LTD CASE DIGESTS (FOR FINALS)

LAND REGISTRATION
1. Villagonzago vs IAC
Action for Reconveyance
Actions for reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust prescribe in 10 years.It is now well settled that an action for
reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust shall prescribe after ten years, since it is an action based upon an obligation created
by law, and there can be no doubt as to its prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten years is counted from the date adverse
title to the property is asserted by the possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title, which consequently was a repudiation
of the implied trust for the purpose of the statute of limitations, took place when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4259 was issued in the name of
private petitioner on July 18,1962.
An action to enforce an implied trust may be barred not only by prescription but also by laches.There is also evidence of record that as far
back as 1961, private respondent refused to give any share in the produce of the land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the property in
her own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one Ramon Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or retaliatory legal action.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that an action to enforce an implied trust may be barred not only by prescription but also by laches, in which case
repudiation is not even required. Whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches. Petitioners were,
therefore, correctly faulted for their unjustified inaction.
2. Aznar Brother Realty Co vs CA
Facts:
In 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely:
Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost
during the war.
In 1964, Lot No. 4399 was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with
Deed of Absolute Sale . This deed was registered with the Register of Deeds.
Herein private respondents (heirs -Aying siblings) were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that
they leave the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purposes.
Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multimillion peso housing subdivision and beach resort.
In 1988, Aznar filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the
war.
In 1991, Aznar, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the
property. Unheeded, Aznar then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants
On the other hand, Aying (private respondent) alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta
Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title. They allege that two of the signatories were not
heirs of the registered owners; that some of the signatories were already dead at the date of the execution of the deed; and that many heirs
were not parties to the extrajudicial partition
Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being simulated and
fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation.
Issue: Whether the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent.
Ruling: The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or death certificates were presented before the MTCC to support
the allegations that some of the parties to the deed were minors and others were already dead at the time of the execution of the deed. What
private respondents adduced as evidence was merely a family tree, which was at most self-serving. It was only when the case was on appeal
with the RTC that the private respondents presented as Annex "B" of their Memorandum and Appeal Brief a photocopy of the certificate of death
of Francisco Aying, son of Crisanta Maloloy-on, who reportedly died on 7 March 1963. The fact remains, however, that this photocopy was not
certified to be a true copy.
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. He who denies its due execution has the burden of
proving that contrary to the recital in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be his
voluntary act. It must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but
should be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Fule vs De Lagare
The rule is that the registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of titles forged deed of sale or other instruments is
null and void
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in
the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (Cui and Joven v.
Henson, 51 Phil. 606).
Under Section 5, Act 496, the production of the owners duplicate certificate of title operates as a conclusive authority from the registered owner
to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate.
When forged deed may convey title.Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is nullity and conveys no title, however there are instances
when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For
then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
Buyer not required to inquire farther than what face of certificate of title indicates.Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule
were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and
nugatory.
4. Tenorio Obsequio vs CA
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and ownership. A
parcel of land with Ortiginal Certificate of Title No. P-1181 was registered in the named of Eufronio Alimpoos and which he acquired through a
homestead application.
Sometime in 1964, private respondents mortgaged the land land to Eduardo Deguro for a loan and delivered to the latter the original certificate
of title to the land to guaranty the loan. Later, Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein private respondents,
prepared a document of sale and through misrepresentation and other manipulations made it appear that private respondents sold the land to
them. This deed of sale was annotated and the Original Certificate Title No. P-1181 in the name of Alimpoos was cancelled and TCT No. T-1360
was issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio. TCT No. T-1421 was
correspondingly issued in the name of the latter. Eufronio Alimpoos learned that the land was already titled in the name of another when he
received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the DAR.
The heirs of Deguro claimed that Alimpoos spouses sold the land to their late parents for consideration which resulted to the issuance of TCT
No. T-1360. Tenio-Obsequio claimed that she purchased the land in good faith and for value.
Issue: Whether the deed of sale executed by Deguro will validate the registration of petitioner.
Held: Yes. Yet, even on the implausible assumption that the deed of sale in favor of Eduardo Deguro was forged and is, therefore, null and void,
such fact cannot be successfully invoked to invalidate the title subsequently issued to herein petitioner who, as earlier stated, is an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith.
It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A deed
of sale executed by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not validate what otherwise is
an invalid document. However, where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger and, while it
remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the
certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of
the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
5. Treasurer of the Phil. vs CA
Duty of the buyer to ascertain the identity of the seller especially when he is not a registered owner
Facts: Sometime in 1965, a person Identifying himself as Lawaan Lopez offered to sell to the private respondents a parcel of land located in
Quezon City and consisting of 1,316.8 square meters, which he claimed as his property.
The sale was deferred, however, because the prospective vendor said his certificate of title had been burned in his house in Divisoria, and he
would have to file a petition with the court of first instance of Quezon City for a duplicate certificate of title.
He did so and the petition was granted after hearing without any opposition. Following the issuance of the new duplicate certificate of title, the
said person executed a deed of sale in favor of the private respondents, who paid him the stipulated purchase price of P98,700.00 in full. The

corresponding transfer certificate of title was subsequently issued to them after cancellation of the duplicate certificate in the name of Lawaan
Lopez.
Trouble began two years later when another person, this time a woman, appeared and, claiming to be the real Lawaan Lopez, filed a petition in
the court of first instance of Quezon City to declare as null and void the transfer of her land in favor of the private respondents, on the ground
that it had been made by an impostor.
After trial, the questioned deed of sale was annulled, (together with the duplicate certificate of title issued to the impostor and the transfer
certificate of title in the name of the private respondents) and the real owner's duplicate certificate of title was revalidated.
Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of
the Assurance Fund for damages sustained by the plaintiffs as above narrated. Both the trial court * ruled the respondent court ** ruled in their
favor, holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable for the sum of P138,264.00 with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint, in
case the judgment could not be enforced against the other defendant who had been defaulted and could not be located.
The petitioner, disclaiming liability, is now before us and prays for relief against the decision of the respondent court which he says is not in
accord with law and jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether or not the Assurance Fund is liable on the ground that the private respondents were deprived of their land or any interest therein
following Section 101 of Act No. 496.
Ruling: No. The applicable law is Section 101 of Act No. 496 (before its revision by P.D. No. 1529) .
Commenting on this provision, Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas, in his book on Land Titles and Deed 6 notes that recovery from the
Assurance Fund could be demanded by:
Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
O that there was no negligence on his part; and
O that the loss or damage was sustained through any omission, mistake, or misfeasance of the clerk of court, or the register of deeds, his
deputy or clerk, in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the land Registration Act,' or
Any person who has been deprived of any land or any interest therein under the following conditions:
O that there was no negligence on his part;
O that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree;
or by the registration by any other persons as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or owner's
duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book, or by any cancellation; and
O that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
A careful reading of the above provision will readily show that the private respondents do not come under either of the two situations above
mentioned.
The first situation is clearly inapplicable as we are not dealing here with any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the clerk of court or of the
register of deeds or his personnel in the performance of their duties.
The second situation is also inapplicable. The strongest obstacle to recovery thereunder is that the private respondents acquired no land or any
interest therein as a result of the invalid sale made to them by the spurious Lawaan Lopez.
The petition correctly points out that such sale conveyed no title or any interest at all to them for the simple reason that the supposed vendor
had no title or interest to transfer. He was not the owner of the land. He had no right thereto he could convey.
Manifestly, the deception imposed upon them by the impostor deprived the private respondents of the money they delivered to him as
consideration for the sale. But there is no question that the subsequent cancellation of the sale did not deprive them of the land subject thereof,
or of any interest wherein, for they never acquired ownership over it in the first place.
The private respondents argue that from the time the new transfer certificate of title was issued in their name on January 28, 1965, until it was
cancelled on October 12, 1967, they were the true and exclusive owners of the disputed property. Hence, the cancellation of their title on the
latter date had the effect of depriving them of the said land and so entitles them now to proceed against the Assurance Fund.
The flaw in this posture is that the real Lawaan Lopez had her own genuine certificate of title all the time and it remained valid despite the
issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the private respondents. That new certificate, as the trial court correctly declared, was null
and void ab initio, which means that it had no legal effect whatsoever and at any time. The private respondents were not for a single moment the

owner of the property in question and so cannot claim to have been unlawfully deprived thereof when their certificate of title was found and
declared to be a total nullity.
Additionally, the Court observes that the private respondents were not exactly diligent in verifying the credentials of the impostor whom they had
never met before he came to them with his bogus offer. The fact alone that he claimed to have lost his duplicate certificate of title in a fire, not to
mention the amount of the consideration involved, would have put them on their guard and warned them to make a more thorough investigation
of the seller's Identity.
As this Court held in La Urbana v. Bernardo "it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings an action for damages against the
Assurance Fund be the registered owner and as the holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value." Being neither the registered owners nor innocent purchasers, the private respondents are not entitled to recover from the Assurance
Fund.
6. Egao vs CA
Failure to exercise caution is equivalent to bad faith
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance within a period of five (5) years from the date
of issuance of the patent of lands acquired under free patent or homestead; It is clear that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period
of five (5) years, case at bar.It is undisputed that Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to petitioner Apolonio Egao over Lot No. 662 on 12
August 1965. Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance, within a period of five (5) years
from the date of issuance of the patent, of lands acquired under free patent or homestead. Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity of the Deeds of
Sale executed by the Egaos in favor of Marfori over portions of Lot No. 662 (the land in question), dated 7 May 1964, 14 January and 6 October
1965, it clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five (5) years.
Sale of patented lands perfected within the prohibited five (5) years period are null and void.Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within
the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly
transferred to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him).
Vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the possession of the land.While the government has not taken steps to assert its title, by reversion, to
a homestead sold in violation of the Public Land Act, the vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the possession of the land, the vendee being in
no better situation than any intruder.
Question of authenticity being one of fact, Supreme Court will not disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the matter.Petitioners
deny the authenticity and due execution of the notarized deeds of sale in favor of Marfori, asserting continued ownership over the land by virtue
of a Torrens Certificate of Title issued in their name. While the Court is not satisfied with respondents explanation of their failure to present the
notaries public (who were residents of a neighboring province) to affirm their participation in the preparation of the Deeds, the Court also finds as
insufficient the mere denials by petitioners as to due execution and authenticity of said Deeds of Sale. A notarial document is evidence of the
facts in clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. The question of authenticity being one of fact, the Court will not disturb
the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the matter.
A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open, and notorious possession. A registered title under the Torrens
system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
Contrary to the appellate courts conclusion, respondents are not innocent purchasers for value. An innocent purchaser for value is deemed,
under the Torrens system, to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. Where a purchaser neglects to make the
necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendors title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making any
further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), formerly Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act (Art No. 496) expressly provides
that the registration of the Deed is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The law requires a
higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, when the land object of the transaction is
registered land. While one who buys from the registered owner need not look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from another who is
not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if
there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise caution of any kind whatsoever is
tantamount to bad faith.
Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain, as only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of
exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantees right to the land under the homestead law.

7. Dacasin vs CA
Forgery
If the question of ownership over a land was already litigated by the parties respective predecessors-in-interest in the first civil case and it is the
only point involved in a subsequent case, the declaration by the court that a party is the true owner of the property should be sustained;
Judgment in the first case already resolved the question of title and ownership over the disputed property.The Court of Appeals held that the
question of ownership was litigated by the parties respective predecessors-in-interest in Civil Case No. 895 and if this were to be the only point
involved there should be no question that Jose Maramba, defendants predecessor-in-interest having been declared the true owner of the
property as against Sabina Capua, plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, the present litigation must have to be decided in the same manner. To this
holding of respondent court, We are in full agreement for indeed the judgment in Civil Case No. 895 filed and docketed in the CFI of Pangasinan
on September 8, 1944, and decided on September 1, 1952 in favor of Jose Maramba, resolved the question of title and ownership of the
property in litigation. x x x
Res Judicata; Requisites and Concept.We find in this case at bar the following requisites that concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) there must be a judgment or
order on the merits; and (4) there must between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of action. x x x The
doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. x x x
Possession of property by a party is interrupted by issuance of judicial summons.In the first place, when Jose Maramba sued Sabina Capua
on September 8, 1944 in Civil Case No. 895, the possession of Sabina Capua was thereby interrupted by the issuance of the judicial summons
x x x The successor-in-interest of Sabina Capua who is the vendee Gualberto Calulot cannot tack his possession to that of his vendor Sabina
Caoua not only because the judicial summons interrupted the latters possession but also because she finally lost in the litigation.
Ordinary prescription of real property requires good faith and just title over the land; Possession of property not legally acquired during
pendency of litigation, but commenced only after judgment.We hold that the vendee Calulot cannot legally acquire possession during the
pendency of the litigation; it can only commence after the decision is rendered therein, which was promulgated on September 1, 1952. By this
time, the New Civil Code was already enforced and the possession of Gualberto Calulot including its legal effects must be governed by the New
Civil Code. Under Article 1131 and 1128, N.C.C., good faith and just title are necessary for ordinary prescription of real property.
For claim of acquisitive prescription to prosper, possession of property must be in concept of owner for certain than period of time.The Court
has ignored or failed to consider material evidence found in the records that disproves clearly and positively respondent Felipe Capuas claim of
acquisitive prescription, this evidence showing that Felipe Capuas possession was not in truth and in fact in the concept of owner during the
required period of time. x x x In other words, Gualberto Calulot had not declared the land in his own name for tax purposes. He had not sought
the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Sabina Capua to him as the vendee, hence the inevitable conclusion is that said Gualberto
Calulot did not deem himself the owner thereof and, therefore, his possession was not in the concept of owner. This being so, Calulots
occupancy failed in one essential requisite of acquisitive prescription, which is possession in the concept of owner. x x x
As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of sale of the same property, lie who has registered his deed must prevail over
his adversary who has not done so; title of ownership of real property annotated in Registry of Property constitutes notice to third persons and
affords protection in favor of him who in good faith relies upon what appears in the registry.x x x Under the law. Article 709 of the New Civil
Code, titles of ownership or of other rights over immovable property duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property constitute notice to
third persons and affords protection in favor of him who is good faith relies upon what appears in the registry. As between two parties relying on
their respective instruments of sale of the same property, law and justice command that he who has registered his deed must prevail over his
adversary who has not done so. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and he who
buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. None of the deeds of sale evidencing the
ownership of Gualberto Calulot and Felipe Capua were registered in the Registry of Property, hence they cannot prevail over the rights of the
petitioner who holds in his favor the instrument of sale duly registered.
8. Roxas vs CA
Facts: This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management and Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the Regional Trial Court
on the ground of actual fraud. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231
and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions
now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein
substituted as petitioners. On 22 May 1997, Meycauayan filed a Petition for Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. Meycauayan alleged that on 14
May 1992, it purchased three parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the property awarded to the heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda.
On 21 August 1997, the Decision dated 21 March 1997 in G.R. No. 118436 became final and executory.
We find Meycauayan's Executive Vice-President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt. We also find that Meycauayan committed
forum shopping, and thus Meycauayan and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are guilty of direct contempt. Meycauayan insists
that as a purchaser in good faith and for value its rights cannot be prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent acquisition by Maguesun of the subject
properties. Meycauayan, therefore, is not liable for contempt of court for filing an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages.

Meycauayan's obstinate refusal to abide by the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 118436 has no basis in view of this Court's clear pronouncement to
the contrary.
The Court ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that Meycauayan's predecessor-in-interest, Maguesun, committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of
registration of the subject properties.
Issue: Whether or not Meycauayan has acquired title over the land in good faith and for value.
Ruling: No. Meycauayan was aware that there is an actual caretaker on the said property, a caretaker from the Roxas family.
The fact that this Court specifically ordered the cancellation of Meycauayan's titles to the disputed parcels of land in the Resolution dated 29
July 1998 should have laid to rest the issue of whether the Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 is binding on Meycauayan.
The Decision in G.R. No. 118436 binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest" since it was a successor-in-interest of Maguesun.
Therefore, Meycauayan did not acquire the property in good faith and for value.
9. Caram vs Laureta
Forgery
A buyer of real estate should exercise ordinary care in purchasing land; Rule of caveat emptor applies; Basis of bad faith.Even if Irespe and
Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the first sale, still, their actions have not satisfied the requirement of good faith. Bad faith is not
based solely on the fact that a vendee had knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor, x x x In the instant case, Irespe and Aportadera
had knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put them on inquiry. Both of them knew that Matas certificate of title together with other
papers pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of Col. Claro L. Laureta. Added to this is the fact that at the time of the
second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and Aportadera should have investigated the nature of Lauretas possession.
If they failed to exercise the ordinary care expected of a buyer of real estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor
requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks
and losses consequent to such failure.
The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions
the existence of which is not there intimated should not apply in this case. It was of common knowledge that at the time the soldiers of Laureta
took the documents from Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet established and that there were no officials to ratify contracts of sale
and make them registerable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew that even if Mata previously had sold the disputed property such sale could
not have been registered.
Principal should be deemed a purchaser in bad faith if agents purchased the property in bad faith.There is no doubt then that Irespe and
Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the princple of agency, Caram, as principal, should
also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Laureta was
first in possession of the property. He is also a possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of Laureta
was procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata
lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.
When fraud considered a ground for annulment of a contract.The petitioners conclusion that the second deed of sale, Exhibit F, is a
voidable contract is not correct. In order that fraud can be a ground for the annulment of a contract, it must be employed prior to or simultaneous
to the consent or creation of the contract. The fraud or dolo causante must be that which determines or is the essential cause of the contract.
Dolo causante as a ground for the annulment of contract is specifically described in Article 1338 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines as
insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties which induced the other to enter into a contract, and without them, he would
not have agreed to.
Second deed of sale not a voidable contract; Reason.The second deed of sale in favor of Caram is not a voidable contract. No evidence
whatsoever was shown that through insidious words or machinations, the representatives of Caram, Irespe and Aportadera had induced Mata to
enter into the contract.
Prescription; Art. 1391 of the Civil Code requiring that annulment actions must be brought within four (4) years from discovery of fraud not
applicable; Action or defense for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe; Case at bar.Since the second deed of sale is not
a voidable contract, Article 1391, Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that the action for annulment shall be brought within four (4) years
from the time of the discovery of fraud does not apply. Moreover, Laureta has been in continuous possession of the land since he bought it in
June 1945. A more important reason why Lauretas action could not have prescribed is that the second contract of sale, having been registered
in bad faith, is null and void. Article 1410 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that any action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Necessity for determining the status of contracts in case of double sale of an immovable property.The fact that the second contract is not
considered void under Article 1409 and that Article 1544 does not declare void a deed of sale registered in bad faith does not mean that said
contract is not void. Article 1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of a double sale of an immovable property. To give full

effect to this provision, the status of the two contracts must be determined and clarified. One contract must be declared valid so that one vendee
may exercise all the rights of an owner, while the other contract must be declared void to cut off all rights which may arise from said contract.
Otherwise, Article 1544 will be meaningless.
10. Crisostomo vs CA
Forgery
A purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendors or mortgagors title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
11. Embrado vs Cimafranca
Facts: Lot No. 564 is originally owned by Carpitanos. In 1946, a notarized document was executed which provided that even though the deed
was prepared and signed in 1946, the effects of the document would retroact to 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold
to Lucia C. Embrado.
The sale was registered in 1948 in the name of Lucia Embrado alone, who was by then already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani since
1943. However, by virtue of a court order in the word "single" appearing in TCT was canceled and replaced in 1970 by the phrase "married to
Oreste Torregiani." The Torregianis then made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958 constructed a residential/commercial building thereon.
In 1971, Lucia Embrado Torregiani sold the lot described as her "own paraphernal property," to her adopted daughter, herein private respondent
Eda Jimenez.
In 1972, Eda Jimenez sold the lot to Marcos Salimbagat and Cimafranca.
The Torregianis instituted an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages 9 against the spouses
Santiago and Eda Jimenez, alleging that the sale of Lot 564 by Lucia Embrado to Eda Jimenez was void not only for lack of consideration but
also because Oreste Torregiani did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property.
Issue: WON the sale in favor of Eda Jimenez was invalid
Held: Yes. Even assuming in gratia argumenti that Lucia signed the document knowing that it was a deed of sale of the property, the sale
thereof by Lucia to Eda Jimenez without her husbands conformity should be considered void ab initio being contrary to law. 21 Since "(t)he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law," 22 it follows that Lucia Embrado
Torregiani could not, by herself, validly dispose of Lot 564 without her husbands consent.
12. Agne vs Director of Lands
Facts: In 1937, Herminigildo Agpoon received a free patent and was issued original certificate of title. In 1960, Precentacion Agpoon Gascon,
daughter of Herminigildo, inherited the land and was issued transfer certificate of title. Said land was in the possession of Marcelino Agne, et al
In. 1971, Presentacion filed an action for recovery of possession against Agne, et al., alleging that they are the registered owners of the land;
that during the Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession of said land by
means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that private respondents repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of
said property but the latter refused. Petitioners, in answer to said complaint, alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed
of the Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its original
bed; that by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, petitioners, by operation of law,
became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties; that since 1920, they
and their predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in
question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present. These facts are deemed hypothetically admitted by Presentacion
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss. In 1974, Agne filed a complaint against the Director of Lands and Agpoon for annulment of title,
reconveyance of and/or action to clear title. In the same year, both actions, the one filed by Agpoon and the other by Agne, were decided in
favour of Agpoon. Agne recourse to SC.
Issue: Who as between the riparian owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue of a free patent, has a better right over
the land?
Held: The title of Agne over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner Agpoon which is a total nullity. The long and
continued possession of Agne under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the
beginning. The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law then in force, which provides: "The beds of rivers
which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their
respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance

therefrom." The acquisition of ownership is automatic. Riparian owner acquires automatic ownership of the abandoned bed without need of any
formal act of acquisition. Thus the land in question was and is of private ownership and therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of lands.
The free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued
pursuant to a patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain.
13. Golloy vs CA
FACTS:
Galiciano Golloy is a registered owner and in possession of the parcel of land covered by TCT 45764. Bounded on the southwest
portion of the land owned and possess by Jose Valdez, et. al.
Jose Valdez, et. al on the other hand is the registered owner and in possession of the parcel of land covered by TCT 8565.
Sometime in February 1966, Jose Valdez,et.al. subdivided their land among themselves, however on the course of the subdivision two
(2) monuments were placed on the southwest portion of Golloys land.
Golloy then filed an action to quiet title.
Valdez asserts that there is no cloud on the title since they merely subdivided their own land according to their title.

During Pre-trial and as agreed of the parties, a public surveyor was summoned to conduct survey on both lands.
On May 20, 1968, Jovino Dauz, public surveyor, on his report finds out that there are overlappings on the bounderies of the two (2)
lands and that the overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on Golloys land.
GOLLOYS LAND
(TCT 45764)
VALDEZS LAND
(TCT 8565)

Date Surveyed
March 18,1918

Date Registered
August 15, 1919

March 11, 1913

March 1, 1918

Owner
Agustin Golloy to Galiciano
Golloy
Dominga Balanga

Issue: Who between the two title holders is entitled to the land in dispute?
Held: The Court ruled in favor of Galicano Golloy.
Private respondents (Valdez) and their predecessor or predecessors never possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped portions. Petitioner
(Golloy) has been always in possession of the same in the concept of an owner, and his possession was disturbed only in February,
1966, when the private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside his land.
The said lands, having been surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective
boundaries. It is hardly persuasive that private respondents predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the
overlapped portions, did not make any move to question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected to the placement and
pointed out that the placement of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her property. However, no such objection was made.
These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and
legal claim to the overlapped portion.
Considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost fifty
(50) years (from August 15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to February, 1966, when the private respondents caused the placement
of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches.
We upheld the equitable defense of laches and ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting his right over the disputed lot
bars him from recovering the same.
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner, held that the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered ordering, private respondents to cause the segregation of the disputed portion presently occupied by the petitioner Galicano Golloy
and reconvey the same to the latter and after the segregation to order the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to issue a new certificate of title covering
said portion in favor of the petitioner.
14. Caragay Layno vs CA
Facts: The Disputed Portion is a 3,732 sq.m.-area of a bigger parcel of sugar and coconut land, with a total area of 8,752 square meters,
situated at Calasiao, Pangasinan. The entire parcel is covered by OCT No. 63 issued on 11 September 1947 in the name of Mariano M. DE
VERA, who died in 1951. His intestate estate was administered first by his widow and later by her nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada.

DE VERA's widow filed in Special Proceedings, an Inventory of all properties of the deceased, which included "a parcel of land in the poblacion
of Calasiao, Pangasinan, containing an area of 5,417 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 12664."

Because of the discrepancy, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property and found that the northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed to be
3,732 square meters, was occupied by Juliana Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they vacate the Disputed Portion
since it was titled in the name of the deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to
JULIANA's father Juan Caragay.

ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the Disputed Portion, which she resisted, mainly on the ground that the
Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in OCT No. 63, so that an implied or constructive trust existed in her favor. She
then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the sense that title be issued in her favor.

Issue: Whether or not Juliana Caragay-Layno may reconvey the disputed portion of the land that was fraudulently and mistakenly included in
OCT No. 63 in the name of Mariano De Vera. YES.

Ruling: The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possessed openly, continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of
an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased father of JULIANA, and had been declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning
with the year 1921, later revised by Tax Declaration No. 2298 in 1951. Upon the demise of her father in 1914, JULIANA adjudicated the property
to herself as his sole heir in 1958, and declared it in her name under Tax Declaration No. 22522 beginning with the year 1959 (Exhibit "2-A"),
later cancelled by TD No. 3539 in 1966. Realty taxes were also religiously paid from 1938 to 1972. Tacking the previous possession of her father
to her own, they had been in actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, until
said possession was disturbed in 1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA's
name.

To substantiate her claim of fraud in the inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63, JULIANA, an unlettered woman, declared that during
his lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, and whom she regarded as a father as he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax Declaration of her
land purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin's assurances, she acceded to his
request and was made to sign some documents the contents of which she did not even know because of her ignorance; that she discovered the
fraudulent inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when ESTRADA so informed her and sought to eject them.

Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-ininterest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would
effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the discrepancy
in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the title.

JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties,
can properly seek its reconveyance.

The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year
from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action
for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in
one's possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the
aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own title.

Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA's right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966 when
she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to
run against her.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered ordering private respondent
Salvador Estrada, as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, Mariano de Vera, to cause the segregation of the disputed portion of 3,732
square meters forming part of Lot No. 1, Psu-24206, Case No. 44, GLRO Rec. No. 117, presently occupied by petitioner Juliana CaragayLayno, and to reconvey the same to said petitioner. After the segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is
hereby ordered to issue a new certificate of title covering said 3,732 sq. m. portion in favor of petitioner, and another crtificate of title in favor of
the Estate of the deceased, Mariano de Vera covering the remaining portion of 5,0520 square meters. No costs.

15. Vda de Recinto vs Inciong

Facts: On March 11, 1918, Petronilo Acar sold the same to the spouses Mariano Recinto and Marta Magsumbol. On July 2, 1931, said spouses
conveyed the said property by way of a donation propter nuptias to petitioner Consuelo Malaluan Vda, de Recinto and her late husband,
Juanario Recinto. Since then, petitioner and her late husband have been in open, public and continuous possession of the entire property. The
adjoining lands have since then been separated by a fence. The land north of the disputed area which is now in the name of the private
respondent was previously owned by Norberto Leyesa, the Templos, Atty. Ponciano Hernandez and Matias Amurao. All of these previous
owners of the land admitted that they recognize the fence of the property. Private respondent acquired his land from Matias Amurao while the
latter purchased the same from Atty. Ponciano Hernandez. Atty. Hernandez disclosed that the area he acquired from his predecessor-in-interest
was only that parcel north of the disputed area separated by the fence.
In 1946 Ruperto Inciong acquired a land by purchase from Matias Amurao. The land was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt379 (T-211) of the Register of Deeds of Batangas. The land was formerly identified as Lot No. 8151 of the Cadastral Survey in the area during
the cadastral proceedings from 1936 to 1940.
In 1961, after a relocation survey of the land was effected it was discovered that its southern boundary covering an area of 8,591 square meters
was in the possession of petitioner, Consuelo Malaluan Vda. de Recinto.
Inciong filed an action for recovery of possession of the portion held by the De Recinto who claims to be the owner of the area in question and
as counter-claim demanded the reconveyance of the land from Inciong.
The area in question has been erroneously included in the cadastral survey of Lot No. 8151 and in the original certificate of title without the
knowledge of the parties concerned. As a result, the same description in the original certificate of title was carried over into the succeeding
transfer certificates of title of the subsequent owners covering the same parcel of land.
Inciong's and his predecessors-in-interest and later have all along treated the area in question as belonging to De Recinto. What prompted him
to get interested over the disputed area was when he came to learn after the relocation survey in 1961 that said disputed area was included in
his title.
The inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No. 8151 is void and of no effect for a land registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to
persons who have put no claim in it and who have never asserted any right of ownership over it. The Land Registration Act as well as the
Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another. Resort to the provisions of said Acts do not give one a better title than he
really and lawfully has the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside and another one entered, ordering private
respondent to return to petitioner the disputed portion of the land in question covering an area of 8,591 square meters; to pay petitioner
damages in the sum of 100.00 a month from the time of the filing of the action until the property is returned and the sum of P1,000.00 for
attorney's fees. The Register of Deeds of Batangas is further ordered to segregate said disputed portion from the entire portion embraced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-379 (T-211) and issue a new certificate of title in favor of petitioner over said disputed portion and another new
certificate of title over the remaining portion of the land in question in favor of private respondent after cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Rt-379 (T-211). With costs against private respondent.
16. Republic vs Delos Angeles

Facts: This case is about the execution in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the 1965 final and executory judgment of this Court
(Republic vs. Ayala y Cia ) 1affirming that of the CFI of Batangas in Civil Case No. 373 thereof and to recover for the Republic what "Ayala y Cia
Hacienda de Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel had illegally expanded [in] the original area of their TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) from
9,652.583 hectares to about 12,000 hectares thereby usurping about 2,000 hectares consisting of portions of the territorial sea, the foreshore,
the beach and navigable waters properly belong(ing) to the public domain."
It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds
or sold by defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales
after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be
parts of Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants- appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the
hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the
system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to defendants)
is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits
issued by the Bureau of Fisheries), were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water itself And, it is an elementary
principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties
of private ownership or confer title on the registrant.
Held: The Supreme Court directed the Clerk of this Court to issue the corresponding writ of execution in the case at bar for Civil Case No. 373 of
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas reverting to public dominion and delivering to the duly authorized representatives of the Republic all public
lands and lots, fishponds, territorial bay waters, rivers, manglares foreshores and beaches, etc. as delineated in the aforesaid duly approved Resurvey Plan and any supplemental Re-survey Plan as may be found necessary and duly approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. This decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be granted.
The Court in said 1965 judgment had stressed the elementary rule that the generally incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens
Certificate of Title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration, as in this case, being part of the sea, beach,
foreshore or navigable water or other public lands incapable of registration. Moreover, as the Court stressed in the 1965 judgment and time and
again in other cases, "it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant."
17. Heir of Gonzaga v CA
Facts: Jose Eugenio once had been the registered owner of lot nos. 3619 and 3620 of the cadastral Survey of Caloocan under TCT no. 17519.
Sometime in 1960, Eugenio sold the said registered lots to Luis Gonzaga, the title of Eugenio was cancelled and the Registry of deeds for the
province of Rizal issued another title under the name of Luis Gonzaga. On September 1981, Gonzaga sold the lots to Mascarias, the title of
Gonzaga was cancelled and another title was issued under the name of Mascarias.
However, According to the record another subsisting Torrens title covered the same lots under the name of Lilia Sevilla. Lilia Sevilla contends
that the lots sold to her by the heirs of Bartolome as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale.
The court a quo and the appellate court recognized that the two conflicting title was derived from one common OCT 994. The court a quo and
appellate court found the title of Gonzaga/Mascarias original registration was made on May 3,1917 but on the other hand the title of Lilia
Sevilla original registration was made on April 19, 1917.
Issue: Between Gonzaga and Sevilla, who has a legal right over the said registered lots
Ruling: The Cadastral court held that the Court has no jurisdiction decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land
registration case and a second decree for the same land is NULL and VOID.
18. Realty Sales Enterprise vs IAC
Three validly registered land titles which has a subject of the same land.
Facts: To confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035, Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador
Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty Sales, Inc., filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases,
LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino
Baltazar, predecessor-in-interest of Morris Carpo, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a consolidated decision on the three cases, deciding in favour
of Estanislao Mayuga. However, before Estanislao Mayuga could secure a decree of registration he died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he
was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration over the property
adjudicated in favor of Estanislao and on May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of Dominador Mayuga and
directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting

therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga in lieu of Estanislao..

On October 13, 1970, a decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and
that an Original Certificate of Title was issued in their name, subject is the land in controversy. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970,
that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the Original Certificate
of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original registered owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of
Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. which was issued on July 27, 1971.
Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No.
20408. (Title of Realty Sales, Inc.)" Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. The complaint alleged that
TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by Judge
Andres Reyes (hereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued the order dated May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of
registration, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original records of
LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed
during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title.
Issue: Which title is superior over the other?
Ruling: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "the general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof
In the case at hand, the title of Realty Sales, Inc. which was derived from Dominador Mayuga whom had registered his right over the subject
property on 1958 shall prevail over the title in the possession of Carpo whose title stemmed from Baltzar who only registered the land under
their name in 1970.
19. Azarcon vs Vallarta
Facts: In 1932, Dr. Cajucom sold to Vallarta an unregistered parcel of agricultural land.
In 1959, Dr. Cajucom executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" of the same land in favor of the Azarcons, and recited that the property was
unregistered land and that it was the "paraphernal" property of Dr. Cajucom.
In 1961, Azarcon filed a Free Patent Application over the disputed property. It was approved on February 26, 1961 and Register of Dees issued
a title in favor of the Azarcons.
In 1965, the Vallarta, filed with the Court of First Instance, an application for registration of the disputed property. The opposition of the Director
of Lands and the Director of Forestry having been withdrawn, a titleis issued in favor of the Vallarta's.
On May 6, 1968, the Azarcons filed the instant Complaint for Cancellation and Annulment of Titles of the Vallartas.
Issue: Whether the land title of Vallarta is superior to the Free Patent Title of Azarcon
Held: Yes. A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest
any title in the patentee as against the true owner. Plaintiffs were fully aware that on February 26, 1961 when their application was approved, the
land in question was not a part of the public domain as to be disposable by the Director of Lands. That said land was no longer a part of the
public domain but of the private ownership of Jose V. Cajucom even before the Second World War is further attested by the fact that as early as
March 14, 1932 the Same owner had disposed of his private property to Valarta's
We are fully cognizant of the well-settled rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is
issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
certificate. This presupposes, however, that the prior title is a valid one. Where, as in the case at bar, it is evident that the prior title of the
Azarcons suffers from an inherent informity, such a rule cannot be invoked in their favor.
20. DBP vs Mangawang
Double Title
Where two certificates of title over the same parcel of land were regularly issued to the same person, one under the Homestead Law and
another under the Cadastral Act, and the owner of said titles, taking advantage of the situation, sold the land to two different persons
surrendering to each purchaser the pertinent certificate of title, both said purchasers having acted in good faith and having registered their titles
on the respective dates of the two sales, it is held that the sale first made and registered is the valid one, considering that when the subsequent

sale was made by the former owner he had nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to the subsequent vendees is one issued
covering the same property.
Where a person sells the same land to two different persons who are unaware of the flaw that lies in its title, the law adjudicates the property to
the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the registry of property.
21. Vda de Jacinto vs Vda de Jacinto
Facts: after the partition of the estate of the deceased spouses Andres Jacinto and Maria C. Santos, Pedro Jacinto, their surviving son,
continued administering the properties allotted to the heirs of his deceased brother;
when he delivered the share of the latter, he withheld delivery of the parcel of more than 11 hectares allotted, among others, to his
aforesaid co-heirs;
one year thereafter he caused the portion withheld from co-heirs to be registered in his name;
the widow and son of his deceased brother did not know that the parcel of land delivered to them by their co-heir was short of 5
hectares, 45 ares and 74 centiares, and said parties "were always of the belief, until the latter part of 1953, that he (Pedro)
delivered to them all that which were rightfully theirs".
Issue
Decision

Whether the claim of the heirs of Pedro Jacinto that the latter had acquired ownership of the property in litigation by
prescription is valid?
In view of these facts, it would be against reason and good conscience not to hold that Pedro Jacinto committed a breach of
trust which enabled him to secure registration of the land in question to the prejudice of his co-heirs. Therefore, in an lotion like
the present, he may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the person rightfully entitled to it. In fact, it has been
held that even in the absence of fraud in obtaining registration, or even after the lapse of one year after the issuance of a
decree of registration, a co-owner of land who applied for and secured its adjudication and registration in his name knowing
that it had not been allotted to him in the partition, may be compelled to convey the same to whoever received it in the
apportionment, so long as no innocent third party had acquired rights therein, in the meantime, for a valuable consideration
(Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790-798). Indeed, any rule to the contrary would sanction one's enrichment at the expense of
another. Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or, it least, of breach of trust, should not be allowed to use a
Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his wrongdoing (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, etc., 40 Phil. 620;
Severino vs. Severino, 41 Phil. 343).
Consequently, a cohier who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter, and the action by them to recover the property does not prescribe.

22. Widows and Orphans Assoc. vs CA

Faulty Registration
Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original writing and 2) that it has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice.
A ground for dismissal based on disputed facts not proper in a motion to dismiss.In the case at bar, it appears that the parties have yet to fully
present their respective evidence in support of their claims before the trial court, As a matter of fact, the trial court had set the case for hearing
on the merits in its order dated May 19, 1989. What is more, the case involves a vast tract of land consisting of 156 hectares, separately
situated in two outlaying localities (i.e., Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila). The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial on the
merits if only to afford the contending parties their respective days in court. Further, a ground for dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this
case, is not proper in a motion to dismiss.
Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title cannot be altered,
amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534
[1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]). Also, no correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition
filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered (Sec. 112, Act 496; now Sec. 108, PD
1529). While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it would
mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a
certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificates
authenticity vis-a-vis the land covered therein.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by the latter
do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1969]) this Court held that the simple

possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described therein. If
a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens
System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.
23. Armentia vs Patricia
He is not a compulsory heir of the vendor. He is not obliged principally or subsidiarily under the contract of sale,
An action to annul a contract based on fraud must be filed within four years from the discovery thereof (Arts. 1146[1] and 1391, New Civil Code).
In legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place f. rom the time the document was registered in the office of the register
of deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world, including the plaintiff, When the sale of the land was recorded on
July 22, 1955, and the action to annul it was filed only on September 17, 1960, the four-year period had elapsed.
24. Gatioan vs Tapucar
Registration of certificate of title from a fraudulent conveyance is constructive notice
ln the present case, it would appear very clearly from the allegations of the complaint as well as the amended complaint and the prayer thereof
that what plaintiffs sought was the annulment of the deed of sale executed by means of fraud. Paraphrasing Rone vs. Claro, supra, recovery of
possession of the property may be the ultimate objective of plaintiff s, but to attain such goal they must need first travel over the road of relief
sought to annul the deed of sale of November 26, 1934 on ground of fraud, otherwise even if the case were to be regarded as a direct action to
recover title and possession, it would, nevertheless, be futile and could not prosper for the reason that defendants could always defeat it by
merely presenting the deed of sale which is good and valid to legalize and justify the transfer of the land to the defendants, until annulled by the
courts. Plaintiffs' action, therefore, prescribed in four years from the time the deed of sale in favor of Bernarda E. Andaya was registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds, which was on December 12, 1934. From said date petitioners are deemed to have constructive notice of the
existence of said deed of sale. Armentia vs. Patriarca, 18 SCRA 1253; Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706.
Where the deed of sale had been executed within the prohibited period of five years after issuance of the patent, the action to declare the deed
of sale as null and void has not prescribed; Period of prescription that governs the deed of sale allegedly executed through fraud in 1934 is four
years under the old Code of Civil Procedure from discovery of the fraud.There is, therefore, no basis for the claim of petitioners that their
action to declare said deed of sale null and void has not prescribed since it is void ab initio, having been executed within the prohibited period of
five years. The period of five years is to be reckoned from and after the date of the approval of the application for free patent up to and including
the fifth year from and after the date of the issuance of the patent. Section 118 Commonwealth Act 141; Beniga vs. Bugas, 35 SCRA 111. The
period of prescription that governs the present case, is therefore four years according to Section 43 of Act 190, the old Code of Civil Procedure,
from the discovery of the fraud, which is December 12, 1934 when the deed of sale sought to be annulled was registered. Article 1116 Civil
Code; Philippine National Bank vs. Dionisio, 9 SCRA 10.
25. Pajarillo vs IAC
Facts: In 1945, Perfecta died intestate leaving inter alia a tract of land consisting of about 28 hectares and covered by TCT No. 4671 in the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon Province.
In 1946, Juana and Felipe claiming as Juanas heirs executed a public instrument entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero with Deed of Donation in favor of Salud Suterio de Matias, daughter of Juana.
Salud immediately took possession of the land but failed to registered it under her own name to accede on her mothers(Juana) request that she
be allowed to possess the land and enjoy its fruits until her death.
In 1951, she transferred the possession of the land to her mother.
In 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio(Saluds brother) for the declared consideration of P12,000.00.
Two years later, in 1958, Claudio had the land registered in his name and was issued TCT No. 32050 in the land records of Quezon Province.
Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private respondents filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property
on the ground that the deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration in his name was null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the land should be reconveyed to Salud.
Held: YES. It is clear that Juana Balane de Suterio had no right to sell the subject land to Claudio because she was no longer its owner, having
previously donated it to her daughter Salud. Juana herself was holding the land merely as a trustee of Salud, who had transferred possession to
her mother at the old womans request. The deed of sale was itself vitiated by bad faith as Claudio is presumed to have known of the previous
donation to his sister Salud, whose acceptance of the donation was formally witnessed by his own wife, the herein principal petitioner. When
Claudio registered the land in his name knowing there was a flaw in his title, an implied trust was created in favor of Salud as the real owner of
the property in accordance with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, reading as follows: If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. As
trustor, Salud had every right to sue for the recovery of the land in the action for reconveyance against Claudios heirs. An action for
reconveyance of realty, based upon a constructive or implied trust resulting from fraud, may be barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is
reckoned from the issuance of the title which operates as a constructive notice.

While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribe in 10 years from registration of the property, private respondents right commenced from
actual discovery of petitioners act of defraudation.
The record shows that while the land was registered in the name of Claudio Suterio, Sr. in 1958, the complaint for reconveyance was filed by the
petitioners in 1965, or still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
26. Caro vs CA
Facts: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of 2 parcels of land covered by TCTs. Mario died in 1957.
His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said
parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino
Benito and Alfredo Benito, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C, under T.C.T. No. T-4978.
Sometime in 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner that the
latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. After further
verification, she sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third undivided share dated August 25, 1966.In as
much as the petitioner ignored said offer, private respondent, filed the present case.
Trial Court- Dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does
not have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing
written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners. MR denied
Court of Appeals reverse,- defendant is ordered to execute a deed of redemption over the one-third share of BENJAMIN BENITO in favor of
plaintiff for herself and as representative of the children of Mario Benito and therefrom, to deliver said one-third share of BENJAMIN BENITO.
Issue: Respondent Court erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal redemption with respect to the lots in question.
Held: YES. The alleged first error of respondent Court is premised on the fact that the lot in question sought to be redeemed is no longer owned
in common. Petitioner contends that the right sought to be exercised by private respondent in the case assumes that the land in question is
under co-ownership, the action being based on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code which provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of alienation is grossly excessive, the petitioner shall pay only a reasonable price.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively
have in the thing owned in common.
However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610
was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as
trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property.
An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding upon the parties. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196)
A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, both
dated September 15, 1960 to the effect that they agree to the segregation of the land formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito
and Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement Lot I-C thereof, with an area of 163 hectares, more or less, was
ceded to petitioner. Thereafter, the co-owners took actual and exclusive possession of the specific portions respectively assigned to them. A
subdivision title was subsequently issued on the lot assigned to petitioner, to wit, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4978.
As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been issued in the name petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Upon the expiration of the term of one year from
the date of the entry of the subdivision title, the Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496). Since the title of petitioner is
now indefeasible, private respondent cannot, by means of the present action, directly attack the validity thereof.
In refutation, private respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud of the rights of the heirs of a deceased Mario
Benito in obtaining a subdivision title over a one-third portion of the land in question which she brought from Benjamin Benito, and for this
reason, she is deemed to hold said property in trust for said heirs. The rule, however, is it fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land
should be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Jaramil vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 420). As private respondent has not shown and
proved the circumstances constituting fraud, it cannot be held to exist in this case.
27. Naga Telephone vs CA
Ten years from the cause of action accrued which is not necessarily the date of execution of the contact
Article 1267 speaks of service which has become so difficult. Taking into consideration the rationale behind this provision, the term service
should be understood as referring to the performance of the obligation. In the present case, the obligation of private respondent consists in

allowing petitioners to use its posts in Naga City, which is the service contemplated in said article. Furthermore, a bare reading of this article
reveals that it is not a requirement thereunder that the contract be for future service with future unusual change. According to Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino, Article 1267 states in our law the doctrine of unforeseen events. This is said to be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic
stantibus in public international law; under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions
cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist. Considering practical needs and the demands of equity and good faith, the disappearance of the
basis of a contract gives rise to a right to relief in favor of the party prejudiced.
On the issue of prescription of private respondents action for reformation of contract, petitioners allege that respondent courts ruling that the
right of action arose only after said contract had already become disadvantageous and unfair to it due to subsequent events and conditions,
which must be sometime during the latter part of 1982 or in 1983 x x x is erroneous. In reformation of contracts, what is reformed is not the
contract itself, but the instrument embodying the contract. It follows that whether the contract is disadvantageous or not is irrelevant to
reformation and therefore, cannot be an element in the determination of the period for prescription of the action to reform.
Action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code provides, inter alia, that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.
Clearly, the ten (10) year period is to be reckoned from the time the right of action accrues which is not necessarily the date of execution of the
contract. As correctly ruled by respondent court, private respondents right of action arose sometime during the latter part of 1982 or in 1983
when according to Atty. Luis General, Jr. x x x, he was asked by (private respondents) Board of Directors to study said contract as it already
appeared disadvantageous to (private respondent) (p. 31, tsn, May 8, 1989). (Private respondents) cause of action to ask for reformation of said
contract should thus be considered to have arisen only in 1982 or 1983, and from 1982 to January 2, 1989 when the complaint in this case was
filed, ten (10) years had not yet elapsed.
28. Leyson vs Bontuyan
Action base on Fraud
Facts: Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Adlawon, Mabolo City. The said property was divided into two parcels of
land because of a construction of a provincial road. He later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Protacio Tabal and
Vivencia Bontuyan, the spouses then sold the two lots to Lourdes V. Leyson as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Despite the knowledge of Gregorio Bontuyan that said property has been sold to his son-in-law and daughter, spouses Noval, he filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands over Lot no 17,150 alleging that the property was public land and was neither claimed nor occupied by any
person and that he first entered upon and began cultivating the same in his favor. Thus, he has obtained a Free Patent on the said lot and
another parcel of land, lot no 13,272, was also registered under his name.
Meanwhile, Gregorio again executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the two lots in favor of Naciansino Bontuyan. He then executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over lot no 17,150 in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a security for a loan. Shortly thereafter,
Naciansino and spouse has left the Philippines and resided in the US.
When the spouses arrived in the Philippines to redeem their property from DBP, they later on discovered that it was tenanted by Engr. Leyson,
on of the late Lourdes Leysons children.
Issue: Whether or not Gregorio Bontuyan acted in bad faith when he applied for free patent for the same parcels of land.
Ruling: Yes, record show that at the time when Gregorio applied for free patent, he was living with his daughter, Vivencia. Thus, Gregorio must
have known that at the time when he applied, the subject lots were already sold by his daughter. Furthermore, records also show that he sold
twice the lot no 17,150 to plaintiff appellants. The first was in 1976 and the other was in 1980. Plaintiff-appellants offered no reasonable
explanation why Gregorio have to sell it twice. These are badges of bad faith which affect the validity of the title of Gregorio over the subject lots.
29. Casipit vs CA
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Fraud:
Facts: On April 1987, a complaint was filed by herein petitioners against private respondents mainly for the recovery of a property, alleging that
Emiliano Casipit is the true and lawful owner of the questioned property located at Sinalhan, Sta. Rosa, Laguna by virtue of continuous,
uninterrupted, peaceful, open and public possession in the concept of owner since 1930; that they were deprived of ownership thereof by the
Beatos through Narciso Beato, who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Titles in the name of Gabriel Beato, using fictitious documents.
Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT and other succeeding titles be cancelled, as well as the tax declarations; that the questioned property be
reconveyed to them; that the document entitled, "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati," insofar as it included the questioned property be
rescinded; and that private respondents be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees.
The lower court dismissed the petition, holding that the defendants have a better right than the plaintiffs, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs
being based on fraud, has prescribed for it must be filed within 4 years after the cause of action arose. The issuance of the reconstituted title
over the subject lot and its registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, in 1963 is the starling date for the prescriptive period to
commence. The respondent court affirmed the said decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioners Contention: pursuant to the Certification issued by the Bureau of Lands that Patent over the questioned property has not been
issued to Gabriel Beato, the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati" is therefore a void contract. This being the case, the action taken by

petitioners is imprescriptible. Private respondents Diaz spouses were buyers in bad faith because they had full knowledge that Emiliano Casipit
has been in actual possession in the concept of owner of the questioned property and paid the real property taxes thereon.
Issue: Whether petitioners action already prescribed
Held: Yes
There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible. However, this is not the case at bar.
The action filed by petitioner before the trial court was 1) for reconveyance based on fraud since the ownership of private respondents over the
questioned property was allegedly established on "false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive allegations"; and 2) for rescission of the
"Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati. Thus, the action for reconveyance based on fraud filed by petitioners before the trial court is subject
to prescription.
Based on jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title.
Conformably with these settled jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for petitioners' action for reconveyance is 10 years from August 30, 1963, the
date of the issuance of TCT in favor of Beato. Obviously, the discussion on this subject matter is not beneficial to petitioners because they filed
the action for reconveyance only on April 27, 1987. Hence, petition was dismissed.
30. Amerol vs Bagumbaran
Facts: A tract of land alleged by the plaintiff to have been forcibly entered into by the defendants and which plaintiff now w&s to recover
possession thereof. It has also been proven that the same lot was covered by two free patent applications: (l) that of defendant Liwalug
Datomanong (erroneously surnamed Amerol) which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and (2) that of Molok Bagumbaran which was
filed on December 27, 1954. plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran was given due course as a result of which Free Patent No. V-19050 was issued on
August 16,1955 whereupon Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly issued, owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished the herein
plaintiff.
The court is also inclined to believe that defendant Liwalug Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's free patent application on the land in
question nor was he ever notified or participated in the administrative proceedings relative to plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime,
since the date he purchased the land from Mandal Tondo, said defendant has been and up to the present in continuous occupation and
cultivation of the same. His co-defendants named in the complaint are merely his tenants.
It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did not take appropriate action to annul the patent and title of the plaintiff within one year from
issuance thereof and that the first step taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal protest dated April 24, 1964, filed before the
Bureau of Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The second step he took was his
counterclaim contained in his answer to the complaint in the above entitled case, which answer was filed with this court on December 4, 1964.
Issue: What is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real property arising from an implied or constructive trust and,
corrolarily reference
Ruling: The act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a
patent and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran
fraudulently misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in question when he was not because it was Liwalug
Datomanong. Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free patent over the land but there was Liwalug
Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner
Liwalug Datomanong. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he, even being already the
registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After
all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad
faith. Further, contrary to the erroneous claim of the respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set aside and put under review anew the
findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, 10 or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real
property acquired under false pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim
interposed in his Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of possession instituted by the respondent, has not yet
prescribed. Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the
respondent, and December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less than
ten years.
31. Solid State Multi-products Corp. vs CA
Action base on void contract
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the
time said lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that the government has
agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and in
the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate. The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the
price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to
the cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849).
Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interests, the government shall then issue a final deed of conveyance in favor
of the purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120.
Later laws, however, required that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.
Registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of
Mabini Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and
again, it has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. Our land registration laws
do not give the holder any better title than that what he actally has (De Guzman, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-46935, December 21, 1987,
156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
An adverse claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from bringing an action for
reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or
wrongfully acquired.Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi
pursuant to the alleged sale from the government, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the acquisition of the
property was in violation of law. Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is
imprescriptible (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 70191, October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA 270). In one case, this Court ruled that an
adverse claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from bringing an action for
reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or
wrongfully acquired (Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718). In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that
the conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing (Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97
Phil. 722; Agne vs. Director of Lands, G.R. L-40399, February 6, 1990; 181 SCRA 793). Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi
and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum (Agne vs.
Director of Lands, supra). There being no title to the land that Mabini Legaspi acquired from the government, it follows that no title to the same
land could be conveyed by the former to respondent Virata.
32. Lacsamana vs CA
Action based on fictitious deed
We affirm the decision of respondent appellate court. On the issue of prescription, we agree that the present action has not yet prescribed
because the right to file an action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which action does not prescribe. Hence, the fact that the alleged sale took place in 1971 and
the action to have it declared void or inexistent was filed in 1983 is of no moment. To reiterate, an action for reconveyance based on a void
contract is imprescriptible.
Neither can the defense of laches be sustained. We cannot see how private respondents may be considered guilty of laches. It should be noted
that private respondents, upon learning that the relevant portion of Lot No. 13535 was no longer registered in the name of Leon, immediately
caused an investigation to be made for the purpose of finding out the author and the circumstances behind the execution of the fictitious 1971
Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, in less than two (2) months after it was discovered by the National Bureau of Investigation that Nestor Lacsamana
was in fact a ficti tious/non-existent person, private respondents through their attorney-in-fact Petronilo Gaitos instituted on 11 November 1983,

the present action i.e., barely three (3) years and nine (9) months after the fraudulent registration on 22 January 1980. Thus, it is said, the
concept of laches is not concerned with the lapse of time but only with the effect of unreasonable lapse.
The rule that a person dealing with registered land has the right to rely on the Torrens title will not apply when such person has actual knowledge
of facts that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry. He cannot close his eyes to such facts and later claim that he acted in
good faith. Thus, LBJ is not entitled to the mantle of protection accorded by the Torrens System of registration which protects only the title holder
in good faith. It has never been created as a shield to fraud.
33. Sapto vs Fabiana
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
Facts: Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) was the registered owner of the registered land covered by TCT No. T-5701 located in
Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died and left the said property to his three sons Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. Ramon later also died leaving
no heirs. On 1931, Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour of Apolonio Fabiana in consideration
of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of Davao but was never registered. However, although the said sale was never registered,
the possession of said property was transferred to Fabiana immediately after the sale on 1931 up to present (the filing of the case on 1954).
Constancio then died with no heirs. Later, Samuel married Dora Bagona and had two children:Vicente and Laureana Sapto. Upon the death of
Samuel, his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land against Fabiana.
The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the
parties and the vendors heirs and ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
1)
2)

Whether or not the sale was binding to the heirs though never registered.--YES
Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid. YES

Ruling:
1) Yes. The sale was valid and binding upon the heirs although not registered.

In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have consistently interpreted Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no
deed . . . shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration" in the sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary to
make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration.

As between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to land not so registered. Registration is intended to protect the
buyer against claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect as between
the parties to their deed of sale. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given
transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the
parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.

No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is
in the possession of the vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee.

2)

Yes. The order of CFI for execution of deed of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid and not barred by prescription.

The contention that the order for execution of conveyance in favor Fabiana has prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the original sale
must be overruled, being predicated on the assumption that the reconveyance is sought by way of performance of the contract of sale entered
into in 1931.

No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred
title to the purchaser. The said action for conveyance was actually an action to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon Fabianas
ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors.

This action accrued only when appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American
jurisprudence, actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.

DOCTRINE:
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some
adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land,
claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complaint when
he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within
the statutory period.

34. Lucas vs Gamponia

Facts: On March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land in the name of Domingo Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. On
March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias
Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and enjoyed its fruits.
Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Sanchez sold the land on January
21, 1940 to Andres Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by
inheritance from Ciscar up to the time he sold it to Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he bought it
to date.
Domingo Mejia, died and left his only surviving kin Pedro Mejia, his brother. Pedro is survived by his daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas,
Plaintiff herein. Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was
made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further held that
since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant Andres Gamponia.
Issue: Whether Gamponias defense is tenable YES
Ruling: Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the
action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription
or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches.
Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long
continued possession for 37 years, the original owners right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the
Defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
It is to be noted that all the above complications would never had been occasioned had the original patentee and his successors in interest not
slept on their rights for more than a generation. Add to this the fact that the original conveyance made by the patentee is not absolutely null and
void. The prohibition against the sale of free patents is for a period of seven years (Section 35, Act No. 926); cafter that period of time a
patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within seven years from the conveyance the original patentee could have brought an action to
recover back his property. Since nothing of this sort was done by him, it was certainly natural for the purchase to have assumed that the original
patentee gave up his right to recover back the property and acquiesced in vendees right and title. The successor in interest of the original
purchaser must also have believed in good faith that the patentee and his successors in interest were reconciled to the idea of allowing the
property to stay in the hands of the successors in interest. By this inaction for a period of 37 years to the consequent prejudice that annulment of
the original sale would entail upon so many successive owners, the equitable principle now stands up as a bar.
In effect, the principle is one of estoppel because it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who
have placed reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his successors in interest.

35. Roxas vs CA
36. Republic vs Ruiz
Facts:

Cayetano Pinto, a registered land owner in which he acquired the land through homestead patent.

Four (4) years after the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT), Cayetano together with her wife Ramona Ruiz
sold the portion of the land in favor of Jacobo Pinto.

The Deed of Sale executed by the deceased Cayetano Pinto in favor of Jacobo Pinto was never registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Isabela, nor annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title.

Later, Ramona Ruiz and her children executed an extrajudicial partition of the entire land (included the portion of the land
sold to Jacobo) which was registered, reason for the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

The widow Herminia Tinonas and heirs of the late Jacobo Pinto filed an action against the widow Ramona Ruiz and heirs of
the late Cayetano Pinto for the conveyance of the portion of 3 hectares, sold and conveyed by the late Cayetano Pinto in favor of the late
Jacobo Pinto.

Supreme Court rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and declaring that the Deed of Sale executed by the deceased
Cayetano Pinto in favor of the late Jacobo Pinto null and void ab initio, for being in violation of Section 116 of the Public Land Law.

(Before the appeal of the heirs of Jacobo Pinto has been perfected and the record elevated to the Supreme Court,) The
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES filed the instant action against the widow and heirs of the late Cayetano Pinto for cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title and Transfer Certificate of Title and the reversion of the land covered by the said titles to the State.

On the grounds that the homesteader Cayetano Pinto violates the condition provided in Section 118 of Commonwealth
Act 141 which produced the effect of annulling and cancelling the said patent and thus caused the reversion to the State of the property
thereby covered.
Issue: W/N can the government may bring a proper action for reversion against the grantee, by that the grantee sold the land within the
prohibitive period of 5 years from the issuance of patent?
Ruling: YES.
By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, any transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five years from the
issuance of the patent is forbidden, making said alienation null and void, and constituting a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In
other words, it was the transgression of the law that nullifies and renders the deed of conveyance null and void and without effect. The
prohibitory provision against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is not only mandatory, but is considered a condition attached to the
approval of every application.
The CFI committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original
certificate title based on the patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of the grantee's heirs.
In relation to the topic under the Discussion guide: STATE NOT BOUND BY PRESCRIPTION.
Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of
the Public Land Law, the court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for reconveyance (or
reversion) is not barred by the lapse of time; the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State.
37. Republic vs CA

Facts: Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a condominium unit, evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 7648, which could not be
located. Hence, he filed, on January 28, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati, a petition for the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate of title in lieu of his lost copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). The trial court ordered the Register of
Deeds of Makati to comment on the petition and thereafter set the case for initial hearing.

On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a manifestation that she had no objection to the petition. After hearing private
respondents evidence, the trial court rendered, on December 15, 1995, its decision granting the petition, declaring as invalid the missing copy of
the certificate of title, and ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to issue a new owners duplicate certificate of title in the name of private
respondent. A copy of this decision was furnished the Solicitor General.

On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the trial courts decision on the ground that no copy of private
respondents petition or notice thereof had been given to him.

Issue: Whether in a proceeding for the issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such
that failure to give such notice would render the proceedings void.

Ruling: NO. It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owners duplicate
certificate of title. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the government in land registration
and related proceedings. Even so, however, the request for representation should have come from the Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was
the proper party to the case. Here, there is no dispute that the Registrar of Deeds of Makati was notified of private respondents petition, but she
manifested that her office had no objection thereto. The Solicitor General does not question the propriety of the action and manifestation of the
Registrar of Deeds, nor does he give any reason why private respondents petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title
should be denied. Instead, he claims that the fact that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission that he is entitled to be notified of all
incidents relating to the proceedings.

This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a
jurisdictional defect.
This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration cases and original land registration proceedings which require that
the Solicitor General be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the appeal filed by the
government, the date of his receipt of the decisions therein and not that of the Director of Lands or of his other representatives. The issue and
the applicable laws in those cases are different.
The important role of the Office of the solicitor General as the governments law office cannot be overemphasized. Its powers and functions,
however, should not be rigidly applied in such a manner that innocuous omissions, as in the case at bar, should be visited with so grave a
consequence as the nullification of proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the government has been shown.
38. Acap vs CA
Facts: Lot 1130 was originally owned by spouses Vasquez and later inherited by their son, Felixberto. Teodoro Acap was the registered tenant
thereto. In 1975, the lot was conveyed by Felixberto to Cosme Pido. The lot remained under the name of original owner spouses. When Pido
died, the heirs (wife and children) conveyed the property to Edy Delos Reyes by executing Notarized Declaration of heirship & waiver of rights.
Delos Reyes also filed with ROD Notice of Adverse claim in the OCT. Acap did not pay the rent since he refused to belief Edy to be the owner
since no proof of ownership was presented to him. Acap contended that the notice of adverse claim, and the Notarized Declaration of heirship &
waiver of rights do not convey ownership. Edy filed complaint for recovery of possession.
Issue: W/N lower court is correct in ruling that Acap has no basis to pay rent to Delos Reyes.
Ruling: Acaps non-payment was justified since there was no proof of transfer of ownership. Asserted Real right (notice of adverse claim) over
the thing arising from juridical act, however justified is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership. The right/title must be completed by fulfilling
certain conditions of the law
Notice of adverse claim is a mere notice, the validity of which is yet to be establish by the court (expires within 30 days)
39. Garbin vs CA
Judicial determination is still necessary
The purpose of the annotation of an adverse claim is to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serve as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner.
Mere registration of an adverse claim does not make such claim valid nor is it permanent in character.From the provisions of the law, it is clear
that mere registration of an adverse claim does not make such claim valid, nor is it permanent in character. More importantly, such registration
does not confer instant title of ownership since judicial determination on the issue of the ownership is still necessary.
When a person slept in his rights for 28 years from the time of the transaction, before filing the action amounts to laches which cannot be
excused even by ignorance resulting from unexcusable negligence.The title of the defendant must be upheld for failure or the neglect of the
plaintiffs for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time of more than fifteen (15) years since they registered their adverse claim, or for a

period of more than three (3) decades since the execution of the deed of sale in their favor upon which their adverse claim is based, to do that
which, by exercising diligence, could or should have been done earlier. For it is this negligence or omission to assert a right within reasonable
time that is construed that plaintiffs had abandoned their right to claim ownership under the deed of sale, or declined to assert it. Thus, when a
person slept in his rights for 28 years from the time of the transaction, before filing the action amounts to laches which cannot be excused even
by ignorance resulting from unexcusable negligence.
40. Carantes vs CA
Facts: Maximino Carrantes, et. al were heirs of Mateo Carantes who died leaving a parcel of land.
Some portion of the said land were expropriated by the Government to be used for landing field.
To minimize expenses and facilitate the expropriation, the other heirs executed a deed denominated as Assignment of Right to Inheritance in
favor to Maximino.
The said deed was registered by Maximino on March 16, 1940 and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title for the unsold portion of the
said land was issued in his name.
It was only on February 18, 1958, when the other heirs came to know that the deed purported to assign in favor of Maximino their rights to
inheritance from Mateo Carantes. Hence, on September 4, 1958 the other heirs filed a complaint against Maximino praying that the Assignment
of Right to Inheritance be declared null and void and the corresponding TCT be partitioned among them.
Maximino moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
The complaint is anchored on the constructive trust created in favor to the other heirs. The fraud committed by Maximino makes the deed null
and void, hence the action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.
Issue: WON the action for reconveyance due to fraud is imprescritiple?
Ruling: In any event, it is now settled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is prescriptible it prescribes in ten
years. In this case the ten-year prescriptive period began on March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered the deed of "Assignment of Right to
Inheritance" and secured the cancellation of the certificate of title in the joint names of the heirs of Mateo Carantes, and, in lieu thereof, the
issuance of a new title exclusively in his name. 14 Since the present action was commenced only on September 4, 1958, it is clear that the same
is barred by extinctive prescription.
The weight of authorities is to the effect that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice to the whole world, and, therefore, discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of the registration
It was also held by the respondent court that the petitioner was merely holding the property in trust for the benefit of his co-heirs as
administrator, hence, there was a continuing and subsisting trust, and pursuant to section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of
the said Code on prescription (Secs. 40-41) do not apply. It is our view, however, that there was no continuing and subsisting trust.
From March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered the deed of assignment and had the Certificate of title in the names of the heirs cancelled
and a new certificate of title issued in his own name, he began to hold the property in open and clear repudiation of any trust. 15
41. Republic vs De Guzman
Facts: Lot 5249-Ts-217, a public land, was awarded to Eusebio Diones by the Board of Liquidators. He later sold his rights to Enrique P. de
Guzman. The lot was claimed by Lucena Ong Ante who authorized Carmen Ty, in 1963 to possess the same up to the filing of the present
controversy. Despite the occupancy of Carmen Ty, a miscellaneous sales patent was awarded to de Guzman to whom a corresponding original
certificate of title was issued. The lot was subsequently sold by de Guzman to his daughter, Carolina and her husband, Rio Rivera, and was
issued a transfer certificate of title containing the adverse claim of Lucena Ong Ante. The spouses also did not possess the land. Title to the land
was mortgaged by the spouses to respondent Hoechst Phils., Inc. The same was foreclosed and a certificate of sale was issued in its name.
However, the mortgage and the certificate of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds. In 1981, petitioner moved for reversion of the
lot on the ground that the same was obtained by means of fraud. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordered the reversion of
the land and the cancellation of the sales patent and the derivative titles issued in connection therewith. On appeal, the assailed decision was
reversed. The Court of Appeals ruled that when the land ceased to be part of the public domain by the issuance of the original title, the Director
of Lands lost control and jurisdiction over the land and title became indefeasible one year after its issuance. It, however, sustained the finding of
the trial court that de Guzman did not possess the property and misrepresented facts in his application. It also held that the spouses Rivera
were innocent purchasers for value. Hence, this petition by the Republic.
The Court ruled that one of the legal requirements in an application for sales application is actual possession of the land. The issuance of the
patent and its derivative titles in violation thereof is null and void; that indefeasibility of title is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of
Lands for the reversion of the land where such title was acquired by fraud; that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and misrepresentation.

The burden of proving the status of a purchaser/mortgagor in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status who must be wary
and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good
faith.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Director of Lands loses authority over the land the moment an original certificate of title is issued covering the
same. The Court of Appeals ruled that the issuance of the original certificate of title converted the lot into a private land, thereby
placing it beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
2.

Whether or not Enrique P. de Guzman validly obtained the sales patent and the original certificate of title.

3.

Whether or not the validity of the patent and the original certificate of title can still be assailed after the lapse of one year from the
issuance of the disputed title.

4.

Whether the spouses Rivera are innocent purchasers for value.

Ruling:
1. We disagree. The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public
Land Act. In fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in securing patents and the
corresponding titles thereto. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility
is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is
to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be
filed by the Government.
2.

We rule in the negative. There is no question that de Guzman was not in possession of the property. Hence, de Guzman
misrepresented facts in his application for sales patent. Even the Court of Appeals sustained the factual finding of the trial court on this
point. However, the Court of Appeals held that an action for cancellation of patent or title could not be maintained after the lapse of
one year from the date of issuance thereof. As heretofore stated, the ruling is erroneous.

3.

We rule that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued by the Director of Lands. "Where public land is acquired by an applicant
through fraud and misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of one year." "The
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation."

4.

We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not innocent purchasers for value. Spouses Rivera are related by consanguinity
and affinity to Enrique P. de Guzman knew that de Guzman was not in possession of the land. In fact, Rio Rivera testified that his
father-in-law was not in possession of the lot in question. Carmen Ty was in possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real estate
taxes thereon. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the presumption of a buyer in good faith must prevail. "The burden of
proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not
enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith." The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of
persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry,
the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith."

42. Legayde vs Sullano

By express provision of the governing law they must yield to better rights