralling of
which beings manifest themselves as being present. The Being of be- the sciences.. . .
ings is therefore taken for granted as the presencing of what presents
Nietzsche calls the disappearance of ontolqgical ground "the death of
itself. It is also decisive that the Greeks never did or could think
through the meaning of presencing and establish it in and for the
Cod" and calls for the liberation of td dvta from the burden imposed
on them by the shade of the dead God-the traditional ~oy<><; ofWest-
history of thought. By the time a philosophical literature develops, the
4. Cited trom Nietzscltes NachltJu by Marianne Cowan In her Introduction to F.
meaning ofiov has receded to the threshold ofoblivion. Soon it crosses
Nie tzsche, Phllcsophv In the Tragic Ag ofth. Cr11b, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago:
that threshold{Being is reduced to one being among others, becomes Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 16.

8 9
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Introduction

fern metaphysics and morals. "The world of things" must once again be philosophy is the expanding planetary dominion of technology. Given
thought in terms of Aion, the child at play. But the experience of Aion, such a tum of affairs-and who could have predicted the way the
"this transfOrmation of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos," is an history of metaphysics has turned out?-we come to face the matters
exercise in "tragic wisdom": Nietzsche utters his truth and goes down raised in the fragments: rise and fall, time and its uses, language and
with it, since the death of God means the failure of dogmatic ).dy<><; and the One, thinking and Being, illumination and concealment.
the death of man. 1
Nietzsche closes the ring of metaphysical enquiry into TO <Sv and At the end to arrive at early Greek thinking: there is something
brings metaphysics to its end, the exhaustion of its final possibility, by distressing-even violent-in such a turnabout. Certainly it would be
turning back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy. Whether or not naive to regard the present book as an introductory volume on early
Nietzsche's turning remains determined by Plat~r by one interpre- Greek philosophy. Although Heidegger takes each word of the frag-
tation of Plato, namely Platonism-it is in Heidegger' s view historic ments seriously-rather because he does so-his thinking plies a
and fateful, for it marks the end of an epoch of Being. e In his dangerous, uncharted course which we are at pains to follow. The
Introduction to Metaphyric.t (p. 30), focusing on the question of the violence of interpretation is unavoidable; no footnote can ameliorate it.
meaning of TO <Sv, Heidegger describes his own task as one of"bringing But it is the violence inherent in any attempt to cross over to that
Nietzsche's accomplishment to a full unfolding." That means following foreign shore, the violence by which we overcome inertia and translate
Nietzsche's tum toward early Greek thinking in such a way as to bring ourselves to the matter of early Greek thinking. If it is violent to insist
- the possibilities concealed in iov to a radical questioning. that this matter casts significant light on contemporary problems, from
Thus the turning of Heidegger's own thought must be seen, not as the history of metaphysics and nihilism to the essence of technology,
some sort of development or shift in point of view, but as that moment then Heidegger is surely violent. He demands that the fragments be
in the eschatology of Being when the rpetaphysical sense of Being rescued from the Museum for Historic Oddities and restored to their
reaches its consummation and goes under. In the turning of its outer- proper milieu: thinking. He insists that the fragments occupy contem-
most gyre, thinking catches sight of remnants of thought which lie porary man's contemporary reflection. Early Creek Thinking is not an
concealed in the beginning of the history of Being's destiny. Today idyll for weary men who would, like Hamlet's crab, go backward.
these possibilities appear as fragments of early Greek thinking. They The path which leads us forward to the realm of early Greek-
have not yet gone down; nor have they yet been heard. 7 We cannot thinking is celebrated in a fragment of a hymn by Friedrich Holderlin
hide ourselves from the matter contained in these fragments, since called "Greece." By way of introduction we offer several lines, some
what they say or do not say to Plato and Aristotle, and through them to from its beginning, some from its never-completed end.
the Schoolmen and to all modem science and philosophy, shapes our
thoughts about Being and man. These in tum determine the character
of our world. Heidegger suggests that the achevement of Occidental
5. F. Nietzsche, Werle, 3 vols., ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich: C. Hanser Verlag, C riechen land
1954), m, 1,111; Ill, 376. Cf. his PhJlosoplafl in tM Tragic Age. pp. 61-63. See also M.
(DriHe Fassung)
Heldegger, Nietuclae, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: C. Neske Verlag. 1961), I, 314, 333-34; Eugen
Fink, Spiel aU Welt'lfl'lbol (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960); and David KreU, "Towards
an Ontology of Play," Research In PMnomenologv. II, 63-93, esp. 67 If. 0 ihr Stimmen des Ceschicks. ihr Wege des Wanderers!
6. Heidegger, NletucM, I, 464 If:
7. See M. Heldegger, "Hegel und die Criechen," Wegmarken (Frankfurt/Main: V. ... Viel sind Erinnerungen ...
~OStermann Verlag. 1967) p . 272. Siiss ists . . . unter hoben Schatten von Bi:iumen

10 11
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

Und Hiigeln zu wohnen, sonnig, wo der Weg 1st

GepOastert zur ICirche. Relsenden aber, wem,
Aus LebensJiebe, messend lmmerhin,
Die Fiisse gehorchen, bliihn
Schoner die Wege, wo das Land 1 ONE

The Anaximander Fragment

uze

It is considered the oldest fragment of Western thinking. Anaxi-

mander reportedly lived on the island of Samos from the end of the
seventh century to the middle of the sixth.
According to the generally accepted text the fragment reads:
t!~ wv ~ r1 yeveo~ t!on toi~ o&n Kaln\v cp9opdv ei~ tauta yfveoOCll Katd to
xpewv 61&Svru ydp autd 6{KilV Kal d01v d.X;\,rf;\.01~ tJt~ d61Kfa~ KOtd n\v tOU
xpdvou td~1v.
Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away aocording to
necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, aocord-
ing to the ordinance of time.

Thus translates the young Nietzsche in a treatise completed in

1873 entitled Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. The treatise
was published posthumously in 1900, thirty years after its composition.
It is based on a lecture course Nietzsche offered several times in the
early 1870's at Basel under the title, ''The Pre platonic Philosophers,
with Interpretation of Selected Fragments."
8. HOldtrlln W.,-ke und BrWfe (Franlcfurt/Maln: Inset Verlag. 1969) I, 239-40. Unes In the same year, 1903, that Nietzsche's essay on the Preplatonic
1, 9, and 46-31 are cited here. philosophers first became known, Hermann Diels' Fragments of the
Creece Presocratics appeared. It contained texts critically selected according
(third draft)
0 voices of destiny sent, you wanderer's ways! to the methods of modern classical philology, along with a translation.
. . . Many ere the memories . . . The work is dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey. Diels translates the Anaxi-
It Is sweet . . . to dwell under high shadows
Of treea and hills, sunny, where the path II mander fragment in the following words:
Paved to church. But to travelers,
To hlm whose feet, &om love of Ule, But where things have their origin, there too their passing away oocun accord-
Measuring always ahead, obey him, Ing to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their
More beautifully bloom those paths where the land recklessness, according to firmly established time.
12 13
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anarimander Fragment

The translations by Niet.zsche and Diels arise from different inten- Anaximander fragment. Furthermore, Hegel too shares the predomin-
tions and procedures. Nevertheless they are scarcely distinguishable. ant conviction concerning the classic character of Platonic and Aris-
In many ways Diels' translation is more literal. But when a translation totelian philosophy. He provides the basis for the classi8cation of the
is only literal it is not necessarily faithful. It is faithful only when its early thinkers as Preplatonic and Presocratic precisely by grasping
terms are words which speak from the language of the matter itself. them as Pre-Aristotelians.
More important than the general agreement of the two transla- In his lectures on the history of Greek philosophy, at the point
tions is the conception of Anaximander which underlies both. where he indicates the sources for our knowledge of this primeval
Nietzsche locates him among the Preplatonic philosophers, Diels epoch of philosophy, Hegel says the following:
among the Presocratics. The two designations are alike. The unex- Aristotle is the richest so~. He studied the older philosophers expressly and _\
pressed standard for considering and judging the early thinkers is the with attention to fundamentals. Especially at the beginning of the Metaphysics l ~U
philosophy of Plato and Arist~ tle. These are taken as the Greek (though in many other places besides) he spoke as a historian about the entire
philosophers who set the standard both before and after themselves. group of them. He is as philosophical as he is l~d; we can depend on him.
Traversing Christian theology, this view becomes firmly entrenched as For Greek philosophy we can do nothing better than take up the first book of
a universal conviction, one which to this day has not been shaken. In his Metaphysics. (Works, XIII, 189)
the meantime, even when philological and historical research treat Wha; Hegel recommends here to his listeners in the 8rst decades of
philosophers before Plato and Aristotle in greater detail, Platonic and the nineteenth century had already been followed by Theophrastus,
Aristotelian representations and concepts, in modern transformations, Aristotle's contemporary, his student, and the 8rst successor to the
still guide the interpretation. That is also the case when attempts are leadership of the Peripatetics. Theophrastus died about 286 B.C. He
made to locate what is archaic in early thinking by finding parallels in composed a text with the title 41uouc:olv 60f;a1, "the opinions of those
classical archaeology and literature. Classic and classicist representa- who speak of q)\Joe1 dv~a. " Aristotle also calls them the cpuo1oXdyo1,
tions prevail. We expatiate on archaic logic, not realizing that logic meaning the early thinkers who ponder the things of nature. 41uou;
occurs for the 8rst time in the curriculum of the Platonic and Aris- means sky and earth, plants and animals, and also in a certain way men.
totelian schools. The word designates a special region of beings which, in both Aristotle
Simply ignoring these later notions will not help in the course of and the Platonic school, are separated from riSo<: and Xoyoc;. For them
translating from one language to another, if we do not first of all see cpuo1~ no longer has the broad sense of the totality of being. At the
how it stands with the matter to be translated. But the matter here is a outset of Aristotle's thematic observations on Physics, that is, on the
matter for thinking. Granted our concern for philologically enlightened ontology of the cpuoe1 dvta, the kind of being called cpuoe1 <Svta is
language, we must in translating 8rst of all think about the matter contrasted with that of rexvn dvta. 41Uoe d~a is that which produces
~ involved. Therefore only thinkers can help us in our attempt to trans- itself by arising out of itself; rexvn dvta is produced by human plan-
late the fragment of this early thinker. When we cast about for such ning and production.
help we surely seek in vain. When Hegel says of Aristotle that he is "as philosophical as he is
In his own way the young Nietzsche does establish a vibrant rap- learned," this actually means that Aristotle regards the early thin.kers
port with the personalities of the Preplatonic philosophers; but his in the historical perspective, and according to the standard, of his own
interpretations of the texts are commonplace, if not entirely superficial, Phyafca. For us that means: Hegel understands the Preplatonic and
throughout. Hegel is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully Presocratic philosophers as Pre-Aiistotelians. After Hegel a twofold
experienced the history of thought; yet he says nothing about the opinion concerning philosophy before Plato and Aristotle ensconces

14 15
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaxlmander. Fragment

itself as the general view: (I) the early thinkers, in search of the first Do we stand in the very twilight of the most monstrous transfor-
beginnings ofbeing, for the most part took nature as the object of their mation our plane~ has ever undergone, the twilight of that epoch in
representations; (2) their utterances on nature are inadequate approx- which earth itself hangs suspended? Do we confront the evening of a
imations compared to the knowledge of nature which in the meantime night which heralds another dawn? Are we to strike off on a journey to
had blossomed in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, the Stoa, and this historic region of earth's evening? Is the land of evening* only now
the schools of medicine. emerging? Will this land of evening overwhelm Occident and Orient
The ~OIKolv ~a1 of Theophrastus became the chief source for alike, transcending whatever is merely European to become the loca-
manuals of the history of philosophy in Hellenistic times. These manu- tion of a new, more primordially fated history? Are we men of today
als prescribed the interpretation of the original writings of the early already "Western" in a sense that first crystallizes in the course of our
thinkers which may have survived to that time,' and founded the sub- passage into the world's night? What can all merely historiologi~
sequent doxographical tradition in philosophy. Not only the content philosophies of history tell us about our history if they o~ly dazzle us
but also the style ofthis tradition made its mark on the relation oflater with surveys ofits sedimented stuff; if they explain history without ever
thinkers-even beyond Hegel-to the history of thought. thinking out, from the essence of history, the fundamentals of their way
About 530 A.D. the Neoplatonist Simplicius wrote an extensive of explaining events, and the essence of history, in tum, from Being
commentary on Aristotle's Phyaic8. In it he reproduced the Anaximan- itself? Are we the latecomers we are? But are we also at the same time
der fragment, thus preserving it for the Western world. He copied the precursors of the dawn ofan altogether different age, which has already
fragment from Tbeophrastus ~uoiKWV ~a1 . From the time Anaxi- left our contemporary historiological representations of history behind?
mander pronounced his saying-we do not know where or when or to NietzschP,, from whose philosophy (all too coarsely understood)
whom-to the moment Simplicius jotted it down in his commentary Spengler predicted the decline of theWest-in the sense of the West-
more than a millennium elapsed. Between the time of Simplicius' em historical world-writes in "The Wanderer and His Shadow"
jotting and the present moment lies another millennium-and-a-half. (1880}, "A .higher situation for mankind is possible, in which the
Can the Anaximander fragment. from a historical and chronologi- Europe of nations will be obscured and forgotten, but in which Europe
cal distance of two thousand five hundred years, still say something to will live on in thirty very ancient but never antiquated books"
us? By what authority should it sPeak? Only because it is the oldest? In (Aphorism no. 125).
themselves the ancient and antiquarian have no weight. Besides, al- All historiography predicts what is to come from images of the past
though the fragment is the oldest vouchsafed to us by our tradition we determined by the present. It systematically destroys the future and
do not know whether it is the earliest fragment of its kind in Western our historic relation to the advent ofdestiny. Historicism has today not
thinking. We may presume so, provided we first of all think the es- only not been overcome, but is only now entering the stage of its
sence of the West in terms of what the early saying says. expansion and entrenchment. The technical organization of communi-
But what entitles antiquity to address us, presumably the latest cations throughout the world by radio and by a press already limping
latecomers with respect to philosophy? Are we latecomers in a history after it is the genuine form of historicism's dominion.
now racing towards its end, an end which in its increasingly sterile Can we nevertheless portray and represent the dawn of an age in
order of uniformity brings everything to an end? Or does there lie ways different from those ofhistoriography? Perhaps the discipline of
f concealed in the historical and chronological remoteness of the frag-
ment the historic proximity of something unsaid, something that will LAnd de Aben&, Abtnd-land. In German Abendlandmeans Occident. or "the
speak out in times to come? West," literally Mthe evening-land."-TR.

16 17
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ana.timander Fragment

history is still for us an indispensable tool for making the historical what is said in the saying, so that it might rescue the translation from
contemporary. That does not in any way meat.t however that historiog- arbitrariness?
raphy, taken by itself, enables us to form within our history a truly We are bound to the language of the saying. We are bound to our
adequate, far-reaching relation to history. mother tongue. !!!2oth cases we are essentially bound to language and
The antiquity pervading the Anaximander fragment belongs to the to the experience of its essence. This bond is broader and stronger, but
dawn of early times in the land of evening. But what if that which is far less apparent, than the standards of all philological and historical
early outdistanced everything late; if the very earliest far surpassed the facts-which can only borrow their factuality from it. So long as we do
very latest? What once occurred in the dawn of our destiny would then not experience this binding, every translation of the fragment must
come, as whaJ once occurred, at the last (eoxaTOv), that is, at the seem wholly arbitrary. Yet even when we are bound to what is said in
departure of ~e long-hidden destiny of Being. The Being of beings is the saying, not only the translation but also the binding retain the
gathered (.Aev4o601, .Aoy<M;) in the ultimacy of its destiny. The essence appearance of violence, as though what is to be heard and said here
of Being hithe~o disappears, its truth still veiled. The history of Being necessarily suffers violence.
is gathered in this departure. The gathering in this departure, as the Only in thoughtful dialogue with what it says can thisfragment of
gathering (.A~<M;) at the outermost point (eoxaTOv) of its essence thinking be translated. However, thinking is poetizing, and indeed
hitherto, is the eschatology of Being. As something fateful, Being itself more than one kind of poetizing, more than poetry and song. Thinking
is inherently eschatological. of Being is the original way of poetizing. Language first comes to
However, in the phrase "eschatology of Being" we do not under- language, i.e. into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the
stand the term "eschatology" as the name of a theological or truth of Being dictates; it is the original dlctare. Thinking is primordial ~
philosophical discipline. We think of the eschatology of Being in a way poetry, prior to all poesy, but also prior to the poetics of art, since art u.r
corresponding to the way the phenomenology ofspirit is to be thought, shapes its work within the realm of language. All poetizing, in this ~'
i.e. from within the history of Being. The phenomenology of spirit broader sense, and also in the narrower sense of the poetic, is in its
itself constitutes a phase in the eschatology of Being, when Being ground a thinking. The poetizing essence of thinking preserves th..!'
gathers itself in the ultimacy of its essence, hitherto determined sway of the truth of Being. Because it poetizes as it thinks, the transla-
through metaphysics, as the absolute subjecticity [Subjektitiit] of the tion which wishes to let the oldest &agment of thinking itself speak
unconditioned will to will. necessarily appears violent. ___.
If we think within the eschatology of Being, then we must some- We shall try to translate the Anaximander fragment. This requires
day anticipate the former dawn in the dawn to come; today we must that we translate what is said in Creek into our German tongue. To that
learn to ponder this former dawn through what is imminent. end our thinking must first, before translating, be translated to what is
If only once we could hear the fragment it would no longer sound said in Creek. Thoughtful translation to what comes to speech in this
like an assertion historically long past. Nor would we be seduced by fragment is a leap over an abyss [Graben]. The abyss does not consist
vain hopes of calculating historically, i.e. philologically and psychologi- merely of the chronological or historical distance of two-and-a-half mil-
cally, what was at one time really present to that man called Anaximan- lennia. It is wider and deeper. It is hard to leap, mainly because we
der ofMiletus which may have served as the condition for his way of stand right on its edge. We are so near the abyss that we do not have an
representing the world. But presuming we do hear what his saying adequate runway for sqch a broad jump; we easily fa)) short-if indeed
says, what binds us in our attempt to translate it? How do we get to the lack of a sufficiently solid base allows any leap at all.

18 19
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ana.d mander Fragment

What comes to language in the fragment? The question is ambigu- ovta means manifold being in totality. The second clause begins:
ous and therefore imprecise. It might mean to inquire into the matter 6t60vat ydp autd. ... The auto refers to the tOi<: du01 of the first
the fragment says something about; it might also mean what the frag- clause.
ment says in itself. More literally translated the fragment says: The fragment speaks of manifold being in totality. But not only
things belong among beings. In the fullest sense, "things" are not only
But that from which things arise also gives rise to their passing away, according
things of nature. Man, things produced by man, and the situation or
to what is necessary; for things render justice and pay penalty to one another
for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.
environment effected and realized by the deeds and omissions of men,
also belong among beings, and so do daimonic and divine things. All
According to the usual view the statement speaks of the origin and these are not merely "also" in being; they are even more in being than
I decay of things. It specifies the nature of this process. Originating and mere things. The Aristotelian-Theophrastian presupposition that td
decaying refer bade to the place whence they come. Things flower, ovta must be <pooet ovta, natural things in the narrower sense, is
things fall. Thus they exhibit a kind of barter system in Nature's im- altogether groundless. It is superfluous for our translation. But even
mutable economy. The exchange of constructive and destructive mo- the translation of td ovta as "the things" does not suit the matter which
ments is, of course, only roughly grasped as a general characteristic of comes to language in the saying.
natural occurrences. The mutability of all things is therefore not yet If the presupposition that the fragment makes statements about
represented with precision in terms of motions defined by exact rela- things of nature fails, however, then so does all foundation for the
tions of mass. At this point an appropriate formula of the laws of motion assertion that what ought to be represented strictly in terms of the
is still lacking. The judgment of later, more progressive times is in- natural sciences is interpreted morally and juridically. With the col-
dulgent enough not to ridicule this primitive natural science. Indeed it lapse of the presupposition that the fragment strives after scientiflc
is found altogether fitting that incipient observation of nature should knowledge concerning the demarcated realm of nature, another as-
describe the processes of things in terms ofcommon occurrences in the sumption becomes superfluous, namely, that at this time ethical or
human sphere. This is why Anaximander's statement mentions justice juridical matters were interpreted in terms of the disciplines we call
and injustice, recompense and penalty, sin and retribution, with re- "ethics" and ..jurisprudence." Denial of such boundaries between dis--
spect to things. Moral and juridical notions get mixed in with his view ciplines does not mean to imply that in early times law and ethicality
of nature. In this regard Theophrastus already criticizes Anaximander were unknown. But if the way we normally think within a range of
for DOllltlKtam!pot<: 0\J'TWC: OVOJ.lOOlV autd Aeywv, that is, for employing disciplines (such as physics, ethics, philosophy of law, biology,
rather poetic words for what he wants to say. Theophrastus means the psychology) has no place here-if boundaries between these subjects
words OiKJ'I, tl01<:, d6tKla, 6t60vat OiKJlv. . . . are lacking-then there is no possibility of trespass or of the unjustified
Before all else we should try to make out what the fragment speaks transfer of notions from one area to another. Yet where boundaries
of. Only then can we judge what it says concerning its subject matter. between disciplines do not appear, boundless indeterminacy and flux
Considered grammatically, the fragment consists of two clauses. do not necessarily prevail: on the contrary, an appropriate articulation
The first begins: il; wv M rl yeveolc: ~Ott toic: ouoL . . . The matter of a matter purely thought may well come to language when it has been
under discussion is dvta; translated literally, td dvta means "beings." freed from every oversimplification.
The neuter plural appears as td noAXd, "the many," in the sense of the The words OiKJ'I, d61Kla, and dote: have a broad significance which
manifold of being. But td dvta does not mean an arbitrary or boundless cannot be enclosed within the boundaHes of particular disciplines.
multiplicity; rather, it means td ndvta, the totality of being. Thus td "Broad" does not mean here extensive, in the sense of something

21
 EARLY GREEK THINKING TM Ana.ximander Fragment

Battened or thinned out, but rather far-reaching, rich, containing much completion of metaphysics the Being of beings is addressed in these
thought. For precisely that reason these words are employed: to bring words.
to language the manifold totality in its essential unity. For that to The ancient fragment of early Western thinking and the late frag-
happen, of course, thinking must apprehend the unified totality of the ment of recent Western thinking bring the Same to language, but what
manifold, with its peculiar characteristics, purely in its own terms. they say is not identical. However, where we can speak of the Same in
This way of letting manifold being in its unity come into essential terms of things which are. not identical, the fundamental condition of a
view is anything but a kind of primitive and anthropomorphic rep- thoughtful dialogue between re-cent and early times is automati y
resentation. fulfilled.
In order to translate at all what comes to language in the fragment, Or does it only seem so? Does there lie behind this "seeming" a
we must, before we do any actual translating, consciously cast aside all gap between the language of our thinking and the language of Greek
inadequate presuppositions. For example, that the fragment pertains philosophy? Whatever the case, if we take Td dvTa to mean "beings"
to the philosophy of nature-in such a way that inappropriate and elvat as nothing else than "to be," we cross every gap; granting the
moralisms and legalisms are enmeshed in it; or that highly specialized differences between these epochs, we are together with the early
ideas relevant to particular regions of nature, ethics, or law play a role thinkers in the realm of the Same. This Same secures our translation of
in it; or finally, that a primitive outlook still prevails which examines Td dvTa and elvat by "beings" and "to be." Must we place in evidence
the world uncritically, interprets it anthropol!lorphically, and therefore extensive texts of Greek philosophy in order to demonstrate the unim-
resorts to poetic expressions. peachable correctness of this translation? AU interpretations of Greek
However, even to cast aside all presuppositions whenever we find philosophy themselves already rest on this translation. Every lexicon
them inadequate is insufficient so long as we fail to gain access to what provides the most copious information concerning these words, elvw
comes to language in the fragment. Dialogue with early Greek thinking meaning "to be," ionv "is," dv "being," and Td dVTa "beings."
will be fruitful only when such listening occurs. It is proper to dialogue So it is in fact. We do not mean to express doubts about it. We do
that its conversation speak of the same thing; indeed, that it speak out not ask whether dv is correctly translated as "being" and elvw as "to
of participation in the Same. According to its wording, the fragment be"; we ask only whether in this correct translati9n we also think
speaks of dvta, expressing what they involve and how it is with them. correctly. We ask only whether in this most common of all translations
Beings are spoken of in such.._~ way that their Being is expressed. Being anything at all is thought.
comes to language as the Being of beings. Let us see. Let us examine ourselves and others. It becomes
At the summit of the completion of Western philosophy these manifest that in this correct translation everything is embroiled in
words are pronounced: "To atamp Becoming with the character of equivocal and imprecise significations. It becomes clear that the always
Being-that is the highest will to power." Thus writes Nietzsche in a hasty approximations of usual translations are never seen as insuffi-
note entitled, "Recapitulation." According to the character of the cient; nor are scholarly research and writing ever disturbed by them.
manuscript's handwriting we must locate it in the year 1885, about the Perhaps great effort is expended in order to bring out what the Greeks
time when Nietzsche, having completed Zarathustra, was planning his truly represented to themselves in words like 9e0<:, wuxrf, ~wrf, nix11.
systematic metaphysical magnum opus. The "Being" Nietzsche thinks xdpt~. Adyoc::. <pUOl~. or words like ioea, TtXVIl, and evepyela. But we
here is "the eternal recun:ence-of the same." It is the way of con- do not realize that these and similar labors get nowhere and come to
tinuance through which will to power wills itselfand guarantees its own nothing so long as they do not satisfactorily clarify that realm of all
presencing as the Being of Becoming. At the outermost point of the realms-so long as they do not cast sufficient light on cSv and elva1 in

22 23
/
EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ananmander Fragment

their Greek essence. But scarcely have we named elvat as a realm than thought. But within them, hovering over them, Being-talk has drifted
"realm" is represented by the logical apparatus ofyevoc; and KOlvov, and far and wide, all at sea. Buoyed by the formal correctness of the transla-
understood in the sense of the universal and all-encompassing. This tion of dv and elva1 by "being" and "to be," drifting right on by the
grasping together (concipere) in the manner ofrepresentational con- confused state of affairs, Being-talk deceives. But not only do we con-
cepts is immediately taken to be the only possible way to understand temporary men err in this confusion; all the notions and representa-
Being. It is still taken to be applicable when one hastens into the tions we have inherited from Greek philosophy remain in the same
dialectic ofconcepts or flees to a nonconceptual realm of mystic signs. It confusion, exiled -for millennia. Neither pure neglect on the part of
is wholly forgotten that the potency ofthe concept and the interpretation philology nor inadequate historical research has occasioned this confu-
of thinking as conceiving rest solely on the unthought, because un~x sion. It arises from the abyss [Abgrund] of that relation by which Being
perienced, essence of dv and elva1. has appropriated the essence of Western man. We cannot therefore
Most often we thoughtlessly catalogue the words dv and elva1 dissolve the confusion by elaborating through some definition a more
under what we mean by the corresponding (but unthought) words of precise meaning for the words dv and dvru, "being" and "to be. On
our own mother tongue, "being" and ..to be." More precisely, we the contrary, the attempt to heed this confusion steadfastly, using its
never ascribe a significance to the Greek words at all: we immediately tenacious power to effect some resolution, may well bring about a
adopt them from our stock of common knowledge, which has already situation which releases a different destiny of Being. The preparation of
endowed them with the common intelligibility of its own language. We such an occasion is already sufficient reason to sef in motion, within the
support the Greek words with nothing except the complacent negli- abiding confusion, a conversation with early thinking.
gence of hasty opinion. This may do in a pinch, when for example we If we so stubbornly insist on thinking Greek thought in Greek
are reading t!1va1 and t!onv in Thucydides' historical works, or rfv and fashion it is by no means because we intend to sketch a historical
t!OTal in Sophocles. portrait of Greek antiquity, as one of the past great ages of man, which
But what if td dvta, dv, and elva1 come to speak in language as would be in-many respects more accurate. We search for what is Greek
the fundamental words of thinking, and not simply a particular kind of neither for the sake of the Greeks themselves nor for the advancement
thinking but rather as the key words for all Western thinking? Then an of scholarship. Nor do we desire a more meaningful conversation sim-
examination of the language employed in the translation would reveal ply for its own sake. Rather, our sole aim is to reach what wants to
the following state of affairs: come to language in such a conversation, provided it come of its own
accord. And this is that Same w "ch taterlilly concernS1lle Greeks and
Neither is it clear and firmly established what we ou~selves are ourselves, albeit in different ways. It is that which brings the dawn of
thinking in the words "being" and "to be" in our own language; thinking into the fate of things Western, into the land of evening. Only
nor is it clear and firmly established whether anything we are as a result of thi fatefulness Geschick] do the Greeks become Greeks
liable to come up with suits what the Greeks were addressing in the in the historic [gesc ic tlich] sense.
words dv and elvat. In our manner of speaking, "Greek" does not designate a particu-
Neither is it at all clear and firmly established what dv and elvaa, lar people or nation, nor a cultural or anthropological group. What is
thought in Greek, say;
nor can we, granted this state of affairs, administer an examination ...
Greek is the dawn of that destiny in which Being illuminates itself in
-
beings and so propounds a certain essence of man; that essence unfoldS
which might determine whether and how far our thinking corresponds historically as something fateful, preserved in Being and dispensed by
to that of the Greeks. Being, without ever being separated from Being.
These simple relations remain thoroughly confused and un- Greek antiquity, Christendom, modern times, global affairs, and
24 25
 EARLl' GREEK THINKING The Ana..rimander Fragment

the West interpreted as the land of evening-we are thi~g all these epoche of Being belongs to Being itself; we are thinking it in terms of
on the basis of a fundamental characteristic of Being which is more the experience of the oblivion of Being.
concealed in Ati9CJ than it is revealed in' AArf9ela. Yet this concealing From the epoche of Being comes the epochal essence ofits destin-
of its essence and of its essential origin is characteristic of Being's ing, in which world history properly consists. When Being keeps to }
primordial self-illumination, so much so that thin.king simply does not itself in its destining, world suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass. ~
pursue it. The being itself does not step into this light of Being. The
unconcealment of beings, the brightness granted them, obscures the
light of Being.
Every epoch of world history is an epoch of errancy. The epochal
nature of Being belongs to the concealed temporal character of Being
and designates the essence of time as thought in Being. What is rep-
J
\

As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws. resented in this word "time" is only the vacuity of an illusory time
In this way, by illuminating them, Being sets beings adrift in derived from beings conceived as objects.
errancy. Beings come to pass in that errancy by which they circumvent For us, however, tl!e most readily experienced correspondence to
Being and establish the realm of error (in the sense of a prince's realm the epochal character of Being is the ecstatic character of Da-sein. The
or the realm of poetry). Error is the space in which history unfolds. In epochal essence of Being lays claim to tPe ecstatic nature of Da-sein.
error what happens in history bypasses what is like Being. Therefore, The ek-ristence of man sustains what is ecstatic and so preserves what is
whatever unfolds historically is necessarily misinterpreted. During the epochal in Being, to whose essence the Da, and thereby Da-sein,
course of this misinterpretation destiny awaits what will become of its belongs.
seed. It brings those whom it concerns to the possibilities of the fateful The beginning of the epoch of Being lies in that which we call
and fatal [Geschicklichen und Ungeschicklichen]. Man's destiny gropes "Greek," thought epochally. This beginning, also to be thought epoch-
toward its fate [Geschick versucht sich an Geschick]. Man's inability to ally, is the dawn of the destiny in Being from Being.

v
see himself corresponds to the self-concealing of the lighting of Being.
Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to
""
~ --
Little depends on what we represent and portray of the past; but
much depends on the way we are mindful of what is destined. Can we
-
destiny: there would be no history. Chronological distance and causal "ever be mindful without thinking? But if thinking does occur we aban-
sequence do indeed belong to the discipline of historiography, but are don all claims of shortsighted opinion and open ourselves to the claim
not themselves history. When we are historical we are neither a great of des~ Does this claim speak in the early saying of Anaximander?
nor a small distance from what is Greek. Rather, we are in errancy 'we are not sure whether its claim speaks to our very essence. It
toward il remains to ask whether in our relation to the truth of Being the glance
As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws. of Being, and this means lightning (Heraclitus, fr. 64), strikes; or
Being thereby holds to its truth and keeps to itself. This keeping to whether in our knowledge of the past only the faintest glimmers of a
itself is the way it reveals it.self early on. Its early sign is 'A-Arf9ela. As storm long flown cast a pale semblance of light.
it provides the unconcealment of beings it founds the concealment of Does the fragment speak to us of dvTO in theit' Being?. Do we
Being. Concealment remains characteristic of that denial by which it apprehend what it says, the dv01 of beings? Does a streak of light still
keeps to itself. pierce the misty confusion of errancy and tell us what dvto and dvo1
We may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its say in Greek? Only in the brilliance of this lightning streak can we
essence the enoxrf of Being. However, this word, borrowed from the translate ourselves to what is said in the fragment, so as to translate it in
Stoic philosophers, does not here have the Husserlian sense of object- thoughtful conversation. Perhaps the confusion surrounding the use of
ification or methodical exclusion by an act of thetic consciousness. The the words dvto and dvo1, "being" and "to be," comes less from the

26 27
 EARLY CREEK TIDNKINC TM Anaxlmander Fragment

fact that language cannot say everything adequately than because we tions with the text tells against this. [Only seldom does a Greek author
cannot think through the matter involved clearly enough. Lessing once immediately begin with a literal quotation.] Further it is safer not to
said, "Language can express everything we can clearly think. " So it ascribe the terms yeveou; and cp&pd in their technical Platonic sense
rests with us to be ready for the right opportunity, which will permit us to Anaximender [and it is not likely that Anaximander said anything
to think clearly the matter the fragment brings to language. about td dvTa]. "*
We are inclined to see the opportunity we are looking for in the On this basis Burnet argues that Anaximander's saying begins only
Anaximander fragment itself. In that case we still are not paying sufB- with the words Katd TO xpeuSv. What Burnet says in general about
cient heed to what the way of translating requires. Greek citations speaks for the exclusion of the words preceding these.
For before interpreting the fragment-and not with its help to On the other hand his reiD)U'ks, which rest on the terminological em-
begin with-it is essential that we translate ourselves to the source of ployment of the words yeveou; and cp&pd, cannot be accepted as they
what comes to language in it, which is to say, to Td dvTa. This word stand. It is correct to say that yevemc; and cp&pd become conceptual
indicates the source from which the fragment speaks, not merely that terms with Plato and Aristotle and their schools. But yt!vemc; and
which it expresses. That from which it speaks is already, before any cp&pd are old words which even Homer knows. Anaximander need not
expression, what is spoken by the Greek language in common everyday have employed them as conceptual terms. He cannot have applied
parlance as well as in its learned employ. We must therefore seek the them in this fashion, because conceptual language necessarily remains
opportunity which will let us cross over to that source Brst ofall outside foreign 'to him. For conceptual language is first possible on the basis of
the fragment itself; it must be an opportunity which will let us experi- the interpretation of Being as f6oo, and indeed from then on it is
ence what td dvta, thought in Greek, says. Furthermore, we must at unavoidable.
first remain outside the fragment because we have not yet delineated Nevertheless, the entire sentence preceding the atatd TO xpeuSv is
each of its terms; this delineation is ultimately (or, in terms of the much more Aristotelian in structure and tone than archaic. The Katd
matter itseU: in the first place) governed by the knowledge of what in n\v Tou xpdvou Tdl;tv at the end of the normally accepted text also
early times was thought or thinkable in such a choice of words, u betrays the same characteristic lateness. Whoever takes it upon himself
distinct from what the prevailing notions of recent times Bod in it. to strike out the part of the text which is dubious to Burnet ~nnot
The text cited and translated above from Simplicius' commentary maintain the usually accepted closing of the fragment either. Of
on the Physics is traditionally accepted as the Anaximander fragment. Anaximander's original words, only these would remain:
However, the commentary does not cite the fragment so clearly that Katd Td xpec.Jv 6t6dvru ydp QUTd 6flCI)V Kal tlOlV cfAArf).Otc; TJlC: d61Kfac:,
we can ascertain with certainty where Anaximander's saying begins and
... according to neces.sity; for they pay one another recompense and penalty
where it ends. Still, our contemporaries who are exceptionally knowl-
for their injustice.
edgeable in the Greek language accept the text of the fragment in the
form introduced at the outset of our inquiry. Heideggercites the German translation of Burnet's t.hird edition by Else Schenk!. Die
Anfange der pchlsckn Philo10phle (Berlin: Teubner, 1913), p. 43, n. 4. I have dted the
But even John Burnet, the distinguished scholar of Greek fourth English edition (London: Black, 1930), p. 52, n. 6, said to be ~a reprint of' the third
philosophy to whom we owe the Oxford edition of Plato, in his book edition" with "additional references and one correction." The first bracketed phrase does not
occur in the English but appears In SchenkTs translation; the second does occur In the
Early Creek Philosophy expressed doubts as to whether Simplicius' English but not in the German. Nevertheless, the first Is a natural expansion of Burnet's
citation begins where it is usually said to begin. In opposition to Diels, view; as for the second, one might expect that Heidegger's response to Burnet regarding Td
cfvTO would duplicate that respecting yeveou: and cp&pd: although not yet a technical term,
Burnet writes: "Diels (Vors. 2, 9) begins the actual quotation with the td cfvro Is an old word, known already by Homer In the li>nn t t!Ovto, as the Iliad pas~
words E!( wv 6~ ri yeveou;... . The Greek practice of blending quota- below (p. 33) attests.- TIL

28 29
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaximander Fragment

Now these are precisely the words in reference to which Theo- question, although nothing speaks against it. The o1.hd in the second
phrastus complains that Anaximander speaks in a rather poetic man- clause, because of the scope of what it says and also because of the
ner. Since thinking through this entire question, which came up often reference of this second clause back to the KOTd 1:0 xpewv, can desig-
in my lecture courses a few years ago, I am inclined to accept only nate nothing less than being-in-totality experienced in a l?reconceptual
these as the immediate, genuine words of Anaximander, with the pro- way, Td nof.f.ci, 1:d ncivYo, "beings." We are still calling Td ovYO
viso however that the preceding parts of the text are not simply set "beings" without ever having clarified what ov and elvo1 indicate when
aside, but rather are positively retained, on the basis of the strength thought in Greek. Yet we have in the meantime won a more open field
and eloquence of their thought, as secondary testimony concerning in which to pursue such clarification.
Anaximander's thinking. This demands that we understand precisely We began with the usually accepted text of the fragment. In a
these words yeveou; and cp9opd as they are thought in Greek, whether preliminary review of it we excluded the common presuppositions
they be preconceptual words or Platonic-Aristotelian conceptual which determine its interpretation. In so doing we discovered a clue in
terms. what comes to language in yeveot<; and q>&pd. The fragment speaks of
Accordingly, yeveot<; does not at all mean the genetic in the sense that which, as it approaches, arrives .in unconceaJmept, and which,
of the "developmental" as conceived in modern times; nor does q>&pd having arrived here, departs by withdrawing into the distance.
mean the counterphenomenon to development-some sort of regres- However, whatever has its essence in such arrival and oeparture
sion, shrinkage, or wasting away. Rather, yevem<; and q>&pd are to be we would like to call becoming and perishing, which is to say, tran-
thought from ql\Jot<;, and within it, as ways of luminous rising and siency rather than being; because we have for a long time been accus-
decline. Certainly we can translate yeveot<; as origination; but we must tomed to set Being opposite Becoming, as if Becoming were a kind of
think this originating as a movement which lets every emerging being nothingness and did not even belong to Being; and this because Being
abandon concealment and go forward into unconcealment. Certainly has for a long time been understood to be nothing else than sheer
we can translate q>9opd as passing away; but we must think this passing perdurance. Nevertheless, if Becoming is, then we must think Being
away as a going which in its turn abandons unconcealment, departing so essentially that it does not simply include Becoming in some vacu-
and withdrawing into concealment. ous conceptual manner, but rather in such a way that Being sustains
Presumably, Anaximander spoke of yivem<: and cp6opd. It re- and characterizes Becoming (yeveot<:q>6opci) in an essential, appro-
mains questionable whether this occurred in the form of the traditional priate manner.
statement, although such paradoxical turns of speech as yeveo1<; eonv In this regard we are not to discuss whether and with what right
{which is the way I should like to read it) and cp&pd yiveTal, we should represent Becoming as transiency. Rather,'we ~ust discuss
"coming-to-be is," and "passj!tg-away comes to be" still may speak in what sort of essence the Greeks think for Being when in the realm of
favor of an ancient language. reveOI<; is coming forward and arriving in the ov1:o they experience approach and withdrawal as the basic trait of
unconcealment. <Peopd means the departure and descent into con- advent.
cealment of what has arrived there out of unconcealment. The coming When the Greeks say 1:d ov1:o, what comes to the fore in their
forward into ... and the departure to . . . become present within un- language? Where is th~re, aside from the Anaximander fragment, a
concealment between what is concealed and what is unconcealed. guideline which would translate us there? Because the word in ques-
They initiate the arrival and departure of whatever has arrived. tion, with all its modifications, lonv, Ifv, lOTal, dvot, speaks every-
Anaximander must have spoken of what is designated in yevem<; where throughout the language-and even before thinking actually
and cp9opd: whether he actually mentioned Td ovTo remains an open chooses this as its fundamental word-it is necessary that we avail

30 31
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ana.ri~Mnder Fragment

ourselves of an opportunity which in terms of it.s subject matter, its cealed. What is here set forth, which at first may be taken for grammat-
time, and the realm to which it belongs, lies outside philosophy, and ical hair-splitting, is in truth the riddle of Being. The participle <Sv is
which from every point of view precedes the pronouncements of think- the word for what comes to appear in metaphy~ics as transcendental
ing. and transcendent Transcendence.
In Homer we perceive such an opportunity. Thanks to him we Archaic language, and thus Parmenides and Heraclitus as well,
possess a reference in which the word appears as something more than always employ eov and eovta.
a term in the lexicon. Rather, it is a reference which poetically brings But iov, "being," is not only the singular form of the participle
to language what <Svta names. Because all A~ts of the lexicographic eovta, "beings"; rather, it indicates what is singular as such, what is
sort presupposes the thought of the ).eyopevov, we will refrain from singular in its numerical unity and what is singularly and unifyingly one
the futile practice of heaping up references to serve as evidence; this before all number.
kind of annotation usually proves only that none of the references has We might assert in an exaggerated way, which nevertheless bears
been thought through. With the aid of this commonly adopted method on the truth, that the fate of the West bangs on the translation of the
one usually expects that by shoving together one unclarifled reference word tov, assuming that the translation consists in crossing over to the
with another every bit as unclear clarity will suddenly result. truth of what comes to language in iov.
The passage upon which we wish to comment is found at the What does Homer tell us about this word? We are familiar with
beginning of the first book of the Iliad, lines 68-72. It gives us the the situation of the Achaeans before Troy at the outset of the Iliad. For
chance to cross over to what the Creeks designate with the word <Svta, nine days the plague sent by Apollo has raged in the Greek camp. At an
provided we let ourselves be transported by the poet to the distant assembly of the warriors Achilles commands Kalchas the seer to inter-
shore of the matter spoken there. pret the wrath of the god.
For the following reference a preliminary observation concerning TOiOl 8 dviotTJ
the history of the language is needed. Our observations cannot claim to Ko?.xoc: 9 catopffii'J<: olwvono;\wv dx d'ptOT<><:
present this philological problem adequately, much less to solve it. In &; 1f611 Tel t MvTa Tel t COOOIJCVO npd T' MvTa
Plato and Aristotle we encounter the words <Sv and <Svta as conceptual KOl vrfcoo' JiyrfoaT' 'Axou.Ov'l;\tov efow
terms. The later terms "ontic" and "ontological" are formed from them. r\'v 6td IJOVTooUVllV, Trfv of nope ~i~ 'AnoAAWV'
However, <Sv and <Svta, considered linguistically, are presumably ... and among them stood up
somewhat truncated forms of the original words eov and i ovta. Only Kalchas, Thestor's son, far the best of the bird interpreters,
in the latter words is the sound preserved which relates them to f!onv who knew all that is, is to be, or once was,
and elvOL The epsilon in Mv and idvta is the epsilon in the root to of who guided into the land of Ilion the ships of the Achaeans
lonv, elt, esse, and "is." In contrast <Sv and <Svta appear as rootless through that seercraft of his own that Phoibos Apollo gave him.
participial endings, as though by themselves they expressly designated
Before be lets Kalchas speak. Homer designates him as the seer.
what we must think in those word-forms called by later grammarians
Whoever belongs in the realm of seers is such a one &; Dl>n ... "who
peTOxrf, participlum, i.e. those word-forms which participate in the
verbal and nominal senses of a word. knew ... "; n&n is the pluperfect of the perfect ol&ev, "he has seen."
Thus <Sv says "being" in the sense of to be a being; at the same
Homer, The Iliad, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago
time it names a being which is. In the duality of the participial signifi- Press, 1961), p. 61, with minor changes. Heidegger uses the German translation by
cance of <Sv the distinction between " to be" and "a being" lies con- Voss.-TR.

32 33
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaxlmander Fragment

Only when a man has seen does he truly see. To see is to have seen. and what is to come also become present, namely as outside the ex-
What is seen has arrived and remains for him in sight. A seer has always panse of unconcealment. What presents itself as non-present is what is
already seen. Having seen in advance he sees into the future. He sees absent As such it remains essentially related to what is presently
the future tense out of the perfect. When the poet speaks of the seer's present, inasmuch as it either comes forward into the expanse of un-
seeing as a having-seen, he must say what the seer has seen in the concealment or withdraws from it. Even what is absent is something
pluperfect tense, r\'l)I'), he had seen. What is it that the seer has seen in present, for as absent from the expanse, it presents itself in uncon-
advance? Obviously, only what becomes present in the lighting that cealment. What is past and what is to come are also eovra.
penetrates his sight. What is seen in such a seeing can only be what Consequently t!ov means becoming present in unconcealment
comes to presence in unconcealment. But what becomes present? The The conclusion of this commentary on eovra is that also in Greek
poet names something threefold; rd r't!ovTO, that which is in being, rd experience what comes to presence remains ambiguous, and indeed
i ioo6.,.eva, also that which will be, npc:S i eovTO, and also the being that necessarily so. On the one hand, rd eovra means what is presently
once was. present; on the other, it also means all that becomes present, whether
The first point we gather from this poetic phrase is that rd t!ovTO at the present time or not. However, we must never represent what is
is distinguished from rd eooc:S.,.eva and np<) edvTO. Thus rd eovra present in the broader sense as the "universal concept" of presence as
designates being in the sense of the present [Gegenwartigen] . When opposed to a particular case-the presently present-though this is
we moderns speak of "the present," we either mean what is what the usual conceptual mode of thought suggests. For in fact it is
"now"-which we represent as something within time, the "now" serv- precisely the presently present and the unconcealment that rules in it
ing as a phase in the stream of time-or we bring the "present" into that pervade the essence of what is absent, as that which is not pres-
relation with the "objective" [Gegenstandigen]. As something objec- ently present.
tive, an object is related to a representing subject However, if we The seer stands in sight of what is present, in its unconcealment,
employ "present" for the sake of a closer determination of eovra, t.hen which has at the same time cast light on the concealment of what is
we mu.st understand "the present" from the essence of iovra,and not absent as being absent. The seer sees inasmuch as he has seen every-
vice versa. Yet eovra is also what is past and what is to come. Each of thing as present; Koi, and only on that account, vrfeoo' ~yrfoar' , was he
these is a kind of present being, i.e. one not presently present. The able to lead the Achaeans' ships to Troy. He was able to do this through
Creeks also named more precisely what is presently present God-given pavrooUvi'). The seer, d ._.dvm:, is the ._.atvo.,.ev<><;, the
rd napeovra, napd meaning "alongside," in the sense ofcoming along- madman. But in what does the essence of madness consist? A madman
side in unconcealment. The gegen in gegenwartig [presently] does not is beside himself, outside himself: he is away. We ask: away? Where to
mean something over against a subject, but rather an open expanse and where from? Away from the sheer oppression of what lies before
[Gegend] of unconcealment, into which and within which whatever us, which is only presently present, away to what is absent; and at the
comes along lingers. Accordingly, as a characteristic of eovra, same time away to what is presently present insofar as this is always
"presently" means as much as "having arrived to linger awhile in the only something that arrives in the course of its coming and going. The
expanse ofunconcealment." Spoken first, and thus emphasized, eovra, seer is outside himself in the solitary region of the presencing of every-
which is expressly distinguished from npoeovra and eooc:S.,.eva, names thing that in some way becomes present. Therefore lie can find his way
for the Greeks what is present insofar as it has arrived in the designated back from the "away" of this region, and arrive at what has just pre-
sense, to linger within the expanse of unconcealment. Such a coming is sented itself, namely, the raging epidemic. The madness of the seer's
proper arrival, the presencing of what is properly present. What is past being away does not require that he rave, roll his eyes, and toss his

34 35
 The Anaxinumder Fragment
EARLY GREEK THINKING

Creeks experience beings as being present. whether at the ~resent

limbs; the simple tranquility of bodily composUre may accompany the
time or not. presencing in unconcealment. The word by ;;vhtch :;-e
madness of vision.
translate dv, "being," is now no longer obtuse; no longer are to be, as
All things present and absent are gathered and preserved in one the translation of elvot, and the Creek word itself hastily employe~
presencingfor the seer. The old German word war [was] means protec- ciphers for arbitrary and vague notions about some indeterminate uru-
tion. We still recognize this in wahrnehmen [to perceive], i.e. to take
versal.
into preservation; in gewahren and verwahren [to be aware of, to keep At the same time it becomes manifest that Being, as the presenc-
or preserve]. We must think of wahren as a securing which clears and ing of what is present. is already in itself truth, provided we think the
gathers. Presencing preserves [wahrt] in unconcealment what is pres- essence of truth as the gathering that clears and shelters; p~vided we
ent both at the present time and not at the present time. The seer dissociate ourselves from the modem prejudice of metaphystc.s-today
speaks from the preserve [Wahr] of what is present. He is the sooth- aocepted as something obvious-that truth is a property ofbetngs or of
sayer [Wahr-Sager]. Being. Being, saying the word thoughtfully now, is elvm as presenc-
Here we think of the preserve in the sense of that gathering which ing. In a hidden way it is a property of truth, but clearly not of truth
clears and shelters; it suggests itselfas a long-hidden fundamental trait of considered as a characteristic of human or divine cognition, and not as a
presencing, i.e. of Being. One day we shall learn to think our exhausted property in the sense of a quality. Furthermore, it has become clear
word for truth [Wahrheit] in terms of the preserve; to experience truth that Td iovTO ambiguously names what is presently present and also
as the preservation [Wahmts] of Being; and to understand that, as what is not presently present; the latter, understood with r~gard to the
presencing, Being belongs to this preservation. As protection of Being, former, means what is absent. But what is at the present time present
preservation belongs to the herdsman, who has so little to do with is not a slice of something sandwiched between two absences. If what is
bucolic idylls and Nature mysticism that he can be the herdsman of present stands in the forefront of vision, everything presences to-
Being only if he continues to hold the place of nothingness. Both are the gether: one brings the other with it, one lets the other go. ~at is
Same. Man 'can do both only within the openedness of Da-sein. presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as m an
The seer is the one who has already seen the totality of what is open expanse. Whatever lingers (or whiles) in the expanse proceeds to
present in its presencing. Said in Latin, vidit; in German, er steht im it from concealment and arrives in unconcealment. But what is present
Wissen [he stands in knowledge]. To have seen is the essence of know- is arriving or lingering insofar as it is also already departing fro~ un-
ing. In "to have seen" there is always something more at play than the concealment toward concealment. What is presently present lingers
completion of an optical process. In it the connection with what is awhile. It endures in approach and withdrawal. Lingering is the .transi-
present subsists behind every kind of sensuous or nonsensuous grasp- tion from coming to going: what is present is what in e~ch case linger~.
ing. On that account. "to have seen" is related to self-illuminating Lingering in transition, it lingers still in approach and lingers already .m
presencin~. Seeing is determined, not by the eye, but by the lighting departure. What is for the time being present. what presently ts,
of Being. Presence within the lighting articulates all the human senses. comes to presence out of absence. This must be said precisely of what-
The essence of seeing, as "to have seen," is to know. Knowledge em- ever is truly present, although our usual way of representing things
braces vision and remains indebted to presencing. Knowledge is re- would like to exclude from what is present all absence. .
membrance of Being. That is why Mvqpool5vq is mother of the muses. Td iovTO names the uniform manifold of whatever lingers awhtle.
Knowledge is not science in the modern sense. Knowledge is thought- Everything present in unconcealment in this way presents itself to all
ful maintenance of Being's preserve. others each after its own fashion.
Whither have Homer's words translated us? To iovTa. The F~ally, we gather something else from the passage in Homer: Td
37
36
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaximander Fragment

iovTa, so-called beings, does not mP.an exc1usively the things of na- by an abyss-from the actualitas of actw purus in medieval scholasti-
ture. In the present instance the poet applies iovTO to the Achaeans' cism.
encampment before Troy, the god's wrath, the plague's fury, funeral In any case, Parmenides' t!OTtv does not mean the "is" which is the
pyres, the perplexity of the leaders, and so on. In Homer's language Td copula of a proposition. It names lov, the presencing of what is
eovTa is not a conceptual philosophical term but a thoughtful and present. The lOTtV corresponds to the pure claim of Being, before the
thoughtfully uttered word. It does not specify natural things, nor does division into a first and second ouoia, into exi8tentf4 and essen&. BuJ
it at all indicate objects which stand over against human representa- in this way, eov is thought &om the concealed and undisclosed richness
tion. Man too belongs to eovTa; he is that present being which, il- of unconcealment in lovTO known to the early Greeks, without it ever
luminating, apprehending, and thus gathering, lets what is present as becoming possible or necessary for them to experience in all its per-
such become present in unconcealment. If in the poetic designation of spectives this essential richness itself. .
Kalchas what is present is thought in relation to the seer's seeing, this From a thoughtful experience of the iov of eovTa, spoken m a
means for Greek thinking that the seer, as the one who has seen, is preconceptual way, the fundamental words for early thinking are ut-
himself one who makes-present and belongs in an exceptional sense to tered: 4>u01<: and Aoyo<;, Moipa and "Epts, 'A>-rf9eaa and "Ev. By
the totality of what is present. On the other hand, it does not mean that means ofthe"Ev, which is to be thought back into the realm of funda-
what is present is nothing but an object wholly dependent upon the mental words, iov and dvaa become the words which expressly indi-
seer's subjectivity. cate what is present. Only as a result of the destiny of Being, as the
Td eovTa, what is present, whether or not at the present time, is destiny of"Ev, does the modern age after essential upheavals enter the
the unobtrusive name of what expressly comes to language in the epoch of the monadology of substance, which completes itself in the
Anaximander fragment. This word names that which, while not yet phenomenology of spirit.
spoken, is the unspoken in thinking which addresses all thinking. This It is not that Parmenides interpreted Being logically. On the con-
word names that which from now on, whether or not it is uttered, lays a trary, having sprung &om metaphysics, which at the same time it
claim on all Western thinking. wholly dominated, logic led to a state of affairs where the essential
Bul only several decades later, not with Anaximander but with richness of Being hidden in these early fundamental words remained
Parmenides, iov (presencing) and elva1 (to presence) are expressed as buried. Thus Being could be driven to the fatal extreme of serving as
the fundamental words of Western thinking. This does not happen, as the emptiest, most universal concept.
the normal misconception still insists, because Parmenides interprets Bul since the dawn of thinking "Being" names the presencing of
being "logically" in terms ofa proposition's structure and its copula. In what is present, in the sense of the gathering which clears and shelters,
the history of Greek thinking even Aristotle did not go so far when he which ba turn is thought and designated as the Aoyo<;. The Aoyo<;
thought the Being of beings in terms of KOuJyopia. Aristotle perceived (Aey1\1, to gather or assemble) is experienced through 'A}.rf9eta, the
beings as what already lies before any proposition, which is to say, as sheltering which reveals things. In the bifurcated essense of 'AArj9~lO,
what is present and lingers awhile in unconcea1ment. Aristotle did not what is essentially thought as"Epa<; and Moipa, which at the same time
have to interpret substance, UnOKefiJVOV, On the basis of the subjecl mean 4>uoa<;, lies concealed.
of a predicate phrase, because the essence of substance, ouoia, in the In the language of these fundamental words, thought from the
sense of napovola, was already granted. Nor did Aristotle think the experience of presencing, these words from the Anaximander fragment
presence of what is present in terms of the objectivity of an object in a resound: 6iKIJ, Tio1<;, d6tKia.
proposition, but rather as evepyeaa, which however is far removed-as The claim of Being which speaks in these words determines

38 39
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anarimander Fragment

philosophy in its essence. Philosophy did not spring from myth. It awhile among one another in unconcealment? What at bottom runs
arises solely from thinking and in thinldng. But thinking is the thinking through whatever is present? The fragment's last word gives the an-
of Being. Thinking does not originate: it is, when Being presences. But swer. We must begin the translation with it. This word designates the
the collapse of thinking into the sciences and into faith is the baneful basic trait of what is present: t1 douda. The literal translation is "injus-
destiny of Being. tice." But is this literal translation faithful? That is to say: does the word
In the dawn of Being's destiny, beings, Td tdvTa, come to lan- which translates dOtK!a heed what comes to language in the saying?
guage. From the restrained abundance of what in this way comes, what Does the autd, the totality of what is present, lingering awhile in
does the Anaximander fragment bring to utterance? According to the unconcealment, stand before our eyes?
presumably genuine text, the fragment reads: How is what lingers awhile in presence unjust? What is unjust
about it? Is it not the right of whatever is present that in each case it
.. Katd t~ xpemv 6t6dvat ydp a1.Jtd 6llU'IV Kal no1v d>.ArfAou: tr}<: d6tK!a~
linger awhile, endure, and so fulfill its presencing? .
In the standard translation: The word d-Ouda immediately suggests that ofKI) 1s absent. We
are accustomed to translate O!Kil as " right." The translations even use
.. according to necessity; for they pay one another recompense and penalty
"penalties" to translate "right." If we resist our own juridical-moral
for their injustice.
notions, if we restrict ourselves to what comes to language, then we
The fragment still consists of two clauses; of the first one only the hear that wherever dotKfa rules all is not right with things. That
closing words are retained. We will begin by commenting on the sec- means, something is out ofjoint. But of what are we speaking? Of wh~t
ond clause. is present, lingering awhile. But where are there jointures i.n what ts
The athd refers to what is named in the previous clause. The present? Or where is there even one jointure? How can what 15 present
antecedent can only be Td dvTa, the totality of what is present, what- without jointure be dOtKOV, out of joint?
ever is present in unconcealment, whether or not at the present time. The fragment clearly says that what is present is in dOtKfa, i.e. is
Whether or not this is expressly designated by the word t!dVYa may out of joint. However, that cannot mean that things no longer com~ to
remain an open question since the text is uncertain. The athd refen to presence. But neither does it say that what is present is only occaston-
everything present, everything that presences by lingering awhile: ally, or perhaps only with respect to some one of its properties, out of
gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree joint. The fragment says: what is present as such, being what it is, is out
and shrub, wind and light, stope and sand, day and night. What is of joint. To presencing as such jointure must belong, thus creating the
present coheres in unifying presencing, as everything becomes present possibility of its being out ofjoint. What is present is that which lingers
to everything else within its duration; it becomes present and lingers awhile. The while occurs essentially as the transitional arrival in depar-
with the others. This multiplicity (noA.Ad) is not a muster of separate ture: the while comes to presence between approach and withdrawal.
objects behind which something stands, embracing them as a whole. Between this twofold absence the presencing of all that lingers occurs.
Rather, presencing as such is ruled by the lingering-with-one-another In this "between" whatever lingers awhile is joined. This "between" is
of a concealed gathering. Thus Heraclitus, catching sight of this essetl- the jointure in accordance with which whatever lingers is joined,. from
tial gathering, unifying. and revealing in presencing. named the "Ev its emergence here to its departure away from here. The presencmg of
(the Being of beings) the Adyoc:. whatever lingers obtrudes into the "here" of its coming, as into the
But before this, how does Anaximander experience the totality of "away" of its going. In both directions presencing is conjointly disposed
things present; how does he experience their having arrived to linger toward absence. Presencing comes about in such a jointure. What is

40 41
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anarimander Fragment

present emerges by approaching and passes away by departing; it does Meanwhile, the thoughtlessly uttered "injustice of things" has
both at the same time, indeed because it lingers. The "while" occurs been clarified by thinking the essence of what lingers awhile in pres-
essentially in the jointure. ence as the disjunction in lingering. The disjunction consists in the fact
But then what lingers awhile is precisely in the jointure of its that whatever lingers awhile seeks to win for itself a while based solely
presencing, and not at all, as we might put it, in disjunction, dtitKla. on the model of continuance. Lingering as persisting, considered with
But the fragment says it is. The fragment speaks from the essential respect to the jointure of the while, is an insurrection on behalf of sheer
experience that dtitKfO is the fundamental trait of eovto. endurance. Continuance asserts itself in presencing as such, which lets
Whatever lingers awhile becomes present as it lingers in the join- each present being linger awhile in the expanse of unconcealment. In
ture which arranges presencing jointly between a twofold absence. this rebellious whiling whatever lingers awhile insists upon sheer con-
Still, as what is present, whatever lingers awhile-and only it-can tinuance. What is present then comes to presence without, and in
stay the length of its while. What has arrived may even insist upon its opposition to, the jointure of the while. The fragment does not say that
while solely to remain more present, in the sense of perduring. That whatever is present for the time being loses itself in disjunction; it says
which lingers perseveres in its presencing. In this way it extricates that whatever lingers awhile with a view to disjunction btOdvru blKI}v,
itself from its transitory while. It strikes the willful pose of persistence, gives jointure.
no longer concerning itself with whatever else is present. It stiffens-as What does "give" mean here? How should whatever lingers
if this were the way to linger-and aims solely for continuance and awhile, whatever comes to presence in disjunction, be able to give
subsistence. jointure? Can it give what it doesn't have? If it gives anything at all,
Coming to presence in the jointure of the while, what is present doesn't it give jointure away? Where and how does that which is pres-
abandons that jointure and is, in terms of whatever lingers awhile, in ent for the time being give jointure? We must ask our question more
disjunction. Everything that lingers awhile stands in disjunction. To clearly, by questioning from within the matter.
the presencing of what is present, to the iov of tovto, dtitKla belongs. How should what is present as such give the jointure of its pres-
Thus, standing in disjunction would be the essence of all that is pres- encing? The giving designated here can only consist in its manner of
ent. And so in this early fragment of thinking the pessimism-not to presencing. Giving is not only giving-away; originally, giving has the
say the nihilism-of the Greek experience of Being would come to the sense of acceding or giving-to. Such giving lets something belong to
fore. another which properly belongs to him. What belongs to that which is
However, does the fragment say that the essence of what is pres- present is the jointure of its while, which it articulates in its approach
ent consists in disjunction? It does and it doesn't. Certainly, the frag- and withdrawal. In the jointure whatever lingers awhile keeps to its
ment designates disjunction as the fundamental trait of what is present, while. It does not incline toward the disjunction of sheer persistence.
but only to say: The jointure belongs to whatever lingers awhile, which in turn belongs
in the jointure. The jointure is order.
6JI>OVOI ydp OUTd 6KrJv . .. tJic: d6n<fa<;.
6lKfl, thought on the basis of Being as presencing, is the ordering
"They must pay penalty," Nietzsche translates; "They pay recom- and enjoining Order. 'AbtKla, disjunction, is Disorder. Now it is only
pense," Diels translates, "for their injustice." But the fragment says necessary that we think this capitalized word capitally-in its full lin-
nothing about payment, recompense, and penalty; nor does it say that guistic power.
something is punishable, or even must be avenged, according to the Whatever lingers awhile in presence comes to presence insofar as
opinion of those who equate justice with vengeance. it lingers; all the while, emerging and passing away, and the jointure of

42 43
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

the transition from approach to withdrawal, continue. This ljngering another. Thus we are generally accustomed to read the text; we relate
endurance of the transition is the enjoined continuance of what is the dXXI{Aot<: to olKilv and tlotv, if we represent it clearly and ex-
present. The enjoined continuance does not at all insist upon sheer pressly name it, as does Diels-though Nietzsche passes over it en-
persistence. It does not fall into disjunction; it surmounts disorder. tirely in his translafion. However, it seems to me that the immediate
Lingering the length of its while, whatever lingers awhile lets its es- relation of dXXrfXot<: to 6t6dvat olKllV is neither linguistically neces-
sence as presencing belong to order. The OlOOVQl designates this "let- sary nor, more important, justified by the matter itself. Therefore it
ting belong to." remains for us to ask, from within the matter itself, whether dXXrfXot<:
The presencing of whatever is present for the time being does not should be directly related also to OlKilv, or whether it should not
consist in d61Kla by itself, i.e. not in disorder alone; rather, it consists indeed rather be related only to the tlo1v ~hich immediately precedes
in Oll>OVGl OiKilv .. . nf<: dotKiac:, since whatever is present lets order it. The decision in this case depends in part on how we translate the
belong in each case. Whatever is presently present is not a slice of Kal that stands between olKllV and tlmv. But this is determined by
something shoved in between what is not presently present; it is pres- what tlot<: here says.
ent insofar as it lets itself belong to the non-present: We usually translate tlo1<: by "penalty." This leads us to translate
cStMval as "to pay." Whatever lingers awhile in presence pays penalty;
6t60V01 , . QUtd 6{KI'JV . . . TJi<: d6tKfa<;, it expends this as its punishment (olKq). The court of justice is com-
plete. It lacks nothirig, not even injustice-though of course no one
-they, these same beings, let order belong (by the surmounting) of rightly knows what might constitute injustice.
disorder. Surely, time: can mean penalty, but it must not, because the
The experience of beings in their Being which here comes to original and essential significance of the word is not thereby named.
language is neither pessimistic nor nihilistic; nor is it optimistic. It is For tlot<: is "esteem" [Schatzen) . To esteem something means to heed
tragic. That is a presumptuous thing to say. However, we discover a it, and so to take satisfactory care of what is estimable in it. The essen-
trace of the essence of tragedy, not when we explain it psychologically tial process of esteem, which is to satisfy, can, in what is good, be a
or aesthetically, but rather only when we consider its essential form, magnamimous action; but with respect to wickedness giving satisfac-
the Being of beings, by thinking the 6t&svat OfKI'JV .. . tri<: dcStKfa<;. tion may mean paying a penalty. Yet a mere commentary on the word
Whatever lingers awhile in presence, td eovra, becomes present does not bring us to the matter in the fragment's use of the word if we
when it lets enjoining order belong. To what does the order ofjointure have not already, as with d61Kia and olKfl, thought from within the
belong, and where does it belong? When and in what way does that matter which comes to language in the fragment.
which lingers awhile in presence give order? The fragment does not According to the fragment the 01hd (td eovta), those beings that
directly say anything about this, at least to the extent we have so far linger awhile in presence, stand in disorder. As they linger awhile,
considered it. If we tum our attention to the still untranslated portion, they tarry. They hang on. For they advance hesitantly through their
however, it seems to say clearly to whom or what the Otl>Ovat is di- while, in transition from arrival to departure. They hang on; they cling
rected: to themselves. When what lingers awhile delays, it stubbornly follows
the inclination to persist in hanging on, and indeed to insist on persist-
6t60V01 ydp OUtd 6{KI'JV KOi tiOtV d~ArJ~Ol<; ing; it aims at everlasting continuance and no longer bothers about
O{Kll, the order of the while.
-present beings which linger awhile let order belong dAXrfAOI<:, to one But in this way everything that lingers awhile strikes a haughty

44 45
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ana.timander Fragment

pose toward every other of its kind. None heeds the lingering presence that it bas to do with human relations, is also true of rooche. But we
of the others. Whatever lingers awhile is inconsiderate toward others, shall take advantage of the obsolescence of the word by adopting it
each dominated by what is implied in its lingering presence, namely, anew in its essential breadth; we will speak of tfot<; as the reck corres-
the craving to persist. Beings which linger awhile do not in this respect ponding to 6iKI'l, order.
simply drift into inconsiderateness. Inconsiderateness impels them to- Insofar as beings which linger awhile do not entirely dissipate
ward persistence, so that they may still present themselves as what is themselves in the boundless conceit of aiming for a baldly insistent
present. Nevertheless, what is present in totality does not simply disin- subsistence, insofar as they no longer share the compulsion to expel
tegrate into inconsiderate individualities; it does not dissipate itself in one another from what is presently present, they let order belong,
discontinuity. Rather, the saying now says: 6t&svru 6iKI'lv. Insofar as beings which linger awhile give order, each
being thereby lets reck belong to the other, lets reck pervade its rela-
tions with the others, 6t&svm ... Kai nmv dUrf:\ot<;. Only when we
have already thought td eovta as what is present, and this as the
-beings which linger awhile let belong, one to the other: considera- totality of what lingers awhile, does dAA.rf:\m<; receive the significance
tion with regard to one another. The translation of Tlo11.; as considera- thought for it in the fragment: within the open expanse of unconceal-
tion coincides better with the essential meaning of"heeding'' and "es- ment each lingering being becomes present to every other being. So
teeming." It is thought from within the matter, on the basis of the long as we do not think of the td eovta, the d.A.Arf:\m<; remains a name
presencing of what lingers awhile. But the word "consideration" means for an indeterminate reciprocity in a chaotic manifold. The more
for us too directly that human trait, while tim<; is applied neutrally, strictly we think in d:\:\rf:\ot<; the manifold of beings lingering awhile,
because more essentially, to everything present, autd (td rovta). Our the clearer becomes the necessary relation of dA:\tf:\ot<; to tfot<;. The
word "consideration" lacks not only the necessary breadth, but above more unequivocally this relation emerges, the more clearly we recog-
all the gravicy to speak as the translating word for Tlot<; in the fragment, nize that the 6t&svru ... timv d:\:\rf:\ot<;, each one giving reck to the
and as the word corresponding to 6iKJ'), order. other, is the sole manner in which what lingers awhile in presence
Now our language possesses an old word which, interestingly lingers at all, i.e. 6t6dvru 6iKI'lv, granting order. The Kai between
enough, we modems know only in its negative form, indeed only as a OfKI'IV and tl01v is not simply the vacuous conjunction "and." It sig
form ofdisparagement, as with the word Unfug [disorder]. This usually ni6es the essential process. If what is present grants order, it happens
suggests to us something like an improper or vulgar sort of behavior, :0 this manner: as beings linger awhile, they give reck to one another.
something perpetrated in a crude manner. In the same fashion, we still fbe surmounting of disorder properly occurs through the letting-
use the word rochlos [reckless] to mean something pejorative and belong of reck. This means that the essential process of the dis~rder of
shameful: something without Ruch [reck]. We no longer really know non-reck, of the reckless, occurs in d6tKla:
what Ruch means. The Middle High German word ruoche means solic-
itude or care. Care tends to something so that it may remain in its
essence. This turning-itself-toward, when thought of what lingers
awhile in relation to presencing, is tim<;, reck. Our word geruhen [to -they let order belong, and thereby also reck, to one another (in the
deign or respect] is related to reck and bas nothing to do with Ruhe surmounting) of disorder.
[rest]: to deign means to esteem something, to let or allow something To let belong is, as the Kai suggests, something twofold, since the
to be itself. What we observed concerning the word "consideration," essence of eovta is dually determined. Whatever lingers awhile comes

46 47
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anarlmander Fragment

to presence from the jointure between approach and withdrawal. It concerning YO xpewv which arose in our commentary on the second
comes to presence in the . between" of a twofold absence. Whatever clause and its reference back to the first clause. First, that it designates
lingers awhile comes to presence in each case in accordance with its the presencing of what is present; second, that if xpewv thinks the
while. It comes to presence as what is present at the present time. presencing of what is present, then presencing may be thought some-
With a view to its while it gives reck, and even a while, to the others. how in terms of what is present; or it may prove to be otherwise, that
But to whom does whatever is present let the order ofjointure belong? the relation of Being to beings can only come from Being, can only rest
The second clause of the fragment, which we have been interpret- in the essence of Being.
ing, does not answer .this question. But it provides a clue. For we have The word Katd precedes to xpewv.. It means "from up there,"
passed over a word: 61&Svw ydp autd . . . they (namely) let or "from over there." The Katd refers back to something from which
belong.... The ydp, ..for" or "namely," introduces a grounding. In something lower comes to presence, as from something higher and as
any case, the second clause delineates the extent to which the matter of its consequent. That in reference to which the Katd is pronounced
the previous clause behaves in the prescribed manner. has in itself an incline along which other things have fallen out in this
What does the translation of the fragment's second clause say? It or that way.
says that the iovta, whatever is present, as that which lingers awhile, But in consequence of what, or by what inclination, can what is
is released into reckless disorder; and it tells how present beings sur- present become present as such, if not in consequence of, or by the
mount disorder by letting order and reck belong to one another. This befalling of, presencing? That which lingers awhile in presence lingers
letting-belong is the manner in which what lingers awhile lingers and ttatd Yo xpewv. No matter how we are to think to xpe,wv, the word is
so comes to presence as what is present. The fragment's second clause. the earliest naine for what we have thought as the Mv of iovta; to
designates what is present in the manner of its presencing. The saying xpewv is the oldest name in which thinking brings the Being ofbeings
speaks of what is present and tells about its presencing. This it places in to language.
the brilliance of what is thought. The second clause offers a commen- That which lingers awhile in presence becomes present as it sur-
tary on the presencing of what is present. mounts reckless disorder, d61Kla, which haunts lingering itself as an
For this reason the first clause must designate presencing itself, essential possibility. The presencing of what is present is such a sur-
and even the extent to which presencing determines what is present as mounting. It is accomplished when beings which linger awhile let
such; only so can the second clause in tum, referring back to the 6rs't order belong, and thereby reck, among one another. The answer to the
by means of the ydp, comment on the presencing of what is present. question to whom order belongs is now provided: order belongs to that
Presencing, in relation to what is present, is always that in accordance which comes to presence by waY, of presencing-and that means by
with which what is present comes to presence. The first clause names way of a surmounting. Order is KOYd YO xpewv. At this point something
that presencing "in accordance with which ... " Only the. last three of the essence of xpewv begins to glimmer, though at first from a great
words of the first clause are preserved: distance. If, as the essence of presencing, xpewv is related essentially
to what is present, then YO xpewv must enjoin order and thereby also
. . . Katd TO xpt:Wv reck in that relation. The xpewv enjoins matters in such a way that
whatever is present lets order and reck belong. The xpewv lets such
This is translated: ... according to necessity;". We will leave YO enjoining prevail among present beings and so grants them the manner
xpewv untranslated at first. But we can still reflect on two matters of their arrival-as the while of whatever lingers awhile.

48 49
 EARLY CREEK THINKING The Ana.timander Fragment

What is present comes to presence when it surmounts the dis- of distinguished. Rather, even the early trace of the distinction is obliter-
disorder, the d- of d&uda. This dno in d&uda corresponds to the KaTd ated when presencing appears as something present and finds itself in
of xpeo.Sv. The transitional ydp in the second clause strings the bow, the position of being the highest being present.
connecting one end to the other. The oblivion of the distinction, with which the destiny of Being
So far we have tried to think what TO xpeo.Sv means only in terms of begins and which it will carry through to completion, is all the same not
the reference of the fragment's second clause back to it, without asking a lack, but rather the richest and most prodigious event: in it the
about the word itself. What does TO xpeo.Sv mean? This first word in the history of the Western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of
fragment's text we are interpreting last because it is first with respect to metaphysics. What now is stands in the shadow of the already foregone
the matter. What matter? The matter of the presencing of what is destiny of Being's oblivion.
present. But to be the Being of beings is the matter of Being. However, the distinction between Being and beings, as something
The grammatical form of this enigmatic, ambiguous genitive indi- forgotten, can invade our experience only if it has already unveiled
cates a genesis, the emergence of what is present from presencing. Yet itself with the presencing of what is present; only if it has left a trace
the essence of this emergence remains concealed along with the es- which remains preserved in the language to which Being comes.
sence of these two words. Not only that, but even the very relation Thinking along those lines, we may surmise that the distinction bas
between presencing and what is present remains unthought. Fr~m been illuminated more in that early word about Being than in recent
early on it seems as though presencing and what is present were each ones; yet at no time has the distinction been designated as such. Il-
something for itself. Presencing itself unnoticeably becomes something lumination of the distinction therefore cannot mean that the distinction
present. Represented in the manner of something present, it is ele- appears as a distinction. On the contrary, the relation to what is pres-
vated above whatever else is present and so becomes the highest being ent in presencing as such may announce itself in su~h a way that
present. As soon as presencing is named it is represented as some presencing comes to speak as this relation.
present being. Ultimately, ptesencing as such is not distinguished from The early word concerning Being, TO xpeo.Sv, designates such a
what is present: it is taken merely as the most universal or the highest relation. However, we would be deceiving ourselves if we thought we
of present beings, thereby becoming one among such beings. The could locate the distinction and get behind its essence merely by
essence of presencing, and with it the distinction between presencing etymological)y dissecting the meaning of the word xpewv with enough
and what is present, remains forgotten . The oblivion of Being is obliv- persistence . ~ Perhaps only when we experience historically what has
ion of the distinction between Being and beings. not been thought-the oblivion of Being-as what is to be thought, and
However, oblivion of the distinction is by no means the conse- only when we have for the longest time pondered what we have long
quence of a forgetfulness of thinking. Oblivion of Being belongs to the experienced in terms of the destiny of Being, may the early word speak
self-veiling essence of Being. It belongs so essentially to the destiny of in our contemporary recollection.
Being that the dawn of this destiny rises as the unveiling of what is We are accustomed to translate the word xpeo.Sv by "necessity.''
present in its presencing. This means that the history of Being begins By that we mean what is compelling-that which inescapably must be.
with the oblivion of Being, since Being-together with its essence, Its Yet we err if we adhere to this derived meaning exclusively. Xpeo.Sv is
distinction from beings- keeps to itself. The distinction collapses. It derived from xpdw, xpdop01. It suggests ri xefp, the hand; xpdw
y remains forgotten . Although the two parties to the distinction, what is means: I get involved with something, 1reach for it, extend my hand to
present and presencing, reveal themselves, they do not do so as it. At the same time xpdw means to place in someone's hands or band

50 51
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaximander Fragment

over, thus to deliver, to let something belong to someone. But such current, derived senses. We should rather keep to the root-meaning:
delivery is of a kind which keeps this transfer in hand, and with it what to use is to brook [bruchen], in Latin frui, in German fruchten,
is transferred. Frucht. We translate this freely as "to enjoy," which originally means
Therefore the participial xpewv originally signifies nothing of con- to be pleased with something and so to have it in use. Only in its
straint and of what "must be." Just as little does the word initially or derived senses does "enjoy" mean simply to consume or gobble up.
ever mean to ratify and ordain. We encounter what we have called the basic meaning of"use," in the
If we firmly keep in mind that '!Ye must think the word within the sense offrui, in Augustine's words, Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus
Anaximander fragment, then it can only mean what is essential in the frui, nisi praesto habere, quod diligisP .. Frui involves praesto habere.
presencing of what is present, and hence that relation to which the Praesto, praesitum is in Greek unoKd~evov, that which already lies
genitive so mysteriously alludes. To xpewv is thus the handing over of before us in unconcealment, ooo{a, that which lingers awhile in pres-
presence which presencing delivers to what is present, and which thus ence. "To use" accordingly suggests: to let something present come to
keeps in hand, i.e. preserves in presencing, what is present as such. presence as such; frui, to brook, to use, usage, means: to hand some-
The relation to what is present that rules in the essence of presenc- thing over to its own essence and to keep it in hand, preserving it as
ing itself is a unique one, altogether incomparable to any other rela- something present.
tion. It belongs to the uniqueness of Being itself. Therefore, in order to In the translation of YO xpewv usage is thought as essential pres-
name the essential nature of Being, language would have to 6nd a encing in Being itself. "To brook," frui, is no longer merely predicated
single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring of enjoyment as a form of human behavior; nor is it said in relation to
every thoughtful word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring any being whatsoever, even the highest (fruitio Dei as the beatitudo
is not impossible, since Being speaks always and everywhere through- hominis); rather, usage now designates the manner in which Being
out language. The difficulty lies not so much in nnding in thought the itself presences as the relation to what is present, approaching and
word for Being as in retaining purely in genuine thinking the word becoming involved with what is present as present: YO xpewv.
found. Usage delivers what is present to its presencing, i.e. to its linger-
Anaximander says, YO xpewv. We will dare a translation which ing. Usage dispenses to what is present the portion of its while. The
sounds strange and which can be easily misinterpreted: YO xpewv, while apportioned in each case to what lingers rests in the jointure
usage [der Brauch]. which joins what is present in the transition between twofold absence
With this translation we ascribe to the Greek word a sense that is {arrival and departure). The jointure of the while bounds and confines
foreign neither to the word itself nor to the matter designated by the what is present as such. That which lingers awhile in presence, Yd
word in the saying. Nonetheless the translation makes excessive de- t!ovta , comes to presence within bounds (m!pa<;~
mands. It loses none of this character even when we consider that all "'To brook" is today used only in negative constructlons-~ru brook no
rlvall"'-whicb suggest unwillingness to put up with a state of affairs. It shares its original
translation in the Geld of thinking inevitably makes such demands. Teutonic stem with the modem Genna~ brauchen and the Middle High German
To what extent is to xpewv "usage"? The strangeness of the trans- brUchen: bruk-, from the Indo-European bhrug-. Its archaic senses Include: to make use
lation is reduced when we think more clearlyabout the word in our of, to have the enjoyment of, to bear or hold, to possess the right of usufruct-i.e. the
right to cultivate and use land one does not own, and to enjoy Its fruits.-Til.
language. Usually we understand "to use" to mean utilizing and ben- .... For what else do we mean when we say frul If not to have at hand something that
efiting from what we have a right to use. What our utilizing benefits is especially prized?" De morlbu.t ecclealae, lib. I, c. 3; cf. De doctrlna chri.ttlana, lib. I,
c. 2-4. For the first see Balle Wrltlng1 of Saint Augustine, 2 vols., ed. Whitney J. Oates
from becomes the usual. Whatever is used is in usage. "Usage," as the (New York: Random House, 1948) I, 321; for the second see On Chriltian Doctrine,
word that translates YO xpewv, should not be understood in these trant. D. W. Robemon, Jr. (New York: Uberal Arts Press, 1958), pp. 9-10.-1'11.

52 53
 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Anaximander Fragment

As dispenser of portions of the jointure, usage is the fateful join- presencing, elucidates what TO xpewv means. What is thought as
ing: the enjoining of order and thereby of reck. Usage distributes order xpewv in the fragment is the first and most thoughtful interpretation of
and reck in such manner that it reserves for itself what is meted out, what the Greeks experienced in the name Moipa as the dispensing of
gathers it to it.s elf, and secures it as what is present in presencing. portions. Gods and men are subordinated to Moipa. To Xpewv, usage,
But usage, enjoining order and so limiting what is present, is the handing over of what is in each case present into its while in
distributes boundaries. As TO xpewv it is therefore at the same time unconcealment.
dne1pov, that which is without boundary, since its essence consists in To Xpewv harbors the still hidden essence of the gathering which
sending boundaries of the while to whatever lingers awhile in pres- clears and shelters. Usage is the gathering: d Aoyoc,. From the essence
ence. of Aoyoc,, thought in this way, the essence of Being is determined as
According to the tradition recounted in Simplicius' commentary the unifying One; Ev. Parmenides thinks this same"Ev. He thinks the
on Aristotle's Physics, Anaximander is supposed to have said that what- unity of this unifying One expressly as the Moipa (fr. Vlll, 37).
ever is present has its essential origin in what presences without Thought from within the essential experience of Being, Moipa
bounds: dpxfl TWV <SvTwv TO dne1pov. What presences without bounds, corresponds to the Aoycx: of Heraclitus. The essence of Moipa and
not joined by order and reck, is not some present being but rather TO Aoyoc, is thoughtfully intimated in the Xpewv of Anaximander.
xpewv. To search for influences and dependencies among thinkers is to
Enjoining order and reck, usage delivers to each present being the misunderstand thinking. Every thinker is dependent-upon the ad-
while into which it is released. But accompanying this process is the dress of Being. The extent of this dependence determines the freedom
constant danger that lingering will petrify into mere persistence. Thus from irrelevant influences. The broader the dependence the more
usage essentially remains at the same time the distribution of presenc- puissant the freedom of thought, and therefore the more foreboding
ing into disorder. Usage conjoins the dis-. the danger that it may wander past what was once thought, and yet
Therefore, whatever lingers awhile in presence can only come to -perhaps only thus-think the Same.
presence when it lets order and thereby also reck belong: with respect Of course, in our recollecting we latecomers must first have
to usage. What is present comes to presence KaTd TO xpewv, along the thought about the Anaximander fragment in order to proceed to the
lines of usage. Usage is the enjoining and preserving gathering of what thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus. If we have done so, then the
is present in its presencing, a presencing which lingers awhile accord- misinterpretation that the philosophy of the former must have been a
ing to each particular case. doctrine of Being while that of the latter was a doctrine of Becoming is
The translation of TO xpewv as "usage" has not resulted from a exposed as superficial.
preoccupation with etymologies and dictionary meanings. The choice However, in order to think the Anaximander fragment we must
of the word stems from a prior crossing over of a thinking which tries to first of all, but then continually, take a simple step: we must cross over
think the distinction in the essence of Being in the fateful beginning of to what that always unspoken word, eov, eOVTO, efva1 says. It says:
Being's oblivion. The word ''usage" is dictated to thinking in the ex- presencing into unconcealment. Concealed in that word is this:
perience of Being's oblivion. What properly remains to be thought in presencing brings unconcealment along with itself Unconcealment it-
the word "usage" has presumably left a trace in TO xpewv. This trace self is presencing. Both are the Same, though they are not identical.
quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being which unfolds in world history What is present is that which, whether presently or not, presences
as Western metaphysics. in unconcealment. Along with the 'AAqee1o which belongs to the es-
The Anaximander fragmeJ}t, thinking of what is present in its sence of Being, the Ar{eq remains entirely unthought, as in conse-

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING The Ana.tlmander Fragment

quence ~o "pr~sently" and "non-presently," i.e. the region of the open [Pri:isenz] of representational thinking. The decisive turn in the destiny
expanse m whtch everything present arrives and in which the presenc- of Being as ivt!pye1a lies in the transition to actualitas.
ing to one another of beings which linger awhile is unfolded and de- Could a mere translation have precipitated all this? We may yet
limited. learn what can come to pass in translation. The truly fateful encounter
Because beings are what is present in the manner of that which with historic language is a silent event. But in it the destiny of Being
~ngers awhile, once they have arrived in unconcealment they can speaks. Into what language is the land of evening translated?
lmger there, they can appear. Appearance is an essential consequence We shall now try to translate the Anaximander fragment:
of presencing and of the kind of presencing involved. Only what ap- . .. KOTd TO xpewv 6t&svat ydp autd 6iK11V KOl TiolV dXXrjXou: Tl)<: d6tKiac;.
pears can in the first place show an aspect and form, thinking these
. . . along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to
matters always from within presencing. Only a thinking which has
one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.
beforehand thought Being in the sense of presencing into unconceal-
ment can think the presencing of what is present as i&ea. But whatever
lingers awhile in presence at the same time lingers as something We cannot demonstrate the adequacy of the translation by schol-
broug~t forward into unconcealment. It is so brought when, arising by arly means; nor should we simply accept it. through faith in some
itself, 1t produces itself; or it is so brought when it is produced by man. authority or other. Scholarly proof will not carry us far enough, and
In both cases what has arrived in the foreground ofunconcealment is in faith has no place in thinking. We can only reflect on the translation by
a certain sense an l.pyov, which in Greek is thought as something thinking through the saying. But thinking is the poetizing of the truth
brought forward. The presencing of what is present, with respect to its of Being in the historic dialogue between thinkers.
l.pyov cha~cter, thought in the light of presence, can be experienced For this reason the fragment will never engage us so long as we
as tha~ which occurs essentially in production. This is the presencing of only explain it historiologically and philologically. Curiously enough,
what ts present: the Being of be ings is ivepye 1a. the saying first resonates when we set aside the claims of our own
The ivepyeJa which Aristotle thinks as the fundamental character familiar ways of representing things, as we ask ourselves in what the
of presencing, ofiov, the i&ea which Plato thinks as the fundamental confusion of the contemporary world's fate consists.
character of presencing, the Aoy~ which Heraclitus thinks as the Man has already begun to overwhelm the entire earth and its
fundamental character of presencing, the Moipa which Parmenides atmosphere, to arrogate to himself in forms of energy the concealed
thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Xpewv which powers of nature, and to submit future history to the planning and
Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing-all these name the ordering of a world government. This same defiant man is utterly at a
Same. ln.,the ~ncealed richness of the Same the unity of the unifying loss simply to say what is; to say what this is- that a thing is.
One, the Ev, IS thought by each thinker in his own way. The totality of beings is the single object of a singular will to
Meanwhile an epoch of Being soon comes in which ivepye1a is conquer. The simplicity of Being is confounded in a singular oblivion.
translated as actualitas. The Greek is shut away, and to the present day What mortal can fathom the abyss of this confusion? He may try to
the word appears only in Roman type. Actualitas becomes Wirklichkeit shut his eyes before this abyss. He may entertain one delusion after
[reality~. Reality becomes objectivity [Objektiviti:it] . But objectivity another. The abyss does not vanish.
must still preserve the character of presencing if It is to remain in its Theories of nature and doctrines of history do not dissolve the
essence, its objectiveness [Gegenstiindlichkeit]. It is the "presence" confusion. They further confuse everything until it is unrecognizable,

56 57
 EARLY CREEK THINKING

since they themselves feed on the confusion prevailing over the dis-
tinction between beings and Being.
Is there any rescue? Rescue comes when and only when danger is.
Danger is when Being itself advances to its farthest extreme, and when
the oblivion that issues from Being itself undergoes reversal. lWO
But what if Being in its essence needs to use [braucht) the essence
of man? If the essence of man consists in thinking the truth of Being? Logos
Then thinking must poetize on the riddle of Being. It brings the (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)
dawn of thought into the neighborhood of what is for thinking.

Dnmemiz iin ihtiyacmz olan en nemli patika/yol ok uzaklara uzanr. Bu yol logos ad altnda
dncenin kalntlar
The path most needed for our thinking stretches far ahead. It leads
to that simple matter which, under the name My<><;, remains for think- 1 ~
ing. Yet there are only a few signs to point out the way.
By means of free reflection along the guidelines of a saying of
Heraclitus (B 50), the following essay attempts to take a few steps along
that path. Perhaps they can carry us to the point where at least this one
saying will speak to us in a more question-worthy way:

ouK ~ou dAM tou Ac.Syou dKovoavta<:

d~oXoyeiv ooqxiv onv"Ev lldvta.

One among the virtually identical translations reads:

When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning,

it is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All.
(Snell)

The saying speaks of OKOU1V, hearing and having heard, of

opoXoyeiv, to say the same, of Aoy<><;, what is said and the saying. of
~yuS, the thinker himself as Xeywv, the one who is talking. Heraclitus
here considers_a hearinund a saying. He expresses what the Aoy<><;
says: "Ev lldvta , all is One. The saying of Heraclitus seems com-
prehensible in every respect. Nevertheless. everything about it is
worthy of question. Most question-worthy is what is most self-evident.
namely, our presupposition that whatever Heraclitus says ought to
58
59
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)

become immediately obvious to our contemporary everyday under- inately if not exclusively, saying and talking. Must we therefore, in
standing. This demand was probably never met even for Heraclitus deference to this preponderant and customary meaning of A.eye1v,
contemporaries. which assumes multiple forms, simply toss the genuine meaning of the
In the meantime, we would correspond sooner to his thinking if word, A.eye1v as laying, to the winds? Dare we ever do such a thing?
( we conceded that!_everal riddles remain, neither for the Srst time with Or is it not Snally time to engage ourselves with a question which
us, nor only for the ancients, but rather in the very matter thought. We probably decides many things? The question asks: ow does tb8\ ~
will get closer to these riddles if we step back before them. That done, _oger sense of M~'1v, tll.lay, come to .mean aying aod ta}.Jdna? f"'
it becomes clear that in order to observe the riddle as a riddle we must In order to Snd the foothold for an answer, we need to reflect on
clarify before all else what .My<><; and A.eye1v mean. what actually lies in A.eye1v as laying. To lay means to bring to lie.
Since antiquity the Ady<><; of Heraclitus _has been interpreted in Thus, to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside another, to lay
various ways: as Ratio, as Verbum, as cosmic law, as the logical, as them together. IP lax is to pther [lesen] . Thelesen better known to us,
necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason. Again and again a call namely, the reading of something written, remains but one .sort of
rings out for reason to be the standard for deeds and omissions. Yet gathering, in the sense of bringing-together-into-lying-before, al-
what can reason do when, along with the irrational and the antirational though it is indeed the predominant sort. The gleaning at harvest time
all on the same level, it perseveres in the same neglect, forgetting to gathers fruit from the soil. The gathering of the vintage involves pick-
meditate on the essential origin of reason and to let itself into its ing grapes from the vine. Picking and gleaning are followed by the\
advent? What can logic, A.oyuuf (~monfllll) of any sort, do if we never bringing together of the fruit. So long as we persist in the usual appear-
begin to pay heed to the Ady<><; and follow its initial unfolding? ances we are inclined to take this bringing together as the gathering
What My<><; is we gather from A.eye1v. What does A.eye1v mean? itself or even its termination. But.gathering is..mo.re.Jhan mere ama.ssipg.'
Everyone familiar with the language knows that A.eye1v means talking To w;atbering belon ollecHng which brbl~der s Iter.
and saying; ~ as a saying_ aloud, and A.eydt.Jevov as Accommodation governs tbe sheltering;.!Q!!lmodationJs in turn gQY~
that which is...g!d. er.n_ed by s:;ekeeping. That "something extra" which makes gathering
Who would want to deny that in the language of the Greeks from more than a jumbling together that snatches things up is not something
early on A.iye1v means to talk, say, or tell? However, just as early and only added afterward. Even less is it the conclusion of the gathering,
even more originally-and therefore already in the previol}sly cited coming last TheJafekeeQing that brings something in has already
meaning-it means what our similarly sounding legen means: to lay determined the first steps oLthe gathering and arranged everything
down and lay before. In legen a "bringing together" prevails, the Latin that follows. If we are blind to everything but the sequence of steps,
Iegere understood as leS!.,n , in the sense of collecting and bringing then the collecting follows the picking and gleaning, the bringing
together. Aeye1v properly means the laying-down and laying-before under shelter follows the collecting, until Snally everything is accom-
which gathers itself and othe)'s. The middle voice, A.eyeoOat, means to modated in bins and storage rooms. This gives rise to the illusion that
lay oneself down in the gathering of rest; A.ex<><; is the resting place; preservation and safekeeping have nothing to do with gathering. Yet
A.dx<><; is a place of ambush [or a place for lying in wait] where some- what would become of a vintage [eine Lese] which has not been
thing is laid away and deposited. (The old word -~A~Y.9J (d gathered with an eye to the fundamental matter of its being sheltered?
copulativum), archaic after Aeschylus and Pindar, should be recalled 'Ihe. shelter!n~coms Srst in the essential formation....oLthe
I
here: something "lies upo!Lme," it oppresses and troubles me.) \(lJ}tage. ' ... ,
All the same it remains incontestable that A.eye1v means, predom- However, the sheltering does not secure just any thing that hap-

60 61
... .
 EARLY CREEK THINKING Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)

pens along: the gathering which properly begins with the sheltering, it remains laid down. What sort of protection is this? What U together
i.e. the vintage, is itself from the start a selection [Auslese] which before us is stored, laid away, secured and deposited in unconceal- - t
requires sheltering. For its part, the selection is determined h) what- ment, and that me~ ~heltered iU..Ym;en~alment. !hktting_things ~e
ver within the crop to be sorted shows itself as to-be-selected together before us }.f!yeiVUndertakes to secure what lies before ~s ~
[Erlesene ]. The most important aspect of the sheltering in the essential unconcealme.nl Th~1, the lying before for-itself of what 1s m
' formation of the vintage is the sorting (in Ale manic [the southwestern
r German dialect]: the fore-gathering [Vor-lese]) which determines the
selection, arranging everything involved in the bringing together, the
this fashion deposited-. i.e. the Keio00l of UnOKefpeVOV, is nothing
more and nothing less than.Ql~esencing of that which lies before us_
Jnto uncopcealment. In this }.eye1v of unoKefpcvov, Aeye1v as gather-
bringing under shelter, and the accommodation of the vintage. ing and assembling remains implied. Because Aeyc1v, which lets
l. The sequence of steps in the gathering act does not coincide with things lie together before us, concerns itself solely with the safety of
the order of those far-reaching, fundamental traits in which the essence that which lies before us in unconcealment, the gathering appropriate
of the vintage [die Lese) consists. to such a laying is determined in advance by safekeeping.
It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to Ae e 1v is to lay. Laying is the letting-lie-before-which is
coordinate their work to the sheltering, and-gathered together with gatheredinto itself-of that which comes together into presence.
that end in view-first begin to gather. The gathering [die Lese] The question arises: How does the proper meaning of}.eyetv, to
requires and demands this assembly. This original cOordination gov- lay, attain the signillcation of saying and talking? The foregoing reflec-
erns their collective gathering. tion already contains the answer, for it makes us realize that we can no
However, lesen [to gather) thought in this way does not simply longer raise the question in su.ch a manner. Why not? Because what we ~
stand near legen [to lay]. Nor does the former simply accompany the have been thinking about in no way tells us that this word }.eye1v
latter. Rather, &-therinKjlaltt;a,dy in.cluq~dJn l~ng. Every gathering advanced from the one meaning, "to lay," to the other, "to say."
is already a laying. Every laying is of itself gathering. Then what does w..Aaowe not busied-oorselv~e..for_egoing witlLthe transfor-
"to lay" mean? Laying brings to lie, in that it lets things lie together mation of word meanings. Rather. we have stumbled,upon an even.t
before us. All too readily we take this '1etting" in the sense of omitting whose immensity still lies concealed in its long unnoticed simplicity.
or letting go. To lay, to bring to lie, to let lie, would then mean to '11le sayingJYLdJalking of mortals comes to pass from early on as
concern ourselves no longer with what is laid down and lies before M ye1v, laY!!!g. Saying and talking occur essentially as the letting-lie-
us-to ignore it. However, ~ye~ , to lay, by its letting-lie-together- together-before of everything which, laid in unconcealment, comes to
~t
before means just this, that _l!.hate~r lies before us involves us and presence. The original }.f!yelv, laying, unfolds itself early and in a
{
~herefore concerns us. Laying as letting-lie-together-before [bei- manner ruling everything unconcealed as saying and talking. Aeyc1v as
sammen-vorliegen-Lassen} is concerned with retaining whatever is laid laying Jets itself be overpowered by the predominant sense, but only in
1 down as lying before us. (In the Alemanic dialect legi means a ~eir or order to deposit the essence of saying and talking at the outset under the
\ dam which lies ahead in the river, against the water's current.) governance of laying proper.
The ;\eye1v or laying now to be thought has in advance relin- That }.eyev is a la)jng wherein saying and talking articulate their }
quished all claims-claims never even known to it-to be that which essence, re.fers to the earliest and most consequential decision concern- ..-_
for the first time brings whatever lies before us into its position [Lage]. blg the essence olanguage. Where did it come from? This question is
~ying, as ;\eye1v, simply tries to let what of itself lies together here as weighty, and supposedly the same, as the other question: How far
: before us, 0$ what lies before, into itJ..protection, a protection in which does this characterization of the essence of language from laying ex-
62 63
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Logo1 (Heraclitw, Fragment B 50)

' I
tend? The question reaches into the uttermost of the possible essential other processes, the result would ~that the reverberation would go in
(ri~s of language. For, like the letting-lie-before that gathers, saying one ear and out the other. That happens in fact when we are not
recetves its essential form from the unconcealment of that which lies gathered to what is addressed. But the addressed is itself th_at which
, together before us. But the unconce~g of the concealed into uncon- lies before us, as gathered and la.!._d before us. Hearing is actually this
cealment is the very presencing of what is present. We call this the gathering of oneself which composes itself on hearing the pronounce-
~ Being of beings. Thus, the essential speaking of language, :Aeye1v as ment and its claim. Hearing is primarily gathered hearkenin~. What is
laying, is determined neither by vocalization (<pwvrf) nor by signifying heard com~s to ~resence in_ hearkening. We hear when we are "all
(ornJa{vetv~ Expression and signification have long been accepted as ears." But ..ear" does not here mean the acoustical sense apparatus.
manifestations which indubitably betray some characteristics of lan- The anatomically and physiologically identifiable ears, as the tools of
guage. But they do not genuinely reach into the realm of the primor- sensation, never bring about a hearing, not even if we take this solely
dial, essential determination oflanguage, nor are they at all capable of as an apprehending of noises, sounds, and tones. Such apprehending
determining this realm in its primary characteristics. That saying as can neither be anatomically established nor physiologically demon-
laying ruled unnoticed and from early on, and~ if nothing at all had strated, nor in any way grasped as a biological process at work within
1 occurred the~that speaking accordingly appeared as :Aeye1v, the organism-although ~prehension lives only so long as it is ~m
~ produced a curious state of affairs. Human thought was never as- bodied. So long as we think of hearing along the lines of acoustical
tonished by this event, nor. did it discern in it a mystery which con- science, everything is made to stand on its head. We wrongly think
)
cealed an essential dispensation of Being to men, a dispensation that the activation of the body's audio equipment is hearing proper.
1 perhaps reserved for that historical moment which would not only But then hearing'i n the sense of hearkening and heeding is supposed to
\ devastate man from top to bottom but send his very essence reeling. be a transposition of hearing proper into the realm of the spiritual [das
To say Is :Aeyetv. This sentence, if well thought, now sloughs off Gelstige]. In the domain of scientific research one can establish many
everything facile, trite, and vacuous. It names the inexhaustible mys- useful findings. One can demonstrate that periodic oscillations in air
tery that the speaking of language comes to pass from the unconceal- pressure of a certain frequency are experienced as tones. From such
ment of what is present, and is determined according to the lying- kinds of determinations concerning what is heard, an investigation can
before of what is present as the letting-lie-together-before. Will think- be launched which eventually only speeialists in the physiology of the
ing finally learn to catch a glimpse of what it means that Aristotle senses can conduct.
could characterize :Aeyetv as dnO<pa{veoOCll? The :Aoyoc; by itselfbrin 1"-contrast to this, perhaps only a little can be sai~ concerning
that which appears and comes forward in its lying before us ~ I proper hearing, which nevertheless concerns everyone directly. Here
appearance-to its luminous self-showi!!g (cf. Being and Time, 7b). ' it is not so much a matter for research, but rather of paying thoughtful
Saying is a letting-lie-together-before which gathers and is attention to simple things. Thus, precisely this belongs to proper hear-
gathered. If such is the essence of speaking, then what is hearing? As ing: that man can hear wrongly insofar as he does not catch what is
Aeyetv, speaking is not characterized as a reverberation which expres- essential. If the ears do not belong directly to prope r hearing, in the
ses meaning. If saying is not characterized by vocalization, then neither sense of hearkening, then hearing and the ears are in a special situa-
can the hearing which corresponds to it occur as a reverberation meet- tion. We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e. our
1 ing the ear and getting picked up, as sounds troubling the auditory bodies are equipped with ears, because we hear. Mortals hear the
sense and being transmitted. Were our hearing primarily and always thunder of the heavens, the rustling of woods, the gurgling of foun-
only this picking up and transmitting of sounds, conjoined by several tains, the ringing of plucked strings, the rumbling of motors, the noises

64 65
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)

of the city-only and only so far as they_ always already in some wa The only way to decide is to consider what Heraclitus himself says
belong to them and yet do not belong to them,_ in the fragment cited. The saying begins: ouK t!pov . . . It begins with
We are all ears when our gathering devotes itself entirely to a strict, prohibiting "Not . .. " ~fers to the__saying ~?d talking ~~
hearkening, the ears and the mere invasion ofsounds being completely Heraclitus himself. It concerns the hearing of mortals. Not to me,
forgotten. So long as we only listen to the sound of a word, as the i.e. not to this one who is talking; you are not to heed-the vooaTIZation
expression of a speaker, we are not yet even listening at all. Thus, in of his talk. You never hear properly so long as your ears hang upon the
this way we never succeed in having genuinely heard anything at all. sound and flow of a human voice in order to snatch up for yourselves a
But when does hearing succeed? We have heard [gehOrt] when we manner of speaking. Heraclitus begins the saying with a rejection of
p elong to [gehoren] the matter addresseq!.. The speaking of the mat-- hearing as nothing but the passion of the ears. But this rejection is
ter addressed is Aiytlv, letting-lie-together-before. To belong to founded on a reference to proper hearing.
speech- this is nothing else than in each case letting whatever a OuK epov dAAd ... Not to me should you listen (as though gap-
letting-lie-before lays down before us lie gathered in its entirety. Such ing), but rather ... -mortal hearing must attend to something else. To
a letting-lie establishes whatever lies before us as lying-before. It estab- what? 'AAAO TOV Aoyou. The way of proper hearing is determined by
lishes this as itself. It lays one and the Same in one. It lays one as the the Aoyoc;. But inasmuch as the Aoyoc; is named without qualification
Same. Such Aeyev lays one and the same, the dpov. Such Aiye 1v is it cannot be just any customary thing. Therefore, the hearing appro-
dpoAoyeiv: One as the Same, i.e. a letting-lie-before of what does lie priate to it cannot proceed c.asually toward it, only to pass it by once
before us, gathered in the selfsameness of its lying-before. again. lf.there is to be proper hearing, mortals must have already heard
Proper hearing occurs essentially in Aiye1v as dpoAoyeiv. This is the Aoyoc: with an attention [GehO,.] which implies nothing less than
consequently a Aiye1v which let.s lie before us whatever already lies their belonging to the Aoyoc;.
together before us; which indeed lies there by virtue of a laying which OuK epov c:iAAd TOV Aoyou dKOUOOVTOC:. "When you have lis-
~ncerns everything that lies together before us of itself. This excep- tened, not merely to me (the speaker), but rather when you maintain
tional laying is the Aeyev which comes to pass as the Aoyoc;. yourselves in hearkening attunement [GehOren], then there is proper
Thus is Aoyoc; named without qualification: d Aoyoc;, the Laying: hearing." .
the pure letting-Ue-together-before of that which of itself comes to Ue What happens, then, when such bearing occurs? When there lS
before us, in its lying there. In this fashion Aoyoc; occurs essentially as such proper hearing there is dpoAoyeiv, which can only be w~at it i~ as
the pure laying which gathers and assembles. Aoyoc; is the original a At!yc1v. Proper hearing belongs to the Aoyoc;. Therefore thJS heanng
\ assemb~age of the. primordial gathering from the primordial Laying. '0 is itself a AeyeJv. As such, the proper hearing of mortals is in a certain
\ Aoyoc; ts the Laymg that gathers [die leaende Lege], and only this. way the Same as the Aoyoc;. At the same time, however, precisely as
However, is all this no more than an arbitrary interpretation and opoAoyeiv, it is not the Same at all. It is not the same as the Aoyoc:
an all-too-alien translation with respect to the usual understanding itself. Rather, dpo;\oyeiv remains a MytJv which always and only lays
which takes Aoyoc; as meaning and reason? At first it does sound or lets lie whatever is already, as dpov, gathered together and lying before
strange, and it may remain so for a long time-calling Aoyoc; "the us; this lying never springs from the dpo;\oyeiv but rather rests in the
Laying that gathers." But how can anyone decide whether what this Laying that gathers, i. e. in the Aoy<><:.
translation implies concerning the essence of Aoyoc; remains appro- But what occurs when there is proper hearing, as OJ.lOAoyeiv? Hera-
priate, if only in the most remote way, to what Heraclitus named and clitus says: ooq>ov lonv. When OJ.lOAoyciv occurs, then ooq>ov comes to
thought in the name d Aoyoc;? pass. We read: ooq>ov lonv. One translates ooq>ov correctly as

66 67
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Loga. (Heracllttu, Fragment B 50)

..wisej~ ~u~ what d~s "wise" mean? Does it mean simply to know in the The text which is now current runs: tv ndvTa elvaL The dvru is
~y o . WJse m~n know things? What do we know of such knowin ? If

(
an alteration of the sole traditional reading: ev ' ndVTQ ei6eva1,
~t 7mw~s ahhavmg-seen whose seeing is not of the eyes of the sen~es understood to mean, "It is wise to know that everything is one." The
~s ~ e aving-heard is not hearing with the auditory equipment conjectural elva1 is more apP.,opriate. Still, we set aside the verb. By
en aving-seen and havi.ng-heard presumably coincide Th d ' what right? Because the"Ev lldvTa suffices. But it not only suffices: it
refer to a mere gra b ey o not
Of th spmg, ut to a certain kind of behavior. Of what sort? remains far more proper for the matter thought here, and likewise for
e sort that maintains itself in the abode of mortals. This abidin the style of Heraclitean speech. Ev lldvTa, One: All, All: One.
~~ ~h~ the Laying that gathers lets lie before us, which in eac~ How easily one speaks these words. How readily they transform
a Y es before us. Thus ~J!.s~mes that which can adh t themselves into a stolid maxim. A swarming_ multiplicinr_of_meaniogs
~hateyer has been indicated can devote itself to it, and can dise:c~ nestles in both these dangerously ~less words, lv and ndvTa. Their
Itself toward it (get under wa to d ) P
[schickliche8 ] h ~ha. Y.. war It . Because it is appropriate indeterminate juxtaposition permits various assertions. In the words !v
sue VIOr ~JDeukillful [geschickt]. When we want ndvTa the hasty superficiality of usual representations collides with the
to sahy that sofmeone is particularly skilled at something we still employ hesitant caution of the thinking that questions. The statement "One is
sue turns o speech "h has
this fashi h. as e a gift for that and is destined for it... In all" can lend itself to an overhasty account of the world which hopes to
on .':'e lt.. upon the genuine meaning of ooq>Ov, which we buttress itself with a formula that is in some way correct everywhere,
translate as fateful rgeschicklich"]. But "fateful" &om th for all times. But the"Ev lldvTa can also conceal a thinker's first steps
something more than .. killful .. Wh e start says
s - en proper hearing, as OIJo>.oyeiv ia which initiate all the following steps in the fateful course of thinking.
~;n th~t~ comes to p~s. and mortal >.eye1v isd ispatched to th; The second case applies with Heraclitus' words. We do not know their
di v:hed mes concerned with the Lamtg that gather;-AeyeJv is content, in the sense of being able to revive Heraclitus own way of
thsp . t~ what is appropriate, to whatever rests in the assemblage of representing things. We are also far removed &om a thoughtful com-
~ pn~ordially gathering laying-before, i.e. in that which the Laying prehension of these words. But &om this "far remove" we may still
t ga ers.has sent. Thus it is indeed fateful when mortals accomplish succeed in delineating more meaningfully a few characteristics of the
proper heanng. B~t ooq>Ov is not TO l:oq>Ov, the "fateful" is not "Fate," scope of the words lv and ndvTa, and of the phrase "Ev lldvTa. This
so ~ed because lt gathers to itself all dispensation, and precise} that delineation should remain a free-flowing preliminary sketch rather
which is approp~ate to the behavior of mortals. We have not et :ade than a more self-assured portrayal. Of course, we should attempt such
out what, accordmg to the thinking of Heraclitus d Aoy<><; . .: . a sketch only in reflecting upon what Heraclitus said from within the
still undecided whether the translation of d Aoy'rv- as "th ISLa ; I ~emthwns unity of his saying. As it tells us what and how the fateful is, the saying
th " ~-. e ymg at
ga ers captures even a small part of what the Aoy<><; is. names the Adycx;. The saying closes with"Ev lldvTa. Is this conclusion
And already we face a new riddle: the word TO l:o,---< If only a termination, or does it first unlock what is to be said, by way of
think it in H l'tu 't'Vv. we are to
in the sa . e.rac J s way, we toil in vain so long as we do not pursue it response?
, : g ~which it speaks, up to the very words that conclude it. The usual interpretation understands Heraclitus' fragment thus: it
0
o Yt:l)' oc::curs when the hearing of mortals h be
proper hearin Wh h h as come
t Wh _g. en sue a t ing happens something fateful comes
o pass. ere, and as what, does the fateful presence? Heraclitus See Dlels-Kranz, Ole Frogmente der Vorsolcratilcer, 6th ed. (Berlln: Weld-
says: OIJOAoyeiv oc:>q>dv eonvEv lldvra "the t fuJ mannscbe Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951), I, 161, line 17. Kranz rejects the Miller-
insofar as 0 ne All. " ' a e comes to pass Compen; paraphrase el&voa and prints elvru. Heldegger's citation of 8 50 capltal-
izes"Ev ndvto and drops elvru.-TR.

68 69
 Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)
EARLY GREEK THINKING
h l' before us (cf. B 112*). All
is wise to listen to the pronouncement of the Aoyoc; and to heed the lets d>..q9ea unconcealed as sue ' le al t Jnsdosure
hat i present from conce men .
meaning of what is pronounced, while repeating what one bas beard in disclosure re1eases w s . A.<en drawing from it and
the statement: One is All. There is the Aoyoc;. It bas something to
a1
needs conce men
t The 'A-Ari9ea rests m ''
. d sited in Ari9q. Aoyoc; is in Use
l'f
relate. Then there is also that which it relates, to wit, that everything is laying before us whatever remalns epo 1' It is , AM9ela.
one. and at the same time a revealing_and a conc:~:!~oir upon w"hich
However, the"Ev fidvta is not what the Aoyoc; relates as a maxim Unconcealment needs concealmen;, Ari: ::ying that gathers, has in
or gives as a meaning to be understood. "Ev fidvta is not what the disclosure can as it were, draw. Auyoc;, e . Aoyoc;
, at h acter When we can see to
Aoyoc; pronounces; ratber;Ev fidvta suggests the way in which Mvoc; itself this revealing-conce mg c ar all clear that
essentially occurs. how theEv essentially occurs as unifying, it bec~me:ne~te{y different
h s in the Adyoc; remams
' ' Ev is the-uni~e Q.I!e, as ul!ify!ng. It unifies by assembling. It this unifying whic occur tin or binding together.
assembles in that, in gathering, it lets lie before us what lies before us from what we tend to re~re,s~nt as isa co=~~:r ag mere comprehensive
_:r...~ that rests to ~.,yelv n all
as such and as a whole. The unique One unifies as the Laying that The u ....,,ng . f sites which equalizes con-
coll~tinTghn~~: ~::~~:~ ~! :og:~:r before us in one presenthcing
1
gathers. This gathering and laying unifying assembles all uniting in
itself, so that it i.t this One, and as this One, is what is unique. What- tranes. e fr osed to one ano er,
things which are usually separated om, an opp c:L ~ waking and
ever is named"Ev fidvta in Heraclitus' fragment gives us a simple clue d 'ght ' nter and summex..peace-m w
concerning what the Aoyoc; is. such as day an D1 , Wl sites home along the far-
Do we wander off the path if we think Aoyoc; as Aeye1 v prior to all sleepin~, Dionysos and Had~:~s:; : : c e, i.acpep<Spevov, let the
profound metaphysical interpretations, thereby thinking to establish thest distance betwe~n prese i its full bearing. Its laying is itself
seriously that Aiye1v, as gathering letting-lie-together-before, can be Laying that gathers lie before us n . th out.-The"Ev is itself a
that which carries things along by beanng em " ' A -
nothing other than the essence of unification, which assembles every-
( thing In the totality of simple presencing? There is only one
carrying out. h t the Adyoc; is. Adyoc; says how~Ev fidvta
appropriate answer to the question of what Aoy<><: is. In our formula- "Ev ndvta says w a
tiall Both are the Same. -
tion it reads: o ~oyoc; Myel. Aovoc; lets-lie-together-before. What? essen y occurs. di t bed to the Adyoc;, dpo>..oyetv
Ddvta. What this word means Heraclitus tells us immediately and When mortal Myew is. spha cE with its unifying domi-
. is assembled 1n t e v,
unequivocally in the beginning of fragment B 7: Ef ndvta td occurs. Th1S h fateful comes to pass. However'
.Svto . . . "If everything (namely) which is present .. . " The Laying Wh dpo>..oyetv occurs, t e ~-d t
nance. en F t 't elf Where do we ever IUl ' no
that gathers has, as Aoyoc;, laid down everything present in uncon- dpoXoyeiv is never properly a e ~sf: . ful 'tself? What is the fateful
cealment. To lay is to shelter. Laying shelters everything present in its merely things that are fated, but t e ate 1
Di 1 Kranz 1 176 reads:
presencing, from which whatever lingers awhile in presence can be Fragment B 112, e s- { d~q6t!a MyeiV llCll noteiv w:ald cpootv
appropriately collected and brought forward by mortal >..ye1v. Aoyoc; owcppoveiv dpen\ pey {OUI. w:al oocp 11
lays that which is present before and down into presencing, that is, it tnafovlac;. rfi . . d . dom consists in saying the truth
th ki . th greatest pe ection, an WlS
puts those things back. P!_esencing nevertheless suggests: having come Healthful in ng 'Jane th nature listening to it.
and acting In accor oe WI . "Th. king . s the greatest arete for what Is
forward to endure in unconcealment. Because the Aoyoc; lets lie before If we may venture another transladtiohn: k '"g w~ let unconoealment lie before us
us what lies before us as such, it discloses what is present in its presenc- h . dedicate ear enm "
fateful comes to pass w. en, m ] al g the lines of self-disclosure. - 1'1\.
and b ring forth [what 1S present on ,-
ing. But disclosure is ' AAri9ela. This .and Aoyoc; are the Same. Ai ye1v

71
70
 EARLY GREEK THINKING
Log01 (Herachtw, Fragment B 50)
itself? Heraclitus says what it Js unequivocall t th be .
..._ B Ya e gtnning of
1111gment 32: Ev t:d....ooiJ>Ov-PO&.ivov "the . The word that carries the saying, iOt!Aw, does not mean "to want,,.
alone th fa fuJ-;;- . ~lllllque One- unifying all is
o Ady~~ o~ ~ . But .if the Ev is the same as the Ady"" th
-
ul i
v,,. e res t s:
but rather "to be ready of itself for ... "; iOeAw does not mean merely
to demand something, but rather to allow something a reference back
Ad I U.Y.QY. The only properly fateful matter is the
i favtoc:fuJ.Whe~ mortal Aeyeiv, as OIJOAoyeiv, is dispatched toward what to itself. However, if we are to consider carefully the import of what is
s e , it 1s sent on its fated way. said in the saying, we must weigh what it says in the first line: "Ev
But how is Ady"" the fat ful h . d . . . . :\eyeo601 OUK eOeAel. "The unique-unifying-One, the Lay-
"" e ow lS it estiny proper that i th '
assembly of that which sends everything into its own? The'La s, e ing that gathers, is not ready . . . " Ready for what? For AeyeoEkn, to be
gathers assembles in itself a]] destiny by brinmng th dyin]g ~t assembled under the name "Zeus." For if in such assemblage the Ev
them lie before us k eo mgs an etting
' eeping each absent and present being in its place should be brought to light as Zeus, then perhaps it would al~ays have
an d on its way and by t bli to remain an apparition. That the saying under consideration concerns
totality Th ' h be I s assem ng it secures everything in the

l tus us eac ing can be joined and sent into it.s own. HeraclJ-
. says (B 64): t:d ~ lldVTa ofaKi{el Kepouv&:. "But li htni
(m p~sencing) the totality (of what is present)." g
in th ~:in~ abruptly lay~ before us in an instant everything present
ng steers
Aeyeo6at in immediate relation to dvopa (the naming word), indisput-
ably points to the rpeaning of Aeye1v as saying, talking, naming. S9
precisely this saying of Heraclitus, which seems to contradict directly
everything said above concerning Aiye1v and Adyoc;, is designed to
brio e all t ~ its presencmg. The lightning named here steers. It allow us renewed thinking on whether and how far Aeye1v in the sense
gs tbmgs .forward to their designated, essential place. Such of"saying" and "talking" is intelligible only if it is thought in its most
~~tantane~~s bnnging is the Laying that gathers, the Adyoc;. proper sense-as "laying" and "gathering." To name means to call
- gh.tning appears here as an epithet ofZeus. As the hi best 0 f od forward. That which is gathered and laid down in the name, by means
Zeus IS cosmic destiny. The Adv"" the"E Ud g g s, of such a laying, comes to light and comes to lie before us. The naming
be h' ""' v vra, would accordingly
not mg other than the highest god Th f (dvopa), thought in terms of Aeye1v, is not the expressing of a word-
uld a e essence o .Adyoc; thus
wo ouer a clue concerning the divinity of the god. meaning but rather a letting-lie-before in the light wherein something
Ought we now to place Adyoc;, "Ev lldvta, and Zeuc; all to ether stands in such a way that it has a name.
an dhevthe~ assert that Heraclitus teaches pantheism? Heraclitus d:es not' In the first place the"Ev, the Aoyoc;, the destining of everything
teac IS or any doctri A th k h
d ne. sa m er, e only gives us to think W'th fateful, is not in its innermost essence ready to appear under the name
1
regar to our question whether .Adyoc: ("Ev lldvta) and '7_ - th "Zeus," i.e. to appear (J$ Zeus: OUK eOeAel. Only after that does KOi
Same be tai 1 . ..c.t::U<; are e
' . cer n y gtves us difficult matters to think about Th eO:\e1 follow: the"Ev is "yet also ready."
r~sentational thought of subsequent centuries and ml'llenn: be rep- Is it only a manner of speaking when Heraclitus says first that
ned thi a] 1a as car-
of this ~=s= b o~g without thinking it, ultimately to relieve itself the "Ev does not admit the naming in question, or does the priority
clitus says (B 32): ur en with the aid of a ready forgetfulness. Hera- of denial have its ground in the matter itself? ForeEv llO:vta, as Adyoc:,
lets everything present come to presence. The "Ev, however, is not
itself one present being among others. It is in its way unique. Zeus, for
"Ev TO l:o<pdv pouvov :\eyweal ouK dlc:Xet his part, is not simply someone present among others. He is the high-
f Kal t!Oc:Xe1 Zl)vd<; dvopa

The One, which alone is wise, does not want

est of present beings. Thus Zeus is designated in an exceptional way in
presencing; he is alloted this special designation, and appropriately
' and yet does want to be called by the name Zeus. called to such an apportionment (Moipa) in the all-assembling Ev, i.e.
(Diels-Kranz) Fate. Zeus is not himself the "Ev, although as the one who aims
72 lightning-bolt.s be executes Fate's dispensations.
73
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment 8 50)

That with respect to the iOe>.et the OUK is designated first suggest. inadequate to the inquiry here undertaken? If this is so, then neither
that the"Ev does not properly admit of being named Zeus, and ofbeing can Adyoc: be the overcoming of mortal >.eyetv, nor can >.eyetv be
thereby degraded to the level of existing as one being present among simply a copying of the definitive Aoyoc:. Then whatever essentially
others-even if the "among" has the character of "above all other occurs in the Myetv of dpo>.oyeiv and in the Myetv of the Ady<><: has a
present beings." more primordial origin-and this in the simple middle region between
On the other hand, according to the saying, the"Ev does admit of both. Is there a path for mortal thinking to that place?
being named Zeus. How? The answer is already contained in what has In any case, the path remains at first confused and confounded by
just been said. If the "Ev is not apprehended as being by itself the the very ways which early Greek thinking opened for those who were
Aoyoc:, if it appears rather as the lldvra, then and only then does the to follow. We shall limit ourselves to steppi.ng back before the riddle,
totality of present beings show itself under the direction of the highest in order to get a first glimpse of several of its puzzling aspects.
present being as one totality under this [unifying] One. The totality of The saying of Heraclitus under discussion (B 50) states, according
present beings is under its highest aspect the "Ev as Zeus. The "Ev to our translation and commentary:
itself, however, as"Ev lldvra, is the Adyoc:, the Laying that gathers. As
Do not listen to me, the mortal speaker, but be in hearkening to the Laying
[ Aoyoc:, the"Ev alone is to :toq>Ov, the fateful as Fate itself: the gather-
that gathers; Srst belong to this and then you hear properly; such hearing is
ing of destiny into presence.
when a letting-lie-together-before occurs by which the gathering letting-lie,
If the dKouetv of mortals is directed to Aoyoc: alone, to the Laying the Laying that gathers, lies before us as gathered; when a letting-lie of the
that gathers, then mortal >.eyetv is skillfully brought to the gathering of letting-lie-before occurs, the fateful c~~es to pass; then the truly fateful, i.e/.
the Aoyoc:. Mortal >.eyetv lies secured in the Aovoc:. It is destined to destiny alone, is: the unique One unifymg All.
be appropriated in dpo>.oyeiv. Thus it remains appropriated to the
Aoyoc:. In this way mortal >.eyetv is fateful. But it is never Fate itself If we set aside the commentary, though not forgetting it, and try to
i.e. ~Ev lldvra as d Aoyoc:. ' translate into our language what Heraclitus said, his saying reads:
Now that the saying of Heraclitus speaks more clearly, what it says Attuned not to me but to the Laying that gath~r~: letting the Same lie: thJ
again threatens to fade into obscurity. fateful occurs (the Laying that gathers): One umfymg All. ..J
The "Ev lldvra indeed contains the clue to the way in which
Aoyoc: in its >.eyetv essentially occurs. Yet whether it is thought as Mortals, whose essence remains appropriated in dpo>.oyeiv are
"laying" or as "saying," does >.eyetv forever remain merely a type of fateful when they measure the Aoye; as the"Ev lldvta and submit
mortal behavior? If"Ev lldvra were the Adyoc:, then would not a themselves to its measurement. Therefore Heraclitus says (B 43):
particular aspect of mortal being be elevated to become the fundamen- "YPp1v xpr} oPevvuva1 }lOAAOV q nvpKairfv.
tal trait of that which, as the destiny of presencing itself, stands above
Measureless pride needs to be extinguished sooner than a raging fire.
all mortal and immortal being? Does the Aoyoc: imply the elevation
and transfer of the mortal's way-to-be to that of the unique One? Does This is needed because Aoy<><; needs OjlOAoyciv jf present beings are to
mortal >.eyetv remain only an image corresponding to the .Aoyoc:, appear and shine in presencing. 'O!lOAoyciv dispatches itself without
which is itself the Fate in which presencing as such and for all present presumption into the measuring of the Adyo<;.
beings rests? From the saying first considered (B 50) we receive a distant coun-
Or does such questioning, which attaches itself to the guidelines of sel, which the last-named saying (B 43) indicates to be the most neces-
an Either-Or, not at all apply, because its approach is from the start sary of all:
74 75
 EARLY GREEK THINKING LiJgo1 (Heraclitu1, Fragment B 50)
/
1 Before you play with fire, whether it be to kindle or extinguish ft, the distinction between the two tU a distinction, is brought to lan-
r ~ut out first the flames of presumption, which overestimates itself and guage? "To bring to language" usually means to express something
' takes poor measure because it forgets the essence of Aeyeav. orally or in writing. But the phrase now wishes to think something else:
"to bring to language" means to secure Being in the essence of lan-
The translation of Aeyeav as gathered-letting-lie-before, and of guage. May we suggest that such an event prepared itself when d
Aoyoc; as the Laying that gathers, may seem strange. Yet it is more Aoycx; became the guiding word of Heraclitus' thinking, because it
salutary for thinking to wander into_the strang~than to establish itself became the name for the Being of beings?
in the obvious. Presumably Heraclitus alienated his contemporaries at '0 Aoyoc;, to Aeyeav, is the Laying that gathers. But at the same
least as much, alt.hough in an entirely different way, by weaving the time Aeyeav always means for the Greeks to lay before, to exhibit, to
words Aeyeav and Aoyoc;, so familiar to them, into such a saying, and tell, to say. '0 Aoycx; then would be the Greek name for speaking,
by making d Aoyoc; the guiding word of his thinking. Where does this saying, and language. Not only this. '0 Aoyoc;, thought as the Laying
word d Aoyoc;-which we are now attempting to think as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence of saying [die Sage] as thought by
that gathers-lead Heraclitus' thought? The word d Aoycx; names that the Greeks. Language would be saying. Language would be the gather-
which gathers aU present beings into presencing and lets them lie ing letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing. In fact, the
before us in it. '0 Aoycx; names that in which the presencing of what is Greeks dwelt in this essential determination of language. But they
present comes !JSS. The presencing of prese-nt beings theGreeks never thought it-Heraclitus included.
c TO eov, that is, yo elvaa tulv dVTWV, in Latin, esse entium. We say The Greeks do experience saying in this way. But, Heraclitus
the ~ing ofbeings. Since the beginning of Western thought the Being included, they never think the essence of language expressly as the
of beings emerges as what is alone worthy of thought. If we think this Aoycx;, as the Laying that gathers.
historic development in a truly historical way, then that in which the What would have come to pass had Heraclitus-and all the Greeks
beginning of Western thought rests first becomes manifest: that in after him-thought the essence of language expressly as Aoyoc;, as the
Greek antiquity the Being of beings becomes worthy of thought u the Laying that gathers! Nothing less than this: the Greeks would have
beginning of the West and II the hidden source of its destiny. Had this thought the essence oflanguage from the essence of Being-indeed, as
beginning not safeguarded what has been, i.e. the gathering of what this itself. Ford Aoycx; is the name for the Being of beings. Yet none of
still endures, the Being of beings would not now govern from the this came to pass. Nowhere do we_find a trace of the Greeks' having
essence of modern technology. Through technology the entire globe is thought the essence of language directly from the essence of Being.
today embraced and held fast in a kind of Being experienced in West- Instead, language came to be represented-indeed first of all with the
em fashion and represented on the epistemological models of Euro- Greeks-as vocalization, q>wvrf, as sound and voice, hence phonetic-
pean metaphysics and science. ally. The Greek word that corresponds to our word "language" is
In the thinking of Heraclitus the Being (presencing) of beings yAt&looo, "tongue." Language is q>WVr\ OllP.OVnKrf, a vocalization which
appears as d Aoyoc;, as the Laying that gathers. But this lightning-flash signifies something:-This suggests that language attains at the outset
of Being remains forgotten. And this oblivion remains hidden, in its that preponderant character which we designate with the name "ex-
tum, because the conception of Aoyoc; is forthwith transformed. Thus, pression." This correct but externally contrived representation of lan-
e~ly on and for a long time it was inconceivable that the Being of guage, language as "expression," remains definitive from now on. It is
bemgs could have brought itself to language in the word d Aoycx;. still so today. Language is taken to be expression, and vice versa.
What happens when the Being of beings, the being in its Being, Every kind of expression is represented as a kind of language. Art

76 77
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

historians speak of the "language of forms." Once, however, in the

beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed in the
light of Being-once, when Heraclitus thought the Aoyoc; as his guid-
THREE
ing word, so as to think in this word the Being of beings. But the
lightning abruptly vanished. No one held onto its streak oflight and the
nearness of what it illuminated.
Moira
We see this lightning only when we station ourselves in the storm (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)
of Being. Yet e verything today betrays the fact that we bestir ourselves
only t~1o.o:n~y. We organize all available means for cloud-
seeding and storm dispersal in order to have calm in the face of the
storm. But this calm is no tranquility. It is only anesthesia; more pre-
cisely, the narcotizationof aJ!Xiety in the_face oLthinking. The relation between thinking and Being animates all Western
To think is surely a peculiar affair. The word of thinkers has DO reflection. It remains the durable touchstone for determining to what
authority. The word of thinkers knows DO authors, in the sense of extent and in what way we have been granted both the privilege and
writers. The word of thinking is not picturesque; it is without charm. the capacity to approach that which addresses itself to historical man as
The word of thinking rests in the sobering quality of what it says. Just to-be-thought. Parmenides names this relation in his saying (Frag. Ill):
the same, thinking changes the world. It changes it in the ever darker
depths of a riddle, depths which as they grow darker offe r promise of a tO ydp autO voeiv l!otfv tf! Kal eJvaL
greater brightness.
The riddle has long been propounded to us in the word "Being." For thinking and Being are the same.
In this matter "lki_ng" remains o.nl}! the provul<mal word. Let us see to
it that our thinking does not merely run after it blindly. Let us 6rst In another verse, Fragment VIII, {34-41) he elaborates this saying. 'nte
thoughtfully consider that ':Being" was originally called "presenc- lines read:
1
iqg"-and "presencing": enduring-here-before in unconcealment. tol.ltov 6'eotl voeiv re Kal ouveKev t!on vdqpo.
otl ydp dveu TOU t!dvtO<;, t!v ~ necponopevov eonv,
eupqoeu: TO voeiv: ou6v ydp q t!onv q t!OtOl
dAXo ndpef; tou t!dvtO<;, eneLtd y.e.._Moip' n6qoev
oUXov c:hdvqtdy_t' t!ppeva1: ti/J ncin' dvop' t!atal,
6ooo 6potol Kate9evto nenot9dte; elvat dAq9r};
yiyveo&i Tf! Kal dAAoo9ol, elva{ Tf! Kal ouxl,
Kal t dnov dXXciaot:lV fnd Tf! xpdo cpovov dpe{j}etv.

Thinking and the thought "it is" are the same. For without the being in relation
to which it is uttered you cannot find thinking. For ere ne'ther is nor shall be '\:;:.
anything outside ofbeing. since-Moira boundit to kwhokaJld im~2.v!hle.
F~.easan, all-the~e..name,s which.moFtals-bave laLd down,

79
78
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Moira {Pan11enldu VIII, 34-41)

convinced that they were true: coming-to-be as well as passing away, Being u succumbs to these crude and clumsy attempts-for which it was an
well as nonbelng, and also change of place and variation of shining colors. effort, to be sure-to assign every being that comes to the fore , among
How do these eight verses more clearly bring to light the relation others also thinking, a place in the totality of being.
between thinking and Being? They seem rather to obscure it, since Consequently our reflection will gain nothing by paying attention
they themselves lead us into darkness and leave us without counsel. to this inept interpretation of the relationship between thinking and
Let us therefore seek some sort of preliminary instruction concerning Being, which represents everything solely by reference to the mass of
the relation between thinking and Being by pursuing the main features beings at hand. Still, this interpretation does give us the J:riceless
of previous interpretations. It has traditionally been explained in three opportunity to make the point once and for all that l!~es no-
ways, each of which we may mention briefly without showing in detail where-axplicitly says that thinking too is one.of the many_edvra, one of
to what extent it is evidenced in the Parmenidean text. In the first, thJ;JDanifold beings, each of which at one time is and at another time is
thinking is taken as something at hand, appearing alongside many not, and therefore always brings to appearance both at once: being and
other such things, and which "is" in thaCseJl!e. Its being must be nonbeing, what comes-to-be and what passes away.
gauged by the standard applied to every other being of its kind, and In contrast to this first interpretation of Parmenides' saying-an
together with those beings be aggregated into a sort of comprehensive interpretation equally accessible to everyone-another more thought-
whole. Jhis unift of heine_ is called Being. Since thinking, considered ful treatment of the text (in verses VIII, 34 ff.) at least finds "utter-
as a being, is just like every other kind of being, thinking proves to be ances difficult to understand." To assist in illuminating what is intelli-
identical with Being. gible in them one has to search about for a proper guide. Where does
One hardly needs to have recourse to philosophy in order to draw one find it? Obviously it will be found in an understanding which has
such a conclusion. The mustering of what is at hand into the totality of more incisively penetrated into that relation between thinking and
being seems quite natural. It involves more than thinking. Seafaring, Being which Parmenides was trying to think. Such penetration p~
temple building, conversation at social gatherings, every kind of claims itself in a question concerning thinking or knowledge with re:)
human activity belongs among beings and is therefore identical with spect to its connection with Being, i.e. with reality. The analysis of the
Being. One wonders why Parmenides, precisely with respect to that relationship ~tween thinking and Being, understood In this fashion, is
human activity called thinking should have insisted on expressly estab- one of the chief aims of modem philosophy. With this aim in view,
lishing that it is included in the realm ofbeings. One would certainly philosophy has even produced a special discipline, theory of knowl-
be justified in wondering further why Parmenides proceeds to give a edge, which today in many respects serves as the chief business of
special proof for this inclusion, particularly through the commonplace philosophy. It has changed only its name, and is now called
notion that aside from beings, and being in totality, there can be no " Metaphysics" or "The Ontology of Knowledge." At present its deflni-
other beings. tive and most widespread form is being developed under the rubric of
Rightly viewed, however, where Parmenides' doctrine is rep- "Symbolic Logic" [Logistik]. Here the saying of Parmenides, by a
resented in such fashion one has long cea:sed to wonder. For by consid- strange and unforeseen transformation, has reached a decisive position
ering Parmenldes' thought in this way we abandon it; it thereupon of dominance. Thus philosophy in the modem age everywhere deems
itself so situated that from its seemingly superior standpoint it can
cf. Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vor.okratilrer, I, 238. Heldegger's citation of extract the true meaning from Parmenides' saying concerning the rela-
Fragment VIII diffen from that of Diels-Kranz In two respects: he replaces the Creek
aemicolon () In lines 36 and 38 with a colon(:), and employs a variant spelling for il)eVQl tion between thinking and Being. Considering the unchecked power of
(1. 38). On the latter see below, p . 91-TA. modern thinking (philosophy of existence and existentialism, along

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EARLY GREEK THINKING

with symbolic logic, are its most effective exponents), it is necessary to Thinking is thus identical with its Being; for there is nothing outside of Being,
emphasize more distinctly that deAnitive outlook within which the this great affirmation.
modern interpretation of Parmenides' fragment operates. for Hegel Being is the affirmation of self-productive thought. Being is
Modem philosophy experiences beings as objects [Gegenstand]. the product of thinking, of perception, in the sense in which Descartes
It is through and for perception that the object comes to be a "standing had already interpre te d idea. Through thinking, Being as
against." As Leibniz clearly saw, percipere is like an appetite which affirmation and as the positing of representation is transposed into the
seeks out the particular being and attacks it, in order to grasp it and realm of the "ideal." For Hegel also-though in an incomparably more
wholly subsume it under a concept, relating this being's presence thoughtful way, a way mediated by Kant-Being is the same as think-
[Priisenz] back to the percipere (repraesentare). Repraesentatio, ing. It is the same as thinking in that Being is what is expressed and
repre~ntation [VorsteUung], is defined as the perceptive self- affirmed by thinking. Thus, from the standpoint of modern philosophy,
arrogation (to the self as ego) of what appears. Hegel can pass the following judgment upon the saying ofParmenides:
Among the doctrines of modern philosophy there is one outstand- In that this saying gives evidence of ascending into the realm of the ideal,
ing formulation which is unfailingly regarded as the final solution by all genuine philosophizing began with Parmenides; ... t~is beg~ing i~ of
those who with the help of modem philosophy undertake to clarify course still dark and indefinite and does not further explam what IS contamed
Parmenides' saying. We mean Berkeley's proposition, which is based in it; but just this explanation constitutes the development of philosophy
on the fundamental position of Descartes' metaphysics and says: esse = itself-which is not yet present here. (pp. 274 I:T.)
percipi, Being equals beil}.g represented. Being falls under the sway of For Hegel philosophy is at hand only when the self-thinking of
representation, understood in the sense of perception. This proposi- absolute knowledge is reality itself, and simply is. The self-perfecting
tion fashions the context in which the saying of Parmenides first be- elevation of Being into the thinking of Spirit as absolute reality takes
comes accessible to a scientific-philosophical explanation which re- place in and as speculative logic.
moves it from that aura of half-poetical "presentiment" to which Pre- On the horizon of this consummation of modern philosophy Par-
socratic thinking is usually consigned. Esse = percipi. Being is being menides' saying appears as the very beginning of genuine philosophiz-
represented. lt is by virtue of representing that Being is. Being is ing, i.e. as the beginning of logic in Hegel's sense-but only as a
identical with thinking insofar as the objectivity of objects is composed beginning. Parmenides' thought lacks the speculative, dialectical form
and constituted in the representing consciousness, in the "I think which Hegel does however Sod in Heraclitus. Referring to Heraclitus
something." In light of this assertion regarding the relation between Hegel says, " Here we see land; there is no s~ntence in He~litus
Being and thinking, the saying of Parmenides comes to be viewed as a which I have not taken up into my Lo~ic." Hegel's Logic is not only the
crude preAguring of contemporary doctrines of reality and the knowl- one and only suitable interpretation of Berkeley's proposition in mod-
edge of reality. em times; it is its unconditioned realization. That Berkeley's assertion
It is no accident that Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of esse = percipi concerns precisely what Parmenides' saying Arst put into
Philosophy (Works, 2d ed., XIII, 274), translates and discusses this words has never been doubted. But this historical kinship of the mod-
saying of Parmenides concerning the relation of Being and thinking': em proposition and the ancient saying at the same til}le has its proper
"Thinking, and that for the sake of which there is thought, are the same. For foundation in a difference between what is said and thought in our
without the beings in which it is expressed (tv olnccpanovevov ionv) you will times and what was said and thought at that time-a difference which
not 6nd thinking; for thinking, without beings, is and shall be nothing. This is could hardly be more decisive.
the main thought. Thinking produces itself, and what is produced is a thought. The dissimilarity between the two is so far-reaching that through it
83
82
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Moira (Parmenldes Vlll, 34-41)

the very possibility of comprehending the difference is shattered. By be purely seen only in voeiv, nonsensible perception. Being belongs in
indicating this difference we are at the same time giving an indication the realm of the v011td, the non- and supersensible. Plotinus interprets
of the degree to which our own interpretation of Parmenides' saying Parmenides' saying in the Platonic sense, according to which Par-
arises from a way of thinking utterly foreign to the Hegelian approach. menides wants to say: Being is something nonsensible. Here the em-
Does the statement esse = percipf contain the proper interpretation of phasis of the saying falls on thinking, although not in the way this is
the saying tO ydp atho vodv eodv t Kal elvOl? Do both understood in modem philosophy. Being is identified in terms of
propositions-provided we may call them propositions-say that think- thintdng's nonsensible nature. Interpreted from the Neoplatonic per-
ing and Being are the same? And even if they do say so, do they say so spective, Parmenides' saying is an assertion neither about thinking nor
in the same sense? To the attentive eye a distinction at once makes about Being, nor even about the essential belonging-together of both in
itself clear which might easily be dismissed as apparently external. In their difference. The saying is rather an assertion about the equal par-
both places (Frags. III and VIII, 34-41) Parmenides words his saying so ticipation of both in the realm of the nonsensible.
that voeiv (thinking) each time precedes dva1 (Being). Berkeley, on Each of these three viewpoints draws the early thinking of the
the other hand, puts esse (Being) before percipi (thinking). This would Greeks into a region dominated by the spheres of questioning of sub-
seem to signify that Parmenides grants priority to thinking, while sequent metaphysics. Presumably, however, aU later thinking which
Berkeley grants priority to Being. Actually the situation is just the seeks dialogue with ancient thinking should listen continually from
reverse: Parmenides consigns thinking to Being, while Berkeley refers within its own standpoint., and should thereby bring the silence of
Being to thinking. To correspond more adequately to the Greek say- ancient thinking to expression. In this process, of course, the earlier
ing, the modem proposition would have to run: percipf = esse. thinking is inevitably accommodated to the later dialogue, into whose
The modem statement asserts something about Being, under- frame of reference and ways of hearing it is transposed. The earlier
stood as objectivity for a thoroughgoing representation. The Greek thinking is thus, as it were, deprived of its own freedom of speech. But
saying assigns thinking, as an apprehending which gathers, to Being, this accommodation in no way restricts one to an interpretation com-
understood as presencing. Thus every interpretation of the Greek say- pletely dedicated to reinterpreting the to-be-thought at the beginning
ing that moves within the context of modem thinking goes awry from of Western thinking exclusively in terms of subsequent modes of rep-
the start. Nonetheless, these multiform interpretations fulfiil their in- resentation. All depends on whether the dialogue we have undertaken
exorable function: they render Greek thinking accessible to modem first of all and continually allows itself to respond to the questioning
representation and bolster the latter in its self-willed progression to a address of early thinking, or whether it simply closes itself off to such
"higher" level of philosophy. an address and cloaks early thought with the mantle of more recent
The first of the three viewpoints that determine all interpretations doctrines. This happens as soon as subsequent thinking neglects to
of Pannenides' saying represents thinking as something at hand and inquire properly into the ways of hearing and frames of reference of
inserts it among the remaining beings. The second viewpoint, in the early thinking.
modem fashion, grasps Being, in the sense of the representedness of An effort at proper inquiry should not end in a historical investiga-
objects, as objectivity for the ego of subjectivity. tion which merely establishes the unexpressed presuppositions under-
The third point of view follows one of the gUidelines of ancient lying early thought; that is, proper inquiry is not an investigation in
philosophy as determined by Plato. According to the Socratic-Platonic which these presuppositions are taken into account solely with respect
teaching, the Ideas endow every entity with "being,'' but they do not to whatever subsequent interpretation either validates as already pos-
belong in the realm of aio011td, the sense-perceptible. The Ideas can ited truth or invalidates as having been superseded by further de-

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velopments. Unlike this type ofinvestigation, proper inquiry must be a it is experienced as Being, consistently understood as the Being of
dialogue in which the ways of hearing and points of view of ancient beings. Meanwhile the beginning of Western thinking was fated to
thinking are contemplated according to their essential origin, so that catch an appropriate glimpse of what the word elv01, to be, says-in
the call [Gehelss ] under which past, present, and future thinking ~uou:, Aoyoc:, "Ev. Since the gathering that reigns within Being unites
-each in its own way-all stand, might begin to announce itself. An all beings, an inevitable and continually more stubborn semblance
attempt at such inquiry should first direct its attention to the obscure arises from the contemplation of this gathering, namely, the illusion
passages of the ancient text, and should not settle upon those which that Being (of beings) is not only identical with the totality of beings,
give the appearance of easy intelligibility. To focus on the latter would but that, as identical, it is at the same time that which unifies and is
end the dialogue before it has begun. even most in being [do$ Seiendste]. For representational thinking ev-
The following discussion limits itself to working through the cited erything comes to be a being.
text by a series of individual commentaries. These may help to prepare The duality of Being and beings, as something twofold, seems to
a thoughtful translation of early Greek speech by advancing a tbinldng melt away into nonexistence, although thinking, from its Greek begin-
which is awake to beginnings. nings onward, has moved within the unfolding of this duality, though
without considering its situation or at all taking note of the unfolding of
the twofold. What takes place at the beginning of Western thought is
I
the unobserved decline of the duality. But this decline is not nothing.
The topic under discussion is the relation between thinking and Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a beginning, in
Being. In the first place we ought to observe that the text (VIII, 34-41) that the lighting of the Being ofbeings, as a lighting, is concealed. The
which ponders this relation more thoroughly speaks of tov and not-as hiddenness of this decline of the duality reigns in essentially the same
in Fragment III-about dva1. Immediately, and with some justiflca- way as that into which the duality itself falls. Into what does it fall? Into
tion, one concludes from this that Fragment VIII concerns beings oblivion, whose lasting dominance conceals itself as Ari9q, to which
rather than Being. But in saying eov Parmenides is in no way thinking 'AAri9ela belongs so immediately that the former can withdraw in its
"beings in themselves," understood as the whole to which thinking, favor and can relinquish to it pure disclosure in the modes of ~umc:,
insofar as it is some kind of entity, also belongs. Just as little does eov Aoyoc:, and "Ev, as though this had no need of concealment.
mean elva1 in the sense of"Being for itself," as though it were incum- But the apparently futile lighting is riddled with darkness. In it
bent upon the thinker to set the nonsensible essential nature of Being the unfolding of the twofold remains as concealed as its decline for
1apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather beginning thought. However, we must be alert to the duality of Being
r idv, being, is thought here in its duality as Being and beings, and is and beings in the eov in order to follow the discussion Parmenides
r participially expressed-although the grammatical concept has not yet devotes to the relation between thinking and Being.
come explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science. This duality is at
least intimated by such nuances of phrasing as "the Being of beings.. II
and "beings in Being." In its essence, however, what unfolds is ob-
scured more than clarified through the "in" and the "of." These expres- Fragment Ill states very concisely that thinking belongs to Being.
sions are far from thinking the duality as such, or from seriously ques- How shall we characterize this belongingness? Our question comes too
tioning its unfolding. late, since the laconic saying has already given the answer with its first
"Being itself," so frequently invoked, is held to be true so long as words: TO ydp a1.ho, "For, the Same .... " The construction of the

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 EARLl' GREEK THINKING Moll'a (Parmenlds1 Vlll, 34-41)

saying in Fragment Vlll, 34 begins with the very same word: Ta\JTdv. Simply through the fact that the duality on aocourtt of which mortals
Does this word give us an answer to the question of how thinking 6nd themselves thinking, demands such thinking for itself.
belongs to Being. in that it says both are "the Same"? The word gives We are still far from experiencing the duality itself-that is, at the
' no answer. In the first place, because the determination "the Same same time, so far as it demands thinking-far from experiencing it in an
precludes any question about "belonging together," which can only essential way. Only one thing is clear from the saying of Parmenides:
_exist between things that are different. In the second place, because neither on account of edvta, "beings in themselves," nor for the sake of
the word "the Same" says nothing at all about the point of view from elva1, "Being for itself," does thinking come to presence. That is.~o s:ay:
which, and for what reason, difference passes over into sameness. Thus a "being in itself," does not make thinking mandatory, nor ~oes Bem~
TO autd, the Same, remains the enigmatic key word for both for itself' necessitate thought. Neither, taken separately, will ever let 1t
fragments-if not for the whole of Parmenides' thought. be known to what extent "Being" calls for thinking. But because of
Ofcourse if we are of the opinion that the word TO autd, the Same, their duality, because of the edv, thinking comes to presence. The
means "identical," and if we accept "identity" completely as the most taking-heed of Being comes to presence on the way to the duality. In
transparent presupposition for the thinkability of whatever is think- such a presencing thinking belongs to Being. What does Parmenides
able, th~n by this opinion we become progressively more deaf to the say about this belonging?
key word, assuming that we have ever heard its call. It is sufBcient,
however, to keep the word in our hearing in its thought-provoking
Ill
character. In doing so we remain listeners, prepared to let this enigma-
tic key word alone for a while in order to listen for a saying which could Parmenides says that voeiv necpanO)JtVOV iv Tll) edvTL This is
help us to contemplate the enigma in all its fullness. translated: "thinking. which as something uttered is in being." But how
Parmenides offers some help. In Fragment VIll he gives a clearer can we eve; hope to experience and understand this being-uttered so
statement as to how we should think the "Being" to which voelv long as we do not take the trouble to question what "utterance," "to
belongs. Instead of dvm, Parmenides DOW says edv, "being" [du speak," and "language" mean here, or so long as we hastily accept edv
Selend], which enunciates the ambiguity of the duality of Being and as a being and let the meaning of Being remain undetermined? How
beings. But voeiv calls to mind vdl)pa: what has been taken heed of by can we ever come to recognize the connection of voerv to
an attentive apprehending. necpanO)Jevov so long as we do not adequately determine the voeiv by
' Edv is explicitly identified as that otl'veKev lon vdi'\)JO for the referring back to Fragment VI? (Cf. What b CaUed Thfnlcing? PP 203
sake of which thankful thought comes to presence. (Concerning think- &'.) Noefv, whose belonging-together with Mv we should like to con-
ing and thanking see What Is CaUed Thinktngr Part 2. Lecture 3, pp. template, is grounded in and comes to presence from ~iye1v. In
138 &'.) ~iye1v the letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing oc-
Thinking comes to presence because of the still unspoken duality. curs. Only as thus lying-before can what is present as such admit the
The presencing of thinking is on the way to the duality of Being and voeiv the taking-heed-of. Accordingly, the vdl'\}10 as vooupevov of the
beings. The duality presences in taJdng-heed-of. According to Frag- voe.iv' is already a ~eyo}levov of the A~e1v. In the Greek experience,
ment VI, taking-heed-of is already gathered to the duality by virtue ofa the essence of saying rests in ~iye1v. On that account voeiv is
prior Aeye1v, a prior letting-lie-before. How does this come about? essentially-not peripherally or accidentally-something said. Cer-
WJaot I1 Called Thinking? New York, Harper~ Row, 1968. -TL tainly not everything said need be an utterance. It can also, and some-

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING Moira (Parmenides Vlll, 34-41)

times must, be a silence. Every utterance and every silence is already present. This gives us food for thought and thoroughly frees us from
something said, though the reverse does not always hold. the hasty presupposition that thinking is something expressed in an
In what does the difference between something said and some- utterance: there is nowhere any suggestion of that.
thing uttered consist? For what reason does Parmenides characterize To what extent can and must voeiv, thinking, come to light in the
the vooupevov and voeiv (VIII, 34 ff.) asneqxmopt!vov? This word is duality? To the extent that the unfolding in the duality of presencing
correctly translated in dictionaries as "utterance." But how are we to and present beings invokes Aeyetv, letting-lie-before, and with the
experience an uttering which gets its name from q>doxetv and cpdvat? released letting-lie of what lies before us, grants voeiv something it can
Does "utterance" here merely stand for the vocalization (q>wvrf) of what take heed of and thus preserve. But Parmenides does not yet think the
a word or sentence signifies (oqpa{vetv)? Is speaking out, uttering, to duality as such; he does not at all think through the unfolding of the
be grasped here as the expression of something interior (something twofold. He does, however, say (Frag. VIII, 35 ff.): otl ydp dveu tou
psychical), and so divided into two component parts-the phonetic and COVTO<; ... evprfoeu: TO voeiv. "For you cannot find thinking apart
the semantic? There is no trace ofthis to be found in the experience of from the duality." Why not? Because thinking belongs with &ov in the
speaking as q>dvat, the experience ofspeech as cpdou:. ~oxetv implies gathering that eov calls for; and because thinking itself, resting in the
"to invoke," "to name with praise," "to call upon," all of which depend >..eyetv, completes the gathering called for, thus responding to its be-
upon the fact that the verb has its essence in letting something appear. longing to eov as a belonging which iov uses. For voeiv takes up, not
clldopa is the shining of the stars and of the moon, it is their way of just anything at random, but only that One designated in Fragment VI:
coming forward into view and of self-concealing. clldoeu: means "pha- COV t!plJVOl, * whatever is present in its presencing.
ses." The changing forms ofthe moon's shining are its phases. clldou: fs Insofar as what is thought-provoking, though not yet thought, is
the saying; to say means to bring forward into view. cllqp{, "I say," has announced in Parmenides' exposition, so far does the fundamental
the same (though not identical) essence as ~eyw: to bring what is requirement clearly come to light for proper reflection upon Par-
present in its presencing forward into shining appearance, into lying- menides' statement that thinking belongs to Being. We have to learn to
before. think the essence of language from the saying, and to think saying as
Parmenides thus wishes to discuss where voeiv belongs. For only letting-lie-before (MyO<;) and as bringing-forward-into-view (cpdou:).
where it belongs and is at home can we find it; only there can we To satisfy this demand remains a difficult task because that first illumi-
experience through our findings how far thinking belongs with Being. nation of the essence oflanguage as saying disappears immediately into
If Parmenides experiences voeiv as ne(j)(lnopevov, this does not mean a veiling darkness and yields ascendancy to a characterization of lan-
that he experiences it as an "utterance" which is to be discovered in guage which relentlessly represents it in te rm s of q>wvrf,
spoken conversation or in written characters, i.e. in some sort of sensi- vocalization-a system of signs and significations, and ultimately of
bly perceptible entitles. We would miss the mark entirely, putting the data and information.
greatest possible distance between ours-Jives and Greek thinking, if we
accepted this notion, and if we further desired to represent both speaJc- In the Ionian dialect and in epic usage the verb dv01 (to be) may appear either as
ing and what is spoken as "conscious experiences," and to establish lllevaa or illllt:vaa. In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics SimpUcius, for no apparent
reason, ascribes both forms to Parmenides. The first vanant appears at 144. 29 (Diels-
thinking within the confines of these experiences as an act of con- Kranz VIII, 38), the second at 117, 2 (Oiels- Kranz VI, 1). Heidegger reproduces the
sciousness. Noeiv, taking-heed-of, and what it takes up, are something second variant (t!lliJEvaa, OK VI, 1) throughout. With a shill of accent to the penult this
second form becomes t!lliJt!vaa, an Att ic Isomorph-used also by Herodotus,
said, something brought forward into view. But where? Parmenides however-which means to dweU in or abide by; or of things, to remain fiXed, stand
says: ev Tllj ovn, in eov, in the duality of presencing and what is fast.-TR

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IV present) to its unfolding. We are aided in our purpose by the insight

that thinking, when brought forward into view within the duality of the
Even now, when the way in which thinking belongs to Being has cov, is something said therein, ne<ponopevov.
been brought somewhat more clearly to light, we are scarcely able to As a result. what reigns in the duality is qxiou;, saying as the
hear the enigmatic key word of the saying-to a uto, the Same-in its invocative and insistent bringing-forward-into-view. What does the
enigmatic fullness. But when we see that the duality of the cov, the saying bring to appear? The presencing of what is present. The saying
presencing of what is present, gathers thinking to itself, then the gov- that comes to pass and governs in the duality is the gathering of pre-
erning duality gives us a clue to the profound riddle of what is hidden sencing, in whose shining what is present can appear. What Par-
by the ordinarily empty and insignificant word "the Same." menides thinks as ~dote; Heraclitus calls the Aoyoc;, the letting-lie-
Is it from the unfolding of the twofold that the duality in turn calls before that gathers.
thinking onto the path of"for its own sake," thereby requiring also the What happens in ~do1c; and in AoyOf_? Could the gathering-calling
belonging-together of the presencing (of what is present) and thinking? saying which reigns in them be that bringing which brings forth a
But what is the unfolding of the twofold? How does it happen? Do we shining? Which gives the lighting in whose endurance presencing is
find any basis in Parmenides' saying for a proper inquiry into the first illuminated, so that in its light what is present appears, thus
unfolding of the duality, or for hearing what is essential to the unfold- governing the duality of both? Could the unfolding of the twofold
ing in what the enigmatic key word of the saying silently conceals? We consist in this, that a shining which illuminates itself comes to pass?
find nothing immediate. The Greeks experience its basic character as disclosure [Entbergen].
Still, it should occur to us that in both forms of the saying concern- Correspondingly, disclosure reigns in the unfolding of the twofold. The
ing the relation of thinking and Being the enigmatic key word stands at Greeks call it 'AM9eta.
the beginning. Fragment III says, "For the Same is taking-heed-of and If indeed Parmenides was saying something about 'A~r{9eta, he
so too presencing (of what is present)." Fragment VIII, 34, says, "The must have been thinking within the unfolding of the twofold. Does he
Same is taking-heed-of and (that) toward which heedful perception is mention 'A~r{9eta? Of course he does, right at the beginning of his
on the way." What does situating the word at the beginning signify in " Didactic Poem." Even more: 'AM9eta is the goddess. Listening to
what this passage says? What tone is Pannenides trying to set in letting what she says, Parmenides speaks his own thought-although he
us hear this resounding emphasis? Ostensibly the dominant tone. In it leaves unsaid what the essence of' ~r{9eta might be rooted in. He also
resounds the anticipation of what the saying really has to say. Gram- leaves unthought in what sense of divinity 'A~r{9eta is a goddess. All
matically, what it says is called the predicate of the sentence. Thus the this remains for the early thinking of the Greeks as obviously outside
subject here would be voeiv (thinking) in its connection with dvat the realm of the thought-provoking as any explanation of the enigmatic
(Being). In accordance with the Greek text this is the sense in which key word, TO a uto, the Same.
one must interpret the grammatical structure of the saying. By placing Presumably, however, there is some hidden link connecting all
its enigmatic key word at the beginning as predicate, the saying calls on these unthought elements. The introductory lines of the poem (I, 22
us to dwell on the word attentively, returning to it again and again. But ff.) are not poetical finery masking an abstract conceptual work. We
even so, the word says nothing about what we would like to learn. make the dialogue with Parmenides' way of thinking too easy if we
Tfierefore we are compelled to focus our gaze relentlessly upon ignore the mythic experience in the philosopher's words, and then
the preferred position of to auto, the Same, and to make a daring object that the goddess 'A:hr{9eta is an extremely vague and empty
attempt to think from the duality of eov (the presencing of what is mental construct in comparison with the sharply delineated "divine

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING Molrd (Pannenlde Vlll, 34-41)

persons," Hera, Athene, De meter, Aphrodite, and Artemis. Such ob- The construction of the passage to ydp duto voeiv iadv te Kal
jections are advanced as if we already possessed old and reliable elva1, grammatically represented, now shows itself in a different light.
knowledge about the divinity of the Greek gods-as if we were certain The enigmatic key word, to auto, the Same, with which the saying
that it makes sense here to talk about "persons," and as if it had long begins, is no longer a predicate repositioned to stand first, but rather
~en determined that if the essence of truth should appear as a goddess the subject-what lies at the core, what supports and maintains. The
1t could do so only llS the abstract personification of a concept. Thought inconspicuous tadv, "is," now means "comes to presence," "endures,"
has scarcely touched upon the essence of the mythical, especially with and further, the bestowal of what endures. As such, to auto, the Same
regard to the fact that the t~u9oc; i the ~ying, while saying is the reigns. Specillcally, it reigns as the unfOlding of the twofold-an un-
calling bringing-into-appearance. Consequently we would be better folding in the sense of disclosure. That which unfolds, and in unfolding
advised to continue questioning with caution, while listening to what is reveals the twofold, allows taking-heed-of to get under way toward the
said (Frag. I, 22- 23): gathering perception of the presencing of what is present. Truth,
characterized as the disclosure of the duality, lets thinking, from out of
Ka{ J.l 9ed npc$cppwv tlne6l;ato, xeipa 6 xetp{ this duality, belong to Being. What is silently concealed in the enigma-
6el;nep~v 'A.ev, c.J6e 6' t!mx; cpdto Kat J.l npool')u6a: tic key word to atlto is the revealing bestowal of the belonging-
together of the duality and the thinking that comes forward into view
And the goddess received me with thoughtful within it.
affection, as hand with hand
she took my right and so gave voice and sang v
to me:
Thus thinking does not belong together with Being because it is
What is herewith given the thinker to think remains at the same also something present and therefore to be counted in the totality of
time veiled with respect to its essential origins. This affirms rather than presencing-which means here the whole of what is present. Admit-
denies that disclosure rules in what the thinker says, and rules as what tedly, it seems as though Parmenides represents the connection be-
the thinker heeds, since this points the way into what is to-be-thought. tween thinking and Being in just this fashion. But he offers some
But what is to-be-thought is named in the enigmatic key word ro auto, justillcation, tacking it on by means of a ydp (for). His explanati~n
the Same. What is so named expresses the relation of thinking to states (VIII, 36 tr. ), ndpe~ tou tdvToc;: outside ofbeings there was, IS,
Being. and will be nothing else in being (following Bergk's conjecture, otlo'
For that reason we must at least ask whether or not the unfolding tfv). However, tO tov does not say "beings," but rathe~ names ~e
of the twofold, taken specillcally as the disclosure of the presencing of duality. Naturally there is never a presencing of what is present outstde
what is present, is tacitly contained in the a uto, the Same. When we it, since presencing as such is grounded in, appears in, and shines out
presum~ that such is the case we do not advance beyond the thought of of the unfolded light of the twofold.
Parmemdes; rather, we only reach back into what must be thought But why does Parmenides expressly append this explanation with
even more primordially. regard to the relation of thinking to Being? Because the name voeiv,
A discussion of the saying that bears on the relation of thinking and "thinking," in not sounding the same as dva1, gives the appearance of
Being inevitably succumbs to the appearance of being arbitrary and actually being an d:\:\o, something different, something set opposite
forced. Being and therefore apart from it. But not only does the pronunciation

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING Moira (Parmenide Vlll, 34-41)

of the name appear to maintain itself"alongside" and "apart from" iov, Parmenides' subordinate clause-in reality his "sentence of
but also what the name names. This appearance is no mere illusion. sentences"-runs (VIII, 37 ff.):
For .Mye1v and voeiv let what is present lie before us in the light of
presencing. Accordingly, they themselves lie opposite presencing, . end TO ye Moip' encl>I'}OCV OUAOV dldvi'}TOV T' t!~~evru :
though certainly not as two independently existing objects. The con-
junction of >.eye1v and voeiv (according to Fragment VI) liberates the ... since Moira bound it (being) to be a whole and immovable.
6>v l ppeva1, presencing in its appearance, for perception, and there- (W. Kranz)
fore does in a certain sense hold itself apart from iov. In one respect
thinking is outside the duality toward which it makes it.s way, required Ear:m.enid~s..speaks oUov. oitMim;sencing (of whatJs p_rese_nt), and of
by and responding to it. In another respect, this very "making its way duality, and inno.senst<U.:.belngs." He names the Moif?_o, the ap~ ~
toward ... " remains within the duality, which is never simply an in- t}onment_which aJiots..b)'..hestmring and so unfolddhe twofold. The '
differently represented distinction between Being and beings, but apportionment dispenses [beschickt], (provides and presents) through
rather comes to presence from the revealing unfolding. It is this unfold- the duality. ApoortionmenU~ the. dispensation of presencing, as the
ing that, as 'A>.rf9ela, bestows on every presencing the light in which presencing of what is present, which is gathered in itself and therefore
something present can appear. unfolds of itself. Moipa is the_dest!nmg.pCBeing,::Jn..th.e.sense..,9f eD.'l!.J
But disclosure, while it bestows the lighting of presencing, at the Moipa has d is(!erued the de$tiny ofBeing,..Id~. into..the..duality, .anJ ~
same time needs a letting-lie-before and a taking-up-into-perception if thus has boundit to totality andJmmobility, from w.hich and in whicH
what is present is to appear, and by this need binds thinking to its the presencing of-what-is.present..com.es__to ~
belonging-together with the duality. Therefore by no means is there - ln the destining oLdY3lfty, however, only p_resencing attains a,
somewhere and somehow something present outside the duality. shining, and only wba.t Js presenLattains appearance. Destiny al-
This entire discussion would be something arbitrarily spun out in together conceals both the duality as such and its unfolding. The es-
thought and insinuated by hindsight had not Parmenides himself ex- sence of'A>.rf9ela remains veiled. The visibility it bestows allows the
plained why anything outside of presencing, anything besides the tov, presencing of what is present to arise as outer appearance [Aussehen],
is impossible. (eiOo<;) and aspect [Gesicht], (iO&a). Consequently the perceptual rela-
tion to the presencing of what is present is defined as "seeing"
VI (ei6evru). Stamped with this character of visio, knowledge and the
evidence of knowledge cannot renounce their essential derivation from
Considered grammatically, what the thinker says here about the luminous disclosure, even where truth has been transformed into the
iov stands in a subordinate clause. Anyone who has only minimal certainty of self-consciousness. Lumen naturale, natural light, i.e. the
experience in hearing what great thinkers say will probably pause to illumination of reason, already presupposes the disclosure of the dual-
ponder the strange fact that they say what is to be thought in a casually ity. The same holds true of the Augustinian and medieval views of
att_ached dependent clau~e and let it go at that. The play of the calling, light-not to mention their Platonic origins-which could only develop
I
bnghtening, expanding hght is not actually visible. It shines impercep- under the tutelage of an 'AArf8e1a already reigning in the destiny of the
"' 1tibly, like morning light upon the quiet splendor of lilies in a field or duality.
~ 1roses in a garden. If we wish to speak of the history of Beiog_we must first have

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""'
EA.RLY GREEK THINKING Moira (Parmenides Vlll, 34-41 )

\ considered that Being says: p.r.e$encing of what is_present: duality. But at becomes of th~<: (~g) teigning in reYealing des-
Only on the basis of Being, so considered, can we first ask with ade- tiny if this destiny should abandon what is unfolded in the twofold to
quate thoughtfulness what "history" might mean here. History-is the everyday perception of mortals? Mortals accept (0xeo9al, ~a)
destining oLthe_duality. It is the revealing, unfolding bestowal of whatever is immediately, abruptly, and first of all offered to them.

l luminous presencing in which what is present appears. The history of

Being is never a sequence of events which Being traverses for itself. It
They never concern themselves about preparing a path of thought.
They never really hear the call of the disclosure of the duality. They
is certainly not an "object" which might offer new possibilities of histor- keep to what is unfolded in the twofold, and only to that aspect which
ical representation, willing to put itself in the place of prior observa- immediately makes a claim upon mortals; that is, they ~eep to what is '
tions of the history of metaphysics with the presumption of knowing present without considering presencing. They relinquish all their af-
1better than they. fairs to what is commonly assumed, Yd OOKouvta (Frag. I, 31). They
~ Paonenides in his inconspicuous subordinate clause says take this to be what is unconcealed, dXq9ij (VIII, 39), for it really does
!about Moipa, into whose grasp edv has been released as the duality, appear to them and is thus something revealed. But what becomes of
, !reveals to the thinker the breadth of vision fatefully reserved for the their speech if it is not capable of being a Xeyetv, a Jetting-lie-before?
j ,With he treads. For in this expanse appears that in which the preseno- Th rdinary speech of mortals, insofar as they do not consider pres-
ing (of what is present) manifests itself: Yd orflJOYO YOu edvYa<:. There encing, that is, insofar as they do not think, e.nds up as a speaking of
are many (noX>.d) oLthese otllJO'tO. They are not signposts for some- names in which vocalization and the immediately peJ'Ceptible form of
thing else. They are the roanifolcLsbining of presencing itself, out of the the wo!JL iS spoken oLWJitten, are str_essed.
i unfolded duality. The unequivocal restriction of speech (of letting-lie-before) to
word-signs shatters the gathering taking-heed-of. The latter now be-
comes Katatleeoew (VIII, 39), establishing, which simply secures this
VII
or that as a hasty opinion. f.cv_erylhing-SO-ecu.t.ed.J:e.roains dvop_Q. -
But we have not yet exhaustively recounted what it is that Moipa Parmenides is in no way saying that what is ordinarily assumed be-
,in its dispensing metes out. Therefore an essential feature of the natUre comes a "mere" name. But Ydlat is thus assumed is given over to a!
(
of its governances till remains unthought. What is the significance of speaking entirely guided by current terms which, rashly spoken, say
the fact that destiny releases the presencing of what is present into the everything about everything and wander aimlessly in the " ... as well
duality, and so binds it to wholeness and rest? as .... "
To take proper measure of what Parmenides says about this prob- Perception of what is present (of idvta) also n~es eiva1 and
lem in the lines that follow his subordinate clause (VIII, 39 ff.), it is knows presencing, although it knows nonpresencing just as fleetingly;
necessary to recollect something previously mentioned (III). The un- of course, it does not know this in the same way as does thinking, which
folding of the twofold reigns as <pdm<;, saying as bringing-forward- for its part is concerned with what is withheld from the duality (the l-It\
'nto-view. The duality conceals within itself both voeiv and its thought cov}. Ordinary opinion knoM only elva{ T KOi odx{ (VIII, 40), pres-
(voq~a) as something said. What is taken up in thinldng, however, is encing as weJJ as nonpresencing. The stress in this knowing fall s on the
I the presencing o~ w~at is present. The th.oug~tful saying that corres- te-Ka{ the "as well as." And where ordinary perception, speaking in { } '
ponds to the duality 1s the Xeye1v, the lettmg-he-before ofpresencing. words.' encounters rise and fall , it is satisfied with the "as weJI as" of
It occurs, and occurs only, on the thought-path of the thinker who has coming-to-be, y{yveo9at [Entstehen] , and passing away, <SAA.uo9at
been called by A.Arf9eta. - [Vergehen]. It never perceives place, tonos, as an abode, as what the

98 99
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Moira (Parmenfdu Vlll, 34-41)

twofold.?ffers as a home t~ ~he presencing ofwhat is present. In the "as . because so much in the preserved fragments of his "Didactic Poem"
J well as, the ordinary opm10n of mortals merely follows the "here and still remains obscure, but also because what is said there continually
r lthere" (dAAdooetv, VIII, 41) of particular "places." Ordinary percep-
tion certainly moves within the lightedness of what is present and sees
deserves more thought. This unending dialogue is no failing. It is a sign
of fue boundlessness which, in and for remembrance, Q.OUri~~
what is shining out, cpavov (VIII, 41), in color; but it is dazzled by possibility of a tra.J!sfonnation of destiny.
changes of color, dJ.tel~etv, and p_ays no attention to the still light of the But anyone who only expects thinking to give assurances, and
lighting that emanates from duality-and. is Ckiou;: the bringing- awaits the day when we can go beyond it as unnecessary, is demanding
forward-into-view-the way the word speaks, not the way in which that thought annihilate itself. That demand appears in a strange light if
terms as mere names speak. we consider that the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed a call
Tw ndvT' dvoJ.t' t!OTat (VIII, 38): thereby will everything (that is which beckons them toward death. As the outermost possibility of
present) become present in a merely presumed disclosure which per- mortal Dasein, death is not the end of the possible but the highest
mits the predominance of terms. How does this happen? thto..ugh keeping (the gathering sheltering) of the mystery of calling disclosure.
~oiQa, throughJhe destining of the disclosure of the duality. How are
we to understand this? In the unfolding of the twofold what is present
comes to appear with the shining of presencing. What is present is
itself also something said, but said in name-words, in whose speaking
lhe ordinary speech of mortals moves. 'th_e_destining of the disclosure
Qfthe duaJity.,(of ~OV) yields what iS present ('rd eOVTO) to the everyday
~tion af.mortal~.
How does this fateful yielding occur? Already only insofar as the
twofold as such, and therefore its unfolding, remain hidden. But then
does self-concealment reign at the heart of disclosure? A bold thought.
Ueraclitus thought it. Parmenides unwittingly experienced this
thought insofar as he heard the call of 'AXrf9eta and contemplated the
Moipo of eov, the destining of the duality, with a view to what is
present and also to presencing.
J., Parmenides would not have been a thinker at the earliest da.wp of
f.fat thinkinuhich is sent into the destiny ofthe_duality if he had not
thought within the area of the riddle which is silently contained in the
enigmatic key word TO at.ho, the Same. Herein is concealed what is
thought-worthy, what in the very predominance of what is present (Td
eOVTO, Td OOKOVVTO) gives us food for thought: as the relation of think-

ling to Being, as the truth of Being in the sense of the disclosure of the
duality, and as withholding from the twofold (J.trl eov).

The dialogue...wlth Parmenides..ney.er....comes to an end, not only

100 101
 Aletheia (Heraclittu, Fragment B 16)

think, we are justified in calling this thinker "the Obscure." Even the
inherent meaning of what this epithet says to us remains obscure.
Heraclitus is called "the Obscure." But he is the Lucid. For he
FOUR tells of the lighting whose shining he attempts to call forth into the
language of thinking. Insofar as it illuminates, the lighting endures. We
Aletheia call its illumination the lighting [die Lichtung]. What belongs to it. and
how and where it takes place, still remain to be considered. The word
(Heraclitus, Fragment B 16) "light" means lustrous, beaming, brightening. Lighting bestows the
shining, opens what shines to an appearance. The open is the realm of
unconcealment and is governed by disclosure. What belongs to the
latter, and whether and to what extent disclosing and lighting are the
Same, remain to be asked.
He is called "the Obscure," o l:Kotelv~ Heraclitus had this An appeal to the meaning of dX11eeola accomplishes nothing, and
reputation even when his writings were preserved intact. Today we will never produce anything useful. Further, we must ask whether
know only fragments of his work. Later thinkers-Plato and Aristotle; what is entertained under the rubrics "truth," "certainty," "objectiv-
subsequent authors and philosophical scholars-Theophrastus, Sextus ity," and "reality" has the slightest bearing upon the direction in which
Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch; even Church revealing and lighting point thought. Presumably, the thinking that
Fathers-Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen-all cite goes in such a direction has more at stake than a securing of objective
passages from Heraclitus here and there in their own works. Thanks to truth-in the sense of valid propositions. Why is it that we are ever and
research in philology and history of philosophy, these quotations have again so quick to forget the subjectivity that belongs to every objectiv-
been collected as fragments. Sometimes the fragments comprise sev- ity? How does it happen that even when we do note that they belong
eral sentences, sometimes only one sentence, and occasionally they together, we still try to explain each from the standpoint of the other,
consist of mere phrases or isolated words. or introduce some third element which is supposed to embrace both
The train of thought of these later thinkers and writers determines subject and object? Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering
their selection and arrangement of Heraclitus' words. This in tum even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does
delimits the space available for any interpretation of them. Thus a not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the
closer examination of their place oforigin in the writings of subsequent object and its objectivity, and the subject and its subjectivity, and
authors yields only the context into which the quotation has been hence is prior to the realm of their reciprocity? That our thinking finds
placed, not the Heraclitean context from which it was taken. The quo- it so toilsome to be in this bestowal, or even on the lookout for it,
tations and the sources, taken together, still do not yield what is essen- cannot be blamed on a narrowness of contemporary intellect or resis-
tial: the definitive, all-articulating unity of the inner structure of Hera- *Ai tho ugh Heidegger positively discourages us from doing so, we offer the follow-
clitus' writing. Only a constantly advancing insight into this structure lOg ph ilologicaJ information: riX118tola is a substantive form constructed from d XI)Elrf<:
( -ic:). an adjectival form of dXri9t la. T. Caisford's Etymologicum Magnum (Oxford,
will reveal the point from which the individual fragments are speaking, IIWS), pp. 62, 51, d iscusses It as follows: Ar]9w = Xa v9dvw: dX1181!c: TO 11~ M 911
and in what sense each of them, as a saying, must be heard. Because unonimov. Ari&lls a collate ral form of >..av9dvw,I escape notice. am hidde n, unseen or
we can scarcely surmise what the well-spring is that gives the writing of forgotte n by others. Caisford describes d X118&c: as that which does not sink into Xri9fl, the
source of obli vion. Lidde U-Scott tran slate dX118ic: as "unconceale d. " Hence d XI)Eleoia
Heraclitus its unity, and becau~ we find this source so difficult to might btl' ren de red as "unconcealme nt."-TR.

102 103
 EARLY GREEK THINKING Alethefa (Heraclitu&, Fragment B 16)

tance to unsettling or disruptive views. Rather we may surmise some- everything, even the sin committed in darkness. Thus his work The
thing else: that we know too much and believe too readily ever to feel Teacher says in another place (Bk. III, chap. 5): ot1T~ ydp pov~
at home in a questioning which is powerfully experienced. For that we dmW<; n<: Olapevel, d ndvTOTe oupnapeivm vop{(Ol TOV erov. "In this
need the ability to wonder at what is simple, and to take up that way alone will a man never fall , if he hold to the belief that God is
wonder as our abode. everywhere present with him." Who would gainsay the fact that Clem-
Of course, "simple" assertion and repetition that the literal mean- ent, pursuing his theologico-pedagogic intentions, put the words of
ing of d:AJ]eeofa is "unconcealment" will not give us what is simple. Heraclitus-seven centuries later-into a Christian frame of reference,
Unconcealment is the chief characteristic of that which has already thereby imposing his own interpretation on them? The Church Father
come forward into appearance and has left concealment behind. That is was thinking about sinners hiding themselves from the light. Hera-
the significance here of the a-, which only came to be classified as the clitus, on the other hand, speaks only about "remaining concealed."
alpha-privative by a grammar based upon later Greek thought. The Clement means the supersensible Light. TOV eeov, God, the God of
connection with :Ariei'J, concealment, and concealment itself do not Christian faith. Heraclitus, however, mentions only the never-setting.
diminish in importance for our thinking simply because the uncon- Whether or not this "only"-emphasized by us-signifies a limitation
cealed is immediately experienced only as what has come forward in or something else is now, and will in what follows remain, an open
appearance, or what is present. question.
Wonder first begins with the question, "What does all this mean What advantage would there be in arguing that this theological
and how could it happen?" How can we arrive at such a beginning? interpretation of the fragment is simply incorrect? At best, such an
Perhaps by abandoning ourselves to a wonder which is on the lookout argument could leave the impression that the following remarks
for what we call lighting and unconcealing? cherish the notion that they engage Heraclitus in the one absolutely
Thoughtful wonder speaks in questioning. Heraclitus says: correct way. Our task limits itself to getting closer to the words of the
Heraclitean saying. This could help to bring some future thinking
TO J.ll\ ouvdvnon;nWc; dv m: >...d8m; within range of still unheard intimations.
Since these proceed from the call under which thinking stands,
How can one hide himself before that which never sets? there is little to be gained from comparing thinkers and calculating
(Diels-Kranz) their proximity to these intimations. Rather, all our efforts should be
directed toward bringing ourselves closer to the realm of what is to be
The saying is numbered as Fragment 16. But because of its inner thought by means of a dialogue with an early thinker.
significance and ultimate implications, perhaps we ought to consider it Discerning minds understand that Heraclitus speaks in one way to
the first. Heraclitus' saying is quoted by Clement of Alexandria in his Plato, in another to Aristotle, in another to a Church Father, and in
Paidagogos (Bk. III, chap. 10) to support a theological-educational pos- others to Hegel and to Nietzsche. If one remains embroiled in a histor-
ition. He writes: ical grasp of these various interpretations, then one has to view each of
:XrioeTQl [I] pev ydp fO<.O<; TO aio91'jTOV <poX: n<:, TO oe VOI'JTOV dOUVQTOV them as only relatively correct. Such a multiplicity necessarily
eonv, rf !&; q>lJOlV ' HpciKAemx;.... threatens us with the specter of relativism. Why? Because the histori-
"Perhaps one can hide from the light perceived by the senses, but cal ledger of interpretations has already expunged any questioning
it is impossible to do so before spiritual light, as Heraclitus dialogue with the thinker-it probably never entered such dialogue in
says .. .. " Clement is thinking about the ever-present God who sees the first place.

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING Alethela ( Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)

The respective difference of each dialogical interpretation of determined by remaining concealed and unconcealed. One need not
thought is a sign of an unspoken fullness to which even Heraclitus begin with a seemingly capricious etymology of OAI10co{a in order to
himself could only speak by following the path of the insights afforded experience how universally the presencing of what is present comes to
him. Wishing to pursue the "objectively correct" teaching of Heraclitus language only in shining, self-manifesting, lying-before, arising, bring-
means refu sing to run the salutary risk of being confounded by the ing-itself-before, and in assuming an outward appearance.
truth of a thinking. All this, in its undisturbed harmony, would be unthinkable within
The following remarks lead to no conclusions. They point toward Greek existence and language if remaining-concealed/remaining-
the event [das Ereignis]. unconcealed did not hold sway as that which really has no need to bring
Heraclitus' saying is a question. The word with which the frag- itself expressly to language, since this language itself arises from it.
ment ends-"end" understood as n !Aoc;-names that from which the Accordingly, the Greek experience in the case of Odysseus does
questioning begins. It is the domain in which thinking moves. The not proceed from the premise that the guests present are represented
word into which the question ascends is Xci9oL What could be easier to as subjects who in their subjective behavior fail to grasp weeping Odys-
establish than this: that Aav9dvw, aorist lXa9ov, means " I am hid- seus as an object of their perception. On the contrary, what governs
den"? Nonetheless, we are scarcely capable of immediately rediscover- the Greek experience is a concealment surrounding the one in tears, a
ing just how this word speaks in Greek. concealment which isolates him from the others. Homer does not say:
Homer (Odyssey, VIII, 83 ff.) tells how Odysseus, in the Phaea- Odysseus concealed his tears. Nor does the poet say: Odysseus con-
cian king's palace, covered his head each time at the minstrel Demo- cealed himself as one weeping. Rather, he says: Odysseus remained
docus' song, whether happy or sad, and thus hidden from those pres- concealed. We must ponder this matter ever more strenuously, even at
ent, wept. Verse 93 runs: iv9' dAAou~ ~ev nciv ta<; t!Xdv9ave OciKpua the risk of becoming diffuse and fastidious. A lack of sufficient insight
Adl}wv. Consistent with the spirit of our own language, we translate: into this problem will mean, for us, that Plato's interpretation of pres-
"Then be shed tears, without all the others noticing it." The German encing as loea remains either arbitrary or accidental.
translation by Voss comes closer to what the Greek says, since it carries A few verses before the one we have cited, Homer says (1. 86):
the important verb t!Xciv9ave over into the German formulation: " He aroeto ydp ~O{IlKO<; th' oq>pUOl OclKpua Ad~wv. In keeping with
concealed his flowing tears from all the other guests." 'EXdv9ave, idiomatic German Voss translates: (Odysseus covered his head) "so that
however, does not mean the transitive "he concealed," but "he re- the Phaeacians could not see his wet lashes." Voss in fact leaves the key
mained concealed"-as the one who was shedding tears. "Remaining word untranslated: aroem. Odysseus shied away-as one shedding
concealed" is the key word in the Greek. German, on the other hand, tears before the Phaeacians. But doesn't this quite clearly mean the
says: he wept, without the others noticing it. Correspondingly, we same as: he hid himself before the Phaeacians out of a sense of shame?
translate the well-known Epicurean admonition Xci9e ~11.1Soa~ as "Live Or must we also think shying away, aioW<;, from remaining-concealed,
in hiding." Thought from a Greek perspective, this saying means: "As granted that we are striving to get closer to its essence as the Greeks
the one who leads his life, remain concealed (therein)." Concealment experienced it? Then "to shy away," would mean to withdraw and
here defines the way in which a man should be present among others. remain concealed in reluctance or restraint [Verhoffen]. keeping to
By the manner of its saying, the Greek announces that concealing- oneself.
and therefore at the same time remaining unconcealed-exercises a Typically Greek, this poetic vision of Odysseus weeping beneath
commanding preeminence over every other way in which what is pres- his cloak makes clear how the poet feels the governance of
ent comes to presence. The fu ndamental trait of presencing itself is presencing-a meaning of Being which, though still unthought, has

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already become destiny. Presencing is luminous self-concealing. Shy- intensify it: ou:\ov9dvopot. Thus they also identify the concealment
ing away corresponds to it. It is a reserved remaining-concealed before into which man falls by reference to its relation to what is withdrawn
the closeness of what is present. It is the sheltering of what is present from him by concealment.
within the intangible nearness of what remains in coming-that coming Both in the way the Greek employs ).ov9dvev, to remain con-
which is an increasing self-veiling. Thus shying-away, and everything cealed, as a basic and predominant verb, as well as in the experience of
related to it, must be thought in the brilliant light of remaining- the forgetting of remaining-concealed, this much is made sufficiently
concealed. clear: :\ov9dvw, I remain concealed, does not signify just a form of
Consequently, we must also be prepared to consider more human behavior among many others, but identifies the basic trait of
thoughtfully another Greek word, whose stem is ).o9-. This is every response to what is present or absent-if not, indeed, the basic
em:\ov9dveo0ot The correct translation is "to forget." On the basis of trait of presence and absence themselves.
this lexical correctness everything seems perfectly clear. We act as if Now, if this word Ari9w, I remain concealed, speaks to us in the
forgetting were the most transparent thing in the world. Only fleet- saying of a thinker, and if perhaps it concludes a thoughtful question,
ingly does anyone notice that there is a reference to ''remaining con- then we are bound to ponder the word and what it says as comprehen-
cealed" in the corresponding Greek word. sively and as persistently as we can today.
But what does "forgetting" mean? Modern man, who puts all his Every remaining-concealed incl~des a relation to the sort of thing
stock into forgetting as quickly as possible, certainly ought to know from which the concealed has withdrawn, but toward which in many
what it is. But he does not. He has forgotten the essence of forgetting, cases it remains directly inclined. The Greek names in the accusative
assuming he ever thought about it fully, i.e. thought it out within the that to which what has withdrawn into concealment remains related:
essential sphere of oblivion. The continuing indifference toward the ev9' d:\:\ouc; pevndvroc; e).dv9ove. . ..
essence of forgetting does not result simply from the superficiality of Heraclitus asks: no)(: dv nc; :\d9o-"how could anyone remain
our contemporary way of life. What takes place in such indifference concealed?" Relative to what? To what is named in the preceding
comes from the essence of oblivion itself. It is inherent in it to with- words, with which the fragment begins: rd Jll1 ouvdvnore, that which
draw itself and to founder in the wake of its own concealment. The never sets. The "anyone" mentioned here is consequently not the
Greeks experienced oblivion, Ari9fl, as a destining of concealment. subject in relation to which something else remains concealed, but the
Aov9dvopol says: I am-with respect to my relation to something "anyone" who comes into question with respect to the possibility ofhi8
usually unconcealed-concealed from myself. The unconcealed, for its own remaining-concealed. Heraclitus' question is not first and
own part, is thereby concealed-even as I am concealed from myself in foremost a consideration of concealment and unconcealment with re-
relation to it. What is present subsides into concealment in such a way gard to the sort of men whom we, with our modern habits of represen-
that I, because of this concealing, remain concealed from myself as the tation, like to interpret as carriers--or even creators--of unconceal-
one from whom what is present withdraws. At the same time, this very ment. Heraclitus' question, expressed in modern terms, thinks the
concealing is itself thereby concealed. That is what takes place in the reverse. It ponders the relation of man to "the never-setting" and
occurrence to which we refer when we say: I have forgotten (some- thinks human being from this relation.
thing). When we forget, something doesn't just slip away from us. With the words "the never-setting" we are translating-as though
Forgetting itself slips into a concealing, and indeed in such a way that it were self-evident-the Greek phrase td 11il ouvdv note. What do
we ourselves, along with our relation to what is forgotten, fall into these words signify? Where do we get our information about them?
concealment. The Greeks, therefore, speaking in the middle voice, This seems the obvious question to explore, even if the pursuit should

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lead us far from the saying of Heraclitus. Here, however, and in similar the realm of concealment, but in the utterly opposite sphere. A slight
instances, we easily run the risk of searching too far afield. For we transposition of the construction into the form to prfnote ouvov clarifies
presume the phrase is clear enough to warrant an immediate and ex- at once what the fragment is talking about: the never-setting. If we
clusive search for the sort of thing to which "the never-setting" must, change the negative expression into a completely affirmative one, we
according to Heraclitus' thinking, be attributed. But our inquiry will then hear for the first time what the fragment means by the
not take us so far. Nor shall we decide whether the question can be "never-setting"-i.e. the ever-rising. In Greek phraseology, this
asked in that way. The attempt to render such a decision would fall would have to be to del cpuov. This turn of speech is not found in
away once it became clear that the question (to what does Heraclitus Heraclitus. The thinker speaks only of cpuou;. In this we hear a primal
ascribe the never-setting?) is superfluous. But how can this be made word of Greek thought. Unexpectedly, then, we get an answer to our
clear? How can we avoid the danger of inquiring too far afield? question as to what it is whose setting Heraclitus denies.
Only if we realize to what degree the phrase to J.tr} cSuvov note But can this indication of cpuou; as an answer satisfy us, so long as it
gives us quite enough to think about, once we clarify what it says. remains obscure how we are to understand cpumc;? And what help are
The key is to cSuvov. It is related to ouw, which means to envelop, impressive-sounding epithets like "primal word," if the grounds and
to submerge. ~uetv says: to go into something-the sun goes into the the abysses [Griinde und Abgriinde] of Greek thinking so little concern
sea, is lost in it. llp<)c; cSuvovtoc; rjAiou means toward the setting sun, us that we can cloak them in arbitrarily chosen terms borrowed in an
toward evening; vicpea ouva1 means to sink into the clouds, to disap- utterly thoughtless fashion from our current stock of ideas? If indeed to
pear behind clouds. Setting, as the Greeks thought of it, takes place as prftote cSuvov is to signify cpuotc;, then the reference to cpuotc; will not
a going into concealment. tell us what to llrl ouvov note is, but the other way around-"the
We can easily see, If at first only tentatively, that the two main- never-setting" urges us to consider how cpuotc; is experienced as the
-because substantial-words with which the fragment begins and ever-rising. And what is this latter but what is always-enduring and
ends, to cSuvov and .AdOot, say the Same. But in what sense this is true self-revealing? The saying of the fragment accordingly takes place in
still remains in question. Meanwhile, we have already gained some- the realm of disclosure, not that of concealment.
thing when we perceive that the fragment, in its questioning, moves How, and with respect to what content, must we think the realm
within the realm of concealing. Or do we, as soon as we pursue this line of disclosure and disclosing itself, so as not to run the risk of chasing
of thinking, lapse into gross error? It seems so, for the fragment names mere terms? The more determined we are to keep from intuitively
to llrl ouvov note, that which never does set. This is obviously some- representing the ever-rising, the never-setting, as some present thing,
thing that never goes into concealment. ConcealQtent is excluded. Of the more urgent will be the discovery of what it is to which "never-
course the fragment would still ask about remaining-concealed. But it setting" has been given as an attribute.
questions the possibility of concealment so emphatically that the ques- The desire to know is often praiseworthy; only not when _it is rash.
tion amounts to an answer-which rejects the possibility of But we could scarcely be proceeding more deliberately, not to say
remaining-concealed. In the form of a simply rhetorical question, the fastidiously, when we remain at all times close to the words of the
affirmative proposition says: no one can remain concealed before the fragment. Have we in fact stayed with them? Or bas a barely noticeable
never-setting. This sounds almost like a maxim. transposition of words seduced us to haste, and thus to waste an oppor-
As soon as we hear the key words to cSuvov and .AdOot in the tunity for observing something crucial? Apparently so. We transposed
unbroken unity of the fragment, and no longer extract them as indi- to~ ouvov note into the form to llrfnon: ouvov, and correctly trans-
vidual terms, it becomes evident that the fragment does not operate in lated prfnote as "never" and to ouvov as "that which sets." We consid-

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ered neither prj', which is stated independently before Mvov, nor non!, Same. If we pay strict attention to this fact, then we are prevented from
the word that follows 6uvov. We therefore failed to pay attention to a carelessly putting n\v <pumv in place oCTo lltl l>UvovnoTe. Or is that
hint proffered us by the negation prj' and the adverb noTe for a more still possible, perhaps even inevitable? In the latter case, however, we
considered interpretation of Mvov. Mrf is a word of negation. Like must no longer think of <puou~ simply as rising. At bottom, it nev_er
ovK, it signifies a" not," but in a differense sense. OuK denies something means that anyhow. No less a figure than Heraclitus says so, clearly
to whatever is being affected by the negation. Mrf, on the other hand, and enigmatically at once. Fragment 123 reads:
attributes something to whatever comes within its sphere of negation, a
~u01c; Kpumeo6ol q>~>.ci.
refusal, a distancing, a preventing. Mrl .. . noTe says: Not ... ever . ..
(Well, what then?) ... does something essentially unfold otherwise Whether the translation "the essence of things likes to hide" even
than the way it does. remotely points toward the realm of Heraclitean thinking will not be
In Heraclitus' fragment prj' and noTe bracket Mvov. Viewed further discussed here. Perhaps we should not attribute such a com-
grammatically, the word is a participle. Up until now we have trans- monplace to Heraclitus, even apart from the fact that an "essence of
lated it in the apparently more natural nominati~e meaning. This has things" first became a matter for thought after Plato. We must heed
served to emphasize the equally natural view that Heraclitus is speak- something else: <pum<: and KpumeoOal, rising (self-revealing) and con-
ing about the sort of thing that never falls prey to setting. But the cealing, are named in their closest proximity. This might seem strange
negating JU\ ... non: touches on a certain kind of enduring and essen- at first glance. For if <pum<: as rising turns away from, or indeed against,
tial occurring [Wesen]. The negation therefore refers to the verbal something, then it is KpumeoOat, self-concealing. But Heraclitus is
sense of the participle 6\.ivov. The same is true of the prj' in the idv of thinking both in closest proximity. Indeed their nearness is explicitly
Parmenides. The phrase TO PI\ Mvdv noTe says: the not setting ever. mentioned. Nearness is defined by <p!Aei. Self-revealing loves self-
If we dare for a moment to change the negative phrase back to an concealing. What is this supposed to mean? Does rising seek out con-
affirmative one again, then it becomes clear that Heraclitus thinks the cealment? Where then must concealment be-and in what sense of
ever-rising; not something to which rising is qualitatively attributed, "her' Or does <pum<: merely have some kind of sporadically appearing
nor the totality affected by the rising. Rather, he thinks the rising, and predilection for being a self-concealing, just for a change, rather than a
only this. The ever and always-enduring rising is named in the thought- rising? Does the fragment say that rising willingly changes into self-
fully spoken word <puou~. We must translate it with the unfamiliar but concealing, so that now the one, now the other holds sway? By no
fitting term "upsurgence," corresponding to the more common means. This interpretation misses the meaning of q>lAei, wherein the
"emergence." relation between <pUot<: and Kpurneo6at is named. The interpretation
Heraclitus thinks the never-setting. In Greek thinking, this is the forgets, above all, that decisive matter which the fragment gives us as
never-going-into-concealment. In what domain, therefo{e, does the food for thought: the way in which rising occurs essentially as self-
saying of the fragment take place? According to its sense, it speaks of revealing. If, in discussing <puot<:, we dare u.se the expression "occur
concealment-i.e. it speaks of never going into concealment. At the essentially" [wesen], <puot<: does not mean "essence" [das W esen], the
same time, the saying directly signifies the always-enduring rising, the d n, the "what" of things. Neither here nor in Fragments 1 and 112,
ever and always-enduring disclosure. The phrase To pfl Mvdv noTe, the where he uses the form KOTd <pu01v, does Heraclitus speak of it. The
not setting ever, l.!!.eans both revealing and concealing-not as two fragment does not think <puot<: as the essence of things, but rather
different occurrences merely jammed together, but as one and the thinks the essential unfolding (Wesen as a verb), of <puot<:.

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Rising as such is already inclined toward self-dosing. The fonner Perhaps the (J)tAia of (J)tAeiv in Fragment 123 and the dpJ1ovfq
is concealed in the latter. KpvmeoOat is, as self-concealing, not a mere d(J)avaf<: in Fragment 54 are the Same-granted that the jointure
self-closing but a sheltering in which the essential possibility of rising is thanks to which revealing and concealing are mutually joined must
\ preserved- to which rising as such belongs. Self-concealing guarantees remain the invisible of all invisibles, since it bestows shining on what-
self-reveali ng its essential~ unfolding. In self-concealing, inversely, ever appears.
what reigns is the restraint of the inclination to self-revealing. What The reference to (J)UOI<:, (J)tAia, dppov{ll has diminished the
would a self-concealing be if it did not restrain itself in its tendency vagueness in which to J1r\ 6uvov note, "the never in any case setting."
toward rising? was first heard. But it is difficult to suppress any longer the wish that
And so (J)VOI<: and Kpum eoOat are not separated from each other, instead of this explanation of unconcealing and concealing which has no
but mutually inclined toward each other. They are the Same. In such images and no fixed place, some clear information might surface, indi-
an inclination each first bestows upon the other its proper nature. This cating just where the phrase we have identified properly belongs. We
inherently reciprocal favoring is the essence of (J)IAeiv and of (J)IA{a. In arrive too late with this question, of course. Why? Because to pq
this inclination by which rising and self-concealing lean toward each &uvovnore names the realm of all realms for early thinking. It is not,
other the full essence of (J)Vou; consists. however, the highest genus which subordinates different species of
Therefore the translation of Fragment 123, (J)Uot<: Kpumeo9at realms to it. It is the abode wherein every possible "whither" of a
(J)tAei, could run: "Rising (out of self-concealing) bestows favor upon belonging-to rests. Thus the realm, in the sense of J1Il &uvov note is
self-concealing." unique by virtue of the extent of its gathering reach. Everything that
Still, we are thinking (J)UOI<: superficially if we think it as merely belongs in the event of a rightly experienced revealing grows upward
rising and letting rise, and if we continue to attribute qualities of any and together (concrescit) in this realm. It is the absolutely concrete.
kind to it. By doing that we overlook what is decisive: the fact that But how can this realm be represented as concrete on the basis of the
self-revealing not only never dispenses with concealing, but actually foregoing abstract expositions? This question appears justified only as
needs it, in order to occur essentially in the way it occurs [Wesen, west] long as we fail to see that we must not precipitously assault Heraclitus'
as dis-closing. Only when we think (J)UOI<: in this sense may we say 11\v thought with distinctions like "concrete" and "abstract," "sensuous"
(J)Votv instead ofTo p~ 6Uvovnore. and " nonseosuous," "perceptible" and "imperceptible." That they are
Both names designate the realm which the reciprocal intimacy of and have long been current among us does not guarantee their sup-
revealing and concealing founds and governs. Within this intimacy is posedly unlimited importance. It could very well happen that Hera
hidden the uniqueness and oneness of"Ev-the One-which early clitus, precisely when he utters a word which names something per
thinkers presumably beheld in the wealth of its simplicity, which has ceptible is just then thinking what is absolutely imperceptible. Thus it
remained closed to posterity. T o pq 6uvovnote, "the never going into becomes obvious how little we profit from such distinctions.
concealment," never falls prey to concealment only to be dissolved in According to our interpretation, we can replace to )lr\ 6Uvov note
it, but remains committed to self-concealing, because as the with ro del (J)UOV on two conditions. We must think (J)UOt<: from self-
never-going-into ... it is always a rising-out-of concealment. For concealing, and we must think (J)VOV as a verb . A search for the word
Greek thinking,Kpunreo9al,though unuttered, is said in ro J11\ 6Uvov dei(J)uov in Heraclitus proves fruitless. We find instead the word
note, and (J)VOJ<: is thereby named in its full character, which is gov- dei(wov, ever-living, in Fragment 30. The verb "to live" speaks in the
1 emed by the (J)lA{a between revealing and self-concealing. largest, uttermost, and inmost significance, which Nietzsche too, in his

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note from 1885/86, was thinking when he said: 'Being'-we have no their unity, possess a wholly different life-essence [Lebe-Wesen] with
conception of it other than as 'life.'-How can something dead 'be'? " animals.
(Will to Power, no. 582). But (wq and cpuot<; say the same: dei(wov means deiq>uov, which
How must we understand our word "life," if we accept it as a means TO ll~ Mvov noTe.
faithful translation for the Greek word (qv? In (qv, (dw the root (a- In Fragment 30, the word dei(wov follows nup, fire, less as a
speaks. It is, of course, impossible to conjure up the Greek meaning of qualifier than as a separate name which begins the saying anew and
"life" from this sound. But we do notice that the Greek language, which says how the fire is to be thought-as ever-enduring rising. With
above all in the speech of Homer and Pindar, uses words like (dOe<><;, the word "fire" Heraclitus names that which 0\JTe nc; Oetiiv 0\he dvOpW-
(apevqc;, (dnup<><;. Linguistics explains that (a- signifies an intensifica- nwv t!noirwev, "that which neither any of the gods nor any mortal
~on. ZdOeoc: accordingly means "most divine," "very holy"; (apevqc;, brought forth," what on the contrary always already rests in itself be-
very forceful"; (dnupoc:, "most fiery." But this "intensification" means fore gods and men as cpuot<;, what abides in itself and thus preserves all
neither a mechanical nor a dynamic increase. Pindar calls various coming. But this is the xoopoc:. We say "world," and think it improp-
locales, mountains, meadows, the banks of a river, (dOe<><;, especially erly so long as we represent it exclusively, or even primarily, after the
when he wants to say that the gods, the shining ones who cast their fashion of cosmology or philosophy of nature.
gaze about, often permitted themselves actually to be seen here. They World is enduring fire, enduring rising in the full sense of q>uou:.
came to presence by appearing here. These locales are especially holy Though we are speaking of an eternal world-conflagration here, we
because they arise purely to allow the appearing of the shining one. So must not first imagine a world which is independent and is then set
too does ~apev* mean that which allows the imminent advance of the ablaze and consumed by some ever-burning torch. Rather, the world-
storm to billow up in its full presencing. ing of world, Tonup, To dei(wov, TO pi\ MvovnoTe, are all the Same.
Za- signifies the pure letting-rise within appearing, gazing upon, 1:herefore, the essence of the fire which Heraclitus thinks is not as
breaking in upon, and advancing, and all their ways. The verb (qv transparently obvious as the image of a glowing flame might suggest.
means rising into the light. Homen says, (tiv xai dpciv cpd<><; rfc:Xio10, We need only heed ordinary usage, which speaks the wordnup from
"to live, and this means to see the light of the sun." The Creek (qv, diverse perspectives and thereby points toward the essential fullness of
{wrf, {o}ov must not be interpreted in either a zoological or a broader what is intimated in the thoughtful saying of the word.
biological sense. What is named in the Creek (~v lies so far from any llup names the sacrificial fire, the oven's fire, the campfire, but
biologically conceived animality that the Greeks could even call their also the glow of a torch, the scintillation of the stars. In ''fire," lighting,
gods (cqa. How so? Those who cast their gaze about are those who rise glowing, blazing, soft shining hold sway, and that whkh opens an ex-
into view. The gods do not experience as animals are. But animality panse in brightness. In "fire," however, consuming, welding, cauteriz-
does belong to (qv in a special sense. The rising of animals into the ing, extinguishing also reign. When Heraclitus speaks of fire, he is
open remains closed and sealed in itself in a strangely captivating way. primarily thinking of the lighting governance, the direction [do,
Self-revealing and self-concealing in the animal are one in such a way Weisen] which gives measure and takes it away. According to a frag-
that human speculation practically runs out of alternatives when it ment in Hippolytus, discovered and convincingly authenticated by
rejects mechanistic views of animality-which are always feasible-as Karl Reinhardt (HerrMs 11 [1942], 1 ff. ) tO nup is for Heraclitus also TO
flrmly as it avoids anthropomorphic interpretations. B~cause the ani- cppov1pov, the meditative [do, Sinnende]. It indicates the direction of
mal does not speak, self-revealing and self-concealing, together with everything, laying before it that to. which it belongs. The medita-

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tive fire which lays before gathers all together and secures it in its meant by the n~? Our first impulse is to think of a human person,
essence. The meditative fire is the gathering which lays everything especially since the question is posed by a mortal and addressed to
there before us (into presencing). To O up is d Aoy<><;. Its meditating is human beings. But because a thinker is speaking here, particularly that
the heart, i.e. the lighting-sheltering expanse., of the world. In a multi- thinker who abides near Apollo and Artemis, his speaking could be a
plicity of different name5---(J)uot~,mip, AOV<><:, dppovq,no>.ep<><;, t!pt~. dialogue with those who cast their gaze on things, and could co-signify
(qu>.fa), t v -Heraclitus thinks the essential fullness of the Same. in n~,"anyone," the gods. We are strengthened in this _surmise by
From beginning to end and back again this list refers to the phrase Fragment 30, which says, o\JTe n~ Oeolv o\JTe dvOpwnwv. Similarly,
that begins Fragment 16: TO J.n16UvovnoTe, the not setting ever. What Fragment 53, often cited, but incompletely for the most part, mentions
is named in it must be heard in consonance with all those fundamental mortals and immortals together when it says noAep<><;, the setting-
words of Heraclitean thinking to which we have referred . apart-from-each-other (the lighting), manifests some of those present as
In the meantime, we have seen that never entering into conceal- gods, others as men, and brings some forward into appearance as slaves
ment is the enduring rising out of self-concealing. In this way does the and others as free. This says: the enduring lighting lets gods and men
world Are glow and shine and meditate. If we think it as lighting, this come to presence in unconcealment in such a way that none of them
includes not only the brilliance, but also the openness wherein every- could remain concealed; not because he is observed by someone, but
thing, especially the reciprocally related, comes into shining. Lighting because-and only because-each comes to presence. The presencing
is therefore more than illuminating, and also more than laying bare. of gods, however, is other than that of men. As oo{pove~ . Oed<?VT~.
Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open. It the gods are those who look into the lighting of what is present, which
is the bestowal of presencing. concerns mortals after their own fashion, as they let what is present lie
The event of lighting is the world. The meditatively gathering before them in its presence and as they continue to take ~eed of it.
lighting which brings into the open is revealing; it abides in self- The lighting, therefore, is no mere brightening and lightening.
concealing. Self-concealing belongs to it as that which finds its essence Because presencing means to come enduringly forward from conceal-
in revealing, and which therefore cannot ever be a mere going into ment to unconcealment, the revealing-concealing lighting is concerned
concealment, never a setting. with the presencing of what is present. Fragment 16, however, does
OWe; d v n <; ~d601; "How then could anyone remain concealed?" not speak of just any and every something, t!, which could come to
the fragment asks, with reference to the forementioned TO PJi Mvov presence, but unequivocally and only of d~, someone among gods and
noTe, which stands in the accusative. In translating, we make it the men. Thus the fragment seems to name only a limited range of what is
object of a preposition in the dative case-"How could anyone remain present. Or, rather than limit us to a particular realm of what is pres-
hidden before it, that is, before the lighting?" Without giving a reason, ent, does the fragment perhaps contain something exceptional which
the form of the question rejects such a possibility. The reason must shatters limits and concerns the realm of all realms? Is its exceptional
already lie in what is questioned itself. All too quickly we are prepared character such that the fragment seeks to know what tacitly collects and
to bring it forward: since the never-setting, the lighting, sees and embraces also those present beings which are not to be counted as
notices everything, nothing can hide before it. But there is no mention among the regions of gods and men, but which are nevertheless human
of seeing and noticing in the fragment. Above all, however, the frag- and divine in another sense-present beings such as plants and ani-
ment does not say no.ic; dv n, "how could something . . .?" but no.ic; dv mals, mountains, seas, and stars?
n~. "how could someone .. . ?" According to the fragment, the light- But in what else could the exceptional character of gods and men
ing is in no way related to whatever j ust happens to be present. Who is consist, if not in the fact that precisely they in their relation to the

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lighting can never remain concealed? Why is it that they cannot? Be- saying that evidently there is no way possible for the relation of the
cause their relation to the lighting is nothing other than the lighting world fire to gods and men to be other than this: gods and men belong
ft.self, in that this relation gathers men and gods into the lighting and in the lighting not only as lighted and viewed, but also as invisible,
keeps them there. bringing the lighting with them in their own way, preserving it and
The lighting not only illuminates what is present, but gathers it handing it down in its endurance?
together and secures it in advance in presencing. But of what sort is the In this case the fragment, with its questioning, could give voice to
presencing of gods and men? They are not only illuminated in the a thoughtful wonder, which stands expectantly [verhofft] before that
lighting, but are also enlightened from it and toward it. Thus they can, relation wherein the lighting takes the essence of gods and men unto
in their way, accomplish the lighting (bring it to the fullness of its itself. The questioning saying would then correspond to what is ever
essence) and thereby protect it. Gods and men are not only lighted by a and again worthy of wonder and is preserved in its worth by wonder.
light-even if a supersensible one-so that they can never hide them- It is impossible to estimate how much and how clearly Heraclitus'
selves from it in darkness; they are luminous in their essence. They are thinking presaged the realm of all realms. That the fragment moves
alight [er-lichtet]; they are appropriated into the event of lighting, and within the realm of the lighting cannot be doubted as soon as we
therefore never concealed. On the contrary, they are re-vealed, consider ever more clearly this one matter: the beginning and the end
thought in still another sense. Just as those who are far distant belong of the fragment name revealing and concealing-particularly with re-
to the distance, so are the revealed-in the sense now to be thought spect to their interconnection. We do not even require a separate refer-
-entrusted to the lighting that keeps and shelters them. According to ence to Fragment 50, in which the revealing-concealing gathering is
their essence, they are trans-posed [ver-legt] to the concealing of the identified as being entrusted to mortals in such a way that their essence
mystery, gathered together, belonging to the Adv<><: in dpoAoyeiv unfolds in this: their correspondence or noncorrespondence to the
(Fragment 50). Aov<><:
Did Heraclitus intend his question as we have just been discussing We are too quick to believe that the mystery of what is to be
it? Was what this discussion has said within the range of his notions? thought always lies distant and deeply hidden under a hardly penetra-
Who knows? Who can say? But perhaps the fragment, independently ble layer of strangeness. On the contrary, it has its essential abode in
of Heraclitus' own representational range, says the sort of thing our what is near by, which approaches what is coming into presence and
tentative discussion has put forward. The fragment does say i t - preserves what has drawn near. The presencing of the near is too close
provided a thoughtful dialogue may bring it to speak. The fragment for our customary mode of representational thought-which exhausts
says it, and leaves it unuttered. The paths that lead through the region itself in securing what is present-to experience the governance of the
of the unuttered remain questions, questions which always evoke only near, and without preparation to think it adequately. Presumably, the
such things as were manifested long ago on those paths under diverse mystery that beckons in what is to be thought is nothing other than
disguises. essentially what we have attempted to suggest in the name the "light-
The fundamentally interrogative character of the fragment indi- ing." Everyday opinion, therefore, self-assuredly and stubbornly
cates that Heraclitus is conte.mplating the revealing-concealing light- bypasses the mystery. Heraclitus knew this. Fragment 72 runs:
ing, the world fire, in its scarcely perceptible relation to those who are
en-lightened in accord with their essence, and who therefore hearken
w1 }ldAlota 6li'IVKtii<: d~tlXoum Adyw1, tol.ltwl 61aq>epovta1, Kol ol<: Ko9'
~}lpov eyKUpoUOl, TOUTQ Ol..ltOi<: f;va q>aiVetQl.
to and belong to the lighting in an exceptional way.
Or does the fragment speak out of an experience of thinking which From that to which for the most part they are bound and by which they are
has already weighed every step? . Might Heraclitus' question only be thoroughly sustained, the Adyo<:. from that they separate themselves; and it
120 121
 EARLY CREEK THINKING Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)

becomes manifest: whatever they daily encounter remains foreign (in it.s pre- But the golden gleam of the lighting's invisible shining cannot be
sencing) to them. grasped, because it is not itself something grasping. Rather, it is the
purely appropriating event [das reine Ereignen]. The invisible shining
Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gather-
of the lighting streams from wholesome self-keeping in the self-
ing which lights everything present in its presencing. But they tum
restraining preservation of destiny. Therefore the shining of the light-
from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present, which is what
ing is in itself at the same time a self-veiling-and is in that sense what
immediately concerns them fn their everyday commerce with each
is most obscure.
other. They believe that this trafficking in what is present by itself
Heraclitus is called o l:KOl'tlvd<;. He will also retain this name in
creates for them a sufficient familiarity with it. But it nonetheless
the future . He is the Obscure, because he thinks questioningly into the
remains foreign to them. For they have no inkling of what they have
lighting.
been entrusted with: presencing, which in its lighting first allows what
is present to come to appearance. Aoyoc;, in whose lighting they come
and go, remains concealed from them, and forgotten.
The more familiar to them everything knowable becomes, the
more foreign it is to them-without their being able to know this. They
would become aware of all this if only they would ask: how could
anyone whose essence belongs to the lighting ever withdraw from
receiving and protecting the lighting? How could he, without im-
mediately discovering that the everyday can seem quite ordinary to
him only because this ordinariness is guilty of forgetting what initially
brings even the apparently self-evident into the light of what is pres-
ent?
Everyday opinion seeks truth in variety, the endless variety of
novelties which are displayed before it. It does not see the quiet gleam
(the gold) of the mystery that everlastingly shines in the simplicity of
the lighting. Heraclitus says (Fragment 9):

dvoU<; oup!Jat' d'v E!>.co&t }Jci>.Xov rf xpuoov.

"Asses choose hay rather than gold."

Oiels-Kranz (1, 167) translate, " ... from the Meaning with which for the most
part they go about (&om that which governs the totality), &om that they separate them-
selves, and the things they encounter every day seem strange to them." A more fluent
translation appears in the excellent French collection by Jean Brun, HeraclUe, ou le
phllosophe de fetemel retour (Paris: Seghers, 1965), p. 188: "However closely united
the~. are to the Logos wh ich governs the world, they separate themselves &om it,
etc. -Tit

122 123
 Glossary
~

das Abendland the West

das Abend-Land the land of evening
abgehen to decline, depart
der Abgrund abyss
die Abwesenheit absence
achten to heed, pay attention to
in-dle-Acht-nehmen (voeiv) to take heed of
die Ankunft advent, arrival
der Ansprucb claim
anwesen to come to presence
das Anwesen (t!ov) presencing
das Anwesende (t!ovta) what is present
die Anwesenheit presence
das Aufgeben rising
das Aussehen (eiOOc:. l&a) form, outer
appearance

das Beharren persistence

beharren auf to insist on, persist in
beisammen-vor-Uegen-Lassen (Xeye1v) to let-Ue-together-
before
der Bereich realm, domain
\ bergen to shelter, secure, conceal
entbergen to disclose, reveal
das Sicbentbergen (cpuou;) self-revealing
verbergen to conceal, hide
das Sichverbergen (Kpum eo9<u) self-concealing
die Bestiindigung continuance
der Brauch (xpewv) usage, use, need, custom
brauchen to need, use, need to use
125
 GLOSSARY

bruchen (frui) to brook, enjoy, have ein Gespriich conversation

usufruct ein Gesprochenes something spoken, utterance
die Geschichte history
das Denken (voeiv) thinking die Historie historiography
andenken remember, recall, recollect ~hick destiny, destining, Fate
bedenken think of, consider das Geschick des Seins the destiny(-ing) of Being
das Denkwiirdige what is worthy of thought, the das Gesicht (i6ea) aspect
thought-provoking das Gleiche what is identical or alike
das zu-Denkende what is to be thought, what is for der Graben gap, gully
thinking der Grund ground, reason (for}
dichten poetize
dunkel (oKotelvOc:) obscure, dark die Helle brightness, brilliance
die Herkunft arrival, emergence, origin
eigentlich proper, genuine die Hut protection
eigens expressly, explicitly
einholen to collect je-weilen to Unger awhile
das Einzig-Eine ("Ev) the unique one das je-weilige Anwesende what linge rs awhile In presence;
. elnen to unify, unite that which for the time being is
das Entbergen disclosure das je und je Weilige what in each case lingen
entlang (Katd} along the lines of
to appropriate lassen to let
ereignen
bei-sammen-vor-liegen-Lassen to Jet-lie-together-before
sich erelgnen to come to pass
loslassen to release
das Ereignis the event
Jegen (At!ye1v) to lay
die Jesende Lege the Laying that gathen
die Friihe dawn, early times
(8{Kq) order lesen to gather, read
der Fug
die Lese the vintage, gathering
der Un-Fug (d61Kla) disorder
die Auslese the selection
die Fuge jointure
das Erlesene the to-be-selected
die Un-Fuge disjunction
lichten to clear, lighten, illuminate
fiigen to join
die Lichtung the clearing, lighting
verfiigen to conjoin, enjoin
die lichtende-bergende- the gathering that clears and
Versammlung shelters
die Gegend expanse, region, province
liegen to lie
das Gehelss call, gesture
gehi:iren belong
massgebend definitive, standard
hi:iren hear
horchen hearken die Niihe nearness, proximity
das Gehi:ir attunement
eln Gesagtes something said der Ort (tdn~ place

126 127
 GWSSARl'

dieOrtschaft abode der Spruch fragment, saying

Strafe und Busse recompense and penalty
das Ritsel riddle, enigma
das Ritselwort enigmatic key word iibersetzen translate, cross over
das Recht (600]) right, justice untergehen (6Uvov) to go down, set
das Unrecht (d61Kia) wrong, injustice das niemals Untergehende the never-setting
der Ruch reck die Unverborgenheit unconcealment
ruchlos reckless
die Riicksicht consideration die Verborgenhelt concealment
riicksichtlos Inconsiderate verborgenbleiben to remain concealed
vergessen (iru).av9dveo801) to forget
die Sage the saying (verbal) die Vergessenheit des Seins the oblivion of Being
sammeln to gather das Vemehmen apprehension, perception
sk:h sammeln to assemble die Versammlung assembly, gathering
die Sammlung the gathering, coordination die Verwindung the surmounting (of)
die Versammlung the assembly(-ing) das Vorhandene something at hand
der Satz sentence, proposition der Vorschein prominence, appearance
~ehitzen to esteem in-den-Vorschein-bringen to bring forward into view
~eheinen to shine, appear zum Vorschein kommen to come forward Into appearance,
der Schein shining, appearance to come to the fore
das Encheinen appearance (verbal) das Vorstellen representational thought
der Anschein semblance, apparition
der Voncheln prominence, appearance wahren (die Wahrheit) to preserve
~ehicken to send die Wahmis preservation
sk:h schicken to devote oneself to, dispatch one- walt en to hold sway, reign, rule, dominate
self toward die Weile the while
schickliches appropriate, fitting weilen to linger
geschickt werden to become skillful wesen to occur essentially, presence
der Schick calling, vocational skill das Wesen essence, essential being
das Ceschickllche Fate, the fateful itself
geschicklich &teful die Zusammengehorigkeit belonging-together
das Ceschick destiny, destining, Fate di_e Zuteilung (Moipa) apportionment, allotment
die Schickung dispensation die Zwiefalt the duality, twofold (of Being and
sein (elva1) to be beings)
das Seln (iov) Being die Entfaltung der Zwiefalt the unfolding of the twofold
das Seiende (iovta) being(s)
das Seiende-im-Ganzen being-in-totality
das Selbe (t~ autO) the Same
die Sprache language, speech

128 129