GUN VIOLENCE

IN CHICAGO, 2016

GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO, 2016

January 2017
University of Chicago Crime Lab1

Acknowledgments: The University of Chicago Crime Lab is a privately-funded, independent,

non-partisan academic research center founded in 2008 to help cities identify the most
effective and humane ways to control crime and violence, and reduce the harms associated
with the administration of criminal justice. We are grateful to the Chicago Police Department
for making available the data upon which this report is based, to Ben Hansen for help
assembling data on Chicago weather patterns, and to Aaron Chalfin, Philip Cook, Aurlie Ouss,
Harold Pollack, and Shari Runner for valuable comments. We thank the Joyce Foundation,
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the McCormick Foundation, and the
Pritzker Foundation for support of the University of Chicago Crime Lab and Urban Labs, as
well as Susan and Tom Dunn, and Ira Handler. All opinions and any errors are our own and
do not necessarily reflect those of our funders or of any government agencies.

1 This report was produced by Max Kapustin, Jens Ludwig, Marc Punkay, Kimberley Smith, Lauren Speigel, and David Welgus, with the
invaluable assistance of Roseanna Ander, Nathan Hess, and Julia Quinn. Please direct any comments and questions to
[email protected].

INTRODUCTION
A total of 764 people were murdered in Chicago in 2016. They were sons, brothers, and fathers;
sisters, daughters, and mothers; they were, as the title of The New York Times reporter Fox
Butterfields book on urban violence noted, All Gods Children. This report represents a first
step towards understanding what happened with the goal of helping the city of Chicago
prevent another year like the one that just passed.
We draw on data obtained from the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and other sources to
provide a more complete picture of the change in our citys crime problem in 2016. Our analysis
highlights a number of key facts that are important for understanding what happened, but
also raises some new puzzles as well. While this report focuses on establishing basic facts and
avoids delving too deeply into solutions, we will continue to partner with policymakers, the
civic community, and local nonprofits to identify promising approaches for moving forward.
We plan to share our thinking about how to reduce violence in Chicago, informed by the best
available data and research, in other venues in the future.
Between 2015 and 2016, Chicago experienced 58 percent more homicides and 43 percent more
non-fatal shootings. Annual increases of this size are not unprecedented among American
cities, particularly in recent years, but are rare for a city of Chicagos size. One striking feature
of Chicagos increase in gun violence is how sudden it was: as of December 2015, there was no
indication that gun violence was on the verge of rising sharply. But in January 2016, homicides
and shootings surged relative to their 2015 levels and remained higher in almost every month
that followed, threatening 20 years of progress on violent crime in Chicago. This increase was
mostly in gun crimes; other crimes did not change by nearly as much.
The characteristics of homicide were generally similar in 2016 and 2015; what changed in
Chicago was not so much the nature of our violence problem, but rather its prevalence. Most
murders involved guns, occurred in public places, and stemmed from what police believe
was some sort of altercation. This violence continues to be very regressive in its impact,
disproportionately affecting the citys most disadvantaged residents. Most gun violence
victims and suspects were African American men, more often than not having had some prior
encounter with the criminal justice system.
Compared to other cities, a larger share of homicide suspects in Chicago consists of adolescents,
although the majority of all homicide suspects are in their 20s or older. The increase in gun
violence occurred disproportionately in several disadvantaged neighborhoods on the citys
South and West sides, which now account for an even larger share of the citys homicides.
Another change is that from 2015 to 2016, the share of homicides that CPD believes stemmed
from an altercation, as well as the share of homicide offenders who were recorded by CPD as
having a gang affiliation, seemed to decline.
What caused Chicagos sudden surge in gun violence in 2016 remains a puzzle. Weather
cannot explain the surge in homicides and shootings, since monthly temperatures in 2016
were close to their historical averages. City spending on social services and public education
did not change much in 2016 compared to previous years, and while the state budget impasse
disrupted funding for many community organizations, this did not seem to change sharply in
December 2015.

Most relevant measures of police activity did not change abruptly enough to explain the surge
in gun violence. Overall arrests declined in 2016, driven by narcotics arrests, but arrests for
violent crimes, including homicides and shootings, barely changed. One policing measure
that declined was the chance of arrest for homicides and shootings (the clearance rate),
which was a result of arrests for these crimes not keeping pace with the increase in gun
violence. Another policing measure that declined was the number of investigatory street
stops. However, for this to explain why shootings increased in Chicago would also require an
explanation for why the previous dramatic decline in street stops in New York City did not
lead to more gun violence there.
We also cannot know the effect of factors not measurable in the available data, such as any
change in street gangs or the use of social media. However, given the timing of the recent
increase in gun violence, for any alternative explanation to make sense it would need to
involve something that changed abruptly near the end of 2015 and disproportionately affected
gun crimes.
Not knowing the definitive cause of Chicagos sudden and substantial increase in gun violence
does not mean the city should be paralyzed in crafting a response. The solution to a problem
need not be the opposite of its cause. One key implication of these data is the importance
of a policy response that is focused on the core problem: violence concentrated largely in a
moderate number of our most disadvantaged neighborhoods, carried out by teens and young
adults in public places with illegally owned, and perhaps increasingly lethal, firearms.

CHICAGOS CRIME IN 2016: WHAT HAPPENED?

Chicagos homicide rate increased substantially in 2016 relative to 2015.
The city recorded 764 homicides last year, an increase of 58 percent from 2015.2
Figure 1: Homicide Victims in Chicago, 2010-2016
764

506
437

437

2010

2011

2012

485

421

416

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

To put this increase into context, the homicide rate in Chicago reached its recent peak in the
early 1990sthe height of the nationwide crack cocaine epidemicat 33 per 100,000. Since
then it has declined by more than half, reaching a low of almost 15 per 100,000 in 2014. The
increase in our homicide rate the past two years (from 15.1 to 27.8 per 100,000) has eroded
approximately two thirds of the decrease Chicago experienced since the early 1990s.
Figure 2: Homicide Rate in Chicago, 1985-2016

Homicides per 100,000

35

27.8
2016

30
25
20
15

15.1
2014

10
5
0

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

2 We calculated 764 homicides in 2016 using data current as of January 11, 2017. Media reports on or around January 1, 2017 referenced
762 homicides in 2016. The discrepancy reflects the fact that the underlying data change as additional information is incorporated.

The size of Chicagos increase in homicides is not unprecedented, but is rare

for a city its size.
In 2015, the U.S. experienced its largest increase single year increase in its homicide rate since
1990, according to the most recently available data from the FBI.3 In that year, cities like
Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C. saw their homicide rates grow at least as fast as
Chicagos did in 2016. Early indications suggest that homicide rates also increased in many
other cities around the U.S. in 2016.4 However, all of the cities that experienced one- or twoyear increases in gun violence as large as Chicagos have much smaller populations than ours.
None of the other five largest cities in the U.S.Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, and
Philadelphia, in addition to Chicagohave witnessed a single-year homicide increase over the
past 25 years that rivals Chicagos increase in 2016.
Figure 3: Homicide Rates, Chicago and East Coast Cities, 1985-2016
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

2014

2015

2016

2015

2016

2013

2011

2012

2010

2008

2009

2007

2005

2006

2003

2004

2002

2001

2000

1999

1997

Baltimore

2014

Chicago

1998

1996

1995

1994

1993

1991

1992

1990

1988

1989

1987

1985

10
1986

Homicides per 100,000

90

Washington, D.C.

Figure 4: Homicide Rates, Chicago and Midwest Cities, 1985-2016

70
60
50
40
30
20

Chicago

Detroit

2013

2011

2012

2010

2008

2009

2007

2005

2006

2004

2002

2003

2001

1999

Milwaukee

2000

1997

1998

1996

1995

1994

1993

1991

1992

1990

1988

1989

1987

1985

10
1986

Homicides per 100,000

80

St. Louis

3 The national homicide rate in 2015 rose from 4.4 to 4.9 per 100,000, and is now at approximately the same level as it was in 2010, still
well below the peak of 10.2 per 100,000 recorded in 1980.
4 http://www.wsj.com/articles/homicides-rose-in-most-big-cities-this-year-1482402602

Figure 5: Homicide Rates, Chicago and Large Cities, 1985-2016

35
30
25
20
15
10

Chicago

Los Angeles

New York

Houston

2015

2016

2014

2012

2013

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2003

2004

2002

2001

2000

1999

1997

1998

1996

1995

1994

1993

1991

1992

1990

1988

1989

1987

1986

5
1985

Homicides per 100,000

40

Philadelphia

Source: FBI UCR, Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

Chicago is an outlier with respect to total homicides but not homicide rates per capita.
Chicago has more total homicides than any other U.S. city because of its size combined with
its higher homicide rate per capita relative to that of the other largest cities in the country. But
compared to all cities in the U.S., Chicagos homicide rate per 100,000 residents is about in
the middle of the pack. Even after its recent increase, Chicagos homicide rate remains lower
than that of (smaller) cities like Detroit, New Orleans, or St. Louis.

Chicagos homicide increase was sudden and sustained.

As recently as December 2015, nothing in the data foreshadowed what would happen in 2016.
Homicides in December 2015 were actually down slightly from December 2014, consistent
with the larger pattern that we have seen in recent years where some months have more
homicides than the same month in the prior year, while other months have fewer.5 Chicagos
increase in homicides began suddenly in January 2016, when the number of victims rose by
67 percent from January of the year before. Almost each month that followed in 2016 saw
more homicides compared to the same month in 2015.6
Figure 6: Homicide Victims: Percent Change Compared to Prior Year,
2000-2016
200%

150%

100%

50%

0%

1/16

1/15

1/14

1/13

1/12

1/11

1/10

1/09

1/08

1/07

1/06

1/05

1/04

1/03

1/02

1/01

-100%

1/00

-50%

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

5 The number of homicide victims in March 2012 (52) represented a 126 percent increase over the number in March 2011 (23).
Chicago experienced a mild winter in 2012, to which experts partially attributed this increase.
http://www.npr.org/2012/05/16/152852264/experts-stumped-by-chicagos-soaring-homicide-rate
6 We focus on year-to-year changes in each month to avoid confusing a change in the trend over time in gun violence (shootings are up or
down this year compared to last year) with seasonal effects (over the course of any given year, gun violence usually increases in the warmer
months and decreases in the colder months). For more details see the Appendix.

Chicagos increase in homicides in 2016 was due mostly to additional gun homicides.
In 2016, 90 percent of the citys homicides were committed with a firearm, up from 88 percent
in 2015. By comparison, the share of homicides committed with a firearm in 2016 was 58
percent in New York City, 72 percent in Los Angeles, 80 percent in Houston, and 84 percent
in Philadelphia.
Figure 7: Homicides Involving a Firearm, 2015 vs. 2016
100%
88%

90%

2015

2016

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

Gun homicides drive the difference between higher- and lower-homicide cities.
Most of the difference in overall homicide rates across the five largest U.S. cities is driven by
the difference in their gun homicide rates. The non-gun homicide rate is much more similar
across these cities. The reason Chicago has a high overall homicide rate is entirely due to its
elevated gun homicide rate.
Figure 8: Gun and Non-gun Homicide Rates, 2016
32

Homicides per 100,000

28
24
20
16

25.1

12
8

10.6

4
0

2.7

2.3
1.6

Chicago

New York

14.7

5.3
2.1

2.7

2.7

Los Angeles

Houston

Philadelphia

Non-gun Homicide Rate

Gun Homicide Rate

Source: Crime Lab analysis of police department records

Gun crimes increased much more rapidly than did non-gun crimes in 2016.
The crime increase Chicago experienced in 2016 occurred disproportionately among offenses
that involved a firearm: gun homicides, non-fatal shootings, and gun robberies.7 The fact that
gun robberies increased alongside other forms of gun violence may suggest the increase in
2016 was not driven exclusively by gang feuds or altercations, since robberies typically also
have a financial motivation. The increase from 2015 to 2016 was, for the most part, much
smaller (in percentage terms) for crimes that did not involve guns, including violent crimes
with no gun involvement and property crimes.
Though non-gun homicides increased by 31 percent, since relatively few occur each year even
small absolute changes can yield large percentage changes: from 2015 to 2016, there were
18 additional non-gun homicides (from 59 to 77), compared to 261 additional gun homicides
(from 426 to 687). This suggests that what happened in Chicago in 2016 was less about an
overall increase in the prevalence of anti-social or criminal behavior, but more about a focused
increase in gun violence.
Figure 9: Gun and Non-gun Crime Victims:
Percent Change, 2015-2016
70%

61%

60%
50%

43%

40%

31%

26%

30%
20%

10%

10%
0%

Gun Homicide

Shooting

Gun Robbery

Non-gun
Homicide

Non-gun
Violent

6%

Property
(Incidents)

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

7 For information on how non-fatal shootings and other crimes referenced in this report are defined, please see the Appendix.

10

We have no reliable way of measuring the number of guns owned or carried in Chicago, or
how that changed, but we know that CPD recovers more firearms than police in New York
City, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.
In 2016, police in Chicago recovered firearms at a rate per capita that was almost twice that
of Los Angeles, six times that of New York City, and roughly on par with that of Philadelphia.8
This could mean that more illegal guns are on the streets in Chicago, or it could mean the
likelihood that a given illegal gun is confiscated by the police is higher in Chicago. In 2016,
CPD recovered 6,644 firearms, about the same number they recovered in 2015.
Figure 10: Firearms Recovered, 2015 vs. 2016
8,000

6,762

6,644

2015

2016

6,000
4,000
2,000
0

Figure 11: Firearms Recovered, 2016

8,000

6,644

6,000

5,908

4,000

3,865

3,583

Philadelphia

New York

2,000
0

Chicago

Los Angeles

Figure 12: Firearms Recovered per 100,000

Residents, 2016
300
250

247

243

200

149

150
100

42

50
0

Chicago

Los Angeles

Philadelphia

New York

Source: Crime Lab analysis of police department records

8 Firearm recovery statistics for Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia exclude weapons obtained through turn-in and
buy-back programs. Including weapons obtained through such programs, police in Chicago recovered 8,248 firearms in 2016.

11

The data also show that the types of guns recovered by CPD are changing.
A growing share of firearms recovered in Chicago consists of 9mm and .40 caliber handguns,
which accommodate larger-diameter ammunition than .22 caliber weapons.9 These largercaliber handguns also often support higher-capacity magazines that allow more ammunition
to be fired without reloading. The combination of larger ammunition and greater magazine
capacity may combine to make these weapons increasingly lethal, although there remains
some uncertainty on this point. This trend was also highlighted in a 2014 report released by
the Office of the Mayor of the City of Chicago, and recent reporting by The Baltimore Sun and
The Trace.10
Figure 13: Firearm Recoveries by Caliber, 2001-2016
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

.22 in

9mm

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

.40 in

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

9 Figure 13 reports the fraction of 9mm, .40 caliber, and .22 caliber firearms submitted by Chicago police for tracing through mid-2016.
Firearms of other calibers submitted for tracing are omitted from the figure for clarity. The vast majority of .22 caliber firearms submitted
for tracing consists of handguns, and are distinct from firearms able to fire .223 caliber rounds such as the AR-15, M16, and M4 rifles.
10 https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2014/May/05.27.14CPDReport.pdf,
http://data.baltimoresun.com/news/shoot-to-kill/, https://www.thetrace.org/2016/12/americas-obsession-powerful-handguns-risinggunshot-lethality/

12

HOW DID GUN VIOLENCE CHANGE IN 2016?

Most available measures that describe the circumstances, victims, and offenders of gun
violence in Chicago suggest that the character of the problem did not change much from
2015 to 2016, simply the volume. That is, Chicago for the most part experienced a broad
increase in all the same types of shootings that the city has experienced in years past.
African Americans continue to be overrepresented among Chicagos homicide victims.
Although African Americans comprise about one-third of the citys population, they made
up almost 80 percent of homicide victims in both 2015 and 2016. This phenomenon is even
more acute among African American men aged 15 to 34, who made up over half of the citys
homicide victims despite accounting for just 4 percent of the citys population. In contrast,
whites comprise about one-third of the citys population but make up approximately 5 percent
of its homicide victims.
Figure 14: Homicide Victims by Race, 2015 vs. 2016
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

79%

78%

16%

16%
4%

African American

Hispanic
2015

5%

White

2016

Most homicide victims were in their 20s and 30s.

In 2015, almost half of homicide victims (48 percent) were between the ages of 20 and 29,
decreasing to 45 percent in 2016.
Figure 15: Ages of Homicide Victims, 2015 vs. 2016
60%
48%

50%

45%

40%
30%
20%

17%

19%

19%

22%
16%

14%

10%
0%

10-19

20-29

30-39
2015

2016

Sources: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

13

40-64

Most homicide victims had prior contact with the criminal justice system.
Around 80 percent of Chicagos homicide victims in 2015 and 2016 had at least one prior
arrest, almost 40 percent had a prior violent crime arrest, and almost 30 percent had a prior
gun arrest. Nearly 40 percent of victims had more than 10 prior arrests, while the share with
more than 20 prior arrests rose from 14 to 18 percent in 2016. The share of victims with a
current or prior gang affiliation as recorded by CPD was about the same in both years (53 and
54 percent).
Figure 16: Homicide Victims:
Prior Arrests, 2015 vs. 2016

Figure 17: Homicide Victims:

Gang Affiliation, 2015 vs. 2016

100%
80%

60%

79% 79%

54%

2015

2016

40%

60%
36% 38%

40%

38% 38%
27% 26%

Prior arrest Prior violent Prior gun

crime arrest
arrest

2015

20%

14% 18%

20%
0%

53%

>10 prior
arrests

0%

>20 prior
arrests

2016

Most gun violence occurs in public places.

In 2016, 77 percent of gun homicides and shootings took place on the street or in an alley,
up from 75 percent in 2015.
Figure 18: Locations of Gun Homicide and Shooting
Incidents, 2015 vs. 2016
100%
80%

75%

77%

60%
40%
20%
0%

12%

Street/Alley

10%

5%

House/Residence

5%

Auto
2015

2%

Parking
Lot/Garage

2016

Sources: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

14

2%

5%

5%

Other

There seems to have been a decline in the share of homicides stemming from an altercation.
Around 64 percent of homicides in 2016 were described by CPD as stemming from an
altercation, down from 74 percent in 2015. Unless there was a change in how CPD recorded
the circumstances of homicides from 2015 to 2016, this suggests that homicides stemming
from other motivations increased more rapidly (by 121 percent) than did homicides stemming
from an altercation (by 35 percent).11
Figure 19: Homicides Stemming
from an Altercation,
2015 vs. 2016

Figure 19(A): Percent Change

in Homicides,
by Motive, 2015-2016

100%

140%
74%

80%

121%

120%
64%

100%

60%

80%

40%

60%

35%

40%

20%

20%
0%

0%

2015

Altercation

2016

Other

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

While adolescents make up a larger share of homicide arrestees in Chicago than in other
U.S. cities, a majority of those arrested for homicide in Chicago are in their 20s.
Across U.S. metropolitan areas, 15 percent of those arrested for homicide in 2015 were
adolescents, compared to 25 percent in Chicago. The average age of those arrested for
homicide in Chicago was 26 in 2016 and 2015.

60%

51%

Figure 21: U.S. Metro Areas: Ages

of Homicide Suspects, 2015

51%

50%
40%
30%

25% 25%
16%

20%

14%
8%

10%
0%

10-19

20-29
2015

30-39

11%

40-64

Percentage of Arrestees

Percentage of Arrestees

Figure 20: Chicago: Ages of Homicide

Suspects, 2015 vs. 2016

60%
50%

43%

40%
30%
20%

22%
15%

20%

10%
0%

10-19

20-29

30-39

40-64

2016
Source: FBI UCR, Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

11 Altercations can include arguments that turn deadly in the moment because a gun is at hand, as well as retaliatory violence that is less
spontaneous. Most of these altercations involve street gangs. As others have noted, these gangs typically consist of young men from the
same block engaged in intermittent conflicts with other gangs over what can appear to be insignificant insults, often delivered through social
media posts or drill music videos. This form of gang violence motivated by personal slights stands in contrast to disputes over territory and
drug selling that seem to have characterized gang activity in a previous era. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/October-2016/
Chicago-Gangs/, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/us/chicago-gang-violence.html, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/12/23/chicagogangs-violence-murder-rate-532034.html

15

Gun violence suspects continue to be people with extensive prior criminal records.12
Individuals arrested for a homicide or shooting in Chicago in 2016 and 2015 had similar prior
criminal records: around 90 percent had at least one prior arrest, approximately 50 percent
had a prior arrest for a violent crime specifically, and almost 40 percent had a prior gun
arrest. The average person arrested for a homicide or shooting in both years had nearly 12
prior arrests, with almost 45 percent having had more than 10 prior arrests, and almost 20
percent having had more than 20 prior arrests.
Figure 22: Homicide and Shooting Suspects:
Prior Arrests, 2015 vs. 2016
92%

100%

88%

80%
50%

60%

48%

40%

39%

43%

35%

44%
16%

20%
0%

Prior arrest

Prior violent crime

arrest

Prior gun arrest

2015

>10 prior arrests

19%

>20 prior arrests

2016

Source: FBI UCR, Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

Gun violence involving those not in gangs increased more rapidly than those committed
by gang-affiliated people.
The share of offenders with a current or prior gang affiliation, as noted by CPD, declined
from 73 percent in 2015 to 67 percent in 2016, suggesting that individuals not affiliated with
gangs may have been overrepresented among those driving the increase in violence. The
number of gang-affiliated individuals arrested for gun violence decreased by 6 percent in
2016 relative to 2015, while the number without a gang affiliation rose by 25 percent. While
data on gang affiliations are inherently imperfect, we have no reason to believe at this point
in time that the way CPD measured and recorded gang affiliation changed substantially in
2016 relative to 2015.
Figure 23: Homicide and
Shooting Suspects:
Gang Affiliation, 2015 vs. 2016
80%

73%

Figure 23(A): Percent Change in

Homicide and Shooting
Suspects, by Gang Affiliation,
2015-2016

67%

60%

20%

40%

10%
0%

20%
0%

25%

30%

-10%
2015

-20%

2016

-6%
Gang affiliated

Not gang affiliated

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

12 Most gun violence perpetrators remain unidentified (as discussed later in this report, there is no suspect arrested in the majority of
homicides and shootings), so the extensive criminal records of known suspects may not be representative of all perpetrators. The number
of individuals arrested for a homicide or shooting in 2015 and 2016 are 529 and 542, respectively.

16

Chicagos homicide increase was disproportionately concentrated in neighborhoods that

have historically been among the citys most disadvantaged.
Of Chicagos 77 community areas, 46 recorded more homicides in 2016 than 2015, while 31
recorded fewer or the same number.13 In neighborhoods where homicide increasedprimarily
on the citys South and West Sidesalmost 27 percent of the population lives below the poverty
level, compared to 17 percent in neighborhoods where homicide decreased or remained the
same, and 13.5 percent nationally.14 Despite containing only 9 percent of Chicagos population,
the five neighborhoods with the largest homicide increasesAustin, Englewood, New City,
West Englewood, and Greater Grand Crossingaccounted for 32 percent of homicides in
2016, up from 25 percent in 2015. These five neighborhoods alone account for nearly half (45
percent) of the citys overall homicide increase.15
Figure 24: Homicide Rates in Chicago

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

1
2
3
4

ROGERS PARK
WEST RIDGE
UPTOWN
LINCOLN SQUARE

17
18
19
20

5
6
7

NORTH CENTER
LAKE VIEW
LINCOLN PARK

21 AVONDALE
22 LOGAN SQUARE
23 HUMBOLDT PARK

37 FULLER PARK
38 GRAND BOULEVARD
39 KENWOOD

53 WEST PULLMAN
54 RIVERDALE
55 HEGEWISCH

NEAR NORTH SIDE

24 WEST TOWN

40 WASHINGTON PARK

56 GARFIELD RIDGE

72 BEVERLY

25 AUSTIN
26 WEST GARFIELD PARK
27 EAST GARFIELD PARK

41 HYDE PARK
42 WOODLAWN
43 SOUTH SHORE

57 ARCHER HEIGHTS
58 BRIGHTON PARK
59 MCKINLEY PARK

73 WASHINGTON HEIGHTS
74 MOUNT GREENWOOD
75 MORGAN PARK

9 EDISON PARK
10 NORWOOD PARK
11 JEFFERSON PARK

DUNNING
MONTCLARE
BELMONT CRAGIN
HERMOSA

33
34
35
36

NEAR SOUTH SIDE

ARMOUR SQUARE
DOUGLAS
OAKLAND

49
50
51
52

ROSELAND
PULLMAN
SOUTH DEERING
EAST SIDE

65
66
67
68

WEST LAWN
CHICAGO LAWN
WEST ENGLEWOOD
ENGLEWOOD

69 GREATER GRAND CROSSING

70 ASHBURN
71 AUBURN GRESHAM

12

FOREST GLEN

28 NEAR WEST SIDE

44 CHATHAM

60 BRIDGEPORT

76 OHARE

13

NORTH PARK

29 NORTH LAWNDALE

45 AVALON PARK

61

77 EDGEWATER

14
15

ALBANY PARK
PORTAGE PARK

30 SOUTH LAWNDALE
31 LOWER WEST SIDE

46 SOUTH CHICAGO
47 BURNSIDE

62 WEST ELSDON
63 GAGE PARK

16

IRVING PARK

32 LOOP

48 CALUMET HEIGHTS

64 CLEARING

NEW CITY

13 Data on each community areas homicides in 2015 and 2016 are presented in the Appendix.
14 http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf
15 This calculation accounts for the fact that some neighborhoods experienced homicide declines from 2015 to 2016, while others
experienced increases. These five neighborhoods accounted for 40 percent of the total increase among only those neighborhoods
that experienced homicide increases from 2015 to 2016.

17

WHAT CAUSED CHICAGOS HOMICIDE INCREASE?

THE UNSOLVED PUZZLE
Many candidate explanations have been offered for why crimeand gun crime in particular
increased in Chicago so sharply in 2016. Our review of news articles published in both local
and national outlets offers a wide-ranging list of claims:16 fractured gang hierarchies and
rivalries; high rates of neighborhood poverty and segregation; an influx of guns from other
places; insufficient penalties for illegal gun-carrying; social media disputes; demolition of
public housing; a lack of resources devoted to solving serious crimes; police department
management and manpower; reduced police activity; changes in city and state funding for
social services and other core government functions; the absence of family involvement in the
lives of youth; closing of mental health clinics; and weather.
However, the fact that Chicagos increase in gun violence happened so suddenly at the start of
2016 would seem to cast doubt on many of these explanations, which often focus on factors
that did not change much from 2015 to 2016. For example, Chicagos proximity to Indiana,
Alabama, and Mississippistates with less restrictive gun laws where many of the weapons
used in crimes in Chicago are initially purchaseddid not change abruptly at the end of 2015.
Nor were there abrupt changes to important but generally slow-moving social conditions,
such as the citys poverty rate or level of neighborhood economic and racial segregation. And
while some important social conditions have changed in Chicago quite sharply at particular
points in timefor example, the demolition of highly distressed public housing projects such
as the Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Greenthe timing of those events does not fit with
the recent increase.17
We focus here on hypotheses that could potentially explain the timing of the gun violence
increasethat is, why homicides and shootings increased so suddenly in early 2016and for
which we are able to bring some data to bear. We unfortunately cannot say much about
candidate explanations for which there is little relevant data. For example, factors such as
shifting gang structures, rivalries, and disputes, or changes in the use of social media by
Chicago gangs, could in principle have played a role in driving the citys recent increase in
violence, but because we are unable to measure these factors we do not know whether or
how they changed from 2015 to 2016. In what follows we explore what the available data can
tell us about what explanations might matter, and which ones clearly do not.

16 We surveyed major news outlets for pieces written in 2016 that offered at least one explanation for Chicagos homicide and gun
violence increase that year. We limited our search to the top 10 print news outlets by readership (USA Today, The New York Times,
The Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, New York Post, Chicago Tribune, The Washington Post, Newsday, Daily News,
amNewYork), local publications (Chicago Sun-Times, DNAinfo Chicago, The Trace), news magazines (The New Yorker, Newsweek,
Newsday, Forbes), and non-print sources (FiveThirtyEight, NPR, Slate, The Root, WBEZ, US News, Vice News).
17 For example, the demolition of these housing projects concluded in 2007 and 2011, respectively.

18

This is not about weather.

Conventional wisdom among both residents and front-line practitioners is that warmer
weather leads to more crime, and inclement weather to less crime. This conventional wisdom
is also supported by social science research.18 However, the available data offer no evidence
that unusual weather patterns contributed to Chicagos surge in gun violence in 2016. This
past year was only slightly warmer than the historical average, and many of the months in
2016 that showed large year-to-year increases in homicides had temperatures almost exactly
equal to that months historical average.

Figure 25: Homicide Victims: Percent Change

Compared to Prior Year, Monthly and Historical Temperature
80

200%

70

150%

60

125%
100%

50

75%

40

50%
25%

30

0%

20

-25%
-50%

10

1/13
2/13
3/13
4/13
5/13
6/13
7/13
8/13
9/13
10/13
11/13
12/13
1/14
2/14
3/14
4/14
5/14
6/14
7/14
8/14
9/14
10/14
11/14
12/14
1/15
2/15
3/15
4/15
5/15
6/15
7/15
8/15
9/15
10/15
11/15
12/15
1/16
2/16
3/16
4/16
5/16
6/16
7/16
8/16
9/16
10/16
11/16
12/16

-75%
-100%

Temperature (F)

Homicide Victims % Change

175%

2013

2014

2015

Monthly Temperature

2016

Historical Temperature

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

18 Brian Jacob, Lars Lefgren, and Enrico Moretti (2007). The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior: Evidence from Weather Shocks.
Journal of Human Resources, 42(3) 489-527. See also the Appendix to Jillian Carr and Jennifer Doleac (2016). Keep the kids inside?
Juvenile curfews and urban gun violence, UVA Working paper, http://jenniferdoleac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Carr_Doleac_
ShotSpotter_Curfew.pdf

19

The City of Chicagos spending on its most needy citizens seems to have remained stable
in recent years.
While the City consolidated its system of mental health clinics from 12 to 6, that occurred in
2012, so the timing of that change does not seem to fit with the suddenness of the increase
in gun violence that happened at the beginning of 2016.19 Other forms of social service
spending seem to have held steady over the recent past. What the City terms Community
Services within its budget includes funding for the Department of Public Health, Commission
on Human Relations, Mayors Office for People with Disabilities, Chicago Public Library, and
the Department of Family and Support Services (DFSS). DFSS, in particular, serves many of
the citys most at-risk youth through out-of-school programs and employment opportunities.
Chicagos annual budget for Community Services overall, and DFSS specifically, has not
fluctuated much in the last few years.

Figure 26: City of Chicago Social Service Spending, 2012-2016

$700

$605

Millions ($)

$600

$581

$561

$547

$534

$500
$400

$364

$322

$298

$300

$333

$348

$200
$100
$0

2012

2013

2014

All Community Service

2015

2016

DFSS

Source: City of Chicago Budget Overview

However, the recent deterioration in the financial condition of the state of Illinois, and the
resulting budget impasse, seems to have caused disruptions for many community organizations
that rely on state funding.20 The cumulative effect of these service disruptions and their impact
on gun violence in 2016, however, is difficult to gauge without more detailed data on their
exact magnitude and timing.

19 http://resources.hdadvocates.org/health/Chicago-Mental-Health-and-Public-Health-2015.pdf
20 For example, as a direct result of Illinois failing to pass a FY2015 budget, Lutheran Social Services of Illinois closed several residential
rehabilitation and prisoner re-entry centers in Chicago; Redeploy Illinois, a community-based alternative to youth incarceration,
curtailed its services; Childrens Home + Aid, a social service agency, suspended a 24-hour crisis intervention service for runaway youth
in Englewood and West Englewood; and a provider of afterschool activities for students on Chicagos Southwest Side cut back its
programming. Earlier in 2015, state funding for Cure Violence, a violence prevention organization operating in Chicago, was suspended,
although the timing of that funding reduction does not seem to fit well as a candidate explanation for the increase in gun violence since
the latter occurred at the end of 2015 (see also the Appendix). http://www.voices4kids.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/BudgetImpasse-Continues-to-Devastate-Illinois-Families-and-Communities-FINAL.pdf

20

Chicagos spending on public schools did not appear to change dramatically.

Instructional spending per student in the Chicago Public Schools system declined slightly
during the 2015-16 academic year, though the high school cohort graduation rate rose gradually
in recent years. There is no evidence in the available data that a collapse in education spending
or performance in Chicago public schools contributed to the 2016 homicide increase.
Figure 27: Chicago Public Schools Spending & Graduation Rate,
2012-2016
80%

$10,000
$8,458

$8,586

$7,970

$8,291
$8,000

Graduation Rate

60%

$6,000
40%
$4,000

20%
$2,000

0%

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

Instructional Spending per Pupil

2014-15

Graduation Rate

Source: Chicago Public Schools

21

2015-16

$0

Instructional Spending per Pupil

$8,294

Arrests were down in 2016, although this decline was concentrated among drug arrests.
In 2016, Chicago police made 24 percent fewer arrests than in 2015, accelerating the steady
downward trend in arrests the city has seen in recent years. However, this overall reduction in
arrests seems to have been driven largely by a decline in arrests for drug offenses, which fell
by 44 percent from 2015 to 2016.21 Arrests for property and violent crimes did not decline as
much, and arrests for homicides and shootings actually rose by 3 and 4 percent, respectively,
while arrests for illegal gun possession remained largely unchanged.
Figure 29: Monthly Narcotics
Arrests, 2010-2016

Figure 28: Monthly Total Arrests,

2010-2016
20,000

5,000

15,000

4,000
3,000

10,000

2,000

5,000

1,000

Figure 30: Monthly Property Crime

Arrests, 2010-2016

Figure 31: Monthly Violent Crime

Arrests, 2010-2016

2,000

1,000

1,500

800
600

1,000

400

500

200

Figure 33: Monthly Shooting Arrests,

2010-2016

Figure 32: Monthly Gun Arrests,

2010-2016
60

500
400

40

300
200

20

100
0

Figure 34: Monthly Homicide

Arrests, 2010-2016
80
60
40
20
0
Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records
21 Two recent legislative changes affecting narcotics arrests by Chicago police include the enactment of local and state measures
decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana. The City enacted its measure, which reduced the penalty for possessing
15 grams or less of marijuana to a ticket of $250-$500, in August 2012. The state law, Illinois SB2228, was signed in July 2016 and
introduced penalties of $100-$200 for possession of up to 10 grams of marijuana.

22

The clearance rate for gun crimes declined in 2016.

Because both homicides and shootings increased markedly in 2016, while arrests for these
offenses held steady, there was a decrease in the likelihood of arrest (or clearance rate)
for gun violence. From 2015 to 2016, the clearance rate fell from 36 percent to 26 percent
for homicide, and from 7 percent to 5 percent for shootings.22 This decrease in the clearance
rate is unlikely to have been what caused the surge in gun violence initially, but it may have
accelerated this phenomenon, for example by fueling a cycle of retaliatory violence.23
Figure 35: Homicide Clearance Rate, 2010-2016
60%
46%

43%
40%

44%

39%

37%

36%
26%

20%

0%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 36: Shooting Clearance Rate, 2010-2016

20%

11%

11%

10%

10%

9%

10%

7%
5%

0%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

22 With the data available to us, we can only approximate the clearance rate by dividing the number of incidents in which an arrest was
made by the number of incidents that occurred. For example, in 2016, 726 homicide incidents (yielding 764 homicide victims) occurred,
while the police made at least one arrest in 189 homicide incidents (occurring in 2016 or a previous year), yielding a clearance rate of
26 percent. Other ways of calculating the clearance rate are unlikely to change the basic conclusion that it was lower in 2016 relative to
2015 for gun violence.
23 If homicide and shooting arrests had declined in 2016, then that could in principle have been the main cause of Chicagos increase in
gun violence. Instead, the data show such arrests holding steady but failing to keep pace with a surge in gun violence that must have
been precipitated by something else. By failing to keep pace, however, the likelihood that shooters are held accountable declines. In
addition, public confidence in the criminal justice system may have declined as community members saw those who committed acts of
violence remain free. Instead of formally seeking justice, some may have been encouraged to resort to retaliation, continuing the cycle
of violence and further eroding trust in law enforcement.

23

Another form of police activity that declined in 2016 is street stops.

Chicago police recorded over 80 percent fewer stops in January 2016 than they had
in November 2015. This drop, from an average of over 50,000 stops per month in 2015
(through November) to approximately 10,000 stops per month starting in early 2016, began
a few months before rates of gun violence in Chicago began to increase. What caused the
decline is itself unclear. Several frequently-mentioned candidate explanationsthe release
of video footage showing the shooting by a CPD officer of teenager Laquan McDonald,
announcement of a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of CPD, implementation
of an agreement between the City and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) concerning
street stops, and a new state law regarding street stopsall happened essentially within a
few weeks of each other in late 2015 and early 2016.24
Figure 37: Street Stops, 2014-2016
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000

11/16

10/16

8/16

9/16

7/16

6/16

5/16

3/16

4/16

1/16

2/16

12/15

11/15

10/15

9/15

7/15

8/15

5/15

6/15

4/15

2/15

3/15

1/15

12/14

11/14

9/14

10/14

7/14

8/14

5/14

6/14

4/14

3/14

1/14

2/14

10,000

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

24 The video of the fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald was released on November 24, 2015, while the announcement that DOJ opened
a civil pattern or practice investigation of CPD came on December 7, 2015. On January 1, 2016, an agreement between the City and
the ACLU went into effect, requiring an independent evaluation of CPD practices and procedures, and introducing a new Investigatory
Stop Report (ISR) that officers were required to complete after every street stop. On the same day, Illinois SB1304 went into effect,
also requiring police to record information about each investigative street stop, as well as requiring them to issue a receipt after each
such stop.

24

Nor is it clear what role, if any, the decline in street stops played in contributing to the increase
in gun violence in Chicago in 2016,25 since other cities have experienced large declines in
street stops without similar increases in gun crime. For example, police in New York City
reported a reduction in street stops between 2011 and 2015 of 97 percent, while homicides
over this period did not increase at alland in fact continued their long-term decline.26 It is
possible that reducing street stops could have different effects across cities, but this is not
something that is currently well understood.

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Homicide Rate

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Street Stops (Thousands)

Homicides per 100,000

Figure 38: Homicide Rate and Street Stops,

New York, 2002-2016

Street Stops

Source: New York Civil Liberties Union, FBI UCR

25 Although previous studies examining various forms of preventive or problem-solving policing on crime have generally found them to
be effective, the studies are typically of small pilot programs implemented in ways that did not exacerbate tensions with the
community. The effects of a much larger scale, citywide effort are difficult to determine from the available academic research. See:
Sherman, Lawrence and Dennis Rogan (1995). Effects of gun seizures on gun violence: Hot spots patrol in Kansas City. Justice
Quarterly, 12(4), 673-693. Cohen, Jacqueline and Jens Ludwig (2003). Policing Crime Guns. Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime
and Violence, 217-218. Braga, Anthony and David Weisburd (2010). Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention.
New York: Oxford University Press.
26 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/nyregion/what-donald-trump-got-wrong-on-stop-and-frisk.html. Even during a two-week
period in late 2014 and early 2015 when arrests for low-level crimes in New York City fell by over 90 percent, crime initially declined
before rising modestly. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/nyregion/decrease-in-new-york-police-arrests-continues-for-a-secondweek.html

25

CONCLUSION
Our hope is that the data reported here may be helpful to the ongoing conversation in
Chicago about how to improve the safety and well-being of all residents of our home city,
particularly those living in our most disadvantaged neighborhoods where the burden of
crime is most severe. The data indicate that overall crime in the city of Chicago is not spiraling
out of control. However, the city has witnessed a sudden, large, and seemingly sustained
increase in gun crime occurring in public, involving teens and men in their 20s and 30s, in a
small number of distressed neighborhoods on Chicagos South and West sides.
Unfortunately, the available data cannot at this time point definitively to what caused the
increase in gun violence in Chicago in 2016. Many common hypotheses for the gun violence
problem in Chicagosuch as proximity to states with less restrictive gun laws, or social
conditions evolve slowly over time and did not change abruptly at the end of 2015. As a
result, these explanations are difficult to reconcile with the sudden and dramatic increase in
gun violence at the start of 2016. Factors such as weather, city spending on social services
or public education, or overall police activity (as measured by arrests) did not seem to
change abruptly enough in 2016 to explain the violence increase either, while the effect of
disruption to community organizations stemming from the state budget impasse is difficult
to measure. We do see declines in 2016 in selected measures of police activity, such as the
likelihood of arrest for a homicide or shooting and investigatory street stops. However, the
contribution of these changes to the increase in gun violence remains unclear. Other factors
that we cannot measure with currently available data, such as the structure of gang activity
and social media use, could also have played a role. The fact that many other American cities
saw homicides increase in 2015 and 2016 suggests that part of what Chicago experienced
this past year may not be unique to our city.
Despite the uncertainty about what caused the increase in gun violence in Chicago in 2016,
the city need not be paralyzed in crafting a response. The solution to a problem need not
be the opposite of its cause. For example, in 1950, the U.S. experienced 22 motor vehicle
fatalities for every 100,000 residents. Most of those fatalities were due to some type of
driver error, such as speeding, veering into an oncoming lane, and running through stop
signs or red lights. But progress in reducing auto fatalities in the U.S. did not come from
eliminating all driver mistakes; instead, it came in large part from improving the safety of cars
and roadways. The result is that U.S. motor vehicle fatalities per 100,000 people today are
less than half what they were in 1950. This example is not intended to illustrate or endorse
any particular strategy for reducing gun violence in Chicago, but rather to emphasize that
the set of possible solutions the city can consider is broader than whatever turn out to be
the causes of the 2016 surge in gun violence. The key lesson from the available data is that
the problem does not represent a widespread change in anti-social or criminal behavior in
general, but rather a narrower challenge of gun crimes committed in public places, frequently
by young peopleadults as well as teenagersin our citys most distressed neighborhoods.
While this report is intended to present just the facts, our goal is to inform the ongoing
conversation about how the city can reverse this trend and keep all city residents safe.
We will continue to partner with the city and civic community to share, help implement,
and evaluate (when possible) the most promising solutions, and aim to share our current
thinking and best ideas in other venues in the future.

26

APPENDIX
Motivation for focusing on monthly year-to-year changes to track the increase in gun violence
Because gun violence follows a seasonal patternhigher in the summer, lower in the winter
we focus on monthly year-to-year changes to isolate trends over time in the data from
regular seasonal changes in violence that occur every year. That is, by comparing rates of
gun violence in each month of the year to the rate of crime in the same month in the prior
year, we can avoid confusing changes in trends with seasonal effects.
To see why this is important, consider the number of homicides in each month of 2014 and
2015. As one can see in the figure below, homicides began to increase in the spring of 2015
and into the summer. Focusing just on those month-to-month changes over the course of
2015 might lead to a conclusion that something in the winter or spring of 2015 (e.g., the cut
in state funding to Cure Violence in March 2015) contributed to the subsequent increase in
homicides. But the figure below also shows that a similar increase in homicides occurred
in 2014 as the temperature increased; that is, at least part of the homicide increase that
occurred after March 2015 was due to the normal seasonal pattern that we see every year.
The figure below shows that, for a few months over the summer, homicides in 2015 were
indeed above their levels in 2014, but by the fall, October, November, and December of 2015
looked very similar to the same months in 2014. There does not appear to have been any
change over the course of 2015 that caused a sustained increase in lethal violence in the city.

Figure 39: Homicide Victims, 2014-2015

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Month
2014

2015

Source: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

27

10

11

12

In contrast, the figure below also includes homicide counts for each month of 2016. This
figure makes it clear that, beginning in January 2016, homicides were immediately much
higher than they were in January 2015, and this remained true for each subsequent month.
Figure 40: Homicide Victims, 2014-2016
100
80
60
40
20
0

10

11

12

Month
2014

2015

2016

Finally, the figure below reproduces part of Figure 6 in the main text and shows the homicide
change in each month of 2016 relative to 2015, expressed in percentage terms. For example,
the 50 homicide victims in January 2016 represent a 67 percent increase over the 30 victims
in January 2015. This figure makes clear that the 2016 homicide surge began suddenly in
January of that year, and was sustained in almost each month that followed.
Figure 41: Homicide Victims:
2016 Percent Change Compared to Prior Year
180%

165%

160%

142%

140%
120%
100%
80%

97%

90%
67%

69%

60%

60%

43%
32%

40%
20%

28%
6%

0%
-20%

-3%
1

Month
Sources: Crime Lab analysis of CPD records

28

10

11

12

Data Sources
The crime-related data used in this report are drawn from multiple sources.
Crime, victimization, and arrest
Homicide rate data were obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program for 1985-2015,
specifically from Table 8: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, by State by City. Homicide rates are
calculated per 100,000 people using each citys annual population data, as reported to the UCR. For
calculating 2016 homicide rates, we use the population each city reported to the UCR in 2015.
Final homicide data for Chicago in 2016 were obtained from internal CPD records, and for the cities of
New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Philadelphia from their respective police departments. For the cities
of Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Milwaukee, Detroit, and St. Louis, 2016 homicide data were obtained from
public sources, including news accounts.27
This report also includes data on homicides committed with and without the use of a firearm. These data
are not available at the city agency level through the FBI, and were obtained separately from the police
departments of Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, Houston, and Philadelphia.
Data on the ages of individuals arrested for homicide were collected from the FBI UCR Crime in the U.S.
2015 report, specifically from Table 52: Arrests: Metropolitan Counties, by Age.
Demographic and prior arrest data for homicide suspects and victims in Chicago, as well as aggregate
counts of crimes, arrests, and victimizations, were obtained from internal CPD records.
Drug arrests include any arrests for possession, sale, or manufacture of narcotics, or misuse of prescription
drugs. Gun-related arrests include only arrests for weapons violations and do not include arrests for violent
crimes where a gun was used. Throughout this report, a non-fatal shooting is defined as an instance of
aggravated battery with a firearm against an individual.

Firearm recoveries
Firearm recovery data for 2011-2016 were obtained from the Chicago Police Department, the New York
City Police Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department. As noted in the report, these numbers
exclude any firearms recovered as a result of gun buyback or trade-in programs. Firearm recovery rates are
calculated using the number of recovered guns per city per year and the corresponding population data
for each city, retrieved from the UCR for each year. The caliber information reported for recovered guns in
Chicago was provided by the Chicago Police Department.

Neighborhood poverty and population

Data on Chicago households below the poverty line, unemployment rate, population, and per capita income
by community area come from the 2014 American Community Survey 5-year estimates.

27 Baltimore: http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-overnight-shooting-20170101-story.html
Washington, D.C.: http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/district-crime-data-glance
Milwaukee: http://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/Milwaukee-Homicide-Tracker-367120481.html
Detroit: http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/01/03/crime-detroit-overall-homicides/96134646/
St. Louis: http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-murders-in-tied-with/article_03532127-f975-511c-8c6c65f25b09e69c.html

29

Weather
Daily weather data for Chicago, reported at Chicago Midway International Airport, were obtained from the
Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN) at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).

Chicago social service spending, education spending, and graduation rates

Data on social service spending by the City of Chicago were obtained from its public budget documents.
Data on instructional spending per pupil by the Chicago Public Schools were obtained from public
budgets for academic years 2012 through 2016. Instructional spending is defined as the sum of studentoriented spending on core instruction, diverse learners, bilingual education, early childhood programs,
other programs, and discretionary funds. Cohort graduation rates were obtained from public data reported
by the Chicago Public Schools.

Street stops
Monthly data on police investigatory street stops in Chicago were provided by the CPD. Annual street stop
data for New York City were obtained from public data reported by the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU).

30

Homicides by Community Area, 20152016

Community Area

Homicides

Homicides per 100,000

Name

Number

Population

2015

2016

Change

2015

2016

Change

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

25
68
61
67
69
49
71
26
27
23
29
66
40
63
20
31
46
58
73
30
43
65
8
24
70
2
57
28
35
37
41
45
50
54
62
10
17
21
32
33
34
36
38
42
51
52
4
5
6
7
9
11
12
13
48
55
56
59
64
72
74
77
1
15
18
19
39
60
76
14
16
75
22
44
47
3
53

99,711
27,297
41,598
34,272
32,849
44,267
47,611
18,885
20,271
54,515
35,623
56,293
11,647
40,381
24,836
34,979
28,550
44,130
26,435
72,881
48,816
33,477
84,305
84,319
42,809
73,019
13,998
58,899
19,430
2,543
26,705
10,098
6,970
7,190
19,165
41,867
43,053
39,117
30,642
22,021
13,850
6,473
22,531
25,451
15,570
23,739
39,547
34,815
97,968
65,951
10,993
26,975
18,478
18,058
13,400
9,338
34,743
16,449
24,452
21,002
18,357
55,276
55,053
64,427
12,840
79,069
18,217
31,939
22,239
52,930
56,490
29,300
74,055
31,493
2,618
54,062
31,878

48
21
18
17
18
18
13
15
17
18
23
10
4
7
0
4
12
5
9
13
16
0
1
5
6
4
1
11
3
3
0
2
0
3
3
0
0
2
1
2
1
2
7
7
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
3
1
0
0
0
1
6
2
1
8
5
3
1
5
7
6
7
22
3
12
15

87
49
41
36
34
32
27
28
28
28
33
19
11
14
6
10
18
11
15
18
21
5
5
9
10
7
4
13
5
5
2
4
2
5
5
1
1
3
2
3
2
3
8
8
2
2
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
3
1
0
0
0
1
5
1
0
7
4
2
0
3
5
4
4
19
0
8
10

39
28
23
19
16
14
14
13
11
10
10
9
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-2
-2
-3
-3
-3
-4
-5

48.1
76.9
43.3
49.6
54.8
40.7
27.3
79.4
83.9
33.0
64.6
17.8
34.3
17.3
0.0
11.4
42.0
11.3
34.0
17.8
32.8
0.0
1.2
5.9
14.0
5.5
7.1
18.7
15.4
118.0
0.0
19.8
0.0
41.7
15.7
0.0
0.0
5.1
3.3
9.1
7.2
30.9
31.1
27.5
6.4
4.2
2.5
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
0.0
0.0
14.9
0.0
8.6
6.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.8
10.9
3.1
7.8
10.1
27.4
9.4
4.5
9.4
12.4
20.5
9.5
69.9
114.6
22.2
47.1

87.3
179.5
98.6
105.0
103.5
72.3
56.7
148.3
138.1
51.4
92.6
33.8
94.4
34.7
24.2
28.6
63.0
24.9
56.7
24.7
43.0
14.9
5.9
10.7
23.4
9.6
28.6
22.1
25.7
196.6
7.5
39.6
28.7
69.5
26.1
2.4
2.3
7.7
6.5
13.6
14.4
46.3
35.5
31.4
12.8
8.4
2.5
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
0.0
0.0
14.9
0.0
8.6
6.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.8
9.1
1.6
0.0
8.9
22.0
6.3
0.0
5.7
8.9
13.7
5.4
60.3
0.0
14.8
31.4

39.1
102.6
55.3
55.4
48.7
31.6
29.4
68.8
54.3
18.3
28.1
16.0
60.1
17.3
24.2
17.2
21.0
13.6
22.7
6.9
10.2
14.9
4.7
4.7
9.3
4.1
21.4
3.4
10.3
78.6
7.5
19.8
28.7
27.8
10.4
2.4
2.3
2.6
3.3
4.5
7.2
15.4
4.4
3.9
6.4
4.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1.8
-1.6
-7.8
-1.3
-5.5
-3.1
-4.5
-3.8
-3.5
-6.8
-4.1
-9.5
-114.6
-7.4
-15.7

Austin
Englewood
New City
West Englewood
Greater Grand Crossing
Roseland
Auburn Gresham
West Garfield Park
East Garfield Park
Humboldt Park
North Lawndale
Chicago Lawn
Washington Park
Gage Park
Hermosa
Lower West Side
South Chicago
Brighton Park
Washington Heights
South Lawndale
South Shore
West Lawn
Near North Side
West Town
Ashburn
West Ridge
Archer Heights
Near West Side
Douglas
Fuller Park
Hyde Park
Avalon Park
Pullman
Riverdale
West Elsdon
Norwood Park
Dunning
Avondale
Loop
Near South Side
Armour Square
Oakland
Grand Boulevard
Woodlawn
South Deering
East Side
Lincoln Square
North Center
Lake View
Lincoln Park
Edison Park
Jefferson Park
Forest Glen
North Park
Calumet Heights
Hegewisch
Garfield Ridge
McKinley Park
Clearing
Beverly
Mount Greenwood
Edgewater
Rogers Park
Portage Park
Montclare
Belmont Cragin
Kenwood
Bridgeport
O'Hare
Albany Park
Irving Park
Morgan Park
Logan Square
Chatham
Burnside
Uptown
West Pullman

31