11/8/2016 G.R.No.

168973

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila


FIRSTDIVISION


CITYOFDUMAGUETE,herein G.R.No.168973
Represented by City Mayor,
AgustinR.Perdices, Present:
Petitioner,
CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
versus BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.

PHILIPPINE PORTS Promulgated:
AUTHORITY,
Respondent. August24,2011
xx


DECISION


LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:


Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
[1] [2]
Decision datedMarch4,2005andResolution datedJune6,2005oftheCourtAppealsinCA
G.R. SP No. 64379, which granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of respondent
PhilippinePortsAuthorityandsetasidetheOrdersdatedDecember7,2000andFebruary20,2001of
theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch44oftheCityofDumagueteinLRCCaseNo.N201.

Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:

OnOctober14,1998,petitionerCityofDumaguete,throughMayorFelipeAntonioB.Remollo
(Remollo),filedbeforetheRTCanApplicationforOriginalRegistrationofTitleoveraparcelofland

with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the
PropertyRegistrationDecree.TheapplicationwasdocketedasLRCCaseNo.N201.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 1/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973

Petitionerallegedinsupportofitsapplication:

1.Thattheapplicant,CityofDumaguetethroughitsHonorableMayorFelipeAntonioB.
Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings
comprisingtheEngineersCompoundwhereitisnowsituatedandhasbeenincontinuousoccupation
and possession of the same for more than 30 years or from the year 1960 (Affidavit of Ownership
executed by Felipe Antonio G. Remollo, the City Mayor, datedAugust 21, 1998 herein attached as
ANNEXA).Thesaidlandconsistof5,410squaremetersandissituatedandboundedanddescribedas
shownontheplan(trueandphotostaticcopiesoftheoriginalplanmarkedPsu07006805approvedby
the Regional Technical Director of the [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] DENR,
Regional Office, Cebu City herein attached as ANNEX B) and technical descriptions attached hereto
(technicaldescriptionattachedasANNEXC)andmadeaparthereof

2.ThatsaidlandatthelastassessmentfortaxationwasassessedatP676,250,Philippine
currency,withmarketvalueofP1,352,500.00,Philippinecurrency.(DeclarationofRealPropertywith
theassessedandmarketvaluesattachedasANNEXD)

3.Thattothebestofmyknowledgeandbelief,thereisnomortgageorencumbranceof
anykindwhatsoeveraffectingsaidland,noranotherpersonhavinganyestateorinteresttherein,legal
orequitable,inpossession,remainder,reversionorexpectancy

4.Thatthelandwasacquiredbypossessorytitleinopen,continuous,adverseoccupation
andpossessionintheconceptofownerformorethanthirtyyearssince1960(pleaserefertoANNEX
A)

5.Thatthelandisadjoinedbythefollowing:

NorthWest
NorthEast
SouthEast

Allalongline12345678910byFloresAvenue,CityRoadandtheDumaguetePortRoad
SouthWestalongline101byPlanMsiV20453

xxxx

8.ThatthelandincludedisboundedontheWestbyFloresAvenueandontheNorthbytheCity
Road,allpublichighwaysandontheEastbytheDumaguetePortRoad,aprivateroadmadepartofthe
[3]
PortZone.


[4]
InanOrder datedOctober23,1998,theRTCnotedthat:

Aperusaloftherecordsofthecaseshowsthattheannexeslackthefollowingcopies:

a)twoblueprintcopiesoftheapprovedplan

b)twocopiesofthetechnicaldescriptionofthelotsoughttoberegistered

c)twocopiesoftheSurveyorscertificate

d)acertificateinquadruplicateoftheCityAssessoroftheassessedvalueoftheland

e)alloriginalmunimentsoftitleinthepossessionoftheapplicantwhichproveownership
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 2/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
e)alloriginalmunimentsoftitleinthepossessionoftheapplicantwhichproveownership
oftheland

f)twocopiesofthepetition/application.

Further,theapplicationdidnotstatethenumberofthelotsoughttoberegistered,thenumberof
parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and indicate whether it claims a portion of the
roadwhichservesasaboundaryline.

AllthesemustbeallegedinthepetitionsothattheCourtwillknowthenatureoftheproperty.


TheRTCexplainedthattheextracopiessubmittedbypetitionershallbeforwardedbytheRTC
ClerkofCourttotheLandRegistrationCommission(LRC)inManilaforcomment.Only thereafter
wouldtheRTCsettheapplicationforhearing.

[5]
Petitioner filed its Compliance with the abovementioned Order, submitting additional
copiesoftherequireddocumentsandclarifyingthus:

1.Theapprovedplandoesnotstatethenumberoflotsoughttoberegisteredbecauseitisapublic
land,thus,onlyPSU07006805appearsontheplanwhichisbeingappliedforregistration
2. Onlyone(1)parceloflandisappliedforbypetitionerswhichconsistoffivethousandfour
hundredten(5,410)squaremeters,moreorless
3. TheCityEngineersBuildingwithintheCityEngineerscompoundaretheonlyimprovement
foundthereonand
4.Petitionersdonotclaimanyportionoftheroadwhichservesasaboundaryline.


The RTC accordingly set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N201 on April 12, 1999, and
sentnoticestotheparties.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,
[6]
representedbytheOfficeoftheGovernmentCorporateCounsel,filedseparateOppositions tothe
application for registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner
maynotregisterthesubjectpropertyinitsnamesincepetitionerhadneverbeeninopen,continuous,
exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionofthesaidpropertyforatleast30yearsimmediatelypreceding
the filing of the application and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain
whichbelongstotheRepublic.

Afterseveralpostponementsofthescheduledhearings,petitionerpresentedthetestimonyofits
first witness, Engineer Rilthe P. Dorado (Engr. Dorado), on January 14, 2000. Engr. Dorados
examination on the witness stand was terminated on April 7, 2000. The presentation of the other
[7]
witnessesofpetitionerwasthenscheduledtocontinueonJune2,2000.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm [8] 3/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973

[8]
However, before the next hearing, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the
dismissalofLRCCaseNo.N201onthegroundthattheRTClackedjurisdictiontohearanddecide
thecase.RespondentarguedthatSection14(1)ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1529,otherwiseknownas
thePropertyRegistrationDecree,refersonlytoalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomain
underabonafideclaimofownership.ThesubjectpropertyinLRCCaseNo.N201isnotalienable
anddisposable,sinceitisaforeshoreland,asexplicitlytestifiedtobypetitionersownwitness,Engr.
Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. This was precisely the reason why, respondent points
out, that the subject property was included in Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 (delineating the
territorial boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so that the same would be administered and
managedbytheState,throughrespondent,forthebenefitofthepeople.

In its Terse Opposition to Oppositors Motion to Dismiss, petitioner claimed that the subject
property was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly, continuously,
exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership. The technical description and
approvedplanofthesubjectpropertyshowedthatthesaidpropertywasnotboundedbyanypartof
[9]
the sea. Petitioner invoked Republic Act No. 1899, which authorizes chartered cities and
municipalities to undertake and carry out, at their own expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands
bordering them and grants said chartered cities and municipalities ownership over the reclaimed
lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is immaterial to the present application for registration
becauseitmerelyauthorizesrespondenttoadministerandmanagetheDumaguetePortZoneanddoes
[10]
notconferuponrespondentownershipofthesubjectproperty.

Respondent filed a Reply/Rejoinder (To Applicants Opposition to Oppositors Motion to
[11]
Dismiss), asserting that there are no factual or legal basis for the claim of petitioner that the
subject property is reclaimed land. Petitioner sought the original registration of its title over the
subjectpropertyacquiredthroughallegedcontinuouspossessionfor30yearsunderSection14(1)of
the Property Registration Decree, and not through the reclamation of the said property at its own
expense under Republic Act No. 1899. The present claim of petitioner that the subject property is
reclaimedlandshouldnotbeallowedforitwouldimproperlychangetheearliertheoryinsupportof
the application for registration. Respondent reiterated that the subject property is foreshore land
whichcannotberegisteredandthatPresidentialProclamationNo.1232isverymaterialtoLRCCase
No. N201 because it confirms that areas within the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject
property,arenotalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomain.

[12]
On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondentbasedonthefollowingratiocination:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 4/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973

The Court agrees with [herein respondent] Philippine Ports Authority that the basis of the
[herein petitioners] application for original registration of the subject lot is Section 14 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. A circumspect
scrutiny of said Section readily shows that it refers to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domainaspropersubjectsofregistration,providedtheapplicanthasmettheotherrequirementssuchas
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for at least thirty (30) years under a bona fide
claimofownership.


It having been shown by [petitioners] own evidence that the lot subject of the application for
originalregistrationisaforeshoreland,andthereforenotregisterable(Dizon,etal.vs.Bayona,etal.,
98SCRA942,944),theapplicationmustbedenied.

Again as correctly argued by [respondent], [petitioners] reliance on Republic Act 1899 which
authorizes all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out the reclamation by
dredging,fillingorothermeansofanyforeshorelandsborderingthemandwhichconfersownershipon
them of the lands so reclaimed, is misplaced, as such has never been alleged in the application. It is
fundamentalthatapartycannotprovewhatithasnotallegedinhiscomplaintorapplication,asinthis
case.

TheadmissionbyEngr.Doradothatthereisnoformaldeclarationfromtheexecutivebranchof
governmentorlawpassedbyCongressthatthelandinquestionisnolongerneededforpublicuseor
specialindustriesxxxfurthermilitatesagainsttheapplication.

Moreover,theauthoritygrantedtomunicipalitiesandcharteredcitiestoundertakeandcarryout
at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them is for the purpose of establishing, providing, constructing, maintaining, and repairing
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

Byitsownevidence,[petitioner]hasutilizedthesubjectpropertyallegedlyreclaimedbyitas
OfficeoftheCityEngineerandnotasdockingandharboringfacilities.[Petitioner]hasfailedtoshow
that such reclamation was undertaken by it in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
[13]
SecretaryofPublicWorksandCommunications.


TheRTCdecreedintheendthattheinstantapplicationfororiginalregistrationisdismissedfor
[14]
lackofmerit.

[15] [16]
In its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
petitionercontendedthatthedismissalofitsapplicationwasprematureandtantamounttoadenialof
its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its
application, such as the subject property already being alienable and disposable at the time it was
occupiedandpossessedbypetitioner.

Petitioneralsopointedoutthatitswitness,Engr.Dorado,testifiedonlyastothephysicalstatus
ofthelandinquestionatthetimewhenthecadastralsurveyofDumaguetewasmadesometimein
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 5/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
ofthelandinquestionatthetimewhenthecadastralsurveyofDumaguetewasmadesometimein
[17]
1916. Infact,Engr.Doradoexpresslytestifiedthatthesubjectpropertywaspartoftheshoreor
[18]
foreshorealongtimeago[] andhedidnottestifyatallthatthesubjectpropertywasaforeshore
lotatthetimepetitioneroccupiedandpossessedthesame.Thephysicalstateofthesubjectproperty
hadalreadychangedsince1916.ItisnowwithinthealienableanddisposableareaaspertheLand
Classification Map No. 674, Project No. 1D, BL C6, certified on July 3, 1927, of the Bureau of
Lands, now Land Management Sector of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources[,]
[19]
asverifiedandcertifiedbytheChiefoftheMapProjectionSection,LandManagementSector,
DENRRegionalOfficeinCebuCity,whohasyettotakethewitnessstandbeforetheRTC.

PetitionerinsistedthattheRTCshouldcontinuewiththehearingofLRCCaseNo.N201and
allowpetitionertopresentevidencethatthesubjectpropertyisreclaimedland.Petitionersufficiently
allegedinitsapplicationforregistrationthatithasbeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotorious
possession of the [subject property] for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of
[20]
ownership. In support of such allegation, petitioner must necessarily prove that the subject
propertywaspreviouslyaswampyarea,whichhadtobefilledorreclaimedbeforetheconstruction
oftheCityEngineersOfficebuildingthereon.

RespondentbaseditsOpposition(ToApplicantsMotionforReconsiderationdatedSeptember
[21] [22]
28, 2000) and Opposition (To Applicants Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration) on
technicalandsubstantivegrounds.

According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4
(Hearingofmotion),5(Noticeofhearing),and6(Proofofservicenecessary),Rule15oftheRules
ofCourt.PetitionerdidnotsetitsMotionforReconsiderationforhearingevenwhenthesaidMotion

couldnotbeconsideredasnonlitigable.TheRTCcouldnothearthemotionforreconsiderationex
parteastheyareprejudicialtotherightsofrespondent.PetitioneralsofailedtocomplywithSection
11,Rule13oftheRulesofCourtwhenitdidnotattachtotheMotionforReconsiderationawritten
explanationwhyitdidnotresorttopersonalserviceofthesaidMotion.Thus,respondentaverredthat
theMotionforReconsiderationofpetitionershouldbetreatedasamerescrapofpaperwithnolegal
effect.ItdidnotinterruptthereglementaryperiodtoappealandtheRTCOrderdatedSeptember7,
2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N201, had already attained finality. Respondent also pointed out
thattheSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationofpetitionersufferedfromthesamefataldefects
astheoriginalMotionforReconsideration.
RespondentagainpositedthatthesubjectpropertywasforeshorelandbelongingtotheState
andnotsubjecttoprivateappropriation,unlessthesamehadalreadybeendeclaredbytheexecutive
or legislative department of the national government as no longer needed for coast guard service,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 6/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
or legislative department of the national government as no longer needed for coast guard service,
publicuse,orspecialindustries,andclassifiedasalienableanddisposable.FullblowntrialinLRC
CaseNo.N201wasnolongernecessaryastheevidencesofarpresentedbypetitionerhadalready
establishedthattheRTClackedjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofthecase.

[23]
InitsOrder datedNovember16,2000,theRTCinitiallyagreedwithrespondentthatthe
MotionforReconsiderationofpetitionerviolatedSections4,5,and6,Rule15andSection11,Rule
13oftheRulesofCourt.Resultantly,theMotionforReconsiderationofpetitionerwasconsideredas
notfiledanddidnottolltherunningoftheperiodtofileanappeal,renderingfinalandexecutorythe
orderofdismissalofLRCCaseNo.N201.

However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
[24]
petitioner,theRTCissuedanotherOrder datedDecember7,2000, setting aside its Order dated
September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a fullblown proceeding to
determinefactualissuesinLRCCaseNo.N201.

[25]
ItwasthentheturnofrespondenttofilewiththeRTCaMotionforReconsideration ofthe
[26]
OrderdatedDecember7,2000.InanOrder datedFebruary20,2001,theRTCdeniedthemotion
ofrespondentandadmittedthefollowing:

AthoroughreviewandperusalofthedisputedorderdatedSeptember7,2000andDecember7,
2000, whereby this Court dismissed [petitioners] petition for registration of Lot No. 1, Dumaguete
Cadastre,andlatersetasidetheOrderofSeptember7,2000,showsthattherewashonestmistakein
declaringsaidlot1,asashoreline.Indeed,theadjoininglotsarealreadytitledandboundedbyaCity
Road.Itisnotboundedbyasea.TheCourtwantstocorrectthiserrorinitsfindingsontheSeptember

7, 2000 Order, that Lot No. 1 is situated on the shoreline of Dumaguete City. The Court simply
committed an oversight on the petitioners evidence that the lot in question is a foreshore land x x x
wheninfactitisnot.AnditisforthisreasonthatthecourtreconsideredandsetasidesaidSeptember
7,2000Order,tocorrectthesamewhileitistruethatsaidSeptember7,2000Orderhadattainedits
finality,yetthisCourtcannotinconscienceallowinjusticetoperpetuateinthiscaseandthathearingon
themeritsmustproceedtodeterminethelegalityandtruthfulnessofitsapplicationforregistrationof
title.


RespondentsoughtrecoursefromtheCourtofAppealsbyfilingaPetitionforCertiorariand
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 64379. Respondent
challengedtheRTCOrdersdatedDecember7,2000andFebruary20,2001forhavingbeenissuedby
the RTC in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent
reiteratedthattheRTCOrderdatedSeptember7,2000,dismissingLRCCaseNo.N201hadalready
attainedfinality.ThedefectsoftheMotionforReconsiderationofpetitionerrenderedthesameasa
merescrapofpaper,whichdidnottolltherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodtoappealtheRTCOrder
datedSeptember7,2000.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 7/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
datedSeptember7,2000.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 4, 2005, found merit in the Petition of
respondent and set aside the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001. The
appellate court, in its Resolution dated June 6, 2005, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner.

Hence, petitioner comes before us via the instant Petition for Review with the following
assignmentoferror:



GROUNDFORTHEAPPEAL

Error of law: The March 4, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 6, 2005
Resolution,erredonquestionoflawinsettingasidetheOrdersoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch44,
datedDecember7,2000andFebruary20,2001.ThesaidOrdersofthetrialcourtweremadeinorder
todeterminefactualissuesandtocorrectitserrorinitsfindingsontheSeptember7,2000Order.Thus,
[27]
theCourtofAppealsdecisioniscontrarytolaw,justice,equityandexistingjurisprudence.


Respondent insists on the strict application of Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Violations of the said rules were fatal to the Motion for
ReconsiderationandSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationofthepetitioner,andasaresult,the
RTCOrderdatedSeptember7,2000,dismissingLRCCaseNo.N201,hadalreadybecomefinaland

executoryand,thus,beyondthejurisdictionoftheRTCtosetaside.Respondenturgesustorejectthe
pleaofpetitionerforaliberalapplicationoftherulesintheabsenceofacompellingreasontodoso.

WegrantthePetition.

ThegrantofapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtrequiresgraveabuse
ofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.Graveabuseofdiscretionexistswherean
act is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.Theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofpositive
dutyortoavirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,
aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonal
[28]
hostility.

TheCourtofAppealserredingrantingthewritofcertiorariinfavorofrespondent.TheRTC
didnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionwhen,initsOrdersdatedDecember7,2000andFebruary
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 8/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
didnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionwhen,initsOrdersdatedDecember7,2000andFebruary
20,2001,itsetasidetheorderofdismissalofLRCCaseNo.N201andresolvedtohaveafullblown
proceedingtodeterminefactualissuesinsaidcase.

Proceduralruleswereconceivedtoaidtheattainmentofjustice.Ifastringentapplicationofthe
ruleswouldhinderratherthanservethedemandsofsubstantialjustice,theformermustyieldtothe
[29] [30]
latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of
procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the
importanceofthesubjectmatterofthecontroversy,asillustratedinwellsettledcases,towit:

TheliberalconstructionoftherulesonnoticeofhearingisexemplifiedinGoldloopProperties,Inc.v.
CA:

Admittedly,thefilingofrespondentspouses'motionforreconsiderationdidnotstopthe
runningoftheperiodofappealbecauseoftheabsenceofanoticeofhearingrequiredinSecs.
3,4and5,Rule15,oftheRulesofCourt.Aswehaverepeatedlyheld,amotionthatdoesnot
contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper it presents no question which merits the
attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to
disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration was filed and,
therefore,thereglementaryperiodwithinwhichrespondentspousesshouldhavefiledanappeal
expiredon23November1989.

But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows
thattheallegeddefectinthequestionedfinalandexecutoryjudgmentisnotapparentonitsface
or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to
resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities.
Litigationsshould,asmuchaspossible,bedecidedonthemeritsandnotontechnicalities.

Hence, this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over a
partyworthP4,000,000.00forameaslyP650,000.00withoutaffordinghimampleopportunityto
prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not in fact an absolute sale but one of
mortgage.Suchgraveinjusticemustnotbepermittedtoprevailontheanviloftechnicalities.

Likewise,inSamosov.CA,theCourtruled:

But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be
appliedinaverystrictandtechnicalsense.Therulesofprocedureareusedonlytohelpsecure
not override substantial justice (National Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Municipality of
Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138 [1980] Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1976]). The
right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of
procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of
substantialjusticewouldbeservedbypermittingtheappeal(Siguenzav.CourtofAppeals,
137SCRA570[1985]PacificAsiaOverseasShippingCorporationv.NationalLaborRelations
Commission,etal.,G.R.No.76595,May6,1998)....

Intheinstantcase,itispetitioner'slifeandlibertythatisatstake.Thetrialcourthassentenced
himtosufferthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaandhisconvictionattainedfinalityonthebasisofmere
technicality. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner be given the opportunity to defend himself and
pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be tantamount to grave injustice. A relaxation of the
[31]
proceduralrules,consideringtheparticularcircumstancesherein,isjustified. (Emphasisours.)


In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner, which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 9/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
Reconsideration of petitioner, which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000
dismissing LRC Case No. N201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of
proceduralrules.

The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently
erroneous.

Basicasahornbookprincipleisthatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofacaseisconferred
bylawanddeterminedbytheallegationsinthecomplaintwhichcompriseaconcisestatementofthe
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaintoftheplaintiff,irrespectiveofwhetherornottheplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallor
someoftheclaimsassertedtherein.The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
soughtaretheonestobeconsulted.Oncevestedbytheallegationsinthecomplaint,jurisdictionalso
remainsvestedirrespectiveofwhetherornottheplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallorsomeof
[32]
theclaimsassertedtherein.

Asanecessaryconsequence,thejurisdictionofthecourtcannotbemadetodependuponthe
defensessetupintheansweroruponthemotiontodismissforotherwise,thequestionofjurisdiction
wouldalmostentirelydependuponthedefendant.Whatdeterminesthejurisdictionofthecourtisthe
natureoftheactionpleadedasappearingfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint.Theavermentstherein
[33]
andthecharacterofthereliefsoughtaretheonestobeconsulted.

Under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, as amended by Act No.
2347,jurisdictionoverallapplicationsforregistrationoftitletolandwasconferredupontheCourts
of First Instance (CFI) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was
situated.Jurisdictionoverlandregistrationcases,asinordinaryactions,isacquireduponthefilingin
[34]
courtoftheapplicationforregistration,andisretaineduptotheendofthelitigation.

ThelandregistrationlawswereupdatedandcodifiedbythePropertyRegistrationDecree,and
underSection17thereof,jurisdictionoveranapplicationforlandregistrationwasstillvestedonthe
CFIoftheprovinceorcitywherethelandwassituated,viz:

SEC.17.What and where to file. The application for land registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file
togetherwiththeapplicationalloriginalmunimentsoftitlesorcopiesthereofandasurveyplanofthe
landapprovedbytheBureauofLands.

The Clerk of Court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnishedtheDirectorofLandswithacopyoftheapplicationandallannexes.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 10/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973


Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
[35]
created the RTC in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is
delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and
[36]
MunicipalCircuitTrialCourtsundercertaincircumstances.

It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner
before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration
Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its Application, petitioner
prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly alleged to have acquired through
continuous and adverse possession and occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or
since1960,beplacedunderthelandregistrationlaws.TheallegationsandprayerintheApplication
ofpetitionerweresufficienttovestjurisdictionontheRTCoverthesaidApplicationuponthefiling
thereof.

RespondentsoughtthedismissalofLRCCaseNo.N201onthegroundoflackofjurisdiction,
not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence
presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a
foreshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of
respondentinitsOrderdatedSeptember7,2000.TheRTCwentbeyondtheallegationsandprayer
for relief in the Application for Original Registration of petitioner, and already scrutinized and
weighedthetestimonyofEngr.Dorado,theonlywitnesspetitionerwasabletopresent.

Astowhetherornotthesubjectpropertyisindeedforeshorelandisafactualissuewhichthe
RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to
presenttheirrespectiveevidenceatafullblowntrial.AswehaveexplainedintheEstateoftheLate
[37]
JesusS.Yujuicov.Republic :

TheplainimportofMunicipalityofAntipoloisthatalandregistrationcourt,theRTCatpresent,
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application which respondent Republic claims is
publicland.Thisrulingneedselucidation.

Firmlyentrenchedistheprinciplethatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylaw.
Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree)hasjurisdictionoverapplicationsforregistrationoftitletoland.

xxxx

Conformably,thePasigRizalCFI,BranchXXIIhasjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofthe
land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners predecessorininterest, since jurisdiction
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 11/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners predecessorininterest, since jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading the application.
Settledistherulethattheauthoritytodecideacaseandnotthedecisionrenderedthereiniswhatmakes
up jurisdiction. When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an
exerciseofjurisdiction.

In our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality of Antipolo that the Land Registration
Court[has]nojurisdictiontoentertaintheapplicationforregistrationofpublicpropertyxxxforsuch
courtpreciselyhasthejurisdictiontoentertainlandregistrationapplicationssincethatisconferredby
PD 1529. The applicant in a land registration case usually claims the land subject matter of the
applicationashis/herprivateproperty,asinthecaseoftheapplicationofCastro.Thus,theconclusion
of the CA that the PasigRizal CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application of
Castrohasnomooring.Thelandregistrationcourtinitiallyhasjurisdictionoverthelandapplied
for at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to the land applied for is registerable and can be
confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be inalienable
public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the registration of the land and perforce must
[38]
dismisstheapplication. (Emphasisours.)


Itistruethatpetitioner,astheapplicant,hastheburdenofprovingthatthesubjectpropertyis
alienableanddisposableanditstitletothesameiscapableofregistration.However,westressthatthe

RTC,whenitissueditsOrderdatedSeptember7,2000,hadsofarheardonlythetestimonyofEngr.
Dorado, the first witness for the petitioner. Petitioner was no longer afforded the opportunity to
present other witnesses and pieces of evidence in support of its Application. The RTC Order dated
September7,2000alreadydeclaringthesubjectpropertyasinalienablepublicland,overwhichthe
RTChasnojurisdictiontoorderregistrationwasevidentlypremature.

TheRTCOrderdatedSeptember7,2000hasnotyetbecomefinalandexecutoryaspetitioner
wasabletodulyfileaMotionforReconsiderationandSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationof
thesame,whichtheRTCeventuallygrantedinitsOrderdatedDecember7,2000.Admittedly, said
motions filed by petitioner did not comply with certain rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non
compliancewouldhaverenderedsaidmotionsasmerescrapsofpaper,consideredasnothavingbeen
filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find that the
exceptionalcircumstancesextantinthepresentcasewarranttheliberalapplicationoftherules.

Also, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner did not comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
RulesofCourt,forthesedidnotincludeawrittenexplanationwhyserviceorfilingthereofwasnot
[39]
donepersonally.Nonetheless,inMacedav.EncarnaciondeGuzmanVda.deMagpantay, citing
[40] [41]
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, and Musa v. Amor, we explained the rationale
behindsaidruleandthemandatorynatureofthesame,visvistheexerciseofdiscretionbythecourt
incaseofnoncompliancetherewith:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 12/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973

InSolarTeamEntertainment,Inc.v.Ricafort,thisCourt,passinguponSection11ofRule13of
theRulesofCourt,heldthatacourthasthediscretiontoconsiderapleadingorpaperasnotfiledifsaid
ruleisnotcompliedwith.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper and
conversely,minimize,ifnoteliminate,delayslikelytobeincurredifserviceorfilingis
done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal
servicewilldoawaywiththepracticeofsomelawyerswho,wantingtoappearclever,
resorttothefollowinglessthanethicalpractices:(1)servingorfilingpleadingsbymail
to catch opposing counsel offguard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to
prepare,forinstance,responsivepleadingsoranoppositionor(2)uponreceivingnotice
fromthepostofficethattheregisteredcontainingthepleadingoforotherpaperfromthe
adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleadingorotherpapers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
thengivesthecourtthediscretiontoconsiderapleadingorpaperasnotfilediftheother
modesofserviceorfilingwerenotresortedtoandnowrittenexplanationwasmadeas
to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must,necessarilyconsiderthepracticabilityofpersonalservice,forSection11itself
beginswiththeclausewheneverpracticable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997RulesofCivilProcedure,personalserviceandfilingisthegeneralrule,andresort
to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal
service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person,personalserviceorfilingismandatory.Onlywhenpersonalserviceorfilingis
notpracticablemayresorttoothermodesbehad,whichmustthenbeaccompaniedbya
written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with.Inadjudgingtheplausibilityofanexplanation,acourtshalllikewiseconsiderthe
importanceofthesubjectmatterofthecaseortheissuesinvolvedtherein,andtheprima
faciemeritofthepleadingsoughttobeexpungedforviolationofSection11.
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretionandliberallyappliedSection11ofRule13:

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadingsmustbedonepersonallywheneverpracticable.Thecourtnotesthatinthe
present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted,
clearly,servicebyregisteredmail[sic]wouldhaveentailedconsiderabletime,effortand
expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have
been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may,
signifyingpermissiveness,aviolationthereofgivesthecourtdiscretionwhetheror
not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are
necessarytosecureanorderlyandspeedyadministrationofjustice,rigidapplicationof
Section11,Rule13mayberelaxedinthiscaseintheinterestofsubstantialjustice.

Inthecaseatbar,theaddressofrespondentscounselisLopez,Quezon,whilepetitionerSonias
counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance
makespersonalserviceimpracticable.AsinMusav.Amor,awrittenexplanationwhyservicewasnot
[42]
donepersonallymighthavebeensuperfluous. (Emphasessuppliedandcitationsomitted.)


Ourrulingintheabovecitedcasesisrelevanttotheinstantcase.Counselforpetitionerholds
officeinDumagueteCity,NegrosOriental,intheVisayaswhilecounselforrespondentholdsoffice
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 13/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
officeinDumagueteCity,NegrosOriental,intheVisayaswhilecounselforrespondentholdsoffice
inQuezonCity,MetroManila,inLuzon.Giventheconsiderabledistancebetweentheofficesofthese
two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was clearly not
practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be
[43]
superfluous. Inaddition,wereferoncemoretothemeritsoftheMotionforReconsiderationand
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by
petitioner,whichjustifytheliberalinterpretationofSection11,Rule13oftheRulesofCourtinthis
case.

JurisprudenceconfirmsthattherequirementslaiddowninSections4,5,and6,Rule15ofthe
RulesofCourtthatthenoticeofhearingshallbedirectedtothepartiesconcerned,andshallstatethe
time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they

render the motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the
[44]
runningoftheprescriptiveperiod.

Yet, again, there were previous cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us to
liberally apply the rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the same.
[45]
OncesuchcaseisPhilippineNationalBankv.Paneda, whereweadjudged:
Thus,eveniftheMotionmaybedefectiveforfailuretoaddressthenoticeofhearingofsaidmotionto
thepartiesconcerned,thedefectwascuredbythecourt'stakingcognizancethereofandthefactthatthe
adversepartywasotherwisenotifiedoftheexistenceofsaidpleading.Thereissubstantialcompliance
withtheforegoingrulesifacopyofthesaidmotionforreconsiderationwasfurnishedtothecounselof
hereinprivaterespondents.

In the present case, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the
respectivecounselsoftheprivaterespondentsandtheyweredulyfurnishedwithcopiesofthesameas
shownbythereceiptssignedbytheirstafforagents.

Consequently,theCourtfindsthatthepetitionersubstantiallycompliedwiththepertinent
provisionsoftheRulesofCourtandexistingjurisprudenceontherequirementsofmotionsand
[46]
pleadings. (Emphasissupplied.)


Itwasnotrefutedthatpetitionerfurnishedrespondentandrespondentactuallyreceivedcopies
of the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTCOrderdatedSeptember7,2000filedbypetitioner.As a result, respondent was able to file its
OppositionstothesaidMotions.TheRTC,inissuingitsOrderdatedDecember7,2000,wasableto
consider the arguments presented by both sides. Hence, there was substantial compliance by
petitioner with the rules on notice of hearing for its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. Respondent cannot claim
thatitwasdeprivedoftheopportunitytobeheardonitsoppositiontosaidMotions.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively or
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 14/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively or
arbitrarily, exercised its discretion when it subsequently issued the Order dated December 7, 2000,
settingasideitsOrderdatedSeptember7,2000andproceedingwiththetrialinLRCCaseNo.N201.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of petitioner City of Dumaguete is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution dated June 6, 2005 of the Court
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 64379 are SET ASIDE, and the Orders dated December 7, 2000 and
February20,2001ofBranch44oftheRegionalTrialCourtoftheCityofDumagueteinLRCCase
No. N201 are REINSTATED. The said trial court is DIRECTED to proceed with the hearing of
LRCCaseNo.N201withdispatch.

SOORDERED.





TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice



WECONCUR:





RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice
Chairperson




LUCASP.BERSAMIN MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice




MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice



CERTIFICATION
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 15/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinionoftheCourtsDivision.



RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 2532 penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Vicente L. Yap,
concurring.
[2]
Id.at3941.
[3]
Records,pp.23.
[4]
Id.at3334.
[5]
Id.at3738.
[6]
Id.at2526and5861.
[7]
Id.at93and108.
[8]
Id.at116124.
[9]
AnActtoAuthorizetheReclamationofForeshoreLandsbyCharteredCitiesandMunicipalities.
[10]
Records,pp.129131.
[11]
Id.at155160.
[12]
Id.at134137.
[13]
Id.at136137.
[14]
Id.at137.
[15]
Id.at138141.
[16]
Id.at151152.
[17]
Id.at138.
[18]
Id.at138139.
[19]
Id.at139.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.at142150.
[22]
Id.at161166.
[23]
Id.at153154.
[24]
Id.at167.
[25]
Id.at169172.
[26]
Id.at179.
[27]
Rollo,p.16.
[28]
CasentRealtyandDevelopmentCorporationv.PremiereDevelopmentBank,G.R.No.163902,January27,2006,480SCRA426,434.
[29]
Bascov.CourtofAppeals,392Phil.251,266(2000).
[30]
Id.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 16/17
11/8/2016 G.R.No.168973
Id.
[31]
Id.at266267.
[32]
Gomezv.Montalban,G.R.No.174414,March14,2008,548SCRA693,705706.
[33]
FortBonifacioDevelopmentCorporationv.Domingo,G.R.No.180765,February27,2009,580SCRA397,404.
[34]
RealtySalesEnterprise,Inc.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt,238Phil.317,329(1987).
[35]
Section13.
[36]
BatasPambansaBlg.129,Section34reads:

SEC.34.DelegatedJurisdictioninCadastralandLandRegistrationCases.MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,and
MunicipalCircuitTrialCourtsmaybeassignedbytheSupremeCourttohearanddeterminecadastralorlandregistrationcases
coveringlotswherethereisnocontroversyoropposition,orcontestedlotswherethevalueofwhichdoesnotexceedOnehundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective
claimantsiftherearemorethanone,orfromthecorrespondingtaxdeclarationoftherealproperty.Theirdecisionsinthesecases
shallbeappealableinthesamemannerasdecisionsoftheRegionalTrialCourts.(AsamendedbyRepublicActNo.7691.)
[37]
G.R.No.168661,October26,2007,537SCRA513.
[38]
Id.at539541.
[39]
516Phil.755(2006).
[40]
355Phil.404(1998).
[41]
430Phil.128(2002).
[42]
Macedav.EncarnaciondeGuzmanVda.deMagpantay,supranote39at763765.
[43]
Records,pp.141and152.
[44]
DeLaPeav.DeLaPea,327Phil.936,942(1996).
[45]
G.R.No.149236,February14,2007,515SCRA639.
[46]
Id.at653.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/168973.htm 17/17