ESPIONAGE IN THE 16TH CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN: SECRET DIPLOMACY,

MEDITERRANEAN GO-BETWEENS AND THE OTTOMAN HABSBURG RIVALRY

A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in History.

By

Emrah Safa Grkan, M.A.

Washington, DC
April 11, 2012

Copyright 2012 by Emrah Safa Grkan

All Rights Reserved

ii

ESPIONAGE IN THE 16TH CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN:

SECRET DIPLOMACY, MEDITERRANEAN GO-BETWEENS AND THE OTTOMAN
HABSBURG RIVALRY
Emrah Safa Grkan, M.A
Dissertation Advisor: Gbor goston, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
Spies played a crucial role in early modern imperial rivalries. While past scholars have
emphasized the Islam/Christendom divide in the Mediterranean, these go-betweens, who
mastered the codes of both cultures, easily crossed invisible boundaries between civilizations and
connected the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, two imperial powers at each others throat. Apart
from providing both empires with regular information on political and military developments,
these entrepreneur information brokers played an active diplomatic role between two capitals and
even participated in Ottoman factional politics.
This dissertation compares both empires secret services and explains the differences
between the two systems of information gathering based on these empires differing
organizational structures. It argues that the Habsburgs tried to institutionalize and standardize
their secret services in accordance with their general efforts of bureaucratization and
centralization, even though the effect of such efforts remained rather limited in the Levant. The
Ottomans, on the other hand, maintained their longstanding decentralized approach and
delegated the responsibility of gathering information to pashas and court favourites who
established their own intelligence networks. This created a rather different situation whereby
these networks served their masterss interests rather than that of the state, thus giving the
iii

historian ample information on Ottoman factional politics. In relying on oral communication and
not following the recent developments in steganography and cryptography, the Ottoman secret
service was more personal than institutional.
Still, the Ottoman secret service produced good results. In spite of these differences that
could have been otherwise considered shortcomings and contrary to the unwarranted
assumptions that prevailed in Western historiography, the Ottomans successfully developed a
functional information gathering mechanism which in itself was coherent. The real factor that
negatively affected the efficiency of both empires was the lack of direct diplomacy between two
capitals. While both empires kept themselves informed of political developments and military
preparations, they failed to develop an awareness of each others legal, political and economic
systems as well as cultural, linguistic and religious particularities.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge those who have been part of this research directly. I
owe too much to my two advisors who supported me for so many years. The eyhl-mverrihin
of Ottoman History, Prof. Halil nalck has not only shared the intricacies of Ottoman sources
with a number of students at Bilkent University including myself, but also encouraged, or to put
it better, demanded me to study languages and paleography so that I could explore the
possibilities that the Mediterranean History could offer for Ottoman historiography. I thank him
for the inspiration and his support during my Ankara years. In Washington, Prof. Gbor goston,
albeit equally demanding, has been a very friendly advisor and a fervent supporter of my
research and my career between that autumn night when we met in Venice in 2005 until the final
penning of this dissertation. He has been a part of every step of my academic journey through the
Ph.D. program in Georgetown University; it was only natural that two Ottomans such as we have
ended up in a relationship of patronage. Few graduate students have an advisor who has brought
more books for his student than for himself every time he comes back from the library. I am one
of that few. Prof. Oktay zel has always been somehow engaged in my research and taught me a
good deal about Ottoman History, sacrificing his time for the benefit of several young scholars,
none of whom, I believe, would fail to appreciate his contributions. I am glad to have joined the
ranks of many whose theses he has supervised unofficially. Finally, I would like to evoke the
memory of Prof. Faruk Tabak, a passionate historian and an altruistic professor, who passed
away in 2008.
Professors Maria Pia Pedani from Universit Ca Foscari, Emilio Sola from Universidad
de Alcal and dris Bostan from stanbul niversitesi kindly shared their vast knowledge on
v

sources and historiography with me. Among my professors at Georgetown University, I

benefitted a good deal from Prof. James Collins interesting courses which left a permanent mark
on my methodology as well as my writing. I thank him and Prof. John McNeill for their useful
comments on how to develop this dissertation into a book. I also enjoyed many interesting
conversations with Profs. James Shedel and David Goldfrank during my five-year stay on the
sixth-floor of ICC. Finally, I should acknowledge the contribution of two authors who made me
love history when I was a child: Kemal Tahir whose works encouraged me to become a historian
and Michel Zvaco, the author of several chivalry novels including his ten-volume opus
magnum, les Pardaillan. His works ignited an interest for European history in me and made me
choose the 16th century as the time period to study.
I would also like to show my appreciation for my family that has supported me for so
many years. Without my parents guidance and support, I would hardly have had a B.A., let
alone a Ph.D. My mother Eda always gave sound advice to this impatient graduate student who
sometimes felt his was too long a road to finish. Also, it was her foresight, and definitely not
mine, that I learned several languages. For reasons I still cannot figure out, she sent me to
language courses in several parts of Europe even when I thought she was ruining my precious
summers which I would have spent playing Civilization or Championship Manager. I would also
like to thank my father Doan who shaped my early intellectual life and sparked the interest for
history in me by taking me to old bookstores when I was a child. My wife Elif valiantly put up
with the disadvantages of being married to a historian who takes occasional archival trips that
last for months. I found in her a stunningly efficient editor who fought her way against an
intransigent author who fiercely defended his every word. Thank you for your endless patience
vi

in the face of ups-and-downs of a highly unpredictable graduate student with a notorious short
temper. Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to my brother-in-law and friend, Ergun.
I should not neglect my friends. I thank Cenk Erkan for long years of friendship and
hospitality, equaling the affection of a brother. I am eternally grateful to Ekin zbier, Melis
Szer and Fehmi nsalan for many things that are hard to explain in one sentence. Polat Safi
convinced me, on a rainy night in 2002, to become a historian, a decision which I never
regretted. I thank Eren Safi and Hakan Arslanbenzer for providing me with the opportunity to
test my writing skills at the beginning of my academic career. Mehmet Uur Ekinci, Kvan Co,
Murat nsoy, Onur i, and Akn nver have been loyal friends and enthusiastic supporters of
my academic pursuit since the beginning of my university education in 1999; I was lucky to meet
the latter three in Washington D.C. as well. I would like to thank them for their engaging
discussions and stimulating conversations. I would like to express my gratitude to Nahide Ik
Demirakn for indulging my wild imagination by listening to my long stories and extravagant
theories. I should also show my appreciation to my other fellow mverrihan- Bilkent, Evrim
Trkelik, Yaln Murgul and Harun Yeni. In Washington, I was lucky to have Anand Toprani
and Andrea Chiovenda as close friends; even though the latter betrayed us by going to Boston
University in the end, the three of us continued seeing each other, discussing a wide range of
topics from Antiquity to cricket, Virgil to tribes in Afghanistan, I.D.F. to Corrado Guzzanti. One
of the most exceptional figures of Turkish community in D.C., Cenk Sidar has been a loyal
friend and an intellectual companion. During my final years in Washington, I had the privilege to
know Chris Gratien with whom I initiated the internet project ottomanhistorypodcast.com, even
though my other engagements lately prevented me from shouldering my fair share of the burden.
vii

Gne Iksel from Leipzig Ekol extensively commented on chapters, while many heated
discussions with Kahraman akul and Gnhan Breki contributed to this dissertation to the
extent that my stubborn nature allowed changes. Although for reasons unexplained we met each
other very recently, zlem Kumrular and I quickly teamed up not only in joint lectures and TV
programs, but also in movie nights and long phone conversations. Her earlier work inspired me
while her friendship was invaluable. I also thank Roy Higgs for his interest in my work and for
giving me the opportunity to test myself in front of a rather unusual crowd for an Ottomanist. To
wrap it up, I finally express my thanks to Heath Lowry, Haluk Oral, Krad Karacagil, Onur
Yazcolu, Ekrem Taha Baer, Piero Zennaro, Muhammed Fatih alr, Asl Niyaziolu, Jorge
Gil Herrara, Serap Mumcu, Christian Christos, Bar Akbulut, Sabrina Scaletta, Emin Nedret li,
Athina Nanou, Tarkan Kocakurt, Eylem Ersal Kzler, Erdem zkan, Pablo Ortego Rico, zgr
Sezer, Ela Okanay, Elin Arabac, Ali Kibar, Sonay Kanber, Graham Pitts, Selim Gngrrler,
Eliana Biasiolo, Erasmo Castellani, Gamze Ergr, Gian Guido Guerrini, Mehtap olak, and
Bahadr Akn.
During my several research trips, I enjoyed the hospitality of the staff of the archives and
libraries that made my research easier and made a number of good friends with whom I
discussed history, watched soccer and travelled. The director of the research room from AGS,
Isabella Aguirre was always ready to help us with the archival fonts and documents. With Benoit
Marechaux, I shared not only many research interests, but also several lunches and night-outs in
plazas of Valladolid, campi of Venice and, just a few days before my dissertation defense, in the
bars of Seville. Another friend, Dr. Martin Rothkegel was always enthusiastic about his gobetween friend from Chios, Giacomo Paleologos. I thank him for his enlightening conversations
viii

and his family for hosting me in Berlin. I also should not forget our conversations with Prof.
Claudio Povolo, who always had something interesting to say, while smoking his cigarette in the
cortile of ASV.
I take full responsibility of any factual errors in this dissertation. If there are many, I can
but quote Seneca the Younger: Errare humanum est perseverare autem diabolicum.
Emrah Safa Grkan
Erenky, Istanbul
April, 2012

ix

Kzm Zeynepe

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Archives and Libraries
AGS
AMAE
AMSC
ASF
ASG
ASN
ASV
AV
BOA
BM
BMC
BNCF
BNM
BNE
DAD
IUK
TSK

Archivo General de Simancas, Valladolid

Archives des Affaires trangres, Paris
Archivo del Marqus de Santa Cruz, Madrid
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Florence
Archivio di Stato di Genova, Genoa
Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Naples
Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice
Archivio Vaticano, Rome
Babakanlk Osmanlk Arivleri, Istanbul
British Museum, London
Biblioteca del Museo Correr, Venice
Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Firenze
Biblioteca Marciana, Venice
Biblioteca Nacional de Espaa, Madrid
Dravni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, Dubrovnik
Istanbul niversitesi Ktphanesi, Istanbul
Topkap Saray Ktphanesi, Istanbul
Frequently used Archival fonts

CCX-LettAmb
CCX-LettRett
CCX-LettSec
COSP
CX-ParSec
DocTR
E
IS
MD
MZD
SAPC
SDC
SDelC
AMP

Capi del consiglio di dieci, Lettere di Ambasciatori

Capi del consiglio di dieci, Lettere di rettori et di altre cariche
Capi del consiglio di dieci, Lettere secrete
Calendar of State Papers
Capi del consiglio di dieci, Parti Secrete
Documenti Turchi
Papeles de Estado
Inquisitori di Stato
Mhimme Defterleri
Mhimme Zeyli Defterleri
Senato, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli
Senato, Dispacci, Costantinopoli
Senato, Secreta, Deliberazioni, Costantinopoli
Archivio Mediceo del Principato

b. busta, box/volume
fil. filza, folder
c. carta, page
col. column
fol. folio
xi

no. number
reg. registro, register
Note on dates. The Ottoman calendar was the lunar Hijri calendar, which was marked by H.
in the references, followed by the conversion of its dates to the Gregorian calendar, marked by
A.D. The Venetian calendar year began on March 1. When they differed from the Gregorian
calendar in the months of January and February, dates in Venetian documents are marked by
m.v. (more Veneto). For instance, 16 January 1581, m.v. corresponds to 16 January 1582
according to the Gregorian calendar. All dates in the body of the text have been modified to
follow the Gregorian calendar.

Abbrevitations for lunar months (Kamer aylar) in the Ottoman calendar

Muharrem M
Safer S
Rebieulevvel Ra.
Rebiulahir R
Cemaziyelevvel Ca.
Cemzzaiyelahir C
Receb B
Saban
Ramazan N
Sevval L
Zilkade Za.
Zilhicce Z
Gurre: The first day of the month in the Hijri Calendar
Evast: The time period between the 11th and 20th day of the month.
Selh: The last day of the month in the Hijri calendar

Other abbreviations
Ar. Arabic
It. Italian
Fr. French
Gen. Genoese
Lat. Latin
o. office
Ott. Ottoman
r. reign
Sp. Spanish
Tur. Turkish
Ve. Venetian
xii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page ........................................................................................................................... i
Copyright information ...................................................................................................... ii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... v
Dedication page ................................................................................................................ x
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... xi
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... xiii
1. CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1
1.1. Justifying the Topic.................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1. Why the 16th Century .............................................................................................. 2
1.1.2. Why the Mediterranean? The case of the Mediterranean espionage and the issue of
conflicting civilizations..................................................................................................... 5
1.1.3. Why the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry .................................................................... 11
1.1.4. Why a comparative study? .................................................................................... 19
1.2. Historiography ......................................................................................................... 21
1.3. A Note on Sources and their Contribution............................................................... 28
1.4. Chapter-by-Chapter Outline..................................................................................... 34
1.5. Defining the Concepts of Secret Diplomacy ........................................................... 38
1.5.1. Politics of information .......................................................................................... 38
1.5.1.1. Information gathering ........................................................................................ 39
1.5.1.2. Counter-intelligence ........................................................................................... 40
1.5.1.3. Disinformation ................................................................................................... 40
1.5.1.4. Analysis.............................................................................................................. 40
1.5.1.5. Cryptanalysis...................................................................................................... 43
1.5.1.6. Domestic Intelligence ........................................................................................ 43
1.5.2. Clandestine Operations ......................................................................................... 43
1.5.3. Usage of Modern Terms ....................................................................................... 44
1.6. A Couple of Clarifications ....................................................................................... 44
2. CHAPTER TWO. SECRET DIPLOMACY: INFORMATION AND POLITICS .... 48
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 48
2.2. Information and Politics: Decision-Making Process(es) ......................................... 49
2.2.1. Information gathering and grand strategy ............................................................. 50
2.2.2. Information and Policy ........................................................................................ 58
2.2.2.1. Perception ......................................................................................................... 61
2.2.2.2. Factional Rivalries ............................................................................................. 65
2.2.2.3. The issue of the continuity of information ......................................................... 66
2.2.2.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 67
2.2.3. Information gathering and war.............................................................................. 68
2.2.4. Information gathering and diplomacy................................................................... 77
2.3. Bureaucratization in Central Governments and the Institutionalization of
Secret Diplomacy ........................................................................................................... 80
xiii

2.3.1. Improvements in cryptography and steganography .............................................. 80

2.3.1.1. Steganography techniques ................................................................................. 81
2.3.1.2. Cryptography techniques ................................................................................... 83
2.3.2. Improvements in the transmission of news ........................................................... 88
2.4. Espionage and International Crises .......................................................................... 88
2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 94
3. CHAPTER THREE. SPIES AND ESPIONAGE AS A PROFESSION .................... 97
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 97
3.2. Professional Background of Spies ........................................................................... 98
3.2.1. Merchants ............................................................................................................ 100
3.2.2. Ransom agents .................................................................................................... 102
3.2.3. Clergy.................................................................................................................. 103
3.2.4. Engineers and Soldiers ........................................................................................ 108
3.2.5. Corsairs ............................................................................................................... 110
3.3. Leading and Operating a Network ......................................................................... 114
3.3.1. Spy-cum-diplomat............................................................................................... 114
3.3.2. Secretaries ........................................................................................................... 119
3.3.3. Translators (Dragoman) ...................................................................................... 121
3.3.4. Network leaders (spymasters) ............................................................................. 123
3.3.5. Auxiliaries ........................................................................................................... 124
3.3.5.1. Couriers ............................................................................................................ 124
3.3.5.2. Guides .............................................................................................................. 126
3.3.5.3. Recruiters ......................................................................................................... 127
3.3.6. Factota ................................................................................................................. 128
3.4. Espionage as a Profession ...................................................................................... 130
3.4.1. Social background ............................................................................................... 131
3.4.1.1. Renegades ........................................................................................................ 132
3.4.1.2. Exiles, convicts and rebels ............................................................................... 135
3.4.1.3. Women ............................................................................................................. 137
3.4.1.4. Spies place in the early modern society ......................................................... 139
3.4.2. Educational background...................................................................................... 140
3.4.3. Recruitment methods and employment standards .............................................. 142
3.4.3.1. Required skills ................................................................................................. 143
3.4.3.2. Offering ones self as a spy.............................................................................. 147
3.4.3.3. Approval and instructions ................................................................................ 148
3.4.3.4. The issue of trust .............................................................................................. 148
3.5. Motives .................................................................................................................. 152
3.6. Espionage as an enterprise: Rewards ..................................................................... 155
3.6.1. Financial rewards ................................................................................................ 155
3.6.2. Favours ................................................................................................................ 160
3.6.3. Hardships ............................................................................................................ 167
3.7. Familial Connections and Espionage ..................................................................... 169
3.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 183
4. CHAPTER FOUR. THE HABSBURG SECRET SERVICE IN THE LEVANT ... 187
xiv

4.1. Introduction: Efforts of Centralization................................................................... 187

4.2. Habsburg Central Organization ............................................................................. 188
4.2.1. Centralizing tendencies ....................................................................................... 192
4.2.1.1. Centralization of information ........................................................................... 192
4.2.1.2. Centralization of transmission of state correspondence .................................. 193
4.2.1.3. Centralization of intelligence networks ........................................................... 195
4.2.1.4. Conclusion: Lack of uniformity ....................................................................... 198
4.3. The Organization of Habsburg Secret Service in the Provinces ............................ 200
4.4. Habsburg Intelligence Networks in the Levant ..................................................... 206
4.4.1. Ragusa ................................................................................................................. 206
4.4.2. Ionian Islands ..................................................................................................... 213
4.4.3. Chios ................................................................................................................... 217
4.4.4. Other networks in the Levant .............................................................................. 220
4.5. Sources of information and methods of information gathering ............................ 221
4.5.1. Interrogation in the ports ..................................................................................... 221
4.5.2. Disgruntled communities: Habsburg fifth columns in the Ottoman Empire ...... 222
4.5.3. Corsairs ............................................................................................................... 227
4.5.4. Renegades in Ottoman employ ........................................................................... 229
4.5.5. Negotiating with the infidel: Muslims in the Ottoman administration ............... 231
4.5.6. European diplomats in Constantinople ............................................................... 232
4.5.7. Jewish communities ............................................................................................ 233
4.5.8. Information Provider Allies ................................................................................ 234
4.5.8.1. Austrian Habsburgs .......................................................................................... 234
4.5.8.2. The Knights of St. John in Malta ..................................................................... 235
4.5.8.3. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany (Florence) ........................................................ 237
4.6. Everything is done with money and without it nothing gets done:
The Financing of Operation ......................................................................................... 237
4.7. The Problem of Coordination and Transmission ................................................... 247
4.8. The Quality and Nature of Information ................................................................. 253
4.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 260
5. CHAPTER FIVE. ESPIONAGE IN THE SUBLIME PORTE: THE HABSBURG
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK IN CONSTANTINOPLE, 1560-1600 ........................ 264
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 264
5.2. Before the Battle of Djerba .................................................................................... 265
5.3. The Establishment of Renzos Network ................................................................ 267
5.4. The War of 1570-1573 and the Network after the Battle of Lepanto (1571) ........ 285
5.5. An Unexpected Consequence: The Truce Negotiations between the Ottomans
and the Habsburgs (1575-1581) .................................................................................... 291
5.6. The Network after Marglianis Departure (1581-1600) ........................................ 313
5.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 341
6. CHAPTER SIX. TONGUES FOR THE SULTAN: THE OTTOMAN SECRET
SERVICE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN .................................................................... 345
6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 345
6.2. The Provincial Nature of Ottoman Espionage ...................................................... 348
xv

6.3. An Empire of Patrimonies: Delegating the Responsibilities of the State .............. 362
6.4. Personal Intelligence Networks at the Service of the Ottoman State .................... 368
6.4.1. Ulu Alis network .............................................................................................. 369
6.4.2. brahim Pashas network..................................................................................... 370
6.4.3. The Gritti Network .............................................................................................. 372
6.4.4. Sokollu Mehmed Pashas network...................................................................... 376
6.4.5. The Nasi Network ............................................................................................... 377
6.4.6. The Mendes Network .......................................................................................... 384
6.4.7. The Passi Network .............................................................................................. 385
6.5. Sources of Information .......................................................................................... 387
6.5.1. Men of both worlds ............................................................................................. 387
6.5.2. Disgruntled communities: Ottoman fifth columns ............................................. 390
6.5.2.1. The Last Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula: The Moriscos ............................. 390
6.5.2.2. The Neapolitan Fuorusciti ............................................................................... 393
6.5.2.3. Jewish Communities ........................................................................................ 394
6.5.3. Ottoman ambassadors and the problem of non-permanent diplomacy............... 396
6.5.4. Information Provider States: Vassals and Allies ................................................ 400
6.5.4.1. In between two Empires: The Republic of Ragusa .......................................... 402
6.5.4.2. The Most Serene Republic of Venice .............................................................. 403
6.5.5. Pressurizing European diplomats in Constantinople .......................................... 405
6.6. Ottoman Transmission of News............................................................................. 410
6.7. The Efficiency of Ottoman Secret Service ........................................................... 414
6.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 423
7. CHAPTER SEVEN. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 432
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 439
Appendix A. Glossary of Terms ................................................................................... 439
Appendix B. Glossary of Main Personae ...................................................................... 446
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 451
Archival Guides ............................................................................................................ 451
Printed Primary Sources ............................................................................................... 452
Books ............................................................................................................................ 455
Articles .......................................................................................................................... 462
Unpublished Dissertations and Theses ......................................................................... 480

xvi

1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the secret diplomacy in the 16th-century Mediterranean
within the context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry. By focusing on a wide range of European
and Ottoman sources, it focuses on how both empires tackled the issue of establishing
intelligence networks and tries to explain the basic differences between the secret services of
both empires based on their differing organizational structure. It also questions predetermined
conclusions and unwarranted assumptions regarding the efficiency of Ottoman secret service
by presenting new evidence.
Secondly, it concentrates on the human element of secret diplomacy and seeks to
situate information brokers within the larger group of Mediterranean go-betweens that
mastered the codes of both cultures and thus could easily cross invisible boundaries between
two civilizations, Christianity and Islam, which supposedly separated the two halves of the
Mediterranean with an iron curtain. It includes ample information on the activities of
Ottoman, Habsburg and Venetian spies. Furthermore, a separate chapter on an operative
intelligence network that gathered information in Constantinople furnishes the historian with
important details regarding Ottoman factional politics and the 16th-century Constantinople as
a center of information.
Finally, it analyzes the multi-layered relation between information and politics and
accentuates the importance of studying information in order to deconstruct the decisionmaking process and to better understand how empires formulated their strategies and made
their policies. It also underlines the political and strategical benefits of accurate information
and focuses on how an intelligence edge created an advantage for either party in the imperial
rivalry between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs.

1.1.

JUSTIFYING THE TOPIC

1.1.1. Why the 16th century?

Historical conditions of the 16th century as well as the international situation brought
espionage what could perhaps be considered its first Golden Age for a number of reasons. 1
First, the information or the news itself, nouvelles, avisos, avvisi, ahbar, ahval, evza or
whatever its name, gained a special importance in the 16th century because of diverse but
related factors such as the development of international exchange, opening of new trade
routes, the invention of the printing press, the Reformation, the founding of public postal
systems and the intensification of human relations. Thanks to these developments, political,
economic, intellectual, religious and social life acquired an international and world-wide
character that it had not possessed before. News itself expanded its domain; it acquired a more
evident role in the daily lives of the ordinary people. The general development of riches,
culture and technique permitted the constitution of indispensable sources for the study of
information, evident from a number of examples demonstrated by Pierre Sardella in 1948.2
Newsletters changed the nature and the scope of information between the last decades of the
15th and the first of the 16th century in Italy.3 The best example of these newsletters was the
Fugger zeitungen.4 These not only demonstrate the extent to which the Augsburg firm
efficiently gathered information from all parts of the world, but also the relationship between

Carlos Garnicer and Javier Marcos, Espas de Felipe II: Los servicios secretos del Imperio espaol (Madrid :
La esfera de los libros, 2005), 13.
2
The developments in book-keeping, the frequency of resorting to public or private acts in daily transactions and
thus the multiplication of diarists. Pierre Sardella, Nouvelles et Spculations Venise au dbut du XVI e Sicle
(Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1948), 16.
3
Merchant letters of private nature gave way to handwritten newsletters about political events in Europe. Before
the invention of newspapers in the 17th century, these newsletters provided a regular source of information for
the public which sought to appease its fever of information. In the words of Pius V in 1568, a new art
emerged, the art of compiling newsletters. Mario Infelise, Prima dei giornali: Assle origini della pubblica
informazione (secoli XVI e XVII) (Roma: Editori Laterza, 2002), vi. This liberal flow of information in centers
like Venice should have facilitated spies jobs.
4
Victor von Klarwill, ed. The Fugger Newsletters: Being a Selection of Unpublished Letters from the
Correspondencts of the House of Fugger During the Years 1568-1605, trans. Pauline de Chary (New York and
London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1926) provides an English translation of some of the newsletters.

the diffusion of information and the revolutionary developments in exchange systems,

overseas communication and international trade networks in the 16th century.
Secondly and more importantly, since the focus of this study is on the central
governments, I should explore the relationship between the development of administrativebureaucratic structures5 and the complexity and efficiency of the mechanisms of secret
diplomacy. During the 16th century, several concomitant trends expanded the influence of
central governments and thus rendered espionage more important. The emergence of the
bigger polities meant the development of more complex institutions for the central
governments to achieve political ends with the financial resources at their disposal. Certain
by-products of bureaucratization and centralization such as the establishment of reliable postal
services, appointment of resident ambassadors and the development of the techniques of
steganography, cryptanalysis and cryptography helped the development of informationgathering mechanisms and consequently raised the importance of counter-intelligence efforts
for policy makers.
Even though diminished in its economic and political power, Venice remained the
center of information in the 16th century. The Republic of San Marco and its agents
gradually built up an intelligence network over the centuries; they relied on the specific
advantages that the Stato di Mar brought. Elsewhere in the continent, there was a direct
correlation between the size of the states, and the investment in bureaucratic, diplomatic and
military apparatus, even though the direction of the casual relation is open to discussion.
This process of bureaucratization and institutionalization brought another advantage
for our study. Starting from the mid-16th century, early modern states produced more
documentation which enables enhanced historical analysis. Most of the archives that were

Paolo Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994), 25-38.

consulted produced little documentation of relevance before the mid-16th century. Neither in
quality nor in quantity, do these records allow one to draw too many conclusions.
The imperial rivalry between the Ottomans and Habsburgs gave the 16th-century
Mediterranean international politics a rhythm that tempts the historian: an inter-dynastical war
without a pause as a result of which more or less every polity along the shores of the
Mediterranean had to invest their resources in the struggle. The Great War of the
Mediterranean, the imperial rivalry between two dynasties on both edges of the sea, resulted
in an unrepeated state investment to the extent that the decision-makers led their empires to
bankruptcies on more than one occasion. This rivalry ended in a stalemate because of these
bankruptcies.
In such a heated political arena, information became ever more important in the
Mediterranean. The scope of information-gathering mechanisms in the 16th century moved in
tandem with the increasing and decreasing intensity of the military confrontation between the
Ottomans and the Habsburgs. No geographic region went unnoticed by policy makers. The
nature of the gathered information also reflected a similar universalist tendency. Reports that
arrived in Naples, Mesina and Constantinople not only brought news from where they were
sent; but also contained information concerning different geographies from a variety of
sources in an effort to harmonize their narrative and to get a sense of the bigger picture.
Experienced spies were aware of the interconnectedness of the events they mentioned. The
answer to the biggest question in the minds of Habsburg viceroys come February or March
whether the Ottoman navy would sail to the Western Mediterranean or not, depended not
only on the military preparations in the Imperial Arsenal in Constantinople, but also the
harshness of Persian winters, the fate of a revolting son or a bad season of crops. Habsburg
informants needed to know about ambassadors that arrived from the vassal states such as
Wallachia or Moldavia or about a rebellion in a far away province such as Yemen. Similarly,

the Ottomans had to be informed of the events in farther geographies such as the Dutch
Revolt, the French Wars of Religion, the Great Armada, the fate of the Portuguese crown, and
the like.
1.1.2. Why the Mediterranean? The case of Mediterranean espionage and the issue of
conflicting civilizations
The Mediterranean, as the geographical focus of our study, gives the researcher a
number of advantages that other geographical areas do not. It represents a different case,
espionage in a religious and civilizational frontier, which allows us to test the validity of
historical theories that divide the Mare Nostrum into two distinct cultural and religious
spheres of influence. These theories present a binary opposition between Christianity and
Islam that was the engine not only of political relations between states, but also, in its
omnipotence, of relations between societies and communities along the Mediterranean shores.
The extent of information gathering networks as well as the stories of spies operating in
between geographies with undeniable religious, linguistic and cultural differences will
demonstrate in the following pages both the permeability of civilizational frontiers and a
special type of people who were accustomed to operate in the borderlands, those who come
and go, as Emilio Sola so conveniently labeled his book after a contemporary term that
frequently appears in the documentation of AGS.6 These people in between polities and
civilizations were the ones from among whom the states recruited their spies and thanks to
whom the information flowed towards political centers with an acceptable regularity and
accuracy.
One of the major issues that informed Mediterranean as well as Middle Eastern
History is the relations between different cultures and religions, namely Christianity and
Islam. The historiography has witnessed a debate between two schools of thought and their
6

Emilio Sola, Los que van y vienen: Informacin y fronteras en el Mediterrneo clasico del siglo XVI (Alcal de
Henares: Universidad de Alcal, 2005).

different representation of the Mediterranean, in Eric Durstelers words, the bifurcated

Mediterranean of the battlefield and the linked Mediterranean suggested by the regions many
bazaars and other places of encounter and exchange.7
The advocates of the bifurcated Mediterranean of the battlefield in the first school of
thought accentuated the clash between two civilizations that divided the Mediterranean in a
so-called dichotomy of Christianity and Islam. This idea came to the fore when the famous
Belgian historian Henri Pirennes post-humous book, Mahomet et Charlemagne, appeared in
1937.8 According to Pirenne, what destroyed the Mediterranean unity of Roman times and
fractured the sea was not the Germanic invasions of the 5th century as was generally assumed,
but the advent of Islam and its expansion along the seas shores in the 7th and 8th centuries. An
inherent and irreconcilable rivalry between Christianity and Islam followed and cut off all
communication and exchange, effectively dividing the Mediterranean into two hostile zones.
Later historians took Pirennes hypothetical proposition about the reasons for the
fracturing of the Mediterranean world and developed into the basis for a theory of an
inevitable clash between Islam and Christianity. Bernard Lewis, a nonagenarian professor of
history whose career has spanned from the 1940s to the 2010s, had long written extensively
on the encounters between Christians and Muslims along the Mediterranean,9 prior to his
books of the last decade, intended for a larger audience seeking a superficial grasp of Islam in
the chaotic and paranoid post-9/11 environment. Hence the titles of his books and articles:

Eric R. Dursteler, On Bazaars and Battlefields: Recent Scholarship on Mediterranean Cultural Contacts,
Journal of Early Modern History, 15 (2011): 414.
8
Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris, F. Alcan Bruxelles, Nouvelle soci t d ditions, 1 37 . Even
though the book was published post-humously, Pirenne wrote a preliminary essay on the subject in 1922 and
gave an outline. Idem, Mahomet et Charlemagne, Revue Belge de Philologie et dhistoire, 1 (1922): 77-86.
9
His major work on the subject is Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (New York and London:
W.W. Norton&Company, 1982). However, he had already expressed the same views on encounters between
Islam and Christendom in an article he wrote a quarter century before the book, see. idem., Muslim Discovery
of Europe, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London vol. 20, no.1/3 (1957),
Studies in Honour of Sir Ralph Turner, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1937-57, 409416.

What went wrong?,10 Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror,11 The Roots of Muslim
Rage.12 Treating Islam as a monolithic entity with no regard to its plurality, historical
evaluation and internal dynamics, Lewis asserted that Muslim societies remained backward
compared to their European counterparts because of internal reasons such as their resistance
to innovation and cultural arrogance, fueled by their sense of superiority. He rejected
explanations focused on external causes such as the Crusades or western imperialism, i.e., on
relations of power between the West and the East. The final picture was thus a medieval iron
curtain...between Islam and Christendom [which] seems to have kept cultural exchanges at a
minimum and greatly restricted even commercial and diplomatic intercourse.13 This line of
thought has been fiercely criticized by many scholars, leaving Lewis totally discredited in
certain academic circles, especially after the appearance in 1 78 of Edward Saids opus
magnum Orientalism,14 an audacious attack on the Western representations of the Orient
which argues that the products of Western Orientalists Eurocentric history writing were
rather tools for Western imperial ambitions than objective academic studies.
On the other side of the debate was perhaps the most influential historian of the 20th
century whose opus magnum, La Mditerrane et le monde Mditerranen lpoque de
Philippe II, defended the Inner Seas unity and presented a rather different picture. 15 Fernand
Braudels Mediterranean, which he scrutinized in every possible aspect (physical, social,
economical and political , was not divided by a religious or civilizational line. It comprised a

10

Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
11
Bernard Lewis, Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003).
12
Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/4643/
13
Lewis, Muslim Discovery of Europe, 411.
14
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
15
Fernand Braudel, La Mditerrane et le monde Mditerranen lpoque de Philippe II. The First edition of
the book appeared in one volume, published by Librairie Armand Colin in Paris in 1949. A revised and enlarged
second edition, consisting of two volumes and 1200 pages, was published by the same publishing house in 1966.
The English translation of the work appeared very late. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sin Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973),
2 vols, compared to Spanish (1953) and Italian (1953). It was translated into Turkish in 1989.

hundred frontiers, not one, some political, some economic, and some cultural.16 The
civilizations it hosted were affected by the same general trends and shared common
destinies imposed by structural factors such as environment, ecology and the consequent
socio-economic relations.17
In spite of the books importance on 20th century historical methodology, few
historians followed Braudels footsteps and studied the Mediterranean in general. What
followed La Mditerrane were several works that concentrated on a given region of the
Mediterranean. In short, La Mditerrane marked an end rather than a beginning in the
Mediterranean studies.18 No historian would try to write a history of the Mediterranean,
restricting themselves to writing history in until Horden and Purcell wrote the first volume
of their colossal work, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History which differs
from Braudels La Mditerrane in that it accentuates the diversity of local microecologies
and contends that the unifying force was rather the connectivity of the Mare Nostrum via its
seaborne communications between these localities.
Many of these specific works that concentrated on the history of the post-Braudelian
Mediterranean continued to inform the debate over the dichotomy of Islam and Christianity.
Within the context of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe, some
historians, such as Paolo Preto19 and Andrew Hess20 sided with the Pirenne camp, while

16

Braudel, The Mediterranean, 168170.

For a recent review of La Mditerrane and an interesting discussion of how efficiently Braudel used Ottoman
sources that were available to him, see. Colin Heywood, Fernand Braudel and the Ottomans: The Emergence of
an Involvement (1928-50), Mediterranean Historical Review 23:2 (2008): 165-184. Also see. Ruggiero
Romano, Braudel e noi: Riflessioni sulla cultura storica del nostro tempo (Roma, Donzelli, 1995) and Maria
Fusaro et al. (eds.), Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Mediterranean: Braudels Maritime Legacy (London
and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010 , especially Maria Fusaros introductory article that outlines the Mediterranean
historiography, After Braudel: A Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and
the Caravane Maritime, in ibid., 1-22.
18
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2000), 37.
19
Paolo Preto, Venezia e i Turchi (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni Editore, 1975).
20
Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1 78 idem, The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in the Sixteenth-Century
Spain, American Historical Review LXXIV (October 1968): 1-25 idem, The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in
Mediterranean History, Past and Present 57 (1972): 53-73 idem, The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and
17

others such as Pedani,21 Dursteler,22 Kafadar,23 Arbel24 and Rothman25 followed Braudels
representation of the Mediterranean. Following the footsteps of the new cultural history that
originally concentrated on the cultural encounters of the West with the societies of Asia,
America and Africa, these authors in the latter group accentuated the civilizational contact
along Mediterranean shores and the cultural pluralism of its metropolitan centers. Because of
their long and unique shared history, their abundant archival resources for the early modern
period, and the richness of their modern historiographical traditions,26 the relationship
between Venice and Constantinople received special attention from these historians who
sought to demonstrate the cultural contacts in the Mediterranean.
Perhaps, this uniqueness of the relationship between Venice and the Ottoman Empire,
which others thought of as a merit, becomes instead a liability for the case for Mediterranean
pluralism. This relationship was the exception rather than the rule and generalizations based
the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 4/1
(1973): 55-76. Hess insists on the prevalent hostility between two religions in the Forgotten Frontier of the
Mediterranean, North Africa.
21
Maria Pia Pedani, Presenze Islamiche a Venezia, Levante XXXV/4 (December 1993): 13-20; eadem, In
Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia
(Venezia: Deputazione Editrice, 1994); eadem, La Dimora della Pace: Considerazioni sulle Capitulazioni tra i
Paesi Islamici e lEuropea (Venice: Universit Ca Foscari di Venezia, 1 6 eadem, Veneziani a
Costantinopoli alla fine del XVI secolo, Quaderni di Studi Arabi 15 (1997): 67-84; eadem, Safiyes Household
and Venetian Diplomacy, Turcica 32 (2000): 9-31; eadem, Dalla Frontiera al Confine (Venezia: Herder
Editrice, 2002); eadem, Venezia: Porta dOriente (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).
22
Eric Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern
Mediterranean (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); idem, Renegade Women: Gender,
Identity, and Boundaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2011); idem, Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era, Turcica 34 (2002):
105-133; idem, Fatima Hatun n e Beatrice Michiel: Renegade Women in the Early Modern Mediterranean,
The Medieval History Journal 12/2 (2009): 355-382; idem, On Bazaars and Battlefields: Recent Scholarship on
Mediterranean Cultural Contacts, Journal of Early Modern History 15 (2011): 413-434.
23
Cemal Kafadar, A Death in Venice (1575 : Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima,
Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986): 191-218 idem, The Ottomans and Europe in Handbook of European
History 1400-1600, Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation: Volume I: Structures and Assertions, eds.
Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, James D. Tracy (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 589-635.
24
Benjamin Arbel, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1995). Also see his several articles.
25
E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2012); eadem, Becoming Venetian: Conversion and Transformation in the Seventeenth
Century Mediterranean, Mediterranean Historical Review 21/1 (June 2006): 39-75 eadem, Self-Fashioning in
the Mediterranean Contact Zone: Giovanni Battista Salvago and his Africa ovvero Barbaria (1625 , in
Renassiance Medievalisms, ed. Konrad Eisenbichler (Toronto: Center for Reformation and Renaissance Studies,
2009): 123-143; eadem, Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern
Mediterranean, Comparative Studies in Society and History 51/ 4 (October 2009): 771-800.
26
Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 2.

on episodes and anecdotes from the harmonious and cooperative relations between these two
empires as well as their elites run the risk of overreaching. Venice had always been a part of
the larger trade networks of the Eastern Mediterranean, both in Byzantine as well as in
Ottoman times, and the political, cultural and artistic influences of the Eastern Mediterranean
on Venice, the celebrated center of meditation between the West and the East, had long
been appreciated.27 Venetian colonies, composed of every segment of Venetian society, were
dispersed along the Levantine ports, while the Ottoman merchants frequented not only Venice
itself, where their growing numbers would justify the allocation of a Fondaco to their service
in the 17th century, but also other Venetian possessions that constituted the Stato da Mar. The
elites of both empires cooperated to the fullest extent, perfectly exemplified by the trade
relations between the Ottoman and Venetian elite as well as the Ottomans incessant requests
from the Venetians for special favors,28 and personal presents so well documented in almost
every archival font in ASV, relevant to the Ottoman Empire.29 The relations between the
Ottoman Empire and Venice should not be an example of the smooth relations between Islam
and Christianity in the Mediterranean any more than Turco-Israeli relations in the 20th century
are an example of harmonious relations between Israel and the Muslim world. In short, the
exceptionality of these relations weakens the case for cultural pluralism and civilizational
contact in the Mediterranean: obviously, for Mediterranean go-betweens, overcoming cultural
barriers and traveling across political frontiers that separated the Ottoman lands from those of
Venice was less difficult than it would have been elsewhere in the Mediterranean and the two
polities were closer to each other more than the historians of both, plagued by notions of
civilizational approach, have been ready to accept. Yet, to what extent could this close
27

Agostino Pertusi, ed., Venezia e l'Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento (Firenze: Sansoni, 1966); idem,
Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1973); William McNeill, Venice: The Hinge of
Europe (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974); Hans G. Beck et al., eds., Venezia Centro di Mediazione tra
Oriente e Occidente, secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e problemi (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1977).
28
The favours might be a license to open a shop or a position in the government for a relative, a sanseria for
Jews in Rialto, safe-conduct for banditi, etc.
29
ASV, SDC, SDelC, CX-ParSec.

10

relationship between a Muslim and a Christian power be generalized to the entirety of the
Mediterranean in which religion was still the primary marker, empires embraced religious
propaganda and the Holy War rhetoric for political ends and corsairs from both sides used
religious justification to reclaim the Middle Sea with their little wars by ravaging its coasts,
enslaving its people, and jeopardizing its internal communication and transportation?
1.1.3. Why the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry?
The geographical focus of this study determined its political focus as well. The
particular character of the imperial rivalry between Constantinople and Madrid brought the
aspect of information and secret diplomacy to the fore. The lack of diplomatic ties and of
diplomatic representation in each others capital created two particular situations.30
I could have chosen a number of different scenes to concentrate on while studying the
early modern espionage in the Mediterranean. For one, the Venetian-Ottoman or the
Venetian-Habsburg Rivalry would be ideal as the intensity of relations, frequency of contact
and the volume of documentation would justify such a choice. In the end, however, I opted for
the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, at the risk of neglecting the most efficient Secret Service in
the early modern Mediterranean, that of Venice, on which a thorough study has already been
published in 1994, and to whose details we will often return in order to delineate the general
characteristics and methods of Secret Diplomacy. The reason I chose the Ottoman-Habsburg
Rivalry was to ascertain the fluidity of civilizational boundaries in the Mediterranean by
30

It could be hypothesized that close relations between Vienna and Madrid should have compensated for the side
effects of the lack of direct diplomatic relations between the two empires to a certain extent. The Spanish
Habsburgs ambassador in Vienna was actively involved in gathering information on things Ottoman and the
Austrian diplomatic presence in Constantinople was definitely a positive factor for the efficiency of Spanish
Habsburgs information gathering. The Austrian ambassador could even be instrumental, to a certain extent, in
inspecting the activities of the Habsburg spies in Constantinople. Did the Viceroy of Naples not rely on him
when he could not figure out whether Guglielmo de Saboya, who came to Naples to offer some clandestine
operations, was an Ottoman spy or not? AGS, E 1090, fol. 116 (2 September 1589). Still, the active role that the
Habsburg spies in Constantinople played in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry as well as their intermediation
between imperial elites may be a proof of the limited role that Austrian ambassadors played after the break-up of
Charles Vs patrimony. I could have analyzed the issue more thoroughly, had I been able to undertake a
comprehensive study of the relevant archival fonts in AGS and in Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) in
Vienna (sterreichische Staatsarchiv-StA). Unfortunately, logistical reasons forced me to shy away from a
comprehensive study and to leave the issue a side for now, apart from a brief analysis of Viennas contribution to
Habsburg secret diplomacy in Chapter Four.

11

testing the case for cultural pluralism and civilizational contact at its weakest point where the
two actors of the focused rivalry had shaped their ideology and propaganda in a spirit of total
rejection of and absolute confrontation with each other while the relation between the two
were plagued by imperial wars, justified with religious reasons and the Otherness of the
rival. The relations between Naples/Messina/Madrid/Barcelona and Constantinople/Algiers
by no means resembled those between Constantinople and Venice because the OttomanHabsburg frontier presented harsher conditions for these Mediterranean go-betweens as
opposed to the Ottoman-Venetian frontier. Devoid of the advantages that legality and
reliability provided the go-betweens who operated in the Ottoman-Venetian borders, the
protagonists of this dissertation had to cope with several obstacles and rely on more complex
networks that would have rendered possible for them to travel through imperial frontiers and
operate between the cities of two empires at each others throats. Stories of these hardly
visible agents of Secret Diplomacy show us the extent to which they managed to overcome
these obstacles as well as cross cultural and civilizational boundaries while operating on the
field, brokering information on the one hand and linking imperial centers in a network of
spies, agents, saboteurs, slaves and diplomats on the other. Once passed, this test of the
Mediterranean cultural pluralism and civilizational contact, albeit a difficult one, would
consolidate the case in its defense decisively.
The first situation, particular to our case, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, was the
difficulty with which both states gathered and transmitted reliable and accurate information
on each other for long time periods. The information gathering systems of both empires
suffered from several disadvantages which the Venetian ambassadors in Constantinople and
Madrid, or the Habsburg Secret Service in Flanders and France did not.
The first disadvantage was the problem of quality, both in terms of the recruitment
pool and the information received. Both empires had to rely on occasional spy reports

12

produced by agents of questionable loyalty whom they had to employ and supervise, even if
not directly from the capital, from provincial centers, still distant to the networks. The
Habsburg authorities often complained about the character of these spies and the unreliability
of the information they transmitted. This problem was only natural given the harsh conditions
of frontier espionage that impeded intelligence networks operating more in a safer and more
complex manner. To give two examples: the Habsburg secret service in Flanders recruited
agents with contracts, transferred money and couriers relatively easily and most surprisingly,
even came to a mutual understanding with the enemy to exchange the captured spies.31 In the
Mediterranean borderlands, one could not even dream of such pleasant conditions. Alain
Hugon asserted that the majority of Habsburg spies who were detained in France managed to
leave prison after a short duration and continued their activities, a stark contrast with the
frequent executions of spies that operated in the Ottoman-Habsburg borderlands.32
The second disadvantage was the problem of ensuring the continuity of information
gathering networks. Well-educated and specifically trained Venetian diplomats followed one
another in foreign capitals and left for their successors as well as the political elites in the
center, an accumulated knowledge with which they could fulfill their diplomatic duties that
obviously also included information gathering. Apart from the dispacci of momentary nature,
these Venetian diplomats left relazioni, long reports about the state structure, factional
politics, financial and military resources and provinces of both empires. Venetian diplomats
were required by law to submit those relazioni to the Senate. This public access in turn
created a profound awareness of the conditions in foreign capitals where future diplomats
would serve and helped the professionalization of information gathering, headed by a well31

Miguel Angel Echevarra Bacigalupe, La Diplomacia Secreta en Flandes, 1598-1643 (Leioa-Vizcaya:

Argitarapen Zerbitzua Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, 1984), 51-67.
32
Alain Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique Honorable Ambassadeurs et Divins Espions: Rpresentation
Diplomatique et Service Secret dans les Relations Hispano-Franaises de 1598 1635 (Madrid: Casa de
Velzquez, 2004), 463. Even though the lack of diplomatic representation should have affected the Ottomans as
well, theirs was a general problem. They did not suffer specifically within the context of the Ottoman-Habsburg
Rivalry, nor with regards to their information-gathering in Naples and Sicily, because they would not appoint
resident ambassadors in European capitals until the last years of the 18th century.

13

educated diplomat, familiar with the diplomatic customs and aware of political realities in
these capitals. A professional Venetian diplomat had a lot more to offer their employees than
Ottoman and Habsburg agents who were given the task to organize and supervise local
information-gathering networks.
Furthermore, the ongoing presence of resident ambassadors ensured the continuity of
established intelligence networks. Compared to Ottoman and Habsburg information gathering
in each others territories, this was no small advantage. Both empires had to go to great
lengths not to lose contact with these local elements. Even the best documented example, the
Habsburg information gathering network in Constantinople was too disorganized. The
Habsburgs had trouble keeping them in check and organizing them efficiently. The hierarchy
of the organization was imperfect. Its leader was always on the move between Madrid, Naples
and Constantinople, while two of his assistants were not fully aware of each others networks.
Neither the Habsburg officials in Naples, nor those in Sicily had a clear picture of how many
agents were employed apart from the ones who received money from the center and even then
they were ignorant of who exactly these agents were. Finally, the original network that the
Habsburg spies established in the 1560s did not seem to be perfectly inherited by their
successors who were operating in Constantinople in the 1590s. The continuity and consequent
improvement of the information gathering system could not be maintained.
A third disadvantage was that these two states could not use diplomacy as an
information-gathering tool. Compared to the Venetian and French ambassadors in the
Ottoman capital who took advantage of their elevated status and audiences with important
state officials from whom they could acquire as much information as possible, the Habsburg
and the Ottoman networks were doomed to operate by means of intermediaries (small-scale
government officials such as secretaries, translators and couriers) between their spies and the
decision-makers, the source of crucial information. They had to solve this problem by relying

14

on other powers: while the Habsburgs relied on Venice and the Austrian Habsburgs; the
Ottomans sought and at times demanded information from Venice, Ragusa, England, France
and, later in the 17th century, the United Provinces. This practice in turn created a second
problem. All of these states had a separate diplomatic agenda, and a fixed position in
international diplomacy vis--vis the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. The information they
transmitted was less than perfect. Most of the time, these states manipulated and selectively
represented information in an effort to serve their own interest by influencing the decisionmakers of both empires rather than providing them with impartial information.
The second particular situation produced by the lack of diplomatic relations and
resident ambassadors was that the states had to use their information gathering networks in
order to ensure communication between each other. To a certain extent, the Austrian envoys
solved this problem, especially before the breakup of Charles Vs patrimony. Yet,
correspondence between the Ottoman and Spanish Habsburg political elites required more
than that. The diplomatic gap was filled and the problem of communication and
correspondence was solved by spies that eagerly undertook further responsibilities in pursuit
of financial gain, sometimes authorized by the center and sometimes on their own initiative,
as was the case of Santa-Croce who single-handedly instigated Ottoman-Habsburg
negotiations for a truce in 1577.
The agents of secret diplomacy that operated in both central governments service did
more than just carry information; they also bridged the communication gap between imperial
centers. They provided necessary channels of communication and accelerated the pace of
correspondence and cooperation between imperial elites not only by engaging in espionage,
but also by serving in other positions such as diplomats, slave ransomers, merchants,
translators, and the like.

15

Although the two empires were continuously fighting with each other, among the
governing elites, instances of courteous relations were many. First of all, in spite of the lack
of direct diplomatic channels, there was still correspondence between the political elites of
both empires, between commanders, viceroys, governors and even the royalty. For instance,
in 1548, the Ottoman Grand Admiral Sokollu sent a letter to his colleague, Juan de Vega, the
viceroy of Sicily, to congratulate him on the recently signed truce between the Ottomans and
the Habsburgs and offer his respects to the Emperor whose hands he would like to kiss.33 A
similar correspondence between the Ottoman Sultan and Don Juan, the Admiral of the allied
Christian fleet, after the Battle of Lepanto conveys a similar tone of courtesy and esteem.34 An
even more astonishing series of correspondence took place between the Ottoman Grand
Admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, alias Scipione Cicala and the Viceroy of Sicily, the
Duke of Maqueda, when the former anchored off Mesina with the Ottoman fleet and asked
the latter for permission to see his mother, brothers and nephews who lived in the city.35
Leaving aside the curious fact that a renegade Ottoman Grand Admiral stopped with a large
Ottoman fleet to visit his mother in a Christian land, the friendly tone in the letters as well as
an apparent elite consciousness between the Viceroy and the Grand Admiral is indicative of
the usualness and frequency of such correspondence. The cooperation as well as the common
decorum and customs between imperial elites on both sides are evident from the indignation
of Cigalazade when he was asked to send his son as a hostage. The Pasha managed to have
the decision reversed by evoking the memory of past favors granted to Habsburg elites in
Constantinople such as Suleiman Is decision to liberate Sancho de Leyva, the father of Pedro
de Leyva, Sicilys general de las galeras without asking for hostages. He also accentuated the
33

AGS, E 1118, fol. 105. 24 June 1548.

AMAE, Mmoires et document divers: Originaux et copies du XVI e et XVIIe sicles sur la priode de 1520
1648, fols. 40-42;BNCF, Collezione Capponi, cod. CLXXIII, pp. 41-44, reproduced in Spanish in Emilio Sola
Castao, Uchal: El Calabrs Tioso, o el mito del corsario mulad en la frontera (Barcelona: Edicions
Bellaterra, 2011), 194-197.
35
AGS, E 1158, fols. 186 (1 October 1598), 187 (15 letters between the Grand Admiral, his family and
Habsburg authorities dated September 1598).
34

16

good relations between the House of Cicala and Leyva and pointed out to the fact that among
these imperial elites precautions that hinted at distrust were not the norm for they, che fanno
professione di honor, would not break their words.36
Secondly, several clandestine operations functioned in such a way that it linked the
political elites of the two empires. It was a custom in the Ottoman capital to give presents to
dignitaries in order to attain certain diplomatic ends.37 This custom convinced the Habsburgs
to extend their patronage to the Ottoman elites some of whom they kept on their payroll. The
list included influential figures such as the Grand Vizier Mustapha Pasha,38 the former
Governor-General of Algeria Mehmed Pasha,39 members of the Ottoman bureaucracy such as
the Dragoman Hrrem Bey40 and other influential figures outside the state mechanism such as
Joseph Nasi, David Passi and Doctor Salomon Ashkenazi.41
Thirdly, there were several instances which demonstrate that imperial elites could
change employers. Examples of negotiations concerning defections are many. Even though
almost none of them was successful in the end, secret negotiations between the Habsburgs and
prominent figures from every aspect of the Ottoman state structure (renegade vs. free-born
Muslim, Enderun-educated vs. self-made) demonstrate that such a move between imperial
elites was at least considered a realistic possibility and was thus worthy of negotiation.
Furthermore, the Ottoman elites entered into similar defection negotiations with important
political and military figures on the other side of the political spectrum, as was the case with
36

Scipione wrote to the Viceroy that he did not expect cusi dura risposta and pointed out that leaving his son
as a hostage would delay him on his voyage back to Constantinople, a just complaint given that it was the end of
the sailing season. He also asserted that in a similar situation he would not have thought of asking for hostages.
The answer was affirmative stating that believing and esteeming your word as it should be, given your estado
y discrecin which the obligations of los grandes hombres recognized.
37
This custom could not be more observable and easily documentable than it is in the Ottoman-Venetian
relations. A quick look to the ASV, CX-ParSec would demonstrate the frequency of the practice of giving
presents to the Ottoman dignitaries who themselves did not shy from directly requesting them.
38
AGS, E 1337, fols. 161 (18 June 1580), 162 (3 July 1580), 167 (7 August 1580).
39
AGS, E 488, Mehmed Pasha to Philip II (21 June 1576).
40
AGS, E 1082, fol. 193 (1 July 1580).
41
Documents related to the activities of dragoman Hrrem, Ashkenazi, Passi and Nasi for Habsburg secret and
open diplomacy will be subject to scrutiny later. Suffice it to call attention to two letters that Philip II wrote to
Hrrem (AGS, E 1082, fol. 194) and Ashkenazi (fols. 195), both dated 1 July 1580, in recognition of their
services for the crown.

17

Christophe de Roggendorf, a hereditary grand master of Austria, who found employment in

the Ottoman palace without being forced to convert.42 Often, they were invited to Islam as
well. Mehmed III took a close interest in the Genoese Carlo Cicala, a spy-cum-corsair on
Habsburg payroll and the brother of the Ottoman Grand Admiral Cigalazade. The Sultan
offered him the opportunity to follow his brothers footsteps and voluntarily adopt Islam in
order to become a part of the imperial elite. A man of such quality had a lot to offer the
Empire.43 Even though he refused to convert, his brother still secured him the governorship of
the Aegean Archipelago (Naxos).44 His was not the only example of a member of the
renegade Ottoman elite bringing his kin to his side.45
Fourthly, one area in which imperial elites came into frequent contact and favored
each other was the exchange of slaves. The practice of ransom put elites into contact because
valuable prisoners-of-war generally ended up at the hands of the other sides elites who
sought to preserve for themselves these prestigious slaves with the hope that they could be
ransomed for large amounts. The fact that prominent people who constituted the human
capital of both empires were ransomed rather than eliminated demonstrates to us the
cooperation between imperial elites as much as a curious example where the financial motives
of individuals outweighed the raison dtat. The release of these prisoners-of-war created farreaching consequences from the point-of-view of the state which the ransom money would
not have compensated. For example, the prominent corsair, Turgud, who was ransomed at
Barbarossas instigation by the Dorias, would go on devastating Italian coasts for two decades

42

Following a dispute with Charles V, he entered the Ottoman service to become a mteferrika in the palace.
After having realized his career would not take off without conversion, he ran away from Constantinople, only to
be caught on the way, brought back to the capital and imprisoned. The French ambassador dAramon saved him
and Roggendorf entered French service where he served Henry II, Charles IX and Henry III. Christine IsomVerhaaren, Shifting Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ottoman Empire, Journal of Early
Modern History 8/1-2 (2004): 130-2.
43
AGS, E 1344 K 1675, fol. 44 (30 April 1591); E 1158, fols. 53 (15 June 1595), 55 (30 March 1595) and 62 (10
May 1595).
44
ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, busta 460, 25 July 1600.
45
Antonio Fabris, Hasan il Veneziano tra Algeria e Costantinopoli, Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5 (1997), 59-61.
Pedani Fabris, Veneziani a Costantinopoli.

18

following his release. In the Ottoman capital, spies-cum-ransom agents negotiated the ransom
of several important Christian nobles from the hands of the Ottoman elite with notable
exceptions of Scipione Cicala and Diego Pachego, both of whom were young enough to be
inducted to the Ottoman palace. Likewise, the Ottoman elites that had fallen captive at the
Battle of Lepanto were ransomed and therefore escaped the unfortunate fate of the Ottoman
sailors who were executed with the intention to debilitate the Ottoman navy by depriving it of
its hard-to-train human capital. Apparently, the raison dtat only prevailed where it did not
affect the elites.46
In short, every segment of the imperial elites conspired with their counterparts on the
other side, the enemy. In this picture of great complexity and profundity, cultural barriers
and religious differences, although still decisive to a certain extent, failed to prevent
communication, conspiracy and cooperation between these elites. Secret diplomacy as an
institutionalized practice and spies as a professional group actively fostered this cooperation.
1.1.4. Why a comparative study?
A comparative study between the secret services of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans and,
to a limited extent, the Venetians contributes to our understanding of Mediterranean history in
two ways. First, it demonstrates to us how polities with different political systems,
administrative structures and diplomatic practices tackled the issue of gathering information,
an issue which will be scrutinized in Chapters Four and Six.
Secondly, such a comparative study informs the historiographical discussion
concerning the issue of the reintegration of Ottoman history into the broader spectrum of
European history.

46

This was a standard practice in the Christian West. Throughout the Middle Ages, elites ransomed their elite
captives and murdered foot soldiers taken prisoner. Kings could intervene directly about a key prisoner, as was
the case of Charles, the Duke of Orlans, and Henry V of England who, on his deathbed, made his brother,
soon-to-regent, swear never to release Orlans until the infant Henry VI had reached adulthood. I thank Prof.
Collins for these remarks.

19

From the very beginning, European interest in Ottoman history presupposed an

inevitable clash between the European civilization and that of the other, the world outside
Europe, in this context, Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Early Ottoman histories written by
non specialist historians such Zinkeisen47 and Iorga48 all shared a Eurocentric worldview and
tried to explain the impact of the Ottoman Empire on Europe, shying away from studying a
dialogue between the two or from rendering agency to possible Ottoman influence on Europe.
Hammer-Purgstall provides the sole exception.49 The historians of Europe from the 20th
century, with notable exceptions such as Braudel, were not more careful. Under the influence
of the notions of nation-states and civilizations, they systematically excluded the Ottoman
history from the general currents of European history.
Thanks to a substantial scholarship, today it is hard to deny that the Ottomans enjoyed
extensive commercial50 and diplomatic51 ties with European states in the early modern period,
while recent studies argue for Ottoman contributions to innovations and developments which
were long assumed to be one hundred percent European products.52 Recent scholarship has
discredited the prevailing view, particularly strong among the military historians, that the

47

Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa (Hamburg, F. Perthes, 1840-63),
7 vols.
48
Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1990), 5 vols.
49
Dursteler, On Bazaars, 428-9.
50
Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine
Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Maurice Aymard,
Venise, Raguse et le commerce du bl pendant la seconde moiti du XVIe sicle (Paris, EHESS, 1966), especially
125-140. Dursteler, Commerce and Coexistence.
51
It is hard to enlist all of these works here, but a number of interesting works should be given credit. Apart from
Braudel, Kenneth Setton successfully reintegrated Ottomans into European diplomatic history. Kenneth M.
Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976-1984), 4
vols; idem, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society, 1991). Also see. Halil nalck, A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between
Innocent VIII and Byezd II on Djem Sultan, Journal of Turkish Studies 3 (1979-80) : 209-230; Nicolas Vatin,
Sultan Djem: Un prince ottoman dans lEurope du XV e sicle daprs deux sources contemporaines: Vkit-
Sultn Cem, Oeuvres de Guillaume Caoursin (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Soci t Turque dhistorie, 1 7 ;
zlem Kumrular, Las Relacines entre el Imperio Otomano y la Monarqua Catlica entre los Aos 1520-1535
y el Papel de los Estados Satllites (Estambul: Editorial The Isis Press, 2003); eadem, El duelo entre Carlos V y
Solim n el Magn ico
-1535) (Estambul: Editorial Isis, 2005).
52
Daniel Goffman, Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy, in
The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61-74.

20

Ottomans resisted innovations this older view provides much of the evidence for Ottoman
decline.53 Moreover, a number of recent studies demonstrate that the Ottomans were as
much products of and affected by the general trends that affected European history, be it price
revolution,54 military revolution,55 age of confessionalization,56 apocalyptical traditions,57
changing dynamics of international trade,58 and even geographical explorations.59 By focusing
on similar general trends, such as the rise of the administrative-bureaucratic structures, the
development of techniques of steganography, cryptanalysis and cryptography, the
establishment of regular postal systems, the institution of permanent resident diplomacy and
the globalization of information, as well as on these trends effects on the institutionalization
of secret services, this dissertation seeks to qualify the position of the Ottomans regarding
these developments, i.e., to what extent these affected the Ottomans and in which particular
manner.
1.2.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Few of the academic works that have been written on the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry
use both European and Ottoman sources and present a comprehensive perspective that goes
further than concentrating on a single battle such as that of Lepanto. A number of historians

53

Gbor goston, Guns for the Sultans: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
54
mer Ltfi Barkan, The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the
Economic History of the Near East, International Journal of Middle East Studies 6/1-2 (1975): 3-28; evket.
Pamuk, Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered, International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 33 (2001): 69-89.
55
Gbor goston, The Guns for the Sultans.
56
Tjana Krsti, Illuminated by the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ottoman Sultanate: Self-Narratives of
Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization, Comparative Studies in Society and History 51/1
(2009): 35-63
57
Cornell Fleischer, The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Sleymn",
in Soliman le magnifique et son temps, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: La Documentation Franaise, 1992), 159-77;
idem, Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s stanbul, in Identity and Identity Formation in the
Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honour of Norman Itzkowitz, eds. B. Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir
(Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 2007), 51-62.
58
Brummett, Ottoman Seapower.
59
Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Benjamin
Arbel, Maps of the World for Ottoman Princes? Further Evidence and Questions concerning the
Mappamondo of Hajji Ahmed, Imago Mundi 54 (2002): 19-29.

21

such as Hess,60 Veinstein,61 goston,62 Dvid,63 Fodor,64 Murphey,65 Skilliter,66 BacquGrammont,67 Glru Necipolu,68 Salgado,69 Raffa,70 Cabanelas,71 Grkan,72 and John
Elliott,73 penned articles on this imperial rivalry that dominated the political scene in the 16th
century. Muzaffer Arkan and Paulino Toledos rather neglected book, now out-of-print,
contains articles as well as the translation of a number archival documents from Spanish to

60

Hess, Forgotten Frontier; idem, An Ottoman Fifth Column idem, The Battle of Lepanto idem, The
Ottoman Conquest of Egypt.
61
Gilles Veinstein, Charles Quint et Soliman le Magnifique: le grand d fi, in Carlos V: Europe smo y
universalidad : Congreso internacional, Granada, mayo de 2000, eds. Juan Luis Castellano and Francisco
S nchez-Montes Gonz lez (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal Para la Conmemoraci n de los Centenarios de Felipe II y
Carlos V, 2001), 519-29.
62
Gbor goston, Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defence, Military Change and Shifts, The Turkish Studies
Association Bulletin 22/1 (1998): 126-141 idem, Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy:
Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, in The Early Modern Ottomans:
Remapping the Empire, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 75-103.
63
G za D vid, The Mhimme Defters as a Source in Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the 16th Century,
Archivum Ottomanicum 20 (2002): 167-209.
64
P l Fodor, Between Two Continental Wars: The Ottoman Naval Preparations in 15 0-15 2, in In Quest of
the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Pl
Fodor (Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2000), 171-190.
65
Rhoads Murphey, A Comparative Look at Ottoman and Habsburg Sources and Readiness for War circa 1520
to circa 1570, in Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarqua Hispanica: Poltica, Estrategia y Cultura en la Europa
Moderna (1500-1700), vol. I: Poltica, Estrategia, Organizacin y Guerra en el Mar, eds. Enrique Garca
Hernn and Davide Maffi (Madrid: Ediciones del Laberinto, 2006), 75-102.
66
S.A. Skilliter, The Hispano-Ottoman Armistice of 1581 in Iran and Islam: in memory of the late Vladimir
Minorsky, ed. C.E. Bosworth (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 491-515.
67
Jean-Louis Bacqu-Grammont, Autour dune Correspondance entre Charles Quint et brahim Paa, Turcica
XV (1983), 231-246.
68
Glru Necipolu, Sleymn the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of OttomanHapsburg-Papal Rivalry in Sleymn the Second and His Time, eds. Halil nalck and Cemal Kafadar (stanbul:
The Isis Press, 1993), 163-194.
69
M. J. Rodrguez Salgado, Carlos Africanus?: El Emperador y el Turco, in Congreso Internacional: Carlos
V y la quiebra del humanismo politico en la Europa (1530-1558), Madrid 3-6 de Julio de 2000, vol. I, eds. Jose
Martnez Milln and Ignacio J. Ezquera Revilla (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoracin de los
centanarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), 487-530. Salgado also wrote an illuminating book about the truce
negotiations between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, idem, Felipe II, el Palad n de la Cristiandad y la paz
con el Turco (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2004).
70
Angelo Raffa, Lultima impresa di hayreddin (Barbarossa . La guerra marittima turco-franco-spagnola del
1543-4, in Aspetti ed attualit del potere marittimo in Mediterraneo nei secoli XII-XVI, ed. P. Alberini (Roma,
Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1999), 397-424.
71
Cabanelas, Proyecto de alianza entre los sultanes de Marruecos y Turquia contra Felipe II, Miscelanea de
Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos VI (1957): 57-78 ; idem, Proyecto de Ulug Ali para la conquista de Or n, in
tudes dorientalisme ddies la mmoire de Lvi-Provenal, vol. II (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose,
1962), 69-78.
72
Emrah Safa Grkan, Osmanl-Habsburg Rekabeti erevesinde Osmanllarn XVI. Yzyldaki Akdeniz
Siyaseti, in Osmanl Dnemi Akdeniz Dnyas, eds. Haydar oruh et al. (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yaynevi, 2011 ,
11-50.
73
John Elliott, Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective, in Sleymn the Second and His Time,
eds. Halil nalck and Cemal Kafadar (stanbul: The Isis Press, 1 3 , 153-62.

22

Turkish.74 The prolific Spanish historian Floristn Imzcoz contributed to the field by
studying, in a book and tens of articles, the abundant documentation in AGS regarding the
Habsburgs relations with the dissident Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.75 zlem
Kumrular wrote two books, published in Turkey, yet written in Spanish,76 as well as a number
of articles which she recently put together in a book.77 Finally, Miguel ngel de Bunes Ibarra
worked extensively on Ottoman-Habsburg relations, shedding light on many different aspects
in several articles he published.78
Yet all these efforts remained rather uncoordinated and the cumulative scholarly effect
of these works is rather disappointing. Written in different languages (English, Spanish,
French, Italian, Turkish) and published in different countries (USA, England, Turkey,
Hungary, Spain, France), these academic works, all of which are well-crafted, failed to create
a forum for discussion and instigate interest for further studies.
It is interesting to see that this most important political rivalry of the 16 th century,
which forced all the political actors of the era to take a position, received little attention from
the historians of both the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires. This dissertation tries to shed
light on one aspect of this rivalry, relying on a vast corpus of both Ottoman and European

74

Muzaffer Arkan and Paulino Toledo, eds., XIV.-XVI. yzyllarda Trk- spanyol ili kileri ve denizcilik
tarihimizle ilgili spanyol belgeleri
Las relaciones Turco-Espa olas en los sigios XIV y XVI. Documentos
Espa oles relativos a la historia naval Otomana (Ankara: Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanl, 1 5 .
75
Jos M. Floristn Imzcoz, Fuentes para la Poltica Oriental de las Austrias, volumen I: La Documentacin
Griego del Archivo de Simancas (1571-1621) (Len: Universidad de Len, 1988). Even though the book deals
mostly with the 17th century, he also penned several articles that covered the 16 th century, most of which are
reproductions of a couple of primary documents. Their number forced me to leave them out of this footnote.
76
zlem Kumrular, Las Relacines; eadem, El duelo.
77
zlem Kumrular, Yeni Belgeler I nda Osmanl-Habsburg Dellosu (stanbul: Kitap Yaynevi, 2011).
78
Miguel ngel de Bunes Ibarra, Kanuni Sultan Sleyman, Barbaros Pasha and Charles V: The Mediterranean
World in The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilization, vol. 2, eds. Kemal iek et al. (Ankara: Yeni Trkiye
Yaynlar, 2000), 343-376; idem, The Maritime War between the Ottoman and Spanish Empires during the
Time of Sultan Selim and Sleyman, in The Turks, volume 3: The Ottomans, eds. Hasan Celal Gzel et al.
(Ankara: Yeni Trkiye Yaynlar, 2002 , 287-295; idem, Charles V and the Ottoman War from the Spanish
Point of View, Eurasian Studies 2 (2002): 165-186 idem, Venecia y la Sublime puerta: La embajada de Diego
Hurtado de Mendoza, in Congreso Internacional: Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo politico en la Europa
(1530-1558), Madrid 3-6 de Julio de 2000, vol. I, eds. Jose Martnez Milln and Ignacio J. Ezquera Revilla
(Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoracin de los centanarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), 487-530;
idem, Carlos V frente al Imperio otomano, Torre de los Lujanes 41 (2000): 63-76. Also see, idem (with
Mercedes Garca-Arenal), Los espaoles y el Norte de Africa, siglos XV-XVII (Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992).
For his other works on the subject, see his Curriculum Vitae in http://www.irishinspain.org/bunes.html.

23

primary and secondary sources and with the hope that its findings will be supplemented by
other focused studies on related aspects such as naval power, financing of warfare,
employment of irregular forces, making of a capital, utilization of diplomatic resources,
application of imperial ideology, formulation of foreign policy, imposing Orthodoxy and the
justification of imperial ambitions by religious discourse. Only then can a truly original,
comprehensive history of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the Mediterranean be written.
In this vein, this dissertation tries to contribute to the field by focusing on the aspect of
gathering information in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, not only by scrutinizing the secret
services of both empires, but also by analyzing them in a comparative context and thus
explaining how differences in each empires political and administrative structures affected
their information gathering practices and the institutionalization of their secret services. In this
way, it would restore the importance of information to the field of early modern political
history and fight the prevalent historiographical prejudices that assumed, in a tautological
circle according to Paolo Preto, that espionage is a light subject and should only be of concern
to novelists and journalists.79
The proliferation of studies that engage in political history and more specifically in
espionage in the last three decades hint at a newly emerging interest. Before the 1980s, few
works of academic quality bothered with espionage in the early modern period.80 Even though
Bacigalupe published his study on the Habsburg secret service in Flanders, La Diplomacia
Secreta en Flandes,81 in 1 84, it was actually Lucien B lys monumental work of 00 pages
on every aspect of diplomacy and espionage around the time of the Treaty of Utrecht that
79

Here is the tautology Preto summarizes: There is little documentation, therefore there is little history; there is
little history, therefore espionage is of little importance in history and therefore a light subject for novelists and
journalists, thus not real history. Preto, Servizi Segreti, 13.
80
Exceptions are James Westfall Thompson and Saul K. Padover, Secret Diplomacy and Cryptography, 15001815 (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1937, 2 nd edition 1965), a well-written study on espionage in
general; Peter Fraser, The Intelligence of the Secretaries of the State and their Monopoly of Licensed News,
1660-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956) which accentuates the central role of state
secretaries in the running of intelligence operations, and Charles Howard Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the
Habsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964).
81
Bacigalupe, Diplomacia Secreta en Flandes.

24

initiated an interest on the subject among the historians of early modern Europe.82 Several
other works soon followed B lys suit and a large number of works on espionage in the early
modern world appeared in several European languages.83 One which should be given special
consideration is Paolo Pretos detailed and diligent work on the Secret Services of Venice,
an impressive effort that engages in an enormous amount of archival documentation and
covers the subject in its entirety from the first recorded instance of espionage to the last one.84
Bacigalupes works have remained more influential among the Spanish historians who
have penned a number of works on espionage in the last two decades.85 Some of these works
are directly related to our subject as they concentrated on espionage targeting the Ottoman
Empire. Solas works on Habsburg agents that operated in North Africa and the Levant
contributed to this essay on both a theoretical and practical level.86 Morever, Solas internet

82

Lucien Bly, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Librairie Arthme Fayard, 1990).
Romano Canosa and Isabello Colonnello, Spionaggio a Palermo: Aspetti della Guerra Secreta TurcoSpagnola in Mediterraneno nel Cinquecento (Palermo: Sellerio Editore, 1991); Alan Marshall, Intelligence and
Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Hugon, Au
Service de Roi Catholique, especially Part III, Chapters 8-10; Jean-Michel Ribera, Diplomatie et Espionnage:
Les Ambassadeurs du roi de France auprs de Philippe II du trait du Cateau-Cambresis (1559) la mort de
Henri III (1589) (Paris: Honor Champion Editeur, 2007), especially Part II. I skipped John Michael Archers
Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993), because it entirely focuses rather on the relationships between surveillance and power as
well as the process by which the royal court expanded its influence by increasing its knowledge on its
aristocracy. For Portuguese agents in the Indian Ocean and the Ottoman Empire, see. Vasco Resende, L'Orient
islamique dans la culture portugaise de l'poque moderne, du voyage de Vasco de Gama la chute d'Ormuz
(1498-1622 (Ph.D. Diss., cole Pratique des Haut tudes, 2011), Chapter 3.
84
Preto, Servizi Segreti.
85
David Salinas, Espionaje y Gastos Secretos en la Diplomacia Espaola (1663-1683) en sus Documentos
(Valladolid: mbito Ediciones, 1994), a work on the financing of espionage; Emilio Sola and Jos F. de la Pea,
Cervantes y la Berbera: Cervantes, mundo turco-berberisco y servicios secretos en la poca de Felipe II
(Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1995); Carlos J. Carnicer Garca and Javier Marcos Rivas, Sebastin de
Arbizu, Espa de Felipe II: La diplomacia secreta espaola y la intervencin en Francia (Madrid: Editorial
Nerea S.A., 1998); Sola, Los que van y vienen; Javier Marcos Rivas and Carlos Carnicer Garca, Espionaje y
Traicin en el Reinado de Felipe II: La historia de vallisoletano Martin de Acua (Valladolid :Diputacin
Provincial de Valladolid, 2001) ; eidem, Espas de Felipe II; Maria Jos Bertomeu Masi (ed.), Cartas de un
Espa de Carlos V: La Correspondencia de Jernimo Bucchia con Antonio Perrenot de Granvela (Valncia :
Universitat de Valncia, 2006); Diego Navarra Bonilla (ed.), Cartas entre espas e inteligencias secretas en el
siglo de los validos, Juan de Torres Gaspar-Bonifaz, 1632-1638 (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2007). For a
detailed bibliography of works on Spanish information gathering from Medieval Age to Present, see Juan R.
Goberna Falque, Inteligencia, Espionaje y Servicios Secretos en Espaa (Madrid : Ministerio de Defensa, 2007).
86
Sola and de la Pea, Cervantes y la Berbera; Sola, Los que van y vienen. One should not forget Solas lessknown article, Moriscos, Renegados y Agentes Secretos Espaoles en la poca de Cervantes, OTAM 4 (1993):
331-362 that focused on Habsburg spies who operated in the Levant for the first time. David Garca Hern ns
1 4 article, Algunas Notas sobre el Servicio de Informaci n de la Monarqua Cat lica en el Mediterr neo en
tiempo de Felipe II, Espacio, Tiempo, Forma, Serie IV, Historia Moderna 7 (1994): 245-258 is very revealing
83

25

project Archivo de la Frontera,87 where he and his students transcribe, according to Solas
unique method of breaking down the text into verses, archival documents from AGS with a
summary introduction and necessary comments, should be given due consideration. This
website provides a unique opportunity for non-specialist historians: access to primary
material. The works of Garca and Marcos are of relevance and should be given credit as well.
Having extensively written on the subject of espionage,88 in 2005, these two authors finally
engaged in a comprehensive analysis of Philip IIs secret services without any specific
geographical concentration.89 A year later, Maria Jos Bertomeu Masi published the letters
exchanged between the Habsburg authorities and a spymaster, Jernimo Bucchia, who used
his familial ties to establish an intelligence network in several cities of Dalmatia which he
remotely coordinated from Turin and Naples.90 Finally, a recently published edited volume
contains, among many interesting works, several essays directly relevant to our topic.91
On the Ottoman side, there are, unfortunately, fewer works. The only book that has
been written on espionage in the early modern Ottoman Empire is a short work of 23 pages
published in 1943, Robert Anheggers Ein angeblicher schweizerischer Agent an der Hohen
Pforte im Jahre 1581.92 This interesting book, now out of print, does not engage in any
scientific analysis at all; it basically consists of the transcription of 10 documents in German
as well. Also See. Enrique Garca Hern ns 1 4, The Price of Spying at the Battle of Lepanto, Eurasian
Studies II/2 (2003): 227-250 idem, Espionaje en la Batalla de Lepanto, Historia 16 27 (2003): 8-41.
87
http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/
88
Their earlier books were biographies of certain spies that worked for the Habsburgs. Garca and Marcos,
Sebastin de Arbizu; eidem, Martin de Acua. The latter figure spied in Constantinople as well. Even though his
tenure was short, he played an important role by instigating the diplomatic talks for a truce between both empires
on his own incentive. (See Chapter 4).
89
Garca and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II: Los servicios secretos del Imperio espaol (Madrid : La esfera de los
libros, 2005).
90
Masi, Jernimo Bucchia.
91
Diego Navarro Bonilla, Espas Honorables, Espas Necesarios: De la Informaci n a la Inteligencia en la
Conducci n de la Poltica y la Guerra de la Monarqua Hisp nica, in Ambassadeurs, Apprentis Espions et
Matres Comploteurs : Les systmes de Renseignement en Espagne lpoque Moderne, ed. Batrice Perez
(Paris : Presses de luniversit Paris-Sorbonne, 2010), 31-47 ; Michle Escamilla, Antonio Rinc n: Transfuge,
Espion, Ambassadeur et Casus Belli au temps de Charles Quint in Ibid., 87-160 ; Raphal Carrasco,
LEspionnage Espagnol du Levant au XVIe sicle daprs la Correspondance des Agents Espagnols en Poste
Venise, in Ibid., 203-222 ; Miguel ngel de Bunes Ibarra, Avis du Levant: Le R seau dEspionnage Espagnol
dans lEmpire Ottoman partir du Sud de lItalie, la Charnire des XVI e et XVIIe Sicles, in Ibid., 223-240.
92
Robert Anhegger, Ein angeblicher schweizerischer Agent an der Hohen Pforte im Jahre 1581 (stanbul:
Marmara Basmevi, 1943).

26

and Latin from the Austrian archives and their Turkish translation. A small number of
relevant articles that were written in English do not bother with a comprehensive analysis
either; their scope remained rather limited to either the operations of a particular agent, 93 the
exchange of information between Constantinople and a vassal state,94 or the reproduction of a
number of intelligence reports from the archives, accompanied by a short commentary.95 The
only exception is Gbor goston who attempted a systematic study of Ottoman information
gathering in the 16th century within the context of the Ottoman grand strategy.96
This dissertation, therefore, aims to make a significant contribution to the study of the
Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the 16th century by instigating new discussions on the subject
and undertaking a comparative study of both empires secret services. By focusing on how
both empires tackled the issue of developing efficient intelligence gathering mechanisms in
order to derive political benefit from information, it tries to explain the differences between
the secret services of both empires within the context of their differing organizational
93

Victor L. M nage, The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France in 1486, Royal Asiatic Society of
Great Britain and Ireland (1965): 112-32; S. A. Skilliter, The Sultans Messenger, Gabriel Defrens an
Ottoman Master Spy of the Sixteenth Century, Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes LXVIII
(1976): 47-59; Gne Iksel, Hac Murd (Agi Morato : An Elusive Algerian Dignitary, Oriente Moderno, (in
press, 2012).
94
N.H. Biegman, Ragusan Spying for the Ottoman Empire: Some 16th-Century Documents From the State
Archive at Dubrovnik, Belleten 26/106 (1963): 237-255.
95
John E. Woods, Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian
Foreign Relations, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 38-1 (1979): 1-9; Percy Kemp, An Eighteenth Century
Turkish Intelligence Report International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 497-506; Christine IsomVerhaaren, An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in
the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V, Turcica 28 (1996): 299-318; Giancarlo Casale, An
Ottoman Intelligence Report from the mid-sixteenth century Indian Ocean, Journal of Turkish Studies 31
(2007): 181-188; Gza D vid and P l Fodor, Ottoman Spy Reports from Hungary, in Turcica et Islamica.
Studi in Memoria di Aldo Gallotta, vol. I, ed. Ugo Marazzi (Napoli: Universit degli Studi di Napoli
LOrientale, 2003 . See p.121 fn. 1 for studies in Hungarian on the Ottoman information gathering in Hungary,
which I could not consult.
96
G bor goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the
Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, in The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, eds. Virginia
H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75-103; see especially 78-92.
For his other articles on Ottoman information gathering, in Hungarian, see. idem. Inform ci szerzs s
kmkeds az Oszmn Birodalomban a 15-17. sz zadban in Informcirmls a magyar s trk vgvri
rendszerben, eds. Tivadar Petercsk and Mtys Berecz (Eger: Heves Megyei Mzeum, 1999), 129-54; idem.
Birodalom s inform ci : Konstantin poly, mint a korajkori Eur pa inform ci s kzpontja in Perjs Gza
Emlkknyv, eds. Gbor Hausner and Lszl Veszprmi (Budapest: Argumentum, 2005); 31-60. See also
Panteleimon Roberts unpublished article recently submitted to a journal, Intelligence and Security in the
Ottoman Empire in the time of Murad IV,
http://independent.academia.edu/PanteleimonRoberts/Papers/474536/Intelligence_and_Security_in_the_Ottoma
n_Empire_in_the_Time_of_Murad_IV

27

structures. Furthermore, it proposes a new method for studying both empires strategies and
policies vis--vis each other and defends that decision-making processes should be analyzed
with a thorough study of primary sources, taking into account a number of factors, some
related to the aspect of information such as perception, prejudice and paranoia, some related
to the aspect of factional politics. Thus it underlines the importance of secret diplomacy in
order to achieve political ends and argues that states that were better informed formulated
their strategies and policies better.
1.3.

A NOTE ON SOURCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

This dissertation tries to amalgamate European and Ottoman sources in an effort to

broaden the source base for the study not only of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, but also of
Ottoman political history per se. Apart from a large number of secondary sources, it relies on
printed primary sources as well as archival material in Ottoman, Italian, Spanish, French,
Portuguese and Latin.
European archival sources that were consulted in this dissertation are mainly located
in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS) in Valladollid and Archivio di Stato di Venezia
(ASV) in Venice, even though occasionally documentation from other archives were used
when necessary. Furthermore, manuscripts in a number of libraries supplemented these
archival sources. A large number of printed primary sources provided crucial information as
well. Comprehensive works like Sanudo, Charrire, Priuli and Albri, compilations of
ambassadorial letters and of state documents, travel reports, diaries and court histories are of
utmost importance to any historian who studies the 16th century Mediterranean.
These European sources give detailed information in a very precise manner. A quick
comparison between these and Ottoman sources presents a stark contrast. The nature of
Ottoman sources restrains the investigator by not rendering detailed information and a
complete picture of Ottoman information-gathering mechanism; as Dvid and Fodor put it,

28

only tactics of small steps can be followed.97 Main sources in the Ba bakanlk Osmanl
Ar ivleri (BOA) such as Mhimme Kalemi (MD and MZD) include only the correspondence
between the center and the provinces and reflect only the outgoing orders reducing the
investigator to seek sparse traces of Ottoman information gathering. These traces appear only
when the result of such gathering was consequential to the order and thus there was a
reference to it in the previous section of the hkm which mentions the previous
correspondence on the issue and gives context to the order to be sent out. Hence, only in cases
where the Ottoman chancellery considered it expedient to mention the results of previous
intelligence activities (orders sent to the frontier provinces asking the officials to continue
gathering information or to act on an information gathered by Constantinople from other
sources and remitted to the province, etc.), we have clues as to what kind of information
received by the central government. Even then, these succinct documents are no match for
their counterparts in AGS and ASV; they relate almost no detail about the organization of
Ottoman information gathering networks. A number of spy reports, extant in the Evrak
section of the TSMA and some of which were already published, are not more illuminating on
the subject, either.98 Lacking any chronological or thematic consistency, these reports hardly
give us an idea about the extent of Ottoman networks in the Western Mediterranean and
Europe, falling short both in volume and in quality of what is required for a systematic study
of Ottoman intelligence gathering.

99

In short, Ottoman historians cannot dream about the

nuanced studies of collection and processing of information we possess, say, regarding the
Venetians or the Spanish Habsburgs.100

97

D vid and Fodor, Ottoman Spy Reports, 122.

erafettin Turan, Barak Reisin ehzade Cem Meselesiyle lgili Olarak Savoieya Gnderilmesi, Belleten
26/103 (1962): 539-551 cf. Victor L. M nage, Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent John E. Woods, An
Ottoman Intelligence Report Christine Isom-Verhaaren, An Ottoman Report G za D vid and P l Fodor,
Ottoman Spy Reports. Also see the appendix of Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim for TSMA Evrak 6320.
99
Giancarlo Casale recently pointed out the scarcity of documentation on the Ottomans involvement in the
Indian Ocean as well. Casale, An Ottoman Intelligence Report.
100
Gbor goston, Information, Ideology and Limits, 7 .
98

29

I would like to propose a number of reasons for these limitations. The first is that the
Ottoman chancellery did not have the habit of producing descriptive long documents; there is
nothing equal, neither in quality nor in length, to Sanudos Diaries or Venetian relazioni
among the documents and literary works produced by the Ottoman elite. Nor was there a wide
range interest that would justify the copious circulation of such political texts, as
demonstrated by the late arrival of the printing press. Compared to Europe, where a large
number of books, pamphlets and newsletters were printed and became part of the public
sphere, Ottoman Constantinople lagged behind in developing a written political culture.
The Ottoman insistence on clinging to the oral communication, especially while
transmitting important information, further aggravated the problem. The Ottoman chancellery
failed to keep up with developments in European cryptology and relied instead, more often
than their Habsburg and Venetian counterparts, on the memory of their messengers. 101 Even
though they carried a letter, these messengers have to keep the important part of the message
in their minds in order not to risk that it fell into the enemy hands. The result was a dualit du
message et du messager, as Nicolas Vatin described it.102 The letter that Suleyman I wrote the
prisoner Francis I in 1526, for instance, finishes abruptly, after a long intitulatio and a short
text of encouragement, with the following words: your afore-mentioned envoy was charged
with telling you, de bouche, the news and affairs relevant to his mission.103 As one could see,
the real message was to be transmitted orally. The letter served a different purpose: that of
introducing the messenger and proving the authenticity of the message he was to transmit.104
Thirdly, the lack of permanent ambassadors abroad should have resulted in the
production of a lesser number of documents that engaged in international politics; an
101

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 79r-80r (18 February 1566, m. v.).

Nicolas Vatin, Remarques sur loral et crit dans ladministration ottomane au XVIe sicle, Revue du monde
musulman et de la Mditerrane 75-76 (1995), 147. Vatin engages in a brilliant discussion of the issue with
interesting examples in this rather overlooked article.
103
BNF, N.a.f. 7669, fols. 305-6 ; Annie Berthier, Un Document Retrouv : La Premire Lettre de Soliman au
Franois Ier (1526 , Turcica XXVII (1995): 263-266.
104
Vatin, Remarques sur loral, 14 -50.
102

30

important portion of the documents in European archives are the correspondence between the
central government and the ambassador who was in charge of gathering information in
foreign capitals. This explains the lack of documentation such as dispacci in the Ottoman
archives from which we could learn more about the activities of Ottoman secret service in
Europe. However, it fails to explain why the Ottoman ambassadors who visited Europe not
with less interest in gathering information than their European counterparts did not leave any
written reports, similar to Venetian relazioni, before the mid-17th century.105 In a similar vein,
in stark contrast with Venetian and Habsburg provincial officials who were required by law to
submit the relevant documentation, summarizing their tenure in office, the Ottomans did not
have such a custom. The provincial nature of the early modern intelligence further aggravated
the problem, especially given that the Ottoman intelligence activities came under the control
of the central bureaucracy to a lesser extent than those of the Habsburgs and the Venetians.
Compared to the Papeles de Estado Npoles and Sicilia sections of AGS where I had the
luxury of consulting more than 100 legajos, each of which contain an average of 150-200
documents, one can find no comprehensive corpus of documents in the Ottoman archives that
arrived with a returning Governor-General who should have employed a good number of
spies. This brings us back to our first two reasons, intrinsically linked to each other: the
underdevelopment of Ottoman chancellery methods and the Ottoman failure to develop a
written political culture. To these two, we shall return later in Chapter Six and explain how, in
spite of these disadvantages, the Ottomans still succeeded in operating an efficient secret
service.
A further problem is the under-representation of Mediterranean politics in the works
of contemporary Ottoman historians. Few contemporary Ottoman court historians engaged the
issues regarding the Mediterranean and relate us the details of Ottoman strategy, objectives

105

Faik Reit Unat, Osmanl Se irleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu Yaynlar, 1 68 .

31

and operations in the Western Mediterranean. Simply, the background of these palace
historians as well as of their intended audience sparked little interest for these naval
expeditions which were undertaken without the presence of the Sultan or the Grand Vizier
and in faraway lands of the Western Mediterranean. For instance, a series of Ottoman naval
operations that ravaged, with partial French participation, the Habsburg shores in the Western
Mediterranean (1543, 1544, 1551, 1552, 1553, 1554, 1555 and 1558) provoked surprisingly
little attention in these historians who were generally very eager to provide military details
when they covered a land war. The activities of the Levantine corsairs were not given their
due attention, either, especially, but not exclusively before 1534.106
To overcome the limitations this corpus of sources imposed upon the researcher, one
has to rely on European primary sources which would provide important information about
Ottoman espionage. These not only demonstrate to us the complexity and the success of the
Ottoman information gathering, but also provide us with case studies and important details
about the Ottoman intelligence network in the Venetian and Habsburg lands.
This should be the most important contribution that these sources brought to Ottoman
studies. However, it is not the only one. European sources provide interesting details about
Ottoman politics in general as well. It is thus essential to incorporate these sources into
Ottoman political history and shed light on its many aspects which remained in the dark
because of the restricting nature of Ottoman sources.
Firstly, Venetian and French ambassadorial reports as well as spy letters on several
European governments payroll provide a rich source base for the study of Ottoman politics.
While Ottoman court histories and archival documentation produced by the government do
not reflect the divisions within the government, European sources help us understand factional
politics in the 16th-century Constantinople. In the light of these sources, this dissertation

106

Grkan, The Center and the Frontier, 130-1.

32

presents new information on rivalries between different political actors such as the Pashas,
power brokers and courtiers and thus between different political factions. Therefore, it
enhances our understanding of how political decisions were made in the Ottoman capital. It
helps us deconstruct the Ottoman decision-making process and see that most of the time the
corporate interest of a faction prevailed over the abstract concept of state interest. This is a
significant contribution to a historiography which studied Ottoman Empire as a monolithic
state for so many years. In contrast to the prevalent attitude among the Ottomanists to discuss
Ottoman strategy and policy with sentences such as the Sultan did, the Ottomans decided,
etc. this dissertations broadened source base demonstrates how there were conflicting
agendas within the Ottoman government and how Ottoman decision-making was a constant
negotiation between different factions that vied for power.107
Secondly, while most diplomatic negotiations between the Europeans and the
Ottomans were covered insufficiently in Ottoman sources, European ambassadors left
important details regarding their tenure in Constantinople. Their reports demonstrate to us
what kind of negotiations took place between these ambassadors, the Ottoman government
and the factions that vied for power in the Ottoman Empire. They also provide crucial insights
on the intricacies of what I call diplomacy alla Ottomana, that is the particularities and
customs of negotiating in Constantinople. In spite of the availability of printed primary
sources such as the Venetian relazioni, ambassadorial diaries, travelogues, etc., a
comprehensive study of diplomacy in the 16th-century Constantinople has not been
undertaken yet. Nor does this dissertation aspire to engage in a comprehensive study of the

107

For other studies that rely on European documentation while studying Ottoman political history, see. Gnhan
Breki, Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) and His Immediate
Predecessors (Ph.D. Diss., Ohio State University, 2011 and Casale, Ottoman Age of Exploration. The latter
work created a controversy among the historians. While it was praised by non-specialists, it also suffered from
the harsh criticisms of some Ottomanists. See. Svat Soucek, About the Age of Exploration, Archivum
Ottomanicum 27 (2010): 313-342; Gne Iksel, Entre d sirs et r alit s: propos de The Ottoman Age of
Exploration de Giancarlo Casale, Turcica 43 (2012): forthcoming.

33

subject by exhausting available information on the subject. Still, Chapter Five includes new
information that would be illuminating for further studies.
Thirdly, European sources allow us to render agency to the often neglected individual
in Ottoman political history. Accessible Ottoman sources do not give much detail on
individuals; even the greatest actors of politics in Constantinople such as brahim and Rstem
Pashas were poorly covered.108 Less important figures such as power brokers, courtiers,
medium-ranking government officials, members of pasha households, informants, spies, gobetweens and the like remained almost invisible. This is a deficiency given that these are the
ones who conducted the day-to-day operations of politics in Constantinople. Figures such as
David Passi, Joseph Nasi, Salomon Ashkenazi, Carlo Cicala, Hrrem Bey, several members
of Ulu Alis household are all indispensable for a comprehensive study of politics in the 16thcentury Constantinople.
In short, this dissertation makes a significant contribution by providing new
information on a number of issues which Ottomanists could not study in detail because of the
nature of Ottoman sources. Obviously, the major contribution would be in the field of
Ottoman information gathering. But it also includes significant insights that shed light on
factional politics and diplomacy in Constantinople and highlight the careers of otherwise
overlooked individuals who played an important role in 16th-century Constantinople politics.
1.4.

CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter Two delineates the complex and multilayered relation between information
and politics. Firstly, by concentrating on different categories of information used by states, I
discuss the processes by which governments made use of information while formulating
strategy and policy, making military decisions and engaging in diplomatic negotiations. I
furthermore describe the impediments to objective political assessment of information in an
108

See for a successful integration of European sources into Ottoman political history and thus rendering agency
to the individual, Ebru Turan, The Sultan s Favorite: Ibrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Universal
Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman (1516-1526 (Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 2007 .

34

effort to demonstrate the imperfect nature of the decision-making process. Secondly, I situate
a number of developments, crucial for the increased efficiency of intelligence operations as
well as the quality of information, within the larger historical processes of bureaucratization
and centralization. Finally, I demonstrate the severity of international crises which were
unintended consequences of secret diplomacy and which crippled relationships between
states.
Chapter Three focuses on spies as a sociological group and espionage as a profession.
It first concentrates on the professional, social and cultural background of Mediterranean spies
in an effort to situate them among a larger group of people, the crossers of so-called
civilizational boundaries, whom the historians for long labeled as go-betweens. Secondly, I
deliberate on other specialists of secret diplomacy who led and operated intelligence networks
in different capacities during several stages of intelligence operations. Thirdly, I describe the
required level of specialization in the trade of espionage and the complexity of methods by
which secret diplomacy was conducted. Fourthly, in order to demonstrate the entrepreneurial
nature of early modern espionage, I examine the motivations of early modern spies and the
diverse methods by which central governments rewarded their spies. Finally, I demonstrate
the importance of familial ties and related networks for Mediterranean go-betweens and more
specifically for the agents of secret diplomacy.
Chapter Four describes the Habsburg secret service in the Eastern Mediterranean
which underwent a slow process of evolution into an institutionalized apparatus at the service
of the central government. These efforts produced mixed results because of logistical,
technological and financial difficulties as well as the resistance of the practical nature of
espionage. By delineating the structure of Habsburg secret diplomacy and focusing on the role
that the central government and the officials in the provinces played, I can analyze the special
case of the Habsburg secret service in the Eastern Mediterranean and demonstrate how unique

35

factors the geographical distance, the hostile environment of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier
and the imperial clash between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs rendered the flow of
regular and reliable information more difficult than it was elsewhere. The Habsburgs had to
employ different methods and means in order to overcome the harsh conditions of the
Ottoman-Habsburg frontier and solve problems of communication, coordination and
transmission.

I also focus on the components of the Habsburg secret service in the

Mediterranean, i.e., separate intelligence networks and sources of information about things
Ottoman. Moreover, this chapter delineates the financial details of secret diplomacy and
demonstrates the inevitable conflict between authorities facing chronic budgetary problems
and entrepreneur spies who constantly sought embezzling government funds. Finally, I
deliberate on the efficiency of the Habsburg secret service in the Levant and the type of
information which the Habsburg decision-makers sought.
Chapter Five is a close look at the activities of an intelligence network, the one which
the entrepreneur go-betweens established in Constantinople on behalf of the Habsburgs.
Stories of these agents who brokered information between rival empires demonstrate how a
central government operated an intelligence network on the other side of the frontier.
Furthermore, it reflects the complex set of relations and details of negotiations among men of
all sorts from diverse religious, ethnic, geographical and cultural background who operated in
a rather hostile environment. Their success in gathering information underlines the fact that
the 16th-century Constantinople was a true center of information towards which news, ideas
flowed. Moreover, in an effort to render agency to the often neglected individual in Ottoman
historiography, this chapter concentrates on the activities of a group of select power brokers,
the invisible figures of Ottoman politics. Therefore, it delineates the intricacies of politics
(internal and external) in Constantinople, not on the highest level between Ottoman grandees
and foreign ambassadors, but on lower levels: between information-brokers, spymasters,

36

unofficial diplomats, translators, ransom agents and merchants who conducted, as agents of
these grandees and ambassadors, day-to-day operations of Constantinople politics. In short, I
tried to accentuate Constantinoples chaotic plurality in which our information brokers of
cross-border background, the long-forgotten protagonists of politics and espionage in 16th
century Ottoman politics, operated.
Chapter Six deals with the Ottoman methods of gathering and processing information
by building upon gostons findings.It discusses the particularities of the Ottoman Empire,
such as its patrimonial structure, the provincial nature of gathering information and the
underdevelopment of a written political culture, which distinguished the Ottoman secret
diplomacy from that of the Habsburgs. It argues that these particularities should not
necessarily be read as shortcomings. In spite of predetermined conclusions and unwarranted
assumptions that prevailed in Western historiography, the Ottomans developed an interest in
political developments around them and managed to operate an efficient intelligence
gathering mechanism. The real particularity which restricted the flow of information between
the two empires was the lack of direct diplomatic relations between them. The main argument
of the chapter then is that while both empires kept themselves informed of political
developments in each others capitals or certain provincial centers, to the greatest extent
possible given the logistical difficulties of the time, they failed to develop an awareness of
each others legal, political and economic systems as well as cultural, linguistic and religious
particularities. This unawareness is in stark contrast with the example of the Venetians whose
diplomatic presence in Constantinople educated the Venetian elite on things Ottoman in such
a profound way that even prompted the Venetians to use the Ottoman political system as a
point of reference while producing texts that discuss their own system of government.

37

1.5.

DEFINING CONCEPTS OF SECRET DIPLOMACY

I use several terms with different meanings in order to describe different components
and stages of early modern secret diplomacy, the generic term I use for all intelligence
activity of the Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman secret services. While the former term
refers to an activity, the latter denotes an institution. I use the term secret diplomacy to
denote the central governments efforts to reach their objectives with extra-diplomatic
methods. On the one hand, states engaged in a number of methods in order to create for
themselves an advantage by using information, i.e., by engaging in politics of information.
On the other hand, they sought to achieve their political ends by using clandestine measures
(or covert actions if you will) such as sabotage, bribery, fomenting rebellion and
assassination.
1.5.1. Politics of information
I study secret diplomacy in two basic categories. The first is the politics of
information which covers much of the secret diplomacy under scrutiny in this dissertation
that had information at the center of its analysis, Politics of information is a larger concept
than gathering of information. Even though information gathering constitutes an important
part of the state efforts to take advantage of information in their rivalries with other powers,
i.e., in formulating their strategy, in employing their military capability and in preparing their
defenses, the politics of information encompassed a wider range of activities. It is the
states efforts to create for themselves political advantages by using information. This
politicization of information created different methods by which states sought to maximize
their power. The control of information by central governments in the internal sphere
(domestic affairs) came under the scrutiny of historical studies, most recently by Filipo
Vivo,109 but what about similar activities concerning the external sphere (foreign affairs)? We
109

Filipo de Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).

38

know too much about how states concealed and manipulated information that was available to
its own subjects, but what about the struggle over information between rivaling sovereign
states? This brings another dimension to the relationship between information and politics and
accentuates the role of information in war-making, diplomacy, decision-making and strategy
formulation.
1.5.1.1.

Information gathering

Polities of all size engaged in information gathering in order to increase the quality of
their decision-making processes. Both empires of vast geographical dimensions and therefore
various political responsibilities had to use information in a number of ways in order to
maximize their interests. Firstly, they developed their strategies that defined their long-term
objectives and shaped their political tendencies as well as their position in the prevalent
alliance systems. Secondly, depending upon the political developments, they formulated
policies in order to react to the opportunities or threats that they perceived. Finally, in warfare,
information was essential, both in the planning of the campaign and the operation on the
battlefield. These are all subjects of the following chapter.
Chapters Four to Six give a detailed picture of the different information-gathering
mechanisms that the Habsburgs and the Ottomans utilized in different parts of the
Mediterranean. In order to prove the existence of a mechanism, this study focuses on a well
defined and institutionalized intelligence activity with established norms and common
methods rather than individual efforts of little analytical value. It tries to demonstrate a
mechanism which operates as an extension of the state itself which employed, supervised and
financially supported the intelligence activity.
Furthermore, the condicio sine qua non of a reliable information-gathering mechanism
is the availability of more than one channel of communication. This would diversify the
sources of information and provide the decision-maker with possibility to compare and

39

contrast the incoming information. Information gathered in different geographies as well as

from different networks in the same geography would prevent the possibility of
misinformation and disinformation and help formulate policy with more reliable and updated
information which was double or triple-checked.
1.5.1.2.

Counter-intelligence

If the goal of politics of information is to make use of information for political ends,
its function could not only be to gather information. Given that information is a commodity
which enhanced the quality of the decision-making process, states had to prevent their
enemies from acquiring information about them. Central governments developed several
methods that restricted the movement of people, regulated the transmission of letters and
limited the access to state secrets, all in order to control the information. The efficiency of
the politics of information depended upon that of the counter-intelligence, i.e., preserving
important secrets and impeding enemy intelligence, as much as information gathering per
se.110
1.5.1.3.

Disinformation

Central governments sought to manipulate information in order to affect the decisionmaking process of their enemies by spreading false rumours and fabricated news. As a part of
their politics of information and in a similar vein to state efforts to manipulate public
opinion, decision-makers developed strategies of disinformation in order to make political
use of information.
1.5.1.4.

Analysis

Information received at the center, however, could not be used in its crudest form. It
has to be verified, processed, simplified and then made ready for consumption for decisionmakers. Intelligence mechanisms provided the information, but it was the central governments
110

For a detailed study of the methods of Ottoman counter-Intelligence in the 16th century, see. Emrah Safa
Grkan, The Efficacy of Ottoman-Counter-Intelligence in the Sixteenth Century, Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientarium Hungaricum 65/1 (2012): 1-38.

40

who had to convert information into knowledge by following an efficient procedure of

processing and internalizing.111 As Alain Hugon asserted, the issue was not the production
of information, but rather a construction, a mise en ordre of facts that were more or less
verified by the informers.112
States tried to diversify the channels of information in order to be able to increase the
quality of the gathered information by comparing and contrasting. They could thus better
determine the veracity of the information which they received under less-than-perfect
circumstances. A number of factors should have advised further caution. Firstly, as will be
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, central governments could not fully trust their
spies. In an effort to conceal their inefficiency or increase their stipend, spies frequently
manipulated the information that they have sent. The scale of their intervention changed from
fabricating from the scratch to exaggeration. Secondly, states frequently received false
information since spies who failed to make observations and gather accurate information
tended to transmit rumours that they heard on the roads, streets or the marketplace. In another
chapter, we will witness the extent of some Habsburg authorities indignation against spies
who fabricated information and transmit baseless rumours.
The question was not only to verify these facts, but also to make meaningful political
decisions. No matter how efficient intelligence networks were and how solid the information
they provided was, in the end what mattered was how aptly decision-makers used the
information. The historian has to make a difference between the factual part of the
information gathering that produced raw information of certainty (aviso and the evaluative
part, the discourse (discurso), where decision-makers developed an assessment of certain

111

Bonilla, Espas Honorables, 46-47.

Alain Hugon, lInformation dans la Politique trangres de la Couronne dEspagne, in lIn ormation
lpoque Moderne : Actes du Colluque de 1999, Bulletin no. 25 (Paris : Presses de lUniversit de ParisSorbonne, 2001), 25.
112

41

information in order to read the political situation accurately.113 To give an example: the
information that the Ottoman fleet would set sail the next spring is a fact which carries
certainty. On the other hand, the conclusion that this was the sign of an approaching war, or
that the Ottoman fleet intended to attack target X, or that such and such preparations had to be
made is an evaluation, a political statement on what could happen, podria ser,114 a point
which decision-makers reached only after a diligent process of verification, comparison and
assessment of the gathered facts. In a further example, we see how the Count of Miranda
evaluated an information he received from his resident spy in Ragusa, Ruggero Margliani.
The information he received, that the Ottoman navy would leave the Dardanelles that year, he
decided, should be an Ottoman disinformation because of a number of factors. It was
inconsistent with other intelligence he received. The Ottomans could not have managed to
hide their war preparations so successfully; he had received other intelligence accentuating
the miserable conditions in the Imperial Arsenal. It was also too late in the sailing season for
the Ottoman navy to be able to make an impact.115
Decision-makers were not the only ones who passed judgment on the incoming
information; information traders also participated in evaluating information by adding their
own points-of-view, to a very limited extent constituting an intelligence community in the
modern sense. For instance in 1563, when they could not verify the target of the Ottoman
navy, the Habsburg spies had to make assumptions. Given that the navy would leave the
Dardanelles rather late, they concluded that it should have been destined for the Aegean Sea
rather than the Western Mediterranean and the westernmost point it could have reached would
be Modon and Koron.116

113

Sola, Los que van y vienen, 9-11.

Ibid., 10.
115
AGS, E 1093, fol. 62 (12 August 1592).
116
AGS, E 1052, fols. 129, 130 and 131 (2 March 1563).
114

42

I discuss the details of the analysis of raw information as well as the importance of
information on strategy formulation, policy-making and warfare in Chapter Two. I also
scrutinize factors affecting the perception of decision-makers, such as dis/misinformation,
perception, prejudice and paranoia in the same chapter.
1.5.1.5.

Cryptanalysis

Hand in hand with the growing size and the increasing complexity of imperial
chancelleries, an important development in the fifteenth and sixteenth century was in the
sciences of cryptography (the science of enciphering/encoding and deciphering/decoding the
correspondence) and steganography (the science of writing hidden messages by using special
methods such as invisible links, microdots, etc.). These sciences had a dual function. States
used these methods to ensure the safety of their transmission of news and the exchange of
correspondence between networks and authorities on the one hand, and tried to penetrate to
their enemies secrets from the intercepted correspondence on the other.
1.5.1.6.

Domestic intelligence

Domestic intelligence in both empires as well as the intelligence between different

factions within a government has been left out of the scope of this study as the importance of
information in decision-making within the context of the imperial conflict in the
Mediterranean is the real focus. Mechanisms that the states used to control their own citizens
became relevant only when related to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, i.e., when there was
foreign patronage and the domestic intelligence became a part of empires counterintelligence.
1.5.2. Clandestine operations
Even though one of the arguments of this dissertation is to accentuate the weight of
politics of information in the overall secret diplomacy, one should still spare room for
clandestine operations, i.e., bribery, sabotage, assassination, fomenting rebellion and

43

defection, in order to abstain from equating politics of information with secret diplomacy.
It is not that these operations produced important political results. Nonetheless, the details of
these projects and the methods applied in their execution give us, as will be evident in Chapter
Five, important details about the extent to which central governments could project their
power abroad by undertaking such risky operations on the one hand, and the extent to which
they could control and supervise their intelligence networks abroad on the other. Before the
modern era, most of these clandestine operations bore little fruit and became rather means to
defraud central governments by proposing ambitious but implausible projects, a tactic that
was especially efficient in the Ottoman-Habsburg borderland where spies were operating
without the supervision of a resident ambassador.
1.5.3. Usage of modern terms
As can easily be seen, I take the liberty of using several modern terms in explaining
pre-modern practices and institutions. This is a necessary narrative strategy to which
historians resort very often. However, I should warn the reader that modern terms such as
secret service, counter-information, mis-/disinformation, covert operation and even
diplomacy (first used in Mabillons De Re Diplomatica, 1681 should still be understood in
inverted commas. Some modern terms, on the other hand, were already in use in the 16th
century: intelligence (albeit with a different meaning more in the sense of a connection or
understanding , spy, informant or plot (conjura , etc.
1.6.

A COUPLE OF CLARIFICATIONS

Before we proceed to Chapter Two, I would like to make a couple of clarifications.

The first is regarding the use of the word Habsburg throughout the text. I mean by this term
the Habsburg possessions excluding those of the junior branch of the family. In 1521, the
hereditary Habsburg lands of the Archduchy of Austria were left by Charles V to the control
of his brother Ferdinand, his lieutenant and later successor in the Holy Roman Empire. Upon

44

the death of the last King of Hungary, Louis II, in 1526 while fighting against the Ottomans
on the plains of Mohcs, Ferdinand put a claim on the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia. With
the abdication of Charles V, the break-up of his patrimony became official. Ferdinand took
the afore-mentioned territories as well as the imperial crown for his issue, while Charles son
Philip II retained the remaining territories in Italy, Spain, the Americas and the Low
Countries, adding to them Portugal, whose crown he inherited via his mother in 1580. The
term Habsburg in the text refers to the empires of Charles V, Philip II and Philip III it
always excludes the Archduchy of Austrias lands including the Empire. My preference is a
narrative strategy that focused on the Mediterranean, so the cadet branch of the Habsburg
family moves to the sidelines. When I have to address the Austrian Habsburgs, I always use
an explicit expression, such as the Austrian, Austrian Habsburgs or simply Vienna.
I use the terms prisoner-of-war and war captive interchangeably, both referring to
the slaves that fell captive to the victors in a battle; these slaves could theoretically be
ransomed. I make a distinction, as will be explained Chapter Three, between a spy and an
informant, while I use the more inclusive term agent for spy, informant and broker. What
I mean by a broker is an agent who negotiates and arranges transactions between two
parties, in this case, between rival states, political factions, different interest groups and
prominent political figures. The term renegade is used in its 16th century meaning, a convert
from one religion to another. I would also like to accentuate the distinction between a pirate
and a corsair. The former is a lawless sea bandit, while the latter is a privateer in the
Mediterranean; he operated under the aegis of a sovereign and followed certain codes of
conduct. For the activity, I translated the contemporary term corso as corsary, rather than
privateering as I believe introducing a third term would confuse the reader, while substituting
privateer for corsair and privateering for corsary seemed ahistorical. Finally, I used Ottoman

45

grandees as an inclusive term that refer to not only high-level Ottoman officers, but also
courtiers and power-brokers that were influential in Ottoman politics.
I abstain from using appellations that can be affiliated with ethnicities or nations to the
greatest extent possible. It is not because these were not used by contemporaries; terms like
Greek, Turk, Spanish, Italian were widely in circulation in the 16th century. However, their
direct importation to a modern text can create problems. To give an example: a Turk in the
16th century might refer to an ethnic Turk, a Turcophone Muslim who may not be ethnically
Turk or just a Muslim (remember how Persians had to stay in Fondaco de Turchi in Venice),
including a renegade, who became (so being a Turk was something that one could become), a
Turk by profession, turco de profesin. Therefore, I make a distinction between a Turk, an
Ottoman, a Muslim and a renegade. Similarly, Italian or Spaniard were very vague terms in
the 16th century context; so I try to use more specific ones such as Venetian, Genoese,
Vallisolitano, etc. Furthermore, the usage of terms like Turkey, Spain and Italy in political
context can be misleading, because not only todays frontiers did not correspond to those of
the past, but also such usage underestimates the plurality of ethnicities in and thus conceals
the political nature of empires we are dealing with.
Most of the spies mentioned in our documentation had names spelled differently
depending on the linguistic background of the scribe. When documents diverge on the
spelling of a name, I try to resolve the ensuing chaos by using the spelling in the spys native
tongue. Thus Aurelio Santa Cruz became Aurelio Santa Croce and Juan Agustino Gilli
became Giovanni Agostino Gigli. When I could not determine the spys origin or the spelling
of his name in his native tongue, I used the lingua franca of the Mediterranean, Italian. Thus,
I kept the Italianized versions of most Greek and Albanian names, such as Bartolomeo Brutti.
Regarding titles and terms in Ottoman, Spanish and Italian, I try to supply the reader
with English equivalents to the greatest extent possible. In order not to confuse the specialists,

46

I chose to keep most titles and terms in the original language and thus to oblige the English
reader to memorize these terms, all of which were extensively used by the historians of
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Regarding several characters mentioned throughout the text,
I give as much information as possible. I also added two glossaries. Appendix I explains basic
terms, alien to non-specialists. Appendix II gives extensive biographical information on main
personae in the text.

47

CHAPTER TWO
SECRET DIPLOMACY: INFORMATION AND POLITICS

2.1.

INTRODUCTION:

Information is of central importance to studies that concentrate on international

political history. In order to avoid teleological conclusions and reading motivations from the
result of an action, the historian has to make the necessary effort in order to deconstruct under
what kind of circumstances strategies and policies were formulated, warfare was waged and
diplomatic negotiations were undertaken. He has to take into account the aspect of
information, i.e., how well-informed statemen and diplomats were of recent developments and
thus political options available to them.
In this chapter, I will try to explain the multilayered relation between information and
political action. Firstly, by concentrating on different categories of information in accordance
with the needs of central governments, I will seek to show the processes by which raw
information will be subjected to analysis in an effort to reach political and military decisions
or will be put into political use by manipulating decision-making processes or getting the
upper hand during diplomatic negotiations. Then, I will discuss the impediments in front of
the objective assessment of the incoming raw information and underscore the importance of
certain factors such as mis-/disinformation, prejudice and paranoia and the realities of
factional politics in decision-making process of early modern empires.
Secondly, I would like to place the developments of secret services of the 16th century
within the larger historical processes of bureaucratization and centralization which
incorporated the intelligence activity to the newly emerging bureaucratic state. The offshoots
of these afore-mentioned processes, key developments such as the improvements in
cryptography, steganography and the introduction of regular state-run postal systems, not only
48

increased the efficiency of intelligence operations as well as the quality of information, but
also brought the intelligence activities of the 16th century under closer control and regulation
of central governments. The result was the first signs of institutionalization.
Thirdly, I will conclude the chapter by discussing how secret diplomacy converged
with open diplomacy, i.e., how states that had open diplomatic relations reacted to each
others activities that were within the realm of secret diplomacy. With a number of examples
whereby international crisis of full scale erupted because of such activities, I will try to show
how serious the consequences could be for the relationship between two states once the very
blurry line between the tolerable and intolerable action was crossed.
2.2.

INFORMATION AND POLITICS: DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

Very few works have been written that shed light to the relation between information
and politics in the 16th century Mediterranean. Paolo Preto, for instance, does not discuss the
use of information in Venetian decision-making at length in his extensive study, otherwise
full of details.1 Among the Ottomanist, in spite of a recent article by Gabor goston on the
subject,2 there is little enthusiasm towards political subjects such as espionage, decisionmaking and strategy formulation, an indirect result of the domination of the field by socioeconomic history as a result of the efforts and pioneering works of Professors Kprl,
Barkan and nalck. Concerning the Habsburgs, Geoffrey Parker accentuates the role of
information in the decision-making process and the Grand Strategy of Philip II, 3 while
Carters book includes a 16 page chapter named The informational base of foreign policy.4
Alain Hugon concentrates rather on the relation between the leakage of information and the

Preto, Servizi Segreti.

goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits.
3
Nevertheless my case is different than his as mine puts greater emphasis on the information that was gathered
as a result of an intelligence activity and concentrates on the information concerning the events in the
Mediterranean and hence its effects on the Mediterranean strategy of Philip II as opposed to that of Parker,
which has a more northern concentration, only natural for a historian who wrote extensively about Habsburg
monarchy and the Dutch Revolt.
4
Carter, Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, Chapter 8.
2

49

decision-making process.5 Other works which concentrated on the Habsburg espionage in

different geographies and time period do not engage the issue in detail at all.6 Given this
dearth of scholarly studies that discuss the relationship between information and politics, the
following part can only aim to open a discussion on the subject rather than concluding it.
Before I go any further, I have to explain what I mean by strategy. I use the term in a
strictly political sense and excluded its military usage. The term, as used in this dissertation,
denotes a states complete plan of actions formulated, in tandem with economic,
psychological and moral factors, as a response to possible threats and opportunities in the
international system. It requires a profound understanding of political dynamics that shape the
decisions of actors in the international arena. Furthermore, I should also differentiate two
levels of decision-making. On the upper-level, states developed grand strategies which were
carefully planned and changed only slowly. On the lower-level, however, states engaged in
policy-making processes of more momentary nature in order to react in accordance with the
foreign as well as the domestic conjuncture.
2.2.1. Information gathering and grand strategy
A Grand Strategy is a blueprint for states. It encompasses their decisions regarding
their overall security, i.e., how to react against a perceived threat. It is a broader concept than
strategy that was designed to win a particular battle or campaign. The Grand Strategy is
a complex and multilayered thing7 that primarily deals with how a state allocates its
resources among various goals and integrates the states overall political, economic and
military aims, both in peace and war, to preserve long-term interests, including the
management of ends and means, diplomacy and national morale and political culture in both

Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 366-373.

Bacigalupe, La Diplomacia Secreta en Flandes; Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu; eidem, Martin de
Acua; eidem Espas de Felipe II.
7
Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategy in War and Peace, in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 1-7.
6

50

the military and civilian spheres.

In the pre-modern times, one should not look for an

official position paper that outlines the details of a grand strategy which was rather a shared
vision and determination of the ruling elite.9 Albeit rather unwritten and implicit than formal
and explicit, it still gives us the outline of a politys operational code.10
Even though historians penned well-crafted works that exhausted available resources
and concentrated on a well-defined and manageable period of time,11 there are many others
who suffer from methodological problems. Firstly, these works attributed Grand Strategies to
empires with a priori assumptions and frameworks that relied on logical reasoning rather than
primary sources, a problem which becomes more palpable in works that dealt with a number
of polities.12 They did not properly concentrate on each of them sufficiently and could not
even keep themselves up-to-date with the latest historiography. Most of the time they based
their conclusions on old-fashioned analyses which had little room for alternative explanations.
Furthermore, even though their focus is on the strategy, these authors had little idea on how
this strategy was formed. Their inability to use archival sources, among which they would
find the details of discussions during the decision-making process and reports that advocate a
certain point-of-view, hindered them to realize that decision-making process was not immune
to misperceptions and ignorance on the one hand (the aspect of information) and factional
politics and rivalry on the other (the aspect of politics).13 As a result of these factors, most of

Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 1.
John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 6-8.
10
Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge and London: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2009), 409.
11
J. H. Elliott, Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain, in Grand Strategies in
War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 87-104; John B. Hattendorf,
Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition: British Grand Strategy in the War of Spanish Succession, 1702-1713, in
Ibid., 11-29; Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II; LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire.
12
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Jakub J. Grygiel,
Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
13
In a work that concentrates on the Ottoman Venetian rivalry, Palmira Brummett justly underlined the
importance of the analysis of notable politics in order to perceive the motives behind political actions and the
decision-making process better. Such focus on the notables who participated both in politics and commerce
allows the historian to see beyond the abstract concept of state interest and realize the corporate interest.
9

51

the time, there may be fluctuations and ups-and-downs in the application of imperial grand
strategies that were far from being perfectly defined. One should not forget even the most
profound strategies evolved, albeit very slowly, with the information received and even
abandoned altogether, even if sometimes only to resume later, as a result of the balances
between factions each of which advocate a different strategy. In short, a student of strategy
should be concerned more with the process before the action was taken rather than on the
result of the political action.
Nor could such works concentrate on the intricacies of complex diplomatic
negotiations so well documented in primary sources and so thoroughly analyzed by
diplomatic historians since the 19th century. The details of such negotiations would check the
validity of afore-mentioned works a priori assumptions that explain strategy with a
teleological methodology: by presenting political actions necessarily as products of longlasting strategies, rather than a loosely connected series of reactions to threats and
opportunities perceived at a given time by a given faction.14
The second methodological problem was the hardness of the task to frame a Grand
Strategy that spanned through a long period of time such as centuries. 15 It may be easier to
present such presumptuous theories for pre-modern times on the political realities of which

Palmira Brummett, The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries, in Great Power
Rivalries, ed. William R. Thompson (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1999), 240.
14
A good example of how the study of diplomatic relationship can demonstrate a slow shift in strategy is
Palmira Brummett, The Transformation of Venetian Diplomacy prior to the Ottoman Conquest of Cairo (15031517 , in Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, vol. I, ed. Sinan Kuneralp, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1987), 1126. For how a study of states military capabilities can be used in understanding their political sets of
preferences, see eadem. Foreign Policy, Naval Strategy and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire in the Early
Sixteenth Century, The International History Review 11/4 (1989): 613-627. See also her book, eadem. Ottoman
Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1994).
15
For instance, Gbor goston accentuates the importance of limiting the time period while studying strategy.
He adds that even though he does not believe that a single overarching Ottoman grand strategyguided
Ottoman conquest and rule throughout the centuries, one still could focus on a strategy applied by an individual
ruler or an omnipotent grand vizier such as Sokollu, brahim Pasha or andarl. G bor goston, The Ottomans:
From Frontier Principality to Empire, in The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present,
eds. John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 108.

52

we know less;16 none the less, it is unacceptable when there is a huge corpus of archival,
primary and secondary sources that awaits the researcher for every single year of the early
modern centuries. Moreover, political realities, economic opportunities and finally
geopolitical picture evolve so rapidly over the centuries that it is impossible to speak of a
constant set of preferences that make up a Grand Strategy or define the fundamentals of interstate rivalries. These authors, even though one of them wrote a book whose title include the
word change, could not undertake a diligent study of available sources that would help them
reflect the element of dynamism behind the decision-making and strategy formulation. What
they did instead, was to apply two basic principles of political realism (1. States are rational
actors. 2. States are unitary.), and present a simplistic picture of international politics.
Let us now concentrate on the information aspect of strategy making. In the making of
the Grand Strategy, decision-makers had to rely on regular and reliable information-gathering
channels which accumulated enough knowledge and help them form a perception concerning
certain political and military options available to them. These perceptions, once formed,
changed only very slowly. For instance, the Ottoman perception of the Protestant threat as a
political tool against the Habsburg challenge to the Ottoman universal sovereignty was a
constant in the Ottoman decision-making process. For all purposes, the Ottomans did not
seem to care for the difference between Lutherans, Calvinists and the Anglicans and drew
little distinction between the Lutheran struggle against Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire,
the Calvinist struggle against Philip II in the Low Countries and the rivalry between the

16

Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the Third
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); idem, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.
Luttwaks work on the Roman Grand Strategy sparked a vigorous debate among the specialists of Roman
history. Arther Ferrill, Roman Imperial Grand Strategy (Lanham.: University Press of America, 1991); idem,
The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 71-86; Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the
East, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Everett Wheeler, Methodological Limits and the Mirage
of Roman Strategy, Journal of Military History 57 (1993): 7-41, 215-40; C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the
Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Kimberly
Kagan, Redefining Roman Grand Strategy, The Journal of Military History 70 (2006): 333-62.

53

Catholic Habsburgs and the Anglican Tudors.17 They both were necessary political tools
against the Habsburg monarchs and their bid for universal hegemony, a challenge to similar
claims by the Ottomans. This slowness of change attests to the fact that when it comes to
strategy formulation, the gathered information played the least decisive role in all the three
fields it was used (the other two being policy-making and warfare, see infra.)
Even though the knowledge both empires had on each other were limited, they
developed a number of political objectives and established political alliances based on their
awareness of the political and diplomatic realities of the time. The formulation and
achievement of these objectives as well as the operation of these alliances necessitated a
certain level of knowledge which both empires had.
The Ottomans awareness of the political situation in Western Europe was sufficient
enough to realize which political options were open to them. We know little on how much the
Ottoman elites knew about the world around them, even though recent historiography
suggests that they knew more than which historians that followed the lead of contemporary
orientalists such as Bernard Lewis would be ready to accept a couple of decades ago. 18 For
instance, in an interesting discussion of two distinct Ottoman image of European in two 16th
century manuscripts,19 Baki Tezcan recently argued that just like their European counterparts,
the Ottomans demonstrated an interest in alien cultures within the confines of their own
political context. With what we have at hand, it is possible to hypothesize that in the 16 th

17

BOA, MD, XXIII, no. 645 (H. 22 Z. 980/A.D. 25 August 1573) names the Calvinist Dutch as Lutheran for
instance. Even though they had been interested in and informed of Protestantism from the very beginning (See
for an early intelligence report on Martin Luther that survived, Isom-Verhaaren, An Ottoman Report about
Martin Luther , it is interesting to see how the Ottomans still could not differentiate Lutherans from Calvinists
in the 1570s. They considered the Anglican English Lutherans as well. Selnik Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selnik,
vol. 1 (971-1003/1563-1595), ed. Mehmet pirli (Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 334 names the English as
the Nation of the Lutherans, Luteraniyyet milleti.
18
Lewis, Muslim Discovery of Europe, 39, 42-3. Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World
Around It (New York and London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). Giancarlo Casale demonstrates the awareness of the
Ottomans on politics of the Indian Ocean in the 16th century in his Ottoman Age of Exploration.
19
Baki Tezcan, The Frank in the Ottoman Eye of 1583 in The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450-1750:
Visual Imagery before Orientalism, ed. James G. Harper (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011): 267-96.

54

century, the Ottoman elite had sufficient means to acquire information on European politics,
even though with certain limits which I will discuss in Chapter Six.
First of all, their negotiations with the foreign ambassadors should have helped their
understanding, no matter the extent to which these ambassadors at times manipulated
information.
Secondly, there was a corpus of manuscripts that help the Ottoman elite to perceive
the realities of European and Mediterranean geography and politics. We know, for instance,
that the author of the famous Mn et20 and the head of the Ottoman chancellery in the first
half of the 1570s, Feridun Bey, had a history of the French kings translated into Ottoman.21
Feridun was a protg of the Ottoman Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha who himself was
one of the masterminds behind the Ottoman strategy in the West. Similarly, the dragoman
Mahmud, a German renegade from Vienna named Sebold von Pribach, ordered two copies of
Abraham Ortelius Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, the first modern atlas that contained uniform
maps and supporting text, in 1573, i.e., only three years after the publication of the work.22
Another important contribution that familiarized the Ottoman elite with their outside world
was the works of Pr Res. Based on contemporary maps, the famous corsair presented the
Ottoman Sultan with two mappae mundi23 that included the newly discovered shores of
Americas, demonstrating that the Ottomans were up-to-date with the geographical
explorations and the recent developments in cartography.24 Furthermore, he penned the finest

20

Feridun Beg, Mecmua- Mn eat- Selatin (Istanbul, 1274-75).

J.H. Mordtmann, Ferdn Beg in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. II, 881.
22
G bor goston, Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet: Rivers, Forests, Marshes and Forts along
the Ottoman-Hapsburg Frontier in Hungary, in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A. C. S. Peacock
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57-79.
23
Both maps only partly survived. TSK, R. 1633, mk. (H. 919/A.D. 1513); H. 1824, (H. 935/A.D. 1528-1529).
24
His was not the only work that concentrated on the New World. See for details, Thomas D. Goodrich, The
Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study o Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth-Century Ottoman
Americana (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1 0 idem, Ottoman Americana: The Search for the Sources of the
Sixteenth-Century Hind-i Garbi, Bulletin of Research in the Humanities 85 (1982): 269-94. For a discussion of
other Ottoman portolan charts and atlases produced in the 16 th century, see Svat Soucek, Islamic Charting in the
Mediterranean, in History of Cartography, Vol. II, Book One: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South
Asian Societies, eds. J.B. Harley et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 279-284.
21

55

example of Ottoman cartography with Kitb- Bahriyye,25 a manual for sailing directions
which contained ample geographical information on the Mediterranean shores. 26 From what
could be deduced from the works concentration on military details, this was not a work of
pure science. Rather the text and the maps are clear manifestations of a political desire to give
useful information for naval warfare, the most evident audience being the Ottoman corsairs.27
The members of the dynasty also demonstrated a genuine interest in maps that would help
them achieve their ambitions to rule the universe. Suleymans three sons, for instance, ordered
world maps from Venice in the early 1550s.28 Another important manuscript is the Gazvat-
Hayreddn Pa a29 which concentrated on the activities of the famous Ottoman corsair and
later Grand Admiral Hayreddin Pasha alias Barbarossa. Albeit written for purposes of
propaganda, it should have played an important role in shaping the Ottoman elites perception
of the Mediterranean world by presenting the complex picture of North African and Western
Mediterranean politics.
Thirdly, the Ottoman interest in Europe is evident from their familiarity with European
formulas and symbols of sovereignty which they did not hesitate to use when they wanted to
lay claim to the political loyalty of their Christian subjects or to claim superiority to their
Christian rivals.30 Mehmed IIs medals with his portrait were widely circulating in 15th
century Europe. A century later, with the instigation of his Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha,
Suleyman I would make a majestic parade with his forces in Belgrade, with a European-style
25

There are two versions of the book. There are several copies of both versions in different libraries all around
the world. See for a full list, Soucek, Islamic Charting, Appendix 14.2. See for a reprint in Ottoman, Piri Reis,
Kitab- Bahriye, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu, 2002).
26
For a good discussion of sources which Pr used while composing his works, see. Soucek, Islamic Charting
in the Mediterranean, 269-279.
27
For Prs works contribution to the Ottomans knowledge of Spain, see. Francisco Franco S nchez, El
Almirante Pr Res y la informaci n de los Turcotomanos sobre los dominios Espaoles, Revista del Instituto
Egipcio de Estudios Islamicos en Madrid 35 (2003): 153.
28
Benjamin Arbel, Maps of the World for Ottoman Princes? Further Evidence and Questions concerning the
Mappamondo of Hajji Ahmed, Imago Mundi 54 (2002 : 23. Also see. Antonio Fabris, The Ottoman Mappa
Mundi of Hajji Ahmed of Tunis, Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies 7-8 (1993): 31-7.
29
IK, MS 2639; also see. Mur d . azav t-i Hayredd n Pa a: MS
Universit tsbibliothek Istanbul :
kommentierte Edition mit deutsche Zusammenfassung, ed. Mustafa Yldz (Aachen: Shaker, 1 3 .
30
Tezcan, Frank in the Ottoman Eye, 288.

56

crown commissioned to Venetian jewellers on his head, as a response to Charles Vs

coronation as the Holy Roman Emperor in Bologna.31
Fourthly, renegades such as the afore-mentioned dragoman Mahmud in the Ottoman
administration had familiarity with European culture. Furthermore, they had personal
acquaintances and kinship relations in Europe could be important assets. Some of these
renegades of Christian/European background reached the highest echelons of the Ottoman
administration, actively participating in the decision-making process as well as the political
forums which shaped the perceptions of the Ottoman elite.
Fifthly, certain trans-imperial communities, such as Jews and Moors familiarized the
Ottomans with the Western world by bridging both halves of the Mediterranean with their
communal networks along the Mediterranean shores.
Finally, the Ottoman intelligence in the West provided Constantinople with
supplementary information that they could use while shaping their strategy.
In the 16th century, the Habsburg Grand Strategy regarding the Mediterranean had
little realistic ambitions in the Levant; the overextended Habsburgs had a lot more at stake in
Italy (their hereditary possessions and alliance systems) and North Africa (their presidios that
gave hope for a further Reconquista and that were threatened by the presence of nearby
corsair bases). Concerning North Africa, the Habsburgs had first hand knowledge and
previous experience on this vast geographical and politically fragmented space where they
had been prior to the Ottomans. We could not talk about the same depth regarding the level of
information they had on the Eastern Mediterranean, even though they could rely on Vienna
and Venice for further information and there are examples of extensive relazioni on the
Ottoman Empire extant in Spanish archives.32 As they were on the defensive against the

31

Necipolu, Representation of Power, 163-194.

A good example is a relazione penned by Antonio Xepuli during the war between the Ottomans and the Holy
League (1570-1573) and sent to Madrid by the Viceroy of Sicily. AGS, E 1147, fol. 174. Another is the one
written by a seasoned go-between and a former slave that escaped Constantinople, Antnio Echevrri entitled
32

57

Ottomans, they were only interested in creating diversions to prevent them from sending their
fleet to the Western Mediterranean. To this end, they sought to ally themselves with the
Safavid Persia, supported Orthodox resistance against the Ottoman rule in the Balkans and
kept a close eye on the Ottoman navy thanks to their extensive intelligence network in
Constantinople, Ragusa, Chios and the Ionian Islands. The fact that these networks reported to
the provinces (Naples and Messina) rather than Madrid demonstrates us that the Habsburgs
rather used gathered information on the policy-making level than on that of strategy
formulation. In other words, provincial centers reacted to the dangers and opportunities in
accordance with the information they received.
2.2.2. Information and Policy
On the lower level, states used information to make short-term policies based on
incoming information. These policies are more prone to change in accordance with the
changing dynamics of the time. States revised their policies quickly according to the gathered
information and short-term conjunctures such as domestic stability as well as military and
financial capabilities. Hence, the information was meant for immediate consumption; it must
be gathered and transmitted as soon as possible.
This study proposes different model for the study of 16th century Ottoman-Habsburg
Rivalry. Historians wrote this political history without accepting information as an element in
decision-making. In this kind of history writing, almost all political decisions were made with
perfect knowledge and almost all logistical difficulties that constrained the optimal choice
among several policy options were disregarded. If the Ottomans attacked Malta, for instance,
it should have been because they had a long-term strategy in mind. The conquest of Malta
should be just one stage of this long-term strategy rather than a quick response to a perceived

La orden que ay en la armada del Turco, AMSC, leg. 18, no. 15. This relacin specifically focuses on the
Ottoman Navy and Arsenal, but also mentions other issues, resembling a Venetian relazioni, albeit shorter and
less detailed: It is accessible on line, Rosa L pez Torrijos, Antonio de Ch varri: Un marino y espa vasco en
Estambul, http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/CLASICOS017.pdf.

58

threat as a result of incoming information, or than an outcome of factional struggles which,

hand in hand with internal dynamics of the empire, shaped the decision-making.
The model that I apply in this work while studying political history is based on two
methods. One is to use the information as a variable in determining the quality of imperial
strategies and thus the fate of military expeditions. Second is to deconstruct the process of
decision-making and consider it as the result of a dual process of information analysis and
factional politics.
Information could be beneficial in the policy-making in a number of ways. First, a
timely transmission of information that shed light on the future military projects of the enemy
could help the decision-makers allocate their resources for defensive purposes on the one
hand and decide on their own military projects on the other. This relation could not be more
obvious than it was in the correspondence between the Habsburg agents in the Levant,
viceroys in Naples and Messina and the central government in Madrid. Each year, viceroys
sought to put together information they received from different channels in order to decide
whether the Ottoman fleet would sail to the West or not. If it would, it was imperative to learn
its target. Especially during the years when the Ottomans had the upper hand in the
Mediterranean, roughly the 1550s and the 1560s, the Habsburg decision-makers, constantly
under the pressure of financial troubles, had to wait for this information before risking any
action and mobilizing their resources elsewhere. Similarly, the Venetians sought to acquire
information regarding the Ottoman Empire, relying on their correspondence with their
diplomats, merchant and spies in the Levant.33 The Ottomans kept a close eye on their
enemies preparations as well, especially during the wartime, such as the War of 1570-1573.34

33

ASV contains ample documentation in this regard, such as SDC and CCX-LettAmb where one can see the
fundamental role of the Venetian bailo. Also for correspondence among the Venetian diplomats in the Levant,
see. BMC, mss. Don delle Rose 147, Lettere di Marco Venier, bailo a Costantinopoli, 1594.
34
The Ottomans employed a number of corsairs to spy on the Christian navy. Kara Byk, the captain of the
corsairs of Santa Maura, for instance was assigned to gather information, a la caza de avisos, about the enemy
navy en aguas de Calabria y Sicilia, and to capture informants. AGS, E 1124, fol. 110 (1558). For information

59

Information is also important on the offensive. Information concerning political events

abroad may persuade the central governments to arrange their diplomatic moves accordingly.
A piece of solid information could tip an already fragile balance between war and peace in
favour of the former. Before undertaking his glorious campaigns against the Mamluks, for
instance, Selim I was well informed about the chaos that reigned in Egypt and how Kansuh
Gavri was hated by his subjects, thanks to one of Gavris slaves, Hoshkadem, who also added
that Egpyt could easily be conquered.35 An order dispatched to Hasan Pasha, the GovernorGeneral of Algeria, states that a navy was being sent to the Western Mediterranean (which
eventually would attack Malta) because of the information he sent, warning the center of the
enemys military preparations, azim tedarik.36 Furthermore, factors that would facilitate the
conquest of a given place (a weakness in the fortifications, lack of personnel, provisioning of
a garrison, epidemics, draught or a plot with some of the soldiers) could determine the target
of the operation. The Ottoman decision to attack Cyprus is a perfect example in order to
demonstrate the afore-mentioned process of information analysis and factional politics in the
making of decisions. It is true that the Ottoman strategy fixated Cyprus as its prime target in
the Eastern Mediterranean since the 15th century,37 and that the Ottoman secret service had
started to show signs of suspicious activity in the island at least a couple of years before they

gathered during the 1570-73 Ottoman Venetian war. See. BOA, MD, XIV, no. 517 (H. 24 Ra. 978/A.D. 26
August 1570); MD, XVI, no. 640 (H. 23 Ca. 979/A.D. 13 October 1571); MD, XIX, nos. 255 (H. 3 Ra. 980/A.D.
13 July 1572), 629 (H. 18 Ra. 980/ A.D. 27 August 1572), 631 (H. 9 Ra. 980/ A.D. 18 August 1572) and 688 (H.
16 B 980/ A.D. 22 November 1572). In 1570, while the Ottoman navy was engaged in Cyprus, a small squadron
under the commands of Ulu Ali and Kara Hoca entered the Adriatic to learn whereabouts of the Christian navy.
They encountered a Venetian galley which took refuge in Ragusa. When Ragusans refused to give back the ship,
Ulu convinced them to provide important information about the preparation of the Christian navy. Ulu Ali then
sent Kara Hoca to Sicily where the latter managed to approach the navy, anchored in Messina at night, counted
130 to 140 ships, and proved the importance of corsair mobility. He then disembarked with some of his men on
the Calabrian shores and captured a Calabrese, a relative of Ulu Ali, who told the corsairs that the Christian
navy was about to set sail to meet the Ottoman navy, Gustavo Valente, Vita di Occhial (Milano: Casa Editrice
Ceschina,1960), 121-5. In 1572, a Venetian nobleman leaked the information that the Venetians would attack
Castelnuovo. The Ottomans learned this four months before the expedition and made necessary preparations.
According to the Habsburg spy, the Venetians could not take the castle as they could not conceal their intentions.
AGS, E 1331, fol. 221 (20 May 1572).
35
Selhattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Ankara: Milli Eitim Basmevi, 1 6 , 117.
36
BOA, MD, VI, no. 904 (H. 22 S 972).
37
Camillo Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana (Roma: Forzani E C. Tipografi Del Senato, 1917), vol. II, 197.

60

attacked. Still, the time of the operation was the direct result of incoming information (The
revolt of Alpujarras in Spain that tied the Habsburgs hands and the fire in the Venetian
Arsenal, both in 1569) and the change in the balance-of-power between different factions in
Constantinople. (The Nasi faction overcoming the Sokollu faction).
Similarly, a close connection is observable between the Habsburg policy vis--vis the
Low Countries and the Ottoman interventionism in the Mediterranean. Every year, the
Habsburg decision-makers were all eyes and ears to know whether the Ottomans would send
their navy or not before deciding the extent of their military engagement in the North. The
Ottoman siege of Malta in 1565, for instance, prevented Philip IIs departure for the Low
Countries a year before the revolt took place. The loss of la Goleta in 1574 gave incentive to
the Habsburgs for a peace in the Low Countries.38 The relationship between the information
regarding the future actions of the Ottoman navy and the Habsburgs deployment of their
military resources elsewhere is more discernible in the following example. Having been
assured on August 31, 1577 that the Ottoman fleet would not set sail for the Western
Mediterranean, Philip II immediately sent his veteran soldiers to Low Countries.
2.2.2.1.

Perception

Due to the physical and cultural barriers between imperial centers, imperfect methods
of the gathering and transmission of information as well as the irregularity of channels of
communication, process of analysis depended upon the perception more than one would
imagine in the 21st century. Therefore, information was processed by the decision-makers
after careful analyses of verification and contextualization with the database that shaped their
perception of the overall picture and according to which, as I had stated above, they
formulated their Grand Strategy as well. No matter how careful they were in their analyses,
the conflict between the stagnant nature of this database and the flexible nature of incoming

38

Geoffrey Parker, Dutch Revolt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 166, fn. 49.

61

information undermined the objective employment of information. Decision-making process

was a mixture of permanent perceptions that were shaped by knowledge, paranoia and
prejudice and the changing examinations of the political realities where the possibility of
dis/misinformation entered the frame. While talking about decision-making process, simply in
Faroqhis words, we must never lose sight of this give and take between hard economic,
political and military realities on the one hand, and soft perceptions on the other.39
A good example of the importance of perception is evident from the following
example where the Venetians had to assure the Ottomans, with whom they had otherwise
good relations, that their recent military build-up was only directed against the recent
amassing of the Habsburg forces in the Duchy of Milan. And still then, they continued, it
was not that the Venetians or other princes in Italy were at war with each other. They just had
to be precautious. The Venetians knew how wrong impressions and perceptions would
quickly change the mood in Constantinople and affect Ottoman decision-making in the shortrun, even in 1601 when Venice or Italy in general was not considered feasible targets in
Constantinople whose hands were tied in a long war against the Austrian Habsburgs in
Central Europe. The Venetian rationale was that the Ottomans might have sensed a threat by a
concerted action among the Italian states or believed that there was an open war in Italy that
might increase the feasibility of an Ottoman intervention in the fragmented peninsula, a longtime fear for the Italian states and a solid plan for the Ottoman decision-makers in harmony
with their Grand Strategy. The Venetian Senate expressed its caution with the Ottomans
perception of political events and the military balance-of-power with the following words
they wrote to the bailo in Constantinople:
It often occurs that the further the things are brought from, the greater
becomes their fame as well as the derivation from their true meaning. We
suppose that all these rumours have already reached the Sublime Porte and that
39

Suraiya Faroqhi, Ottoman Empire and the World around it (New York and London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 18.

62

hearing these, the Turks could agree on the fact that such preparations, with the
mutual agreement between Christian princes, were aimed at them or, on the
contrary, that there was an open war between these princes. Provoked by that,
they might decide to make new and great preparations, especially in the
Navy.40
As they had an efficient intelligence network as well as a centuries-long expertise of
manipulating and servicing information to governments of Constantinople, the Venetians
were the last to panic in front of such a problem. If they were overcautious, it should be for a
good reason.41
This element of perception could result in different sets of preferences for decisionmakers in the center and provinces. Alain Hugon already explained the differences between
the attitudes of Habsburg officials in Madrid and Valladolid and those in Italy and Low
Countries with their relative geographical positions and perception of information.42 A similar
difference can be observed within the context of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, where the
provincial authorities at times overlooked the decisions of the center, the best examples of
which being Don Juans decision to conquer Tunis in 1573, or Viceroys of Naples decision
to harbour corsairs in spite of repetitive prohibitions of Madrid.43 This difference does not
have to be only between the center and its provinces, but also between different authorities,
say the Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Francisco de Vera y Aragn and the Habsburg
viceroy in Naples, the Count of Miranda. These two, for instance, were at a disagreement over
which policy to be followed regarding the Habsburg secret service in the Levant. De Vera
40

...suole occorrer che quanto piu da lontano vengono portate le cose, tanto maggiormente sia accresciuta la
fama et la relatione di esse con diversificatione dal vero senso et supponendo noi, che tutte queste voci siano
hormai pervenute a quella porta; et che intesa da turchi, possano essi far concerto che simili preparationi con
universal intelligenza de principi christiani tendino a loro danni o che per il contrario possa esser tra essi
principi aperta guerra; da che eccitati si rissolvano a fare nove et maggiori provisioni et particolarmenti di
armata. ASV, SenDelC, reg. 9, cc. 153v-155r (10 April 1601).
41
A similar example, again from Venetian sources: In 1500 when the Venetians and Ottomans were in a war, the
Venetian senators were discussing what to do with the Ottoman orator that was destined for France. One of the
arguments against granting him permission to proceed was that he might have seen how rich the cities of Italy
were. He could then put fantasies in the head of Bayezid II and had him attack Italy. Arturo Segre and Roberto
Cessi, eds., I Diarii di Girolamo Priuli (AA. 1494-1512)(Citt di Castello: Casa Editrice S. Lapi, 1912-1938),
vol. II, 21.
42
Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 75.
43
AGS, E 1162, fol. 50 (24 April 1606), E 1889, fols. 11-12 (14 March 1615); E 1892, fol. 152 (24 March
1620).

63

advocated for the efficiency of the Habsburg spies in the Levant and protested when the
Count abstained from paying their salaries. Obviously, their relative position determined each
officials stance in the debate. De Vera, a diplomat in Venice, was pro-espionage since an
important part of his duty was to gather information. The Count of Miranda, on the other
hand, was the one who had to govern an entire Viceroyalty and allocate finite resources in the
most efficient way possible. Espionage was one of his many tasks, and not the most important
one in his eyes, one gets the impression.44 There was a similar chronic disagreement over
which policy to follow in the Western Mediterranean between the Ottoman corsairs in North
Africa and the Ottoman elite in Constantinople. Corsairs lobbied for a more active policy vis-vis Western Mediterranean and North Africa and saw in the Morisco Revolt of las
Alpujarras or the instability in Morocco a realistic opportunity that justified intervention. The
Ottoman authorities in Constantinople, on the other hand, did not share their enthusiasm for
such far-reaching objectives. They concentrated more on relieving the French from the
Habsburg pressure, seeking naval bases such as Malta and la Goleta and using their navy to
provide booty and slaves for the imperial capital.45
The world of information was one filled with prejudices, paranoia and
dis/misinformation that undermined the quality of decisions taken. There is a positive
correlation between these factors that impeded the decision-makers to engage in a fully
objective analysis of a political situation and the importance of states intelligence capabilities
which aimed to overcome these impediments by verification and contextualization on the one

44

Especially see the disagreement of the two concerning the money owed to Marco Antonio Estanga who died in
1593 without recovering his stipend for many years, in spite of the impressive traffic of correspondence between
Venice, Madrid and Naples and repetitive orders of the Crown authorizing the pending payment. AGS, E 1343,
K 1674, fols. 131 (3 March 1590), 137 (31 March 1590), 156 (21 July 1590); 164 (18 August 1590), 168 (10
September 1590), 169 (13 October 1590), 180 (10 November 1590), 186 (8 December 1590); E 1541, fols. 195
and 222; E 1344, K 1675, fols. 26 (8 February 1591), 182 (15 October 1592), 196 (21 de Agosto 1592); E 1345,
fols. 5 (16 January 1593), 20 (10 April 1593), 25 (24 April 1593), 28 (15 May 1593), 34 (5 June 1593), 56 (11
September 1593), 79 (4 December 1593), 81 (11 December 1593), 115 (12 February 1594).
45
Grkan, Osmanl-Habsburg Rekabeti, 22-44.

64

hand and tried to damage the decision-making process of other states by engaging in counterintelligence and by extension forcing them to decide with imperfect information on the other.
2.2.2.2.

Factional rivalries

Another factor that impeded the objective assessment of the facts was the reality of
factional rivalries. Historians should not consider decision-making process as the product of a
monolithic state.46 Decisions regarding what we today consider foreign policy might not
necessarily be taken on the basis of abstract notions of the states best interests.47 Different
interest groups, organized around relations of parentage or patronage/clientele, challenged
each other in both capitals, advocating different points-of-view in accordance with their own
collective interest. For instance, a hawkish faction led by Joseph Nasi overcame the dovish
Sokollu faction and persuaded the Sultan to undertake an expedition against Cyprus, while in
Madrid, the rivalry between the Ebola and Alba factions determined the crowns policy. 48 As
I will explain in Chapter Five, the faction that I labeled as the Mediterranean faction, led by
the corsair-cum-Grand Admiral Ulu Ali, was an important factor in determining the
Ottomans Mediterranean policy. These factions tended to use gathered information as a
political tool in order to convince their monarch. This flawed the objectivity and the
efficiency of the decision-making process. A very good example is the following one where
the Ottoman Grand Admiral Ulu Ali, the ardent opponent of the Ottoman-Habsburg truce
negotiations, used gathered information in the service of factional politics, i.e., to debilitate
the negotiation process that his faction of corsairs and naval officers vehemently opposed.
When the captain of the Algerian galleys Arnavud Memi sent him a chaus with a Neapolitan
slave, Ulu sent both to Mustafa Pasha where the Neapolitan gave the news that Philip II
conquered Portugal and argued that he was planning to attack North Africa, playing with the

46

Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 366.

Faroqhi, Ottoman Empire and the World around It, 48.
48
For factional rivalries in the Ottoman Empire between the 1570s and the 1620s, see. Breki, Factions and
Favorites.
47

65

Ottomans already aroused fears and suspicions. Ulu moreover had a letter, which Arnavud
Memi intercepted and sent him, translated into Ottoman in order to use this as a document for
his anti-truce argumentation.49 He furthermore used the Neapolitans statement that all
Habsburg ships were in Spain in order to convince the Sultan to give him permission to sail
West with the Ottoman fleet.50 Even though he failed in the end, in this particular case, his
efforts of manipulation are revealing. The information did not even have to reflect the truth;
some daring figures did not hesitate to engage in disinformation against the very ruler that
they were supposed to serve in order to manipulate the decision-making process. Ulu Ali, for
instance, had one of his agents spread the rumour that the Habsburgs were preparing a great
armada, in an effort to convince the Sultan to spare funds for a major naval campaign a year
after the Ottoman-Habsburg truce was signed and a Moroccan expedition was aborted at the
last minute.51
Perhaps, factional rivalry was also an important factor that facilitated the diffusion of
information. Had decision-making process been monolithic, state secrets would have been
kept better. Because of these rivalries and the ensuing process of discussion, negotiation, and
reformulation, a number of outsiders that assisted the faction leaders indirectly participated in
the evaluation of information and evolution of policy. Most of the time, it was they who
spread the news, rather than high ranking officials.
2.2.2.3.

The issue of the continuity of information

Central governments had to make sure that the flow of information continued without
interruption. This objective was harder to achieve in the Ottoman-Habsburg borderland than
elsewhere, given the lack of diplomatic relations, geographical distance and the hostility
between two empires. One reasonable way to solve this problem was to diversify the channels
of communication and multiply intelligence networks that operated at times unaware of each
49

AGS, E, 1338, fol. 15 (30 June 1580).

AGS, E, 1338, fols. 19 (2 July 1580) and 20 (7 July 1580).
51
AGS, E 1152, fol. 40 (6 April 1582).
50

66

other, as was the case of the Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople in the 1560s or
that of two Venetian spies that the Governor of Catharo employed in Ragusa in 1570.52
The flow of information became especially harder to sustain during wartime, even
when there is a resident ambassador who could transmit information more efficiently than a
spy. The Venetian bailo in Constantinople during the War of 1570-1573, Marcantonio
Barbaro, brilliantly overcame many obstacles that the Ottomans put on his way53 and
informed his capital on a regular basis.54 However, his was an astonishing accomplishment;
the harshness of Ottomans methods of counter-intelligence and surveillance should not be
overlooked.
Therefore, warfare ironically created two opposing conditions. On the one hand,
anxious decision-makers who had to decide and act in the swiftest manner created a huge
demand for regular and reliable information. On the other, however, the paranoia surrounding
capitals, random prosecutions of any suspicious figures (most commonly Jews and foreigners)
and states counter-intelligence mechanisms created a supply problem. In short, the real
difference between an efficient and an inefficient intelligence network became more obvious
during wartime.
2.2.2.4.

Conclusion

In short, the efficiency of the information gathering did not necessarily result in
appropriate decisions; accurate intelligence does not mean good policy. 55 Several factors

52

ASV, CCX-LettRet, b. 275, fols. 137-138 (26 October 1570).

The Ottomans tried to keep him secluded at home without any contact with the outside world and searched his
servants while entering and leaving the house in order to prevent them from carrying correspondence. There
were also janissaries who accompanied the bailo and even his son all the time so they could not talk to anybody.
When the bailo used his chaplain to carry his letters, the Ottomans arrested the latter and put him in prison. The
bailo could liberate him only thanks to the large sum he paid; but his conditions became even harder to endure:
his windows were walled, one of his agents was executed and in a terrifying scene, the Ottoman soldiers passed
under the bailos windows with his head on a pole. BOA, MD, XVI, no. 173 (H. 9 C 979/A.D. 29 October 1571).
Michel Lesure, Notes et Documents sur les Relations Vnto-Ottomanes, 1570-1573, I, Turcica 4 (1972), 152156, 163.
54
See his letters in ASV, SDC, fil. 6E.
55
Ohad Leslau, The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process, International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23 (2010), 443.
53

67

related to perception (misperception, prejudices, paranoia, etc.) as well as the realities of

domestic politics and factional rivalries prevented the objective assessment of facts and
hindered the optimal use of information. Decision-making may have shaped politics but
politics shaped decision-making as well. It is precisely this imperfect nature of informationgathering that required the processing of the gathered information and it is exactly this flawed
nature of decision-making process that rewarded those central governments who invested in
secret diplomacy and punished those who did not.
2.2.3. Information gathering and war
Information was important for not only the carefully formulated grand strategies or
policies, but also military decisions where the correlation between the quality of information
and the material result is stronger.56 Apart from the information that had been prepared for the
consumption after a careful process of analysis, information that was gathered from the
enemy after a reconnaissance mission or via a double agent had to be responded to in a more
immediate manner. Thus, the benefit from this type of information depended upon the
decision skills of the commander which had to take further responsibility. Nevertheless, it
offered in return more than the analyzed information would offer since the former was fresh
information which did not suffer from the effects of time.
States started using the means of secret diplomacy even before taking military action.
They not only gathered information on a possible target, but also take the possibilities of
defection, sabotage and assassination into account. For instance, the Habsburg secret service
was unusually active in Tripolis before their navy set sail for North African shores. It secured
a number of connections from among the renegades in Turgud Res entourage in the castle
of Tripolis via spy-cum-merchant Matheo de Lione. These discontented renegades provided
Matheo with important military information regarding the castles defenses, and in case of a
56

Diego Navarro Bonilla made a case for the correlation between the efficiency of secret diplomacy and success
in warfare, claiming that Richelieu owed his military success over the Habsburgs in the 17 th century, partly to the
enormous sums he spent on spies. Bonilla, Espas Honorables , 41-2.

68

siege, agreed to set the weapon arsenal on fire, arrange the cooperation of local nomadic
Berbers (alrabes) and surrender the castle to the Habsburgs. Their help could have been
crucial had the intended siege been realized in 1560.57 Similarly, the Ottomans acquired as
much information as possible on an intended target. There are surviving maps and siege plans
in the Topkap Palace that were prepared before the undertaking of major military
expeditions.58 Similarly, during the Hungarian campaign of 1541, an unknown author
prepared a plan of conquest, listing strategic Hungarian castles to be conquered, indicating
their location, short history and owners.59 Before a major military expedition, Ottoman spies
activities intensified as well; information they acquired and covert operations they undertook
could be of great service to Ottoman military efforts. For instance, in 1561, an Ottoman spy in
Sicily corrupted a number of soldiers in the fortress of la Goleta so that when the Ottoman
navy arrived, they would poison the wells, jam the artilleries, explode the weapon arsenal,
torch the houses and start a revolt among the soldiers of the garrison. The Governor-General
of Tripolis, Turgud Res and the ruler of Tunis, nominally a Habsburg ally, had furthermore
20-30 Moors among the soldiers that secretly re-converted to Islam and were ready to help the
Ottomans.60 History repeated itself thirteen years later when la Goleta finally fell to the
Ottomans. The commander of the castle realized the existence of an Ottoman plot from the
insistent unanimous messages sent inside the castle with arrows. On the predetermined date of
the Ottoman general assault, five Spanish soldiers would not only explode the weapon
arsenal, but also put two flags in the thinnest part of the city wall so that the Ottoman soldiers
knew where to charge.61 During the years preceding the expedition, the Ottoman secret

57

AGS, E 1124, fol. 150

Belgrade (1521?), Malta (1556), Szigetvr (1566) and Vienna (1683). goston, Where Environmental and
Frontier Studies Meet, 64.
59
You can find this plan in Pl Fodor, Ottoman Policy towards Hungary, in In Quest of the Golden Apple:
Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Pl Fodor (Istanbul, The Isis
Press, 2000),146-51.
60
AGS, E 1126, fols. 152 (30 April 1561), 47 (11 May 1561), 48 (8May 1561), 107 (4 October 1561), 141, 168,
169 and 176 (26 July 1561).
61
ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, fil. 4148, fol. 12; Sola, Uchal, 216.
58

69

service was very active in Cyprus as well.62 These efforts paid off. The Ottomans had the
luxury of doing their military planning with the designs and plans of important Venetian
fortifications such as Famagusta which their spies acquired.63 Furthermore, the Ottomans
resorted to their traditional policy of istimalet, i.e., winning the local communities alliances
against their lords with a carrot-and-stick strategy. Letters were dispatched by the Governor of
el, urging the Cypriotes to defect to the Ottomans, so that they could keep their lands and
possessions; if they helped the Venetians, their women and children would be enslaved and
their property would be confiscated.64 During the siege, several soldiers on Venetian payroll
changed sides to become Muslims; these were inducted into the Ottoman military.65 The
contribution of Ottoman collaborators within the castle of Kyrenia also proved decisive as
they convinced the population to surrender.66 Similarly, the fact that the Christian navy easily
located and tried to rob the Ottoman grain depots in imperial havass, demonstrate that they
(most probably the Venetians rather than the Habsburgs) had before-hand knowledge about
their locations.67

62

Paolo Preto, Servizi Segreti, 100.

ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 3, fols. 146-147 (11 May 1568).
64
sabka gnderilen istimalet hkmi mucebince cezirenn reayasna gir kend canibnden mektublar
gnderb her birine yeni istimalet virb yle ki d man tara na meyilleri ve muavenetleri olmayup Sdde-i
Saadetm canibine togrlk zre tevecchleri mukarrer ola, in aa'llah ethi myesser oldukda her birisi
mutasarr olduklar tmarlar ve evleri ve sair emlak ile mua u msellem olup bir nesneleri ellerinden
alnmayub ve kimesneye dahl taarruz itdrilmeyb ancak ziraat itdkleri yirlerinden er ile rin virrler ve
eer Dergah- Muallam'a itaatleri olmayub d man tara na mallar ve ne sleriyle muavenetleri olub muin
zahir olalar, sonra inayet-i Hakk celle ve ala ile etholundukdan sonra ol asl d mana muavenet muzaheret
idenlere asla himayet olunmayub kendler katlolunup et al ezvac esir ve emval esbablar nehb garet ve
yama ve talan u tarac olmak mukarrerdr. Ana gre erman- eri mi ilan idp ve mmkin oldug zre say
ihtimam idb bu canibe itaat idenler kemal mertebe riayet olunur. Dirlik rica idenlere muradlar zre ar
dirlikler virilb mua iyyet taleb idenler dahi mua nameler virilr diy her birin itaate tergib itdresin ve
muttasl yarar casuslar gnderb sahih haberler alub ilam itmekden hali olmayasn. BOA, MD, XII, no. 19.
There are many similar examples throughout the MD.
65
BOA, MD, XIII, nos. 110 (H. 9 Za. 978 / A.D. 4 April 1571), 134 (H. 7 Za. 978 / A.D. 2 April 1571), 498 (H.
16 Z 978 / A.D. 11 May 1571), 1211 (H. 20 M 979 / A.D. 13 June 1571), 1340 (H. 25 M 979 / A.D. 18 June
1571) and 1072 (H. 14 M 979 / A.D. 7 June 1571). There were even nobles (beyzade) among those who
defected. BOA, MD, XII, 290 (H. Gurre-yi Z 978 / A.D. 26 April 1571), 353 (6 Z 978 / A.D. 1 May 1571) and
713 (H. 28 Z 978 / A.D. 23 May 1571).
66
BOA, MD, VIII, no. 356 (H. 14 Ca. 978 / A.D. 14 October 1570). XIII, no. 684 (H. 26 Z 978 / A.D. 21 May
1571).
67
BOA, MD, XVIII, nos. 48 (H. 28 N 979/ A.D. 13 February 1572), 49 (H. 25 N 979/ A.D. 10 February 1572),
50 (H. 27 N 979/ 12 February 1572) and 56 (H. 29 N 979/14 February 1572).
63

70

Incoming information could effectively decide the military target. The authorities sent
their agents to gather information about a number of possible targets according to which they
decided their next step. The Ottoman naval campaign in 1534 is a clear indication of the
correlation between the intelligence gathered in the last minute and the planning of military
campaigns. In 1534, the Ottoman Grand Admiral Hayreddins success (his successful raids of
the Neapolitan shores, the burning of six Christian galleys, the capture of Giulia Gonzaga, his
attack on the undefended shores of Calabria instead of fortified places such as Gaeta and
Pozzuoli) is a sign of how well-informed he was. The Habsburg intelligence suggested that
Hayreddin would attack either Otranto or the Apulian coast, while Hayreddin, informed of
Habsburgs preparations, changed course and attacked the Tyrrhenian coasts which were
unguarded, save for Naples and a couple of well fortified places. Furthermore, it could be
inferred from the complete silence of Marquis de la Tripaldas intelligence network about an
Ottoman attack on Tunis that Hayreddin changed his target after he realized, via incoming
intelligence, the infeasibility of an attack on the kingdom of Naples itself. 68 To decide on their
next target after their victory at Lepanto, the Habsburgs sent Battista Corso who managed to
acquire crucial military information regarding the defenses of possible Habsburg targets in the
region, Tlemcen, Bugia, Bone, and Constantine.69 Similarly, the year following the Battle of
Lepanto, Ulu Ali and Piyale Paa also discussed incoming information and decided that they
should not risk the newly built Ottoman navy by setting sail for North Africa when the allied
Christian navy left Messina.70
When all measures fail, the authorities were reduced to a system of alarm which gave
them an advantage of only hours, not days. The Habsburgs, for instance, built a defense

68

Jos Mara del Moral, El Virrey de Napoles Don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco (Madrid:
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas, 1966), 170. The viceroy of Naples, Don Pedro de Toledo
frequently complained about Hayreddins spies in the kingdom of Naples who were sending information about
defense preparations, Ibid., 201 fn 42.
69
AGS, E 1137, fol. 123.
70
AGS, E 1063, fol. 55 (8 August 1573).

71

system based on a network of towers that aimed to provide both defense and alarm
functions.71 The amount of effort and money that the Viceroys of Naples and Sicily such as de
Toledo, de Rivera, Gonzaga (he alone built 137 of them!) spent on these towers clearly reflect
their significance. Although less studied, similar defense-cum-alarm systems were built in
other Habsburg territories such as Sardinia and the Spanish coasts and by other states such as
Florence and Papacy.72 The Habsburgs also developed special methods, to an astonishing
degree of innovation, to provide continuous communication between the towers that made up
the system, so that the tower that was assaulted by the Ottomans could alert the next one.73
Similarly, the Ottomans entrusted certain villages (dilci) in strategic locations with providing
information against smugglers, pirates, corsairs and the incoming enemy in exchange for
certain tax exemptions.74
Military decisions were given on the battlefield. As Guilmartin states, no amount
of communications can replace a competent and responsible commander on the scene. To
attempt to do so is to invite disaster.75 Hence, the commanders of early modern armies had to
rely on information gathering in situ. Where central governments intervened, their orders
were most of the time outdated, given the speed of communications of the time. This would
imperil the strategic accuracy of the decision taken, a good example being the Battle of
Lepanto (1571) where the Ottoman high command gave in to the pressures from the centre
and engage the enemy with a worn-out fleet and an exhausted crew despite the warnings from
the experienced corsair, Ulu Ali. Similarly, the Duke of Medinaceli ignored warnings from
his experienced lieutenant Gianandrea Doria that he should not risk the worn-out Habsburg

71

There were two types of those: The more expensive square towers were built according to the new
developments in the military technology and could host cannons. The cheaper circular towers were mostly built
before the 16th century and therefore were not suitable for cannons; their main function was to give the alarm.
72
Salvatore Bono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e musulmani fra guerra, schiavit e commercio (Milano:
Mondadori, 1993).
73
All these methods are explained in Ibid., 166-9.
74
BOA, MD, XVIII, no. 217 (H. 3 979 / A.D. 20 December 1571). Also, see. Chapter Six.
75
John Francis Guilmartin, A very Short War. The SS Mayaguez and the battle o Koh Tan (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press), 157, quoted by Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, 74.

72

navy in the Tripolitan waters given the possibility of an Ottoman relief. He had direct orders
from the king, he answered, and set sail for disaster.
A good example of sensitive strategic decisions taken with an efficient intelligence
network would be Don Garcia de Toledos intervention in the siege of Malta in 1565. The
Habsburg admiral kept a close eye on the Ottoman siege of Malta and made a very hard
decision while choosing the right moment to intervene and break the siege. The geography of
Malta would make it harder for the relieving force to achieve its objective. Therefore, if he
attacked prematurely, he would have to directly face the fresh Ottoman forces that had
superior numbers. On the other hand, had he waited for too long, the island might have
fallen.76 Thanks to his intelligence network which kept him up-to-date with the situation of
the siege and the wear and tear of the Ottoman forces, he came at the right moment and forced
the worn-out Ottomans to retire. 77
De Toledos military decision-making in situ presents a stark contrast with decisions
taken by the Ottomans before the Battle of Lepanto. The Ottomans generally decided on
military matters in a War Council. In these councils, a number of leading Ottoman
commanders discussed the information and options available to them in an effort to maximize
the efficiency of the decision-making process. Generally, these War Councils were also
attended by either the Ottoman Sultan or the Ottoman Grand Vizier and thus there was no
higher authority in the capital to intervene in the decision-making process by giving premeditated orders. This, however, was not the case at the Battle of Lepanto. The newly
appointed Ottoman Grand Admiral Mezzinzade Ali Paa had clear orders from the Sultan to
engage the enemy. Furthermore, thanks to the realities of the factional politics in the Ottoman
Navy, he was in fear of criticisms of his political adversaries. He could have stayed in the
Gulf of Patras and shied away from engaging the enemy fleet, a tactic that served Barbarossa
76

Francis Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in
the Sixteenth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 191-3.
77
For examples of de Toledos information gathering on the siege, see. AGS, E 1054, fols. 113 and 117.

73

so well thirty-three years before at the Battle of Prevesa. However, he chose to accept the
battle with the worn-out and partially manned Ottoman fleet, in spite of warnings from his
lieutenants who were expert on naval affairs. The result was, as well known, a disaster for the
Ottomans.
The contribution of espionage is more visible during sieges because of the stagnant
nature of siege warfare where forces confronted each other for a long time, allowing ample
time and opportunity to conduct business with the other side. Barbarossa was the real expert
of employing spies and using secret diplomacy as an effective tool in siege warfare. He
established contacts with the besieged populations,78 expedited his own spies to major targets
along the Mediterranean79 and received information from those who voluntarily came to him
for political or financial reasons.80 His well-functioning intelligence network helped him
during important military decisions. For instance, information brought at the last minute by
the fugitive Granadine soldiers convinced him to continue the siege of Castelnuovo in 1539,81
while the news that the Habsburgs forces were approaching made him lift the siege of Nice in
1543.82 The operational importance of information on the siege warfare is most evident in the
following example. In 1536, Hayreddin asked Sinan the Jew, the famous corsair and his
second in command, whether he should attack the castle first or immediately launch an assault
on Crotone itself. Sinan provided detailed information about the Habsburg defences in

78

For instance, he conquered Tlemcen thanks to his contacts with the local population who agreed to surrender.
Murd, azav t-i Hayredd n Pa a, fols. 153b-154b.
79
For instance, in 1543, an Ottoman spy was captured in Messina. According to his confession, he had
previously spied in Messina for four years. This time, he was sent to spy and then return to the island of San
Giovanni to meet with the navy and submit his report. Angelo Raffa, Lultima impresa di hayreddin
(Barbarossa). La guerra marittima turco-franco-spagnola del 1543-4, in Aspetti ed attualit del potere marittimo
in Mediterraneo nei secoli XII-XVI, ed. P. Alberini (Roma, 1999), 408.
80
For instance, in 1544, renegades from the island of Lipari approached and furnished him with information
concerning the islands defenses. AGS E 1116, fol. 69 (1 September 1544).
81
Francisco Lpez de Gomra, Crnica de los Barbarrojas, in Memorial histrico espaol: Colleccin de
documentos, opsculos y antigedades (Madrid: la Real Academia de la Historia, 1853), Vol. VI, 428.
82
Sagredo, p. 287 cited by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de lEmpire Ottoman depuis son origine
jusqu nos jours, trans. J. J. Hellert (Istanbul: Les editions Isis, 1996), vol. V, 175.

74

Crotone which proved vital in the sacking of the badly defended castle.83 Information
mattered for the besieged as well. In 1533, for instance, the Habsburg garrison chose to hold
on much longer because one of ships sent by Andrea Doria sailed past the Ottoman navys
blockade and brought the auspicious news that a relief force was being prepared. 84
The price of neglecting information could be disastrous. The Viceroy of Naples,
Cardinal Granvela, for instance, ignored several letters sent by Aurelio Santa Croce, the longtime spymaster in Constantinople, informing that the Ottomans would attack la Goleta.85
Cardinal could be excused to a certain extent given the unreliability of the Habsburg spies in
Constantinople in ascertaining the destination of the Ottoman fleet. (Who could blame them
given that sometimes even the Ottoman Grand Admiral did not have a clear idea where the
navy was heading, showing us once again the importance of the incoming information on
determining military targets?) But the story was rather different with the Duke of Medinaceli,
the Viceroy of Sicily and the Admiral of the Habsburg fleet, who suffered both from the
inefficiency of his intelligence network as well as his own neglect of the incoming
information. If he took the incoming information seriously, he could have avoided the
unhappy end that awaited him and his fleet. Firstly, as mentioned above, he risked the navy by
sailing to North Africa in February ignoring Dorias information that the Ottomans were
preparing a fleet. Secondly, when he arrived to the canal of Al-Qantara on the island of
Djerba, he could not realize that Turgud was in the island. He should have been suspicious by
the activities of an invisible hand that provoked the otherwise pacific Berbers of the island to
attack Habsburg soldiers that went on shore to find water. Had he been aware of Turguds
presence, he could have caught him either by directly attacking Djerba or by negotiating with
the population for the surrender of the corsair. Instead he set sail for Tripolis, totally

83

AGS, E, 1025, fol. 105, declaraci n que presta en la C rcel de N poles Francisco de Alderete, cited by
Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 82-5.
84
Jurien de la Gravire, Doria et Barberousse (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1886), 209.
85
AGS, E 1071, fol. 171, Aurelios letters dated 1 May and 20 September 1574.

75

outmaneuvered by Turgud who learned the destination of the Habsburg fleet and left Djerba
for Tripolis. He arrived there before the indecisive Viceroy, who, unaware of Turguds
activities, lost precious two weeks by resting his fleet in between Djerba and Tripolis. Neither
could he realize that the galiot that mysteriously vanished in the canal of Djerba after seeing
the Habsburg navy belonged to Ulu Ali who immediately set sail for Constantinople in order
to ask for help. Unfortunately, his inefficient intelligence network did not furnish him with
any of these crucial information. Only thanks to Arabs who came with their small ships to sell
fruit and vegetables to the Habsburg fleet, he learned the truth, and only too late, on March 1,
instead of February 14. A day later, he decided to return and conquer Djerba. From his
activities afterwards, one already gets the impression that he would not have reacted to the
accurate information anyways. After the conquest of Djerba, he continued to ignore incoming
intelligence. He may not have his own network, but the Habsburg authorities, spies and allies
were sending several intelligence reports alarming the arrival of the Ottoman fleet. Could he
not at least have listened and heeded to those who advised him to leave? On the contrary, the
Viceroys reaction to these reports was to spend two months with building a castle and
strengthening the defenses. On May 10, a report arrived informing that on May 7 Ottoman
fleet was observed doing acquata in Gozo and heading for the southwest where the island of
Djerba laid. The Viceroy hesitated to leave and chose to stay despite warnings from his
lieutenants, Gianandrea Doria and Flaminio Orsini, both naval experts. With his stubbornness
and refusal to listen to his more able lieutenants, does he not resemble Mezzinzade? He
chose to take his time and wait one more day to retire, assuming (which is most of the time a
dangerous activity while deciding on the battlefield) that the Ottoman fleet would first go to
Tripolis to meet Turgud and therefore could not reach Djerba in less than four or five days.
He missed his last opportunity to escape, waiting to do acquata and recall his soldiers.
Obviously he was not aware of the good example of Andrea Doria who left 400 of his soldiers

76

on the beach at the enemys mercy when he saw Hayreddins fleet in 1532.86 When the next
day the Ottoman fleet appeared on the horizon, not only everybody was in a state of panic, but
also the day befores favorable winds gave way to the northern Tramontane (grecotramontana). It was impossible to leave and the Habsburgs lost almost their entire fleet
without fighting. The Ottomans expected a battle but what they found was a massacre.87
The result of the Battle of Djerba reflects us the importance of information gathering
on the battlefield should perhaps the maxim change to Information is the sinews of war?
2.2.4. Information gathering and diplomacy
The efficiency of states secret diplomacy gave them the upper hand in their
diplomatic relations. This became more evident in peace negotiations where the parties tried
to measure the strengths and weaknesses of each other in order, on the one hand to formulate
their demands and concessions on the negotiation table and on the other to use this
information as leverage against each other during the negotiation process.
Information during negotiation would be a precious commodity as argued in the
instructions given to the Venetian ambassador Andrea Gritti in 1503. In order to gain
advantage during the negotiations, to avantazar le cose nostre, he should try to learn all the
recent events that took place not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in Persia where a
potential political ally, Shah Ismail, had recently risen to power.88 Similarly during the peace
negotiations of 1540, the Ottomans increased their demands and asked for Nauplia and
Malvasia after having learned from a Neapolitan exile that the Venetians were worn out by
the war and could not go on fighting.89 In another example, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Rstem
Pasha freed the Austrian ambassador Busbecqs men just because he sought to have the upper

86

Gravire, Doria et Barberousse, 199.

Rinaldo Panetta, Pirati e corsari turchi barbareschi nel Mare Nostrum: XVI secolo (Milano: Mursia, 1981),
Chapters 22 and 23.
88
BNM, IT. VII. 878 8652, Andrea Gritti, Copialettere, Nos Lauredanus dei gratia Dux Venetiarum...
89
L. Bonnelli, Il Trattato Turco-Veneto del 1540 in Centernario della Nascita di Michele Amari, ed. Giuseppe
Salvo Cozzo (Palermo: 1910), 332.
87

77

hand in the negotiations with the Persian ambassador by convincing him that the Ottomans
were ready to make peace in the West in order to have their hands free against the Safavids in
the East.90
The details of the negotiation process itself became the target of intelligence efforts.
The Venetians were the most efficient in this respect, thanks to their extensive network of
diplomats all over Europe who informed them of such negotiations immediately and then
intervened in the most efficient manner. Their activities in Constantinople are illuminating of
the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy. When they could, they sought to
manipulate the negotiation process between the Ottomans and another power to their
advantage. The correspondence between the Serenissima and its bailo in Constantinople
reveals the Venetian intervention to prevent the normalizing of diplomatic relations between
other Italian states such as Genoa and Florence and the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the
French ambassador (1558) as well as the Venetian bailo (1562) managed to prevent the efforts
of the Genoese diplomats that arrived in Constantinople by means of a number of convincing
arguments.91 The Venetians had a similar negative attitude towards the Florentine efforts of
opening diplomatic relations with Constantinople.92 They even spoke against a truce between
the Ottomans and Philip II in 1573.93 Nonetheless, they shifted their position later when the
possibility of a truce seemed evident. The traffic of correspondence between the Council of
Ten and the Venetian diplomats in Madrid, Naples and Constantinople all aimed to make sure
90

This tactic did not work as the Persian ambassador was well informed thanks to his own intelligence network.
Michel Lesure, Michel ernovi Explorator Secretus Constantinople (1556-1563), Turcica 15 (1983): 136.
91
The arguments were the following: Genoa was a Habsburg subject, evident from its inclusion in the Treaty of
Cateau-Cambr sis and Philip IIs insistence on the return of the Genoese rule in Corsica. There were also
numerous Genoese captains in the Habsburg navy. Furthermore, once allowed with capitulations, the Genoese
would flood the Ottoman Empire, only in order to spy for the Habsburgs. Finally, they argued that the grandeur
of the Ottoman Sultan would not allow for an alliance, (unirsi in confederatione) with a power that was subject
to the King of Spain. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 7, cc. 100v-102v (13 and 18 January 1562, m.v.). The Venetians felt
that their interests would be threatened by such close relations between the Ottoman Empire and Genoa. See.
ASV, CCX-ParSec, fil. 11 (14 January 1562, m.v.). The Venetian bailo continued to keep a close eye on the
Genoese diplomatic efforts in Constantinople, ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 7, cc. 144v-145r (19 January 1563, m.v.);
reg. 9, cc. 43v-44v (9 December 1569).
92
ASV, CCX-ParSec, reg. 7, cc. 41r-41v (12 february 1560, m.v.); reg. 12, cc. 50r-50v (4 October 1580).
93
The bailo argued that such a truce would be impossible, because Philip II would not risk losing the financial
support of the Pope. ASV, CCx-ParSec, reg. 10, cc. 133r-133v (16 july 1573).

78

that the Venetians had the latest information and Venice was included in this general truce,
intriguingly, as an Ottoman ally.94
To demonstrate a second point where information can become leverage in the
negotiation process, let us focus on the indirect and unofficial negotiations in Venice between
Charles Vs ambassador, Rodrigo Nio and the Ottoman envoy to Venice, the Dragoman
Yunus Bey,95 through an intermediary, Lorenzo Belojo. In an effort to achieve one of the key
objectives of the Ottoman Grand Strategy and make their rivals send an envoy to
Constantinople asking for a truce,96 Yunus Bey enumerated Charles Vs problems in the
international arena, relying on the information he should have collected thanks to his contacts
in the city. The Emperor had better sent an ambassador to Constantinople for a truce because
he was diplomatically isolated and threatened from both inside and outside. Christian
monarchs such as the kings of England and France envied the Emperor and always wanted
him in trouble. Furthermore, given that the Emperor would not negotiate for a council with
the Pope, all Lutherans would be his enemies and the Catholics in Germany would convert to
Lutheranism. In fear of Charles Vs brother and lieutenant Ferdinand, all would be friends to
the Ottomans. Yunus Bey furthermore made allusions to several letters written by the French
king and Protestant nobles in order to document his claims. When this message was
transmitted to Nio, he refused the offer, yet did not fail to appreciate the efficiency of the

94

ASV, CCX-ParSec, fil. 20, 22 August 1577, 11 September 1577, 21 September 1577, 26 September 1577, 6
June 1578, 12 July 1578, 23 July 1578, 23 August 1578, 10 December 1578 and 17 December 1578. They
already had a similar position in 1564 when the possibility of a truce was again on the table. ASV, SDelC, reg. 2,
c. 103r (13 March 1564). They also sought to be included in the capitulations between Suleyman I and
Maximilian II, Ibid., c. 113v (30 May 1564).
95
The document does not mention Yunus Beys name however, according to Pedanis list, Yunus Bey arrived in
Venice 10-13 December 1532, approximately two weeks before the Habsburg ambassador mentioned this event.
Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 206.
96
According to the Ottomans, sending an ambassador to negotiate a truce was a sign of submission and therefore
humiliating. This belief was also shared by the Habsburgs, as evident in Charles Vs categorical refusal to send
an envoy and Philip IIs insistence that the truce negotiations in 1578-1581 be conducted without the presence of
an official ambassador who had to arrive in Constantinople with presents for the Sultan.

79

Ottomans intelligence. He ordered Belojo to learn the content of the afore-mentioned

letters.97
2.3.

BUREAUCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SECRET DIPLOMACY.

The expansion of the influence of central governments in the 16th century resulted in
the bureaucratization that in its turn absorbed secret diplomacy into the sphere of central
governments. States could then establish institutionalized secret services, rather than
employing spies occasionally. Even though the extent to which central governments could
control their spies activities should not be exaggerated especially in the Ottoman-Habsburg
borderlands, they developed certain methods in order to enhance the quality of operations.
These developments could not have been possible without the rising number of chancellery
personnel, some of which, started to professionalize in the conduct of secret diplomacy.
2.3.1. Improvements in cryptography and steganography
Gathered information must be transmitted the fastest and the safest way possible.
Central governments had to organize the transmission of news so that the flow of information
would not suffer from the activities of enemy counter-intelligence. Chancelleries increasingly
employed new techniques of steganography or cryptography in order to better conceal the
nature of their correspondence and to penetrate to the enemy correspondence which was
written with the same techniques. The development was swift. From a primitive medieval
practice that existed in a very simple form and applied in games and magic formulae, the early
modern steganography and cryptology turned into a complex science. Even though this
development mostly was the result of the demand created by central governments and
permanent embassies, it also attests to a change of mentality that occurred in the 13th century

97

AGS, E 1310, fol. 42 (24 December 1532).

80

which in itself was intertwined with the birth of the modern state and diplomacy: the
integration of writing in society and of the written word in legality.98
Firstly, I should explain the terminology. Steganography is the science of hiding a
written text with some arrangement such as invisible links, microdots, and the like.
Cryptography, on the other hand deals with making the text unintelligible rather than hiding
it. By using a number of different methods, it aims to encipher/encode the text.
Encipher/encode means hiding a text with a cipher/code while decipher/decode is to break this
cipher/code.
2.3.1.1.

Steganography techniques:

In spite of the primitiveness of early modern technology, central governments had at

their disposal an impressive number of methods to hide the text. By using invisible inks, they
managed to conceal the true nature of their correspondence which could only be read by
special methods such as reading with the light of the burning coal or putting the letter under
the water.99 An invisible ink commonly used, for instance, was the Roman vitriol (Sulfate)
which had to be pulverized and mixed with normal water. Once the hidden text was written
with this special substance, the normal message had to be written with a solution of carbn de
sauce with water, covering the hidden text. To make the hidden text legible, sufficed it to
scrub the text with galla de Istira, pulverized and mixed with water as well; the hidden text
appeared while the normal text became obscure.100 Another invisible ink was the lemon juice.
According to this, the informant/spy would write a normal letter that included relevant
information such as commercial details that would not raise any suspicion in case of its
interception. Between the two faces of front pages, the informant/spy would write the secret

98

Desiree Scholten, Trust in Untrustworthy Businesses: Communication in Diplomatic Espionage from the
Early
Middle
Ages
to
the
16th
century,
paper
written
in
September
200 ,
http://cambridge.academia.edu/DesireeScholten/Papers/188764/Trust_in_Untrustworthy_Businesses_Communic
ation_in_diplomatic_espionage_from_the_early_middle_ages_to_the_16th_century
99
Sola, Los que van y vienen, 203.
100
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 237.

81

information with lemon juice which could only be read after having been tormented with
fire.101 There are several examples of these tormented letters extant in AGS whose red ink
and careless handwriting make them so hard to read that in the end, these letters ironically
torment the researcher. Written with a manera que se han sacado al fuego, on the first page
there was a letter written by a slave asking for ransom money from his relatives, followed by
the red-inked tormented part on the following pages.102 Fortunately for debutants in
paleography, some of the deciphered copies,103 as well as the relazioni that central
governments chancelleries compiled, summarizing the incoming information in several such
letters, survived.104 The receiver could only know that these letters were actually written by
spies thanks to the name of the recipient and a code word. The Habsburg spies in
Constantinople, for instance used the word honorando in the beginning of the letter
(nobile et honorando, Ill.e et honorando S.or, honorando miser Antonio/Gioane,
mag.co et honorando miser Antonio, ill.e et honorando ms. Bartolomeo, etc.) and/or
before the name of the recipient (a Dominio Antonio Rimini suo honorando, a Domino
Anibal pinto suo Carmen (another codeword?), al nobile ms. Bartolomeo Tupuri suo
honorando, etc. in order to inform the authorities that such letters, which otherwise seemed
uninteresting correspondence penned by merchants and slaves, contained ample information
hidden with steganography techniques.105

101

For instance, in 1563, the Genoese agent in Constantinople in Habsburgs employ, Giovanni Agostino Gigli
wrote: They torment all the letters to the heat of the burning coal and put it in a warming pan (scaldaletto)
inside of which the letters would be heated up with diligence in order not to burn them. They do this, because the
letter, feeling the heat, had the words written on it appear. The letter of Giovanni Agostino Gigli al Doge e ai
Governatori (8 January 1563). Carlo Bornate, La Missione di Sampiero Corso a Costantinopoli, Archivio
Storico di Corsica XV (1939): 485.
102
AGS, E 1392, fols. 63 (18 January 1563), 65 (21 January 1563), 67, 68 (18 January 1563), 75 (29 March
1563) and 76 (30 March 1563); E 1324, fol. 128 (18 January 1563); E 1326, fols. 46 (23 September 1565), 47
(23 September 1565), 48 (24 September 1566), 49 (23 September 1566), 50 (26 September 1566), 53 (27
October 1566), 56 (16 November 1566), 60 (November 1566), 61 (November 1566), 64 (16 December 1566), 68
(29 December 1566), 69 (29 December 1566), 75 (January 1567) and 80 (9 March 1567).
103
AGS, E 1392, fols. 64 (18 January 1563), 66 (21 January 1563), and 68; E 1326, fol. 51 (26 September 1566).
104
AGS E 1326, fol. 99 (15 November 1567), 103, 152 ( 6 January 1568), 179 (4 May 1566), 307 (15 October
1569), 312 (26 November 1569), 314 (26 December 1569), 315.
105
AGS, E 1326, fols. 53, 56, 60, 61, 64, 68, 69 and 75.

82

Surely, there were other steganography techniques that remained more in theory than
in practice, such as the Cardano grille106 and many other interesting ones mentioned by
Giambattista della Porta in the sixteenth volume of his opus magnum, Magia Naturalis. They
attest further to the complexity of a flourishing science of steganography in the 16 th century;
however, for the sake of brevity, I will not go into further detail.
2.3.1.2.

Cryptography techniques:

Renaissance Europe produced a vivid interest in cryptology; intellectual figures of the

time developed an amateur interest in this science. Leon Battista Alberti, for instance, wrote a
25-page manuscript on the subject for the papal secretary and made two key contributions: 1)
the polyalphabetic substitution,107 thanks to his invention of the cipher disc with which the
writer could easily shift to a different cipher key, 2) the enciphered code.108 The development
in cryptology went hand in hand with the development of chancelleries and the establishment
of modern diplomacy following the introduction of permanent representation. These
developments that started slowly in the 1390s accelerated after the mid-16th century.
Throughout Europe, the increasing number of secretaries in the chancelleries of central
governments and of embassies abroad developed and utilized a wide range of techniques from
simple transposition (rearranging the places of letters in the text) to substitution (replacing
letters by numbers, symbols, signs, pictograms, musical notes or other letters) which
developed in itself from simple homophonic and slightly more complex but rare polyphonic
substitution to Albertis polyalphabetic substitution. Further inventions such as the square
table, diagraphic cipher (two letters were represented by a single symbol), mnemonic key

106

David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967),
144-5.
107
In polyalphabetic substitution, different alphabets use the same symbols for the ciphertext and a given symbol
can represent different plaintext letters, a novelty which intended to confuse the cryptanalyst. Unlike a simple
homophone which always represents the same letter or a slightly more complex polyphone which always
represents the same set of plaintext letters, in polyalphabetic substitution, the relation between the symbol and
the letter is not fixed, creating a great complexity which brought Alberti the nickname, the father of Western
cryptology.
108
Kahn, Codebreakers,125-130.

83

(writing out the keyword, omitting any repeated letters and then following it with the
remaining letters of the alphabet) and autokey (where the message itself is its own key)
followed, creating a great diversity and paving the way for modern cryptology.109 Still, a
reservation should be made. One should not be overwhelmed by the theoretical progress that
European cryptologists assured for the chancelleries. Those which were in practice were less
complex than would be expected.
The correlation between the rise of the Habsburgs as a political power and the
proliferation of her ciphers is most discernible after 1556 when Philip II decided to take
initiative and change all the ciphers by introducing the general cipher of 1556, the best
example of nomenclator, a mixture of codes and ciphers. In its complexity, it set the pattern
for the Habsburg cryptography into the 17th century.110 The Habsburgs instituted a secretario
de cifra, under the control of the secretario de estado. Luis Valle de la Cerda, for instance,
was a famous cryptologist who served under Alessandro Farnesio in Flanders and then the
secretario de estado Juan de Idiaquez.111 Philip II and his omnipotent secretary Antonio Prez
were also interested in cryptology.
The Venetians similarly demonstrated a close interest in cryptography and kept
themselves updated with the latest development in the field. In the 16th century, they
developed two sets of cipher, zifra grande and zifra picciola,112 which they used in their
correspondence and the keys of which they carefully guarded from the outsiders. 113 The
109

Ibid., 108-124.
Ibid., 114-116.
111
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 244-246.
112
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 10, cc. 49v-50r (31 July 1572), 51r-51v (9 August 1572).
113
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, c. 135r (2 July 1577) warns the Captain of Corfu that the cipher should not be left
in the couriers possession. Only the secretary sent by the ducal chancellery should have access to it. Less than
two months later, a similar order (cc. 137v-138r (27 August 1577)) was sent to the Provedditore-General of
Candia, accentuating the dangers of the fact that an ex-criminal had the responsibility of the cipher, carico della
ciphra. It should be touched by nobody, let alone a criminal, except the Grand Chancellor of the island. Once
exiled, an officer had to submit all the ciphers, letters and disegni in his possessions to the State. Ibid., reg. 13,
cc. 22 r (5 February 1584, m.v.) When the cipher secretary Francesco Marin died in 1578, all his writings were
confiscated and inventoried to be kept in the office of the Heads of the Council of Ten under lock-and-key,
accessible only to three other cipher secretaries. Ibid., reg. 11, cc. 158r-158v (23 May 1578). In 1601, when
there was a disorder in the handling of the cipher, the authorities set up a commission that consisted of five
110

84

number of cipher secretaries who were employed in the Venetian chancellery (there were also
those in the provinces) quickly grew from one to four in less than a century, hinting at the
rising importance of cryptography as well as the swift expansion of the chancellery. 114 The
necessity of new secretaries and more complex ciphers due to the intensification of written
correspondence between government officials forced the hands of the Venetian central
government. The authorities tried to fill the gap by encouraging the extant secretaries to train
their sons and relatives115 and promoting the science of cryptography. The Council of Ten
seemed interested in proposals for new ciphers that their experts perfected and authorized
handsome rewards for such useful inventions.116
Most of the afore-mentioned developments took place in the Christian world. But what
about the Ottomans? Unfortunately, our knowledge is limited regarding methods of
cryptology used by the Ottomans who used the Arab alphabet and therefore might have
developed different techniques, as they did with musical notes. There are indications that the
Ottomans utilized cryptography at least partially. One of the rare studies on Ottoman
cryptography, published in 1899, enumerates four cryptology systems used by the Ottomans,
not only in the 16th century, but also later.117 All four systems, (kentkl, orduyi, damgalu,
msrlu), however, were based on simple homophonic substitution and therefore were far from
the complexity of their Western counter-parts, hinting that the Ottomans were not actually upto-date with Western cryptology. To concentrate specifically on the 16th century, there is only
nobles. The comissions duty was to declare their opinion on how to preserve the secrecy of the cipher. Ibid.,
reg. 14, cc. 109r (27 February 1600, m.v.)
114
According to ASV, CCX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 158r-158v (23 May 1578), the number of these secretaries
should always be three. However, this rule was not observed. In the beginning of the 17 th century, there were
only two of them. In 1605, the moltiplicita degli affari et negotii publichi convinced the Venetian Council of
Ten to appoint two new secretaries to help the two extant secretaries of the Senate with the special duty of
writing and extracting all the ciphers. Ibid., reg. 14, cc 177r-177v (31 August 1605).
115
See Chapter Three.
116
For an innovative new cipher that Girolamo Franceschi developed with a false sconto, see. ASV, CX-ParSec.
For those developd by Piero Partenio, see. Ibid., reg. 13, cc. 92v-93r , 107r (24 March 1593), 113r (30 August
1593); reg. 14 cc. 180r-180v (30 January 1605, m.v.). Also see. Ibid., reg. 13, cc. 40v (26 August 1587); reg. 11,
cc. 166r-166v (18 August 1578).
117
M. J. A. Decourdemanche, Notes sur quatre system turcs de notation numerique secrete Journal Asiatique,
Neuvime Srie 14 (1899): 258-271.

85

one reference to the Ottomans utilization of cipher. The famous cryptographer Blaise de
Vigenre saw a Turkish cryptogram solved in six hours in Rome.118 The conversation
between the Ottoman Grand Vizier and the Venetian bailo, however, suggests that the
Ottomans did not use cipher. According to the instructions sent to the Venetian bailo, if the
Ottoman Grand Vizier insisted that the Venetian should not use cipher since the Ottomans did
not use it either, he should have protested that the Ottomans did not have to use it. They did
not have permanent embassies (and therefore they did not need to regularly send letters to
their representatives in foreign countries) and they sent important correspondence with a
avu and homini espressi (ulaks?) so that it did not fall in the hands of their enemies.119 As
will be explained in Chapter Six, the Ottomans seemed to have resorted to oral
communication more than the Venetians and the Habsburgs.
When it comes to cryptanalysis, the Ottomans utilized specialists who were familiar
with foreign embassies chancellery methods. For instance, the Ottomans managed to
cryptanalyze the letters of the Venetian Bailo Vettore Bragadin only with the help of one of
their giovani di lingua, Colombina, who was sent to Constantinople to study Ottoman.
According to Bragadin, this young apprentice, who converted to Islam and defected to the
Ottomans, knew the Venetian cipher because he should have seen and perhaps even helped
the Venetian scribes in Bailos house decipher letters.120 It is not hard to guess how efficient
somebody like Colombina, who did not have a proper education but only learned a specific
cipher by helping others use it, would be. The Ottomans had mixed success in cryptanalysis.

118

Kahn, Codebreakers, 146.

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 79r-80r (18 February 1566, m.v.).
120
ASV, Capi del consiglio di dieci, Lettere di Ambasciatori (hereafter CCX-LettAmb), b. 3, fol. 55; Christiane
Villain-Gandossi, Les d pches chiffr es de Vettore Bragadin, baile de Constantinople (12 Juillet 1564 15
Juin 1566), Turcica X (1978): 77. Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 42. Colombina would serve in the
Ottoman chancellery for years, appearing frequently in correspondence between the bailo and the Council of
Ten. In 1578, he was even designated as the Ottoman envoy to the Serenissima, to the great chagrin and protest
of the Venetian authorities. ASV, Consiglio dei dieci, Parti Secrete (hereafter CX-ParSec), reg. 11, cc. 154v (24
March 1578), fil. 20 (24 March 1578).
119

86

For instance, they succeeded in deciphering the Venetian bailos letters in 14 2,121 but failed
to decipher the correspondence of the Austrian ambassador which they intercepted on two
occasions in 1580.122 The fact that the Ottomans were frustrated with foreign ambassadors
utilization of cryptography techniques and tried to put pressure on them to write without
cipher/code or hand down their keys to them suggests that they had troubles in cryptanalysis.
In 1567, Sokollu warned the Venetian bailo not to write in cipher and Ibrahim Bey, the
Ottoman envoy to Venice, made it known that the Pasha wanted a special clause prohibiting
the use of cipher added to the to-be-renewed capitulations. This created an interesting traffic
of diplomacy between Constantinople and Venice which tried to avoid such limitations at all
costs.123 Even though the issue was left aside, it resurfaced when Sokollu warned
Marcantonio Barbaro once again in 1570 and even went as far as to ask him, albeit with a
laugh in his face, to teach one of his own men how to write in cipher. The bailo kindly refused
the offer, saying it would take too much effort and time.124 The Ottoman chancellery fell short
of expectations when it comes to detecting the steganography techniques that the European
ambassadors used in their correspondence with their capitals; a failure which would have

121

Francesco Longo, ed., Annali Veneti dallanno 4 7 al

del Senatore Domenico Malipiero (Firenze:
Gio. Pitro Viesseux, Direttore-Editore, 1843), vol. I, 141-142.
122
AGS, E 1338, fol. 15 (30 June 1580).
123
According to the instructions given by the Council of Ten, the bailo and the ambassador should argue that
such a limitation would jeopardize the safety of their correspondence in case their letters were intercepted. They
should at all cost reject the novelty of adding a clause to the capitulations and tell the Pasha that Venice should
not be singled out: Diplomatic representatives of other princes were also writing in cipher. If Pasha said that
the Ottomans themselves did not use cipher, then the ambassador should point out to the fact that the Ottomans
did not have permanent embassies and that they sent important correspondence with a avu in order to prevent
enemy interception. Unless these arguments convinced the Pasha, the bailo then should accept the demand but
make sure that it was not written down as a clause in the capitulation arguing that this would be best for the
dignity of the Serenissima. Interestingly, the bailo was also advised to remind the Ottomans, had the Venetians
been forced to write without cipher, this would have meant they would be able neither to provide the Ottomans
with information nor to transmit Constantinoples messages to the Ottoman navy operating far away in the
Western Mediterranean, if need be, as was the case in 1565 during the siege of Malta. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8,
cc. 76v-77r (27 January 1566, m.v.), 79r-80r (18 February 1566, m.v.), 92v-93v (19 July 1567); BOA, MD, VI,
no. 1424 (H. Evast- Z 72, A.D. 9-18 July 1565). When they learned that Sokollu made a similar demand to
other representatives, the Venetians changed their strategy by on the one hand telling the Ottomans that they
would follow the example of other diplomats, and on the other trying to form a unified diplomatic front against
such excessive demands with other European powers. If all this failed, the final resort was, unsurprisingly for the
students of Ottoman-Venetian relations, to bribe Sokollu and other pashas. Ibid., cc. 93v-94r (19 July 1567), 96r
(20 August 1567), 97r (2 October 1567).
124
ASV, SDC, fil. 5, fol. 12 (21 April 1570).

87

neutralized the possible benefits of Sokollus policy of forcing ambassadors to write without a
cipher. When, for instance, he forced the Austrian ambassador to submit the correspondence
destined for Vienna for Ottoman investigation in 1576, his men failed to realize the existence
of the scripture written with an invisible ink.125
2.3.2. Improvements in the transmission of news:
The bureaucratization and the centralization of the 16th century enabled the states to
establish a regular postal system. This system brought two major advantages. Firstly, it gave a
great advantage to central governments who used this efficient monopoly of the flow of
information by better controlling their otherwise centrifugal provinces (one could understand
how great a problem this would be in large polities such as the Habsburg and the Ottoman
Empire). Secondly, it also increased the efficiency of decision-making process by providing
regular information the fastest way possible. Aware of these advantages, both empires
centralized the flow of information; but the details of this process are the subject of Chapters
Four and Six.
2.4.

ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES

States that do not have open diplomatic relations can easily engage in espionage
without suffering any diplomatic consequences. However, the war of information in the
Mediterranean was not waged with only two actors; other participants of the imperial rivalry
between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs used their secret services as well. As a result, secret
diplomacy went hand in hand with open diplomacy and at times created diplomatic tensions
between states that maintained, or feigned to maintain, otherwise good relations.
When there were open diplomatic relations, it was the ambassador who suffered the
consequences of an international crisis sparked by espionage. For instance, in 1492 when the
Ottomans intercepted and deciphered the Venetian bailos correspondence, they realized that
125

Stephan Gerlach, Trkiye Gnl, ed. Kemal Beydilli, trans. Trkis Noyan (stanbul: Kitap Yaynevi, 2006 ,
vol I, 285.

88

he was sending information to Venice. They immediately ordered him to leave, sparing
merchants, though, who could stay in the Empire. The Venetian response to this was the
dispatch of an ambassador, Domenego Trivisan, to correct the situation.126 In another
example, this time it was Venice that was the victim of ambassadorial espionage. In 1542,
The French ambassador Guillaume Pellicier acquired from the secretaries of the Council of
Ten the instructions of the Venetian ambassador who negotiated the peace treaty with the
Ottomans. When the Venetians realized that he sent this vital information to the Ottomans,
giving them an upper hand in the negotiations, an international crisis of full scale erupted.
When Pellicier did not want to surrender his agents who gathered information from the
secretaries, the Council of Ten besieged the French embassy with soldiers, threatening to
demolish the building, while there was also an angry mob outside. Unsurprisingly, the French
ambassador had to surrender his agents and leave Venice.127
Ambassadors were accused of more than simple espionage. In two occasions, foreign
ambassadors were implied in overthrowing governments. In 1583, Bernardo de Mendoza, the
bellicose and intransigent Habsburg ambassador in London, participated in a plot led by
Francis Throckmorton to overthrow the queen. When Walsinghams counter-intelligence
managed to uncover the plot and discover Mendozas participation, the Habsburg ambassador
was declared persona non grata and was given, in an ironically friendly conversation full of
decorum and courtesy, fifteen days to leave the kingdom.128 A passionate employer of spies,
the Habsburg ambassador in Venice, the Marquis of Bedmar, managed to establish a wide
network of spies and informants who provided him, in spite of the Venetian Inquisitori di
Statos vigilant eyes, with crucial information during his tenure (1606-1618) which coincided
126

Longo, Annali Veneti, vol. I, 141-142.

Preto, Servizi Segreti, 75. For Pelliciers activities in Venice that resulted in his expulsion, see his published
correspondence. Alexandre Tausserat-Radel (ed.), Correspondance Politique de Guillaume Pellicier,
Ambassadeur de France Venise, 1540-1542, 2 vols. (Paris : Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillire et
Compagnie, 1899).
128
Miguel ngel Ochoa Brun, Historia de la Diplomacia Espaola, VI: La Diplomacia de Felipe II (Madrid:
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2000, 2nd edition 2003), 178.
127

89

with a worsening of relations between Venice and the Habsburgs. When the Serenissima
realized the Congiura di Bedmar, however, her tolerance for ambassadors intelligence
networks gave way to indignation and the ensuing international crisis that paralyzed relations
between Venice and Madrid even further. According to this plan proposed by Bedmar and the
Duke of Osuna, the Viceroy of Naples, Habsburg agents would set the Arsenal and the Mint,
zecca in fire, deflect the Dutch soldiers in the city and attack the Palazzo Ducale with the
Habsburg fleet that would arrive from Naples in order to sack the city and invade it. Amidst
the swift persecution of the Habsburg spies implicated in the plot, the Habsburg ambassador
also took its fair share of authorities outrage and populaces fury. In order not to jeopardize
the relations further, Bedmar, in spite of his insistence on his innocence, fled the city and
moved to Milan where he waited the royal order for his transfer to the Low Countries.129
Documents related to secret diplomacy frequently mention assassination plans, even
though most of the time these did not succeed. When they did, however, they might create an
international crisis and a propaganda war that might be problematic for the culpable central
government who authorized the mission. Leaving many famous cases of assassination, such
as that of Henri de Valois, Henri de Navarre and William of Orange aside, in our context the
best documented example is the assassination of the French diplomats Antonio Rincn and
Cesare Fregoso on their way from France to Constantinople at the hands of a band of soldiers
who, the French justly claimed, were sent by the Habsburg Governor-General of Milan. Paris
pressed the matter further, raising the issue of diplomatic immunity and used the incident as a
tool of propaganda against Charles V.130 The affair caused a tremendous stir in European

129

Preto has argued that the Inquisitori and the Council of Ten never believed in a real plot, but rather used the
occasion to achieve a number of objectives: 1) The recalling of Bedmar, a proponent of an anti-Venetian policy
among Habsburg circles, 2) forcing the Duke of Osuna to obey Madrids orders and to retreat the fleet from the
Adriatic Sea, 3) dismantling of the Habsburg intelligence network in Venice, 4) elimination of riotous elements
among the Dutch mercenaries, and 5) the weakening of the party of the Old. Paolo Preto, Servizi Segreti,
chapter 7.
130
Michle Escamilla, Antonio Rinc n.

90

capitals and proved itself costly for the Emperors image and reputation in the international
arena.
These were episodes of exceptional importance, but there were other minor issues that
created tensions in the international scene. One recurring problem was related to the secrecy
of correspondence and couriers right of safe-passage, both of which were often overlooked
by counter-intelligence mechanisms. For instance, a diplomatic incident occurred in 1589
between the Papal authorities and the Habsburg ambassador in Rome, the Count of Olivares.
First the Pope ordered that the Habsburg correspondence arriving from Milan be first brought
to the house of a Papal governor where the bags would not be opened. Then when one day,
the Habsburg correo mayor in the city failed to show up to take the bags, the authorities
opened them to take letters that were written to the Papal authorities. Then, the Papal maestro
de postas distributed the rest of the letters instead of the Habsburg correo mayor. The
Habsburg ambassador responded to this transgression by immediately requesting an audience
with the Holy Father.131 As states regulated their own postal system, they also claimed the
monopoly of all correspondence that passed from their possessions. Starting from 1601, the
Valois, for instance, forced the Habsburgs to submit their correspondence to French couriers
in Lyon and Bordeaux. These French couriers would carry Habsburg correspondence within
the French territory to finally submit either to the Habsburg ambassador in Paris or to other
Habsburg couriers outside of France, in Italy and Low Countries. Even though these couriers
should not keep the correspondence for more than one day, transgressions were many as Alain
Hugon so well put into a graphic.132 Such problems damaged the Habsburg-Valois relations,
but the casual relationship was two sided. As the relations between the two powers
deteriorated, the French used their central position between the Habsburg center and the

131
132

AGS, E 1540, fol. 34 (11 July 1589), 36 (22 July 1589), 37 (29 July 1589) and 39 (12 August 1589).
Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 24, Graphic 1.

91

provinces, in order to wage a war of couriers and violated the secrecy of the Habsburg
correspondence without hesitation.133
There were clear violations of couriers right of safe-passage. In 1553, for instance,
the Duke of Mirandolas men stopped a Habsburg courier, confiscated the letters he was
carrying and took them to their lord. When the Duke refused to restitute the letters to the
courier, the latter did not give up and protested to the Duke of Ferrara of the maltreatment he
suffered in the latters possessions. The Duke of Ferrara first refused responsibility on the
ground that the transgressors were not his vassals. However, when the courier outwitted him
by presenting detailed information (their names, origins, the names of their relatives) about
the soldiers that robbed him and even gained the upper hand by asking where all the victuals
and gunpowder were being transferred to (a courier was also a spy), the Duke had to relent.
Threatened with the wrath of Charles V, he caught the transgressors (cowboys in soldiers
disguise) and restituted his goods even though he failed to recover the letters.134 Similar
incidents came more frequently from the hands of the Ottoman authorities. The employment
of local couriers who were Ottoman subjects by foreign powers created a legal problem and a
political opportunity for the Ottomans who wanted to use the occasion to hamper the
correspondence of other states and control the flow of information in their possessions better.
They frequently complained to the Venetians who chose their couriers from among the
Ottoman subjects since the Byzantine times, especially from two regions in Montenegro,
Katun and Ljubotin.135 That this created a problem over the political status of these couriers,
Ottoman subjects under Constantinoples jurisdiction, and justified the Ottoman intervention
is evident from the discrepancy between the attitude of the Austrian ambassador in claiming
the detained letters and the fate of two detained couriers in two different cases. In 1580, the
133

Ibid., 22-7.
AGS, E 1045, fol. 101.
135
Eric R. Dursteler, Power and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Mediterranean,
in From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho, eds. Diogo Curto, Eric Dursteler,
Jules Kirshner and Francesca Trivellato (Florence: Olschki, 2009), 611.
134

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Austrian ambassador refused responsibility when un turco di nacione unghera, a Muslim and
an Ottoman subject, was caught with letters addressed to the Emperor and the Ottomans sent
the courier to galleys.136 A couple of days later, however, upon the capture of another courier
with similar letters, the ambassador took a different approach and demanded the restitution of
his letters and the return of the courier; a request which the Ottomans, after an initial
resistance, had to fulfill.137 Galley was not the only form of punishment that awaited Ottoman
couriers under foreign employ. In 1582, a Muslim courier from Macedonia was hung, accused
of spying.

138

In 1584, the Ottomans detected that the Venetians employed fifty or sixty

Ottoman subjects from the Karada village in the district of Iskenderiye (Shkodr as
couriers. They were to be thrown into prison while the letters they carried were to be sent to
Constantinople.139 In 1605, the governor of the afore-mentioned district had several Venetian
couriers stopped and beaten, and their mail sacks thrown into the river.140 All these
transgressions had little diplomatic echo than was due them because of the unequal
relationship of power between the Ottoman Empire on the hand and Venice and Vienna on the
other.
One states secret service could create an international crisis for another state that
hosted its activities. In the context of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, two city-states, Ragusa
and Venice, that were stuck between two mighty empires, unwilling to break with neither and
eager to maintain the friendship of both, were occasional victims of Constantinoples wrath
because they harbored Habsburg spies. I will return to this subject later; suffice it to say that
the Ottomans threatening tone was an important component of their counter-intelligence

136

Being sent to galleys was a form of punishment. Slaves and convicts were one major source of rowers in the
16th century.
137
AGS, E 1338, fol. 15 (30 June 1580).
138
Dursteler, Power and Information, 60 .
139
BOA, MD, LV, no. 166 (H. 21 Z 992, A.D. 24 December 1584).
140
Dursteler, Power and Information, 610.

93

mechanism. It was sometimes enough to convince the authorities to give in and dismiss
Habsburg agents from their possessions.
Interestingly, there were instances where secret services sought using the means of
diplomacy in order to recover their spies that were detained. For instance, the Ottomans tried
to have one of their agents, a certain Mahmud from Castelnuovo, released from Venetian
prisons. The Venetians, however, were aware of the true nature of this enemy of religion who
not only committed the most enormous crimes, homicides and assassinations, but also
organized a plot against the Venetian city of Cattaro.141 The Ottomans were obviously trying
to recover one of their key spies. Unfortunately for Mahmud, things were different in the
Mediterranean borderlands and we are still far from the friendly environment for espionage in
Flanders where secret services exchanged spies that they caught.
2.5.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I tried to delineate the relationship between information and politics in
an effort to fill a gap in the relevant historiography and make a meaningful contribution. Most
studies on early modern espionage bothered little with how information was analyzed by
central governments and what kind of an effect it had on decision-making processes.
Firstly, I have argued that states needed and used information on a number of different
levels of decision-making according to which the content and type of the information varied.
What is constant is the central role the information played on all these levels. Any study that
concentrates on any of these levels (strategy formulation, policy making and warfare) needs to
focus on the information available to decision-makers and to analyze how these perceived the
available information. States with better intelligence mechanisms benefitted from the
intelligence edge by better allocating their sources and more efficiently reacting to threats and

141

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 83v-83r (15 February 1575, m.v.), 84v-85r (17 February1575, m.v.), 85v-86v
(22 February 1575, m.v.).

94

opportunities. In short, intelligence was decisive in the imperial rivalry between the Ottomans
and the Habsburgs, a fact that both empires were aware of.
I made a critique of the current historiography of imperial strategies and introduced a
rather alternative method for further studies in the field. In what perhaps could be seen as a
historians attempt to reclaim the field for historians, I criticized that these studies put forward
a constant set of preferences and allowed little room for change while explaining the decadesor centuries-long history of otherwise very complex processes of strategy formulation which
should only be scrutinized by a close reading of primary sources. In an effort to overcome the
teleological assumptions that equate military result with political intention, I have argued that
the decision-making process should be deconstructed in accordance with primary sources. It
should be reconsidered as a result of a dual process of information analysis and factional
politics and by taking into account the ensuing impediments in front of the objective
assessment of the incoming information and the optimal political action. I concluded that an
objective analysis will suffer not only from misperceptions, prejudices, paranoia and dis/misinformation, but also from factional politics and the corporate interests that overcame
those of the state. I then explored how information was used in the making of policies of more
momentary nature as well as of military decisions and tried to demonstrate the importance of
information by providing examples whereby its neglect or mishandling resulted in devastating
consequences.
Secondly, I have tried to show that certain developments became the catalyst of the
institutionalization of secret diplomacy and its incorporation into the central administration in
the 16th century. Developments such as improvements in cryptography, steganography and the
introduction of regular state-run postal systems increased the quality of information and the
efficiency of intelligence operations. All these should be seen as a part of the state building

95

process and were direct results of larger historical processes of bureaucratization and
centralization.
Finally, I concluded the chapter by revealing the complex relation between the secret
and open diplomacy. The agents of the latter, the diplomats, were also entrusted with the task
of engaging in espionage, i.e., secret diplomacy. As will also be discussed in the following
chapters, they recruited spies, informants, saboteurs and even plotted against the very
government that hosted them. When discovered, such activities seriously jeopardized the
relations between two powers as well as the implicated diplomats position in a hostile capital.
Furthermore, other issues such as assassinations, hosting enemy spies, the violation of the
secrecy of correspondence and of couriers right of passage created full scale international
crises as well.
The world of espionage was a sellers market it was hard for governments to neglect
secret diplomacy. They had to gather information in order to shape their decision-making
process better and engage in clandestine operations in order to debilitate their enemy. Thanks
to these central governments patronage and financial backing, opportunist and entrepreneur
agents thrived in their business and held, at least most of the time, the upper hand in their
negotiations with their employers. The next chapter is their story.

96

CHAPTER THREE
SPIES AND ESPIONAGE AS A PROFESSION

3.1.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will engage in a sociological study of spies who operated in the 16th
century Mediterranean. The 16th century espionage was an industry whose agents,
seeking material benefits, most of the time did not have particular regional, communal or
dynastical allegiances. Therefore, a differentiation has to be made between secret services
that central governments established and spies that they employed. Spies were not mere
extensions of the administrative and military apparati of central governments, even when
they operated under their scrutiny and protection. As these information traders were more
than eager to share their loyalties among the bidders, several of them were, while many
others were suspected to be, double, triple or even quadruple agents. In a spirit of
entrepreneurship, these go-betweens took advantage of their privileged position in
between different cultures and civilizations while negotiating with state officials and
maneuvering between central governments in an effort to raise their profits. The fact that
the Habsburg/Papal agent Rinaldi, who was saved from the Ottoman prison with the
money provided by English ambassador, still complained that he was left alone by the
Habsburgs as well as the French and the Venetian ambassadors demonstrate the number
of allegiances a spy might have.1
Spies came from similar social, educational and professional backgrounds. They
followed similar tactics and faced similar opportunities, rewards and dangers. Therefore,
1

ASV, IS, b. 416, 24 January 1607, 3 March 1608.

97

it would be more accurate to study spies in the Mediterranean borderlands by

concentrating on the afore-mentioned common traits, regardless of governments that
employed them, be it Ottoman, Habsburg or Venetian. In short, this chapter aims to study
the extra-state aspects of the early modern espionage and delineate the common
characteristics observed in spies backgrounds, demands, actions and operations.
First, I focus on the professional, social and cultural background of Mediterranean
spies in an effort to situate them among a larger group of people, the crossers of
civilizational boundaries which historians long labeled as go-betweens. Secondly, I focus
on other specialists of secret diplomacy who led and operated intelligence networks in
different capacities during several stages of intelligence operations. Thirdly, I delineate
the prerequisite skills that early modern espionage required such as linguistic and
educational skills. Then I concentrate on the reasons that motivated these spies to
participate in secret diplomacy, facing many hardships and perils and risking their lives.
With a special emphasis on financial motivations of early modern espionage, I describe
the diverse methods by which central governments rewarded their spies and thus
demonstrate the entrepreneurial nature of early modern espionage. Finally, I demonstrate
the importance of familial ties and of related networks for Mediterranean go-betweens
and more specifically agents of secret diplomacy.
3.2.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF SPIES

Early modern espionage was not a profession per se. As was the case with the
profession of diplomacy in the 15th century,2 the 16th century espionage did not have
well-defined boundaries even though its agents developed an ad-hoc specialization in

Paul M. Dover, Economic Predicament of Italian Renaissance Ambassadors, Journal of Early Modern
History 12 (2008), 165.

98

unique techniques and methods such as cryptography, steganography and the use of
special signs (seal). Different people from different social groups and occupations
engaged in information brokering at one point in their lives for one or more parties
interested in their services. In short, among the ranks of spy, there were men from diverse
professional and social backgrounds who did not seem to have been content with
restricting their activity to spying. It was the age of spy-cum-diplomats, ransom agents,
merchants, clerics, corsairs, engineers, etc.
One reason for this multiplicity of professions should be the unreliability and
irregularity of payments. For most, spying was a means to an end, to extract money,
sacar dinero, and to enjoy royal favours in exchange for the services that the agents
provided or pretended to have provided. Still, even for those who had other motives than
money, economic hardship was a constant problem in the 16th century, especially given
the deep fiscal crises which central governments, especially that of the Habsburgs, found
themselves in. In the long run, financial remunerations were simply not enough to sustain
ones self and make ends meet without engaging in another profession. A second reason
was the need to disguise ones self with another profession in order to justify his presence
where the information was gathered. In the borderlands of the early modern
Mediterranean, one needed a good alibi to travel.
Certain professions seemed to have created a favorable environment in which one
could establish social networks and political connections, as well as easily cross the
political borders and so-called civilizational barriers that supposedly separated the two
halves of the Mediterranean.

99

3.2.1. Merchants
Since they frequently travelled between the Eastern and the Western
Mediterranean, merchants were ideal candidates for recruitment. Frontiers that were
otherwise closed were open to them, even during the time of the war, guaranteed by the
insatiable appetite of the ruling elites for their goods. They did not hesitate to cash this
advantage in by offering their services to secret services. In some cases, spies travelled in
merchants disguise by either joining a caravan or embarking on a ship to be able to
easily reach their final destination. Central governments even gave some of these spycum-merchants additional money so that they can buy goods.3 More frequently though,
one encounters information provided by merchants who, thanks to their trade networks,
not only familiarized with local elites, but also eavesdropped on rumors and news on the
streets and in the marketplace, vox populi.4 Some of these became seasoned spies and
directly engaged in building up intelligence networks, as was the case with the leader of
the Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople, Aurelio Santa Croce. Some even
engaged in diplomacy such as the Persian Hseyin who contacted the Venetian bailo in
Constantinople and offered his services as an intermediary between the Serenissima and
the Safavid Shah.5 Trade networks established between cities can also be used for
gathering information. Prominent merchant houses/partnerships who engaged in longdistance trade had to be aware of political developments abroad. Their partners,
correspondents and agents informed them regularly so that these merchants could safely
3

AGS, E 1399, fols. 8-9 (30 January 1570) mention the authorization of the payment of 200 escudos to buy
merchandise for a ship captain destined for a mission in North Africa, so that he could go there in disguise,
or as it was said in 16th century Spanish, under the color of a merchant. Furthermore, according to BOA,
MD, III, no. 1457 (H. 22 Za. 967/A.D. 14 August 1560), the Ottomans sent to Venice, a spy in merchant
disguise who on his return visited Pe as well, where the Emperor Ferdinand was and therefore which
should be another city than the Ottoman Pcs.
4
This expression is first used in this context by Prof. Emilio Sola.
5
ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 5, fols. 81 (7 May 1579) and 95 (1 October 1579).

100

invest their capital and better govern their business.6 These prominent merchants
conveniently shared valuable information with central governments, as proven by the fact
that this information exchange worried the authorities who would not have otherwise
produced such an impressive amount of documentation on these merchants activities.
The importance of these merchants services for information gathering was such
that it convinced Hans Kissling to argue, not so much unjustifiably, that a mercantile
state, such as Venice, which relied on the intelligence provided by their large colonies in
trade centers along the Mediterranean, had an advantage over other types of states (the
non-mercantile state and the military state, Stato di Guerriglia) that had to rely only on
information provided by their agents. The former enjoyed the cooperation of her citizens
who, in accordance with their own interest, provided a more diverse pool of information,
while the latter two had to rely on salaried agents, dispatched for specific missions and
could only provide occasional information and build a dead network.7
Merchants not only provided both empires with information, but also helped the
transmission of news as well as the transfer of money for central governments by
generously offering their services, obviously always in exchange for some benefit. Their
contribution proved significant especially within the context of war of information
between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, given that the lack of open diplomatic relations
and a reliable postal service hindered the transmission of news and transfer of money

ASV, IS, b. 433 (13 January 1585).

Hans J. Kissling, Venezia come Centro di Informazioni sui Turchi, in Venezia Centro di Mediazione tra
Oriente e Occidente, secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e problemi, eds. Hans Georg Beck et al. (Firenze: L.S. Olschki,
1977), vol. I, 98-9. A similar argument could be made for the Ragusans who relied on several Ragusans
living throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire to gather information. See. I. Mitich (in Croat),
Consuls and the Consul Service of the Old Dubrovnik, JAZU, 1973.
7

101

between Ottoman and Habsburg cities in many respects, compared to those, say between
Habsburg and French, or Ottoman and Venetian cities.
3.2.2. Ransom agents
A second profession, which could as well be categorized under that of merchants,
is the ransom negotiatior/agent. In the early modern world where slavery was common,
these agents negotiated the payment of ransoms on the one hand, and secured the
liberation and transfer of the slaves/prisoners-of-war back to their homeland, on the other.
Thanks to their profession, they were as mobile as merchants, but with an extra
advantage. Since only the families of rich slaves could offer ransom money, these ransom
agents got into contact and familiarized themselves with the political elite, who spared for
themselves the crme de la crme of captured slaves. Therefore, they gathered
information from different parts during their journey back and forth. They could also
contact local officers easily without arousing too much suspicion, and consequently,
brokered information and engaged in other clandestine operations, one example being
Scipion Ansalon whom the Viceroy of Sicily sent to Tripolis to negotiate the defection of
prominent Ottoman officials.8 Needless to say, resident spies used their established
connections to ransom prisoners-of-war, proven by the efforts of the Habsburg network
in Constantinople, following the capture of several prominent Habsburg officials when la
Goleta fell to the Ottomans in 1574.9 Other prominent ransom agents who engaged in
espionage were Bartolomeo Brutti, who negotiated the exchange of prominent Ottoman
slaves that had fallen captive to the Christians at the Battle of Lepanto for those whom

8
9

AGS, E 1144, fol. 137 (3 December 1575); E 1147, fol. 10 (28 February 1577).
AGS, E 1066, fols. 16 (1 April 1575) and 123 (24 February 1575).

102

the Ottoman captured when they conquered la Goleta,10 Gulliermo de Saboya, who
negotiated the ransom of a number of Habsburg elites in Constantinople,11 Antonio
Avellan,12 Agustin Manuel,13 Giovanni Barelli,14 Hieronimo Paronda,15 and finally the
Habsburg network leader in Chios, Nicol Giustinian.16
3.2.3. Clergy
An impressive number of clerics directly participated in information gathering by
using their privileges in the employ of secular sovereigns, surprisingly sometimes
including those of a different religion.
Traveling disguised as a monk or a pilgrim provided a good excuse to travel. A
French spy, who came to Malta in 1602, en abito de peregrine, in order to spy on the
military forces of the island, was caught and tortured to death.17 It was not only the
Christians who used the disguise of a pilgrim. In 1570, having been sued by a number of
Jews with whom he did business in Thessalonica, a priest confessed in front of the
Ottoman kad to be an Ottoman spy named Mustafa who was going to Corfu for spying.18
A prince from the dethroned Hafsid family, the infante of Tunisia, went in the winter of
1581 to his motherland, disguised as a pilgrim and accompanied by the Habsburg agent
Augustin Manuel, in order to start a rebellion against the Ottomans who dispossessed his
family.19

10

AGS, E 1066, fol. 123 (24 February 1575). ASV, SDelC, reg. 4, cc. 101r-101v (18 March 1575).
AGS, E K 1675, fol. 141 (18 and 19 April 1592).
12
AGS, E 1144, fol. 282.
13
AGS, E 1152, fol. 83 (15 August 1582). ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 6, fols. 67-69 (3 February 1581).
14
AGS, E 1337, fol. 66.
15
ASV, IS, b. 460, 5 September 1606.
16
AGS, E 1127, fol. 88 (3 October and 2 December 1562).
17
AGS, E 1160, fol. 150.
18
BOA, MD IX, no. 59.
19
AGS, E 1151, fol. 145 (5 October 1581). Also see. fol. 306.
11

103

Apart from the secular spies traveling in monk disguise, there were also real
monks who participated in espionage. In 1553, a friar of St. Francis travelled all around
Naples and spied for the French.20 The Habsburg authorities encouraged the Catholic
monks who wanted to go to the Ottoman Empire for pilgrimage21 and even directly
recruited some, such as a Father Felice Torre who was given his cipher before he took off
for Constantinople in 1582.22 In Galata, the Latin quarter of Constantinople, there was a
Franciscan community who not only ransomed Christian slaves,23 but also engaged in
espionage by sending information to the Habsburgs,24 as well as facilitating the Christian
slaves escape attempts and the transmission of news to Naples. The Ottomans detected
their services for Habsburg secret diplomacy and prosecuted them harshly. 25 Also several
monks, who travelled to the Ottoman North Africa, generally for ransoming Christian
slaves, at times provided interesting intelligence reports. For instance, a cleric named
Fransisco Nuez befriended, by means of lavish banquets, important political figures
among the wine-friendly Turks, turcos de vino, including the Governor-General
himself. Moreover, he managed to send valuable information regarding the fortifications
of Algiers which he extracted from the renegades working there, at such a critical time in
1572-3, in the aftermath of the Christian victory at Lepanto when an attack on the city
was a realistic possibility. After 20 years in Algiers, his network was so vast that he even
gained the confidence of governors (alcayde) wives who narrated their dreams for him
to interpret them.26
20

AGS, E 1121, fol. 122.

AGS, E 1525, fol. 23; E 1526, fol. 10 (8 September1582).
22
AGS, E 1526, fol. 202, 31 October 1582.
23
AGS, E 1144, fol. 211.
24
AGS, E 1120, fol. 242, 23 March 1552; 1928, fol. 85 (30 January 1603).
25
AGS, E 1060, fol. 140 (5 May and 15 June 1571).
26
AGS, E 487, Francisco Nuez.
21

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The quality of information that a cleric could have provided and the efficiency of
their participation in clandestine operations such as assassination could not be as blatant
as it is in the following example where a number of clergy were employed by different
secret services (Habsburg, Ottoman) for different purposes (intelligence, counterintelligence, assassination). In 1622, a certain Friar Angelo decided to go to the Levant
after continuing his studies in Pavia and befriended a Venetian merchant named Giovanni
Antonio Poleni with whom he travelled to Spalato and Sarai. In the former, he met the
merchants brother Pietro who was both a Venetian and an Ottoman spy. In Sarai, he
encountered a Spanish preacher belonging to the Order of the Holy Trinity, using the
alias Mehmed Bey, who was a double agent as well, working for both the Viceroy of
Naples and the Ottomans. Mehmed Bey asked him too many questions on his natal land
Sicily and its Viceroy, Prince Emmanuel Filibert of Savoy, whose assassination the
Ottoman Sultan commissioned to Mehmed Bey. The story got more interesting when on
his way back Friar Angelo encountered in the port of Palermo one of Mehmed Beys
companions, also a priest of the same order, and another Venetian which he had seen
before in Pietro Polenis house in Spalato. Realizing the danger of being detected, these
offered money to the friar in return for his silence and asked him questions regarding the
island as well as when the Viceroy will be returning to Palermo. Friar Angelo countered
their move by asking where they would stay, a question which these veteran spies
naturally did not answer correctly. Having eventually lost track of the two spy-cumassassins, he contacted the authorities, accentuating the miserable condition of the
Habsburg counter-intelligence and the fact that Sicily was full of enemy spies. He
furthermore offered to go to Venice and contact Giovanni Angelo Poleni in order to learn

105

the names of Ottoman spies who operated in Sicily. The viceroy answered that it was
enough to write to Poleni with some other pretext in order to learn more about the issue.27
High level clerics in key positions could also participate in information gathering,
at least as employers, such as the Milanese born pro-French archbishop of Ragusa,
Filippo Trivulzio who furnished both Paris and Constantinople with information. He did
more than sending information he overheard; he actively contributed to the French and
the Ottoman counter-intelligence as well. In July 1537, for instance, he had the Venetian
courier that carried letters to Kotor robbed. He then sent the letters to the French
ambassador in Constantinople to be deciphered and transmitted to the Ottomans.28 His
example should be the reason why the Habsburg network leader Jernimo Bucchia
argued the benefits of having a native pro-Habsburg archbishop in Ragusa for the
Habsburg intelligence network two decades later.

29

Another good example is Zaccaria

Delphino, the Bishop of Lesina and the papal nuncio to Vienna, who set up an
intelligence network in Constantinople that provided the Emperor Ferdinand I with
information.30 Finally, the Roman/Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople provided
the Venetian bailo with information regarding the Ottoman campaigns in the East, a
crucial information coming from a region otherwise inaccessible to the Venetian secret
service.31

27

AGS, E 1894, fols. 94 (21 October 1622), 95 (20 October 1622) and 96 (20 October 1622).
J. Tadi, panija I Dubrovnik,(Belgrade: Sirpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1932), 60-2, quoted by Robin
Harris, Dubrovnik. A History (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 111. AGS, E 1028, fol. 23 (20 April 1538); E
1311, fols. 83-5 (19 March 1534).
29
With the patronage of this pro-Habsburg archbishop, it would be easier to gather information about the
Ottoman Empire and transmit those to Naples with no extra cost. Unlike the current archbishop, Giovanni
Angelo de Medici, he would know the language and the customs of the region and reside in his See where
he would have extensive connections. See. BNE, Correspondencia del Cardenal Granvela, ms. 7905/174,
ff. 2v-4r. Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 94-7.
30
Lesure, Michel ernovi, 127-154.
31
AGS, E 1078, fol. 29 (14 April 1579).
28

106

It was not only the Christian princes who used men of religion as spies. Apart
from the afore-mentioned Mehmed Bey and the men he sent to Sicily for the
assassination of the Viceroy, I found two interesting examples. In the first, the
Archbishop of Thessalonica, Macharius Chiensis,32 contacted the Habsburg authorities
when he came to attend to the Council of Trent in 155133 and offered his help in a
number of implausible anti-Ottoman plots.34 The Habsburgs later realized that he was an
Ottoman spy who used the excuse of such negotiations to come to the court of Charles V
in Germany.35 It made perfect sense for the Ottomans to send him as a spy. Who else
could have travelled in Christian Europe easier than a Christian, albeit Orthodox,
archbishop? What better excuse could there be than to attend to the Council of Trent in
order to travel in Christian lands? In the second example, it was this time a certain
Scipione, a hermit from Mallorca who became Muslim and migrated to Algiers, was
reported to be contemplating to come to Rome to talk with the Muslim prisoners there
and far la spia.36
When it comes to Muslim clergy, the Ottomans could not use them given the
difficulties with which a Muslim would travel in Europe. This, nevertheless, did not mean
that the Ottomans categorically refused to employ them; a quick look at the Ottoman-

32

Original documents mention him as the Bishop of Heraclea; however, he should be the Archbishop of
Thessalonica. Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 40.
33
He could not attend the Council, because the Catholic clergy insisted on an express profession of the
Catholic faith and obedience to Pope as a prerequisite.
34
The Habsburgs tried to contact and support Prince Selim who, they calculated, would lose against his
half-brother Mustafa in the struggle for the Ottoman throne. On the other hand, others who were fearful of
Mustafas ascension to the throne, such as Sinan Pasha (the Grand Admiral and the brother of the Grand
Vizier Rstem Pasha), would join the alliance. The Habsburgs would thus have created division within the
the Ottoman Empire and conquered the Balkans. Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 37. Macario offered to contact
Rstem and Sinan and negotiate an alliance between Charles V and the Safavid Shah against the Ottomans.
35
BNE, Correspondencia del Cardenal Granvela, ms. 7905/189 8r, quoted by Masi Jernimo Bucchia,
168.
36
AV, Principi, no. 37, f. 204.

107

Safavid border would present several occasions where men of religion were engaged in
secret diplomacy for both empires.
Spies needed safe lodgings during their perilous travels and some tried to solve
this problem by staying in monasteries; this was what Martin de Acua did while
travelling in the Ottoman Balkans.37 This practice increased the importance of news that
monks sent. For instance, a Franciscan friar in a monastery in Zante, Pedro de Sanct
Pedro, informed the viceroy of Sicily about the intentions harboured by spies sent to
Constantinople by the Prince of Salerno, an ally of the French, and by extension the
Ottomans. He managed to familiarize with them during their visit in the monastery and
discovered a plot to help an Ottoman attempt to conquer the city of Naples.38
In their quality as confessors, clerics had access to important information. A
Fransiscan friar Arcangelo, living in the Ottoman Empire for 18 years, 8 of which he
spent as a slave, managed to establish good relations with the French ambassador who
invited him to recite mass in his house. He used this acquaintance to inform the
Habsburgs about French and Ottoman plans against Malta and Genoa which he heard
during one of his regular visits to the ambassadors house. He also mentioned a renegade
from Messina who told him during a confession that he heard Turgud and Salih Reis,
prominent Ottoman corsairs, discussed with Sinan Pasha, the Ottoman Grand-Admiral,
which military tactics to apply while attacking the castle of Trapana.39
3.2.4. Engineers and Soldiers
When it comes to gathering information about a military target, states relied on
the expertise of soldiers, and even better, military engineers who could observe the
37

AGS, E 1074, fol. 108 (5 March 1577).

AGS, E 1121, fols. 105-6, 111-2 (25 March 1553).
39
AGS, E 1120, fol. 242 (23 March 1552).
38

108

enemy defenses and compile a report to inform the authorities on the weaknesses to be
exploited and military strategies to be applied in case of an expedition.
These spy-cum-engineers traveled around and observed enemy fortifications. Juan
Sebastian, upon having been detained as an Ottoman spy by the Habsburg in Castille in
1577, confessed that he was an engineer, matematico, and an expert on fortifications. He
was in Venice in 1575 where he spied on Venetian fortifications for the Ottomans. The
cunning Habsburg ambassador grew suspicious of his activities and tried to have him
captured; however, Don Sebastian, as he was known in Venice, fled the city for Padua
and vanished, only to be later captured in Castile.40 In 1573, Sokollu sent a number of
spies to Corfu to pass to Puglia, one of which was a military engineer destined for
Messina. He had previously gone to Corfu in 1572 to investigate the fortifications of
possibly the next Ottoman target.41
The Habsburgs used the services of military experts as well. In 1547, a captain
Polidoro Corso offered to enter the city of Algiers and measure inch by inch, paso por
paso, the citys disposition and inner and outer fortress.42 In 1574, the Duke of
Terranova accepted the offers of two bombardieri to go to Constantinople and torch the
Ottoman Arsenal because, thought he, their quality would be apt for such a task.43
Pantoleo Carrago whom the Duke of Maqueda sent to the Levant in 1602, gave detailed
information on a number of Ottoman fortifications: the number of soldiers, the height as
well as the size of the city walls, the number of artilleries, etc.44

40

AGS, E 1336, fol. 132 (18 March 1577).

AGS, E 1064, fol. 100.
42
AGS, E 1497, Libro E 79, fols. 8 (12 June 1547), 13 (26 July 1547) and 18 (23 August 1547).
43
AGS, E 1141, fol. 11 (25 February 157 4).
44
AGS, E 1160, fol. 100 (21 May 1602).
41

109

Some of these soldiers had acquaintances with their colleagues in their target city
from whom they gathered first-hand information. Pantoleo Carrago, for instance, learned
from the janissaries of Constantinople, that the Sultan was determined to lead the army to
Hungary in person. The afore-mentioned engineer, who was sent to Corfu to investigate
on Venetian defenses by Sokollu in 1572, had dined with the Venetian provveditore
Marco Querini. The provveditore even invited him to his galley on several occasions.
This friendship would be costly for our engineer. Next year, when he was dispatched on a
mission to Messina, he could not pass through Corfu, fearful of being recognized by
Querini who was on the island at the time.
Both empires tried to establish contacts with each others soldiers and sailors. The
Habsburgs managed to penetrate into the Ottoman navy and Arsenal which included
several renegades on every level: high-ranking officials, ship captains, experts in the
Imperial Arsenal, sailors, slave rowers, etc. These wrote a plethora of letters and reports
which included crucial information about the Ottoman Empire, first and foremost of all,
regarding the military preparations and the destination of the Ottoman navy. Given that
Ottoman centers such as Constantinople and Algiers were full with renegades, the
Christian powers had a natural advantage over the Ottomans whose efforts of recruiting
spies from among the enemy soldiers and sailors produced more mediocre results.
3.2.5. Corsairs
In

spite

of

tendency towards

centralization,

bureaucratization

and

standardization, states in the 16th century still frequently employed irregular forces in
their military apparatus, especially in the borderlands. Ottoman gazis that were the main
actors of Ottoman conquest in the Balkans in the 14th and 15th century survived, albeit

110

with less political relevance, through our time period, while the adventurers and soldiers
of the Reconquista found themselves a new frontier in Americas, rich with opportunities
of plunder and away from the oppression and control of the center. The irregular forces of
the Mediterranean were corsairs who not only ruled the sea by intercepting its traffic and
ravaging its coast with regular raids (razzia), but also managed to accomplish something
which their colleagues in the Balkans and Americas failed to do. They developed
independent political bodies and preserved their autonomy even when they were
operating under the aegis of empires, North African corsairs under that of the Ottomans
and the Knights of St. John and the Uskoks under that of the Habsburgs. In short, corsairs
and corso were the major force in the Mediterranean warfare. In spite of historians
interest in the Great War, the struggle between colossal empires and significant
military clashes such as Djerba and Lepanto,45 little wars prevailed and claimed the
Mediterranean. States, aware of these factors, eagerly accepted these corsair states as
their vassals.
Much more importantly for our study, both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans
relied on these corsairs expertise in navigation and their knowledge of the enemy shores
by sending them on reconnaissance missions. This was by no means a trivial task. Time
and time again, corsairs contribution proved useful thanks to their swiftness and
precision. One other advantage was that these corsairs were content with the letter of
marque that provided them with authorization for their corso and did not demand

45

John Guilmartin aptly demonstrated the inapplicability of Mahan Thesis, which was developed for naval
warfare in the Atlantic Ocean, on the Mediterranean galley warfare. He thus relegated decisive naval battles
to a position of secondary importance in the 16th-century Mediterranean world where logistics determined
the fate of military expeditions. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys. This increased the importance of
corsair warfare waged by small and highly mobile corsair ships that needed few men and thus suffered less
from logistical limitations.

111

financial remunerations from the state in return for their intelligence activities apart from
any stipend or fief that was assigned to them because of other offices they simultaneously
held.
At least in the Ottoman case, corsairs enjoyed extensive relations on the other side
of the frontier. Some of these corsairs were landless peasants who fled the rigid
seigneurial order46 of the poor and overpopulated Western Mediterranean islands such as
Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily which, colonized from the continent, were already facing
economic difficulties because of the imposed export agriculture.47 Attracted by the
opportunities of corso, these changed their religion, and made themselves Turk (farsi
turco) and became renegades or, as contemporaries would say, Turk by profession,
turco de profesin. These renegades, therefore, could rely on their familial ties and
acquaintances in their homeland which they had not so long ago left, and therefore with
whose language, culture and customs they were familiar. For instance, in 1570, corsairs
learned that the Christian navy was about to set sail to meet the Ottoman navy from a
relative of the Ottoman Grand Admiral Ulu Ali in Calabria.48 Sometimes, they even
recruited spies among their relatives and compatriots, such was the case, at least, with
Hasan Veneziano who brought his cousin Livio Celeste from Venice and recruited him as
a spy.49
It was not only the Ottomans who were aware of these renegades ties with
Christian Europe. The Habsburgs tried to capitalize on their personal background by
offering them to come back to their old faith and obedience to their legal monarch, the

46

Sola, Los que van y vienen, 99-200.

Braudel, La Mditerrane, vol. I, 139-46.
48
Valente, Vita di Occhial, 121-5.
49
Fabris, Hasan il Veneziano, 51-66.
47

112

Habsburg king, against whom they ironically waged a so-called gaza, the holy war in
the name of Islam. Well documented examples of such negotiations are those with the
Ottoman Grand Admirals Hayreddin (1534-46), a born Muslim from the island of
Mytilene to a Greek Orthodox mother and a renegade father,50 Ulu Ali (1571-87), a
Christian fisherman from Le Castelle in Calabria,51 Hasan Veneziano (1588-1591), a
Venetian and a childhood friend of the bailo in Constantinople52 and finally the Governor
of Algeria Hasan Aa (1535-1544) from Sardinia.53 The Habsburgs did not limit such
offers to high-ranking corsairs; it is just that they produced more documentation for those
lengthy negotiations with more promising political and strategic benefits. Still, middleranking corsairs, such as Kara Mustafa, resentful of having been dismissed from the
governorship of Mitylene, also participated in similar negotiations.54 Furthermore, the
Habsburgs successfully penetrated to Ulu Alis household and managed to recruit some
of his men as spies. Regular report that especially Sinan (Juan Briones) and Haydar the
English (Robert Drever) sent to Naples and Sicily contained invaluable information about
the military preparations in the Arsenal, conditions of the navy and the target of the
forthcoming Ottoman expedition.55

50

AGS, E 1027, fol. 13; E 1031 fols. 26, 58, 98 and 99; E 1033, fol. 160; E 1372, fols. 57, 60, 64, 66, 73
and 84, (1539); E 1373 fols. 15, 18, 19, 20, 28, 30, 41, 42, 85, 88, 117, 118, 119, 151, 156, 160, 165, 176,
178, 181, 187 and 226 (1540); E 1376, fol. 34 (1543-4). See also E 1027, 1031, E 1033, passim. For a good
summary of the negotiations between Charles V and Hayreddin, see Capasso, Barbarossa e Carlo V,
Rivista Storica Italiana 49 (1932): 169-209.
51
AGS, E 1061, passim (1573), E 1400, fol. 34 (1570), E 1061; D. Luciano Serrano, Correspondencia
diplomatica entre Espaa y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de S. Pio V (Madrid: Imprenta del
Instituto Pio X, 1914), vol. IV, 516-7.
52
AGS E 1417, fol. 41, 62 and 109 (1583). ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 38 (20 January 1590) quoted by Fabris,
Hasan il Veneziano, 52, fn.5.
53
AGS, E 1374, fol. 171, (1541). Also see. A. Berbrugger, N gociations entre Hassan Agha et le comte
d Alcaudete, gouverneur dOran, 1541-1542, Revue Africaine IX (1865): 379-385.
54
AGS, E 1127, fols. 81 (4 October 1562), 87 (2 December 1562) and 88 (3 October and 2 December
1562).
55
AGS, E 490, 17 October 1579, 18 October 1579, 22 October 1579; E 1080, fol. 51 (1579); E 1081, fols.
3 (7 June 1580 and 163 (14 November 1580 . For another Habsburg spy Ulu Alis household, Pedro

113

A corsair was also an adventurer. There were instances where corsairs left their
ships and operated as normal spies as well. The Viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Osuna,
sent the corsair Jacques Pierre to Venice where he was executed by the authorities who
discovered his involvement in the Bedmar plot.56 Similarly, the Corphiote Pietro Lanza
served the Viceroys of Naples for many years as a corsair and spy. After many years in
service, he even offered, at a very old age, an interesting plan, worthy of the caliber of
this seasoned corsair. He would go to Constantinople and engage in a number of
clandestine operations including the assasination of the Ottoman Sultan with a fake
present in whose lower part there would be explosives.57
3.3.

LEADING AND OPERATING A NETWORK

Intelligence networks required more than spies who gathered information on the
field. Information had to be encrypted, protected, transmitted, decrypted and finally
processed. Each of these different stages of intelligence operations required specialized
personnel as well as special means in the disposal of state officers. States tried to train
some of their officers to specialize in some of these functions while they also recruited
non-official auxiliaries who helped the transmission of news, wages and the dispatch of
spies. The two formed what Garca and Marcos called instrumental spies.58
3.3.1. Spy-cum-diplomat
Several historians accentuate the importance of ambassadors in early modern
espionage one even labeled them honorable spies, spie onorate.59 Enjoying the

Brea see. E 1338, fol. 72 (22 December 1580); E 1414, fol. 164 (18 November 1581); E 1538, fol. 286 (20
December 1585).
56
Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 457.
57
ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 19, fol. 81 (16 December 1608).
58
Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 81.
59
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 197. The term was coined, however, by Franois de Callires, the writer and the
diplomat of Ludovican France. De la Manire de ngocier avec les souverains (Amsterdam: La

114

privileges granted by their diplomatic immunity, no matter how imperfectly states

observed such status in the 16th century, ambassadors operated nothing short of a network
leader; the best example of which would be the Venetian ambassadors in Constantinople
and Rome or the Habsburg ambassador in Venice and Genoa. These not only
eavesdropped in social circles, but also recruited spies, bribed officials, resorted to
clandestine operations to kidnap or remove undesirable elements and thus engaged also in
counter-intelligence. The ambassador was not only an information broker, but also a part
of the information processing and by extension decision-making. He was an expert on the
politics, institutions and customs of the capital in which he served. Therefore, central
governments paid attention to his opinions and commentaries on the gathered information
and relied on him to perceive the information within the greater context. Even though the
non-permanent Ottoman representatives could not offer their services with the quality
and efficiency of their Venetian and Habsburg counter-parts,60 we still do know they used
the occasion to gather as much information as possible.61
The weight of the ambassadorial correspondence as a source of information for
central governments is evident from the calculations of Alain Hugon. The Habsburg
resident ambassadors in Paris between 1598 and 1635 transmitted almost two thirds of
information concerning France (%61.6) in spite of the small number of the embassy
personnel that only constituted %7.1 of the entire personnel whose activities were related

compagnie, 1716), 30 : We call an ambassador an honorable spy [honorable espion], because one of his
primary responsibilities was to discover the secrets of the Courts where he was and he fails his duties if he
does not make the necessary spending on those who could inform him.
60
According to Graphique 3 in Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 123, there is an abyss between
permanent ambassadors contribution to information gathering (%61.6 of all the information remitted to the
capital) and those of extraordinary ambassadors who came with a specific mission and left the capital after
a short visit (only %2.4). Also see p. 129.
61
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 98-9. Also see. Chapter Six.

115

to the Habsburg-Bourbon relations.62 This effective role in intelligence that the

ambassadors played did not go unnoticed by the states which looked for a legitimate
excuse to put pressure on and control their actions. Their effectiveness is also proven by
the frequency and severity of international crises that plagued relations between states
when ones ambassador was accused of spying in others territory. The Habsburg
ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza had to leave London in 1584 because he was
implied in a plot to overthrow Elizabeth I.63 Likewise, the French ambassador, Guillaume
Pellicier, was dismissed from Venice in 1542 because he corrupted the secretaries of the
Council of Ten and acquired from them the instructions given to the Venetian bailo for
peace negotiations in Constantinople.64 The Ottomans, always more merciless with
foreign ambassadors, expelled the Venetian bailo Girolamo Marcello in 1492 because he
was sending information to his government.65 Some of these ambassadors also informed
other governments, such as the Austrian ambassadors and Venetian baili in the Ottoman
capital who occasionally provided Madrid and Naples with crucial information. Madrid
even corrupted the Venetian bailo, Girolamo Lippomano, who paid the price of sending
confidential information to the Habsburgs with his life; a Venetian civil servant should
have known better what state secret meant.66
In addition to setting up intelligence networks, ambassadors were also useful tools
of counter-espionage; they were expected to eliminate undesirable elements such as spies,
62

See Graphique 2 and 3 in Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 122-123.

Brun, La Diplomacia de Felipe II, 178.
64
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 75.
65
Longo, Annali Veneti, vol. I, 141-142.
66
As soon as he saw Venice on the horizon, Lippomano committed suicide (if not assassinated, a less likely
possibility) by jumping from the ship that brought him to face justice. P. Augusto Tormene, Il Bailaggio a
Costantinopoli di Girolamo Lippomano e la sua tragica fine, Nuovo archivio veneto, n.s. 3, t. 6 (1903):
375-431; n.s. 4, t. 7 (1904): 66-125, 288-333; t. 8 (1904): 127-161. On the concept of state secret and the
severity of the Venetian Council of Ten and Inquisitors of the State in punishing those who betrayed state
secrets, see. Preto, Servizi Segreti, 55-74; Vivo, Information and Communication, 40-45.
63

116

informants and dangerous exiles. The role that the Habsburg ambassador to Venice,
Diego Hurtado de Mendoza played in the infamous assassination of the French envoy to
Constantinople, Antonio Rincon,67 as well as the requests made by the Council of Ten to
their baili to eliminate Venetian exiles in Constantinople68 prove the central position of
diplomatic representatives in central governments counter-intelligence efforts abroad.69
More interestingly, in our context, spies could be ambassadors as well. The
diplomatic gap between Madrid and Constantinople were too big to be covered by the
intermediaries such as the Venetians and the Austrians, and with the complicity of both
sides, these spies appeared to be the closest thing to a representative, no matter the extent
to which they lacked proper training or decorum required by diplomatic finesse and thus
were subject to authorities constant criticism and suspicions of ill-will. Relationship
between the capitals as well as the elites of both empires was conducted thanks to the
intermediary role of these semi-official representatives. The instigator of the OttomanHabsburg truce negotiations in 1577 were Habsburg spies, Martin de Acua and Aurelio
Santa Croce, who improvised an offer of truce on behalf of Philip II in oder to save their
own skin. This was by no means an isolated incident where unofficial intermediaries
dealt with diplomacy in the Ottoman capital, hinting that still the rules and institutions of

67

Although Spanish, Rincon was a Communero and a fervent enemy of his monarch, Charles V.
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, c. 119v; Preto, Servizi Segreti, 103.
69
A good example of how important an ambassador was for the central governments counter-intelligence
efforts could be found in the correspondence between the Venetian Inquisitori di Stato and the bailo in
Constantinople. ASV, IS, b. 148, Lettere ai baili ed ambasciatori Costantinopoli (1585-1688) and b. 416,
Dispacci dai baili a Costantinopoli (1585-1630). Baili in Constantinople were, however, exceptional
figures among the Venetian diplomats. They had the convenience to open the correspondence of diplomats
and spies in the Ottoman capital, thanks to the Venetian monopoly of postal services between
Constantinople and Europe until the French established one for themselves. For a good example of how the
Venetian bailo guessed the author of a letter he opened from the characters in the letter, see the document
dated 28 October 1617 in b. 416.
68

117

diplomacy allowed exceptions. In 1539, the Ottoman translator-cum-diplomat70 Yunus

Bey tried to use a friend from his native Modon, Antonio de Modone, who came to
Adrianopolis to ransom some of his family members. Yunus advised him to tell the
Venetians that they could send an ambassador to ask for a truce.71 In 1559, it was the
merchant-cum-spy Francesco de Franchis who carried a similar message from the
Ottomans for the Habsburgs.72 In a similar fashion, there were rumors that the Ottomans
entrusted the Habsburg spy Michel ernovi with the task to instigate truce negotiations
with Philip II.73 Three decades later, when Carlo Cicala arrived in Constantinople to spy
for the Habsburgs and to visit his brother, the Ottoman Grand-Admiral, the rumour was
that he came in order to negotiate a new Ottoman-Habsburg truce. 74 The rumour turned
out to be false, but it is evident that Carlo saw himself more than a spy or a confident. In
spite of his lack of appropriate credentials, he refused for instance to walk in after the
French ambassador and be seated in an inferior seat during the Venetian ambassadors
usual banquet.75 In 1614, an alferez, Pedro Munez Montefrio negotiated a truce on behalf
of Philip III with the Ottoman Grand Vizier, even though he had been originally sent by

70

The Ottoman translators or dragomans were experts in diplomacy and played a significant role in the
conduct of foreign affairs. They were sent to the West as ambassadors (Yunus Bey for one went to Venice
six times, see. Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 40-44 and Appendix I), and allowed to negotiate directly
with foreign diplomats in the Ottoman capital, one example being the negotiations between Hrrem Bey
and Giovanni Margliani.
71
AGS, E 1314, fols. 126 and 131 (16 March 1539). ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 4, cc. 111v-112r (14 March
1539).
72
AGS, E 1323, fols. 232 (6 October 1559), 243-244 (20 January 1559) and 281 (8 April 1559).
73
This rumour that the Venetian bailo Barbarigo (ASV, SDC, fil. 4D (5 February 1564) related is plausible
since the Ottomans treated this agent, who had been sending information to the Habsburgs for years,
exceptionally well. They not only refused to hand him down to the Venetian bailo, saving him from the
Venetian prosecution, but also gave him a safe-conduct assuring the cooperation of local authorities while
leaving the Empire.
74
COSP, vol. 9, nos. 150 (4 April 1593), 170 (3 May 1593), 172 (24 May 1593) and 174 (9 June 1593).
75
COSP, vol. 9, no. 273 (3 May 1594).

118

the Emperor in order to negotiate the ransom of certain Hungarian cavalleros.76 Finally,
in 1630, Iuseppo da Messina, a spy-cum-courier-cum-friar, sent from Naples, was also
entrusted with the task of secretly negotiating with the Grand Vizier so that the Ottomans
did not send the navy to attack Puglia and Calabria.77
3.3.2. Secretaries
The real operators of these intelligence networks, however, were not governors,
commanders or ambassadors. The continuity of operations as well as the increased
specialization in espionage required a level of expertise that officials who were appointed
for short terms and had very little knowledge on cryptography and steganography could
not provide. The responsibility of such specialization fell on the shoulders of secretaries
who were the real head of intelligence networks on every level. The Habsburg secretarios
de Estado such as P rez, V zquez, Idi quez and Zayas were the real eminent-gris78 of
the entire Habsburg intelligence network in Madrid where there was also a secretario de
cifra.79 Cipher secretaries in the Venetian chancellery proved their worth in more than
one occasion by inventing new ciphers, developing new techniques, training new pupils
and adding new members to their cadre.80 The secretaries in provinces and embassies also
played an important role in the conduct of secret diplomacy by supervising intelligence
networks and providing the required continuity of operations. The Habsburg secretaries
76

AGS, E 1168, fols. 59 (22 October 1614), 60 (FES 2423), 61 (H. 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1023, A.D. 23 June
1614) and 62.
77
AGS, IS, b. 148, fol. 41 (6 July 1630).
78
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 94.
79
Ibid., 103. The instructions given to the secretary Antonio Milledonne by the Heads of the Council of
Ten, CCX is very revealing. Milledonne was instructed to teach a potential spy, which cipher he should use,
how much money he could spend, which information he should send and how he should relate the
information he acquired, i.e., that he had to relate the information he had for sure as well as his sources.
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, c. 180r (10 October 1571).
80
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 77v (25 January 1575), 117v-118r (8 January 1576, m.v.), 135r (3 July
1577), 137v-138r (27 august 1577), 142r-142v (23 October 1577), reg. 13, cc. 40v (26 August 1587), 48r49r (10 March 1588), 52v-53v (13 July 1588), 57r-58r (18 April 1587), 61v-62r (27 August 1587), 82r-82v
(23 January 1590, m.v.), 92v-93r (16 Mart 1592), 107r (24 March 1593), 113r (30 August 1593).

119

in Venice even took up the duties, if not the title, of the absent ambassador between
1558-1571 and 1580-1587,81 while in Madrid Pierre de Segusson, sieur de Longle,
secretary of the French embassy, succeeded the ambassador in 1582, although with the
title of a permanent resident.82 Finally, some of them, such as the secretary of the
Venetian bailo in Constantinople, actively participated in information-gathering as well.83
The Ottomans also developed a complex bureaucracy in the 16th century that consisted of
the members of the scribal kalemiyye class. These members, not the military elite, ran the
day-to-day operations of the Ottoman diplomacy and intelligence. The Ottomans hired
specialists, such as dragomans and cryptology experts,84 who were familiar with Western
languages as well as diplomatic and espionage techniques.
Unsurprisingly, some of these secretaries abused their privileged position and
easy access to information. Authorities had been in contact with those with the hope of
acquiring important information, the afore-mentioned Pellicier who had corrupted the
secretaries of the Council of Ten being an example among many.85 An interesting series
of correspondence between the secretary of Madrids embassy in Venice, Garca
Hern ndez and the secretary of Viennas embassy in Constantinople, Juan de Trillanes is
a good example of the central position of the secretaries in information exchange.
81

Brun, La Diplomacia de Felipe II, 225-227.

Ribera, Diplomatie et Espionnage, 97.
83
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 114v-115v (23 May 1568).
84
For instance, the Ottomans managed to cryptanalyze the letters of the Venetian Bailo Vettore Bragadin
only with the help of one of the giovani di lingua who were sent to Constantinople to study Turkish
named Colombina. When he attacked his classmate Matheco Salvega with a knife, the bailo had him
arrested, but he managed to escape and then converted to Islam. According to Bragadin, he knew the
Venetian cipher because he could have seen and even helped the Venetian scribes in Bailos house decipher
letters. ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 3, fol. 55; Villain-Gandossi, Les D pches Chiffr es, 77. Pedani, In Nome
del Gran Signore, 42. In spite of the contemporary belief (ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 79r-80r (18
February 1566, m.v.) repeated by modern historians (Preto, Servizi Segreti, 273) that the Ottomans did not
write in cipher, I could locate at least one example in which they did so. The famous cryptographer and
father of polyalphabetic substitution Blaise de Vigenre saw a Turkish cryptogram solved in six hours in
Rome. Kahn, Codebreakers, 146. Still, this issue requires further investigation. See Chapter Six.
85
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 75-6.
82

120

Trillanes, a Vallisolitan who had fallen captive to the Ottomans at the Battle of Djerba,
offered to provide his compatriot and colleague Hernndez with information that reached
the Austrian embassy, in exchange for 20 escudos per mensem.86 Secretaries might have
more than information to offer, hinting at the possible damages that their betrayal might
have caused to central governments. In 1606, a secretary of the Habsburg chancellery in
Naples did more than offering the Venetian representative in the city all the letters that
the viceroy and his colleague in Milan exchanged. He could as well lend the cipher that
the Habsburg authorities used in their correspondence and name three Habsburg spies
whom the Governor of Milan employed in a plot to take over two Venetian fortresses.87
3.3.3. Translators (Dragomans)
Translators that helped the functioning of diplomacy between capitals actively
participated in secret diplomacy. Their role is especially relevant when it comes to the
diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and European states, given the cultural
differences and linguistic difficulties that awaited European envoys when they arrived in
Constantinople. The dragoman (from Arabic tarjuman and Turkish tercman), was a
common figure in this diplomacy; foreign diplomats had to rely on these dragomans who
came from a handful Periote families and who used their position between Europe and
the Ottoman Empire in the service of both sides in order to further their interest. 88 With
the comfort provided with their in-between position, these trans-imperial subjects
relied on their linguistic skills as well as their expertise on Ottoman diplomatic protocol,
86

AGS, E 1324, fols. 113 (9 June 1563), 117 (22 February 1563), 133 (8 August 1563), 188 (1 October
1563) and 214; E 1325, fols. 16 (12 April 1564) and 35 (11 August 1564). Also see. E 1324, fols. 129,
131, 133, 180 and 188. Cf. Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 182-3.
87
ASV, IS, b. 460, 1606, ff. Always in financial trouble, the Viceroys of Naples frustrated their employees
by not paying their salaries. That was the main motive behind the secretarys betrayal. Morimo da fame
he lamented. Ibid., 3 October 1606. A similar problem of payment was an important issue between Naples
and the spies on its payroll, something I discuss elsewhere.
88
Rothman, Brokering Empire.

121

bureaucratic hierarchy and court ceremony and thus provided foreign diplomats with
services of crucial significance. Without their presence, these diplomats could neither
communicate nor negotiate with the Ottomans. The problem was that their loyalties were
always questionable as their familial relations with other translators in other embassies
suggest. Furthermore, as Ottoman subjects, most of these dragomans cooperated with
European ambassadors with the knowledge of their Ottoman superiors. In most cases,
they deliberately leaked information in order to get the Portes message out, to warn
enemies and friends and with the purpose of misinformation.89
These dragomans did not only work in the embassies. The Ottomans employed
their own tercmans as middlemen in their dealings with European envoys. These played
an extraordinarily important role in diplomatic negotiations. For instance, as will be seen
in Chapter Five, Hrrem Bey was instrumental in the conclusion of truce negotiations
between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in 1577-1581. Needless to say, he also worked
for the Habsburgs in these negotiations and played an astute double game,
outmaneuvering the historian who tries to realize which ones, among his acts of
friendship, assistance and leakage of information, were actually his own initiatives for
furthering his personal ends and which ones were ordered by the Ottoman Grand Vizier
Sokollu for purposes of disinformation, manipulation and pressure on the Habsburg
diplomat. Similarly, the Venetian central government employed in Venice its own Public
Dragoman who had a dual role. His responsibilities included state matters such as
translating letters sent to the Doge by the Sultan, accompanying Ottoman dignitaries on
official audiences and producing reports on such occasions, traveling to the Ottoman
frontier during the negotiations for border disputes. They also protected the Ottoman as
89

goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits, 86.

122

well as, surprisingly, Safavid merchants (regardless of ethnicity and religion) during their
their commercial transactions in Venice against incidents of possible fraud at the hands of
the local merchants and commercial brokers.90 With this range of responsibilities, one
could only imagine the extent of their connections and access to information.
3.3.4. Network leaders (Spymasters)
Another important figure in the intelligence networks was the network leader who
was responsible from the operational efficiency of intelligence networks on the field. He
was the one who set up the network by choosing spies and informants, transmitting news
and delivering wages. He furthermore sought to consolidate it by securing the financial
support and the good-will of the Habsburg authorities, keeping channels of
communication open, inspecting (double) agents, establishing social and political
networks essential for reliable information and devising clandestine operations such as
bribery, sabotage, defection and assassination. In short, negotiations between spies and
the central government went through his hands.
Some network leaders controlled their networks from afar, as was the case with
Jernimo Bucchia who used his extensive familial connections to establish an
intelligence network in Dalmatia.91 Other network leaders such as Giovanni Maria Renzo
preferred to travel, carrying letters and wages between the Habsburg authorities and his
network, while others remained in situ, spying themselves and employing other spies and
informants, such as Balthasar Prototico and Nicol Giustinian. In certain cases, there
90

Ella-Nathalie Rothman, Between Venice and Istanbul: Trans-Imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation
in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, 2006), 347-356.
91
A former classmate of Cardinal Granvela, he was from an influential family from Cattaro. Formerly, the
ambassador of Duke of Bavaria in Venice, he entered the Habsburg employ and remotely coordinated from
Turin and Naples his vast intelligence network that gathered information from quite an impressive number
of different cities: Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Valona, Venice and even Constantinople. Masi, Jernimo
Bucchia.

123

were more than one network leader. In Constantinople, for instance, in Renzos absence,
Aurelio Santa Croce and Adam de Franchis stepped up and assumed his duties, creating
the awkward situation in which the Habsburgs Constantinople network was divided into
two as Santa Croce and Franchis were unaware of spies on each others payroll.92
3.3.5. Auxiliaries
Apart from spies and Habsburg officials, there were also others who functioned as
auxiliaries and helped the well-functioning of networks. Without their less frequently but
not ungratefully appreciated help, information could neither be gathered nor transmitted,
and spies could neither travel nor receive their payments from the center.
3.3.5.1.

Couriers

The most important problem that central governments had to overcome was the
transmission of news. The speed, the reliability and the predictability of the transmission
was as important as the quality of the gathered information. In the 16th century, as the
political power and the financial means at the disposal of central governments expanded,
states sought to overcome this problem by establishing regular postal services between
important cities. Couriers that carried letters between the Ottoman Empire and the
Habsburgs and connected the intelligence networks to their consecutive center, however,
faced additional difficulties. The lack of established postal routes and of open diplomatic
channels as well as the continuous air of distrust and enmity between two empires (think
of the reported paranoia and hatred towards the Christians in major Ottoman cities after
the crushing Ottoman defeat in battle of Lepanto), added the dangers of being identified,
caught and persecuted in a hostile environment, to those already existed in the life of a

92

AGS, E 487, lo que scrive Baptista Ferraro y Compania de Constantinopla (16 April 1569).

124

courier that carried letters in Europe: the discomfort of long voyages, the risk of being
attacked by bandits or corsairs, unpredictable weather, illnesses, epidemics, etc. The
Ottomans frequently prosecuted couriers in foreign employ with the hope of preventing
enemy intelligence as well as intercepting correspondence which could include important
information.93 Couriers that carried Ottoman letters in Habsburg lands were not more
welcome; in the 16th century, no-one liked those who travelled with suspicious letters in
their bags.
The line between a courier and a spy was not always clear. Given the difficulties
involved in such a dangerous task, network leaders and spies who travelled and back and
forth carried letters with them, such as Giovanni Maria Renzo in 1567, in spite of the
risks involved while the Ottomans were looking for him everywhere. 94 Still, the dangers
involved required specialization. The Habsburg intelligence network in the Levant relied
on seasoned couriers, such as Giovanni Stefano Ferrari and Giovanni Antonio Santa
Croce, who acted as intermediaries between Naples and Constantinople by carrying
letters, transferring money and helping coordination. It was not only the spies who turned
out as couriers, but also vice versa. First, their voyages gave them plenty of opportunity
to gather information. The messi that carried the letters sent by the Jer nimo Bucchias
network, for instance, also related their own observations concerning the Ottoman war
preparations as well as the rumours they heard during their travels.95 The courier who
was robbed by the men of the Duke of Mirandola managed to detect the suspicious

93

goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits, 84 Dursteler, Power and Information, 60 -10; BOA,
MD, LV, no. 166 (H. 21 Zilkade 992/A.D. 24 December 1584). AGS, E 1338, fol. 66 (12 November 1580)
reports the death of a Habsburg courier carrying letters from Constantinople near Ragusa, but it is not clear
whether he was killed by the Ottomans or not.
94
AGS E 1056, fol. 43 (20 April 1567).
95
Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 29-30.

125

transfer of victuals and gunpowder, information of critical importance with which he

threatened the Duke of Ferrara to take action against the transgressors.96 Second, as
carriers of secret information back and forth, they could make handsome profits by
selling information to other governments. Given that the Ottomans transmitted important
information orally, they had access to tradeable information. In several instances, we see
that the Ottoman couriers were more than willing to share information with Habsburg
agents.97 Whether the information they provided was of quality or whether this was a
deliberate effort of Ottoman disinformation or not is another debate. In either case, the
central role of couriers in intelligence services is obvious.
3.3.5.2.

Guides

In order to penetrate through enemy borders and evade border patrol, spies needed
the cooperation and guidance of local people. Martin de Acua mentioned that two
guides that took him until Constantinople were so specialized and experienced in their
profession that they had previously followed the exact same trajectory forty-one times. 98
The Habsburgs found a natural ally among the dissident Orthodox population in the
Ottoman Balkans, ready to take up arms against the Ottomans with the encouragement of
the Habsburgs. The cooperation of these locals was crucial for the safe passage and travel
of Habsburg spies. A good example is the case of Duli, an Albanian noble and the leader
of villages near Bastia on the Adriatic shores facing Corfu. Although in Ottoman employ,
he had been helping the Habsburg agents who traveled to and from Constantinople and
providing them with lodgings since 1564. If not for him, it would be impossible for these
96

AGS, E 1045, fol. 101.

AGS, E 1040, fol. 28 (7 March 1551); E 1063, fol. 35 (30 June 1573) ; E 1068, fols. 32 (5 February
1575) and 103 (16 May 1575); E 1079, fol. 15 (12 November 1578). Sometimes, informants overheard
couriers discussing the orders they carried. ASV, SDC, fil. 6E, fol. 4 (13 December 1572).
98
AGS, E 1074, fol. 104 (3 January 1577) quoted by Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 332.
97

126

agents to travel between the Ottoman lands and Corfu without being inspected in the port
by the Ottoman commissary who was sent there only to catch spies and run-away
slaves.99
Road guides (klavuz) were frequently mentioned in Ottoman campaign journals,
chronicles and geographical descriptions as well. The Ottomans resorted to their services
during military campaigns so much so that they even used them while marching between
Ni to Belgrade, a familiar terrain and a usual campaign route, underlining the
importance of up-to-date topography and illustrating the difficulties and hazards
associated with moving large forces even in familiar territory.100 Ottoman spies also
used guides. In 1552, Pr Reis sent a spy to Salerno to meet with his informants in order
to gather information and conspire for an anti-Habsburg rebellion. He attached to the
mission one of his Greek slaves as a guide. The latter had a brother in a nearby hamlet
and thus knew the region. Much to the spys chagrin, however, the Greek guide Nicol
left him on his own and went to see his brother, causing him many inconveniences. He
was first robbed and then caught.101
3.3.5.3.

Recruiters

The authorization of a new spy, the allocation of his salary and the assignment of
a specific mission generally had to go through officials such as ambassadors, secretaries,
viceroys and military commanders. There were, however, entrepreneur recruiters who
looked for suitable spies for specific missions in the name of official authorities. In 1602,
the French spy who was caught in Malta in pilgrim disguise, for instance, confessed that

99

AGS E 487, Giralomo Combi Albanes, 20 April 1577; E 488, Dulis Albanes, 14 July 1576.
goston, Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet, 65.
101
AGS, E 1043, fol. 71 (1552).
100

127

he was recruited by a French doctor who was living in Venice.102 In another example in
1610, a Mehmed elebi alias Manuel Enriquez, a Granadine Moor from Murcia, was
recruiting the Moors that arrived in Venice and other parts of Italy in in great numbers in
the aftermath of their final expulsion from Iberia in 1609 by the royal decree of Philip
III.103 These Moors would enroll in the Ottoman army and most probably function as
spies. Network leaders were also important recruiters as they were the ones who built
their networks.
3.3.6. Factota
Among many functions and professions cited above, there was not a clear cut
distinction. Many agents, in quite a spirit of entrepreneurship, performed several of these
functions and sought to increase financial remunerations they enjoyed. The celebrated
Ottoman spy, Gabriel Defrens was a spy-cum-diplomat that travelled with the alibi of
buying clocks and mechanical instruments for the Sultan; he may also have worked as a
translator in the French embassy in Constantinople.104 Antonio Avellan was a spy,
ransom agent and diplomat;105 Jaime Losada, added military engineer to the aforementioned three.106 Antonio Sanz was a spy, ransom agent and the translator of the
Habsburgs diplomat Giovanni Margliani.107 Ambrodio Benedetti was a ransom agent,
military expert (professor di cose militari) and by extension an Ottoman spy.108 Nicol
Giustiniani spied for the Habsburgs in Chios, ransomed their prisoners in Constantinople
102

AGS, E 1160, fol. 150.

AGS, E 1929, fols. 12 (9 de abril 1610), 41 (4 February 1611), and 52 (13 March 1611).
104
Skilliter, Gabriel Defrens, 51, 53. Also see for instructions given him on what to buy, BOA, MD,
XLIII, nos. 340 (H. 7 B 988/A.D. 18 August 1580) and 402 (H. 24 B 988/A.D. 4 September 1580).
105
AGS, E 1144, fols. 280, 281 and 282.
106
AGS, E 1071, fol. 191 (5 March 1577); E 1138, fols. 52 and 53; E 1139, fols. 85 (5 June 1573) and 86
(20 May 1573); E 1142, fol. 26 (26 January 1574).
107
AGS, E 1085, fols. 80 and 81. Margliani, however, was not satisfied with his translators Italian. AGS, E
1338, fol. 46 (16 August 1580).
108
ASV, IS, b. 460, 25 July 1600.
103

128

and negotiated a trade capitulation with the Ottomans on behalf of the Genoese.109
Mehmed elebi alias Manuel Enriquez was a commercial agent (factorias de
mercaderes) as well as a recruiter of soldiers and spies. 110 The Habsburg spy-cumdiplomat Michel ernovi in the Ottoman capital worked for both branches of the
dynasty. He sent information to Vienna and Naples and negotiated on behalf of the
Emperor Ferdinand I with the Persian ambassador in Constantinople for a possible antiOttoman alliance. Who can know for sure he did not work for the Ottomans as well?
Could he have not passed information in one of his many private conversations with
Ottoman grandees?111 Be that as it may, his talents were not limited to espionage. He
furthermore secured himself the office of grand dragoman in the Venetian bailos house
and gained the confidence of the Serenissima to such an extent that when the new bailo
had to pass to Anatolia to pay homage to the winner of the Ottoman civil war, Prince
Selim, he was ordered to leave his duties in ernovis care. Finally, he was a ransom
agent who secured the liberation of several Spanish and Italian slaves in the Ottoman
capital.112 Another good example of the factotum spy, Bartolomeo Brutti, ransomed
slaves, spied and engaged in official diplomacy on more than one occasion, each time in
the service of a different master. He helped the negotiations between the Habsburgs and
the Ottomans until he lost the confidence of the Habsburg ambassador Margliani who
excluded him from the negotiations. He then secured himself a career as a statesman
when he used his connections with his kin Sinan Pasha and managed to secure the
109

AGS, E 1127, fols. 87 and 88 (2 December 1562); ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 43v-44v (9 December
1569).
110
AGS, E 1929, fols. 12 (9 April 1610), 41 (4 February 1611), and 52 (13 March 1611).
111
This is possible since the Ottoman grandees unusually protected this Habsburg spy against the Venetian
bailo who wanted ernovi to be handed down to him because he was passing information to the
Habsburgs while in his service.
112
Lesure, Michel ernovi, 127-154.

129

enthronement of the Moldavian prince, Iancu Sasu, who returned the favor by making
him a high official in Moldavia. He will assume a diplomatic role at least two more
times: when he came to Constantinople as the ambassador of the Moldavian prince and
when he went to Poland as the Ottoman ambassador.113
3.4.

ESPIONAGE AS A PROFESSION

Let us now concentrate on the details of espionage as a profession. In the

following pages, in an effort to delineate the characteristics of early modern espionage, I
will seek answers to the following questions: what was the social background of the
recruitment pool from which central governments had to choose their spies? What were
the employment standards as well as the training and education required for 16th century
espionage? What were the motives of spies and material benefits of espionage? How did
central governments compensate their agents for their services?
Before we go any further, I would like to make one final clarification. Some
historians suggested categorization of spies according to their function. Garca and
Marcos, for instance, enumerated five different categories.114 I prefer not to use such
categories which contemporaries did not use, since the terminology will be an invented
one that did not depend on an institutionalized, hierarchical organization in
operation.115 In addition, even Garca and Marcos acknowledge that the distinction
between these different categories is not always clear and one person can be placed in

113

AGS, E 1080, fols. 44 (4 July 1579), 46 (4 July 1569), 47 (18 July 1579), 59 (3 August 1579), 60 (11
August 1579) and 61 (18 August 1579); E 1085, fol. 81. ASV, IS, b. 416 (4 September 1590). For more
information about Bartolemeo as well as Brutti family in general, see. Cristian Luca, Dacoromano-Italica:
Studie e ricerche sui rapporti italo-romeni nei secoli XVI-XVIII (Cluj-Napolca: Accademia Romena,
Centro di Studi Transilvani, 2008), 107-128. Also see. Rothman, Between Venice and Istanbul, appendix
14.
114
Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 72-90; eidem, Espas de Felipe II.
115
Ibid., 303.

130

more than one category easily.116 The only useful distinction, although still an invented
one, should be the one between a spy and an informant. A spy was a covert agent in
disguise who was sent by the central authorities on a specific mission. An informant, on
the other hand, was source of information, in Luttwaks terms, a secret friend or an
agent-in-place.117 Most of the time, he was a government official or a member of the
military who used his important political and social connections to sell information to
other governments.118 Venetian officers who frequented the house of the Habsburg
ambassador and passed him the details of secret dealings of the Serenissima, renegades in
the Ottoman military and administrative mechanism providing information to the
Habsburgs, the bailo Girolamo Lippomano on Habsburg payroll, Venetian secretaries
corrupted by the French ambassador Pellicier were all informants, not spies. 119
3.4.1. Social background
As there was a concentration of spies among the practitioners of certain
professions, spies social background was also an important variable in creating the
favorable environment for the ideal spy by facilitating their operation in both sides of the
Mediterranean borderlands. Renegades, exiles, convicts and rebels resorted to espionage
more often than others; while no women appeared on the scene save for those who played
only a partial role.

116

Ibid., 305.
Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 62.
118
Ribera, Diplomatie et Espionnage, 181.
119
The difference between them is more explicit in the financial remunerations allocated to them. For
instance, a Habsburg informant in Venice, Angelo Badoer, had a yearly salary of 2.000 ducats, an
enormous amount compared to yearly spy salaries which changed between 100 and 400 ducats. AGS, E
1355, fols. 154 (15 August 1611) and 253 (20 November 1611); E 1356, fols. 97, 98, 99 and 100 (25 April
1612).
117

131

3.4.1.1.

Renegades

The early modern Mediterranean, as a borderland between Islam and Christianity,

hosted a significant number of renegades, especially, but not exclusively, in more
cosmopolitan Ottoman cities such as Constantinople and Algiers which attracted poor
Christians with their opportunities as well as relative tolerance. In a world where the
impediments created by physical and political boundaries were exacerbated by cultural
and linguistic ones, a turncoat would be an ideal spy. In the absence of the concept of
training (even the armies did not have drills until the counts of Nassau came up with them
in the closing decade of the 16th century),120 states had to make use of people who were
familiar with certain practices and techniques. As the Moors who left Spain in 1492 were
valuable for Ottoman corsary in North Africa thanks to their skills in sailing and
familiarity with the Iberian coasts, renegades who knew the language, customs and
geography of and had connections in the land of the infidel were invaluable assets for
governments that gladly employed and generously rewarded them. The composite
identity of these men of two worlds furthermore facilitated the process and hence their
increased number among information brokers.
The Habsburgs appreciation of the contribution of Christian renegades in
Constantinople is evident from their response to renegades who complained of living like
Turks, desordinato e damnoso modo de turchi and asked help to return to their former
faith and fatherland. Surprisingly, the Habsburgs responded to their petition by advising
them to stay in the Ottoman capital where they would be more useful for all the

120

Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 20-22.

132

Christianity.121 The Venetian bailo would have a similar attitude when the Venetian
expert sent to help the Ottomans in their Arsenal, Zuan Francesco Giustiniani, protested
that he was helping the enemy.122 Numerous renegades working in strategic places in the
Ottoman Empire were important for both Habsburg and Venetian intelligence. Those who
worked in the Arsenal could send information regarding the preparations in the Arsenal,
the size and the destination of the Ottoman navy as well as the time of the departure from
the capital. Those who worked in the fortifications, such as those in Argel whom the
cleric Francisco Nuez managed to contact,123 could inform about the weaknesses in
enemy defenses. A fifth column that could jeopardize the Ottoman military production,
these renegades also proposed and participated in several sabotage attempts, especially in
the Ottoman Navy and Arsenal. There were also a few examples of Muslim renegades
who converted to Christianity and offered their services to the Habsburgs, such as a
Turkish convert named Pedro Aldobrandino, once primary avu of the Ottoman
Sultan who was at the time living in Rome with his wife. 124 Add to this, the nominally
Christian Moors who joined the Habsburg military.
Given that the Ottomans preferred to choose spies from among those with local
access and that conversion to Islam, although not obligatory, brought advantages for
those who sought lucrative opportunities of Ottoman employment, it should not be
surprising to see renegades working for Ottoman intelligence. In fact, their numbers
should be considerably high, proven by the fact that an unanimous report on the
precautions to be taken for the conservation and defense of the kingdom of Naples,

121

AGS, E 1140, fol. 108.

Sanuto, Diarii, LVI, 105-7; LVIII, 442-5.
123
AGS, E 487. Francisco Nuez.
124
AGS, E 1100, fol. 136 (20 September 1603).
122

133

presented to Philip II in 1559 suggested that the Greek sailors who frequented the
Neapolitan ports should be checked whether they were circumcised or not. Although
dressed like Westerners; these could still be renegade Ottoman spies. 125 Other Christians
should have followed the Greeks in benefitting from the employment opportunities
offered by the Ottoman secret service with no more scruples than they demonstrated
when they converted to Islam in order to take advantage of similar opportunities offered
by the North African corsary. Even men of religion were tempted. The Spanish
Trinitarian Friar Cristobal Perez, who came to Constantinople to ransom Christians,
decided instead to become a Muslim. He would almost have two Habsburg spies, who
revealed their identities during a confession, caught if not for Giovanni Margliani who
managed to keep him under lock and key in his house and then hand him to the
Inquisition in Rome.126

Especially the Iberian Moors who were more likely to be

sympathetic towards Islam as well as to have the required knowledge and expertise
required from an Ottoman spy to operate in the Western Mediterranean would be perfect
candidates. In 1552, a Mdejar, Alonso de Ayala ran way from the fortress of Djerba to
the Ottoman side to once again become Muslim in front of Turgud Reis. He would later
settle in Constantinople and provide the Ottomans with information he received from his
brothers in the fortress of la Goleta.127 In 1561, the Governor-General of Algeria was in
secret negotiations with the Habsburg soldiers, of Morisco origin, in an island between
Algerian coasts and Sardinia.128 In 1621, two Moors who had been soldiers and officers

125

AGS, E 1049, fol. 145 (1559).

AGS, E 1081, fol. 154 (4 November 1580) ; E 1081, fols. 163 (14 November 1580) and 170 (21
November 1580) ; E 1083, fol. 58 (28 February 1581) ; E 1084, fol. 35 (6 June 1581); E 1338, fols. 22, 36
(27 July 1580), 59 (15 October 1580) and 74 (30 December 1580); E 1339, fol. 127 (7 February 1581).
127
AGS, E 1132, fol. 28 (4 December 1567).
128
Canosa and Colonnello, Spionaggio a Palermo, 73.
126

134

in the Sicily and Naples for years, converted to Islam in the presence of the Sultan and
offered him a plot to easily conquer Augusta and Terranova in Sicily. 129 Interestingly
enough, there were Moors who worked for Christians as well; there is no trusting to the
barriers we presumed to have been created by religious and civilizational differences.
With those, it would be hard to explain how come two Moors captured in Constantinople,
shortly after the Ottoman attack on Malta failed in 1565, ended up in the employ of the
Knights of St. John. 130
3.4.1.2.

Exiled, convicts and rebels

Another group from among whom the states recruited their spies was the outlaws:
exiles, convicts and rebels. Some of these offered their services to their own governments
with hope of revoking their sentences. The Habsburg resident agent in Ragusa Don Cesar
de la Mara, for instance, is a good example. Exiled from the kingdom of Naples after
having murdered his mother, he agreed to work for the Habsburgs in exchange for the
ransoming of his son and the revoke of his exile, the bando.131 In hard-pressing times,
central governments rehabilitated these exiles in advance so that they could use them in
the operations of their secret services. In March 1570, the Venetian Council of Ten
revoked the bando of and distributed safe-conducts to banditi in Dalmatia who were
ready to become spies.132 Some, on the other hand, turned against their own governments
and offered their knowledge and skills to others. A Venetian, Tristan Savorgnan who shot

129

AGS, E 1893, fol. 144 (1 February 1621).

AGS, E 486, Avisos de Constantinopla de 27 de diciembre 1565.
131
AGS, E 1332, fol. 72 (26 July 1573).
132
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 250. For instance, the Venetian Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci considered Benetto
Bolizzo, exiled from Catharo, as a suitable resident agent in Ragusa even though in the end they appointed
somebody else. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 89r-90r (13 sett 1570); 122r-122v (15 january 1571, m.v.).
130

135

his enemies in the middle of the Canal Grande in 1551, unsure of his end, fled Venice
only to appear in the house of an Ottoman Pasha, arousing fear among the Venetians.133
Some high-ranking officials and military elite could be important information
providers when they decided to defect to the other side, thanks to their familiarity with
the state apparatus, local connections and their own intelligence network. The best
documented as well as the most famous case is that of Antonio Prez. Philip IIs once
omnipotent secretary of state fell from power after having been accused of ordering the
assassination of the secretary of Don Juan (1578). He was prosecuted and imprisoned. He
finally managed to escape from prison in 1590 and ended up in the court of Catherine of
Bourbon in Pau, Barn, near the Spanish-French border where he offered his intelligence
network, political connections and vast knowledge of the Habsburg affairs. Needless to
say, he started working for the Habsburgs as well, in search for financial remunerations
and with the hope of a royal pardon.134 In the case of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, even
though we do not have similar high-level government figures that were willing to change
sides, there were out-of-favor noblemen who offered their services to other governments.
In 1568, the Habsburg resident spy in Zante, Balthasar Prototico mentioned the desire of
Count Antonio Martinengo from Brescia, whom the Venetians exiled to Cephalonia for
life, to run away and serve the Habsburgs.135 The Ottomans had close contact with the
Prince of Salerno, the Neapolitan noble who rebelled against the Habsburgs and
Sampiero, the leader of the Corsican rebellion against the Genoese. With the hope of
recruiting the Ottoman navy for his cause, the latter would even come to Constantinople

133

ASV, SAPC, fil. 5, cc. 29r-34v, (1 January 1550); AGS, E 1319, fols. 200-1 (8 February 1551).
AGS, E 1593 (30 August 1604) ; Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 435-436.
135
AGS, E 1056, fol. 217.
134

136

in 1562.136 Needless to say, both nobles had extensive intelligence networks in their
respective countries which could provide information to the Ottomans.
There were certain communities more deeply involved in the espionage exactly
because they were exiled from their fatherland. Their knowledge and experience on the
other side of the border as well as psychological motives made them competent spies.
The Ottomans used the exiled Jews and Moors, while the Habsburg capitalized the
Greeks who left the Ottoman lands.
3.4.1.3.

Women

The world of the espionage in the early modern Mediterranean was misogynist
ante litteram. Women were not recruited as spies and there was no 16th century Lady
Carlisle or Mata Hari. It is not surprising given the total absence of women from the
administration and military save for a couple of examples from the high aristocracy in
Europe. The mentality of the time and the social restrictions placed upon the female
gender would have rendered a woman spy inefficient. So far, I could encounter only one
mention of a woman who seemed to have indirectly engaged in intelligence by carrying
the letters of his husband, Luis de Portillo, from Ragusa to Venice.137 This is a surprising
exception as it was implausible, or at least impractical, to choose a woman to undertake
the dangerous task of a courier. As Alain Hugon put it, in this monde viril, a woman
like Fausta, the heroine of Michel Z vacos opus magnum, les Pardaillan could hardly
overcome physical hardships and dangers of long voyages.138 Neither did the

136

Bornate, Sampiero Corso a Costantinopoli, 472-502.

AGS, E 1331, fol. 127 (29 November 1572).
138
In the ten-volume novel, Fausta travels between Paris and Madrid alone on horseback, passes the
Pyrnes, full with bandoleros and sails between Genoa and Barcelona without a large entourage. Hugon,
Au Service de Roi Catholique, 402.
137

137

prostitution-espionage139 played a role in the brokering of information within the

context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In a similar fashion to Echevarria Bacigalupe who
encountered two cases of female participation in espionage in the Dutch War,140 and
Alain Hugon who found only one case among Habsburg spies who operated in France141
I will state that the rareness of such examples demonstrate to us that women did not
significantly participate in the gathering of information.
Perhaps, should we search for them among the informants instead of spies? Did
they play a less visible but equally important role in the diffusion, instead of gathering, of
information? The answer is affirmative as women appeared in documents, tearing down
their confinement, albeit in the capacity as wives, sisters and mothers.142 Antonio Prez
escaped from his Madrid prison with the help of his wife, while probably it was Martin
de Acuas wife who denounced his husband as a French spy.143 The last case proves that
women had access to certain secrets of their husbands and suggests that they could
certainly be great sources of information. If not, why should the cleric Fransisco Nuez
have bothered to gain the trust of the wives of the North African governors by
interpreting their dreams?144 In a similar fashion, the Venetian bailo found a reliable
informant in his compatriot Beatrice Michiel, the renegade sister of the chief of the white
eunuch in the Topkap Palace, Gazanfer Aa. She had access to important information
since, with her brothers insistance, she first entered the Imperial Harem and then married

139

Preto, Servizi Segreti, 479.

Bacigalupe, La Diplomacia Secreta en Flandes, 46.
141
Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 402.
142
For similar examples of womens participation in the war of information between the Habsburgs and the
Valois, see. Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 162-3.
143
Rivas and Garca, Martin de Acua, 85-6.
144
AGS, E 487, Francisco Nuez.
140

138

to one of her brothers proteg e, Ali Aa.145 Some of the information she shared with the
bailo was of exceptional quality thanks to her access to the inner palace and other places
which foreign diplomats or spies could not even dream of entering.146 There is also the
exceptional figure of Lucia de Flores whose daughter and niece were wives of the
Ottoman Sultan, while her other daughter was married to a renegade, favourite of the
Sultan. Her access to palace rendered her as a suitable informant. Her cousin Jason
Buytron quickly became one of the Habsburg spies who operated in Constantinople.147
The wife of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed III and the future Valide Sultan, communicated
with the Austrian ambassador via her Jewish kira, also a woman, and kept him informed
of Ottoman military preparations on the eve of the War of 1593-1606.148 One should not
take these incidents as exceptions; womens role in the diffusion of information was
common knowledge for contemporaries; it was even asserted in Juan Antonio de Veras
famous manual for early modern ambassadors, El Enbajador.149
3.4.1.4.

Spies place in the early modern society

Espionage was a difficult profession in so far as spies were not held in high
esteem by the rest of the society. It is hard to make generalizations as most of our spies
had a second identity, another profession apart from that of espionage and a normal life
with families and friends, the details of which the documentation reflects very little and
we could do nothing but speculate. It is apparent, however, from those who had a high
profile as spies and appeared frequently in the documentation under study as well as from
145

Pedani, Veneziani a Costantinopoli, 74-76, fn. 1 . Also see. Dursteler, Fatima Hatun n e Beatrice,
355-382.
146
ASV, SDC, b. 39, cc. 282r-282v (20 May 1594); Senato, Dispacci, Copie moderne, r. 11, cc. 183-185
(11 November 1596).
147
AGS, E 1346, fols. 38 (1 July 1595) and 133 (30 August 1595).
148
A. H. Wratislaw, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz (London: Bell and Daldy,
1862), 103, 109-116. See also Chapter Six.
149
Juan Antonio de Vera y Zuiga, El Enbaxador (Kesinger Publishing, no date or place), 103-6.

139

the public opinion about espionage in general that spies were disdained by others because
of the nature of their activity and not trusted even by the officials who recruited them. In
the West, the word itself had always had negative connotations since the beginning of its
appearance in the 13th century.150 Even though this seemed to have changed in the 16th
and 17th centuries and even an influential office with the flamboyant title of the Grand
Spy was created in 1613, only seven years later, Juan Antonio de Vera would have a
subchapter in his El Enbajador named The ambassador should not be a spy,151 hinting
at a contrast between the ambassador, a man of reason and peace and the spy, a man of
military conflict and trouble.152 The contemporaries should have agreed with him; if not
why should they name these ambassadors, honorable spies?
It was not only a problem of what others thought of these spies; there were more
concrete disadvantages. They enjoyed almost none of the protections and advantages that
their colleagues in the military and administrative apparati of central governments
enjoyed. They were the ones whose names were quickly erased from the payroll with the
first budgetary problem and who had to operate facing so many dangers with no hope of
even saving their lives when caught by the enemy, let alone the extra comfort of being
ransomed or exchanged as would be the case with soldiers and even corsairs, for instance.
3.4.2. Educational background
There were some educated figures who engaged in espionage, such as Jernimo
Bucchia who was recruited by his classmate Cardinal Gravela, with whom he studied

150

Preto, Servizi Segreti, 42-6.

Vera y Zuiga, El Enbaxador, 28.
152
Bacigalupe, La Diplomacia Secreta en Flandes, 47-8.
151

140

Law in the University of Padua in 1537,153 Sbastian Arbizu, the doctor of law and a
laureate of Colegio y Universidad de Gran Noble,154 and Luigi Bassano who wrote a
book about the Ottoman Empire.155 Nevertheless, these were isolated incidents. Most of
the spies lacked formal training, not surprisingly, because the profession required very
little of it. Although preferable, even the ability to read and write was not a prerequisite,
especially for those who were operating as a resident spy belonging to a large network.
Two Habsburg spies in Constantinople, Simon Massa, and Giovanni Battista da Sorrento
alias Mahmud, for instance, had another agent, Giovanni Agostino Gigli, write their
letters in 1562 and the latter of the two confessed he did not know how to read and write
in either language, ne in turchescho ne in cristianesco.156
Knowledge of languages and customs would provide a real advantage for those
who had to travel between different cities and cross cultural boundaries. The strategic
value of linguistic capital for information gathering was appreciated also by the
contemporaries. For instance, Hayreddin Barbarossa initially agreed to allow sixty
Spanish soldiers in his army, remnants of Don Hugos failed 1518 expedition, to leave for
Spain. When one of his renegade lieutenants, however, pointed out to the fact that their
knowledge of the land and the Arabic language would make their services valuable to the
Habsburgs, Hayreddin changed his mind and imprisoned them in order to force them to

153

Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 15-6. His educational background can also be observed in his prose. See. pp.
52-6 to see how Bucchias educational background affected his prose: The usage of less-known
abbreviations, numerous Latin phrases and expressions, complex grammar and his loyalty to words
original Latin spelling.
154
Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 21.
155
Luigi Bassano, I costumi et i modi particolari de la vita de Turchi (Roma: Antonio Blado, 1545); for a
reprint see. I costumi, et i modi particolari de la vita de Turchi. Ristampa otomeccanica delledizione
originale (Roma, Antonio Blado, 1545) corredata da una introduzione, note bio-bibliografiche ed un indice
analitico a cura di Franz Babinger (Monaca di Baviera: Casa Editrice Max Hueber, 1963).
156
AGS, E 486, Simon Massas letter (9 November 1562), Gio. Battista Napolitano de Sorrento in
Turchesco Mamuts letter (24 October 1562 .

141

convert.157 Generally, problems caused by cultural and linguistic differences were sought
to be solved by employing people familiar with both worlds such as the afore-mentioned
Luigi Bassano who lived in Constantinople between 1532 and 1540,158 or Domingo
Cigala who was given the task to accompany the avu sent by the exiled Ottoman prince
Bayezit, to Spain, because he grew up in Chios and thus could speak and read Turkish.159
Exposure to different cultures and societies diversified the linguistic pool of spies.
Thanks to large foreign communities, living in foreign lands was not a condicio sine qua
non for learning languages. For instance, in 1552, an Ottoman soldier from Bursa was
caught spying in Salerno, pretending to be Spanish. In his interrogation, he said he learnt
Spanish by talking to Christians in Constantinople.160 Even though there were some
polyglot agents among the spies of our period,161 linguistic ability was still a rare
commodity which should have paid off well. One should not take language barriers
lightly; even officers had problems of communication. Upon receiving two contradictory
orders, the Habsburg diplomat and spymaster in Ragusa, the Count Ruggero Margliani
wanted clarification in his own native tongue, alla grammatica di milano.162
3.4.3. Recruitment methods and employment standards
Recruitment of a spy was by no means a random process. After careful analysis,
central governments tried to find the most suitable and trustworthy candidates. Still,

157

Gomra, Crnica de los Barbarrojas, 390-3.

Allain Servantie, Information on Ottoman Shipbuilding and on the Moves of the Turkish Fleet to the
West (1522-1547 , Archivo de la Frontera, http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/pdf/A-MED28.pdf
159
AGS, E 1125, fols. 73 (8 June 1560) and 75.
160
AGS, E 1043, fol. 71.
161
Amerigo Balassa is reputed to know twelve languages. AGS, E 1056, fol. 217. For Astrume Elia, see.
Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 80-2; for Altobello Palavicino, see. Sola, Los que van y vienen, 55; for Pedro
Aldobrandino, see. AGS, E 1100, fol. 136 (20 September 1603), for Giovanni Battista Cules, see. ASV,
CCX-LettAmb, b. 19, fol. 59 (22 May 1607), for Gil Hernandez, see. ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, c. 30v (12
February 1585). For Marxeben Lener, see. AGS, E 1072, fol. 232.
162
AGS, E 1541, fol. 201 (25 December 1591).
158

142

circumstances of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier in the Mediterranean forced both central

governments to drop some of this prudence. The life of a spy was riskier, the conditions
of communication channels were less than perfect, close inspection and surveillance was
not possible; in short, central governments could not be as exigent as elsewhere and had
to lower their standards.
3.4.3.1.

Required skills

Linguistic ability as well as the familiarity with the culture of the target region, as
mentioned above, was a decisive factor in the employment of spies. Spies acquired other
skills useful for their trade, thanks to their professional or social background. Merchants
would know how to read and write, soldiers would be expert on fortifications. Clerics
would easily contact the disgruntling Christian populations and have access to the true
intentions of those who confide in them during confession. Jews would enjoy the
hospitality and cooperation of Jewish communities along the Mediterranean coasts.
Renegades and exiles would have the prerequisite linguistic and cultural background. So
on, so forth...
There are not too many clues that demonstrate which traits the authorities sought
in a good spy. We can only speculate based on the opinions of seasoned spymasters and
recruiters which we have at hand today. Let us turn to what Giovanni Margliani, an
expert spy-cum-diplomat who negotiated the Ottoman-Habsburg truce and led the
Habsburg network in Constantinople between 1578 and 1581, had to say about the
characteristics of a good spy. According to him, a good spy should be precautious, have a
good memory and discretion and know how to talk politely and write as well as how to
relate information as was instructed to him. He should speak in a certain manner, saying

143

certain things with sweetness, others with seriousness, and others with resolution, an
ability which could not be taught to those who were not blessed with a certain level of
farsightedness and discretion.163 Thus, Margliani believed that these good qualities
depended upon ones nature, i.e., intrinsic traits that came by birth. In another
document, he advised the employment of a potential spy, Giacobo Bernardini, a
Florentine merchant who had been living in Constantinople for five years where he was
sent by his father Giuseppe.164 Margliani exalted his social standing and citizenship as
well-born from a free fatherland under the Habsburg protection and praised his quiet
nature, suitable for living for a long time (lungamente) with anybody in any place. He
furthermore mentioned another Florentine renegade who was living in Bernardinis
house. Margliani knew this Siyavu Pashas avu who had previously served him as
well. He would be a great informant as he had important connections in the Ottoman
capital. He befriended one of Venetian bailos dragomans named Marucini and his
compatriot the Ottoman dragoman Hrrem Bey. He frequented the houses of the French
ambassador and the Venetian bailo. Moreover, he had a garden in a good part of the city,
suitable for receiving spies if necessary.165 In addition to ones social standing (wellborn), familial ties (the son of Giuseppe from Florence and citizenship (from a free
fatherland), other factors such as his immediate social environment, a post in government
or possession would also add to ones trustworthiness. For instance, a Habsburg spy in
Ragusa, most probably Don Cesar de la Mara, used all these factors to discredit Secondo

163

AGS, E 1338, fol. 30 (22 July 1580).

AGS, E 1338, fol. 66 (12 November 1580).
165
AGS, E 1338, fol. 42 (10 August 1580).
164

144

de Poo, a rival spy. He was not only a friend of the renowned liar Luis de Portillo, but
also he never held any office or benefice in Ragusa.166
Expertise was an essential factor. The fact that spies did not require too much of a
formal training does not mean that they were not specialized in their profession. The
instructions on how to transmit information from Constantinople to Naples that Giovanni
Agostino Gigli gave to Giovanni Maria Renzo in 1562 to be remitted to the Habsburg
authorities is a very good example. The amount of details included attests to the high
level of specialization in and the complexity of methods of early modern espionage.
According to this, Giovanni Agostino Gigli would send his correspondence from
Constantinople to the Habsburg resident agent in Ragusa, Lorenzo Miniati, with the alias
Domino Simeone de Zaqueria, an Anconite merchant. Miniati would in turn send the
letters to Barleta, Trani or Manfredonia in the Kingdom of Naples. This was not the only
way to transmit the news. The Governor of Otranto would send two frigates to Zante in
April, so early that neither the captain nor the rowers of the ship would know anything
about the preparation of the Habsburg fleet, a precaution to prevent them from giving
information under torture in case they were captured by the corsairs. There the captains
would meet the sacristan of a church on the coast, and ask him during a confession
whether a foreigner asked for two sailors from Otranto. That foreigner would be the
courier who set sail from Constantinople to Negroponte and then passed to Casteltornes
on the Dalmatian coasts across Zante in three hour distance. When these sailors met the
foreigner they had to give him the special signal (el seal) by biting his right ear and
upon receiving the letters, handing a written receipt where at the below of the signature
they would write Jesus. Then the courier would hand in two folders, pliegos, one to the
166

AGS, E 1332, fol. 197 (8 Julio 1573).

145

Viceroy of Naples and the other to the Viceroy of Sicily and the Admiral of the Catholic
Navy. The courier would take these pliegos to Otranto where the castle commander
would transmit them to Naples and Messina accordingly. The most important news for
the Habsburg authorities were those regarding the Ottoman navy; so it was expected from
Gigli and his network to provide the most accurate information about the destination of
the Ottoman fleet as soon as possible. To do that, when the Ottoman fleet set sail, Gigli
would sail until Chios on the capitana of the Ottoman Grand Admiral and gather
information from the pages of Ottoman renegades who were always ready for
conversation. From the Genoese Chios, he would send a frigate to Negroponte with
dispatches informing the Habsburgs of the Ottoman fleets arrival to Chios and its future
destination. His agent, upon reaching Chios would contact another frigate captain who
would use a different seal by biting the nose and write Jesus Christ below the
signature in the written receipt. Gigli would not follow the navy farther than Chios, but
would send a ship to sell food to the Ottoman fleet. This ship would follow the navy with
the excuse of carrying fat until the right moment when it would leave to find the
Habsburg admiral to inform him about the details of his voyage. Gigli furthermore
suggested he should send this frigate to Cerigo where he would meet a Habsburg agent
and even offered to go to Negroponte himself if need be, with the alibi of ransoming a
relative, and to write fresh news. Other precautions followed. He pointed out that those
who came to pick his letters in Casteltornes should look like Turks for otherwise guards
would not let them embark for Zante, thinking they were runaway slaves or renegades.
He ended his report by asking for money so that he could save himself from slavery if he
was discovered and suggesting that the Admiral of the Catholic Navy and the Viceroy of

146

Sicily should also be informed of the secret of writing, i.e., which steganography
technique used in each letter. From the shape of the cross in the beginning of the letters,
could one know whether he should put the letters on the burning coal (this technique was
called tormenting the letter in 16th century Italian and Spanish), or put them underwater
and read the true version of the information in an obscure part with a candle behind the
letter.167
3.4.3.2.

Offering ones self as a spy

The authorities recruited spies from among those who fit the above criteria;
nonetheless, it was often the spies, these restless entrepreneurs themselves, who contacted
the authorities and offered their services. In 1540, two spies contacted the Habsburg
ambassador in Venice; one offering to go to Constantinople, and the other, who knew
Persian and Turkish, to Persia where he had been before as a merchant.168 In 1560, the
Genoese Domingo Cigala from Chios, who knew Persian and Turkish, contacted in a
similar fashion, the Habsburg ambassador in Genoa, Lope de Figueroa.169 There are
several examples where potential spies even offered to visit the capital, and thus
circumvent provincial authorities, present a plan, offer their services or transmit a
correspondence, such as Galeazzo Franchis from Venice who was transmitting the news
his friend sent from Constantinople,170 or Luca da Sorgo, a double agent from Ragusa.171
The Habsburg authorities rejected such proposals, unless they were familiar with the
agent, as was the case with Nicol Prototico. They simply feared the possibility that
167

AGS, E 486, Instruxion para el s.r. Juo Maria Renzo que a da procurar de dar orden que se exigua, sino
se allare mas perfeta, y si se allare que se ordene la condicion della para exeguirse. Juan Agustino Gilli,
Constantinople (8 November 1562).
168
AGS, E 1316, fols. 101 and 118 (8 January 1540).
169
AGS, E 1389, fol. 29 (6 July 1560).
170
AGS, E 1526, fol. 159 (18 August 1582).
171
AGS E 1331, fol. 228 (25 July 1572).

147

double agents penetrated to Castile and Aragon. In some cases, agents who were already
working for central governments in some capacity tried to use their position to attain
more prestigious posts. Nicol Prototico, already under Habsburg employ with a
generous stipend of 400 ducats, for instance, asked for the more lucrative position of the
deceased Gioantomaso who was the captain of the frigates in Otranto that sailed to
Levant to gather information and to pick up the correspondence of the Habsburg
intelligence network in the Ionian islands led by the father Prototico, Balthasar.172
Similarly, Jernimo Bucchia wanted to be appointed by Charles V to a post in the
Neapolitan Conseglio Colateral Regio in 1553.173 In another example, the Genoese
Phelipe Balestrin, who served the Habsburgs for years in the Levant, asked for a ventaja
in the galleys of the Kingdom of Naples. He was counting on the reference that the
veteran Habsburg spy in Constantinople, Pedro Brea, wrote for him.174 In one of his
comeback attempts in 1584, the former network leader Aurelio Santa Croce, recently
released from a Madrid prison, asked for one of the two prestigious posts. One was the
post of the senior network leader of the Habsburg intelligence in Constantinople which
was vacant after his superior Giovanni Maria Renzo died in 1577, while the other was the
captain of frigates in Otranto.175

172

AGS, E 1056, fol. 243.

BNE, Correspondencia del Cardenal Granvela, ms. 7905/189, ff.1r-10r, Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 149175.
174
He was originally a slave of an important naval officer and the scribe of the Christians, meaning the
Christian slaves in the baos of the Ottoman Arsenal. Pedro Brea convinced him to run away when the
navy set sail and carry his letters to Naples; however he was caught and put into chains. Brea then had to
ransom him for 1.000 ducats, probably an exaggerated amount. AGS, E 1094, fols. 234 and 238 (27
September 1596).
175
AGS, E 1071, fol. 161 (4 June 1584). The office that Nicol Prototico asked for two decades ago, was
once again available when the Habsburgs had to move the incumbent Pietro Lanza to another post because
of an international crisis caused by his misdemeanors against Venetian subjects.
173

148

3.4.3.3.

Approval and instructions

In the Habsburg case, once a spy was recruited by viceroys, ambassadors or

network leaders, he still had to be approved and assigned a stipend by the center. At
times, the monarchs themselves wrote letters to spies authorizing their employment with
words of encouragement and assurances.176 Such letters were extremely important for
those spies who were recruited by network leaders in situ in so far as these gave
recruitment efforts of these network leaders an official status in a place like
Constantinople where spies faced further risks and sought additional assurances.
Sometimes spies themselves wrote letters to the monarchs, assuring their goodwill and
zeal for royal service.177 After the approval of the recruitment, central governments
produced specific instructions for agents explaining their mission.178 Sometimes, it was
the spies themselves who left instructions for the authorities. One good example is the
very detailed instruction that the Habsburg agent in Constantinople Giovanni Agostino
Gigli gave to Giovanni Maria Renzo in 1562 to be remitted to the Habsburg authorities
on how to receive the information transmitted from the recently set up intelligence
network in Constantinople.179
3.4.3.4.

The issue of trust

An important issue was spies trustworthiness. Early modern espionage was an

enterprise where economic motivations outweighed others. There were often liars, double
176

There are several such letters written by Philip II to agents in Constantinople in AGS, E 486, 487,
passim. Constantinople was not the only place where spies sought assurances from the king. In 1568,
Balthasar Prototico asked a letter of assurance for Count Antonio Martinengo, exiled by Venetians to the
island of Cephalonia. AGS, E 1056, fol. 217.
177
AGS, E 1071, fols. 184-187 (28 February 1575).
178
AGS, E 1503, fol. 32 (28 September 1572).
179
AGS, E 486, Instruxion para el s.r. Juo Maria Renzo que a da procurar de dar orden que se exigua, sino
se allare mas perfeta, y si se allare que se ordene la condicion della para exeguirse. Juan Agustino Gilli,
Constantinople (8 November 1562).

149

agents and cheaters among spies who, in order to better off themselves financially, had no
scruples in fabricating news, working for other governments and engaging in all kinds of
fraudulent activity. In an effort to prevent disinformation by the enemy, infiltration of
enemy agents to their own intelligence networks and spies embezzlement, central
governments had to be careful while employing a new agent. They developed a couple of
methods.
Firstly, they investigated the background of the potential spy. In fact, most of
them were employed thanks to references from the authorities or men of credibility.
Spymasters, ambassadors, governors and viceroys had to vouch for spies they recruited
and take responsibility when they turned out to be rotten apples. When he realized one of
the spies that he advised for recruitment four years ago, Luca da Sorgo, was a double
agent selling information to the Ragusan authorities Cesar de la Mara had to confess: I
feel bad for I have vouched for him and presented him as a good man even though what
he wrote was always of little substance.180
Authorities occasionally received letters of recommendation which praised the
nature and deeds of a certain spy and were written by people of credibility such as
Vincente de Herrara, a friar and a theologian.181 It was also common for those who
wanted to prove their services to the crown to submit a report full of testimonies that
supported their case. A number of Habsburg officers and soldiers that fell captive to the
Ottomans after the fall of Tunis (1574) signed a testimony which attested that the
Franciscan Diego de Mallorca was a good Christian who tried to incite the spirit of the
soldiers during the siege, converted Muslims and Jews who came to Tunis and attended
180

AGS, E 1331 fols. 227 (18 July 1572), 228 (25 July 1572), fol. 236 (1 November 1572); E 1335, fol. 80
(30 January 1576).
181
AGS, E 487, 4 October 1570, de Argel.

150

to the spiritual needs of the slaves in their barracks (bao) in Constantinople by preaching
and saying mass with them.182 Sometimes, authorities made inquiries as was exemplified
in a document called [r]eport on the character (ser and quality of Adam de Franquis
which consist of the declarations of a runaway from Constantinople named Bernal and a
captain apata Stevan de Monrreal who personally knew the Genoese spy.183
In the early modern era, it was common to leave a family member hostage as a
guarantee. In order to control their vassals better, the Ottomans demanded from them to
send their sons as hostages to Constantinople.184 The Habsburg followed a similar
pattern; when Francis I was released from his captivity from Madrid in 1526, having
signed the impracticably disadvantageous Treaty of Madrid, his two sons had to be
delivered to Charles V as hostages. In a similar fashion, spies offered their sons as
hostages to assure the authorities of their well intentions.185 One of his spies from
Castelnuovo even told Cesar de la Mara that if he did not do his duty, he could cut his
hostage sons head.186 An exceptional self-confidence! The idea of keeping relatives as
hostages should have appeared even more reasonable to those such as the governor of the
newly conquered Mahdiyya, Hernando de Vega, who had to rely for intelligence on
locals of questionable loyalty. When he sent the local Moors on a reconnaissance mission
to learn the whereabouts of Turgud Reis, he made them leave their brothers as
hostages.187

182

AGS, E 1144, fol. 206 (December 1574).

AGS, E 1127, fol. 106.
184
Among these elite hostages who were trained in the Ottoman palace one can find interesting figures
such as Vlad Dracul and Georg Kastriota.
185
One of the two spies that came to offer great things for the service of His Majesty offered to leave his
son as a hostage. AGS, E 1136, fol. 38 (5 February 1571).
186
AGS, E 1332, fol. 167 (1 February 1573).
187
Sola, Los que van y vienen, 80.
183

151

3.5.

MOTIVES

A number of motives for early modern espionage have been asserted by the
historians. Garca and Marcos enumerated three motives in 1998, the first being
ideological and religious motivations, the second the judicial rehabilitation, i.e., the
revoke of a sentence and the third economic motivations.188 In 2005, they diversified
their lists: loyalty to the monarch, defending ideals such as religion, honor, family,
property, and fatherland, money, coercion, vengeance and thirst of power. 189 Hugon
repeated some of the aforementioned reasons and asserted new ones such as
disappointment because of ingratitude of ones master and blackmail.190 Carrasco
recently added to the financial motives other ones such as patriotism, refusal of foreign
domination, religious attachments and a desire for liberty.191
I will rather concentrate on the financial motives for two reasons. The first is my
opinion that material benefits seemed to have outweighed religious and psychological
motives, attesting to the entrepreneurial nature of the early Mediterranean espionage,
similar to that of Mediterranean corsary (Hence it is not surprising some were both).
Most of these Mediterranean go-betweens were crossing cultural and religious borders,
trying to survive in the hardships of the 16th century and their sole modus operandi was to
further their own interest in one way or another. This is why most of them, if not all, were
double, triple or even quadruple spies or swindlers who made up information much to the
authorities chagrin such as the frustrated viceroys of Naples who repeatedly refused
payment to spies even at the expense of indignation of the Habsburg ambassador in

188

Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 90-1.

Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, Chapter 9.
190
Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 395-403.
191
Carrasco, LEspionnage Espagnol du Levant, 215.
189

152

Venice. In short, spies mentioned in this study are, as Emilio Sola once mentioned to me
in a private conversation, simply homo economicus.
This argumentation has one obvious flaw though. The fact that financial motives
outweighed others could be because of the nature of correspondence that survived in the
archives. What is more natural than finding documents filled with financial details while
studying the correspondence between an employee and employer? Thus, it can be argued
that I exaggerated the importance of financial motivations and exported an idea from the
field of Mediterranean corsary to that of Mediterranean espionage: that in the world of
Mediterranean borderlands, both professions were financial enterprises.
However, even if one accepts this is the case, there is still one problem in
accentuating the religious and psychological factors: the hardness of verifying whether
motivations such as religious zeal, obedience to the monarch, patriotism, refusal of
foreign yoke, desire of liberty, etc. were statements that reflected the truth or basic
rhetoric that accentuated ones moral duty in order both to prevent the negative
implications attached to the activity of espionage and to promote ones self in the eyes of
the employer. Even Garca and Marcos who proposed such motivations acknowledge this
problem.192 The fact that among the spies who mentioned such moral duties, very few
actually abstained from negotiating for financial remuneration and volunteered to serve
without them suggests that even if some of these had religious and psychological
motives, they also had more pressing financial ones.
To conclude, I claim, yet not to a full extent prove, that financial motivations
were the main ones for espionage. I can comfortably state, on the other hand, that these
are the only ones that could come under a methodological study given the nature of the
192

Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 252.

153

documentation, i.e., correspondence between the spy and the government or the
employee and the employer where personal convictions were declared to a superior from
whom some sort of benefit was expected. It would be problematic to take such
declarations at face value.193 In short, unless somebody discovers diaries written by
sixteenth century spies, it is impossible to know the extent to which these were motivated
by religious and psychological factors.
So, what is the role of religion in this profession depicted as an enterprise in the
frontier world of material benefits? Even though it is hard to give a complete answer to
this question, again because of the nature of documentation, I can still propose that the
religion became a positive factor rather than a negative one and provided cooperation and
solidarity among coreligionists rather than preventing contact and collaboration between
those from different religions. In short, it did not deter, but encouraged. Religious
boundaries do not seem to have worried the decision makers who gladly employed
infidels and renegades and even negotiated the defection of prominent military
commanders from the other side. The Habsburg negotiated the defection of not only the
renegades in Ottoman service such as Ulu Ali, Hasan Aa, Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan
Pasha and Hasan Veneziano, but also free-born Muslims such as Barbarossa and
Mehmed Pasha, the son of Salih Reis and the former Governor-General of Algeria.
There were similar examples in the more tolerant Ottoman world. For instance, Alvise
Gritti, the illegitimate son of the Venetian doge Andrea Gritti and an important political
193

A similar case for the difficulty of judging sincerity and motivation from the available documentation of
early modern conversion as well as the lack of analytical rigor in doing so was made by Webb Keane,
From Fetishism to Sincerity: Agency, the Speaking Subject, and Their Historicity in the Context of
Religious Conversion, Comparative Studies in Society and History 39 (4): 67493, Talal Asad,
Comments on Conversion. in Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity, ed. Peter van
der Veer (New York: Routledge, 1996), 26373 and recently reinforced by Ella-Natalie Rothman,
Between Venice and Istanbul, 120-1.

154

figure in Constantinople, negotiated on behalf of the Ottomans the defection of Andrea

Doria, Charles Vs admiral and the de-facto ruler of Genoa. An Austrian noble who
fought against the Ottomans, Christophe de Roggendorf, could find employment in
Constantinople without converting to Islam.194 Religions positive role was that at times
it may have convinced decision makers to engage in certain implausible strategies and
employ spies who relied on sentiments of solidarity between coreligionists. The best
example of this can be seen in the relationship between both governments and their
respective fifth column in each others lands: the Moors in the Habsburg Castile and
the Orthodox in the Ottoman Balkans.
3.6.

ESPIONAGE AS AN ENTERPRISE: REWARDS

If early modern espionage was a financial enterprise, what were the rewards that
spies sought in exchange for their services?
3.6.1.

Financial rewards

Financial remunerations varied according to the quality and the social standing of
the person. Officers and nobles who were offered bribes for betrayal and defection as
well as informants who held office in foreign governments and provided important
information all received more money than regular spies and saboteurs who themselves
were paid according to their rank and duty, quoting a contemporary document: cada uno
en su grado y cargo respectivamente.195
According to Garnicer and Marcos, the Habsburg spies in England and France
received more than those operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, because the Habsburg

194

Isom-Verhaaren, Shifting Identities, 10 -134.

AGS, E 486, Relacion de lo que se escrivio al Comendador Mayor de Castilla con Juan Maria Renzo de
Madrid a XXV de maro 1568.
195

155

authorities did not trust these Turks, Greeks, Albanians and renegades.196 A couple of
things should be added to this statement. First, it should be stated that it was the lack of
open diplomatic relations between two empires that hindered the operations. The
consequent deficiency in the quality of recruited spies created distrust towards them
among the Habsburg authorities. Things would have been different had there been a
Habsburg ambassador in Constantinople who would advocate the allocation of more
resources for spies in the Levant whose quality and trustworthiness would not be a matter
of debate as long as the ambassador would employ and inspect them personally.
Secondly, two further questions appear: could this difference Garnicer and Marcos state
attest to a difference of nominal prices and wages in these two distinct regions? Or could
it show us that Philip II did not invest as much in the conflict with the Ottomans in the
Mediterranean as in that with the British and Netherlands in Northern Europe? Both of
these questions require comparative studies that are outside the scope of this dissertation:
first, that of wages of soldiers and officers in both empires, second that of Habsburg
military expenditures in both regions.
Central governments resorted to different forms of payment. For instance, in the
Habsburg administration, there was a difference between ayuda de costa, the one-time
lump sum payment made to the newly recruited spies to cover their travel and other
expenses, and entretenimiento, annual salary that generally ranged between 100 to 400
ducats.197 Some spies had to endure a trial period during which they would be given a
limited amount of money until they produced results. The Habsburg ambassador in
Venice Guzman de Silva suggested such a method for Luis de Portillo who should be
196

Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 372.

Garnicer and Marcos gives different figures. According to Espas de Felipe II, 291, Habsburg spies
received an average monthly stipend of 25-40 ducats, which means 300-500 ducats per annum.
197

156

given money, but not entretenimiento ordinario y sealado. 200 ducats for once would be
enough to give the hope of more to this spy against the employment of whom the
ambassador advised caution.198 There were instances where spies also asked for
additional money for specific operations. For instance, Giovanni Agostino Gigli asked for
money to employ necessary people among the renegades who would realize the
impractical Habsburg plot to torch Ottoman ships in the Arsenal.199 Gigli had to ask the
center for he requested a large sum, but other spies would go to their network leaders to
ask for smaller sums as well. In Ragusa, Don Cesar de la Mara paid 20 tallers
impromptu to one of spies in his network even though he already received 60 escudos
sent by the center a couple of days ago.200 A more lucrative form payment was the
assignment of a fief or rentas, offered rather in defection negotiations, since assigning
fiefs would be an impractical method of payment for spies on the field who could not
make use of a fief in a far away land.201
There is less information shedding light on the Ottoman financing of espionage.
The reason for this could be our source base. Most of our conclusion for the Ottoman

198

AGS, E 1506, fols. 86 (16 April 1573) and 94 (20 July 1573). He would be proven right when the
Habsburgs realized what kind of a scoundrel Portillo was.
199
AGS, E 1392, fol. 74 (16 March 1563).
200
AGS, E 1332, fol. 207 (14 September 1573).
201
For instance during the negotiations of submission of Algiers to the Habsburgs, the authorities offered
Ulu Ali 10.000 ducats de renta in the kingdom of Naples that he could pass to his descendants as well as
the title of Count, Marquis or Duke. Other less important figures offered similar compensations. Catania
would receive 4.000 ducats de renta in the kingdom of Sicily with the title of Baron or Count, Chiaya 3.000
ducats de renta in either one of the two kingdoms with the title of Baron or Count. AGS, E 487 (28 July
1569) Instruction primera a Andrea y Francesco Gasparo sobre el negocio de Argel. Similarly, Maranca, a
Comite General of the Ottoman Navy was offered 5.000 ducats de renta as well as 5.000 ducats de ayuda
de costa in return for his defection with a part of the Ottoman navy. E 486, Relacion de lo que se escrivi al
Comendador Mayor de Castilla con Juan Maria Renzo, de Madrid a XXV de maro 1568. The French
ambassador in Constantinople requested, in case of a likely negative response to his request to be included
into Venetian nobility, a 3.000 ducats dintrata with another thousand to be divided between his two
dependents in exchange for his services to Venetian secret service and (voluntary) defection to the
Serenissima. ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 3, fols. 85-88 (13 January 1566, m.v.), 98-100 (8 February 1566,
m.v.).

157

information gathering was based on the documents issued by the Ottoman central
government or documents regarding Ottoman intelligence that were kept in the foreign
archives. Contrary to the case with the Habsburgs, we do not have the documentation
issued by the Ottoman local administration which may have given us further details on
the Ottoman financing of their own intelligence. Documents issued by local authorities
would have been even more useful in the Ottoman case since it was relatively more
decentralized than the Habsburg one. Most Ottoman spies were either employed by local
governors without any authorization from the center or by private entrepreneurs such as
Alvise Gritti and Joseph Nasi and statesman such as brahim Pasha, Ulu Ali and Sokollu
Mehmed Pasha. Our conclusions could have been different if we could find documents
regarding the activities of the Governor of Avlona, or at least the Governor-General of
Rumelia in a similar manner that we could find documents regarding those of their
counterparts in the Habsburg administration: the Governor of Tierra de Otranto y Bari
and the Viceroy of Naples.
The Ottoman documentation regarding the Ottoman financing of espionage
generally refer to the assignment of military fiefs (timar) to those who participated in
intelligence, most of the time during a military expedition, by bringing information or
catching enemy soldiers and spies.202 Still, there are indications that Ottomans paid their
spies in cash. Upon the discovery of an Ottoman plot to capture la Goleta with the help of

202

For examples of promotions and increase (terakk) in the value of their timars granted to those who
brought information or caught enemy spies. BOA, MD, I, nos. 13, 15, 18 19, 20, 22, 42, 54, 123, 135, 166
246, 247, 378, 610, 639, 996, 1056 and 1593; II, nos. 576 and 1039; XLII, no. 1792. Some of these
promotions were lucrative. Sometimes even zemets were directly assigned (BOA, MD, XLII, no. 1791) or
timar holders were promoted and given zemets, (BOA, MD, I, nos. 46 and 140). New timars (ibtid)
were also assigned to volunteers who participated in intelligence, see BOA, MD, I, no. 132; II, nos. 47 and
576; VIII, no. 132, 151, 849 and 943; LIII, no. 7; LVI, no. 70. Dismissed timariots could hope for their
reappointment and the reassignment of timar when they brought important information. (BOA, MD, VIII,
no. 1040).

158

some artillerymen and soldiers in the castle, the Habsburgs interrogated the culprits under
torture. One of them confessed that an Ottoman spy in Sicily recruited them and assured
them of good payment.203 The document does not mention an amount, but there are no
indications as to why the Ottoman should be more generous than the Habsburgs. The
Christian who convinced the population of Kyrenia to surrender to the besieging Ottoman
forces was given a non-impressive amount of 30 ake (app. half ducat) per diem from the
Cyprus budget (Kbrs ceziresi mahsulnden).204 Most of the spies were more interested
in posts in the Arsenal and the Navy; this meant that the Ottomans had to pay them in
cash a salary, ulfe,205 contrary to the case with the Persian front where most of the
payments related to intelligence activity could be made by the assignment of timar
revenues, the most common form of payment in the Ottoman army. A similar situation
occurred for the appointments of those who brought information to military posts in the
salyaneli eyalets, semi-autonomous provinces such as Egypt and Damascus. The
Ottomans paid them in cash since military and administrative officers in salyaneli
provinces were paid from the provincial treasury.206 In short, Ottoman spies were paid in
different methods based on their function and the military corps they belonged.
The Ottomans assigned lavish military posts and fiefs to those who brought
critical news. This news could be an auspicious one such as the fall of la Goleta brought
by the Gran Admiral Sinan Pashas lieutenant, kahya. He was given the sancak of
203

AGS, E 1126, fols. 41 and 152 (30 April 1561).

BOA, MD, VIII, no. 356 (H. 14 Ca. 978/A.D. 14 October 1570).
205
For assignment of the office of reislik, captaincy of a ship, with an ul e to a corsair (gnll reis)
that brought information, see. BOA, MD, VIII, nos. 18, 2804. For an assignment in the Arsenal to those
who brought information, see BOA, MD, XLV, no. 2529 (kalafatlk). For an increase in the amount of the
ulfe of a ship captain (reis) that brought information, see BOA, MD, VIII, no. 15; LXV, no. 96.
Sometimes, corsairs (gnll reis) were awarded timars as well (BOA, MD, XXV, 2686). A promotion
could mean shifting from one form of payment to another. For an example of an allocation of timar to an
ulfe holder, see. BOA, MD, XXV, no. 17.
206
For an example, see. BOA, MD, VIII, no. 951.
204

159

Mytilene in return.207 A bad news which would give the Ottomans the time to do
necessary preparations would bring reward as well. For instance, a granadino broke the
news that the Ottoman siege of Malta failed. The Ottomans convinced him to convert and
appointed him as galiot captain with 15 ake per diem.208
The Ottomans had a practice of giving tax concessions to local people who
cooperated with them. This cooperation included their participation in clandestine
operations. For instance, a Mehmed who convinced the population to peacefully
surrender the castle of Kyrenia and brought the keys to the Ottomans was given such a
concession he would not pay tekalif-i r iyye ve avarz- divaniyye.209 There were also
villages (dilci) that were entrusted, in exchange for similar tax concessions, with the task
of informing the nearby military garrisons of incoming pirates, corsairs and smugglers. 210
3.6.2. Favours
Spies used all the advantages of state employment and sought other types of
rewards in addition to their salaries. Requests for favors followed one another,
demonstrating the great diversity of ways in which governments could compensate their
agents services.
The authorities found themselves responsible for their spies families. On several
occasions, they asked favors for family members. Some extracted money using their
families as an alibi. In 1565, Giovanni Maria Renzo lamented that he was penniless after
having spent a fortune while moving his household from Genoa to Naples on Viceroys

207

AGS, E 1068, fol. 31 ( January 1575 . In another example, Kaid Mehmed who brought information
from Algiers was given the sancak of Cherchell. BOA, MD, XXV, no. 1163 (H. 13 Zilhicce 981/A.D. 13
December 1574).
208
AGS, E 1054, fol. 215 (19 October 1565).
209
BOA, MD, XIII, no. 684 (H. 26 Z. 978/A.D. 21 May 1571).
210
BOA, MD, XVIII, no. 217 (H. 3 979 / A.D. 20 December 1571).

160

orders. Her sick wife got worse with the change of air and his family needed the crowns
help in order to survive during Renzos absence while in mission.211 In 1577, Aurelio
Santa Croce used his 19 year-old daughter to ask for an ayuda de costa which would
relieve his financial troubles. His king would help his daughter marry, as he had done so
with his other daughter before, by conceding this money.212 Even though most of the
times should one take such declarations with a grain of salt,213 some of these spies were
genuinely looking out for their relatives. Jernimo Bucchia asked for a merced for his
widower sister who was financially struggling since his husband died.214 In 1579, the
Habsburg informant on the Ottoman Navy, Juan Briones, asked for the crowns help for
his brother who worked as a scribe for a Spanish noble. He was maltreated and
persecuted on the ground that his mother was a Moro; a slander to the poor woman who
was currently a slave in Algiers and had been born in Tripolis to Christian parents.215
Pedro Brea asked for a merced of 40 ducats for his sons until they reached the age of
service to the king and a special gracia to his oldest son: a reserve spot for the office
capitan de canpana de tierra de lavoro.216 It was not Breas first time asking for a
position for a family member. In 1580, Giovanni Margliani wrote to his superiors to
convince the Bishop of Albegna to allow Pedro Breas brother to be a priest. 217 16 years
later, this time Pedro Brea himself asked for a suitable position in the Church for his

211

AGS, E 1054, fol. 189 (7 September 1565).

AGS, E 1071, fol. 190. He succeeded and was given a merced of 500 ducats. AGS, E 1074, fol. 56 (20
October 1577).
213
The fact that Aurelio wanted the payment to be made secretly without notifying his creditors clearly
demonstrates the credibility (or lack thereof) of this debt-ridden spy, under the suspicion of many financial
irregularities.
214
BNE, Correspondencia del Cardenal Granvela, ms. 7905/168, Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 104-5.
215
AGS, E 1080, fol. 24 (19 February 1579).
216
AGS, E 1094, fols. 231 and 237.
217
AGS, E 1338, fol. 66 (12 November 1580).
212

161

brother who had then become a Franciscan and a doctor in theology. 218 In another
example, Papa Acida secured the office of viceportulano in Messina for his brother.219
Families of the deceased spies also sought state employment, accentuating the fact that a
relative of theirs sacrificed his life in the service of the state, such as the son of Antonio
Barato whose wish to be appointed as either a sansaria in Fontego dei Tedeschi, a
fantaria or a massaria was rejected.220 Finally, the crown could also solve family
members legal problems as it did in 1582 by having Don Cesar de la Maras sons
legitimized.221
The Habsburgs used religious posts as means of reward as well. Giovanni Barelli
was given an encomienda in the order of St. John222 while Martin de Acua was rewarded
with an entrance to that of St. James.223 Sleyman Pashas brother who offered his
services to go to Constantinople for talks of a truce in 1543 was offered the post of a
bishop.224 Jernimo Bucchia went so far as to ask for the intervention of the Habsburg
ambassador in Rome, Diego de Mendoza, to secure the Archbishopric of Ragusa for one
of his relatives, even though in the end he had to settle for his acceptance to the
Dominican congregation in Ragusa.225
Some sought central governments intervention in solving a problem. A slave in
Algiers, Captain Geronimo de Mendoza, for instance, was sending information with the

218

AGS, E 1094, fol. 233 (c. 1596). Although acknowledging the need to compensate his useful services,
the former Viceroy of Sicily still advised against such nepotism. AGS, E 1094, fol. 236. For other similar
examples, see. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 164r-164v (30 June 1571).
219
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 259.
220
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 78v (27 january 1575, m.v.).
221
AGS, E 1527, fols. 100 (4 January 1582) and 129 (6 October 1582).
222
AGS, E 1132, fol. 194 (12 November 1569).
223
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 259.
224
AGS, E 1497, libro E 66, fol. 63 (7 January 1543).
225
BNE, Correspondencia del Cardenal Granvela, ms. 7905/174, ff. 2v-4r; ms. 7905/187, f. 1r; Masi,
Jernimo, 94-7, 143-4.

162

hope that the authorities could exchange him for a Muslim slave.226 In 1563, Philip II
authorized the ransoming of a slave called Esmeradin Calfa from the Knights of St. John
in Malta and fulfilled Giovanni Maria Renzos promise to one of Habsburg informants in
Constantinople called Murad Aa alias Gregorio Bregante.227 A Habsburg informant and
an important figure in Ottoman-Habsburg negotiations, Salomon Ashkenazi was similarly
given compensation for his goods captured by the Sicilian fleet.228 When he asked for the
assoluzione of a Jew who was sentenced to 12 year confinement in Cerigo, he would face
rejection from the Venetian authorities. Even though they held Ashkenazi in high esteem,
the Venetians cited their hesitation to disturb the matters of justice. Nonetheless, they
saw no harm in authorizing the payment of a large sum to appease Ashkenazi.229
A more interesting petition came from the renegades in Constantinople who asked
for the intervention of the Habsburg ambassador in Rome in securing the benediction and
absolution of the Pope, in case they were to die doing their duty in Constantinople.230
Some sought concessions to better their insufficient funds. Marino Zamagni,the Habsburg
resident agent in Ragusa, asked for the concession to carry and sell wheat in Naples in
1539.231 In 1552, Jernimo Bucchia made a similar request. He asked for the concession
of the tratta ordinario to carry 300 carts (carros) of grain and as much wine with the
profit of which he promised to send several spies to Constantinople.232 Grain and wine
trade were lucrative business at the time and it was only natural for spies who had
connections on both sides to ask for similar concessions. Another interesting example in a
226

AGS, E 487, 19 March 1570 and ff.

AGS, E 1056 fol. 56 (28 July 1563).
228
AGS, E 1080, fol. 98 (1 April 1579).
229
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 23r-24r (18, 23, 25 and 30 August 1574).
230
AGS, E 1140, fol. 108. (8 May 1567).
231
AGS, E 1314, fol. 134; his proposal, however, was rejected by the authorities, E 1315, fol.212 (23 May
1539).
232
AGS, E 1044, fol. 40 (8 April 1552).
227

163

similar fashion, even though not from the Mediterranean, is that of the Viscount of Chauz
who was granted the license to pass two horses through the Spanish-French border.233
The following example can tell us the diversity of favours that states could grant.
After the disastrous fire in the Arsenal in 1569, the Council of Ten decided to offer
Lorenzo Cuchini, who offered to denounce the criminals, a series of favours. According
to this, apart from the lump sum money he was to receive, he was also offered a voce
liberar bandito with which he could revoke the bando of anybody who were exiled from
the Venetian possessions, save for those who had certain exceptional conditions.
Furthermore, he would also receive half of the goods to be confiscated from the criminals
he would denounce.234
When states neglected their responsibilities towards their agents, they risked the
efficiency of their intelligence networks and security of their spies. In 1564, Amerigo
Balassa, one of the spies whom the viceroy of Sicily sent to Constantinople, was
frustrated because he was not paid what was due to him. When he decided to take his
vengeance, he offered the Ottoman Grand Admiral to catch Balthasar Prototico in Corfu,
and almost succeeded.235 Another Habsburg spy, sent from Naples to Morea, was furious
because the Viceroy refused him both the safe-conduct to return and his overdue
payments. Furthermore, he had the agents father imprisoned in Naples. Martin de Acua
had to intervene on his behalf to the Habsburg authorities, as the furious agent threatened
to denounce to the Ottomans the special signals (las seas) used by the Habsburg spies in

233

Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu,104.

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 48r-48v (29 December 1569) and 63r-64r (31 march 1570). There was also
an improved offer on the table, three times the money (2000 ducats) and two voci liberar banditi.
235
He went to the nearby island of Zante with a frigate and pretended to have come from Sicily to collect
the letters for the Viceroy. When Prototico was about to fall into the trap and bring the letters personally,
the frigate left the port hurriedly, having seen a Maltese ship coming into the port. AGS, E 1056, fol. 217.
234

164

Constantinople as well as their identities. Fortunately, he was given a safe-conduct to

return to Naples and if the authorities heeded to de Acuas advice, he must have never
returned to the Levant.236
From certain petitions, it is possible to get a grasp of additional assurances the
state employment brought to these spies.
First, spies expected to be taken care of in one way or another in case things were
to go wrong. After having to leave Zante because he was in danger, the Rhodesian
Michel Candi, one of Balthasar Prototicos couriers, petitioned for the crowns help in
settling him and his family in Messina and asked for a tratenimiento in accordance with
his merits in the Kingdom of Sicily.237 States extended their care and protection and
ensured the security of their spies families as well when some misfortune befell them
during a mission in a far away land. For instance, the Duke of Terranova accepted
without hesitation the responsibility of the child which Francisco Peloso entrusted to his
care before he went to the Levant on a dangerous mission.238 Similarly, when he was a
target of Venetian assassins, Michel ernovic entrusted the future of his children to the
care of his employer, the Emperor himself.239 The Venetian Council of Ten was the most
generous. They gave Giovanni Antonio Barata, a potential spy set for the Levant, the
assurance that his family would be well taken care of. His wife and children were to be
given 50 ducats to move to Bergamo where they would live under Venetian protection
with a monthly stipend of 6 ducats for the duration of Baratas mission in the Levant.
This amount could be increased based on the success of his mission. In case of his death,
236

AGS, E 1078, fol. 60, Five letters of Martin de Acua, see 16 and 27 January.
AGS, E 1056, fols.218-220 (c. 1568).
238
AGS, E 1144, fol. 96 (9 August 1575). The mission was to poison Ulu Ali and his captains and set the
imperial powder magazine on fire.
239
Lesure, Michel ernovi, 149.
237

165

this money would become a permanent pension for his wife and children for the duration
of their lives. When he was decapitated in Constantinople shortly after, the Venetian
authorities fulfilled their promise.240 Similarly, the Venetians assured the payment of 200
ducats for one of Giovanni Maria Renzos sons in case the Renzo was to die during his
mission.241
Secondly, the authorities transferred unpaid stipends to the inheritors of the
deceased spies. In 1584, Rodrigo Zapata left a will asking the transfer of his unpaid 4800
ducats to his inheritors, a request which the Viceroy of Naples approached cautiously and
asked for verification.242 More humble amounts met less resistance from the authorities.
It was the Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Francisco de Vera, himself who asked that
the mother and the sister of his Franciscan spy in Constantinople had to be given
satisfaction and paid from extraordinary expenses.243 Similarly in the Ottoman case,
there are examples where sons inherited the timars that their fathers who died while
gathering information left vacant.244
Thirdly, spies could retire on state pension. Even though he was refused the
increase he requested, Don Cesar de la Mara kept his stipend of 200 ducats when,
expelled from Ragusa, he had to retire and settle in the Papal States. 245 Mathias Vicudo,

240

His family was first given 6 ducats as indicated, ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 48r-48v (29 December
1569), 126v-127r (22 January 1570, m.v.), 198r (15 December 1571). Later, with the supplication of the
decaseds wife, this amount was increased to ten. Ibid., reg. 11, cc. 78v (27 january 1575, m.v.).
241
Although a Habsburg agent, Renzo also worked for the Venetians. During his visit to the laguna in
1571, he proposed a plot to incite a rebellion in Narenta as a result of which he would, in cooperation with
the Venetian Captain-General of the Sea, conquer the Ottoman Castelnuovo. The Venetians took the plan
seriously and gave him and two of his accomplices considerable amount of money as well as war materials.
They also assured the security of the families of two other accomplices in case the plan failed and given
that the two did their part. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 160r-160v (10 May 1571); 162r (12 May 1571, 15
May 1571).
242
AGS, E 1087, fol. 244.
243
AGS, E 1348, K 1677, fol. 135 (30 June 1601).
244
BOA, MD, I, nos. 13 and 610.
245
AGS, E 1527, fols. 131 (4 October 1582) and 156 (17 June 1582).

166

another Habsburg resident spy in Ragusa, mentioned his desire to leave the city and enjoy
his jubileo as his age and indispositiones required, hinting that it was time for him to
retire. He had asthma and was limping so bad that it could have moved a tiger to
compassion.246 Giovanni Margliani after having successfully completed his mission and
returned to Madrid, was given a benefice (feudo) in the Duchy of Milan worth 450
escudos per annum; an amount which, after six years of work and 40 months of troubled
residence in Constantinople, did not satisfy the spy-cum-diplomat at all.247
3.6.3. Hardships
In exchange for all these pay-offs, spies had to endure many hardships and perils.
Firstly, states counter-intelligence went to great lengths in order to detect enemy spies,
whom they often punished severely: imprisonment, torture and even execution. Even
when they were operating in the territory of a neutral state such as Venice and Ragusa,
the authorities, aware of the potential problems their activities may cause, expelled them.
During one of his voyages, a spy might contract an illness that would cause much
inconvenience in a far away and hostile land. In 1575, Giovanni Antonio Santa Croce, for
instance, was stuck in Dalmatia for two months when he almost died from an illness.248
Problems created by epidemics that were rampant in early modern cities were further
aggravated by the fact that most of the intelligence activity was concentrated on capitals
and that spies had to travel through trade centers. A spy could easily perish in a plague
epidemic; if he managed to survive, what awaited him on his return would still be the
quarantine, as was the case with the Habsburg spy Miguel Sagui in Corfu.249

246

AGS, E 1517/cuaderno IV, fol. 1 (29 August 1575).

AGS, E 1528, fol. 161 (18 May 1583).
248
AGS, E 1066, fol. 123 (24 February 1575).
249
AGS, E 1047, fol. 163 (6 June 1554).
247

167

Spies were constantly afraid of being denounced by enemy agents or detected by

counter-intelligence mechanisms. However, sometimes personal rivalries among spies in
the same network could create similar problems. These rivalries were more than natural
between spies who had to compete for governments favor and who generally showed no
contempt for unscrupulous means such as assassination, fraud, theft, sabotage and deceit
for reaching their personal ends. Three Habsburg agents that were part of the OttomanHabsburg truce negotiations, Bartolomeo Brutti, Aurelio Santa Croce and Giovanni
Margliani, for instance, fell out with each other. The division among them not only
exasperated the Habsburg authorities who eventually removed Brutti and Santa Croce
from the mission, but also gave leverage to the Ottomans who took advantage of such
divisions in the negotiations. Being left in Naples and out of the negotiation process of a
truce, Santa Croce wrote letters to the Ottomans, denouncing Marglianis conduct and
urging them not to sign the truce without the dispatch of an official ambassador. 250 When
Margliani finally signed the truce, Aurelio complained to the Habsburg authorities about
its content, this time from his prison cell in Madrid where he was because of his debts.251
Similarly, Bartolomeo Brutti on the one hand complained about Margliani to the
Habsburg authorities,252 and on the other tried to sabotage his mission in
Constantinople.253 Two examples of his intrigues would suffice to demonstrate the extent
of the damages these may have caused. When the negotiations are at a deadlock and the
Ottomans refused Margliani the license to return, Brutti offered him to arrange his escape
from the Ottoman capital. When Margliani rejected, he then accused him of planning to

250

AGS, E 1076, fol. 45 (24 October 1577); E 1077, fol. 25 (25 January 1578).
AGS, E 1083, fol. 86 (1581).
252
AGS, E 1337, fol. 21 (10 February 1580).
253
AGS, E 1338, fol. 2 (2 February 1580).
251

168

run away from Constantinople in front of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Sokollu Mehmed
Pasha, in an effort to destroy his reputation.254 In the second example, he told Ulu Alis
slaves that Margliani usurped the money that Philip II gave him to ransom them and
created a tumult in Ulu Alis slave barracks. Margliani, who himself employed a number
of informants in these barracks, was barely saved from the disastrous consequences of
being denounced by one of the infuriated slaves, Gaspar Ligero, when another slave
fought with him.255 There was a similar enmity between Martin de Acua and Pietro
Lanza, the Habsburg corsair-cum-spy in Naples. One of de Acuas men, Fabio Bordon
accused Lanza of informing his arrival to Janina and thus being responsible for the attack
targeting him.256 Among the rank-and-file of intelligence networks, less responsible spies
could even shed each others blood. While a company of five Habsburg spies were
travelling from Constantinople, two of them killed another, an old enemy of theirs, and
then ran away taking two of the best horses. Needless to say, this jeopardized the security
of what was left of the entire company at a time when the Ottomans were searching for
them in every ship.257
3.7.

FAMILIAL CONNECTIONS AND ESPIONAGE

If espionage was about establishing networks, it was natural that familial relations
played an important role in the process. A couple of factors increased the importance of
families in early modern espionage.

254

AGS, E 1080, fols. 44 and 46 (4 July 157 . Margliani was furious: I did not have to write that he was
a traitor no, this is the greatest betrayal in this world.
255
Armed with clubs (palo), the two slaves would almost kill each other if the Habsburg agent Pedro Brea
did not intervene. AGS, E 1338, fol. 5 (29 February 1580).
256
AGS, E 1077, fol. 25 (25 January 1578).
257
AGS, E 1059, fols. 51 and 52 (14 June 1571).

169

First of all, in the early modern Mediterranean there was a general tendency
among the families towards specialization in a profession. This trend became more
apparent when families sought lucrative position in the military and administrative
apparati of empires. Fathers trained their sons from an early age and the latter succeeded
the former. Requests were made to ensure the employment of a kin and such favors were
occasionally granted. It was a prerogative to be employed by central governments, a fact
which spies were aware of as well.
Given that there was no established concept of training in the 16th century, those
who attained the required level of specialization and complex skills of secret diplomacy
from their families had a natural advantage. This was true especially in those cases where
the head of the family was also the head of an intelligence gathering network, such as
Balthasar Prototico who used his sons Anibal and Nicol and his nephew Juan Manioti in
different positions in his network.258 His was not the only family that gathered
information in the Ionian Islands under Venetian control. The Habsburgs employed
others such as Latinos who served in Zante and Venice.259 It was common that a relative
inherited the task of a deceased network leader. This was what happened in 1567 when
Lorenzo Miniati, the Habsburg spymaster in Ragusa, died and his nephew Dino replaced
him.260 Even though Dino was shortly after expelled from the city because of the

258

He also had another nephew, Alexander Manioti who worked for the imperial ambassador in
Constantinople and sent Balthasar regular information. See. AGS, E 1056 fols. 229 and 230 (30 April
1569).
259
Giovanni K. Hassiotis, Venezia e i domini Veneziani tramite di informazioni sui Turchi per gli
Spagnoli nel sec. XVI, in Venezia centro di mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente, secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e
problemi, ed. Hans Georg Beck et al., vol. I, 129. A Zorzi Latino was active in 1617. ASV, IS, b. 416, (28
October 1617).
260
AGS, E 1056, fols. 84 (13 September 1567)

170

Ottoman pressure on Ragusa,261 the Florentine family moved to Otranto and continued
their regular business. In 1571, a Juan Miniati was spying for the Habsburgs in Corfu.262
Apart from the expertise, connections that these families enjoyed in strategic
places were important as well. First of all, some of these families belonged to the local
elite such as the Bucchia family from Cattaro that enjoyed extensive connections in the
coastal cities of Dalmatia under Venetian control. Jer nimos father and cousin were
captains of the Venetian galleys in the region. Two of his relatives became professors of
theology while he himself may have died as the Bishop of Cattaro. 263 One did not have to
come from a local family to establish good relations and important connections. When
Ruggero Margliani, for instance, arrived in Ragusa as an unofficial Habsburg envoy
destined for Constantinople, he was welcomed by the Ragusan authorities in great
enthusiasm. He was even allowed to stay in Archbishops house until he found himself
one, all thanks to his father Giovanni Marglianis connections in the city.264
Certain families used their trade networks in different parts of the Mediterranean
for gathering information. The best example of how merchant families used their
agencies to gather information should be the letters sent by the correspondents of the
House of Fugger, the Fugger zeitungen that brought together information from all
around the world for one of the richest and most influential banker families of the 16th
century.265 There were other families with more modest networks that lent their services
to both empires. These little Fuggers made important contribution not only in information
261

AGS, E 1056, fols. 84 and 118.

Sola, Los que van y vienen, 210.
263
We cannot be sure whether Jernimo Bucchia who died in 1603 as the Bishop of Cattaro was the same
person with our network leader. Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 13, 26-7.
264
The owner was away. AGS, E 1541, fol. 198, (12 November 1591). Giovanni Margliani had a second
son, Ercole, who was also employed by the Habsburgs. AGS, E 1539, fol. 272 (6 May 1587).
265
Klarwill, Fugger Newsletters. See for the authors criticism of some historians who depicted these
newsletters in a fashion almost similar to newspapers, pp. xiii-xix.
262

171

gathering, but also in other aspects of the secret diplomacy in the 16th century
Mediterranean. For instance, five Gasparo Corso brothers each of whom resided in a
different Mediterranean port city such as Valencia, Algiers, Barcelona and Marseille
offered their family networks to central governments employ. These Corsican merchants
not only ran a trade agency between these port cities, but also coordinated diplomacy and
trade between northern Mediterranean and North Africa by engaging in information
gathering, translation of documents, ransoming Christian slaves and the negotiation of
commercial agreements between Europe and North Africa. The brother in Algiers,
Andrea negotiated the defection of a number of important corsairs including Ulu Ali to
the Habsburg side, while Francisco, his brother in Valencia, reported the details of these
negotiations and transmitted the information that he sent to the Habsburg authorities.266
Andrea also befriended the pretender to the Moroccan throne Abdul-Melik who was in
exile in Algiers. When the latter acquired the throne with the Ottoman help in 1576,
Andrea accompanied him to Morocco and became the middleman in his dealings with
Lisbon and Madrid.267 A third brother, Felipe carried information between Algiers and
Barcelona.268
Family members dispersed along the Mediterranean shores were useful as well to
the extent that relatives kept their connections. Another good example of how such
connections could be useful for information gathering is the story of the Ayala family
which consisted of three Mdejar brothers from Malaga. One of them, Alonso de

266

AGS, E 487, passim.

Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Policy (New
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1 81 , 71. When Abdul-Melik died, Andrea was also proposed as the medium
between Philip II and the new Sultan of Morocco, Ahmed al-Mansur, Ibid., 102.
268
AGS, E 487, Bishop of Cuenca to Francesco Gasparo Corso (30 November 1569), AGS E 487 Philip II
to Count of Benavente (30 November 1569).
267

172

Ayala ran away from the Habsburg fortress of Djerba and defected to the Ottoman side to
once again become Muslim in front of the famous corsair, Turgud Reis. After a two year
stay in Tripolis, an Ottoman city since 1551, he went to Constantinople where he got
married with another Mdejar and opened a shop in the Galata quartier. After learning
how to mint coins (larte dargentero/monedero/thesorero) in Trapana, the other brother
Ernando de Ayala ended up in the fortress of la Goleta as a soldier. A third, whose name
is not cited in the document, was a scribe to the commander of the same fortress. Three
brothers set up an intelligence network through which crucial information from la Goleta
flowed to the renegade brother in Constantinople who in turn informed Sokollu Mehmed
and Piyale Pashas. The Habsburgs were caught off guard, only to detect this network
thanks to the warning of the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John in Malta. 269 The
Genoese Franchis family used their trade connections in the service of secret diplomacy
as well. Spy-cum-merchant Francesco de Franchis, not only negotiated for the Genoese in
the Ottoman capital,270 but also tried to start talks between the Ottomans and the
Habsburgs in 1558-9 for a tentative truce, yet in vain.271 In the following years, other
members of the Franchis family performed important functions for both the Habsburgs
and the Venetians.272 Adam de Franchis negotiated the ransoming of Spanish and Italians
who had fallen captive at the Battle of Djerba, and became one of the leaders of the

269

AGS, E 1132, fol. 28 (4 December 1567).

ASG, Costantinopoli, 1.2169.
271
AGS, E 485, Instruction del Rey a Nicol Secco para tratar con el Turco (6 March 1559); E 1323, fols.
232 (6 October 1559), 243-244 (20 de Enero 1559) and 281 (8 April 1559).
272
Sola, Los que van y vienen, 34.
270

173

Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople. His brother, Galeao de Franchis273

and his nephew Francesco Piloso274 also offered their services to Habsburgs authorities.
For those who had relatives in important positions, family connections appeared
as a precious commodity. The Habsburgs employed several agents who offered to
capitalize on their familial connections in Constantinople and Algiers. For example, in
1553, the Habsburg ambassador in Genoa offered the authorities to send Antonio
Salvarezza to Constantinople under the pretense of trading and ransoming slaves where
he in fact would contact his relative, the principal dragoman of the Ottoman Sultan,
Giorgio Salvarezza and send information to the Habsburgs.275 Spy-cum-conspirators
Dionisio and Joan de la Vecchia, who offered Habsburgs, among many things, the
surrender of the Ottoman castle of Scutari,276 were relatives of the Ottoman vizier Ayas
Pasha. The nephew Joan even stayed in the Pashas house in Constantinople. The Pasha
even ironically ordered to the newly appointed governor of the very castle which the two
conspirators tried to surrender to the Habsburgs to favor the uncle Dionisio.277
Some tried to convince their relatives in the Ottoman palace to return to
Christianity. For instance, after having found himself in Constantinople as a prisoner-ofwar, Diego de Mallorca, the Padre Vicario of la Goleta, negotiated in such fashion with
his relatives. He contacted his renegade cousin, Hasan Aa, alias Marco Antonio, the
secretary of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and Hasans mother Leonora Spalleta, a maid of
Piyale Pashas wife, an Ottoman princess. Both expressed their desire to return to

273

AGS, E 1334, fol. 17 (5 March 1575).

AGS, E 1137, fol. 53 (17 March 1572); E 1144, fols. 96 (9 August 1575) and 122 (21 October 1575); E
1145, fol. 54 (9 February 1576).
275
AGS, E 1383, fols. 51 and 113.
276
AGS, E 1310, fols. 76 (29 November 1533) and 195-197; E 1312, fols. 121-122 (11 May 1536).
277
AGS, E 1312, fol. 161 (8 September 1536)
274

174

Christianity and asked Philip IIs intervention in securing the benediction and the
absolution of the Pope.278 Carlo Cicala, the brother of the Ottoman Grand Admiral,
Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha alias Scipione Cicala,279 went to the Levant with
permission from Habsburgs authorities280 in order to enter into negotiations with his
brother. Needless to say, he received instructions from the authorities before he settled in
the island of Chios whence he sent regular information to the Habsburg authorities. 281 He
stayed in the Ottoman Empire for a long time, -he was still negotiating his brothers
defection in 1602,282 making one think that the information he sent justified his presence
in the Levant despite his failure in convincing his brother to return to Christianity.283
The renegade Ottoman grandees also tried to use their familial ties for the sake of
secret diplomacy, proving Krstis point that conversion to Islam in the Ottoman Empire
does not necessarily entail severance with ones former ties.284 Carlo Cicala may have
gone to the Levant to negotiate with his brother; nevertheless, it should not be forgotten
278

AGS, E 1144, fols. 207 and 208 (identical, 24 February 1575) and 209 (24 March 1575). Even though
on the back of the document in fol. 207 reads de la muger de Pialy Bassa, Leonora should be the maid of
Piyales only wife. (According to the Ottoman custom, one had to divorce all his other wives when getting
married to an Ottoman princess, which Piyale did in 1562 Still, someone elses hand added the following
inexplicable statement to the end of the letter: la seora tia del padre vicario [Leonora] juntamente con la
sultana nuestra hermana besan las reales manos de su real alteza. Since he also had a Christian name,
Hasan should have been born as Christian before his mother was brought to Constantinople as a slave.
279
See. Iliaro Rinieri, Clemente VIII e Sinan Bass Cicala (Roma: Civilta Cattolica, 1898); Gaetano Oliva,
Sinan-Bass (Scipione Cicala , celebre rinnegato del secolo XVI, Archivio Storico Messinese Anni VIIIIX (1907-1908): 266-303; Gino Benzoni, Cicala, Scipione (igala-Zade Ysuf Sinn , Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 25 (1981), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/scipione-cicala_(DizionarioBiografico)/
280
The permission was granted after long correspondence between Habsburg authorities. AGS, E 1344 K
1675, fols. 4 (13 September 1590), 8 (8 December 1590), 44 (30 April 1591), 70 (3 July 1591), 125 (16
February 1592) and 150 (12 December 1592); E 1885, fol. 6 (June 1592).
281
Carlo received specific instructions in Venice and Naples. AGS, E 1157, fols. 151 (26 February 1593)
and 152.
282
AGS, E 1160, fols. 116 (9 June 1602), 139 (25 September 1602) and 140 (12 October 1602); E 1885,
fol. 144 (15 December 1602).
283
He had regular access to his brother; at one point Scipione even stayed at his house in Chios with the
Ottoman navy anchored in the port. AGS, E 1158, fol. 26 (3 November 1594). This access allowed him to
send precise information whose quality was exalted by the Viceroy of Naples, the Count Olivares. AGS, E
1158, fol. 30 (30 December 1594).
284
Tijana Krsti, Narrating Conversions to Islam: The Dialogue of Texts and Practices in Early Modern
Ottoman Balkans (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, 2004).

175

that it was Cigalazade who first wanted to see his brother.285 In addition, ironically as
Carlo failed to convert his brother to Christianity, the Ottomans tried to convert Carlo to
Islam as well.286 Theirs was by no means a doomed effort. A nephew of Cigalazade had
already converted and become the kapucba Mustafa Aa, while his mother was in fact
born a Muslim. The daughter of an Ottoman notable from Castelnuovo, she had fallen
captive to corsairs, converted and then got married with the father Cicala, Visconte.287
When he invited his brother, the apple of his eyes, could Cigalazade have thought of
using him as a spy? According to the Venetian documents, even though he refused to
convert, Carlo seems to be well-integrated in Ottoman circles. He was highly esteemed
by the Venetian bailo who agreed to give a letter of reference for his brother-in-law who
would go to Venice with letters written by Scipione.288 The latter not only secured for
Carlo the governorship of the Aegean Archipelago (Naxos , but also used him for his
intelligence activities, resulting in the awkward situation where an Ottoman governor was
recruiting spies in his native Sicily. In 1600, he sailed off from Messina accompanied by
a Genoese spy-cum-ransom agent-cum-military engineer (professor di cose militari) for
Chios. The two stopped in Corfu where the Genoese copied the designs of the fortress to

285

AGS, E 1344 K 1675, fol. 44 (30 April 1591).

The Venetian bailo Marco Venier reported that there were some who asked Mfti whether Carlo could
be forced to convert given that he was born to a Muslim woman. COSP, vol. 9, no. 198 (3 August 1593).
In order to convince Carlo to change his religion, Mehmed Aa, the Sultans favourite, even sent him a
book named Apologia penned by a former Genovese Augustinian friar who himself converted to Islam. The
author was an important person. He was a priest, preacher, theologian and finally a general of the
Augustinians for 3 years and twice the nuncio of Pope Sixtus V in England. AGS, E 1158, fols. 53 (15 June
1595), 55 (30 March 1595) and 62 (10 May 1595). For other Christian clergy who converted to Islam and
wrote similar treatises, narrating the process of their conversion and accentuating the superiority of Islam
over other religions, see. Tjana Krsti, Illuminated by the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ottoman
Sultanate: Self-Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization, Comparative Studies
in Society and History 51/1 (2009): 35-63.
287
Pedani, Veneziani a Costantinopoli, 71-72. Also see. AGS, E 1080, fol. 58 (3 August 1579).
288
BMC, mss. Don delle Rose 147, Lettere di Marco Venier, bailo a Costantinopoli, 1594, letters dated 25
July 1594.
286

176

be given to the Ottomans.289 Cigalazade was not the only renegade who brought a family
member and sought employment opportunities for them. Suleyman Is favourite and
brother-in-law, the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha had both his parents convert to Islam,
secured the governorship of a sandjak near Parga for his father and ensured the induction
of his two brothers to the Palace School (Endern).290 In a similar fashion, the Grand
Admiral Hasan Veneziano was in contact with his family members in Venice. His
brother-in-law came to Constantinople to ask for Hasans reference for the Signoria.
Hasan also brought to his side his cousin Livio Celeste who spied for him, albeit with
poor results. He was caught and imprisoned on several occasions, in Malta, Marseille and
Naples.291 Other similar examples of influential renegades who brought their relatives to
Constantinople for whom they sought to secure important positions in the capital
included the chief of the white eunuch in the Ottoman palace Gazanfer and one of his
aas, mer. 292
One family deserves special attention even though we will return to them in
Chapter Six. The Gritti network that consisted of spies and confidents employed by
Alvise Gritti, became a key component of the Ottoman intelligence during the time of
Ibrahim Pasha (o. 1523-1536 , Alvises protector. The illegitimate son of the Venetian
doge Andrea Gritti (o. 1523-1538) and the mistress he had while he was a grain merchant

289

ASV, IS, b. 460, 25 July 1600.

Eugenio Albri, ed., Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto
(Firenze: Societ Editrice Firoentina, 1855), Serie III, Vol. III, 97 and 103.
291
In his final capture in 1590, Hasan Veneziano woved to roast all the Neapolitan and Spaniards that fell
in his hands alive if the Viceroy of Naples was to kill his cousin. The Viceroy seemed to have taken him
seriously given that Livio returned to Algiers where he died and buried in the trbe of Hasan Veneziano.
Fabris, Hasan il Veneziano, 59-61.
292
For details, see. Pedani, Veneziani a Costantinopoli, 67-84; Dursteler, Renegade Women, Chapters
One and Two. The Venetians were aware of all these, ASV, SDelC, reg. 8, c. 3v (14 Luglio 1590), 32r (15
February 1590, m.v.). There were also other similar examples. ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 19, fol. 81 (16
December 1608).
290

177

in Constantinople, Alvise followed the example of his father who managed to build
important connections in the Ottoman capital, sent regular information to Venice and, at
the absence of an official bailo, negotiated the treaty that ended the 1499-1503 War.293
Alvise left Venice for Constantinople where he befriended, obviously capitalizing on his
fathers connections in the city, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and even Sultan
Suleyman. Engaging in the game of high politics, he used his connections on both sides
of the Mediterranean and lent his personal network to the Ottoman service. Although his
father, a war hero and the Doge of Venice, was never comfortable with his sons
influential position in Constantinople,294 Alvise refused to return to Venice and stayed in
Constantinople where he seemed to have other members from his family by his side. His
son Antonio was along his side in his adventures in Hungary,295 while his brothers, Zorzi
and Lorenzo, were a part of his network of intelligence and diplomacy and, after Alvises
death, still influential diplomatic mediators between the Ottomans and the Venetians.
Among other participants of secret diplomacy, certain families gained
prominence, once again attesting to the importance of familial relations and patronage in
the early modern military and administrative structures. The families of Prez and
Idi quez dominated the prestigious and influential office of secretary of state for
decades. Gonzalo Prez, the secretary of Charles V since 1543, trained his son Antonio
293

J.C. Davis, Shipping and spying in the early career of a Venetian doge, 14 6-1502, Studi Veneziani
XVI (1974): 97-108. Andrea was also sent as an ambassador to Constantinople for the final ratification of
the treaty. Obviously the Serenissima was trying to capitalize on la gratia che ha[i] appresso quelli
signori. For the instructions given to him and the letters he sent to Venice during his voyage to and stay in
Constantinople in 1503, see the first two parts of the BNM, IT. VII. 878 (8652) Andrea Gritti, Copialettere.
294
For correspondence between the father and the son, see. ASV, SDC, fil. 1-A, the separate folder entitled
lettere di Alvise Gritti al padre Andrea Doge, da Costantinopoli, fols.1-9 (1525). Not that Andrea Gritti
refrained from using his sons influential position in the Ottoman capital for solving Venices problems.
For instance, in 1533, a year of bad harvest and penuria di grano, he asked for his sons mediation for the
Sultans permission for Venetian ships to import grain from the Ottoman Empire. Francesco della Valle,
Vita di Alvise Gritti, Biblioteca Marciana, It VI 122 (6211), cc. 19r-20r.
295
Francesco della Valle, Vita di Alvise Gritti, Biblioteca Marciana, It VI 122 (6211), Mss. Italiani, Serie
VI, 122 (6211), ff. but especially 12v, 18r.

178

who succeeded him a year after his death in 1566. After Antonios fall in 1579, another
family took the reins of the office. Juan de Idiquez, the former ambassador to Venice
and the son of Charles Vs secretary Alonso de Idi quez, replaced him. When he decided
to retire, two of his relatives resumed his tasks. Francisco took charge of those regarding
the Mediterranean and Martin, those concerning Flanders.
In the transmission of news, an important component of information gathering,
certain families dominated the scene as well. De Tassis family that had been organizing
the couriers between Spain and other Habsburg lands since 1505, monopolized the office
of Correo Mayor General after Charles V ratified their asiento in 1516. Members of this
family served the crown in other capacities as well, such as that of an ambassador. Juan
Baptista de Tassis negotiated the Treaty of Vervins and defended the interests of his king
in Paris for years. Another family who specialized in carrying correspondence was the
Balaban family that took charge of carrying Habsburg correspondence between Lyon and
Madrid.296 The veteran Habsburg courier between Constantinople and Naples, Giovanni
Stefano Ferrari also had a brother Giovanni who was receiving the letter his brother sent
from Constantinople to Venice.297
The training that a family member could provide was unsurprisingly a decisive
factor in the demanding science of cryptography. The remarkable family of cryptologists,
the Argenti, monopolized the office of cipher secretaryship of the Papal States and left
their impress upon cryptology in spite of remaining in office for less than 20 years.298
The remarkable talent of cipher secretary Zuanne Francesco Marin persuaded the Council
of Ten to order him to train his son, who would share his natural inclination to
296

AGS, E 1344 K 1675, fols. 66, 74 (13 July 1591) and 89 (16 August 1591).
AGS, E 1539, fol. 276 (1 April 1587).
298
Kahn, Codebreakers, 112-3.
297

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cryptography, alongside his nephew.299 The Marin family would occupy the position of
cifrista for generations.300 When a talented cifrista died and the burden of his family fell
upon the states shoulders, it was a common practice of the Council of Ten to secure a
place for his underage sons in the Venetian chancellery with special provisions, hinting at
their belief that the fathers talent would pass to his sons as well.301

299

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 77v (25 January 1575, m.v.), 117v-118r (8 January 1576, m.v.), 142r142v (23 October 1577). Both the son and the nephew successfully passed their exams and inducted among
the secretaries of cipher when they reached the age of twenty-five. Ibid., reg. 13, cc. 61v-62r (27 August
1587), 82r-82v (23 January 1590). Tabelle nominative e cronologiche dei segretari della Cancelleria
Ducale, (BNM, IT. VII. 1667 (8459)) gives us a complete picture of the careers of the members of the
Marin family as well as many other secretarial families such as Cavazzo, Milledonne and Assanocia (for
the family tree of the latter, see fol. 1v) that have filled the ranks of the secretaries of the Venetian Ducal
Chancellery. The founder of the family, Alvise Marin del Zuanne, became a Secretario Estraordinario on
24 February 1496, m.v., and was promoted first to Secretario Ordinario on 17 September 1505 and then to
Secretario di Pregadi on 12 June 1510 (fol. 4v . Alvises brother, Marin Marin became a Secretario
Estraordinario on 11 August 1498 and Secretario Ordinario on 30 April 1513 (fol. 4v). Alvise had two
sons who managed to enter the Chancellery. Zuanne Francesco Marin, the afore-mentioned cifrista, became
a Secretario Estraordinario on 21 August 1532, a Secretario Ordinario on 29 December 1534, a Secretario
di Pregadi on 30 December 1545, and finally a Secretario di Consiglio di Dieci, on 29 December 1572 (fol.
6r), the second-highest ranking position in the hierarchy of the Ducal Chancellery, the highest being the
Cancellier Grande. The other son was less successful. Ferigo Marin could not reach further than a
Secretario Estraordinario (fol. 6v, 18 June 1544). Zuanne Francesco Marin also had three secretary sons.
Alvise Marin became a Secretario Estraordinario on 22 September 1561 and a Secretario Ordinario on 20
February 1565, m.v. (fol. 7v), while Zuanne remained a Estraordinario without a promotion (fol. 8r, 27
June 1571). The afore-mentioned Ferigo Marin whom the father was supposed to train as a cifrista, had a
more successful career than his brothers, demonstrating us the benefits of the art of cavar la ziffra (Note
that the Zuanne Francesco Marin was also more successful than both his father and brother) Ferigo became
a Secretario Estraordinario on 25 January 1575, a Secretario Ordinario on 23 September 1577 and a
Secretario di Pregadi on 22 August 158 (fol. 8r . Zuanne Francescos second student, the nephew Alvise
became a Secretario Estraordinario on 23 November 1576 and Secretario Ordinario on 29 November
1590 (fol. 8v). Ferigo also secured for his sons two secretarial positions: Zuanne Francesco became a
Secretario Estraordinario (fol. 10r, 23 July 1607) and Antonio became a Secretario Estraordinario on 24
November 1608 and Secretario Ordinario on 9 June 1616 (fol. 10r). For other members of the family, see.
fols. 8v and 12v.
300
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 276.
301
When a teacher of cifra, Agostin Amadi (not a ducal secretary) died and left his wife and two underage
sons to the care of Serenissima, the Council of Ten decided to employ his sons as secretaries when they
reached the age of fifteen. They would not be examined with standard examination, however, but with the
esame alla zifra since the Council of Ten expected at least one of these would be inducted among the
cifristas. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 13, cc. 48r-49v (10 and 16 March 1588). One of these under-aged sons,
Piero would be trained by Girolamo de Franceschi as a cifrista and would be inducted among the Secretari
Estraordinarii on 29 Nov 1591, to be a Secretario Ordinario on 30 July1602 and a Secretario di Pregadi
on 22 November 1610, ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 13, cc. 73v (18 June 1590). BNM, IT. VII. 1667 (8459),
Tabelle nominative e cronologiche dei segretari della Cancelleria Ducale, fol. 9r. Given that Venice was
an oligarchy based on a close caste system; could the patricians in charge of the Council of Ten have
intended to distinguish their secretaries from the rest of the populace by supporting their familial
specialization? Vivo, Information and Communication, 51, fn. 31.

180

In the Ottoman Empire as well, certain families specialized in diplomacy and

chancellery methods. Careers of the families in foreign ambassadors employ which can
easily be tracked down have a demonstrative value. The Brutti family appears as the best
example of how families can benefit to a surprising extent from their specialization and
familiarity with the bureaucracy as well as diplomatic customs of early modern states.
One of the members of the family, Bartolomeo Brutti, had the most interesting career.
Coming from a family whose origins went back to Durazzo and whose members served
in the Venetian military, Bartolomeo entered the service of the bailo in Constantinople as
a giovane di lingua, an apprentice dragoman schooled in the Venetian bailos house to
learn Turkish. After two short spells, he decided that being a dragoman was not his cup of
tea,302 and left his post to make himself a ransom agent. He ransomed important members
of the Ottoman elite who had fallen captive at the Battle of Lepanto. Then he became a
part of the Habsburg intelligence network in the Levant and conspired with the
Habsburgs for the surrender of Algiers with the help of its former governor-general
Mehmed Pasha (the son of the famous Salih Reis) whom he had ransomed from
Rome.303 He also accompanied the Habsburg envoy Giovanni Margliani from Naples to
Constantinople to help him negotiate a truce with the Ottomans. Later in 1579, when he
fell out with Margliani and the Habsburgs were no more interested in his services, he left
Constantinople with the new prince of Moldavia, Iancu Sasul, whose release from the
exile in Rhodes and the appointment to the principality he himself secured from the
Sultan with the help of his kin Sinan Pasha, to the great chagrin of Sokollu Mehmed

302

ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 5, fol. 11 (2 August 1576).

AGS, E 488, Mahamet Pasha to Philip II (21 June 1576). ASV, SDelC, reg. 4, cc. 101r-101v (18 March
1575). ASV, SDC, fil. 8, c. 20 (12 March 1575).
303

181

Pasha who supported a rival candidate.304 Despite Bartolomeos poor performance as a

giovane di lingua, the familys kinship relationship with Sinan Pasha convinced the
Council of Ten to authorize the induction of his brother Christoforo among the giovani di
lingua.305 Before he set for Moldavia where he became an influential statesman and at
one point his princes ambassador to Constantinople, Bartolomeo managed to make his
son a giovane di lingua as well.306 Furthermore, one of his brothers, Benedetto, was in
Aurelio Santa Croces entourage when the latter came to Naples in order to start the
negotiations for an Ottoman-Habsburg truce.307 Bartolomeo finished his interesting career
in Ottoman service and became the Ottoman envoy to Poland in 1590, again thanks to
Sinan Pasha.308 Other members of the family followed the suit and worked for the
Venetians not only as translators but also as envoys and diplomats. The choice of the
Brutti family to enter into familial relationship through marriages with other families that
also served as dragomans for foreign ambassadors demonstrates us the importance of
family networks even more blatantly.309 Among the members of the Habsburg spies in
Constantinople, it is possible to find dragomans in the employ of other states
ambassadors, such as Matheo dal Faro, the dragoman of the imperial ambassador, who
contributed to the efficiency of the Habsburg intelligence network that was led by his
304

AGS, E 1080 fols. 44 (4 July 1579), 46 (4 July 1569), 47 (18 July 1579), 59 (3 August 1579), 60 (11
August 1579), 61 (18 August 1579); E 1085, fol. 81. ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 5, fol. 113. For more
information about the Brutti family, see. Luca, Dacoromano-Italica, 107-128.
304
AGS, E 486, Battista Ferraro, Gregorio Bergante, Simon Massa, (20 Aprile 1567); E 1056 fol. 43.
305
ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 6, fol. 1 (5 March 1581). Cristoforo would undertake important diplomatic tasks
for both Venetians and the Moldavans.
306
Francesca Lucchetta, La scuola dei giovani di lingua veneti nei secoli XVI e XVII, Quaderni di
studi arabici 7 (1989): 19-40. It was an accepted tradition for the dragomans in the Venetian bailos service
to propose their kins as potential interpreters. Cristian Luca, Documentary Notes Relative to the Kinships
of Levantines and Venetians with the Princely Families from Wallachia and Moldavia (16 th-17th Centuries),
in Romnii n Europa medieval : ntre Orientul bizantin i Occidentul latin : studii n onoarea
profesorului Victor Spinei, eds. Dumitru Teicu and Victor Spinei (Br ila : Ed. Istros, 2008 , 663.
307
AGS, E 1073, fol. 157 (25 October 1577).
308
ASV, IS, b. 416 (4 September 1590).
309
Rothman, Between Venice and Istanbul, Chapter 6.

182

father-in-law Aurelio Santa Croce.310 Aurelios brother, Giovanni Antonio, was also a
part of the network. He carried letters between Naples and Constantinople.311
Close personal ties that could be exploited in the service of information gathering
did not always come from familial ties. We had already demonstrated how Yunus Bey
tried to use his native Antonio de Modone to start negotiations for a truce between the
Ottomans and the Venetians in 1539. In a similar fashion, friendships can be presumed to
provide an important rapport between people from opposite sides. Childhood friends, the
Ottoman Grand Admiral, Hasan Veneziano and the Venetian bailo, Lorenzo Bernardo,
have benefitted from such a rapport. Ulu Ali similarly could have relied on his old
acquaintances, even though these came from humbler backgrounds. The Habsburgs
recruited a childhood friend, Juan Baptista Ganzuga, to negotiate his defection in 1569.312
In 1555, a Habsburg spy from Zante also offered to send an agent to Morea where he
would use his friendship with the Ottoman Governor of Morea to learn crucial
information.313
3.8.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I tried to engage in a sociological study of spies that operated in

the 16th-century Mediterranean and study in detail espionage as a profession. This chapter
calls for a necessary distinction between secret services that central governments
established and spies that they employed and accentuates the fact that a spy was not an
extension of the administrative and military apparati of central governments.Therefore, it

310

AGS, E 1064, fol. 136 (17 February 1574); For Matheo and Aurelios daughters wedding, see. Gerlach,
Trkiye Gnl, vol, I, 278-281.
311
AGS, E 1064, fol. 136. (17 March 1574).
312
AGS, E 487, Relacin que hiz el theseorero Alonso Sanchez; E 487, the Duke of Alcala, Naples, 18
March 1569.
313
AGS, E 1123, fol. 106 (20 November 155).

183

focuses on spies that operated in the Mediterranean rather than those that operated on
behalf of a given government; in short, Mediterranean spies is a better unit of analysis
than spies of Philip II, the title of Garca and Marcos work.314
Given that the early modern espionage was not a profession per se, men of diverse
professional and social backgrounds filled the ranks of spies at central governments
employ. This chapter explained how each group in this recruitment pool had specific
advantages that granted its members easier access to information and contact with key
officials, main sources of information. Furthermore, I concentrated on other agents of
secret diplomacy, instrumental spies,315 such as ambassadors, secretaries, translators
and other auxiliaries without whose contributions crucial stages between gathering
information and political action could not have been realized.
Then I tried to give a picture of what constituted an able spy, i.e., what kind of
background and skills central governments expected them to have. I argued that even
though early modern espionage was a highly specialized trade whose agents had to
engage in several complex methods during their operations, most of the potential spies in
the recruitment pool fell short of central governments expectations. Special skills
required from spies on the one hand and the lack of a formal training on the other created
a supply problem for central governments that had already gradually started to train their
officials and soldiers and had constantly been expanding their influence in political,
military and social sphere in the 16th century. Exigencies of secret diplomacy as well as
the impediments that spies had to overcome while operating on the field, crossing the
frontiers, evading enemy counter-intelligence, penetrating to the state secrets,

314
315

Garca and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II.

Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 81.

184

transmitting information, engaging in assassination and sabotage resulted in

specialization and the monopoly of the profession in the hands of a group of people that
came from similar social and professional backgrounds. In the end, central governments
were aware of the limitations of the recruitment pool and the common characteristics of a
good spy. Their social (familial and professional networks) and cultural (linguistic
knowledge and cultural familiarity) capital316 as well as their ability to master the codes
of both empires rendered them as expert information brokers and ideal intermediaries.
They were the ones who offered themselves willingly and from among whom the central
governments had to choose their spies, going to great lengths not to fall victim to
embezzlement in the hands of these Mediterranean go-betweens, able negotiators and
astute entrepreneurs.
The relationship between the central government and the spies in their employ
was a difficult one. I believe I made a compelling case for the entrepreneurial nature of
early modern espionage by demonstrating how our information brokers were mostly
motivated by personal interests and financial betterment. Realizing the benefits of state
employment, these developed different strategies to make the most of this opportunity. In
addition to regular financial benefits which they tried to increase by introducing several
inventions, they also petitioned their employers for several favours for themselves and
their families.
Finally, networks around the kinship relations proved to be a key factor in the
world of secret diplomacy. Following a general trend of the time, some families

316

For a discussion of social and cultural capitals, see. Pierre Bourdieu, konomisches Kapital, kulturelles
Kapital, soziales Kapital. in Soziale Ungleichheiten, ed. Reinhard Kreckel, (Goettingen: Otto Schartz &
Co., 1983), 183- 8 reprinted in English in 1 86, The forms of capital, in Handbook of Theory and
Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 241-258.

185

specialized in different trades related to different aspects of secret diplomacy such as

spies, spymasters, couriers, cryptologists, translators and secretaries. Given the lack of
the concept of training at the time, states found themselves compelled to hire among
those who attained the required level of specialization and learned the complexity of the
methods of secret diplomacy at an early age from a relative. Furthermore, familial
connections brought other advantages in the form of social capital, crucial for operations
of information gathering: key political connections, trade networks, kinship relations in
different localities, and the like.

186

CHAPTER FOUR
THE HABSBURG SECRET SERVICE IN THE LEVANT

4.1.

INTRODUCTION: EFFORTS OF CENTRALIZATION

This chapter deals with the Habsburg secret service in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Throughout the 16th century, the Habsburg secret service underwent a slow process of
evolution into an institutionalized apparatus at the service of the central government. In a
process that accelerated, albeit hardly completed at the turn of the 17th century, the
Habsburg administrators introduced methods and regulations by which they sought to
centralize their secret services, an effort which faced logistical, technological and
financial difficulties as well as the resistance of the practical nature of espionage. The
extent to which these efforts of centralization, institutionalization and standardization
succeeded is one of the subjects of this chapter.
To this end, I will outline the structure of the Habsburg secret diplomacy. After a
brief summary of its general organization, I will more specifically concentrate on the role
that the Habsburg officials in the provinces played and argue that this role was more
significant in the case of the Habsburg secret service in the Levant given the distance
between Madrid and Constantinople as well as the hostile environment of the
Mediterranean borderlands due to the imperial clash between the Ottomans and the
Habsburgs. The lack of open diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and the
Habsburgs rendered the flow of regular and reliable information difficult. I will discuss
the methods and means employed in order to overcome the harsh conditions of the
187

Ottoman-Habsburg frontier and solve problems of communication, coordination and

transmission. I will then describe the components of the Habsburg secret service, i.e.,
separate intelligence networks that operated in the Levant and other sources of
information on things Ottoman. Finally, I will discuss the financial details of secret
diplomacy and the inevitable conflict between the authorities facing chronic budgetary
problems and entrepreneur spies who constantly sought to embezzle governments.
Finally, I will deliberate on the overall efficiency of the Habsburg secret service
in the Eastern Mediterranean. I will argue that the Habsburg secret service had specific
objectives in the Levant, in accordance with the Habsburg strategy vis--vis the Ottoman
Empire. Given that the Habsburg sphere of influence laid rather in the Western instead of
the Eastern Mediterranean and that the Habsburgs remained on the defense against the
Ottomans, Madrid, Naples and Messina were interested in a specific type of information,
those regarding the military preparations in the Ottoman Arsenal, the destination of the
Ottoman navy and the results of Ottoman wars in other frontiers. The Habsburg officers,
unlike their Venetian counterparts, neither showed, nor had any reason to show, any
interest in engaging in a detailed study of the Ottoman state, society, culture and
economy.
4.2.

THE HABSBURG CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

A large number of officials were required to govern the 16th century Habsburg
Empire, mostly because of its quick expansion due to the discovery of the New World
and the addition of new territories after the enthronement of Charles V. New bureaucratic
methods and administrative procedures gradually prevailed in the court as the number of
royal secretaries increased, a permanent capital was selected, a number of advisory

188

councils were formed, the state archives were instituted and, in an arduous task of
producing a large and encyclopaedic corpus of information1 on the realms of the
monarchy, several geographical and demographic surveys were prepared. With this
process of bureaucratization that started in the 1520s and continued throughout the 16th
century, the crown sought to assume a number of responsibilities in order to govern more
efficiently and expand its sphere of influence. Secret Diplomacy was well within the
boundaries of this sphere.
As the very head of the system, the king himself demonstrated a keen interest in
secret diplomacy. Even though the last word in all matters always belonged to the king,
his role in the conduct of secret diplomacy was more than that, at least in the case of
Philip II who, in every step of an operation, was an active participant. He was the one
who authorized the recruitment of agents, approved their stipends as well as the
allocation of secret payments, determined the usage and the change of the cipher,
coordinated information, gave instructions for the transmission of news and chose the
precautions and security measures to be used for intelligence and counter-intelligence.2
A small number of advisers participated in the decision-making process, via the
advisory councils which the Grand Chancellor Gattinaras reforms in the 1520s reorganized along the following lines. In an effort to advise Charles V and make up for his
long absences in the Iberian Peninsula, a number of new Councils, Consejos, were added
to the existing ones, divided broadly in two groups. The first group comprised those that
dealt with the entire empire with a thematic focus, such as the Council of Inquisition
(1483), Council of Orders (1495), Council of Cruzada (1509), Council of War (c. 1517),

1
2

Henry Kamen, Philip of Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 238.
Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 81.

189

Council of State (1522) and Council of Finance (1523). In the second group, there were
councils with specific territorial foci, such as the Council of Castile (1480), Council of
Aragon (1494), Council of Indies (1524), Council of Italy (1555), Council of Portugal
(1582) and Council of Flanders (1588). Decisions and policies regarding different fields
such as war, diplomacy and economy as well as different realms of the monarchy were
discussed by the members of the relevant council. The result of these discussions was
presented in the written form of consulta to the King who did not generally attend the
sessions to leave his councillors in relative freedom and autonomy.3 These consultas,
albeit advisory, influenced the crowns policy decisively.
The most important Council for our purposes was the Council of the State
(Consejo de Estado). Originally lacking a specific description of duties and
responsibilities, it started to deal with the important issues regarding the Monarchy and
the relations with foreign powers. The only council directly presided by the King, it had
the control of embassies in European capitals. Furthermore, all the ciphered letters that
the provincial officials, be they ambassadors, viceroys or governor-generals, sent to the
capital, had to be directed to this Council.4 Expertise in diplomacy and secret diplomacy
was an essential factor for being a part of this council; several of its members had
experiences as viceroys, military commanders and most importantly ambassadors and by
extension spymasters.
During the final years of Philip IIs reign, however, a newly created institution,
the Junta de Estado, took over these councils various responsibilities including the
conduct of foreign affairs and became a clearing house for the consultas produced by
3

Feliciano Barrios, El Consejo de Estado de la monarqua espaola, 1521-1812 (Madrid: Consejo de

Estado, 1984), 95.
4
Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 52.

190

various councils. The Prudent Kings ailing health convinced him to rely exclusively on
this Junta that was composed of his three immediate advisors (thus it was also called
Junta de Tres) with the addition of his personal secretary, Mateo Vzquez and which met
during the night (hence the name, Junta de Noche). Even though it was abolished with
the death of Philip II, councils could not regain their former prominence. In an effort to
prevent the intervention of the aristocratic magnates who managed to penetrate into the
councils from which they had been successfully barred by Charles V and Philip II, the
Duke of Lerma, Philip IIIs favourite, preferred to go on without these councils. He
instead instituted special juntas, small committees of ministers, operating independent of
the councils.
Working in tandem with these councils were secretaries who, by their meticulous
work, assured the well-functioning of the system and the expansion of the central
governments sphere of influence. Given Philip IIs habit of relying on a small number of
confidants and therefore circumventing the Council of State, these secretaries
furthermore increased their power. They not only provided the link between the monarch
and the councils; but also made crucial decisions regarding the functioning of these
councils, i.e., when to convene, which issues to lay down for discussion and which
information to relate to the members of the council. Some, such as the Secretary of the
State Antonio Prez, even directly participated in high politics as a member of one of the
two factions that vied for power in the court. From recruitment to transmission, from
deciphering to financing, on every level of secret diplomacy, these secretaries were the
real head of the Habsburg secret services, for as mentioned in Chapter Three, only their
expertise and longevity in office could provide the necessary continuation and efficiency.

191

Therefore, it is not surprising to see among the secretaries of state those with experiences
in secret diplomacy, such as Juan de Idiquez, who supported and supervised several
Habsburg agents during his tenure as the ambassador in Genoa and Venice.
4.2.1. Centralizing tendencies
Let us now concentrate on the methods, regulations, practices and institutions by
which the crown sought to centralize secret diplomacy.
4.2.1.1.

Centralization of information

First, the king and his advisers insisted upon the centrality of Madrid toward
which all the correspondence should flow. In an effort to monopolize the information,
Philip II was anxious to receive all the available information in order to make sure the
best decision had been made. This diligence should explain his habit of procrastination of
decisions. His secretaries of the State should have the control of incoming information
and even the members of Councils were not allowed to intermingle. After the creation of
the Council of Italy, its members were explicitly warned that they should not intervene
with the affairs that fell within the secretary of the States sphere of influence, i.e., the
correspondence of Habsburg officials in the provinces with officials of other provinces as
well as with foreign princes, states and ambassadors. Later in 1620, factional concerns in
the capital resulted in the banning of the correspondence between Habsburg officers in
the provinces. The viceroys, governor-Generals and ambassadors should not
communicate with each other due to the evident danger this may have caused for the
ruling faction in the capital they may conspire against the Kings favourite, the valido.5

Hugon, lInformation dans la Politique trangres, 33-4. On the importance of favourites in 17th
century Spain, see. Antonio Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

192

4.2.1.2.

Centralization of Transmission of State Correspondence

Secondly, the Habsburg central government established an institutionalized postal

service and closely monitored the transmission of state correspondence. A centralized
position under the name of the Grand Master of hosts and couriers had already been
institutionalized in 1477 by the Catholic Kings. In 1505, the Tassis family took control of
the post, then called the Correo Mayor General (The General Grand Courier). The family
guaranteed the crown reliable and regular transmission of correspondence (post stations
at regular intervals with two horses) in exchange for a lucrative lease contract. When the
young Charles V acquired the crowns of Castile and Aragon in 1516, he made a contract
with the Tassis, worth 6.500 ducats, hinting that from the beginning he was well aware of
the problem of coordination and correspondence that awaited him in his empire
composed of scattered possessions.6 The Tassis family retained the control of the post for
generations and created a complex system nominating correo mayores in major cities.7
With several regional agencies throughout Europe, they contributed to the Habsburg
efforts to standardize and institutionalize state correspondence.
State postal service provided regularity, but not unity. In spite of the capitals
warnings, several extraordinary couriers were used by the Habsburg authorities in the
provinces and embassies. Furthermore, this system offered little to the public. Big private
6

Juan Caramazana, Asiento con Baptista y Maffeo de Taxis sobre los Correos del Imperio: 1517, Dicembre
20, Valladolid, Archivo General de Simancas: edicin facsmil (Madrid: CTA Auditores y Ars Millenii,
2000).
7
The system was hierarchically organized in Madrid and the secretary of the state was also that of
Despacho Universal, the correspondence coming from the Habsburg provinces in all parts of the world. At
large towns, there was a correo mayor. Most of these were family members, while in certain occasions, the
family chose to lease out. The distance between two stations varied between 5 and 24 kilometers and below
the correo mayor came maestros de postas who had several responsibilities: The reception and distribution
of dispatches, the provisioning of horses and military equipment for couriers, the compiling of a register of
incoming and outgoing correspondence, delays and their reasons. At his command there were a number of
men, called postillones, who took the package from the courier to distribute the letters immediately to
their recipients. Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 202-3.

193

postal systems such as the Antwerp mail of the Genoese banking family of Affaitadi
existed and even surpassed the royal postal services efficiency. 8 The volume of the
public correspondence, triggered by the flourishing trade and the intensified relations of
international finance, convinced the Habsburgs to declare their postal service in the Low
Countries, open to the public in 1551.9 Later Philip II would lay his hands on the public
postal service as well and create the ordinary courier in order to assure a constant flow of
information. Its creation not only served the merchants and private figures anxious to
send their letters but also intensified the communication between the center and its
ambassadors, viceroys and governor-generals who could now rely on a regular system.
The Habsburg ambassador in Venice for instance assured the center of the benefits of the
system which allowed him to communicate only the most pressing matters with special
couriers and thus save money.10
In spite of irregularities and shortcomings, the crown could extend its information
gathering networks and make use of information in a better way, thanks to this
institutionalized postal service. Considering the hands-on-approach of the Prudent
King, the efficient functioning of the Habsburg secret service depended upon reliable
transmission of news and the consequent solution of problem of coordination between the
center and the Habsburg officials in the provinces. For otherwise, the gathered
information, no matter its accuracy, could not be a part of the decision-making process
and would produce little direct political benefit.

John B. Allen, Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1972), 9.
9
J. Devos, La poste au service des diplomates espagnols accr dit s auprs des Cours dAngleterre et de
France, 1555-15 8, Bulletin de la Commission Royale dHistoire CIII (1938), 216.
10
AGS, E 1329, fol. 64 (14 June 1577).

194

This centralization was also an attempt to supervise all the correspondence and
regulate the flow of information as a part of counter-intelligence efforts. For instance,
until 1582, parallel to the state postal service, there was also a private courier service at
the hands of merchants in Milan. Considering that these couriers could be a useful tool
for enemy secret services, the Governor banned them. In Naples, the Viceroy, in a similar
spirit, proclaimed that no private courier should be dispatched without royal license.11
4.2.1.3.

Centralization of intelligence networks

The centralization and the institutionalization of the Habsburg secret diplomacy

was a slow process. Before the de-facto appearance of the office of The Grand Spy
(Espia Mayor in the final years of Philip IIs reign, no ad-hoc state institution in charge
of Habsburg secret diplomacy existed. Still, the center tried to keep intelligence networks
and clandestine operations in the provinces under close surveillance.
First of all, the center insisted on keeping a close eye on potential spies right from
the beginning, their recruitment. Especially secretaries of state such as Prez and Idiquez
paid special attention to the quality of potential spies and examined those whom they
personally recruited. In the provinces, it was the viceroys and ambassadors who recruited
informants and spies on their own volition and choice. Nonetheless, central authorities
still sought to retain the last word in the recruitment process. Most of the time, provincial
authorities role was relegated to recommendation to the center which recruited the spy
and determined his stipend.
Secondly, payments related to the secret diplomacy, or gastos secretos
constituted the major part of the extraordinary expenses that were reserved for wages,
couriers, bribes, presents, charities and obviously information gathering. These were
11

Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 220.

195

authorized directly by the king and the amount was generally transmitted by the
authorities of the Treasury (Hacienda), even though in our case, payments were
occasionally made from the provincial treasuries of Naples and Sicily. The recipient of
these extraordinary expenditures could use this money to whatever end, without having to
give a formal justification to the Treasury.12 He was only responsible to the King.
Provincial authorities had to inform the center before undertaking clandestine
operations that required money for the simple reason that they need the authorization of
the Treasury. Even though the extent of the centers involvement in the details of the
operation was still limited in most cases, there was also direct communication between
the members of remote intelligence networks and the authorities in the center, sometimes
by-passing provincial authorities. For instance, Brutti and Marglianis mission to
negotiate a truce with the Ottomans had been kept away from the Viceroy of Naples who
was hostile to the idea of a truce with the infidel. Even though the two travelled to
Constantinople via Naples, the Viceroy could not learn the true content of their mission
and found himself totally excluded from the rest of the negotiations. Discontented spies
could directly contact central authorities as well. For instance, Nicol Prototico, the son
of the leader of the Habsburg intelligence network in the Ionian Islands, travelled to
Madrid in order to ask for more money and even tried to embezzle the central
government by forging documents with the help of Per zs page. To this story, however,
we shall return later.

12

There were exceptions. The officials of the Treasury investigated these extraordinary expenditures when
there were suspicions of embezzlement. For instance, the ambassador to London, Bernardino de Mendoza
and the Captain-General of Oran, Tremecen and Mazalquivir, Martin de Crdoba had to endure such
invasive investigations. Ibid., 376-8.

196

In order to regulate intelligence activity, the Habsburgs imposed uniform

regulations and methods. A very good example of this is the establishment of the office
of the Superintendente de las inteligencias secretas or shortly, the Grand Spy, Espia
Mayor. Even though this office existed de-facto since the final years of Philip IIs reign,
it was officially created in 1613 in order to synchronize the actions of different
intelligence networks, solve the problems of coordination between these networks and the
Habsburg authorities and better regulate financial matters, often reasons of conflict
between the agents and the authorities. Even though it is an explicit proof of state efforts
to centralize and institutionalize secret diplomacy, this office will be of limited
importance for our case as its sphere of influence mostly could not extend beyond the
Iberian Peninsula and the Low Countries, definitely not as far as the Levant. It will lose
its political relevance and will be an honorific title after the middle of the 1620s for
reasons unexplained.13 This last point is also important in demonstrating us that the state
efforts of centralization is not necessarily a marche en avant and a linear progress of
constructing a modern state without setbacks, but rather a course of ups and downs.14
The Habsburg also created a number of regulations regulating the intelligence
activity, such as the regulation that was promulgated in the Kingdom of Sicily,
concerning vagabonds, foreigners, drunkards and spies and explaining the duties and
responsibilities of royal censors who had to fight these problematic elements,15
regulations given to the provincial Correo-Mayores16 or several instructions that the

13

Hugon, Au Service de Roi Catholique, 508.

Ibid., 519.
15
AGS, E 1157, fol. 5 (9 March 1590).
16
For two surviving examples of such ordenanzas, see. for Naples, AGS, E 1049, fol. 178 (28 September
1559) and for Milan, AGS, E 1255, fol. 98 (1582).
14

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central government gave to ambassadors, viceroys and governor-generals before the start
of their mission.17
4.2.1.4.

Conclusion: Lack of uniformity

In spite of all these efforts of centralization and institutionalization, the crown

failed to create a unified system, unable to overcome the technological and logistical
restrictions of the 16th century as well as the financial difficulties of the Habsburg
Empire. Some historians of the Habsburg secret service, such as Garca and Marcos,
failed to acknowledge the fact that there existed several independent networks that were
very loosely connected to each other and shared very few common traits. Raphal
Carrasco justly stated that the two authors failed to address specific problems and to
accentuate the particularities of each network in an effort to present a homogenous
Habsburg secret service. This specificity could not have been more explicit in the
Habsburg intelligence network in the Levant which had its own way of operating. For
instance, the Habsburg spies in England and France enjoyed several benefits that their
colleagues in the Eastern Mediterranean, neglected by the center, could not even dream
of enjoying.18 In short, the Levantine spies on Habsburg payroll is a better unit of
analysis than spies of Philip II.
The proximity determined the extent of intervention from the center. For instance,
in Navarre, Madrid intervened in every aspect of Habsburg secret service. All instructions
were sent from the Council of State and Philip II made all the decisions on the
recruitment of agents, the strategies to follow in operations, stipends assigned to each
spies as well as the form of their distribution. Situation in Naples, as would be described

17
18

Garnicer and Marcos, Espas de Felipe II, 120.

Carrasco, LEspionnage Espagnol du Levant, 206.

198

below, was far from this and the intervention from the center was rare. Philip II might
have known the names of his agents in Barn,19 but he did not know those in the Levant.
Or at least viceroys thought so, reminding the king in their letters the names of even the
most prominent agents operating in the Levant on Habsburg payroll. Recognizing the
shortcomings of a centralized system, Madrid gave in and delegated the organization and
operation of intelligence networks to local hands.
Most of the afore-mentioned efforts of centralization produced mixed results on
the Habsburg secret service in the Levant. First, information could not be monopolized to
the fullest extent of intention, at least on the level of policy making. It was vital for
provincial Habsburg officials of all ranks to be informed as soon as possible, so that they
could react and decide in the most appropriate manner. The immediateness of the threat
did not leave any time for transmitting information directly to Madrid and then wait for
instructions. Because of practical reasons, the crown had to be left out of the policymaking process most of the time, even though its role in the formulation of strategy and
in the approval of clandestine operations of a certain importance faced no challenge.
Secondly, centralizing institutions such as the regular postal system or later the Espia
Mayor were of little relevance for Habsburg spies who operated in the Levant. In the
Ottoman-Habsburg borderland, the center had to trust its provincial officials in assuring
the safety of the transmission of news, synchronizing different intelligence networks and
inspecting their operations.
It was not only Madrid that failed. Provincial centers such as Naples and Messina
and embassies such as Venice and Genoa were frustrated as well in effectively
controlling and inspecting agents on their payroll. The specific characteristics of the
19

Garca and Marcos, Sebastin de Arbizu, 53.

199

Ottoman-Habsburg frontier as well as the hostility and the lack of diplomatic relations
between the two empires constrained them. The details are the subject of the following
pages.
4.3.

THE ORGANIZATION OF HABSBURG SECRET SERVICE IN

THE PROVINCES

In the far away provinces, the Habsburg secret diplomacy had to rely on the
(dis)coordinated efforts of a combination of Habsburg officials. Viceroys, governorgenerals, ambassadors, captain-generals, provincial governors and castle commanders all
participated in secret diplomacy, subject to the intervention from the center to varying
degrees, depending on the particularities of the centre-province relations which were
shaped by several different factors such as the distance between the province and the
center, the degree of local autonomy, the size of operations, the political situation and the
imminence of the threat. For the functioning of secret services, secretaries had an
important role on the provincial level as well both in provincial capitals at the service of
the viceroys and governor-generals and in embassies helping ambassadors. These
secretaries are the secretaries of a province or an embassy, rather than the personal scribe
of the Habsburg official; therefore, in spite of frequent changes of viceroys and
ambassadors, they assured the continuity of operations. Secretaries in provincial capitals
undertook the recruitments, surveillance, payments as well as enciphering, deciphering
and archiving of documents. Secretaries in embassies were not less important, evident
from the fact that some even led intelligence networks personally in the absence of an
official ambassador. Such was the case with secretaries of the embassy in Venice, Garca

200

Hernndez between 1558 and 1567, Julin Lopez between 1567 and 1570 and Cristbal
de Salazar between 1580 and 1587.
The Habsburg rule in Italy was protected and operated by a number of officials
with varying duties and responsibilities. The Governor of the Duchy of Milan in the
North, the viceroys of the Kingdom of Naples and of Sicily in the South all had different
agendas with their own military forces and spies. The Habsburg ambassadors in Rome,
Venice and Genoa differed in their job descriptions as well.
The Habsburg secret service operated against the Ottomans in two fronts, the
Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. The semi-official head of the Habsburg
intelligence in the Levant was the Viceroy of Naples who had the control of the financing
of the operations. Since Naples was the first line of defense against a possible Ottoman
attack, this was only natural. The Habsburg ambassador in Venice and governors of
provinces prone to Ottoman attack, such as the Land of Otranto and Bari, were also
important figures. The Habsburg operations in North Africa, on the other hand, fell more
under the responsibility of the Viceroy of Sicily (who sent spies to the Levant as well),
the ambassador in Genoa and even at times, officials from the Iberian Peninsula who
could intervene given the proximity of Algiers to the Iberian shores.
According to del Moral, the Kingdom of Naples played a central role in Habsburg
intelligence as it had a spy network not only in Italy and Ottoman Empire, but also in
several European cities; it was the centre of reception and distribution of information for
the Habsburg power.20 One of the Viceroys many responsibilities was to prepare the
defenses of this bulwark of the Habsburg Empire against a possible Ottoman attack or
even an invasion, a duty for the accomplishment of which he needed the most recent and
20

Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 78.

201

most reliable information. Furthermore, most of the Habsburg clandestine operations

against the Ottoman Empire in the Adriatic Sea, the Balkan Peninsula and the Aegean
Sea were organized in Naples and financed from Neapolitan coffers.
The Viceroy at times actively participated in secret diplomacy by personally
recruiting and giving instructions to spies who were dispatched to the Levant. Most of
these spies made seasonal voyages into the Ottoman Empire where they travelled and
befriended, if they could, merchants, mariners, Arsenal workers and soldiers in order to
learn the news that their mission required. However, reliance on these spies that were sent
on an ad-hoc basis can demonstrate the fragility rather than the strength of Habsburg
service. What is more striking is the existence of an institutionalized structure which
Naples financed. This structure was based on a number of (at times) interrelated
intelligence networks throughout the Eastern Mediterranean basin.
Even in the Kingdom of Naples, the role of the center was limited. An alternative
center of Habsburg intelligence against the Ottoman Emnpire was under the control of
the Governor of the Lands of Otranto and Bari. Due to its geographical proximity to the
Ottoman possessions on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, this provinces governor had
to actively participate in secret diplomacy, not only to be informed of the Ottoman war
preparations, but also to organize the coordination between the Habsburg authorities and
the Christian rebels in the Balkans who continuously asked for help from the Habsburg
territories.21 Governors then transmitted the information that their spies brought not only
to the Viceroys of Naples and Sicily, but also directly to the center, as evident from the

21

AGS, E 1035, fols. 84 and 86; E 1040, fols. 100, 117, 118, 150, 174, 185 and 205; E 1041, fol. 10; E
1043, fols. 59, 60 and 65; E 1044, fols. 113; E 1055, fols. 132, 159 and 183; E 1056, fols. 13, 47, 76, 78,
80, 86, 123, 127, 131, 136, 139, 163 and 171, ; E 1063, fol. 18; E 1119, fol. 123.

202

correspondence between the Marquis of Tripalda and Charles V.22 The governor
transmitted news to the Emperor and established extensive relations with the Christian
insurgents in the Balkans, including important ecclesiastical figures such as the
metropolitan of Coron who offered his loyalty and submission to the emperor and the
metropolitan of Salonica who was sending information to the governor.23 Another
provincial governor who seemed to have participated in Habsburg secret service was the
governor of Calabria,24 even though the degree of his efficiency was no match for that of
his colleague in Otranto and Bari.
Agents who returned from their missions and letters that were sent from different
intelligence networks in the Levant flooded the ports of the Lands of Otranto and Bari,
such as Otranto, Bari and Brindisi. In the port of Otranto, 70 miles from Turkey,25 there
were royal frigates whose duty was to regularly collect letters from Habsburg intelligence
networks on the other side of the Adriatic, mainly in the Ionian Islands under the
Venetian control. The system was effective enough to closely monitor an approaching
enemy fleet. Facing a menacing Ottoman navy in 1594, these provincial centers of
information proved their worth by effectively informing Naples of the daily trajectory of
the enemy fleet. Between the months of August and October, in collaboration with the
Habsburg intelligence networks in Corfu and Zante with which they communicated via
royal frigates, local authorities in Otranto and Cotron furnished regular information on
the activities of the Ottoman fleet and updated an anxious Viceroy in Naples.26
22

AGS, E 1011, fols. 155-199; Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 64.

Ibid., 68, 71.
24
AGS E 1122, fols. 42 (25 February 1554), fol. 102 (4 June 1558).
25
AGS, E 1056, fol. 241.
26
AGS, E 1094, fols. 89 (25 August 1594), 90 (27 August 1594), 92 (24 August 1594), 94 (25 August
1594), 96 (28 August 1594), fol. 97 (28 August 1594) 100 (2 and 4 September 1594), 105 (11 and 13
September 1594), 106 (14 September 1594), 111 (5 October 1594), 112 (28 September 1594), 113 (11 and
23

203

The importance of Venice as a centre of information in the early modern

Mediterranean has long been appreciated.27 Thanks to the Serenissimas historical,
political and economic ties with the Eastern Mediterranean, Venice was also a meeting
point where men of all religions, ethnicities and professions negotiated and traded. The
prospect of getting into contact with so many people familiar with the Ottoman world and
who could be useful for espionage increased the importance of the Venetian ambassador
for the Habsburg secret service in the Levant. First and most important of all, relying
either on the goodwill of Venice or on his informants in the Venetian state structure, the
ambassador tried to acquire information received by the Venetian authorities that had by
far the most efficient intelligence networks in the Levant. Secondly, he furthermore
collected information from a number of Habsburg intelligence networks that were located
in the Ottoman Empire. Some of this information came from Naples agents who had the
habit of sending a duplicate to Venice in order to secure the uninterrupted transmission of
news. Some, however, came from the ambassadors own network and agents whom he
employed with his rather limited funds.28 Thirdly, he was in close contact with the
Viceroys of Naples, Sicily and Governor-General of Milan as well as Habsburg
diplomats in Rome, Paris and Vienna with whom he exchanged information.29 Thanks to

14 September 1594), 114 (13 September 1594), 115 (18 September 1594), 116 (9 October 1594), 117 and
122.
27
Kissling, Venezia come Centro di Informazioni Giovanni K. Hassiotis, Venezia e i domini
Veneziani Robert Mantran, Venise: centre dinformations sur les turcs, in in Venezia, Centro di
Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente, secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e problemi, eds. Hans Georg Beck et
al. (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1977), vol. I, 111-116;
28
For instance, Francisco de Vera y Aragn, the spy-friendly Habsburg ambassador to Venice was
allocated only 834 ducats from the treasury of Naples for his extraordinary expenses, more specifically to
spend in secret things in the service of his majesty for which the afore-mentioned ambassador did not have
to give justification. N. F. Faraglia, Bilancio del reame di Napoli degli anni 15 1 e 15 2, Archivio
Storico per le Provincie Napoletane 1 (1876), 428.
29
All from AGS E 1333 and dated 1574. For Rome: fols. 145 and 146. For Paris: fols. 138, 139, 140, 141,
142 and 147. For Vienna: fols. 135, 136 and 137. Also again for Vienna, AGS E 1330 (all in this folder are
dated 1572), fols. 57, 58, 59, 60-7, 93-4, 97, 152, 168 and 180; E K 1675 (dated between 1590 and 1592),

204

these extensive networks, the Habsburg ambassador in Venice, (or during the years in
which he was absent, his secretary), was no less an influential figure than the Viceroy of
Naples for the conduct of Habsburg secret diplomacy in the Levant.
As the focus of the chapter is the Habsburg information gathering in the Levant, I
will rarely mention other two centers of the Habsburg espionage, Messina and Genoa,
whose specialty was rather the operations in North Africa. Even though the Kingdom of
Sicily sent his own spies to the Levant, these were mostly sent for a specific mission. 30 In
spite of the fact that the stipends of some of the resident agents in the Levant were partly
paid by the Sicilian Treasury, the viceroys of Sicily did not seem to put up an extensive
intelligence network that operated independently from those established by Naples and
Venice. They left this task to others and were content with supplementing the information
which Naples and Venice sent with the reports written by their ad-hoc spies as well by
those who arrived in Sicilian ports from the Levant. The ambassador in Genoa as well
had a very little direct interest in the affairs of the Levant. His sphere of influence
included the North Africa, Northern Italy and Southern France where he collaborated
with the Governor-General of Milan, the Duke of Savoy31 and the Grimaldis of
Monaco.32 Functioning in a similar manner to his colleague in Venice, he depended on

fols. 14, 24, 28a, 28b, 34, 39, 48, 56, 67 and 73; E K 1676, fol. 108 (9 Aprile 1598). According to E 1345
and E 1346, information reached the Spanish court from a number of places that were ruled by the Austrian
Habsburgs, such as Gratz, Cracovia, Strigonia and Prague as well as from the camp of the imperial army
and the secretariat of Archduke Mathias.
30
AGS, E 1120, fols. 243 (25 March 1552), 251-253 (17 to 27 mayo 1552), 256-7 (18 June 1552), 264, 267
(12 December 1552) and 268 (December 1552); E 1121, fols. 110, 113 (21 March 1553); E 1123, fol. 18
(15 April 1555 . Juan dOrta was a regular which the Viceroy sent to the Levant with two frigates every
year. E 1147, fol. 10.
31
For a good example of cooperation between the Duke and the ambassador in an operation targeting North
Africa, see. AGS, E 1399, fols. 8 (30 January 1570), 9, 10 (11 January 1570), 11 (6 September 1569), 42
(25 April 1570), 43 (2 May 1570), 50 (14 June 1570), 58, 98 (22 September 1570), 99 (20 October 1570),
103 (17 October 1570), 150 (26 April 1570) and 158 (12 May 1570); E 1327, fols. 43 (12 May 1570) 87
(16 August 1570).
32
AGS, E 1404, fol. 58 (27 September 1574).

205

the goodwill of a friendlier, but less knowledgeable Genoa that was not as informed
about Ottoman affairs as Venice was. Apart from a number of ad-hoc spies,33 he did not
establish contacts in the Levant. He neither attempted, nor had the financial resources to
set up and operate a separate intelligence network.
4.4.

HABSBURG INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN THE LEVANT

The Habsburgs established a number of separate intelligence networks in the

Levant, the most important of which was the one that they set up in the Ottoman capital,
following the influx of Spanish and Italian soldiers and sailors that had fallen captive at
the Battle of Djerba (1560) to Constantinople. Leaving aside this best documented
Habsburg network in the Levant for further elaboration in the next chapter, I will focus
on other ones in order of efficiency.
4.4.1. Ragusa
The Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) had a special position between the East
and the West similar to that of Venice. As a Catholic power, it entertained close
relations with the Catholic World, while as a tributary state it enjoyed the protection of
the Ottoman Sultan. This dual role made this city-state particularly important for both the
Habsburg and the Ottoman secret services.34
Ragusa was not only a venue for information gathering, but also a point through
which the Habsburgs transferred money to its agents in the Levant and the news and
directives flowed between the Habsburg authorities and intelligence networks. This
importance increased especially after the establishment of the Habsburg network in
33

AGS, E 1382, fols. 119-20 and 319; E 1383, fol. 379.

Other powers as well had agents in Ragusa. For instance, on the information concerning the Ottomans
Empire, sent from Ragusa to Rome in the 17th century, see. Ivan Dujev, Avvisi di Ragusa: Documenti
sullimpero Turco nel sec. XVII e sulla Guerra di Candia (Roma: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studium,
1935).
34

206

Constantinople in the early 1560s as the letters from Constantinople were generally sent
to Ragusa to be remitted to Habsburg ports in Italy such as Barleta.35
Ragusa had another strategic importance. First of all, it was the entrance and exit
point for official visitors, such as foreign diplomats and envoys who traveled to
Constantinople by land. These had to have the necessary safe-conduct (amn) in the
form of an imperial diploma (bert) and then wait for the Ottoman avu that would
accompany them. Furthermore, Ottoman messengers who carried letters for European
states and spies that went on a mission in Habsburg territories also used Ragusa as their
point of embarkment on their way to the West. 36 This made Ragusa an important venue
for exchanging information between ambassadors, messengers and spies. The Habsburg
spies in the city contacted foreign ambassadors frequently and easily. In 1572, with the
hope of acquiring information from him, one of these spies offered his services to the
French ambassador, the Bishop of Aix who arrived in the city on his way to
Constantinople.37 In 1592, Rugier Margliani contacted the Venetian bailo in a similar
fashion.38 Secondly, as several Ottoman spies sent their letters to Constantinople via
Ragusa, the importance of Ragusa for the Habsburg counter-intelligence became more
evident; thanks to this correspondence, one of the Habsburg spies could easily name two
Ottoman spies of key importance in Naples and Rome in 1554.39 Thirdly, several

35

AGS, E 1056, fol. 84.

AGS, E 1058, fol. 40 (7 April 1570).
37
He convinced the ambassador to show him a letter that the French ambassador in Venice wrote as well as
the jewelry he carried to Constantinople. The Bishop accepted to recruit him and told him to contact his
own spymaster in the city who would provide him with the necessary cipher and countersign. AGS E 1331,
fol. 236 (1 November 1572); E 1332, fol. 167 (13 January 1573).
38
AGS, E 1542, fol. 122 (7 April 1592).
39
AGS, E 1047, fol. 8 (22 March 1554).
36

207

Ragusan merchants, these eyes and ears of the Republic40 dispersed in Ottoman cities,
as well as diplomats and envoys who were sent to the Ottoman central and local
authorities provided their own government with important news, some of which the
Habsburg agents managed to intercept.41 Fourthly, merchants of different origins
frequented the port of Ragusa and brought fresh news from all around the world in which
the Habsburg authorities were very much interested.
At times the Ragusan authorities found themselves compelled to share
information with the Habsburgs. As was the case in Venice, the Habsburg secret service
operated on three different levels. Apart from employing spies on the field as well as
informants within the government, on a third level, the Habsburgs officially requested
and acquired information from the Ragusan authorities, even though it is evident that the
latter was most of the time uncooperative. They sent information intentionally so late so
that it could not be used against the Ottomans42 and copied documents of no importance,
such as the zafernme that Suleyman I sent to foreign rulers, a propaganda text which
was prepared in celebration of Ottoman victories in the East and which the Ottoman
government intended to circulate anyways.43
Enjoying all these advantages, the Habsburg intelligence network in Ragusa
became the major source of information, after Constantinople. In a regular fashion,
thanks to the royal frigates that went back and forth between Ragusa and the Neapolitan
ports, the Habsburgs acquired information of critical importance regarding the Ottoman40

Steven Dedijer, Ragusan Intelligence and Security (1301-1806): A Model for the Twenty-First
Century, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 15:1 (2002), 107.
41
A good example is AGS, E 1040, fol. 28 (7 March 1551) whereby the Habsburg agent sent the
information that a Ragusan envoy, carrying presents to the Governor of Herzegovina, transmitted to the
Ragusan authorities. The Habsburg agent in Ragusa even managed to put one of his men among the
Ragusan envoys that brought yearly tribute to Constantinople. AGS, E 1047.
42
AGS, E 1331, fol. 220 (10 May 1572).
43
AGS, E 1319, fols. 118 and 119.

208

Venetian relations (it was through Ragusa they learned that the truce between the two
was signed in 1573), military preparations in strategic places around Ragusa, such as
Cattaro and Castelnuovo, and the details of diplomatic relations between European
powers and the Ottoman Empire. Add to those the letters of Habsburg intelligence
network in Constantinople that were remitted through Ragusa.
This intermediary position of strategic importance became a disadvantage as
much as an advantage for the Ragusans. Stuck between two empires, the Ragusan
authorities had to follow a careful policy. The Ottomans, who themselves had several
agents in Ragusa, had a threatening tone when they noticed the activities of Habsburg
agents in one of their vassal states. The authorities tried to take measures against a
possible Ottoman reaction and sought to control the intelligence activity in the city. As
early as December 1526, they forbade everyone from sending information about the
Ottomans abroad, albeit under the threat of a light punishment.44 Repeated prohibitions
did not work, due partly to the incentive created by the strategic location of Ragusa,
partly to the reluctance of the Ragusan authorities to offend the Habsburgs. The Ottomans
could have persuaded the Ragusans to drag their feet over sending information to
Habsburgs, but neither they nor Ragusans could do little to prevent several opportunist
entrepreneurs who one after another contacted the Habsburgs and offered their services.
Central governments were helpless to contain the information exchange.
The first important figure that appears in our documents is the patrician Marin
Zamanja who was sent by the Republic as an ambassador to Spain in 1533. Having
earned the Charles Vs favour, he returned from his mission in 1536 as a Habsburg
spymaster and played such an active role for the Habsburg secret service that in the end
44

Dedijer, Ragusan Intelligence and Security, 111.

209

the disturbed Ottomans ordered the Ragusans to expel him in 1547. The Ragusan
authorities could not do better than relenting and prohibiting him from writing to the
Habsburg authorities under the penalty of death.45 He died soon after from gout;
nevertheless the Habsburgs kept receiving information from Ragusa, sent by anonymous
agents whom the documents mention as un particular or persona que suele avisar.46
In 1551, the governor of the Lands of Otranto and Bari sent a certain captain Juan
Busto as a grain merchant who managed to establish good relations with the Ragusan
authorities and sent crucial information.47 He returned with the recommendation that the
polyglot Altabello Pallavicino would be a good candidate for Habsburg intelligence in the
city.48 In 1560, appears the famous Jernimo Bucchia, the class-mate of Cardinal
Granvela, who established his own intelligence network which operated extensively
along the Adriatic coasts, in Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Venice, Valona and Albania.49
With the establishment of a new network in Constantinople, the importance of Ragusa
once again increased. A new spymaster, who would ensure the transfer of money and
transmission of correspondence between Constantinople and Habsburg centers, was
essential. With the recommendation of Giovanni Maria Renzo, the Florentin Lorenzo
Miniati became the new spymaster in 1563;50 and upon the assassination of the latter in
1566, his nephew Dino and a certain Donato Antonio Lubelo succeeded him.
Nevertheless once again the Ottomans learned about the presence of a Habsburg agent so
close to their borders and in such a strategic location. An international crisis of full scale

45

AGS, E 1318, fol. 222 (23 August 1547).

AGS, E 1124, fol. 152 (15 March 1559).
47
AGS, E 1040, fols. 98, 101, 122, 123, 135. (1551).
48
Sola, Los que van y vienen, 52.
49
Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 16.
50
AGS, E 1056, fol. 56 (28 July 1563).
46

210

erupted when the Ragusans dismissed the two from the city. When the Viceroy of Naples
gave an ultimatum to the Ragusans, warning them that they would suffer the
consequences unless they readmitted the two to the city, a solution was quickly found.51
The Habsburgs should send new agents, yet without informing the Ragusans of their
identity.52 In 1568, they sent the Florentine merchant Luca Renier who shortly after left
the Habsburg service with permission.53 Renzo had to arrange a quick replacement and
found a certain Juan Popilesco.54 Around the same time, a fraudulent who claimed to be a
cavalry of Jerusalem and to have a cousin in the Ottoman palace, a secretary of the
Sultan, started to send letters to the authorities on his own initiative. One of the most
interesting figures among the Mediterranean spies, Luis de Portillo sent several letters
that included crucial but fabricated details of discussions in the Ottoman Divan-
Hmayun (Imperial council) as well as fantastic yet incredible news. Having first sent
him 200 escudos, the Habsburgs realized the truth and cut him out even though he kept
sending information and demanding money and cipher until he met his unfortunate end.
The Ragusan authorities, amidst rumours of an Ottoman attack because of foreign agents
in the city,55 could not tolerate the likes of Portillo. They cut his ears and put him in
galleys ad vitam; he was still lucky because there were also those who voted for chopping
him up to four pieces.56 The War of 1570-1573 intensified the war of information
between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs and thus the increased volume of intelligence
activity of the Habsburgs in the city. In 1573, an anonymous Habsburg agent, most
51

AGS, E 1056, fol. 84

AGS, E 1065, fol. 118; Sola, Los que van, 208.
53
Enrique Garca Hern n, The Price of Spying at the Battle of Lepanto, Eurasian Studies II/2 (2003):
237-238.
54
AGS, E 1060, fol. 129 (9 May 1571).
55
AGS E 487, advertimientos de turquia y otros de importancia.
56
AGS, E 1331 and E 1332, ff.; E 1063, fol. 18; E 1503 fol. 162; E 1506, fols. 86, 94 and 195; E 1512, fol.
77.
52

211

probably Don Cesar de la Marea whom the Viceroy of Naples sent to Ragusa to lead the
network, mentions six spies, including Portillo, extant in the city.57 More agents of
serious background joined this Mareas network in time: the brother of Ali Pasha, named
Estefano Kendresi, who used his connections and managed to acquire the internal
correspondence between the Ottoman center and provincial governors58; Mathias Vicudo
who always complained of his old age, poverty and the neglect of the Habsburg
authorities,59 and the Jewish David Passi who also worked for other powers, and on
whom we will read more in the following two chapters.60 Marea successfully operated in
Ragusa until 1581, when the Ragusans, once again pressurized by the Ottomans, expelled
him. Then the same old story: the Viceroy of Naples protested, gave 20 days to the
Ragusan authorities to revoke their decision, imprisoned six of their richest merchants in
Naples and froze all Ragusan merchants accounts in Neapolitan banks. 61 Even though
this time he did not succeed (Marea could not return to Ragusa and passed away in 1583),
the Habsburg agents continued to frequent the city. How could they not, when Madrid
started to send unofficial ambassadors, envoys and couriers to Constantinople who had to
take the route of Ragusa? For instance, in 1584, Stefano Ferrari, the long-time courier
between Constantinople, Naples and Madrid, contacted in one of his many stays in the
city a Nicolo Sfondarati, who seemed to have inherited the position of Marea. 62 A more

57

AGS, E 1332, fol. 167 (13 January 1573).

AGS, E 1062, fol. 206 (18 June 1573); E 1063, fol. 29 (18 June 1572).
59
AGS, E 1514, fol. 129 (28 October 1574); E 1517/cuaderno IV, fols. 1 (29 August 1575), 9-10 (13
October 1574), 23 (1 October 1575), 24 (9 November 1575) and 30-1 (7 November 1575); E 1519, fol. 1
(23 January 1576).
60
He worked for the Venetians as well. ASV, CX-ParSec, r. 9, cc. 89-90, 101v; AGS, E 1331, fols. 78 and
233; E 1332, fol. 110. He would later become representative of Dom Antonio in Constantinople (Cecil
Roth, The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos (New York: Greenwood Press, 1948, 204-12 and Murad IIIs
confidant (P l Fodor, Between Two Continental Wars, 179). For more details, see Chapters Five and Six.
61
AGS, E 1083, fol. 88; E 1084, fol. 44 (21 June 1581).
62
AGS, E 1083, fol. 58 (28 February 1581); E 1533, fol. 285 (12 April 1584).
58

212

interesting figure, the son of the negotiator of the Ottoman-Habsburg truce in 1581 and
the former commander of the Milanese cavalry in Savoy, the Count Ruggero Magliani
arrived in the city in late 1591.63 His original duty was a diplomatic visit to
Constantinople, but the Habsburg court repeated the tradition by ordering his envoy not
to proceed at the last minute.64 Ruggero Margliani stayed in the city and coordinated
Habsburg intelligence network for many years.
The importance of Ragusa for Habsburg secret service increased even further in
the early decades of the 17th century as the relations between the Habsburgs and Venice
soured. Ragusa, the perennial rival of Venice, became an important ally and contributed
to Habsburg military and intelligence efforts in the region.65 However, since it is outside
the scope of this study, I will not enter into further details.
4.4.2. Ionian Islands
The Habsburgs established another intelligence network in the Ionian Islands
which constituted a part of the Venetian Stato da Mar with the exception of St. Maura, an
Ottoman possession since 1503. These islands, most importantly Corfu, were strategic
locations. Firstly, lying at the entrance of the Adriatic Sea, every ship that wanted to sail
there had to pass by those islands. This was how Venice could realize their theoretical
claims on the Adriatic Sea. Captains and crews of ships that arrived in these islands from
all corners of the Eastern Mediterranean were interrogated at the port first by the
Venetian authorities, and then by sociable Habsburg agents who were always interested

63

AGS, E 1092, fol. 196 (25 October 1591); E 1541, fols. 196-201.
AGS, E 1542, fols. 2 (29 April 1592) and 3 (8 July 1592); Rubn Gonzlez Cuerva, Mediterr neo en
tregua: Las negociaciones de Ruggero Marliani con el Imperio Ottomano (1590-15 2 , in Actas de la
X Reunin de la Fundacin Espaola de Historia Moderna, ed. Manuel Reyes Garca Hurtado (Santiago de
Compostela: Universidad, 2009), Vol. 2, 209-220.
65
Miguel ngel de Bunes Ibarra, Avis du Levant.
64

213

in listening to vox populi in the public sphere, marketplaces, bars, taverns, etc. These
provided information of not only incredible diversity (activities in the Arsenal,
whereabouts and the target of the Ottoman Navy, Ottoman military preparations in
provincial centers, political struggles and rumours in the streets of Constantinople), but
also, at times, of impressive quality.
Secondly, the proximity of these islands to the Ottoman coasts created a number
of advantages. Firstly, the Habsburg agents who wanted to enter the Ottoman Empire
could easily do so,66 facilitated by the incredible volume of commercial traffic between
these islands and the Levant and evident from the easiness with which the Prototico
network sent several agents not only to Constantinople, but also to Ottoman provincial
centers.67 Corfu was also important for the transmission of letters; one of the duties of the
intelligence network there was to collect the letters that were sent from Constantinople
and then to quickly remit them to the Neapolitan ports. The network also operated in
nearby Ottoman provincial centers with an incredible efficiency so that it could even
intercept orders sent from the center to provincial governors.68 Secondly, the Venetians
also had an active intelligence network that gathered information from the Ottoman
lands. The Habsburg agents seemed to have laid their hands on the information that
reached the Venetian authorities on these islands, either by intercepting letters or
corrupting the Venetian spies and couriers who brought the news.69 Even though Venice

66

AGS, E 1124, fols. 73 (10 and 18 April 1557) and 83 (4 April 1558).
See. AGS, E 1056, fols. 218-220 for the interesting range of activities of one of Prototicos agents,
Michel Candi Rodioto. He traveled several times, in search for information, Lepanto, Modon, Coron,
Negroponte, Thessalonica and Constantinople.
68
For instance, see. AGS, E 1068, fol. 103 (16 May 1575). A friend of the Governor of Morea agreed to
send information to a Habsburg agent in Zante. E 1123, fol. 106 (20 November 1555). Also see. E 1056,
fol. 217 (c. 1568).
69
AGS, E 1048, fol. 53; E 1055 fols. 2 (21 May 1565) and 154 (2 July 1566), E 1056, fols. 86 (27
Seotember 1567) and 163, E 1407, fol. 152 (4 October 1554).
67

214

was a formidable rival in information gathering,70 there were times when the Venetian
authorities shared the information themselves,71 obviously choosing the right time and the
right information to do so, always in accordance with the interests of the Serenissima.
Thirdly, another good source of information was the fugitive renegades and slaves who
arrived in the Ionian Islands. The Habsburg agents were always eager to hear what these
renegades and slaves, most of whom used to work in the Ottoman Arsenal or sail with the
Ottoman Navy, had to say.72 Fourthly, Corfu was conveniently close to the areas where
the Christian subjects of the Sultan were constantly in revolt and were always asking the
Habsburgs for military help. These were of crucial importance for the Habsburg secret
service as well as their eastern policy. Finally, some Ottoman envoys with destinations in
the West passed from the Ionian Islands, such as Hac Murad, Suleyman Is avu who
was set for North Africa with a secret diplomatic mission that Habsburg agents quickly
discovered.73
The earliest corpus of documentation that refers to an operational Habsburg
intelligence network dates back to the 1550s. Balthasar Prototico was sent to the islands
in 1552,74 with the stipend of 320 escudos per annum,75 in order to inform the authorities
about the andamientos of the Ottoman Navy.76 There he established an efficient
network which provided the authorities with regular and reliable information. Balthasar
70

A document dated c. 1571 (AGS E 487, advertimientos de turquea y otros de importancia) argued against
the employment of Greeks and Italians in the Ionian Islands, precisely because these passed the incoming
information to the Venetians towards whom they were more affectionate. The Venetians kept the good
information for themselves and only shared the irrelevant ones, according to the same document.
71
AGS, E 1047, fol. 24 (16 February 1554); E 1062, fol. 82 (15 May 1573); E 1063, fol. 164 (27 July
1573); E 1064, fol. 31 (6 May 1574); E 1066, fol. 61 (2 August 1575).
72
For instance, AGS, E 1060, fol. 14 (26 April 1571).
73
AGS, E 1123, fol. 106 (20 November 1555 . On his activities, see. Gne Iksel, Hac Murd (Agi
Morato : An Elusive Algerian Dignitary, Oriente Moderno (in press, 2012).
74
AGS, E 1056, fol. 213.
75
AGS, E 1056, fol. 215.
76
ASN, Regia Cammara della Summaria, Segretaria, Consultationum, vol. II, fols. 42v-48v, 1562-5; Sola,
Los que van y vienen, 53-4.

215

himself settled in Zante while his son Anibale and his nephew Juan Manioti were
operating in Corfu. Another son, Nicol, appears in the documentation in the late 1560s.
His father sent him to Madrid,77 in order to present a project to capture Modon, ask for a
raise (to 400 escudos per annum) and recover the unpaid stipends.78 Evidently, he was a
part of the network as well, given that he claimed to have fallen captive to the
Ottomans.79 Nicol wanted for himself the office of the captain of the frigates that sailed
to the Levant in order to gather information and pick up the correspondence of the
Habsburg intelligence network in the Ionian Islands led by his father. According to
Nicols petition, the Prototicos established intelligence networks in a number of places,
such as Corfu, Lepanto, Algiante, Cefalonia, Modon, and Negroponte as well as in the
court of the Governor of Morea. They furthermore had a contact in Constantinople,
Atanasi Scoloyeni who had acquaintances with several Ottoman ministers. To what
extent these claims reflect the true is uncertain though, because Nicol was a swindler
who forged documents in order to embezzle the Habsburgs.80 Still, the Prototico network
seemed to have operated efficiently by sending regular information and keeping the
channels of communication with the Habsburg network in Constantinople open during
the critical time of the War of 1570-3.81 Prototicos remained in Habsburg service for a

77

AGS, E 1127, fol. 193 (9 December 1563)

AGS, E 1056, fol. 217 (c. 1568).
79
AGS, E 1057, fol. 94.
80
Unfortunately for him, the Habsburgs realized what he did and put him in prison. AGS, E 1132, fols. 136
(28 February 1569) and 187 (12 July 1569); E 1056, fols. 226 (24 January 1569, 227 (8 March 1569), 228
(9 March 1569), 229 (24 August 1569) and 230 (30 April 1569).
81
AGS, E 1059, fol. 59, 62(4 February 1571) and 65; E 1060, fols. 10, 13 (29 March 1571) and 138 (4
February 1571).
78

216

long time; Anibale left Habsburg service in 1577,82 while the father was still mentioned
in the Neapolitan budget of 1591-2.83
Prototicos were not the only agents in the islands, and the extent to which other
information providers were connected to their networks is uncertain. Several names
appear for once or twice, hinting that these may be volunteers who pushed their chances
of receiving a stipend by providing information. There were also permanent spies, most
of whom were members of the leading families of these islands such as Latinos, Palma
and Siguro families. A certain Cesare Palma, for instance, was operating for a long time
in Corfu, Cefalonia and Zante.84 In Corfu, in 1577, Francesco Sforio replaced Anibale
Prototico,85 while Angelo Salviati replaced a Francesco Blanco86 under the orders of Juan
dOrta,87 who was the captain of the royal frigates that carried correspondence between
the Ionian Islands and Otranto.88 A very active agent, Antonio Lipravoti, appeared in
Corfu in the 1580s and operated throughout the 1590s.89
4.4.3. Chios
Another conveniently located location was the island of Chios, in the middle of
the Aegean Sea and a couple of miles away from the Anatolian shores. As Chios
anachronistically remained in Genoese hands until 1566, years after Genoa, the
Repbrica de Zna, abandoned its colonial empire in the Levant and the Ottomans started
82

AGS, E 1336, fol. 46 (13 July 1577).

Faraglia, Bilancio del reame di Napoli, 3 7-9.
84
AGS, E 1055, fol. 49l; E 1073, fol. 120 (6 Julio 1577); E 1074, fol. 48 (2 October 1577); E 1077, fol.90
(28 June 1578).
85
AGS, E 1336, fol. 46.
86
On Branco, see. AGS, E 1073, fol. 120 (6 July 1577).
87
AGS, E 1147, fol. 10 (28 February 1577).
88
AGS, E 1066, fol. 148; E 1070, fol. 107 (23 July 1576).
89
AGS, E 1536, fol. 224 (10 July 1586); E 1537, fol. 294 (January 1586); E 1538, fol. 289; E 1093, fols. 86
(12 October 1592), 205 (14 September 1593), 206 (14 September 1593), 208 (21 September 1593) and 209
(22 September 1593); E 1094, fols. 169 (12 July 1595) and 171 (8 July 1595). In 1584, he was replaced for
a short time by a Juan Baptista Estaybano. E 1340, fol. 97 (27 April 1584).
83

217

to consolidate their rule in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was the final checkpoint where
the ships that Naples and Messina sent on information gathering missions frequented
since the Ottoman fleet that left the Dardanelles had to pass by the island. Moreover, it
was a stepping stone for spies on their way to Constantinople; in 1562, both Renzo and
Gilli came to the island and contacted the spymaster Nicol Giustiniani who carried the
surname of the extended Giustiniani family, a society of investors who controlled the
partnership, Maona, which ruled the island and appropriated its resources in Republics
stead, in a similar fashion to how East India Companies controlled French and English
colonies later.90 Giustianiani did more than leading an efficient network that worked in
tandem with the newly established network in Constantinople; he made voyages to
Constantinople to ransom soldiers that had fallen captive at the Battle of Djerba and
negotiated the defection of a prominent corsair, the former-governor of Mytilene,
discontent after being removed from his governorship.91
The network on which we know little because of the paucity of documentation
seemed to have survived the Ottoman conquest of the island. Giustiniani disappears from
the AGS documentation only to reappear in a Venetian document dated 1569; apparently
he was in Constantinople negotiating on behalf of the Genoese possibly, the Venetians
feared, for a trade capitulation.92 A certain Francisco Peloso appears in documents in the
1570s.93 Apart from sending information, he also proposed a plot to poison Ulu Ali and
torch the Ottoman Arsenal.94 These agents operations might have suffered from
logistical problems, since Philip II ordered in 1580 that the agents in Chios and other
90

AGS, E 1127, fol. 81 (4 October 1562).

AGS, E 1127, fols. 87 and 88 (2 December 1562).
92
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 43v-44v (9 December 1569).
93
AGS, E 1068, fol. 31 (9 January 1575); E 1145, fol. 54 (9 February 1576).
94
AGS, E 1144, fol. 96 (9 August 1575).
91

218

islands of the Archipelago should not be paid anymore, because when their letters
arrived, the information they contained had already arrived via Venice anyways. 95 Still,
Chios continued to be a safe haven for the incoming Habsburg agents. When Carlos
Cicala requested permission to leave for the Ottoman Empire in 1590, invited by his
renegade brother, the Ottoman Grand Admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, he was
commissioned to settle in Chios. From there, he would seek to set up an intelligence
network and negotiate the defection of his brother to the Habsburg side, to the obedience
to his re naturale.96 He seemed to have played a double game; even though he resisted
the Ottoman offers for conversion,97 still he entertained friendly relations with the
Ottomans. He enjoyed the protection of his brother98 and according to a Venetian
document, he became the governor of the Aegean Archipelago, i.e., the Ottoman
Duchy of Naxos. He even recruited spies for the Ottomans in Sicily in 1600.99
Nonetheless, he still did his duty, remitting information he acquired during many
conversations with his brother,100 the spies that he sent to Constantinople and the
prisoners-of-war that he ransomed from the Ottoman hands.101 The Habsburg authorities
were content with him and the information he sent.102 The Habsburg intelligence activity
in Chios seemed to have continued up until the 17th century. One of them, a Cassano
Giustiniano was arrested by the Ottomans in 1609. He could only liberate himself with a

95

AGS, E 1151, fol. 245 (10 April 1581).

AGS, E 1158, fol. 26 (4 November 1594). Also see. E 1344 K 1675, fols. 4 (13 September 1590), 8 (8
December 1590), 44 (30 April 1591), 70 (3 July 1591), 125 (16 February 1592) and 150 (12 December
1592); E 1885, fol. 6 (June 1592); E 1157, fols. 151 (26 February 1593) and fol. 152.
97
AGS, E 1158, fols. 53 (15 June 1595), 55 (30 March 1595) and 62 (10 May 1595).
98
AGS, E 1158, fol. 26.
99
ASV, IS, b. 460, 25 July 1600.
100
AGS, E 1157, fol. 151 (26 February 1593), E 1158, fol. 187; E 1160, fol. 139 (25 September 1602).
101
AGS, E 1158, fol. 53 (15 June 1595).
102
AGS, E 1158, fol. 30 (30 December 1594). According to the Count of Olivares, the Viceroy of Sicily, he
was the autor mas digno de fe que los otros .
96

219

handsome sum he paid to the Ottomans, he implored, and added that other spies would
not be able to write for a while as they feared being caught.103
4.4.4. Other networks in the Levant:
The Habsburgs sent spies to other locations even though it is hard to trace their
activities in a chronological order or to decide whether these spies went there in order to
set up a separate network, operate in accordance with an existing one or just gather
information and return on an ad-hoc mission. The documentation that survived consists
of reports sent by agents from those locations and references by the Habsburg authorities
to their sources in these regions.
The island of Crete, for instance, seemed to have hosted a number of Habsburg
spies, curiously though, to a lesser frequency than one would expect. The reason could be
that ships, merchants, spies and therefore news that reached Crete had to pass through the
more conveniently located Ionian Islands or Chios as well. Another location of
importance was the Ottoman Valona, an important port city and a provincial center,
where the Habsburgs sent several spies, even though they did not seem to set up a
separate network than the one that operated in the Ionian Islands. This would be
unnecessarily risky. Valona was not Constantinople and there were nearby bases given
the proximity to the Otranto, from where spies could easily come and go. A third place
was Cattaro, which remained in Ottoman hands between 1540 and 1571. There, the
Habsburgs relied on the network that the famous Jernimo Bucchia, on whom a wellwritten monograph written in Spanish exists,104 established from afar and controlled

103
104

AGS, E 1163, fols. 238 (14 May 1609) and 239 (21 August 1609).
Masi, Jernimo Bucchia.

220

thanks to his familial relations in the region.105 To avoid repetition, I will not go into
further details.
4.5.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND METHODS OF

INFORMATION GATHERING

Not all the information came from reports produced by networks that were
established or spies who were recruited directly by the center. There were other sources
of information and methods of information gathering that produced an impressive amount
of information, surpassing in number, albeit not in quality, regularity or accuracy, those
which the spies in central governments employ sent.
4.5.1. Interrogation in the ports
One frequent method was to rely on the testimonies of the merchants who
frequented the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean. With no extra cost, these could
provide the authorities with the most updated information on the Ottoman military
preparations and relate the vox populi, rumours that circulated in Ottoman centers. Some
of these merchants were sent by the authorities on ad-hoc missions, while the majority of
the hundreds of reports extant in AGS came from the testimonies given by regular
merchants who went to the Levant for purposes of trade. The Habsburg authorities
interrogated the captains and the crews of these ships that arrived in Sicilian and
Neapolitan ports, especially when an imminent Ottoman military threat was expected,
such as the first half of the 1550s when the relation between information, war and
perception became more apparent as accentuated by Emilio Sola.106 Merchants were not

105

I extensively rely on the book because AGS does not have too much documentation for the period when
this network was operational, except for a few documents such as AGS, E 1044, fols. 39, 40 (8 April 1552),
54 (8 May 1552).
106
Sola, Los que van y vienen, 45-111.

221

the only ones that arrived in these ports and the authorities were well aware of that fact;
they interrogated everybody useful who set foot in a port: renegades who decided to
return, Ottoman soldiers, sailors and corsairs who were recently captured and slaves who
either ran away, seized their ship after a successful rebellion or were ransomed after
spending years in the Levant.
4.5.2. Disgruntled communities: Habsburg fifth columns in the Ottoman
Empire
A second source of information was the Habsburg fifth column in the Ottoman
Balkans.107 These Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ottomans were in a constant
rebellion against Constantinople especially in remote areas where the physical
impediments hindered Ottoman military deployment.108 The Ottoman and the Spanish
archives contain a large amount of documentation that relate us the precariousness of the
situation. Endemic rebellions and intensive correspondence between Orthodox nobles,
clergy, towns and European rulers leave no doubt about the problems that the Ottomans
faced in ruling their Christian subjects. They were reduced to a policy of carrot and stick.
On the one hand, they used brute force by executing and imprisoning the rebels,109
sending them to galleys,110

removing entire populations from strategic locations,111

107

Jos M. Floristn Imzcoz extensively published on this subject, see his book, Fuentes para la Poltica
Oriental. Also see. idem, Felipe II ya la Empresa de Grecia, Erytheia 15 (1994): 155-190.
108
The center of these rebellions were the Adriatic coasts and the Morea: The districts of skenderiyye,
Ohri (Eng. Ohrid , Elbasan (which included the port of Dra Eng. Durazzo), Avlonya (En. Valona/ Vlor
which included the cities of Arnavut Belgrad and Delvine , Yanya (Eng. Ioannina , Karl-eli (especially
Engeli-kasr and Mora (En. Morea, especially Manya/Mayna -Mani Peninsula, Kalamata, Mezistre Mistra, Cimarra, Anapoli -Nauplia/Nafplion) and finally the Aegean islands.
109
BOA, MD, XLVI, nos. 405 and 406 (H. 17 L 988/A.D. 25 November 1580).
110
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 5 (H. 3 M 980/A.D. 15 May 1572); XIX, no. 344 (H. 19 S 980/A.D. 30 June
1572); XXI, no. 762 (H. 11 M 981/A.D. 13 May 1573).
111
AGS, E 1329, fol. 134 (16 December 1571); BOA, MD, XII, no. 1217 (H. 27 Z 979/A.D. 11 May 1572).

222

pillaging villages,112 ruining the crops113 and kidnapping the families the rebels left
behind on the plains.114 On the other hand, however, they tried to appease them and
repeatedly offered amnesties (the policy of istimalet, meclis-i ere davet or er-i
serfe davet ,115 invited them to come and settle in the low plains116 and even bribed
them,117 all with the hope of ending the rebellion. Repeating MD records prove us the
failure of these policies in establishing order in these provinces and preventing the
cooperation between the Europeans and their own subjects.118
These rebels sent several ambassadors to induce the Habsburgs to intervene on
their behalf, using a religious rationale accentuating the tyranny of the Turk and the
misery of the Christians at the hands of the Muslims, but without neglecting the
persuasive promises that would be more influential in the pragmatic minds of decisionmakers. Prospects of an overall rebellion that would destroy the Ottoman rule in the
Balkans and projects for the defection of strategic locations to the Habsburgs followed

112

BOA, MD, XLVIII, no. 708 (H. 23 Z 990/A.D. 18 January 1583).

BOA, MD, XIX, no. 14 (H. 5 M 980/A.D. 17 May 1572).
114
BOA, MD VI, no. 677 (H. 4 B 972/A.D. 5 February 1565); XIX, no. 211 (H. 29 M 980/A.D. 10 June
1572); XXXI, no. 537 (H. 27 C 985/A.D. 10 September 1577); XXXV, no. 876 (8 N 986/A.D. 8 November
1578). These kidnapped families were used to convince the rebels in the mountains to end their rebellion.
They were to be returned once the rebels descended from the mountains. BOA, MD, nos. 689 and 788 (H.
26 B 972/A.D. 27 February 1565.)
115
BOA, MD, XXVII, nos. 39 (H. Gurre-yi B 983/A.D. 5 October 1575) and 67 (H. 4 B 983/A.D. 8
October 1575); XLVI, no. 425 (H. 21 L 989/A.D. 18 November 1581); LV, no. 370.
116
BOA, MD, XII, nos. 390 and 647 (H. 6 S 979/A.D. 29 June 1571); XXVII, nos. 298 (H. 27 B 983/A.D.
31 October 1575), 343 (H. 12 N 983/A.D. 15 December 1575), 353 (H. 12 N 983/A.D. 15 December
1575); XXXV, no. 213 (H. 19 Ca. 986/A.D. 24 July 1578); XLIII, no. 81; XLVIII, no. 424 (H. 6 L
990/A.D. 2 November 1582); LVIII, no. 125 (H. 3 Ca. 993/A.D. 3 May 1585). They even sent delegations
that consisted of trustworthy Muslims in order to convince them. MD, XLVIII, nos. 266 (H. 25 B
990/A.D. 14 August 1582), 267 (H. 29 B 990/A.D. 18 August 1582) and 274 (H. 8 N 990/A.D. 25
September 1582).
117
BOA, MD, XIV, nos. 514 (H. 24 Ra. 978/A.D. 26 August 1570) and 759 (H. 28 C 978/A.D. 27
November 1570).
118
There are several records in both Ottoman and Spanish archives, especially in Mhimmes nos. VI, X,
XII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXIII, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXIX, XL, XLVI, XLVIII,
XLIX, LI, LVIII and Mhimme Zeyli Defterleri (hereafter MZD) V. There is also a myriad of related
documents scattered in the Venecia and Npoles sections of AGS. See also. Floristn-Imizcoz, Fuentes
para la Poltica Oriental.
113

223

one another. It is not clear to what extent the Habsburgs believed in the feasibility of the
project, (I tend to hypothesize they did not119) they certainly realized the importance of
this fifth column in the Ottoman Empire for its disruptive effect. Such and endemic
rebellion could divert Ottoman forces120 and help Habsburg secret service in many ways.
The military and political aspects of these rebellions are out of the scope of this
study; suffice it to demonstrate, then, their role for the Habsburg secret service in the
area. The War of 1570-3, when the Ottomans were fighting a Christian coalition formed
by Spanish Habsburgs, Venice, the Papal States, Genoa, Florence and Malta and the
long-yearned military help from their fellow Christians seemed imminent to the rebels,
would be an ideal case study to do that demonstration. The Christian fleet under the
command of the young Habsburg prince Don Juan made good use of Christians
cooperation in order to learn the whereabouts of the Ottoman navy and gain a strategic
advantage. Members of the Orthodox Church in the afore-mentioned areas were primary
accomplices. The metropolitan of Balya Badra (Patras), for instance, not only organized a
local rebellion against the Ottomans in cooperation with rebels of Manya, but also
provided critical information for the Christian navy. He sent letters including his
observations about the Ottoman navy when it reached the shores of Balya Badra. The
galleys were not fully manned and it was the time for Christians to attack.121 Around the
same time, the Ottomans issued an order for inspection against the monks of a monastery
in Eriboz (Negroponte/Euboea who were suspected to be sending information to the

119

For instance, Charles V dismissed a proposal for the submission of Valona in 1555 because he gave
little credit to most of those Greeks and thought that similar inventions intended nothing but squeeze
money, sacar dinero. AGS, E 1323, fol. 24 (31 May 1555); E 1332, fol. 144 (23 April 1555).
120
A good example of how these rebellions diverted Ottoman military capabilities is BOA, MD XIX, nos.
493 (H. 18 N 980/A.D. 22 January 1573) and 495.
121
BOA, MD, X, no. 174 (H. 28 aban 7 , A.D. 15 January 1572 .

224

enemy.122 In a very critical moment, at the beginning of the naval campaigning season in
1572, a year after the destruction of almost the entire Ottoman navy at Lepanto when
according to a Spanish agent in Ragusa toda la Turqua comiena a llamar Espaa,
Espaa,123 the Ottomans detected that Don Juan asked the metropolitan of Rhodes to
inspect secretly the fortifications of the island. They ordered the elimination of the
responsible clergy immediately.124 Other Christian powers made use of this fifth
column as well. During the same period, monk-cum-spies who were caught in Wallachia
and sent to Constantinople for interrogation revealed that the Patriarch of Thessalonica,
Yasef, dispatched certain Christians with letters to Poland and Muscovy. 125 The
Ottomans ordered an overall investigation of the issue and the dispatch of the accused to
the capital for interrogation; unfortunately no documentation concerning the result of the
interrogation could be located in the archives.
The Habsburgs found important allies among the Balkan nobility as well. Exiled
nobles who were trying to get back their lost possessions and vassal princes who strove to
get rid of Ottoman suzerainty were potential accomplices. Their letters, which invited the
Europeans to fight the Ottomans and offered cooperation, were also important sources of
information concerning the Ottoman affairs. One of the princes of Wallachia, for
instance, was in correspondence with both the Habsburgs and the Venetians. He offered
to send them informationnot only concerning Wallachia, but also regarding Moldavia,

122

BOA, MD, X, no. 299. The order also took the possibility of a military cooperation into account. It
authorized the inspection of the monastery to see whether it was fortified and it had guns stored in it.
123
AGS, E 1332 fol. 170 (12 February 1573).
124
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 75 (mkerrer) (H. 13 Muharrem 980 / A.D. 26 May 1572).
125
BOA, MD, X, nos. 325 and 326 (H. 3 Ramazan 979 / A.D. 19 January 1572).

225

Podolia, Transylvania and Bulgaria, a valuable service given that the Spanish Habsburgs
had no intelligence network in these provinces.126
Rebels played an active role for the Habsburg secret service not only by gathering
information, but also by engaging in other aspects of secret diplomacy as well. For
example, the Christian Ottoman subjects in the district of Dukakin were in cooperation
with the Venetian garrison in the nearby castle of Kotron (Kotor/Cttaro). The rebels
were plundering Ottoman villages, taking victuals to the Venetian castle, setting up
ambushes on the roads and finally engaging in intelligence activity. 127 Some of the
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire provided invaluable services to Christian
information gathering not only by directly sending information to their coreligionists, but
also by providing lodging and scouting services for the incoming enemy spies. One of the
most interesting examples is the cooperation between the Spanish Habsburgs and an
Albanian noble, Duli, the leader of villages near Bastia on the Adriatic shores facing
Corfu.

He was favoured by the Ottoman governors of both Delvine and Avlonya

(Valona) who gave him important military tasks and shared military secrets with him.
Although in Ottoman employ, however, he had been helping the Habsburg agents who
traveled to and from Constantinople since 1564. It was impossible for these agents to
travel between the Ottoman lands and Corfu without being inspected in the port by the
Ottoman commissary who was sent there only to catch spies and run-away slaves. Duli
helped these agents enter and leave the Ottoman lands and gave them lodgings. He
furthermore provided information to the Spanish consul/spy in Corfu. Finally, he was
also considered by the Habsburgs a necessary ally that would join the Empresa de Grecia

126
127

AGS, E 1329, fol. 78 (2 August 1571).

BOA, MD, X, no. 451 (H. Gurre-yi Receb 979, A.D. 19 November 1571).

226

with his 5.000 men when the Habsburgs invaded Ottoman shores in cooperation with
Christian insurgents.128
4.5.3. Corsairs
Another important component of the Habsburg secret service in the Levant was
the corsairs that the Viceroys of both Naples and Sicily employed. These corsairs were
given specific instructions by the authorities, regulating where to sail for purposes of
reconnaissance missions as well as of corso, that is the Mediterranean privateering, when
and with which frequency to send information to the Habsburg authorities, where to send
the captured ships, what to do with the captured slaves and how to share the captured
booty among themselves.129 The details of the arrangement between the corsairs and the
authorities were also quite clear. The Habsburg authorities legalized their activities (thus
they were privateers, not pirates)130 and provided them with safe harbours to winter and
refresh their crew as well as with marketplaces where they could sell their booty and buy
necessary raw materials to repair their ships. In exchange, these corsairs provided these
authorities with certain benefits, one of which was their information-gathering
capabilities. With their knowledge of the enemy coasts, connections in port cities and the
swiftness of their ships, corsairs were ideal candidates for reconnaissance and
information gathering missions. Every year, with the start of the sailing season, a fleet
that consisted of a small number of corsair ships (four in 1576, for instance) penetrated

128

AGS E 487, Giralomo Combi Albanes, 20 April 1577.

AGS, E 1519, fols. 138 (25 March 1576) and 139. E 1336, fol. 78 (21 May 1577) clearly demonstrates
the entrepreneurial nature of the Mediterranean corso and the detailed methods by which the booty was
meticulously divided into three among the captain of the ship, the investors who armed it and the crew.
130
For the difference between these two terms, see. P. Alberto Guglielmotti, Storia della marina pontificia
(Roma: Tipografia Vaticana, 1886-1893), vol. 3, 49; Braudel, La Mditerrane, vol. II, 191; Salvatore
Bono, I corsari barbareschi (Torino: ERI-Edizion RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana, 1964), 12.
129

227

deep into the Levantine waters in order, among acts of corso, to gather information from
the ships they captured and the shores they sacked.
The employment of corsairs was a double-edged sword. These corsairs frequently
created problems with neutral states, as well as allies, as I mentioned in one of my
articles;131 and corsairs working for the Habsburgs were no exception. Even though some
local authorities eagerly supported these corsairs, (at one point even the son of the
Viceroy of Sicily participated in corso),132 the central government was not amused when
things got complicated. When in 1577, one of them, Pietro Lanza attacked Venetian ships
and created too much tension with the Serenissima, they quickly ordered that the
Venetians were compensated and Lanza should be employed elsewhere, a decision which
was taken with the intention of appeasing the Venetians, rather than dismissing the
corsair who was a hombre de servicio133 and would continue to serve until the first
decade of the 17th century.134 Still, it seems that the authorities gradually grew tired of the
activities of this unruly lot; in 1599, the ambassador in Venice argued for the prohibition
of their employment, accentuating the fact that their activities might provoke the
Ottomans to send their fleet to Italian waters. Furthermore, occasionally these did not
make any difference between Christians and Muslims and thus disturbed commerce.135
The central government acquiesced to its ambassadors advice. The prohibition met
resistance, however, from the Habsburg local authorities, most importantly the Viceroy of
Naples who argued that such a prohibition would negatively affect the information

131

Grkan, The Center and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the
Sixteenth Century, Turkish Historical Review 1/2 (2010): 151-5.
132
AGS, E 1121, fols. 236-238 (1553).
133
AGS, E 1521, fol. 103 (22 February 1578).
134
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 14, c. 191v (1 December 1606); IS, b. 460, 26 September 1606.
135
AGS, E 1928, fol. 22 (31 January 1599).

228

gathering capabilities and proposed a reform plan instead which would prevent the
undesired consequences of these corsairs activities and unburden the Habsburg
authorities from any responsibility.136 In the end, despite repeated orders, the Viceroys
continued, at the risk of being reprimanded, to support corsairs. 137
4.5.4. Renegades and Christians in Ottoman employ
Renegades in Ottoman employ unsurprisingly became the main target of the
Habsburg secret service that wanted to use these renegades expertise and knowledge on
things Ottoman. A number of different factors persuaded them to accept Habsburg offers.
Some of them, especially those who were of slave status, were basically discontent with
their conditions. Some who were employed in strategic locations, such as the Imperial
Arsenal, Navy or an important castle, sought to enjoy the material benefits of double
employment by providing information of value or offering projects of defection, sabotage
and betrayal. Certain high-ranking ones also negotiated in order to capitalize on
alternative possibilities, a plausible exit strategy in case they found themselves politically
isolated and thus under the threat of elimination.
A number of sources in the Ottoman capital provided the Habsburgs with
important information; renegades were among the most useful. Even though, these will
be delineated in the next chapter, I would like to briefly examine the successful
penetration of the Habsburg secret service into the Ottoman system by establishing
contact with and gathering information from a number of important people on several
levels of the Ottoman military and administrative cadres.

136
137

AGS, E 1162, fol. 50 (24 April 1606)

AGS, E 1889, fols. 11 (14 March 1615) and 12 (27 April 1615).

229

On the lower level, several Christians, some but not all of whom converted to
Islam, worked in strategic locations such as the Imperial Arsenal and the Navy. These
regularly provided the Habsburg agents or directly the authorities with information
regarding the Ottoman military preparations. They furthermore engaged in a number of
sabotage projects by which, one can conclude from the success rate of these projects,
(zero percent) they tried to provoke the Habsburgs appetite and defraud them (see
Chapter Five). The insatiable Habsburg desire to learn every detail about the Ottoman
navy made them invest in an extensive network that managed to extend its operations to
every segment of the Ottoman naval structure; its success is evident from the extent to
which the Habsburgs managed to penetrate into the extended household of the Ottoman
Grand Admiral Ulu Ali and to get into contact not only with several Christian slaves
who were experts on naval warfare and lived in the barracks near the Arsenal, but also
with high-ranking figures such as Ulu Alis officers, his corsair lieutenants, captains and
sailors. Two of his men, for instance, regularly sent information on whereabouts of the
Ottoman navy to the Habsburg authorities. In the corsair centers of Ottoman North
Africa, the Habsburgs enjoyed the cooperation of renegades as well. Their spies
contacted not only several renegades that worked in military projects, but also a good
many renegade local authorities of strategic importance, such as the kaids of the North
African district-provinces (sancaks) who were implied in an extensive plot with the
Habsburgs to change sides with the military forces and territories under their
command.138

138

AGS, E 1140, fol. 137 (12 July 1573); E 1144, fols. 92 (8 August 1575), 128 (24 November 1575) and
137 (3 December 1575); E 1145, fols. 118 (2 November 1576) and 119; E 1147, fol. 4 (9 January 1577); E
1149, fols. 9 (10 February 1579), 13 (1 March 1579), 18 and 21.

230

Renegades were also important in the Ottoman chancellery, thanks to their

knowledge of the prerequisite languages; most of the avu es and ulaks who carried
information and of the dragomans who specialized in diplomatic negotiations with
European powers were of Christian origin. The Habsburgs seemed to have successfully
acquired the content of the correspondence carried by some of these ulaks and avu es
and, in the case of Hrrem Bey, managed to corrupt one of the dragomans, at a crucial
time during the Ottoman-Habsburg negotiations for a truce, when Madrid desperately
needed both the information he provided and his expert opinion on the process of
negotiations.
4.5.5. Negotiating with the infidel: Muslims in the Ottoman administration
Renegades were not the only connection that the Habsburg secret service
established among the members of the Ottoman elite. In search of material benefit,
several Muslim-born Ottomans sought Habsburg employment. A good example is
Mehmed Pasha, the son of famous corsair Salih Reis. He negotiated with the Habsburgs
his defection and the submission of Algeria, in exchange for their financial support with
which he planned to bribe the Grand Vizier Sokollu and ensure his re-appointment as the
Governor-General of Algeria. Even though these negotiations came to naught and were
forgotten amidst the truce negotiations between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, this
example is still demonstrative of the possibility that a free born Muslim, a former
Governor-General and the son of a renowned Ottoman corsair, could contemplate
conspiring with the Catholic King and even retire to Christian lands, retaining his
religion, in case of failure.139

139

AGS, E 488, 21 June 1576.

231

4.5.6. European diplomats in Constantinople

The Habsburgs managed, albeit to a limited extent, to gather information from
European diplomats as well. We had already mentioned how they corrupted the Venetian
bailo, Girolamo Lippomano who paid dearly the price of leaking information and sharing
state secrets with others. More important than penetrating to the internal communication
of a neutral power such as Venice that retained a position (in spite of the zig-zags that her
independent foreign policy and his geo-strategic position between the Eastern (Ottoman)
Mediterranean and the Catholic World dictated) within the Habsburg system of alliances,
was to acquire information brokered by the diplomats of other less friendly powers to the
Habsburgs. For one, the latter managed to corrupt the dragoman of the French
ambassador in Constantinople, Battista Bendoria.140 In 1576, the Habsburg ambassador in
Venice learned the number of galleys in the Ottoman navy from the correspondence
between the French ambassador in Constantinople and his colleague in Venice.141 In
1593, the Viceroy of Naples detained, for a couple of days, Jacques Savary de Lancosme,
the Catholic French ambassador who refused to recognize his new King, Henri IV and to
give up his ambassadorial post. The Viceroy managed to use the occasion and persuaded
the disgruntled and impoverished diplomat, with bribes and presents, to share
information.142 The Viceroy of Sicily, the Prince Filiberto of Savoy, made a likewise deal
with the English ambassador who was passing from Messina on his way to
Constantinople. The ambassador agreed to write him about things Ottoman if the Viceroy
agreed to free some English forzados that rowed in his galleys.143

140

AGS, E 1064, fol. 102.

AGS, E 1070, fol. 30 (10 March 1576).
142
AGS, E 1093, fols. 133, 134 and 167 (24 June 1593).
143
AGS, E 1894, fols.3 (15 February 1622) and 24 (27 February 1622).
141

232

4.5.7. Jewish communities

Similarly, from among the Jewish communities, dispersed along the
Mediterranean shores, came several Habsburg agents and informants. These agents
enjoyed the benefits of the interconnectedness of Jewish communities thanks to which
they could easily travel, trade and contact with locals as well as imperial elites who had
to cut deals with these Jews for purposes of luxury trade and certain business relations.
Their role and influence in politics was particularly significant in the Ottoman
Empire where they immigrated in great numbers after their expulsion from the Iberian
Peninsula in 1492 and where they managed to ally themselves with the ruling elite and
gained important positions. The well-known story of Joo Miches, alias Joseph Nasi,144
for instance, is a good example of how fast an exiled Marrano family could reach
prominence in the Ottoman Empire. We will talk about Nasi in the following chapters
since he established an intensive intelligence network that provided the Ottomans with
information and proved once again the importance of the interconnectedness of Jewish
communities in early modern espionage. What was surprising was, however, that he also
worked with (not for!) the Habsburgs as well.145 Similarly, Doctor Salomon Ashkenazi
became an important figure in the Ottoman court and played a crucial role by helping the
Habsburg diplomat-cum-spymaster Giovanni Margliani in the Ottoman-Habsburg truce
negotiations. Two other important figures, David Passi and Guillermo de Saboya also
worked for the Habsburgs, albeit for other powers as well. We will soon come to their
stories.

144

Roth, The House of Nasi.

Norman Rosenblatt, Joseph Nasi, Friend of Spain, in Studies in Honor of M. J. Benardete (Essays in
Hispanic and Sephardic Culture, eds. Izaak A. Langnas and Barton Sholod (New York: Las Americas
Publishing Company, 1965), 323-332. AGS, E 1072, fol. 232. Also see. E 1071, fol. 191 (5 March 1577).
145

233

4.5.8. Information provider allies

4.5.8.1.

Austrian Habsburgs

The Habsburgs cooperated with other polities and their secret services as well.
Even after the Habsburg axis split up with Charles Vs abdication (1556 and death
(1558), two branches of the family kept close ties with each other well into the
seventeenth century. They not only contracted several marriages between their princes
and princesses,146 practicing endogamy, but also hosted147 and employed148 each others
members. Even though Madrid and Vienna may have differed on minor issues, during the
time under investigation they shared information with no prejudice. Madrids ambassador
in Vienna was the most active, contacting authorities and providing Madrid with
information that reached the Austrian capital.149 These information, however, were more
concerned with the political realities of Central Europe, rather than those of the
Mediterranean; so it is only natural to see that such relations intensified during the
Ottoman-Austrian Wars, such as that of 1593-1606 when all of a sudden letters not only
from Vienna, but also from other places such as Cracow, Strigonia, Possonia and Prague
started to arrive in Madrid.150 Furthermore, Viennas ambassador in Constantinople sent
regular information151 and even helped the operations of the Habsburg intelligence

146

Bartolom Bennassar, Histoire des Espagnols: VIe-XXe sicle (Paris : ditions Robert Laffont, 1992),
320-4.
147
The Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, for instance, grew up in Spain while his son and successor,
Rudolf II, spent 8 years in the Peninsula, where he received his education with his brother Archduke Albert
III.
148
Archduke Albert III of Austria, for instance, was the Governor-General of the Habsburg Low Countries
and Bourgogne (o. 1596-8). He was made the sovereign of the same territories (r. 1598-1621), jointly with
his wife, Isabella Clara Eugenia, the daughter of Philip II.
149
For Count of Montagudos activities, for instance, see. AGS, E 1330, fols. 57-67 (April-August 1572),
93-4, 97, 152, 168, 180, ff.; E 1333, fols. 138-143 (January-April 1574) and 147 (15 October 1574).
150
AGS, E K 1675, fols. 14, 24, 28a, 28b, 34, 39, 48, 56, 67 and 73 ; E 1345, ff. ; E 1346 ff.; E K 1676, fol.
108 (9 April 1598).
151
AGS, E 1062, fol. 84 (3 March 1573); E 1080, fol. 31 (14 May 1579); E 1338, fol. 48 (20 August 1580);
E 487, por carta del embaxador del emperador que residen en constantinopla de dos de noviembre 1573.

234

network in the Ottoman capital.152 Still, the extent of the Austrian contribution to the
Spanish Habsburg secret service requires a comprehensive study of the relevant
documentation in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) that I could not undertake.
Until then, suffice it to say, Austrian cooperation should have meant much for the
Spanish Habsburgs who lacked any diplomatic means at their disposal.
We had already mentioned the details of the Habsburgs cooperation with the
Venetian and the Ragusan authorities. Two Habsburg allies followed the suit and
exchanged information with the Habsburg authorities.
4.5.8.2.

The Knights of St. John in Malta

The first was the Knights of St. John in Malta whose contribution to the
Habsburgs was unproportional to the size of their state. These remnants of the Crusades,
who were expelled from Rhodes by the Ottoman in 1522, had come under Charles Vs
wings and received from the Emperor the small yet strategically located island of Malta
and the castle of Tripolis, only to lose the latter to the Ottomans in 1551. These Maltese
knights, in quite a crusading spirit, engaged in corso from their well-protected (the failure
of the Ottomans 1565 expedition is a good witness to that) base in Malta and attacked
Muslim ships, at times penetrating deep into the Levantine waters, despite the repeated
Ottoman attempts to contain them. The sea belonged to corsairs fast and mobile ships
and the Ottomans were not more successful in containing corso than their adversary, the
Habsburgs.

152

Margliani praised the information he received from the imperial ambassador. AGS, E 1338, fol. 48 (20
August 1580). This is not surprising given that one of the basic arguments of this dissertation is that
resident diplomacy is crucial for efficient information gathering.

235

Therefore, the Maltese ships sailed freely in the Mediterranean and gathered
information regarding the whereabouts of the Ottoman navy153 as well as the preparations
in the Ottoman Arsenal. Moreover, they could gather information from several ships that
frequented the port of Malta; in 1585, they would even encounter one of these ships the
Ottoman avu that was traveling with letters for Algiers and France.154 They even had
their own spies who operated in Constantinople, some of whom belonged to the order,155
and some not, such as the two Moors captured in 1565.156
Evidently, even after their expulsion from Rhodes in 1522, they kept their
intelligence ties. It should not be a coincidence that the first French ambassador to
Constantinople, Jean de la Forest was a Maltese knight and the first book published in
French on the Ottoman Empire, estat de la cour du gran turc (1542),157 was written by
another knight.158
In short, the Maltese did not hide any information from the Habsburgs, because
their survival depended on the alertness of the Habsburgs to the Ottoman threat, as the
siege of 1565 clearly demonstrates. Therefore, the Grand Master of the Order informed
the Habsburg center as well as the provincial centers such as Messina and Naples. The
quality of information he sent deserves attention; thanks to him, the Habsburgs could

153

For instance, had the Duke of Medinaceli listened to the information brought by Maltese ships, things
would have been different in 1560. See. Chapter Two.
154
The ship had to take shelter in the port of Malta because of a storm. When the Maltese interrogated the
captain, he confessed the presence of an Ottoman avu . The Maltese then immediately informed the
Habsburgs and asked him what to do, whether to burn the ship with the avu and his three men in it and
kill the captain or let them go when eventually the King of France would demand their restitution. AGS, E
1155, fol. 144 (7 December 1585). Meanwhile, they sent the translations of the letters that the avu
carried, fols. 145-8.
155
AGS, E 1124, fol. 125 (4 January 1558).
156
AGS, E 486, Avisos de Constantinopla de 27 de diciembre 1565.
157
There is also a contemporary English translation. Antoine Geuffruy, The order of the greate Turckes
courte, of hys menne of warre, and of all hys conquestes, with the summe of Mahumetes doctryne.
Translated out of Frenche. 1524 [sic]. (London: Ricardus Grafton, 1542).
158
Servantie, Information on Ottoman Shipbuilding, 5.

236

discover an Ottoman intelligence network that operated between Constantinople and la

Goleta.159
4.5.8.3.

The Grand Duchy of Tuscany (Florence)

A second Habsburg ally was Florence, even though their contribution was more
mediocre and less related to the Mediterranean. Still, the Florentine documentation attests
to an active exchange of information between the Viceroy of Naples and the Duke of
Florence in the early 1550s; how else could we explain the existence of the
correspondence between the Habsburg spies and the Viceroys of Naples and Sicily in
Florentine archives?160
4.6.

EVERYTHING IS DONE WITH MONEY AND WITHOUT IT

NOTHING GETS DONE: THE FINANCING OF OPERATIONS

If early modern espionage was an enterprise and its spies were information
traders, then a fortiori there had to be a direct correlation between the financial
capabilities at the disposal of central governments and the efficiency of their secret
services. Omnia per pecuniam acta sunt et sine ipsa actum est nihil, lamented a
Habsburg agent in Ragusa in 1573;161 to gather information de tal calidad que es
menester, the authorities had to have an open purse in order to pay and give presents to
those who could provide secrets, warned another from Constantinople in 1588.162
The authorities begged to differ and penny-pinched instead when it comes to
paying their agents. Without going into too much detail, suffice it to say, a good many

159

AGS, E 1132, fol. 28 (4 December 1567).

ASF, AMP, fils. 4148, 2863, 4178, 4277; Sola, Los que van y vienen, 66-7.
161
AGS, E 1332, fol. 167 (1 February 1573).
162
AGS, E 1090, fol. 8 (10 September 1588). Juan Segui de Menorca.
160

237

number of agents complained of crowns frugality.163 Even those who received their
payments were not content with the amount;164 their greed seemed to be coupled with the
rise of real prices in the inflationary 16th century. Still, none could top the fury of Juan
Segui de Menorca, who lost a portion of his stipend when he was asking for the payments
in arrears as well as a raise for the future.165
A series of criticism, penned by the Habsburg spymaster, Balthasar Prototico,
demonstrate the importance of money in the conduct of secret diplomacy.166 According to
Prototico, these Viceroys habit of not regularly paying their agents paralyzed
intelligence operations. First of all, disgruntled agents who could not receive their
payments created a security problem for other spies on the field. For instance, Amerigo
Balassa, one of the spies whom the Viceroy of Sicily sent to Constantinople, defected to
the Ottoman side, much to Prototicos chagrin, since it was with the information he
provided that the Ottomans organized an expedition in order to capture Prototico.
Likewise, the son of a certain Murad Aa who died while on Habsburg payroll,
blackmailed the authorities that had the money that was due his father not been paid, he

163

For Cesar de la Mareas complaints from Ragusa, see. AGS, E 1517/cuaderno VI, fols. 18-9 (27 May
1577). For Brutti, E 1337, fol. 15 (25 January 1585). For extensive correspondence on Marco Antonio
Estanga alias Bartolomeo Pusterla whose payments were in arrears for five years and who died before
receiving his money, see. AGS, E K 1674, fols. 131, 137, 156, 164, 168, 180 and 186 (all 1590); E K 1675,
fols. 26 (8 February 1591), 182 (15 October 1592) and 196 (21 August 1593); E 1345, fols. 20, 25, 28, 34,
56, 79, 81 (all 1593) and 115 (12 February 1594). Juan Segui de Menorca were luckier than Estanga and
received his money shortly. See. AGS, E 1090, fols. 8 (10 September 1588), 193 (25 October 1591) and
194 (25 October 1591). 6 years later, though, after Marglianis death, payments stopped. AGS, E K 1676,
fols. 79 (3 November 1597), 80 (3 November 1597). For Ambrosio Grillo, see. AGS, E 1345, fol. 193 (24
September 1594). For payments that were not honored in 1608, see. AGS, E K 1678, fols. 14, 20, 32, 43a,
43b, 70, 81 and 85. For Andrea Rinaldis fury the same year, see. ASV, IS, b. 416, 3 March 1608 and 2
March 1608.
164
AGS, E 1044, fol. 40 (8 April 1552); E 1056, fol. 241; E 1528, fol. 161 (18 May 1583); BNM, ms.
7905/168, fols. 1r-2v; Masi, Jernimo Bucchia, 104-5. Some of these demands were met; For instance, for
the raise in the stipends of the leading spies in the Constantinople network, see. E 1071, fol. 171.
Sometimes, the authorities themselves demanded a raise for their spies. E 1148, fol. 3 (9 September 1577).
165
AGS, E K 1676, fols. 79, 80 and 81 (all 3 November 1597).
166
AGS, E 1056, fol. 217.

238

would have denounced Habsburg agents and used a letter that Philip II wrote to his father
as a proof.167 Even though less troublesome than defection per se, the frequency of agents
leaving networks and ceasing operations still decreased the efficiency of the Habsburg
secret service. Prototico warned that the irregularity and unreliability of payments played
into the hands of the Ottoman Sultan who wanted to use the occasion to employ the
disgruntled Habsburg agents. Furthermore, the words of Cesar de la Marea undoubtedly
demonstrates how the well-functioning of the system was jeopardized: [a]ll [our agents]
are lost and getting lost because we do not honor promises we made to them and I lose
here the credit, honor and reputation and se perde el servitio.168 It was the crown that
lost in the end! Not only the operations of information gathering, but also covert
operations suffered. For instance, Prototico claimed to have secured the cooperation of
people who had important connections in the Ottoman palace as well as two renegade tax
collectors that offered to hand the castle of Modon to the Habsburgs. In both operations,
however, money was essential. His connections in the capital had to be appeased with
bribes and presents. Renegade tax collectors, on the other hand, wanted 100 escudos per
capita and the opportunity to plunder the Customs House. Among the Levantine
renegades, he added, suona in levante una ama in ra renegati, the rumour was that
all who have returned to Christianity were dying of hunger and nobody was getting any
merced. Thanks to these rumours, renegades did not wish to work with the Habsburgs;
according to Prototico, Philip II had to warn his ministers.
For sure, none of these criticisms was novelty for the Habsburg authorities, nor
were they things that they themselves could not think of. They insisted, however, on
167

AGS, E 1071, fol. 171.

AGS, E 1517/cuaderno VI, fols. 18-9 (27 May 1577). With a similar argument, Mathias Vicudo also
stated that he was losing credit and his honor. Fol. 23 (1 October 1575).
168

239

jeopardizing the well-functioning of the system, despite the resistance from within the
system; the protests of those like Francisco de Vera169 or Duke of Sessa,170 as well as
explicit orders from Madrid171 fell mostly on deaf ears. The Viceroys of Naples were not
willing to indulge these agents by fulfilling their obligations.
There were basically four reasons behind their dragging feet when it comes to do
the payments. Firstly, given that the Viceroys of Naples were more experienced in the
daily conduct of the secret diplomacy, their unwillingness to pay these agents or support
their operations might as well demonstrate their disillusionment with the overall
performance of these spies. Some of the expressions they used and the observations they
made, while defending their decision not to pay, support this idea.172
The second reason could be the chronic financial problems that the Habsburgs had
to endure as a consequence of a series of bankruptcies (1557, 1560, 1575, 1596) triggered
by the military costs of Charles Vs and Philip IIs overextended empire. It would be
unrealistic to expect that the Habsburgs regularly paid these spies who were at the bottom
of the Habsburg administrative hierarchy, while they could hardly pay their military and

169

The Habsburg ambassador in Venice. AGS, E K 1674, fols. 131, 137, 156, 164, 169, 180 and 186 (all
1590); E K 1675, fols. 26 (8 February 1591), 182 (15 October 1592) and 194 (2 April 1593); E 1345, fols.
5, 20, 25, 28, 34 and 56 (all 1594).
170
The Admiral of Naples. E 1075, fol. 18 (14 January 1575).
171
AGS, E K 1674, fol. 168 (10 September 1590); E K 1675, fol. 196 (21 August 1593).
172
See especially Cardinal Granvelas disappointment and chagrin. According to him, the information these
agents in Constantinople sent was inconclusive, imprecise, contradicting each other and therefore useless.
They claim to have intercepted Ottoman correspondence and sent fake letters that were supposedly written
by the Sultan. They were sending information about events that had already occurred by putting an old date
on letters and then blaming the slowness of couriers. Granvela was further amazed that they did not even
care to use aliases and signed their reports with their own names. It was that either they were double agents,
or the Ottomans tolerated their presence to feed the Habsburgs with incorrect information. The only aim of
their leader, Renzo, the gran palabrero y mentiroso, and his equally deceiving men was to extract money
which they did not deserve; none of the information that they sent was worth a tornes. Better without
them, complained the viceroy and asked the Habsburg ambassador in Venice to look for men of quality
there. AGS, E 1329, fol. 57 (2 June 1571); E 1061, fol.3; E 1064, fol. 61 (23 December 1574); E 1140, fols.
97 (20 May 1573) and 98 (9 November 1571), E 1500, fol. 60 (12 June 1571).

240

administrative personnel. The Viceroy of Sicily confessed, for instance, that he could
only pay these spies 500 escudos, simply because he did not have the money.173
Thirdly, the Habsburgs reluctance to pay their spies can be considered a part of
an overall tendency. The reluctance of the newly emerging bureaucratic state in the
second half of the 15th century to honor its obligations to its ambassadors and condottieri
in the face of new financial responsibilities caused by the broader administrative
challenges clearly resembles the Habsburgs case in the 16th century. The reason why the
Habsburg authorities did not regularly pay their spies could be that early modern
espionage was not considered a distinct profession. This imprecise nature of the
profession is at least how Paul M. Dover explains a similar irregularity of payments to
diplomats and condottieri in the second half of the 15th century.174 Shortly, spies were not
officers of the state and therefore could be neglected.
Finally, this could be the effect of the diminishing importance of the Great War in
the Mediterranean. Even though there were similar complaints prior to the OttomanHabsburg truce, the Habsburg authorities seemed to honor their obligations more
responsibly in the 1560s and the 1570s. Lavish payments that were made to the agents in
Constantinople, and generous resources that were allocated to covert operations such as
sabotage and bribery clearly highlight the direct correlation between the tenor of the
Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the Mediterranean and financial resources allocated to
secret diplomacy in the Mediterranean borderlands. When the memory of an Ottoman
Navy in the Western Mediterranean was fresh and the Viceroys had to invest huge sums
of money in defense preparations every year come sailing season in March, they showed
173

AGS, E 1163, fol. 32 (27 June 1608).

Paul M. Dover, Economic Predicament of Italian Renaissance Ambassadors, Journal of Early Modern
History 12 (2008), 165.
174

241

more interest in what their spies had to say and therefore were more willing to pay. With
the changing dynamics of international politics and inter-dynastical rivalry, they may not
be so receptive in the 1590s. In short, the Viceroys had several military and
administrative responsibilities according to which they had to allocate their dwindling
financial resources wisely; the payments to spies of questionable loyalty and mediocre
quality may not have been their priority, especially during the times when the Ottoman
threat seemed less imminent.
An interesting dispute between the ambassador in Venice, Francisco de Vera, and
the Viceroy of Sicily, Count of Miranda, over the payments to spies in Constantinople
demonstrate to us how each Habsburg officers had his own view, in tandem with their
official duties and responsibilities, regarding the necessity of gathering information in the
Levant. The Viceroy, his hands full with several other responsibilities and pressing
financial needs of an entire viceroyalty, stopped paying one of the most efficient
Habsburg spies in Constantinople, Marco Antonio Stanga. De Vera, an ambassador
whose primary task was to gather information, intervened in January 1590, accentuating
the qualities of Stanga, the best piece that His Majesty had in Constantinople who sent
punctual and reliable information every fifteen days with great care and at the risk of his
life. When de Vera did not hear from the Viceroy who was supposed to pay Stangas 4
years of salaries as well as 1.000 ducats that he spent on the Ottoman grandees in the last
11 years, he wrote to Madrid on March. The very person who originally allocated
Stangas salary as the Habsburg ambassador in Venice (o. 1577-1579) and the then
Secretary of the State in 1590, Juan de Idiquez, approved the payment on September.
Francisco de Vera, in the meantime, continued his lamentations. Marco Antonio Stanga

242

was essential for gathering information especially given that he could not gather fresh
information in Venice. News sent by bailo should not be trusted, because the Venetians
were generally manipulating information in order to reach their own political objectives.
The ambassadors in Venice were kept under close surveillance, almost besieged,
assediados, and thus could learn no more than the rumours on the street, vox populi. In
February, the Viceroy sent a cdula worth 834 escudos, excluding the salary of 1590 and
declared that he would pay no more. De Vera reacted immediately asking the center
whether it was they who took Stanga off the crowns payroll or whether the Viceroy
himself took the initiative. The issue was not resolved until August-September 1593,
when Stanga perished in Constantinople, with four years of his salaries unpaid.175
In several instances, there were financial irregularities that demanded the attention
of the authorities. We had previously mentioned Luis de Portillos attempts to defraud the
Habsburgs with fabricated information;176 he should be encouraged with his early success
in persuading the Viceroy to, albeit half-heartedly, reward him with a pension. In 1573,
Portillo even sent a quenta summarizing his expenditures, only to be reprimanded by the

cynical Viceroy.177 The same year, Aurelio Santa Croce demanded 15.000 ducats for his
network, surely an inflated one.178 Six years later, his successor, Giovanni Margliani
could now make himself rich by sending a letter to the Viceroy of Naples and demanding
thousands of ducats to be paid as bribes to the Ottomans during the negotiations of truce,
or at least thought so the corsair Mustafa Bey, Marglianis former owner.179 Even though
175

AGS, E K 1674, fols. 131 (3 March 1590), 137 (31 March 1590), 156 (21 July 1590), 164 (18 August
1590), 168 (10 September 1590), 169 (13 October 1590), 180 (10 November 1590) and 186 (8 December
1590); E K 1675, fols. 26 (8 February 1591) and 182 (15 October 1592); E 1541, fol. 222.
176
AGS, E 1332, fols. 33, 34, 35, 37, 103, 131, 180, 188 and 192 (all 1573).
177
AGS, E 1332, fol. 200 (28 July 1573).
178
AGS, E 1071, fol. 171 (29 November 1573).
179
AGS, E 490, 22 October 1579.

243

Margliani, more diplomat than a spy, abstained from doing so, he was an exception.
These spies would defraud anybody, even their own kind. In 1566, Ambrosio Giudice
came to Ragusa in order to receive the payments sent from the Habsburgs. After having
spent 600 ducados of 1000 he received, this wine-drinker returned to Constantinople with
the rest of the money and claimed to have been robbed in Rome.180
The most interesting story of fraud was that of Niccol Prototico who came to the
court in Madrid in late 1566 to request lavish financial concessions on behalf of his father
(the honoring of the payments in arrears, the reimbursement of certain expenditures such
as the 718 ducats spent in the ransom of Niccol and even a raise in Balthasars salary as
well as the post of the captain of the royal frigates who carried the correspondence
between Otranto and the Ionian Islands for himself. Surprisingly, certain documentation
records that all of these excessive demands were accepted. The mystery was resolved
when the Secretary of State Antonio Prez discovered the discrepancies between the
kings letters and those of the Viceroy of Naples regarding the appointment of Niccol to
the afore-mentioned post. After a brief interrogation, he quickly discovered that Prototico
befriended one of his officers, Martn Ruiz de Velasio. The two contacted, on a Sunday
morning while everybody was attending the mass, one of his pages, Francisco de Salinas,
and made him copy certain letters, ordering the Viceroys of Naples and Sicily that
Prototicos demands be accepted. Having realized the scheme, Prez immediately ordered
the local authorities to detain Prototico and confiscate his papers. Despite the pleas of his

180

Garca Hern n, Algunas Notas, 253.

244

father who even came to Otranto to recover his son, he was sent to Spain for
imprisonment.181 From him, we hear no more.
Central authorities developed a couple of methods to increase their control over
the financing of secret diplomacy and to more effectively deal with these financial
irregularities. Firstly, financial bestowments could not have been realized without the
approval of the center while an official of the provincial Treasury kept a close eye on the
distribution of the approved amounts.182 An extant document in AGS, a quenta listing, to
an impressive extent of detail and precision, the payments that were due and those that
had been made to the Habsburg spies in Constantinople over the years, clearly proves the
efficiency of central governments in supervising their finances, even when it was
regarding the secret expenditures.183 Furthermore, even though the authorities whose
responsibilities included secret diplomacy were allocated a generous sum of money for
these secret expenditures, they still had to give detailed reports every six months,
justifying the usage of these special funds.184 These reports were only for the eyes of the
king and his secretaries of the state,185 even though as mentioned, there were exceptions.
To prove the legitimacy of their expenses, these authorities in turn occasionally
demanded from their agents, statements or detailed lists explaining the money they

181

AGS, E 1057, fol. 94; E 1127, fol. 193 (9 December 1563); E 1132, fols. 136 (28 February 1569) and
187 (12 July 1569); E 1056, fols. 226-230 (all 1569).
182
These officials in Naples were in chronological order, Lope de Mardones, Alonso Snchez and Juan
Baptista Carachiolo. AGS, E 1060, fol. 129; E 1073, fol. 68 (17April 1577).
183
AGS, E 1073, fols. 48 and 49.
184
For reports submitted by the Habsburg ambassadors to Venice regarding their semiannual expenditures
(1589-1593), AGS, E K 1675, fols. 1, 3, 12, 78, 157 and 192.
185
AGS, E 1408, fol. 192. Garnicer and Marcos, 85.

245

received from them.186 These written statements would be a legal defense in case the
authorities wanted to audit these expenditures.
Given the primitiveness of the early modern financial system, the transfer of
money to spies on the field was an issue to be reckoned with. Even though, the
Habsburgs unwillingness to pay to begin with might give the impression that the
geographical and logistical difficulties impeded the transfer of money, the economic ties
between the two halves of the Mediterranean helped the authorities overcome these
difficulties. The money flowed in the Mediterranean at a relative freedom and the
Habsburgs did not lack the means to transfer money when they wanted to so.
First of all, there were always itinerant agents and couriers that traveled back and
forth between Constantinople, Ragusa, Naples, Messina and Madrid. They obtained from
the authorities either a letter of credit (litera di credito) or a bill of exchange (cdula) that
authorized the payment of a certain sum.187 Surprisingly for such large amounts, they
were paid in cash as well.188 Also merchants carried the money, even though this should
be less secure and less often.189 Still, this system brought several disadvantages, such as
delays, inconsistencies and ruptures. Gigli for instance made a case for the presence of a
resident pagador that would be in charge of distributing the money in situ with the
authority to dispense at his own discretion, con su consulta y sabida y por su mano.

186

One good example is the detailed quenta that Cesar de la Marea gave to Guzman de Silva. AGS, E
1527, fols. 311 and 312. (8 September 1582). Also see those of Manuel Glinzon. AGS, E 1540, fols. 141,
385, 386, 388 and 401; E 1542, fols. 127-8 (1 February 1591); E 1543, fol. 139; E 1545 fols. 162 and 192.
For simple statements, see. AGS, E 487, 21 Julio 1569; 488, 18 October 1577.
187
For examples of litera de credito and cdula, see. AGS, E 1071, fols. 162-164 (1566); E 1140, fols. 99,
104, 109, 110 and 111.
188
Ambrosio Giudice, for instance, went to Ragusa in order to receive the provisions of all the spies,
even though he seemed to have spent some of the money he was supposed to bring back. The fact that he
claimed to have been robbed in Rome shows that he was paid in cash. Garca Hern n, Algunas Notas,
253.
189
AGS, E 1060, fol. 129 (9 May 1571).

246

Obviously he was after more money which, according to him, was prerequisite for the
well-functioning of the network as well as the realization of many of his projects, such as
torching the Arsenal. His argument would have still had a rationale, had any of the covert
operations he proposed been plausible.190 His offer seemed to have fallen on deaf ears.
Thanks to the extant networks of international trade and finance, spies continued
receiving their payments with letters of credit signed by the Habsburgs. Venices central
position in the process of the transfer of money is obvious. The cdula to be made for the
bribes proposed to the Ottoman pashas in 1579, for instance, could not be produced in
Naples, because here, there is no correspondence with Constantinople, or merchants
who can give these cdulas. Given the risk of carrying 30.000 escudos in gold, the
authorities had to exchange money in Venice that had great correspondence with
Constantinople and that were filled with merchants who were ready to give cdulas muy
ciertas.191 Sometimes, even the Venetian bailo himself participated in these transfers
and paid the salary of certain agents such as Juan Segui. 192 The Florentine bailo played a
similar role as well.193 Finally, there were instances when the payees sent agents to
receive what was due to them from the Habsburg authorities.194
4.7.

THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION AND TRANSMISSION

One other problem was related to the coordination of operations and the
transmission of news. The communication between Habsburg centers in Europe was

190

AGS, E 1392, fol. 74 (16 March 1563).

AGS, E 1079, fol. 6 (10 January 1579).
192
AGS, E 1090, fol. 8 (10 September 1588).
193
AGS, E 1056, fol. 56 (28 July 1563).
194
We had already mentioned supra how Balthasar sent his son to recover his unpaid stipends. With same
intentions, Salomon Ashkenazis nephews came to Venice in 1583 as well. AGS, E 1529, fols. 51, 52 and
53 (30 December 1583). Isaac Passi visited the city three years later and requested a safe-conduct in order
to proceed to the Habsburg court from which he hoped to recover the money due his brother David Passi.
AGS, E 1537, fols. 206 and 207 (both 23 July 1586).
191

247

realized with the institutionalized postal services as was mentioned before. The
Habsburgs leased these services to the Tassis family that monopolized the office of the
Correo Mayor General. These established in their turn, courier centers and appointed
correo mayores and postmasters in order to ensure the reliability and the continuity of the
correspondence as well as the coordination between the Habsburg authorities. This
system was not only used within the Habsburg territories, but also extended to the
embassies abroad. The nature of the Ottoman-Habsburg relations, however, impeded the
utilization of such a system. Given the geographical distance and the lack of
correspondence between the Habsburg centers and the Ottoman cities, communication
and coordination between different Habsburg centers and separate intelligence networks
became issues to be dealt with. The gravity of these issues was further exacerbated by the
fact that the Habsburgs were more interested in using information for making decisions
regarding military matters. Therefore, when the letters sent by these agents informing the
sailing date, the whereabouts and the possible target of the Ottoman navy arrived too late,
the information would be useless. Furthermore, the authorities sought to gather
information from a number of different networks in order to be able to compare and
contrast the incoming information more efficiently. Finally, the flow of information must
be continuous, at least between March and October, the sailing season in the
Mediterranean.
In order to overcome this problem, the Habsburgs developed a frigate system. A
small number of royal frigates collected the letters that Habsburg spies who operated in
Adriatic ports such as Ragusa, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Cattaro wrote and brought those
to the port cities in the Kingdom of Naples such as Barleta, Brindisi and Otranto.

248

Needless to say, the Habsburg authorities in Naples, Messina, Otranto, Genoa, Rome,
Florence and Venice exchanged information via either the same system of frigates195 or
regular couriers.196 The Habsburg agents also used Venetian frigates when it served them.
This met resistance from the Venetian authorities, however. In 1592, the governor
(provveditore) of Cattaro, who rather wished that his government received the
information that reached Cattaro before the Habsburg authorities, banned the frigate that
sailed between Cattaro and Venice to stop in Ragusa or touch the shore elsewhere. This
way, he aimed to delay the communication and the timely flow of information between
Habsburg agents in Constantinople, the spymaster in Ragusa, Ruggero Margliani, and the
Habsburg ambassador in Venice.197
Apart from information the networks in these port cities and islands provided the
frigates, itinerant spymasters such as Renzo, spies such as Nicol Curenzi, Ambrosio
Giudice alias Murad Aa Napolitano and regular couriers such as Giovanni Stefano
Ferrari and Giovanni Antonio Santa Croce198 carried letters between Constantinople and
the port cities from where the information was re-collected by the afore-mentioned
frigates. It was also common to place a resident agent or a courier in strategic locations
such as the islands of Chios and Mytilene, conveniently close to Constantinople, but far

195

From Otranto and Lecce, these frigates rapidly carried letters for both Viceroys. Sola, Los que van y
vienen, 49.
196
AGS, E 1124, fol. 100 (18 May 1558); E 1547, fol. 96; E 1552, fols. 243-4.
197
The provveditore seemed to have succeeded; Margliani was complaining that the letters which arrived
from Constantinople to Cattaro was reaching nearby Ragusa later than they reached far-away Venice. AGS,
E 1542, fols. 117 (5 January 1592), 118 (15 January 1592) and 124 (8 and 12 May 1592). A similar order
was given in 1601 as well. AGS, E K 1677, fol. 118 (21 April 1601).
198
These two were regular couriers that worked for decades. A document dated 1576, however, enlisted
some others that appear otherwise less frequently in the documentation. AGS, E 1071, fol. 189.

249

from the repressive Ottoman surveillance.199 Still, agents in Constantinople experienced

difficulties while sending their letters, especially when they could not find a courier to
carry them until the afore-mentioned port cities and when the routes were interrupted,
both possibilities testifying to the success of the Ottoman counter-intelligence.200 The
only regular postal system between Europe and the Ottoman Empire belonged to the
Venetians. Even though Habsburg agents tried to use this postal system to send their
letters to the ambassador in Venice, at least some of the baili resisted the idea. For
instance, Lorenzo Bernardo (o. 1585-7) refused the letters Juan Segui gave him to be sent
to Venice,201 while his successor, Lippomano (o. 1589-91), a traitor and a Habsburg
informant, was more sympathetic to the idea.202 Apparently, the Franciscan monks in
Constantinople also helped the dispatch of the letters.203 In short, the results were mixed,
depending on the conjunctural factors of the time. At times, such as during the period of
truce negotiations, Margliani managed to send a letter every two or three days. There
were times as well, however, when the Habsburg agents in Constantinople were reduced
to risky measures and impressive innovations. In Chapter Three, we had already
mentioned the detailed instructions given by Gigli for the transmission of news between
Constantinople and Naples. Another good example is Pedro Breas method. He

199

That was the main rationale behind Niccol Giustinianis presence in Chios. Similarly, one of Carlo
Cicalas functions was to provide a bridge between the network in Constantinople and Habsburg authorities
in Naples and Sicily. Also see, AGS, E 1120, fols. 238 and 246.
200
For instance, after the expulsion of Dino Miniati and Donato Antonio Lubelo from Ragusa because of
the Ottoman pressure, couriers could not arrive and letters could not be sent via Ragusa. They had to send
the duplicate letters via Venice. AGS, E 1056, fols. 86 (2 August 1567).
201
ASV, IS, b. 416, 30 November 1591.
202
ASV, CX-ParSec, c. 130. (22 April 1591).
203
AGS, E 1060, fol. 140 (15 June 1571).

250

convinced a certain Filipo Balestrin, a slave of Ulu Ali, to sail with the Ottoman navy to
escape at the nearest opportunity and bring his letters to Naples.204
The Habsburgs employed a couple of methods to transmit information safely and
without interruption. One was to send two or more separate couriers in order to
circumvent the enemy counter-intelligence and decrease the chances of a letter being lost
because of the hazards that awaited the couriers on the roads.205 Another method was to
send couriers via unusual routes where there would be less enemy patrol. In order to
ensure the continuity and the integrity of correspondence, the sender generally included
in his letters the dates of the other letters he wrote so that the receiver could actually
make sure that all the letters reached him without getting lost or being interrupted. The
receiver, in turn, returned the courtesy by including the dates of the letters he received.
The third method was to write with aliases in order not to be identified by the
enemy. The fact that Cardinal Granvela was shocked with the example of the Habsburg
agents in Constantinople who did not bother to use aliases (he even thought that they
were double agents!)206 suggests that this was a common method in the 16th century. In
fact, Habsburg spies who operated in Constantinople used aliases, in stark contrast with
their colleagues in Corfu, Zante or Ragusa who saw no harm in using their own names.
That should tell something about the dangers of spying in the very center of the Ottoman
Empire.

204

The Ottomans realized the scheme and put him in chains. Brea claimed to have spent 1.000 ducats to
save him from prison. Balestrin showed up in Naples and asked for a ventaja in the galleys of the Kingdom.
Could the entire story be a fabrication, a scheme to convince the authorities to grant him his wish and, even
better, compensate Brea with the ransom money? AGS, E 1094, fol. 234 and 238 (27 September 1596).
205
For instance, letters sent from Constantinople in 1576 were sent to Venice, Corfu and Ragusa
simultaneously. AGS, E 1070, fol. 27 (27 December 1576).
206
AGS, E 1064, fol. 61 (23 December 1574).

251

Finally, oral transmission was another method that was utilized more by the
Ottomans than the Habsburgs. As Michael Jucker states in opposition to Werner
Faulstich,207 in the late medieval diplomacy written messages did not directly replace oral
ones what we see is rather a superimposition of media instead of the succession of one
medium by another and thus the co-existence of orality and literacy.208 Especially, spies
who were sent on ad-hoc missions and were to come back in a matter of months lacked
the means to send their letters; in a hostile environment which they knew little, they could
not find a way to establish a new route. Therefore, these either brought back news in an
oral form when they returned or sent one of their men to the authorities. 209 On certain
occasions, Habsburg spies sent, in addition to the letter, an oral message to be delivered
by the courier a bocca.210 Furthermore, agents, who brought important projects of covert
operations or wanted to recover their unpaid stipends, personally appeared before the
authorities; the discomfort of a long voyage was nothing compared to the amount they
attempted to defraud the authorities. In spite of the fact that written documentation
regarding the details of their contacts with the authorities survived; these are only partial;
by bits and pieces we know what kind of information they exchanged. The method of oral
communication was even used between the Habsburg authorities, especially while
exchanging information of value. It was recommended by the Junta de Tres in 1602, for
instance, that the Duke of Sessa should not write to the Duke of Feria about the secret

207

W. Faulstich, Die Geschichte der Medien, vol.2 :Medien und ffentlichkeiten im Mittelalter: 800-1400
(Gttingen: Vandenhoek&Ruprecht, 1996), 267-272.
208
Michael Jucker, Trust and mistrust in letters: late medieval diplomacy and its communication
practices, in Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy 13: Strategies of Writing, Studies on Text and Trust in
Medieval Europe, eds. Petra Schulte et al., (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 222-223.
209
For instance, a certain Antonio Pantaleo sent back his brother-in-law from Mytilene as soon as he
realized the date of the departure of the Ottoman fleet. AGS, E 1120, fol. 246.
210
AGS, E 486, Simon Massa, 9 November 1562.

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negotiations of defection with the Ottoman Grand Admiral Cigalazade, but rather sent
one of his trustworthy men to relate the issue orally.211
4.8.

THE QUALITY AND NATURE OF INFORMATION:

The Habsburgs tried to increase the efficiency of their information gathering and
therefore raise the quality of their decision-making process by comparing and contrasting
information that arrived from a number of different channels.212 They tried to put together
reports that were provided by multiple Habsburg networks in the Levant or by spies who
were sent on ad-hoc missions as well as the information that were gathered by several
other methods described above.
The most frequent information that appeared in our documentation is regarding
the strategic calculations in the Ottoman capital and military preparations in the Arsenal.
The Habsburg decision-makers had to allocate their limited military and financial
resources in accordance with the actions of the Ottoman Navy. Therefore, the sooner they
were informed whether it would sail the next year or not, and if it would, when it would
do so, how many ships it would have and where its target would be, they could start
doing the necessary defensive preparations. Certain examples suggest that the Habsburg
intelligence gathered precise and crucial information regarding the Ottoman military
preparations. In 1554, they were informed of the arrival of a avu to Lepanto to demand
rowers to be sent to Constantinople with celerity. These rowers would be used in the
eighty galleys that would soon be put on the sea. Seventy of these would be given to the
French service, while the remaining ten would sail to Algiers with Hasan Pasha. From
another source, it was also learned that another avu arrived in Valona to collect rowers

211
212

AGS, E 1885, fol. 144 (15 December 1602).

A good example of compare-and-contrast is AGS, E 1092, fol. 146 (19 April and 4 May 1591).

253

and the tax for it (avarz akesi). From the number of men and money he collected, it was
guessed that the Ottomans were preparing a navy of 80-100 galleys.213 In 1558, from a
number of different sources, the Habsburgs succeeded in learning that the Ottoman navy
arrived in the waters of Corfu on August 11 and started to do an inspection towards the
end of the month, as a result of which it was noticed that 1700 men, including the
governor of St. Maura, died. On August 27, a Genoese renegade provided the Habsburgs
with the Sultans orders for the Grand Admiral Piyale Pasha not to return to the capital
for the entire month of September.214
When it comes to informing the next years targets, the Habsburg spies in
Constantinople proved their worth. In three instances I could document, agents in
Constantinople succeeded in sending precise information regarding Ottoman naval
preparations. In 1563, in spite of the initial recalcitrant reports dated March 2 that could
not tell whether the Ottoman fleet would sail to the Western Mediterranean or not,215 in
two-weeks time, (March 16) they ascertained that it would stay within the Ottoman
waters for the guardia del arcipelago.216 On March 29, they started to give
hypothetical numbers (60)217 and verified for sure, on April 14, that no more than 15
ships would sail out of the Dardanelles.218 Even though in the end, their supposition that
these 15 ships would not sail to the Western Mediterranean were erroneous,219 this was
something that the Habsburg spies could not see. A small expedition led by a prominent
corsair lacked any strategic objective and probably a fixed destination that could not have
213

AGS, E 1047, fol. 24 (16 February 1554).

AGS, E 1124, fol. 1124, fol. 136 (August 1558).
215
AGS, E 1052, fols.129, 130 and 131 (all 2 March 1563).
216
AGS, E 1052, fols. 137 (16 March 1563), 139, 140 and 141 (all 26 March 1563).
217
AGS, E 1052, fol. 142 (29 March 1563).
218
AGS, E 1052, fol. 178 (18 April 1563). The report provides important details concerning these 15 ships.
219
AGS, E 1052, fol. 202 (28 June 1563).
214

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been ascertained beforehand anyways. If Ali Portuk encountered defensive military

preparations when he arrived in Capo dOtranto, he would simply choose another target.
Two years later, the Habsburg intelligence learned about the planned Ottoman attack on
Malta in December, soon enough to leave time for military preparations.220 Similarly in
1573, agents successfully warned the authorities that the Ottomans sent two galleys to
Algiers with the order for corsairs to be ready for the next years expedition against la
Goleta.221 There were episodes of failure as well; even though Renzo received the
information from Constantinople that the navy would set sail in 1570, his agents named
other targets such as Malta, la Goleta and even Granada rather than Cyprus.222 They seem
to have fallen prey to Ottoman disinformation. Two of them wrote around the same time
and related that even though there were rumors of a Cyprus expedition, some informants
told them that this was an Ottoman disinformation in order to conceal the actual target,
which is either la Goleta or Malta.223 If there was such a disinformation, it was not the
rumor of a Cyprus expedition but rather what these informants related to two Habsburg
agents; the information of a possible Ottoman disinformation seemed to be the actual
disinformation.
The information that reached the Habsburgs had an impressive geographical
scope; their spies and informants in the Levant related more than information regarding
the Ottoman strategic plans and military projects for the Western Mediterranean.
Ottomans other endeavors were worthy of the attention of the Habsburg decision-makers
who were aware of the interconnectedness of events in international politics. Detailed
220

AGS, E 1054, fol. 71 (29 December 1564).

AGS, E 1063, fol. 35 (30 June 1573); E 1506, fol. 189 (1573).
222
AGS, E 1057, fols. 81 and 82 (both 14 October 1569); E 487, ff. several letters by Baptista Ferraro, Juan
Sarrabal and Adam de Franchis in 1569.
223
AGS, E 1326, fol. 314 (26 December 1569).
221

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information concerning the developments that might divert the Ottoman military forces
and relieve the Habsburg defenses from the Ottoman pressure (be it of international
nature such as the expedition in the Kipchack steps224 and negotiations of a Persian
ambassador in the Ottoman capital,225 or of domestic nature such as the rebellion in
Yemen226 and civil wars between the sons of Suleiman227) was precious intelligence.
The success of the Habsburg intelligence is evident from the correspondence that
their agents managed to intercept via their informants within the Ottoman military and
administrative apparatus. Firstly, the translations of a good many number of imperial
orders addressed to the local authorities and correspondence between the Ottoman center
and the provinces are extant in AGS.228 Secondly, AGS hosts correspondence between the
Ottoman Sultan and the European powers, especially those with which the Habsburgs had
sour relations. Several letters exchanged between the Ottoman Sultan and the French king
informed the Habsburg authorities who did not lose time to translate those.229 In 1579, the
passport that the Ottomans sent to the men of the Prince of Orange fell into Habsburg
hands.230 The Habsburg spies managed to acquire and translate a number of letters,
shedding light on the negotiations between the Ottoman Sultan, the Queen of England,
the King of France and the pretender to the Portuguese throne, Dom Antonio in 1591, a
224

AGS, E 1326, fols. 219, 220, 223, 285, 299 and 314 (all 1569).
AGS, E 1124, fol. 112 (27 December 1557).
226
AGS, E 1326, fol. 198, 212 and 219 (All April 1569). There is even a map of the region whose name
demonstrates a political interest rather than a geographical one. description of the part of Arabia where the
Turk had a war. AGS, E 1326, fol. 230.
227
For the information concerning the rivalry between prince Mustafa and his father that ended with the
execution of the prince, see. AGS, E 1322, fols. 17, 29, 201, 237, 251 and 252 (all 1554); E 1046, fol. 32
(29 December 1553); E 1047, fol. 24 (16 February 1554). For those regarding the civil war between Selim
and Bayezid, see. AGS, E 1124, fol. 151, 181, 182, 208 and 212 (All between November 1558 and June
1559)
228
AGS, E 1064, fol. 37; E 1066, fol. 15; E 1071, fols. 174, 198, 200, 201, 203 and 205; E 1077, fols. 145
and 147; E 1033, fol. 197; E 1339, fol. 123.
229
AGS, E 1062, fols. 119, 206 and 208; E 1063, fols. 29 and 32; E 1064, fol. 38; E 1068, fol. 101; E 1071,
fols. 175, 178, 182, 183, 199 and 206.
230
AGS, E 1546, fol. 185. Passports date is H. 1 Za. 87/A.D. 18 January 1580.
225

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crucial time when the Ottomans were prepared to intervene on behalf of both Dom
Antonio and Henri de Navarre.231 In times of warfare, instances of interruption
intensified; between 1570 and 1574, the Habsburg secret service intercepted letters that
the Ottoman Sultan and the French king exchanged,232 as well as the internal
correspondence among the Ottoman authorities which contained crucial information
regarding Ottoman military preparations.233
After all these efforts, the Habsburg secret service produced results of quality
albeit there was room for improvement. False news, for instance, should have confused
the authorities, even though their numbers do not exceed tolerable levels. Entertainingly,
most of these were rumors that informed the premature death of prominent figures in the
Ottoman Empire, such as the Sultans Suleiman234 and Selim (on the accuracy of the news
of his death, people even started to place bets in Ragusa),235 the Grand Vizier Rstem
Pasha,236 the Grand Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa237 and the prominent corsair
Turgud.238 There were also fabricated news, such as those sent by the swindler Luis de
Portillo, the nature of which the authorities were quick to realize. Rather than the falsity,
what was more frustrating for the authorities should be the ambiguity, especially when
the Ottoman threat seemed imminent and the reports were unable to provide precise
information with which decisions regarding military matters had to be made. This

231

AGS, E 1092, fols. 217, 218, 219 and 220 (all January 1591).
AGS, E 1062, fol. 119 (September 1572), 206 (18 June 1573) and 208 ; E 1063, fols. 29 and 31, E 1064,
fols. 36 and 38.
233
AGS, E 1064, fol. 37; E 1066, fol. 15; E 1071, fols. 174, 198, 200, 203 and 205.
234
AGS, E 1011 (1532) E 1124, fol. 56 (1557).
235
AGS, E 1332, fols. 66, 69, 74, 193, 196, 197 and 216 (all 1573). E 1332, fol. 195 even stated that Ulu
Ali fomented a janissary rebellion and had Mehmet Pasha killed. According to, E 487, 4 July 1573, Sokollu
enthroned the Selims two-year old son.
236
He was assassinated by the janissaries. AGS, E 1123, fol. 100 (8 November 1555).
237
AGS, E 1315, fol. 40.
238
AGS, E 1124, fol. 56 (1557).
232

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problem was so chronic that it convinced some Habsburg authorities, such as Cardinal
Granvela, who neglected the incoming information about an Ottoman attack against la
Goleta in 1574, that these spies were nothing but swindlers who sent inconclusive,
imprecise information that contradicted each other which one could learn in taverns.239
Still, the Habsburg officers, both in the capital and provincial centers such as
Naples and Sicily, were only interested in information that would help them to react to
the danger of an Ottoman expedition. The Ottoman Empire, per se, did not seem to have
occupied the minds of these decision-makers who never developed an interest, unlike
their Venetian counterparts for instance, in understanding the nature of the Ottoman state,
society and economy. Sufficed it to learn whether the Ottomans were coming or not.
One reason was the lack of diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. Apart from
the brief period of 1578-81, when the unofficial Habsburg diplomat Margliani was in
Constantinople to negotiate a truce, the Habsburgs did not have a resident ambassador in
the Ottoman capital. The members of a permanent embassy, the chancellery, the
ambassador and his retinue, could have not only furnished the Habsburgs with regular
and more reliable information, but also observed the Ottoman state, society and economy
just was the case with the Venetian bailate.
Furthermore, the relations between the Habsburg centers and Constantinople were
limited in other respects as well. Few people coming from the Ottoman Empire were
given permission to travel freely in the Habsburg provinces, because the authorities
feared that those Ottoman subjects, most of whom came with the excuse of offering
secret plans of clandestine operations, might have in fact come for spying. Philip II gave
an explicit order to his ambassador in Venice in 1574 that he should not give licencia to
239

AGS, E 1064, fol. 61 (23 December 1574).

258

David Passi, because people like him came more often for spying than serving the
crown.240
There were no direct economic relations between these centers. As mentioned
above, when he had to make a bill of exchange (cdula) to transfer money to
Constantinople, the Viceroy could not send it directly from Naples, because there was no
correspondence with Constantinople. Neither were there merchants who had credit in
Constantinople so that their bills of exchange would be valid. Instead, the Viceroy had to
send the money to Venice that had great correspondence with Constantinople and that
was filled with merchants whose bills of exchanges were very certain.241
In short, the Habsburgs did not engage in a detailed study of the Ottoman world
and kept their activities limited to the realm of international politics. They had no reason
to do so, given that they were usually on the defensive against the Ottomans and had no
long-term strategy concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, apart from implausible projects
of crusades and cooperation with the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Their
sphere of influence was the Western Mediterranean and their targets were in North
Africa, not in the Balkans, especially after the break-up of Charles Vs empire when the
Archduchy of Austria fell under the control of the junior branch of the family. During the
War of 1570-3, the Habsburgs showed little inclination to follow the example of the siege
of Castelnuovo in 1538. Two years after the total annihilation of the Ottoman navy at the
Battle of Lepanto, Don Juan, Philip IIs brother and the Admiral of the Christian fleet,
would choose to attack Tunis instead of Cyprus or any other Ottoman possessions in the
Balkans.

240
241

AGS, E 1333, fol. 106 (18 February 1574).

AGS, E 1079, fol. 6 (10 January 1579).

259

4.9.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I summarized the slow process of institutionalization and

centralization that the Habsburg secret service underwent. I showed how the central
government sought to centralize the information in the hands of few decision makers in
the capital and closely regulated the transmission of state correspondence by establishing
a regular postal system. Moreover, it started to expand its influence by directly
intervening in the recruitment, or at least approval, of agents, the authorization of
clandestine operations as well as of salaries allocated to Habsburg spies. At the close of
the century, they even created a centralized office, that of the Grand Spy, in order to
synchronize the activities of different intelligence networks and solve the problems of
coordination between these networks and the center. Even though unsuccessful in the
end, the creation of this office clearly demonstrates central governments efforts to
closely regulate intelligence activity within the framework of an institutionalized state
apparatus.
In spite of these efforts, this process of centralization and institutionalization was
by no means complete at the turn of the century. Special factors that affected the
Habsburg secret service in the Levant, such as technological and logistical difficulties,
the harsh conditions of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier as well as the enmity between two
empires hindered these efforts of centralization further. The central government had to
delegate more responsibilities of secret diplomacy to its viceroys and ambassadors, even
though in the end it kept the last word to itself, never renouncing its claim to the control
and supervision of the Habsburg secret service. There was a certain division of labor
between the viceroys of Sicily and Naples and ambassadors in Venice, Rome and Genoa,

260

in accordance with each ones description of duties and sphere of influence. This chapter
concentrated more on the role of Naples and Venice given that these were more central to
the Habsburg intelligence activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A historial study that engages in a comprehensive study of Habsburg espionage
without a special focus on regional differences is misleading exactly because of this
failure in creating a unified system of intelligence gathering. For instance, as mentioned
above, Garca and Marcos overlooked the fact that the Habsburg secret service relied on
several independent networks that shared very few common traits. They studied this
secret service as a homogenous entity and shied away from accentuating each networks
particularities and dealing with problems specific to it. The independence of Habsburg
networks that operated away from each other in a large georgraphy could not have been
more apparent than in the case of Habsburg intelligence networks in the Levant.
Operating under the harsh conditions of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier, these networks
had to deal with other issues and face additional difficulties. Analyzing them with
Habsburg networks that operated in Flanders or Paris brings little benefit.
The heat of the Ottoman Habsburg rivalry compelled the Habsburgs to develop a
complex system of espionage that gathered information from a number of spies that
traveled between Habsburg and Ottoman centers, intelligence networks dispersed in the
Eastern Mediterranean as well as other sources of information such as merchants, sailors
and pilgrims that frequented the Levantine ports, slaves that returned from captivity, the
rebellious Orthodox communities of the Ottoman Empire, corsairs that roamed the enemy
waters, informants within the Ottoman administrative and military hierarchy, foreign
diplomats in Constantinople, Jewish communities and other sovereign powers.

261

This complex system compelled the authorities to tackle certain problems. For
instance, the willingness of the Habsburgs to allocate their already strained financial
resources for operations of secret diplomacy depended upon the tenor of the OttomanHabsburg confrontation, the condition of the crowns finances at a given time and the
authorities evaluation of spies performance. There was an inevitable clash between the
authorities who, having too many obligations and too little money, were reluctant to
honor their financial obligations and entrepreneur spies who were always innovative in
devising the most innovative methods to squeeze money from the authorities. Regarding
the necessity of gathering information in the Levant and the issue of the crowns financial
obligations to its spies, there were also differing opinions between the Habsburg officials
in accordance with responsibilities attached to their office.
Moreover, the coordination of operations and the safe transmission of news
without interruption were chronic problems given the logistical limitations of the 16th
century; in our case, the distance, the lack of a regular postal system and the enmity
between two empires further exacerbated the problem. The Habsburgs tried to overcome
these problems by using a number of methods such as setting up a frigate system between
the Neapolitan and Adriatic shores, using multiple specialized couriers, writing with
aliases and even resorting to oral transmission of information.
Finally, I argued that the Habsburg secret service had specific objectives in the
Levant, in accordance with the Habsburgs Mediterranean strategy. They were interested
in a specific type of information, i.e., those regarding the whereabouts of the Ottoman
navy, military preparation in the Ottoman Arsenal and any political development that
would distract the Ottoman military might away from the Western Mediterranean. Their

262

main sphere of influence remained the Western Mediterranean and their main concern in
the Levant was to learn whether the Ottomans would attack them and thus what kind of
preparations should be made. The reports that Habsburg agents sent to Naples, Messina
and Madrid contained very little information on other aspects of the Ottoman Empire.
Neither did the authorities inquire about them; they showed little genuine interest in a
detailed study of the Ottoman state, society, culture and economy, unlike their Venetian
colleagues.

263

CHAPTER FIVE
ESPIONAGE IN THE SUBLIME PORTE: THE HABSBURG
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK IN CONSTANTINOPLE,
1560-1600

5.1.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter tells us the story of a number of entrepreneurs who used their dual
position and brokered information between clashing empires. Their stories are important,
not only because they demonstrate how the Habsburgs set up and operated an intelligence
network at, from a Habsburg-centered world-view, the farthest corner of the
Mediterranean, or how these information brokers furthered their own interest while
negotiating with central governments. It is also significant because it gives us an
alternative vision of political life in the Ottoman capital which could not be delineated by
relying on Ottoman sources alone. This chapter also seeks to elucidate the details of
relations and negotiations not only between Muslims and non-Muslims, in a similar
fashion to Durstelers book on the Venetian community in Constantinople, but also
between men of all sorts from diverse religious, ethnic, geographical and cultural
backgrounds that operated in Constantinople. Furthermore, this chapter is an effort to
give some agency to the often neglected individual in Ottoman historiography by
concentrating on the activities of a group of select power brokers in the Ottoman capital,
the invisible figures of Ottoman politics whose existence often escaped chronicles and
government documents. Thus, it seeks to delineate the intricacies of politics (internal and
264

external) in Constantinople, not on the highest level between Ottoman grandees and
foreign ambassadors, but on lower levels: between information-brokers, spymasters,
unofficial diplomats, translators, ransom agents and merchants who conducted, as agents
of these grandees and ambassadors, the day-to-day operations of Constantinople politics.
This is the story of these long-forgotten protagonists of politics and espionage in the 16th
century Ottoman capital, whose centrality and importance vis--vis the provinces was
cemented by the monetarization of Ottoman economy and the expansion of the state
apparatus.
5.2.

BEFORE THE BATTLE OF DJERBA (1560)

The commencement of direct Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation in the Mediterranean

can be dated as early as 1534, when the Ottomans sent their navy to the Western
Mediterranean under the command of the Grand Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa and
conquered Tunis, a Habsburg vassal. Even though the Habsburgs quickly pacified the
threat of an Ottoman base so close to Sicily, the need to be informed about Ottoman war
plans became apparent to the authorities. As the struggle for the mastery of the Mare
Nostrum intensified, the Habsburgs found themselves helplessly on the defense. The
Ottoman victory against the united Venetian and Habsburg navies at Prevesa (1538) and
the consequent withdrawal of Venice from the struggle clearly demonstrated what was to
come for the Viceroys of Naples and Sicily in the following years. The Ottoman-Valois
rapprochement furthermore deteriorated the situation and tipped the already negative
balance-of-power further against the Habsburgs. The Ottoman navy, thanks to French
complicity and cooperation, easily roamed the Western Mediterranean. It wintered in
Toulon in 1543-44 and even undertook a joint military venture against Nice with the

265

French forces. In 1551, 1552, 1553, 1555 and 1558, other naval operations of mass scale
followed, threatening Habsburg possessions, exhausting provincial budgets, alerting the
authorities, and reminding them once again of the importance of gathering information on
time and subsequently making necessary preparations.
The Habsburg authorities sought to solve the problem through a couple of
methods, already described in Chapter Four. They sent their trusted men on ad-hoc
missions to gather information and return as soon as possible. More frequently, however,
they sent agents with necessary cultural and social capital, i.e., those who knew the area
and the language and could capitalize on their local connections and acquaintances in
order to gather information. Former prisoners-of-war who were slaves of important
Ottoman figures, for instance, were ideal candidates since they could contact their old
masters and the members of their household. These, however, were in moderate numbers
and were not aware of each other. Thus, they were not operating together as a network. In
order to supplement the information that these spies were supposed to send, the
authorities adopted other strategies for gathering information. They interrogated anybody
who might have information on the Ottoman Empire, such as captured Ottoman soldiers,
Christian slaves who ran away and returned from the Ottoman Empire, the crews of the
ships who arrived from the Eastern Mediterranean, pilgrims who visited the Holy Places
in the Levant, and the like. Furthermore, they relied on other states goodwill and used
their diplomatic network to convince them to share information.
With so many limitations and uncertainties these methods hardly ensured a fullfunctioning system. The results were mediocre, or in other words, there was always room
for improvement. But there was little that could be done. Such a network could not be

266

easily organized and supervised from such a distance, especially given the lack of
diplomatic relations between the two empires.
All this changed with the resounding Ottoman victory at the Battle of Djerba in
1560. This victory more clearly demonstrated to the Habsburg authorities the need to
gather reliable information on the activities of the Ottoman navy; it was the Habsburg
Admirals mistrust and neglect of the information he received that paved the road to
perdition for the Habsburg navy. More important than giving the Habsburgs a solid
reason to establish a network that would provide reliable information was that it gave
them an opportunity to do so. The influx of several Christian prisoners-of-war that fell
captive during the battle into Constantinople created the supply that met the high demand
for a network composed of resident spies. Furthermore, the ransom negotiations for some
of these soldiers created a convenient alibi for Habsburg agents to easily travel between
the two empires and coordinate the establishment of the network.
5.3.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RENZOS NETWORK

A Genoese from San Remo named Giovanni Maria Renzo arrived in Madrid in
1561 and contacted the Habsburg authorities with an interesting proposal. He had brought
letters written by renegades and prisoners-of-war that lived in Constantinople, some of
whom worked in the Ottoman Arsenal. These were offering their services to the Catholic
King. Renzo quickly convinced the authorities, partly thanks to a letter written in his
favour by Captain Rodrigo apata, a former slave in Constantinople and a Habsburg
soldier-cum-ransom agent.1 He then immediately returned to Constantinople with royal
letters as well as 4.000 ducats. There he organized a network of spies, to which the
contemporary documents give a number of different names such as la compania, los
1

Sola, Moriscos, Renegados y Agentes Secretos, 338 ; idem., Uchal, 90-1.

267

renegados, los ocultos and gli amici. He immediately found reliable lieutenants: the
Neapolitan Giovanni Agostino Gigli, who was in charge of arranging the transmission of
correspondence; Adam de Franchis, a Genoese merchant from Chios who knew Turkish,
made translations for Christian merchants and at one point even functioned as the ransom
agent of the Viceroy of Sicily; Aurelio Santa Croce, a merchant who was born in the
Italian dominions of Venice and had been trading and living with his family in
Constantinople since 1552; and two Genoese renegades from within the Ottoman
military-administrative apparatus: Gregorio Bregante de Sturla from Santa Margarita,
(Tur. Murad Aa), who was the eunuch of the Ottoman Sultan and the commander of a
force of 6.000 horsemen and Simon Massa, the mastermind behind the sabotage plans of
the Ottoman Arsenal and most probably the same person with Mustafa Genoves alias
Gregorio Bucon/Gregorio Barian, a galley captain in the navy who fell captive to the
Ottomans in Tunis and then converted to Islam. When he fell captive, this time, to the
Christians at the Battle of Lepanto, his relatives in Constantinople would cause much
trouble for the network as explained below.2
Several other names are indicated in the documents: Ambrosio Giudice alias
Murad Aa Napolitano who had the task of carrying the letters to the Habsburg
authorities with his frigate; Melchor Stefani de Insula (Tur. Ferhat Bey) who was the
nephew of one of Charles Vs colonels the Neapolitan Giovanni Battista from Sorrento
(Tur. Mahmud) who had confidants both in Constantinople and the fortress of Gallipoli;
Ambrosio Corvato (Tur. Hasan Bali who was a member of the Grand Admirals
household; the Venetian merchant Camillo Strozzi, Giovanni Sarimbal and two galley

AGS, E 486, 20 August 1566; E 1052, fol. 89 (20 January 1562); E 1056, fol. 83; E 1127, fol. 106; Sola,
Los que van y vienen, 201-2.

268

captains (Ott. reis) from the Ottoman Navy, Francesco de Bisagno (Tur. Ahmed Reis)
and Hamid Reis. There were also two religious figures among the members of the
network: Stefano Gatalusio, the Bishop of Milos and the abbot of a monastery in
Constantinople, who helped the ransoming of several prisoners-of-war and Fra Marino
Genovese Carvo, a Genoese friar who travelled back and forth between the two empires.3
In order to exonerate themselves in case their letters were captured by the Ottomans,
these spies wrote with aliases and thus had alternative names: Santa Croce/Battista
Ferraro, Melchor Stefani de Insula/Renato, Simon Massa/Gregorio Barian or G.B., Gigli/
Urban de Mengrelia and later after Giglis death, Hrrem Bey/Urban de Mengrelia and in
the 1570s, Matheo dal Faro/Jorge Riesei.
Renzo would be the intermediary between the network and the authorities while
his lieutenants would supervise the operations and ensure the well-functioning of the
system. The network would operate in cooperation with other Habsburg spies nearby.
The spymaster in Chios, Niccol Giustiniani, for instance, played an important role in
these early years. When Renzo arrived in the island of Chios in 1562 on his way to
Constantinople, it was him who ordered Gigli to give up his voyage to Italy and escort
Renzo to Constantinople.4 Furthermore, Renzo chose Lorenzo Miniati to reside in
Ragusa; he would ensure the continuity of information flow by transmitting the letters
that arrived from Constantinople to the Habsburg authorities.5 According to the
instructions which Gigli gave to Renzo to be remitted to the Habsburg authorities, agents

AGS, E 486 ff. Relacin a Juan Baptista Corso, also several letters written by these spies, dated 8, 9, 11,
14 and 17 November 1562. Garca Hern n, Price of Spying, 237.
4
AGS, E 1127, fol. 81 (4 October 1562).
5
AGS, E 1056, fol. 56 (28 July 1563).

269

would send letters to the Ionian Islands as well. From here, the men sent by the Governor
of the Lands of Otranto and Bari had to pick them up.6
These newly employed Habsburg spies offered two things. The first was gathering
reliable and updated information about Ottoman military preparations. In this task, they
seemed to have succeeded. In 1563, they immediately informed the authorites that the
Ottoman fleet would not set sail for the Western Mediterranean and assuaged the
Habsburg fears of an Ottoman naval attack.7 As mentioned earlier, thanks to their
diligence and aptness, the Habsburgs learned beforehand of the Ottoman attacks on Malta
in 1565,8 and la Goleta in 1574.9
Secondly, spies offered to undertake covert operations that would debilitate the
Ottoman military capabilities. They offered to torch the Imperial Arsenal among whose
workers they had agents, to ensure the defection of Ottoman galleys with the complicity
of some high ranking officers, and to sabotage the Ottoman galleys during either a naval
battle with the Christians or a siege operation. None of these covert operations succeeded,
showing us the true nature and the entrepreneurial character of early modern espionage.
No doubt that all these were just schemes to manipulate the fears and appettites of
Habsburg authorities and to defraud them.
Renzo stayed in Constantinople for two months and left in November 1562. In
June 1563, he was in Spain, in talks with Philip II who authorized payments to be made
to the spies via the intermediation of the Florentine bailo. The fact that the king did not
6

AGS, E 486, Instruxion para el s.r. Juo Maria Renzo que a da procurar de dar orden que se exigua, sino se
allare mas perfeta, y si se allare que se ordene la condicion della para exeguirse. Juan Agustino Gilli,
Constantinople (8 November 1562).
7
AGS, E 1052, fols.129, 130 and 131 (all 2 March 1563), fols. 137 (16 March 1563), 139, 140 and 141 (all
26 March 1563).
8
AGS, E 1054, fol. 71 (29 December 1564).
9
AGS, E 1063, fol. 35 (30 June 1573).

270

refuse a favor to Renzo in a rather unusual matter, in spite of a negative reference of his
veteran ambassador in Genoa,10 demonstrate the reputation and the level of credibility
these spies enjoyed in the Habsburg capital in these early years. The issue was as follows:
a friend named Morfeti11 requested the intervention of Gregorio Bregante alias Murad
Aa for the ransoming of Esmareddin Kalfa, an aged slave in Malta. Renzo promised to
relate the issue to the Catholic King and ensure his release. Philip II took the matter at
hand and immediately ordered the Viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Alcala to ransom him
from Malta, a task that would cost royal coffers more or less 100 ducats.12
Around the same time, reports from Constantinople streamed in with regularity,
informing Habsburg centers that the Ottoman navy would not set sail except for a small
number of galleys that would protect the Ottoman coasts (guardia del archipelago) under
the command of the famous corsair Ali Portuk. This small fleet would not leave the
Aegean Sea and pass further than Modon and Coron.13 Even though, as mentioned in
Chapter Four, Ali Portuk staged a quick assault on the Capo dOtranto nonetheless, the
network proved its value by informing the authorities regularly of military preparations in
the Arsenal and that a sizable Ottoman fleet would not sail in the Western Mediterranean.
Spies continued, on the one hand sending information regarding military
preparations and the political situation in Constantinople, and on the other exhorting
Renzos return with Esmareddin Kalfa and more money. Their avidity seemed to have
forced them to put pressure on the authorities to send Renzo. When they realized Renzo

10

According to Figueroa, in Genoa, he was considered a swindler, a barbullista, an untrustworthty man

who left the city because of his debts. The experienced ambassador did not have high hopes for these spies
contributions as well. AGS, E 1392, fols. 20 (30 April 1563) and 32 (10 July 1563).
11
AGS, E 1392, fol. 74 (16 March 1573) cites him as Musti.
12
AGS, E 1056, fol. 56 (28 July 1563).
13
AGS, E 1052, fols.129, 130, 131, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 177, 178 (a very detailed report) and 195.

271

would not come on time, they directly asked for money to be used for the execution of
the plot, efectuacin desta conjura.14 Furthermore, Gigli wrote a letter accentuating the
importance of funds for the proposed covert operation of torching the Ottoman Navy. He
needed at least 15 renegados who would torch 30-40 galleys which were on water at
night, using artificial fires. Furthermore, he had to wait for the right winds to arrive and
spread the fire to other galleys ashore. All these required money, which Gilli could not
recover from the paymaster in Naples without royal authorization. He then made a daring
move and offered that a resident supervisor who would authorize the expenditures made
by the network, a veedor, be appointed in order to ensure the regular flow of money to
the Habsburg spies coffers. His willingness to serve the Habsburgs (! was such that he
even offered to secure a safe-conduct for the veedor from the Ottomans by claiming that
he was his brother. If not, another solution could be to ransom one of the Habsburg tercio
captains in Constantinople and to appoint him as the veedor of the network. Evidently,
spies were confident that their scheme deceived the authorities who would not hesitate to
invest further in the realization of these infeasible covert operations.15 Gigli made another
strategic move by suggesting that Renzo, who had aroused the suspicion of many in the
Ottoman capital including the Venetian bailo, should not come without Esmareddin Calfa
or a letter written by him. If his Majesty were to tell him that Renzo would be the veedor,
he added, he would like to remind him that even though he was a fine fellow and a great
servant to his Majesty, such negotiations required men of more trustworthiness, prudence
and knowledge.16

14

AGS, E 1392, fols. 68 (18 January 1563) and 72 (17 February 1563).
AGS, E 1392, fol. 74 (16 March 1563).
16
mas confiana, mas prudencia y mas saber.
15

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His Majesty seemed to have heeded to Giglis advice, because Renzo stayed in
Naples and his pleas to come to the court to receive new instructions fell on deaf ears. His
luck would change in 1565 when Gigli, Ambrosio Corvato and the Bishop of Milos died
and Ambrosio Giudice arrived in Naples to discuss diversas cosas. Evidently, the death
of the three affected the sabotage operations since no one else knew all the saboteurs who
would be distributed among Ottoman galleys once the Ottoman fleet set sail. His
lieutenants asked for the return of Renzo who quickly took the opportunity and offered to
go to Constantinople, with money needless to say, in order to renew the orders and
instructions so that the sabotage plans could be put into effect. In the end, the authorities
realized that they could not find a better person to send to Constantinople than Renzo
who, as the first founder, inventor and director of the plot and the plotters, 17 was the
only other person who knew everybody implicated in the plot. Renzo showed his
expertise on the trade of information by asking for blank checks (polise con nomi in
bianco) signed by Philip II to be distributed to agents in Constantinople on the one hand,
and enumerating the struggles he had to face after he moved his family from Genoa to
Naples with the Viceroys orders on the other. Not only did he have to spend 600 ducats,
300 of which were debt, but also his wife got sick because of the change of air and the
great scarcity. He furthermore repeated the example of Gigli by seeking to discredit a
rival, Niccol Giustiani, who came to Madrid to recover the money he spent on ransoms.
He was of little service to the crown and a great disturbance to other agents (nostri
consorti) while his projects were useless. It is not surprising these spies were in bitter

17

il primo inventor, fundator et essectuore della congiura et congiurati.

273

rivalry; there were several of them, while there was only one Philip II to pay these
generous sums.18
Renzo left Naples and arrived in Madrid in 1566. He then traveled to
Constantinople, in spite of warnings from his friends that the Ottomans, who were
informed via Ragusa that he was coming as a Habsburg spy, were looking for him
everywhere. Refusing to relent, he changed his name and followed unusual routes in
order to evade patrols. When he arrived at his destination in in April 1567, agents in
Constantinople hid him in a house and advised him to return immediately and leave the
matter to them. He refused once again. He brought a patente from Philip II as well as 500
cdulas to distribute among agents according to their merit. Furthermore, he was
allocated 5.000 ducats from the Neapolitan treasury. He was also authorized to negotiate
the defection of a certain Genoese renegade from Santa Margarita named Marana (Tr.
Durmu Reis) who, as the comite general of the Ottoman Navy, offered to defect to the
Habsburg side with all or at least some part of the Ottoman navy. Renzo offered Marana
5.000 ducats per year and another 5.000 for once. Nor did he forget others who would
participate in this tri-partite covert operation of torching the Ottoman Arsenal, ensuring
the defection of the Ottoman galleys and sabotaging the Ottoman fleet during combat
with the Habsburg one. Even though these received less extravagant amounts, the total
amount still reached the outrageous figure of 30.000 ducats.19 Renzo was aiming high

18

AGS, E 1054, fols. 71 (29 December 1564), 189 and 190 (both 7 September 1565).
For instance, the other ten to twelve galley captains that would defect with him would get 500 ducats for
once and another 500 as rent for life, except for the three leading ones who would get 1000 ducats for once
and 500 as rent for life. Those who participated in torching the Arsenal or cutting the ropes of the lateen
yard of the Ottoman galleys would get 500 escudos for once and another 500 as rent for life. Furthermore,
the eunuch Murad Aa (Gregorio Bregante and the captain of galleys and the principal guardian of the
Arsenal, Mustafa Genovs (Simon Massa) would get 1000 ducats as an annual rent. Renzo moreover left
the door open to spend more by stating that he could offer smaller amounts to others in a manner that
19

274

and making full use of the Habsburgs nave eagerness. Everything fell apart when
Marana, afraid of being discovered, refused to take Philip IIs letter and participate in
the plot, albeit leaving the door open for future negotiations, at least according to what
Renzo told the authorities. Renzo distributed the money among others in the presence of
four pensionarios who, it seems, replaced Gigli as network leaders: Santa Croce,
Franchis, Massa and Bregante. Then, he returned to Naples via Ragusa disguised as the
French ambassador.20
Upon his return, Renzo compiled a report that delineates the details of the covert
operation which interestingly included a new mission: the sabotage of the Ottoman Navy
during a siege. According to the plan, when the Ottoman Navy unloaded its infantry and
artillery to begin a siege, renegades in the Navy would send one of their men to the city,
carrying a cdula signed by the king as proof of his identity. His mission would be to
inform the Governor so that he could invite the Habsburg Governor-General of the Sea.
The two would then agree on the details of the plot. As a signal, the first guards of the
night put up a fire on two towers of the besieged city, high enough to be seen from the
navy. The renegades would start the operation the next day, leaving 24 hours for those
ashore to come aboard. Each would put explosives in four or five different parts of the
Ottoman galleys and start shouting for help, in order to create confusion so that no one
realized that these were taking water. The Ottoman soldiers who saw that their galleys
were sinking would soon realize the treachery and panic in fear. Next thing, the Ottoman
admiral would call the soldiers and sailors back aboard to do a la vanda. Admist this

would not exceed 30.000 ducats in total. AGS, E 486, Relacin que dix juan maria renzo quando parti de
Segovia para constantinopla, 20 August 1566.
20
AGS, E 486, 8 May 1567 and 25 March 1568. We know the names of the four from other documents. E
1056, fol. 43 (20 April 1567).

275

confusion, the garrison in the city would use the advantage and attack, while a Habsburg
navy would be waiting nearby, casting further fear into the hearts of the Ottomans.
Saboteur renegades would defect to the other side when they accomplished the last stage
of their plan: to incite a rebellion among Christian slave-rowers.
More details regarding other parts of the plot come to light in the same report. For
instance, when the Ottoman navy confronted the Habsburg navy, Renzos agents would
cut the robes that held the lateen yard (antenna), sink the galleys by exploding the middle
room, and incite a rebellion among the Christian slave-rowers so that the outnumbered
Ottomans would jump into the sea and leave their galleys defenseless. Meanwhile some
of the Ottoman galley captains would defect to the Habsburg side with their ships. If the
Ottoman navy did not set sail, or there occured no occasion of realizing this plot, there
was the contingency plan of torching the galleys in the Arsenal. According to Renzo, the
right time was when the Ottoman fleet was being prepared, in February or March. When
they left the Arsenal three or four hours after the nightfall, Greek, Spanish and Italian
maestros whom Renzo hired would leave their tools in rooms in the galleys which one
could only enter with a candle. This would give them a good alibi to hide balls (pelotas)
of artificial fire composed of tar in galleys ashore; the wicks would assure that by
midnight all the galleys would start to burn simultenously. To make sure of the effect of
the fire, they had to choose a windy night; some of these strong winds lasted for six to
eight days in Constantinople. With the cold and the wind, the Ottomans could do nothing
but watch. The blame would fall on the guards of the Arsenal, and even if it did not, it
would still be impossible to distinguish the Renzos maestros from among three to four
thousand others who were working in the Arsenal. In case things went wrong, Renzo had

276

a reserve team as well, composed of three Italian maestros who did not want to do
business with the rest. Each would go to one of the three quarters of the Arsenal to torch
the galleys and then run away to a previously designed safe house. From there, they were
to go to Naples, carrying Philip IIs letter as a proof (contrasea) and expecting their
rewards. If these failed too, then Gregorio Bregante heroically offered to do it himself.21
In the meantime, the go-between who was supposed to carry letters and stipends,
Ambrosio Giudice, defrauded his own friends. He arrived in Ragusa to receive the
stipends in May 1566. His friends in Constantinople had already grown suspicious of him
because this wine-lover was talking too much. They sent letters to the authorities urging
them to neither pay him nor let him leave Ragusa. Unfortunately for them, the letter
arrived too late. Ambrosio had already taken the money and gone to Venice where he did
not abstain from arousing the vigilant eyes of the Council of Ten. He then returned
Constantinople via Candia with only 400 of the 1000 ducats he was supposed to receive,
claiming that he was robbed in Rome. He was then sent away from Constantinople to
Ragusa and passed to Naples with his family in 1569. Still, not only was he paid the two
year stipend in arrears,22 but also spies wrote a letter to the authorities in Naples
recommending them to give him some allowance, so that he did not blow the whistle.23
The four pensionarios, expecting the return of Renzo with more money, continued
sending letters full of information on things Ottoman and recommendations of new
agents.24 Renzo reached Naples on July 2, 1567, gave a brief report and submitted letters
from Constantinople to the Viceroy. Then, he started to complain right away of the poor
21

AGS, E 486, 8 May 1567. Another document dated 1567, entitled relacin de lo que juan maria hize en
levante y dex concertado con los amigos pensionarios y renegados de la conjura.
22
Garca Hern n, Algunas Notas, 253.
23
AGS, E 487, 16 April 1569; E 1060, fol. 129 (9 December 1571).
24
AGS, E 1326, fol. 99; E 1140, fols. 99, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110 and 111 (all 1567).

277

condition of his motherless daughters (it seemed like the afore-mentioned illness took the
life of his wife) who had to live away from their natal land, aging without a husbands
hand.25 One of the letters he brought relates an interesting story, giving us one of the few
proofs of the religious motivations behind early modern espionage. Apparently, certain
renegades in Constantinople had already written to the authorities and informed them of
their dissatisfaction with having to live like Turks and their desire to return to the
Christianity. Given that the authorities kindly rejected this request, reminding them of
their usefullness to the cause of Christianity, they now asked for the intervention of the
Habsburg ambassador in Rome in securing the benediction and absolution of the Pope in
case they were to die doing their duty in Constantinople.26
Renzo then went to Madrid where he was given his cipher.27 The next year, he
was lobbying once again for his return to Constantinople in order to embark on Mustafa
Reis galley and join the Ottoman navy that would definitely set sail for the waters of
Spain. He was obviously trying to capitalize on the Habsburgs fear of an Ottoman
intervention in the face of the recently erupted Morisco Revolt of Las Alpujarras. Having
married once again and found a husband for one of his two daughters, he was still ready
to risk his life for the crown, parting from his son Angelo and unwed daughter. His
presence and another 5.000 ducats would for sure bring success this time; he also
guaranteed to put an end to spending and come back with the money if the Ottoman navy
did not leave that year. 28

25

AGS, E 1056, fol 75 (11 June 1567).

AGS, E 1140, fol. 108. (8 May 1567).
27
AGS, E 1140, fol. 112 (21 May 1568).
28
AGS, E 1057, fols. 81 and 82 (Both 14 October 1569).
26

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The authorities must have been fed up with Renzo and his machinations; they
refused to let him come to Spain or go to Constantinople. When Renzo declared that he
would go with his own money, they had to pay him 500 ducats, however.29 He decided to
bring along Ambrosio Giudice who was hardly convinced to return to Constantinople
because he feared evil might befall him given his taste for wine. As soon as they reached
Ragusa, however, the recalcitrant renegade ran away from Renzos company and
returned to Naples, leaving the orbit of the Habsburg secret service.30
In the meantime, a problem with the distribution of the money sent by the
authorities demonstrates the disorganization of the network as well as the lack of trust
between its members. Apparently, the authorities sent Adam de Franchis 1.000 ducats to
distribute among Habsburg agents. Shortly after, however, Aurelio Santa Croce
complained that Adam de Franchis did not know all the spies in the network which
totaled an impressive number of 112, 100 renegades as well as 12 Christian masters from
the Arsenal. He then distributed it among the 44 whom he knew, leaving 68 agents
without allowance. Apparently, these 68 agents did not want Adam de Franchis to know
their identity, even though Aurelio showed them a letter that made obvious that the
authorities wanted them to work with Franchis. They insisted that they would serve more
efficiently on their own and that the authorities should send them money without the
knowledge or intervention of Adam de Franchis.31 The authorities had no idea of who
these 112 agents were; only a handful spies were allocated regular allowances, even then
irregularly paid. Therefore, such efforts should be read as these entrepreneur agents

29

AGS, E 1058, fols. 23 and 24 (Both 28 January 1570).

AGS, E 1060, fol. 129 (9 December 1571).
31
AGS, E 487, 16 April, 25 June and 17 September 1566; E 1060, fol. 129 (9 May 1571).
30

279

pretenses of making progress on the realization of clandestine operations and thus

attempts of convincing the authorities to allocate them more money.
The next year, Santa Croce and Sarimbal wrote that they succeeded in starting fire
in the Arsenal on 27 December, 1570. A certain Corsican Suleiman Bey found an
accomplice in a twenty-year old Cypriot slave who was a master (capo) of fila canevi32 in
the Magazen Grande of the Arsenal. He offered him and his friends to take them back to
the Christian lands after the sabotage mission. The group calculated the full-moon and
waited for the day of St. John the Baptist so that they could observe the change of
weather. Convinced of favourable winds, they started the fire and closed the Magazens
doors. However, since the canevi were humid, the fire could spread only slowly and with
too much smoke and odor that alerted the guardians who passed before the door.
Guardians informed the Grand Admiral who came and had the fire put out. Furthermore,
after a brief investigation, the Cypriot and his men were caught and tortured. When asked
whether the Venetian bailo or some merchant was behind all this, the Cypriot claimed to
have done the deed for his own personal reasons.33 His men, however, told the Ottomans
that he offered them a return to the Christian lands. The Cypriot, however, proved his
intransigence when he said that he lied in order to convince them to help him. The
Ottomans had him impaled. Suleiman, after waiting for some time in their rendez-vous
spot, heard the rumours and then fled. The Ottomans forbade any Christians to come
close to the Arsenal under the penalty of death and put three guards for each galley, some

32

Filo de canevo: the thread made of hemp, It. Canapa, Ven. canevo and Lat. cannabis. Giuseppe Boerio,
Dizionario del Dialetto Veneziano, 3rd edition (Venezia: Giovanni Cecchini Edit., 1867), 128.
33
He was still not franchised after 22 years of slavery. Moreover, he told them that he wanted to avenge the
destruction of his natal city, Nicosia, at the hands of the Ottomans.

280

of whom were captains themselves.34 Suleiman Bey was supposed to go to Naples in

order to claim his reward, but, the Ottomans caught and executed him shortly thereafter.35
One wonders to what extent this story was true yet Renzos audacity in claiming
that his men impeded 60 Ottoman galleys from firing their cannons during the Battle of
Lepanto surprises one even further.36 Renzo could not reach Constantinople. With the
outbreak of the war, he was stuck in Ragusa where he tried every method to leave, only
to be barred each time by the Ragusan authorities anxious not to provoke the Ottomans.
Soon it became evident why Renzo insisted on this fourth voyage and even volunteered
to pay from his own pocket. A true entrepreneur, he sought to make full use of the
opportunities of wartime and sought new employers. As he had once capitalized on the
Habsburg fears following the defeats of Djerba (1560) and Mostaganem (1562), he was
quick to act when the Venetians found themselves in a war against the Ottomans in which
they already lost Cyprus. He contacted the Venetian authorities and offered them the
execution of a covert mission. He claimed to have an agreement with a certain Nicolizza
Costanich, the Count of Claina, who would rebel against the Ottomans with his men in
Narenta near Castelnuovo, in exchange for generous recompensation, a good portion of
which the Venetian authorities should guarantee to pay even if the mission failed. These
would help the allied Christian navy that would attack Castelnuovo where Renzos men
would nail down the cannons and burst them with argenti vivi and acque forte and where
another Venetian agent, Triffon Zaguri, was seeking to take advantage of the plague and
the consequent shortage of guards in order to explode the weapon arsenal. Moreover,
Renzos men on the Ottoman Navy would sink the galleys. Renzo, after having boasted
34

AGS, E 1059, fols. 56-7.

AGS, E 1071, fol. 171(19 June 1571).
36
AGS, E 1133, fol. 124 (1570).
35

281

of his success in starting a fire in the Ottoman Arsenal, went even further and suggested
that he could secure the conquest of Ragusa itself where he had been for a year as a
resident Habsburg spymaster. The Council of Ten accepted the plan and dispatched
Renzo to meet with the Captain-General of the Venetian fleet to do the planning and gave
him money and certain war materials such as chiodi di artigleria, acqua forte and
argento vivo. Unfortunately, the plan could not have been realized and the next year, the
Venetian authorities seemed less willing to undertake such a risky operation, especially
after the Christian victory at the Battle of Lepanto.37
Meanwhile, the network lost nothing of its dynamism when it comes to recruiting
agents. New agents were coming in to replace the old ones, such as Marco Antonio
Stanga38, the Ottoman dragoman (divan- hmayun tercman) from Luca, Hrrem Bey,
who replaced the deceased brahim Bey, the secretary of the Ottoman Grand Chancellery,
Hasan Bey, and the dragoman of the Austrian ambassador and Aurelios nephew Matheo
dal Faro.39 In 1570, one of the most efficient members of the network, Adam de Franchis,
passed away. It is not surprising to see that the Battle of Lepanto hit the Habsburg
network hard given that most of these Habsburg spies were also Ottoman officers who
fought at the battle. When a second pensionario, Simon Massa alias Mustafa Genoves,

37

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9 cc. 159v (9 May 1571), 160r-161v (10 May 1571), 162r (12 and 15 May 1571),
192v-193r (24 November 1571), 195r-195v (1 December 1571); fil. 15, 9 March, 1 December (two
documents , 24 December 1571 and al Zaguri in Ragusi, 1571 LettRett, b. 302, 5 May 1571.
38
ASV, LettRett, b. 292, fol. 175 (1571). According to Gerlach, the Ottomans imprisoned Stanga in
November 1573 and then released him a month later, thanks to the intervention of the Austrian ambassador.
Gerlach, Trkiye Gnl, vol. I, 109, 111. Gerlach does not indicate why he was imprisoned, but it is
tempting to think that the issue was related to his activities as an information trader. Even though it could
be argued that this rich merchant could as well be imprisoned because of another reason such as an unpaid
debt, I would like to add that he was originally thought to be strangled and thrown into the sea. These
rumours might reflect the fact that he was caught on charges against the state that deserved, at least in the
imagination of vox populi, such a severe punishment. The fact that the Austrian ambassador intervened on
the behalf of an Italian also supports this argument. It was possible in the Ottoman Empire for foreign
ambassadors to negotiate the release of even those who were accused of spying.
39
AGS, E 1071, fols. 171.

282

fell into the Habsburg hands, this created the problem of what to do with him. Even
though it was agreed that the decision of what to do with important prisoners-of-war fell
to the Pope, Mustafa was kept in Naples by the Viceroy, Cardinal Granvela pro servitio
sacri foederis,40 recognizing his past services to the crown. However, he was not freed.
Ironic is indeed that while the Comendador Mayor argued for his liberation, Renzo, his
employer, opposed the captains release; he was still a Turk and would only do harm if he
was allowed to return.41 In 1574, Aurelio Santa Croce warned the Viceroy of Naples not
to allow Mustafa to write any letters for this might jeopardize their mission. He feared
that this able agent might somehow reveal their identity.42 A couple of months before
Mustafas captivity, either Murad Aa alias either Giovanni Battista Napolitano43 or
Gregorio Bregante, was first reported to have been executed by the Ottomans who
realized that he was a friend of Christians.44 Whichever of these two agents the
executed spy may be, both spies disappeared from documentation after 1571.45 Only
Aurelio, a merchant, survived without a stratch.
Around the same time, in 1569, another entrepreneur appeared with an interesting
plan. The Corphiote friar Giovanni Barelli, recommended by the Grand Master of the
Order of Hospitalliers in Malta, contacted the Marquis of Pescara, the Viceroy of Sicily.
40

Rosi, Alcuni documenti relativi alla liberazione dei principali prigionieri turchi presi a Lepanto,
Archivio della R. societ romana XXI (1898): 142.
41
AGS, E 1140, fols. 97 (20 May 1573) and 98 (9 November 1571).
42
AGS, E 1064, fol. 136 (17 February 1574).
43
In one of the letters, Giovanni Battista Napolitano da Sorrento was named Murad Aa instead of
Mahmud. AGS, E 1059, fol. 42. This induced Emilio Sola to speculate that the executed spy might in fact
be Giovanni Battista rather than Gregorio Bregante, idem, Los que van y vienen, 203.
44
AGS, E 1060, fol. 140 (5 May and 15 June 1571); E 1071, fol. 171.
45
I found a letter dated 1574 (AGS, E 1064, foc. 103 (14 February 1574)) and written by a eunuch named
Murad Aa. According to his story, he was brought to Constantinople as a child and rose to important
positions in the Ottoman palace during the reign of Suleiman I. Then he was expelled from the palace for
being (note that the expression is identical a friend of Christians and drinking too much. If this person
was Gregorio Bregante, then, the executed Murad Aa should be Giovanni Battista Napolitano da Sorrento.
However, this could not be the case as the eunuch Murad Aa of 1574 claimed to be a Romano from the
family of Oliva, while Gregorio Bregante was Genoese.

283

He offered him to undertake a number of clandestine operations, which he originally

planned with the recently deceased Grand Master of the Order of St. John and the famous
defender of Malta, Jean de la Valette, who had opposed the Ottoman navy a couple of
years ago. The operation consisted of torching the Ottoman navy or the Arsenal,
poisoning the Sultans son with the help of a certain renegade named Mustafa Lampudis
and killing or imprisoning Selim IIs Jewish courtier, Joseph Nasi, whose intelligence
network was a great menace to the Habsburgs. Moreover, he could secure the defection
of the castles of Napoli of Romania, Corinth and Napoli of Malvasia as well as of
Nicolao Cernota (Tsernotades, a noble Greek family from Morea) Bey, an Ottoman
renegade who wanted to return to Christianity. Finally, he could negotiate with the
Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople, Metrophanes III, and ask him to supply
information, a service which he had been undertaking for the Maltese knights anyways,
and to help the negotiations for defection. All of these plans received enthusiastic support
from Philip II. The Marquis of Pescara dispatched Barelli with necessary supplies,
clothes and money; the two, however, had to return from Crete without finalizing their
mission. Moreover, failing to give a full account of his expenditures, Barelli found
himself in a Palermitano prison, only to leave thanks to the intermediation of the
Habsburg ambassador to Venice, Diego Guzmn de Silva, who vouched for some of his
expenditure. He resumed the operations after he was released. In 1572, Barellis coconspirator, Papa Juan Acida, a cleric from Rhodes, was still asking for his dispatch to
the Levant with the 6.000 ducats to be paid to the defectors. It was decided that he should
travel under the disguise of negotiating the ransom of the two sons of the deceased
Ottoman Grand Admiral Ali Pasha and Mehmed Bey, the Governor of Negroponte (Ott.

284

Egriboz).46 There was a change in plans however. Another agent, Agustin Manuel, was
then acting as a middleman between Philip II and Joseph Nasi who, at the height of his
power, was expecting to be appointed by the Sultan as the Governor of the newly
conquered Cyprus. Nasi offered to re-convert to Christianity, pass to the Habsburg lands
with his large patrimony and secure the Ottoman Castelnuovo for Philip II.
Unsurprisingly and probably much to the authorities chagrin, once again none of the
afore-mentioned operations could be realized.47
5.4.

THE WAR OF 1570-1573 AND THE NETWORK AFTER THE BATTLE

OF LEPANTO (1571)
After the battle of Lepanto, Renzo and his friends seemed to have lost a good deal

of credibility in the eyes of the authorities. First of all, the Habsburg officials were not
convinced of arguments of Renzo and Aurelio that the renegades had sabotaged the
Ottoman navy during the battle of Lepanto. The truth was quite the contrary, at least
according to the Comendador Mayor, Luis de Requesns, who warned that one should
not believe this great liar Renzo, gran palabrero y mentiroso, from whom nothing could
come worth a tornes. His men on Ottoman galleys did not carry out what they promised
to do during the battle; nonetheless, they fought so well that, one of them, the famous
Marana, died fighting valiantly. Furhtermore, Renzo was a known gambler with a game
table, tabla de juego, in his house; in an effort to impress his friends, he did not abstain
from revealing that he was a Habsburg spy. Thanks to his libertine ways, the Ottomans

46

di Mehmet Bechasan Giaco di Negroponte. AGS, E 1137, fol. 66.

AGS, E 1132, fols. 155 (26 July 1569), 164 (15 September 1569), 193 (23 October 1569), 194 (12
November 1569), 196, 205 and 207; E 1137, fols. 53 (17 March 1572) , 65 (21 April 1572), 66, 130 (17
August 1572), 223 (20 February 1572); E 1141, fol. 11 (15 February 1574 . I cut Barellis story short, for
the rest of the story, see. Jose. M. Florist n Imzcoz, Felipe II ya la Empresa de Grecia Tras Lepanto
(1571-1578 , Erytheia 15 (1994): 155-190.
47

285

knew that there was a Habsburg agent in Ragusa and pressurized their vassal to expel him
from the city. Furthermore, as the Comendador Mayor indicates, after the death of Adam
de Franchis, the quality of information dropped significantly. They sent information they
heard in taverns, bodegones, and wrote about events that had already occurred by putting
an old date on letters and then blaming the slowness of couriers. Finally, he even argued
that these spies should be double agents; otherwise one could not explain why the
Ottomans could not catch them.48 He was not the only Habsburg official who had a
negative opinion about the spies in Constantinople. The Viceroy of Naples shared a good
deal of his comments and even asked the ambassador in Venice to find men of quality,49
while the new paymaster, pagador, in Naples, Alonso Sanchez could not restrain himself
from adding his personal comments on the feasibility of the operations to a relacin that
explained the funds remitted to the Habsburg spies in Constantinople: the sabotage
mission could have no other aim but to defraud the government, since the chances of
success were zero in such a dangerous mission with the participation of 112 agents.50
Finally, the newly appointed resident spymaster in Ragusa, don Cesar de la Marea, was
also of the opinion that Aurelio might be a double agent that worked for the Venetians
and even for the Florentines.51
The War of 1570-3 not only increased the importance of gathering information
concerning the decisions taken and the military preparations made in the Ottoman capital,
but also created a temporary center towards which all the information should flow: the
allied Christian fleet that sailed in the Mediterranean. During wartime, when the channels

48

AGS, E 1140, fols. 97 (20 May 1573) and 98 (9 November 1571).

AGS, E 1061, fol. 3.
50
AGS, E 1060, fol. 129 (9 May 1571).
51
AGS, E 1332, fols. 178 (19 April 1573) and 201 (1 August 1573).
49

286

of communications were under duress, Cardinal Granvela, the Viceroy of Naples, on the
one hand sent Nicolo Curenzi to contact the network and on the other remitted any
information that reached him to the Admiral of the Allied Christian Fleet, Don Juan, as
soon as possible.52 Don Juan dispatched his own spies to Constantinople such as
Francesco Piloso who was the nephew of the late Adam de Franchis, Agustin Manuel
who secretly established contact with the Sultans prestigious advisor Joseph Nasi,53 and
the afore-mentioned friar Giovanni Barelli who would travel under the alibi of
negotiating the ransom of important prisoners-of-war held by the Habsburgs, while in
fact his real mission was to negotiate with the Orthodox Patriarch in tandem with the
everlasting Habsburg desire to ensure the cooperation of the Orthodox subjects of the
Sultan.54 In spite of this renewed vigor behind the Habsburg secret service in the Levant,
Don Juan was still unimpressed with the results and accentuated in one of his letters to
the ambassador in Venice the necessity to have efficient spies and establish different
channels of communication.55
Agents that survived the war such as the dismissed eunuch Murad Aa,56 the
dragoman of the French ambassador Giovanni Battista Bendoria, Chaim de Selenia and
the Genoese Ahmed Reis alias Francesco di Bisagno were more concerned with
recovering their unpaid stipends, rather than sending fresh information.57 Having lost
several agents, Aurelio started to introduce new ones in order to strengthen the network.
Now that both masterminds of the sabotage plans, Massa and Bregante, were gone,
52

AGS, E 1063, fols. 13 (27 April 1573) and 35 (30 June 1573); E 1506, fol. 189.
AGS, E 1137, fol. 130 (17 August 1572).
54
AGS, E 1137, fols. 53 (17 March 1572), 65 (21 April 1572) and 66.
55
AGS, E 1506, fol. 94 (12 July 1573).
56
He was not the Genoese Gregorio Bregante, but another figure, a Romano from the family of Oliva.
AGS, E 1064, fol. 103 (14 February 1574).
57
AGS, E 1064, fols. 102-5. (all 14 February 1574).
53

287

Aurelio also gave up on presenting the already suspicious Habsburg court with infeasible
sabotage plans, the only exception being a brief mention of an insignificant fire in the
foundry of the Arsenal on March 1574.58 This cunning merchants new strategy seemed
to secure the friendship of dragomans of Constantinople, who in their capacity as
translators, were dealing with the daily function of diplomacy in Constnatinople. It
should not be a coincidence that he now succeeded in securing the friendship of Hrrem
Bey whom Renzo wanted on Habsburg payroll since 156259 and furthermore added the
afore-mentioned dragomans of the French and Austrian ambassadors. Among the 9
people who were to be paid by Madrid, 3 were dragomans.60 These moves were
obviously attempts on Aurelios part to make up for the Habsburg disadvantage in the
Ottoman capital. If Madrid lacked a permanent ambassador in Constantinople who would
try to gather information and gain impressions during his negotiations with Ottoman
Pashas, it was Aurelios duty to make sure Philip II was not deprived of at least the
information that was already available to other diplomats in the capital.
Aurelio was quick to diversify his activities and intervened on behalf of the
Spanish nobles who wanted to ransom their kins that had fallen captive to the Ottomans
when they conquered la Goleta in 1574. Philip II also sent him money to ransom some of
his men such as a certain Lorenzo and Gabriel Cervelln, the commander of the castle of
la Goleta, while Aurelios brother, Giovanni Antonio went to Spain where he met Ana de

58

AGS, E 1064, fol. 36 (4 May 1574).

AGS, E 1071, fol. 189.
60
The remaining six were Aurelio, Sarimbal, Ahmed Reis, Murad Aa, Chaim de Selenia and Friar
Benedetto Lipareli Zaralino, see. AGS, E 1064, fol. 136 (17 March 1574). There were other names
mentioned in the documents. These sent information without receiving any money. For instance, Mehmed
Reis and a certain Juan appear in documents in 1575 AGS, E 1071, fols. 187 and 188. It is natural to
volunteer given that there were others such as Sarimbali and Chaim who were given stipends only after
having worked for free for some time. AGS, E 1060, fol. 129 (9 May 1571).
59

288

Toledo, the mother of Garca de Toledo, captive in Constantinople.61 When Giovanni

Antonio, however, failed to secure the liberation of the captive pensionario, Mustafa
alias Bregante, the latters family threatened Aurelio with molti vanni. Alarmed by the
danger of being discovered, Croce found the solution in sending away his brother, the
target of the familys anger, and advised the Habsburg authorities to send Mustafa to
Spain and spread rumours that he re-converted to Christianity so that his family gave up
on him.62 In the end, Aurelio had to buy the familys silence with a large sum, 3.000
escudos.63
One of the agents that the Habsburgs sent to Constantinople to reside there and
send information, Francisco Peloso, returned to Sicily in 1575. Like so many failed spies
who could not gather important information, he changed strategy and came up with an
interesting offer. Having realized the danger of a renewed Ottoman naval vigor under the
leadership of the new Grand Admiral Ulu Ali, an experienced corsair, Peloso followed
the example of his colleagues in Constantinople and found a quick solution to the
problem. He would poison the Grand Admiral as well as other important captains in the
Ottoman navy on the one hand and explode the ammunition depot in the Arsenal on the
other. Even though the Viceroy of Sicily, the Duke of Terranova, did not categorically
refuse the other; having perhaps learned from past mistakes, he was still cautious, saying
I know very well the difference between word and deed. Even though Peloso returned
to the Levant, there is no further mention in the documents about the plan.64
61

In the end, it was the Austrian ambassador, David Ungnad who secured the liberation of Garca de
Toledo, Gerlach, Trkiye Gnl, vol I, 158.
62
AGS, E 1066, fols. 16 (1 April 1575), 17 (18 April 1575) and 123 (24 February 1575).
63
AGS, E 486, 20 August 1566; E 1052, fol. 89 (20 January 1562); E 1056, fol. 83; E 1127, fol. 106; Sola,
Los que van y vienen, 202.
64
AGS, E 1144, fol. 96 (9 August 1575). For his letters from Scio in 1576, E 1145, fols. 54 (9 February
1576) and 60. Also see. E 1144, fols. 113-4 (29 September 1575).

289

In 1573, Don Juan had Antn Avelln and Virgilio Polidoro on an official visit to
Constantinople, to accompany the ransomed Ottoman slaves, among whom the son of the
Ottoman Admiral at Lepanto, Mezzzinzade Ali Pasha. According to the French
ambassador, Franois Noailles, the Bishop of Dax, the duo also tested the water for a
five-year truce. Unofficial negotiations could not proceed as the Ottomans rejected the
duos offer of including the Habsburgs in the capitulations of the Ausrian branch of the
family and insisted on a yearly tribute brought by an official ambassador (par personnage
exprs, pourtant tiltre et qualit dambassadeur resident).65 Still, Madrid was satisfied
with their diplomatic skills, as two years later, the duo traveled once again to
Constantinople, ostensibly to negotiate the ransoming of Christian soldiers that had fallen
captive in la Goleta. They received a safe-conduct from Sokollu with the condition that
they returned with more Ottoman captives to be exchanged for Christians. They also
contacted Aurelio, Hrrem and two new potential informants, Murad Aa, the Lucano
mayorduomo of Ulu Ali and Lorenzo Saminiate, the resident of Luca in Constantinople
and a relative of a Habsburg official. They were carrying letters of encouragement from
Philip II addressed to Aurelio, Hrrem and Murad Aa. The Prudent King congratulated
their decision to reduce themselves to their holy Catholic faith and asked Murad Aa to
intervene in securing a similar reduction from Ulu Ali as well, 66 following the earlier

65

Ernest Charrire, ed., Ngociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, mmoires et actes
diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoys ou rsidents
divers titres Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jrusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Gorgie, Crime, Syrie,
Egypte, etc., et dans les tats de Tunis, d'Alger et de Maroc (Paris: Impr. Nationale: 1848-60), vol. III, 416424.
66
Avell ns first letter, AGS, E 1144, fol. 281 (6 June 1575 . For Philip IIs letters, fols. 283-5. Full text
online in Emilio Sola, Ant n Avell n, un eficaz agente espaol en estambul al descubierto, Archivo de la
Frontera, http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/pdf/A-MED03-avellan.pdf. Interestingly, the letter written
to Murad Aa fell into the Ottoman hands. Avelln was shocked when the son of an Ottoman Pasha, a
prisoner-of-war whom he ransomed and brought to Constantinople (he should be the son of Mezzinzade

290

attempts of securing the corsairs defection when he was the Governor-General of

Algeria.67 Furthermore, Avelln managed to recruit five renegades from Ulu Alis
household.68
5.5.

AN UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCE: THE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS

BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND THE HABSBURGS (1575-1581)
In March 1575, a former slave of the Grand Admiral Ulu Ali, named Jaime

Losada, set sail from Messina for Constantinople, seemingly to negotiate the exchange of
slaves with the Ottomans, while in fact, he had a secret mission: to contact his former
master and negotiate his defection. Even though he refused the offer, Ulu welcomed him
warmly and even secured an audience with Sokollu, advertising his former slaves
expertise in Habsburg affairs with the hope of acquiring information from him. The
Grand Vizier initially requested Losadas intervention in securing the restitution of a ship
whose crew rebelled and took refuge in Malta. The conversation took a different turn,
however, when the issue came to the possibility of a truce, an opportunity of which both
the Grand Vizier and Jaime were quick to realize the importance. The Grand Vizier told
him that if Philip II sent them a diplomat, he would be welcome and well-treated. Losada
showed an impressive acumen, arguing against a possible tribute and refusing to say
something binding. Moreover, he quickly socialized within the diplomatic circles of the
Ottoman capital by befriending the Venetian, French and Austrian ambassadors. Setting
sail to relay the message, he died in Otranto before completing his mission, leaving

Ali Pasha), gave him the letter so that he cryptanalyzed it. Avelln managed to lie about its content and
destroyed the letter.
67
AGS E 487, ff.; E 1134, fol. 199 (20 December 1571); E 1400, fol. 34 (22 September 1570).
68
AGS, E 488, Antn Avelln, Constantinopla, 1576 and the two letters written by two of these renegades.

291

behind a detailed report. It was one of his men who went to Naples and informed the
Viceroy.69
Two more key figures appeared in 1576. The first was perhaps one of the most
impressive factota and go-betweens of the 16th century; a former giovani di lingua,70 the
young trainee dragoman in the Venetian embassy, who travelled to Italy and negotiated,
as the agent of the Venetian ambassador and on behalf of the Ottomans, the exchange of
slaves that had fallen captive at Lepanto and la Goleta. This Albanian, named Bartolomeo
Brutti, came to Naples and contacted the Habsburg authorities with an interesting offer
from one of the Ottoman grandees who had fallen captive at the Battle of Lepanto and
could only return to Constantinople four years later with the help of Brutti.71 When this
former Governor-General of Algeria and the son of famous corsair Salih Reis, Mehmed
Pasha, realized upon his return that he was out of favour with no hope of recovering his
former position (he was in fact appointed to the inferior position of a sancakbeyi), he
offered to defect to the Habsburg side with the following conditions. If Philip II could
lend him 30.000 ducats with which he could secure his re-appointment as the GovernorGeneral of Algeria,72 he would then accept Philip IIs suzerainty and became his vassal
without changing his religion, a first step in forming an anti-Ottoman coalition in North
Africa with the further participation of Abdul-Melik, his close friend and the Moroccan
prince whom Ramazan Pasha, the Governor-General of Algeria at the time, only recently
had put on the throne as an Ottoman vassal. He also sought the assurance that, in case the

69

AGS, E 1072, fol. 14, (10 December 1575); ASV, SDC, fil. 11, fol. 12 (23 March 1577).
He quit the job twice and finally left his brother, Cristoforo in his stead in the Venetian embassy. See.
ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 5, fol. 11.
71
ASV, SDelC, reg. 4, cc. 101r-101v (18 March 1575).
72
It was a common practice in Ottoman political culture to resort to bribery in order to secure appointment
to important positions.
70

292

mission failed, he could settle in Sicily where he should be allowed to live as a Muslim,
demonstrating us the differences in dealing with renegades and Muslims during defection
negotiations.73
The second figure, Martin de Acua,74 a Spanish knight from Valladolid, was a
former slave as well. After he was ransomed, he came to Madrid and proposed a sabotage
plan that targeted, unsurprisingly, the Ottoman Navy and the Arsenal. His project was
taken seriously in the ever-optimistic and nave Madrid, and he was sent to Naples to
negotiate the details with the Viceroy.75 There he met Bartolomeo Brutti, who was
already in talks with the Viceroy concerning the defection of Mehmed Pasha. Brutti,
however, vehemently opposed the plan, arguing a number of interesting points that shed
light on the feasibility of such plans that these spies offered the authorities over and over
again. According to him, it was already too late in the season and that they would never
arrive in Constantinople on time. When they did, all the galleys would be on water and
not on land as de Acua believed. Moreover, he accentuated the impossibility of
acquiring artificial fires without being discovered given that the production of these
materials was in the hands of a few people. Likewise, it was impossible to get close to the
galleys as the Arsenal was well-guarded at all times by patrols of small boats (caicchi)
and it was prohibited to sail into the Golden Horn after the second hour of the night. De
Acuas plan to ransom slaves in important positions could not be realized either as it
was impossible to ransom them with money; the only possible way was to exchange them
for Christian slaves.76 His contacts among Ulu Alis men were useless as well. His main

73

For details of these negotiations, see. AGS, E 488, 21 June 1576.

For a detailed monograph on him, see. Rivas and Garca, Martin de Acua.
75
AGS, E 1072, fol. 177 (28 August 1576).
76
Brutti, an expert on the trade of ransoming, was right. See. AV, Nunziature di Spagna, no. 15, fol. 367.
74

293

contact, Soliman Veneziano, was inexperienced and others should not be trusted. Most of
Ulu Alis renegades generally wanted at first to return to Christianity but when their
enthusiasm, colera, passed, they changed their minds and started accusing anybody who
negotiated with them. Brutti did not only enumerate the possible impediments, but also
left his own version explaining under which circumstances such a plan of sabotage could
be realized. With the knowledge of a handful of people, everything had to be carefully
planned and executed on a gloomy night in December when the galleys were taken to
land and the Arsenal was little guarded because of the cold weather, snow and wind.77
Bruttis arguments could not dissuade the authorities and de Acua arrived in
Constantinople on 24 February 1577, under the pretense of negotiating the ransom of
prisoners-of-war,78 and travelling with Avell ns passport which the latter obtained
during his third visit in Constantinople in 1576.79 Aurelio made the necessary
arrangements and placed de Acua in his son-in-law Matheo dal Faros house. He also
warned him and the three men he brought himself to be careful and not leave their
lodgings. When these warnings fell on deaf ears and one of de Acuas men took a walk
in the city, a certain Greek named Esteban, a former Habsburg spy who had run away
from Naples, converted to Islam and entered Ottoman service, recognized him and had
him captured. When he confessed under torture, the panicked de Acua and Santa Croce
came up with an interesting story. Evoking the memory of Jaime Losadas mission, Santa
Croce contacted the dragoman Hrrem and claimed that de Acua was the long-awaited
envoy that Philip II would send to the Ottomans. Hrrem asked whether de Acua

77

AGS, E 1073, fol. 22.

ASV, SDC, fil. 11, fol. 2 (9 March 1577).
79
AGS, E 1074, fols. 6, 102, 104 (3 January 1577), 105 (16 January 1577), 106 (21 January 1577), 107 (27
January 1577), 108 (5 March 1577).
78

294

brought a safeconduct or a letter of credence from the king; such a document would ease
the minds of the Ottomans who had just caught three Habsburg spies, one of whom
confessed that they had come with their boss, a gentleman (cavallero). Aurelio
immediately solved this problem. He forged a letter of credence by putting the name of
the Grand Vizier on the letter that Philip II had originally written to Joseph Nasi in
recognition for his services to the crown. He also came up with the story that de Acua
arrived secretly not to diminish Philip IIs reputation by publicizing his mission and the
three men who were caught were his guides, not spies. With Hrrems intermediation, all
was square. Having acquired the necessary clothes for an ambassador and a suitable
present for the Grand Vizier, Aurelio quickly prepared de Acua for an audience with
Sokollu. The contented Grand Vizier assured his goodwill towards the possibility of a
truce and sent de Acua back to his king.80 As could easily be seen, the merchant-cumsaboteur-cum-spymaster-cum-ransom agent Aurelio quickly invested in another trade,
that of diplomacy and proved himself to be a master entrepreneur and apt broker who
continually improvised to find new means of survival and further his own interest in the
world of secret diplomacy, second perhaps only to Bartolomeo Brutti in the diversity of
his activities.
It is not certain, to what extent the Ottomans were convinced of this story,
especially given the suspicions among Habsburg authorities as well as other spies such as
de la Marea and Diego de Mallorca, the Friar of la Goleta,81 that Aurelio was also an
Ottoman agent. It might the case that everything was a set up to create a favourable
environment and persuade the Catholic King to send an ambassador to Constantinople,

80
81

AGS, E 1071, fol. 191 (5 March 1577).

AGS, E 1144, fol. 212.

295

one of the main objectives of Ottoman diplomacy since the time of Charles V.82 Relations
between both empires were hitherto conducted via Austrian ambassadors. Nonetheless,
the conflict between Madrid and Constantinople could only be repaired by direct
diplomatic relations and the two empires could only negotiate through go-betweens, those
capable of crossing the insivible boundary between the two halves of the Mediterranean.
It could alternatively be argued that Aurelio and de Acua geniuinely came up with the
plan with the hope of saving their skins. If this was the case, three possibilities arise. The
Ottomans could have decided to use the occasion even though they were not convinced of
Aurelios story. As long as it ensured the arrival of an official ambassador from Madrid,
they would have no reason to complain. As will be explained later, the Grand Vizier
Sokollu was a proponent of an Ottoman-Habsburg truce in the Mediterranean and he
might have intended to play along in order to overcome the resistance of what I would
call the Mediterranean faction, led by the Grand Admiral Ulu Ali. Alternatively, even

82

One of the basic tenets of Ottoman diplomacy vis--vis the Habsburgs was to compel them to send their
diplomats to Constantinople, an act which they considered a sign of submission. In accordance with the
Ottoman imperial ideology, this was an effort to claim the superiority of the eternal Empire, the heir to
the Roman throne, and to delegate other claimants such as Charles V, to the status of kings, that is those
who received their crowns from the dispenser of the crowns, the Ottoman Sultan. However, Charles V
skillfully dodged the danger of recognizing the Ottoman superiority and publicly entering into an impious
alliance, impium foedus. He refused to send an official envoy and tried instead to have himself included in
the negotiations between the Ottomans and his brother Ferdinand. When he sent an envoy, such as Cornelio
Duplicio Schepper or Gerhart Veltwyck, these officially appeared as Ferdinands envoys rather than that of
the Emperor. Miguel ngel Ochoa Brun, Historia de la Diplomacia Espaola, V: La Diplomacia de Carlos
V (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999, 2nd edition 2003), 452-3. Such diplomatic gestures
should by no means be considered trivial. The issue of intitulatio, for instance, was a serious aspect of the
Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In Ottoman diplomatics, there was a clear distinction between the Ottoman
Emperor, the sole ruler of the world, and several other kings. The title of king was also used for the
very person of the Emperor, Charles V, the King of Spain. It was not a unique Ottoman practice to insist
on denying other sovereigns equal titles in an effort to apply the imperial prestige in the implementation of
their grand strategy. The Ottomans could have (willingly or unwillingly) adopted this from the Byzantines
of whom they considered themselves the legal heir. To the Ottomans, Charles V was what Charlemagne
was to the Byzantines: a usurper of the imperial title and a staunch rival. For similar attitudes of the
Byzantines regarding how the Emperor and his ambassadors should address the envoys of lesser barbarian
rulers, see. De Cerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae, a 10th-century book on ceremonial procedures in
Constantinople, generally attributed to the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennetos, in Corpus
Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, ed. J. Reiske (Bonn: Weber, 1829), 679-92.

296

though they realized that de Acua was the employer of the three spies that they caught,
the Ottomans might not have seen a contradiction. After all, werent all ambassadors
honorable spies? Finally, the Ottomans might have simply believed in Aurelio. His
story would not have been outlandish given the frequency with which in sixteenthcentury states employed unofficial intermediaries who lacked the career and decorum of
an official diplomat. The fact that only a couple of days after de Acua had an audience
with the Ottoman Grand Vizier, the Venetian bailo was convinced that he was sent by
Philip II to negotiate a secret treaty furthermore illustrates the potential credibility of
Aurelios story.83
Be that as it may, the negotiations for an Ottoman-Habsburg truce commenced
under these rather unorthodox circumstances. Having secured an armistice, a suspensin
de armas, for a year, de Acua returned to Naples with the mission of informing the
authorities that the Ottomans consented to an incoming Habsburg ambassador.84 When he
failed to show up, however, Aurelio faced another problem. The Ottomans were already
uneasy because of the rumours of a possible Habsburg participation in the Portuguese
king Sebastian Is campaign against Morocco. Their suspicion forced Aurelio to forge
two more letters, one for the Grand Vizier, the other for the Dragoman Hrrem, testifying
to the illness of Martin de Acua. Unable to write in Spanish, he had one of Uluc Alis
slaves translate his version to proper Spanish and dismantled the Prudent Kings seals in
other letters and put it on the new ones. Sokollu, convinced by this fraud, decided to send

83

ASV, SDC, fil. 11, fol. 2 (9 March 1577).

For Constantinoples orders to local judges, corsairs and port officials (iskeleler eminleri that Don
Martine nam adem drt nefer adem ile, de Acua and four of his men, should be escorted and not be
molested on their way to and from Madrid, and that no attack should be undertaken against the Puglian
coasts, see. BOA, MD, XXX, nos. 76 (H. 28 M 985, A.D. 17 April 1577) and 78.
84

297

a second person to Naples, which ended up being, thanks to the dragoman Hrrems
instigation, none other than Aurelio himself!85 He arrived in Naples on August 1577.
In the meantime, de Acua arrived in Madrid. Instead of this sketchy adventurer,
Philip II and his ministers chose a former slave named Giovanni Margliani to further
negotiations in Constantinople. Margliani, accompanied by Antonio Echvarri, arrived in
Naples, where they teamed up with Bartolomeo Brutti who by then was familiar with the
Habsburg authorities and secured himself a spot in the negotiations, thanks to his social
capital in Constantinople as well as his experience in Ottoman diplomatic circles. He was
to help Margliani in Constantinople and continue negotiating with Mehmed Pasha, the
son of Salih Reis. It is interesting to see that Madrid was seeking to secure on the hand a
truce for two or three years and on the other the defection of an Ottoman pasha who
would submit the most strategic Ottoman port in North Africa to the Habsburgs. This
double game demonstrates not only the multi-layerness and complexity of inter-imperial
diplomacy, but also the faith (or lack thereof) Philip II and his ministers put in Ottoman
good intentions. It should still be recorded that in order not to jeopardize the diplomatic
talks, they abstained from capitalizing on Ant n Avell ns offer to arrange the defection
of five principal renegades of Ulu Ali.86
Margliani insisted on excluding Aurelio (who was in Naples as well) from the
negotiations in order to avoid too much publicity. Everybody knew that he was in the city
85

AGS, E 1071, fol. 1 7. For Sokollus reply to one of these fake letters, see E 1073, fol. 135. For Ottoman
order to governors, local judges, corsairs and port officials that Sante Kroje nam zimmi, Aurelio, who
was sent to Spain for the handling of some important issues, bazi mesalih-i mhimme, should not be
molested, see BOA, MD, XXXI, fol. 49 (H. 28 R 985 / A.D. 8 December 1577). It is interesting to see that
the Ottomans were not less tightlipped than the Habsburgs when it comes to revealing information about
the truce negotiations to the local authorities. Other similar ordes that ordered the provisioning of postal
horses to Civani Iste ano ve re ikleri, Giovanni Stefano Ferraro and his companions, see. BOA, MD,
XXXIII, nos. 560 (both H. 27 Za. 985 / A.D. 4 February 1578) and 637 (H. 18 Z 985 / A.D. 25 February
1578).
86
For instructions given to Margliani, Brutti and Avelln, see. AGS, E 1074, fols. 101 and 103.

298

for the neg[oti]o di Constantinopoli. He and Brutti decided to buy some time by telling
Aurelio that Brutti had not yet arrived in the city and that he was coming by land from
Civitavecchia. Aurelio was quick to discover the truth from Brutti, however. Margliani
complained harshly of the indiscretion of the Albanian who even dined with Aurelio.
Brutti defended himself on the ground that he could not restrain himself from contacting
his brother Benedetto who was in Aurelios company. He had not seen him for many
years and his intention was only to inform him, not Aurelio. Margliani, however, was not
convinced, insistent that this was un procedere da mal hombre, the deed of an evil
man. This could have created an irrepearable antagonism between Aurelio and Margliani,
unless the latter succeeded in convincing the former that he had lied in order to keep
Bruttis presence in Naples secret from Giovanni di Cardona in whose house they had
met that night. Furthermore, even though Brutti told him that he did not reveal their
secret mission to Aurelio, this was not true.87 Fortunately for them, Aurelio could neither
secure a passport from the Viceroy and nor prevent Margliani from proceeding to
Constantinople. Nevertheless, he showed tact by writing a letter to Hrrem Sultan and
jeopardizing Marglianis mission. He informed the dragoman that Margliani not only
came with too little money to give to Sokollu, Hrrem and Aurelio (15.000 escudos), but
also intended to defraud them by keeping a large portion of the money to himself (9.000
escudos). If Hrrem could persuade Sokollu to stall the Ottoman Navy for a year and
send a capitulation to Philip II via Brutti, the king, who was in need of peace so badly,
would actually agree to give more money. Obviously, Margliani had to be kept in
Constantinople without contact with the king while Aurelio and Brutti were furthering

87

AGS, E 1073, fol. 157 (25 October 1577).

299

negotiations.88 His schemes seemed to have worked; Margliani reported in January 1579
that, thanks to Aurelios warnings, Sokollu was now demanding a bombastic entry of the
Habsburg ambassador to Constantinople.89
It was not only Aurelio whom Margliani sought to exclude from negotiations.
With direct orders from the king, he abstained from revealing the true nature of his
mission to the Viceroy of Naples who had earlier demonstrated his intransigent
opposition to a truce.90 If Madrids choice to exclude him from the negotiations could be
explained with the fear that he might retard Margliani and try to sabotage the mission,
this explanation clearly demonstrates the importance of the Viceroy and the extent to
which he exercised power with great autonmomy in the matters regarding the Levant. He
was the one with whom Margliani and Brutti had to deal with regarding the safe-conducts
as well as the credits so that they could bribe the Ottoman pashas, a common diplomatic
practice for those who wanted to negotiate in 16th-century Constantinople. Margliani
tactfully kept the secret and did not yield to the Viceroys pressures and threats.91 He
arrived in Constantinople on 14 December 1577 with Brutti and without Aurelio. Having
quickly secured an armistice, or gentlemans agreement in Braudels words,92 for a year
in February 1578, he officially agreed to the dispatch of an official ambassador.
The details of diplomatic negotiations and Marglianis three years in
Constantinople are out of the scope of this study; the issue has already been studied in
detail, first by Fernand Braudel,93 then by Skilliter94 and Rodrguez Salgado.95 Suffice it
88

AGS, E 1076, fol. 45 (24 October 1577).

AGS, E 1080, fol. 22 (29 January 1579).
90
For his arguments against the truce, see.AGS, E 1074, fols. 20 and 21.
91
AGS, E 1073, fol. 160 (27 October 1577).
92
Braudel, La Mditerrane, vol. II, 441
93
Braudel, La Mditerrane, vol. II, 439-450.
94
Skilliter, Hispano-Ottoman Armistice, 4 1-515.
89

300

to give a brief analysis of factional balance-of-power in the Ottoman capital which

directly affected these negotiations. The main proponent of a truce was the Grand Vizier
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha who had no interest in continuing a costly confrontation of little
benefit to his faction, while its main opponent was Ulu Ali and his men, the
Mediterranean faction, which comprised sea governors, North African elites, corsairs,
sailors, people of the Arsenal and the like whose livelihoods depended upon the
continuation of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and the consequent Ottoman investment
in the navy and the Arsenal. To elaborate the issue further, let us return to the Venetian
baili: according to Giovanni Correr, Ulu Ali had 3.000 slaves. Even though he arranged
positions in the Arsenal with 10 ake per diem for 600 of those, he still had to feed the
rest of this three thousand mouth on his back from his own pocket. These expenditures
were so burdensome that they were one of the two reasons why the Grand Admiral asked
the Sultan to demote him and dispatch him to North Africa as the Governor-General of
Algeria with supreme control over the other two North African provinces. His
lieutenants, who had their own households filled with slaves to feed, were in no better
situation.96 One of Corrers successors, Paolo Contarini would make the same argument
in his relazioni dated 1583: Ulu was trying to convince the Sultan to authorize an
expedition against Morocco on the one hand and to break the truce with the Habsburgs
and the peace with the Venetians on the other. These he was doing, because it [was]
in so much his interest that the Ottoman navy [left] for some expedition that he would
even be convinced to turn against one of his own sons. 97 Apparently, without a war in
the Mediterranean, their economic situation will deteriorate further. Moreover, Ottoman
95

Salgado, Felipe II, el Palad n de la Cristiandad.

ASV, SDC, fil. 12, c. 353r (9 January 1576, m.v.).
97
Albri, Le Relazioni, Serie III, Vol. III, 225.
96

301

corsairs in North Africa depended upon the continous political help from Constantinople,
especially in the late 1570s when a joint Portugese-Habsburg intervention in North Africa
seemed a strong possibility. In order to hinder the truce negotiations, Ulu Ali and his
corsair network resorted to every method from misinformation (exaggerating Habsburg
activity in the Western Mediterranean) to persuasion (Ulu Alis arzes to the Sultan
against a truce and threat (Ulu Alis threatening tone against Margliani). If in the end if
they failed in spite of the Habsburgs resistance to send an official ambassador, it was
thanks to Sokollus resistance, Marglianis diplomatic aptness and the Ottoman-Safavid
War that erupted in 1578.
The year 1577 represented a milestone for the Habsburg network in the Levant.
Renzo died that year and the authorities ignored Aurelios advice that he should be
replaced by a Diego de Squiva, a former slave of Hasan Pasha and an agent already in
Habsburg service.98 Aurelio himself would never return to Constantinople where he left
his family. The Habsburgs had grown too suspicious of him. Cardinal Granvela
considered him a double agent who was more beneficial to the Ottomans than to the
Habsburgs.99 Furthermore, Aurelios connections with the Venetian resident in Naples
did not go unnoticed; the Venetians decided not to directly communicate with him
regarding the details of truce negotiations anymore, but to use his brother in order not to
provoke Habsburgs suspicions further.100 When Margliani intercepted his aforementioned letter addressed to Hrrem Bey, the secretary of the State and the unofficial
98

AGS, E 1073, fol. 171. Diego had been a slave of Hasan Pasha for 16 years and was very knowledgeable
in things regarding the Ottoman government and military. Aurelio had ransomed him and used him as a gobetween in the defection negotiations with some important Ottomans from the palace (E 1332, fol. 172 (28
February 1573)). He also participated in other clandestine operations. Aurelio met Diego in Naples when
the latter was going to Flanders.
99
AGS, E 1521, fol. 27 (23 January 1578).
100
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 147r-147v (8 January 1577, m.v.).

302

head of the Habsburg secret service, Antonio Prez, had it with Aurelio: he should be
punished.101 When, in spite of all these, he managed to receive a safe-conduct from the
Viceroy to go to Madrid, this voyage became his undoing. There he was imprisoned,
surprisingly, not because of his double games and betrayals, but because of the issue of
an unpaid debt.102 It took him some time to leave the scene completely however. In 1581,
he was still in prison from where he was on the one hand commenting on issues regarding
the Ottomans (Persian War, Sinan Pashas Grand Vizierate, a detailed critique of the
truce Margliani signed, etc.) and on the other begging to be released so that he could
resume his services to the crown.103
With the negotiations, new faces entered the picture, both on the level of open
diplomacy, helping Margliani in negotiations, and that of secret diplomacy, spying and
sending information. During the entire negotiation process, Margliani had to work closely
with Dragoman Hrrem Bey and the Jewish courtier and power broker Salomon
Ashkenazi. Hrrem might have been a dragoman of the court, yet he was not a simple
translator. He was a key figure in the diplomatic negotiations of Constantinople whose
intermediation and brokerage were of cardinal importance for the Venetians as well as
the Florentines. An entrepreneur with extensive trade connections throughout the
Mediterranean, Salomon Ashkenazi was not only a close confidant and political advisor
of the Ottoman Grand Vizier Sokollu, but also the physician of European ambassadors in
101

AGS, E 1080, fol. 98 (1 April 1579).

Apparently, Aurelio vouched for two Moors who ransomed some Muslim slaves from the Marquis of St.
Croce for a total amount of 12.000 ducats. When these Moors failed to honor their obligations and did not
send the money from Constantinople, the Marquis had Aurelio, who had just arrived in Spain, imprisoned.
AGS, E 1080, fol. 62 (18 November 1579).
103
AGS, E 1083, fols. 85 and 86 (22 May 1581). According to Santa Croce, the truce was of little value
because it did not include the oath, juramento, that the Sultans usually swore in similar documents signed
with the Venetians and the Austrian Habsburgs. It was just a document signed by the Grand Vizier that was
not binding for the Ottomans at all. Furthermore, it did not include Ottoman corsairs who were the real
problem to be dealt with.
102

303

the Ottoman capital. It could be assumed that he was helping not Margliani, but Sokollu
by trying to learn what Margliani had on his mind; a possibility that Margliani himself
reported.104 However, considering him only as an agent of Sokollu would be a
simplification of a complex set of reasons behind the actions of intriguing figures of
information traders, power-brokers and go-betweens. His intermediation during the War
of 1570-3 clearly demonstrate how self-centered and interest seeking Ashkenazi was;
with no special attachment to either party, he used his unique position by brokering
between them and furthering his own interest. The main figure behind the secret
negotiations between the Venetian bailo and Ottoman Grand Vizier for a tentative truce,
he did more than simply acting as Sokollus agent. On the one hand he negotiated with
the Bailo on behalf of Sokollu, while on the one other he assured the communication
between the bailo and the Venetian authorities by smuggling bailos letters from his
house; a perilous operation as a result of which he found himself twice in Ottoman
prisons. His influence in both capitals was undisputed. He could exert pressure upon the
Venetians regarding the ban on the Jews of the city.105 He was the one who compiled the
text of the 1573 capitulation and it was was to him that Sokollu entrusted the task of
finalizing the negotiations for the Dalmatian borders between the two states. He came to
the Lagoon as the Ottoman envoy in 1574.106 Furthermore, even after the death of
Sokollu, he resumed his key position in the Ottoman-Habsburg truce negotiations;
Margliani praised his contributions and the familiarity (domestichezza) with which this

104

AGS, E 1080, fol. 48 (18 July 1579).

Arbel, Trading Nations, 89-91.
106
Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 25-6. Even though he arrived in Venice with letters of Sokollu and
not the Sultan, the Venetians immediately treated him as an official envoy. Ibid., 166. Also see. ASV,
SDelC, reg. 4, cc. 52v, 56v, 59v, 80v-81v, 84, 85, 88, 116.
105

304

power broker negotiated in Mustafa Pashas household in 1580.107 A couple of months

later when the factional balance-of-power was reconfigured once again after the death of
Mustafa Pasha, however, Margliani added that Ashkenazi did not have introduzione
with either Siyavu or Sinan Pasha and could in turn have become an agent of the French
ambassador with whom he started to entertain unusually good relations.108 Marglianis
growing distrust for Ashkenazi is justified given that the latter worked for the Venetian
bailo, supplying him letters written by Philip II and Viceroy of Naples regarding the
truce.109
Margliani was less reluctant to accept the intervention of other pretenders. For
instance, he responded to another influential Jewish courtier and power broker, the Grand
Giudio Joseph Nasis offer of help with a visit and empty words, thus walking a fine line
between offending a once-powerful courtier and infuriating his arch-rival, Sokollu
Mehmed Pasha.110 Similarly, another dragoman named Mehmed Bey approached
Margliani, who preferred to keep him at bay because he was in total disgrace in the eyes
of Sokollu and Ulu Ali.111 After the death of Sokollu and the reconfiguration of balanceof-power between factions, even though Hrrem and Ashkenazi retained their positions,
new power brokers, such as the Jewish Benvenistes, close confidant of Siyavu Paa, rose
to prominence.112
Margliani started to set up his own intelligence network by recruiting new
informants in key positions in the Ottoman military and administration. Ulu Alis

107

AGS, E 1338, fol. 30 (22 July 1580).

AGS, E 1338, fol. 71 (21 December 1580).
109
ASV, CCX-LettSec, b. 5, fol. 212 (8 January 1580, m.v.).
110
AGS, E 1080, fol. 23 (3 February 1579).
111
AGS, E 1080, fol. 59 (3 August 1579).
112
AGS, E 1338, fols. 52, 59, 65 and 68 (all 1580).
108

305

household, the very headquarter of the anti-truce Mediterranean faction, was the primary
target. There Margliani found several discontent renegades, not so surprisingly given the
frequent notices in contemporary documents to flights and riots among the Grand
Admirals slaves as well as several projects of assassination and sabotage they offered to
European governments. Two of Ulu Alis men, Sinan (Juan de Briones) and Haydar
(Robert Drever), agreed to furnish the Habsburgs with regular information as to
whereabouts of the Ottoman Navy on which they sailed.113 They duly delivered and
proved themselves able informants; a good number of their letters,114 some of which
written aboard the Ottoman Navy,115 survived in AGS. The Habsburg authorities also
considered the possibility that these might assassinate Ulu Ali,116 while Sinans plan to
escape to Christianity was endorsed as well.117 Margliani recruited another slave of Ulu
Ali, Pedro Brea, who provided him with letters his master wrote to Christian rulers118 and
used his social capital to gather information from among the Ottoman dignitaries such as
Gazanfer Aa. Furthermore, in order to go to Marglianis house freely, he tricked Ulu
Ali into believing that he corrupted one of Marglianis men who would write for him in a
notebook, in exchange for the liberty of one of his kin, all the letters exchanged between
Margliani and the Habsburg authorities.119 Margliani furthermore secured the allegiance
of a chaus of Siyavu Pasha who had extensive connections beyond the household of his
master. He was a close friend of the bailos dragoman Marucini and his compatriot

113

AGS, E 1080, fol. 33 (3 and 18 June 1579).

AGS, E 490, 17, 18 and 22 October 1579; full text in Emilio Sola, Un Ferrar s en Estambul, Regef Bei
Uglan o Recep Oglan Bei, Archivo de la Frontera, http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/pdf/AMED24.pdf.
115
AGS, E 1080, fols. 41 (14 May 1579), 51, 58 (3 August 1579) and 93 (7 June 1580).
116
AGS, E 1081, fol. 61 (24 March 1580).
117
AGS, E 1083, fol. 58 (28 February 1581); E 1338, fol. 59 (15 October 1580).
118
AGS, E 1338, fol. 13 (13 June 1580).
119
AGS, E 1338, fols. 36 (27 July 1580) and 70 (14 December 1580).
114

306

Hrrem Bey; furthermore, he was also well-connected in the house of the French
ambassador. Finally, he had a garden in a good part of the city and thus could receive
spies if need be.120 Moreover, Margliani dismissed from his service in December 1580, a
scribe in the Ottoman administration, a relative of a certain Pietro Vesti, from whom he at
one point hoped to obtain a copy of the draft of the proposed peace treaty with the
Persians.121 Bartolomeo Pusterla a.k.a. Marco Antonio Stanga, a rich and generous
Italian122 who was already sending information for some time, returned from Venice and
resurfaced again. His familiarity with Mustafa Pasha made him an important figure for
the Habsburg secret service, an importance which continued even after the Pashas death
a couple of months later, in August 1580.123 Margliani had his agents in the Ottoman
Arsenal as well: an unnamed capo maestro124, Giovanni da Agreda from slave barracks,
the bao, of Constantinople125 and Matheo Boncuchillo.126 In 1580, the Ottomans caught
Marglianis other spy who carried letters and put him in prison from where he managed
to escape shortly after.127 Finally, a number of other names appear in the documentation:
Vincenzo Corrado who was sending information from Sofia,128 Jacopo Mormoray,129
Tobia de Juan,130 and Giacomo Bernardini.131
Even though he was originally sent to secure a safe-conduct for the incoming
Habsburg ambassador, Juan de Rocaful, Margliani soon found out that it was him who
120

AGS, E 1338, fol. 42 (10 August 1580).

AGS, E 1338, fols. 51 (21 August 1580) and 60 (10 December 1580); E 1339, fol. 123.
122
Gerlach, Trkiye Gnl, vol. I, 109.
123
AGS, E 1337, fols. 161, 162, 163, 169, 171 and 174 (all 1580).
124
AGS, E 1338, fol. 65 (12 November 1580).
125
AGS, E 1338, fol. 59 (15 October 1580).
126
AGS, E 1338, fol. 65 (12 November 1580) and 72 (22 December 1580).
127
AGS, E 1338, fol. (30 June 1580).
128
AGS, E 1338, fol. 6 (31 May 1580).
129
AGS, E 1338, fol. 30 (22 July 1580).
130
AGS, E 1337, fols. 164, 165, 169, 172 and 173 (all 1580).
131
AGS, E 1338, fols. 42 (10 August 1580) and 66 (12 November 1580).
121

307

had to negotiate the Ottoman-Habsburg truce. Rocaful never arrived and remained in
Naples even though a chaus named Ali waited for him in Ragusa for months.132 Sokollu
was quick to realize what was going on. His efficient secret service soon found out that
Rocaful was far from being ill, as Margliani claimed to be. He was seen walking around
in Naples. Moreover, Sokollu was also informed of the Habsburg military preparations in
Naples which, he feared, might target Algiers.133
In the meantime, a new go-between, Antonio Echevarri, appeared as a potential
Habsburg ambassador.134 Margliani vehemently opposed the idea, however, because
Echevarri was once a slave in the Ottoman capital. This scrivano mayor de los esclavos
del Gran Seor, had run away from the Ottoman capital with other slaves on January 25,
1571, causing much trouble for other Christian slaves left in the capital and the
Franciscan monks amidst rising intercommunal hatred, typical of wartime.135 Therefore,
it would have devastating consequences if somebody recognized Echevarri.136 In August,
Margliani reported that he was being mocked because Rocafull did not arrive; he also
suggested new agents for the Habsburg secret service. A certain Giovanni Volpe
Vicentino, who came to Constantinople in order to ransom his brother, could be a
possible source of information. He also added that a Roman named Paolo earned the
Grand Viziers favor because he had stolen three Christian slaves, one from Naples and
two from Rome and submitted them to the emin of the Ragusan customs house, in
132

As soon as Margliani arrived in Constantinople, Ali Chaus was dispatched to Ragusa to wait for the
incoming ambassador. BOA, MD, XXXV, no. 42 (H. 19 R 985, A.D. 19 November 1578); XXXVI, nos.
107, 108 and 109 (all H. 19 Za. 986 / A.D. 17 January 1579); also see. XL, nos. 276-277 (H. 20 87 /
A.D. 11 October 1579).
133
AGS, E 1080, fol. 48 (18 July 1579). The target was Portugal.
134
AGS, E 1079, fols. 185 and 186 (both 9 August 1579).
135
These monks were enslaved and sent to galleys because the Ottomans realized that they were assisting
the transmission of letters written by Habsburg spies. AGS, E 1060, fol. 140 (5 May and 15 June 1571).
136
AGS, E 1080, fol. 22 (29 January 1579). Aurelio made a similar warning as well. E 1080, fol. 98 (1
April 1580).

308

exchange for the liberty of his brother who was a rower in Ottoman galleys. The fact that
he refused the Sokollus offer for conversion brought him further credit in Marglianis
eyes.137 In October, Antonio Echevarri arrived in Constantinople, only to leave for
Naples soon after because, just as Margliani had suggested, the face of this slave on the
run was familiar to many in Constantinople. 138
Margliani and Brutti on the other hand, fell out with each other quickly.
Marglianis correspondence is full of complaints about Bruttis bad intentions, while
Brutti, frustrated with Marglianis efforts to exclude him from the negotiations, devised a
couple of interesting plans to get rid of his colleague.
First, he told Margliani that Sokollu was angry with him because Rocaful had not
arrived and that he should ask from the Pasha the licence to leave Constantinople. If he
did not allow him to leave, then they would ask the Sultan when he left Constantinople
for hunting. There Brutti could talk in Albanian with the Sultans men so that Sokollu
could not understand what he said. If this did not work either, then he would secretly take
him to Anatolia from where he could pass to Chios and then to freedom. When Margliani
kindly but astutely rejected the offer, Brutti informed the Grand Vizier that Margliani was
contemplating to escape and added that Rocaful was not coming because the Habsburgs
were planning an expedition against Algiers. When Ashkenazi broke the news to him,
Margliani was appalled by this greatest betrayal of the world.139
Rest of Bruttis story is indicative of the realities of factional politics in the
Ottoman capital. Brutti quickly alienated everybody including the Grand Vizier and
found himself busy with other problems that closed one page in his career, but opened
137

AGS, E 1080, fols. 58 (3 August 1579).

Sola, Uchal, 298, 300.
139
AGS, E 1080, fols. 44 and 46 (both 4 July 1579).
138

309

another. His activities were by no means restricted to espionage, diplomacy and slave
ransoming; he also directly participated in Ottoman court politics. He was a relative of
the rival of Sokollu, Sinan Pasha. Furthermore, he acted as an agent of the Moldavian
prince who was seeking to assume the crown from Rhodes where he was kept by the
Ottomans in exile. Bruttis machinations against the reigning prince, a client of Sokollu,
had already infuriated the Pasha. When he furthermore learned that Brutti lied to him on
several occasions, he had him imprisoned. Margliani then found himself in an awkward
position because he was obliged to defend Brutti in compliance with his instructions that
he had received from Philip II before undertaking his voyage. Furthermore, he feared that
Brutti might convert to Islam in order to save his skin and confess the details of
negotiations for Mehmed Pashas defection. He sent Hrrem to Sokollu and argued that
Brutti came with him and therefore, as a part of his mission, should be treated with
respect, no matter what he did. If he was executed, the negotiations could not proceed.
Meanwhile, Sokollu had already made his case in front of the Sultan who ordered that the
Albanian should be impaled. Sinan Pasha, as the recipient of 8.000 ducats that Brutti
secured from the candidate prince, knew that Sokollus real target was none other than
himself. He quickly made an arz to the Sultan, arguing that Sokollu was trying to punish
Brutti because he was involved in factional politics. In order to convince the Sultan that
Brutti was a Habsburg spy, Sokollu even went as far as to forge a letter written by the
Viceroy of Naples who thanked the Albanese for the information he sent. Sinan then
made another arz, arguing that Sokollus man, Ashkenazi, deceived Margliani into
submitting a document (scripture which, although used as a proof to Bruttis culpability,
should be given no credit. Sokollu then agreed to release him with the condition that he

310

should immediately leave for Naples where he would be punished by the Viceroy. Brutti
was told that he was going to welcome the incoming Habsburg ambassador Rocafull. He
met in Ragusa Giovanni Stefano de Ferrari and Antonio Echevarri who informed him that
this was a ruse and Rocafull was not coming. He tried to return with the two to
Constantinople; yet the authorities forced him to return to Ragusa from where he was put,
on Sokollus orders, on a ship that set sail for Barleta. Unfavourable winds saved Brutti
from a compulsory trip which might have been the end of his career as a power broker in
the Ottoman capital. When his ship had to take refuge in a Ragusan island, he easily
passed to a nearby Venetian island and from there to Alessio in his native Albania. There
he was once again detained by the men sent by the Ragusan authorities upon the
instigation of Margliani. In the meantime, the balance-of-power in Constantinople
changed decisively after the assassination of Sokollu and the consequent purging of his
faction.Upon learning Bruttis detention, Sinan Pashas sister (a rare reference to a
woman) sent one of her sons with 25 men to recover Brutti by force and bring him back
to Constantinople. The brother Christoforo Brutti and a chaus sent by Sinan Pasha arrived
in Alessio with an imperial order for Bruttis release. Unable to find him in the city, the
chaus arrested the Ragusans who detained the Albanian at the first place.140
As soon as he returned to Constantinople, Brutti at once resumed his
machinations against Margliani. He first contacted Ulu Ali, the ardent opponent of the
truce and the leader of the Mediterranean faction who was looking for any excuse to
hamper the negotiations. Then he told Ahmed Pasha that Marglianis real mission was to
buy time rather than to sign a truce. Furthermore, via one of his men in the bao, the

140

AGS, E 1080, fols. 47 (18 July 1579), 60 (11 August 1579), 61 (18 August 1579); E 1337, fol. 15 (25
January 1580).

311

lodgings of the Christian slaves working in the Arsenal, he spread the rumour that
Margliani usurped the money Philip II gave him for the ransoming of Spanish slaves. The
provoked slaves were almost making ciertas in ormaciones y poderes, a written
statement against Margliani, if not for a certain Gaspar Ligero who opposed to sign and
even fought fist to fist with another slave. Fortunately for Margliani, Bruttis
machinations against him did not work. He would soon leave Constantinople for
Moldavia where he would become the high dignitary of the new prince.141
While Margliani was negotiating the details of truce and expanding his network of
spies and informants, an unexpected visitor jeopardized the entire Habsburg operation. A
Trinitarian Friar named Cristobal Perez arrived in Constantinople for ransoming Christian
slaves. When he suddenly wished to convert, however, Margliani was on alert because
two of his agents in Ulu Alis household (Sinan and Haydar? made confessions in front
of him. He secretly arrested the friar in his house. The Dragoman Mehmed Bey, on the
other hand, could not keep his silence about the issue and mentioned it to the Venetian
bailo. The bailo in turn informed the papal authorities who, always jealous of their
jurisdiction over the clergy, intervened at once. When Margliani contemplated poisoning
the friar, for instance, they opposed and asked that the Friar be returned to Inquisition.
Margliani then had to keep him under lock-and-key in his house until the end of his
mission in February 1581. Perez would have to travel back with him until Rome.142

141

AGS, E 1338, fols. 1 (24 January 1580), 2 (2 February 1580), 4 (4 February 1580), 5 (29 February
1580), 13 (13 February 1580), 30 (22 July 1580), 45 (August 1580) and 48 (20 August 1580).
142
AGS, E 1081, fols. 154 (4 November 1580), 163 (14 November 1580) and 170 (21 November 1580); E
1083, fol. 58 (28 February 1581), E 1084, fol. 35 (6 June 1581); E 1338, fols. 22, 36 (27 July 1580), 59 (15
October 1580) and 74 (30 December 1580); E 1339, fol. 127 (7 February 1581).

312

5.6.

THE NETWORK AFTER MARGLIANIS DEPARTURE (1581-1600)

When Marglini signed a three year truce143 and set sail for Spain, he left behind a

functioning intelligence network, composed of the afore-mentioned agents. He made

necessary arrangements for the transmission of letters and distributed ciphers to
prominent agents such as Sinan, Haydar, Pedro Brea and Giacomo Bernardini.144 These
seemed to have adapted to the new situation given that soon their letters started to arrive.
In April, the Viceroy of Naples learned that Ulu Ali would leave Constantinople with 60
galleys for an expedition against Morocco.145 In August, he received a letter from Sinan
which stated that due to the newly signed truce, Ulu Ali would not attack the Habsburg
coasts as well as another which Pedro Brea wrote before setting sail with the Navy,
informing the arrival of one of his men to Catalonia with information.146
Another Habsburg agent, Antonio Sanz, arrived in Ragusa in March 1582 where
he encountered Dragoman Pasquale and three janissaries that was accompanying
Giacomo Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador who came to Constantinople with presents
for the festival in honour of Ottoman princes circumcision. Two of the janissaries
previously served, or was entrusted with the task of supervising, Margliani in
Constantinople. So they knew Sanz, who was then Marglianis interpreter, very well,
which may mean that they were well bribed. They offered him to join them, giving us
another example where a well treated Ottoman officer helped a Habsburg spy. Once

143

For the text of the truce, see. BM, Add. MS 28415, fols. 123-4, reprinted and translated in Skilliter,
Hispano-Ottoman Armistice, 4 2-6.
144
AGS, E 1083, fol. 58 (28 February 1581); E 1338, fol. 66 (12 November 1581); E 1339, fol. 127 (7
February 1581); E 1414, fol. 164 (18 November 1581). For instance, according to AGS, E 1081, fol. 163
(14 November 1580). Sinan and Haydar should write their letters with the name of another Christian and
could send their pliegos via the Ragusan ambassador to Nicolao Sfrondato, adressed to, or with the
sobrescripto for, Diego Felices, the castellano of Barleta.
145
AGS, E 1084, fols. 32 (26 May 1581) and 36 (June1581).
146
AGS, E 1084, fol. 57 (4 August 1581).

313

reaching Constantinople, Sanz immediately started gathering information. The precision

ande detailedness of observations (news of the census, resea general, in the Arsenal,
arrival of Greeks from Candia offering a port in case of an Ottoman attack, negotiations
with the Persian ambassador, foreign diplomats arriving in Constantinople for the
circumcision festival, future Ottoman targets in the Mediterranean, and finally a detailed
report of the physical conditions of the galleys left in Constantinople, the layout of and
the materials in the Arsenal as well as missions and whereabouts of small fleets that left
Constantinople) Sanz made in just eleven days (May, 12-23) demonstrate to us the
importance of resident ambassadors if one accepts the hypothesis that Sanz already
established these connections as a part of Marglianis mission. Unfortunately for Sanz,
however, Brutti in the meantime came to Constantinople as an ambassador of his prince
and quickly informed Sinan Pasha of Sanz identity and real intentions. They took him in
front of Sinan Pasha who accused him of treason and abandoning el tuerto de [s]u
patron, his one eyed boss, a common insult among Ottoman circles to Margliani who
had lost an eye on the battlefield. Sanz insisted that he came to see his family and left
Margliani in the Habsburg court. He also wished to receive a safe-conduct to be able to
exchange Muslim slaves for Christians. Sinan Pasha should have thought it wiser not to
go further with Sanz and risk the truce, about the validity of which he was already
anxious. Instead, he sent him to Ulu Ali who could give him the necessary safe-conduct.
Sanz, on the other hand, knowing Ottoman customs very well, had already visited the
Grand Admiral and acquired a safe-conduct. The next day, he would immediately leave
Constantinople without informing anyone including his wife.147

147

AGS, E 1085, fols. 80 and 81.

314

In the meantime, Margliani arrived in Madrid on 4 January 1582 and talked to

Cardinal Granvela and Antonio Prez who still seemed to have exercised some sort of an
influence even while he was in total disgrace with the sword of Damocles hanging over
his head because of an assassination he was implicated in.148 Margliani then proceeded to
Lisbon where Philip II stayed for three years after he became the King of Portugal.
During this time, Margliani was regularly supplied with information by Crisobal Salazar,
the Habsburg secretary in Venice, who sent him not only the results of his own network,
but also the pliegos which a certain Federigo Curelli brought from Constantinople and
submitted to him. Margliani, in return, was keeping him informed of events in the court.
It is interesting to see how the three year experience as a diplomat in Constantinople
promoted Margliani to an expert on things Ottoman. Unlike a spymaster or a decisionmaker of mediocre quality, Margliani exhibited a profound proficiency in making
meaningful interpretations and political use of the received information, or in other
words, in transforming information into knowledge. For more than once he dismissed the
information he received because it did not correspond to other sources of information he
had and/or it simply did not make sense, i.e., fit in, according to his own view, the
dynamics of politics in the Ottoman capital and the logistics of the time. For instance, in
1581, he commented on the information that arrived in Naples that Ulu Ali was leaving
with 60 galleys for an expedition against Morocco. Given that the War with Persia went
on, the Ottomans would have to send 40 galleys to Black Sea in order to transport
munition; therefore Ulu Ali could not leave. Even if he did, he would be of no harm to
the Habsburg possessions since the Ottomans desired that the armistice, suspensin de
148

For a good biography of Prez as well as a detailed study of his prosecution, see. Gregorio Maran,
Antonio Prez (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1947); idem, Los procesos contra Antonio Prez (Madrid : Viuda de
E. Maestre, 1947).

315

armas, would be followed by a truce, tregua.149 The next year, he commented that neither
the Persians, nor the Ottomans could engage in a major military operation because the
former does not have enough power while the latters supply lines would not support an
operation with so many men and so far away from the capital. When Salazar informed
him of Sinan Pashas demands that Venice should compensate the Ottomans for the
losses inflicted by the Knights of St. Stephen,150 because these corsairs were getting
supplies from the Venetian island of Cythera (Cerigo), he was quick to remind that as
soon as the Persian War ended, the Ottomans, in order to appease the soldiers, could try
their luck with an easier target. Given that they used the same excuse, the corsairs
depredations, to legitimize the abrogation of capitulations with Venice and the invasion
of Cyprus in 1570, this target would most probably be Crete.151 Having been given, as a
compensation for his services in Constantinople, a fief worth, much to his dismay, only
450 ducats, and the title of the Conde de Intelvi y los Cuatro Valles, Margliani was still
sending letters to Constantinople via Venice in 1583.152 He also sent the seasoned courier
Giovanni Stefano Ferrari to Constantinople with the diplomatic mission of negotiating
with the Ottomans so that Ulu Ali could not undertake a naval expedition, a mission in
which he succeeded.153
Santa Croce was finally free in 1584 with a safe-conduct from the Marquis of St.
Croce who had him imprisoned him at the first place. As an expert information specialist
149

Apparently, Margliani considered what he signed as an armistice, while in fact it was a truce for three
years. Then, what the Ottomans wanted to have should be a treaty rather than a truce.
150
Resembling the Knights of St. John of Malta, the Knights of St. Stephen were operating under the aegis
of Florence instead of Venice. It was the very Duke of Florence (later the Grand Duke of Tuscany with the
Papal bull in 1569) that officially created the order on March 15, 1562 with a ceremony in the Cathedral of
Pisa. He was the Grand Master of the Order and even compiled its first statutes. Salvatore Bono, I corsari
barbareschi (Torino: ERI-Edizion RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana, 1964), 125-135.
151
AGS, E 1084, fol. 32 (26 May 1581); E 1527, fols. 208-218 (all 1582), especially fol. 210 (7 May 1582).
152
AGS, SP, 1340, ff. 197r-202r; E 1528 fols. 160-3 all (February-August 1583).
153
AGS, E 1528, fol. 161 (18 May 1583); E 1340, fol. 31 (25 June 1583).

316

and a consummate entrepreneur, Aurelio quickly asked for three favours: 1. to be given
satisfaction for the duration of time he spent in prison, 2. to be given merced for the
services he rendered for the crown, 3. to be appointed to a post that would provide him
with income, essential for his return to Constantinople. What is striking is that Margliani
backed all these three demands and suggested that Aurelio should either be appointed in
place of Renzo, in charge of taking care of people sent to Constantinople or Pietro
Lanza, the adroit corsair-cum-spy who was the captain of the royal frigates in Otranto,
before being dismissed with the instigation of the Venetians.154
In 1583, the artful courier-cum-diplomat Giovanni Stefano Ferrari was sent to
Ragusa, from where he would pass to Constantinople to renew the truce of 1581, if
authorization arrived from Margliani who, in the meantime, would try to assess the
inclinations of the new Grand Vizier in Constantinople. Ferrari accomplished his mission
in spite of the English ambassador William Harebornes efforts to convince the Ottomans
to join England against the Habsburgs.155 In the meantime, Don Martin de Acua, whom
we left in Madrid in 1578, was imprisoned, because of, according to Giovanni Stefano
Ferrari, his contacts with the Ottomans.156 However, this was not actually the case; recent
scholarship successfully established that the reason was that he was spying for the French
with the alias Pero Rondela.157 He was shortly strangulated in February 1585.158

154

AGS, E 1071, fol. 161 (4 June 1584). For the diplomatic crisis between the Habsburgs and Venice that
Lanzas activities caused, see. E 1336, fols. 39, 46, 52, 60, 78, 79, 118,161, 219 and 220; E 1520, fols. 60
and 61; E 1521, fols. 39 and 103 (all between June 1577-February 1578).
155
Edwarde Barton and Edwin Pears, The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte, English Historical
Review 31 (1893): 439-466.
156
AGS, E 1532, fols. 109-113 (all June-October 1584).
157
Rivas and Garca, Martin de Acua, 74-88.
158
Fernand Braudel, La Mort de Martin de Acua, 4 F vrier 1585, in Melanges offerts Marcel
Bataillon par les hispanistes franais, eds. Maximie Chevalier, Robert Ricard and Nol Salomon
(Bordeaux: Fret & Fils, 1962), 3-18.

317

Marglianis network lost an important agent when Pedro Brea ran away from
Constantinople first to Naples and then to Spain. The Habsburg authorities secured the
liberation of Pedro Breas family who arrived in Venice from Constantinople on March
31, 1585, an auspicious event in the honor of which Brea bought 92 pounds of candels
worth 37 ducats.159 The long-time Habsburg spy Bartolomeo Pusterla a.k.a. Marco
Stanga, however, kept the network alive by continously sending fresh information. 160 The
Habsburgs established contacts with two new figures that rose to prominence in the
Ottoman capital as powerful agents of factional politics and were ready to offer their
services to whomever willing to pay for it: the Portuguese Marrano David Passi and his
go-between Guglielmo de Saboya.
Passi was a Levantine merchant who first appears in Venetian sources as a Jewish
merchant in Ragusa from where he warned the Venetian authorities of the imminent
Ottoman attack on Cyprus and acted as an active Venetian agent during the war. 161 After
the war was over, he returned to Venice where he ran a salon attended by Venetian
patricians, a venue for information exchange; thus he found a perfect trade for an
information broker.162 From there he moved to Constantinople where he rose to
prominence as a confidant of Murad III and acted as the agent of Dom Antonio, the
pretender to the Portuguese throne which Philip acquired in 1580. His reputation in the
eyes of the Sultan was such that he was influential not only in determining the domestic
159

AGS, E 1533, fol. 284 (3 April 1585); E 1538, fol. 286 (20 December 1585).
AGS, E 1517/cuaderno XI, fols. 3, 8, 18, 21, 30, 32, 36, 38 and 48, cuaderno XII, fols. 4, 9, 14, 30, 34,
cuaderno XVII, fols. 1, 19, 28, 34, 37 and 43; cuaderno 19, fols. 10, 20, 24 and 36; cuaderno XXI, fols. 7,
11, 28, 34, 43, 44 and 49; cuaderno XXII, fols. 1,4, 9 and 37; cuaderno XXV, fols. 14, 23, 26, 33 and 40;
cuaderno XXVIII, fols. 3, 10, 13, 28, 34 and 50; cuaderno XXX, fols. 1, 4, 8, 13 and 19; E 1340, fols. 3,
48, 53, 58, 61, 62, 65 and 69; E 1341, fols. 62 and 65; E 1536 fols. 192-200; E 1537, fols. 262-3 (All
between 1582-1586).
161
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 100; ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, c. 101v (16 November 1570); reg. 10, cc. 91r-91v
(13 February 1572, m.v.); fil. 16, 13 February 1573, m.v.; CCX-LettRett, b. 300, 28 August 1573.
162
Arbel, Trading Nations, 164.
160

318

and foreign policy, but also in financial matters, such as taking charge of the
Constantinople mint. He was also assumed as the mastermind behind Sinan Pashas
ingenious plan to impose on local officials the responsibility to equip galleys for the state
from their private wealth.163 As the master of an impressive intelligence network, he
provided the Ottomans, the Venetians and the Habsburgs with information.164 Moreover,
Passi and his man Guglielmo de Saboya negotiated the ransom of a number of Spanish
nobles in Constantinople on behalf of their families, the money being transferred via
Habsburg authorities, most notably Cristobal Salazar in Venice.165
In 1585, Passi informed the Habsburgs of his desire to leave Constantinople for
going back to Christianity with his family and asked Philip II to write a letter to the
Venetian authorities in his familys recommendation. He also added, however, he could
not leave Constantinople in the meantime, because the Sultan, willing to profit from his
services, detained him and offered handsome rewards, a piece of information by which
Passi engaged in a strategy of self-promotion in order to raise its status and thus enhance
the range of possible financial remunerations and other favours he might expect.166
Meanwhile, Passis network was detected by the Venetian Inquisitori di Stato who
warned the bailo in Constantinople that Passis agents all over the Christianity were
sending him letters hidden among merchant correspondence. They asked him to search
163

P l Fodor, An Antisemite Grand Vizier? The Crisis in Ottoman Jewish Relations in 1589-1591 and its
Consequences, in In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration
in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Pl Fodor (Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2000), 197. Another Ottomanist who
penned an article on this important broker of Constantinople politics is Suraiya Faroqhi. Ein Gunstling des
osmanischen Sultan Murad III: David Passi, Der Islam 47 (1971): 290-7.
164
For his first contact with the Habsburg authorities in 1572, see. AGS, E 1331, fol. 233. He was shortly
after accepted to the Habsburg service. E 1332, fol. 110 (18 November 1573), E 1333, fols. 42 and 106 (18
February 1574); E 1334, fols. 8 (15 January 1575) and 125 (11 July 1575).
165
AGS, E 1531, fols. 107, 111, 134, 136,137, 144-9, 163 and 183; E 1532, fols. 149-51, 154, 169, 172,
174, 175, 178-80 and 183 (all 1584); E 1533, fols. 202, 222, 257-62 and 296-8; E 1584, fols. 130-6 and
165-6; E 1535, fols. 121-2; E 1537, fols. 203-5, 317, 330, 342 and 417; E 1538, fols. 109, 180-4, 276, 293
and 367; E 1539, fols. 234-9, 360-2 and 493-8.
166
AGS, E 1535 fol. 183 (9 July 1585).

319

the letters submitted him by the Jews in Constantinople to realize with whom he was in
correspondence in Venice and the extent of their operations. The bailo responded that,
given that the Consul of the Jews brought the letters together, he could not know for
certain which ones were written by Passi. From his other sources he acquired the
information, however, that Passi had agents in Ancona and his brother was in Venice.
The only letters he could intercept were the ones that Passi directly gave the bailos
secretary to be mailed to Venice. Even then, fearful of Passis power in the Ottoman
capital, he did not risk more than sending these letters to the Inquisitori without opening
them.167
Margliani in the meantime continued his correspondence with the Habsburg
secretary in Venice, Cristobal Salazar and went on exchanging information about the
political situation in Philip IIs court with those regarding the activities of, and letters sent
by, the Constantinople network. Apart from signing the follow-up truce after nine months
of hard work in 1584, Giovanni Stefano Ferrari was the go-between and the nodal point
between Margliani in Madrid, Salazar in Venice and the network in Constantinople,
providing information, carrying letters, instructions and wages. He was so efficient in this
role that he was awarded a one-time payment of 1.000 escudos in 1586.168 He was less
successful in the next round of truce negotiations, however. In spite of all his efforts, the
Ottomans did not renew it and thus unsettled the Habsburg decision-makers, leaving
Habsburg coasts susceptible to a potential Ottoman attack at a crucial time when the
Habsburgs troubles culminated in Flanders and a major naval expedition against

167

ASV, IS, b. 148, 25 September 1585; b. 416, 8 January 1585, m.v., 22 January 1585, m.v., 25 March
1585.
168
AGS, E 1533, fols. 284-6 (all 1585); E 1535, fol. 174 (12 January 1585); E 1536, fols. 189-191 (all
1586); E 1340, fol. 78 (17 March 1584); E 1080, fol. 149 (28 July 1586).

320

England was being planned in Madrid. Margliani himself quickly realized the danger and
submitted a report, arguing for the necessity of another attempt for the renewal of the
truce.169 Rumours of military preparations in Constantinople started to circulate
immediately in 1587, once again oiling the gears of the Habsburg secret service in the
Levant.170 Information regarding the activities of the Ottoman navy as well as of North
African corsairs flowed not only from Constantinople, but also from other networks in
the Levant.171
In the meantime, Margliani passed away, leaving in his stead his son Ruggero
who inherited not only his fathers title of count, but also his skills in espionage and
diplomacy. His death proved to be a harsh, if not fatal, blow to a handful Habsburg
agents. Juan Segui de Menorca, who was sent to Constantinople in 1586 by Margliani
and Idiquez,172 could not receive his stipend from the Venetian bailo Lorenzo Bernardo.
Now that Margliani was dead, he had no more credit with the bailo. Juan Segui, of whom
Bernardo was not very fond at all,173 traveled to Naples to reclaim his wages in arrears
for 15 months.174 According to his own testimony nine years later, his voyage proved to
be fruitful; the Viceroy increased his salary to 440 ducats.175
Simultaneously, Passis go-between, Guglielmo de Saboya, a Portuguese
Marrano, arrived, after visiting Malta and Messina, in Naples. Apart from sending
information, he offered many other projects. He could have the Ottoman galleys
captured; in Malta he had negotiated with the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John to
169

COSP, vol. 8, nos. 576 and 577 (4 September 1587).

AGS, E 1089, fols. 7 (25 February 1587), 28 and 81 (20 December 1587).
171
AGS, E 1089, fols. 258, 259, 262, 263, 265, 290 and 306 (all 1588).
172
AGS, E K 1675, fol. 21 (19 January 1591).
173
Lorenzo Bernardo refused to include his letters in his own mail and advised him to use the Venetian
spazzi pubblici, public postal service, instead. ASV, IS, b. 416, 30 November 1591.
174
AGS, E 1090, fols. 8 (10 September 1588), 9 (20 September 1588).
175
AGS, E K 1677, fol. 79 (3 November 1597).
170

321

this effect. He boasted of enjoying the confidence of the Ottoman Grand Admiral Hasan
Veneziano so much so that the latter even asked him where he should conquer in the land
of the Christians. This confidence should be used in order to deceive him. He also
claimed that he could discover the Ottoman spies abroad. Moreover, if the Habsburgs
could send somebody to Constantinople, Passi was willing to negotiate things of much
importance, tratar cosas de mucha importancia, the details of which de Saboya did not
wish to trust with the Viceroy. The latter, however, was informed of certain misdeed de
Saboya committed a couple of years ago. He tried to defraud Doa Maria de Castro who
sent him to Constantinople to search for his son, Duarte de Meneses, who had fallen
captive at the Battle of Alccer Quibir (1578). When de Saboya claimed to have found
him and then asked for 6.000-7.000 escudos as ransom money, the suspicious de Castro
sent another agent who quickly revealed de Saboyas scheme the son was not in
Constantinople. Given his past, the Viceroy grew suspicious that de Saboya might be a
double agent who was working for the Ottomans and that, once discovered, he may have
made all these up in order to save his skin. He had him incarcerated in Naples
Castelnuovo where he was treated well and then wrote to the imperial ambassador in
Constantinople in order to learn who this man actually was. Fortunately, the ambassador
accentuated his services in the past and vouched for him. He knew de Saboya from the
household of the Venetian bailo, Gianfrancesco Morosini (o. 1582-4) where he was under
the pretext of ransoming prominent Portuguese slaves. Even though considered by vox
populi as Dom Antonios spy, he was always well-inclined towards the Habsburgs. The
Viceroy released him from the prison and told him that he had him incarcerated for his
own good, in order to keep his mission in secret and to have Hasan Veneziano trust him

322

even more. He was contemplating to send him back to Constantinople, with letters,
written by him and the Viceroy of Sicily, for Passi. According to the Viceroy, the only
useful service Passi and de Saboya could offer was to send information. Other schemes,
otros effectos, such as seizing or torching the Ottoman galleys, burning down the Arsenal
and the warehouse, were of little value. It was established by experience that all these
schemes in the end turned out to be ineffectual, in vain, per averse visto per experiencia
que todos los sobredichos effectos salen vanos. In the meantime, however, another letter
from the Austrian ambassador arrived. Passi, upon learning the encarceration of his man,
showed letters from Cristobal Salazar and other important Habsburg officials in
recommendation of de Saboya. Passi furthermore mentioned that he had other plans,
magiori et cosi altri pensieri, for his Majestys service for the benefit of which he had
already spent more than 10.000 escudos. Evidently, he was expecting remunerations for
his services that included preventing the Ottoman Navy from sailing to the Western
Mediterranean by opposing the Ottoman Pashas and the Sultan himself, all resolute to
attack the Habsburg lands. Having learned all these pretenses, the Viceroy nolens volens
let de Saboya proceed with his dispatches to the Habsburg court in order not to offend
Passi. He added, however, that all these schemes were useless. They had nothing to do
with acquiring information from Constantinople, a task so essential at a time when the
information that arrived was of little substance. These too costly schemes should be
intended but for embezzling the court and squeezing money, sacar dinero.176 De Saboya
arrived in court in Spring 1590 and offered the defection of the Ottoman navy under the
command of Hasan Veneziano as well as Passis intermediation on behalf of Philip II in
Ottoman circles. He could not only keep the Ottoman fleet away, but also help the
176

AGS, E 1090, fol. 116 (2 September 1589).

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Habsburgs secure a truce. Even though his proposals were considered unfeasible, Madrid
ordered the Viceroy of Naples to give de Saboya letters of encouragement to be delivered
to Passi.177 De Saboya proved himself a productive informant by sending several letters
which he wrote with the alias, Galeazo Berno and to which the Habsburgs would respond
with the alias, Francisco Americo.178
Passi would leave the scene of Constantinople politics and a fortiori dropped out
of Habsburg payroll in 1591 in one of many turning points of factional rivalries in the
Ottoman capital. His arch-rival at the time was the omnipotent Sinan Pasha whom we
have mentioned before as Bruttis relative. During his second tenure as Grand Vizier
(April 1589-August 1591), in an effort to weaken his competitors in the court, Sinan
Pasha tried every method to eliminate this Jewish courtier who was too influential in the
making of important decisions. He wrote several telhises179 to the Sultan, full of
arguments against Passi, some of which were extremely anti-semitic ante litteram.
Nonetheless, all these efforts were to no avail. Passi retained his influence in
Constantinople and continued to play a key role in the Ottoman decision-making process
as well as military preparations and to enjoy extensive financial privileges and contracts.
Moreover, he remained at the heart of the negotiations for a comprehensive antiHabsburg alliance between England, Ottoman Empire, Henry of Bearn (Frances future
Henry IV), and Dom Antonio, the pretender to the Portuguese throne. Given that he was

177

AGS, E 1092, fol. 72 (3 April 1590).

According to AGS, E 1092, fol. 202. For examples of such letters, see. AGS, E K 1675, fols. 55 (31
May 1591) and 110 (28 November 1591)
179
For the Ottoman telhis institution, see. Suraiya Faroqhi, Die Vorlagen (telh se des Growesirs Sin n
paa an Sultan Mur d III, (Ph.D. Diss., University of Hamburg, 1 67 P l Fodor, Sultan, Imperial
Council, Grand Vizier: Changes in the Ottoman Ruling Elite and the Formation of the Grand Vizieral
Telhs, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47/1-2 (1994): 67-85 and idem, The Grand
Vizieral Telhis: A Study in the Ottoman Central Administration, 1566-1656, Archivum Ottomanicum 15
(1997): 137-188.
178

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also on Habsburg and Venetian payroll, it was not surprising that he tried to start a war
between Poland and Ottoman Empire. The two states were in the brink of war in the late
1580s and the relations could only be bettered with the intervention of the English
ambassador who was trying to keep the Ottoman hands free so that they could send their
navy against the Habsburgs. When the Ottomans accepted a compromise, however, the
Poles did not send an ambassador to Constantinople as agreed beforehand, much to Sinan
Pashas chagrin. The infuriated Grand Vizier then realized that it was Passi who was
impeding an agreement with the help of his brother in the Polish court in order to relieve
the Habsburgs and the Venetians from the worries of an Ottoman attack, already aroused
with the conclusion of peace between the Ottomans and the Safavids.180 This gave Sinan
Pasha the necessary alibi to eliminate his arch-rival; only months before Sinan would lose
his post in July 1591, Passi was in Yengihisar prison. Although Sinan pushed for an
execution and even demaded the greatest holy war, gaza-y ekber, against Passi, the
Sultan did not abandon his favourite altogether. He was only exiled to Rhodes.181
Although he was pardoned with the instigation of his ally Ferhad Pasha and allowed to
return after Sinans dismissal,182 he never regained his influence. Nevertheless, even after
his fall from power, he kept sending letters to the Habsburg officials and claimed, with
the hope of being compensated, that he was the main reason why the Ottoman navy did
not leave in 1591.183 Unfortunately for him, the Count of Miranda was convinced of his
duplicity, that he was the mastermind behind the alliance between the Ottoman Empire,

180

Fodor, An Antisemite Grand Vizier?, 197; Halil Sahilliolu, ed., Koca Sinan Pa ann Telhisleri
(stanbul: IRCICA, 2004 , no. 8.
181
Sahilliolu, Koca Sinan Pa ann Telhisleri, nos. 9, 62, 142, 143; BOA, MZD, V, no. 266. AGS, E 1092,
fol. 177 (24 July 1591).
182
AGS, E 1092, fol. 202.
183
AGS, E 1092, fol. 177 (24 July 1591).

325

England, Henry of Bearn and Dom Antonio.184 Passis double game became his own
undoing. As an agent of Dom Antonio and the negotiator of the alliance, he lost credit in
the Habsburg court; as a Habsburg and Venetian agent who started to instigate an
Ottoman-Polish War, he gave his rival Sinan Pasha the necessary excuse to remove him
from power. Passi was of no relevance any more even though we hear of him
occasionally. In 1592, he wrote a letter, asking for his two-year salary and the crowns
intervention in the matter of an unpaid debt.185 In 1593, letters from Constantinople
indicated that Passi lost the influence he had during the time of Siyavu Pasha.186 Having
been arrested a couple of times in 1593 and 1594, due to his connections with the
Habsburgs, he left the scene of Ottoman politics. Even though de Saboya was no les
immune to Mirandas suspicions; he continued as a Habsburg agent.187 In 1592, Baron de
la Fage, a French renegade and an agent for the English, revealed the identity of a number
of leading Habsburg spies, among them de Saboya and David Passi. The English
ambassador intervened at once. The Ottomans detained de Saboya who was about to
embark with several slaves that he ransomed on a Venetian ship with the intention to pass
first to Venice and then to Naples. He was carrying letters written by Passi addressed to
Philip II and the Habsburg authorities regarding the money which the Empress owed to
Passi. When he was imprisoned, de Saboya showed the orders and safe-conducts he
carried; he had been serving the Ottomans for eight years by simply using such occasions
to gather information about the Christianity. Passi disappeared first, but then showed up
and made a similar case, accentuating the necessity of giving the Habsburgs the
184

AGS, E 1092, fol. 202.

AGS, E K 1675, fol. 131 (20 March 1592)
186
AGS, E 1345, fol. 31 (25 April 1593).
187
AGS, E 1092, fols. 99 (25 February 1591), 110, 138 (May 1591), 151 (31 May 1591) and 177 (24 July
1591); E K 1675, fol. 138 (11 April 1592).
185

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impression that one was well inclined towards their cause, mostrarse aficionado al
servicio del rey catholico, in order to serve the Sultan better. Once again, fluid
boundaries of allegiances in the Ottoman capital proved to be the rule. Passi was shortly
out, never to reappear as an actor in Ottoman factional politics and a broker of
information; nevertheless Saboya died in prison.188
Giovanni Marglianis report on the necessity of making another attempt to secure
a truce in Constantinople did not fall on deaf ears. The rapproachment between England
and the Ottoman Empire, thanks to the new ambassador Bartons efforts, on the one hand
and the end of the Ottoman-Persian War in 1590 on the other should have demonstrated
the expediency of another diplomatic move.189 In the final months of 1589, Giovanni
Stefano Ferrari contacted Siyavu Pasha in Constantinople. Much to Bartons chagrin, the
Pasha told the seasoned courier-cum-diplomat that he would negotiate a truce if Philip II
sent an ambassador. After a full circle, once again the point of contention was the
Ottoman insistence of receiving an official ambassador. In reply, once again, the
Habsburgs refrained from sending a prominent figure as an ambassador, but rather chose
Giovanni Marglianis son, Ruggero. Ferrari received oral instructions in Madrid from the
state secretary Juan de Idiquez and teamed up with Margliani in Milan where the latter
was the captain of light cavalry. The two passed to Naples in September 1591 where they
received instructions from the Viceroy who tried so hard to conceal the true nature of
Marglianis mission. Successful brokers and negotiators they may be, majority of our
protagonists were indiscreet. Margliani was no exception; he could not wait until
188

AGS, E K 1675, fols. 138 (11 April 1592), 141 (18 and 19 April 1592), 142, 144 (2 and 3 May 1592),
167b (15 August 1592), 172 (5 September 1592) and 183 (24 October 1592).
189
For a detailed explanation of how financial difficulties as well as changing balances-of-power, both in
Europe and among the factions of Constantinople, determined the Ottomans Mediterranean policy during
the troubled years of 1590-1592, see. Fodor, Between Two Continental Wars, 171-190.

327

reaching Naples to share this important information with others. To overcome this
chronic problem of Ottoman-Habsburg truce negotiations, the Viceroy spread the rumour
that Marglianis original destination was Rome and he only came to Naples in order to
see the city. Ferrari in the meantime recovered from gastos secretos 1.200 escudos for his
last trip to Constantinople as well as a one time 1.000 ducats granted by Philip II.
Moreover, he was to pay 330 ducats to Juan Segui de Menorca who was not paid for 20
months.190 The Viceroy then ordered the two to immediately proceed to Ragusa where
Margliani would wait until Ferrari obtained a safeconduct from the Pasha. In Fall 1591,
the wind started to blow, once again as usual, against the dispatch of an official
ambassador. The ambassador in Venice, Francisco de Vera, whom Madrid preferred to
keep in the dark regarding the truce, learned about it and made a quite convincing case
for the dangers of such a move, supplementing his own arguments with those of the
imperial ambassador in Constantinople. Margliani reached Ragusa in November and
Ferrari arrived in Constantinople the next month. When the Ottomans offered Ferrari a
one-way safe conduct for Margliani, the former quickly realized their intentions,
remembering the hard days of the father Margliani who was refused licence to leave and
was constantly harrassed and pressurized during the negotiations of 1581 truce. He left
the Ottoman capital in January191 to which he returned shortly thereafter; the Ottomans
nolens volens relented and issued a two-way safe-conduct. In spite of the machinations of
the English ambassador and the Venetian bailo as well as the opposition of Sinan Pasha
and the Mfti, the two protagonists of the negotiations, Siyavu Pasha, back in power in
April, and Ferrari succeeded to come to an understanding. The Pasha sent to Ragusa a
190

Even though Segui was supposed to receive 396 ducats per annum, the authorities decided that it was
too much and paid him only 330. AGS, E 1092, fols. 193 and 184 (both 25 October 1591).
191
E K 1674 fol. 121 (5 January 1590).

328

draft document for a truce for one or two years. When his agent, rather than Margliani
himself, arrived in Constantinople in May, the tide once again turned against the
Habsburgs in the Ottoman capital: a dead end for negotiations. Margliani received new
instructions in June. Philip II, always recalcitrant to buy the tranquility of mind with a
loss of reputation, revoked his mission. Ruggero arrived in Naples in August, only to
return short after to Ragusa, however. There he would operate as a spymaster in the
following years.192
The relacin of the state of affairs in the Levant given by the Count of Miranda to
Ruggero Margliani before he set sail for Constantinople reveals the identities of
operational Habsburg spies in Constantinople in 1591. Apart from Passi and Saboya, the
network included Juan Segui de Menorca, the dragoman Ambrosio Grillo, a certain spy
who did not wish to reveal his name and a certain Turk who was giving information
orally, a boca. Furthermore, the same report mentions one of Marglianis former men, a
Greek named Horatio, who converted to Islam and was now threatening to reveal the
identities of the Habsburg spies.193 Another operative Habsburg agent not mentioned by
this relacin should be Marco Antonio Stanga alias Bartolomeo Pusterla whom the
Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Francisco de Vera praised as the best piece that His
Majesty had in Constantinople. He was for long at the center of a fierce dispute between
de Vera who exhalted his qualities and the Viceroy of Naples who refrained from paying
the agent. (This alone could explain why he was not mentioned in the Count of Mirandas
relacin). Vera managed to force the Viceroy, thanks to crowns intervention, to pay
Stangas salaries until 1590; in February 1591, the Viceroy sent a cfdula worth 834

192
193

For a diligent study of Ruggeros activities in 15 0-2, see. Cuerva, Mediterr neo en tregua.
AGS, E 1092, fol. 202.

329

escudos. A certain Benedero Bramero made the payment in Constantinople, according to

the receipt, to Bartolomeo Pusterla, not Stanga. The shrewd agent apparently preferred to
use his alias while receiving his stipend for security purposes. He continued sending
information and the dispute continued; when he died in August or September 1593, his
salaries for almost four years were unpaid by the obdurate Viceroy.194
When the Ottoman threat once again seemed imminent in the turbulent years of
1590 and 1592, the efficiency of the Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople is
impressive. Regular information, mostly but not exclusively from de Saboya and Segui
de Menorca,195 regarding the military preparations in the Ottoman Arsenal started to flow
once again,196 while the authorities tried to realize the extent of the Ottoman commitment
to a possible alliance with England, even acquiring copies of letters exchanged between
the Sultan, the English ambassador, Elizabeth I, Henry of Bearn and Dom Antonio.197 In
the meantime, a great scandal erupted when the Venetians realized that their bailo,
Girolamo Lippomano, was on Habsburg payroll, not only sending information to Philip II
at whose court he was first an extraordinary (1581) and then a resident ambassador
(1585-8), but also giving Segui de Menorca the afore-mentioned letters.198 The Venetians
quickly dispatched Lorenzo Bernardo who arrived in Ottoman capital, detained
Lippomano and put him on a ship that set sail for Venice. The Ottomans were perplexed
194

AGS, E K 1675, fols. 131 (3 March 1590), 137 (31 March 1590), 156 (21 July 1590), 164 (18 August
1590), 168 (10 September 1590), 169 (13 October 1590), 180 (10 November 1590) and 186 (8 December
1590); E K 1675, fols. 26 (8 February 1591) and 182 (15 October 1592); E 1340, fol. 5 (16 January 1593),
20 (10 April 1593), 25 (24 April 1593), 28 (15 May 1593), 34 (5 June 1593), 56 (11 September 1593), 79
(4 December 1593), 81 (11 December 1593) and 115 (12 February 1594); E 1541, fol. 222.
195
For instance, E 1675, fol. 36 (30 March 1591) cites Ambrosio Grillo and fol. 63 (12 June 1591)
mentions Giovanni Casteche. According to E 1092, fol. 195 (25 October 1591), a certain Pelegrin Castellin
who resided in Constantinople was allocated a modest wage of 6 escudos per mensem.
196
AGS, E 1092, fols. 15, 18, 23, 24, 33, 54 (all 1590), 93, 138, 146 and 151; E 1541, fol. 125. 159 and
162; E K 1675, fol. 16 (all 1591)
197
AGS, E 1092, fol. 217, 218, 219 and 220; E K, 1675 fols. 9a, 9b, 15, 21, 22 and 23.
198
AGS, E K 1675, fol. 21 (19 January 1591).

330

by this sudden change and the arrival, without their authorization, of a new bailo. Trying
to realize what was going on, and perhaps sensing an unusual opportunity, the Grand
Vizier wanted to see Lippomano who, he argued, should appear before him in order to
receive a licence to leave the Ottoman capital. Nevertheless, the astute Lorenzo, a
seasoned diplomat who previously served in Constantinople (1584-1587), and thus
familiar with the politics and diplomacy alla Ottomana,199 found a way to prevent such
a dangerous meeting by arguing that it was not the custom that such a dismissed person,
mazul, should appear before the Grand Vizier. Upon seeing Venice on the horizon from
aboard the galley, Lippomano jumped to the sea and perished. To this day, it has
remained a mystery whether this was a suicide or an execution on the orders of the
Venetian Council of Ten.200
Philip II responded favourably to the insistence of Francisco de Vera who
lamented the loss of Stanga as well as the stinginess of Count of Miranda and accentuated
the need to recruit new spies. Information from only Venice would not suffice; de Vera
could recruit his own spies.201 The Count of Miranda, on the other hand, was building up
his own network in fierce rivalry with de Vera, demonstrating that, if not to the extent in
the Ottoman context, personal rivalries among Habsburg officials resulted in rivaling
parallel intelligence networks that occasionally operated independently from and even
unaware of each other. In January 1593, he sent a certain Neapolitan named Gioseffo

199

The expression is mine. For the particularities of Ottoman diplomacy, see. A. Nuri Yurdusev, ed.,
Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), especially
the first two articles that specifically focus on the Ottoman diplomacy in the Classical Age. A. Nuri
Yurdusev, The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy, in Ibid., 5-35; Blent Ar, Early Ottoman
Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period, in Ibid., 36-65.
200
Tormene, Girolamo Lippomano, all four parts.
201
AGS, E 1345, fols. 115 (12 February 1594), 153, 203 (22 October 1594) and 215 (8 April 1594).

331

Rossiglia to reside in Constantinople and receive incoming spies.202 Next year, the Count
dispatched two more spies, Giovanni Masi and Marco Collato.203
On de Veras camp, Ambrosio Grillo arrived in Venice in September 1594. He
complained that the Viceroy owed him 3 years of salary and added that he felt defrauded
of what he gained with risking his life.204 In 1595, de Vera was still looking for his own
agents that would operate in Marco Antonio Stangas stead and supplement Grillo and
Segui de Menorca in Constantinople. He found a certain Jason Buytron, a man of
interesting cross-border background. Born in Cyprus, he claimed to have descended from
a Spanish noble family. Centuries ago, one of his great grandfathers had followed a
certain king of Cyprus who brought many nobles to the island after his marriage in Rome.
Jason and his family moved to Venice after the loss of the island to the Ottomans. He
spent three years in Constantinople and Anatolia as a merchant and knew perfect Latin,
Italian and Turkish. Furthermore, he had an aunt in Constantinople, named Lucia Flores,
whose two daughters were well connected in the Ottoman capital. One was the wife of
Mehmed III and the mother of an Ottoman princess while the other was married to an
important figure and a renegade who was the favourite of the Sultan and whom the
document names as a vayvoda flangrino, the first word meaning an agent, namely a
voivoda. In addition, Lucias niece was married to the Sultan she was in fact the mother
of his first-born son, the heir to the throne in de Veras undersanding, even though the
Ottomans did not have an established rule of primogeniture.205 This niece was from a
202

ASV, SDelC, reg. 8, c. 106v (20 March 1593).

ASV, SDelC, reg. 8, c. 140r (26 March 1594).
204
ASV, E 1345, fol. 193 (24 September 1594).
205
Halil nalck, Osmanllarda Saltanat Veraseti Usul ve Trk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle lgisi, Siyasi
Bilgiler Fakltesi Dergisi XIV (1959), 69- 4 idem, The Ottoman Succession and its Relation to the
Turkish Concept of Sovereignty, in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays
on Economy and Society, ed. Halil nalck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1 3 , 37-69.
203

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Cypriote noble family named Saflatro, descending on the mothers side from the
Buytrones, Jasons family. Even though this means that the Ottoman heir-apparent and
his mother were of Spanish origin, what mattered more for the Habsburgs was Lucias
connections. Thanks to these two Sultanas, she could at will enter the Ottoman Palace
which increasingly became the focal point of Ottoman politics and administration with
the rising importance of the Imperial Harem206 and the court favourites.207 There she
could get hold onto information of utmost quality and penetrar muchas cosas importantes
y secretas que no se entiendan fuera del serrallo. Jason set for Constantinople after
having received from de Vera the six-month payment in advance, his cipher and an alias,
Federico Mazi.208 From there, he sent information of quality according to what de Vera
wrote in 1601, and traveled frequently between Madrid, Naples and Constantiople. In
spite of his efficiency, it was not long before he met the chronic stinginess of the
Habsburg viceroys; in 1603, he was not paid for two years.209
Another important figure worth mentioning is Carlo Cicala, the brother of the
Ottoman Grand Admiral, Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha alias Scipione Cicala.210 In
1561, Turgud Res captured Scipione and his father, the famous corsair, Visconte Cicala.
The young Scipione was then inducted into the Ottoman palace school, Enderun and
reached, with his new Muslim name Yusuf Sinan, the highest echelons of the Ottoman
administration. In 1591, after a career as a palace officer, governor, Janissary Agha,

206

Leslie P. Pierce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapters 3 and 4.
207
For the commencement of the era of favourites (ca. 1580 - ca.1650 with the appearance of the
institution of royal favourite, musahib, and the decline of the importance of the post of Grand Vizier, see.
Breki, Factions and Favorites, Chapter 3.
208
AGS, E 1346, fols. 38 (1 July 1595) and 133 (30 August 1595).
209
AGS, E K 1677, fol. 122 (12 May 1601); E 1349, fols. 5 (2 February 1602), 17, 45, 113 (4 January
1603) and 119 (1 February 1603).
210
Rinieri, Sinan Bass Cicala; Oliva, Sinan-Bass.

333

governor-general and vizier, he was appointed as the Ottoman Grand Admiral and thus
given the opportunity to prove the naval skills that he must have acquired during his
teenage years. Meanwhile, he managed to keep contact with his family; in 1598, he
would anchor off Mesina and asked the Viceroy that his mother and friends be brought
aboard and the result was the most unusual family reunion.211 In 1590, he called his
brother Carlo Cicala to Constantinople. Carlo, a corsair in Habsburg employ like his
father,212 asked for permission from the Habsburg authorities to whom he offered to
secure the defection of his brother. After long correspondence and negotiation, Carlo was
granted permission.213 Having received specific instructions from both the Count of
Miranda in Naples and de Vera in Venice,214 he set sail for the Levant and settled in
Chios. From there he would send several letters to the Habsburg authorities,215 full of
information which he received not only from his brother, but also from his own contacts
in Constantinople.216 Amidst the rumours that he came in order to negotiate a new truce
on behalf of Philip II, he arrived in Constantinople in August 1593 and started to wait for
the return of his brother with the Ottoman fleet.217 The Venetian bailo, Matteo Zane
immediately speculated that he was expecting to receive, with his brothers intervention,

211

AGS, E 1158, fols. 186 (1 October 1598) and 187 (15 letters between the Grand Admiral, his family and
Habsburg authorities dated September 1598).
212
An Ottoman document (BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 486 (H. 989 / A.D. c. 1581)) mentions that a brother of
Yusuf Sinan, Cigalaoglunun ka irde olan karnda , was equipping 15 galleys to come to the Levant; this
brother should be none other than Carlo.
213
AGS, E 1344 K 1675, fols. 4 (13 September 1590), 8 (8 December 1590), 44 (30 April 1591), 70 (3 July
1591), 125 (16 February 1592) and 150 (12 December 1592); E 1885, fol. 6 (June 1592); COSP, vol. 9, no.
198 (3 August 1593).
214
AGS, E 1157, fols. 151 (26 February 1593) and fol. 152.
215
The Viceroy of Naples praised the quality of information Carlo sent. AGS, E 1158, fol. 30 (30
December 1594).
216
For instance, he received information from a Spanish slave, Francesco de Leone, whom he ransomed
from Halil Pasha. Francesco had worked in the Ottoman Arsenal for 25 years. There was also a certain
Musa Bey. A navy captain named Geronimo Giustiniano was carrying his letters from Chios to Naples.
AGS, E 1158, fols. 53 (15 June 1595), 54 (29 March 1595) and 67 (21 April 1595).
217
COSP, vol. 9, no. 197 (2 August 1593).

334

the throne of either Moldavia or Wallachia, both Ottoman vassals. When this proved
impossible, he sought the Duchy of Naxos, following the example of Joseph Nasi, again,
however, to no avail.218 In May 1594, the new bailo Marco Venier heard that Carlos spent
the night in the Arsenal, drinking, eating and sharing the same bed with his brother, a
clich expression often used in diplomatic correspondence to accentuate cordial
relations.219 Months later when Carlo returned to Chios, it was his turn to show his
hospitality. When Yusuf Sinan anchored in Chios with the Ottoman fleet, the two spent
the night together, chatting and trying to persuade each other to change allegiances. 220
Carlo right away showed his ability in the trade of information and politics. His
arrival was interpreted by the Venetian diplomats in Rome and Constantinople as another
Habsburg attempt to secretly negotiate a truce that would rest their minds in peace
without losing reputation, with the intermediation of an unofficial diplomat such as
Carlo.221 Even though I could not locate any proof in AGS to this effect, Carlos
behaviours gave the impression that at least he was acting like a diplomat. The first thing
he asked, as soon as he arrived, was how Giovanni Margliani dressed up when he was in
Constantinople.222 Moreover, in spite of his lack of appropriate credentials, he refused to
walk in after the French ambassador and be seated in an inferior seat during the Venetian
ambassadors usual banquet; he did not recognize him as an ambassador as he was not
aware that there was a king in France.223 Apart from diplomacy, it is possible that he
engaged in disinformation as well. If Marco Veniers fears and suspicions were justified,
218

Benzoni, Cicala, Scipione.

COSP, vol. 9, no. 273 (3 May 1594).
220
AGS, E 1158, fol. 26 (3 November 1594). This was one of many instances where two brothers shared
intimate moments.
221
COSP, vol. 9, nos. 150 (4 April 1593), 170 (3 May 1593), 172 (24 May 1593), 174 (9 June 1593).
222
COSP, vol. 9, no. 197 (2 August 1594).
223
COSP, vol. 9, no. 273 (3 May 1594).
219

335

he was the one behind the false rumours that the Venetians were equipping a sizeable
fleet in alliance with the Pope and the Habsburgs to attack the Ottomans.224 According to
the French ambassador, the reason why Carlo chose to evoke in the Ottoman minds the
distasteful memories of the past, that of a Christian holy alliance that challenged Ottoman
supremacy in the Mediterranean, was that he was trying to induce the Ottomans to wage
war against Venice. This way he would force the Pope, Venice, Florence, Savoy and
other Italian states into an alliance with the Habsburgs.225 It is also obvious that such
rumours would also serve his brother who, as the Ottoman Grand Admiral, had vested
interest in an interventionist policy vis--vis the Mediterranean.
Even though his brother welcomed him with enthusiasm, his presence in
Constantinople was not immune to rumours and resentment. In December 1594, he wrote
from Chios that he could not at the moment pass to Constantinople, because the
ambassadors of Elizabeth I and Henry IV were spying on his movements.226 No doubt
that these were planting doubts in Ottoman hearts and inciting Yusuf Sinans enemies to
that effect. For instance, when Yusuf Sinan warned his captains that there were spies
among their ranks, the latter furiously accused the Grand Admiral of being the actual spy
for bringing his brother, on Habsburg payroll, to Constantinople: [y]ou are the real spy,
for you keep your brother here, a Christian and paid subject and spy of the King of
Spain.227 In spite of such rumours on Carlos allegiances and Ottoman pressures to
convert, to which Carlo did not yield,228 Yusuf Sinan successfully incorporated his
brother into the Ottoman administration. According to a Venetian document, he secured
224

COSP, vol. 9, no. 273 (3 May 1594).

COSP, vol. 9, no. 264 (3 April 1594).
226
AGS, E 1158, fol. 29 (1 December 1594).
227
COSP, vol. 9, no. 273 (3 May 1594).
228
AGS, E 1158, fols. 53 (15 June 1595), 55 (30 March 1595) and 62 (10 May 1595).
225

336

the governorship of the Aegean Archipelago (Naxos for his brother. The same
document dated 1600 also states that Carlo was recruiting agents for Ottoman employ in
Messina. He arrived in Corfu with one such agent, a Genoese spy-cum-ransom agentcum-military engineer (professor di cose militari) named Ambrosio Benedetti. The latter
quickly copied the designs of the Venetian fortress to be remitted to Constantinople.229
As an Ottoman governor recruiting spies in Habsburg lands (apparently he informed the
Habsburgs of his appointment as the Duke of Naxos), Carlo showed impressive aptitude
with remaining on Habsburg payroll, in spite of a suspicious Viceroy of Sicily, the Duke
of Maqueda. The latter responded to his king, who authorized Carlos departure for the
Ottoman Empire to assume his ducal post, that he preferred this vanissimo Carlo away for
then the Ottomans would have less news on the affairs of this kingdom.230 When he
returned, Carlo immediately resumed negotiating the defection of his brother.231 The
latter died in the Ottomans eastern front in the first days of February 1606; nonetheless,
Carlos relations in the Ottoman capital did not seem to disappear immediately. In 1630,
he would surprisingly appear in the Ottoman capital once again, trying to have his son
appointed to one of the two principalities he sought for himself almost 40 years ago,
those of Wallachia and Moldavia.232
The Habsburgs still considered the defection of a prominent Ottoman official to
the Habsburg side a possibility for which it was worth sending an agent. The aforementioned Pedro Brea, the former slave of Ulu Ali who ran away from Constantinople
in 1585, appears once again in the documentation when he left Naples on April 30, 1594
229

ASV, IS, b. 460, 25 July 1600.

AGS, E 1159, fol. 243 (23 June 1601).
231
AGS, E 1160, fols. 116 (9 June 1602), 139 (25 September 1602) and 140 (12 October 1602); E 1885,
fol. 144 (15 December 1602).
232
Benzoni, Cicala, Scipione.
230

337

for Venice. There he took a ship for Tripolis of Syria on June 26 with clothes to be given
to Cafer Pasha, the former Governor-General of Tunisia with whom Brea had previously
negotiated in 1591 in Tunis. Brea could not find the Pasha neither in Tripolis of Syria,
nor in Cyprus where he passed with another Venetian merchant ship. Thanks to the help
he mustered from Ottoman local officers with presents, he arrived in Constantinople
where Cafer Pasha was again nowhere to be found. In the meantime, in Constantinople,
he was seen by a Venetian who had been previously imprisoned in the Castelnuovo of
Naples, on charges of spying on behalf of French and English ambassadors. He informed
the same ambassadors of Breas real identity. Juan Segui de Menorca quickly warned
Brea who retired to Cafer Pashas house, an action which dissuaded both ambassadors to
push the matter further; they could not risk offending an Ottoman Pasha. Brea then
learned that the Pasha was appointed as the Governor-General of Tripolitania of North
Africa and thus not coming back to Constantinople. Luckily for him, when Murad III
died in 1595, in one of these moments of what Gnhan Breki calls reconfiguration of
power and patronage relations within the Ottoman administration, at the faction-ridden
imperial court and among broader Ottoman ruling elite,233 Memi Pasha was appointed in
Cafers stead. Cafer returned to Constantinople and the two started to negotiate. Brea
soon realized that it was impossible to conclude such a deal with such a timid person.
Nonetheless he still recognized the fact that it was still essential to assure, with letters
and qualche gentilesa, the friendship of such an important figure who might soon be the
next Ottoman Grand Admiral. In order to communicate safely with the Viceroy of
Naples, Brea also devised an interesting method. He convinced a Genovese scribe of
Christians, Phelipe Balestrin, to set sail with the Ottoman navy, run away when it was
233

Breki, Factions and Favorites, 143, 146, 189, 202.

338

ashore and go to Naples with his dispatches. Unfortunately, the Ottomans grew
suspicious of him and put him in chains. Brea then had to ransom him for 1.000 ducats,
surely an inflated amount that makes one wonder whether this was one of these usual
ruses to defraud the authorities. Brea returned to Naples in November 15 6 with Cafers
letter and presents for Philip II. He was compensated the money he spent during his two
voyages to Tunis and Constantinople; nevertheless, it was decided that somebody else
should go on with negotiations given the risks of sending such a renowned person for
such a secret operation. Phelipe returned to Naples as well, seeking, with Breas backing,
a ventaja in the galleys of the Kingdom of Naples. Brea himself, after 17 years of
service, six of which in Constantinople, asked for many things: a merced of 40 ducats
until his sons reached the age of service to the king, a special gracia, a reserve spot for
the office capitan de canpana de tierra de lavoro, for his oldest son and a suitable
position in the Church for his brother, a Franciscan and a doctor in theology. Madrid sent
a memorial to the Viceroy, approving the petitions of Phelipe and Brea, excluding only
Breas last wish regarding his brother.234
Juan Segui de Menorca continued sending information235 and receiving most of
the 440 ducats allocated to him as a salary from the Neapolitan coffers until 1595, when
the new Viceroy, the Count of Olivares, refused him the 140 ducats increase assigned to
him by his predecessor and paid only 300 ducats. The rest is the usual story, an agent
who bombards the authorities with letters that accentuate his misery and astonishment in

234

AGS, E 1094, fols. 227, 228, 229 (20 September 1596), 234,235, 236, 237, 238 (27 September 1596),
272 (2 November 1596) and 312 (27 November 1596).
235
AGS, E 1346, fol. 33 (24 June 1595); E K 1676, fol. 80 (3 November 1597).

339

seeing his services to the crown be punished with a decrease in his salary rather than
rewarded with an increase, say, to 500 ducats.236
In order to avoid repetition, it is time to leave aside our pratoganists with crosscultural background, agents of Constantinople politics, brokers of information and
entrepreneur spies. Their collective stories should have by now given enough clues about
the operational principles of an intelligence network in the 16th-century Mediterranean as
well as rules of politics and realities of factional rivalries in the Ottoman capital.
Habsburg officers by no means gave up on sending spies to Constantinople and
keeping the network alive. In spite of negative factors such as the decreasing tension of
the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, chronic problem of payments from the Neapolitan and
Sicilian coffers and the passing away of Juan de Vera in 1603 before receiving 4.000
ducats for gastos secretos that would finally arrive from Naples,237 Constantinople of the
first two decades of the 17th century still hosted several Habsburg spies such as Jason
Buytron, Antonio Paronda, his father Hieronimo Paronda, Fray Eustachio Fontana (the
Catholic Bishop of Andros and the Vicar-General of the Dominicans in the Levant),
Pantoleo Carrugo, Jacobo de Marin, Nicolas Renault, Dionisio Roca, Geronymo Espata
(the doctor of the Ottoman Palace). These still impressed the researcher with their
performance and flexibility. Yet, at one point, the researcher should restrain his
enthusiasm and refrain from bombarding the reader with too much information; a crime
which I may have already been culpable of. After all, few people would find this chapter
not illuminating enough if the issue was to decorate it with details.

236
237

AGS, E K 1676, fol. 79, 80 (both 3 November 1597) and 81.

AGS, E 1349, fol. 140 (20 April 1603).

340

5.7.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I attempted to present a very detailed picture of the best

documented example of an operational intelligence network in the 16th-century
Mediterranean and tried to answer a number of questions: how was such a network
founded? Under what conditions did it operate? How efficient was it? How was it
financed? How was regular and reliable communication between the network and the
Habsburg authorities ensured? What were the relations between the officers of the crown
and the spies on field? How did the first supervise the latter? What were the points of
contention between the authorities and the network?
Moreover, the chapter offers preliminary findings that could contribute to the
history of politics in the 16th-century Constantinople, a cosmopolitan center where people
of different geographical, ethnic, cultural and religious background intermingled with
such an ease and beyond the control of the watchful eyes of the Ottomans. The result was
a chaotic plurality in which our information brokers of cross-border background operated.
This aspect of the Ottoman imperial capital had long been appreciated; but, with notable
exceptions,238 more in the form of an axiom than of a scientific argument supported by
factual examples emanating from primary sources. The collective stories, presented in
this chapter, of our agents of secret diplomacy and power brokers introduced important
insights and detailed descriptive information shedding light on the day-to-day relations
between men of diverse background.
Constantinople in this chapter also presents a stark contrast with Naples and
Madrid. As a port city and an imperial capital that hosted a myriad of foreigners, different
communities of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, it was a true center of
238

Pedani, Veneziani a Costantinopoli, 67-84; Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople.

341

information towards which news, rumours and ideas diffused.239 Madrid, an

administrative capital that lacked the vigor of Constantinople, was visited by fewer
traveling merchants and fewer foreigners, while port cities such as Messina and Naples
could not be a match for Constantinople in term of diversity of communities, religions
and cultures.240 Furhtermore, the presence of a large number of renegades in the highest
echelons of Ottoman military and administration facilitated the leak of information. This
was hardly the case with the Habsburg military and administration. Apart from a couple
of Moors that served at the very bottom of the Habsburg military (See Chapter Six), the
Ottomans could find no former Muslims who had access to important state secrets.
Obviously this meant that the Ottoman Empire was easier to penetrate than its
rival, the Habsburgs. Early modern empires considered enemy access to the nerve center
of their empires as a great menace to their security. Take for instance, the Venetian
diligence in controlling the activities of Ottoman envoys who arrived in the Laguna. The
Ottomans were no exception.241
This particularity of Constantinople also meant, however, that the Ottomans had
the convenience of relying upon this diversity and benefitting from the consequent flow
of information that reached Constantinople. Even though the presence of so many
different communities, religious groups and adventurers made it hard for the Ottomans to
control the traffic of sensitive information, it also gave them the opportunity to
familiarize themselves with developments all around the world on the one hand, and to
239

See. G bor goston, Birodalom s inform ci : Konstantinpoly, mint a korajkori Eurpa informcis
kzpontja, [Empire and Information:Constantinople as Center of Information Gathering in Early Modern
Europe ], in Perjs Gza Emlkknyv, eds. Gbor Hauser and Lszl Veszprmi (Budapest: Argumentum,
2005), 31-60.
240
I owe this point to Prof. McNeill.
241
Throughout the dissertation, I gave a couple of examples whereby Ottoman officials tried to control this
flow of information. I also discussed this issue in a separate article. Grkan, The Efficacy of Ottoman
Counter-Intelligence.

342

easily manipulate the information that enemy agents gathered and transmitted to the their
rivals on the other. That could be the reason why the Ottomans, who must have mostly
been aware of the existence of many information traders such as Santa Croce in their
capital, did not move against them as long as these agents did not cross the line by, for
instance, engaging in sabotage. The Habsburg authorities suspicions to this effect should
be well grounded; the Ottomans manipulated their agents and perhaps even used them to
start truce negotiations without having to openly ask for one.
Finally, this chapter has shown how agents of secret diplomacy did more than
only gathering and manipulating information, participating in counter-intelligence or
proposing clandestine operations. They participated in international diplomacy as
unofficial diplomats (truce negotiations), thus reversing the direction of the often
assumed relation between an ambassador and a spy. Furthermore, as summarized in the
careers of prominent factota such as Bartolomeo Brutti and favourite-cum-spymasters
such as Joseph Nasi and David Passi, our spies acted as agents of Ottoman factional
politics in the imperial capital, whose centrality to the Ottoman system of administration
was strengthened by the monetarization of Ottoman economy in the 16th century that
tipped the balance-of-power between the central and provincial elites in favour of the
former.242 This plethora of activities that our information brokers engaged in simply
blurred the line between espionage, international relations and court politics.
This is an important contribution given the fact that works on Ottoman politics
have mostly been written with little or no focus on the individuals who run the politics.

242

Baki Tezcan, Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of Sultan Osman II (r. 16181622 (Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 2001), Chapter 3; Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire:
Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010), Chapter 1.

343

Few works were dedicated to the Ottoman elite and the realities of factional politics,
giving life to many important individuals who operated an empire which seemed
persplexingly complex and immensely large to a modern mind. But given the patrimonial
nature of the empire (see Chapter Six) and the small size of the 16th century Ottoman
administration, these individuals were even more important than they would normally be
in an empire that was relatively more centralized than its contemporary counterparts.
Hand in hand with recent works of Tezcan243 and Breki244 on Ottoman factional
politics, this chapter focused not only on the high-level political life between the great
players of Ottoman politics, i.e., the Sultan, Pashas, courtiers and foreign ambassadors,
but also on low-level daily operations of Ottoman politics in the hands of small players,
i.e., information-brokers, spymasters, unofficial diplomats, translators, ransom agents,
merchants, etc., in short, agents of great players of politics and diplomacy in
Constantinople.

243
244

Tezcan, Searching for Osman, idem, The Second Ottoman.

Gnhan Breki, Factions and Favorites.

344

CHAPTER SIX
TONGUES FOR THE SULTAN: THE OTTOMAN
SECRET SERVICE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

6.1.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the Ottoman methods of gathering and processing

information. It explains the particularities of the Ottoman Empire that directly affected
the organization and day-to-day operations of Ottoman secret service and demonstrates
how the latter differed from that of the Habsburgs. First, I make a case for the provincial
nature of Ottoman espionage and accentuate the autonomy that provincial authorities
enjoyed in accordance with Ottoman imperial pragmatism. Then I argue that the Ottoman
Empire retained its patrimonial character by delegating government responsibilities to its
grandees who established their personal intelligence networks with the financial
resources granted to them by the state. I examine a couple of such personal networks,
most relevant for the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, and demonstrate how factional/personal
rivalries led to the manipulation of information at the hands of the factions. Next, I study
the sources which provided information for the Ottoman secret service. While discussing
the role of ambassadors for Ottoman secret diplomacy, I demonstrate how Ottoman
abstinence from sending resident ambassadors abroad affected the efficiency of their
secret service. I then describe how the Ottomans transmitted news and discuss the
efficiency of Ottoman secret service.

345

I finally argue that particularities such as the patrimonial structure of the Empire,
the provincial nature of information gathering and the underdevelopment of a written
political culture, all of which can also be read as shortcomings, did not impede the
Ottomans from developing an efficient intelligence gathering mechanism that matched
that of their arch-enemy, the Habsburgs, if not that of the Venetians of exceptional
efficiency. My argument is that the Ottomans managed to operate a functioning system
which in itself was coherent and that the real difference maker was none of these, but the
diplomacy. The lack of direct diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and the
Habsburgs created a disadvantage and hindered the flow of information. The main
argument of the chapter then is that while both empires kept themselves informed of
political and military developments in each others capitals or certain provincial centers
to the greatest extent possible given the logistical difficulties of the time, they failed to
develop an awareness of each others legal, political and economic systems as well as
cultural, linguistic and religious particularities. This is in stark contrast with the example
of the Venetians whose diplomatic presence in Constantinople educated the Venetian
elite of things Ottoman in such a more profound way that even prompted the Venetians to
use Ottoman political system as a point of reference while producing texts that discussed
their own system of government.
The only systematic study of Ottoman information-gathering has recently been
undertaken by Gbor goston who opposed the sweeping generalizations regarding the
Ottomans supposed lack of knowledge about Europe, their allegedly insufficient
understanding of European politics and flawed foreign policy decisions vis--vis

346

European affairs [that] continually resurface in the literature.1 goston proposes four
levels of information gathering that provided the Ottomans with sufficient information to
formulate a grand strategy: 1) central intelligence in Istanbul, 2) information gathering
undertaken by local Ottoman authorities, especially along the Empires frontiers, 3
intelligence provided by Istanbuls client or vassal states, and 4 espionage carried out by
the Portes spies and saboteurs in foreign countries.2 This useful classification is
instrumental to the organization of this chapter. However, in the end, I chose to organize
it differently by first focusing on provincial information gathering and personal
intelligence network at the hand of the Ottoman grandees separately and then dealing
with all other sources of information, from vassal states to European ambassadors in the
capital, from fifth columns in Habsburg lands, to men of both worlds.
This chapter expands on gostons findings, developing some and criticizing
others. I agree with goston on a number of issues such as the efficiency of Ottoman
information gathering system in furnishing the central government with information of
sufficient quality to develop a meaningful grand strategy, I differ from his model on a
number of issues. First, I make the additional argument that the Ottoman secret service
was not directly run by the state. It was rather based on personal networks led by rival
Ottoman pashas, courtiers and power brokers, demonstrating to us the interconnectedness
of information gathering and factional rivalries. Consequently, I also give more emphasis
on the provincial nature of Ottoman espionage and argue that along the lines of Ottoman
pragmatism,3 Constantinople allowed greater freedom to its frontier officials, especially

goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits, 78.

Ibid., 81-2.
3
goston, A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers, International Journal
of Turkish Studies 9/1-2 (2003): 15-31 idem, From Frontier to Empire. Also see. Halil nalck,
2

347

in military matters that required prompt reactions, including the duty of gathering
information. Thirdly, this chapter provides ample information on the activities of the
Ottoman spies abroad and focuses on the operational level of the Ottoman secret service
in an effort to demonstrate the extent of its operations.
6.2.

THE PROVINCIAL NATURE OF OTTOMAN ESPIONAGE

I have already mentioned a few times the provincial nature of early modern
espionage and accentuated the autonomy that provincial authorities enjoyed. The degree
of this autonomy was far greater in the case of the Ottoman Empire for two basic reasons.
First, their imperial pragmatism convinced the Ottoman elite to keep their
centralizing tendencies in check when it comes to the frontier provinces. Giancarlo
Casale recently accentuated the special administrative role played by Egypt as an
intermediary between the central government and its frontier to the southeast and
described how intelligence reports regarding the Indian Ocean first arrived in Cairo
where they should have been archived and then sent, in a summarized form, to
Constantinople.4 This role may be special, but not unique to the province of Egypt, one of
the most important Ottoman provinces whose capital Cairo Casale took for a second
capital of the Ottoman Empire. As a general rule, the Ottomans very often employed
irregular forces, both on land (akncs) and on sea (corsairs), in little wars of the
Balkans as well as the Mediterranean.They also kept their intervention to a minimum
which created a relatively greater degree of autonomy in frontier provinces, in stark

Ottoman Methods of Conquest, Studia Islamica 2 (1954): 103-12 idem, Stefan Duandan Osmanl
mparatorluuna: XV. asrda Rumelide hristiyan sipahiler ve meneleri, in
. Doum yl
mnasebetiyle Fuad Kprl Armaan: Mlanges Fuad Kprl (stanbul: Osman Yaln Matbaas,
1953),207-248.
4
Casale, An Ottoman Intelligence Report, 186.

348

contrast with other territories located in the inland and away from the threat of an enemy
attack.5
The second reason is the differences in the administrative structure of the two
empires. The Habsburgs had to rule an empire that lacked physical cohesion, composed
of non-adjacent territories dispersed all around the world from Peru (and later the
Philippines) to Sicily and from Antwerp to Oran. Furthermore, apart from the territories
that constituted the core of their empire (The Crown of Castille, enlarged with the
addition of Granada, Navarre and the Americas), other territories that the Habsburgs
inherited in accordance with feudal laws brought their own rules and customs which the
Habsburg monarchs swore to observe. In the end, the Habsburg Empire consisted of a
number of loosely related provinces which shared little in common, except for the fact
that they were ruled by the same monarch.6 In order to overcome the problem of cohesion
and distance, the Habsburgs sought to create a centralized system that would harmonize
the action between these different parts of the Habsburg governing machine. This effort
of centralization and harmonization to a certain extent affected the conduct of secret
diplomacy; as described in Chapter Four, Madrid jealously guarded its right to say the
final word in many instances.
This was not the case in the Ottoman Empire. The particular characteristics of the
frontier forced Constantinople to allow greater freedom to its governors and governorgenerals, at least in military matters, given the promptness with which they had to react to

I had already discussed the limitations of Ottoman power in North Africa in the 16 th century. See. Grkan,
The Center and the Frontier, 156-163.
6
J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain (1469-1716) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 167-8; Henry Kamen,
Golden Age Spain (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1988), 37-49.

349

threats and opportunities.7 Moreover, it was a custom for an Ottoman official to have a
large number of retinues, kapu halk, in their households which mirrored that of the
Ottoman Sultan. In a less monetarized economy, Ottoman officials were paid in kind
instead of in cash. They were allocated the right to collect certain taxes with which they
were to maintain their retinues and feed their household that was of central importance
for the career of an Ottoman officer. The members of a household fulfilled certain tasks
on behalf of their master who tried to secure for his kapu lavish positions in the military
and administrative apparatus of the Empire. Along the same lines, with the funds
allocated to them by the state, these governors and governor-generals established their
own private armies and chancelleries. They kept the rest of the money for their personal
expenses and in order to assure themselves a more important position by giving gifts
(pi ke ) to their superiors.8 If gathering information about the enemy was one of the most
important responsibilities of a governor in the frontier, then it was only natural that he
employed several spies without, unlike the Habsburg officials, either the knowledge or
the authorization from Constantinople which, unlike Madrid, was more interested in
results, rather than the means.
It was also more convenient given the primitiveness of early modern logistics to
process most of the information in the provinces immediately. The governor was in a
better position to decide whether the incoming information should be acted upon in the
7

Still, one has to make a reservation at this point. Theoretically, frontier officials had to ask Constantinople
for authorization in many instances such as appointments, making repairs, assignment of timars (excluding
those of smaller value and the like. In practice, however, Constantinoples influence over its frontiers was
limited. This limitation depended upon the particular circumstances of a given time, i.e., the character of
the governor, whether it was a wartime or not, the political stability of the empire, etc. In any instance,
however, the Ottomans had a few reasons to be concerned with how information was collected in the
provinces as long as its officers produced concrete results.
8
On the widespread practice of r vet, bribery in the Ottoman Empire, see. Ahmet Mumcu, Osmanl
Devletinde R vet zellikle Adl R vet (Ankara: Ankara niversitesi Hukuk Fakltesi Yaynlar, 1 6 ,
especially pp. 86-92 with a special focus on the venality in the Ottoman Empire.

350

most immediate manner, or if not, whether it was important and relevant enough to be
remitted to Constantinople with an express courier. First of all, the time might be of
essence especially during wartime when most of the information that arrived was of
military nature that deserved a prompt reply. During the War of 1570-3, the Ottomans
appointed Vezir Hseyin Pasha as the commander-in-chief (Serdar) in the Balkans with
the task of organizing the Ottoman defenses in the absence of many governors and
soldiers that were sailing with the Ottoman fleet.9 As the sole responsibility fell on
Hseyin Pasha under these dire circumstances, the Ottomans expected the remaining
governors to communicate important information to him rather than to Constantinople; it
was the Pasha who needed it in order to organize a defense in cooperation with the
Ottoman Navy.10 Secondly, to send the information with an express courier cost a lot of
money. Philip II himself warned his ministers to differentiate between information that
deserved a prompt reply and those that did not, and therefore not to use the express
courier instead of the regular ones simply because it cost too much.11 In a similar
fashion, the Ottomans warned their governors not to use the menzil system (see infra) for
information of minor importance and their own private purposes, on the ground that such
abuses were suppressing the local people.12 One such order even precluded the
governors authority to issue ulak hkm, diploma for a courier, and warned the
provincial judges (kad) that only those who received their hkm from the GovernorGenerals should be given a horse.13 Thirdly and most importantly, this way the
9

BOA, MD, XIX, no. 547.

BOA, MD, XIX, nos. 521 (H. 2 R 980 / A.D. 11 August 1572) and 527 (H. 26 N 980 / A.D. 30 January
1573).
11
AGS, E K 1675, fols. 66, 74 (13 July 1591) and 89 (16 August 1591).
12
BOA, MD, XIX, nos. 487 (H. 24 N 980 / A.D. 28 January 1573), 488 (H. 22 N 980 / A.D. 26 January
1573) and 521 (H. 2 Ra. 980 / A.D. 12 July 1572); XLIV, no. 233, XLIX, no. 499, LI, no. 63.
13
BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 233.
10

351

information of little relevance or credibility was being filtered out, surely an important
factor in increasing the quality of the decisions taken as well as in assuring the indirect
participation of the experienced provincial officials in the decision-making process. In the
light of the fact that Geoffrey Parker demonstrated how the excessive overflow of
information paralyzed the decision-making abilities of Philip II,14 the importance of
delegating to other officials could better be understood. In conclusion, by filtering out the
information and distributing the responsibility within the Ottoman hierarchy, the
Ottomans reacted swiftly on the one hand and took the weight off the back of the central
government on the other.
This did not mean that the Ottoman central government did not wish to participate
in information gathering. Provincial authorities for instance were required to dispatch the
prisoners-of-war to Constantinople for their further interrogation.15 Ottoman officials
personally attended these interrogations in order to find answers to specific questions that
would shed light on many important details and affect the decision taken in the Imperial
Council.16 The criterion here seemed to be the information that could be extracted from
the prisoner. For instance, the Ottomans did not want to interrogate a Christian soldier
which the Governor of Iskenderiye caught during the War of 1570-3 and sent to
Constantinople,17 probably because the information that could be extracted from such
people, i.e., the condition and the whereabouts of the Christian navy, would lose its
importance before it reached the capital or at least before the central government

14

Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, 70-5.

BOA, MD, XII, no. 787; XVIII, no. 21 ; XIX, nos. 136, 490 (H. 24 N 980 / A.D. 28 January 1573) and
521 (H. 2 Ra. 980 / A.D. 11 August 1572); LVIII, no. 294 (H. 17 Ca. 993 / A.D. 17 May 1585); LXVII, no.
188 (H. Selh-i Ra. 999 / A.D. 26 March 1591).
16
ASV, SDC, fil. 5, fol. 19 (11 June 1569).
17
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 521 (H. 2 R 980 / A.D. 11 August 1572).
15

352

extracted and processed the information and sent its decision to the Serdar Hseyin Pasha
to whom the prisoner should have been sent in the first place. In a similar example, aban
Reis caught five enemy sailors however, since none of them was an informed infidel,
he sent their letters, instead of themselves.18
In the end though, Constantinople retained its central position as a supervisor. The
center used the information which the provincial authorities deemed worthy enough to
relate in a number of ways. An important portion of the Ottoman MD registers were
responses to the information sent from the provinces, informing them of the arrival of the
information (generally formulated as, her ne demi isen malum oldu or malum-
eri im olmu dur) and ordering to go on gathering information on the one hand and
making necessary preparations on the other.19 Sometimes, these orders mentioned a
specific topic to be informed of or a mission to be assigned to a spy, mostly concerning
the military preparations on the other side of the frontier. 20 The Ottomans occasionally
sent chauses that visited local authorities to gather information. On the eve of the Malta
expedition and a new war between the Ottomans and the Austrians, an order was sent, for
18

... ilernde endan haber bilr ka ir bulunmaman gnderlmediin ve mektublarn gnderdin...,

BOA, MD, XII, no. 403 (H. 16 Za. 978 / A.D. 11 April 1571).
19
BOA, MD, III, nos. 518, 878 (H. 27 Ca. 967 / A.D. 24 February 1560) and 1208 (H.11 N 967 / A.D. 6
June 1560); XII, no. 938 (H. 7 Ra. 979 / A.D. 29 July 1571); XIV, nos. 356 (H. 14 Ra. 978 / A.D. 16
August 1570) and 786 (H. R 978 / A.D. September 1570); XVI, no. 410 (H. 27 Z 979 / A.D. 10 May 1572);
XVIII, no. 109 (H. 22 N 979 / A.D. 7 February 1572); XIX, no. 8 (H. 5 M 980 / A.D. 17 May 1572);
XXVII, no. 486 (H. 19 L 983 / A.D. 21 January 1576); XXVIII, nos. 245 (H. 25 B 984 / A.D. 18 October
1576), 801 (H. 8 984 / A.D. 30 October 1576) and 520 (25 B 984 / A.D. 18 October 1576); XXX, nos.
513 (H. 13 Ra. 985 / A.D. 31 May 1577), 610 (H. 28 Ra. 985 / A.D. 15 June 1577) and 611; XXXI, no. 76
(H. 28 R 985 / A.D. 15 July 1577); LXI, no. 953 (H. 12 Za. 988 / A.D. 19 December 1580); LXIX, no. 65
(H. 991 / A.D. 1583), LXI, no. 46 (H. 9 B 994 / A.D. 2 October 1576).
20
TSMA, Evrak 12321, no. 434; Halil Sahilliolu, ed., Topkap Saray Ar ivi H.
-952 Tarihli ve E
12
Numaral Mhimme De teri (stanbul, IRCICA, 2002); BOA, MD, VI, no. 1134 (H. 13 L 972 / A.D.
14 May 1565); VII, no. 630 (H. 975-6 / A.D. 1567-9); XII, no. 851 (H. 2 R 979 / A.D. 23 August 1571);
XVI, nos. 192 (H. 10 Za. 979 / A.D. 25 March 1572), 411 (H. 27 Z 989 / A.D. 22 January 1582) and 636
(H. 21 C 979 / A.D. 9 November 1571); XIX, nos. 268 (H. 3 S 980 / A.D. 14 June 1572) and 300; XLVII,
nos. 165 and 166 (both H. 24 Ra. 990 / A.D. 18 April 1582); LX, nos. 273 (H. 17 Z 993 / A.D. 9 December
1585), 570, 571 (both H. 8 Ca. 994 / A.D. 27 April 1586); MZD, V, no. 27 (H. 24 L 999 / A.D. 14 August
1591).

353

instance, to all the governors, judges and castle commanders that they should present the
incoming chaus with the results of their mission of gathering information on whereabouts
of the enemy navy.21 That the Ottomans delegated the responsibility of gathering
information to local authorities and were little concerned with the means by which this
information was gathered is evident from the fact that the person to be sent out to gather
information was almost always named as casus, spy, without any specific instructions as
to his identity, quality, personality or profession, the only adjective used being yarar,
useful or competent.22 As the final hub of important information, Constantinople also
coordinated action among its officials not only by harmonizing their military action with
orders sent from the center, but also by updating each of them of the recently arrived
information.23 Furthermore, by cross-checking the information it received from less
reliable sources such as vassal states, it sought to diversify its sources and increased the
quality of information.24 Moreover, it supervised, to the greatest extent possible given the
distance, the activities of its provincial authorities in the frontiers; the harsh tone of the
center when these authorities failed to fulfill their military duties because they were not

21

BOA, MD, VI, no. 1287 (H. 20 Za. 972 / A.D. 19 June 1565).
TSMA, Evrak 12321, no. 215 Sahilliolu, Topkap Saray Ar ivi; BOA, MD, XVI, no. 410 (H. 27 Z 979
/ A.D. 10 May 1572); XIX, nos. 8 (H. 5 M 980 / A.D. 17 May 1572) and 194 (H. 29 M 980 / A.D. 10 June
1572);MZD, V, no. 27 (H. 24 L 999 / A.D. 14 August 1591); XXVIII, nos. 520 (H. 25 B 984 / A.D. 18
October 1576) and 801 (H. 8 984 / A.D. 30 October 1576); XLII, no. 953 (H. 12 Za. 988 / A.D. 19
December 1580); XLIX, no. 65 (H. 991 / A.D. 1583); LXIII, nos. 48 (H. 15 R 996 / A.D. 13 March 1588)
and 56 (H. 19 R 996 / A.D. 17 March 1588). The only exception I could find is LVII, no. 486 (H. 19 L 983
/ A.D. 21 January 1576) which orders the dispatch of a muktedir levent reisi, an able corsair to gather
information from the enemy.
23
BOA, MD, III, no. 1265 (H. 23 N 967 / A.D. 18 June 1560); VII, no. 202 (H. 975-6 / A.D. 1567-9); X,
nos. 166 (H. 21 978 / A.D. 18 March 1571) and 198; XII, no. 1194 (H. 24 Za. 979 / A.D. 8 April 1572);
XIV, nos. 343 (H. 20 S 978 / A.D. 24 July 1570) and 463 (H. 12 Ra. 978 / A.D. 14 August 1570); XVI,
nos. 109 (H. 7 B 979 / A.D. 25 November 1571) and 649 (H. 9 B 979 / A.D. 27 November 1571); XIX,
nos. 268 (H. 3 S 980 / A.D. 14 June 1572) and 300; XLIX, no. 96; LVIII, no. 518 (H. 8 993 / A.D. 4
August 1585). LX, no. 650 (H. 5 C 994 / A.D. 24 May 1586).
24
BOA, MD, III, no. 1256 (H. 23 N 967 / A.D. 18 June 1560); XIX, nos. 710 and 711. (both H. 980/A.D.
1572).
22

354

informed of enemys intentions,25 sent incomplete information to Constantinople26 or

failed to inform at all27 accentuates the diligence of the Ottoman center.
The local authorities that were responsible with gathering information were not
only governor-generals (beylerbeyi), governors (sancakbeyi) and provincial judges
(kad),28 but also other figures of lesser rank such as castle commanders (dizdar),29
regiment commanders (alaybeyi),30 and the commander of corsair captains in a port such
as the Avlonya Azebleri Aas and Gnll Levend Reisleri Kapudan.31 Local military
forces penetrated deep into the enemy territory on reconnaissance missions, bringing
back captives for interrogation, which in Ottoman was referred to as dil, the tongue. In
1572, the governor of Ohri sent Ibrahim and Pervane to Darl-Harb (the Abode of War)
to bring back dils and esirs (slaves).32 For instance, in 1573, a certain ahin Aa among
the Faris Aalar of stolni-Belgrad and Sefer, a timariot cavalry (tmarl sipahi) of 8.000
akes, returned from their mission of dil almak (literally taking a tongue, cf. in Spanish
tomar lengua, i.e., capturing captives that would give information) after they killed a
good number of enemy soldiers they encountered on their route.33 These reconnaissance
missions, as seen above, needed not be undertaken by large forces. The governor of
Akkirman soonafter sent a expeditionary force led by his lieutenant, kethda, Sleyman
who defeated the enemy and captured eight enemy soldiers, keeping three to be
25

BOA, MD, X, nos. 209 (H. 27 N 978 / A.D. 16 February 1571) and 274; XII, no. 1021 (H. 29 L 979 /
A.D. 14 March 1572); LI, no. 246 (H. 983 / A.D. 1585).
26
BOA, MD, VI, no. 1288 (H. 20 Za. 972 / A.D. 19 June 1565).
27
BOA, MD, IX, no. 246 (H. 977-8 / A.D. 1569-70); XIV, nos. 781 (H. R 978 / A.D. September 1570) and
816 (H. Selh-i Ca. 978 / A.D. 30 October 1570).
28
BOA, MD, VI, no. 1287 and 1288 (both 20 Za. 972 / A.D. 19 June 1565).
29
BOA, MD, VI, no. 1287 and 1288 (both 20 Za. 972 / A.D. 19 June 1565).
30
BOA, MD, VI, no. 1288 (20 Za. 972 / A.D. 19 June 1565).
31
BOA, MD, XII, nos. 403 (H.16 Za. 978 / A.D. 13 April 1571), 532 (H. Gurre-yi S 979 / A.D. 24 June
1571) and 787.
32
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 119 (H. 21 M 980 / A.D. 2 June 1572).
33
...dil almak in irsal olunub kffara rastgeldkde yarar cebel ka ir ykub ba kesb yolda lk
itmi dr... BOA, MD, XXV, no. 16 (H. 13 981 / A.D. 8 December 1573).

355

interrogated and killing five.34 Some reconnaissance missions preceeded a larger

expeditionary force. Preparing for a punitive raid attack to the Venetian possession of
Styria with a large force including the Crimean cavalry, the Ottomans ordered the
governors of Kilis and Hersek to dispatch spies to learn the conditions of the roads and
passes, enemys military forces as well as whether the enemy was informed of the
incoming expedition or not.35 These missions were extremely important for those who
wanted to be re-appointed to a lucrative position or getting a promotion. The afore
mentioned ahin Aa, for instance, received a promotion and a new tmar.36 Furthermore,
Mustafa Bey, dismissed from a tmar in Semendire and was waiting for his re-location to
Temevar crossed the border and came back with dil, his reward being a promotion.37
Similarly, Mehmed, dismissed from a tmar in the province of Silistre, was sent by the
governor to bring dil. When he managed to bring back a soldier from the enemy
regiment, with his arms and shield intact, he received, with governors recommendation,
a promotion as well.38
In a similar vein, corsairs in Ottoman employ were frequently sent on
reconnaissance missions which constituted an important part of their responsibility to the
state, evident from their complaints to Sokollu that their ships, which were sailing on an
information-gathering mission and not of corsary, were sunk by the Venetian ships. This
responsibility seemed to have been recognized even by the Venetians; when Sokollu took

34

BOA, MD, XXVIII, no. 315 (17 N 981 / A.D. 11 January 1574).
vilayet-i mezbureye yarar ve mutemedun-aleh casuslar gnderb vilayet-i mezbure keferesinin ahval
etvarn tetebbu idb garet olacaklarn haber alm lar mdr yohsa ga let zre midr yat u yara ve atl
askeri var mdur nicedr tamam mertebe vuku tahsil eyleyb, BOA, MD, XIX, no. 194 (H. 29 M 980 /
A.D. 10 June 1572) and 201.
36
BOA, MD, XXVIII, no. 17 (H. 3 81 / A.D. 28 November 1574).
37
BOA, MD, XXVIII, no. 1846 (H. 9 Ra. 982 / A.D. 28 June 1574).
38
d man taburundan cebeli ve cev enli bir dil tutub, BOA, MD, XXVIII, no. 2193 (H. 20 R 982 /
A.D. 8 August 1574).
35

356

the issue with the bailo, he denied Venetian responsibility rather than simply accusing
them of being corsairs.39 Some of these corsairs were directly employed by the center in
the Navy and Arsenal. In 1562, the rumour was that the Sultan sent Ulu Ali (Beciali)
with three galiots to the Western Mediterranean, to use diligence in learning whether his
Catholic Majesty was putting a fleet together or not.40 In 1589, a hassa reis, Yusuf
received a five-ake terakki because he set sail from Navarino, caught a yarar dil from
the enemy and returned to Tripolis.41 Some, however, were operating in the provinces,
situated generally in strategic ports in the Adriatic and acting under the protection of local
governors.42 In 1566, the Venetians confessed that these corsairs, who had recently taken
one of their ships with the letters it carried, were great menaces. 43 In 1572, the governor
of lbasan sent two corsairs, Memi and aban to gather dil.44 Another corsair in Ottoman
employ (gnll reis) named Cafer captured one of Don Juans galiots, carrying two
recently captured Ottoman dils to the Habsburg admiral.45 In 1576, two Ottoman corsair
ships came to the Calabrian waters to take tongue, tomar lengua.46 Furthermore, the
captain of the corsairs that operated in the Adriatic (with the dual office of the Avlonya
Azebleri Aas and Gnll Levend Reisleri Kapudan), named Kara Hoca, played an
important role during the War of 1570-3 for the Ottoman secret service by gathering

39

ASV, SDC, fil. 2, fol. 24 (28 May 1567).

AGS, E 1052, fol. 27.
41
BOA, MD, LXV, no. 96 (H. 24 L 997 / A.D. 5 September 1589).
42
dris Bostan, Adriyatikte Korsanlk: Osmanllar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler,
Yaynlar, 200 , 36-56.
43
ASV, SenDelC, reg. 3, cc. 51v (29 August 1566).
44
BOA, MD, no. XIX, no. 87 (H. 28 S 980 / A.D. 9 July 1572).
45
BOA, MD, XXV, no. 2686 (H. 26 C 982 / A.D. 12 October 1574).
46
AGS, E 1070, fol. 77.
40

357

7 -1620 (stanbul: Tima

information of crucial importance.47 The employment of corsairs, however, was a double

edged sword for the local authorities and there was a fine line between a legitimate
corsair and a lawless pirate. Ottoman documentation is full of examples that demonstrate
the tensions between these corsairs and Ottoman authorities.48 A good example where
corsary, piracy and espionage were intertwined was the case of aban, Yusuf and Kse
Mustafa, Barbarossas three men who were arrested by the Governor of Lepanto.
Constantinople ordered the release of these prisoners who went on an expedition and
returned with yarar diller.49 Needless to say, that the corsairs reconnaissance missions
were even more important in the Western Mediterranean, where the prospects of
gathering information by other means were meager for the Ottomans.50 Also, their
expertise on enemy shores, even recognized by competent Habsburg naval commanders
such as Gianandrea Doria,51 was an important asset for the Ottomans.
Ottoman governor-generals in North Africa enjoyed an even greater autonomy
than the governor-generals in the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier in the Balkans or the
Ottoman-Safavid frontier in Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, their role for the Ottomans
Mediterranenan policy was more important. Similarly to the Indian Ocean, the Western
Mediterranean remained out of the reach of Constantinople which therefore had to
delegate parts of its authority to these provincial authorities. Without French or North
African bases, the traditional Ottoman area of naval operation was limited to the Eastern

47

BOA, MD, XII, nos. 403 (H.16 Za. 978 / A.D. 13 April 1571), 532 (H. Gurre-yi S 979 / A.D. 24 June
1571) and 787; XIV, no. 469 (H. 12 Ra. 978 / A.D. 14 August 1571); ASV, SDC, fil. 5, fol. 19 (11 June
1569).
48
Grkan, The Center and the Frontier, 151-5.
49
TSMA, Evrak 12321, no. 380; Sahilliolu, Topkap Saray Ar ivi.
50
BOA, MD, III, no. 139; XIV, no. 539 (H. 27 R 978 / A.D. 28 September 1570); XVI, no. 640 (H. 23 Ca.
979 / A.D. 13 October 1571); XIX, nos. 629 (H. 18 R 980 / A.D. 8 September 1571), 631 (H. 9 R 980 /
A.D. 30 August 1571) and 668.
51
AGS, E 1541, fol. 159 (20 November 1591).

358

Mediterranean until the Strait of Otranto in the North and the Strait of Sicily in the South.
This increased the importance of information sent by the provincial administrations of
North Africa. The three provinces in the region, Algeria (est. 1519), Tripolitania (est.
1551) and Tunisia (est. 1534-5, 1569-73, 1574) retained their relative autonomy, each to
a varying degree, given the realities of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the
Mediterranean and the logistical difficulties caused by the communication capabilities
and the military technology of the time.52 Furthermore, as these were corsair provinces,
information regularly flowed to their lively port cities which hosted not only a good
number of corsair and merchant ships that roamed the Mediterranean and came back with
fresh news, but also slaves, merchants, ransom-agents and all sorts of adventurers from
all parts of the Western Mediterranean. These made these port cities information markets.
In short, the unique position of as well as the autonomy granted to these provinces of the
Forgotten Frontier53 of North Africa, imposed upon the provincial authorities (not only
the governor-generals) several diplomatic and military tasks. Local authorities did not
only play a decisive role in the conduct of the Ottoman-French, Ottoman-Moroccan and
Ottoman-Morisco relations, but also built their own separate information gathering
networks in areas outside the Ottoman influence.
This was a process that Constantinople, conscious of its limits, actively supported,
demonstrating once again the pragmatism goston accentuated.54 The Ottomans
repeatedly ordered their governor-generals to develop reliable information-gathering

52

Grkan, Osmanl-Habsburg Rekabeti.

Hess, The Forgotten Frontier.
54
G bor goston, A Flexible Empire idem, From Frontier Principality to Empire.
53

359

networks.55 The threatening tone of the Ottoman documents when Constantinople did not
receive information proves that the Ottomans highly appreciated the news that arrived
from North Africa.56 Apart from the indirect information gathering, thanks to the
advantages of geographical proximity to and close trade relations with Western Europe,
these governor-generals took the initiative by sending spies, mostly chosen from the
renegades, to Habsburg lands,57 dispatching corsair ships on reconnaissance missions,58
entering into secret negotiations with Habsburg soldiers,59 and interrogating the slaves
that arrived after each years plunder, razzia.60 This regular flow of information kept
Constantinople up-to-date about current political events in the Western Mediterranean on
the one hand,61 and about Habsburg military preparations and whereabouts of their navy
on the other.62 North African provinces contribution did not only give the Ottomans time

55

For orders sent to the governor-general of Algeria, BOA, MD, VI, nos. 561 (H. 29 Ca. 972 / A.D. 2
January 1565 , 04 (H. 22 72 / A.D. 25 March 1565 XLIV, no. 287 (H. c. 23 M 991 / A.D. 16
February 1583), to the Governor-General of Tripolitania, VII, nos. 653 (H. 6 B 975 / A.D. 6 June 1568),
1060 (H. c.14-16 N 975 / A.D. 13-15 March 1568), 1472 (H. 25 Z 975 / A.D. 22 May 1568).
56
See, for instance, the order sent to the governor-general of Algeria, BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 297 (H. c. 28
M 991 / A.D. 21 February 1583).
57
AGS, E 1127, fols. 103-4 records a renegade spy sent by Turgud, Constantino de Candia alias
Muhammed. Having been interrogated, he gave the names of other spies sent by other corsairs, such as a
Greek named Juan employed by Memi Reis and a Genoese employed by Ali Reis. See also E 1070, fol.
77. According to E 1119, fols. 95-2o (14 December 1547 , Turguds nephew, who was captured by the
Habsburgs in Messina, was travelling in Sicily with such a familiarity that it gave the impression that he
had agents in the island that provided him with information regularly.
58
Gazavt, fols. 280b-281a and 2 6b. In 1558, the futures famous Kapudan- Derya, Ulu Ali participated
in one of these reconnaissance-cum-corsary missions. AGS, E 1124, fol. 135 (25 August 1558).
59
Canosa and Colonnello, Spionaggio a Palermo, 73.
60
According to the Gazavt, Hayreddin made a habit of interrogating the leading captives as soon as they
arrived in Algiers. Bell ba lu sz anlar ka ir var ise huzurna getrb ka ir yakas havadislerinden dahi
ne var ise sual idp her eyden haberdar olurd, Gazavt, fols. 233b-235a, also see fol. 238b.
61
For information Murad Reis extracted from the Christians he captured in Sicilian waters (Cicilye canibi)
and sent to Algiers, to be transmitted to Istanbul, regarding the naval struggle between Spanish, English and
Lutheran (i.e., Calvinist, the Dutch rebels) ships, see BOA, MD, XXIII, no. 645 (H. 22 Z 980 / A.D. 25
August 1573). The responsibility to inform the centre of the events in Morocco, Fas and Marake fell upon
the shoulders of the Governor-General of Algeria. MD, XXX, nos. 348 and 424.
62
BOA, MD, VII, nos. 653 (H. 6 B 975), 1060 and 1472; XIX, no. 255 (H. 3 Ra. 980); XXVII, no. 555 (H.
2 Za. 983); LV, no. 283 (H. 22 S 993).

360

to react to the dangers and opportunities every year,63 but also shaped the Ottoman policy
by providing a detailed picture of European and North African politics.
Given the dearth of precious metals and the agricultural nature of Ottoman
economy, the Ottomans had to develop a complex system of taxation in order to make the
most of their resources which they could not channel to the center and had to collect in
situ. As a part of this system of taxation, they delegated certain duties to its tax-paying
subjects, reaya, in exchange for exemption from certain taxes.64 In order to maintain and
supervise

strategic

routes

and

locations,

nearby

villages

undertook

certain

responsibilities, such as supervising the roads and passes (derbendci), repairing bridges
(kprc) and acqueducts (suyolcu), transporting people with boats (gemici), maintaining
postal stations (menzilci). I encountered a MD register that refers to a village which
seems to be entrusted with the task of informing the castle whenever pirates, corsairs and
smugglers approached the port.65 The name of the village makes one think that the
Ottomans may have entrusted this strategically located dilci demekle maru karye with
the duty of informing the authorities of possible threats in exchange for tax exemptions.
We also know that both the Ottomans and the Austrians forced the village people that

63

BOA, MD, VI, no. 904 (H. 22 S 972) states that the reason why Constantinople sent the navy to the
Western Mediterranean (the navy would eventually besiege Malta) was because the Governor-General of
Algeria informed Constantinople of immense Habsburg naval preparations.
64
cemi avarz- divaniyyeden, tekali -i r iyyeden, ulakdan sekbandan, cerehordan, naibden ve
salgundan muaf ve msellem. Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanl mparatorluunda Derbend Te kilat, 2nd edition
(stanbul: Eren Yaynclk, 1 0 , 15.
65
Gelibolu kadsna hkm ki: Hala taht- kazanda dilci demekle maru karye, hisardan a a vak olan
liman kadimden bekleygelb, anun gibi gemi grdklerinde gelp hisara haber viregelmi ler iken imdiki
halde bekletmeyb haber vermedikleri sebebi ile baz tereke gemilerin ele geb ve kffar gemileri ol
tara lara varup zarar ziyan eyledikleri ilam olund. mdi buyurdum ki: Vusul buldukda, bu husus onat
vech ile te ti eyleyb gresin. Fil-vak karye-i mezbure halk zikr olunan liman kadimden bekleyegelb
haber vermi ler midir, nicedr, bekleyegelmi ler ise ne mukabelede bekleyegelm lerdir, maakabet eyle
midir, yohsa artlarmz vardur, asl nedir imdiye dek bekleyb haber viregelmi ler iken hala
beklememee sebeb nidr? Asl ile malum idinb vuku zre yazub sdde-i saadetime bildiresin. BOA,
MD, XVIII, no. 217 (H. 3 7 / A.D. 20 December 1571 . Transliteration from: Kazm Krat Ycel, 18
numaral Mhimme Defteri, (M.A. Thesis, Istanbul niversitesi, 1 6 , no page number.

361

lived in the contested territories of the Ottoman-Austrian frontier to give information

about the other side.66
Reiterating the provincial nature of the Ottoman espionage once again, we should
now concentrate on Constantinople. The Ottoman officials in the center established their
own intelligence networks as well, again as a part of their household and operating in
tandem with their official responsibilities. These are the subject of the next sub-chapter.
6.3.

AN EMPIRE OF PATRIMONIES: DELEGATING THE

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE STATE

One important feature that separated the Ottoman Empire from their European
counterparts was that it retained its patrimonial character by delegating certain
governmental functions to its grandees who used the financial resources that the central
government assigned to them. Therefore, the allocated amount was a share from the
Treasury, rather than a wage, and this share was given in exchange for the services that
the grandee was supposed to undertake. This was why the central government created a
habit of confiscating the income that the deceased grandees left. Given that they were no
longer in state service, and therefore unable to undertake the governmental functions that
had been assigned to them, it was time for their share of the state money to return to
Treasury to be assigned to other grandees who were still sharing the burden of
government by undertaking these functions. The Ottomans saw no contradiction in
confiscating67 the riches that these grandees accumulated using the authority bestowed

66

Gerlach, Trkiye Gnl, vol. I, 223.

On the Ottoman practice of confiscation, msadere, see. C. E. Bosworth, Musdara, Encyclopedia of
Islam, 2nd. ed. Vol. VII, 652. Klaus Rrhborn, Konfiskation und intermedire Gewalten im Osmanischen
Reich Der Islam 55 (1 78 : 345-51 P l Fodor, V llalkoz sra knyszer tve: az oszm n pnzgyigazgat s
s hatalmi elit v ltoz sai a
- 7. sz zad ordulj n (Budapest: Hist ria MTA Trt nettudom nyi
Int zete [u.a.], 2006 , 125-144.
67

362

upon them by the state in whose stead they acted. There were times when these
confiscations extended even to figures not directly related to the Ottoman military and
administrative structure, such as the Greek banker Michel Cantecuzenus or even better
several vak s that lost their land during Mehmed IIs land reform. Furthermore, the state
demanded at times the financial participation of its officers in military expenditures.
Given that the Ottoman elite, theaskeri class, did not pay taxes, it was a form of securing
their contribution. For instance, when the Treasury could not afford to build a fleet in
1590, the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha came up with a solution that Selim II had resorted to
during the War of 1570-1573. He ordered the high level Ottoman officials in
Constantinople and the provinces to arm, with their private funds, a certain number of
galleys for the state. This method once again demonstrates to us that the Ottoman State
considered its officers personal riches belonging to itself.68 As was the case with the
Ottoman land system, what was granted to these officers was just the right of the
usufruct, usus fructus, rather than the full possession, abusus, of the money and the
property that they accumulated by using the privileges their offices provided them,
totaling an amount that exceeded far beyond the revenues allocated to the office itself.69

68

Sinans original plan was to directly tax these provincial governors. When this plan was opposed,
however, he concealed the fact that he was indirectly taxing the tax-exempt askeri class and came up with
a new plan. According to this, the taxes in arrears, unpaid by tax collectors and inspectors for nine years,
would be reserved for the reconstruction of the Navy while the provincial authorities responsible for
collecting these taxes would pay in advance, given the urgency with which the fleet had to be put together,
and then collect the money from the taxes. Given that these taxes were hard to be collected (they were
taxes in arrears for a good reason: A hundred or so tax collectors who defaulted on their debts were in jail
at the time), Sinan Pasha basically followed the example of Selim II and used the private wealth of the
Ottoman elite for state business, proving the blurriness of the line between state coffers and those of its
officers. Fodor, Between Two Continental Wars, 179.
69
Baki Tezcan gives a couple of interesting examples of Ottoman elites who left behind huge fortunes that
they could only have amassed by using their political power and personal connections. For Rstem and
Semiz Ali Pashas see. Tezcan, Searching for Osman, 147-8. One needed be neither a Pasha, nor a high
level officer to produce extra income from his personal connections; for the example of Ali Efendi, the
newly appointed judge of Mecca, see. Ibid., 111-2.

363

One of the many functions that the Ottoman grandees had to undertake on behalf
of the state was espionage. The responsibility of building up intelligence networks and
recruiting spies mostly fell on them, rather than the central government, quite contrary to
the Venetian and Habsburg examples where spies were employed and supervised by the
bureaucracy. The Sultan and the Ottoman grandees employed, as a part of their
household, several spies whom they generally reimbursed from the financial resources at
their disposal. This plurality of employers behind Ottoman spies did not escape the
attention of the contemporaries either. The Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Lope de
Soria, for instance, detected an Ottoman spy, sea del Turco o de Abrayn Bassa o del
Gritti.70 This created the awkward situation whereby agents we presume to be in Ottoman
service may serve not the abstract concept of the state interest, but rather those of their
employers who, even though part of the Ottoman elite, may have different sets of
preferences than the state, especially given that their careers depended on the presents
and the bribes they were supposed to distribute to their superiors, including the Sultan.
The following examples would illustrate my point better: Salomon Ashkenazi, a
close advisor to the Ottoman Grand Vizier Sokollu, for instance, smuggled in his shoes
the letters that the Venetian bailo was sending to Venice during the War of 1570-3.
Ashkenazi was sending these letters to Crete among his own correspondence with a ship
that he chartered for that purpose. When one day his courier died in the Duchy of Naxos,
his rival Joseph Nasis men sequestered the letters and sent them to their boss. Nasi
immediately went to the Sultan and had Ashkenazi imprisoned. The latter was almost

70

AGS, E 1310, fol. 155 (7 August 1534).

364

executed if not for his master Sokollu who intervened and saved his life.71 Shortly after
when he was arrested for the second time, Sokollu would save him once again. Now, who
did Ashkenazi work for? Definitely, not the Ottoman Empire to which he betrayed. He
could be furthering his own interests, given his close relations with Venice72 in whose
territory he was born, of whose bailo he was the physician and whose favours he needed
because of his extensive commercial ventures.73 Even if Ashkenazi served Venice for his
own private reasons; what about when he was helping the Habsburg envoy Margliani
during the Ottoman-Habsburg truce negotiations; did he have similar connections in
Naples or Spain as well? Hardly. Therefore, it could alternatively be argued that by
helping the Venetian bailo, Ashkenazi was serving, at least partly, the interests of his
master as well. Even though his betrayal was undisputed, the Ottoman Grand Vizier
saved this Jewish physician from an Ottoman prison twice and did not heed to Ulu Alis
advice to hang him.74 What could this mean other than that the Pasha endorsed his actions
and that everybody was aware of the fact that Sokollu himself was in a double game,
walking a fine line between furthering his own interest (the humiliation of his rivals Nasi,
Piyale and Mustafa who started the War of Cyprus that Sokollu opposed as well as
handsome Venetian bribes he might expect) and proving his worth to the state
(negotiating a preferable treaty). Would the same Grand Vizier not order Ashkenazi to
bribe his influential colleague Ahmed Pasha so that he had the order to imprison the bailo
71

Arbel, Trading Nations:; idem, Salomone Ashkenazi: mercante e armatore, in Il mondo ebraico: gli
ebrei tra Italia nord-orientale e impero asburgico dal medioevo alleta contemporanea, ed. Giacomo
Todeschini and Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini (Pordenone : Studio tesi, 1991), 116.
72
Born in Udine, he took, or at least pretended to have taken, pride in being a Venetian citizen. He was
originally a client of the Venetian bailo who was the very person who first introduced him to Sokollu. His
reputation in Venice was so much that he could intervene on behalf of the Jewish community in Venice that
was banished from the city by the authorities.
73
A Venetian document (ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 12, cc. 50r (4 October 1580 reads: As you know that the
Doctor [i.e., Ashkenazi] makes the profession of serving our Signoria.
74
ASV, SDC, fil. A7-6E, fols. 14-7; Sola, Uchal, 206.

365

abrogated?75 We should finally add that among the things Ashkenazi, authorized by
Sokollu, negotiated with the bailo towards the finalization of a peace treaty was a lump
sum payment to be made to his master in exchange for his good-will towards the
Republic, separate from the compensation money destined for the Ottoman state.76
Similarly in 1567, Joseph Nasi informed the Venetian bailo that the Ottomans
were planning an attack on Cyprus.77 It seems surprising at first glance that this
information came from the very person whom the Venetians would curse three years later
as their greatest enemy and the mastermind behind the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus and
by extension the consequent War of 1570-3. He would even be held responsible for the
fire in the Venetian Arsenal in 1569. The explanation is simple however: by betraying
this information, Nasi, who had troubles with the French crown at the moment over an
unpaid loan, was basically trying to better his relations with Venice for his own
commercial purposes.78 In a more daring way, the Ottoman Grand Admiral Ulu Ali was
manipulating the Sultan with false information in 1582, in order to persuade him to send
the navy to the West. One of his agents, Agustin Manuele, who worked for the Habsburgs
as well and who was saved from possible execution with the intervention of Ulu Ali,
spread the (false) rumour that the Habsburgs were preparing a great armada.79
These were by no means isolated incidents. It was a part of the Ottoman political
culture to accept bribes from foreign ambassadors; a quick look at the Parti Secrete and
Dispacci in ASV as well as several printed contemporary works penned by these

75

Arbel, Trading Nations, 80.

ASV, SDC, fil. A7-6E, 29 January 1572, m.v.; Romano Canosa, Lepanto: Storia della Lega Santa
contro i Turchi (Roma: Sapere, 2000), 256.
77
ASV, SDC, fil. 2, fol. 137 (10 July 1567).
78
Arbel, Trading Nations, 58-9.
79
AGS, E 1152, fol. 40 (6 April 1582). ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 6, fols. 67-69 (3 February 1581, m.v.).
76

366

ambassadors would demonstrate to us the extent to which these diplomats were defending
the interests of their masters by bribes. Ranging from ulaks who gave away the secrets
they carried,80 to chauses who turned a blind eye to foreign ambassadors very actions
which they were assigned to prevent,81 from the aas of the Palace who sold information
to foreign ambassadors,82 to imperial dragomans who related the details of discussions in
the Divan83 and mistranslated documents in favour of their benefactors,84 officers from
all ranks were engaged in secret diplomacy in the corruption-ridden Ottoman capital. A
handsome present would make sure that an Ottoman pasha advocated for a given states
interests in the Divan to the greatest extent possible, walking a similar fine line as
Sokollu. The deal for sure included the exchange of information; from bottom to the top,
everybody in the Ottoman administration sold information, including the members of the
imperial family. The Jewish kira of the Sultans wife, Safiye, for instance, was providing
the Austrian ambassador with information regarding the Ottoman plans against Hungary
at such a crucial time, right before the start of the War of 1593-1606. The kira obviously
was rewarded handsomely by the ambassador; but the Sultana was directly involved as
well.85

80

ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 5, fols. 57-8 (26 October 1578); AGS, E 1063, fol. 35 (30 June 1573); E 1068,
fol. 32; E 1079, fols. 15 (12 November 1578), 60 (25 March 1579) and 136.
81
Wratislaw, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas, 115; AGS, E 1338, fol. 36 (27 July 1580).
82
Ibid., 102.
83
AGS, E 1072, fol. 14 (15 December 1575).
84
Charrire, vol. III, 85.
85
When one of the ambassadors men became a Muslim and brought the letters incriminating the Sultana,
however, the cunning Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha did nothing but to keep it to himself. Wratislaw,
Adventures of Baron Wenceslas, 103, 109-116. Baron Wratislaw identified this Empress as the mother of
the Ottoman Sultan. However, this is not possible since the mother of Murad III, Nurbanu, died in 1583 and
the mother of Mehmed III, Safiye, became the Valide Sultan only when his son ascended to the throne in
1595. Baron Wratislaw must have been confused because when he left Constantinople, Safiye was the
Valide Sultan. Therefore, in 1593, she was selling information in the capacity of the wife, and not the
mother, of the Ottoman Sultan.

367

Even for Ottomans themselves, it was conventional wisdom that relations and
networks established by bribes and presents were essential tools in participating in
factional politics and affecting the decision-making process. For instance, when the
Governor-General of Algeria Hasan Pasha asked for the Ottoman Navy in Western
Mediterranean in 1564, he was immediately reminded that he sent very few presents.
When his predecessor Salih Pasha made a similar demand in 1555, he had sent 100.000
ducats, excluding the presents to the pashas in the Divan. The next year, Hasan Pasha
would not repeat the same error of neglecting this essential rule of Ottoman politics and
underestimating Constantinoples greed. Thus he would convince the Ottomans to send
their navy to the Western Mediterranean and undertake the siege of Malta.86
In short, the Ottoman secret service as well followed the suit and remained in a
rather more different, even though not necessarily less effective, form than its Habsburg
and Venetian counterparts. Therefore, in order to understand the true nature of Ottoman
information gathering systems, it is necessary to focus on intelligence networks that
worked for not directly the state, but some of these grandees. The following pages focus
on some of these networks.
6.4.

PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS AT THE SERVICE OF THE

OTTOMAN STATE
Naturally, the responsibility of gathering information regarding the developments

in the Mediterranean fell on the shoulders of those grandees who took a close interest in
the Ottomans Mediterranean policy and thus who had a stake at using information for
their own political ends, i.e., advocating for the policies that would serve their interests
the most.
86

Sola, Uchal, 111.

368

6.4.1. Ulu Alis network

The Grand Admirals, for instance, had to develop such intelligence networks, not
only in order to be informed of recent developments, but also in order to be able to
defend their own position in the Ottoman Divan regarding the Ottoman foreign policy.
For instance, Ulu Ali, the ardent opponent of the Ottoman-Habsburg truce
negotiations,87 used the gathered information, the intercepted documents and a captured
slave, all attesting to a Habsburg attack on North Africa, in order to lobby against the
Ottoman Habsburg truce.88 Habsburg suspicions that his relatives might be spying for
him notwithstanding,89 Ulu entertained a good number of spies dispersed along the
Mediterranean shores. In 1572, one of his spies in Messina wrote him that the Christian
fleet set sail, urging him not to return to the capital and stay on the sea.90 A year later,
Ulu was reported to have sent molte spie to Naples in order to learn how the OttomanVenetian peace was taken there. In my opinion, this was just another move on his behalf
to gather useful information that would consolidate his position vis--vis the Ottoman
foreign policy; he was looking for a proof to back him in front of the Sultan to whom he
kept writing that the Venetians could not make peace with the Ottomans without
Habsburg consent.91 Among his many spies in Naples, reported Diego de Mallorca, the
friar of la Goleta and then captive in Constantinople, there was a Morisco of Valencia

87

Grand Admirals fortunes were directly related to the Ottoman foreign policy; this is why they
(especially those with a corsair background) constantly lobbied for war in the Mediterranean which meant
more money, slaves and lavish positions in the state for their followers.
88
AGS, E 1338, fols. 15 (30 June 1580), 19 (2 July 1580) and 20 (7 July 1580).
89
For instance, his cousin Ruger Belhomo became subject to such suspicions which were not totally
unjustified. It was one of his relatives during the War of 1570-3 that informed Kara Hoca of the enemy
navys whereabouts. Sola, Uchal, 59; Valente, Vita di Occhial, 125.
90
AGS, E 1331, fol. 232 (10 September 1572).
91
AGS, E 1332, fol. 179 (6 May 1573).

369

who was easily entering the palace and the castle.92 In 1576, he sent the engineer of the
castle of Navarino to Corfu the engineer successfully took the plan of the entire island,
especially the fortress.93 In 1584, four of his spies arrived in Venice, two Calabrian
renegades with the plans of the castle of Candia with other two arriving from Naples
where they had several contacts.94 In August, in the island of Tabarca was discovered one
of his agents, a Sicilian renegade, who confessed that every year he was visiting the
Spanish shores, especially Valencia, on the orders of the Ottoman Grand Admiral. There
were others entrusted with the same task, he added, and named two of them.95 A couple
of months later, three of his spies were reported, with their full names, to be traveling to
Valencia and Naples from Bizerta.96
6.4.2. brahim Pashas network
It was not only the Grand Admirals, however, who had a stake at the Ottoman
foreign policy vis--vis the Mediterranean. Depending on their personality and the
political interests, some of the Ottoman Grand Viziers also employed spies in the
Mediterranean. A good example would be Ibrahim Pasha (o. 1523-1536), whose interest
in European politics recently provoked the attention of the Ottomanists.97 Glru
Necipolu showed us in detail how well-informed he was of political developments in
Italy such as the coronation of Charles V, a pompous celebration of Habsburg imperial
claims against which he felt obliged to stage a counter ceremony in Belgrade. 98 No

92

AGS, E 1144, fol. 212 (c. 1575).

AGS, E 1335, fol. 77 (10 September 1576).
94
AGS, E 1517, cuaderno XIII, fol. 21 (21 January 1584).
95
AGS, E 1417, fol. 172 (7 August 1584).
96
AGS, E 1417, fol. 181 (28 October 1584).
97
Turan, The Sultan s Favorite Necipolu, Representation of Power. On Ibrahim Pasha, also see.
Hester Donaldson Jenkins, Ibrahim Pasha, the Grand Vizir of Suleyman the Magnificent (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1911).
98
Necipolu, Representation of Power.
93

370

wonder given the extent of the Gritti network which worked under his patronage as well
as his own spies who roamed Italy! A certain Venetian named Marco de Nicolo, most
probably one of the jewelers which Lorenzo Gritti took to Constantinople in 1534,99
arrived in Venice, accompanied by one of Ibrahims men. Ibrahim asked for a safeconduct for Marco who was banished from the city because of a crime that he committed
in the past, The Serenissima did a surprising favor to the Pasha and authorized a safeconduct. Sent from the Ottoman army, Marcos mission seemed to be spying on Venice
as well as the Habsburgs and then proceed to France. While in Venice, he contacted the
Habsburg ambassador Lope de Soria. He not only revealed that he was a spy of Ibrahim
Pasha, but also offered his services to the Habsburgs stating that he was working for the
Ottomans by force. His asking too many questions about the Habsburg Navy as well as
his desire to come meet the Emperor, however, made the ambassador suspicious who
would cut [his] finger to catch him outside the Venetian dominions. When Marco left
Venice, he informed the authorities so that they could catch him.100 Marco would meet
his end, not in Habsburgs hand, however. The Ottomans, upon learning that he was a
double agent, would decapitate him in 1536.101 Another spy that worked for Ibrahim, a
Jew named Astrume Elia, was arrested and confessed under torture to have been a spy for
the Grand Vizier and, upon the latters death, to have returned with letters of
recommendation to join the many Jews in Naples that worked for the Ottomans
anyways.102 In 1534, the Habsburg counter-intelligence detected a band of spies of the

99

AGS, E 1311, fol. 23 (21 May 1534).

AGS, E 1311, fols. 40-2 (9 August 1535), 45-7 (15 July 1535), 48-51 (6 July 1535), 60-1 (24 June 1535)
and 149. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 4, cc. 38r-37v (7 October 1534), 50r (23 June 1535), 50v (12 July 1535),
51r (8 August 1535).
101
E 1312, fol. 12 (27 March 1536).
102
Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 80-2.
100

371

same league that Ibrahim Pasha, using the Gritti network, sent to Venice, Their mission
was to spy on the Habsburgs under the pretension of serving His Majesty, that is
feigning to offer projects of clandestine operations in order to freely travel in Habsburg
lands: 1. a spy that offered to come to Genoa to discuss Barbarossas defection 2. Juan
Mida, an engineer and a friend of Ibrahim Pasha and Alvise Gritti; 3. Fray Ludovico de
Martinengo from Brescia who was spying for both the Ottomans and the Valois; and 4.
Count Abbatis de Villanova who, formerly in the service of Emperor Maximilian II, was
hired by Lorenzo Gritti in Venice and recently joined the three.103
6.4.3. The Gritti Network
In order to set up a network, one did not have to be a member of the Ottoman
administrative and military structure. The influential courtier Alvise (Ludovico) Gritti104
and his brothers in this context played an important role in supplementing the Ottoman
secret service. Alvise was one of the three illegitimate children that Andrea Gritti had
while he was in Constantinople. Andrea was a grain merchant when the OttomanVenetian War erupted in 1499 and ended up being the very person who conducted the
103

AGS, E 1310, fols. 55 (7 August 1535), 166 (30 October 1534), 189 (17 August 1534) and 191 (11
August 1534); E 1311, fols. 67 (7 April 1535), 80 (13 March 1535), 103 (11 January 1534) and 124 (28
November 1534).
104
There are several works on Gritti. See for instance. Francesco della Valle, Una breve narrazione della
grandezza, virt, valore et della infelice morte dellIllustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del
Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et
General Capitano dellesercito Regno, appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re
Giovanni Re dOngaria, Magyar Trtnelmi Tr 3 (1857), 9-60; Heinrich Kretschmayr, Ludovico Gritti:
Eine Monographie, (Wien: Gerold, 18 6 Carla Coco, Alvise Gritti fra Veneti, Turchi e Ungheresi, in
Studi Miscellanei Uralici e Altaici, no: 20, ed. Andrea Csillaghy (Venice: Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina,
1984), 379-3 6 Aurel Decei, Aloisio Gritti au service de Soliman le Magnifique dapr s des documents
turcs indits (1533-1534 , Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu, eds. Jean Louis Bacqu-Grammont et al., 3
(1992), 103 Ferenc Szak ly, Lodovico Gritti in Hungary: 1529-1534 : a Historical Insight into the
Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry (Budapest: Akad miai Kiad , 1 5 Gizella Nemeth and
Adriano Papo, Ludovico Gritti: Un principe-mercante del Rinascimento tra Venezia i Turchi e la orona
dUngheria, (Friuli: Edizioni della Laguna, 2002 G bor Barta. Gritti Ludovicusun Macar Valilii
(1531-1534 , Belleten 263 (2008): 251-2 3, Elvin Otman, The Role of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman
politics in the Context of the Hungarian Question (1526-1534 (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2009).
Note the differences in the spelling of Grittis first name.

372

peace negotiations between the two powers in 1503.105 Thus, he gained an impressive
influence in both Venice and Constantinople. As Andrea was furthering his career in
other fields, as a renowned general who saved Venice from utter destruction during the
League of Cambrai (1508-1516) and later as the Doge of Venice (o. 1523-1538), Alvise
sought his fortunes elsewhere. In 1506, he left Venice for Constantinople where he
befriended Ibrahim Pasha and Suleyman I. He became an important advisor to both in
European affairs and became influential on the Ottomans policy vis--vis Hungary
whose crown of St. Stephen he sought for himself. In order to achieve his ends, he
naturally had to develop a large network of spies and informants whose activities showed
an impressive diversity, judging from the rumours and gossips attributing him several
projects: guiding the Ottoman fleet against Italy, provoking French to enter Milan,
aspiring to be the King of Naples, organizing a Protestant revolt, governing Vienna on
behalf of the Ottomans and destroying Venice.106 He even sent a Genoese to offer Andrea
Doria to leave the Habsburg service for that of the Ottomans.107 In November 1533, for
instance, two of his spies that fell in Habsburgs hands, made very interesting confessions.
According to them, Gritti was negotiating an anti-Habsburg alliance with the Valois and
the Tudors as well as several other princes on behalf of the Ottoman Emperor. While a
large Ottoman army, paid by France, attacked the Habsburgs, Gritti himself would invade
Croatia, Slavonia and Hungary with his allies. In the meantime, Charles Vs enemies in
the Empire, namely the Dukes of Bavaria and Wrtemberg and the Count of Hesse would

105

For his mission for the ratification of the treaty, see. BNM, IT. VII. 878 8652 Andrea Gritti,
Copialettere.
106
Robert Finlay, Al Servizio del Sultano: Venezia, i Turchi e il Mondo Cristiano, 1523-1538, in
Renovatio Urbis: Venezia nellet di Andrea Giritti, ed. Manfredo Tafuri (Roma: Oficina Edizioni, 1984),
100.
107
AGS, E 1367, fol. 60.

373

create disturbances in Germany.108 Even if mostly exaggerated, these rumours reflected

Grittis extensive contacts and networks as well as his perceived influence on Ottoman
politics.
Alvise Gritti aptly used his familial connections in the service of his intelligence
network. His father, the Doge of Venice, regularly sent him information regarding
European politics to be remitted to Ibrahim Pasha.109 Alvise also found in his brothers
able lieutenants who contributed to the well-functioning of the Gritti network. In 1531,
Zorzi (Giorgio) Gritti was reported to be spying on what went on in the Christendom for
the Ottomans.110 In February 1531, on Alvises orders, he went to Venice and then to
Paris on a secret mission with the alibi of recovering 10.000 ducats that a French agent in
the court of Jnos Zpolya owed to Alvise. He arrived to the French capital in May and
was arrested by an imperial agent on his way back, in a tavern in Chambre, Savoy, only
to be released a week later at the Emperors orders. An envoy to France and the son of
the Doge of Venice, Zorzi was not even tortured so that his secrets could be
strapped.111 When the Habsburgs captured the Ragusan Serafin de Gozo, an
intermediary between Ottomans and the French in 1535, they found in his sack letters
written by no other than the same Zorzi, leaving the Doge in a very difficult position. He
had some explanations to make not only to the Emperor, but also to the Sultan and the
French king.112 Alvises other brother Lorenzo reported to be bringing jewelers, among

108

COSP, Spain, 4/2 (London: Institute of Historical Research, 1882), 858-868 (19 November 1533).
ASV, Ducali et Atti Diplomatici, b. 22; Carla Coco, Alvise Gritti fra Veneti, Turchi e Ungheresi, in
Studi miscellanei Uralici e Altaici dedicati ad Alessandro Krsi-Csoma nel secondo centenario della
nascita (1784-1984), ed. Andrea Csillaghy (Venezia: Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina, 1984), 383.
110
AGS, E 1308, fol. 186.
111
Finlay, Al Servizio del Sultano, 4.
112
AGS, E 1311, fols. 140-3 (5 October 1535), 144 (8 October 1535) and 194-6 (11 October 1535).
109

374

them the afore-mentioned Marco de Nicolo, from Venice to Constantinople in 1534.113

Even after the deaths of Alvise, his two teenage sons and Zorzi in 1536 and that of
Andrea in 1538, Lorenzo went on using his dual position as a trans-imperial subject.
Having received authorization from the Venetians for a truce, Lorenzo went to Edirne
under the pretense of recovering his brothers patrimony and contacted the Chief
Dragoman (Ba tercman) Yunus Bey. Hethus instigated the peace negotiations that
ended the Ottoman-Venetian War in 1540.114
Here, too, it is possible to see that the Gritti network furthered the interests of the
Gritti family and did not hesitate to play a double game and injure the interests of the
Ottoman Empire. An expert on using information for his own political ends, this son of
the Doge (and thus the Turkish name for Pera where he lived, Beyolu) regularly
furnished Venice with information on things Ottoman.115 In 1531, for instance, Alvise not
only informed the Venetians that the Ottomans would attack Austria and Italy
simultaneously next year,116 but also warned the Pope that an Ottoman attack was
imminent and offered his mediation.117 Needless to say, the information he sent was
accurate; the Ottomans staged simultenous attacks on both fronts in 1532.
We know relatively less on Grittis activities, because he lived in the first half of
the 16th century that left us a less amount of documentation compared to the second half
of the same century. Had his career not ended abruptly in 1534, while fighting for the
Hungarian crown with his private army, one wonders what other episodes the Gritti
113

AGS, E 1311, fol. 23 (21 May 1534).

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 4, cc. 106r-107v (6 January 1538, m.v.), 109r-110v (19 January 1538, m.v.);
AGS, E 1314, fols. 120 (8 October 1539), 126, 144 and 147 (25 February 1539).
115
For instance, see. Sanudo, I Diarii, vol. LI, 312, 379, 434 and 517-8.
116
Jean Aubin, Une frontire face au p ril ottoman: la Terre dOtrante (152 -1532 , in Soliman Le
Magnifique et son Temps: Actes du Colloque de Paris Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, 7-10 Mars
1990, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: La Documentation, Franaise, 1992), 476.
117
Finlay, Al Servizio del Sultano, 5.
114

375

network would have provided us; let us hope these illustrative examplessufficed to
demonstrate to the reader the extent of this network.
6.4.4. Sokollu Mehmed Pashas network
Another important Ottoman grandee who demonstrated a keen interest in
Mediterranean and European politics was the omnipotent Ottoman Grand Vizier Sokollu
Mehmed Pasha (o. 1565-1579). His interest in espionage as well as the personal
relationship between Ottoman spies and their employers is evident from the insistence
and diligence the Pasha showed in order to rescue one of his agents from the prisons of
Venice. Sokollu had the idea that his spy, Mahmud from Castelnuovo, had to be
delivered to him as a part of the exchange of prisoners-of-war. The Venetians,
considering Mahmud a very dangerous spy, however, had no intention to set him free,
especially given that he was caught during the peacetime, and thus could not be
considered part of the deal for exchanging prisoners. For years, they stalled the Pasha by
presents and good words. After 11 years of negotiation, they finally poisoned him,
informing the Ottomans (Sokollu was already dead) that he passed away in prison after a
long illness. Mahmud was not the only spy that the Pasha had in the West. 118 In
September 1572, one of his agents who had previously been to Naples and other places
and sailed on the capitana of the Maltese knights, left Ragusa for Rome under the cover
of a ransom agent.119 In January 1574, one of the Governor of Delvines men named
Kasm elebi informed the Habsburgs of the arrival of two renegade engineers with
letters from the Pasha. One of them had previously spied on the fortifications of Corfu for

118

ASV, ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 83v-83r, 84v-85r, 85v-86r and 86r-86v (all February 1575); reg. 12, cc.
number lost (21 May 1579); reg. 13, cc. 6r (23 June 1583), 30v (20 January 1585, m.v.) and 34v (9 July
1586); fil. 20, 16 October 1577 and 26 October 1577; LettAmb, b. 6, fols. 56-7 (22 December 1582).
119
AGS, E 1331, fol. 232 (10 September 1572).

376

the Ottomans. Their mission was to go to Corfu and then to Puglia under the disguise of
ransom agents.120 Sokollus network had an impressive geographical scope. In 1567, he
sent a number of Moriscos to spy in Sicily, Spain, Italy and Germany;121 the same year
the Habsburgs realized that through a Mudejar of Malaga that had a shop in Galata, he
was receiving regular information even from the strategic castle of la Goleta in North
Africa.122 In 1578, he sent a Flemmish renegade to his native Antwerp in order to learn
the situation of the Dutch War, a critical piece of information amidst the negotiations for
an Ottoman-Habsburg truce and rumours of a joint Avis-Habsburg expedition against
Morocco where the Ottomans had only recently enthroned their candidate.123
6.4.5. The Nasi Network
Sokollu found a staunch rival in the person of Joseph Nasi, not only in terms of
factional politics, but also those of espionage as well. This influential Jewish courtier was
born as a Portuguese Marrano in 1520 and a member of the Mendes/Benveniste family of
bankers. Escaping persecution, he moved all around Europe. In the meantime, his
banking business thrived, allowing him to familiarize with Charles V and Mary of
Hungary (he was even knighted jousting partner of Prince Maximilian) and to lend
money to the French king. In 1554, He came to Constantinople where he could openly
profess his religion and reached to prominence when the Ottoman prince with whom he
established a personal relationship, Selim, became the next Ottoman Sultan.124 Enjoying
the advantages of his extensive financial networks along the Mediterranean as well as the
connections that the Jewish communities would have provided him, Nasi was in a unique
120

AGS, E 1064, fol. 100.

Sola, Uchal, 141.
122
AGS, E 1132, fol. 28 (4 December 1567).
123
ASF, AMP, fil. 4277, fol. 222.
124
On Nasi, see. Roth, The House of Nasi.
121

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position to broker information. Furthermore, as the close confidant of Selim II who did
not hesitate to create him the Duke of Naxos in 1566,125 and as a participant in Ottoman
factional politics (he was a close ally of Mustafa and Piyale Pashas against the
omnipotent Grand Vizier Sokollu Pasha), Nasi had to engage in information gathering.
The Sultans trust in the efficiency of his network as well as his expertise on European
affairs is evident from his reply to Sokollu when the latter told him that a Jew should not
have the government of an Ottoman province: Nasi was a good servant and there was
nobody who was better informed of Christian affairs.126
An interesting document from AGS reveals the names of tens of Jewish spies that
belonged to Nasis network, dispersed all around Europe, in Bologna, Ferrara, Prague,
Candia, Lvow, Lublin, Cracow, Cutin, etc.127 Again, as was the case with Gritti, rumours
may have exaggerated, if not his political power, at least the efficiency of his secret
service. Especially during the war which erupted between the Ottoman and Venice in
1570, he became a scapegoat amidst the war-time anti-Semitic paranoia that dominated
the Serenissima that took things as far as banning the Jews from the city. Nasis special
position in the Ottoman court as well as the anti-Venetian policy he advocated made
things even worse. The mysterious fire in the Venetian Arsenal in 1569 was attributed to

125

Even though his successor in Naxos was appointed with the title of governor, sancakbeyi, Nasis title
was the Duke of Naxos, Nak e Dkas. See for a document where Nasi was mentioned as a Duke and his
successor as a governor. BOA, MD, XLI, no. 561 (H. 21 L 987/A.D. 10 December 1579). See also. BOA,
MD, XXXI, no. 153 (H. 7 Ca. 985/A.D. 23 July 1577). The Ottomans conquered the islands from the
Venetians in 1540, but they kept the Duke of the island in power in exchange for a yearly tribute of 4.000
ducats. The reigning Duke John was deposed in 1566 and imprisoned in Constantinople. Apparently when
Nasi was given the island, its status as an Ottoman vassal continued and it did not become a full fledged
Ottoman territory until the death of Nasi in 1579. There are proofs in the Ottoman archives that the
Ottomans used the title of the Duke for Nassis predecessors. BOA, MD, VI, no. 536 (H. 16 Ca. 972/A.D.
20 December 1564 calls Nasis predecessor Nak e Ceziresi Dkas while MD, VII, no. 1555 cite the
Duke as Nak e cezireleri zabiti olan Dka nam.
126
ASV, CX-LettAmb, b. 3, fols. 179-180 (26 March 1569).
127
AGS, E 656, fol. 2; E 664, fol. 91.

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his agents,128 unjustly, but not so unexpectedly, given that he had an extensive network of
spies in Venetian possessions. In Venice, he had been seen as a threat since the 1560s. In
1564, he was thought to incite Emanuele Filiberto, the Duke of Savoy to reclaim his right
on Cyprus. In 1568, a Venetian renegade from the Ottoman navy informed the
Serenissima that Nasi was given the task to go personally spy on some Venetian
fortresses in the Archipelago with his galley. The same year, he was thought to be
devising a plot to seize Famagusta which the Ottomans would conquer two years later on
his advice.129 In January 1570, the Council of Ten warned the Bailo of Crete to keep an
eye on the Jews, especially those who were Nasis agents. With necessary caution and
secrecy, he should try to intercept the letters that these agents wrote to Nasi and learn
their true intentions.130 These rumours were not confined to the sphere of OttomanVenetian relations. Months before the Moriscos Revolt of the Alpujarras erupted, there
were rumours that he was going to conquer Granada at the head of an Ottoman navy.131
During the war, however, the Venetians detected and caught several of his spies
with their fear and hatred having been further consolidated. In June 1570, the bailo
protested against Ragusa who allowed the passage of one of Nasis agents who would
later be captured in Naples.132 In July 1570, one of his men, Salamon Zise was captured
and the letters, which he was supposed to carry, dressed up as a Christian merchant, to

128

Bartolomeo Sereno, Commentari della Guerra di Cipro e della Lega dei Principi Cristiani contro il
Turco (Monte Cassino: Tipi di Monte Cassino, 1845), 16-7.
129
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 101.
130
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, cc. 50v-50r (25 January 1569, m.v.).
131
AGS, E 1326, fol. 117 (29 May 1568).
132
Preto, Servizi Segreti, 102. In April, Nasi was reported to have sent two agents from Lucha to spy on the
Venetians, named Carlo Saminiati and Benedetto Simoni, AGS, E 1058, fol. 40 (5 April 1570). Simoni was
captured in Naples and put to torture. Threatened with execution, he did not confess, however, even when
the Habsburgs brought a sacristan to scare him. AGS, E 1058, fol. 42 and 214.

379

Venice, Bologna and other cities, were sequestered.133 In August, the bailo denounced
another of his agents, this time located in Thine.134 Even after the conclusion of the war
and the fall of Cyprus to the Ottoman hands, Nasis networks seemed active in Venetian
territories. In 1577, the Bailo reported that Nasis lieutenant in Naxos had an operational
intelligence network in Candia and was in direct contact with both Nasi and Ulu Ali.135
A month later, the Council of Ten warned the Provveditor Generale of Corfu that he
should be careful with Aron Mazza, Nasis spy.136
He also had close connections in the Low Countries where erupted a revolt that
would drain the financial resources of the Habsburg Empire for many years to come. If
the Ottomans did have a strategy concerning the Dutch Revolt, Nasis connections
played the central role in the shaping of this strategy as well as in the execution of
policies. He knew certain local leaders of the revolt, of Marrano origin like himself, from
Antwerp where he spent his youth.137 A 17th century historian mentions, although without
citing a source, that Nasi sent a letter to Antwerp in 1566, urging them to revolt against
the Habsburgs.138 Furthermore, in 1569, with the hope of using his influence in the
Ottoman court, the leader of the revolt, William of Nassau, the Prince of Orange sent him
an envoy.139
The following interesting example would demonstrate to us the extent of Nasis
interests and networks. Zuan Vancimuglio from Vicenza, the assistant of an Inquisitor in
Rome, learned a precious truth in the prisons of the Inquisition from the father of the very
133

ASV, CX, Parti Criminali, reg. 11, cc. 78r-78v (3 July 1570); Preto, Servizi Segreti, 102.
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 9, c. 87r (19 August 1570).
135
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 118r-118v (16 January 1576, m.v.).
136
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 119v-120r (15 February 1576, m.v.), 130v (17 May 1577).
137
Roth, The House of Nasi, 58.
138
F. Strada, De Bello Gallico (Frankfurt am Main, 1699), 163-4; Roth, The House of Nasi, 33-4.
139
Charrire, III, 61.
134

380

person who poisoned the Queen of Poland, Bona Sforza. The Queen had retired to Bari,
her patrimony, upon the death of his husband, the King of Poland. Her favourite Gioan
Lorenzo Pappacoda not only poisoned her in 1557, upon the orders of Philip II who
borrowed a huge sum from the Queen, but also forged a will which left Bari to the
Habsburgs. Surprisingly, Vancimuglio had also met a heretic in prison who had been in
talks with Nasi so that the latter could make sure the Ottoman fleet attacked Italy.
Vancimuglio quickly made up his mind and descended to Bari whose population was
discontent with ending up with the assassin of their queen as their governor and wanted
the rule of the King of Poland. If he rejected, they were even ready to accept the Ottoman
rule under which they would happily live, paying only the more acceptable Ottoman tax
imposed upon the People of the Book, harac, or, as the document states, caraggi minima.
Vancimuglio passed to the Balkans, with a letter of recommendation written by a
Christian prelate to Nasi in his pocket, and went to Herzegovina. He was caught by the
local authorities, though, who sent him to the Grand Vizier. Sokollu, realizing the
opportunity of discovering Nasis clandestine measures without authorization, took him
in front of the Sultan. Nasi was dismissive, stating that he had amicitia all over the world
in the Sultans service in order to inform him of events in Christianity. The Sultan was
content with his reply, consolidating our argument that the Ottoman secret diplomacy
was based on personal networks that operated not necessarily with authorization from and
under the supervision of the center and that personal rivalries meant separate intelligence
networks that did not work in cooperation. Nasi could employ spies that sent him
information from Europe and the Mediterranean without the knowledge of the Sultan and
much to the chagrin of his rival, the Grand Vizier Sokollu. The triumphant Nasi had

381

Vancimuglio liberated and even gave him an escort on his way to Poland, with the sole
condition that he should return to Constantinople. Before taking his voyage, Vancimuglio
stayed six months in Nasis house, once again proving us the importance of personal
households in Ottoman information gathering efforts.140 I should cut the story short,141
and just add that Vancimuglio was impressed with Nasis intelligence networks in
Poland. According to letters of warnings he sent to the Venetians that Nasi had agents
everywhere in Poland; all the Jews in Leopoli (Lviv), for instance, were his kin and they
were regularly sending him information.142
Once again we see that the interests which served the Nasi network did not
necessarily coincide with those that served the Ottoman Empire. At the zenith of his
influence in the Ottoman capital, he saw no contradiction in negotiating with the
Habsburgs for personal gains. True, he had an unstable relationship with Philip II who
even acquiesced to Giovanni Barellis advice to either kidnap or assassinate Nasi,
because he had an extensive network that worked against the Habsburgs.143 Nevertheless,
there were better episodes as well. His alleged hatred for the Spanish should not be as
deep as Baron suggested.144 In 1567, during the peace negotiations between Vienna and
Constantinople, for instance, he sent an agent to France to meet with the Habsburg
ambassador in an effort to capitalize on Philip IIs desire to be included in the treaty

140

ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 3, fols. 147 (10 June 1568), 179-80 (26 March 1569).
For a comprehensive study on Vancimuglio that I have only recently discovered, see. Francesco
Giannini, La carriera di una spia: Giovanni Vancimuglio da Vicenza (1527-1571? (Tesi di Laurea,
Universit di Pisa, 2011).
142
ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 19, fol. 211 (6 July 1570).
143
This was not Barellis only objective. See. AGS, E 1132, fols. 155 (26 July 1569), (15 September 1569),
193 (23 October 1569), fol. 194 (12 November 1569), 196, 205, 206 and 207.
144
Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, volume XVIII: The Ottoman Empire,
Persia, Ethiopia, India and China, 2nd ed. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1982), 92.
141

382

indirectly without sending an official ambassador and thus without losing reputation.145
Nasi should have known that the position of the Ottoman Empire was to sign only a
separate truce with Philip II who had to bear the humiliation of sending an ambassador.
Therefore, his offer should be designed for no other reason but to further his personal
interests. Even though this came to naught, in 1570, he entered into negotiations with
Madrid once again, asking for a safe conduct for his entire household and expressing his
desire to re-convert to Christianity.146 The negotiations were still going on in 1577; Philip
IIs letter which Aurelio Santa Croce forged in 1577 was originally written to Nasi,
thanking for his contributions to the crown.147 Again, the documentation describe a
different Nasi than Barons idealized version who made deliberate efforts to undermine
the overwhelming power of Spain because he felt that such a policy was dictated by the
genuine interest of both his newly adopted fatherland and world Jewry.148 To me, it
seemed any policy he may adapt would be dictated by pure self-interest.
In the light of the afore-mentioned evidence, it is hard to share Barons apologetic
opinion that Nasi was not spying for the Ottomans and that he felt obliged to remit the
information he had learned in the course of his business activity, or from
correspondence with his agents or customers, and definitely not as a result of a cloak
145

Rosenblatt, Joseph Nasi.

AGS, E 1137, fols. 130 (17 August 1572) and 223 (20 February 1572); E 1141, fol. 11 (15 February
1574). Even though Rosenblatt (Joseph Nasi, 330-1) considers his move as a sign of his fall in disfavour
with the Ottoman Sultan, this could not be the case. In 1570, when his faction overcame Sokollu and
convinced the Sultan to attack Cyprus, Nasi was at the height of his power. Could he have genuinely
thought of going back to Europe? Or did he try to gain the trust of the Habsburgs, so that with the excuse of
negotiating with them he could more easily send his spies to the Habsburg lands? The latter is not unlikely.
Most Ottoman spies offered to visit the Habsburg monarch with interesting plans of sabotage and
defections in order to receive an official permission so that they could easily travel in Habsburg territories.
147
AGS, E 1071, fol. 191 (5 March 1577).
148
Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews,vol. XVIII, 2. Note Barons apologetic tone on p. 5
while dismissing Nasis letter to Philip II, in which he offered to return to Christianity, as simple forgery or
if not, a temporary aberration of a man who, under the impact of the Turkish defeat at Lepanto, feared
being executed or at least being deprived of his great fortune because of his earlier hawkish stand in the
war. Nasis move, according to the author, represented no more than an impulsive reaction.
146

383

and dagger affair.149 Even though, some of the conspiracies attributed to Nasis spies,
such as the 1569 Fire in the Venetian Arsenal, should be taken with a grain of salt, it is
obvious that Nasi was an eager spymaster who used the information his spies transmitted
to him for his own personal interests
6.4.6. The Mendes Network
Let us conclude this part with two other Jews who seem to have established
European-wide networks that enabled them to broker information. Alvaro Mendes, born
in Portugal as a member of a new Christian family, lived in India for ten years where he
made a fortune by farming diamond mines. Then he returned to Europe where he became
an intimate of the king of Portugal and established good relations with other European
monarchs. After embracing in 1580 the cause of Dom Antonio, the pretender of the
Portuguese throne against Philip II, he came to Constantinople in 1585 where he returned
to Judaism. His arrival was anticipated by the Ottomans who even sent a letter to the
Doge of Venice, indicating that he was invited from France and warning that he should
safely be transferred with his family and belongings from Venice to Ragusa,
accompanied by a trusted man.150 Imported thus, he became an influential figure in
Ottoman foreign policy regarding Europe and lobbied for an Ottoman English alliance
against the Habsburgs as well as an Ottoman military intervention on behalf of Dom
Antonio. In 15 2, one of his agents went to England to secure the Englands neutrality at
the dawn of a new Ottoman-Austrian War. In 1596, the same agent was this time in

149

Ibid., 90.
ASV, DocTR, b. 7, no. 931 (2-11 April 1584). Also see. BOA, MD, LX, no. 175 (H. 21 Za. 993 / A.D.
13 November 1585) for a similar order sent to kads, informing the arrival of a certain Musa from Portugal.
This Musa could be Alvaro Mendes who had not yet adopted his Jewish name, Solomon, in 1585.
150

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Spain, discussing the exchange of prisoners-of-war.151 He was a regular information

broker thanks to his extensive connections among the Jewish communities in Europe. In
1586, the Venetian bailo noted that he may be receiving information from his brother and
nephew that lived in Venice.152 If this is so, his connections were not only confined to
Venice. He was closely connected with Marranos in London and via his brother-in-law,
the Queens physician, he was in direct contact with the English government. He was the
one from whom the Ottomans first learned the defeat of the Armada in 1588.153 The same
year, a Habsburg spy noted that he became Siyavush Pashas adviser on Indian Ocean,
providing him with detailed information on Portuguese fortifications.154
6.4.7. The Passi Network
Another such figure was David Passi (known by the Ottomans as Firenk David), a
Jewish courtier and a confidant of Murad III. He played a decisive role in the Ottoman
factional politics and foreign policy by acting in many different roles and thus
epitomizing the factotum entrepreneur broker of this dissertation. Passi was an agent of
the pretender to the Portuguese throne, Dom Antonio, on whose behalf he negotiated a
joint alliance between the Ottoman Empire, England and King of France against the
Habsburgs with such power and influence in Constantinople that he was always present
in political discussions alongside other important figures such as the Grand Vizier, Grand
Admiral, the Janissary Agha, the Sultans secretary and the English ambassador. When
Sinan Pasha refused the Sultans orders to consult with David Passi in all matters

151

Roth, The House of Nasi, 213-4.

ASV, IS, b. 416, 15 October 1586.
153
COSP, vol. 8, no. 753 (9 October 1588); Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, vol. XVIII,
144; Avram Galanti, Trkler ve Yahudiler (stanbul: Gzlem Gazetecilik Basn ve Yayn, 1995), 138;
goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits, 83.
154
AGS, E 1090, fol. 9 (20 September 1588).
152

385

regarding this alliance, evoking the ante-litteram anti-Semitic155 51st and 82nd verses
(ayat) from the Surah al-Maidah and accusing him of being a Venetian and a Habsburg
spy,156 the Sultan warned him, according to the Venetian bailo Lippomano, that slaves
like [him] he hart in abundance, but never a one like David, probably alluding to all the
information about Christendom with which Passi furnishes the Sultan157 Although
working for many other governments as well, he also lent his intelligence network to the
Ottomans. In September 1585, the Inquisitori di Stato warned the bailo Lorenzo Bernardo
in a secret correspondence that from Venice and any place in Christianity, his agents
were regularly writing to Passi. The Inquisitors wanted him to check letters sent by the
Venetian postal service to learn their content as well as to whom these were addressed in
Venice.158 The bailo agreed that Passi had correspondents on Ottoman payroll in all
Christian courts and furthermore added that in four days, one of his agents would leave
the Ottoman capital for Ragusa in the presence of a chaus with explicit instructions to go
to Venice to spy on the preparations in the Venetian Arsenal and then pass to Flanders.
There he would gather information about the Dutch War and return the next spring.159 No
doubt was he playing a double game between Don Antonio, Philip II and the Ottoman
Sultan. In spite of the fact that he was one of the architects and mastermind behind this
expedition, he was the one who was contemplating, shortly before his fall, to send his
right-hand guy Guglielmo si Savoya to warn Philip II of an incoming Ottoman descend
155

On Sinan Pashas anti-semitic views related to his rivalry with Passi, see. Fodor, An Antisemite Grand
Vizier?.
156
Sahilliolu, Koca Sinan Pa ann Telhisleri, no. 8.
157
Lippomano goes on: Passi is a man of natural ability, and sufficient knowledge. I carefully weigh and
balance all he says, but I have frequently had occasion to find him correct; and so I think it well to attach
him as much as may be, for he is able to do great harm and great good. COSP, Vol. 8, No. 994 (5 January
1590, m.v.).
158
ASV, IS, b. 148, fol. 1 (25 September 1585). Also see. b. 416, 8 January 1585, m.v., 25 March 1586 and
2 August 1590.
159
ASV, IS, b. 433, 30 October 1585.

386

upon the Iberian coast and advise him to divert the expedition with money. 160 No other
than the same Lippomano described perfectly how adroit a broker of information and
factional politics David Passi was: [t]his David, for one truth tells a hundred lies; he
would betray us if he could; he is agent for Don Antonio of Portugal and in the
confidence of the King of Spain; he is the warm supporter of Venice, and the trusty spy
of the Sultan161
6.5.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

In addition to the reports of agents that were sent on ad-hoc missions as well as
information provided by provincial governors and personal networks, there were other
sources of information.
6.5.1. Men of both worlds
The Ottomans were diligent in acquiring information from the people who had
recently arrived from the enemy lands. As mentioned above, they frequently interrogated
the soldiers and sailors that were captured, the famous dils, who might either be forced to
reveal information or voluntarily offered it with the hope of recovering their liberty.162
Furthermore, Muslim slaves that arrived from Western Europe shared with the authorities
the observations that they made and the rumours that they heard during their captivity.
Some of these were run-aways; escape was a viable option especially for corsairs since
160

COSP, vol. 8, no. 1008 (2 February 1590, m.v.).

COSP, vol. 8, no. 1015 (16 February 1590, m.v.).
162
Ottoman documents do not specify whether some of these dils volunteered to give information. BOA,
MD, XII, nos. 60, 477, 478, 1005 and 1217 (H. 27 Z 979/A.D. 10 May 1572); XIV, nos. 517 (H. 24 Ra.
978/A.D. 26 August 1570), 520 (H. 21 Ra. 978/A/D/ 23 August 1570), 816 (Selh-i Ca. 978/A.D. 30
October 1570) and 1313 (26 N 978/A.D. 23 January 1571); XVI, nos. 34 (H. 20 Ca. 979/A.D. 10 October
1571), 640 (H. 23 Ca. 979/A.D. 13 October 1571) and 649 (H. 9 B 979/A.D. 27 November 1571); XXII,
no. 429 (H. 14 R 981/A.D. 23 August 1571); XXXI, no. 717 (H. 20 B 985/A.D. 3 October 1577 Murd,
azav t-i Hayredd n Pa a, ff. 235a and 238b. Cf. with the Ragusans who chose to reveal information
himself. AGS, E 1158, fol. 26 (3 November 1594) and a slave that offered Barbarossa the opportunity to
sack his own village in exchange for his liberty and some money, Gomra, Crnica de los Barbarrojas,
405.
161

387

they would be useful to a nearby galley or could find another way to leave the Christian
territories by sea.163 Some, on the other were either liberated by the sheer military force
of Ottoman galleys,164 or exchanged for Christian prisoners.165 Ottoman agents who
crossed the border to negotiate such exchanges gathered information as well. 166 The
Ottomans moreover seemed to have established contact with Muslim slaves during their
captivity. In 1573, Scipione, a Christian hermit from Mallorca that converted to Islam
was travelling to Rome to establish contact with Ottoman prisoners. 167 In their
correspondence with their families, these slaves seemed to have included information that
they overheard. For instance, when in 1574 a Morisco ransom agent arrived in
Constantinople with letters written by Muslim slaves, the Habsburg spies in the city were
quick to realize that these slaves were writing all that happen in those parts.168
Moreover, the turn-coats were ideal sources of information given their expertise
on the other sides politics and military as well as the fact that they recently came and
therefore could have the latest information.169 The Ottomans sought to make use of a
similar expertise by employing potential renegades, some of whom accepted to change

163

BOA, MD, XXI, no. 709 (H. 29 Z 980/A.D. 2 May 1573); XXVI, no. 833 (H. 15 B 982/A.D. 30 October
1574); LII, no. 816 (H. 13 Ra. 992/A.D. 26 March 1584); LV, no. 315 (H. 8 S 993/A.D. 8 February 1585);
AGS, E 1063, fol. 40 (June 1573 . Certain documents use the verb gelmek, to come, from which I
understand that they were not ransomed or liberated, but rather ran away. MD, X, nos. 5 and 171 (H. 21 B
978); XIV, no. 1532; LVIII, no. 60 (H. R 993/A.D. c. April 1585). The fact that in 1580, the Viceroy of
Naples threatened those who contemplated escape with execution and ordered the captains of the ships to
guard their ships during the night time to prevent that slaves who ran away use them proves that such
escapes were common. Gustavo Valente, Vita di Occhial (Milano: Casa Editrice Ceschina,1960), 139. See
for 14 reises that ran away from the castle of Naples in 15 1, AGS, E 1541, fol. 125 (12 March 1591).
164
BOA, MD, LII, no. 718 (H. 20 S 992/A.D. 3 March 1584).
165
BOA, MD, X, no. 292; XVI, no. 312 (H. 23 Z 979); LX, no. 606 (H. 26 Ca. 994 / A.D. 15 May 1586).
Rosi, Alcuni documenti idem, Nuovi documenti.
166
BOA, MD, X, no. 147 (H. 15 979 / A.D. 1 January 1572).
167
AV, Principi, no. 38, fol. 206 (11 July 1573).
168
AGS, E 1064, fol. 36 (4 May 1574).
169
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 472 (H. 16 N 980); Gomra, Crnica de los Barbarrojas, 375, 428.

388

their religion with the sole prospect of becoming a spy.170 A ransom agent and the
Trinitarian friar Cristobal Perez, for instance, would have almost converted to Islam had
the unofficial Habsburg ambassador/spymaster Margliani not imprisoned him in his
house and shipped him to the Inquisition in Rome.171 In 1570, arrived in Algiers a
Neapolitan who converted to Islam and offered the Governor-General a military strategy
to easily seize the Habsburg ships in a military confrontation.172 In 1571, when a number
of Hungarian nobles wanted to defect with the castles under their control to the Ottoman
side and convert to Islam, the Ottomans had to reject their defection in order not to break
the ahdname signed with Vienna, especially at such a crucial time when they were
fighting a war against a coalition of the Habsburgs, Venice and the Pope. What they did
instead was to assure that they would accept their offer in the future and to tell them that
they should send information regarding their vicinities in the meantime.173 There is also
the example of Gabriel Defrens, a French renegade who travelled in Europe as an
Ottoman spy for years and engaged in diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire, England
and the leader of the Dutch rebels, William of Orange. 174 Some of these renegades
achieved higher status in the Ottoman capital and received honors and positions in the
Ottoman military.175

170

BOA, MD, IV, nos. 742 and 743; ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 10, cc. 101v (2 March 1573) and 146v-147r (25
September 1573); AGS, E 1094, fol. 145 (1559); 1893, fol. 144 (1 February 1621).
171
AGS, E 1081, fols. 154 (4 November 1580), 163 (14 November 1580) and 170 (21 November 1580); E
1083, no. 58 (28 February 1581); E 1084, fol. 35 (6 June 1581); E 1338, fols. 22, 36 (27 July 1580), 59 (15
October 1580) and 74 (30 December 1580); E 1339, fol.127 (7 February 1581). Margliani was disturbed by
the fact that two of his spies confessed to the friar,
172
AGS, E 487, 22 February, 1 April and 6 April 1570.
173
BOA, MD, XII, no. 826 (H. 22 Ra. 979 / A.D. 13 August 1571).
174
Skilliter, Gabriel Defrens.
175
BOA, MD, XXV, no. 1615 (H. 10 S 982 / A.D. 31 May 1574) mentions the induction of a Spanish noble
from Valencia to the sol ulufeciler while AGS, E 1077, fol. 44 (4 and 5 April 1576) names a don Francisco
de Zorrilla who were given a handsome provision of 800 sultans from Sokollu.

389

The Ottomans not only interrogated the merchants and merchant ships that arrived
in their ports,176 but also employed them in their secret service. Using the ease with
which they could travel relatively unmolested, some of these roamed the Mediterranean
as Ottoman spies,177 while some facilitated the voyages of other spies by carrying them
between Ottoman and Christian ports with their ships.178
6.5.2. Disgruntled communities: Ottoman fifth columns179
Disgruntled communities constituted a veritable fifth column for the Ottomans
and provided them with information with the hopes of provoking an Ottoman military
campaign against their rulers.
6.5.2.1.

The Last Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula: The Moriscos

First of these communities were the Moriscos, the Muslims of the Iberian
Peninsula who, having converted at gunpoint, continued practicing Islam and hardly
forgot their Muslim past. Between the fall of Granada in 1492 and their final expulsion
from Castile and Aragon in 1609-1613, the Moorish communities in the Iberian
Peninsula posed a veritable threat to the Habsburg rule by establishing direct
communication with the Ottoman Sultan whom they invited, as the leader of the Muslim
world, to liberate his fellow Muslims from the Habsburg yoke. The Ottomans seemed to
be informed of their revolt in 1568 in advance.180 They supported it with weapons and

176

Isom-Verhaaren already demonstrated how an Ottoman suba interrogated an Albanian merchant who
travelled all around Europe for three years. Suba immediately informed the center with a report (TSMA,
Evrak 7671) of his investigation. Isom-Verhaaren, An Ottoman Report, 2 , 301. Also, see. AGS, E
1070, fol. 30 (10 March 1576).
177
AGS, E 1894, fols. 94 (21 October 1622), 95 (20 October 1622) and 96 (20 October 1622).
178
AGS, E 1043, fol. 26 (1552).
179
Even though the term was first used in this context by Hess, Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column, 125, it was originally coined by Emilio Mola in 1936 (see "fifth column", Encyclopdia Britannica Online).
180
AGS, E 1324, fol. 84 (2 February 1561); E 1056, fol. 197 (31 August 1568).

390

ammunition on the one hand,181 and envoys that brought encouragement and promises of
further assistance on the other.182 Even though these close relations came to naught from
a military perspective, the Ottomans showed an impressive aptness in acquiring
information from these Moors. In 1565, a Moor confessed under torture, that the
Ottomans had an agent in Lyon who was passing the information he received from the
Moors to Constantinople, while the Moors from the Granadine coasts were sending
information to the Governor-General of Algeria, a contribution that facilitated the corsair
attacks against the Habsburg shores.183 In a letter dated 1571, the Ottomans excused
themselves of not being able to send the Navy because of the War of 1570-3 and urged
them to continue not only fighting, but also sending information.184 Even after the revolt
was crushed, communication did not cease between the Moors and the Ottomans.185
Moreover, a good number of Moors migrated to the Ottoman Empire with their own free
will, buena voluntad186 where they could get circumcised and openly practice Islam
again.The Ottomans treated them well and used them as soldiers and spies.187 For
instance, a Moorish spy who was sent by the Governor of Valona, Suleyman Pasha, to
spy on fortifications in Puglia, Naples and Gaeta was caught in 1552.188 In 1610, a

181

BOA, MD, IX, nos. 204 and 231.

AGS, E 1327, fol. 7 (28 January 1570); E 1499, fol. 189 (22 February 1570).
183
M. LAbb Douais, ed., Dpches de M. De Fourquevaux ambassadeur du Roi Charles IX en Espagne,
1565-1572 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1896), vol. I, no. 5.
184
BOA, MD, no. 283 (H. 23 S 979 / A.D. 16 July 1571).
185
AGS, E 1073, fol. 52 (24 March 1577).
186
AGS, E 1043, fol. 26 (1552).
187
AGS, E 1324, fol. 84 (2 February 1561).
188
AGS, E 1043, fol. 26 (1552).
182

391

Moorish chaus passed to France via Venice.189 There were Moors within the Habsburg
military who provided important information to the Ottomans as well.190
Even after their expulsion, they continued for some time to be an important
component of the Ottoman secret service in the Mediterranean. The Habsburgs seemed to
have lost control over where these expelled Moors would end up.191 This created a
serious security problem for the Habsburgs and a great opportunity for the Ottoman
secret service. Aware of these Moors value to the Ottomans, in 1610, the Habsburgs
were trying to assassinate a certain Moor, Mehmed elebi alias Manuel Enriquez who
was arranging the transport of the Moors to Constantinople. This trade agent-cum-spy
who resided in Venice for many years was convincing the expelled Moors to enroll in the
Ottoman army, collecting the letters of exchange they brought from Spain and urging the
Sultan to send his ships to transport 80.000 thousand Moors that ended up in North
Africa.192 In 1613, the Viceroy of Sicily detained in a French ship a number of Moors
who told during their interrogation that they were going to Marseille to settle there, a
statement which the Viceroy hardly believed because they left their families in Tunis.
Unable to decide what to do, given that he had no authority to detain these Moors who
were sailing under the banner of France with whom the Habsburgs had peace, the
Viceroy contacted the center for further instructions.193

189

AGS, E 1887, fol. 5 (10 April 1610).

AGS, E 1126, fols. 152 (30 April 1561), 47 (11 May 1561), 48 (8May 1561), 107 (4 October 1561),
141, 168, 169 and 176 (26 July 1561); E 1132, fol. 28 (4 December 1567); E 1893, fol. 144 (1 February
1621). Also see. Canosa and Colonnello, Spionaggio a Palermo, 73.
191
AGS, E 1928, fol. 334 (14 December 1609).
192
AGS, E 1929, fols. 12 (9 de abril 1610), 41 (4 February 1611), and 52 (13 March 1611).
193
AGS, E 1166, fol. 18 (27 March 1613).
190

392

6.5.2.2.

The Neapolitan fuorusciti

An important connection which the Ottomans managed to establish among the

Habsburg subjects was with the opponents of the Habsburg rule in Naples, the fuorusciti.
Important Neapolitan nobles in exile allied themselves to the Ottomans as a part of the
Ottoman-French alliance that would relieve Naples from Habsburg rule. For instance, the
Ottoman navy hosted a good number of Neapolitan exiles, including the Prince of Melfi,
his son, the Duke of Soma and the Count of Nicastro in 1537,194 and again in 1553.195
Their extensive networks in Naples and agents in their employ contributed to the
Ottoman secret service. One of Prince of Salernos men, for instance, offered a plot to
the Ottomans for capturing the city of Naples in cooperation with some of the locals who
would open the doors. He also brought along two engineers, expert on castles
fortifications.196 Even though, this alliance between the Ottomans, French and the
fuorusciti lost pace after the 1540s and the 1550s, still, the local people continued
considering the Ottomans and the French as potential liberators. In the last year of the
century, the Habsburgs discovered in Calabria a conspiracy led by a number of
Dominican Friars, one of whom was Tommaso Campanella, the famous author of the
City of the Sun. It aimed to replace the Habsburg rule with a republic with the Ottoman
help if necessary. Even though it is less clear whether the Ottomans were the organizer of
the revolt or not, it is certain that the Ottoman Grand Admiral, Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan
Pasha was actively communicating with these Calabrian dissidents.197
194

Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 87.

Manfroni, Storia della marina italiana, vol. III, 386.
196
AGS, E 1121, fols. 105-6 and 111-2. (25 March 1552).
197
In 1598, a year before the plot was discovered, a large Ottoman fleet visited the Sicilian waters and even
anchored off Messina when the Ottoman Grand Admiral, a renegade, wanted to see his mother and siblings
who lived in the city. One of the conspirators, Mauricio went aboard the galleys of Murad Reis and
negotiated with him the arrival of the Ottoman fleet; he even showed Campanella an Ottoman document.
195

393

6.5.2.3.

Jewish communities

Constantinople hosted a number of prominent Jewish entrepreneurs in the 16th

century such as the afore-mentioned Joseph Nasi, Salomon Ashkenazi, Alvaro Mendes
and David Passi who lent their personal networks of trade, diplomacy and espionage to
the Ottoman service. Thanks to this human capital, the Ottomans could easily
communicate with Jewish communities dispersed along the Mediterranean ports. The
close trade and familial relations between these communities with their fellow Jews in
Thessalonica and Constantinople as well as the stark contrast between the intolerance and
persecution these faced in Europe and the relatively tolerant environment in the Ottoman
Empire where many persecuted Jews took refuge and reached influential positions,
should have won the sympathies of these Jews for the Ottoman rule.198
We had already mentioned to what extent the Jews in Venice were widely
accused of cooperating with the Ottomans in the paranoid years of 1570-3. A report
submitted to the Inquisitori di Stato by a Jewish informer Cain Saruch suggests that, as
exaggerated as the Venetian fears may be, there was close correspondence between the
According to what the Venetian resident in Naples, Scaramelli related to his government, the agreement
was that Cigala was to appear with the Ottoman Navy on September 7. The Ottoman fleet made a brief
appearance, sending ships off the Calabrese shores, making signals with lights on September 13. However,
conspirators were already discovered and arrested, so they had to return without result. Furthermore, when
the Habsburgs discovered the conspiracy and started arresting the culprits, one of the conspirators, the
Dominican Friar Dionisio Poncio de Nicastro, ran away to Constantinople. Does the fact that he was able to
pass the frontier and reach the Ottoman capital demonstrate to us that the Ottomans were actively involved?
Or was it already easy for the Calabrese to travel unmolested to Constantinople where he would find many
compatriots working in the Ottoman Arsenal and living in a part of Constantinople named Nuova Calabria.
Poncios namesake, the famous Ottoman Grand Admiral Ulu Ali (d. 1587), among many other less
important figures, was a Calabrian. Ten years ago, the assassin of Poncios uncle, both the assassin and the
victim being Dominican friars as well, had escaped justice and gone to Constantinople where he converted
to Islam. One of the conspirators, Giulio Constestabile, a Calabrian from Stilo, upon seeing an image of
Philip III on the wall, expressed his disappointment to Friar Tommaso Campanella that neither the Turks,
nor the French came to take this kingdom. He took out an image of the Sultan and told Campanella
that several times he was ready to go to the Sultan to seek assistance. See. Emilio Sola, La Conjura de
Campanella (Madrid: Turpin Editores, 2007 , 37, 56 and Part 2, Chapter 5, Campanellas testimony and
Chapter 7.
198
For detailed information on the Jews in the Ottoman Empire, see. Baron, A Social and Religious History
of the Jews, vol. XVIII; Galanti, Trkler ve Yahudiler.

394

Jews of Constantinople and those of Venice. Saruch named five Jews that resided in
Venice in 1585 that sent to and received information from Constantinople. As these were
doing business with the Jews of Constantinople, all rich and successful businessmen (di
gran negotio), they were exchanging information in order to govern their trade relations
better.199 However, the fact that this came to the attention of the Inquisitori di Stato, the
Venetian magistrate responsible for preventing the diffusion of state secrets, suggests that
the Venetians were keeping the Jewish community under close surveillance even years
after the War of 1570-3.
Another Jewish community that contributed to the Ottoman secret service was
that of the Kingdom of Naples. Two Ottoman spies, caught in Naples, confessed, for
instance, the existence of a complex organization all over the kingdom acting under the
order of the Ottoman Grand Admiral Barbarossa. The Habsburg commissioned Juan de
Figueroa who started an investigation to prevent this leak of information which took him
to Malfredonia facing the Adriatic and conveniently close to the Ottoman lands. There he
detained several Marranos who confessed that they were sending information via their
sons and brothers in Thessalonica. Realizing the danger of leaving a fifth column in such
a strategic place located in the heart of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier, the Viceroy
banned them from the city, accusing them of informing the Ottomans of Habsburg
preparations.According to the Viceroy, they also went to the Ottoman and French side as
agents and spies, when the French army had invaded the kingdom in 1528.200 Three years
later, when the interesting figure of Astrume Elia, the Jewish miracle-worker, was
arrested for espionage, he made similar confessions. His confessions provide the historian

199
200

ASV, IS, 13 January 1585.

AGS, E 1017, fol. 39 (28 March 1533); Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 75.

395

with ample information on the career of a polyglot Jewish spy in between empires. Born
in Naples, he traveled to several parts of the Mediterranean where he learned Castilian,
French, Arabic, Turkish, Italian and Greek. He was Ibrahim Pashas spy. However,
following the Pashas death which he erroneously believes to have happened while
fighting the Safavids, he came back to Naples with letters of recommendation for the
Jews who welcomed him. He then joined a secret network composed of spies on Ottoman
payroll and among the ranks of which one could find several Jews.201 Even though, in the
end, his statements, filled with contradictions, were believed to be mere fabrications in
order to hide his true mission, they still had a degree of validity, attesting to not only
what Elia believed the extent of Ottoman network in Naples could be, but also what he
thought would be credible to the Habsburg authorities. If he lied, he must have wanted to
tell a credible lie. After a long process of investigation, torture and trial, the Viceroy,
unable to discover the true nature and the extent of his mission, decided to let him go and
then keep him under secret surveillance with the hope of discovering more. Much to his
chagrin, however, Elia would take his secrets to the grave; he was found dead in the sea
in June 1537. How he died remains a mystery.
Similarly, the Ottomans seemed to establish contacts with the Greeks that lived
under the Venetian rule; but for the sake of brevity I do not enter into details.
6.5.3. Ottoman ambassadors and the problem of non-permanent diplomacy
The Ottomans refrained from following the example of their contemporaries in
Europe and refused to establish permanent embassies abroad.
The reason was partly the Ottoman worldview, which put Constantinople at the
center of the world, and the Sultan at the highest position in the hierarchy of worlds
201

AGS, E 1026, fols. 36 ff.; Moral, Don Pedro de Toledo, 80-2.

396

rulers. According to this, opening up diplomatic talks for a peace or establishing a

permanent embassy in the court of another prince was unacceptable. It was other rulers
who had had to keep a permanent agent in Constantinople. In a similar vein to Ottoman
vassals or Governor-Generals did, these rulers should send their envoys to the Porte
whose doors were open to anyone who came to ask, in humility, to be included among
the friends of the Sultan (sitne-i sadet-nvnmz mesdd olmayup inyet-i hakk celle
ve al ile dimen mek olup etr u cevnibde eer dostlua ve d manla kimesne
gelp gitmesine men redd yokdur).
Partly, however, this should still be linked to the underdevelopment of the
Ottoman bureaucracy. While the European states developed rules of diplomacy and
trained a corpus of diplomats, the Ottomans made the best of the day by, once again,
delegating the responsibility of international diplomacy to their officials with or without
some experience in diplomacy such as dragomans, chauses, solaks, sipahis, suba s,
mteferrikas, emins,202 and even to private persons with sufficient knowledge on
European affairs, such as the afore-mentioned Salomon Ashkenazi and Gritti brothers.
Add to that, the messages that were conveyed by countless Mediterranean go-betweens
such as Gabriel Defrens and Hac Murad.203 It was not so much that these figures lacked
the necessary training and decorum (and they did!), but rather that these were not
specifically trained to serve the interests of their state abroad along the lines more or less
demarcated by the rules of diplomacy.
Whatever their shortcomings were, however, Ottoman diplomats were apt
information gatherers, their curiosity having perhaps been provoked by their short tenure
202

Walter Zele, Aspetti delle Legazioni Ottomane nei Diarii di Marino Sanudo, Studi Veneziani XVIII
(1989): 252.
203
On Hac Murad, see. Iksel, Hac Murd.

397

and unfamiliarity with their destination. A close look to the activities of Ottoman
ambassadors and envoys that arrived in Venice (by far the largest and the best
documented corpus of examples) would illustrate the point. The Venetians were careful
to limit the movements of Ottoman envoys who arrived in the Laguna with their retinue
on some diplomatic mission. Their laws forbade government officials to have private
conversations with foreign ambassadors concerning politics. They did not leave it to
chance, however, and gave an escort to foreign ambassadors to keep an eye on them.204
Furthermore, they chose the residence allocated to the Ottoman ambassador carefully, in
an effort to limit his observations and contact with potential informants.205 They
moreover sought to get rid of the Ottoman envoys as soon as possible, evident from
Sanudos phrases of discomfort with Ottoman ambassadors who did not leave the Laguna
rather quickly.206 The freedom of an Ottoman envoy depended upon the tone of the
relations between two state. Some suffered several limitations during their stay, such as
Ali Bey who was reduced to looking out of a window in a house arrest,207 while others
traveled freely in the city such as Yunus Bey and the Ottoman ambassador in 1522, who
not only dined with Venetian officials, but also received a present from a Venetian noble,
the map of Istria and Dalmatia, an incident which caused a stir among the Venetian
governing circles.208 During wartime, some Ottoman diplomats who wanted to come to

204

Zele, Aspetti delle Legazioni Ottomane, 275.

For instance, in 1500, when the Ottomans sent a chaus to Venice for peace negotiations, the Council of
Ten placed him in Ca Dandolo next to Palazzo Ducale, instead of Giudecca, so that he could talk to
nobody. Maria Pia Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 193. In 1522, the unnamed Ottoman ambassador
was located by the Collegio in Ca Ghisi at the center of the city to impede him from learning the extension
of the city and the distance of the Terraferma. Sanudo, XXXIII, 447-450. Zele, Aspetti delle Legazioni
Ottomane, 267.
206
Ibid., 267.
207
Sanudo, vol. V, col. 25. Also see. Segre and Cessi, I Diarii di Girolamo Priuli, vol. I, 286-7.
208
Sanudo, vol. XIX, col. 339; XXXIV, col. 100; 115-6, XXXIX, col. 118 LIII, col. 250 Zele, Aspetti
delle Legazioni Ottomane, 266.
205

398

Venice or pass through the city to go on another mission were denied entry to the city or
passage to their final destination with the fear that these might have come for spying.209
The Ottoman ambassadors efficiency in gathering information in such a short
time in such a hostile environment gives one the impression that these were sent on a
mission of as much espionage as diplomacy. Thus, Venetian fears seem to have been well
grounded, especially when one looks at several instances quoted by Venetian sources
where an Ottoman envoy showered the authorities with questions, acquired maps of
strategic value and established suspicious contacts in spite of the Venetian efforts to
prevent the contact between the locals and the foreign diplomats.210 The Habsburg
ambassador, Rodrigo Nio, had a couple of words to say regarding the efficiency of these
precautions. When the Ottoman ambassador was dragging its feet not to leave Venice and
wishing to spend the winter in the Lagoon, Nio concluded that he was not surprised that
the Ottoman ambassador was so well informed of everything. In spite of living in the
island of Giudecca under close surveillance, anybody who wanted to relate him some
information could do so thanks to the intermediation of his several men who walked
around freely in Venice.211

209

Segre and Cessi, I Diarii di Girolamo Priuli, vol. I, 300; vol. II, 16, 21.
In 1504, the Venetians suspected that the Ottoman oratore Mustafa was involved in the escape of three
young men from a convent, even though they dropped the idea afterwards. Segre and Cessi, I Diarii di
Girolamo Priuli, vol. II, 338; Sanudo, vol. V, col. 98. In 1517, Ali Bey wanted to go on top of the
campanile of San Marco and asked several questions on the extension of the territory of the Republic, the
means of defense, the distance between the centers of the Terraferma, the income in Laguna, the direction
of Friuli and the countermeasures against a possible Ottoman attack. In 1518, the Venetians thought his
successor, Yunus Bey, arrived for spying as well. In 1520, a certain Adamo was exiled because he had
suspicious connections with the Ottoman envoy, the mteferrika Ahmed. Preto, Servizi Segreti, 98-9. In
1566, they found some maps of Cyprus and Corsica in Ibrahims house which was brought by a Granadine
Moor who wanted to do Ibrahim a favor. In 1567, Kubad Chaus asked the Public Dragoman Michele
Membr a series of questions regarding the income of Cyprus, land and naval forces of the Republic, its
capacity to resist an attack, etc. Pedani, In Nome del Gran Signore, 161 and 194. In 1600, the Habsburg
ambassador to Venice suspected the arrival of an Ottoman chaus under the color of recovering the
patrimony of a recently deceased Turk. He might simply be a spy. AGS, E K 1677, fol. 46 (3 July 1600).
211
AGS, E 1310, fol. 42 (24 September 1532).
210

399

6.5.4. Information Provider States: Ottoman Vassals and Allies

In spite of Ottoman ambassadors efficiency in gathering information during their
missions abroad, the Ottomans still could not be sure of a regular flow of information,
informing them of events in Europe. They sought to use a couple of methods to overcome
their disadvantage.
The first method, as mentioned above, was to rely on the information provided by
the provincial administration, which could remedy the situation to a certain extent,
especially in remote areas where the Ottomans had little direct control such as North
Africa.
Second was the information sent by other states which could be categorized under
two categories from a legalistic point of view, while in practice, the Ottomans saw no
difference between the two. Firstly, for basic military reasons, the Ottomans established,
promoted or at times allowed vassal states along their borders. Each of these vassal states
was a political as well as a military convenience for the Ottomans, not only keeping the
enemies at bay, but also, in some sort of a more autonomous administration, overtaking
certain military and economic functions so dear to the Ottomans. In short, each of these
vassal states (Translyvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, Ragusa, Crimea, Caucasian
principalities, Hidjaz) had their own responsibilities towards the state (Crimean cavalry
participated in campaigns, while every year thousands of sheep arrived in Constantinople
from the ports of Wallachia and Moldavia, etc.) as well as a sphere of influence. The
Ottomans expected them to send information in tandem with their military responsibility
of keeping the enemy at bay.212 The princes of Transylvania,213 and Moldavia,214 the

212

For orders sent to the prince of Translyvania, urging him to send spies to learn about enemy, see. BOA,
MD, III, ff.; LX, no. 536 (H. 27 R 994/A.D. 17 April 1586); LXX, no. 247 (H. 15 Ra. 1001/A.D. 19

400

khans of Crimea,215 the rulers of the Republic of Ragusa,216 all dispatched spies against
the enemy and sent information regarding their respective spheres of influence, not only
to the center, but also to the nearby Ottoman Governor-General of whose interest the
information might be worth.217 Secondly, the Ottomans similarly expected their allies to
provide them with information regarding the military and political developments around
their territories.
Before proceeding to two most important information provider states, Venice and
Ragusa, I would like to make one reservation. Even though the information that these
states provided were instrumental to the Ottomans understanding of European and
Western Mediterranean politics, it should still not be forgotten that these sought to
manipulate information in accordance with their own foreign policy priorities.218 They
remitted the information which could convince the Ottomans to make a decision that
would serve their interests and held back those that could result in decisions that they

December 1592). For similar instructions to Moldavia, see. BOA, MD, III, nos. 93 and 350 (H. 22 Z
967/A.D. 13 September 1560), to Ragusa, see. MD, X, no. 383 (which mentions that it was the Ragusans
duty to send information, as an Ottoman vassal, in accordance with their servitude to the Ottomans,
ubudiyyetiniz muktezasnca); XII, no. 266 (H. 21 Za. 978/A.D. 16 April 1571). Also, see. goston,
Information, Ideology and Limits, 8 .
213
BOA, MD, V, nos. 953, 1548 (H. 16 L 973/ A.D. 6 May 1566) and 1925. VI, no. 1134 (H. 13 L
972/A.D. 14 May 1565); VII, nos. 2540 and 2743; XXIII, no. 19; LXX, no. 296 (H. 28 S 1001/A.D. 3
December 1592). Also, MD, VII, no. 1008 and XXIII, no. 19, cited by D vid, Mhimme Defters, 199.
214
BOA, MD, V, no. 747 (H. 9 C 983 / A.D. 1 October 1566); XIV, nos. 507 and 508 (H. 12 Ra. 978/ A.D.
14 August 1570).
215
BOA, MD, XXX, nos. 610 and 611 (H. 28 Ra. 985/A.D. 15 June 1577).
216
Most of the information that was recorded in MD registers are from the War of 1570-3, another proof
the close relation between intelligence and war. BOA, MD, VII, nos. 503, 704, 705, 1261 and 2767; XII,
nos. 266 (H. 21 Za. 978/A.D. 16 April 1571), 529 (H. 22 M 979/A.D. 15 June 1571) and 856 (29 Ra.
979/A.D. 20 August 1571); XIV, nos. 97 (H. 16 M 979/A.D. 9 June 1571), 307 (H. 14 S 978/A.D. 18 July
1570), 758 (H. 28 C 978/A.D. 27 November 1570), 854 (6 C 978/A.D. 5 November 1570) and 1644 (H. 21
L 978/A.D. 18 March 1571); XIX, nos. 128 (H. Gurre-yi 80/A.D. 7 December 1572), 254, 656, 710 and
711; XXII, no. 208; XXIII, no. 175 (H. 6 B 981/A.D. 1 November 1573); XXXIX, no. 679 (H. 10 Ra.
988/A.D. 24 April 1580). LIII, no. 357 (H. 27 B 992/A.D. 4 August 1584); DAD, Acta Turcorum, A8 9a,
A8 10, K 68, K 113, A7 2 a and K 82. See. Biegman, Ragusan Spying.
217
See. BOA, MD, VI, no. 1134 (H. 13 L 972/A.D. 14 May 1565) according to which the Prince of
Transylvania sent information not to Constantinople, but to the Governor-General of Temevar.
218
goston, Informciszerzs s kmkeds, 151.

401

deemed harmful. In short, the accuracy and the impartiality of the information that a
given state provided the Ottomans with depended upon the relationship between
Constantinople and the given state as well as the given states position according to
possible Ottoman foreign policy options. By providing the Ottomans with information,
these vassals and allies thus gained the opportunity of being a part of the Ottoman
decision-making process.
6.5.4.1.In between two Empires: The Republic of Ragusa
Among these vassal states, Ragusa by far and large played the most important role
for the Ottoman secret service in the Mediterranean, justified by its strategic location as
well its commercial and diplomatic networks all around the Mediterranean. 219 Stuck
between two colossal empires, both of which were aware of their duplicity, 220 the
Ragusan authorities regularly sent information to the Ottomans as well, concerning the
events in the Western Mediterranean,221 Europe and even farther: news of the succession
of a new pope,222 events in France, cose di Francia, the departure of the Habsburg fleet
from Naples for the Portuguese expedition,223 the Duke of Albas victory against Dom
Antonio,224 preparations of the Habsburg Great Armada225 Their network of consuls
throughout the Europe226 should have compensated for the side effects created by the
Ottoman lack of permanent ambassadors abroad; once again the Sublime Porte seemed to
219

For Ottoman-Ragusan relations in the 16th century, see. Biegman, Turco-Ragusan Relationship and
Metin Ziya Kse, Dou Akdenizde Casuslar ve Tacirler: Osmanl Devleti ve Ragusa li kileri,
-1600
(stanbul: Giza Yaynlar, 200 .
220
BOA, MD, XVI, no. 633 (H. 9 Ra. 979/A.D. 31 July 1571); AGS, E 1331, fols. 35 (10 April 1572) and
99 (2 September 1572).
221
For instance, they sent an express courier informing the Ottomans of the fall of Mahdiyya to the
Habsburgs in 1550, a crucial information which renewed the war between Suleyman and Charles V. Sola,
Los que van y vienen, 82.
222
DAD, Lettere di Levante, 11 February 1592.
223
DAD, Lettere di Levante, 24 November 1579, 20 January 1580.
224
AGS, E 1338, fol. 64 (28 October 1580).
225
Biegman, Turco-Ragusan Relationship, 129-130 and idem., Ragusan Spying.
226
See figure 1 in Dedijer, Ragusan Intelligence, 108.

402

have delegated its responsibilities. Using their dual position between the two empires, the
Ragusan authorities moreover sent spies to Europe on Ottoman account.227 In the crucial
period of the Siege of Malta, when Constantinople lost direct contact with its navy, these
agents seemed to have proven their worth; a Habsburg spy located in Ragusa comments:
here every ten days, arrive the news from Messina, particularly
regarding what Signor Don Garcia [de Toledo], General of His Majesty,
doeswhen he washes his face, soon its news arrive here and then
leaves the city a Turk, carrying the news to Constantinople.228
Furthermore, as there were Habsburg spies in Ragusa, there were Ottoman ones as well.
In 1580, the rumour was that a Jewish spy in Ottoman employ was secretly assassinated
by the Ragusans.229 Add to all these, the network that operated under the supervision of
the Arcbishop of Ragusa, Filippo Trivulzio (o. 1521-1543), who was sending information
not only to France, but also, on the orders of the French king, to the Ottomans.230
6.5.4.2. The Most Serene Republic of Venice
In Ottoman eyes, an ally was no less responsible from sending information than a
vassal, in accordance with the friendship and military alliance with the Porte. Venice231
played a role similar to that of Ragusans, serving both empires. The Ottomans repeatedly
asked information from Venice232 and demonstrated a threatening attitude when the

227

AGS, E 1047, fol. 8 (22 March 1554) and E 1331, fol. 99 (2 September 1572) mention spies in Rome,
Naples and Messina. According to Portillo, Ragusan frigates that claimed to bring news should
immediately be sent back from Habsburg ports with a proper excuse so that they could not spy on the
Habsburg navy. E 1332, fol. 185 (30 May 1572).
228
AGS, E 1054, fol. 173 (5 August 1565).
229
AGS, E 1541, fol. 199 (25 November 1599).
230
J. Tadi, panija I Dubrovnik,(Belgrade: Sirpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1932), 60-2, quoted by Harris,
Dubrovnik, 111; AGS, E 1028, fol. 23 (20 April 1538); E 1311, fols. 83-5 (19 March 1534).
231
Even though Venice was not exactly an Ottoman ally, the Ottomans expected certain services from the
Venetians as required by the friendship between two states, accentuated in many of the fermans extant
among ASVs DocTR. As the recipient of an Ottoman ahdname, the Venetians had to rely on Ottoman
good will towards their merchant communities; they were also dependent upon the Ottoman grain.
232
ASV, DocTR, b. 3, nos. 315 and 336; b. 4, no. 467. ; b. 5, no. 655

403

Venetians fell short of their expectations.233 The Venetians became increasingly more
willing to provide the information after 1573 in exchange for the Ottoman permission to
recruit soldiers and import grain from the Balkans. This willingness did not escape the
attention of the Habsburgs who labeled the Venetians, amancebada, concubine, of the
Ottomans.234 They even concealed information from them, such as in 1530, that the navy
which was being prepared in Genoa was destined for Valona.235 They were not
unjustified in their caution: between the turbulent years of 1533 and 1535, when both
empires clashed over Tunis, for instance, The Council of Ten passed sensitive
information to the Venetian bailo concerning the Habsburg Navy to be remitted to the
Ottomans.236 They should have heeded to the request the Ottomans made to oratore
Pietro Zen in 1533; they had reminded the experienced diplomat that the Venetians
would sure know what the Habsburg navy was up to as they could even tell what fishes
were doing at the bottom of the sea.

237

Similarly, in 1611, when the Venetians were

suspicious of a Habsburg attack on Serbia and Albania, they quickly sent two noblemen
to Castelnuovo to inform the Ottomans.238 The Ottoman reliance on the Venetians was
such that, not only Constantinople, but also local authorities demanded information239
and that the Ottomans asked for information even regarding their own fleet when it was
operating out of reach in the Western Mediterranean.240

233

ASV, DocTR, b. 3, nos. 338, 340 and 343.

Preto, Servizi Segreti, 117.
235
AGS, E 1308, fol. 31 (11 April 1530).
236
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 4, cc. 11v (11 July 1533), 36r (26 October 1534) and 51r-51v (14 August 1535).
237
Sardella, Nouvelles et Spculations, 15.
238
AGS, E 1335, fol. 220 (22 September 1611).
239
ASV, DocTR, b. 5, no. 705.
240
ASV, DocTR, b. 4, no. 507 (14-23 July 1543); BOA, MD, VI, no. 1424 (H. Evast- Z 72/ A.D. -18
July 1565).
234

404

Ottomans other allies in Europe in the 16th century, France and England,
followed the example of the Venetians, to varying degrees. For the sake of brevity and in
order to avoid repetition, I do not discuss those in detail.
6.5.5. Pressurizing European diplomats in Constantinople
It was only natural that the Ottomans, under these circumstances, saw European
diplomats residing in Constantinople as legitimate sources of information.241 It was very
common for an Ottoman Grand Vizier to send for European ambassadors and ask
questions regarding the political situation in Europe as well as geographical and strategic
details of their potential targets. For instance, in 1521, the Ottoman pashas interviewed
the Venetian oratore Marco Minio who had just arrived in Constantinople in order to
congratulate Sleyman Is conquest of Rhodes and thus could provide them with detailed
information regarding the latest political developments. Their questions give us a clue
about what type of information interested the Ottomans and what they knew and what
not:
asking me first of the power of the Pontiff and the way by which he
found money, and I exaggerated his power, yet conveniently so that they
could believe in what I was telling them; and so I told them in general that
he could easily find a large quantity of money. Then they asked the number
of soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, that the Emperor could put to the
field, I invented big numbers (li feci le cose molto grandi), trying to confirm
what I had told by declaring the kingdoms which that Caesar possessed,
with the recent addition of Germany, thanks to his election as the
EmperorSimilarly, they asked me about the Most Christian King and I
exaggerated also his things (le cose sue) a great deal. Then they asked me
how Your Sublimitys relations were with each king I told them that you
were in peace with both of the aforementioned Majesties. They told me: you
are in fact more bound (congiunti) to France than to emperor. I responded
them that it was true that Your Sublimity had particular relationship
(intelligenza) with the Majesty of France, but that because of this you were
not but in good peace with the aforementioned emperor. They moreover
asked me of much information regarding Rome (particolarit di Roma), and
241

goston, Information, Ideology and Limits, 84 idem, Birodalom s informci, 45-48.

405

how many days it took between Constantinople and Rome, and which would
be the easier route to go there, in such a way that one cannot come to
another conclusion than that they were discussing to undertake an
expedition against the Christianity They asked me, if I believed that the
Pontiff would give him [the king of Hungary] help; I told them yes. They
asked me, moreover, what he [the king of Hungary] had to do with the
Serenissimo Emperor, I declared kinship.242

It seems like the Ottomans had previous knowledge on the subject and they
were trying to compare and contrast the information they had; evident from their
refusal to accept Minios argument that Venice was on good terms with both
Emperor Charles V and Francis I, just at the beginning of a Franco-Venetian
alliance against the Habsburgs. What they were after, it appears, were up-to-date
information concerning the recent changes in the political relations between
European powers, but even more, strategic information that the Venetian orator
could reveal such as how much military power that the Emperor and Francis I had,
where the Pope found the money from and even simple questions regarding
whereabouts of Rome.
The simplicity of the question might have one think that this interrogation
could be an Ottoman manipulation, an effort of disinformation, in order to scare the
Venetians or spread the word of an incoming Ottoman descend in Europe which
was not to come for another 5 years. However, this seems unlikely, given that it
would produce counter-results for the Ottoman foreign policy. The Ottomans
generally abstained from making too much noise before an expedition against
Europe in order not to unite their enemies. For instance, the Ottomans would write
letters to the Protestants of the Holy Roman Empire, assuring them that their enemy
242

Albri, Le Relazioni, vol. IX, 75-77.

406

was the Emperor and not them. In the very same interrogation, Mustafa Pasha
advised Minio that the Venetians should stay neutral in order to evade the Ottoman
wrath. Furthermore, questions that seemed easy to answer to a modern mind may be
a puzzle for one in the 16th century; there were several other examples where the
Ottoman pashas asked such simple geographical and strategic information. In 1565,
for instance, Sokollu asked the Ragusan ambassador similar questions: where was
Puglia? How far was it from Castelnuovo? How well-fortified was it? How many
thousand cavalry could there be?243 Six years later, he was to ask the Venetian bailo
under house arrest, Marcantonio Barbaro, whether the Pope had possessions near
Puglia.244
The afore-mentioned quotation also demonstrates the failure of this type of
method for gathering information. Minio manifestly manipulated every piece of
information in order to achieve the objectives of the Venetian foreign policy at the time,
i.e., to keep the Ottomans away from Europe. In another example, The Grand Vizier
Rstem Pasha, upon hearing that their ally, France, signed a peace treaty with the
Habsburgs, called the Venetian bailo to ask him what news his government gave him
regarding the recent developments in Europe. The bailo quickly told how the Pope was
instrumental in assuring the cooperation between the two monarchs and that the King of
England would follow the suit as well. Obviously, the information bailo provided
infuriated Rstem who was reported to be determinant not to send the Ottoman fleet to
the French help anymore and thus created a stir in the Ottoman-French relations. The
French reply was quick to come though: while on the one hand the French ambassador in

243
244

AGS, E 1054, fol. 205 (28 September 1565).

Lesure, Notes et Documents, 144-145, fn. 47.

407

Constantinople was trying to assure the Ottomans that his King would never sign a peace
with the Emperor, his colleague in Venice was complaining about the bailos behaviour
to the Venetian Signoria.245 This opportunity to manipulate information and thus
indirectly affect the Ottoman decision-making should explain the unusual willingness of
the Council of Ten to send information to its bailo to be passed to the Ottomans. Three
years after the conclusion of the disastrous war with the Ottomans, they ordered the bailo
to inform Sokollu that the revolt in Genoa was over after the intervention of Gregory III,
Philip II and Maximilian II, the peace between Henry III and Huguenots was
promulgated in the French armies as well as the city of Paris, from Flanders no news of a
rising (moto arrived after the death of Philip IIs comendator, Don Luis de Requesens,
the Habsburgs navy remained divided in different provinces, and Don Juan of Austria
would go to Vigevano in Milan.246 Peace in Europe, no direct threat from the Habsburgs.
In short, no need to send a navy to the Western Mediterranean.
To overcome the possibility of manipulation, the Ottomans either had to compare
and contrast the information they received from different sources or find means to spy on
these ambassadors so that they could get a hold onto the information they received from
their governments to the fullest extent, i.e., connecting themselves with the source of
information without the intermediation of the ambassador. It was easy for them to put
pressure on the dragomans that worked in these embassies for these were Ottoman
subjects; most of them were working for these embassies with the knowledge of the
Ottomans anyways.247 Furthermore, the Ottomans could attract, by handsome financial
remunerations, people from the ambassadors chancellery and entourage, whose
245

AGS, E 1321, fol. 101.

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 99r-99v (6 June 1576).
247
goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits, 86.
246

408

defection would be of great benefit to the Ottoman secret service, thanks not only to the
information these would bring, but also to the familiarity they had with European
chancellery techniques. For instance, the Ottomans managed to cryptanalyze the letters of
the Bailo Vettore Bragadin only with the help of one of the giovani di lingua, Colombina
who was sent to Constantinople to study Ottoman, but later converted to Islam on
Sokollus insistence.248 Colombina would serve in the Ottoman chancellery for years,
appearing frequently in correspondence between the bailo and the Council of Ten.249 A
disgruntled employee could always be an east target. The Austrian ambassador Frederick
von Kregwitzs steward converted to Islam in 1593, only to denounce the intelligence his
master had with the wife of the Ottoman Sultan who betrayed state secrets to him and to
personally appear with chauses at the ambassadors door to search his house and detain
his papers that included confidential information.250 Similarly, the Ottomans, upon
hearing the detention of the bailo Lippomano in his house by his own government,
invited Lorenzo Bernardo whom the Council of Ten sent to Constantinople to secure
Lippomanos removal from office and safe transfer to Venice. Acting surprised of
receiving a new bailo without their authorization and trying to understand the real story,
the Ottoman Grand Vizier insisted that, as was the custom with other baili, Lippomano
should appear in front of him and obtain a license to leave before sailing for Venice. The
shrewd Bernardo quickly realized the danger behind allowing Lippomano who had
already betrayed many state secrets to Philip II, to talk to the Grand Vizier. He wisely

248

ASV, CCX-LettAmb, b. 3, fol. 55; Villain-Gandossi, Les Dpches Chiffr es, 77 Pedani, In Nome del
Gran Signore, 42.
249
In 1578, he was even designated as the Ottoman envoy to the Serenissima, to great chagrin and protest
of the Venetian authorities. ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 11, cc. 154v (24 March 1578), fil. 20, 24 March 1578.
250
Wratislaw, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas, 109-117.

409

replied that it was not the custom that such a dismissed, mazul, person should appear
before the Grand Vizier.251
6.6.

OTTOMAN TRANSMISSION OF NEWS

The methods by which the Ottoman central and provincial authorities

communicated were different than those used by the Habsburgs. First, the Ottoman postal
system252 was operated by the state rather than leased to private entrepreneurs as was the
case with the Habsburgs and described in Chapter Four. Second, the fact that the Ottoman
Empire consisted of adjacent territories and lacked permanent ambassadors abroad meant
that the correspondence between Ottoman officers did not run the risk which
correspondence that reached Madrid from Milan, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Flanders,
Burgundy, and presidios in North Africa ran, that of being intercepted by a third party.
The sole exception to his should be the communication by sea, especially those between
Constantinople and North Africa.
Until the 16th century, there was no organized postal system. A messenger that
carried the ulak hkm, an order proving that he was an imperial courier (ulak), had the
right to take at will any horse from travelers on the road and the locals were responsible
with his provisioning. In order get rid of the abuses on local population,253 however,
251

Augusto Tormene, Girolamo Lippomano, n.s., 4, t. 7 (1904), 83-4.

See. Colin Heywood, Some Turkish Archival Sources for the History of the Menzilhane Network in
Rumeli during the Eighteenth Century, Boazii niversitesi Dergisi, Be eri Bilimler. Humanities 4-5
(1976-1977): 39-54; idem, The Ottoman Menzilhane and Ulak System in Rumeli in the Eighteenth
Century, in Trkiyenin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi
7 -1920), ed. Osman Okyar and Halil nalck
(Ankara: Meteksan, 1980), 179-186; idem, The Via Egnatia in the Ottoman Period: The Menzilhanes of
the Sol Kol in the Late 17th/Early 18th Century, in Via Egnatia under Ottoman Rule (1380-1699), ed.
Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymon: Crete University Press, 1996), 129-144. All three articles are reprinted
in Colin Heywood, Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Interpretations (Aldershot, Hampshire:
Ashgate, 2002); Also see. Yusuf Halaolu, Osmanllarda Ula m ve Haberle me: Menziller (Ankara: PTT
Genel Mdrl, 2002 .
253
See for a good example of a report lamenting the abuses of these ulaks, TSMA, E 3192. Even Selim I
himself demonstrated remorse in front of such abuses, Lutfi Paa, Tevrh-i l-i Osmn (Istanbul 1341),
371-80. There were still abuses even after Ltfis reforms. See. BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 233; XLIX, no. 499.
252

410

Suleymans Grand Vizier, Ltfi Pasha reformed the system. A number of post stations,
called menzils, were established in varying distances according to geographical
conditions, between 3 and 18 hours of horse-ride according to a document from the end
of the 16th century.254 Generally, messages could quickly be remitted to the center,
carried by ulaks that operated between two menzils. For matters that required urgency,
there were also express couriers, hususi emirle gelen ulak255, who carried important or
secret messages (mhim ve mstacel husus)256 directly from the sender to the recipient
without trusting it to other ulaks who operated only between two menzils. When such an
ulak arrived with an inam hkm, he could then take a horse from and rest in these
menzils. In an effort to expedite the process, frontier ulaks did not have to carry an inam
hkm, given the exceptional conditions of Ottoman frontiers.
The menzils had a number of permanent staff, such as menzil emini, menzil
kethdas, ahur kethdas, etc. While these were responsible with the maintenance of the
menzil, it was mainly the kad who had the task to supervise the functioning of the
system. This postal system was by no means open to public. The use of the horses in
these menzils was exclusive to governmental correspondence; even the officers
themselves were not allowed to use them for their private affairs.257 These menzils had a
military function as well; they were used to provision the army during a campaign.

254

BOA, KK, nr. 2555, Yusuf Halaolu Klasik Dnemde Osmanllarda Haberleme ve Yol Sistemi. In
an Yakalayan Osmanl! Osmanl Devletinde Modern Haberle me ve Ula trma Teknikleri, ed.
Ekmeleddin hsanolu et al., (stanbul: IRCICA, 1 5 , 14.
255
Halaolu, Menziller, 4. Note that this term offered by Halaolu was not uniformly used in the 16th
century. Most of the MD registers use the term ulak for express couriers as well. BOA, MD, XIV, no. 442
(H. 23 S 978/A.D. 27 July 1570); XIX, no. 487 (H. 24 N 980/A.D. 19 February 1571); XLIV, no. 233.
256
BOA, MD, XIX, nos. 488 (H. 22 N 980/A.D. 26 January 1573) and 521 (H. 2 R 980/A.D. 11 August
1571).
257
BOA, MD, XXX, no. 62 (H. 25 M 985/A.D. 14 April 1577); XLIV, no. 233; LI, no. 63.

411

The money to support this system did not directly come from state coffers in the
form of cash payment. Instead, the Ottomans financed those by creating a special tax
called menzilke , within the system of the avarz- divaniye taxes, a number of financial
or service responsibilities which the state first imposed as a temporary tax during
extraordinary circumstances, but never revoked later. When this amount did not suffice,
other revenues were created, depending on the situation, which are of little relevance to
our subject.
The system was created in order ensure communication within the Ottoman
Empire. Thus, the Ottomans needed other means to communicate with European rulers,
their agents outside the Empire and the navy when it was operating in the Western
Mediterranean. Let us now concentrate on these other means.
The most effective postal system between the Ottoman Empire and Europe
belonged to the Venetians; naturally the Ottomans, as well as other diplomats such as the
French ambassador258 had to rely on the Venetians,259 even at the risk of their letters
being secretly opened and read. When they could, they entrusted the resident ambassador
of a foreign power who, accompanied by a chaus until the border, would proceed to his
country with letters to his ruler. They also sent envoys that delivered special messages of
importance in person, some of whom we mentioned before.
It is less clear how Ottomans communicated with their spies outside the empire
where the Ottomans did not have a functioning postal system. Those who were sent on
ad-hoc missions reported their findings upon their return to their employers, whether in
the provinces or in the center. The communication between Constantinople and the

258
259

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 82v-83v (9 April 1567).

ASV, DocTR, b. 6, no. 805; b. 8, no. 1014.

412

resident spies were realized via the existing means of communication. Ottoman spies
used mainly the Venetian postal system, using fake names and without revealing true
intentions, such as Ludovico Veggia, writing from Rome to Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan
Pasha260 or David Passi whose letters, as mentioned above, aroused the suspicion of the
Council of Ten.
The Ottomans sent small ships, kalyete, mostly captained by a corsair, to
communicate with their navy, especially when the latter was operating in the Western
Mediterranean. 261 For instance, during the corsairs siege of Oran (1556 , it was another
corsair, Ulu Ali, who arrived from Constantinople with the imperial order that 40
galleys should immediately return to the Levant.262 If operating nearby, it sufficed to send
a chaus, such as a certain Sleyman who was sent to (this time the Grand Admiral) Ulu
Ali.263 When the communication via sea proved impossible, couriers were sent via land
as well, until the nearest port.264 Sometimes, in order to assure that a message reached the
navy, two couriers were sent, one from the land and one from the sea. 265 This system was
not foul-proof, however. The Ottomans seemed to have lost contact with their navy
during the siege of Malta. It was the Venetians who received, encrypted and passed the
orders sent by the Ottoman Sultan to the besieging Ottoman forces on the one hand and
kept Constantinople informed of the conditions of the siege on the other.266

260

ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 14, cc. 128v (22 November 1601).

dris Bostan, Osmanllar ve Deniz: Deniz Politikas, Te kilat, Gemiler (stanbul: Kre Yaynlar, 2007 ,
126.
262
Aziz Samih lter, imali A rikada Trkler (stanbul: Vakit Matbaas, 1 36 , vol. I, 133. Also see. BOA,
MD, III, nos. 580, 581, 582, 583, 624 and 629.
263
BOA, MD, XIX, no. 508 (H. 21 N 980 / A.D. 21 January 1573).
264
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 987 (H. 11 L 1003/A.D. 10 July 1593).
265
BOA, MD, XIV, no. 442 (H. 23 S 978/A.D. 27 July 1570).
266
ASV, CX-ParSec, reg. 8, cc. 79r-80r (18 February 1566, m.v.); BOA, MD, VI, no. 1424 (H. Evast- Z
972/A.D. 9-18 July 1565).
261

413

6.7.

THE EFFICIENCY OF OTTOMAN SECRET SERVICE

The Ottomans strove hard to remain up-to-date with political developments in

Europe. The geographical extent of the Ottoman secret service is impressive at first
glance, reaching not only nearby Rome, Naples, Sicily and Austria, but also farther
France, Spain and even Flanders.267 Ottoman agents succeeded in overcoming enemy
vigilance and traveled extensively in their dominions. Some of these agents were really
experts in their profession, impressing the reader with their ability to cross cultural and
geographical borders as well as to establish contacts with important political figures. The
polyglot agent of Sokollu, a Transylvanian renegade named Marxeben Lener, for
instance, spied in Germany on the one hand and defrauded the Emperor with false
promises on the other in 1575. The next year, he was spotted by Habsburg counter
intelligence and reported to have left Constantinople for his new targets. He would first
go to Naples where he would pretend to re-convert to Christianity and stay in the
Viceroys house. From there he would pass to Rome, Venice and finally to Spain, to the
Habsburg court.268 A more impressive example is that of Baron de la Fage, a French
renegade, originally from Languedoc, who was an agent for the Queen of England as well
as a spy in Ottoman employ. With the alibi of converting to Christianity (reduzirse al
gremio de la sancta madre), he went to Italy where he not only spied for the Ottomans,
but also established contacts with people of importance. He received many favours
from the Grand Duke of Tuscany as well as Henry IVs ambassador in Florence.
267

AGS, E 1054, fol. 173 (5 August 1565); E 1072, fol. 232, E 1144, fol. 212; E 1327, fol. 7 (28 January
1570); E 1331, fol 232 (10 September 1572); E 1332, fol. 198 (16 July 1573); E 1333, fols. 48 (21 June
1574) and 74; E 1894, fols. 6, 94 and 95 (20-21 October 1622). Add to those the afore-mentioned examples
of the Ayalas and the team of Mida-Martinengo-Abbatis. Also see. Canosa and Colonnello, Spionaggio a
Palermo: Aspetti della Guerra Secreta Turco-Spagnola in Mediterraneno nel Cinquecento (Palermo:
Sellerio Editore, 1991), ff.
268
AGS, E 1072, fol. 232.

414

Furthermore, he went to Rome where he had an audience with the Pope Innocent IX and
several cardinals. He offered to win the Governor of Negroponte back to the Christianity
and seize several galleys which the renegade Christians sailed. He then passed to Venice
and contacted the Habsburg ambassador for money; yet the ambassador de Vera,
otherwise very friendly and supportive to spies, quickly realized de la Fages true nature
and refused him help. Continuing his machinations, he tricked four Christian boys to
accompany him to Levant, under the pretense of showing them the Ottoman Empire,
nevertheless with the intention of either selling them into slavery or forcing them to
convert to Islam. On his way back, he defrauded the captain of the ship he embarked for
Cattaro and took his 450 escudos as well as other goods promising to buy horses for him.
Upon his return, he revealed the identity of a number of leading Habsburg spies in
Constantinople, including David Passi and Guglielmo de Saboya. Enjoying his successes,
de la Fage was making fun of the Pope and Cardinal de Santa Severina by showing off
with brevets and safe-conducts that he acquired from them. Unfortunately for the
Ottomans, he died in the fall of 1592 in a plague epidemic.269
The Ottomans managed to diversify the channels of information and effectively
compare and contrast the news that reached them even during the times of crisis, such as
the turbulent years of 1570-3. In 1571, an Ottoman spy in pilgrim disguise was detained
in Ragusa.270 A year later, a number of Ottoman spies appeared in Habsburg possessions.
News of the Christian Armada was reaching Ulu Ali with letters from Sicily; an
Ottoman agent returned from Spain and Flanders with the news of Habsburg military
preparations, Philip IIs fear of the Dutch and difficulties in financing his wars a veteran
269

AGS, E K 1675, fols. 142, 167b (15 August 1592), 172 (5 September 1592) and 183 (24 October 1592);
K 1677, fol. 5 (2 February 1602).
270
AGS, E 1329, fols. 57 (2 June 1571) and 59 (2 June 1571).

415

agent appeared in Ragusa carrying Sokollus letters of safe-conduct to proceed to Rome

under the pretense of ransoming slaves.271 A year later, if what Portillo wrote was true,
there were 30 spies in the Sultans employ, operating in Naples and Sicily to follow the
movements of the Christian Navy.272 In addition to these spies, corsairs in the Adriatic
under the leadership of the afore-mentioned Kara Hoca, provincial governors and
Ragusan authorities were trying to keep Constantinople up-to-date regarding the military
preparations and whereabouts of the enemy navy. When all these failed, there were
always European diplomats in Constantinople who could share information, including
even the Venetian bailo. Albeit under house arrest, he was still corresponding with
Venice and thus could be pressurized to reveal information.273
It was not only military information that reached Constantinople. The Ottomans
seemed to develop efficient channels of communication that furnished them with
information regarding international politics as well. The Ottoman authorities were aware
of the changing balances-of-power and thus the diplomatic possibilities open to them,
evident from their counterarguments in front of foreign ambassadors, such as the one that
Mustafa Pasha gave Marco Minio concerning Venices position between Charles V and
Francis I. The Ottoman envoy to Venice, the Dragoman Yunus Bey demonstrated a
similar familiarity with European politics while discussing in 1532 with a middleman
between him and the Habsburg ambassador, Rodrigo Nio to whom Yunus offered his
intermediation in securing a truce between Charles V and Suleyman I. During the
conversation, the middleman, Lorenzo Belojo argued that Charles V would under no
circumstances send an ambassador to Constantinople and seek for a truce given the
271

AGS, E 1332, fol. 232 (10 September 1572).

AGS, E 1332, fol. 198 (16 July 1573).
273
Lesure, Notes et Documents, 144-145, fn. 47.
272

416

grandeur and dignity he had among the Christians; Yunus Bey should better rely on the
Venetian intermediation. Yunus answered that the Venetians would have little inclination
to intervene for such a truce given that all the Christian princes wanted to see each other
in war and necessity such as the Kings of France and England who were envying the
Emperor; the French king was the reason why the Ottomans were in Hungary. The
Emperor was in a fragile position and had better sign a truce given that from the far away
Spain he could do little to prevent the powerful Ottoman army. When Lorenzo insisted
that the Emperor was all-powerful, Yunus Bey went on with his comments on the
political future of Christianity. The Emperor would not negotiate with the Pope the issue
of a Council, all the Protestant would be his enemies, all the Catholics in Germany would
be Lutherans and, with the fear of Ferdinand, all would turn to the Ottomans. Had they
not already send many letters to the Ottoman Sultan?274 Evidently, the experienced
dragoman was an expert of diplomatic negotiations in the Porte who had access to
detailed information;275 he was present as a translator during the negotiations of the
French diplomat Rincn with the Ottoman pashas, for instance. Still, his ideas should also
reflect the perceptions and opinions of the Ottoman decision-makers, during the critical
time of 1532, just after the Ottoman armies returned from a campaign of massive scale,
Alaman Seferi, with the hope of rallying the Protestants around their flag and conquering
Vienna.
We had already concluded in Chapter Two that the Ottomans made good use of
secret diplomacy as a part of their military planning. Before undertaking an expedition,
274

AGS, E 1310, fol. 42 (24 December 1532).

Jean-Louis Bacqu-Grammont, propos de Ynus Beg, Ba Tercmn de Soliman le Magnifique, in
Istanbul et ses langues orientales : Actes du colloque organis par lIFA et lINALCO loccasion du
bicentenaire de lcole des langues orientales, Istanbul,
-31 mai 1995, ed. Frdric Hitzel (Paris :
LHarmatan, 1995), 23-39.
275

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they not only gathered information, but also resorted to clandestine measures such as
espionage and defection. Furthermore, in certain instances, the Ottoman secret service
proved its efficiency by anticipating an incoming enemy attack and making necessary
preparations. In 1572, they learned from a Venetian noble that the Venetians would
attack Castelnuovo in four months. In this time, they managed to make necessary military
preparations by piling up ammunition within the castle and entrusting five governors with
a relieving mission.276 Similarly, the dils that corsairs brought in 1573 informed that the
enemys next target would be Tunis, a piece of information which was transmitted to
Tunis immediately.277
Before concluding, however, we should differentiate between the information and
knowledge. Even though the Ottomans received information regarding the recent political
events in Europe and military preparations of their enemies, there was still room for
improvement for the Ottoman elites knowledge on the Christian world in general. Their
interest did not extend much beyond pragmatic reasons and remained within the context
of their own political aims. It is true that some Ottoman officers demonstrated a genuine
interest in things European and seemed to have acquired enough knowledge; still this was
by no means the norm among the Ottoman decision-makers.
In terms of Mediterranean geography, the existence of manuals such as Kitab-
Bahriye as well as the incorporation of expert corsairs did not seem to educate some
high-level Ottoman grandees whose training was based and careers depended on land
warfare rather than naval. For instance, perhaps quite shockingly to a modern mind, the
Ottoman Grand Admiral Sinan Pasha interrupted the Venetian bailo Bernardo Navagero

276
277

AGS, E 1331, fol. 221 (20 May 1572).

BOA, MD, XXII, nos. 416 (H. 14 R 981 / A.D. 12 August 1573) and 419.

418

when the latter mentioned Rome in their conversation: where was this Rome? Did the
Venetians have merchants that informed them from this city? Navagero explained to him
that it was the center (patrona) of the world, the seat of the Pope and one of the most
important cities of Italy and perhaps the world.278 It could be argued that Sinan Pasha was
a graduate of the Ottoman palace school, the Enderun, where he received a classical
training based on land warfare and he only became the Ottoman Grand Admiral thanks to
the nepotism of his brother, the Grand Vizier, Rstem Pasha instead of his naval skills.
Still, the fact that months before he took the Ottoman navy into a daring expedition in the
Western Mediterranean, the Ottoman Grand Admiral did not know where Rome was
remains perplexing. Furthermore, Rome was not just a Mediterranean city, but the center
of the Christian world; his unawareness extends well beyond geography. Should we look
for other explanations? For instance, given that the two were originally conversing on
whether the bailo could confirm the widespread rumours regarding the unexpected
Habsburg attack on Mahdiyya, it could also be argued that Sinan Pasha asked a trick
question in order to learn about the sources of information the Venetians had in Rome.
Still, it is hard to explain what he would do with such useless information regarding who
informed (actually in this case, failed to inform) Navagero from Rome. Perhaps, if he
himself had Venetian agents in the city, was he trying to realize whether they were in a
double game? Even if this could be the case, this explanation is still not fully satisfactory.
If he had Venetian agents in Rome, what was so striking, given the entrepreneurial nature
of early modern espionage so many times accentuated in this dissertation, that these
agents were also providing information regarding the developments in Western Europe to
the Venetian government, their own? Given that these agents were Venetians, it should
278

ASV, SAPC, fil. 5, c. 19v (18 December 1550).

419

be the most expected thing in the world. As long as this information was not on the
Ottoman Empire, this should not even be considered double spying. Moreover, even if
Sinan could still consider his own agents selling information to another employer as a
transgression, he had very little to do about it; it should by now be apparent to the reader
of this dissertation that the employers would not have too much leverage over their spies
from such a distance. Finally, Sinan Pasha should have known better that the Venetians
would have such information before the Ottomans anyways; if not, why did he ask bailo
to confirm what his own network could not in the first place? Be that as it may, this was
not the only example. Similarly, in 1567, when the Grand Vizier Sokollu, once a Grand
Admiral himself, mentioned that the Ottoman navy would attack Puglia and Rome, the
bailo felt obliged to remind him that Rome was not on the coast, but fra terra and thus
could not be attacked by the navy.279
Still, these examples are too few to make a definitive conclusion especially at a
time when there is a trend among the Ottomanists to argue that the Ottomans were
knowledgeable in European geography.280 This is why I prefer to relate the evidence and
leave the issue aside until I encounter enough evidence that would justify a general
argument.
I still would like to offer two explanations for the contradiction between the aforementioned examples and the sporadic knowledge we have at hand such as several
military maps and siege plans in the archives of the Topkap Palace281 which suggests
279

ASV, SDC, fil. 2, fol. 27 (28 June 1567).

Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, 194-200; goston, Where Environmental and
Frontier Studies Meet.
281
In these archives there are maps of Kiev (sometime in 1481-1512), Belgrade (1521?), Malta (1556),
Szigetvr (1566), Vienna (1683), Van, Adakale (1738) and diagrams of the battles of Haov/Mezkeresztes
(1596 and Prut (1711 . goston, Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet, 64. Also see. Ahmet
T. Karamustafa, Military, Administrative, and Scholarly Maps and Plans, in The History of Cartography,
280

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that the early modern Ottomans were engaged in cartography. First of all, as goston has
suggested awareness of geography worked differently in global and local contexts 282
the occasional ignorance of Ottoman pashas at the center might have been compensated
by the diligent intelligence activity that frontier authorities undertook; these activities
might as well have geographical considerations. For instance, the Governor-General of
Buda, veys Pasha commissioned a surprisingly detailed and accurate Ottoman map of
the Habsburg border fortresses around Kanizsa, outlying all the forts and castles, as well
as major river crossings, and sent it to Constantinople. In the light of this evidence,
Sokollus ignorance in thinking Rome was on the coast seemed even more suspicious as
he had not only served as a Grand Admiral, but also the Governor-General of Rumelia
and thus should know better.
Secondly, even when these examples are accepted to reflect a general lack of
knowledge on behalf of the Ottoman grandees on European geography, one still needs to
explain how the Ottomans managed to undertake successful military operations in
faraway lands such as the Western Mediterranean. How could an Ottoman Grand
Admiral, who did not know where Rome was, have successfully commanded the
Ottoman navy in one of the most logistically challenging expeditions of Ottoman naval
history in the Western Mediterranean in 1551?283 Sinan Pasha should have then relied on
a number of well-experienced corsairs, especially Turgud Res who would take charge
of next years expedition, even though without the title of the Grand Admiral. Such

II/1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, eds. J. B. Harley and David
Woodward (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992): 209-227.
282
goston, Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet, 65.
283
Ottoman naval operations in the 1550s were the most daring ones in terms of logistics. Due to the
development in naval technology that decreased the galleys operational radius, the Ottomans will not be
able to undertake such large expeditions so far away from Constantinople in the following decades.

421

incidents once again prove us the importance of less visible figures in decision-making
process which was by no means undertaken only by the major actors of Ottoman politics.
Every high-level decision-maker should have people around them who were, to risk
anachronism and use a modern word, briefing them before decisions were undertaken.
The occasional unawareness of certain Ottoman officials was not confined to the
field of geography. The Ottomans were unable, for instance, to make a difference
between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Nor did they know how much a doblone was
worth; the Grand Vizier had to send one of his men to Margliani to figure this out in
order to be able to calculate how much Philip II distributed to his armies after the
Portuguese expedition; he even asked for 10 dobloni to weigh.284
In the end, information seemed to have served mostly for immediate consumption
during the decision-making process. It did not drastically increase the quality of the
Ottoman elites knowledge of European affairs in general which remained rather limited.
They showed rather little inclination, nor had any material reason, to decorate themselves
with such knowledge, clinging to their classical Enderun education. Their interest and
thus the information they targeted was basically confined to the realm of military and
international politics. What mattered was that, Lutheran or not, the Protestants were their
allies against the Habsburgs. Moreover, as mentioned above, Constantinople was a center
of information hosting many Europeans, some of whom converted to Islam and became
part of the Ottoman military and administration. If an Ottoman pasha wanted to learn
where Rome or how much a doblone was, he could always find somebody in his
entourage to ask. In fact we could realize that he did not know it only because he did ask
such questions.
284

AGS, E 1338, fol. 64 (28 October 1580).

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6.8.

CONCLUSION

The Ottomans may have maintained their decentralized approach and fallen
behind in following, or chosen not to follow, certain developments that started to take
place in Europe. The Ottoman State retained its patrimonial character with imperial
households that undertook certain responsibilities which in the Habsburg and Venetian
examples the state increasingly began to claim for itself. The Ottoman bureaucracy was
not, like its Habsburg and Venetian counterparts, re-organized so as to specialize around
many regional and functional political bodies. Nor did the Ottomans develop a
centralized bureaucracy which insisted on overseeing every step of an operation in effect.
They rather allowed the provincial authorities considerable autonomy and delegated the
responsibilities of espionage to important political figures and private entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, the Ottoman world of information was dominantly an oral one; the
Ottomans had not yet developed a written political culture. They generally relied on oral
communication, especially while carrying messages of importance. They did not write
down the details of decision-making process in the Imperial Council on paper. There was
no printing press which could diffuse information in a written form in the public sphere.
Constantinople was no venue for pamphlet wars like Venice was in the beginning of the
17th century during the Interdict period.285 Sermons in the mosques, criers on the streets
and gossips in the marketplace shaped the Ottoman public opinion.
In the end though, from the states perspective, none of these deeply affected the
efficiency of the Ottoman secret service in gathering information. The Ottoman state
managed to acquire information of strategic value such as a civil war in a European state,
a revolt in an enemy province, religious dissidences in Europe, a treaty of peace, alliance
285

Vivo, Information and Communication.

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or marriage between European monarchs, enemys military preparations, whereabouts of

the enemy navy, etc. As goston has stated, in the 16th century, the Ottomans had the
means to gather enough information in order to develop a meaningful strategy in their
imperial rivalry with the Habsburg Empire. They succeeded in possessing up-to-date
information about [their] rivals, a sine qua non of conducting a viable foreign policy
that also attempted to counter Habsburg aspiration and claims to universal
sovereignty.286
One should not take conclusions that the Ottomans failed to establish an efficient
intelligence gathering system as these statements were mostly based on personal opinions
and definitely not on a comprehensive study of sources. The nature of Ottoman
documentation and the scarcity of written evidence as a result of the Ottoman insistence
of resorting to oral communications make it harder for historians to provide ample
evidence on the activities of Ottoman spies and the details of a network that worked for
Constantinople. But this does not mean that these networks did not exist; one just has to
dig deeper. This is exactly what I tried to do in this chapter. I mobilized every possible
source that could shed light on Ottoman information gathering in the 16th-century
Mediterranean in order to discredit predetermined conclusions such as Certainly, the
entire Ottoman intelligence service did not compare with the effective espionage network
developed by Philip II of Spain.287 This sentence was penned by a non-specialist
historian who did not hesitate to pass judgement on such an important issue without
conducting any research. Unfortunately, one could see a plethora of similar unwarranted
assumptions in Western literature about the Ottomans awareness of the world around it.

286
287

goston, Information, Ideology and Limits, 78.

Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, vol. XVIII, 91.

424

What both empires failed in, in the end, was developing a profound awareness of
each others legal, political and economic systems as well as cultural, linguistic and
religious particularities. The real reason for that was the lack of diplomatic relations
between the two powers, a factor further aggravated by the physical distance. Venetian
diplomats in Constantinople serve as a good example of how permanent diplomatic
presence would enable central governments to train a corpus of diplomatic personnel with
profound knowledge of an alien culture. The Venetian baili not only sent information of
momentary nature, via dispacci, but also were required to leave tens-of-pages long
reports that summarized their tenure in office in the form of relazioni.288 These relazioni
gave an overall picture of the Ottoman state with its administrative structure, fiscal
resources and factional rivalries as well as of Ottoman society with its beliefs and
customs. These texts by no means remained accessible only to a restricted audience; but
rather they found a large one throughout Europe and were printed again and again. They
educated the Venetian elite of the structure of the Ottoman State in such a profound way
that even prompted the Venetians to use Ottoman political system as a point of reference
while producing texts that discussed their own system of government.289
Venice might be considered an exception since it enjoyed for centuries extensive
commercial ties in the Eastern Mediterranean where they had several merchant
communities. After all, Hans Kissling argued that it was exactly these ties that gave
Venice an advantage in gathering information over his rivals. Even though this may be
true to a certain extent for earlier centuries, the volume and importance of information

288

On relazioni, see. Donald E. Queller, The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni in Renaissance

Venice, ed. J. R. Hale (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 174-196.
289
Lucette Valensi, The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993).

425

merchants sent seem to be dwindling throughout the 16th century, especially given the
increasing quality of Venetian baili, the improvements in the transmission of news and in
channels of communication as well as other developments in the Venetian bailate such as
initiating a program for educating translators in the bailos house.290 Increasingly after the
mid-16th century, the Venetian authorities were mainly relying on the information that
their baili sent on a regular basis. Obviously, as the executers of daily diplomacy in
Constantinople, frequenting diplomatic circles, negotiating in the Imperial Divan,
chatting with Ottoman grandees, the baili were in a unique position to observe their
subject, the Ottoman Empire, in a more profound way than any other merchant or spy
could.
This lack of profound awareness of the others culture, religion, legal, political
and economic systems created a number of disadvantages not only for the Ottomans, but
also for the Habsburgs, at least in their relations with the Ottomans, given that they
conducted these without the presence of a resident ambassador.
First of all, both empires failed to participate in court politics and exploit the
rivalries between different factions for gathering information. The Venetian, French and
Austrian ambassadors all entertained good relations with certain Ottoman officials who
furnished them with information; a luxury which the Ottomans did not have in Naples,
Messina or Madrid and Habsburgs in Constantinople. Furthermore, both the Ottomans
and the Habsburgs missed the chance to exploit each others weaknesses by fomenting
dissidence or finding themselves potential allies that would serve their interest. Ottoman
and Habsburg intelligence networks in each others lands remained ineffective in this
regard, compared to, for example, the efforts of the Habsburg ambassador in London,
290

See. Lucchetta, giovani di lingua, 1 -40.

426

Bernardo de Mendoza who tried to overthrow Elizabeth I by exploiting religious

dissidence and factional rivalries. Most of the negotiations of defection failed as well,
because there were no stable channels of communication and such projects had to be
realized by intermediaries of little trustworthiness. Similarly, both empires efforts of
making use of a fifth column came to naught this may not have been the case had there
been a diplomatic figure who could establish extensive relations with these dissident
communities and played a role comparable to that of the Habsburg ambassador in Paris
during the French Wars of Religion. Furthermore, both empires failed to truly grasp the
factional rivalries in each others capitals. This failure prevented them from
understanding which way the wind was blowing during crucial times. What did it mean
for the Ottomans when Don Carlos died amidst rumours of being poisoned by his father,
Antonio Perez was eliminated from Madrid politics or the Viceroy of Naples Cardinal
Granvela was called from Naples to Madrid to succeed Prez? What did brahims
assassination, Hrrems demise or Rstems death mean for the Habsburgs? What did
they make of these?
Furthermore, another side effect of the lack of permanent diplomacy between two
empires was that it precluded for both empires the possibility of training a corpus of
experts that would more effectively and with greater authority process the incoming
information and help the formulation of meaningful policies. Imperial dragomans such as
Yunus Bey and Hrrem Bey, otherwise of little political status and administrative rank,
as well as courtiers such as Gritti, Nasi and Passi who knew Europe very well, played a
crucial role in Ottomans negotiations with European powers as well as in the
formulation of their foreign policy. The Ottomans reliance on these medium level

427

officers and power brokers in their foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations clearly
proves the potential benefits a trained corpus of diplomats would bring to the Ottomans.
Resident diplomats, their chancelleries and retinues would form a pool of trained experts
who would be not only more loyal, but also, having served in foreign capitals for years
and acquired the necessary know-how, better trained than these dragomans and courtiers.
The Habsburgs as well recognized the trained diplomatic personnels potential value in
information processing, decision-making and strategy formulation; this is why Philip II
chose one of them as successor to Antonio Prez. In spite of the fact that he had no
experience as a secretary, the former ambassador to Venice, Juan de Idiquez, was
unexpectedly appointed to the post of the secretary of state, whose responsibilities,
among many other things, included the relations with foreign powers and the operations
of Habsburg secret services.
Finally, the lack of detailed information on the enemys decision-making
institutions and processes should have hindered the effective formulation and
implementation of a long-term strategy to a certain extent. For instance, the Venetians
closely observed the Ottoman political system and tried to understand how the Ottoman
Empire operated. They also learned, by their connections within the Ottoman
administration, discussions that took place in the Divan and found means to influence the
process by both diplomatic and extra-diplomatic means such as presents and bribery. Can
we tell the same thing about the Ottomans? Were they aware of the complex nature of the
Venetian government? If they were, could they regularly get a hold onto what they
discussed in the Senate, what kind of decisions were taken in many different governing
bodies of the Republic? If they could, then could they influence the decision-making

428

process? It is hard to answer all these questions affirmatively. On the other side of the
spectrum, the Habsburgs were not more successful than the Ottomans in similar matters;
excluding perhaps the brief period of 1578-81, when they had a permanent diplomat in
the Ottoman capital.
A final issue to be addressed is that this lack of permanent diplomatic
representation should then be a chronic problem for the Ottomans who, unlike the
Habsburgs, did not appoint permanent ambassadors until the final years of the 18th
century. While their European counterparts perfected their diplomatic systems, training
more qualified diplomatic personnel, establishing new embassies, refining the rules of
international diplomacy, the Ottomans failed to keep up with these developments and
found themselves in a disadvantage that each day grew. One should not rely on only one
factor though; this disadvantage was by no means decisive in the 16th century and what
happened in the 17th and 18th centuries is out of the scope of this study. Furthermore, the
disadvantage created by this lack of Ottoman embassies abroad should have been
compensated to a certain extent by the unique position of Constantinople as a center of
attraction for European military experts, religious and political exiles. After all, even
though the Ottoman elite did not study the European law, culture and religion, they did
not live in complete isolation either. The Ottomans always kept the door open to its
useful novelties and innovations, demonstrating us their pragmatism of acquiring the
essential, regardless of its origins.
This chapter diverges from gostons preliminary findings on Ottoman
information gathering. Firstly, apart from a short paragraph which repeats Paolo Pretos

429

and Ibarras findings,291 goston does not give too much detail about the activities of
particular Ottoman spies; he is more interested in where the Ottomans gathered
information from, rather than how, focusing on a number of sources that provided the
Ottomans with information regarding developments in Europe foreign ambassadors in
Constantinople, dragomans, vassal states and Jews. This dissertation, on the other hand,
includes ample information on operational level in an effort to demonstrate the extent of
the operations that Ottoman spies undertook.
Secondly, this chapter accentuates the personal nature of these intelligence
networks and does not see information gathering mechanisms as necessary extensions of
the Ottoman State. It proposes a different model: rather than developing a single secret
service directly controlled by the central government, the Ottoman state relied on
independent intelligence networks led by Pashas, courtiers and other power brokers who
vied for power in the 16th-century Constantinople. Therefore, power struggles between
imperial factions resulted in rivalries between different intelligence networks.
Furthermore, leaders of these factions used the information that their networks provided
for their own personal interests; their manipulation could go as far as misleading their
own government in order to make sure that the Ottoman Empire adopted the policy that
served their interest the most (disinformation) and even selling information to other
foreign governments from whom they expected a material benefit. The same was true for
other states, vassals or allies that provided the Ottomans with information or for
European diplomats in Constantinople that the Ottomans convinced or pressurize to share
what they knew. Thus, these states and their diplomats could manipulate information and
become a part of the Ottoman decision-making process.
291

goston, Information, Ideology and Limits, 1.

430

Thirdly, my model gives more emphasis on provincial information gathering than

goston did. It accentuates the fact that the special conditions of the frontier forced the
Ottomans to allow greater freedom to its officers in the frontier regions, especially in
military matters that required a prompt response, all along the lines of Ottoman
pragmatism which goston himself was an advocate of.292 Gathering information was
among the many duties of governors and governor-generals of the frontier provinces.
Given that not much of a documentation that could shed light on the activities of Ottoman
provincial officials survived, unfortunately, this part of the story will always remain little
known.

292

goston, A Flexible Empire idem, From Frontier Principality to Empire.

431

7. CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I tried to study early modern espionage in the 16th-century
Mediterranean within the context of the imperial rivalry which dominated the sea, the one
between the Ottomans and Habsburgs. I argued how the geographical scene, the time period
and the political rivalry chosen for this study present a special case. I demonstrated how
certain developments in the 16th century enhanced the quality as well as the scope of
information on the one hand, and institutionalize and centralize secret services on the other.
Furthermore, I tried to situate my arguments in the everlasting debate regarding the clash of
civilizations which appeared ante litteram in the Mediterranean historiography, almost as
early as the historiography itself. I discussed how works that aimed to accentuate the fluidity
of civilizational boundaries between Europe and the Ottoman Empire mostly concentrated on
the exceptionally profound relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire. By focusing
on similar boundaries between two great powers, archenemies that engaged in a global
imperial confrontation, I tried to demonstrate how Mediterranean go-betweens could still
overcome the additional difficulties of the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier and pass the
civilizational boundaries between these two rivaling empires.
Furthermore, regarding the study of early modern secret diplomacy, my opinion is that
the case of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry is a special one. Diplomatic relations and resident
ambassadors are central to all of the works that engage in early modern espionage. However,
excluding a brief period when there was an unofficial Habsburg envoy in the Ottoman capital
and the occasional intermediation of the Austrian ambassadors notwithstanding, there were no
open diplomatic channels between the two empires. This profoundly affected the operations
of intelligence networks, given that in many other examples, it was the ambassador who led
and operated these networks. Furthermore, money was transferred and information was
432

transmitted by using extant diplomatic channels. In the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier, one had
to look for other solutions. More interestingly, however, spies stepped in ambassadors shoes
while it was more common elsewhere to see the opposite; it was generally the ambassadorcum-spy, not vice-versa. On several occasions, our spies played key diplomatic roles, the
most exceptional example being those who started, on their own initiative, direct truce
negotiations between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, an achievement which politicians of
both sides could not accomplish for many years.
This dissertation also tries to make a meaningful contribution to the study of OttomanHabsburg Rivalry, the historiography of which consisted of several well-written yet
uncoordinated articles, written in many languages and published in books and journals in
different countries. I tried to give a rather different picture of this rivalry which was generally
explained within the context of an irreconcilable conflict. I sought to demonstrate how the
intermediation of these go-betweens would render possible the cooperation between imperial
elites, be it in exchange of letters of courtesy or negotiating bribery, defection and treason. I
also believe that a comparative study could instigate further debate on how the two empires,
which differed so much in administrative and bureaucratic structures, organized their secret
services. Finally, in my opinion, comparative works such as this dissertation could help
incorporate the Ottoman History into early modern European history.
This dissertation deals with a number of historical issues and makes important
contributions to the relevant literature. The first is the relationship between information and
politics which I claimed to be multi-layered. I demonstrated in Chapter Two how different
levels of decision-making required different types of information and how states consumed
the incoming information in the formulation of strategy and policy, the making of military
decisions and the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. My intention was to accentuate the
importance of studying information when dealing with these matters in order to be able to

433

deconstruct the decision-making process and understand how decision-makers perceived the
world around them and the options available to them. Most studies that focus on imperial
strategies shy away from a rigorous study of primary sources that would shed light not only
on the aspect of information, but also on that of factional politics. A close look on the
divisions within a government and different policy agendas advocated by rival factions
demonstrates the element of change in imperial strategies better. Furthermore, I argued in the
same chapter that information played a crucial role in the quality of decisions taken and thus
created an advantage for either party in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry. States with better
intelligence mechanisms benefitted from the intelligence edge by better allocating their
resources and more efficiently reacting to threats and opportunities,
After describing the state element of secret diplomacy, I sought to delineate the
human element by engaging in a sociological study of the spies operating in the 16th century
Mediterranean. I concluded that even though it required certain special skills and familiarity
with complex methods, early modern espionage was not a profession per se. Certain
conditions created a favourable environment to attain these special skills which could not be
taught. People that came from certain social and cultural backgrounds and dealt with specific
professions were ideal candidates for early modern secret services. What united these gobetweens were their entrepreneurship and the ability to master the cultural codes of both
empires as well as to cross civilizational borders with relative ease. One other key factor was
the networks that they managed to establish. I tried to accentuate the importance of kinship
relations not only in developing such networks, but also in attaining the necessary level of
specialization. One other major argument I made was that these spies basic motivations were
self-interest which induced them to devise innovative methods and plans in order to defraud
central governments, hence several cases of contention between the two. I then accentuated
the helplessness of central governments in the face of a restricted recruitment pool, a direct

434

result of the lack of means of training for agents on the one hand, and the complexity of the
methods required in the conduct of secret diplomacy on the other. These information traders
used their special skills and in-between/trans-imperial positions while negotiating with
governments and tried to make the most of it by offering their services to more than one
government. Thus, historians should better focus on Mediterranean or Levantine spies as
a unit of historical analysis rather than spies of Philip II, Suleyman I, Sokollu, Granvela, etc.
Apart from this general sociological study, Chapter Five offers many insights with a
more focused study on the Habsburg spies who operated in the Ottoman capital roughly
between 1560 and 1600 and demonstrates the roles these information brokers played. In a
very detailed and descriptive chapter, I tried to show that these agents, who were supposed to
trade information between empires, proved their entrepreneurship by diversifying their
activities. They not only participated in unofficial diplomacy and bridged the diplomatic gap
between the two empires, but also participated in Ottoman factional politics. Perhaps the most
interesting chapter of this dissertation, it deals with several power brokers who ran the day-today operations of the 16th-century Constantinople politics and thus renders agency to the longneglected individual in the Ottoman political history.
New information that this chapter brought to light enhances our knowledge on the
balance-of-power between different factions in the Ottoman capital and the effect of factional
rivalries on the decisions taken. This chapter demonstrates 1) how personal/corporate interests
prevailed over those of the state, 2) how personal intelligence networks rivaled each other
within the parameters of factional rivalries, and 3) how even high-level officers manipulated
information and disinformed their own government in order to serve the interests of their
factions. In short, it is an open criticism of the studies that treat the Ottoman Empire as a
monolithic state and overlook the internal divisions within the Ottoman government. This

435

criticism should be a significant contribution to the studies of Ottoman factional politics as

well as the Ottoman business of rule.
Another important contribution that a focused study on the activities of these spies,
power brokers and diplomats makes to the political history of the 16th century Ottoman
Empire is the detailed picture of Constantinople as a center of information towards which
ideas, news and rumours flowed. This availability of information created two contradictory
situations. Firstly, the presence of several enemy spies in the chaotic plurality of
Constantinople, the very center of the Empire, and the usualness of contacts between
government officials, power-brokers, spies and men of all sorts rendered the control of
information very difficult for the Ottomans. Constantinople was simply easier to penetrate
than Madrid, Naples or Messina. Secondly, while the Ottomans suffered from this leak of
information, however, they also benefitted from the exceptional status of their capital. It was
thanks to its center of information status, they could easily gather information on political
and military developments all around the world. Furthermore, the Ottomans lenience towards
enemy spies makes one think that rather than eliminating them, they sought to mislead these
spies, in order to get their message out and manipulate the information available to their
adversary.
Finally, I engaged in a comparative study of the secret services of both empires. I tried
to demonstrate how different administrative and bureaucratic structures resulted in different
characteristics of each empires state service. While the Habsburgs were more determined in
institutionalizing and centralizing their secret services, a generalization which loses some of
its vigour when the issue was the Habsburg secret service in the Levant, the Ottomans did not
follow a similar path. They instead relied on personal networks and bothered less with
controlling the details of intelligence operations, providing the frontier authorities with more
authority. Nor did they follow recent developments in cryptography and steganography; rather

436

they stick to the oral transmission. Still, in the end, these differences did not seem to have
created a disadvantage for the Ottomans who rather relied on a different, yet still inherently
coherent and ultimately efficient system of information gathering. In short, this chapter proves
the unreliability of predetermined conclusions and unwarranted assumptions that prevailed in
Western historiography. These conclusions and assumptions that defended that the Ottomans
did not have an interest for the world around them and failed in developing efficient methods
of information gathering are simply based on personal opinions, rather than rigourous
scientific study of primary sources. The nature of Ottoman sources and the oral nature of
Ottoman correspondence may have made it harder for historians to detect the activities of
Ottoman espionage. But it does not mean that there were no such activities. Chapter Six tried
to overcome this difficulty by mobilizing all available sources, European and Ottoman, in
order to give the most complete picture of Ottoman secret service in the 16th century.
What affected the secret services of both empires negatively was in fact the lack of
direct diplomatic channels and of a resident ambassador. This factor becomes quite obvious
when one compares the Venetian and French efficiency in gathering information on things
Ottoman with that of the Habsburgs or simply the operations of Habsburg intelligence
networks in Paris, Rome, Venice or London with those of their network in Constantinople.
Both empires failed in developing a profound awareness of each others legal, political and
economic systems as well as cultural, linguistic and religious particularities. They were
interested in each others military preparations, internal stability and diplomatic relations with
other states. The unavailability of a trained corpus of diplomatic personnel, such as the one
that existed in Venice, precluded the possibility of developing a profound interest in the
enemys culture, religion and language. Both empires interest in each other simply remained
political.

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This in turn created a number of other disadvantages for other aspects of imperial
secret services. The two empires could not train the diplomatic personnel who would better
analyze the incoming information regarding each others activities. The lack of diplomatic
relations also meant that they could not participate in court politics, either to exploit the
rivalries between different factions for gathering information, or to capitalize on each others
weaknesses by fomenting dissidence, negotiating defections or finding useful allies.

438

APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Aa (Ott.): A title for a civil or military leader such as the chief black eunuch or the
commander in chief of the Janissaries.
Ahdname (Ott.): Even though it referred to all kinds of documents bestowing
privileges, for the purposes of this dissertation, suffice it to know that it refers to a treaty
between the Ottoman Sultan and a foreign ruler. From a legalistic point-of-view, these
ahdnames were unilateral declarations on behalf of a Muslim ruler, granting commercial
privileges and safe conducts to the subjects of an infidel ruler.
Ake (Ott.): The Ottoman silver coin which in most English literature is named as
asper, originally the name of the Byzantine coin. One ake is valued approximately 60 ducats
in the 16th century.
Aknc (Ott.): A raider in the frontier who fought for booty.
Alaybeyi (Ott.): Regiment commander.
Alcayde (Sp.): Deriving from the Arabic al-qaid, this term means an officer in charge
of the administration of a royal town.
Alferez (Sp.): Company lieutenant.
Aman (Ott.): A safe conduct granted to an infidel.
Arz (Ott.): The act of informing the Sultan of a particular situation in a written or
oral way.
Askeri (Ott.): Separate from the reaya, this section of the Ottoman society that
consisted of the members of the military, administrative and religious establishment, was
immune from taxation.
Asiento (Sp.): A contract between an asientista (in most cases a banker) and the
crown.
Aviso (Sp.) Avviso (It.): The generic name that Spanish and Italian documents used
for news that reached them.
Avlonya Azebleri Aas (Ott.): A military office that was generally bestowed upon
the leader of the corsairs that operated in Valona in the 16th century.
Ayat (Ar.): Literally meaning the sign, an ayat is the smallest unit of the Quran.
Ayuda de costa (Sp.): The one-time lump sum payment made to the newly recruited
spies to cover their travel and other expenses,
Bailo (Ve.): A Venetian title that may refer to a couple of things. The one that is
relevant to our purpose is the Venetian diplomatic representative in Constantinople. He is
different than an ambasciatore and oratore who came with a specific task for a limited
period of time. He was also the official head of the resident Venetian community in
Constantinople whose litigations he settled as the supreme judge, interests he defended in the
Ottoman court and other problems he solved to the greatest extent possible. His term of office
was 3 years in the 16th century.
Bando, banditi (It.): Somebody who was exiled from a certain place for a certain
period of time depending on the type and severity of the crime committed.
Bao (Sp.) Bagno (It.): A generic name used for barracks where slaves slept, such
as the ones in Algiers and Constantinople.
Berat (Ott.): An imperial diploma.
Beylerbeyi (Ott.): The governor-general of a province (beylerbeyilik)
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Bodegn (Sp.): Tavern

Capitn General de las Galeras de Espaa (Sp.): The Admiral of the Spanish fleet.
Capitana (It.): The galley that belonged to the Admiral of the Fleet.
Casus (Ott.): The Ottoman word for spy.
Carta di credenza (It.) Carta de credencia (Sp.): A letter of credence.
Cavallero (Sp.): Literally meaning a cavalryman, it refers to a noble.
Cdula (Sp.): A document of debt, a bond or a bill of exchange.
Condottiere (It.): Literally meaning a contractor, a condottiere was a mercenary
captain leading a company of soldiers whom the Italian city states hired.
Conjura (Sp.) Congiura (It.): A plot.
Consiglio dei Dieci (It.) The Council of Ten: One of the main governing bodies of
Venice, the Council of Tens members was elected for one year by the Great Council. It
enjoyed several responsibilities on many aspects of the Republic including its diplomacy,
military and secret service.
Consejo (Sp.): A council where the monarchs secretaries and advisors discussed state
matters.
Consejo de Estado (Sp.): The most important of consejos, the Council of State
discussed important issues regarding the Monarchy and the relations with foreign powers. It is
the only council that the King directly presided.
Consulta (Sp.): A written recommendation compiled by a council, consejo, to be
submitted to the King.
Contrasea (Sp.): Countersign
Correo Mayor (Sp.): Agents of the Correo Mayor General in important cities.
Correo Mayor General (Sp.): The person that operates the Habsburg postal system
in exchange for a lucrative contract.
Corso (It.): Corsary, or simply Mediterranean privateering. Corsairs should be
distinguished from pirates, as the former operated under the aegis of a central authority and
followed a code of conduct, while the latter is a lawless bandit.
Chaus Cavu (Ott.): A military officer whose vast range of duties included
carrying correspondence.
Cruzada (Sp.): First conceded to the Spanish kings by the papal authority in 1482,
this was the right to sell bulls of indulgences to the entire population. It was one of the most
important revenues for the crown.
Darl-Harb (Ott.): Literally meaning the Abode of War, in Islamic Law (Sharia .
this term signified the lands that had never fallen under the Muslim rule. Given the perpetual
state of war between Islam and Christianity, these lands were major objectives of the Holy
War efforts.
Darl-slam (Ott.): Literally meaning the Abode of Islam, in Islamic Law
(Sharia), this term signified the lands that had at least once fallen under the Muslim rule. Once
the people heard the Muslim call to prayer in these lands, it became an inalienable part of the
Darl-slam.
Dil (Ott.): A captive that was captured to extract information.
Dil almak (Ott.): An expression literally meaning to take a tongue, denoting
bringing a captive to be interrogated.
Dispacci (It.): Regular dispatches of Venetian ambassadors. As opposed to relazioni,
these inform the government of recent developments and include little comprehensive
analysis.
Divan- Hmayun (Ott.): The Ottoman Imperial Council, consisting of the Sultan,
the Grand Vizier, viziers (numbering between three to seven), two Kazaskers, two Defterdars,

440

Ni anc and other high-ranking Ottoman officials who appeared in discussions on a nonpermanent basis, only when the issue under consideration required their participation.
Divan- Hmayun Tercman (Ott.): A translator in the employ of the Ottoman
Divan. Generally chosen from among the renegades, these played key roles in the daily
conduct of diplomacy in the Ottoman capital.
Dizdar (Ott.): An Ottoman castle commander.
Doblone (It.): A gold coin worth 2 escudos, weighing 6.77 grams.
Doge (Ve.): Elected for life by the Maggior Consilio after a confusing voting system,
the Doge was the most senior official of the Republic of Venice.
Dragoman (It.), Tercman (Ott.): A translator between the Ottoman authorities and
European merchants and diplomats.
Ducato (Ve.) Ducat: The Venetian gold coin that weighs 3.5 grams. This was the
strongest and most stable currency in the Mediterranean after the fall of the Byzantine asper.
It eventually became a monetary unit of account.
Emin (Ott.): A salaried Ottoman officer whose task was to supervise a certain
department, function or revenue.
Encomienda (Sp.): An administrative district that belonged to a religious order.
Enderun (Ott): The Palace School situated in Topkap Palace where select slaves of
the Sultans household received their education in order to become high ranking military and
administrative officers.
Entretenimiento (Sp.): Permanent monthly salary which the Habsburg Treasury
allocated to an entretenido.
Escudo (Sp.) Scuto (It.) cu (Fr.): A gold coin widely in circulation in 16th
century Europe. Spanish escudo was worth 350 maraved and weighed 3.38 grams.
Esir (Ott.): A slave.
Espia Mayor Superindente de las inteligencias secretas (Sp.): This was an office
that existed de facto starting from the final years of Philip IIs reign. It was officially created
in 1613 in order to synchronize the actions of different intelligence networks, solve the
problems of coordination between these networks and the Habsburg authorities and better
regulate financial matters, often reasons of conflict between the agents and authorities. It
quickly lost its political relevance and became an honorific title after the middle of the 1620s.
Faris Aas (Ott.): A cavalry commander.
Farsi turco (It.): Literally meaning make ones self Turk, this was the most
commonly used term of the 16th century for conversion from Christianity to Islam.
Firenk (Ott.): The Ottoman term which was used for all the Westerners, even though
it literally meant Frank. It could be seen as the Ottoman equivalent of turco in Latin
languages which was mostly used for Muslims, rather than ethnic Turks.
Fondaco dei Turchi (It.) Fontego dei Turchi (Ve.) : A palazzo on the Grand Canal
that the Venetians reserved in the 17th century for Turkish (read Muslim and not only
Ottoman) visitors of the city. It functioned as a warehouse, market and lodging.
Fondaco dei Tedeschi (It.) Fontego dei Tedeschi (Ve.): A palazzo which the
Venetians reserved for German (this term does not fully correspond to the modern German
merchants in the city.
Forzado (Sp.): A criminal that was sent to galleys in order to row as a punishment.
Fuorusciti (It.): The rebels that opposed the Habsburg rule in Naples.
Gastos secretos (Sp.): Literally meaning secret expenditures, this term denotes the
money allocated from the provincial and ambassadorial budgets for secret missions such as
bribes and espionage.
Gaza (Ott.): Even though traditional historiography explained this term as the Islamic
Holy War against Christianity, historians recently challenged this description and accentuated
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the fluidity and the inclusiveness of the concept of gaza. It may mean simply a raid, a holy
war and most of the time a combination of the two.
Gazi (Ott.): Somebody who participated in a gaza.
Giovane di lingua (It.): An apprentice who was trained in the Venetian embassy to
learn Ottoman.
Gnll Levend (Ott.): A corsair. He operated under the aegis of a central authority
and obeyed certain conventional rules. Thus, he was different than a lawless pirate, which in
Ottoman was named as harami levend.
Gnll Levend Reisleri Kapudan (Ott.): Literally meaning the Captain of the
corsairs, this was a military title granted to the leader of the corsairs that operated from an
Ottoman port.
Gracia (Sp.): A favour.
Gran Signore (It.) Gran Seor (Sp.): A generic title which the European used to
designate the Ottoman Sultan.
Hacienda (Sp.): The Treasury.
Hassa reis (Ott.): The captain, reis, of a galley in the Ottoman navy.
Harac (Ott.): The poll tax which the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Sultan had
to pay.
Hkm (Ott.): An imperial order.
Infante (Sp.): Infantry
Inquisitori di Stato (It.): A magistrate consisted of three Venetian officials in charge
of preventing the spread of state secrets. Permanently established in 1539 and decorated with
highest authority, these Inquisitors against the propagation of secrets, as they were
otherwise called, functioned attached to the Venetian Council of Ten. These should not be
considered with Inquisitors of the Catholic Church.
Intitulatio (Lat.): The part of a letter that contained titles.
stimalet (Ott.): Ottoman policy of tolerance and co-optation while dealing with nonMuslim populations of the conquered territories.
Janissary Agha (Ott.): The commander of the Janissary corps, elite infantry units.
Junta (Sp.): The meeting of a group of people to discuss a certain issue.
Kad (Ott.): An Ottoman provincial judge.
Kahya (Ott.): A steward or a butler of a household. It can also refer to an officer.
Kaid (Ott.): A military title which meant master, leader. For the purposes of this
dissertation, a kaid is an Ottoman governor in North Africa.
Kalemiyye (Ott.): A term used for the Ottoman bureaucracy.
Kalyete (Ott.): Galiot.
Kapu halk (Ott.): Members of an extended household, kapu.
Kapudan- Derya (Ott.): The Ottoman Grand Admiral.
Kethda (Ott.): Lieutenant.
Klavuz (Ott.): A road guide.
Kira: The Sultanas lady-in-waiting.
Legajo (Sp.): Folder.
Littera di credito (Sp.): Letter of credit.
Maona (Ge.): Although a generic term denoting the association of investors, it was
used in this dissertation to refer to the Genoese Maona that was ruling the island of Chios on
behalf of the Genoese government, making use of its resources and paying an annual fee.
Marrano (Sp.): An Iberian Jew that was forced to convert to Christianity. Also called
a new Christian, a Marrano would most likely practice Judaism secretly.
Maestro (It.): Master.
Maestro de posta (Sp.): A postmaster.
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Mappamundi (Lat.): A generic name for European world maps.

Mare Nostrum (Lat.): Literally meaning our sea, this was one of many names of
the Mediterranean.
Matematico (It.): An engineer.
Mayorduomo (Sp.): A steward or a butler.
Menzil (Ott.): Ottoman postal stations that were established in varying distances
according to geographical conditions. These also had a military function and could be used in
order to provision the army during a campaign.
Menzilke (Ott.): A special text that the Ottomans levied for the maintenance of
postal stations or menzils.
Merced (Sp.): Gifts, fiefs, offices or titles that the monarch and the aristocrats
distributed to their subjects.
Morisco (Sp.): Iberian Muslims that were forced to convert to Christianity in the 16th
century.
Mudjar (Sp.): Muslims who remained in the Iberian peninsula under Christian
administration without converting to Christianity.
Mfti (Ott.): A religious scholar who could give a legal opinion. The Europeans also
used that term to denote the Ottoman eyhl-slam, the functionary at the head of the
Ottoman religious scholars as the Mfti of Constantinople.
Msadere (Ott.): The practice of confiscating the property of deceased and/or
dismissed officials and other persons to the Ottoman Treasury.
Mteferrika (Ott.): Guards in the Ottoman palace, attached to the person of the
Sultan. Their occupations were not restricted to the military and court; several officers with
various tasks were inducted into the mteferrika corps, the idea being to provide them with a
reliable source of income. Ottoman diplomats, dragomans and even Christians such as
Christophe de Roggendorf could be found among their ranks.
Nomenclator (Lat.): A type of substitution cipher that combined codes and ciphers.
Oratore (It.): A diplomat on an ad-hoc mission.
Pagador (Sp.): Paymaster.
Palazzo Ducale (It.): The Doges Palace. It is a palace adjoining the St. Marks
Basilica and the prisons. It houses government offices and the Doges private quarters.
Pasha (Ott.): A military title granted to Ottoman Viziers and Governor-Generals in
the 16th century.
Pike (Ott.): A gift that an Ottoman official gave his superiors mostly in order to
please him and secure for himself a more lucrative office.
Pliego (It.): An envelope or a folder in which the letters were sent.
Provveditore (Ve.): A title that could refer to a number of offices with different
responsibilities. It was mainly used for Venetian governors.
Quenta (Sp.): An explanation or a justification.
Razzia (It.): It refers to the seasonal corsair attacks and pillages in the Mediterranean.
Reaya (Ott.): The tax-paying section of the Ottoman population.
Reconquista (Sp.): A long period of Christian expansion in the Iberian Peninsula
which started in the Middle Ages and ended in 1492 when the last Muslim ruler of the
Peninsula surrendered to the Catholic Kings.
Relazione (It.): 1. Reports that the Venetian ambassadors had to read in the Senate
after they completed their mission abroad. The ambassador, following a strict template, used
to give a basic outline of a given states ruler, court factions, dynasty, military, navy,
Treasury, expenses and to make some basic but very interesting observations on its society
and culture. These were also published and circulated extensively among the literati of the
16th century. 2. A general term used for reports, Relacin (Sp.).
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Repbrica de Zna (Ge.): The Republic of Genoa.

Salyaneli eyalet (Ott.): This is a term that denotes Ottoman provinces which were not
administrated directly and where the basic tenets of Ottoman land system such as the tmar
regime were not introduced. These provinces benefitted from financial autonomy and had
separate treasuries. After the necessary expenditure was made, the remaining amount was
transmitted to the central treasury every year.
Sandjak Sancak (Ott.): The Ottoman district province headed by a sancakbeyi.
Sancakbeyi (Ott.): The governor of a district province (sancak).
Secretario de Cifra (Sp.): The secretary in charge of cryptography.
Secretario de Estado (Sp.): Secretary of the State was the most influential position in
the nascent Habsburg bureaucracy. His responsibilities included, among many things, foreign
policy and secret service. He provided the link between the monarch and the councils. He also
made crucial decisions regarding the functioning of the councils, i.e., when to convene, which
issues to lay down for discussion and which information to relate to the members of the
council.
Seal (Sp.): Special signs, such as biting each others nose or ear, which agents used
in order to recognize each other.
Serdar (Ott.): Commander in chief of the Ottoman army.
Serenissima (It.): Literally meaning the most serene, this term was used to denote
the Republic of Venice whose official name was the Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia.
Signoria (It.): An abstract noun which referred to a governing body. In this
dissertation, it was used to denote the supreme body of Venetian government that consisted of
the Doge, his six advisors and the 3 leaders of the Quarantia.
Sipahi (Ott.): An Ottoman cavalryman.
Solak (Ott.): The name of a part of the sultan's bodyguard in the old Ottoman military
organisation.
Stato di Mar (It.): With the Dogado and the Terraferma, this term constituted the
third and the largest subdivision of the Venetian empire. It denotes the Republic of Venices
maritime possessions in the Adriatic Sea (Istria, Dalmatia) and the Eastern Mediterranean
(Crete, Cyprus, possessions in Morea, some of the Aegean Islands and Constantinople proper
in the 13th century).
Suba (Ott.): An Ottoman officer in charge of police functions in the Ottoman
provinces. The term was also used to designate a certain military rank in the cavalry corps of
the Ulu eci.
Sultana (It.): A word produced from the Turkish word Sultan with the feminine
suffix a, denoting a female member of the Ottoman dynasty.
Surah (Ar.): A division of the Quran that consisted of ayats. There are 114 surahs in
the Quran.
Tekalif-i rfiyye ve avarz- divaniye (Ott.): Extraordinary taxes and duties that the
Ottoman central government imposed on its subjects based on the Sultanic Law (r ) and
directly collected from the population.
Telhis (Ott.): A document in which an important issue is summarized to be presented
to the Sultan by the Grand Vizier or eyhl-slam.
Terakki (Ott.): Promotion.
Tercio (Sp.): A unit in the Habsburg army that consisted of 12 companies and
approximately 2500 men under the command of a maestro de campo.
Tmar (Ott.): Literally meaning care or attention, this term denotes the non-hereditary
prebends that the Ottoman Empire allocated to its cavalry troops, the tmarl sipahi.

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Tmarl Sipahi (Ott.): This term refers to Ottoman provincial cavalry troops that were
supported by non-hereditary prebends, the tmars. These troops constituted the backbone of
the Ottoman army in the Classical Age.
Tomar lengua (Sp.): An expression literally meaning to take a tongue, it means
bringing a captive to be interrogated. Spanish equivalent of dil almak.
Tornes (Sp.): Tournois (Fr.): A currency that was used in Medieval and Early
Modern France. It was mostly an accounting currency.
Turco de nacin (Sp.): In the parlance of the 16th century, a Turk by birth may
refer to a variety of things: a free-born Muslim, a Levantine or an ethnic Turk. Most of the
time, though, it meant a free-born Muslim.
Turco de profesin (Sp.): In the parlance of the 16th century, a Turk by profession
meant a renegade, somebody who changed his religion because of his profession.
Ulak (Ott.): An Ottoman courier.
Ulak hkm (Ott.): An imperial diploma granted to the ulaks that authorized them
the use of horses in the menzils and ensured the cooperation of local officials.
Ulufe (Ott.): Regular wage.
Vakf (Ott.): A charitable trust instituted in accordance with the Islamic Law, Sharia.
These provided funds for religios, educational and charitable institutions such as mosques,
schools and hospitals.
Valido (Sp.): Favourites such as the Duke of Lerma and the Count-Duke of Olivares
who played key roles in the Habsburg court and ruled the Empire with the authority bestowed
upon them by the monarch. These figures gained prominence in the 17th century when the
business of rule became more complex and therefore demanded more than the attention of a
half-hearted monarch and yet there were no political institutions to fill the gap.
Veedor (Sp.): Inspector.
Ventaja (Sp.): A wage supplement.
Vezir (Ott.): The Sultans minister or a member of the Imperial Divan. Their numbers
varied over time. The highest ranking Vezir is the Sadr- Azam or Vezir-i Azam.
Voce liberar bandito (Ve.): The privilege which the Venetian government granted in
exchange of outstanding favours to the state. Somebody who received a voce liberar bandito
could liberate an exile, bandito.
Vox populi (Lat.): Literally voice of the people. The opinion of the general public
expressed by rumours on the strees, and in marketplaces, taverns, etc.
Yarar (Ott.): A common adjective in Ottoman used for soldiers, sailors and spies,
meaning useful and competent.
Zafername (Ott.): Literally meaning the letter of victory, it was a letter sent to
foreign rulers, announcing a recent victory that the Ottoman Sultan achieved.
Zecca (It.): The Venetian mint, both an office and a 16th century building by Jacopo
Sansovino, hosting today the manuscript section of BNM in Bacino di San Marco.
Ziffra grande (Ve.): The main cipher that the Venetian provincial officials used in
their correspondence with the central government.
Ziffra picciola (Ve.): The Venetian cipher that the provincial officers, such as baili
and rettori used among themselves.

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APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF MAIN PERSONAE
OUTSTANDING SPIES, SPYMASTERS, INFORMANTS AND
BROKERS
Alvise Gritti: The illegitimate son of the Venetian doge, Alvise was an influential
courtier in the 1520s and 1530s Constantinople. He was a close friend of Ibrahim Pasha and a
favourite of the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I who did not hesitate to pay visits to Grittis house
in Pera. Gritti and his brothers operated an impressive intelligence network that provided both
the Ottomans and the Venetians with crucial information.
Andrea Gritti: A successful grain merchant, Andrea Gritti was the key figure in the
negotiations for the treaty that ended the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1499-1503. He also
proved himself an able commander at the critical Battle of Agnadello in 1509, an outstanding
achievement the reward of which was his election as the Venetian Doge in 1523. Andrea
fathered illegitimate sons during his sojourn in Constantinople. Alvise and his brothers were
key figures in Constantinople politics in 1520s and 1530s.
Antn Avelln : The Admiral of the allied Christian fleet, Don Juan sent Avelln and
Virgilio Polidoro to Constantinople in 1572 in order to bring the ransomed Ottoman slaves.
The two also tested the water for a five-year truce, and offered to include Spanish Habsburgs
in the capitulations granted to the Austrian branch of the family, yet without success. The duo
was in Constantinople once again in 1575, in order to negotiate the ransoming of the Christian
slaves that had fallen captive when la Goleta fell. During their visit, they also recruited several
informants in Constantinople, especially from Ulu Alis household.
Antonio Rincn: A Spanish communero and an intransigent enemy of Charles V,
Rincn was a seasoned diplomat in French service. He came to Constantinople on various
missions between 1530 and 1541 as a French diplomat. When he was assassinated by the
Governor-General of Milan in 1541, a full scale international crisis erupted between the
Habsburgs and the French.
Aurelio Santa Croce: A merchant born in the Venetian dominions, Aurelio was one
of the lieutenants of the Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople from the very
beginning in the 1560s until his voyage to Naples in 1577. He was the one who instigated the
Ottoman-Habsburg truce with his own initiative and without authorization from the
authorities, only to save his own skin. The Habsburgs decided to exclude him from the
negotiations and he could not return to Constantinople. He was shortly imprisoned in Madrid
because of an unsettled debt.
Balthasar Prototico: The head of the Prototico network that gathered information for
the Habsburgs in the Ionian Islands.
Baron de la Fage: A French renegade, originally from Languedoc, was an agent for
the Queen of England as well as a spy in Ottoman employ. With the alibi of converting to
Christianity, he went to Italy where he not only spied for the Ottomans, but also established
contacts with people of importance. He received many favours from the Grand Duke of
Tuscany as well as Henry IVs ambassador in Florence. Furthermore, he went to Rome where
he had an audience with the Pope Innocent IX and several cardinals. He offered to win the
Governor of Negroponte back to the Christianity and to seize several galleys which the
renegade Christians sailed. He then passed to Venice and contacted the Habsburg ambassador
for money; yet the ambassador de Vera, otherwise very friendly and supportive to spies,
quickly realized de la Fages true nature and refused to help him. Continuing his
machinations, he tricked four Christian boys to accompany him to Levant, under the pretense
of showing them the Ottoman Empire, nevertheless with the intention of either selling them
446

into slavery or forcing them to convert to Islam. On his way back, he defrauded the captain of
the ship he embarked for Cattaro and took his 450 escudos as well as other goods promising
to buy horses for him. Upon his return, he revealed the identity of a number of leading
Habsburg spies in Constantinople, including David Passi and Guglielmo de Saboya. Enjoying
his successes, de la Fage was making fun of the Pope and Cardinal de Santa Severina by
showing off with brevets and safe-conducts that he acquired from them. Unfortunately for the
Ottomans, he died in the fall of 1592 in a plague epidemic.
Bartolomeo Brutti: A factotum Mediterranean go-between par excellence, Brutti was
born in the Venetian dominions in Dalmatia and entered the state service as a giovane di
lingua. After two short spells, he established himself as the ransom agent and negotiated the
exchange of prisoners-of-war between the Ottomans and the Christians in the mid-1570s. He
then established contact with the Habsburg secret service and offered them the defection of
the former Governor-General of Algeria, Mehmed Pasha in exchange for 30.000 ducats with
which the latter would secure his re-appointment as the Governor-General. In the meantime,
the Habsburgs gave him the task to accompany and help the unofficial Habsburg envoy to
Constantinople, Giovanni Margliani. The two quickly fell out, however, and Brutti did
nothing but to sabotage Marglianis mission. Brutti was also a relative of Koca Sinan Pasha
and thus an actor in Ottoman factional rivalries. He found himself in prison when he clashed
with the omnipotent Grand Vizier Sokollu. The latter was indignant when he realized that
Brutti was plotting on behalf of the Moldavian prince which the Ottoman sent in exile to
Rhodes. The intervention of Sinan Pasha and Margliani saved him from prison, yet only with
one condition. He was to leave for Naples immediately. When his ship crashed, however, he
managed to run and return thanks to the death of Sokollu and consequent purging of his
faction. He then moved to Moldavia with the new prince on whose account he was plotting a
short time ago. There he played an important political role as the high dignitary. In 1582, he
returned to Constantinople as the Moldavian envoy. In 15 0, we see him as Sinan Pashas
envoy to Poland.
Carlo Cicala: Coming from the famous Genoese corsair family of Cicala, he was a
corsair that operated under the aegis of the Sicilian Viceroy. When his brother Cigalazade
Yusuf Sinan Pasha, who had been captured by the Ottomans and forced into conversion a
long time ago, reached the highest echelons of Ottoman military, he invited his brother to his
side. Carlo went to the Ottoman Empire with the permission from the Habsburg authorities on
the condition that he sent regular information and tried to ensure the defection of his brother.
Carlo first settled in Chios where his brother came to see him on his way back to
Constantinople with the Ottoman navy. He then went to Constantinople where there were
rumours that he came to renew the Ottoman-Habsburg truce and that he was a Habsburg
agent. Unable to have himself appointed as the Prince of either Wallachia or Moldavia and
unwilling to convert to Islam, he returned to Sicily. He was there when he was appointed as
the Duke of Naxos by the Ottomans. He left Sicily for Constantinople, accompanied by a spy
he recruited for the Ottomans. Even though his influence should have decreased with the
death of his brother in 1606, we still encounter him in Constantinople in 1630, trying to have
his son appointed as the Prince of one of the Danubian Principalities.
Colombina: One of the giovani di lingua in the Venetian bailate. One day he attacked
his classmate Matheco Salvega with a knife as a result of which the bailo had him arrested in
his house. He managed to escape, however, and then converted to Islam. He helped the
Ottomans decipher the Venetian letters. He served in the Ottoman chancellery for years,
appearing frequently in correspondence between the bailo and the Council of Ten. In 1578, he
was even designated as the Ottoman envoy to the Serenissima, to great chagrin and protest of
the Venetian authorities.

447

David Passi : A Portuguese Marrano, Passi was a broker par excellence. Sending
information from Ragusa to the Venetian government during the War of 1570-3, he then
returned to the Laguna and opened a saloon, a perfect trade for an information broker. He then
settled in Constantinople where he became the Ottoman Sultans favourite. Apart from
profiting from substantial financial concessions, he became an influential actor in Ottoman
factional politics. He had spies all over the Europe that sent him information which he shared
not only with the Ottomans, but also with other governments. He was also an agent of Dom
Antonio, the pretender to the Portuguese throne on whose behalf he lobbied in Constantinople
for an alliance between Dom Antonio, the French, the English and the Ottomans. In the
meantime, he and his go-between de Saboya negotiated the ransom of important Spanish
prisoners-of-war on behalf of their families. He also offered several clandestine operations
against the Ottomans to the Habsburg authorities. In 1591, the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha, his
archrival, managed to convince the Sultan to send Passi to exile when it was discovered that
Passi was trying to start an Ottoman-Polish War. Even though he returned from the exile
shortly after, he never regained his influence. He disappears from documentation after 1594.
Avram Galanti put forward a rather unproven hypothesis that Passi converted to Islam after
that date, changed his name to Halil. According to him, Passi was no other than the influential
vizier and the brother-in-law of Murad III, Halil Pasha.
Filippo Trivulzio (o. 1521-1543): The Milanese born pro-French archbishop of
Ragusa. He was feeding the French and the Ottomans with information he acquired thanks to
his intelligence network.
Francisco de Vera y Aragn: The spy-friendly Habsburg ambassador to Venice that
argued that the Viceroy of Naples should pay spies stipends regularly and advocated for a
more aggressive policy of espionage in Constantinople.
Gabriel Defrens: A French renegade who travelled in Europe as an Ottoman spy for
years and engaged in in diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire, England and the leader of
the Dutch rebels, William of Orange.
Giovanni Margliani: A Milanese officer who not only fell captive to the Ottomans,
but also left an eye when la Goleta fell in 1574. After having been ransomed, he returned to
Constantinople as the unofficial Habsburg envoy to conclude the truce. After three years of
hard work, he reorganized the Habsburg intelligence network in Constantinople and signed
the long-awaited truce of 1581. On his return, he was given the title of the Conde de Intelvi y
los Cuatro Valles in 1583. He continued playing an important role as a political advisor
regarding the Ottoman Empire and the overseer of the negotiations for the renewal of the
1581 truce.
Giovanni Maria Renzo: The Genoese from San Remo who set up the Habsburg
intelligence network in Constantinople in the early 1560s. He traveled frequently between
Madrid, Naples and Constantinople in order to ensure coordination between the network and
the Habsburg authorities. He not only recruited several spies and informants in the Ottoman
capital, but also devised clandestine operations such as torching the Ottoman Arsenal,
ensuring the defection of the Ottoman galleys and sabotaging the Ottoman fleet during
combat with the Habsburg one. During the War of 1570-3, he contacted the Venetian
authorities as well with a clandestine operation in order to seize Ottoman Castelnuovo. He
died in 1577.
Giovanni Stefano Ferrari : A seasoned courier-cum-diplomat who operated between
Madrid, Naples and Constantinople for years. He was the one who negotiated the renewal of
the 1581 truce in 1584.
Girolamo Lippomano: The Venetian diplomat who served both in Madrid and
Constantinople. He was secretly providing state secrets to the Habsburgs. When the Venetian
authorities realized this, they sent Bernardo Lorenzo to Constantinople to replace him and
448

send him back to Venice to be tried. Seeing Venice on the horizon, Lippomano jumped off the
ship and was drowned.
Guglielmo de Saboya: A Portuguese Marrano, David Passis right hand man who
negotiated with the Habsburg authorities on his behalf. He died in an Ottoman prison in 1592.
Hrrem Bey: An Italian renegade from Luca, this dragoman (Divan-i Hmayun
Tercman) on Habsburg payroll, was one of the main protagonists of the Ottoman-Habsburg
truce negotiations.
Jernimo Bucchia: A classmate of Cardinal Granvela with whom he studied Law in
the University of Padua in1 537, Bucchia used his familial ties to establish an intelligence
network on behalf of the Habsburgs in several cities of Dalmatia which he remotely
coordinated from Turin and Naples.
Joseph Nasi: a rich Jewish banker, Nasi finally settled in Constantinople after many
years in Europe. He became a close confidant of the Ottoman Sultan Selim II who created him
the Duke of Naxos. An important figure in factional politics, he was the arch-rival of the
Grand Vizier Sokollu and the instigator of the War of 1570-3. He employed several spies who
sent him information from all parts of Europe and the Mediterranean. The great fire in the
Venetian Arsenal in 1569 was largely attributed, unjustly, to these spies. He also had
extensive commercial relations throughout the Mediterranean. He died in Constantinople in
1579.
Marcantonio Barbaro: The Venetian bailo that had to endure the hardships of the
Ottoman-Venetian War of 1570-3. In spite of his isolation under house arrest during the war
years, this maltreated Venetian diplomat proved his prowess by resuming contact with the
Venetian government, thanks to the complicity of Salomon Ashkenazi and the Grand Vizier
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. He sent several letters informing Venice of recent developments in
Constantinople that would shed light on military preparations, balance-of-power between war
and peace factions and consequently the prospects of a truce.
Marxeben Lener: The polyglot agent of Sokollu, he was a Transylvanian renegade.
He spied for the Ottomans in Germany on the one hand and defrauded the Emperor with false
promises on the other in 1575. The next year, he was spotted by Habsburg counter
intelligence and reported to have left Constantinople for his new targets. He would first go to
Naples where he would pretend to re-convert to Christianity and stay in the Viceroys house.
From there he would pass to Rome, Venice and finally to Spain, to the Habsburg court.
Nicol Giustinian: The leader of the Habsburg intelligence network in Chios,
operational in 1560s. He also ransomed Christian soldiers on behalf of Philip II.
Pietro Lanza: A Corfiote corsair who was employed by the Viceroy of Naples. His
activities, spanning decades, created international tensions between the Habsburgs and the
Venetians who had exiled Lanza from his natal Corfu at the first place. His raid created an
international crisis between the Venetians and the Habsburgs in 1578 as a result of which
Lanza was dismissed from his post as the captain of the royal frigates. Yet, he continued
serving the Neapolitan viceroys until the first decade of the 17th century. He also devised a
plan to assassinate the Ottoman Sultan in 1608.
Salomon Ashkenazi: A Jewish physician educated in Padua, he was exiled from the
Papal territories. He first went to the Polish court and then to Constantinople where he
became the Venetian bailos physician. Introduced by the bailo to the Ottoman Grand Vizier
Sokollu, Ashkenazi became the Pashas close-ally. He was the intermediary between Sokollu
and the bailo during the War of 1570-3 when the latter was under house arrest. He also helped
the Venetian bailo by smuggling his letters in his boots and then sending them by a ship to
Crete. Caught and imprisoned twice by the Ottomans, in both instances, he was saved by his
protector, Sokollu. Playing a decisive role in the Ottoman-Venetian negotiations for a peace,
he came to Venice as an Ottoman envoy in 1574 in order to finalize the peace treaty. His
449

influence in the Lagoon was such that he convinced the Venetian authorities to revoke the
impractical ban over the Jews in Venice. He also claimed to have been influential in the
election of Henri de Valois as the Polish King. When the latter became the French King,
Henri III, he asked for remunerations for his support in these elections. Henri simply refused.
He was also a rich merchant and had extensive trade relations in the Eastern Mediterranean.
He died around 1602.
Sinan (Juan Briones) and Haydar the English (Robert Drever): Two renegades
from the household of Ulu Ali. They regularly sent information to the Habsburgs regarding
Ottoman navy and military preparations.
The Marquis of Bedmar: The Habsburg ambassador in Venice who managed to
establish a wide network of spies and informants who provided him, in spite of the Venetian
Inquisitori di Statos vigilant eyes, with crucial information during his tenure (1606-1618). At
a time when the relations between the Venetians and the Habsburgs worsened substantially,
Bedmar and the Duke of Osuna, the viceroy of Naples, devised a plan together according to
which the Habsburg agents would set the Arsenal and the Mint, zecca in fire, deflect the
Dutch soldiers in the city and attack the Palazzo Ducale with the Spanish fleet that would
arrive from Naples in order to sack and submit the city to Philip III. When the Venetians
discovered the plan, a great scandal followed, forcing Bedmar to leave Venice.
Yunus Bey: An influential Ottoman dragoman and diplomat who visited Venice six
times.
Zaccaria Delphino: The Bishop of Lesina and the papal nuncio to Vienna who set up
a spy network in Constantinople that provided the Emperor Ferdinand I with information.

450

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