The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3, JulySeptember 2012 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.00000.

Better O Out? Britain and Europe

Since the election of 2010 not just one, but was easily defeated, but the rebels were
both of the Unions in which Britain is jubilant. This was the largest ever rebel-
involved have gone critical: the relation- lion by Conservative MPs on the issue of
ship of Britain with the European Union Europe. It dwarfed the revolts of the
(EU) because of the crisis in the eurozone, 1990s when the party was torn apart by
and the relationship of Britain with Scot- the civil war over the Maastricht Treaty,
land with the announcement of a denite and it was a personal rebuke to the
date for a referendum on Scottish inde- leadership, so early in the Parliament.
pendence. The union with Europe has None of this will have come as a
lasted just short of forty years, the union surprise to Philip Norton who in a series
with Scotland more than 300. Would the of landmark studies in the 1970s demon-
United Kingdom be better o out of the strated the signicance of backbench dis-
EU, and would Scotland be better o out sent in the House of Commons and
of the British Union? There are loud charted the way in which it had steadily
voices calling for both, and calling too grown in all parties over successive par-
for these constitutional questions to be liaments. But it was certainly an unwel-
settled by that most un-British device come surprise to David Cameron, who in
the referendum. 2006 shortly after he became leader had
On 24 October 2011 there was a vote in urged his party to stop banging on about
the House of Commons on whether there Europe. For a time the Conservatives
should be a referendum on Britains had taken the hint, and Europe was
membership of the EU following a peti- downplayed as a topic in the run-up to
tion presented by David Nuttall, one of the 2010 election, but it did not go away.
the new Conservative MPs, taking advan- The problem is that there is a large elem-
tage of the policy of the coalition govern- ent of the Conservative party which can-
ment to allow parliamentary time for not imagine anything more important
debates on petitions from the public sup- than banging on about Europe. It is
ported by 100,000 signatures. These votes what they came into politics to do. As
are advisory only; they cannot commit Andrew Rawnsley has suggested, asking
the government to legislation. Neverthe- these Conservative MPs to stop banging
less, the government took this vote su- on about Europe is like asking a philate-
ciently seriously to impose a three-line list to stop collecting stamps. It will not
whip on its MPs, and David Cameron happen. What must be particularly wor-
and William Hague changed their travel rying to the leadership is that the dissen-
plans so that they could be present at the ters are not simply the irreconcilables, the
debate in person. A great deal of pressure battle-scarred veterans of the European
was brought to bear on Conservative MPs wars of the 1990s like Bill Cash and John
in order to minimise the vote in favour, Redwood. The 81 rebels also include 49
but to no avail: 81 Conservatives deed MPs who were elected in 2010, and who
the whip, and another 15 abstained. With might have been expected to show rather
the Liberal Democrats and Labour, for the more loyalty to the leadership. It is a far
most part, both voting against, the motion cry from those parliamentary sessions in
# The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
468 Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
the 1950s which could sometimes pass personal standing and the Conservative
with hardly a dissenting vote against a party briey moved into a lead over the
party whip. opposition.
On 9 December there was another sig- Under a headline British Bulldog right
nicant moment. In the early hours of the to bite the Euro-bullies and with a pic-
morning after ve hours of negotiation at ture depicting Cameron as a bulldog with
the European summit about a new scal a Union Jack wrapped around his neck,
compact to save the euro, David Cameron Sarkozy as a diminutive poodle and Mer-
sprang a surprise on his partners. He kel as a dachshund, Trevor Kavanagh
announced that he would only agree to wrote in The Sun:
such a scal compact becoming part of a Euro-bullies France and Germany think they
new European Treaty if Britain were have cast Britain into the outer darkness,
given a number of specic guarantees, alone and adrift in dangerous waters. In fact,
particularly concerning the City of Lon- they have done us a huge favour. This great
don, to be written into the Treaty. This trading nation is now free to paddle its own
was the rst time that many of the Heads canoe while the EU Titanic steams on to
of Government had seen these proposals, inevitable doom. This is Black Wednesday
and most reacted with irritation and all over againthe fateful day in 1992 when
incredulity. Nicolas Sarkozy said they they booted us out of preparations for the
were unacceptable, and it became clear European single currency. . . . There is no
way back. The die is now cast for an IN/OUT
that Angela Merkel and the other Heads
referendum. The PM has time on his side.
of Government agreed with him. David Polls are certain to show massive support.
Cameron was isolated, but refused to Europe now looms as the decisive issue at
withdraw his demands. The meeting the next election. . . . The danger for Brussels is
broke up without agreement. that we thrive while Europe sinks into per-
At the press conferences a few hours manent recession and others peel o and join
later both sides put their own spin on us . . . (domineering) Mrs Merkel wants all EU
what had happened. David Cameron statesincluding Franceto hand Berlin con-
declared that he had wielded the veto in trol of their economies. With some German-
order to protect Britains vital interests. style discipline she believes Portugal, Ireland,
Nicolas Sarkozy accused him of under- Greece and Spain could be saved from the
abyss. But after this weeks meltdown, the
mining the eorts to save the eurozone
whole world knows those PIGS wont y.
and making proposals that would
threaten the single market by seeking to A few newspapersthe Guardian, the
exempt the United Kingdom nancial Financial Times, the Independentcarried
sector from its rules. The Conservative articles criticising Camerons negotiating
papers and many of Camerons MPs style, suggesting that he had miscalcu-
were jubilant. The tabloids were lled lated and ended up with a result he had
with Churchillian rhetoric, and the drum- not planned and which was not sustain-
beat of 1940: Very Well, Alone. Cameron able because it isolated and marginalised
received enormous praise for showing Britain within the EU. Nick Clegg, after
the bulldog spirit, at long last drawing a apparently agreeing the negotiating tac-
line in the sand, and telling the Euro- tics Cameron would deploy and initially
peans, this far and no further. The MPs seeming relaxed about the result, rapidly
and commentators who had been so cri- changed tack once members of his party
tical of him when he imposed a three-line began ringing him to register their dis-
whip in October 2011 to defeat the pro- may. However, in the weeks before
posal for a referendum now cheered him Christmas 2011 Cameron emerged as
as a true patriot. The public approved as the clear victor, having taken on the
well. There was a big jump in Camerons precious mantle of Churchill and
Better O Out? Britain and Europe 469

# The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3
Thatcher. Some of his strongest critics in Member States, with the exception of
the party, including Simon Heer, went Britain and the Czech Republic, would
out of their way to congratulate him, eventually signa deeper integrated bloc
welcoming the veto as a dening moment at the heart of Europe which would meet
in the relationship of Britain to the EU. without Britain.
Nothing would ever be the same again What dismayed the eurosceptics even
they suggested. The way was now set for more was that the government appeared
the government to demand the repatria- to have no desire to press its advantage
tion of major powers from the EU which and demand that the EU concede a signi-
the Conservatives had included in their cant repatriation of powers. If the
manifesto, and if the EU refused to con- December summit was a historic turning
cede them, to call an IN/OUT referen- point, then it needed to be followed
dum. through to put pressure on the EU to
The January summit of the EU Council give Britain what it wanted. Failing that,
brought much less favourable coverage Britain should hold a full IN/OUT refer-
for David Cameron in the blogs and endum. Yet nothing seemed further from
commentaries of the eurosceptics. In- the governments mind. As an excuse, it
stead, he was accused of selling out, of could point to the existence of the coali-
betrayal, of equivocation, of backsliding, tion. The Liberal Democrats remained the
of reverting to business as usual. The most pro-EU party in Britain, and would
clear lines in the sand established in not support moves to weaken Britains
December were looking rather smudged. ties with the EU, still less sever them
Back then Cameron had promised that if altogether. It was clear, too, that the Con-
the seventeen members of the eurozone servative leadership, although overwhel-
wished to go ahead with a new treaty, it mingly eurosceptic, was not willing to
would have to be a treaty outside the force the pace in disengaging Britain
European Union, and therefore the signa- from the EU. These were eurosceptics
tories to it would not be able to use EU who did not want any further integration,
institutionsparticularly the European and favoured some repatriation of
Commission and the European Court powers, but securing that was not a prior-
to implement and enforce its provisions. ity for them, and despite everything they
When he had been party leader, William still wanted Britain to stay in the EU.
Hague had called for Britain to be in Their overriding reason was that the
Europe but not run by Europe. Many single market remained a vital British
applauded the sentiment, but no-one interest.
was quite sure what it meant. It lacked Over the course of the eurozone crisis
the clarity of IN or OUT. It seemed to British policy has become highly con-
imply that Britain could be both IN and fused, but then it has always been highly
OUT. Many came to suspect that phrases confused. Britain has never made up its
like these were devices which allowed mind about Europe, and what its object-
European integration to proceed steadily ives should be. Does it want to be further
while giving reassurance that it was not. in, or further out, or out altogether? The
At the January summit it emerged that single market was originally fought for
Britain would not after all block the use by Margaret Thatcher. She even accepted,
by the eurozone countries of the Euro- and indeed pressed for, the principle of
pean institutions in enforcing their scal qualied majority voting to ensure that
compact. Eurosceptics complained that if its provisions were enforced, and that
this so it was hard to see what David individual countries could not veto pro-
Cameron had vetoed. There would be gress. An eective single market required
a new European treaty which all 27 a strong European Commission and a
470 Andrew Gamble

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3 # The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
strong Court of Justice to enforce com- as quickly as possible. But Britain objects
mon standards and rules, otherwise na- to this scal union becoming part of the
tional interests would tend to prevail. But European Treaties, because that might
when Thatcher changed tack and began create a union within the Union, and
to emphasise national sovereignty and one from which Britain would be
the need to resist the encroachment of excluded. This inner union might act in
the Commission and the Court as instru- ways detrimental to British interests. So
ments of European federalism, she to avoid that Britain wants to shape the
appeared to undermine the rationale of rules of this inner union, but without
her support for the single market to the joining it. That earned the rebuke from
dismay of some of her colleagues. Sarkozy Enough is Enough. Was it ac-
The same dilemmas can be seen at ceptable that Britain could refuse to be a
work in the debates over the future of member of a club yet still insist on shap-
the eurozone. George Osborne and David ing the rules of the club?
Cameron have become strong advocates In the 1980s many Conservatives on the
of the eurozone proceeding to full scal Thatcherite wing of the party had
union as quickly as possible, making the accepted that the logic of the single mar-
European Central Bank (ECB) a true len- ket required progress on economic and
der of last resort for the eurozone, agree- monetary union to make it fully eective.
ing rm scal rules for all eurozone This was a step too far for Thatcher
countries and ways of enforcing them. herself (NO, NO, NO, she declared;
They have taken this position not because which led Georey Howe to conclude
they wish Britain to be part of the euro- that she had broken his cricket bat). But
zone, but because they fear that if the despite her increasing denunciations of
eurozone disintegrates there will be cata- the encroachments of the EU, Thatcher
strophic consequences for British banks had to concede British membership of the
and the British economy. In the worst Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1990. The
case scenario, the world could be tipped ERM fell apart in 1992, which greatly
into a full-blown depression. In these weakened the case made by those across
circumstances it has apparently suddenly all three main parties who wanted Britain
become a vital British interest for the to join the rst wave of the single cur-
eurozone to survive, and to do so by rency in 1999. For a time after the launch
embracing scal union. Such a solution of the single currency it appeared that the
is anathema to radical eurosceptics who drive to further integration was weaken-
do not want to prop the euro up, but to ing, and that the Union would become
dance on its grave. The breakup of the increasingly dierentiated and diverse.
eurozone might be the prelude to the end But the eurozone crisis has brought inte-
of the EU itself and the recovery of na- gration back to centre stage in the shape
tional sovereignty across Europe. For of the proposals needed to rescue the
eurosceptics, nothing should be done to eurozone from collapse.
hinder this outcome; the United Kingdom Britain does not want the eurozone to
should be actively promoting it, and integrate without having a say, but it is not
advising its European partners that they prepared to participate in the eurozone.
should plan for an orderly winding up of To its partners it seems to want power
the euro. without responsibility. They have become
This is not, however, the path which increasingly exasperated. Count Lambs-
Osborne and Cameron are pursuing. dor of the Free Democratic Party in
They declare that a scal union in the Germany enquired politely whether Brit-
eurozone is in Britains interest, and that ain after all might not be happier to leave
the eurozone members should conclude it the EU and negotiate an associate status
Better O Out? Britain and Europe 471

# The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3
like Norway. Other popular models are much of the pro-European wing in the
Switzerland and Hong Kong; less atter- party to form the Social Democratics, the
ing models are Iceland and Bahrain. party adopted a manifesto in 1983 calling
The majority of Britains political lea- for British withdrawal.
ders, however, believe that Britain should Since that time, however, the parties
remain a full member of the EU. That is a have reversed position with the Conser-
position apparently still shared by the vatives growing ever more eurosceptic,
British electorate. In a YouGov poll con- while majority opinion in Labour has
ducted in February 2012 for YouGov@- come to adopt the pro-European line of
Cambridge there was a substantial social democratic parties elsewhere in
majority of voters who thought the EU Europe. Even then, divisions have per-
was, on balance, a bad thing for Britain, sisted, particularly over whether Britain
but a clear majority still favoured Britain should join the euro. Tony Blair urged it
staying in the EU. Support for the EU is strongly because he wanted to end once
strongest in London and Scotland; majo- and for all Britains half-hearted commit-
rities there think the EU is a good thing ment to the EU, but he was blocked by
for Britain, outweighed by majorities Gordon Brown at the Treasury, and he
thinking the opposite everywhere else. delayed. After 2003 and Iraq, he no longer
The British electorate is clearly euroscep- had the strength to push the policy
tic, but it is not the radical euroscepticism through against Browns opposition.
which seeks complete withdrawal. Yet at Britain has always been reluctant,
the same time it does not seek real semi-detached, the awkward partner
engagement either. when it comes to things European. It
The politicians reect this ambivalence. used to be argued that Britain always
In most members of the EU there is adopted the latest measure of integration,
bipartisan consensus between the leading but several years after everyone else. This
parties about their countrys membership pattern no longer seems to hold. It is hard
of the Union. In Britain, the leading par- at the moment to see Britain ever signing
ties have often been divided, but not up to the Schengen Agreement on open
consistently. The Conservatives in the borders or joining the euro. Forty years of
1960s under Macmillan and Heath were membership have not made Britain
the pro-European party, initiating the noticeably more European. If anything,
rst application and eventually securing euroscepticism has increased. Britain has
Britains membership. The Labour party become more reluctant, not less. The high
was predominantly opposed, starting water mark of Britains engagement with
with Hugh Gaitskells emotional outburst the European project may paradoxically
that joining the European Community come to be seen as the Thatcher years.
would mean the end of Britain as an Constructing the single market, shadow-
independent European state, the end of ing the deutschmark, joining the ERM
a thousand years of history. Gaitskells all took place under the Iron Lady. There
faction in the party was strongly pro- has been nothing to compare with them
European, but the majority of the party since.
members and trade unionists were dee- The roots of Britains ambivalence
ply sceptical, and although the party about Europe go deep. Keynes wrote in
leadership converted to a pro-European 1919: England still stands outside Eur-
position, the party was never convinced. ope. Europes voiceless tremors do not
A majority of Labour MPs voted against reach her. Europe is apart and England is
entry in 1971 and voted no in the 1975 not of her esh and body. But Europe is
Referendum. After the partys defeat in solid with itself. Churchill told de Gaulle
the 1979 election and the defection of (rather disobligingly) before the Nor-
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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3 # The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
mandy landings: Each time we must wished it well but made it clear that they
choose between Europe and the open wanted no part of it. Ernest Bevin and
sea we shall always choose the open sea. Anthony Eden were at one mind on
Each time I must choose between you and thisno matter that Churchill had once
Roosevelt I shall always choose Roose- proposed an immediate union between
velt. When he came to veto Britains France and Britain in the dark days of
application to join the Economic Commu- 1940 (a proposal rejected by the French).
nity twenty years later, de Gaulle had not In the 1950s the French briey revived the
forgotten this exchange. Yet this separ- proposal. This time it was rejected by the
ation of Britain from Europe is relatively British. The French turned elsewhere.
recent. In Roman times or in the Middle Anthony Eden refused to participate in
Ages the separation of England and the the negotiations which led to the Treaty
other British nations from Europe would of Rome, signed in 1956. Like Churchill,
have seemed absurd. Catholic Britain and he felt that Britain had a separate and
Roman Britain were integral parts of Eur- distinct task. Churchill may have
opeeven after the Reformation bells included Europe as one of the three
were rung throughout England in 1565 circles which dened British power and
at the news that the Ottoman siege of interest, but it was clear that for him as for
Christian Malta had been lifted. But it most Conservatives, the other two cir-
was the Reformation which began the clesEmpire and Anglo-Americatook
process that increasingly set England priority. The imperial dream took a long
apart from the great Catholic monarchies time to die in the Conservative party, and
of Spain, France and Austria. It was when it did some Conservatives turned to
reinforced by the policy of overseas Europe as the new means to project Brit-
expansion launched by Oliver Cromwell. ish power and inuence, but others fol-
The open sea was eventually to dene lowed Margaret Thatchers lead and
Britain as a global power rather than a chose America. Visions of Europe existed,
continental power, and it shaped the but they were a minority pursuit.
national myth of British exceptionalism. It is often said that the British thought
Yet for all its global reach and the they were joining a common market, and
wealth it brought, Britain remained a were dismayed to nd it turning into a
group of islands situated close to the federal union. But no serious British poli-
European mainland and could never iso- tician can have ever really been deceived.
late itself from matters European. The There were political objectives from the
aim of its diplomacy became to ensure start in Britains application to join the
that there should always be a balance of Common Market, and a clear realisation
power in Europe, that no one country that Britain was joining a political com-
should ever dominate the continent, and munity, with all that that entailed. The
to that end perdious Albion, this nation real problem has been that unlike the
of shopkeepers and later shoppers and political elites of most other Member
users of safety razors, was active in con- States, the British never overcame their
structing alliances and using its cash to ambivalence about Europe. They wanted
pay its allies to ght its enemies, reser- to be part of it, but at the same time
ving its energies for the more exciting detached. The political elite has never
tasks of exploring and conquering the committed whole heartedly to Europe,
rest of the world. Britain always needed and currently it is in headlong retreat.
allies. Without the Prussians Wellington The retreat began in the 1990s. The
could not have prevailed at Waterloo. Maastricht Treaty was the culmination
When the idea of European union was of the new impulse to integration which
rst mooted after 1945 British ministers took hold in the 1980s, particularly under
Better O Out? Britain and Europe 473

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the Delors Presidency. It committed the right now. Remarkably 40 per cent, with
Union to the introduction of a single varying degrees of enthusiasm, concede
currency, and it renamed the enterprise that it might be a good idea for Britain to
a Union, setting out the goal of ever closer join at some stage in the future, but 51 per
union, but the Treaty was not an unal- cent are opposed in principle. Britain,
loyed success for the federal cause since it nonetheless, is deeply involved in the
also saw the reassertion of the power of eurozone crisis. It is providing funds
the nation-states and the weakening of both directly to eurozone countries and
the Commission. Britains contribution to also through the International Monetary
this was the securing of precious opt-outs Fund (IMF), and it is doing so because if
from some of the provisions of the the eurozone were to disintegrate the
Treatynotably the commitment to join consequences for British banks, British
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) jobs and British growth would be cata-
and sign up to the social chapter. John strophic. Britain needs the eurozone to
Majors negotiating triumphs were, how- overcome its problems quite badly, even
ever, disregarded by Conservative euro- though almost all British politicians and
sceptics, who were overjoyed when commentators are convinced that the
sterling crashed out of the Exchange eurozone is deeply awed and its col-
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September lapse was always likely.
1992. The dent to the authority of the The travails of the eurozone have vin-
government helped launch the bitter civil dicated all those politicians who warned
war over the ratication of the Maastricht of the folly of this grand project, against
Treaty, and later the leadership challenge the urging of a motley array of cosmo-
to John Major. politansbusiness leaders, academics,
The failure of the ERM and the steady if commentators and politicians. But
unspectacular growth which Britain instead of calling for the immediate aban-
experienced once it had left it reduced donment of the euro, these same euro-
the attractiveness or the necessity of the sceptic politicians now demand that it be
single currency, and in the end British saved, that Europe pull itself together
stayed out. Eleven other states went and sort out its problems. British policy
ahead in 1999 with six others joining on Europe has become a muddle. Having
subsequently, and nine more pledged to threatened to veto a new treaty to create a
join eventually. Opinion against the euro scal compact the government also be-
hardened in the Conservative party after lieves that the scal compact must be
1997. This reected the trend in public adopted as a matter of urgency. No won-
opinion. All this was before the nancial der the eurosceptics are confused. Cheer-
crash in 2008 and the eurozone crisis ing the government one minute, they are
which began to take hold in 2010. This muttering about treason the next. One of
crisis has become an existential crisis for them described the guarantees the gov-
the EU itself, raising questions not only as ernment thinks it has secured as being as
to whether the eurozone can survive, but eective as a chocolate teapot.
whether the EU can survive. The euro- Britain faces an acute dilemma over the
zone crisis is a crisis of the banks and of euro. To radical eurosceptics in the Better
debt, but it is also, and increasingly, a O Out Campaign formed in 2006 the
crisis of growth and employment and of issue could not be simpler. The crisis of
democratic legitimacy. Britain is not a the eurozone and the desire of its mem-
member of the euro, and no longer even bers to push for deeper integration
an aspirant member of the euro. Only 1 through scal coordination or even a
per cent of the British public think it full scal union gives Britain the oppor-
would be a good idea to join the euro tunity to detach itself by calling an IN/
474 Andrew Gamble

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3 # The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
OUT referendum. If David Cameron considerable popular resentment against
were to do, this they suggest he would all things European.
have overwhelming support from his Reading the British tabloids and hear-
party at all levels, and overwhelming ing the speeches of British politicians and
support from the public. He would win the unwillingness to mount a robust
a landslide at the next election, destroy- defence of the EU, the question arises as
ing both Labour and the Liberal Demo- to why does Britain not leave? Would it
crats, and drawing United Kingdom not be better both for Britain and for the
Independence party (UKIP) voters into EU if the relationship were severed? Yet
the Conservative fold. since 1983 no mainstream United King-
It is a heady prospect, so why does dom party has advocated withdrawal. A
David Cameron not oblige? There is a variety of fringe parties, UKIP and the
rule about referendums that govern- Referendum party, have done so, but
ments generally only call them when although UKIP has done well in Euro-
they know they can win. Cameron does pean Parliament elections, it has still to
not call one because he would have to capture a seat in the Westminster Parlia-
campaign for the United Kingdom stay- ment.
ing IN. He might not win, and he would This could change. John Rentoul has
split his party irrevocably. This is exactly speculated as to when a front-line British
what the eurosceptics suspect and why politician will break ranks and call for
he is not trusted by many in his party. He Britain to leave the EU. One reason they
speaks a good sceptic talk, even ad- do not is the lack of interest of the
dressing meetings as We sceptics, but electorate. Although polls are regularly
his actions point in a dierent direction. produced showing majorities in favour of
His problem is that although the Conser- an immediate referendum and of leaving
vatives appear united on Europe, in fact the EU, pollsters also gently point out that
the split is as large as ever, between those when asked to rank the EU as an issue
eurosceptics who want OUT altogether only 1 per cent of the electorate regard it
and those who want to stay IN, but with as the most important issue facing the
no further integration. country and only 4 per cent put it in the
There is a familiar pattern here. Europe top ten issues. This is one reason why
has always been a two-level game, and David Cameron advised his party to stop
British politicians have played it as gus- banging on about Europe. Another rea-
tily as anyone else. They show one face to son is that, unsatisfactory though the
their domestic parties and voters, and relationship may be, there are powerful
another to the Council of Ministers and reasons for remaining part of the club
the Commission. Politicians use national which still persuade a majority of the
symbols to dene themselves against Britains political class.
Europe, and when they oer reasons for The case for IN argues that the United
being members of the EU it is overwhel- Kingdom has a strong permanent interest
mingly pragmatic and instrumental. It is in shaping the rules and policies which
rare for politicians to defend the concept govern its largest market: around 54 per
of Europe itself. But the more the positive cent of British exports. Standards and
case for Europe is not made the louder rules for the single market are set in
the clamour for Britain to exit. Europe has Brussels, and are necessary for genuine
become a scapegoat for innumerable ills free trade. The British concern has always
at home, including many things that are been to shape the single market in a
nothing to do with the EU, such as the liberal, Anglo-Saxon direction, building
European Court of Human Rights, and alliances to do so. Germany has often
even the Eurovision song contest. There is welcomed the United Kingdom as a
Better O Out? Britain and Europe 475

# The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3
counter-weight to France. This strategy is ability in EU institutions cannot be
now threatened by events in the euro- resolved without changing the whole
zone. If a separate economic governance basis of the relationship. The euro has
of the eurozone is allowed to develop become a disaster, and Britain should
without British involvement, the Franco- not get involved. Simon Jenkins calls
German alliance is likely to be strength- plans for more bailouts and more quan-
ened, and the Commission weakened. titative easing as like pumping petrol into
The United Kingdom has a natural inter- a tank which is disconnected from the
est in supporting the Commission as the engine. The OUT camp dismisses fears
upholder of the rules of the single market, that Britain would not be able to survive
although that is not something any self- outside the EU. On the contrary it would
respecting British politician wants to thrive. Gwyn Prins has argued that the
admit to the British newspapers. The United Kingdom is still a globally
case for being IN is therefore a case for engaged economy, and that the EU has
recognising, as Peter Mandelson puts it, been a distorting inuence. With its dis-
the complex grand bargain that is the tinctive culture, the City of London, its
EU. This implies for example that the links with the United States and its ex-
reform of the eurozone is too important ible labour markets, the United Kingdom
to be left to the Europeans. There is the has the capacity and the opportunity to
risk that it might act to impose new rules recreate itself as a global entrepreneur. In
which were against British interests, and doing so it would not need to sacrice its
might not take the measures needed to trading ties with the EU. Since the United
make the European economy grow. This Kingdom is such a valuable market, the
is why there are still advocates of Britain EU, it is suggested, would be keen to
joining the euro itself, on the grounds that continue to trade. The European ideal
had Britain been involved from the start has decayed and the idea of a scal union
some of the design aws could have been to rescue the eurozone is only likely to
avoided. Supporters of the case for fuel a resurgence of nationalism. Britain
remaining IN also point to the inward should stand aside.
investment into the United Kingdom The arguments on both sides are
which comes in part because it is seen powerful, and seem to leave little room
as an entry point to the single market, and for compromise. There is no halfway
argue that the City should be treated as a house with the EU, but it is a halfway
global resource for the EU as a whole, not house that Britain has always craved.
as an exclusive national interest. David Nuttalls referendum proposal
The case for OUT argues that Europes contained three questions: whether Brit-
direction is set, and it is not a direction ain should stay in the EU on current
with which Britain can live. Tim Mon- terms, whether it should leave, or
tgomerie of ConservativeHome recalls whether it should renegotiate and
that John Major had declared after Maas- repatriate powers. Like the proposed
tricht that the direction of the EU was Scottish referendum, the last question is
towards decentralisation and demo- the devo-max option. Britain would stay
cratisation. It wasnt. Disengagement in the Union, but opt out of almost all EU
has become imperative, both for reasons common policies. This seems the direc-
of party and electoral management, and tion that Britain is headed. The other
because of national interest. The burden members of the EU, and the eurozone in
of regulation (one-third of government particular, may tolerate this so long as the
time some eurosceptics calculate is spent United Kingdom does not obstruct their
on compliance with European directives) deeper integration. The basis of a deal is
and the lack of democracy and account- emerging. Some observers think that it
476 Andrew Gamble

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3 # The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
may never need to be made explicit much less propitious from the last time
because the eurozone will not hold Britain was truly a global player, in the
together, and the result of its fragmenta- nineteenth century. Enoch Powell argued
tion or disintegration will be a much the case dierently, in terms of national
looser and decentralised EU, if it man- independence, and the merits of splendid
ages to survive at all. That would help isolation, from the United States as well
David Cameron enormously in the task of as from Europe. Advocates of the Anglo-
managing his party, but if it led to a major sphere argue that it is not too late for
new economic downturn and nancial Britain (and Ireland) to turn their backs
collapse it would create a much larger on Europe in favour of building a net-
threat to the survival of his government. work commonwealth of the English-
If, however, the eurozone manages to speaking peoples. This is a dream that
hold together and implements its scal has lasted more than one hundred years,
compact, with or without all its current but it has always foundered on the di-
members, or even if it divides into a hard culties of reconciling dierent national
currency zone around Germany and a interests and nding common institu-
soft currency zone around the southern tions through which it can be expressed.
states, that will spell problems for Britain It has an emotional pull for many British
in the future. If the markets no longer people that Europe seems unable to
thought the countries of the eurozone at match. But the Irish are unlikely to have
risk, attention might turn to the fragile much time for it, and the Scots too,
economic fundamentals of the United whether they remain part of the United
Kingdom, and just as in the 1980s a Kingdom or not, want a European future.
British Chancellor might be forced to Do the English want a European
link sterling to the resurgent euro or to a future? They still seem not to know.
newly re-constituted deutschemark. Opt-
ing to be a global player rather than a This article is a slightly revised version of the
regional player is supercially attractive, 2012 Norton Lecture, which was delivered at
but circumstances are very dierent and the University of Hull on 10 February 2012.

Better O Out? Britain and Europe 477

# The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3