Using The GNU Privacy Guard
Using The GNU Privacy Guard
Using The GNU Privacy Guard
Version 2.0.9
March 2008
Short Contents
1 A short installation guide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Invoking GPG-AGENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 Invoking GPG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4 Invoking GPGSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Invoking the SCDAEMON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6 How to Specify a User Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7 Helper Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8 How to do certain things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9 Notes pertaining to certain OSes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
10 How to solve problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
GNU General Public License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Contributors to GnuPG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Option Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
ii Using the GNU Privacy Guard
iii
Table of Contents
2 Invoking GPG-AGENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Option Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Use of some signals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6 Agent’s Assuan Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.1 Decrypting a session key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.2 Signing a Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.3 Generating a Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.4 Importing a Secret Key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.5 Export a Secret Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.6 Importing a Root Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.7 Ask for a passphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6.8 Ask for confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6.9 Check whether a key is available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6.10 Register a smartcard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6.11 Change a Passphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6.12 Change the standard display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6.13 Get the Event Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6.14 Return information about the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Invoking GPG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Commands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1 Commands not specific to the function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.2 Commands to select the type of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.3 How to manage your keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Option Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.1 How to change the configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.2 Key related options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.3 Input and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.4 OpenPGP protocol specific options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.5 Compliance options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.6 Doing things one usually doesn’t want to do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.7 Deprecated options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Configuration files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
iv Using the GNU Privacy Guard
4 Invoking GPGSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Commands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1.1 Commands not specific to the function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1.2 Commands to select the type of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1.3 How to manage the certificates and keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Option Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 How to change the configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.2 Certificate related options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.3 Input and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.4 How to change how the CMS is created. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.5 Doing things one usually don’t want to do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Configuration files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.5 Unattended Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6 Automated signature checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.7 The Protocol the Server Mode Uses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.7.1 Encrypting a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.7.2 Decrypting a message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.7.3 Signing a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7.4 Verifying a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7.5 Generating a Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7.6 List available keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.7.7 Export certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.7.8 Import certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.7.9 Delete certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.7.10 Return information about the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7 Helper Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.1 Read logs from a socket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2 Verify OpenPGP signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.2.2 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.2.3 FILES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.3 Create .gnupg home directories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.4 Modify .gnupg home directories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.4.1 Invoking gpgconf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.4.2 Format conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.4.3 Listing components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.4.4 Checking programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.4.5 Listing options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.4.6 Changing options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.4.7 Listing global options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.4.8 Files used by gpgconf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.5 Run gpgconf for all users. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.6 Generate an X.509 certificate request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.7 Put a passphrase into the cache. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.7.1 List of all commands and options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.8 Communicate with a running agent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.8.1 List of all options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.8.2 Control commands.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.9 Parse a mail message into an annotated format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.10 Call a simple symmetric encryption tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.10.1 List of all commands and options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter 1: A short installation guide. 1
2 Invoking GPG-AGENT
gpg-agent is a daemon to manage secret (private) keys independently from any protocol.
It is used as a backend for gpg and gpgsm as well as for a couple of other utilities.
The usual way to run the agent is from the ~/.xsession file:
eval ‘gpg-agent --daemon‘
If you don’t use an X server, you can also put this into your regular startup file ~/.profile
or .bash_profile. It is best not to run multiple instance of the gpg-agent, so you should
make sure that only one is running: gpg-agent uses an environment variable to inform
clients about the communication parameters. You can write the content of this environment
variable to a file so that you can test for a running agent. This short script may do the job:
if test -f $HOME/.gpg-agent-info && \
kill -0 ‘cut -d: -f 2 $HOME/.gpg-agent-info‘ 2>/dev/null; then
GPG_AGENT_INFO=‘cat $HOME/.gpg-agent-info‘
export GPG_AGENT_INFO
else
eval ‘gpg-agent --daemon‘
echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO >$HOME/.gpg-agent-info
fi
Note that the new option ‘--write-env-file’ may be used instead.
You should always add the following lines to your .bashrc or whatever initialization file is
used for all shell invocations:
GPG_TTY=‘tty‘
export GPG_TTY
It is important that this environment variable always reflects the output of the tty com-
mand. For W32 systems this option is not required.
Please make sure that a proper pinentry program has been installed under the default
filename (which is system dependant) or use the option ‘pinentry-program’ to specify the
full name of that program. It is often useful to install a symbolic link from the actual used
pinentry (e.g. ‘/usr/bin/pinentry-gtk’) to the expected one (e.g. ‘/usr/bin/pinentry’).
See [Option Index], page 131,for an index to GPG-AGENT’s commands and options.
2.1 Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command
is allowed.
--version
Print the program version and licensing information. Not that you can abbre-
viate this command.
--help
-h Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options. Not
that you can abbreviate this command.
--dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Not that you can abbreviate
this command.
4 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--server Run in server mode and wait for commands on the stdin. The default mode
is to create a socket and listen for commands there.
--daemon [command line ]
Run the program in the background. This option is required to prevent it from
being accidently running in the background. A common way to do this is:
$ eval ‘gpg-agent –daemon‘
--debug flags
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change at any
time without notice. FLAGS are bit encoded and may be given in usual C-
Syntax. The currently defined bits are:
0 (1) X.509 or OpenPGP protocol related data
1 (2) values of big number integers
2 (4) low level crypto operations
5 (32) memory allocation
6 (64) caching
7 (128) show memory statistics.
9 (512) write hashed data to files named dbgmd-000*
10 (1024) trace Assuan protocol
12 (4096) bypass all certificate validation
--debug-all
Same as --debug=0xffffffff
--debug-wait n
When running in server mode, wait n seconds before entering the actual pro-
cessing loop and print the pid. This gives time to attach a debugger.
--no-detach
Don’t detach the process from the console. This is mainly useful for debugging.
-s
--sh
-c
--csh Format the info output in daemon mode for use with the standard Bourne shell
or the C-shell respectively. The default is to guess it based on the environment
variable SHELL which is correct in almost all cases.
--write-env-file file
Often it is required to connect to the agent from a process not being an inferior
of gpg-agent and thus the environment variable with the socket name is not
available. To help setting up those variables in other sessions, this option may
be used to write the information into file. If file is not specified the default
name ‘${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info’ will be used. The format is suitable to be
evaluated by a Bourne shell like in this simple example:
eval ‘cat file ‘
eval ‘cut -d= -f 1 < file | xargs echo export‘
--no-grab
Tell the pinentry not to grab the keyboard and mouse. This option should in
general not be used to avoid X-sniffing attacks.
--log-file file
Append all logging output to file. This is very helpful in seeing what the agent
actually does.
6 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--allow-mark-trusted
Allow clients to mark keys as trusted, i.e. put them into the ‘trustlist.txt’
file. This is by default not allowed to make it harder for users to inadvertently
accept Root-CA keys.
--ignore-cache-for-signing
This option will let gpg-agent bypass the passphrase cache for all signing op-
eration. Note that there is also a per-session option to control this behaviour
but this command line option takes precedence.
--default-cache-ttl n
Set the time a cache entry is valid to n seconds. The default is 600 seconds.
--default-cache-ttl-ssh n
Set the time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to n seconds. The default
is 1800 seconds.
--max-cache-ttl n
Set the maximum time a cache entry is valid to n seconds. After this time a
cache entry will be expired even if it has been accessed recently. The default is
2 hours (7200 seconds).
--max-cache-ttl-ssh n
Set the maximum time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to n seconds.
After this time a cache entry will be expired even if it has been accessed recently.
The default is 2 hours (7200 seconds).
--enforce-passphrase-constraints
Enforce the passphrase constraints by not allowing the user to bypass them
using the “Take it anyway” button.
--min-passphrase-len n
Set the minimal length of a passphrase. When entering a new passphrase shorter
than this value a warning will be displayed. Defaults to 8.
--min-passphrase-nonalpha n
Set the minimal number of digits or special characters required in a passphrase.
When entering a new passphrase with less than this number of digits or special
characters a warning will be displayed. Defaults to 1.
--check-passphrase-pattern file
Check the passphrase against the pattern given in file. When entering a new
passphrase matching one of these pattern a warning will be displayed. file
should be an absolute filename. The default is not to use any pattern file.
Security note: It is known that checking a passphrase against a list of pattern
or even against a complete dictionary is not very effective to enforce good
passphrases. Users will soon figure up ways to bypass such a policy. A better
policy is to educate users on good security behavior and optionally to run a
passphrase cracker regularly on all users passphrases to catch the very simple
ones.
Chapter 2: Invoking GPG-AGENT 7
--max-passphrase-days n
Ask the user to change the passphrase if n days have passed since the last
change. With ‘--enforce-passphrase-constraints’ set the user may not
bypass this check.
--enable-passphrase-history
This option does nothing yet.
--pinentry-program filename
Use program filename as the PIN entry. The default is installation dependent
and can be shown with the --version command.
--pinentry-touch-file filename
By default the filename of the socket gpg-agent is listening for requests is passed
to Pinentry, so that it can touch that file before exiting (it does this only in
curses mode). This option changes the file passed to Pinentry to filename. The
special name /dev/null may be used to completely disable this feature. Note
that Pinentry will not create that file, it will only change the modification and
access time.
--scdaemon-program filename
Use program filename as the Smartcard daemon. The default is installation
dependent and can be shown with the --version command.
--disable-scdaemon
Do not make use of the scdaemon tool. This option has the effect of disabling
the ability to do smartcard operations. Note, that enabling this option at
runtime does not kill an already forked scdaemon.
--use-standard-socket
--no-use-standard-socket
By enabling this option gpg-agent will listen on the socket named
‘S.gpg-agent’, located in the home directory, and not create a random socket
below a temporary directory. Tools connecting to gpg-agent should first try to
connect to the socket given in environment variable GPG AGENT INFO and
then fall back to this socket. This option may not be used if the home directory
is mounted as a remote file system. Note, that ‘--use-standard-socket’ is
the default on Windows systems.
--display string
--ttyname string
--ttytype string
--lc-type string
--lc-messages string
--xauthority string
These options are used with the server mode to pass localization information.
--keep-tty
--keep-display
Ignore requests to change the current tty or X window system’s DISPLAY vari-
able respectively. This is useful to lock the pinentry to pop up at the tty or
display you started the agent.
8 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--enable-ssh-support
Enable emulation of the OpenSSH Agent protocol.
In this mode of operation, the agent does not only implement the gpg-agent
protocol, but also the agent protocol used by OpenSSH (through a separate
socket). Consequently, it should be possible to use the gpg-agent as a drop-in
replacement for the well known ssh-agent.
SSH Keys, which are to be used through the agent, need to be added to the
gpg-agent initially through the ssh-add utility. When a key is added, ssh-add
will ask for the password of the provided key file and send the unprotected key
material to the agent; this causes the gpg-agent to ask for a passphrase, which
is to be used for encrypting the newly received key and storing it in a gpg-agent
specific directory.
Once a key has been added to the gpg-agent this way, the gpg-agent will be
ready to use the key.
Note: in case the gpg-agent receives a signature request, the user might need
to be prompted for a passphrase, which is necessary for decrypting the stored
key. Since the ssh-agent protocol does not contain a mechanism for telling the
agent on which display/terminal it is running, gpg-agent’s ssh-support will use
the TTY or X display where gpg-agent has been started. To switch this display
to the current one, the following command may be used:
echo UPDATESTARTUPTTY | gpg-connect-agent
All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after stripping off the
two leading dashes.
2.3 Configuration
There are a few configuration files needed for the operation of the agent. By default they
may all be found in the current home directory (see [option –homedir], page 4).
‘gpg-agent.conf’
This is the standard configuration file read by gpg-agent on startup. It may
contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and the
option may not be abbreviated. This file is also read after a SIGHUP however
only a few options will actually have an effect. This default name may be
changed on the command line (see [option –options], page 4).
‘trustlist.txt’
This is the list of trusted keys. Comment lines, indicated by a leading hash
mark, as well as empty lines are ignored. To mark a key as trusted you need
to enter its fingerprint followed by a space and a capital letter S. Colons may
optionally be used to separate the bytes of a fingerprint; this allows to cut and
paste the fingerprint from a key listing output.
Here is an example where two keys are marked as ultimately trusted:
# CN=Wurzel ZS 3,O=Intevation GmbH,C=DE
A6935DD34EF3087973C706FC311AA2CCF733765B S
# CN=PCA-1-Verwaltung-02/O=PKI-1-Verwaltung/C=DE
Chapter 2: Invoking GPG-AGENT 9
DC:BD:69:25:48:BD:BB:7E:31:6E:BB:80:D3:00:80:35:D4:F8:A6:CD S
Before entering a key into this file, you need to ensure its authenticity. How to
do this depends on your organisation; your administrator might have already
entered those keys which are deemed trustworthy enough into this file. Places
where to look for the fingerprint of a root certificate are letters received from
the CA or the website of the CA (after making 100% sure that this is indeed the
website of that CA). You may want to consider allowing interactive updates of
this file by using the See [option –allow-mark-trusted], page 5. This is however
not as secure as maintaining this file manually. It is even advisable to change
the permissions to read-only so that this file can’t be changed inadvertently.
As a special feature a line include-default will include a global list of trusted
certificates (e.g. ‘/etc/gnupg/trustlist.txt’). This global list is also used if
the local list is not available.
It is possible to add further flags after the S for use by the caller:
relax Relax checking of some root certificate requirements. This is for
example required if the certificate is missing the basicConstraints
attribute (despite that it is a MUST for CA certificates).
cm If validation of a certificate finally issued by a CA with this flag set
fails, try again using the chain validation model.
‘sshcontrol’
This file is used when support for the secure shell agent protocol has been
enabled (see [option –enable-ssh-support], page 7). Only keys present in this
file are used in the SSH protocol. The ssh-add tool may be used to add new
entries to this file; you may also add them manually. Comment lines, indicated
by a leading hash mark, as well as empty lines are ignored. An entry starts
with optional whitespace, followed by the keygrip of the key given as 40 hex
digits, optionally followed by the caching TTL in seconds and another optional
field for arbitrary flags. The keygrip may be prefixed with a ! to disable this
entry.
The following example lists exactly one key. Note that keys available through
a OpenPGP smartcard in the active smartcard reader are implicitly added to
this list; i.e. there is no need to list them.
# Key added on 2005-02-25 15:08:29
5A6592BF45DC73BD876874A28FD4639282E29B52 0
‘private-keys-v1.d/’
This is the directory where gpg-agent stores the private keys. Each key is stored
in a file with the name made up of the keygrip and the suffix ‘key’.
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory
‘/etc/skel/.gnupg/’ so that newly created users start up with a working configuration.
For existing users the a small helper script is provided to create these files (see Section 7.3
[addgnupghome], page 86).
10 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
2.5 Examples
The usual way to invoke gpg-agent is
$ eval ‘gpg-agent --daemon‘
An alternative way is by replacing ssh-agent with gpg-agent. If for example ssh-
agent is started as part of the Xsession initialization, you may simply replace ssh-agent
by a script like:
#!/bin/sh
and add something like (for Bourne shells)
if [ -f "${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info" ]; then
. "${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info"
export GPG_AGENT_INFO
export SSH_AUTH_SOCK
export SSH_AGENT_PID
fi
to your shell initialization file (e.g. ‘~/.bashrc’).
Chapter 2: Invoking GPG-AGENT 11
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: PKSIGN
S: # I did ask the user whether he really wants to sign
S: # I did ask the user for the passphrase
S: INQUIRE HASHVAL
C: D ABCDEF012345678901234
C: END
S: # signature follows
S: D (sig-val rsa (s 45435453654612121212))
S: OK
C: END
S: OK
Known sequences with the pattern @foo@ are replaced according to this table:
@FPR16@ Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v3 keys.
@FPR20@ Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v4 keys.
@FPR@ Choose an appropriate format to format the fingerprint.
@@ Replaced by a single @
The agent either returns with an error or with a OK. Note, that the length of description
is implicitly limited by the maximum length of a command.
3 Invoking GPG
gpg2 is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It is a tool to provide
digital encryption and signing services using the OpenPGP standard. gpg2 features com-
plete key management and all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP
implementation.
In contrast to the standalone version gpg, which is more suited for server and embedded
platforms, this version is installed under the name gpg2 and more targeted to the desktop
as it requires several other modules to be installed. The standalone version will be kept
maintained and it is possible to install both versions on the same system. If you need to use
different configuration files, you should make use of something like ‘gpg.conf-2’ instead of
just ‘gpg.conf’.
Documentation for the old standard gpg is available as a man page and at See Info file
‘gpg’, node ‘Top’.
See [Option Index], page 131, for an index to gpg2’s commands and options.
3.1 Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command
is allowed.
gpg2 may be run with no commands, in which case it will perform a reasonable action
depending on the type of file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a
signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed).
Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as a non-option
is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option ‘--’.
--clearsign
Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is readable
without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed to verify the
signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line whitespace for platform
independence and are not intended to be reversible.
--detach-sign
-b Make a detached signature.
--encrypt
-e Encrypt data. This option may be combined with ‘--sign’ (for a signed and
encrypted message), ‘--symmetric’ (for a message that may be decrypted via
a secret key or a passphrase), or ‘--sign’ and ‘--symmetric’ together (for a
signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).
--symmetric
-c Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default symmetric
cipher used is CAST5, but may be chosen with the ‘--cipher-algo’ option.
This option may be combined with ‘--sign’ (for a signed and symmetrically
encrypted message), ‘--encrypt’ (for a message that may be decrypted via a
secret key or a passphrase), or ‘--sign’ and ‘--encrypt’ together (for a signed
message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).
--store Store only (make a simple RFC1991 literal data packet).
--decrypt
-d Decrypt the file given on the command line (or stdin if no file is specified) and
write it to stdout (or the file specified with ‘--output’). If the decrypted file
is signed, the signature is also verified. This command differs from the default
operation, as it never writes to the filename which is included in the file and it
rejects files which don’t begin with an encrypted message.
--verify Assume that the first argument is a signed file or a detached signature and verify
it without generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
read from stdin. If only a sigfile is given, it may be a complete signature or a
detached signature, in which case the signed stuff is expected in a file without
the ".sig" or ".asc" extension. With more than 1 argument, the first should be
a detached signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff. To read the
signed stuff from stdin, use ‘-’ as the second filename. For security reasons a
detached signature cannot read the signed material from stdin without denoting
it in the above way.
--multifile
This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for processing
on the command line or read from stdin with each filename on a separate
line. This allows for many files to be processed at once. ‘--multifile’ may
currently be used along with ‘--verify’, ‘--encrypt’, and ‘--decrypt’. Note
that ‘--multifile --verify’ may not be used with detached signatures.
--verify-files
Identical to ‘--multifile --verify’.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 21
--encrypt-files
Identical to ‘--multifile --encrypt’.
--decrypt-files
Identical to ‘--multifile --decrypt’.
--list-keys
-k
--list-public-keys
List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the command
line.
Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as it
is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See ‘--with-colons’ for a machine-
parseable key listing command that is appropriate for use in scripts and other
programs.
--list-secret-keys
-K List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the command
line. A # after the letters sec means that the secret key is not usable (for
example, if it was created via ‘--export-secret-subkeys’).
--list-sigs
Same as ‘--list-keys’, but the signatures are listed too.
For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig" tag
and keyid. These flags give additional information about each signature.
From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
‘--ask-cert-level’), "L" for a local or non-exportable signature (see
‘--lsign-key’), "R" for a nonRevocable signature (see the ‘--edit-key’
command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see
‘--cert-policy-url’), "N" for a signature that contains a notation (see
‘--cert-notation’), "X" for an eXpired signature (see ‘--ask-cert-expire’),
and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
(see the ‘--edit-key’ command "tsign").
--check-sigs
Same as ‘--list-sigs’, but the signatures are verified.
The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following the "sig"
tag (and thus before the flags described above for ‘--list-sigs’). A "!" in-
dicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad
signature and a "%" is used if an error occured while checking the signature
(e.g. a non supported algorithm).
--fingerprint
List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their fingerprints. This is the
same output as ‘--list-keys’ but with the additional output of a line with
the fingerprint. May also be combined with ‘--list-sigs’ or ‘--check-sigs’.
If this command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are listed
too.
--list-packets
List only the sequence of packets. This is mainly useful for debugging.
22 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--card-edit
Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides an
overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please see the Card
HOWTO at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-
cardHOWTO .
--card-status
Show the content of the smart card.
--change-pin
Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This functionality is
also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the ‘--card-edit’ command.
--delete-key name
Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either ‘--yes’ is required or
the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a safeguard against accidental
deletion of multiple keys.
--delete-secret-key name
Remove key from the secret and public keyring. In batch mode the key must
be specified by fingerprint.
--delete-secret-and-public-key name
Same as ‘--delete-key’, but if a secret key exists, it will be removed first. In
batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
--export Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those registered
via option ‘--keyring’), or if at least one name is given, those of the given
name. The new keyring is written to stdout or to the file given with option
‘--output’. Use together with ‘--armor’ to mail those keys.
--send-keys key IDs
Similar to ‘--export’ but sends the keys to a keyserver. Fingerprints may be
used instead of key IDs. Option ‘--keyserver’ must be used to give the name
of this keyserver. Don’t send your complete keyring to a keyserver — select
only those keys which are new or changed by you.
--export-secret-keys
--export-secret-subkeys
Same as ‘--export’, but exports the secret keys instead. This is normally
not very useful and a security risk. The second form of the command has the
special property to render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is a
GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to
successfully import such a key. See the option ‘--simple-sk-checksum’ if you
want to import such an exported key with an older OpenPGP implementation.
--import
--fast-import
Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the keyring. The fast version
is currently just a synonym.
There are a few other options which control how this command works. Most
notable here is the ‘--keyserver-options merge-only’ option which does not
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 23
insert new keys but does only the merging of new signatures, user-IDs and
subkeys.
--refresh-keys
Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the local
keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest signatures, user
IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh the entire keyring. Op-
tion ‘--keyserver’ must be used to give the name of the keyserver for all
keys that do not have preferred keyservers set (see ‘--keyserver-options
honor-keyserver-url’).
--search-keys names
Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will
be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver. Option
‘--keyserver’ must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Keyservers
that support different search methods allow using the syntax specified in
"How to specify a user ID" below. Note that different keyserver types support
different search methods. Currently only LDAP supports them all.
--fetch-keys URIs
Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different installations of
GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP, LDAP, etc.)
--update-trustdb
Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and builds
the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may have to ask
for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give an estimation of how
far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to correctly certify (sign) other
keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust value if it has not yet been assigned
to a key. Using the ‘--edit-key’ menu, the assigned value can be changed at
any time.
--check-trustdb
Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or signatures
and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be tracked. Normally,
GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it automatically unless
‘--no-auto-check-trustdb’ is set. This command can be used to force a
trust database check at any time. The processing is identical to that of
‘--update-trustdb’ but it skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".
For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with ‘--batch’ in
which case the trust database check is done only if a check is needed. To force
a run even in batch mode add the option ‘--yes’.
24 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--export-ownertrust
Send the ownertrust values to stdout. This is useful for backup purposes as
these values are the only ones which can’t be re-created from a corrupted trust
DB.
--import-ownertrust
Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in files (or stdin if not
given); existing values will be overwritten.
--rebuild-keydb-caches
When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used to
create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other situations
too.
--print-md algo
--print-mds
Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or stdin. With the
second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all available algorithms
are printed.
--gen-random 0|1|2
Emit count random bytes of the given quality level. If count is not given or
zero, an endless sequence of random bytes will be emitted. PLEASE, don’t use
this command unless you know what you are doing; it may remove precious
entropy from the system!
--gen-prime mode bits
Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change.
--enarmor
--dearmor
Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor. This
is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.
sign Make a signature on key of user name If the key is not yet signed by
the default user (or the users given with -u), the program displays
the information of the key again, together with its fingerprint and
asks whether it should be signed. This question is repeated for all
users specified with -u.
lsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and
will therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make
keys valid only in the local environment.
nrsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and
can therefore never be revoked.
tsign Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the no-
tions of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communi-
ties or groups.
Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable, and "t"
(for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to create a signature of
any type desired.
revsig Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been gener-
ated by one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation
certificate should be generated.
trust Change the owner trust value. This updates the trust-db immedi-
ately and no save is required.
disable
enable Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally
be used for encryption.
adduid Create an alternate user id.
addphoto Create a photographic user id. This will prompt for a JPEG file
that will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG
will make for a very large key. Also note that some programs will
display your JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will
scale it to fit in a dialog box (PGP).
deluid Delete a user id. Note that it is not possible to retract a user id,
once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that
case you better use revuid.
delsig Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signa-
ture, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
that case you better use revsig.
revuid Revoke a user id.
addkey Add a subkey to this key.
addcardkey
Generate a key on a card and add it to this key.
26 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
keytocard Transfer the selected secret key (or the primary key if no key has
been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types
may be transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select
on what card to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get
that key back from the card - if the card gets broken your secret
key will be lost unless you have a backup somewhere.
bkuptocard file
Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to
restore a backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a
new card. In almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You
should use this command only with the corresponding public key
and make sure that the file given as argument is indeed the backup
to restore. You should then select 2 to restore as encryption key.
You will first be asked to enter the passphrase of the backup key
and then for the Admin PIN of the card.
delkey Remove a subkey (secondart key). Note that it is not possible to
retract a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a
keyserver). In that case you better use revkey.
addrevoker
Add a designated revoker. This takes one optional argument: "sen-
sitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will not
be exported by default (see export-options).
revkey Revoke a subkey.
expire Change the key expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the expi-
ration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
key expiration of the primary key is changed.
passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key.
primary Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary
user id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all
affected self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo
user ID as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and
setting a regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other
regular user IDs.
uid n Toggle selection of user id with index n. Use 0 to deselect all.
key n Toggle selection of subkey with index n. Use 0 to deselect all.
check Check all selected user ids.
showphoto
Display the selected photographic user id.
pref List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
preferences, without including any implied preferences.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 27
showpref More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of
3DES (cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression)
if they are not already included in the preference list. In addition,
the preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.
setpref string
Set the list of user ID preferences to string for all (or just
the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets
the preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
‘--default-preference-list’), and calling setpref with "none"
as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use gpg2--version
to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you can
change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these
preferences will not be used by GnuPG.
keyserver Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
‘--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url’ for more on how
this works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
keyserver.
notation Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
‘--cert-notation’ for more on how this works. Setting a value
of "none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with
a minus sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation
name (without the =value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all
notations with that name.
toggle Toggle between public and secret key listing.
clean Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user
ID that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, re-
move any signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signa-
tures, and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the
keyring.
minimize Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.
cross-certify
Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that
may not currently have them. Cross-certification signatures
protect against a subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
‘--require-cross-certification’.
save Save all changes to the key rings and quit.
quit Quit the program without updating the key rings.
28 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user ids. Selected
keys or user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust value is displayed with
the primary key: the first is the assigned owner trust and the second is the
calculated trust value. Letters are used for the values:
- No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.
e Trust calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key.
q Not enough information for calculation.
n Never trust this key.
m Marginally trusted.
f Fully trusted.
u Ultimately trusted.
--sign-key name
Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of the
subcommand "sign" from ‘--edit’.
--lsign-key name
Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as non-exportable. This
is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign" from ‘--edit-key’.
--default-recipient-self
Use the default key as default recipient if option ‘--recipient’ is not used and
don’t ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first one from the secret
keyring or the one set with ‘--default-key’.
--no-default-recipient
Reset ‘--default-recipient’ and ‘--default-recipient-self’.
-v, --verbose
Give more information during processing. If used twice, the input data is listed
in detail.
--no-verbose
Reset verbose level to 0.
-q, --quiet
Try to be as quiet as possible.
--batch
--no-batch
Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands. ‘--no-batch’
disables this option.
--no-tty Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output. This option
is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints warnings to the TTY
even if ‘--batch’ is used.
--yes Assume "yes" on most questions.
--no Assume "no" on most questions.
--list-options parameters
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
listing keys and signatures (that is, ‘--list-keys’, ‘--list-sigs’,
‘--list-public-keys’, ‘--list-secret-keys’, and the ‘--edit-key’
functions). Options can be prepended with a ‘no-’ (after the two dashes) to
give the opposite meaning. The options are:
show-photos
Causes ‘--list-keys’, ‘--list-sigs’, ‘--list-public-keys’,
and ‘--list-secret-keys’ to display any photo IDs attached to
the key. Defaults to no. See also ‘--photo-viewer’.
show-policy-urls
Show policy URLs in the ‘--list-sigs’ or ‘--check-sigs’ listings.
Defaults to no.
show-notations
show-std-notations
show-user-notations
Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
‘--list-sigs’ or ‘--check-sigs’ listings. Defaults to no.
30 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
show-keyserver-urls
Show any preferred keyserver URL in the ‘--list-sigs’ or
‘--check-sigs’ listings. Defaults to no.
show-uid-validity
Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings. De-
faults to no.
show-unusable-uids
Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.
show-unusable-subkeys
Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.
show-keyring
Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.
show-sig-expire
Show signature expiration dates (if any) during ‘--list-sigs’ or
‘--check-sigs’ listings. Defaults to no.
show-sig-subpackets
Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take
an optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument
is passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
meaningful when using ‘--with-colons’ along with ‘--list-sigs’
or ‘--check-sigs’.
--verify-options parameters
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when verifying
signatures. Options can be prepended with a ‘no-’ to give the opposite meaning.
The options are:
show-photos
Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
Defaults to no. See also ‘--photo-viewer’.
show-policy-urls
Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to no.
show-notations
show-std-notations
show-user-notations
Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.
show-keyserver-urls
Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
Defaults to no.
show-uid-validity
Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
the signature. Defaults to no.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 31
show-unusable-uids
Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
Defaults to no.
show-primary-uid-only
Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That
is all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the
signature verification status.
pka-lookups
Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA
is based on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose infor-
mation on when and what signatures are verified or to whom data
is encrypted. This is similar to the "web bug" described for the
auto-key-retrieve feature.
pka-trust-increase
Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
--enable-dsa2
--disable-dsa2
Enables new-style DSA keys which (unlike the old style) may be larger than
1024 bit and use hashes other than SHA-1 and RIPEMD/160. Note that very
few programs currently support these keys and signatures from them.
--photo-viewer string
This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i" will
be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the same, except
the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits. Other flags are "%k" for the
key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f" for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the
extension of the image type (e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image
(e.g. "image/jpeg"), and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I
are present, then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.
The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title ’KeyID 0x%k’ stdin". Note
that if your image viewer program is not secure, then executing it from GnuPG
does not make it secure.
--exec-path string
Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver helpers. If
not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in default directory, and photo
viewers use the $PATH environment variable. Note, that on W32 system this
value is ignored when searching for keyserver helpers.
--keyring file
Add file to the current list of keyrings. If file begins with a tilde and a
slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not
contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory ("~/.gnupg"
if ‘--homedir’ or $GNUPGHOME is not used).
Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to use the
specified keyring alone, use ‘--keyring’ along with ‘--no-default-keyring’.
32 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--secret-keyring file
Same as ‘--keyring’ but for the secret keyrings.
--primary-keyring file
Designate file as the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported
keys (via ‘--import’ or keyserver ‘--recv-from’) will go to this keyring.
--trustdb-name file
Use file instead of the default trustdb. If file begins with a tilde and a
slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not
contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory (‘~/.gnupg’
if ‘--homedir’ or $GNUPGHOME is not used).
--homedir dir
Set the name of the home directory to dir. If his option is not used, the
home directory defaults to ‘~/.gnupg’. It is only recognized when given on
the command line. It also overrides any home directory stated through the
environment variable GNUPGHOME or (on W32 systems) by means on the Registry
entry HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir.
--display-charset name
Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some informa-
tional strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding. Note that this has
nothing to do with the character set of data to be encrypted or signed; GnuPG
does not recode user-supplied data. If this option is not used, the default char-
acter set is determined from the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the
chosen set. Valid values for name are:
iso-8859-1 This is the Latin 1 set.
iso-8859-2 The Latin 2 set.
iso-8859-15
This is currently an alias for the Latin 1 set.
koi8-r The usual Russian set (rfc1489).
utf-8 Bypass all translations and assume that the OS uses native UTF-8
encoding.
--utf8-strings
--no-utf8-strings
Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF8 strings. The default
(‘--no-utf8-strings’) is to assume that arguments are encoded in the charac-
ter set as specified by ‘--display-charset’. These options affect all following
arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.
--options file
Read options from file and do not try to read them from the default options
file in the homedir (see ‘--homedir’). This option is ignored if used in an
options file.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 33
--no-options
Shortcut for ‘--options /dev/null’. This option is detected before an attempt
to open an option file. Using this option will also prevent the creation of a
‘~/.gnupg’ homedir.
-z n
--compress-level n
--bzip2-compress-level n
Set compression level to n for the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithms.
The default is to use the default compression level of zlib (normally 6).
‘--bzip2-compress-level’ sets the compression level for the BZIP2
compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a different option from
‘--compress-level’ since BZIP2 uses a significant amount of memory for
each additional compression level. ‘-z’ sets both. A value of 0 for n disables
compression.
--bzip2-decompress-lowmem
Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This alter-
nate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs at half the
speed. This is useful under extreme low memory circumstances when the file
was originally compressed at a high ‘--bzip2-compress-level’.
--mangle-dos-filenames
--no-mangle-dos-filenames
Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one dot.
‘--mangle-dos-filenames’ causes GnuPG to replace (rather than add to) the
extension of an output filename to avoid this problem. This option is off by
default and has no effect on non-Windows platforms.
--ask-cert-level
--no-ask-cert-level
When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this option
is not specified, the certification level used is set via ‘--default-cert-level’.
See ‘--default-cert-level’ for information on the specific levels and how they
are used. ‘--no-ask-cert-level’ disables this option. This option defaults to
no.
--default-cert-level n
The default to use for the check level when signing a key.
0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified the key.
1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own it but
you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is useful for a "persona"
verification, where you sign the key of a pseudonymous user.
2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this could mean
that you verified that the key fingerprint and checked the user ID on the key
against a photo ID.
3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this could mean
that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the key in person, and
that you checked, by means of a hard to forge document with a photo ID (such
34 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
as a passport) that the name of the key owner matches the name in the user ID
on the key, and finally that you verified (by exchange of email) that the email
address on the key belongs to the key owner.
Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that: examples.
In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual" and "extensive" mean
to you.
This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).
--min-cert-level
When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a certification level
below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which disregards level 1 signatures. Note
that level 0 "no particular claim" signatures are always accepted.
--trusted-key long key ID
Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is
as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don’t
want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able
to check the validity of a given recipient’s or signator’s key.
--trust-model pgp|classic|direct|always|auto
Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:
pgp This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in
PGP 5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating
a new trust database.
classic This is the standard Web of Trust as used in PGP 2.x and earlier.
direct Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
Web of Trust.
always Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
trusted. You generally won’t use this unless you are using some ex-
ternal validation scheme. This option also suppresses the "[uncer-
tain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no evidence
that the user ID is bound to the key.
auto Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
database says. This is the default model if such a database already
exists.
--auto-key-locate parameters
--no-auto-key-locate
GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this option.
This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the "[email protected]"
form), and there are no [email protected] keys on the local keyring. This option
takes any number of the following arguments, in the order they are to be tried:
cert locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in rfc4398.
pka locate a key using DNS PKA.
ldap locate a key using the PGP Universal method of checking
"ldap://keys.(thedomain)".
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 35
auto-key-retrieve
This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a key-
server when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
local keyring.
Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
Keyserver operators can see which keys you request, so by sending
you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will
not have on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP
address and the time when you verified the signature.
honor-keyserver-url
When using ‘--refresh-keys’, if the key in question has a pre-
ferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh
the key from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the sig-
nature being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that
preferred keyserver to fetch the key from. Defaults to yes.
honor-pka-record
If auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a
PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. De-
faults to yes.
include-subkeys
When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note
that this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not
support retrieving keys by subkey id.
use-temp-files
On most Unix-like platforms, GnuPG communicates with the key-
server helper program via pipes, which is the most efficient method.
This option forces GnuPG to use temporary files to communicate.
On some platforms (such as Win32 and RISC OS), this option is
always enabled.
keep-temp-files
If using ‘use-temp-files’, do not delete the temp files after using
them. This option is useful to learn the keyserver communication
protocol by reading the temporary files.
verbose Tell the keyserver helper program to be more verbose. This option
can be repeated multiple times to increase the verbosity level.
timeout Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
For example, when retrieving multiple keys via ‘--recv-keys’, the
timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
‘--recv-keys’ command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.
http-proxy=value
Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers. This overrides
the "http proxy" environment variable, if any.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 37
max-cert-size
When retrieving a key via DNS CERT, only accept keys up to this
size. Defaults to 16384 bytes.
--completes-needed n
Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to
1).
--marginals-needed n
Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to
3)
--max-cert-depth n
Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).
--simple-sk-checksum
Secret keys are integrity protected by using a SHA-1 checksum. This method
is part of the upcoming enhanced OpenPGP specification but GnuPG already
uses it as a countermeasure against certain attacks. Old applications don’t
understand this new format, so this option may be used to switch back to the
old behaviour. Using this option bears a security risk. Note that using this
option only takes effect when the secret key is encrypted - the simplest way to
make this happen is to change the passphrase on the key (even changing it to
the same value is acceptable).
--no-sig-cache
Do not cache the verification status of key signatures. Caching gives a much
better performance in key listings. However, if you suspect that your public
keyring is not save against write modifications, you can use this option to disable
the caching. It probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of
damage can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.
--no-sig-create-check
GnuPG normally verifies each signature right after creation to protect against
bugs and hardware malfunctions which could leak out bits from the secret key.
This extra verification needs some time (about 115% for DSA keys), and so this
option can be used to disable it. However, due to the fact that the signature
creation needs manual interaction, this performance penalty does not matter
in most settings.
--auto-check-trustdb
--no-auto-check-trustdb
If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be updated,
it automatically runs the ‘--check-trustdb’ command internally. This may be
a time consuming process. ‘--no-auto-check-trustdb’ disables this option.
--use-agent
--no-use-agent
This is dummy option. gpg2 always requires the agent.
--gpg-agent-info
This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with gpg2.
38 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--lock-once
Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested and do not release the lock
until the process terminates.
--lock-multiple
Release the locks every time a lock is no longer needed. Use this to override a
previous ‘--lock-once’ from a config file.
--lock-never
Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very special envi-
ronments, where it can be assured that only one process is accessing those files.
A bootable floppy with a stand-alone encryption system will probably use this.
Improper usage of this option may lead to data and key corruption.
--exit-on-status-write-error
This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately terminate
the process. That should in fact be the default but it never worked this way
and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the change won’t break
applications which close their end of a status fd connected pipe too early. Using
this option along with ‘--enable-progress-filter’ may be used to cleanly
cancel long running gpg operations.
--limit-card-insert-tries n
With n greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a smartcard gets
limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won’t at all ask to insert a card if
none has been inserted at startup. This option is useful in the configuration file
in case an application does not know about the smartcard support and waits
ad infinitum for an inserted card.
--no-random-seed-file
GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations. This
makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations are not
desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of slower random
generation.
--no-greeting
Suppress the initial copyright message.
--no-secmem-warning
Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".
--no-permission-warning
Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (‘--homedir’) per-
missions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are not in-
tended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about certain common
permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a warning means that
your system is secure.
Note that the warning for unsafe ‘--homedir’ permissions cannot be suppressed
in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to place an unsafe gpg.conf
file in place, and use this file to suppress warnings about itself. The ‘--homedir’
permissions warning may only be suppressed on the command line.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 39
--no-mdc-warning
Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.
--require-secmem
--no-require-secmem
Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no (i.e. run,
but give a warning).
--require-cross-certification
--no-require-cross-certification
When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign. Defaults to
‘--require-cross-certification’ for gpg2.
--expert
--no-expert
Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an expired
or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like generating un-
usual key types. This also disables certain warning messages about potentially
incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is for experts only. If
you don’t fully understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave
this off. ‘--no-expert’ disables this option.
--group name=value1
Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs. Any time
the group name is a recipient (‘-r’ or ‘--recipient’), it will be expanded to
the values specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically
merged into a single group.
The values are key IDs or fingerprints, but any key description is accepted.
Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as two different values.
Note also there is only one level of expansion — you cannot make an group
that points to another group. When used from the command line, it may be
necessary to quote the argument to this option to prevent the shell from treating
it as multiple arguments.
--ungroup name
Remove a given entry from the ‘--group’ list.
--no-groups
Remove all entries from the ‘--group’ list.
--local-user name
-u Use name as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
‘--default-key’.
--try-all-secrets
Don’t look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret keys in
turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the behaviour as used
by anonymous recipients (created by using ‘--throw-keyids’) and might come
handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.
import-local-sigs
Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not gen-
erally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults
to no.
repair-pks-subkey-bug
During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS
keyserver bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple
subkeys. Note that this cannot completely repair the damaged key
as some crucial data is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least
give you back one subkey. Defaults to no for regular ‘--import’ and
to yes for keyserver ‘--recv-keys’.
merge-only
During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.
import-clean
After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not
usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are
not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the
‘--edit-key’ command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.
import-minimal
Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures ex-
cept the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is
the same as running the ‘--edit-key’ command "minimize" after
import. Defaults to no.
--export-options parameters
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for exporting keys.
Options can be prepended with a ‘no-’ to give the opposite meaning. The
options are:
export-local-sigs
Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not gen-
erally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults
to no.
export-attributes
Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is
useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP
program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes.
export-sensitive-revkeys
Include designated revoker information that was marked as "sensi-
tive". Defaults to no.
export-reset-subkey-passwd
When using the ‘--export-secret-subkeys’ command, this op-
tion resets the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This
42 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
option forces v3 signatures for signatures on data. Note that this option
implies ‘--ask-sig-expire’, ‘--sig-policy-url’, ‘--sig-notation’, and
‘--sig-keyserver-url’, as these features cannot be used with v3 signatures.
‘--no-force-v3-sigs’ disables this option.
--force-v4-certs
--no-force-v4-certs
Always use v4 key signatures even on v3 keys. This option also changes
the default hash algorithm for v3 RSA keys from MD5 to SHA-1.
‘--no-force-v4-certs’ disables this option.
--force-mdc
Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This is always
used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater than 64 bits), or if
all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in their feature flags.
--disable-mdc
Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by using this
option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a message modification
attack.
--personal-cipher-preferences string
Set the list of personal cipher preferences to string. Use gpg2--version to
get a list of available algorithms, and use none to set no preference at all. This
allows the user to factor in their own preferred algorithms when algorithms are
chosen via recipient key preferences. The most highly ranked cipher in this list
is also used for the ‘--symmetric’ encryption command.
--personal-digest-preferences string
Set the list of personal digest preferences to string. Use gpg2--version to
get a list of available algorithms, and use none to set no preference at all. This
allows the user to factor in their own preferred algorithms when algorithms are
chosen via recipient key preferences. The most highly ranked digest algorithm
in this list is algo used when signing without encryption (e.g. ‘--clearsign’
or ‘--sign’). The default value is SHA-1.
--personal-compress-preferences string
Set the list of personal compression preferences to string. Use gpg2--version
to get a list of available algorithms, and use none to set no preference at all.
This allows the user to factor in their own preferred algorithms when algorithms
are chosen via recipient key preferences. The most highly ranked compression
algorithm in this list is algo used when there are no recipient keys to consider
(e.g. ‘--symmetric’).
--s2k-cipher-algo name
Use name as the cipher algorithm used to protect secret keys. The default
cipher is CAST5. This cipher is also used for conventional encryption if
‘--personal-cipher-preferences’ and ‘--cipher-algo’ is not given.
--s2k-digest-algo name
Use name as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases. The default
algorithm is SHA-1.
44 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--s2k-mode n
Selects how passphrases are mangled. If n is 0 a plain passphrase (which is
not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt to the passphrase and a 3 (the
default) iterates the whole process a number of times (see –s2k-count). Unless
‘--rfc1991’ is used, this mode is also used for conventional encryption.
--s2k-count n
Specify how many times the passphrase mangling is repeated. This value may
range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive, and the default is 65536. Note
that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value
is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only
meaningful if ‘--s2k-mode’ is 3.
--pgp6 Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This restricts you
to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed), 3DES, and CAST5, the
hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms none
and ZIP. This also disables –throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing
subkeys as PGP 6 does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.
This option implies ‘--disable-mdc --no-sk-comment --escape-from-lines
--force-v3-sigs’.
--pgp7 Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is identical to
‘--pgp6’ except that MDCs are not disabled, and the list of allowable ciphers
is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH.
--pgp8 Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot closer
to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all this does is
disable ‘--throw-keyids’ and set ‘--escape-from-lines’. All algorithms are
allowed except for the SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.
--log-file file
--logger-file file
Same as ‘--logger-fd’, except the logger data is written to file file. Note
that ‘--log-file’ is only implemented for GnuPG-2.
--attribute-fd n
Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor n. This is most useful for use
with ‘--status-fd’, since the status messages are needed to separate out the
various subpackets from the stream delivered to the file descriptor.
--attribute-file file
Same as ‘--attribute-fd’, except the attribute data is written to file file.
--comment string
--no-comments
Use string as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII armored
messages or keys (see ‘--armor’). The default behavior is not to use a comment
string. ‘--comment’ may be repeated multiple times to get multiple comment
strings. ‘--no-comments’ removes all comments. It is a good idea to keep the
length of a single comment below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail
programs wrapping such lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header
lines, are not protected by the signature.
--emit-version
--no-emit-version
Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output.
‘--no-emit-version’ disables this option.
--sig-notation name=value
--cert-notation name=value
-N, --set-notation name=value
Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data. name must
consist only of printable characters or spaces, and must contain a ’@’ char-
acter in the form [email protected] (substituting the appropriate
keyname and domain name, of course). This is to help prevent pollution of
the IETF reserved notation namespace. The ‘--expert’ flag overrides the ’@’
check. value may be any printable string; it will be encoded in UTF8, so
you should check that your ‘--display-charset’ is set correctly. If you pre-
fix name with an exclamation mark (!), the notation data will be flagged as
critical (rfc2440:5.2.3.15). ‘--sig-notation’ sets a notation for data signa-
tures. ‘--cert-notation’ sets a notation for key signatures (certifications).
‘--set-notation’ sets both.
There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will be
expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the long key ID
of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the key being signed, "%s"
into the key ID of the key making the signature, "%S" into the long key ID of
the key making the signature, "%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the
signature (which might be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary
key of the key making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the
OpenPGP smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 47
--compress-algo name
Use compression algorithm name. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB compression. "zip"
is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP. "bzip2" is a more modern
compression scheme that can compress some things better than zip or zlib,
but at the cost of more memory used during compression and decompression.
"uncompressed" or "none" disables compression. If this option is not used,
the default behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for maximum
compatibility.
ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression window
size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better compression results than
that, but will use a significantly larger amount of memory while compressing
and decompressing. This may be significant in low memory situations. Note,
however, that PGP (all versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any
algorithm other than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with
PGP. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate
the OpenPGP standard. ‘--personal-compress-preferences’ is the safe way
to accomplish the same thing.
--cert-digest-algo name
Use name as the message digest algorithm used when signing a key. Running the
program with the command ‘--version’ yields a list of supported algorithms.
Be aware that if you choose an algorithm that GnuPG supports but other
OpenPGP implementations do not, then some users will not be able to use the
key signatures you make, or quite possibly your entire key.
--disable-cipher-algo name
Never allow the use of name as cipher algorithm. The given name will not be
checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled.
--disable-pubkey-algo name
Never allow the use of name as public key algorithm. The given name will not
be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled.
--throw-keyids
--no-throw-keyids
Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to hide
the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic anal-
ysis. On the receiving side, it may slow down the decryption process because
all available secret keys must be tried. ‘--no-throw-keyids’ disables this op-
tion. This option is essentially the same as using ‘--hidden-recipient’ for all
recipients.
--not-dash-escaped
This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures so that they can be
used for patch files. You should not send such an armored file via email because
all spaces and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this option for data
which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a line, patch files don’t have this. A
special armor header line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 49
--escape-from-lines
--no-escape-from-lines
Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it is
good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext signatures to
prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note that all other PGP
versions do it this way too. Enabled by default. ‘--no-escape-from-lines’
disables this option.
--passphrase-repeat n
Specify how many times gpg2 will request a new passphrase be repeated. This
is useful for helping memorize a passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.
--passphrase-fd n
Read the passphrase from file descriptor n. Only the first line will be read from
file descriptor n. If you use 0 for n, the passphrase will be read from stdin. This
can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Note that this passphrase
is only used if the option ‘--batch’ has also been given. This is different from
gpg.
--passphrase-file file
Read the passphrase from file file. Only the first line will be read from file
file. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a
passphrase stored in a file is of questionable security if other users can read this
file. Don’t use this option if you can avoid it. Note that this passphrase is only
used if the option ‘--batch’ has also been given. This is different from gpg.
--passphrase string
Use string as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one passphrase
is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable security on a multi-user
system. Don’t use this option if you can avoid it. Note that this passphrase
is only used if the option ‘--batch’ has also been given. This is different from
gpg.
--command-fd n
This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode. If this
option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected from the TTY but
from the given file descriptor. It should be used together with ‘--status-fd’.
See the file doc/DETAILS in the source distribution for details on how to use
it.
--command-file file
Same as ‘--command-fd’, except the commands are read out of file file
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid
--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not self-signed.
This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is trivial to forge.
‘--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid’ disables.
50 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--allow-freeform-uid
Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new one. This
option should only be used in very special environments as it does not ensure
the de-facto standard format of user IDs.
--ignore-time-conflict
GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and signa-
tures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature seems to be older
than the key due to clock problems. This option makes these checks just a
warning. See also ‘--ignore-valid-from’ for timestamp issues on subkeys.
--ignore-valid-from
GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future. This
option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the pre-1.0.7 behaviour.
You should not use this option unless you there is some clock problem. See also
‘--ignore-time-conflict’ for timestamp issues with signatures.
--ignore-crc-error
The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by the
OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG to ignore
CRC errors.
--ignore-mdc-error
This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning. This
can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is necessary to get as
much data as possible out of the corrupt message. However, be aware that a
MDC protection failure may also mean that the message was tampered with
intentionally by an attacker.
--no-default-keyring
Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that GnuPG will
not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option and do not provide
alternate keyrings via ‘--keyring’ or ‘--secret-keyring’, then GnuPG will
still use the default public or secret keyrings.
--skip-verify
Skip the signature verification step. This may be used to make the decryption
faster if the signature verification is not needed.
--with-key-data
Print key listings delimited by colons (like ‘--with-colons’) and print the
public key data.
--fast-list-mode
Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved by
leaving some parts empty. Some applications don’t need the user ID and the
trust information given in the listings. By using this options they can get a
faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may change in future versions.
If you are missing some information, don’t use this option.
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 51
--no-literal
This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
--set-filesize
This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
--show-session-key
Display the session key used for one message. See ‘--override-session-key’
for the counterpart of this option.
We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have the
freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content of one specific
message without compromising all messages ever encrypted for one secret key.
DON’T USE IT UNLESS YOU ARE REALLY FORCED TO DO SO.
--override-session-key string
Don’t use the public key but the session key string. The format of this string is
the same as the one printed by ‘--show-session-key’. This option is normally
not used but comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of
an encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing out
the secret key.
--ask-sig-expire
--no-ask-sig-expire
When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
option is not specified, the expiration time set via ‘--default-sig-expire’
is used. ‘--no-ask-sig-expire’ disables this option. Note that by default,
‘--force-v3-sigs’ is set which also disables this option. If you want
signature expiration, you must set ‘--no-force-v3-sigs’ as well as turning
‘--ask-sig-expire’ on.
--default-sig-expire
The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid values are "0"
for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks),
m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for
five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".
--ask-cert-expire
--no-ask-cert-expire
When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option
is not specified, the expiration time set via ‘--default-cert-expire’ is used.
‘--no-ask-cert-expire’ disables this option.
--default-cert-expire
The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration. Valid values
are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for
weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or
"5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults
to "0".
--allow-secret-key-import
This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.
52 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--allow-multiple-messages
--no-allow-multiple-messages
Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file or
stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with multiple
messages being processed together, so this option defaults to no. Note that
versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple messages.
--enable-special-filenames
This options enables a mode in which filenames of the form ‘-&n’, where n is
a non-negative decimal number, refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file
with that name.
--no-expensive-trust-checks
Experimental use only.
--preserve-permissions
Don’t change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user read/write only.
Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.
--default-preference-list string
Set the list of default preferences to string. This preference list is used for
new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the edit menu.
--default-keyserver-url name
Set the default keyserver URL to name. This keyserver will be used as the
keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key, which includes key
generation and changing preferences.
--list-config
Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option is
intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and is thus
not generally useful. See the file ‘doc/DETAILS’ in the source distribution for
the details of which configuration items may be listed. ‘--list-config’ is only
usable with ‘--with-colons’ set.
--gpgconf-list
This command is similar to ‘--list-config’ but in general only internally used
by the gpgconf tool.
--gpgconf-test
This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration file and
returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent gpg from startup.
Thus it may be used to run a syntax check on the configuration file.
--show-keyring
Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring
a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use ‘--list-options
[no-]show-keyring’ instead.
--always-trust
Identical to ‘--trust-model always’. This option is deprecated.
--show-notation
--no-show-notation
Show signature notations in the ‘--list-sigs’ or ‘--check-sigs’ listings
as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These options
are deprecated. Use ‘--list-options [no-]show-notation’ and/or
‘--verify-options [no-]show-notation’ instead.
--show-policy-url
--no-show-policy-url
Show policy URLs in the ‘--list-sigs’ or ‘--check-sigs’ listings as well
as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in it. These options
are deprecated. Use ‘--list-options [no-]show-policy-url’ and/or
‘--verify-options [no-]show-policy-url’ instead.
‘~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg’
The trust database
‘~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock’
and the lock file
‘~/.gnupg/random_seed’
used to preserve the internal random pool
‘/usr[/local]/share/gnupg/options.skel’
Skeleton options file
‘/usr[/local]/lib/gnupg/’
Default location for extensions
Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:
HOME Used to locate the default home directory.
GNUPGHOME
If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".
GPG AGENT INFO
Used to locate the gpg-agent. The value consists of 3 colon delimited fields:
The first is the path to the Unix Domain Socket, the second the PID of the
gpg-agent and the protocol version which should be set to 1. When starting the
gpg-agent as described in its documentation, this variable is set to the correct
value. The option ‘--gpg-agent-info’ can be used to override it.
PINENTRY USER DATA
This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey extra
information to a custom pinentry
COLUMNS
LINES Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.
LANGUAGE
Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a a valid and
available language name (langid), the file with the translation is loaded from
gpgdir /gnupg.nls/langid.mo. Here gpgdir is the directory out of which the
gpg binary has been laoded. If it can’t be loaded the Registry is tried and as
last resort the native Windows locale system is used.
3.4 Examples
gpg -se -r Bob file
sign and encrypt for user Bob
gpg –clearsign file
make a clear text signature
gpg -sb file
make a detached signature
Chapter 3: Invoking GPG 55
RETURN VALUE
The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least a signature was bad, and other
error codes for fatal errors.
WARNINGS
Use a *good* password for your user account and a *good* passphrase to protect your
secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the whole system. Programs to do
dictionary attacks on your secret keyring are very easy to write and so you should protect
your "~/.gnupg/" directory very well.
Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it is *very* easy to
spy out your passphrase!
If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the program knows about
it; either give both filenames on the command line or use ‘-’ to specify stdin.
that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which OpenPGP program they use. Only
override this safe default if you really know what you are doing.
If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences on a given key are
invalid for some reason, you are far better off using the ‘--pgp6’, ‘--pgp7’, or ‘--pgp8’
options. These options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in violation
of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a "PGP-safe" list.
BUGS
On many systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock
memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing memory
pages (which may contain passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without
being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated.
Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to “suspend to disk”
(also known as “safe sleep” or “hibernate”). This writes all memory to disk before going into
a low power or even powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material may be recoverable
from it later.
Chapter 4: Invoking GPGSM 57
4 Invoking GPGSM
gpgsm is a tool similar to gpg to provide digital encryption and signing servicesd on X.509
certificates and the CMS protocol. It is mainly used as a backend for S/MIME mail pro-
cessing. gpgsm includes a full features certificate management and complies with all rules
defined for the German Sphinx project.
See [Option Index], page 131, for an index to GPGSM’s commands and options.
4.1 Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command
is allowed.
because they are passed verbatim to the Dirmngr and the working directory of
the Dirmngr might not be the same as the one of this client. Currently it is not
possible to pass data via stdin to the Dirmngr. command should not contain
spaces.
This is command is required for certain maintaining tasks of the dirmngr where
a dirmngr must be able to call back to gpgsm. See the Dirmngr manual for
details.
--call-protect-tool arguments
Certain maintenance operations are done by an external program call gpg-
protect-tool; this is usually not installed in a directory listed in the PATH
variable. This command provides a simple wrapper to access this tool. ar-
guments are passed verbatim to this command; use ‘--help’ to get a list of
supported operations.
--keydb-clear-some-cert-flags
This is a debugging aid to reset certain flags in the key database which are used
to cache certain certificate stati. It is especially useful if a bad CRL or a weird
running OCSP reponder did accidently revoke certificate. There is no security
issue with this command because gpgsm always make sure that the validity of
a certificate is checked right before it is used.
--delete-keys pattern
Delete the keys matching pattern.
--export [pattern ]
Export all certificates stored in the Keybox or those specified by the optional
pattern. Those pattern consist of a list of user ids (see [how-to-specify-a-user-
id], page 81). When used along with the ‘--armor’ option a few informational
lines are prepended before each block. There is one limitation: As there is no
commonly agreed upon way to pack more than one certificate into an ASN.1
structure, the binary export (i.e. without using ‘armor’) works only for the
export of one certificate. Thus it is required to specify a pattern which yields
exactly one certificate.
--export-secret-key-p12 key-id
Export the private key and the certificate identified by key-id in a PKCS#12
format. When using along with the --armor option a few informational lines
are prepended to the output. Note, that the PKCS#12 format is not very
secure and this command is only provided if there is no other way to exchange
the private key. (see [option –p12-charset], page 62)
--import [files ]
Import the certificates from the PEM or binary encoded files as well as from
signed-only messages. This command may also be used to import a secret key
from a PKCS#12 file.
--learn-card
Read information about the private keys from the smartcard and import the
certificates from there. This command utilizes the gpg-agent and in turn the
scdaemon.
--passwd user_id
Change the passphrase of the private key belonging to the certificate specified
as user id. Note, that changing the passphrase/PIN of a smartcard is not yet
supported.
--options file
Reads configuration from file instead of from the default per-user configuration
file. The default configuration file is named ‘gpgsm.conf’ and expected in the
‘.gnupg’ directory directly below the home directory of the user.
--homedir dir
Set the name of the home directory to dir. If his option is not used, the
home directory defaults to ‘~/.gnupg’. It is only recognized when given on
the command line. It also overrides any home directory stated through the
environment variable GNUPGHOME or (on W32 systems) by means on the Registry
entry HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir.
-v
--verbose
Outputs additional information while running. You can increase the verbosity
by giving several verbose commands to gpgsm, such as ‘-vv’.
--policy-file filename
Change the default name of the policy file to filename.
--agent-program file
Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value
is the ‘/usr/local/bin/gpg-agent’. This is only used as a fallback when the
envrionment variable GPG_AGENT_INFO is not set or a running agent can’t be
connected.
--dirmngr-program file
Specify a dirmngr program to be used for CRL checks. The default value is
‘/usr/sbin/dirmngr’. This is only used as a fallback when the environment
variable DIRMNGR_INFO is not set or a running dirmngr can’t be connected.
--prefer-system-dirmngr
If a system wide dirmngr is running in daemon mode, first try to connect to
this one. Fallback to a pipe based server if this does not work. Under Windows
this option is ignored because the system dirmngr is always used.
--disable-dirmngr
Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.
--no-secmem-warning
Don’t print a warning when the so called "secure memory" can’t be used.
--log-file file
When running in server mode, append all logging output to file.
--enable-crl-checks
--disable-crl-checks
By default the CRL checks are enabled and the DirMngr is used to check for
revoked certificates. The disable option is most useful with an off-line network
connection to suppress this check.
--enable-trusted-cert-crl-check
--disable-trusted-cert-crl-check
By default the CRL for trusted root certificates are checked like for any other
certificates. This allows a CA to revoke its own certificates voluntary without
the need of putting all ever issued certificates into a CRL. The disable option
may be used to switch this extra check off. Due to the caching done by the
Dirmngr, there won’t be any noticeable performance gain. Note, that this also
disables possible OCSP checks for trusted root certificates. A more specific way
of disabling this check is by adding the “relax” keyword to the root CA line of
the ‘trustlist.txt’
--force-crl-refresh
Tell the dirmngr to reload the CRL for each request. For better performance,
the dirmngr will actually optimize this by suppressing the loading for short
time intervalls (e.g. 30 minutes). This option is useful to make sure that a
fresh CRL is available for certificates hold in the keybox. The suggested way of
doing this is by using it along with the option ‘--with-validation’ for a key
listing command. This option should not be used in a configuration file.
--enable-ocsp
--disable-ocsp
Be default OCSP checks are disabled. The enable option may be used to en-
able OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If CRL checks are also enabled, CRLs will be
used as a fallback if for some reason an OCSP request won’t succeed. Note,
that you have to allow OCSP requests in Dirmngr’s configuration too (option
‘--allow-ocsp’ and configure dirmngr properly. If you don’t do so you will get
the error code ‘Not supported’.
--auto-issuer-key-retrieve
If a required certificate is missing while validating the chain of certificates, try
to load that certificate from an external location. This usually means that
Dirmngr is employed t search for the certificate. Note that this option makes
a "web bug" like behavior possible. LDAP server operators can see which keys
you request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
you naturally will not have on your local keybox), the operator can tell both
your IP address and the time when you verified the signature.
--validation-model name
This option changes the default validation model. The only possible values are
"shell" (which is the default) and "chain" which forces the use of the chain
model. The chain model is also used if an option in the ‘trustlist.txt’ or an
attribute of the certificate requests it. However the standard model (shell) is in
that case always tried first.
62 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified
and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully
selected to best aid in debugging.
--debug flags
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change at any
time without notice; using --debug-levels is the preferred method to select
the debug verbosity. FLAGS are bit encoded and may be given in usual C-
Syntax. The currently defined bits are:
0 (1) X.509 or OpenPGP protocol related data
1 (2) values of big number integers
2 (4) low level crypto operations
5 (32) memory allocation
6 (64) caching
7 (128) show memory statistics.
9 (512) write hashed data to files named dbgmd-000*
10 (1024) trace Assuan protocol
Note, that all flags set using this option may get overriden by --debug-level.
--debug-all
Same as --debug=0xffffffff
--debug-allow-core-dump
Usually gpgsm tries to avoid dumping core by well written code and by disabling
core dumps for security reasons. However, bugs are pretty durable beasts and
to squash them it is sometimes useful to have a core dump. This option enables
core dumps unless the Bad Thing happened before the option parsing.
--debug-no-chain-validation
This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It lets gpgsm
bypass all certificate chain validation checks.
--debug-ignore-expiration
This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It lets gpgsm
ignore all notAfter dates, this is used by the regresssion tests.
--fixed-passphrase string
Supply the passphrase string to the gpg-protect-tool. This option is only use-
ful for the regression tests included with this package and may be revised or
removed at any time without notice.
--no-common-certs-import
Suppress the import of common certificates on keybox creation.
All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after stripping off the
two leading dashes.
Chapter 4: Invoking GPGSM 65
‘help.txt’
This is plain text file with a few help entries used with pinentry as well as
a large list of help items for gpg and gpgsm. The standard file has English
help texts; to install localized versions use filenames like ‘help.LL.txt’ with
LL denoting the locale. GnuPG comes with a set of predefined help files in the
data directory (e.g. ‘/usr/share/gnupg/help.de.txt’) and allows overriding
of any help item by help files stored in the system configuration directory (e.g.
‘/etc/gnupg/help.de.txt’). For a reference of the help file’s syntax, please
see the installed ‘help.txt’ file.
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory
‘/etc/skel/.gnupg/’ so that newly created users start up with a working configuration.
For existing users the a small helper script is provided to create these files (see Section 7.3
[addgnupghome], page 86).
For internal purposes gpgsm creates and maintaines a few other files; They all live in in
the current home directory (see [option –homedir], page 4). Only gpgsm may modify these
files.
‘pubring.kbx’
This a database file storing the certificates as well as meta information. For
debugging purposes the tool kbxutil may be used to show the internal structure
of this file.
‘random_seed’
This content of this file is used to maintain the internal state of the random
number generator accross invocations. The same file is used by other programs
of this software too.
‘S.gpg-agent’
If this file exists and the environment variable GPG_AGENT_INFO is not set, gpgsm
will first try to connect to this socket for accessing gpg-agent before starting
a new gpg-agent instance. Under Windows this socket (which in reality be
a plain file describing a regular TCP litening port) is the standard way of
connecting the gpg-agent.
4.4 Examples
$ gpgsm -er [email protected] <plaintext >ciphertext
In mosted cases it is required to look at several status lines. Here is a table of all cases a
signed message may have:
The signature is valid
This does mean that the signature has been successfully verified, the certificates
are all sane. However there are two subcases with important information: One
of the certificates may have expired or a signature of a message itself as expired.
It is a sound practise to consider such a signature still as valid but additional
information should be displayed. Depending on the subcase gpgsm will issue
these status codes:
signature valid and nothing did expire
GOODSIG, VALIDSIG, TRUST_FULLY
signature valid but at least one certificate has expired
EXPKEYSIG, VALIDSIG, TRUST_FULLY
signature valid but expired
EXPSIG, VALIDSIG, TRUST_FULLY Note, that this case is currently
not implemented.
The signature is invalid
This means that the signature verification failed (this is an indication of af a
transfer error, a programm error or tampering with the message). gpgsm issues
one of these status codes sequences:
BADSIG
GOODSIG, VALIDSIG TRUST_NEVER
Error verifying a signature
For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it can’t be decided
whether the signature is valid or invalid. A common reason for this is a missing
certificate.
why the recipient can’t be used, the encryption will then not be done for this recipient. If
the policy is not to encrypt at all if not all recipients are valid, the client has to take care
of this. All RECIPIENT commands are cumulative until a RESET or an successful ENCRYPT
command.
INPUT FD[=n ] [--armor|--base64|--binary]
Set the file descriptor for the message to be encrypted to n. Obviously the pipe must
be open at that point, the server establishes its own end. If the server returns an error
the client should consider this session failed. If n is not given, this commands uses the last
file descriptor passed to the application. See section “the assuan sendfd function” in the
Libassuan manual, on how to do descriptor passing.
The --armor option may be used to advice the server that the input data is in PEM
format, --base64 advices that a raw base-64 encoding is used, --binary advices of raw
binary input (BER). If none of these options is used, the server tries to figure out the used
encoding, but this may not always be correct.
OUTPUT FD[=n ] [--armor|--base64]
Set the file descriptor to be used for the output (i.e. the encrypted message). Obviously
the pipe must be open at that point, the server establishes its own end. If the server returns
an error he client should consider this session failed.
The option armor encodes the output in PEM format, the --base64 option applies just
a base 64 encoding. No option creates binary output (BER).
The actual encryption is done using the command
ENCRYPT
It takes the plaintext from the INPUT command, writes to the ciphertext to the file
descriptor set with the OUTPUT command, take the recipients from all the recipients set
so far. If this command fails the clients should try to delete all output currently done or
otherwise mark it as invalid. GPGSM does ensure that there won’t be any security problem
with leftover data on the output in this case.
This command should in general not fail, as all necessary checks have been done while
setting the recipients. The input and output pipes are closed.
5.1 Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command
is allowed.
--version
Print the program version and licensing information. Not that you can abbre-
viate this command.
--help, -h
Print a usage message summarizing the most usefule command-line options.
Not that you can abbreviate this command.
--dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Not that you can abbreviate
this command.
--server Run in server mode and wait for commands on the stdin. This is default mode
is to create a socket and listen for commands there.
--multi-server
Run in server mode and wait for commands on the stdin as well as on an
additional Unix Domain socket. The server command GETINFO may be used to
get the name of that extra socket.
--daemon Run the program in the background. This option is required to prevent it from
being accidently running in the background.
--debug-level level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. level may be one of:
none no debugging at all.
basic some basic debug messages
advanced more verbose debug messages
expert even more detailed messages
guru all of the debug messages you can get
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified
and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully
selected to best aid in debugging.
Note: All debugging options are subject to change and thus should
not be used by any application program. As the name says, they
are only used as helpers to debug problems.
--debug flags
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change at any
time without notice. FLAGS are bit encoded and may be given in usual C-
Syntax. The currently defined bits are:
0 (1) command I/O
1 (2) values of big number integers
2 (4) low level crypto operations
5 (32) memory allocation
6 (64) caching
7 (128) show memory statistics.
9 (512) write hashed data to files named dbgmd-000*
10 (1024) trace Assuan protocol
11 (2048) trace APDU I/O to the card. This may reveal sensitive data.
--debug-all
Same as --debug=0xffffffff
--debug-wait n
When running in server mode, wait n seconds before entering the actual pro-
cessing loop and print the pid. This gives time to attach a debugger.
--debug-ccid-driver
Enable debug output from the included CCID driver for smartcards. Using this
option twice will also enable some tracing of the T=1 protocol. Note that this
option may reveal sensitive data.
--debug-disable-ticker
This option disables all ticker functions like checking for card insertions.
Chapter 5: Invoking the SCDAEMON 75
--debug-allow-core-dump
For security reasons we won’t create a core dump when the process aborts. For
debugging purposes it is sometimes better to allow core dump. This options
enables it and also changes the working directory to ‘/tmp’ when running in
‘--server’ mode.
--no-detach
Don’t detach the process from the console. This is mainly useful for debugging.
--log-file file
Append all logging output to file. This is very helpful in seeing what the agent
actually does.
--pcsc-driver library
Use library to access the smartcard reader. The current default is
‘libpcsclite.so’. Instead of using this option you might also want to install
a symbolic link to the default file name (e.g. from ‘libpcsclite.so.1’).
--ctapi-driver library
Use library to access the smartcard reader. The current default is
‘libtowitoko.so’. Note that the use of this interface is deprecated; it may be
removed in future releases.
--disable-ccid
Disable the integrated support for CCID compliant readers. This allows to fall
back to one of the other drivers even if the internal CCID driver can handle
the reader. Note, that CCID support is only available if libusb was available at
build time.
--reader-port number_or_string
This option may be used to specify the port of the card terminal. A value of 0
refers to the first serial device; add 32768 to access USB devices. The default
is 32768 (first USB device). PC/SC or CCID readers might need a string here;
run the program in verbose mode to get a list of available readers. The default
is then the first reader found.
To get a list of available CCID readers you may use this command:
echo scd getinfo reader_list | gpg-connect-agent --decode | awk ’/^D/ {print $2}’
--disable-keypad
Even if a card reader features a keypad, do not try to use it.
--allow-admin
--deny-admin
This enables the use of Admin class commands for card applications where this
is supported. Currently we support it for the OpenPGP card. Deny is the
default. This commands is useful to inhibit accidental access to admin class
command which could ultimately lock the card through worng PIN numbers.
--disable-application name
This option disables the use of the card application named name. This is mainly
useful for debugging or if a application with lower priority should be used by
default.
76 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after stripping off the
two leading dashes.
‘scdaemon.conf’
This is the standard configuration file read by scdaemon on startup. It may
contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and
the option may not be abbreviated. This default name may be changed on the
command line (see [option –options], page 4).
‘scd-event’
If this file is present and executable, it will be called on veyer card reader’s
status changed. An example of this script is provided with the distribution
‘reader_n.status’
This file is created by sdaemon to let other applications now about reader status
changes. Its use is now deprecated in favor of ‘scd-event’.
5.5 Examples
$ scdaemon --server -v
Chapter 5: Invoking the SCDAEMON 77
234AABBCC34567C4
0F323456784E56EAB
01AB3FED1347A5612
0x234AABBCC34567C4
• By fingerprint. This format is deduced from the length of the string and its content or
the 0x prefix. Note, that only the 20 byte version fingerprint is available with gpgsm
(i.e. the SHA-1 hash of the certificate).
When using gpg an exclamation mark (!) may be appended to force using the specified
primary or secondary key and not to try and calculate which primary or secondary key
to use.
The best way to specify a key Id is by using the fingerprint. This avoids any ambiguities
in case that there are duplicated key IDs.
1234343434343434C434343434343434
123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434
0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434
0xE12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434
(gpgsm also accepts colons between each pair of hexadecimal digits because this is the
de-facto standard on how to present X.509 fingerprints.)
• By exact match on OpenPGP user ID. This is denoted by a leading equal sign. It does
not make sense for X.509 certificates.
=Heinrich Heine <[email protected]>
82 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
• By exact match on an email address. This is indicated by enclosing the email address
in the usual way with left and right angles.
<[email protected]>
• By word match. All words must match exactly (not case sensitive) but can appear in
any order in the user ID or a subjects name. Words are any sequences of letters, digits,
the underscore and all characters with bit 7 set.
+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf
• By exact match on the subject’s DN. This is indicated by a leading slash, directly
followed by the RFC-2253 encoded DN of the subject. Note that you can’t use the
string printed by "gpgsm –list-keys" because that one as been reordered and modified
for better readability; use –with-colons to print the raw (but standard escaped) RFC-
2253 string
/CN=Heinrich Heine,O=Poets,L=Paris,C=FR
• By exact match on the issuer’s DN. This is indicated by a leading hash mark, directly
followed by a slash and then directly followed by the rfc2253 encoded DN of the issuer.
This should return the Root cert of the issuer. See note above.
#/CN=Root Cert,O=Poets,L=Paris,C=FR
• By exact match on serial number and issuer’s DN. This is indicated by a hash mark,
followed by the hexadecimal representation of the serial number, then followed by a
slash and the RFC-2253 encoded DN of the issuer. See note above.
#4F03/CN=Root Cert,O=Poets,L=Paris,C=FR
• By keygrip This is indicated by an ampersand followed by the 40 hex digits of a keygrip.
gpgsm prints the keygrip when using the command ‘--dump-cert’. It does not yet work
for OpenPGP keys.
&D75F22C3F86E355877348498CDC92BD21010A480
• By substring match. This is the default mode but applications may want to explicitly
indicate this by putting the asterisk in front. Match is not case sensitive.
Heine
*Heine
Please note that we have reused the hash mark identifier which was used in old GnuPG
versions to indicate the so called local-id. It is not anymore used and there should be no
conflict when used with X.509 stuff.
Chapter 6: How to Specify a User Id 83
Using the RFC-2253 format of DNs has the drawback that it is not possible to map them
back to the original encoding, however we don’t have to do this because our key database
stores this encoding as meta data.
84 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Chapter 7: Helper Tools 85
7 Helper Tools
GnuPG comes with a couple of smaller tools:
--status-fd n
Write special status strings to the file descriptor n. See the file DETAILS in
the documentation for a listing of them.
--logger-fd n
Write log output to file descriptor n and not to stderr.
--ignore-time-conflict
GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and signa-
tures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature seems to be older
than the key due to clock problems. This option turns these checks into warn-
ings.
--homedir dir
Set the name of the home directory to dir. If his option is not used, the
home directory defaults to ‘~/.gnupg’. It is only recognized when given on
the command line. It also overrides any home directory stated through the
environment variable GNUPGHOME or (on W32 systems) by means on the Registry
entry HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir.
The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least one signature was bad, and
other error codes for fatal errors.
7.2.1 Examples
gpgv2pgpfile
gpgv2sigfile
Verify the signature of the file. The second form is used for detached signatures,
where sigfile is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and
are the signed data; if this is not given the name of the file holding the signed
data is constructed by cutting off the extension (".asc", ".sig" or ".sign") from
sigfile.
7.2.2 Environment
HOME Used to locate the default home directory.
GNUPGHOME
If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".
7.2.3 FILES
~/.gnupg/trustedkeys.gpg
The default keyring with the allowed keys
gpg2(1)
copying all files from ‘/etc/skel/.gnupg’ to the home directories of the accounts given on
the command line. It takes care not to overwrite existing GnuPG home directories.
addgnupghome is invoked by root as:
addgnupghome account1 account2 ... accountn
--check-config [filename ]
Run a syntax check on the global configuration file. If filename is given, check
that file instead.
The following options may be used:
-v
--verbose
Outputs additional information while running. Specifically, this extends nu-
merical field values by human-readable descriptions.
-r
--runtime
Only used together with --change-options. If one of the modified options can
be changed in a running daemon process, signal the running daemon to ask it
to reparse its configuration file after changing.
This means that the changes will take effect at run-time, as far as this is possible.
Otherwise, they will take effect at the next start of the respective backend
programs.
unsigned number
Some fields contain an unsigned number. This number will always fit into a 32-
bit unsigned integer variable. The number may be followed by a space, followed
by a human readable description of that value (if the verbose option is used).
You should ignore everything in the field that follows the number.
signed number
Some fields contain a signed number. This number will always fit into a 32-bit
signed integer variable. The number may be followed by a space, followed by a
human readable description of that value (if the verbose option is used). You
should ignore everything in the field that follows the number.
boolean value
Some fields contain a boolean value. This is a number with either the value 0
or 1. The number may be followed by a space, followed by a human readable
description of that value (if the verbose option is used). You should ignore
everything in the field that follows the number; checking just the first character
is sufficient in this case.
option Some fields contain an option argument. The format of an option argument
depends on the type of the option and on some flags:
no argument
The simplest case is that the option does not take an argument
at all (type 0). Then the option argument is an unsigned number
that specifies how often the option occurs. If the list flag is not
set, then the only valid number is 1. Options that do not take an
argument never have the default or optional arg flag set.
number list
If the option takes a number argument and it can occur more than
once, then the option argument is either empty, or it is a comma-
separated list of numbers as described above.
string If the option takes a string argument (alt-type is 1), and it can only
occur once (list flag is not set) then the option argument is either
empty (only allowed if the argument is optional), or it starts with
a double quote character (") followed by a percent-escaped string
that is the argument value. Note that there is only a leading double
quote character, no trailing one. The double quote character is only
needed to be able to differentiate between no value and the empty
string as value.
90 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
string list If the option takes a number argument and it can occur more than
once, then the option argument is either empty, or it is a comma-
separated list of string arguments as described above.
The active language and character set are currently determined from the locale environ-
ment of the gpgconf program.
name This field contains a name tag of the program which is identical to the name
of the component. The name tag is to be used verbatim. It is thus not in any
escaped format. This field may be empty to indicate a continuation of error
descriptions for the last name. The description and pgmname fields are then
also empty.
description
The string in this field contains a human-readable description of the component.
It can be displayed to the user of the GUI for informational purposes. It is
percent-escaped and localized.
pgmname The string in this field contains the absolute name of the program’s file. It can
be used to unambiguously invoke that program. It is percent-escaped.
avail The boolean value in this field indicates whether the program is installed and
runnable.
okay The boolean value in this field indicates whether the program’s config file is
syntactically okay.
cfgfile If an error occured in the configuraion file (as indicated by a false value in
the field okay), this field has the name of the failing configuration file. It is
percent-escaped.
line If an error occured in the configuration file, this field has the line number of
the failing statement in the configuration file. It is an unsigned number.
error If an error occured in the configuration file, this field has the error text of the
failing statement in the configuration file. It is percent-escaped and localized.
In the following example the dirmngr is not runnable and the configuration file of scdaemon
is not okay.
$ gpgconf --check-programs
gpg:GPG for OpenPGP:/usr/local/bin/gpg2:1:1:
gpg-agent:GPG Agent:/usr/local/bin/gpg-agent:1:1:
scdaemon:Smartcard Daemon:/usr/local/bin/scdaemon:1:0:
gpgsm:GPG for S/MIME:/usr/local/bin/gpgsm:1:1:
dirmngr:Directory Manager:/usr/local/bin/dirmngr:0:0:
name This field contains a name tag for the group or option. The name tag is used
to specify the group or option in all communication with gpgconf. The name
tag is to be used verbatim. It is thus not in any escaped format.
flags The flags field contains an unsigned number. Its value is the OR-wise combina-
tion of the following flag values:
group (1) If this flag is set, this is a line describing a group and not an option.
The following flag values are only defined for options (that is, if the group flag
is not used).
optional arg (2)
If this flag is set, the argument is optional. This is never set for
type 0 (none) options.
list (4) If this flag is set, the option can be given multiple times.
runtime (8)
If this flag is set, the option can be changed at runtime.
default (16)
If this flag is set, a default value is available.
default desc (32)
If this flag is set, a (runtime) default is available. This and the
default flag are mutually exclusive.
no arg desc (64)
If this flag is set, and the optional arg flag is set, then the option
has a special meaning if no argument is given.
no change (128)
If this flag is set, gpgconf ignores requests to change the value. GUI
frontends should grey out this option. Note, that manual changes
of the configuration files are still possible.
level This field is defined for options and for groups. It contains an unsigned number
that specifies the expert level under which this group or option should be dis-
played. The following expert levels are defined for options (they have analogous
meaning for groups):
basic (0) This option should always be offered to the user.
advanced (1)
This option may be offered to advanced users.
expert (2)
This option should only be offered to expert users.
invisible (3)
This option should normally never be displayed, not even to expert
users.
internal (4)
This option is for internal use only. Ignore it.
Chapter 7: Helper Tools 93
The level of a group will always be the lowest level of all options it contains.
description
This field is defined for options and groups. The string in this field contains a
human-readable description of the option or group. It can be displayed to the
user of the GUI for informational purposes. It is percent-escaped and localized.
type This field is only defined for options. It contains an unsigned number that
specifies the type of the option’s argument, if any. The following types are
defined:
Basic types:
none (0) No argument allowed.
string (1)
An unformatted string.
int32 (2) A signed number.
uint32 (3)
An unsigned number.
Complex types:
pathname (32)
A string that describes the pathname of a file. The file does not
necessarily need to exist.
ldap server (33)
A string that describes an LDAP server in the format:
hostname :port :username :password :base_dn
key fingerprint (34)
A string with a 40 digit fingerprint specifying a certificate.
pub key (35)
A string that describes a certificate by user ID, key ID or finger-
print.
sec key (36)
A string that describes a certificate with a key by user ID, key ID
or fingerprint.
More types will be added in the future. Please see the alt-type field for infor-
mation on how to cope with unknown types.
alt-type This field is identical to type, except that only the types 0 to 31 are allowed.
The GUI is expected to present the user the option in the format specified
by type. But if the argument type type is not supported by the GUI, it can
still display the option in the more generic basic type alt-type. The GUI must
support all the defined basic types to be able to display all options. More basic
types may be added in future versions. If the GUI encounters a basic type it
doesn’t support, it should report an error and abort the operation.
94 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
argname This field is only defined for options with an argument type type that is not 0.
In this case it may contain a percent-escaped and localised string that gives a
short name for the argument. The field may also be empty, though, in which
case a short name is not known.
default This field is defined only for options for which the default or default desc
flag is set. If the default flag is set, its format is that of an option argument
(See Section 7.4.2 [Format conventions], page 88, for details). If the default
value is empty, then no default is known. Otherwise, the value specifies the
default value for this option. If the default desc flag is set, the field is either
empty or contains a description of the effect if the option is not given.
argdef This field is defined only for options for which the optional arg flag is set. If
the no arg desc flag is not set, its format is that of an option argument (See
Section 7.4.2 [Format conventions], page 88, for details). If the default value
is empty, then no default is known. Otherwise, the value specifies the default
argument for this option. If the no arg desc flag is set, the field is either empty
or contains a description of the effect of this option if no argument is given.
value This field is defined only for options. Its format is that of an option argument.
If it is empty, then the option is not explicitely set in the current configuration,
and the default applies (if any). Otherwise, it contains the current value of
the option. Note that this field is also meaningful if the option itself does not
take a real argument (in this case, it contains the number of times the option
appears).
a bulletproof of forcing a user to use certain options. A user may always directly edit the
configuration files and bypass gpgconf.
applygnupgdefaults is invoked by root as:
applygnupgdefaults
--preset Preset a passphrase. This is what you usually will use. gpg-preset-
passphrase will then read the passphrase from stdin.
--forget Flush the passphrase for the given keygrip from the cache.
-v
--verbose
Output additional information while running.
-P string
--passphrase string
Instead of reading the passphrase from stdin, use the supplied string as
passphrase. Note that this makes the passphrase visible for other users.
Chapter 7: Helper Tools 97
--no-ext-connect
When using ‘-S’ or ‘--exec’, gpg-connect-agent connects to the assuan server
in extended mode to allow descriptor passing. This option makes it use the old
mode.
--run file
Run the commands from file at startup and then continue with the regular
input method.
-s
--subst Run the command /subst at startup.
98 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
--hex Print data lines in a hex format and the ASCII representation of non-control
characters.
--decode Decode data lines. That is to remove percent escapes but make sure that a new
line always starts with a D and a space.
unpercent args
unpercent+ args
Remove percent style ecaping from args. Note that %00 terminates
the string implicitly. The string to be converted are the entire
arguments right behind the delimiting space of the function name.
unpercent+ also maps plus signs to a spaces.
percent args
percent+ args
Escape the args using percent style ecaping. Tabs, formfeeds, line-
feeds, carriage returns and colons are escaped. percent+ also maps
spaces to plus signs.
errcode arg
errsource arg
errstring arg
Assume arg is an integer and evaluate it using strtol. Return the
gpg-error error code, error source or a formatted string with the
error code and error source.
+
-
*
/
% Evaluate all arguments as long integers using strtol and apply
this operator. A division by zero yields an empty string.
!
|
& Evaluate all arguments as long integers using strtol and apply the
logical oeprators NOT, OR or AND. The NOT operator works on
the last argument only.
/cleardef
Delete all definitions
100 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
/run file
Run commands from file.
/bye Terminate the connection and the program
/help Print a list of available control commands.
Chapter 7: Helper Tools 101
0 Success.
1 Some error occured.
2 No valid passphrase was provided.
3 The operation was canceled by the user.
Chapter 8: How to do certain things 103
I opted for creating a new RSA key. The other option is to use an already exist-
ing key, by selecting 2 and entering the so-called keygrip. Running the command ‘gpgsm
--dump-secret-key USERID’ shows you this keygrip. Using 3 offers another menu to create
a certificate directly from a smart card based key.
Let’s continue:
Key length
[1] 1024
[2] 2048
Your selection: 1
You selected: 1024
The script offers two common key sizes. With the current setup of CAcert, it does not
make much sense to use a 2k key; their policies need to be revised anyway (a CA root key
valid for 30 years is not really serious).
Key usage
[1] sign, encrypt
[2] sign
[3] encrypt
Your selection: 1
You selected: sign, encrypt
We want to sign and encrypt using this key. This is just a suggestion and the CA may
actually assign other key capabilities.
Now for some real data:
104 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Name (DN)
> CN=kerckhoffs.g10code.com
This is the most important value for a server certificate. Enter here the canonical name
of your server machine. You may add other virtual server names later.
E-Mail addresses (end with an empty line)
>
We don’t need email addresses in a server certificate and CAcert would anyway ignore
such a request. Thus just hit enter.
If you want to create a client certificate for email encryption, this would be the place to
enter your mail address (e.g. [email protected]). You may enter as many addresses as you
like, however the CA may not accept them all or reject the entire request.
DNS Names (optional; end with an empty line)
> www.g10code.com
DNS Names (optional; end with an empty line)
> ftp.g10code.com
DNS Names (optional; end with an empty line)
>
Here I entered the names of the servers which actually run on the machine given in the
DN above. The browser will accept a certificate for any of these names. As usual the CA
must approve all of these names.
URIs (optional; end with an empty line)
>
It is possible to insert arbitrary URIs into a certificate; for a server certificate this does
not make sense.
We have now entered all required information and gpgsm will display what it has gathered
and ask whether to create the certificate request:
Chapter 8: How to do certain things 105
Parameters for certificate request to create:
1 Key-Type: RSA
2 Key-Length: 1024
3 Key-Usage: sign, encrypt
4 Name-DN: CN=kerckhoffs.g10code.com
5 Name-DNS: www.g10code.com
6 Name-DNS: ftp.g10code.com
gpgsm will now start working on creating the request. As this includes the creation of an
RSA key it may take a while. During this time you will be asked 3 times for a passphrase
to protect the created private key on your system. A pop up window will appear to ask for
it. The first two prompts are for the new passphrase and for re-entering it; the third one is
required to actually create the certificate signing request.
When it is ready, you should see the final notice:
gpgsm: certificate request created
Now, you may look at the created request:
$ cat a.p10
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
$
You may now proceed by logging into your account at the CAcert website, choose Server
Certificates - New, check sign by class 3 root certificate, paste the above request
block into the text field and click on Submit.
If everything works out fine, a certificate will be shown. Now run
$ gpgsm --import
106 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
and paste the certificate from the CAcert page into your terminal followed by a Ctrl-D
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
gpgsm: issuer certificate (#/CN=CAcert Class 3 Ro[...]) not found
gpgsm: certificate imported
gpgsm tells you that it has imported the certificate. It is now associated with the key
you used when creating the request. The root certificate has not been found, so you may
want to import it from the CACert website.
I used ‘-K’ above because this will only list certificates for which a private key is available.
To see more details, you may use ‘--dump-secret-keys’ instead of ‘-K’.
To make actual use of the certificate you need to install it on your server. Server software
usally expects a PKCS\#12 file with key and certificate. To create such a file, run:
$ gpgsm --export-secret-key-p12 -a >kerckhoffs-cert.pem
You will be asked for the passphrase as well as for a new passphrase to be used to protect
the PKCS\#12 file. The file now contains the certificate as well as the private key:
$ cat kerckhoffs-cert.pem
Issuer ...: /CN=CAcert Class 3 Root/OU=http:\x2f\x2fwww.CA[...]
Serial ...: 4C
Subject ..: /CN=kerckhoffs.g10code.com
aka ..: (dns-name www.g10code.com)
aka ..: (dns-name ftp.g10code.com)
-----BEGIN PKCS12-----
MIIHlwIBAzCCB5AGCSqGSIb37QdHAaCCB4EEggd9MIIHeTk1BJ8GCSqGSIb3DQEu
[...many more lines...]
-----END PKCS12-----
$
Copy this file in a secure way to the server, install it there and delete the file then. You
may export the file again at any time as long as it is available in GnuPG’s private key
database.
108 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Chapter 9: Notes pertaining to certain OSes. 109
1
Well, OpenPGP keys are not implemented, gpg still used the keyring file ‘pubring.gpg’
112 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
To import the created file on the machine you use this command:
/usr/local/libexec/gpg-protect-tool --p12-import --store foo.p12
You will be asked for the pkcs#12 passphrase and a new passphrase to protect the
imported private key at its new location.
Note that there is no easy way to match existing certificates with stored private keys
because some private keys are used for Secure Shell or other purposes and don’t have
a corresponding certificate.
• A root certificate does not verify
A common problem is that the root certificate misses the required basicConstrains
attribute and thus gpgsm rejects this certificate. An error message indicating “no
value” is a sign for such a certificate. You may use the relax flag in ‘trustlist.txt’
to accept the certificate anyway. Note that the fingerprint and this flag may only be
added manually to ‘trustlist.txt’.
• Error message: “digest algorithm N has not been enabled”
The signature is broken. You may try the option ‘--extra-digest-algo SHA256’ to
workaround the problem. The number N is the internal algorighm indentifier; for
example 8 refers to SHA-256.
Preamble
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116 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Finally, every program is threatened constantly by software patents. States should not
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118 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
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You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of sections 4 and
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GNU General Public License 119
a. Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product (including a phys-
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120 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
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“Additional permissions” are terms that supplement the terms of this License by mak-
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When you convey a copy of a covered work, you may at your option remove any
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, for material you add to a covered
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GNU General Public License 121
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122 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
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GNU General Public License 123
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124 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the GNU
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THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PER-
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If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided above cannot be given
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GNU General Public License 125
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short notice like this when
it starts in an interactive mode:
program Copyright (C) year name of author
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type ‘show w’.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain condi-
tions; type ‘show c’ for details.
The hypothetical commands ‘show w’ and ‘show c’ should show the appropriate parts
of the General Public License. Of course, your program’s commands might be different;
for a GUI interface, you would use an “about box”.
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, if any, to
sign a “copyright disclaimer” for the program, if necessary. For more information on
this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it
more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what
you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License.
But first, please read http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-not-lgpl.html.
126 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Contributors to GnuPG 127
Contributors to GnuPG
The GnuPG project would like to thank its many contributors. Without them the project
would not have been nearly as successful as it has been. Any omissions in this list are
accidental. Feel free to contact the maintainer if you have been left out or some of your
contributions are not listed.
David Shaw, Matthew Skala, Michael Roth, Niklas Hernaeus, Nils Ellmenreich, Rmi
Guyomarch, Stefan Bellon, Timo Schulz and Werner Koch wrote the code. Birger Langk-
jer, Daniel Resare, Dokianakis Theofanis, Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS, Gal Quri, Gre-
gory Steuck, Nagy Ferenc Lszl, Ivo Timmermans, Jacobo Tarri’o Barreiro, Janusz Alek-
sander Urbanowicz, Jedi Lin, Jouni Hiltunen, Laurentiu Buzdugan, Magda Procha’zkova’,
Michael Anckaert, Michal Majer, Marco d’Itri, Nilgun Belma Buguner, Pedro Morais, Tedi
Heriyanto, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Rafael Caetano dos Santos, Toomas Soome, Urko
Lusa, Walter Koch, Yosiaki IIDA did the official translations. Mike Ashley wrote and
maintains the GNU Privacy Handbook. David Scribner is the current FAQ editor. Lorenzo
Cappelletti maintains the web site.
The new modularized architecture of gnupg 1.9 as well as the X.509/CMS part has
been developed as part of the gypten project. Direct contributors to this project are:
Bernhard Herzog, who did extensive testing and tracked down a lot of bugs. Bernhard
Reiter, who made sure that we met the specifications and the deadlines. He did extensive
testing and came up with a lot of suggestions. Jan-Oliver Wagner made sure that we met
the specifications and the deadlines. He also did extensive testing and came up with a lot
of suggestions. Karl-Heinz Zimmer and Marc Mutz had to struggle with all the bugs and
misconceptions while working on KDE integration. Marcus Brinkman extended GPGME,
cleaned up the Assuan code and fixed bugs all over the place. Moritz Schulte took over
Libgcrypt maintenance and developed it into a stable an useful library. Steffen Hansen had
a hard time to write the dirmngr due to underspecified interfaces. Thomas Koester did
extensive testing and tracked down a lot of bugs. Werner Koch designed the system and
wrote most of the code.
The following people helped greatly by suggesting improvements, testing, fixing bugs,
providing resources and doing other important tasks: Adam Mitchell, Albert Chin, Alec
Habig, Allan Clark, Anand Kumria, Andreas Haumer, Anthony Mulcahy, Ariel T Glenn,
Bob Mathews, Bodo Moeller, Brendan O’Dea, Brenno de Winter, Brian M. Carlson, Brian
Moore, Brian Warner, Bryan Fullerton, Caskey L. Dickson, Cees van de Griend, Charles
Levert, Chip Salzenberg, Chris Adams, Christian Biere, Christian Kurz, Christian von
Roques, Christopher Oliver, Christian Recktenwald, Dan Winship, Daniel Eisenbud, Daniel
Koening, Dave Dykstra, David C Niemi, David Champion, David Ellement, David Hallinan,
David Hollenberg, David Mathog, David R. Bergstein, Detlef Lannert, Dimitri, Dirk Lat-
termann, Dirk Meyer, Disastry, Douglas Calvert, Ed Boraas, Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS,
Edwin Woudt, Enzo Michelangeli, Ernst Molitor, Fabio Coatti, Felix von Leitner, fish
stiqz, Florian Weimer, Francesco Potorti, Frank Donahoe, Frank Heckenbach, Frank Sta-
jano, Frank Tobin, Gabriel Rosenkoetter, Gal Quri, Gene Carter, Geoff Keating, Georg
Schwarz, Giampaolo Tomassoni, Gilbert Fernandes, Greg Louis, Greg Troxel, Gregory
Steuck, Gregery Barton, Harald Denker, Holger Baust, Hendrik Buschkamp, Holger Schurig,
Holger Smolinski, Holger Trapp, Hugh Daniel, Huy Le, Ian McKellar, Ivo Timmermans,
Jan Krueger, Jan Niehusmann, Janusz A. Urbanowicz, James Troup, Jean-loup Gailly, Jeff
128 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Long, Jeffery Von Ronne, Jens Bachem, Jeroen C. van Gelderen, J Horacio MG, J. Michael
Ashley, Jim Bauer, Jim Small, Joachim Backes, Joe Rhett, John A. Martin, Johnny Teveen,
Jrg Schilling, Jos Backus, Joseph Walton, Juan F. Codagnone, Jun Kuriyama, Kahil D.
Jallad, Karl Fogel, Karsten Thygesen, Katsuhiro Kondou, Kazu Yamamoto, Keith Clay-
ton, Kevin Ryde, Klaus Singvogel, Kurt Garloff, Lars Kellogg-Stedman, L. Sassaman, M
Taylor, Marcel Waldvogel, Marco d’Itri, Marco Parrone, Marcus Brinkmann, Mark Adler,
Mark Elbrecht, Mark Pettit, Markus Friedl, Martin Kahlert, Martin Hamilton, Martin
Schulte, Matt Kraai, Matthew Skala, Matthew Wilcox, Matthias Urlichs, Max Valian-
skiy, Michael Engels, Michael Fischer v. Mollard, Michael Roth, Michael Sobolev, Michael
Tokarev, Nicolas Graner, Mike McEwan, Neal H Walfield, Nelson H. F. Beebe, NIIBE Yu-
taka, Niklas Hernaeus, Nimrod Zimerman, N J Doye, Oliver Haakert, Oskari Jskelinen,
Pascal Scheffers, Paul D. Smith, Per Cederqvist, Phil Blundell, Philippe Laliberte, Peter
Fales, Peter Gutmann, Peter Marschall, Peter Valchev, Piotr Krukowiecki, QingLong, Ralph
Gillen, Rat, Reinhard Wobst, Rmi Guyomarch, Reuben Sumner, Richard Outerbridge,
Robert Joop, Roddy Strachan, Roger Sondermann, Roland Rosenfeld, Roman Pavlik, Ross
Golder, Ryan Malayter, Sam Roberts, Sami Tolvanen, Sean MacLennan, Sebastian Klemke,
Serge Munhoven, SL Baur, Stefan Bellon, Dr.Stefan.Dalibor, Stefan Karrmann, Stefan
Keller, Steffen Ullrich, Steffen Zahn, Steven Bakker, Steven Murdoch, Susanne Schultz,
Ted Cabeen, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Thijmen Klok, Thomas Roessler, Tim Mooney,
Timo Schulz, Todd Vierling, TOGAWA Satoshi, Tom Spindler, Tom Zerucha, Tomas Fasth,
Tommi Komulainen, Thomas Klausner, Tomasz Kozlowski, Thomas Mikkelsen, Ulf Mller,
Urko Lusa, Vincent P. Broman, Volker Quetschke, W Lewis, Walter Hofmann, Walter Koch,
Wayne Chapeskie, Wim Vandeputte, Winona Brown, Yosiaki IIDA, Yoshihiro Kajiki and
Gerlinde Klaes.
This software has been made possible by the previous work of Chris Wedgwood, Jean-
loup Gailly, Jon Callas, Mark Adler, Martin Hellmann Paul Kendall, Philip R. Zimmer-
mann, Peter Gutmann, Philip A. Nelson, Taher ElGamal, Torbjorn Granlund, Whitfield
Diffie, some unknown NSA mathematicians and all the folks who have worked hard to create
complete and free operating systems.
And finally we’d like to thank everyone who uses these tools, submits bug reports and
generally reminds us why we’re doing this work in the first place.
Glossary 129
Glossary
‘ARL’ The Authority Revocation List is technical identical to a CRL but used for CAs
and not for end user certificates.
‘Chain model’
Verification model for X.509 which uses the creation date of a signature as
the date the validation starts and in turn checks that each certificate has been
issued within the time frame, the issuing certificate was valid. This allows the
verification of signatures after the the CA’s certificate expired. The validation
test also required an online check of the certificate status. The chain model is
required by the German signature law. See also Shell model.
‘CMS’ The Cryptographic Message Standard describes a message format for encryption
and digital signing. It is closely related to the X.509 certificate format. CMS
was formerly known under the name PKCS#7 and is described by RFC3369.
‘CRL’ The Certificate Revocation List is a list containing certificates revoked by the
issuer.
‘CSR’ The Certificate Signing Request is a message send to a CA to ask them to issue
a new certificate. The data format of such a signing request is called PCKS#10.
‘OpenPGP’ A data format used to build a PKI and to exchange encrypted or signed mes-
sages. In contrast to X.509, OpenPGP also includes the message format but
does not explicilty demand a specific PKI. However any kind of PKI may be
build upon the OpenPGP protocol.
‘Keygrip’ This term is used by GnuPG to describe a 20 byte hash value used to identify
a certain key without referencing to a concrete protocol. It is used internally
to access a private key. Usually it is shown and entered as a 40 character
hexadecimal formatted string.
‘OCSP’ The Online Certificate Status Protocol is used as an alternative to a CRL. It is
described in RFC 2560.
‘PSE’ The Personal Security Environment describes a database to store private keys.
This is either a smartcard or a collection of files on a disk; the latter is often
called a Soft-PSE.
‘Shell model’
The standard model for validation of certificates under X.509. At the time of
the verification all certifciates must be valid and not expired. See also Chain
mode.
‘X.509’ Description of a PKI used with CMS. It is for example defined by RFC3280.
130 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Option Index 131
Option Index
- default-keyserver-url . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
--enarmor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 default-preference-list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
-a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 default-recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
-u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 default-recipient-self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
delete-key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
delete-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A delete-secret-and-public-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
delete-secret-key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
agent-program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
deny-admin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
allow-admin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
desig-revoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
allow-mark-trusted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
detach-sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40, 62
dirmnr-program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
assume-armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
disable-application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
assume-base64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
disable-ccid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
assume-binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
disable-crl-checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
auto-issuer-key-retrieve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
disable-keypad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
disable-ocsp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
B disable-policy-checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
disable-scdaemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
base64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 disable-trusted-cert-crl-check . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
batch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 29 display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
dry-run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
dump-cert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
C dump-chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
c............................................... 5 dump-external-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
call-dirmngr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 dump-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
call-protect-tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 dump-options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 19, 57, 73
card-edit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 dump-secret-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
card-status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
change-pin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
check-passphrase-pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 E
check-sigs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 edit-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
check-trustdb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 enable-crl-checks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
cipher-algo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 enable-ocsp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
clearsign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 enable-passphrase-history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
csh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 enable-policy-checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
ctapi-driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 enable-ssh-support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
enable-trusted-cert-crl-check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
enarmor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
D encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 57
daemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 73 encrypt-files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
debug. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 45, 64, 74 enforce-passphrase-constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
debug-all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 64, 74 exec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
debug-allow-core-dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64, 75 export. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 59
debug-disable-ticker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 export-ownertrust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
debug-ignore-expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 export-secret-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
debug-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 63, 74 export-secret-subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
debug-no-chain-validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 extra-digest-algo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
debug-wait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 74
decode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
decrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 57 F
decrypt-files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 faked-system-time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 63
default-cache-ttl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 fetch-keys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
default-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 62 fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
132 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
fixed-list-mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 keyedit:nrsign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
fixed-passphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 keyedit:passwd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 keyedit:pref . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
force-crl-refresh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 keyedit:primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
forget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 keyedit:quit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
keyedit:revkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
keyedit:revsig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
G keyedit:revuid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
gen-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 58 keyedit:save . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
gen-prime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 keyedit:setpref . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
gen-random. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 keyedit:showphoto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
gen-revoke. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 keyedit:showpref . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
gnupg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 keyedit:sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
gpgconf-list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 keyedit:toggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
gpgconf-test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 keyedit:trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
keyedit:tsign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
keyedit:uid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
H keyring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 19, 57, 73, 85
hex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
hidden-recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
L
homedir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 32, 60, 73, 86, 97, 101 lc-messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
lc-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
learn-card. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
I list-chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
ignore-cache-for-signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 list-config . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
ignore-time-conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 list-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 58
import. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 59 list-options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
import-ownertrust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 list-options:show-notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
include-certs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 list-options:show-photos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
interactive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 list-options:show-policy-urls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
list-options:show-std-notations . . . . . . . . . . . 29
list-options:show-user-notations . . . . . . . . . . 29
K list-packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
keep-display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 list-secret-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 58
keep-tty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 list-sigs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
keydb-clear-some-cert-flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 local-user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40, 62
keyedit:addcardkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 log-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 60, 75, 101
keyedit:addkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 logger-fd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
keyedit:addphoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 lsign-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
keyedit:addrevoker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
keyedit:adduid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
keyedit:bkuptocard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 M
keyedit:check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 mangle-dos-filenames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
keyedit:clean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 max-cache-ttl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
keyedit:cross-certify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 max-cache-ttl-ssh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
keyedit:delkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 max-output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
keyedit:delsig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 max-passphrase-days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
keyedit:deluid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 min-passphrase-len . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
keyedit:disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 min-passphrase-nonalpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
keyedit:enable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 multi-server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
keyedit:expire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 multifile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
keyedit:key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
keyedit:keyserver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
keyedit:keytocard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 N
keyedit:lsign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 no . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
keyedit:minimize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 no-batch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
keyedit:notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 no-common-certs-import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Option Index 133
no-default-recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 S
no-detach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 75 s............................................... 5
no-ext-connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
no-grab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 scdaemon-program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
no-mangle-dos-filenames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 search-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
no-secmem-warning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 send-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
no-tty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 57, 73
no-use-standard-socket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 sh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
no-verbose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 57
sign-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
status-fd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
O store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
openpgp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 subst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 60, 73 symmetric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40, 62
T
P ttyname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
p12-charset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 ttytype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
passphrase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
passwd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
pcsc-driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 U
pgp2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 update-trustdb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
pgp6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 use-standard-socket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
pgp7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
pgp8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
pinentry-program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 V
pinentry-touch-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 60, 73
policy-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 validation-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
prefer-system-dirmngr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 verbose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 29, 60, 73, 85, 96, 97, 101
preset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 verify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 57
print-md . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 verify-files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 19, 57, 73, 85
Q
q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 97, 101
W
quiet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 29, 85, 97, 101 warranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 57
with-colons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
with-ephemeral-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
R with-fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
with-key-data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
raw-socket. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
with-validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
reader-port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
write-env-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
rebuild-keydb-caches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 62
recv-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 X
refresh-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 xauthority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
rfc1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
rfc2440 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
rfc4880 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Y
run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
134 Using the GNU Privacy Guard
Index 135
Index
C P
command options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 19, 57, 73 policies.txt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 pubring.kbx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
G Q
GPG command options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 qualified.txt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
GPG-AGENT command options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
gpg-agent.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
gpgconf.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
GPGSM command options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
R
gpgsm.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 65 random seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
H S
help.txt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 S.gpg-agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
scd-event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
SCDAEMON command options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
O scdaemon.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
SIGHUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
options, GPG command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
SIGINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
options, GPG-AGENT command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SIGTERM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
options, GPGSM command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
SIGUSR1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
options, SCDAEMON command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
SIGUSR2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
136 Using the GNU Privacy Guard