home > 1946-1960 > the korean war > overview

An Overview of the Korean War

An Overview of the Korean War
by Michael Barnes
1. Post-WWII
For centuries, Korea had been within the Chinese sphere of influence. In the 1870s, Japanese
pressure began to force Korea away from China and toward more cooperation with Japan. In 1910
Japan annexed Korea outright, colonized it, and suppressed Korean culture. When Japan invaded
China in 1937 they forced hundreds of thousands of Korean civilians to labor for the Japanese war
machine throughout the empire. Meanwhile, the peninsula was stripped of much of its food and
natural resources, forcing additional Korean immigration to Japan. As a result, about 25% of the
casualties from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were Koreans. Japanese Japanese troops in Korea,
dominion over Korea ended with their acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 15, 1945. 1904

The Japanese surrender and withdrawal from Korea created a power vacuum
there. Weeks earlier at Potsdam President Truman had gotten Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin to commit to declaring war on Japan, including attacks against the
Japanese in Korea. With the Japanese withdrawing, nothing stood in the way of
the Soviets taking over the entire peninsula. The Americans, trying to limit Russian
gains, hastily proposed a division of Korea between Soviet forces in the north, and
US forces in the south, with the 38th Parallel as the dividing line, picked by some
Allied Leaders at Potsdam junior officers who thought it looked roughly in the middle, where the peninsula
narrowed. The US was lucky that Stalin agreed to the division. Even as Russian
Map of Korea troops stopped at this artificial dividing line, American units were still a month away
from arriving in Korea.
The US was totally unprepared for administering a free South Korea. The American in charge, Lt. General John R. Hodge,
instantly disliked the Korean people. After accepting the Japanese surrender, Hodge put key Japanese colonial
administrators back in charge, much to the dismay of the Koreans. When Hodge finally turned to Koreans for help in
administering their own country, it was to those who had collaborated with the Japanese. Hodge refused to permit democratic
elections, and at one point, martial law was declared.

2. North and South Korea

The US eventually created a government, The Republic of Korea (South Korea),
headed by Syngman Rhee, a nationalist who had fled the Japanese occupation
decades earlier and had lived in exile mostly in the United States. He spoke
English well, held 3 degrees from American universities, was anti-Communist,
and he had not collaborated with the Japanese. But Rhee was a dictator who
frequently arrested anyone who disagreed with him. Perhaps most problematic,
Rhee frequently voiced his desire to invade the North. Russian Troops in Korea

Syngman Rhee

Meanwhile, the Soviets oversaw the creation of the communist Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea), led by Kim Il-Sung, a former anti-Japanese guerilla fighter; a communist who
had fought alongside the Russians at Stalingrad. The North Korean leader was even worse than
his South Korean counterpart; Sung often had his political enemies executed.

By the end of 1948, the Korean peninsula was divided into two different nations, each with a leader
who boasted about conquering the other, each supported by their ideological counterparts. The
Soviets withdrew from North Korea, but US withdrawal from South Korea was repeatedly delayed
Kim Il-Sung, 1950 to allow time for Rhee to improve South Korea's security situation. By 1949, the US was
disengaging
from Korea in every way. On January 12, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson told the press that South Korea was not a
vital part of the US defense perimeter in Asia. By June only 500 American military advisors remained. Congress had become
nervous that if too much aid were given to South Korea, Rhee would use it to invade the North. They sent light arms and
armor, but withheld tanks and aircraft. In January 1950, when aid to South Korea was up for renewal the US House defeated
the bill, thereby cutting off all aid to South Korea. The fate of Korean aid had become intertwined with the desire by many
Americans to get on with the business of their own lives. Having survived both the Great Depression and World War II, it was
time to go to college on the G.I. bill, get a job, buy a home in the suburbs, and start families. Consequently, Americas mighty
war machine was being quickly disassembled. By 1948, the US army was down to 677,000 men. By May 1949 it was at
630,000 and shrinking. By June 1950, with the military budget cut to the bone (supported by both Republicans and
Democrats), there were only 591,000 men in the army. Additionally, its most-experienced troops were gone, and its
equipment had been allowed to deteriorate. In short, the US was in no position to fight a war that no one in America wanted
anyway.

These actions by the United States were a signal to Kim Il-Sung that he could unite the Korean peninsula without American
intervention. Unlike their Southern counterparts, the North Korean military was disciplined, well-trained, and well-armed. It
was made up of ten divisions, some 135,000 men. Many of its officers had fought alongside Mao Zedongs Communist
Chinese forces during the Chinese Civil War. Most significantly, the Soviets had left behind 150 T-34 tanks, a model that had
proved very effective against German armor in World War II. On June 25, 1950, after probing border forces for several weeks,
Kim Il-Sung launched a full-scaled invasion across the 38th Parallel.

3. Phase 1: North Korean Attack & UN Intervention (6/50-9/50)

Outmatched in every way, the South Korean army broke ranks and ran. Within a day, North Korean
forces reached the outskirts of Seoul, the South Korean capital. In the ensuing panic, a key
strategic bridge was blown up with the South Korean army on the wrong side of it, and while 500
people were still crossing it. Seoul was taken on the 28th.

Even as the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the invasion, the Truman
administration wrestled with what to do about it. Politically, Truman understood that to do nothing Newspaper Headlines on
would open him up to attack from the conservative right. The President assumed that the Soviets Korea
were
behind the attack, and seems to have believed that WWIII had begun. But he made up his mind
that America would take a stand. Korea may have been of little to no strategic importance to the
United States, but it had enormous psychological value. Communists had crossed an
internationally recognized line. They would have to be contained, but Truman wasnt sure how.

Truman turned to the United Nations, where it just so happened that the Soviet Union was
boycotting Security Council proceedings in protest of what they felt was UN preference for the
Chiang Kai-Sheks government on Taiwan (the loser in Chinas civil war) over the mainland UN Security Council Vote
communist Chinese government. Without fear of a veto from the absent Soviets, the Security on Resolution 83
Council approved Resolution
83, recommending military assistance to South Korea. Shortly thereafter, the UN put these forces under American command.
UN Ambassador Warren Austin to Truman, 6/27/50

The American commander who would lead the charge to contain communism was
none other than Americas most popular military figure, General Douglas MacArthur.
70 years old in 1950, MacArthur was one of the heroes of WWII. Although he had
underestimated the Japanese military during the early stages of WWII, he
subsequently displayed fine strategic skill and was especially good at predicting
Japanese strategy. He was a strong proponent of air power, preferring to pulverize
fixed Japanese positions from the air rather than risking direct frontal assaults. He
had been on-hand to accept the official Japanese surrender, and then had been in
charge of US-occupied Japan. But MacArthur was also a supreme egotist who had
spent so much time in the Pacific that he had come to see himself as both invincible MacArthur in Truman address on
and above any other authority. Truman had twice summoned him home to receive Korea Korea (7/19/50)
Americas thanks for his
role in the Pacific victory, but twice MacArthur had turned him down. Truman rightly suspected that MacArthur was planning a
triumphant return just in time to challenge the Democrats in the 1952 presidential election. To that end, MacArthur had quietly
made strong ties with conservative Republicans in Washington. In the coming war, MacArthur would achieve his greatest
success, and because of his flaws, his greatest failures as well. His ego would ultimately prove his undoing.

Right off the bat, MacArthur exceeded his authority by bombing North Korean airfields. But this did not stop the North Korean
advance, and when MacArthur returned to Tokyo after inspecting the situation, he reported that the only way to stop them was
to introduce American troops. Truman authorized the divisions MacArthur asked for, without seeking congressional approval,
but he was wary of things escalating. He tried to downplay his actions. At a press conference on the 29th, he insisted that
the United States was not at war. A reporter then asked, Mr. President, would it be correct, against your explanation, to call
this a police action under the United Nations? Truman replied, Yes. That is exactly what it amounts to.

Very few of the American troops sent to Korea were combat ready. Only one in six had even seen combat. The American G.I.
had grown soft while serving in Japan as an occupation force. One of the top American generals in Korea later stated they
had become fat and happy in occupation billets, complete with Japanese girlfriends, plenty of beer and servants to shine
their boots.

Of the four American divisions stationed in Japan, the 24th Infantry Division was the least combat-ready. Yet they were
extremely confident as they rolled into the theater of operations that the North Koreans would run away at the sight of
American troops. This fallacy was based on judging the enemy through the lens of racism, the dangers of which the
American should have learned from WWII. The North Koreans were good. They were disciplined, they used camouflage
effectively, and they had no trouble leaving the main roads and hiking overland. They used battle tactics learned from the
Chinese communists, which included infiltrating behind the American lines with small units that made the Americans think
they were surrounded. They attacked at night and engaged in close combat in order to reduce the effectiveness of American
air power. On the morning of July 5, 540 men from the 24th Infantry Division moved north and took up a position north of
Osan, where they soon encountered North Korean forces for the first time. The Americans attacked North Korean tanks, but
their small mortars and recoilless rifles proved useless against the T-34. Some brave bazooka men closed to within 30 yards
and fired, but that weapon too was ineffective. Only with a howitzer did they manage to knock out a few of the tanks, but the
rest plowed right through them. When the order to retreat was given, many of the Americans threw aside their weapons and
ran away. It took five days to round them all up. Of the 540-man task force, 180 were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, all
of whom had to be left behind. An American colonel later wrote about the pathetic condition of his fellow troops:
Theyd spent a lot of time listening to lectures on the differences between communism and Americanism and not enough time crawling on
their bellies on maneuvers with live ammunition singing over them. Theyd been nursed and coddled, told to drive safely, to buy War Bonds,
to give to the Red Cross, to avoid VD, to write home to motherwhen someone should have been telling them how to clear a machine gun
when it jams.

Now these troops were in a desperate fight for survival, in a place most Americans had never heard of and didnt want to hear
about, in brutally hot weather with no water. Many of these soldiers became sick from drinking water directly out of muddy
holes and paddies without first purifying it. By the end of the first week two divisions had been badly mauled, suffering some
3,000 casualties. General MacArthur drew up a massive wish-list, most of which was approved, and some emergency
equipment was rushed to Korea to help stop the North Korean tanks. But each time the 24th regrouped and took a stand,
they were hammered again. By the end of the 3rd week they were at half strength. After a fierce three-day struggle, the
Americans withdrew from Taejon. Although they had failed to stop the North Korean advance, they had delayed it long
enough for the other American
Edward R. Murrow in Korea
Edward R. Murrow report on the divisions to establish a defensive perimeter around Pusan
Situtation in Korea, 8/1/50 further south. It was here the Americans would make their
last stand. But even as the Battle of Pusan Perimeter was
Edward R. Murrow with the 1st about to being, there were signs that things were turning.
Cavalry in Korea, 8/8/50 Fresh troops and better equipment continued to arrive.
The Americans cracked the relatively simple North Korean
Edward R. Murrow on Korea as a code, providing advanced notice of the enemys battle
Testing Ground for Ideas, 9/6/50 plans. And by then the North Korean supply line was
stretched thin.

The Battle of Pusan Perimeter began in August and ended on September 15, during which
the Americans withstood numerous North Korean attacks. The United States Air Force
interrupted enemy movements by destroying 32 bridges and bombing convoys, and they
hammered anything that might be of material value to the North Koreans. Meanwhile, United
Nations troops and material continued to pour in. By late August, the Americans in the Pusan
Perimeter had some 500 tanks, while the North Korean tank force had been reduced from
150 to 40. By early September 1950, South Korean and UN Command forces outnumbered
the North Koreans by 180,000 to 100,000. As MacArthur planned his next move, a special
representative of President Trumans met with him in Tokyo to make sure he understood the
administrations intent to not widen the war by provoking Chinese intervention in Korea or
possibly a Chinese takeover of Formosa. MacArthur responded that if the Chinese were to do
such a thing, he would "deliver such a crushing defeat it would be one of the decisive battles
Map of Phase 1: June 25-
September 15, 1950 of the worlda disaster so great it

would rock Asia, and perhaps turn back Communism." He went on to say that he prayed nightly that the Chinese would try
something.
4. Phase 2: Escalation & Counterattack (9/50-10/50)
From the time that MacArthur had visited Korea, he began to conceive of a
bold plan. He would undertake an amphibious landing behind North Korean
lines, trap them, and then destroy them. Most military planners disagreed
with him. The landing site he had chosen, Inchon, had no natural beaches.
One sunken ship could block the whole harbor. The tides were difficult, and
there was evidence the harbor had been mined. But MacArthur swayed
them with a dramatic speech, and he got his way. One day after the initial
landings at Inchon,
US Forces Land at September 16
The landings at Inchon took place on September 15, 1950. Some 13,000
Marines went ashore and met little resistance. Only 21 Americans were Inchon
killed,
and the North Korean forces there were routed. The Americans moved quickly to re-capture
Seoul, and to trap the North Korean army before it could retreat from Pusan, a hundred miles
away, and get back across the 38th Parallel. This was MacArthurs finest hour. Practically
overnight he had turned an inglorious American defeat into a stunning victory. The impact it had
on his ego and power was incalculable. Whereas before he was thought by many political and
military leaders as untouchable, now he was practically a god. But even though the Americans
moved quickly, the North Koreans, now heading north at breakneck speed, were getting away.
Some 40,000 had re-crossed the 38th Parallel.

On October 1, 1950, South Korean and UN forces pushed past the 38th parallel into North Korea
in hot pursuit. Although a few experts in the State Department warned about aggravating China
to the north, no one really stopped to listen. Given the situation, even President Truman was
reluctant to halt the operation for fear of providing further ammunition for Republicans to label him
soft on Communism. MacArthur would be allowed to finish the job of Korean unification. The
Chinese immediately signaled their disapproval. As UN forces continued north, the Chinese
became increasingly agitated. Chou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Minister, relayed a message to
Map of Phase 2: September Washington through the Indian ambassador, that if United States or UN forces, crossed the 38th
15-October 23, 1950 Parallel, "China
would send troops to the Korean frontier to defend North Korea." The British especially expressed reservations about UN
troop movements, but MacArthur dismissed them as appeasers. American forces crossed the 38th Parallel on October 7.
Unbeknownst to the US, Mao Zedong then ordered his forces to start heading for the Korean border.
At this point, President Truman became nervous. He did not like the rumbling coming out of China,
and he worried that UN supply lines were being stretched too thin. Of additional concern was the
coming winter. He hastily arranged a meeting with MacArthur on Wake Island for October 15.
Although the two men had never met, Truman did not have a high opinion of MacArthur, whom he
had once described in a memo as Mr. Prima Donna. MacArthur, a conservative Republican,
didnt have a very high opinion of his commander-in-chief, a liberal Democrat. But their meeting
went reasonably well. When Truman expressed concern about China intervening in the war,
MacArthur assured him that the war was basically over. He even thought it possible that the Eighth
Truman and MacArthur at
Army could be home by Christmas. When Truman pressed a little harder on China, MacArthur Wake Island
dismissed the idea and
claimed that if the Chinese crossed into North Korea and headed for Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, there would be
the greatest slaughter.
5. Phase 3: Chinese Intervention (10/50-12/50)
The Chinese army wasnt as well equipped as UN forces, but they
marched 286 miles on foot in 18 days to get to the Yalu River. They
carried minimal equipment, and about a weeks supply of food
some rice, a little meat and fishabout ten pounds in all. They were
trained not to move when aircraft were overhead, and they were
extremely adept at camouflage. They knew much more about the
American soldier than he knew about them, but they didnt know Chinese troops cross the
enough specifics about the troops MacArthur had under his Yalu River Map of the early part of Phase 3:
commandhow well hed October 24-November 24, 1950

stand up in a fight, their weapons tactics, how theyd behave in the face of extreme adversity. As a way of gathering
intelligence, the Chinese planned a series of limited attacks designed to reveal the enemys strengths and weaknesses. That
information would then factor into the all-out attack that would come later. Unaware of Chinese tactics or even their existence,
the Americans headed directly for them. Though MacArthur had been strictly forbidden to stay away from the Yalu, he
disobeyed. Once back at Tokyo, he ordered his two main forces to continue north to the Chinese border. The Joint Chiefs
heard about this through an army backchannel, and told MacArthur that he had violated their instructions. MacArthur replied
that he had military reasons for doing so.

South Korean troops first encountered small bands of Chinese on October 25 and took some prisoners. Shortly thereafter
they were hit hard at Pukchin. The South Korean forces suffered heavy losses, but more prisoners were taken. Clearly,
these were not North Korean soldiers. Their uniforms were different, and they spoke Chinese with a southern accent. Despite
this evidence, MacArthur still refused to accept they had encountered Chinese. On the 29th, Fifth Regiment forces of the
24th Division under the command of John Throckmorton encountered stiff resistance about 40 miles from the Yalu. They took
88 prisoners, 2 of whom where Chinese. Throckmorton felt something ominous was in the air, and later said, By that time I
could feel the hair raising on the back of my neck. On October 30, the commander of X Corps interrogated 16 Chinese
prisoners in South Korean custody. He then sent a message to MacArthurs headquarters warning that large units of Chinese
infantry were in Korea, but nothing came of it.

Then on November 1, while maneuvering to destroy South Korean forces just north of Unsan, the Chinese accidentally
encountered the US 8th Cavalry Regiment. UN intelligence had failed to detect them. The Chinese immediately launched a
major three-pronged assaultfrom the north, northwest, and westand overran the defensive flanks. The South Korean 6th
Infantry Division on the right flank was quickly destroyed. Wave after wave of Chinese were sent against the Americans.
When two of the three American battalions began to run out of ammunition, they retreated south. But Chinese forces had
infiltrated behind UN lines and blocked the roads. At 2:30 a.m. they ambushed the retreating UN forces. The Americans
suffered heavy losses and only managed to escape by abandoning their vehicles and heavy weapons, forming small groups,
and slipping through the Chinese lines on foot. Survivors reached the UN line on November 2. Meanwhile, another American
battalion had been cut off in the north. At 3:00 a.m. Chinese commandos disguised as South Koreans launched a surprise
attack on the mostly sleeping soldiers. The US 5th Cavalry Regiment tried several times to rescue them, but were driven
back with heavy casualties. The trapped battalion endured several days of constant combat, and finally managed to break
out of the trap on November 4. Only 200 survivors made it back to the UN line. It was a devastating defeat for UN forces.

Amazingly, MacArthur (still commanding the overall action from Tokyo), still refused to accept that they had been attacked by
Chinese rather than North Korean forces, that the war had fundamentally changed. Reality sunk in slowly. On November 1 he
said that frankly he didn't know whether his troops had encountered Chinese troops, and if they had, whether they
represented the Chinese government. On the 2nd, he admitted there were Chinese in Korea, and that they posed "a serious
proximate threat." On the 4th, he concluded that the Chinese were in country in size and strength large enough "to threaten
the ultimate destruction of my command." It was quite a turnaround. He then claimed the battle a UN victory, and urged the
international community to censure the Chinese government. The next day, November 6, he announced that his troops would
continue pushing north toward the Yalu River in order to probe the enemy's strength. But when MacArthur received reports
that more Chinese troops were crossing bridges over the Yalu, he ordered them bombeda direct violation of his orders to
stay clear of the Chinese border. He sent a copy of the order to Washington and went to bed. Hours later, he was awakened
by an urgent message from Washington directing him to rescind the order. MacArthur, enraged, drafted a reply in which he
threatened to resign, but he was persuaded to rethink the message. Instead he prophesized doom if his orders weren't
carried out:
Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood...I trust that the matter be immediately
brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot
accept the responsibility.

MacArthur's messages were so contradictory that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were shocked. First he had said there were no
Chinese in Korea at all, and now suddenly total disaster was at hand. President Truman, when told of the disagreement
about bombing the bridges, gave MacArthur the go-ahead, but now the general wanted permission to pursue Chinese aircraft
across the border. MacArthur's superiors liked the idea, but the other UN partners unanimously said no, so Truman wouldnt
permit it. MacArthur was furious.

Meanwhile, having completed their initial, intelligence-gathering offensives, the Chinese disappeared into the mountains to
study the results and see what lessons they could glean. Other Chinese forces continued to cross the Yalu, but because of
their superb organization and camouflage, continued to be undetected.

MacArthur mistakenly assumed the Chinese had withdrawn from the battlefield, that American air power had made it
impossible for the Chinese to resupply their forces in Korea. He did not send out deep patrols to confirm his assumptions. On
the 17th, he told the US ambassador to Korea that there were only 30,000 Chinese in North Korea. In fact, there were about
300,000. MacArthur ordered his forces to prepare for a major operation, which, based on remarks he made within earshot of
the press, became known as the Home-by-Christmas offensive. Asiatics respect aggressive leadership, he explained.
This brief period in November, Secretary of State Dean Acheson later reflected in his memoir, represented the last possible
moment to avoid the total disaster that seemed just beyond the horizon. The Chinese had clearly indicated their intentions.
But, Acheson wrote, We sat around like paralyzed rabbits while MacArthur carried out this nightmare. On November 24,
MacArthur flew to Korea and inspected the front lines. When he returned to Tokyo, he issued a communiqu that not only
tipped off the Chinese that a major offensive was coming, but that the Americans had totally underestimated Chinese
strength.
The "Home-by-Christmas" UN Offensive was launched on November 24, 1950. MacArthur
divided his forces, sending the US Eighth Army under the command of General Walton H.
Walker to advance in the northwest, while the US X Corps under the command of Major
General Edward Almond attacked along the Korean east coast. South Korean forces
advanced along the center. At first things went fairly well. Despite wind chills of 20 degrees
below zero, the UN forces advanced some fifteen miles.

But the Chinese were waiting in ambush. Their goal was to utterly destroy MacArthurs forces.
On November 25 they attacked along a 300-mile front. First, a column of Chinese infantry hit
the Eighth Armys right flank, MacArthurs weakest point, totally annihilating South Korean
forces and widening the gap between the Eighth Army and X Corps. Meanwhile, as the US
Eighth Army made its way north on narrow, indefensible corridors that wound through
mountains MacArthur had said were too rugged to shelter Chinese troops, the Chinese Map of the 2nd part of Phase 3:
attacked with machine guns and mortars. It was a desperate moment. November 24-December 15, 1950

But even as the US Eighth Army stalled in the mountains, Almonds X Corps on the right flank, unaware of the desperate
situation to the west, continued forward along a 100-mile front. Almond ordered the 1st Marine Division, commanded by
General Oliver P. Smith, to push rapidly along the 78-mile mountain road that connected the port city of Hungnam to the
Chosin reservoir. Almond believed there was no enemy out there. Smith, however, wasnt so optimistic. He advanced
cautiously to allow time to close gaps in the ranks, and he established supply points and airfields along the way. Smiths
caution would pay off. During their intelligence-gathering offensive weeks earlier, only one anomaly stood out. Several
Chinese divisions had been soundly defeated by the 7th Regiment of US Marines. Now the Chinese had prepared something
special for those same Marines. On the morning of the 27th, Major General Almond toured the area by helicopter. He again
urged the Marines forward, dismissing the Chinese as nothing but the remains of a few divisions fleeing north. Were still
attacking and were going all the way to the Yalu. Dont let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you, he said. Following
Almonds order, Smith attacked to the west, but after meeting stiff resistance, he ordered his men to dig in.

That night, the Chinese 9th Army attacked with 5 battalions. But they committed their soldiers to the battle with less than
adequate intelligence on UN forces, and without artillery or proper weather gear. Smiths well-organized Marines inflicted
heavy casualties and rendered all 5 Chinese battalions combat ineffective. But Smith was stuck in place. Even though he
sent a report every 4 hours, he received no orders permitting him to withdraw. Without orders, he had no choice but to stay
and defend. By the 29th the 30,000 men who comprised Smiths 1st Marine Division, were surrounded and cut off.
By now it was obvious that the Home-by-Christmas offensive was a disaster, and that the Chinese
had enough troops to surround both Walker in the West and Almond in the East and still have
enough troops to move south and take Seoul, the South Korean capital. After pouring over his maps
and searching for a way to prove that he had not been totally outgeneraled, MacArthur accepted the
reality. He ordered the Eighth Army to fight a series of delaying actions while the X Corps tried to
break out of the Chosin and escape to the coast. On the 30th, the surrounded 1st Marines finally
received orders to withdraw. What followed was a 13-day running battle in brutally cold conditions
along the narrow 78-mile road that led southeast to Hungnam. The campaign has been nicknamed
"The Frozen Chosin" by the Marines, who after a series of attacks and defensive engagements
Map of Chosin Reservoir executed a breakout while famously repatriating their dead along the way. Air support from the First
Marine Air Wing proved decisive. They used night

attack aircraft, and once, when the Marines had come up against an
impassible abyss, sections of a huge suspension bridge were delivered by
air. When the ground proved to be too frozen for digging up the earth
needed to form a solid base for the bridge, the Marines used the corpses
of Chinese soldiers as landfill. The breakout prompted General Smith to
remark, "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a
different direction." By the 11th, the 1st Marines and X Corps had managed
to cripple the Chinese 9th Army Group while establishing a defensive
Dead Marines from Chosin Marines retreat from
perimeter at the port city of Hungnam, where they were evacuated from
Reservoir, 11/50 Chosin Reservoir, 11/50
North Korean soil to the South Korean city of Pusan.
Meanwhile, the Eighth Army on the western side of the peninsula continued its retreat south, and the 2nd Infantry Division
found itself in one of the most brutal ambushes in military history. Believing they were avoiding a three-sided trap, the division
entered a valley by way of a narrow road. They did not know the Chinese had established a 6-mile roadblock through which
the division would pass. It became known as, the gauntlet. As they entered it, Chinese machine guns and mortars rained
down on the Americans. Soon the road was further blocked with wrecked vehicles and scores of wounded and dead. A
vehicle would be hit, blocking the road, and some brave soldier would try to move it aside while the Chinese poured down fire
from above. Bodies too clogged the road, alive or dead no one knew, and jeep drivers would have no choice but to run over
them or risk being the next target, which would only further block the road. American air power helped some during the day,
but at night the Chinese attack intensified. One particularly harrowing section about five miles down was known as "the pass,"
a quarter mile slit in the mountains
flanked by steep embankments fifty feet high. There was no cover and no escape. When the
division commander, Major General Laurence B. Keiser arrived at the pass in mid-afternoon, he
found it so clogged with wreckage and casualties that it was virtually impassable. As he walked
along the road, Keiser stepped on a wounded soldier, who cursed him. "My friend, I'm sorry" was all
the stunned commander could say. Finally, the road was completely blocked when elements of the
division were completely destroyed, leaving broken and abandoned artillery pieces in the way. At
the rear of the division, the 23rd Infantry Regiment blew up its supply of 3,206 artillery shells as a
U.S. forces cross the 38th diversion, allowing them to slip into the hills on foot. Some three thousand men were killed,
Parallel back into South wounded, or missing during that terrifying 6-mile journey. Finally, on the 2nd, the remnants of the
Korea fleeing division lost contact with the enemy.

President Truman struggled to comprehend what it all meant. At a press conference on the 30th, the same day the 2nd
Infantry Division was running the gauntlet, Truman was asked in a press conference if the United States might have to resort
to the atomic bomb. There has always been active consideration of its use, the President responded. On December 15, UN
forces re-crossed the 38th Parallel back into South Korea, and President Truman declared a state of national emergency.
President Truman Address on State of Emergency, 12/15/50

Although the Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a stunning victory for the Chinese, it came at a staggering
cost of fighting strength. At the same time, General Smiths leadership had preserved much of the fighting
strength and supplies of X Corps. Ultimately, the battle allowed the UN forces to maintain a foothold in
Korea. And another fateful event would prove to have a critical impact on the UN mission in Korea. On
December 23, General Walker, commander of the Eighth Army, was killed when his jeep crashed head-on
into an oncoming truck. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, one of the most
capable and talented officers of his generation.

6. Phase 4: Fighting Around the 38th Parallel (1/51-5/51)

On December 31, 1950, Chinese and North Korean forces pressed their advantage by launching another Lt. General
Ridgeway

offensive. They used night attacks and spooked UN forces with loud trumpets and gongs, causing some soldiers to run away.
By the end of the first week of January they had taken Seoul, and UN forces had withdrawn from Inchon. General MacArthur
considered using nuclear weapons against the Chinese or North Korean interiors, with the intention that the resulting
radioactive fallout zones would interrupt the Chinese supply chains. But the arrival of General Ridgway had quick results on
the morale and fighting effectiveness of the Eighth Army. Ridgway was a dynamo of action. He constantly toured the front
lines. He whipped his officers into shape, and made it clear he expected the Army to get out of their jeeps and start
toughening up. Ridgway employed better tactics too, making sure they took advantage of reconnaissance, the terrain,
artillery, stronger defensive positions, and more flares to illuminate the sky during night fighting. In short, Ridgway resurrected
the Eighth Armys pride and moral, and turned them into a confident, effective fighting force.
Meanwhile, in their latest push, Chinese and North Korean forces had overextended their
supply lines, and they began to pull back from ground they had taken south of Seoul.
General Ridgway conducted extensive reconnaissance and moved north. Over the next few
months, the Chinese attacked, and UN forces counter-attacked. The Soviet Union began to
contribute material (mostly trucks, air, and anti-aircraft support), but the modest improvement
in the effectiveness of the Chinese supply lines could not prevent UN forces recapturing
Seoul.

UN Ambassador Warren Austin Speech on Korea, 1/15/51

Map of Phases 4-5: January 1951- General MacArthur comment to the Press, 1/21/51
July 1953

During these early months of 1951, General MacArthur wrestled with the fallout of his failed offensive. Characteristically, he
did not accept any of the responsibility for what had happened. He blamed Washington for his situation, and he simply
couldnt accept that his career would end in this way. He wanted to finish the job of unifying the Korean peninsula, which
meant taking the war directly to China. He believed that the decision of whether or not to use atomic weapons should be his,
not the Presidents. In Tokyo, he began to give regular interviews to the press in which he advocated for such a policy. But the
Truman administration and Americas UN allies saw too many pitfalls to expanding the war. For one thing, there werent
enough men to fight a larger war and still meet NATO commitments. International opinion was turning against the Korean
mission, and there loomed the specter of direct Soviet intervention and nuclear war. Time and again MacArthur would ask
permission to bomb China. He would be told no, and that he was not to make any statements regarding Americas foreign
policy. MacArthur would then fire off a series of angry protests. Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later
wrote:
His legendary pride had been hurt. The Red Chinese had made a fool of the infallible military genius the only possible means left to
MacArthur to regain his lost pride and military reputation was now to inflict an overwhelming defeat on those Red Chinese generals who had
made a fool of him. In order to do this he was perfectly willing to propel us into all-out war with Red China, and possibly with the Soviet
Union, igniting World War III and a nuclear holocaust.
Eventually, MacArthur went too far. Knowing that on March 24 Truman would be announcing his intention to seek a cease-
fire with the Chinese as a first step toward a negotiated settlement of the Korean question, MacArthur cut him off at the
knees. He made a public statement taunting the Chinese military, and he boasted that he would wipe them out if only his
hands werent tied (by Truman). He attempted to shame the Chinese so that, in order to save face, they would continue to
fight rather than negotiate. The Chinese took the bait and reiterated their goal to fight to the bitter end. Trumans plans had
been ruined. The President was stunned. In direct defiance of his orders, MacArthur had attempted to dictate policy. Truman
later wrote, By this act MacArthur left me no choiceI would no longer tolerate his insubordination. Truman sent a message
through General Bradley, reminding MacArthur of his orders. But MacArthur continued to make suggestive remarks about
Trumans policy to the press. Then, a message MacArthur had written to the House minority leader, a conservative
Republican who had publicly accused the President of murdering thousand of American boys by not escalating the war, was
read into the Congressional record. MacArthur had agreed with the congressmans views, and added, There is no substitute
for victory. Truman had finally had enough.
On April 11, 1951, President Truman removed Douglas MacArthur from his post
as commander of UN forces in Korea, explaining that the general had been
"unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States
government and the United Nations." For firing General MacArthur, the
celebrated hero of the war against Japan and genius behind the brilliant Inchon
landing, Truman was subjected to a torrent of right-wing attacks, and some
Republicans even called for his impeachment. The President addressed the
nation that night to explain why he had relieved MacArthur of his command:
President Truman
explains why he fired I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have
News: Truman
MacArthur discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with
all my heart that the course we are following is the best course. I believe that we fired MacArthur
must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the
precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our
country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third
world war. A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not
agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General
MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and
aim of our policy. It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself
compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military
commanders. But the cause of world peace is much more important than any
individual.

When General MacArthur returned home, the American people lavished him with attention. In
Washington, Republican supporters invited him to address a joint session of Congress. He did so
on April 14. It was a powerful speech, but he continued to make suggestions about foreign policy,
and he outright lied when he said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with his Korean policies.
MacArthur concluded his speech:
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it
was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took
MacArthur Address to the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still
Congress, 4/14/51 remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly
that old soldiers never die; they just fade away. And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my
Truman on His Decision military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see
to Fire MacArthur, 10/21/59 that duty. Good Bye.

Not surprisingly, Republicans and Democrats were divided on the speech. A Missouri Republican said, We saw a great hunk
of God in the flesh, and we heard the voice of God. Former president Hoover called MacArthur the reincarnation of Saint
Paul into a great General of the Army who came out of the East. Truman, on the other hand, bluntly stated, It was nothing
but a bunch of damn bullshit.

Weeks later, Truman was vindicated. From May 3 to June 25, 1951, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigated
MacArthur's dismissal. Most damning was the testimony of Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (MacArthurs
boss), and himself one of the most cherished heroes of WWII. In regards to MacArthurs proposed strategy, Bradley said,
Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the
wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. The committees final judgment was that MacArthur had defied the orders of the
President and thus had violated the US Constitution.

With MacArthur gone, Matthew Ridgway took over the top spot, and General James Van Fleet assumed command of Eighth
Army. From April 14-22, and then again in May, the Chinese launched what would be the last of their major offensives against
UN forces. After several major battles, UN forces successfully repulsed the attacks and then counter-attacked. By the end of
May, fighting had ceased with the UN line just north of the 38th Parallel.

7. Phase 5: Stalemate (6/51-7/53)

The final and longest phase of the Korean War (more than 2/3 of the entire war), is
characterized as a stalemate. Both sides made overtures towards peace, and talks
began as early as July 1951. During this time, each side continued to fight in order to
gain ground and test the enemys resolve. Numerous battles were fought, including the
Battle of Heartbreak Ridge (September 13-October 15, 1915). This month-long battle
between American and French forces and Chinese and North Korean forces, just a few
miles north of the 38th Parallel, resulted in 3,700 American and French casualties and
an estimated 25,000 North Korean and Chinese casualties. In the spring of 1952,
President Truman announced that he would not run for reelection, not surprising given Rep. Kennedy Saturday Evening
the unpopularity of the war by this time. Meanwhile, Truman relieved General Dwight on Korea, 7/15/51 Post Cold War
Articles 9/29/51
D. Eisenhower, of his
military duties so that Ike, the former Supreme Allied Commander of WWII, could run for
president. He won easily. It had been 20 years since a Republican had occupied the White House.
Congressman James E. Van Zandt (R-PA) advocates use of A-bomb

8. Armistice
President Eisenhower too pressed for an end to the war. By the spring of 1953, peace talks were
finally reaching fruition. Terms for exchanging prisoners of war were signed in June, and a peace
agreement was achieved shortly thereafter. On July 27, 1953, the Peace Treaty was signed at
Eisenhower Campaign
Panmunjom. The 38th parallel, that arbitrary border set back in 1945, was reset as the boundary
between communist North and anti-communist South. Tens of
thousands of American G.I.s were permanently stationed in South
Korea as a deterrent to further communist aggression. Cold War
tensions continued.

On his decision to make a stand in Korea, President Truman later

wrote in his autobiography:

General Walker signs Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Eisenhower
Armistice Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if announces
South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be armistice, 7/27/53
emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the
Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of
Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would
have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger
Communist neighbors.

Sources Used & Recommended

| top |

Like 1.5K people like this. Sign Up to see what your friends like.

Last modified January 28, 2013