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G.R.No.159883

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

DR.PEDROF.GOBENCIONG,
G.R.No.159883
Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO,CJ,

QUISUMBING,
versus
YNARESSANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIOMORALES,

AZCUNA,
HON.COURTOFAPPEALS,
TINGA,
DEPUTYOMBUDSMAN
CHICONAZARIO,
(VISAYAS),REGIONAL
VELASCO,JR.,
DIRECTORoftheDepartmentof
NACHURA,
Health,RegionVIII,andFLORA
REYES,and
DELAPEA,
LEONARDODECASTRO,JJ.
Respondents.

xx

OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN,
G.R.No.168059
Petitioner,

versus

DR.PEDROF.GOBENCIONG

andtheHON.COURTOF

APPEALS(CEBUCITY),

Respondents.

xx

DR.PEDROF.GOBENCIONG,
G.R.No.173212
Petitioner,

versus

DEPUTYOMBUDSMAN

(VISAYAS),REGIONAL
Promulgated:
DIRECTORoftheDepartmentof
March31,2008
Health,RegionVIII,andFLORA
DELAPEA,
Respondents.
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xx
DECISION

VELASCO,JR.,J.:

ThePetitions

BeforetheCourtarethesethreepetitions,twointerposedunderRule45andoneunder
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. These petitions stemmed from OMBVISADM970370
entitled Dr. Flora de la Pea v. Dr. Rafael C. Omega, Chief of Hospital, Dr. Pedro F.
Gobenciong,AdministrativeOfficerIV,CrisologoR.Babula,SupplyOfficerIV,etal.,allof
EasternVisayasRegionalMedicalCenter,TaclobanCity.

The first, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
[1]
[2]
159883, seeks to nullify the Decision and Resolution dated November 26, 2002 and
August 27, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 49585,
denying petitioner Gobenciongs petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and, thus, effectively
[3]
affirmingtheassailedOrder dated August 24, 1998 of the Deputy OmbudsmanVisayas,
preventivelysuspendinghimfromoffice.

In the second, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
168059,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanassails,astaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,the
[4]
Decision datedApril29,2005oftheCAinCAG.R.SPNo.61687,whichsetasidethe
[5]
[6]
Ombudsmans Decision of March 21, 2000 and Order of August 10, 2000 Order in
OMBVISADM970370butonlyinsofarasitimposedapenaltyofoneyearsuspensionon
Gobenciong.

The third, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
[7]
173212,seekstosetasidetheDecisionandResolution datedApril29,2005andMay29,
2006, respectively, of the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 61687, which sustained the aforesaid
March21,2000andAugust10,2000rulingsinOMBVISADM970370.

On January 17, 2006, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 159883 with
[8]
G.R.No.168059,bothtobeconsideredasenbanccases. TheconsolidationofG.R.No.
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[9]
173212withthefirsttwocaseslaterfollowed.

TheFacts

Duringtheperiodmaterial,GobenciongheldthepositionofAdministrativeOfficerIV
inEasternVisayasRegionalMedicalCenter(EVRMC),apublichospitalinTacloban City.
OnDecember3,1996,theappropriateEVRMCofficeissuedRequisitionandIssueVoucher
No. (RIV) EO196 for one unit hemoanalyzer (also called particle counter), among other
items. On its face, RIV EO196 carried, for the hemoanalyzer, the specifications electric
220V,50feedshelvescapacitywithahandwrittenunitpricequotationofPhP1,195,998.

After public bidding where Alvez Commercial, Inc. (Alvez) emerged as the best
bidder,PurchaseOrderNo.(PO)EO596datedDecember9,1996wasissuedcoveringtwo
units of nebulizer and one unit particle counter with specifications 23 Parameters, Genius,
Italy,electric220V,fullyautomatedattheunitpriceasaforestated.

Ashospitaldocumentswouldshow,thenebulizersandthehemoanalyzerappearedto
have been delivered on December 20, 1996 and accepted by Engr. Jose M. Jocano, Jr. and
SupplyOfficerIIICrisologoR.Babula,perCertificationofAcceptancetheysignedtoattest
having accepted all the articles delivered by Alvez per Sales Invoice No. 0786. Similarly,
Babula signed Sales Invoice No. 0786 to acknowledge receipt in good condition of the
articlescoveredthereby.Inaddition,itwasmadetoappearinaCommissiononAudit(COA)
Inspection Report that Jocano and Gobenciong had certified as correct the
finding/recommendationthatthetwonebulizersandthehemoanalyzerhadbeeninspectedas
toqualityandquantityasperSalesInvoiceNo.0786.

On December 26, 1996, Disbursement Voucher No. (DV) 10196121986, for PhP
1,161,817.35, net of creditable VAT, was prepared. Gobenciong, among others, signed the
vouchertoattestthattheexpensecoveredtherebywasnecessary,lawful,andincurredunder
hisdirectsupervision.AppendedtoDV10196121986weredocumentsadvertedtoearlier,
suchasSalesInvoiceNo.0786,theCertificationofAcceptance,theCOAInspectionReport,
POEO596,andRIVEO196.

TheissuanceonDecember27,1996ofLandbankCheckNo.456359intheamountof
PhP 1,161,817.35 in favor of Alvez, which then purportedly issued Receipt No. 0815,
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followed.

On March 31, 1997, or little over three months after the supposed delivery of the
hemoanalyzer, Alvez addressed a letter to EVRMC to assure the hospital that it would be
replacingtheyettobedeliveredslightlydefectivehemoanalyzerwithanotherunit.OnApril
1, 1997, Alvez actually delivered the promised replacementa Genius particle counter with
SerialNo.36162.ItwasinstalledonApril2,1997andinspectedthefollowingdaybyJocano
andGobenciong.

The instant case started when Dr. Flora dela Pea, Head of the EVRMC Laboratory
Unit, filed, on June 20, 1997, an administrative complaint before the Office of the
OmbudsmanVisayas, charging Gobenciong, Jocano, Babula, and three other EVRMC
officers with Falsification of Public Documents and Misconduct. The complaint was
docketedasOMBVISADM970370.

In a related move, dela Pea also filed a complaint with the Department of Health
(DOH) which forthwith formed a committee to look likewise into the alleged anomalous
purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer. The investigation culminated in the filing by the
[10]
DOHSecretaryofaFormalCharge
datedOctober29,1997forGraveMisconduct,Gross
Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against
Gobenciongandthreeothers.

OmbudsmanOrderedPreventiveSuspension

OnAugust24,1998,theDeputyOmbudsmanVisayas,upondelaPeasmotion,issued
an Order, placing all, except one, of the respondents in OMBVISADM970370 under
preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH officer to immediately implement the
[11]
Order.

FollowinghisreceiptonNovember9,1998ofacopyofthesaidorder,Gobenciong
wrote Dr. Lilia O. Arteche, DOH Regional Director for Region VIII, requesting the
deferment of the implementation of the preventive suspension until after his tobefiled
motionforreconsiderationshallhavebeenresolved.

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[12]
[13]
Conformably with the Ombudsmans directive,
Arteche, via a Memorandum
dated November 11, 1998, informed the affected respondents in OMBVISADM970370
thattheirsixmonthpreventivesuspensionshalltakeeffectimmediatelyupontheirreceiptof
thememorandum.

On November 12, 1998, Gobenciong sought reconsideration of the August 24, 1998
preventivesuspensionorder.Butduetothevirtualdenialofhispleaforthedefermentofhis
preventivesuspension,Gobenciong,withoutawaitingtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmansaction
onhismotionforreconsideration,wenttotheCAonapetitionforcertiorari,withapleafor
theissuanceoftemporaryrestrainingorder(TRO).ThepetitionwasdocketedasCAG.R.SP
No.49585.

On November 19, 1998, the CA issued a TRO enjoining then Deputy Ombudsman
VisayasArturoMojicaandArtechefromimplementingtheorderofpreventivesuspensionin
[14]
OMBVISADM970370.

As later developments would show, the TRO, while duly served, evidently went
unheeded,forGobenciongfailedtogetbacktohisworkorgethissalaryuntilafterthelapse
ofthesuspensionperiodinMay1999.ThisturnofeventsimpelledGobenciongtomovethat
ArtecheandMojicabecitedincontempt.TheCA,however,didnotactonthemotion.

TheRulingoftheOmbudsmaninOMBVISADM970370

Before the CA could resolve CAG.R. SP No. 49585, the Ombudsman rendered on
March 21, 2000 a Decision, finding Gobenciong and several others guilty in OMBVIS
ADM970370.ThedecretalportionoftheOmbudsmansDecisionpartlyreads:
WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence to hold respondents RAFAEL C.
OMEGA,PEDROF.GOBENCIONG,CRISOLOGOR.BABULA,andJOSEM.JOCANO
of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, it is respectfully
recommended that they be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM THE SERVICE
[15]
FORONE(1)YEARWITHOUTPAY.
(Emphasisadded.)

TheaboveguiltyverdictwasmainlypredicatedonthefindingthattheCertificationof
Acceptance and the COA Inspection Report, among other documents, were falsified, there
beingnoactualdeliveryonDecember20,1996ofthecoveredhemoanalyzer.Therewasthus

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nolegalbasisfortheissuanceofDV10196121986andthecorrespondingLandbankcheck
forPhP1,161,817.35.

Subsequently,Gobenciong,etal.movedforreconsideration,buttheOmbudsman,by
anOrderofAugust10,2000,deniedtheirmotion.

Induetime,Gobenciongappealedfromtheabovedecisionandordertotheappellate
court,theappealdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.61687.

On November 16, 2000, the Office of the OmbudsmanVisayas, through Director

[16]
Virginia P. Santiago, by an Order,
directed the DOH Regional Office No. VIII to
immediatelyimplementitsDecisionandimposethepenaltiesdecreedtherein,which,inthe
caseofGobenciong,wasoneyearsuspensionfromofficewithoutpay.

On December 11, 2000, Gobenciong moved that Santiago be cited in contempt of

[17]
court
for issuing the November 16, 2000 Order despite being notified of his appeal in
CAG.R.SPNo.61687.Likehisearliersimilarmotion,thismotionwasneitherdeniednor
grantedbytheCA.

TheRulingoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.49585

LongaftertheissuanceoftheDecisiondatedMarch21,2000inOMBVISADM97
0370, the CA, on November 26, 2002, rendered a Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 49585,
denying Gobenciongs petition for certiorari assailing the directive, and the implementation
thereof, for the immediate execution of his preventive suspension. Dispositively, the CA
wrote:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
DENIEDDUECOURSEandherebyDISMISSED.Nopronouncementastocosts.

[18]
SOORDERED.

The CA dismissed Gobenciongs petition on the strength of Section 24 in relation to

Sec.27ofRepublicActNo.(RA)6770,otherwiseknownastheOmbudsmanAct of 1989.
The interplay of both sections expressly empowers the Ombudsman, under defined
conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three
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categoriesofpublicofficialsandemployeesunderinvestigationbyhisofficeandtodirectthe
immediateimplementationofthecorrespondingsuspensionorder.
Gobenciongs motion for reconsideration of the above decision was rejected by the
appellatecourtonAugust27,2003.

Hence,thePetitionforReviewonCertiorariinG.R.No.159883.

TheRulingoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.61687

OnApril29,2005,theCA,onthepostulatethatthedisciplinaryauthorityoftheOffice
of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory, rendered its Decision in CAG.R. SP No.
61687, partially granting due course to Gobenciongs appeal and effectively modifying the
DecisiondatedMarch21,2000oftheOmbudsman.ThedecretalportionoftheCADecision
reads:

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingpremises,judgmentisherebyrenderedbyus
GRANTINGthepetitionfiledinthiscaseandSETTINGASIDEtheDecisiondatedMarch
21, 2000 and the Order dated August 10, 2000 rendered and issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMBVISADM970370 insofar as said office directly imposes upon the
[19]
petitionerthepenaltyofsuspensionfromtheserviceforone(1)yearwithoutpay.

InvokedaspartoftheratiodecidendioftheCADecisionwasTapiadorv.Officeofthe
[20]
Ombudsman,
whichtheappellatecourtviewedasdeclaringthatthedisciplinarypowerof
theOmbudsmaninadministrativecasesislimitedonlytorecommendingtothedisciplining
authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. In the concrete, as gleaned from the CA
Decision, this means that the Ombudsman cannot compel the DOH to impose the penalty
recommendedinitsunderlyingDecisionofMarch21,2000.

Therefrom,thepartiesavailedthemselvesofdifferentremediestocontestbeforethis
CourttheabovedecisionoftheCA.

TheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,ascribinggraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofthe
appellatecourt,assailedtheabovedecisionthroughaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65,
[21]
docketedasG.R.No.168059.

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On the other hand, Gobenciong filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
[22]
Decision dated April 29, 2005,
which the CA denied via its Resolution dated May 29,
2006.Thus,theinstantPetitionforReviewonCertiorarifiledbyGobenciong,nowdocketed
asG.R.No.173212.
Inthemeantime,onJanuary16,2005,Gobenciongretiredfromtheservice.

TheIssues

InG.R.No.159883,petitionerGobenciongsubmitsthattheCAerred:
A.
x x x WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION ORDER DESPITE THE [TRO] IT ISSUED AND THE CONTINUED
DEFIANCEOFPUBLICRESPONDENTSOFTHE[TRO].

B.
xxxINNOTHOLDINGPUBLICRESPONDENTSGUILTYOFCONTEMPTOFCOURT
FORDEFYINGTHE[TRO].

C.
x x x WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSIONORDER

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONERS

RIGHTTODUEPROCESSOFLAW
2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONERS
RIGHTTOTHEEQUALPROTECTIONOFTHELAWSAND
3. DESPITE THE FACT THAT TO DO SO WOULD SANCTION AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 27(1) AND THE SECOND
PARAGRAPHOFSECTION24OF[RA]6770.

In G.R. No. 168059, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman raises the following grounds for
theallowanceofitspetition:

I.

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT BAR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FROM
EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC
OFFICIALSANDEMPLOYEESINGENERAL.

II.

CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY CLOTHED THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

WITH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IN GENERAL,
COMPLETE WITH ALL THE REQUISITE COMPONENTS AS CONTAINED IN [RA]
6770,CONSIDERINGTHAT:

A.THE1987CONSTITUTIONEXPRESSLYAUTHORIZEDCONGRESSTOGRANT
THEOMBUDSMANADDITIONALPOWERS

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B. CONGRESS, BOTH PURSUANT TO ITS EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL

AUTHORITYINTHECASEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN,ANDINTHEEXERCISEOFITS
PLENARYLEGISLATIVEPOWERS,ENACTED[RA]6770PROVIDINGTHEREINTHE
OMBUDSMANSFULLANDCOMPLETEADMINISTRATIVEDISCIPLINARYPOWER
ANDDUTY

C.THEREISNOTHINGINTHESAIDSTATUTORYGRANTOFADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARYPOWERWHICHCANBEREMOTELYCONSIDEREDINCONSISTENT
WITHTHE1987CONSTITUTIONAND

D. VESTING THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IS

ABSOLUTELYINCONSONANCEWITHTHESOVEREIGNINTENT,ASEXPRESSED
BYTHELETTEROF,ANDINTHEDELIBERATIONSON,THE1987CONSTITUTION,
I.E., THE INTENT TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN EFFETE,
PROTECTOROFTHEPEOPLEINSULATEDFROMPOLITICALINFLUENCE.

III.

THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE OMBUDSMAN INCLUDES

THEAUTHORITYTODETERMINETHEPENALTYANDTOCAUSETHESAMETO
BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE HEAD OF AGENCY CONCERNED, CONSIDERING
THAT:

A.[RA]6770CONTAINSEXPRESSPROVISIONSGRANTINGTHEOMBUDSMAN
THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE AND CAUSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVEPENALTIES

B. A DISCIPLINARY POWER BEREFT OF THE NECESSARY COMPONENT OF

DETERMINING THE PENALTY AND CAUSING THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF
ISOTIOSE

C. EVENASSUMINGTHATTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFPENALTIESASSESSED
BY THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 13(3), ART. XI OF THE
CONSTITUTION,ANDTHEINDEPENDENTFIRSTPARTOFSECTION15(3)OF[RA]
6770,THELATTERPROVISIONSSTILLEMPOWERTHEOMBUDSMANTOENSURE
COMPLIANCEWITHITSRECOMMENDATIONSAND

D. A CONTRARY RULE CAN ONLY RESULT IN FURTHER LEGAL AND

PRACTICALABSURDITIES.

IV.

THERELIANCEBYTHEHONORABLE[CA]ONTHEOBITERDICTUMINTAPIADOR
VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, x x x DISPOSSESSING THE OMBUDSMAN OF
ITS DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY, CONSITUTES A GRAVE ERROR CONSIDERING
THAT:

A.SUCHAPASSINGSTATEMENTMUSTBEINTERPRETEDTOMEANTHATTHE
OMBUDSMAN CANNOT DIRECTLY IMPLEMENT ITS ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONSAND

B. SUCHASTATEMENTISANDHASREMAINEDANOBITERDICTUMWHICH
DOESNOTHAVETHESTATUSOFALEGALDOCTRINE.

In G.R. No. 173212, petitioner Gobenciong argues that the CA committed errors of
law:
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A.
xxxWHENITDIDNOTDECLAREASUNCONSTITUTIONAL[RA]6770,SECTIONS
15 (1), 19, AND 21, [INSOFAR] AS THEY GRANT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS
DEPUTIES THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ANY ACT OR
OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE, FROM ANY INVESTIGATORY
AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF SUCH CASES, FOR BEING
ANINVALIDDELEGATIONOFLEGISLATIVEAUTHORITY.

B.
xxxWHENITDIDNOTDECLAREASUNCONSTITUTIONAL[RA]6770,SECTIONS
15(1),19,21,24AND25,[INSOFAR]ASTHEYGRANTTOTHEOMBUDSMANAND
HISDEPUTIESTHEAUTHORITYTOINVESTIGATE,PROSECUTEANDPENALIZE,
ANY ACT OR OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY PUBLIC
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE FROM ANY
INVESTIGATORY AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF SUCH
CASES, AND TO IMPOSE SUSPENSION, EITHER PREVENTIVE OR AS PENALTY,
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTIONOFTHELAWS.

C.
x x x WHEN IT ACQUIESCED TO THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS)S
VIOLATIONOF[RA]6770,THEOMBUDSMANLAW.

D.
xxxWHENITUPHELDTHEDECISIONOFTHEDEPUTYOMBUDSMAN(VISAYAS)
FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF CONDUCT GROSSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE
BESTINTERESTOFTHESERVICE.

E.
x x x IN REFUSING TO CITE DIRECTORVIRGINIA PALANCASANTIAGO OF THE
OFFICEOFTHEDEPUTYOMBUDSMAN(VISAYAS)INCONTEMPTOFCOURT.

Thegroundsrelieduponandtheerrorsassignedmaybereducedintothreeissues,to
wit: first, whether the preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman is immediately
executory, the filing in due time of a motion to reconsider the corresponding order
notwithstanding second, whether the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is merely
recommendatory and excludes the authority to ensure compliance of his recommendations
andthird,whetherRA6770,onthegroundofunduedelegationoflegislativeauthorityand
undertheequalprotectionclause,isunconstitutionalinsofarasitgrantstheOmbudsmanand
his deputies the authority to investigate, prosecute and penalize any act or omission,
administrativeorotherwise,ofanypublicofficeroremployee,ortotakeover,atanystage,
fromanyinvestigatoryagencyofGovernment,theinvestigationofsuchcases.

TheCourtsRuling

Thereisnothingnovelabouttheunderlyingdeterminativeissuesraisedbyanyofthe
petitioners.TheCourt,inacatena of recent cases, has for the most part fully settled them
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and the corresponding dispositions in those cases militate against Gobenciongs cause, as
articulatedinhistwinPetitionsforReviewonCertiorari,butaugurwellfortheOmbudsmans
petition.

FirstMainIssue:ProvisionaryOrdersoftheOmbudsman
ImmediatelyExecutory

AsGobenciongargues,histimelyfilingofamotionforreconsiderationofthesubject
preventive suspension order stripped such order of its otherwise quality of immediacy. He
points out that while Sec. 27 of RA 6770 provides for the immediate execution of
provisionary orders of the Ombudsman, Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure,whichispurportedlyderivedfromsaidSec.27,intentionallyomittedthematterof
immediate execution. Pushing the point, Gobenciong would then argue that this omission
contextuallyworkedtorepealpartofsaidSec.27.ToGobenciong,therepealiswithinthe
OmbudsmanspowertoeffectunderthelastparagraphofSec.27,RA6770.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Gobenciong would posit the view that the
immediate implementation of his preventive suspension, despite his having moved for
reconsideration, violated his right to due process and to the equal protection of law. In this
regard,hecitesthemorelenient,butjustasapplicableandeffective,CivilServicelawwhich
allowsanappealfromanorderofpreventivesuspensionanddoesnotconsiderthesameas
immediatelyexecutory.

Finally, Gobenciong makes reference to the matter of the CA having issued a TRO,
which both the DOH and the Deputy OmbudsmanVisayas ignored, and to the CAs
subsequentrefusaltoresolvehiscontemptmotion.

Wearenotconvinced.

Repeals by implication are not favored, as laws are presumed to be passed with full
knowledgeofallexistinglegislationsonthesubject.Inorderthatonelaworwhatpassesfor
onemayoperatetorepealanotherlaw,thetwolawsmustbeinconsistent,thatis,theformer
[23]
mustbesorepugnantastobeirreconcilablewiththelatteract.

EvenasweconcedetheOmbudsmansauthoritytoamendcertainproceduralrulesof
RA6770,weagreewiththeCAsholdingontheabsenceofanirreconcilableconflict,visvis
theimplementationofapreventivesuspensionorder,betweenSec.27ofRA6770andSec.
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8,RuleIIIoftheOmbudsmanRulesofProcedure.Forreference,wereproducethepertinent
provisionsofbothissuances:

Sec.27ofRA6770

Sec.27.EffectivityandFinalityofDecisions.AllprovisionaryordersoftheOfficeof
theOmbudsmanareimmediatelyeffectiveandexecutory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertainedonlyonanyofthefollowinggrounds:

(1)Newevidencehasbeendiscoveredwhichmateriallyaffectstheorder,directiveor
decision

(2)Errorsoflaworirregularitieshavebeencommittedprejudicialtotheinterestofthe
movants.Themotionforreconsiderationshallberesolvedwithinthree(3)daysfromfiling
Provided,Thatonlyonemotionforreconsiderationshallbeentertained.

x x x Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or

reprimand,suspensionofnotmorethanonemonthssalaryshallbefinalandunappealable.

TheaboverulesmaybeamendedormodifiedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanasthe
[24]
interestofjusticemayrequire.

Sec.8,RuleIIIoftheOmbudsmanRulesofProcedure

Sec.8.MotionforReconsiderationorreinvestigationGrounds.Wheneverallowable,
amotionforreconsiderationorreinvestigationmayonlybeentertainediffiledwithinten(10)
daysfromreceiptofthedecisionbytherespondentonanyofthefollowinggrounds:

a)Newevidencehadbeendiscoveredwhichmateriallyaffectstheorder,directive
ordecision

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed

prejudicialtotheinterestofthemovant.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the
hearingofficersshallresolvethesamewithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptthereof.

Indeed,thereexistsnoirreconcilableinconsistencybetweenthetwosetsofprovisions
respectingtheimmediateimplementabilityofapreventivesuspensionorderemanatingfrom
the Ombudsman. As it were, the conflict concerns only the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration.WhatwasoncethefivedayreglementaryperiodfixedunderSec.27(2),RA
6770isnow10daysunderSec.8,RuleIII,OmbudsmanRulesofProcedure.Apartfromthis
change, both sections in question can validly be harmonized and given effect at the same
time.
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Wecannot,accordingly,subscribetoGobenciongscontentionthatSec.27(1),RA6770
is deemed repealed for not being incorporated or carried into the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure.For,ifthisoutlandishpostureofGobenciongis,underthepremises,pushedtoits
logicalconclusion,thenanyandallrelatedprovisionsofRA6770nottoucheduponinthe
OmbudsmanRulesofProcedurewouldbeconsideredabrogated,regardlessoftheabsenceof
realconflicts.TheCourtneednotbelabortheabsurdityofGobenciongslogic.

ReadingandharmonizingtogethertheaforequotedSec.27(1)ofRA6770andSec.8,
RuleIIIoftheOmbudsmanRulesofProcedure,itisatonceapparentthattheimmediately
executory quality of a preventive suspension order does not preclude the preventively
suspendedrespondentfromseekingreconsiderationofsuchorder.Infine,theexistenceand
availment,ifthisbethecase,oftherighttomoveforreconsiderationdoesnotmotuproprio
stay the immediate execution of the provisionary order of preventive suspension. The
unqualifieduseofthephraseimmediatelyeffectiveandexecutoryinSec.27(1)ofRA6770
suggeststhisconclusion.

An order of preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation. And it is usually made immediately effective and executory to prevent the
respondentfromusinghis/herpositionorofficetoinfluenceprospectivewitnessesortamper
[25]
withtherecordswhichmaybevitaltotheprosecutionofthecase.

Atanyrate,RA6770itselfcontainslimitingbarstotheexercisebytheOmbudsmanor
his deputies of the power to impose preventive suspension. Sec. 24 of RA 6770 thus
provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension.The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively

suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgmenttheevidenceofguiltisstrong,and(a)thechargeagainstsuchofficeroremployee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty
(b)thechargeswouldwarrantremovalfromtheserviceor(c)therespondentscontinuedstay
inofficemayprejudicethecasefiledagainsthim.

ThepreventivesuspensionshallcontinueuntilthecaseisterminatedbytheOfficeof
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computingtheperiodofsuspensionhereinprovided.

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Expounding on the limitation adverted to, the Court has held that a preventive
suspensionordershallissueonlyiftheOmbudsman,oranyofhisdeputies,exercisingsound
judgment,determinesthattheevidenceofguiltisstrongandthatanyofthethreeconditions
setforthinSec.24ofRA6770ispresent.Thus,inGarciav.Mojica,theCourtheldthatthe
Ombudsmanandhisdeputieshavethediscretiontoexercisesuchdetermination,thus:

There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent
Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the
petitioner,topreventthatofficialfromusinghisofficetointimidateortoinfluencewitnesses
[26]
ortotamperwithrecordsthatmightbevitaltotheprosecutionofthecaseagainsthim.

As things thus stand, the Office of the Ombudsman can, as a matter of statutory
empowerment, validly order the immediate execution of a preventive suspension after
determining the propriety of the imposition, regardless of the remedy of reconsideration
madeavailableunderthelawtothesuspendedrespondent.Accordingly,Gobenciongslament
abouthisrighttodueprocess,beingviolatedasaresultoftheimmediateimplementationof
hispreventivesuspension,hasreallynolegallegtostandon.Andifonlytostressapoint,a
preventive suspension, not being a penalty for an administrative infraction, is imposable
withoutpriorhearing.

Theforegoingconsidered,themattersoftheissuancebytheCAofaTRObearingon
the implementation of the preventive suspension in question and Gobenciongs unacted
contemptmotionshavebecomemootandacademic,forthepreventivesuspensionhadbeen
servedandtheCAhad,forallintentsandpurposes,deniedthesaidmotions.

This brings us to the issue of the alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
Gobenciong parlays the theory that the application of RA 6770, which authorizes the
Ombudsman to impose a sixmonth preventive suspension, instead of the civil service
provisionsoftheAdministrativeCode,whichlimitsthediscipliningauthoritysprerogativeto
onlyimposingapreventionsuspensionforaperiodnotexceeding90days,violatestheequal
protectionguarantee.

Wearenotpersuaded.Atitsmostbasic,theequalprotectionclauseisagainstundue
favorandindividualorclassprivilege,aswellashostilediscriminationitdoesnotdemand
absoluteequality.Thefundamentalguaranteeisnotbreachedbyalawwhichappliesonlyto
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
classandprovidedfurtherthatthereisasubstantialdistinctionbetweenthosewhofallwithin
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[27]
suchclassandthosewhodonot.
InMirandav.Sandiganbayan,wheretheissueofequal
protection was raised, albeit the 60day preventive suspension limit under the Local
Government Code was involved, we ruled against any violation of the constitutional
proscriptionagainsttheequalprotectionofthelaw,thus:

In essence, [the dissenting opinion] avers that there is no substantial distinction

between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman and those imposed by
executive officials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The
ConstitutionhasendowedtheOmbudsmanwithuniquesafeguardstoensureimmunityfrom
politicalpressure.Amongthesestatutoryprotectionsarefiscalautonomy,fixedtermofoffice
andclassificationasanimpeachableofficer.ThismuchwasrecognizedbythisCourtinthe
earliercitedcaseofGarciav.Mojica.Moreover,therearestrictersafeguardsforimpositionof
preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the
Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong and (2) that any of the
followingcircumstancesarepresent:(a)thechargeagainstsuchofficeroremployeeinvolves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service or (c) the respondents continued stay in
[28]
officemayprejudicethecasefiledagainsthim.

SecondMainIssue:Ombudsmanhaspowertoensure
compliancewithimpositionofpenaltiespursuant
tohisadministrativedisciplinaryauthority

The Office of the Ombudsmans assertion, about being in possession of full

administrativedisciplinaryauthorityoverpublicofficialsandemployees,exceptimpeachable
officials, members of Congress, and the Judiciary, including the power to determine the
penalty therefor and to cause the same to be implemented by the head of the government
agency concerned, is correct. Jurisprudence on the matter is settled. Accordingly, any
suggestion that its power to remove, suspend, or censure is merely advisory or
[29]
recommendatory has to be rejected outright. And the CAs reference to Tapiador
to
underpin its conclusion on the recommendatory nature of the Ombudsmans disciplinary
authority is misplaced and erroneous, the cited portion of Tapiador being a mere obiter
[30]
dictum. The Court made this abundantly clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
and
[31]
subsequentlyinOfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.CourtofAppeals.
InLedesma,weheldthat
the pronouncement in Tapiador on the authority of the Ombudsman is at most an obiter
dictum, which cannot be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement of the Court, ratiocinating as
follows:
Petitionerinsiststhatthewordrecommendbegivenitsliteralmeaningthatis,thatthe
Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect,
citingTapiadorv.OfficeoftheOmbudsman,thus:

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...Besides,assumingarguendo,thatpetitionerwere(sic)administrativelyliable,the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
serviceUnderSection13,subparagraph(3),ofArticleXIofthe1987Constitution,the
Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee
foundtobeatfault,tothepublicofficialconcerned.

Fortheirpart,theSolicitorGeneralandtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanarguethatthe
word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the
Ombudsmanhastheauthoritytodeterminetheadministrativeliabilityofapublicofficialor
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implementthepenaltyimposed.Inotherwords,itmerelyconcernstheproceduralaspectof
theOmbudsmansfunctionsandnotitsjurisdiction.

Weagreewiththeratiocinationofpublicrespondents.Severalreasonsmilitateagainst
a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of
Tapiadorrevealsthatthemainpointofthecasewasthefailureofthecomplainantthereinto
presentsubstantialevidence to prove the charges of the administrative case.The statement
thatmadereferencetothepoweroftheOmbudsmanis,atbest,merelyanobiterdictum
and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations,aswhatpreciselyisbeforeusinthiscase.Hence,itcannotbecitedasa
[32]
doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
(Emphasisours.)

Forgoodmeasure,wefurtherstated:

xxxThattherefusal,withoutjustcause,ofanyofficertocomplywithanorderofthe
Ombudsmantopenalizeanerringofficeroremployeeisagroundfordisciplinaryaction,isa
strongindicationthattheOmbudsmansrecommendationisnotmerelyadvisoryinnaturebut
is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. x x x By stating that the Ombudsman
recommendstheactiontobetakenagainstanerringofficeroremployee,theprovisionsofthe
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed
[33]
throughtheproperofficer,whichinthiscasewouldbetheheadoftheBID.

InOfficeoftheOmbudsman,onthecoreissueofwhetherthe Ombudsman can only

recommend, but cannot impose, administrative sanctions over erring public officers and
employees,theCourtreiterateditsrulinginLedesma,observing:

Inthepresentcase,theCourtsimilarlyupholdstheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanspower
to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and
[34]
RepublicActNo.6770.

Andtoputtorestanyuncertaintythatmighthavebeenoccasionedbyamisreadingof
Tapiador, we proceeded to explain in Office of the Ombudsman that the Office of the
Ombudsmans basic constitutional mandate as [protector] of the people is embodied in Sec.
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[35]
13
ofRA6770,whileitsspecificconstitutionalfunctionsaresubstantiallyreiteratedin
[36]
Sec.15
ofthesameRA.Thus,theauthorityoftheOmbudsmantoconductadministrative
investigationsisofconstitutionalorigin,proceedingasitdoesfromSec.13(1),ArticleXIof
[37]
theConstitution,
whichreads:

Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functionsand
duties:

(1)Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofany
publicofficial,employee,officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearsto
beillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient.

NottobeoverlookedofcourseisRA6770whichgrants,asitwere,theOmbudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority as said statute is replete with provisions that, to
borrowfromOfficeoftheOmbudsman:

covertheentiregamutofadministrativeadjudicationwhichentailstheauthorityto,interalia,
receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of
procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and,
[38]
necessarily,imposethesaidpenalty.

[39]
Amongothers,theprovisionscitedinOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwereSecs.19,
21,
[40] [41] [42]
[43]
22,
23,
and25
ofRA6770.
Asafinalpoint,inOfficeoftheOmbudsman,westressedthatthehistoryofRA6770
bears out the conclusion that Congress intended the Office of the Ombudsman to be an
[44]
activistwatchman,notmerelyapassiveone,
possessingfulladministrativedisciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal and to prosecute a public
[45]
officer or employee found to be at fault. The Court, in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,
gave
validationtothelegislativeintentadvertedto.
TheparallelholdingsinLedesmaandOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwouldlaterbeechoed
inaslewofcases,amongthelatestofwhichwereCommissiononAudit,RegionalOfficeNo.
[46]
[47]
13,ButuanCityv.Hinampas
andOfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.Santiago.

ThirdMainIssue:RA6770provisosgrantinginvestigative,prosecutorialand
disciplinarypowerstothe
Ombudsmannotunconstitutional
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Wenowcometotheconcludinginquiry.

Gobenciong asseverates that the grant unto the Ombudsman under RA 6770 of the
powertotakeoveradisciplinarycase,atanystageoftheinvestigation,toinvestigateanyact
or omission, administrative, or otherwise, and to direct the implementation of a preventive
suspension order constitutes unconstitutional delegation of authority. He describes the
exercisebytheOmbudsmanandhisdeputiesofsuchpowersasarovingcommission,devoid
ofanylimitationandcheckandbalancemechanism,addingthatRA6770doesnotprovide
any guiding standard. To Gobenciong, such unbridled power and wide and sweeping
authorityareladenwithperilousopportunitiesforpartialityandabuse,andevencorruption.

Wearenotpersuaded.

As earlier discussed, the Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with
sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people
againsttheinept,abusive,andcorruptintheGovernment.They,however,leftittoCongress
[48]
toinvesttheofficewithmorebroadpowerstoenforceitsownaction.
Andsoitwasthat
RA6770wasenactedempowering,underSec.15(1)thereof,theOmbudsmantotakeover,at
anystage,fromanyinvestigatoryagencyofgovernment,theinvestigationofcases[ofwhich
hehasprimaryjurisdiction].

Clearlythen,theespousedtheoryofunduedelegationofauthorityisuntenable.For,in
theultimateanalysis,itisthe1987Constitutionnolesswhichgrantedandallowedthegrant
by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the
Ombudsman.

Lestitbeoverlooked,theunconstitutionalityofalawmustclearlybedemonstrated.It
cannot be predicated on speculations or hypothetical fears that its provisions may be
pervertedorthepowersgrantedabused.Allpowersaresusceptibletomisuseandabuse,but
thatishardlyareasontostrikedownthelaw.WhiletheCourtmaydeclarealaworportions
thereof unconstitutional, it is imperative that the petitioner shows a clear and unequivocal
[49]
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.
Anditisbasic
that the matter of constitutionality shall, as a rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the

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caseandraisedandarguedattheearliestopportunity.Estarijav.Ranadaformulatestherule
inthefollowingwise:

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court may
exerciseitspowerofjudicialreviewonlyifthefollowingrequisitesarepresent:(1)anactual
andappropriatecaseandcontroversy(2)apersonandsubstantialinterestofthepartyraising
the constitutional question (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunityand(4)theconstitutionalquestionraisedistheverylismotaofthecase.

Forourpurpose,onlythethirdrequisiteisinquestion.Unequivocally,thelawrequires
thatthequestionofconstitutionalityofastatutemustberaisedattheearliestopportunity.In
Matibagv.Benipayo,weheldthattheearliestopportunitytoraiseaconstitutionalissueisto
raiseitinthepleadingsbeforeacompetentcourtthatcanresolvethesame,suchthat,ifitwas
notraisedinthepleadingsbeforeacompetentcourt,itcannotbeconsideredatthetrial,and,
[50]
ifnotconsideredinthetrial,itcannotbeconsideredonappeal.

The issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity this
meansbeforetheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,oratleastbeforetheCA.Withal,itcannotnow
be considered in Gobenciongs petitions for review. This is not to say, however, that what
Gobenciongconsidersasaquestionofaconstitutionalnatureisabsolutelynecessarytothe
dispositionofthiscase.

Finally,GobenciongssubmissionabouttheOfficeoftheOmbudsmantakingoverthe
casefromtheDOHstrikesusasaclearcaseofamisleadingafterthought.Forthefactofthe
matteristhattheDeputyOmbudsmanVisayasdidnotwrestjurisdictionfromtheDOHover
theadministrativeaspectofthisghostdeliverycase.Farfromit.Therecordstendtoshow
thattheOfficeofOmbudsmanVisayastookcognizanceofandassumedjurisdictionofwhat
wouldlaterbeOMBVISADM970370onJune20,1997whendelaPeafiledhercomplaint
for falsification and misconduct against Gobenciong and other hospital officials. This was
fourmonthsbeforetheDOHformallychargedGobenciong,etal.onOctober29,1997with
anoffensearisingfromtheanomalousprocurementofahemoanalyzer.Themerefilingofthe
formal charge, without more, did not as it cannot oust the Office of the Ombudsman of its
jurisdiction over the administrative case. Jurisdiction, once it attaches, continues until the
caseisconcluded.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 159883 and 173212 are hereby
DISMISSEDforlackofmerit,andtheappealedDecisionandResolutiondatedNovember
26, 2002 and August 27, 2003, respectively, of the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 49585 are
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 168059 is hereby
GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution dated April 29, 2005 and May 29,
2006,respectively,oftheCAinCAG.R.SPNo.61687areANNULLEDandSETASIDE.
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Accordingly,theDecisiondatedMarch21,2000andtheOrderdatedAugust10,2000ofthe
Ombudsman in OMBVISADM970370 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.

CostsagainstDr.PedroF.Gobenciong.

SOORDERED.

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBINGCONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
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ANTONIOT.CARPIOMA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONACONCHITACARPIOMORALESAssociateJusticeAssociate
Justice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNADANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIOANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

RUBENT.REYESTERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassigned
tothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
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[1]
Rollo(G.R.No.159883),pp.3037.PennedbyAssociateJusticeJuanQ.Enriquez,Jr.andconcurredinbyAssociate
JusticesBernardoP.AbesamisandEdgardoF.Sundiam.
[2]
Id.at3940.
[3]
Id. at 4143. Per Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) I Allan Francisco S. Garciano, reviewed by GIO III Virginia
PalancaSantiago,recommendedbyDeputyOmbudsmanfortheVisayasArturoC.Mojica,andapprovedbyOmbudsmanAniano
A.DesiertoonOctober16,1998.
[4]
Rollo(G.R.No.168059),pp.103114.PennedbyAssociateJusticeIsaiasP.DicdicanandconcurredinbyAssociate
JusticesVicenteL.YapandEnricoA.Lanzanas.
[5]
Rollo(G.R.No.173212),pp.7177.PerGIOIAllanFranciscoS.Garciano,reviewedbyDirectorVirginiaPalanca
Santiago,recommendedbytheOIC,OfficeoftheOmbudsmanVisayasNicanorJ.Cruz,Jr.,andapprovedbytheOmbudsmanon
May19,2000.
[6]
Id.at7880.
[7]
Id.at6263.
[8]
Rollo(G.R.No.159883),p.137.
[9]
Id.at213C.
[10]
Id.at8283.
[11]
Supranote3,at43.
[12]
Rollo(G.R.No.159883),p.45.
[13]
Id.at46.
[14]
Id.at49.
[15]
Supranote5,at7677.
[16]
Rollo(G.R.No.173212),pp.8182.
[17]
Id.at8588,datedDecember8,2000.
[18]
Supranote1,at36.
[19]
Supranote4,at114.
[20]
G.R.No.129124,March15,2002,379SCRA322.
[21]
TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanearlierfiledaMotionforPartialReconsiderationrollo(G.R.No.168059),pp.135
144.
[22]
Id.at194207.
[23]
DipidioEarthSaversMultiPurposeAssociation,Incorporated(DESAMA)v.Gozun,G.R.No.157882,March30,2006,485
SCRA586,612.
[24]
ThepenultimateparagraphofSec.27providingforadirectappealinadministrativedisciplinarycasesfromthe
OmbudsmantotheSupremeCourthadbeendeclaredunconstitutionalinFabianv.Desierto,G.R.No.129742,September16,
1998,295SCRA470.
[25]
Alonzov.Capulong,G.R.No.110590,May10,1995,244SCRA80,86citationsomitted.
[26]
G.R.No.139043,September10,1999,314SCRA207,221citingGloriav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.131012,
April21,1999,306SCRA287Yasay,Jr.v.Desierto,G.R.No.134495,December28,1998,300SCRA494.
[27]
SeeTiuv.Guingona,G.R.No.127410,Jan.20,1999,301SCRA278andIchongv.Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
(1957).
[28]
G.R.No.154098,July27,2005,464SCRA165,196.
[29]
Supranote20.
[30]
G.R.No.161629,July29,2005,465SCRA437.
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[31]
G.R.No.160675,June16,2006,491SCRA92.
[32]
Supranote30,at448449.
[33]
Supranote30,at449450.
[34]
Supranote31,at108.
[35]
Sec.13.Mandate.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyoncomplaints
filedinanyformormanneragainstofficersoremployeesofthegovernment,orofanysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,andenforcetheiradministrative,civilandcriminalliabilityin
everycasewheretheevidencewarrantsinordertopromoteefficientservicebytheGovernmenttothepeople.
[36]
Sec.15.Powers,FunctionsandDuties.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions
andduties:
(1)Investigateandprosecuteonitsownoroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofanypublicofficeror
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdictionovercasescognizablebytheSandiganbayanand,intheexerciseofhisprimaryjurisdiction,itmaytakeover,atany
stage,fromanyinvestigatoryagencyofgovernment,theinvestigationofsuchcases
(2)DirectxxxanyofficeroremployeeoftheGovernment,orofanysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,as
wellasanygovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharter,toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequired
bylaw,ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties
(3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficeroremployeeatfaultorwhoneglectsto
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act:
Provided,ThattherefusalbyanyofficerwithoutjustcausetocomplywithanorderoftheOmbudsmantoremove,suspend,
demote,fine,censure,orprosecuteanofficeroremployeewhoisatfaultorwhoneglectstoperformanactordischargeaduty
requiredbylawshallbeagroundfordisciplinaryactionagainstsaidofficer
(4)Directtheofficerconcerned,inanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasitmayprovideinitsrulesof
procedures,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredintobyhisofficeinvolvingthe
disbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularitytotheCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction
xxxx
(6)Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationofthemattersmentionedinparagraphs(1),(2),(3)and(4)hereof,when
circumstancessowarrantandwithdueprudence:Provided,thattheOmbudsmanunderitsrulesandregulationsmaydetermine
whatcasesmaynotbemadepublic:Providedfurther,ThatanypublicityissuedbytheOmbudsmanshallbebalanced,fairand
true
(7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraud,andcorruptioninthegovernmentandmake
recommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsofethicsandefficiency[.]
[37]
SeeGarcia,supranote26,at218.
[38]
Supranote31,at116.
[39]
Sec.19.AdministrativeComplaints.TheOmbudsmanshallactonallcomplaintsrelating,butnotlimitedtoactsor
omissionswhich:
(1)Arecontrarytolaworregulation
(2)Areunreasonable,unfair,oppressiveordiscriminatory
(3)Areinconsistentwiththegeneralcourseofanagencysfunctionsxxx
[40]
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority Exceptions.The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, governmentowned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries,exceptoverofficialswhomayberemovedonlybyimpeachmentoroverMembersofCongress,andtheJudiciary.
[41]
Sec. 22. Investigatory Power.The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious
misconductinofficeallegedlycommittedbyofficialsremovablebyimpeachment,forthepurposeoffilingaverifiedcomplaint
forimpeachment,ifwarranted.
[42]
Sec.23.FormalInvestigation.(1)AdministrativeinvestigationsconductedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallbe
inaccordancewithitsrulesofprocedureandconsistentwithdueprocess.
(2)Atitsoption,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmayrefercertaincomplaintstotheproperdisciplinaryauthorityforthe
institutionofappropriateadministrativeproceedingsagainsterringpublicofficersoremployees,xxx.Anydelaywithoutjust
causeinactingonanyreferralmadebytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallbeagroundforadministrativeactionagainstthe
officersoremployeestowhomsuchreferralsareaddressedandshallconstituteagraftoffensexxx.
[43]
Sec. 25. Penalties.(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules
providedthereinshallbeapplied.
(2)Inotheradministrativeproceedings,thepenaltyrangingfromsuspensionwithoutpayforoneyeartodismissalwith
forfeitureofbenefitsorafinerangingfromfivethousandpesos(P5,000.00)totwicetheamountmalversed,illegallytakenorlost,
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orbothatthediscretionoftheOmbudsman,xxx.
[44]
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,supranote31,at119.
[45]
G.R.Nos.10596570,March20,2001,354SCRA651.
[46]
G.R.Nos.158672,160410,160605,160627&161099,August7,2007,529SCRA245.
[47]
G.R.No.161098,September13,2007,533SCRA305.
[48]
Ledesma,supranote30,at452453.
[49]
Cawaling,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,October26,2001,G.R.Nos.146319&146342,368SCRA453,457.
[50]
G.R.No.159314,June26,2006,492SCRA652,664.

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