499793

2013

TCR18110.1177/1362480613499793Theoretical CriminologyNivette

Article

Legitimacy and crime:

Theorizing the role of the
state in cross-national
criminological theory

Theoretical Criminology
2014, Vol. 18(1) 93111
The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1362480613499793
tcr.sagepub.com

Amy Nivette

University of Oxford, UK

Abstract
One of the primary components of state stability and order is that citizens consider
those in power just and legitimate. Citizens who perceive the state as legitimate are likely
to consider its institutions a valid source of morality and social control. T
heoretically,
legitimacy should play an important role in criminal offending across countries. This
link between state power and citizensthat is, legitimacyhas the potential to be an
important social mechanism connecting state actions to individual criminal behaviours.
With this in mind, this article explores how political legitimacy might affect levels of
crime and violence across countries. A lack of legitimacy may lead citizens to (1) reject
the monopoly of physical force to employ self-help and/or (2) withdraw commitment
from institutions, breaking down social control.
Keywords
Comparative criminology, legitimacy, multilevel theory, social control, state

Introduction
In her recent survey of cross-national research, Stamatel (2009a: 17) emphasized that
comparative criminologists must move beyond the limited explanatory power of traditional grand theories (e.g. modernization and conflict) to theorize about regime types,
efficacy and legitimacy of governments and incorporate political factors, especially the
role of the state in maintaining law and order. Much cross-national criminology uses the
Corresponding author:
Amy Nivette, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, New Road, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK.
Email: [email protected]

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state as an aggregation unit containing a range of characteristics such as democracy or

GDP, but rarely does it give full attention to the role the state plays in forming and changing these characteristics. Theorists such as Norbert Elias (1939/2000), Thomas Hobbes
(1651/1996) and Max Weber (1978) specifically attributed changes in social organization to attributes of the state, most notably its ability to centralize and monopolize the use
of force within its boundaries.
This article argues that the state is not only a unit containing a set of aggregate characteristics, but is a functioning and often decisive actor in building and maintaining
social order. As such, the concept of the state and its associated political, economic and
legal institutions provide a useful analytic framework for understanding differences
between and within countries in outcomes like economic prosperity, social inequalities
and crime (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Bates et al., 2012; Karstedt, 2010). In particular, the
dynamic of power between the state and its citizens, as well as between political and
other institutions, offers a link between broad macro-structural forces and individual or
collective behaviours.
One of the primary components of state stability and order is that the citizens consider
those in power just and legitimate. Citizens who perceive the state as legitimate are likely
to consider its institutions a valid source of morality and social control. This link between
state power and citizensthat is, legitimacyhas the potential to be an important social
mechanism connecting state actions to criminal behaviours. With this in mind, this article explores how the state, and specifically political legitimacy, might affect levels of
crime and violence across countries. Expanding upon the work of Nivette and Eisner
(2013), two possibilities are proposed. A lack of legitimacy may lead citizens to:
(1) reject the monopoly of physical force to employ self-help (Black, 1983) and/or (2)
withdraw commitment from institutions, breaking down social control (LaFree, 1998).
The following section reviews definitions and roles of the state in relation to society
in order to frame the argument that the state is essential to social order. Then current
cross-national theories of crime are evaluated in relation to the role of the state, and
finally two pathways are presented linking the state to levels of crime via legitimacy. The
present focus is on cross-national and comparative criminology because of the centrality
of the state in this area of research as both a unit of analysis and as a possible risk factor.
However, it is important to note that legitimacy is an inherently multilevel phenomenon
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) and therefore is relevant to examining variation in crime
within and across countries, groups or neighbourhoods (Kirk and Papachristos, 2011;
Nivette and Eisner, 2013; Tyler, 2004).

The state, monopolization and compliance

Theorists often refer to Webers (1978) definition of a state: a centralized, administrative
apparatus that holds a monopoly over the use of physical force within a given territory
(see Beetham, 1991; Elias, 1939/2000; Gilley, 2009; Mann, 1986). The key ingredient
here is the monopoly of violence. Elias (1939/2000: 268) argued that the state has a
monopoly when the [f]ree use of military weapons is denied the individual and
reserved to a central authority of whatever kind. Individuals are only granted the use of
physical force where dictated by legal and social norms (e.g. a parent may discipline his/

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her child, an individual may fight back if provoked) (Weber, 1978). With monopolization, the state has authority over a range of human behaviours,1 and implicit in the concept of monopoly is the idea that this authority must be demonstrated and accepted across
a large, diverse population. Thus in order to understand how the state maintains control
over certain human actions (in this case violence), it is necessary to discuss how the state
demonstrates its authority and ensures acceptance. Essentially, the state is capable of
enforcing its authority through direct and indirect means. Direct means generally refer to
formal techniques of social control operated by the criminal justice system and the rule
of law, whereas indirect control operates through institutions by instilling a sense of willing co-operation, or normative compliance (Bottoms, 2002).

Types of authority and compliance

The institution of state control that applies the most direct form of power is the criminal
justice system (Tankebe, 2008; Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). These state agents
essentially operate by means of physical coercion and the threat of force, for example
visible police patrols, arrest, imprisonment or execution. However, the most pervasive
manifestation of state power is the rule of law (Bingham, 2010). In this basic sense, the
rule of law is a fundamental tool of instrumental compliance. In law, the states monopoly of force is codified for all to obey. As a result, the criminal justice system is only the
visible fraction of the states power to gain compliance. The ultimate authority is the law,
or as Thomas Paine (1776: 44) put it, law is king.
The use of direct power in gaining citizens instrumental compliance is generally based
on the idea that humans are self-interested, calculating actors (Hough et al., 2010). The
states display of force maintains its monopoly by threatening or physically punishing those
who do not comply. By this method, the states ability to maintain social order requires a
vast number of criminal justice power-holders to increase the risk and visible threat of punishment for non-compliance. While some research suggests that direct rule is not an effective or cost-efficient method of maintaining social order (Hough et al., 2010; MacCoun,
1993; Tyler, 2004), police, courts and prisons nevertheless send an important signal to citizens that the law will be enforced. In societies where the criminal justice system is corrupt,
non-functioning or ineffective, there is little certainty of punishment and hence little deterrent effect (see Apel and Nagin, 2011). Therefore direct rule has the some benefit in demonstrating the states monopoly of force, and may in fact be effective in deterring certain crimes
in certain contexts (e.g. post-conflict societies, failing or failed states).
In contrast to direct authority, indirect authority relies on a number of social institutions that instil routines and embed state-sanctioned norms and morals regarding violent
behaviours (Karstedt, 2010). Through these institutional patterns, the state ensures social
order not through threat, but through voluntary co-operation, or normative compliance
(Bottoms, 2002). Normative compliance relies on an individual or groups positive attitudes towards state social institutions, in particular the criminal justice system and the
rule of law. Focusing on the criminal justice system, Tyler (2006) argued that if citizens
perceive that the law reflects their own beliefs (morality) and the police have the right to
enforce these rules (legitimacy), they are more likely to willingly abide by the non-violent
rules of the state.

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Since normative compliance rests generally on an individuals morality and institutional legitimacy, the state has two routes by which to maintain order: influencing the
individual and improving institutional legitimacy. In the former route, moralities are
cultivated (i.e. either promoted or discouraged) by power-holders through institutions of
socialization (e.g. school, family, work).2 Importantly, one must not overstate the role of
the state in individual or group morality. As Mann (1986) argued, there are numerous
sources of power in societies that exert competing control over behaviours, beliefs and
morals (i.e. economic, ideological, military).
The second route concerns the states right to hold power that limits individual behaviours. In order to maintain a monopoly on force, the state and its delegate power-holders
(i.e. police, courts, schools) must justify to citizens that its actions conform to the rules,
are administered fairly and coincide with citizens moralities (Tyler, 2006). Thomas
Paine (1776: 44) declared that law is king, but he qualified that lest any ill use should
afterwards arise, let the crown ... be demolished, and scattered among the people whose
right it is. When a state is considered legitimatewhen it has the right to rule (Gilley,
2009)citizens accept its monopoly and comply with the law because they supposedly
share a normative understanding about appropriate social behaviours. Tyler (2006) and
more recently Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) have shown that the perceived legitimacy of
a state and its power-holders is one of the most important factors in securing widespread
normative compliance.
Indeed, numerous scholars have argued the centrality of legitimacy in understanding
how political power commands obedience (Beetham, 1991; Coicaud, 2007; Habermas,
1976; LaFree, 1998; Tyler, 2006; Weber, 1978). Legitimacy not only encourages citizens
to co-operate with state power-holders when required (e.g. reporting a crime, obeying a
police officers request), it instils an obligation and commitment to orderly behaviours in
everyday life (Karstedt, 2010; LaFree, 1998). The states power to maintain social order
arguably hinges not on its display of force, nor its manipulation of socialization practices, but on whether its citizens consider the states authority as just.

Mechanisms of legitimation
Weber (1978: 213) argued that:
Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to
material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such
system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.

Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) highlighted Webers use of the word cultivate and the
importance of power-holders active pursuit of positive belief. The state must continually
prove its right to regulate the use of force and in turn citizens must recognize and confer
this power to the state. In this sense, legitimacy is conditional, or in Bottoms and
Tankebes (2012) words, dialogical.
This necessarily intertwines citizens and the state, forming a reciprocal relationship
based on legitimacy. The result is a continual cycle of claim and response (Bottoms and
Tankebe, 2012): the state makes a claim to power (i.e. the monopoly of force), citizens

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judge the claim based on its alignment with their own moralities and existing laws, and
can either accept and comply or reject. In turn, the state may either adjust its actions to
correspond with citizens moralities or coerce obedience by increasing punitiveness (see
Karstedt, 2010: 350). However, as previously mentioned, the display of force only
increases instrumental compliance in certain circumstances (Apel and Nagin, 2011).
Thus the states more effective option for order is to engage in the dialogue and cultivate citizens approval and normative compliance (i.e. increase legitimacy).
Understanding the mechanisms by which legitimacy works to maintain social order
requires a closer look at this dialogue, or how the state cultivates approval. Tyler (2006:
4) pointed out that this involves a focus on peoples internalized norms of justice and obligation [and] suggests the need to explore what citizens think and to understand their values. States theoretically appeal to citizens senses of reciprocity, fairness and justice to
gain normative compliance. Tyler (2006) argued that this is accomplished by increasing the
transparency, consistency and equality of criminal justice processes, that is, procedural
justice. Procedural justice concerns individuals views about the appropriateness of the
manner in which the [power-holders] exercise their authority (Tyler, 2004: 91). A number
of studies have shown that citizens who consider the treatment and decision-making processes of the police to be fair and informed are more likely to co-operate with the police
(Tyler and Huo, 2002), trust criminal justice agents (Rottman, 2007; Tyler and Fagan,
2008) and obey the law (McCluskey, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1997; Pruitt et al., 1993).
Beyond procedural justice, Tankebe (2013) argued that there are multiple dimensions
and paths to legitimation, including effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness. In
democratic societies, state institutions are expected to provide certain public goods
such as security, education and welfare, and there is a normative expectation that these
goods are distributed fairly and that they produce the desired result (Tankebe, 2013: 111).
Beetham (1991: 137) makes the point that legitimacy requires both a morally authoritative source for government, and an ability to satisfy the ends which justify its enormous
concentration of power. He argues that the most basic ends that the state is required to
fulfil are the provision of security and social welfare. A state that is unable to provide
these material needs (among others), or one that provides for only the preferred population, is at risk of being seen as illegitimate and losing citizens compliance.

The cross-national theoretical framework

The above reviewed definitions, theories and mechanisms of legitimacy provided context
for considering the relationship between the state and its citizens and how this might affect
social order: the state is the regulator of order through education, law and economy, and
society must legitimate these means of control. Current cross-national theories tend to minimize the state in favour of economic risk factors (Nivette, 2011), but nevertheless provide
an important framework in which to build a theory of the state, legitimacy and crime.

Grand theories of crime

There are three so-called grand theories used to explain cross-national variations in
crime: modernization theory, civilization theory and conflict theory (Stamatel, 2009a:

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14). Modernization theorists argue that crime increases as states industrialize, weakening
the collective conscience and control (see Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Shelley, 1981).
Modernization theory assumes that all states follow this 19th-century pattern of social
change and institutional breakdown, resulting in weakened social control (Neapolitan,
1997). Civilization theory, based primarily on the work of Elias (1939/2000), proposes
that with social change comes personality change, whereby external behavioural controls
shift to internalized self-controls. States that are more civilizedthat is, those that have
successfully monopolized the use of force, provide formal conflict resolution and rely on
economic demonstrations of success as opposed to physical (Elias, 1939/2000; Gurr,
1981)have lower levels of crime. Again, this relies on the assumption of a common
trajectory of state and social development. Finally, conflict theorists (or world systems
theorists) propose that variations in crime across states are due to uneven economic
development within and across nations leading to inequality [and] exploitation (Stamatel,
2009a: 14). Neapolitan (1997: 75) explained that these perspectives rely on the argument
that dominance by economic institutions causes social miseries, spiritual malaise and
values of selfishness leading to crime.
Although these theories were designed to explain cross-national variations in crime
and violence, with the exception of civilization theory, they tend to ignore the specialized
role of the state in maintaining monopolies, regulating institutions and cultivating legitimacy. For instance, modernization theorists often situate industrialization and the transformation of the division of labour as the driving force behind changes in the social
structure leading to anomie (Shelley, 1981). While industrialization certainly affected the
basic social constitution of modern societies, this does not necessarily lead to crime.
Chamlin and Cochran (2005) argued that social destabilization does not invite anomie
unless it is accompanied by delegitimization. Further, evidence that modernization indicators alone cause crime is mixed at best (see LaFree and Tseloni, 2006; Neapolitan,
1997; Nivette, 2011; Stamatel, 2009a).
Only civilization theory (Elias, 1939/2000) recognizes the transformative role of the
state in pacifying society. As described above, Elias argued that the monopolization of
force, driven by the need to extricate violence from economic exchange, changed the
primary method of social control from external to internal. The state did so by replacing
the need to enact private justice and worry about self-protection with systems of formal
and informal conflict resolution. Effective pacification requires a great deal of legitimacy
in that citizens must willingly give up their known (and sometimes rather effective) tools
of contract enforcementthat is, threat and violenceto trust in the states ability to
secure justice and enforce the law. Unfortunately, civilization theory is somewhat
neglected in cross-national empirical research despite its historical support (Eisner,
2003; Spierenburg, 2008; cf. LaFree and Tseloni, 2006).

Institutional anomie and crime

Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argued that institutional imbalances created by structural
and cultural market dominance and weakening non-economic institutions (e.g. the family) lead to institutional breakdown and crime in what has been called institutional anomie theory (IAT). Their theory rests on the idea of the American Dream, which posits

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that Americans are particularly affected by this institutional imbalance due to the cultural
emphasis on achieving monetary success. They claimed that their emphasis is not necessarily on the harmful conditions created by a dominant economic institution, but the
effect this has on other institutions that provide social control (Messner and Rosenfeld,
2009). As shown in Nivette (2011), IAT gains moderate support in cross-national
research.
Chamlin and Cochran (2007) argued that institutional anomie theory is not clear about
how economic institutions come to dominate others, which values are particularly criminogenic and how social institutions respond to market infiltration. Although this places
the validity of IAT in question, particularly in relation to other countries, the idea that
market values can be harmful to social institutions and bonds is not without merit in
criminological research (Karstedt and Farrall, 2006).
However, what IAT tends to overlook is that implicit in these perspectives is the role
of the state in both fostering and protecting from the economic market and cultural goals
(see Habermas, 1976). In ideal terms, the state is expected to foster economic growth and
simultaneously protect its citizens from capitalisms harmful consequences (i.e. through
social support, see Chamlin and Cochran, 1997; Halpern, 2001; Pratt and Godsey, 2002).
Institutional anomie theory is preferable to grand theories in that it recognizes the
role of different institutions within society in creating and socializing rules and obedience to authority. Although it is somewhat vague about how these institutions interact
and which values damage and which values strengthen institutions and control, the
theory at least brings us a step closer to understanding the connection between the state
and citizens behaviours.

Democracy and crime

As shown above, much of the cross-national focus is on economic, family, education and
welfare institutions, with little attention paid to political institutions (Karstedt, 2010;
Stamatel, 2009a). The small but growing area of research on political institutions tends
to concentrate on the effects of democracy and political transitions (e.g. Karstedt, 2003,
2006; LaFree and Tseloni, 2006; Lin, 2007; Stamatel, 2009b; Sung, 2006). Schwarzmantel
(2010) argued that democracies are particularly concerned with levels of crime because
conflict and group antagonism undermine the democratic principles of consensus and
citizenship. Thus the values, practices and structures of democracies are ideally formed
to exclude violence from both political and social realms. This conceptualization is often
only an ideal, and in reality democracies face the constant challenge of balancing principles of individualism and inclusion with tensions brought by weak ties and self-expression
(Karstedt, 2006). In these ideally inclusive states, inequalities may have a particularly
detrimental impact, and [i]f democracies do not make good on their promises, it
might elicit violent reactions among those who feel themselves to be victims of discrimination (Karstedt, 2006: 60).
It is important to note that while democracies contain these inherent tensions, and
certainly the possibility of extreme violence, most fully democratic states have very low
levels of homicide (e.g. Western Europe, Scandinavia, Canada, Japan, see WHO, 2013).
Karstedt (2006) reported that violence was lowest where states promoted democratic

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values upheld by egalitarian structures. In states where values of tolerance and inclusion
are coupled with discrimination, inequality and repression, violence is comparatively
higher. For instance, where the state is perceived to treat certain groups unfairly, citizens
may see this as a violation of the promised democratic principles of equality and justice.
Thus the state is no longer justified according to shared beliefs, and citizens may withdraw consent, and ultimately compliance.

Legitimacy and crime

If legitimacy is a key component to understanding levels of social order, we must consider how illegitimacy leads to crime and violence. Cross-national theory provides several contexts in which the criminogenic nature of illegitimacy is apparent: when there is
disjunction between state actions and values and during social and political transformations/breakdowns. The first has implications for certain groups and individuals who
experience unfairness, injustice and inequality at the hands of the state. To borrow
Habermas (1976) phrase, these citizens reside in the legitimation gap. The second has
universal implications in that states and institutions are constantly changing, requiring
constant cultivation of legitimacy in order to maintain normative compliance as institutions weaken. The following sections will discuss these pathways from illegitimacy to
crime more thoroughly. It is important to note that these legitimation mechanisms reflect
an ongoing dialogue between the state and its citizens (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012),
and so each pathway should allow for feedback effects.

Lack of legitimacy and social control

The first possibility is that a lack of legitimacy discourages citizens from using the criminal justice system to solve interpersonal conflicts. This argument is based on the ability
of the state to hold the monopoly of force, solve conflicts and to provide justice in return
(Elias, 1939/2000; Hobbes, 1651/1996; Weber, 1978). Where the police are perceived as
illegitimate agents of social control, citizens may fill this gap using their own tools of
conflict resolution, including violence (Black, 1983).
Researchers argue that police are often considered a visible representation of the
states monopoly of violence and moral identity (Tankebe, 2013). As such, conceptions
of illegitimacy are likely to stem from interactions between criminal justice agents and
citizens. Conceptions of illegitimacy would therefore include illegal actions and unfair
treatment by criminal justice power-holders, inequality of outcomes within the criminal
justice system and conflicting moral values and identities between power-holders and
citizens. Any of these examples supposedly reflects a lack of legitimacy in the moral
authority of the state, as represented by its criminal justice institutions. Previous studies
support the premise that legal actors, among others, can shape individual perceptions of
legitimacy, and that these perceptions change as more information and experiences are
processed (Fagan and Piquero, 2007; Fagan and Tyler, 2005; Kirk and Papachristos,
2011; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).
The primary mechanism at work here is the delegitimization of the states criminal justice system, which weakens the monopoly of violence, causing individuals to use violence

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State actions (i.e.

discrimination,
corruption,
injustice)

Societal effects
(i.e. high levels
of crime)

3
Effects on
individuals (i.e.
delegitimization)

Loss of monopoly of
violence

Individual
actions (i.e.
self-help)

Figure 1. Proposed mechanisms linking the state, legitimacy, self-help and crime.

as a tool to mete out justice and resolve conflicts. This process is illustrated in Figure 1
using Colemans (1986) macro-micro-macro causal social mechanisms. Indicated by the
first arrow (1), unjust, discriminatory and illegal actions perpetrated by the state, and especially the police, lead citizens to perceive the criminal justice system as illegitimate.
Delegitimization causes citizens to reject the states monopoly of physical force and turn to
self-help (2), the effects of which contribute to higher levels of crime and violence (3).
Although this mechanism has yet to be tested, certain individual pathways are well
supported in criminology. We know based on Tylers (2004, 2006; see also Hagan et al.,
2005; Reisig and Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013) work that distributive injustice, procedural injustice and ineffectiveness lead citizens to withdraw support and co-operation from the criminal justice system (arrow 1). Upon interviewing a
sample of young men (ages 1624) recently involved in violent offences, Wilkinson et
al. (2009: 29) found that the youth experienced a profound lack of access to the law
(arrow 1). The participants in their study continually expressed a lack of confidence in
the police that drove them to keep guns for protection and use violence to solve conflict
(arrow 2). In a study of retaliatory homicides in St Louis, Missouri, Kubrin and Weitzer
(2003) found that violent self-help is part of the code of the streets (Anderson, 1999),
and that this code functions where police are seen as illegitimate (arrow 2).
As suggested by the diverse examples above, self-help can manifest in a number of
ways. Where criminal justice actors and institutions are seen as unjust, unfair and ineffective, a vacuum of power may exist, allowing for opposing value systems, illegal markets and alternative (sometimes violent) forms of social control to move in and fulfill the
need for order.
The literature on vigilantism provides a number of situations where ineffectiveness
and injustice delegitimize the criminal justice system, leading to an unavailability of law,
and consequently self-help. For example, Goldstein (2003: 36) interviewed a number of
community members and leaders in the barrios of Cochabamba, Bolivia, finding that
vigilante violence is a direct challenge to state legitimacy, in that it accus[es] the legal
authorities of neglecting the needs of the people, deploying the inclusive discourse of
citizenship to forge a new kind of political relationship between the marginal communities and the state. In the words of one resident, If you as the authority do not make
justice, then we are going to make it with our hands (quoted in Goldstein, 2003: 30).

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Similarly, Varese (2011) argues that state ineffectiveness and illegitimacy are key
local conditions for the migration and growth of organized crime groups. When a state
cannot protect its citizens, settle disputes or enforce economic contracts, a demand arises
for extra-legal protection typically provided by mafias. Organized crime groups, in addition to perpetrating acts of violence themselves, arguably foster social and moral networks within controlled areas that value violence as retaliation (Loftin, 1986). For
instance, in Jamaica, Reisig and Lloyd (2009) found that the presence of area dons
inhibited students co-operation with the police. Cross-nationally, Van Dijk (2007) found
that effective and incorruptable criminal justice systems are negatively associated with
the presence of organized crime groups.
The analytical strategy needed to test these hypothetical relationships should be
adaptable to different locations and contexts, but still test the core premise. Simplistically,
this requires measuring levels of criminal justice legitimacy, individual perceptions of
the states right to hold the monopoly of force and individual criminal behaviours.
Ideally, analyses should measure changes in legitimacy, attitudes and behaviours over
time in order to detect whether the proposed links are in fact causal.
In addition, the above review has highlighted a number of potential moderators and
confounding variables that should be accounted for in future analyses. In relation to both
co-operation with the police, vigilantism and organized crime, community levels of
cohesion and trust may moderate the effect of legitimacy on crime. Sunshine and Tyler
(2003) reported that moral cohesion within the community enhanced the legitimacy and
hence co-operation with the police. Conversely, Zizumbo-Colunga (2010) found that
high levels of cohesionmeasured by trustcan be a barrier to co-operation, leading to
more support for vigilantism. This suggests that the relationship between legitimacy and
violence may not be linear: in societies with low levels of legitimacy, building too much
cohesion and trust may have the opposite effect, creating the wrong kind of social
capital.
Another potential moderator is the existence of social supports, or safety nets.
Colvin et al. (2002) argue that support differentially affects individuals and communities,
depending on how consistently it is administered (i.e. consistent versus erratic support)
and from whom it is offered (i.e. legal versus illegal support). Consistent and legal types
of social supportsuch as neighbourhood cohesion, religious organizations and social
welfaremay minimize the effect of illegitimacy on violence. The more safety nets
available to citizens, the less likely they are to revoke the states monopoly and use violent self-help. Social support and cohesion may be key to understanding why certain
individuals subject to illegitimate state institutions, including a lack of security, unfairness and abuses turn to other forms of political participation to affect change.

Legitimacy, institutional commitment and informal

social control
The second pathway focuses on the role of institutionseconomic, political, family,
welfare, education, criminal justicein maintaining order by embedding individuals in
obligations, instilling non-violent moralities, constructing social interactions based on
trust and reciprocity and overall encouraging obedience to authority and a willingness to

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co-operate as agents of informal social control (Karstedt, 2010 see also Granovetter,
1985; Roth, 2009) argued that since humans are embedded in these obligations, when
institutions begin to lose legitimacy, people feel less obligated to abide by their responsibility to participate in social control and comply with formal and informal rules.
Essentially, an institutional loss of legitimacy leads to crime because citizens withdraw
compliance to the rules, but more importantly they withdraw commitment to policing the
states monopoly.
As with the first pathway, unjust and discriminatory criminal justice institutions may
delegitimize the authority of the state and the rule of law among citizens. However,
police and courts are not the only source of legitimation in society, and legal socialization (Fagan and Tyler, 2005) occurs through the development of relationships, rules and
obligations across a number of institutions. This includes political, family, economic,
education, welfare, religion, military and employment institutions, among others.
In political institutions, a tyrannical dictator, unfair or exclusive electoral system, or
an unrepresentative national parliament may all be sources of illegitimacy to citizens.
Within economic and work institutions, unequal pay, non-meritocratic promotions and
poor or dangerous working conditions may delegitimize and weaken commitment to
these institutions. In family institutions, power structures vary across societies, but generally authority lies with the parents. Family authority may weaken if parents are cruel,
violent or if parental values differ drastically from childrens (e.g. as in immigrant households and first generation children). In addition, family institutions play a role in forming
beliefs and attitudes towards the law and police, meaning illegitimate family institutions
may fail to instil certain legitimizing legal attitudes. Education and welfare institutions
may lose legitimacy by discriminating against certain groups, providing unequal services, or as further extensions of state power, they may suffer tangentially from political
illegitimacies. Religious institutions contain a variety of rules, authority structures and
laws (both natural and legal), and thus play a unique role in the legitimization and delegitimization of the state among committed citizens.
The mechanisms linking legitimacy to crime here occur in two parts. Generally speaking, each institution provides sets of rules that promote or discourage certain behaviours,
and optimally there exists an equilibrium in which legitimate institutions work to embed
individuals in networks and patterns that result in a diffuse obligation to obey authority
(March and Olsen, 2006; Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007). The delegitimization of institutions causes disruptions to this potential (and likely unobtainable) equilibrium, weakening obligations and loosening normative control over citizens. The second mechanism is
the breakdown of social control caused by the withdrawal of commitment and weakening of obligations to the rules and patterns of institutions. This affects levels of crime in
two main ways: by loosening social bonds and discouraging citizens from participating
in informal social control (LaFree, 1998; Nivette and Eisner, 2013).
To be clear, Figure 2 illustrates this relationship in terms of causal social mechanisms
(Coleman, 1986). The process occurs in two stages. First, indicated by arrow (1), injustice, discrimination and corruption lead citizens to perceive the state as illegitimate.
Delegitimization causes citizens to withdraw commitment to social institutions (2), the
effects of which destabilize and break down social institutions (3). In the second stage,
institutional breakdown weakens obligations and social controls (4). As a result, social

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Figure 2. Proposed mechanisms linking the state, legitimacy, institutional breakdown and crime.

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bonds are loosened, participation in informal social control is discouraged and individuals commit more opportunistic and moralistic crime (5), which contributes to overall
levels of crime and violence (6).
Again, individual links have been empirically examined. It is also well established
that disruptions to social institutions (arrow 4) disorganize and reduce individuals willingness to participate in informal social control (i.e. through losses of cohesion and collective efficacy, see Sampson et al., 1997). Further, the loss of informal social controls
(arrow 5) has been shown to predict individual delinquency (Sampson and Laub, 2008).
Indeed, Sampson and Laub (2008) provide compelling longitudinal evidence that commitment to certain institutions such as marriage, employment and religion can significantly alter an individuals criminal career.
The content and context in which institutional rules, beliefs and behaviours exist is
essential to unpacking how these complex, interdependent institutions control and/or
cause crime and violence. One theoretical framework that may assist this endeavour is
institutional anomie theory (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007), which focuses on the balance of power between institutions and the subsequent effect on values and social control. Rosenfeld (2004) elaborates briefly on the consequences of non-economic
domination, but this avenue requires more theoretical and empirical development in
order to understand the delegitimizing effects of various balances of power in society.
Measuring and testing the institutional pathway requires us to first understand the institutional layout of a society. It is likely that institutional balances, as well as norms, rules
and patterns associated with each institution, vary across the globe. However, we may be
able to group certain societies for comparison by political, economic or social organization (e.g. advanced welfare states or newly industrialized countries). By doing so, we
would expect institutions in these societies to be relatively similar in structure, power
distribution and value content, and so would hypothetically respond to delegitimization in
a comparable fashion. For instance, Pratt (2008) argues that the phenomenon of low
imprisonment in Scandinavian societies is related to shared institutional characteristics,
including bureaucratic autonomy from political influence and strong welfare traditions.
Yet another layer of dialogue to add to this model is between state and sub-national
state actors (i.e. police departments, district courts, school districts). The focus so far has
largely centred on state agents and agencies as aggregate national-level institutions, but
this misses a range of diversity across neighbourhoods, cities and counties. The extent to
which these meso-level organizations engage in the dialogue is likely dependent on the
extent of institutional interdependency and centralization (or conversely, agencies may
be insulated from other institutions, Karstedt, 2010). The resulting multilevel model is
rather complex, but it is nevertheless important to structure these conversations of legitimacy in order to grasp how reactions at various levels impact social order.
Second, we must understand who are the power-holders within each institution in
order to appropriately measure levels of legitimacy, commitment and obligation. In criminal justice institutions, researchers typically use police as representative power-holders,
but can we make the same assumption about teachers, parents, managers, imams and
social workers? Or should we instead focus on evaluating the legitimacy of the processes
of educational attainment, parenting, hiring and firing, religious education and the

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provision of social support, respectively? It is likely that legitimacy is evaluated based on

both power-holder actions and institutional processes.
Third, in order to test the link between delegitimization and institutional withdrawal,
a measure of commitment and obligation is needed. This brings up a number of important questions about the causal process of commitment to, participation in and abandonment of institutions. For instance, an important confounding factor to consider in this
context is dull compulsion, or a ritualistic adherence to prescribed roles (Bottoms and
Tankebe, 2012; Carrabine, 2004). Citizens that dully comply feel little moral obligation
to participate beyond the routine fulfilment of institutional roles. In other words, they
comply with the rules, but feel no obligation to enforce them (i.e. participate in informal
social control). This may also be the case in situations where citizens comply due to
sheer fear or material inducement (Carrabine, 2004: 184): compliance is secured, but
active commitment is absent.
These distinctions portray more nuanced pathways connecting institutional legitimacy to crime. Illegitimate polities and institutions induce the withdrawal of moral commitment to the non-violent rules of social interaction, but they may also lead to routine
obedience (Johnson et al., 2006). Researchers must investigate citizens motivations for
non-normative compliance and its effect on social order (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).

Summary: A multilevel model of legitimacy and crime

These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and most likely work together to disrupt
participation in institutions and social controls, reject the states monopoly and morally
validate the use of violence for self-help. Changes brought by modernization, imbalances
between economic and social institutions, inequalities and democratization all undoubtedly alter the foundations of social life, but these factors areto use Wikstrms (2006:
62) phrasecauses of the causes. What leads citizens to break from normative compliance and ignore obligations to violate moral rules and laws may be the delegitimization
of authority. Legitimacy offers a direct link between the institutions that hold authority
and demand obedience (in particular political institutions) and individual rule-breaking,
crime and violence.
However, more research must be done on how these mechanisms operate on an individual psychological and situational level. Wikstrms (2006) situational action theory is
particularly relevant here because it provides a framework for multilevel integration of
theory and analysis. Specifically, situational action theory proposes that socio-structural
characteristics (e.g. concentrated disadvantage, political capital, policing policy and
effectiveness) interact with individual characteristics (e.g. legal attitudes, self-control,
morality) to influence choices in a given situation (Wikstrm et al., 2012). For instance,
attitudes related to the legitimacy of authority are likely to directly impact an individuals
perceptions of crime alternatives in criminogenic settings. An example of a criminogenic
setting is a neighbourhood characterized by concentrated disadvantage, aggressive policing tactics and low social capital (Kane, 2005; Kirk and Papachristos, 2011; Sampson
and Bartusch, 1998). In situations that generate a choice between breaking rules and not
breaking rules, feelings that the police are unjust, corrupt or ineffective may lead an
individual to choose the criminal option.

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Together this theoretical model illustrates the dialogical nature of legitimacy and thus
the cyclical connection between state actions and citizens behaviours. Illegitimate institutionscharacterized by violence, discrimination, inequality and unfairnesslead to
crime through the revocation of the monopoly on violence and/or the deterioration of
informal social controls. In this model, violence may be considered a reaction to state
illegitimacy. Crime and violence may therefore be interpreted as moral declarations that
the state does not hold the monopoly on force and that it does not properly care for its
citizens. The state may either react positively by changing policy to influence institutions, altering its values to coincide with citizens or providing further safety nets to
prevent institutional breakdowns. The state may also react negatively by either using
physical coercion to gain compliance or doing nothing.
With positive reactions, states are working to improve legitimacy by increasing institutional fairness, transparency and justice. These reactions demonstrate the state is using
power in a way that is acceptable among the populace and that its authority is justifiable.
Consequently citizens comply with state monopoly and institutional rules, and crime
decreases. Negative reactions such as police crackdowns, excessive use of force and (an
extreme) ethnic cleansing may further inequalities, unfairness and discrimination and
increase crime and violence. Since crackdowns are likely to target citizens in the legitimation gap, problems of mistrust and illegitimacy only intensify the preference for selfhelp. Furthermore, constant pressure for change from global social forces such as
modernization and democratization means that inaction will only increase institutional
breakdown and illegitimacy.

Conclusion
This article sought to fill a significant gap in cross-national criminological theory, namely
the lack of consideration given to the role of the state in building and maintaining social
order. The state is linked to levels of social order via political interrelations with other
social institutions and the claim on the monopoly on legitimate force. The states monopolization of force must be accepted across large geographical areas and diverse populations, and the most effective method of accomplishing widespread compliance may be
through legitimacy. Legitimacy is gained when political, social and economic institutions are fair, transparent, justified according to shared beliefs and when they provide
basic social goods such as security and social welfare. Most importantly, an illegitimate
state may cause crime and violence when citizens withdraw commitment from institutions (LaFree, 1998) and/or reject the monopoly of physical force to employ self-help
(Black, 1983).
Notes
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
1.
2.

Wrong (2004: 35) defines authority as successful ordering or forbidding.

While this is potentially an important route, for brevity and relevance this article will focus on
the second route (i.e. legitimation).

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Author biography
Amy Nivette is a Postdoctoral Prize Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

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