Zeller, Eduard - The Stoics

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Grad. R. R. 3
6
Z e
THE
STOICS,
EPICUBEANS
AND
SCEPTICS
WORKS BY DR. E. ZELLER.

HISTORY OF ECLECTICISM IN GBEEK PHILO
SOPHY. Translated by Sarah P. Allkynb. Crown
870. 10. 6d.
THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SCEPTICS.
Translated by the Rev. 0. J. Rkichel, M.A. Crown 8vo.
16.
SOCKATES AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
Translated by the Rev. O. J. Rkichkl, M.A.. Crown 8vo.
10s. ed.
PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY. Translated
by Sarah P. Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, B.A. Crown
8vo. 18j.
THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS : a History of
Greek Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the time of
Socrates. Translated by Sarah F. Alleyne. 2 vols. Crown
8vo. 30*.
OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF GREEK
PHILOSOPHY. Translated by Sarah P. Alleyne and
Evelyn Abbott. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
London : LONGMANS, GREEN, k CO.
THE
STOICS,
EPICUREANS
AND
SCEPTICS
TRANSLATED FROM T ItjE GERMAN 0?

Dr e>zeller
Professor of the University of Heidelberg
BY
REV. OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L., M.A.
sometime Vice-Principal of Cuddesden College
NEW AND REVISED EDITION
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
AND NEW YORK : 15 EAST
STREET
1892
A 11 rights reserved
GRAD. R. R. 3
Z e
/S"7 2-
rRIKTKD BY
SrOTTISWOODE AND CO., NKW-3TRKKT SQtTAUI
LONDON
PBEFACE.
The present translation aims at supplying an intro

ductory volume to a later period of the history of
mind in Greece, which may be collectively described
as the post-Aristotelian.
To the moralist and theo
logian no less than to the student of philosophy this

period is one of peculiar interest ; for it supplied
the scientific mould into which Christianity in the
early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the
shape of which it has come down to us.
The translation has been carefully revised for the
present edition, with the view of rendering more
clear any passages which seemed obscure.
A LA RONDE, NEAR LYMPSTONE, DEVON I
August 1891.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
STATE OF VULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER L
THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OP GREECE
AT THE CLOSE 01? THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.
PAfiK
A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aris
totle
.
.
.1
I!. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and tbe
Greek character' .
. ' .
.
ti
C. Greece after the battle of Cha^ronea
.
.
.12
CHAPTER II.
CHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE
POSTÂRISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
Causes forming the post-Aristotelian philosophy .
, 15
1. Political causes
.
.
.
.
.15
2. Intellectual causes .
.
.
.
.17
li.- Common characteristics of the post-Aristotelian phi
losophy
.
.
.
.
.
.19
1. Theory subordinated to practice
.
.
.19
2. Peculiar mode of treatingthe practical problem . 21
3. These peculiarities illustrated by subsequent phi
losophy
22
'
viii
'
CONTENTS.
PACK
I C. Development of the post-Aristotelian philosophy
. 25
V J L Dogmatic SchoolsStoics and Epicureans, Dogma
tic Scepticism
.
.
.
.
.25
2. Sceptical Schoolsinfluences producingSceptic
ism and Eclecticism
.
.
.
. 2f>
3. Religious School of Neoplatonists ,
,
, 31
PART II.
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OP THE
SECOND CENTURY B.C.
A. Zeno
.
.
B. Pupils of Zeno
.
1. Cleanthes
.
2. Aristo and ilerillus
3. Other pupils .
C. Chrysippus and the later
1. Chrysippus .
2. Later Stoics .
.
.
.
.
.
Stoics
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.36
.4(1
.4(1
.41
.43
.45
.45
.48
CHAPTER IV.
AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY ; ITS PROBLEM
AND DIVISIONS.
A. Authorities .
.
.
.
1. Review of authorities
.
2. Use to be made of authorities
.
.
.
.
.
.
.53
.53
.55
CONTENTS.
ix
PAGE
. 56
B. ^Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy
. 56
1. Its practical character
.
.
. 58
2. Necessity for intellectual knowledge
3. Attitude towards logic and natural science of
. 59
Aristoof Zeno and Cleanthes
. 66
C. Divisions of philosophy .
,
. 67
1. Threefold division .
.
.
. 68
2. Relative importance of each part
CHAPTER V.
LOGIC OP THE STOICS.
A. General remarks .
.
.
.
.
.70
1. Field of Logic
.
.
.
.
.70
2. Words and thoughts .
.
.
.
.73
B. Theory of knowledge
.
.
.
.
.75
1. General character of this theory
.
.
.75
2. Prominent points in the theoryperceptionscon
ceptionsstandards of truth
.
.
.77
C. Formal logic
.
.
.
.
.
.92
1. Utterance in general .
.
.
.
.92
2. Incomplete expressionwordsthe categories
. 94
3. Complete utterance judgment inference fal
lacies
.
.
.
.
.
.110
D. Estimate of Stoic logic .
.
.
.
.123
1. Its shortcomings
..... 123
2. Its value
.
.
.
.
.
.123
CHAPTER VI.
THE STUDY OF NATUBE : 1. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.
A. Materialism
...... 126
1. Meaning of the Stoic Materialism .
.
. 126
2. Causes which led to Stoic Materialism
.
.132
3. Consequences of Stoic Materialismindividual
perceptionstheory of universal mingling
. 135
CONTENTS.
PASI
B. Dynamical theory of Nature
.... 139
1. Matter and force .
.
.
.
.139
2. Nature of force
.
.
.
.
.141
3. DeityGod as forceGod as matter
.
. 148t/
C. Pantheism ....... 156
1. God identical with the world
.
.
. 156 '
2. Relative difference between God and the world . 1 58
3. Views of Boethus .
.
.
.
. 1 59
CHAPTER VII.
THE STUDY OF NATURE: 2. COURSE, CHARACTER,
AND GOVERNMENT OV THE UNIVERSH.
A. The General Course of the Universe
1. Origin of the world ....
2. End of the world ....
3. Cycles in the world's course
B. Government of the World
1 . Nature of Destinyas Providenceas Generative
Reason ....
2. Arguments in favour of Providence
3. The idea of Providence determined
C. Nature of the world
....
1. Its unity and perfection . .
2. Moral theory of the world .
.
161
161
163 /
165
170
170
173
175
182
CHAPTER VIII.
THE STUDY OP NATURE : 3. IRRATIONAL NATURE.
THE ELEMENTS.THE UNIVERSE.
A. The most general ideas on Nature
B. The Elements
C. The Dniverse
1. The stars
2. Meteorology .
3. Plants and animals
194
197
202
204
206
208
CONTENTS.
xi
CHAPTER IX.
THE STUDY OF NATURE : 4. MAN.
PAGK
A. The Soul
2ia
V. Materialistic nature of the soul .
.
.
2. Divisions of the soul
.
.
.
.213
B. The Individual Soul and the Soul of the Universe
. 21(5
C. Freedom and Immortality
.... 219
CHAPTER X.
ethics: 1. the general principles of the stoic
ethics. abstract theory of morality.
A^ The
TR Highest Good
A:
1. Nature of the Highest Good
2. The Good and Evil .
3. Pleasure and the Good
4. Negative character of Happiness .
5. The Highest Good as Law .
B. Emotions and Virtue
1. The Emotionstheir naturevarieties of
2. Idea of Virtue positive and negative aspects of
the virtues severallytheir mutual relations
unity of virtue
0. The Wise Man
1 . Wisdom and Folly .
2. Universal Depravity
3. Conversion .
.
225
225
230
236
239
240
243
243
254
268
268
272
275
CHAPTER XI.
ETHICS: 2. THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS
MODIFIED IN PRACTICE.
Things to be preferred and eschewed .
.
.
1. Secondary goods .....
2. Classes of things indifferent
.
.
.
3. Collision of modified and abstract theory .
.
278
280
281
284
xii
CONTENTS.
B. Perfect and intermediate duties

C. Emotions .
1. Permitted affections .
2. Modification of apathy
3. The state of progress
4'
j A..
B.
C.
rAurc
287
290
290
292
293
CHAPTER XII.
ETHICS 3. APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.
The Individual .
.
.
.
.
.301
1. Importance attaching to the individual .
(fob
2. Cynicism of the Stoics
.... 3Do
Social Relations ...... 311
1 . Origin and use of society .... /All)
2. Justice and mercy ..... (31jp
3. Friendship .
.
.
.
.
.317
4. The family and civil lifeaversion to political life /^^N
citizenship of the world
.
.
J 32i)J
;
Man and the Course of the World
.
.
.v.. 832
1. Submission to the course of nature
.
. 332
2. Suicide
.
.... 335
CHAPTER XIII.
THE RELATION OF THE STOICS TO RELIGION.
A. General connection of Stoicism and Religion .
. ( 34j
1. Connection of Stoicism with popular faith.
. Rijp
2. Free criticism of popular belief .
.
. 344
3. The truth in Polytheism .
.
.
.348
4. Doctrine of Demons
.... 351
B. The Allegorising spirit ..... 354
1. Allegorical interpretation of myths
.
. 354
2. Interpretation of myths respecting the Gods
. 357
3. Allegory applied to heroic myths .
.
. 367
C. Prophetic powers ...... 369
1. Divination .
.
.
.
.
.370
2. Prophecy explained by natural causes
.
. 374
3. Causes of divination
.... 377
CONTENTS.
ziii
CHAPTER XIV.
^
THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS.
A. Inner connection of the system .

.
.
U
1. Ethical side of Stoicism .
.
,
2. Scientific side of the Stoic system .
3. Connection of the moral and scientific elements
B.; Relation of Stoicism to previous systems
1. Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics
2. Relation to Megarians and Heraclitus
3. Relation to Aristotle
4. Relation to Plato
t. 'The Stoic philosophy as a whole
Vic) 1. Its place in history .
^ 2. Its onesidedness
PASS
381
382
383
385
387
387
392
396
399
-BHK
[400
402/
PART III.
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XV.
EPICUREANS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL.
A. Epicurus ....... 404
B. Scholars of Epicurus
..... 408
C. Epicureans of the Roman period
.
.
. 411
CHAPTER XVI.
CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OP THE EPICUREAN
TEACHINS. THE TEST-SCIENCE OP TRUTH.
A. Character of Epicurean system .... 418
1. Its power of self-preservation
.
.
.418
CONTENTS.
PAGE
2. Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans . 4.'0
3. Divisions of philosophy
.... 424
B. Canonic or the Test-Science of Truth .
.
. 425
1. Sensation and perception .... 425
2. Notions
.
.
.
.
.428
3. Opinions
...... 429
4. Standard of truth subjective
.
.
.431
;
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EPICUREAN VIEWS OP NATURE.
A. General Views on Nature
.... 434
1. Object, value, and method of the study of nature . 431
2. Mechanical explanation of nature .
.
. 437
3. Atoms and empty space
.... 439
B. The World
.
.
.
.
.444
1. The swerving aside of atoms
.
.
. 444
2. Origin of the world ..... 447
3. Arrangement of the universe
.
.
. 449
4. Plants and animals ..... 451
C. Mankind .
.
.
.
.
.
.451
1. Origin of the human race .... 451
2. The soul
.
.
.
.
.
.453
3. Sensation ...... 457
4. Will .
.
.
,
.
.
. 459
CHAPTER XVIII.
VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.
A. Criticism of the Gods and the popular faith
B. The Gods according to Epicurus .
.
1. Reasons for his belief
, 2. Nature of the Epicurean Gods
.
.
.
.
462
464
464
467
CONTENTS.
xv
CHAPTER XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OP THE EPICUREANS:
1. GENERAL VIEWS.
PAGE
(A?) Pleasure ....... 472
\J 1. Pleasure the Highest Good .
.
.
.472
2. Freedom from pain .
.
.
.
.474
B. Intellectual Happiness ..... 476
1. Intelligence ...... 47fi
2. Reasons for rising superior to the senses .
. 478
3. Virtue
.
.
.
.
.
.480
dj The Wise Man
...... 483
CHAPTER XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED : 2. SPECrAL POINTS.
A. The Individual
.
.
.
.
.485
B. Civil Society and the Family .
.
.
.490
1. Civil society ...... 490
2. Family life .
.
.
.
.492
C Friendship
.
.
.
.
.
.493
I .
.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS. A WHOLE.
ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.
Ai Coherence of the Epicurean teaching .

.
. 499
îB.' Historical positton of Epicureanism
.
.
. 503
1. Relation to Stoicism
.... 503
2. Relation to Aristippus
.... 508
' 3. Relation to Democritus . .
.
.510
4. Relation to Aristotle and Plato
.
.
.51]
xvi
CONTENTS.
PART IV.
THE SCEPTICS: PYRRHO AND THE OLDER
ACADEMY.
CHAPTER XXII.
PYEKHO.
/=X
PAOK
/ A. J Historical position of Scepticism
.
.
. 514
^ 1. Eelation to cotemporary dogmatic systems
. 514
2. Causes producing it .
.
.
.
.515
3. Pyrrho and his followers .... 517
B. Teaching of Pyrrho
.
.
.
.
.521
: 1. Impossibility of knowledge .... 521
Withholding of judgment .... 523
3. Mental imperturbability .... 525
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE NEW ACADEMY.
A. Arcesilaus ....... 528
1. Denial of knowledge
.... 528
2. Probability .
.
.
.
.
.534
B. Carneades ....... 536
1. Negative views of
.
.
.
. 638
2. Positive views of .
.
.
.
. 553
C. School of Carneades
..... 563
GENERAL INDEX
.567
PART I.
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER I.
THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE
AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.
In Plato and Aristotle Greek Philosophy reached its
greatest perfection. In their hands the Socratic philo-
Chap.
I'
sophy of conceptions grew into elaborate systems,

which embraced the whole range of contemporary
knowledge, and grouped it from definite points of a. Merits
view so as to afford a connected view of the universe, jf8^ dftj
The study of nature was by them supplemented by systems of
careful enquiries into the subject of morals. It was, Îfstotlf
moreover, transformed, enlarged, and enriched by
Aristotle. In metaphysics, the foundations for a
philosophical structure were deeply laid, everything
being referred to first principles, in a way which no
previous philosopher had before attempted. A mul
titude of phenomena which earlier thinkers had care
lessly passed over, more particularly the phenomena
of mental life, were pressed into the service of
research ; new questions were raised ; new answers

Chap,
J
given. New ideas had penetrated every branch of

knowledge. That idealism in which the Greek mind
so beautifully and lucidly found expression had
been set forth by Plato in brilliant purity, and had
been by Aristotle combined with careful observation.
Practice and theory had brought the dialectical
method to the position of an art. A valuable instru
ment of thought had been gained in the scientific
use of terms of which Aristotle was the real origi
nator. Within a few generations the intellectual
treasures of Greece had been manifoldly increased,
both in extent and value. The heritage received by
Socrates from his predecessors could hardly be recog
nised as the same in that which Aristotle left to his
successors.
Great as was the progress made by Greek phi
losophy in the fourth century before Christ, quite as
great were the difficulties with which it had per
petually to contend ; quite as difficult the problems
on the solution of which it had to labour. Aristotle
had already pointed out the weak points in the
system of Plato, which rendered it impossible for
him to accept that system as satisfactory. From the
platform of later knowledge still further objections
might be raised to it. Even in Aristotle's own
system inconsistencies on some of the most important
points might be found, concealed under a certain
indefiniteness of expression, but fatal if once brought
to light to the soundness of the whole. For with all
his ingenuity, Aristotle never succeeded in harmo
niously blending all the elements out of which his
MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

system was composed. Thus the divergencies of his
immediate followers from the original Aristotelian
teaching may be accounted for.
Nor were these defects of a kind that could be
easily disposed of. The deeper the enquiry is carried,
the clearer it becomes that they were defects em
bedded in the foundations of the systems both of
Plato and Aristotle, and underlying the whole
previous range of philosophic thought. Omitting
details and minor points, they may all be ultimately
referred to two : either to an imperfect knowledge
and experience of the world, or to the overhaste of
idealistic philosophy to draw conclusions. To the
former defect may be attributed the mistakes in
natural science into which Plato and Aristotle fell,
and the limited character of their view of history ; to
the latter, the Platonic theory of ideas with all that
it involvesthe antithesis of ideas and appearances,
of reason and the senses, of knowledge and ignorance,
of the present world and the world to comeand
likewise the corresponding points in the system of
Aristotle; such, for instance (to name some of the
principal ones only), as the relation of the particular
and the general, of form and matter, of God and the
world, of the theory of final causes and natural ex
planations, of the rational and the irrational parts of
the soul, of speculative theory and practice.
Both defects are closely connected. The Greek
philosophers were content with an uncertain and
imperfect knowledge of facts, because they trusted
conceptions too implicitly, and were ignorant of their
B 2
3
chap.
'4

Chap,
'
origin and worth ; and they had this unconditional

trust in the truth of conceptions because the study of
nature was yet in its infancy. Their knowledge of
history was too limited for them to see the difference
between the results of careful observation and those
of ordinary unmethodical experience, to realise the
uncertainty of most of the traditional principles and
the necessity for a stricter method of induction. The
fault common to both Plato and Aristotle lay in
attaching undue prominence to the dialectical method
inherited from Socrates to the neglect of observa
tion, and in assuming that conceptions expressing
the very essence of things can be deduced in a" purely
logical way from current beliefs and the use of
language. In Plato this dialectical exclusiveness
appears most strongly, and finds striking expression
in his theory of recollection. If all conceptions are
inherent from the moment of birth and need only
the agency of sensible things to produce a conscious
ness of their existence, it is only legitimate to infer
that, to know the essence of things, we must look
within and not without, and obtain ideas by abstrac
tion from the mind rather than by induction from .
experience. It is equally legitimate to infer that
the ideas derived from the mind are the true standard
by which experience must be judged. Whenever
ideas and experience disagree, instead of regarding
ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon the data of
experience as imperfect, and as inadequately express
ing the ideas which constitute the thing as it really
exists. Thus the whole theory of ideas, and all that
MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

it implies, is seen to be a natural corollary from the
Socratic theory of conceptions. Even those parts of
this theory which seem most incongruous are best
explained by being referred to the principles of the
Socratic process.
From this defective assumption Aristotle is only
partially free. He attempted, it is true, to supply
the defects in the Socratic and Platonic theory of
conceptions by observation of a kind with which
Plato's experimental knowledge cannot be compared
either for accuracy or extent. With that attempt he
also combined a complete transformation of the
Platonic metaphysics, whereby he secured the same
position for particulars in relation to the universal
that his predecessor had secured for observation in
relation to conceptional knowledge. But Aristotle
did not go far enough. In his theory of knowledge
he cannot wholly discard the assumption that the
soul has its knowledge by a process of development
from within, and is not only e'ndowed with the capa
city of thinking, but possesses also from its birth the
substance of ideas. In his scientific method a cri
tical investigation of common notions and of idiom
that in fact which he himself calls proof by proba
bilitiesis constantly taking the place of strict
induction. His endeavours to harmonise the two
antagonistic currents in Plato's teaching may have
been undertaken in all sincerity, but the antagonism
was too deeply seated to yield to his efforts. It not
only reappears in the fundamental ideas of his system,
but it colours all its general results. Beginning with
5
Chap.
r'

Chap,
B. Con^tweenthe'
theoriet of
a^td^Greek
character.
the antithesis between form and matter, it ends in

the contrast between the world and a soul independent
of the world, in the conception of reason as something
above man, never combining with the lower parts of
his nature to form one complete living unity.
Granting that the Socratic philosophy of concep*in8 *s *ne source from which these peculiarities are
derived, still that philosophy is itself only the expressin f the character of the nation which produced
it. jn an earlier work it has been shown 1 that the
most distinctive feature of Greek life lay in con
founding the outer and the inner worlds, in ingenu
ously assuming that the two originally corresponded,
and are still in perfect harmony with one another.
When the whole mental life of a people bears this
impress, it is sure to be reflected in its philosophy
also. Together with the advantages which accrue
from the confusion of the two, philosophy shares also
the disadvantages which unavoidably attend any
theory which ignores the real distinction between
them. The mind only gradually and imperfectly
becomes aware of the distinctive peculiarity of mental
life, of the notion of personality, of the fact that
moral rights and duties are independent of external
circumstances, of the share of the individual will in
creating ideas. It has also less hesitation in trans
ferring phases of consciousness directly to things
themselves, in regarding the world from ideal points
of view borrowed from the sphere of mind, in accept
ing its own notions of things as realities without
1 Zeller's Philosophie der Griecieti. Part I. 9(1.
PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.

testing their actual truth, and even treating them
as more real than the reality of the senses, and
in confounding the critical analysis of a notion
with the experimental investigation of a thing.
If the philosophy of Greece in the time of its greatest
perfection was not free from these defects ; if, further,
these defects were the cause of all the important
faults in the systems of Plato and Aristotle; the
creators of these systems and their immediate suc
cessors are not the only ones to blame ; but the whole
mental peculiarity of the people is at fault of which
within the province of science these men were the
greatest representatives.
As the faults of the Platonic and Aristotelian
systems are seen to be connected with the geaeial
character of Greek life, it becomes obvious how diffi
cult it must have been for Greeks to emancipate
themselves from them. To overcome the difficulty
nothing short of a radical breaking away from old
lines of thought would avail. The origin of ideas,
the primary meaning ofconceptions, must be enquired
into with searching thoroughness; a sharper dis
tinction must be drawn between what is supplied
from without and what is supplied from within ; the
truth of axioms hitherto received in metaphysics
must be more carefully investigated than had ever
been done as yet. The intellect must accustom itself
to an accuracy of observation, and to a strictness of
inductive process, never before reached in Greece.
Experimental sciences must attain a degree of com
pleteness which it was vain to hope to reach by the
7
Chap.
8
Chap,
l'
methods and means then in vogue. The fashion of

regarding nature as though it were a living being
which allowed questions as to facts to be answered
by speculations as to final causes or by the desire of
nature to realise beauty, must be abandoned. En
quiries into a man's moral nature and duties must
be kept apart from the simple study of his conduct
in relation to natural surroundings, the disastrous
effects which flow from the confusion of the two being
1 only too apparent in the national type of the Greeks,
! in the exclusively political character of their morality,
and in their adherence to slavery.
Before this pass could be reached how much was
there not to alter in the condition and mental habit
of Greece ! Could it indeed be expected that a more
vigorous and more scientific method would gain
foothold so long as the tendency to look upon the
life of nature as analogous to the life of man was
kept alive by a religion such as that of Hellas ? Or
that moral science would liberate itself from the
trammels of Greek propriety of conduct, whilst in all
practical matters those trammels were in full force ?
Or that a clearer distinction would be drawn between
what comes from without and what from within in
ideasa distinction which we vainly look for in
Aristotleuntil a depth and an intensity had been
given to the inner life, and until the rights and value
of the individual as such had obtained a recognition
which it required the combined influence of Chris
tianity and the peculiar Germanic character to bring
about ? The more vividly the national type and the

national conditions surrounding Greek philosophy are
realised, the firmer becomes the conviction, that to
heal its defectswhich are apparent even in its
greatest and most brilliant achievementsnothing
short of a revolution in the whole mental tone of
Greece would availsuch as history has seen accom
plished, but not till after many shifts and many
centuries.
On the platform of the ancient life of Greece
such a change could not possibly have come about.
It may be that under more favourable circumstances
Greek philosophy might have further developed along
the same course of purely intellectual enquiry which
it had previously so successfully followed in the hands
of its earlier representatives, more particularly of
Aristotle. What results might in this way have been
attained, we cannot exactly determine. Speculation
is, however, useless. In point of fact, the historical
circumstances under which philosophy had to grow
cannot be ignored. Philosophy had become what it
was under the influence of those circumstances. The
Socratic theory of conceptions, and Plato's theory
of ideas, presuppose on the one hand the high cul
ture of the age of Pericles, and the brilliant career
of Athens and Greece following on the Persian war.
They also presuppose the political degradation and
the moral exhaustion of Greece during and after the
Peloponnesian war. Aristotle, with his high intel
lectual culture, despairing of everything direct and
practical, with his wide view of things, his knowledge
of every kind, his system matured and elaborate,
9
Chap.
'
10

Chap,
^
and embracing all the results of previous enquiry

appears as the child of an age which was bearing to
the grave a great historical epoch, in which intel
lectual labour had begun to take the place of vigorous
political action.
The bloom of Greek philosophy was short-lived,
but not more short-lived than the bloom of national
life. The one was dependent on the other, and both
were due to the action of the same causes. The Greeks,
with a high appreciation of freedom, a ready aptitude
for politics, and a genius for artistic creations, pro
duced within the sphere of politics one result of its
kind uniivalled and unique. They neglected, how
ever, to lay the foundations wide and deep. Their
political endurance was not equal to their versatility
and restlessness. Communities limited in extent
and simple in arrangement sufficed for them. But
how could such communities include all branches of
the Greek family, and satisfy at once all legitimate
aspirations ? It is the same within the department of
science. Prematurely concluding and rashly advanc
ing from isolated experiences without mediating links
to the most general conceptions, they constructed
theories upon a foundation of limited and imperfect
experience, which it was wholly inadequate to bear.
Whether, and in how far, the intellect of Greece, if
left to itself, might have remedied these defects in a
longer protracted calm of development, is a question
which it is impossible to answer. As a fact, that
intellect was far too intimately bound up with the
political, the moral, and the religious lifein short,

with the whole mental tone and culture of the people
not to be seriously affected by a change in any one
of them. It lay, too, in the character and historical
progress of that people to have only a brief period of
splendour, and that soon over. At the time that the
philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in
Plato and Aristotle, Greece was in all other respects
in a hopeless state of decline. Notwithstanding
individual attempts to revive it, the old morality and
propriety of conduct had disappeared since the begin
ning of the Peloponnesian war. The old belief in
the gods was likewise gone. To the bulk of the
people the rising philosophy with its ethics afforded
no substitute. Art, although carefully cultivated,
failed to come up to the excellence of the strictly
classic period. Political relations became daily more
unsatisfactory. In the fifth century before Christ
the rivalry of Athens and Sparta had ranged the
states of Greece into two groups. In the succeeding
century disunion spread further. The effort made by
Thebes under Epaminondas to found a new leader
ship only multiplied parties. Destitute of a political
centre of gravity, the Greeks, of their own choice,
drifted into a disgraceful dependence on the conquered
and now declining Persian empire. Persian gold
wielded an influence which Persian arms had been
unable to exercise. The petty jealousies of tiny
states and tribes frittered away in endless local feuds .
resources which with unity and leadership might have
accomplished wonders. Civil order declined, and with
it the well-being and martial prowess of the nation
11
Chap.
l'
12
Chap,
['
declined also. The growing pursuit of the art of

war as a profession took the decision of battle more
and more out of the hands of free citizens, and placed
it in those of the numerous bands of mercenaries
which are one of the most baneful phenomena of that
age, a sure sign of the decline of freedom, and of the
approach of a military despotism. When by the rise
of the Macedonian power the danger of a military
despotism loomed nearer, patriots in Greece con
tinued to deceive themselves with the hope that
their self-devotion would avert the danger ; but any
unbiassed reader of history sees in the failure of their
attempts to avert it the natural and inevitable result
of causes so deeply rooted in the Greek character and
the course of Greek history, that neither the most
' heroic exertions of individuals, nor the united resist
ance of the divided states, which came too late,
could for one moment have rendered the final issue
doubtful.
c. Greece
By the battle of Chseronea the doom of Greece
battle of was sealed. Never since then has Greece attained to
ciueronea. reaj political freedom. All attempts to shake off the
Macedonian supremacy ended in humiliating disasters.
In the subsequent struggles Hellas, and Athens in
particular, were the play-ball of changing rulers, the
continual arena of their warfare. The second half
of the third century was reached before a purely
Grecian powerthe Achsean Leaguewas formed,
round which the hopes of the nation rallied, but the
attempt was wholly inadequate to meet the real
requirements of the times. Soon it became apparent
DECLINE OF GREECE.
that no remedies were forthcoming to heal the ills
from which the country was suffering. Discord, their
old hereditary failing, rendered it impossible for
Greeks to be independent in foreign relations, or to
be united and settled at home. Their best resources
were wasted in perpetual struggles between Acheeans,
Êtolians, and Spartans. The very individual who
led the Achseans against the Macedonians in the
cause of independence, called the Macedonians back
to the Peloponnesus to gain their support against
Sparta. When the supremacy of Macedonia was
broken by the arms of Rome, a more avowed depend
ence on Italian allies succeeded. And when, in the
year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia was incorporated
into the Roman empire, even the shadow of freedom
which up to that time had been assured departed for
ever.
Sad as were the external affairs of Greece at this
period, and marked as was the decline of its intel
lectual power, its mental horizon, nevertheless, ex
tended and its culture became more generally diffused.
The Macedonian ascendency, which gave the death
blow to the independence of Greece, also broke down
the barriers which had hitherto separated Greeks
from foreigners. A new world was opened out before
them, and a vast territory offered for their energies
to explore. Greece was brought into manifold con
tact with the Eastern nations belonging to the
Macedonian monarchy, whereby it secured for its
culture the place of honour among them, but at the
same time became subject to a slow, but, in the long
13
Chap.
J'
14
Chap,
*

run, important back-current of Oriental thought,
traces of which appear in its philosophy a few
centuries later. By the side of the old famed centres
of learning in the mother country of Hellas, new
centres arose, suited by position, inhabitants, and
peculiar circumstances to unite the culture of East
and "West, and to fuse into one homogeneous mass the
intellectual forces of different races. Whilst Hellas,
by the number of emigrants who left her shores to
settle in Asia and Egypt, was losing her popula
tion and the Greeks in their ancestral homes were
being ousted by foreigners, they were gaining the
most extensive intellectual conquests at the time
over the very nations by and through whom they had
been oppressed.
POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
16
CHAPTER II.
CHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POSTARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
The circumstances which have been briefly sketched
in the preceding chapter are of the greatest import-
Chap
II-
ance in their bearing on the character of the post

t
i m
i
-i
,.,
Aristotelian philosophy. Greek philosophy, like
i Greek art, is the offspring of Greek political inde' pendence. In the whirl of public life every one is
thrown on himself and his own resources. Thereby,
and by the emulation begotten of unlimited competi
tion for all the good things of life, the Greek had
learned to make full use of his intellect. Conscious
ness of his dignitywhich a Greek associated far
more closely than we do with the privilege of
citizenshipand independence of the necessity of
struggling for daily food, had taught him independ
ence of mind, and enabled him to devote himself to
the pursuit of knowledge without any ulterior aim.1
With the decline of political independence the
mental powers of the nation were broken past
remedy. No longer borne up by a powerful esprit
A- Causes
producing
the post^f"^^.
sophy.
(!) Polite
1 Conf Arist. Metaph. I, 2, 282 b, 19.
16

C'ha.p.
1 '
de corps, weaned from the habit of working for

the common weal, the majority gave themselves
up to the petty interests of private life and per
sonal affairs. Even the better disposed were too
much occupied in contending against the low tone
and corruption of their times, to be able to devote
themselves in moments of relaxation to independent
speculation. "What could be expected in such an
age as that which preceded the rise of the Stoic
and Epicurean systems, but that philosophy would
become practical itself, if indeed it were studied
at all ?
'
An age like that did not require theoretical
knowledge, but it did require moral bracing and
strengthening. If these were not to be had from
popular religion in its then state, was it matter for
wonder that philosophy should be looked to to supply
the deficiency, seeing that in all cultivated circles
philosophy had already taken the place of religion ?
If we ask in what form, and in what form only,
philosophy could supply the deficiency under the
then circumstances, the answer is not far to seek.
There was little room for creative effort, plenty for
sustained endurance ; little for activity without, plenty
for activity within ; little room for public life, plenty
of room for private life. So utterly hopeless had the
public state of Greece become, that even the few who
made it their business to provide a remedy could
only gain for themselves the honour of martyrdom.
As matters stood, the only course open for the bestintentioned was to withdraw entirely within them-
CAUSES OF POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
17
selves, to entrench themselves within the safe barriers Chap.

of their inner life against outward misfortunes, and
'
to make happiness dependent entirely on their own
inward state.
Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-contentment, and
Sceptic imperturbability, were the doctrines which
suited the political helplessness of the age, and they
were therefore the doctrines which met with the most
general acceptance. There was yet another which
suited itviz., the sinking of national distinctions
in the feeling of a common humanity, the severance
of morals from politics which characterises the philo
sophy of the Alexandrian and Roman period. The
barriers which kept nations apart had been swept
away, together with their national independence :
East and West, Greeks and barbarians, were united
in large empires, brought into communication end
forced into comparison with one another in matters
the most important. Philosophy declared that all
men are of one blood and are equally privileged
citizens of one empire, that morality rests on the
relation of man to man, and is independent of
nationality and position in the state ; but in so doing
it only explicitly stated a truth which was partly
realised and partly implied in actual life.
The very course which philosophy itself had (2) I.iteltaken during the previous century and a half had Raises.
prepared the way for the turn which now set in.
Socrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt,
had each devoted themselves to the practical side of
life ; and thus the Cynic School was the precursor
c
18
Chap,
n'

of Stoicism, the Cyrenaic of Epicureanism. These
two Schools are, however, only of minor importance
in the general progress of philosophy in the fourth
century, and sophistry by the close of the same cen
tury was already a thing of the past. Socrates, it is
true, would have nothing to do with physical en
quiries ; yet he felt the desire for knowledge far too
keenly to bear comparison with the post-Aristotelian
philosophers. Proposing to concern himself only with
subjects which were of practical use in life, he yet
put forth a theory of knowledge which involved a
reform quite as much of speculative as of practical
philosophy, and that reform was accomplished on a
grand scale by Plato and Aristotle.
However little Greek philosophy as a whole deve
loped during the fourth century along the lines of
its subsequent expansion, still the speculations of
Plato and Aristotle necessarily helped to prepare for
the coming change. The antagonism between the
ideal and-phenomeral worlds which Plato set up, and
Aristotle vainly attempted to bridge over, leads ulti
mately to a contrast between the outer and the inner
life, between thought and the object of thought.
The generic conceptions or forms, which Plato and
Aristotle regard as most truly real, are, after all,
fabrications of the human mind. The conception of
reason, even in its expanded form as the divine
Reason, or reason of the world, is an idea formed by
abstraction from the inner life. And what is really
meant by identifying form in itself with what is, and
matter with what is possible, or even (as Plato does)
18
with what is not, or by placing God outside of and in Chap.

contrast to the world, but the admission that man
'
finds in his own mind a higher and more real
existence than any which he finds outside of it, and
that what is truly divine and unlimited must be in
the mind as an idea, apart from and independent of
all impressions from without ? Plato and Aristotle
in fact declared that reason constitutes the real
essence of man reason coming from above and
uniting itself with the body, but in itself superior to
the world of sense and life in timeand that man's
highest activity is thought, turned away from all
external things, and meditating only on the inner
world of ideas. It was only one step further in the
same direction for the post-Aristotelian philosophy
to contemplate man in complete severance from
the outer world, and to refer him to himself for
that satisfaction which he can find nowhere else in
life.
This step was taken by the Schools of the Stoics, B. Com*
Epicureans, and Sceptics which appeared in the first Mterishalf of the third century before Christ, superseded ties of the.
the influence of the older Schools, and asserted their totelian
supremacy without great variation in their teaching i*^0until the beginning of the first century. In whatever
else these three Schools may differ, at least they agree
in two fundamental points, (1) in subordinating theory
to practice, and (2) in the peculiar character of their
practical philosophy.
The subordination of theory to practice is most (1) Theory
apparent in the School of Epicurus. It is nearly as "atedt'o
c 2
practice.
20
Chap,

clear in the case of the Sceptics, who, denying all
possibility of knowledge, left as the only ground of
action conviction based on probabilities. Both Schools
also agree in considering philosophy as only a means
for securing happiness. By the Stoics, on the other
hand, the need of philosophic speculation was felt
more strongly ; but even in their case it may be seen
that speculation was not pursued simply for its own
sake, but for practical purposes, by which it was also
determined. Thus the Stoics, like the Epicureans,
in the speculative part of their system confined them
selves to current viewsthereby showing that the
source of their philosophical peculiarities lay else
where than in speculation, and that other studies had
greater value in their eyes, in which also they
considered themselves more proficient. They even
expressly stated that the study of nature is only
necessary as a help to the study of virtue. It is
beyond question, that their chief peculiarities, and
those which give them an importance in history, are
ethical. The other parts of their system, more par
ticularly those in which their distinctive tenets
appear, are likewise regulated by practical considera
tions. This statement will hereafter be shown in
detail. It may suffice to observe now, that the most
important point in the logic of the Stoicsthe ques
tion as to the standard of truthwas decided by a
practical postulate ; that the fundamental principles
of the Stoic metaphysics are only intelligible from
the ground of their ethics ; that for natural science
the Stoics did very little ; that in their theory of
POST-AP.ISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
final causes on which they lay so much stress nature
is explained by moral considerations ; and that their
Chap.
ll' _
natural as well as their positive theology bears ample ,

testimony to the practical tone of their system.
Standing in advance of the Epicureans by their
higher intellectual training and their learned energy,
and in opposition to the Sceptics by their dogma
tism, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both these
Schools in the essentially practical character of their
teaching.
This relationship is more strikingly seen in the (2) Pecuway in which they deal with the practical problem. ltfd"ali>lj
The Epicurean imperturbability is akin to that of the mith the
Sceptics ; both resemble the Stoic apathy. All three ûbkni!
Schools are agreed that the only way to happiness
consists in peace of mind, and in avoiding all those"'
disturbances which sometimes arise from external
influences, at other times from internal emotions ;
they are only divided as to the means by which peace
of mind may be secured. They are also agreed in
making moral activity independent of external cir
cumstances, and in separating morals from politics,
although only the Stoics set up the doctrine of the
original unity of the whole human family, and
insist on being citizens of the world. Through all
the Schools runs the common trait of referring every
thing to the subject, and constantly falling back on
man and his own inner life, one consequence of which
is the prominence given to action in preference to
speculation, and another that action is determined by
personal certainty, and a mental equilibrium which

Chap,
II-
must be attained by the exercise of will and the cultivation of the intellect.
(3) Their
The same character belongs to philosophy in the
ttes'ittus- cen*uries succeeding the rise of these three Schools ;
trated by during which the circumstances which produced
>nhllo-Uent ât character were not materially altered. In additapky,
tion to the followers of the old Schools, Eclectics are

now met with, who gather from every system what
seems true and probable. In this process of selection
their guiding principle is regard for the practical
. wants of man. Hence the ultimate standard of truth
is placed in personal consciousness.
Everything
is referred to the subject as its centre. In ethics
and natural theology the Eclectics were mainly in
debted to the Stoics. A new School of Sceptics also
arose, not differing in its tendencies from the older
one. Neopythagoreans and Platonists appeared, not
satisfied with human knowledge, but aspiring to
higher revelations. Professing to appeal to the
metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, these philoso
phers betray their connection with the later postAristotelian Schools, not only by borrowing largely
from the Stoics for the material for their theology
and ethics, but also by their general tone; know
ledge is for them less even than for the Stoics an end
in itself, and they are further from natural science.
With them philosophy is subservient to the interests
of religion ; its aim is to bring men into proper re
lation with God ; and the religious needs of mankind
are the highest authority for science.
The same observations apply also to Plotinus and
POST- ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
23
his successors. These philosophers are not lacking Chap,

in an elaborate science of metaphysics. The care , IT'
which they devoted to this science leaves no doubt
as to their lively interest in scientific completeness
and systematic arrangement. For all that their
speculative efforts bear the same relation to the
practical aim of philosophy as those of the Stoics,
who in point of learning and logical elaboration of a
system are quite their equals. A real interest in
knowledge was no doubt one of the elements which I
brought Neoplatonism into being ; but it was not
strong enough to counterbalance another, the prac
tical and religious sentiment. The mind was not
sufficiently independent to be able to get on without
appealing to intellectual and theological authorities ;
the scientific procedure was too mixed to lead to a
simple study of things as they are. As in the case
of the Neopythagoreans, the ultimate ground of the,
system is a religious want. The divine world is only
a portion of human thought projected out of the
mind, and incapable of being fully grasped by the
understanding. The highest business of philosophy
is to reunite man with the divine world external to
himself.* To attain this end, all the means which
science supplies are employed. Philosophy endea
vours to explain the steps by which the finite
gradually came to be separated from the original
infinite being ; it seeks to bring about a return by a
regular and systematic course ; and in this attempt
the philosophic spirit of Greece, by no means extinct,
proved its powers by a result of its kind unrivalled.
24
Chap.
}j

In the first instance, no doubt, the problem was so
raised as to press philosophy into the service of reli
gion ; but, in the long run, it became apparent that,
with the premises assumed, a scientific solution of
the religious question was impossible. The -idea of
an original being with which the system started was
a reflex of the religious sentiment, and not the
result of scientific research, and the doctrine of a
mystical union with a transcendental being was a
religious postulate, the gratuitous assumption of
which betrays an origin in the mind of the thinker.
The platform of Neoplatonism is the same, therefore,
as 1 hat of the other post-Aristotelian systems; and
it is hardly necessary in proof of this position to
point to the agreement of Neoplatonism in other
respects with Stoicism, and especially in ethics. Far
a? the two systems lie asunder, the one standing at
the beginning the other at the end of the postAristotelian philosophy, nevertheless both display
one and the same attitude of thought ; and we pass
from one to the other by a continuous series of inter
mediate links.
In passing from School to School the post-Aris
totelian philosophy assumed, as might be expected,
various modifications of character in course of time ;
nevertheless, it retained a certain mental habit and
certain common elements. Such was the neglect of
intellectual originality, which drove some thinkers to
a sceptical denial of all knowledge, and induced
others to take their knowledge at second hand from
older authorities. Such was the prominence given
to practical over speculative questions. Such was
the disregard for natural science, and, in comparison
with former times, the greater importance attached
to theology, apparent not only in the controversy
between the Epicureans and Stoics, but also in
the apologetic writings of the Stoics and Platonists.
Such, too, was the negative morality which aimed at
independence of the outer world, at mental com
posure, and philosophic contentment ; the separation
of morals from politics ; the moral universalism and
citizenship of the world ; the going within self into
the depths of the soul, the will, and the thinking
powers ; the deepening of the consciousness accom
panied at the same time by a narrowing and isola
tion of it, and the loss of a lively interest in the
outer world, and in the simple scientific study thereof.
This mental habit, first of all, found simple
dogmatic expression in philosophical systems. Not
only moral science, but also logic and natural science,
were treated in a way consonant with it, although
they were partially built upon older views. In dealing with the moral problem, two Schools come to
view, markedly different and decided in their peculiarities. The Stoics regard almost exclusively the
,
universal element in man who seeks contentment
within, the Epicureans catch at the individual side
of his being. The Stoics regard man exclusively as
a thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of
feeling. The Stoics make happiness to consist in
subordination to the law of the whole, in the sup
pression of personal feelings and iuclinations, in
26
Chap.
II-
0. Dere^'JfJ^f.
totelian
ôj/hy.
(l) Boy%j?lu
stoics
cnd
cureans.
L'fi

Chap,
'
virtue ; the Epicureans in individual independence

of everything external, in the unruffled serenity of
the inner life, in painlessness. The theoretical bases
of their teaching correspond with these fundamental
ethical positions.
(*) BogAlthough the rivalry between these two Schools
teepticwm. was 8rea' both, nevertheless, stand on the same
platform. Absolute composure of mind, freedom of
the inner life from all disturbance from without, is
the goal at which both aim, although they follow
different methods. Hence it becomes necessary to
insist on the common element as the essential aim
and matter of philosophy. If the philosophic axioms
of the two systems contradict one another, it may be
thence inferred that the aim of both may be attained
independently of any definite dogmatic view ; in
short, knowledge may be despaired of in order to
pass from a recognition of ignorance to a general
indifference to everything and to an unconditional
repose of mind. Thus Scepticism is connected with
Stoicism and Epicureanism, as the third chief form
of the philosophy of that age. Apart from Pyrrho's
School, it is most effectually represented in the New
Academy.
(2) SeepThe rise, the growth, and the conflict of these
thiols.
three Schools, by the side of which the older Schools
have only a subordinate value, occupies the first por
tion of the period of post-Aristotelian philosophy,
and extends from the end of the fourth to the begin
ning of the first century before Christ. The dis
tinctive features of this epoch consist partly in the
rOST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
27
predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in

their separate existence, without modification by
Ohap.
J*'
intermixture. After the middle of the second

, , ,
,
_
century a gradual change may be observed, breece

had then become a Roman province, and the intelr
'
lectual intercourse between Greece and Rome was
continually on the increase. Many learned Greeks
resided at Rome, frequently as the companions of
(a) In~
Jtuences
producing
sêPu~
cum. .
^ p0nti,
cal ing^,' f
families of high birth ; others living in their own

country, were visited by Roman pupils. Was it
possible that in the face of the clearly-defined and
sharply-expressed Roman character, the power and
independence of the Greek intellect, already unques-
tionably on the decline, would assert its ancient
supremacy ? Or that Greeks could become the
teachers of Romans without accommodating them
selves to their demands, and experiescing in turn a
reflex influence ? Even Greek philosophy could not
withdraw itself from this influence. Its creative
power was long since in abeyance, and in Scepticism
it had openly avowed that it could place no trust in
itself. To the practical sense of a Roman no philo
sophical system commended itself which did not
make for practical results by the shortest possible
route. To him practical needs were the ultimate
standard of truth. Little did he care for strict logic
and argumentative accuracy in scientific procedure.
Differences of schools, so long as they had no practical
bearing, were for him of no importance. No wonder
that Greek philosophy, touched by the breath of
Rome, lent itself to Eclecticism !
28
Chap.
Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks

were falling under the influence of the nation that
(6) Intelsubdued them, on the other they were assimilaleatual in.
_'
.
,
jiuence of ting the views of the Oriental nations whom they had
^rla'
subdued by martial as well as by mental superiority.
For two centuries, in philosophy at least, Greece had
held her own against Oriental modes of thought.
Now that her intellectual incapacity continually in
creased, those modes of thought gained for themselves
a foothold in her philosophy. Alexandria was the
place where the connection of Greece with the East
was first and most completely brought about. In that
centre of commerce for all parts of the globe, East
and West entered into a connection more intimate
and more lasting than in any other centre. Nor was
this connection a mere accident of circumstances ;
it was also a work of political forecast. From its
founder, Ptolemy Soter, the Ptolemasan dynasty in
herited as the principle of government the rule always
to combine what is native with what is foreign,
and to clothe new things in the old and venerable
forms of Egyptian custom and religious ceremony.
At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards the
beginning of the first century before Christ, a School
calling itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean,

which later still, in the shape of Neoplatonism,
gained the ascendency over the whole domain of
philosophy. The very fact, however, that such a
change in philosophic views did not appear sooner,
is sufficient to show that it was produced by external
circumstances. But notwithstanding external cir
29
cumstances it would never have come about bad not

Chap.
the intellect of Greece in the course of its own
11
development been ripe for it.
The same remark holds good of the rise of that (*) Sefptipractical Eclecticism which we have before traced to Eeleetithe influence of Rome. Even in the period of intel- eismlectual exhaustion, Greek philosophy was not simply
the resultant of its outward surroundings, but, under
the influence of outward surroundings, took shape in
a way indicated by its previous progress. If the
lingering remains of a few small Schools, which soon
expired, are excepted, there existed, after the begin
ning of the third century before Christ, only four
great philosophic Schoolsthe Peripatetic, the Stoic,
the Epicurean, and the School of Platonists. The
last-named of these was converted to Scepticism by
Arcesilaus. These four Schools were all permanently
established at Athens, where a lively interchange of
thought took place between them, which renders a
thorough comparison of their several teachings com
paratively easy. It was only natural that they would
not long exist side by side without making overtures
towards union and agreement. These overtures were
favoured by Scepticism, which, denying the possi
bility of knowledge, only allowed a choice between
probabilities, and decided that choice by the standard
of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the
second century before Christ, these philosophic
Schools may be observed to emerge more or less
from their exclusiveness. An eclectic tendency
steals over philosophy, aiming nob so much at
30

Chap,
IL
scientific knowledge as at attaining certain results

for practical use. The distinctive doctrines of each
School drop into the background ; and in the belief
that infallibility resides solely in the mind itself, such
portions are selected from each system as seem most
in harmony with the selecting mind. The germ of
this eclectic mode of thought lay in Scepticism. On
the other hand, Eclecticism involves doubt. Hence,
soon after the Christian era, a new school of doubt
developed, which continued until the third cen
tury. There was thus, on the one hand, a lively
interest in knowledge, which was desired in the prac
tical interest of religion and morals ; and, on the other
hand, a disbelief in the truths of existing knowledge,
and, indeed, of knowledge generally, openly avowed
by some as Sceptics, secretly betrayed by others in the
unsettledness of their Eclecticism. These two cur
rents coalescing, led to the thought that truth, which
cannot be found in knowledge, exists somewhere out
side of it, and must be looked for partly in the
religious traditions of the early days of Greece
and the East, partly in direct divine revelation.
Then came in such a notion of God, and of His rela
tions to the world, as accords with this belief in reve
lation. Man knowing that truth lies outside himself,
and doubting his own capacities to attain it, removes
deity, as the absolute source of truth, into another
world ; and because the need of a revelation of truth
still exists, the interval between God and the world
is peopled with intermediate beings, who are some-
TOST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
time3 conceived of as metaphysical entities, and at
other times appear as the demons of popular belief.
31
Chap.
_ n'
This mental habit, which is connected with Plato

and Pythagoras, among the older systems, forms the
transition to Neoplatonism. The appearance of Neoplatonism introduces the last stage in the develop
ment of Greek philosophy.
Yet even this turn in Greek philosophy was not (3) Reliuninfluenced by the circumstances of the times. School of
Since the end of the second century after Christ, the Ne0Pla.
tonists,
decline of the Roman Empire progressed apace.
Dread of the dangers which threatened it on all
sides, the pressure of the times and distress made
startling progress. All means of defence hitherto
employed had proved unavailing to stem destruction.
With ruin everywhere impending, the desire and
longing for higher assistance increased. No such
assistance was forthcoming from the old gods of
Rome or the religious faith of the day ; despite witrich
circumstances were daily becoming more hopeless.
Then it was that the desire for foreign forms of wor
ship which had been gradually spreading over the
Roman world since the last days of the Republic, and
which the circumstances of the Empire had stimulated,
gained ground. That desire was favoured by the
highest power in the state, under the Oriental and half
Oriental emperors who for nearly half a century after
Septimius Severus occupied the imperial throne. The
state and the gods of the state were continually losing
their hold on the respect of men. Meanwhile, on the
32
Chap,
1

one hand, Oriental worships, mysteries old and new,
and foreign heathen religions of the most varying
kinds, were ever gaining fresh adherents. On the
other, Christianity was rapidly acquiring a power
which enabled it openly to enter the lists for supre
macy among the recognised religions of the state.
The powerful monarchs who about the middle of the
third century attempted to refound the Empire, had
not for their object to restore a specifically Roman
form of government, but to bring the various elements
which composed the Empire under one sovereign will
by fixed forms of administration. In this attempt
Diocletian and Constantine succeeded. The Roman
character asserted itself, as a ruling and regulating
power, but it did so under the influence of another
originally foreign character. The Empire was a
congeries of nations artificially held together, and
arranged on a carefully-designed plan ; its centre of
gravity lay not within the nation, but in the simple
will of the prince, himself exalted above all rules
and laws of state, and deciding everything without
appeal and without responsibility.
In like manner Neoplatonism united all the
elements of previous philosophical Schools into one
comprehensive and well-arranged system, in which
each class of existences had its definite place assigned
to it. The initial point in this system, the allembracing unity, was a being lying beyond the
world, high above every notion that experience and
conception can supply, unmixed with the process of
life going on in the world, and from his unattainable
height causing all things, but himself subject to no
conditions of causality. Neoplatonism is the intel
lectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism. As
Byzantine Imperialism combines Oriental despotism
with the Roman idea of the state, so Neoplatonism
supplements the scientific forms of Greek philosophy
with Oriental mysticism.
In Neoplatonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy
had manifestly veered round into its opposite. Selfdependence and the self-sufficingness of thought
made way for implicit resignation to higher powers,
for a craving for revelation, for an ecstatic departure
from the sphere of conscious mental activity. Man
has abandoned the idea of truth within for truth to
be found only in God. God stan Is there as abstract
spirituality removed into another world in contrast
to man and the world of appearances. Speculation
has but one aimto explain the procession of the
finite from the infinite, and the conditions of its
return into the absolute ; but neither of these
problems can meet with a satisfactory intellectual
solution. Even this form of thought betrays un
deniably the personal character of the post-Aristo
telian philosophy, and is the natural outcome of
previous teaching, as will be more fully seen in the
sequel. With it the creative powers of the Greek
mind were exhausted. After being driven step by
step during centuries from the platform of their own
national philosophy, the Greeks were eventually
D
83
Chap.
U'
STATU OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Char,
l1'
entirely dislodged therefrom by the victory of Christianity. Neoplatonism made one more futile attempt
to rescue the forms of Greek culture from its mighty
rival, but when that attempt failed Greek religion
and Greek philosophy went down together.
HISTORY OF THE STOICS,
35
PART II.
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE
SECOND CENTURY B.C.
A STRIKING feature in the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, and one which at the same time
brings forcibly home the thorough change in its
surroundings, is the fact that so many of its repre
sentatives come from eastern countries in which
Greek and Oriental modes of thought met and
mingled. Although for centuries Athens still con
tinued to have the reputation of being the chief seat
of Greek philosophy, and did not cease to be one of
the most important seminaries of philosophy, even
when it had to share that reputation with other
cities, such as Alexandria, Rome, Rhodes, and
Tarsus, yet at Athens itself there were teachers not a
few whose foreign extraction indicates the age of
Hellenism. This remark applies primarily to the
later Neoplatonic School ; next to it it is of none
more true than of the Stoic. With this fact may be
also associated the world-citizenship of this School,
though it would be unfair to attribute a general
D 2
c
]
THE STOICS.
characteristic of the then state of the world to purely
external circumstances. Nearly all the most im
portant Stoics before the Christian era belong by
birth to Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of
the Eastern Archipelago. Then follow a series of
Roman Stoics, by the side of whom the Phrygian
Epictetus occupies a prominent place ; but Greece
proper is represented only by men of third or fourth
rate capacity.
The founder of the Stoic School, Zeno 1 by name,
was the son of Mnaseas,2 and a native of Citium 3 in
Cyprus. Leaving his home, he repaired to Athens,4
1 For the life of Zeno, Dio is himself called a Phoenician
genes is the chief authority, (Diog. vii. 3; 15; 25; 30; ii.
who appears to be indebted 114. Said. lA\v. Athen. xiii.
for his information chiefly to 563, e. Cic. 1. c ). A continu
Antigonus of Carystus, who ous connection between Citium
lived about 250 B.C. In proof and Phoenicia is implied in
of this, compare the account of Diog. vii. 6 ; oi iv 2i$&vi KiTteFy.
4 The details are differently
Diogenes with the extracts
given bv Athenseus (viii. 345, given by Ding. 2-5; 31 ; Pint.
d; xiii. 563, e; 565, d; 603, e ; Inimic. Util. 2, p. 87 ; and Sen.
607, e ; and, in particular, ii. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts
55, f) from Antigonus' life of say that he came to Athens
Zeno. Of modern authorities, for trading purposes, and ac
consult Wagenmann, in Paulg's cidentally became acquainted
with Crates and philosophy
Eealencyclop.
2 Diog. vii. 1. Said. TAivav. after being shipwrecked. Ac
Pint. Plac. i. 3, 29. Pausan. ii. cording to other accounts, he
8, 4. He is called by others remained at Athens, after dis
posing of his merchandise, and
Demeas.
3 Citium, which the ancients devoted himself to philosophy.
unanimously call the native Demetrius of Magnesia (Thecity of Zeno, was, according to mitt. Or. xxiii. 295, D) further
Ding. vii. 1, a tr6\iafia''E\\riviKhv relates that he had already
Qotviicas iiroiKovs 4(rxvK^s) i.e. occupied himself with philo
Phoenician immigrants had sophy at home, and repaired to
settled there by the side of the Athens to study it more fully
old Greek population, whence a view which seems most
its inhabitants are sometimes likely, because the least sensa
called ' e Phoenicia profecti ' tional.
(Cic. Fin. iv. 20. 56), and Zeno
ZEXO THE STOIC.

about the year 320 B.C.,1 where he at first joined the
Cynic Crates.2 He appears to have soon become
disgusted with the extravagances of the Cynics' mode
of life,3 and his keen desire for knowledge could find
no satisfaction in a teaching so meagre as theirs.4
To supply their defects he had recourse to Stilpo,
who united to the moral teaching of the Cynics the
logical acumen of the Megarians. He also studied
under Polemo, and it is said under Xenocrates and
1 The dates in Zeno's life are he only attained the age of
very uncertain. He is said to seventy - two ( Clinton Fast.
have been thirty when he first Hell. II. 3(58 capriciously sug
came to Athens (Diog. 2). Per- gests 92), and was altogether
saeus, however (Ibid. 28), his only fifty years in Athens. On
pupil and countryman, says the other ' hand, in his own
twenty-two. These statements letter to Antigonus (Diog. 9),
are of little use, since the date he distinctly calls himself an
of his coming to Athens is un octogenarian, but the genuine
known. If it is true that after ness of this letter, borrowed by
reading with Crates he was for Diogenes from Apollonius the
ten years a pupil of Xenocrates, Tyrian about 50 B.C., may per
who died 314 B.C. (Tinwcrates haps be doubted. The year of
in Diog. 2), he must have come Zeno's death is likewise un
to Athens not later than 328 known. His relations to Anti
B.C. But this fact may be gonus Gonatas prove at least
doubted. For his whole line of that he was not dead before the
thought resembles that of Crates beginning of his reign in 278
and Stilpo. How then can he B.C., and probably not till long
have been for ten years a pupil afterwards. It would appear
in the Academy, and in addi from the calculation of his age,
tion have enjoyed Polemo's that his death did not take
teaching ? Altogether he is place till 260 B.C. He may,
said to have frequented the then, have lived circa 350 to
schools of different philosophers 2li() B.C. ; but these dates are
for twenty years before opening quite uncertain.
* Diog. vii. 2 ; vi. 105.
his own (Diog. 4). According
8 Diog. 3: evTevdevljicowTe rod
to Apollon. in Diog. 28, he pre
sided over his own school for KpcirTjTOS, &K\ws jui/ eitrot/os irph\
fifty-eight years, which is <pt\o(ro(ptav, aiMifjLwv 5e &>s irpbs
hardly reconcileable with the t}ji> kvvik))v avaiaxwriav.
above data, even if he attained
* Conf., besides what imme
the age of ninety-eight (Diog. diately follows, Diog. 25 and
28 ; Lucian. Macrob, 19). Ac 15 : ffv 5i ^rjTTjriKbs Kal irtp'i
cording to Persseus (Diog. 28), irdvTuv OKpifioKoyovficvos .
88
Chap.
III.
THE STOICS.
Diodorus the logician, with whose pupil Philo 1 he
was on terms of intimacy. After a long course of
intellectual preparation, he at last appeared as a
teacher, soon after the beginning of the third, or
perhaps during the last years of the fourth century
B.C. From the Stoa ttoikiKt), the place which he
selected for delivering his lectures, his followers
derived their name of Stoics, having first been called
after their master Zenonians.2 Such was the uni
versal respect inspired by his earnestness, moral
strictness,3 and simplicity of life,4 and the dignity,
modesty, and affability of his conduct,5 that Antigonus
Gonatas vied with the city of Athens in showing
1 Diog. vii. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24;
ii. 114; 120. Niimen. in Eus.
Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 9 ; 6, 6. Polemo
is called his teacher by Cic.
Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 9, 35.
Strabo, xiii. 1. 67, p. 614. On
Xenocrates compare p. 37, 1.
How ready he was to learn from
others is proved by the saying
in Diog. 25 ; Piut. Fragm. in
Hesiod. ix. T. V. 511. W.
2 Diog. 5, according to whom
he gave instruction walking to
and fro, like Aristotle, but
never to more than two or three
at a time (Diog. 14). It is not
probable that he gave any for
mal lectures.
3 Which, however, must be
judged by the standard of that
time and of Greek customs.
Conf. Diog. 13 ; and the quota
tions in Athen. xiii. 607, e; 563,
e, from Antigonus of Carystus.
4 See Musoni us in
Serm.
17, 43. His outward circum
stances also appear to have been
very simple. According to one
account (Diog. 13), he brought

to Athens the fabulous sum of
1000 talents, and put it out to in
terest. Themist. Or. xxi., p. 252,
says that he forgave a debtor his
debt. He is said to have paid
a logician 200 drachmas, in
stead of the 100 which he asked
for (Diog. 25). Nor is there
any mention of a Cynical life
or of poverty. But, according
to Diog. 5, Pint, and Sen., he
had lost his property almost
entirely. According to Sen.
Consol. ad Helv. 12, 5 (contra
dicted by Diog. 23), he owned no
slave Had he been well to do,
he would hardly have accepted
the presents of Antigonus. That
Zeno was anmarried appears
from Diog. 13.
1 Conf. Diog. 13; 16; 24; 26;
Athen. in the passage quoted p.
36, 2 ; Said. ; Clem. Strom, 413,
A. It is mentioned as a pecu
liarity of Zeno, that he avoided
all noise and popular display
(Diog. 14); that, though gen-
ZENO THE STOIC.
39
appreciation of him.1 Although lacking smoothness Chap.

of style and using a language far from pure,2 Zeno _ III.
had nevertheless an extensive following. Leading a
life of singular moderation, he reached an advanced^
erally grave, he relaxed over
his wine, and that too much ;
that he could not tolerate many
words, and was very fond of
epigrams. See Diog. 16 ; 20 ;
24 ; Athen. I.e. Stob. Serm. 34 ;
10; 36; 19; 23. He is said to
have carried his parsimoniousness too far. In this respect
he was a thorough Phoenician
(Diog. 16). The presents of
ADtigonus he never sought,
and broke with an acquaintance
who asked for his interest with
the king. Still he did not
despise them, without abating
from his dignity. The loss of
his property he bore with the
greatest composure (Diog. 3 ;
Plut. and Sen.}.
1 Antigonus (conf. Athen.
xiii. 603, e ; Arrian, Diss. Epict.
ii. 13, 14 ; Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283, c ; uEl. Y. H. ix. 26)
was fond of his society, attended
his lectures, and wished to have
him at courtbut Zeno declined
the offer, sending two of his
pupils instead. The Athen
ians, to whom, according to
Elian's untrustworthy account
V. H. vii. 14, he had rendered
political services, honoured him
with a public panegyric, a gol
den crown, a statue, and burial
in the Ceramicus. That the
keys of the city were left in
his keeping is not probable.
The offer of Athenian citizen
ship he declined (Plut. Sto.
Kep. 4, 1, p. 1034). Nor did
his countrymen in Citium fail
to show their appreciation

(Diog. 6 ; Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19,
32) of him, and Zeno always
insisted on being a Citian
(Diog. 12 ; Plut. I.e.).
2 He himself (Diog. vii. 18)
compares the \6yot airrjpTHrixevoi
of the &(t6\oikoi to the elegant
Alexandrian coins, which, in
stead of being better, were often
lighter than those of Athens.
He is charged in particular
with using words in a wrong
sense, and with inventing new
words, whence Cic. Tusc. v. 11,
34,callshim 'ignobilisverborum
opifex,' and Chrysippus, in a
treatise irepl tqv Kvplws /cexpwât
Zyvaiva to?s dv6ij.aaru>, dispar
ages this KaivoTOfietv
toIs
bv6â(ri (Galen. Diff. Puis. III.
1., vol. viii. 642, K.). He is also
charged with maintaining that
nothing ought to be concealed,
but that even the most indeli
cate things should be called by
their proper names. He is fur
ther charged with having pro
pounded no new system, but
with having appropriated the
thoughts of his predecessors,
and having concealed his pla
giarism bythe use of new terms.
In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says :
K\iirT(jiv refc 86y/j.aTa toivucws
fxera.fi(pi(vvis ; and Cicero fre
quently repeats the charge
(Fin. v. 25, 74 ; iii. 2, 5 ; iv. 2,
3 ; 3, 7 ; 26 ; 72 ; v. 8, 22 ; 29,
88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. 1, 13,
38 ; 20 ; 53. Tusc. ii. 12, 29).
THE STOICS.
40
Chap,
m"
age untouched by disease, although he naturally

enjoyed neither robust health nor an attractive
person.1 A slight injury having at length befallen

him, which he regarded as a hint of destiny, he put
an end to his own life.2 His not very numerous
writings 3 have been lost, with the exception of a few
fragments, some no doubt dating from the time when,
as a pupil of Crates, he adhered more strictly to
Cynic ideas than was afterwards the case.4 This
point ought not to be forgotten in sketching his
teaching.
B. Pupils
The successor to the chair of Zeno was Cleanthes,s
(1) ^Cleantkes.
a native of Assos in the Troad,6 a man of strong and

fjrm character, of unusual endurance, energy, and con1 Diog. 28, 1. The statement
that he was &vo<ro<; must be
taken with some limitation, ac
cording to Diog. vii. 162 ; Stob.
Floril. 17, 43.
2 Diog. 28 ; 31. Lucian,
Macrob. 19. Lactant. Inst,
iii. 18. Stob. Floril. 7, 45.
Suid.
3 The list of them in Diog.
4, to which additions are made
Diog. 34; 31); 134. The
AiaTpi/3al (Diog. 34 ; Sext. Pyrrb.
iii. 205; 245; Math. xi. 90) may
perhaps be identical with the
1ATronvvôv^vfj.aTaKpa.TT]Tos(Diog.
4), the Te'xvr; ^pwriiri) (Diog. 34)
with T(X"V (.Diog 4). An ex
position of Hesiod, which had
been inferred to exist, from Cic.
N. D. i. 14, 36, Krische, Foisch.
367, rightly identities with the
treaiise irtpl toD '6\ov, and this
with the treatise irepi ttjs <pia*j>s
{Stob. Eel. i. 178). Other au
thorities are given by Fabric.

Bibl. Gr. iii. 580.
1 This appears at least prob
able from Diog. 4 : cws fiev oitv
Tivbs tficovae too KpdTfjros ' Hre
real T?)x/iroA.tTc/af avTodypdâvros,
Tivts eXeyov 7raioi/Tes eirl rrjs rod
Kuvbs oiipas avrfyv yeyptupevai.
s Mohnike, Cleanthes d. Sto. :
Greifsw. 1814. Cleanthis Hymn,
in Jovem, ed. Stun, ed. nov.
cur. Merzdorf. : Lips. 1835.
6 Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610.
Diog. vii. 168. JElian, Hist.
Anim. vi. 50. How Clemens,
Protrept. 47, A, comes to call
him TlioaSfiis, it is hard to say,
nor is it of any moment. Moh
nike, p. 67, offers conjectures.
Mohnike also rightly maintains,
p. 77, that Cleanthes <S IIovtikos
in Ding. ix. 15 must be the same
as this Cleanthes, and Cobet
strikes out the words 6 TlovTiubs
after KXidyBris.
ARISTO AND HERILLUS.
41
tentment, but also slow of apprehension, and some

Chap.
III.
what heavy in intellect. Kesembling Xenocrates in
mind, Cleanthes was in every way adapted to uphold
his master's teaching, and* to recommend it by the
moral weight of his own character, but he was
incapable of expanding it more completely, or of
establishing it on a wider basis.1
Besides Cleanthes, the best known among the (2) Aritio
pupils of Zeno are Aristo of Chios,2 and Herillus of jierillus.
1 According to Antisthenes
(the Ehodian), in Diog. 1. a,
Cleanthes was a pugilist, who
came to Athens with four drach
mae, and entered the school of
Zeno (according to Hetyoh. v.
Suid., that of Crates, which is
impossible for chronological
reasons. Conversely, Valer.
Max. viii. 7, ext. 11, makes him
a pupil of Chrysippus, con
founding the relations of pupil
and teacher, as we have met
with elsewhere), in which he
studied for nineteen years
(Diog. 176), gaining a mainten
ance by working as a labourer
(Diog. 168; 174; Plut. Vit. Mr.
Al. 7, 6, p. 830 ; Sen. Ep. 44, 3;
Knsche Forsch.). A public
maintenance, which was offered
him, Zeno induced him to re
fuse, and, in other ways, tried
his power of will by the severest
tests. It is, therefore, all the
more improbable that ALtigonus
gave him 3000 minte (Diog.
169). On the simplicity of his
life, his constant application,
his adherence to Zeno, &c., see
Ding. 168; 170; 37; Plut. De
Audi. 18, p. 47 ; Cic. Tusc. ii.
25, 60. He also refused to be
come an Athenian citizen (Plut.
Sto. Rep. 4, p. 1034). He died

of self-imposed starvation^/*/.
176 ; Lucian, Macrob. 19 ; Stob.
(Floril.7, 54). His age is stated by
Diog. 176, at eighty ; by Lucian
and Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 11,
at ninety-nine. Diog. 174, gives
a list of his somewhat numerous
writings, mostly on moral sub
jects, which is supplemented by
Fabric. Bibl. iii. 551,Harl. and
Mohnike, p. 90. Cleanthes was
held in great esteem in the
Stoic School, even in the time
of Chrvsippus (Diog. vii. 179 ;
182; Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126).
At a later time, the Roman
Senate erected a statue to him
at Assos (Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b).
2 Aristo, son of Miltiades, a
Chian, discussed most full}' by
Kriscke, Forsch. 405, known as
the Siren, because of his per
suasive powers, and also as the
Baldhead, was a pupil of Zeno
(Ding. 37 ; 160 ; Cic. N. D. i.
14, 37 ; Acad. ii. 42, 130 ; Sen.
Ep. 94, 2), but is said, during
Zeno's illness, to have joined
Polemo (Diocl. in Diog. 162).
Although it may be objected
that his teaching does not di
verge in the direction of Pla-
42
Chap.
THE STOICS.
most
Carthage,1
opposite
who directions,
diverged from his teaching in the
Aristo confining himself
tonism, but rather in the op- 1
posite direction, still Polemo's
contempt (Diog. iv. 18) for
dialectic may at one time have
had its attractions for him. It
is a better established fact that
his attitude towards pleasure
was less indifferent than it
ought to have been, according
to his principles (Eratos and
Apollophanes in AtJwn. vii.
281, c) ; but the charge of flat
tery towards his fellow-pupil
PersEeus appears not to be substantiated(4iAe.vi.25L,c). His
letters show that he was on in
timate terms with Cleanthes
(Themist. Or. xxi. p. 255, b).
His loquacity is said to have
been displeasing to Zeno (Diog.
vii. 18). He appeared as a
teacher in the Cynosarges, Antisthenes' old locality (Diog.
161), thus claiming descent
from Cynicism. Of his numer
ous pupils (Diog. 182 ; Pint. C.
Princ. Philos. i. 4, p. 776), two
are mentioned by Diogenes, 161;
Miltiades and Diphilus. Athenasus names two more : Apollo
phanes, and the celebrated
Alexandrian sage.Eratosthenes,
both of whom wrote an ' Aristo.'
The latter is also named by
Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15, Suid.
'EpaToo-8. Apollophanes, whilst
adopting Aristo's views of
virtue in Diog. vii. 92, did not
otherwise adopt his ethics. His
natural science is mentioned by
Diog. vii. 140, his psychology
by Tertul. De An. 14. Since
Eratosthenes was born 270
B.C., Aristo must have been
alive in 250 B.C., which agrees
with his being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus (Strabo, L c. ; Diog. vii.
162 ; iv. 40, and 33). According
to Diog. vii. 164, he died of
sunstroke. Not only had his
School disappeared in the time
of Strabo and Cicero (Cic. Legg.
i. 13, 38 ; Fin. ii. 11, 35 ; v. 8,
23 ; Tusc. v. 30,85 ; Off. i. 2, 6 ;
Strabo, 1. c), but no traces of
it are found beyond the first
generation. The writings enu
merated by Diog. vii. 163, with
the single exception of the
letter to Cleanthes, are said to
have been attributed by Pano
titis and Sosicrates to the Peri
patetic ; but Krische's remarks,
p. 408, particularly after
Sauppe's demurrer (Philodemi
de Vit. Lib. X. Weimar, 1853,
p. 7), raise a partial doubt as
to the accuracy of this state
ment. The fragments, at least,
of ' O/toiaijuoTa preserved by Stobajus seem to belong to a Stoic.
Perhaps from the "Ojuoia come
the statements in Sen. Ep. 36,
3 ; 115, 8 ; Plat. De Aud. 8, p.
42; De Sanit. 20, p. 133; De
Exil. 5, p. 600 ; Prase. Ger. Keip.
9, 4, p. 804 ; Aqua an Ign. Otil.
12, 2, p. 958.
1 Herillus's native place was
Carthage (Diog. vii. 37; 165).
If XoAxiSiWj isreadby Cobet in
the last passage, we have again
the same confusion between
KaKxySki' and Kapx^S&i', which
made Xenocrates a KapxrjSonor.
He came as a boy under Zeno
(Diog. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42,
129). Diog. 1. c. enumerates the
writings of Herillus, calling
PUPILS OF ZENO.
48
rigidly to Cynicism, Herillus approximating to the Chap.

leading positions held by the Peripatetic School.
Other pupils of Zeno were Persseus, a countryman (3) Other
.
.
pupils.
and companion of Zeno ; 1 Aratus, the well-known
poet of Soli;2 Dionysius of Heraclea in Pontus,
them, however, oXrvdoTixa fiiv
tvrafitms Be /xeard, Cic. De
Orat. iii. 17. 62, speaks of a
School bearing his name, but no
pupil belonging to it is known.
1 Citium was his birthplace.
His father's name was Deme'trius (Diog. 6 ; 36), and his own
nickname Dorotheus (Said.
nep<r.). According to Diog.
86 ; Sotion and Nicias in A then.
iv. 162, d ; Gell. ii. 18, 8 ; Orig.
C. Cels. iii. 483, d ; he was first
a slave of Zeno's, which agrees
with his being a pupil and in
mate of his house (D'wg. 36 ;
13 ; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38 ; Athen.
xiii. 607, e ; Pansan. ii. 8, 4).
It is less probable that he was
presented by Antigonus to Zeno
as a copyist (Diog. 36). He
subsequently lived at the court
of Antigonus (Athen. vi. 251, c ;
xiii. 607, a ; Themitt. Or. xxxii.,
p. 358), whose son Halcvoneits
(.Elian, V. H. iii. 17, says
falsely himself) he is said to
have instructed (Diog. 36), and
with whom he stood in high
favour (Pint. Arat. 18 ; Athen.
vi. 251, c). He, however, al
lowed the Macedonian garrison
in Corinth to be surprised by
Aratus, in 243 B.C., and, accord
ing to Pausan. ii. 8, 4 ; vii. 8,
], perished on that occasion.
The contrary is as-serted by
Pint. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv.
162, c. In his teaching and
manner of life, he appears to
have taken a very easy view of

the Stoic principles (Diog. 13 ;
36; Atlien. iv. 162, b; xiii. 607,
a). It is therefore probable
that he did not agree with
Aristo's Cynicism (Diog. vii.
162), and his pupil Hermagoras
wrote against the Cynics (fluid.
'Eppary.). Political reasons were
at the bottom of Menedemus'
hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143).
Otherwise, he appears as a
genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120 ;
Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38 ; Mimic. Felix
Octav. 21, 3; Philodem. De
Mus., Vol. Here. i. col. 14).
Compare p. 39, 2. The treatises
mentioned by Diog. 36 are
chiefly ethical and political. In
addition to these, there was a
treatise on Ethics (Diog. 28) ;
the (TUjUiroTiKct viro/i^jUOTa, or
ffvfiiroriKol 8id\oyoi, from which
Athen. (iv. 162, b ; xiii. 607, a)
gives some extracts ; and the
'IirTopi'o (in Suid.). Whether
Cicero's statement is taken
from a treatise omitted by Diogenes,or from that irepl a<reg<ias,
it is hard to say.
2 According to the sketch of
his life in Buhle (Arat. Opp. i.
3), Aratus was a pupil of Per
sseus at Athens, in company
with whom he repaired to An
tigonus in Macedonia, which
can only mean that he was, to
gether with PersiEus, a pupil of
Zeno. Another writer in Buhle
(ii. 445) calls him so, mention-
44
Chap,
1 L
THE STOICS.
who afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean
School ; 1 and Sphaerus from the Bosporus, who studied
first in the School of Zeno, and afterwards in that
of Cleanthes, and was the friend and adviser of
Cleomenes, the unfortunate Spartan reformer.2 Of
a few other pupils of Zeno the names are also known ;3
but nothing beyond their names. No appreciable
ing one of his letters addressed

to Zeno. Other accounts (Ibid,
n. 431 ; 442 ; 446) describe him
as a pupil of Dionysius of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his Stoi
cism is the introduction to his
' Phfenomena,' a poem resem
bling the hymn of Cleanthes.
Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle ii.
429), in calling him a native of
Tarsus, is only preferring a
better-known Cilician town to
one less known.
1 Hence his name i MtTaflfnevos. On his writings, consult
Diog. vii. 166; 37; 23; v. 92;
Athen. vii. 281, d; x. 437, e ;
Cie. Acad. ii. 22, 71; Tusc. ii.
25, 60: Fin. v. 31, 94. Pre
viously to Zeno, he is said to
have studied under Heraclides
i nofTiic&s, Alexinus, and Menedemus.
2 Diog. 177 ; Pint. Cleomen.
2; 11; Athen. viii. 354, e.
Sphaerus' presence in Egypt
seems to belong to the time be
fore he became connected with
Cleomenes. He was a pupil of
Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 18i;
Athen. 1. c.) when he went to
Egypt, and resided there at
the court of Ptolemy for several
years. He had left Egypt by 221
B.C., but was then himself no

longer a member of the Stoic
School at Athens. It is pos
sible that Sphaerus may first
have come to Cleomenes ou a
commission from the Egyptian
king. In that case, the Ptolemy
referred to must have been
either Ptolemy Euergetes or
Ptolemy Philadelphuscer
tainly not Philopator, as Diog.
177 says. If, however, the
view is taken that it was Pto
lemy Philopator, it may be sup
posed that Sphajrus repaired to
Egypt with Cleomenes in 221
B.C. Sphaerus' numerous writings(7?icj7.1 78: AaKaviKi/iroKnela.
also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer
to all parts of philosophy, and
to some of the older philoso
phers. According to Cie. Tusc.
iv. 24, 53, his definitions were
in great esteem in the Stoic
School.
3 Athenodorus, a native of
Soli (Diog. vii. 38 ; 100) ; Callippus of Corinth (Diog. 38) ;
Philonides of Thebes, who went
with Persaaus to Antigonus
(Diog. 9 ; 38) ; Posidonius of
Alexandria (Diog. 38) ; Zeno of
Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus
Cronus, who joined Zeno (Diog.
38; 16; Suid.).
THE LATER STOICS: CHRYSIPPUS.
4S
addition was made to the Stoic doctrine by any one

of them.
"
Chap.
IIL
It was therefore fortunate for Stoicism that

Cleanthes was followed in the presidency of the
School by a man of learning and argumentative power
like Chrysippus.1 In the opinion of the ancients,
Chrysippus was the second founder of Stoicism.2
Born3 in the year 280 B.C.,4 at Soli in Cilicia,8 after
being a pupil of Cleanthes6 and it is said even of
Zeno7 himself, he succeeded, on the death of
Cleanthes, to the conduct of his School.8 He is also
c- Chrysthe later
8tl<;sj^jj^*"
1 Bagicet, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.

" Et tii] yitp XputnJriros ovk
ar jjx <TToa (Biog. 183). Cic.
Acad. ii. 24, 75 : Chrysippum,
qui fuloire putatur porticum
Stoicorum, Athen. viii. 335,
b. : XpvtTLVirov rbv rrjs aroas
Ttytydva. See Baguet, p. 16.
It is recorded (Biog. 179)
that he was brought up in early
life as a racer, which is an
exceedingly suspicious state
ment (confer D, 1G8) ; and
that his paternal property was
confiscated (Hecato in Biog.
181). Subsequently, his domes
tic establishment was scanty,
consisting of one old servant
(Biog. 185; 181; 183); but
whether this was the result of
Stoicism or of poverty is not
known. The Floril. Monac. (in
Stub. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 283)
262 calls him \trhs, lxa"
* According to Apollodorus
in Biog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C.,
in his 73rd year, which would
make 281 to 276 the year of
his birth. According to Lxician,

Macrob. 20, he attained the age
of 81, and, according to Valer.
Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed
the 39th book of his logic in
his eightieth year.
5 This is the view of Biog.
179 ; Plat. De Exil. 14, p. 605;
Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610; xiv.
4, 8, p. 671, and most writers.
Alexander Polyhist or, however,
in Biog. and Suid. TA\v. call him
a native of Tarsus ; and since
his father Apollonius migrated
from Tarsus to Soli (Strabo,
p. 671), it is possible that
Chrysippus may have been born
in Tarsus.
6 On this point all authori
ties are agreed. When andhow he
came to Athens is not recorded.
He subsequently obtained the.
rights of citizenship there
(Pint. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034).
7 Biog. 179. This statement
cannot be tested by chronology.
Authorities, however, do not
look promising.
8 Biog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii.
1, 57, 610.
46
Chap.
III.
THE STOICS.
said to have attended the lectures of Arcesilaus and
Lacydes, philosophers of the Middle Academy ; 1 whose
critical methods he so thoroughly appropriated, that
later Stoics accused him of furnishing Carneades
with the necessary weapons for attacking them,2 by
the masterly manner in which he raised philoso
phical doubts without being able to answer them
satisfactorily. This critical acuteness and skill,
more than anything else, entitle him to be regarded
as the second founder of Stoicism.3 In learning,
too, he was far in advance of his predecessors,
and passed for the most industrious and learned
man of antiquity.1 Independent in tone, as his
general conduct and intellectual self-reliance5 often
1 Diog. vii. 183. It is pos
sible, as Sitter, iii. 524, sup
poses, that he was for some
time doubtful about Stoicism,
whilst he was under the influ
ence of the Academic Sceptic
ism, and that during this time
he wrote the treatise against
avi4\Qeia. This is possible, but
not probable. But that he
should have separated from
Cleanthes, and have set up a
school in the Lyceum in opposi
tion to him.is unlikely, and does
not follow from the words of
Dwg. 179 ; 185.
2 Diog. 184; iv. 62. Cic.
Acad. ii. 27, 87. Plut. Sto.
Rep. p. 10, 3, 1036. These pas
sages refer particularly to
Chrysippus' six books kotA tSs
trvvrideias. On the other hand,
his pupil Aristocreon, in Plut.
1. c. 2, 5, commends him as
being rwv 'Affa5?jjUiafca>j/ ffrpayya\t$u>y kott'lSu. (Conf. Plut.
Comm. Not. i. 4, p. 1059).

8 When a learner, he is said
to have used these words to
Cleanthes : ' Give me the prin
ciples ; the proofs I can find
myself.' Subsequently it was
said of him : ' If the Gods have
any logic, it is that of Chry
sippus' (Diog. 179). See Cic.
N. D. i. 15, 30, where the
Epicurean calls him Stoicorum
somniorum vaferrimus interpres : ii. 6, 16 ; iii. 10, 25 :
Divin. i. 3, 6 : Chrysippus
acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec.
Benefic. i. 3, 8 ; 4, 1, com
plains of his captiousness.
Dionys. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68,
calls him the most practical
logician, but the most careless
writer. Krisolie, Forsch. i.
445.
1 Dwg. 180. Athen. xiii. 565,
a. Damasc. V. Isid. 36. Cic.
Tusc. i. 45, 108.
5 Diog. 179; 183.
THE LATER STOICS: CHRYSIPPUS.

proved,1 he deviated from the teaching of Zeno and
Cleanthes, as might be expected, in many respects.2
Still, the fundamental principles of the system were
not altered by him ; only their intellectual treatment
was perfected and deepened. In fact, the Stoic
doctrine was expanded by him with such complete
ness in details, that hardly a gleaning was left for
his successors to gather up.3 In multitude of
writings 4 he exceeded Epicurus ; 3 their titles, and a
comparatively small number of fragments, being all
that have come down to us.6 With such an extra
ordinary literary fertility, it will be easily under
stood that their artistic value is not very high. The
ancients are unanimous in complaining of their
careless and impure language, of their dry and often
obscure style, of their prolixity, their endless repeti
tions, their frequent and lengthy citations, and their
1 Diog. 185, mentions it as
deserving of especial notice,
that he refused the invitation
of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his numerous
writings to a prince.
2 Ci'e.Acad.ii.47,143. Diog.
179. Pint. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p.
1034. According to the latter
passage. Antipater had written
a special treatise irepl rijs K\edvfloui Kal Xpvtri'n-irou Statpopas.
* Quid enim est a Chrysippo
pnetermissum in Stoicis ? tie.
Fin. i. 2, 6.
4 According to Diog. 180,
there were not fewer than
750. Conf. Yaler. Max. viii.
7, ext. 10 ; I.ucian, Hermotim.
48.
This appeared to the Epi-
cureans disparaging to the

honour of their master. Hence
ths charge that Chrysippus had
written against Epicurus in
rivalry {Diog. x. 26, and the
criticism of Apollodorus in
Diog. vii. 181).
6 Bagvet, pp. 114-357, discusses the subject very fully,
but omits several fragments,
As to his logical treatises, of
which alone there were 311
{Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De 1 ogicis Chrysippi libris: Quedlinb.
1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log.
i. 404. Petersen (Philosoph.
Chrysip. Fundamenta : Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a
systematic arrangement of all
the known books.
47
Chap.
III.
49
THE STOICS.
Chap,
'
too frequent appeals to etymologies, authorities, and

other irrelevant proofs.1 But by Chrysippus the
Stoic teaching was brought to completeness ; and
when he died, in the year 206 B.C.,2 the form was
in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be
handed down for the next following centuries.
(2) Later
A cotemporary of Chrysippus, but probably some
what his senior, was Teles, from whose writings a
few extracts3 have been preserved by Stobseus,4 in the
shape of popular moral considerations written from a
Cynic or Stoical point of view. The same age also
produced the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes,5 a man distin
guished in every branch of knowledge, but particu
larly celebrated for his mathematical attainments,
1 See Cus. De Orat. i. 11,50;
Dionys. Hal See above 46, 3 ;
Diog. vii 180; x. 27. Galen,
Differ. Puis. ii. 10 ; vol. viii.
631 K ; Hippocr. et Plat. Plac.
ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295,
308, 312, 314, and Baguet, 26.
See also Pint. Sto. Rep. 28, 2 ;
and Bergk, Commentat. de
Chrys. lib. irepi luroipaTiKuv :
Cassel, 1841.
2 The circumstances of his
death are related differently in
Diog. 184 ; bi t both stories are
untrustworthy. The story of
the ass is also told in Lncian,
Macrob. 25 of Philemon ; the
other version in Ding. iv. 44 ;
61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes.
On the statue of Chrysippus in
the Ceramicus see Diog. vii.
182 ; Cic. Fin.i. 11, 39; Pausaii.
i. 17, 2 ; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5.
3 In Stob. Floril. 40, 8, men
tion is made of the honourable
position enjoyed by the Athe

nian Chremonides, who had
been banished from his country.
The banishment of Chremo
nides being placed in the year
263 B.C., Teles' treatise Tcpt
(pvyf/s must have been written
bei ween 260 and 250 B.C. This
is further proved by the fact
that there is no reference in the
fragments preserved to persons
or circumstances later than this
date. The philosophers to whom
reference is made are the Cynics
Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles,
Stilpo, Bio the Borj sthenite,
Zeno, and Cleanthes (95, 21),
the latter being called d
"A<r<nos.
4 Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91,
33 ; 93, 31 ; 98, 72 ; 108, 82 and
83.
5 According to Suid., he
was born c. 275 B.C., and died
in his 8(Jth year.
THE LATER STOICS.

who was gained for Stoicism by Aristo.1 Another
cotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellowstudent,2 who in many respects approximated to the
teaching of the Peripatetics,3 was the Stoic Boethus.
The proper scholars of Chrysippus were without doubt
numerous;4 but few of their names are known to us.5
The most important among them appear to have
been Zeno of Tarsus,6 and Diogenes of Seleucia,7 who
1 See p. 41, 2.
2 Conf. Diog. 54 : 6 Si Xpvcrnriros tiajpfpifxtvos vpbs avr6v. . .
KptrJipid tfyqffiv tlvai aXvQriaiv koX
rp6\ri^tv. That he was junior
to Aratus appears by his
commentary on Aratus' poem.
See Appendix to Geminus,
Elem. Astron. (Petavii Doctr.
Temp. III. 147). The Vita
Arati (Von Buhle's Aratus,
vol. ii. 443), probably con
founding him with the Peri
patetic Boethus, calls him a
native of Sidon.
3 We shall have occasion to
prove this in speaking of his
views of a criterion, and of his
denial of a conflagration and
destruction of the world. Never
theless, he is frequently ap
pealed to as an authority among
the Stoics. Philo, lncorruptib.
M. 947, C, classes him among
&vZpts iv to?s ^TtetKots 56yfiaffiv
4 This follows from the
great importance of Chrysip
pus, and the esteem in which
he was held from the very first,
and is confirmed by the num
ber of persons to whom he
wrote treatises. See the list
from Diog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl.
iii. 549. It is, however, am
biguous whether Trpbs means to

or against.
s Aristocreon, the nephew
of Chrysippus, is the only pupil
who can be definitely men
tioned by name. See Diog. vii.
185 ; Pint. Sto. Bep. 2, 5, p. 1033.
6 What is known of this
philosopher is limited to the
statements in Diog. 35 ; Suid.
TA\v. AioffK. ; Bus. Pr. Ev. xv.
13, 7; Arius Didymus, Ibid. xv.
17,2; that he was a native of
Tarsus (in Suid. tii4s say of
Sidon, evidently confounding
him with the Zeno mentioned
p. 44, 3); that he was the son of
Dioscorides, the pupil and fol
lower of Chrysippus ; that he
left many pupils, but few
writings ; and that he doubted
a conflagration of the world.
7 According to Diog. vi. 81 ;
Luoian, Macrob. 20, he was
a native of Seleucia on the
Tigris ; but he is sometimes
called a native of Bahylon
{Diog. vii. 39; 55; Cio. N. D.
i. 15, 41 ; Divin. i. 3, 6 ; Pint.
De Exil. 14, p. B05). Cio. Divin.
i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of
Chrysippus ; and Acad. ii. 30,
98, the instructor of Carneades
in dialectic. Pint. Alex. Virt.
5, p 328, calls him a pupil of
E
'49
Chap.
m"
THE STOICS.
Chap,
IH'
succeeded Chrysippus in the presidency of the School.'

The pupil and successor of Diogenes, in his turn,
was Antipater of Tarsus,2 in connection with whom
Archedemus his countryman is frequently mentioned.8
Zeno (of Tarsus). Zeno, he
says, noyivT\ rbv Ba&vKwviov
?iriff <pt\otrotpciv. Dioff. vii.
71, mentions a SiaXtKriieh Te'x<"i
of his ; and, vii. 55 and 57. a
tc'x>/') fpl <pa>vys. Cic. Divin.
i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on
divination. Atlwn, iv. 168, e,
of a treatise irepl tvytvttas, xii.
626. d, of a work ntp\ vouw
the same work probably which,
according to Cic. Legg. iii. 5,
1 4, was written ' a Dione Stoico.'
Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, calls him
' magnus et gravis Stoicus ; '
Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1, men
tions a trait showiDg great
presence of mind. Diogenes
was, without doubt, aged in
156 B.C. {(lie. De Senec. 7, 23).
According to Lneian, he at
tained the age of 88, and may
therefore have died 150 B.C.
1 It was often supposed,
on the strength of Cic. N. D.
i. 15, 41, Divin. i. 3, 6, that
Diogenes was the immediate
successor of Chrysippus. The
words, however, consequens
or subsequens, by no means
necessarily imply it. On the
authority of Arius, Eusebius,
and Suidas, it would seem that
Zeno was the successor of
Chrysippus, and that Diogenes
followed Zeno.
1 Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, only
calls him his pupil ; but it is
clear that he taught in Athens
from Plut. Ti. Gracch. c. 8, as
Zumpt. Deber die philos.
Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl.
Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl. p. 103,

already remarks ; and Plut.
Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to
imply that he continued to live
at Athens after leaving Cilicia.
The same fact is conveyed by
the mention of Diogenists and
Panastiasts at Athens {Athen.
v. c. 2, p. 186, a); by the charge
brought against Antipater
{Plut. Garrul. c, 23, p. 514;
Numen. in Hut. Pr. Ev. xiv.
8, 6 ; Cic. Acad ii. 6, 17, and
the fragment from Acad. Post.
I. in Non. p. 65), that he never
ventured to dispute with Carneades ; and by Diog. iv. 65 ;
Stob. Floril. 119, 19. According
to these two authorities, he
voluntarily put an end to his
own life. In Acad. ii. 47, 143,
Cicero calls him and Arche
demus 'duo vel principes
dialecticorum, opiniosissimi ho
mines.' It appears from Off.
iii. 12, 51, where he is also
called ' homo acutissimus,' that
he pronounced a severer judg
ment on several moral questions
than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5,
reckons him among the magnos
Stoicas secta? auctores. Epictet.
Diss. iii. 21, 7, speaks of the
(popa 'ApTiTrdrpov Kal 'ApxeSôu.
See Van Lyiulen, De Panaetio,
33 ; and Fabric. Biblioth. iii.
538 for his numerous lost
treatises.
3 Cic. 1. c. ; Slrabc xiv. 4, 14,
p. 674, Ejrictet. 1. c. ; Diog. vii.
65. It does not follow that they
were cotemporaries, but only
THE LATER STOICS.

Under Panaetius, Antipater's scholar, Stoicism entered
the Roman world, and there underwent internal
changes, to which attention will be drawn in the
that their writings and philo

sophy were the same. We
have otherwise no accurate in
formation as to the date of
Archedemus. Passages where
he is mentioned may be found
in Fabric. Bibl. III. 540. He
also appears to be meant in
ttimpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in Arist.
605, a, 45, In Diog. 134, he
appears to be placed between
Chrysippus and Posidonius. In
Plut. De Exil. 14, 605, he
follows Antipater. According
to this authority he established
a school in Babylon, and be
cause he came there from
Athens, Plutarch appears to
have considered him an Athe
nian.
1 Apollodorus of Athens, the
compiler of the Bi/JAioflijKi), a
well-known grammarian, is also
mentioned as a pupil of Dio
genes (Scijmnus, Chius Perieges.
v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated
to Attalus II., Philadelphus of
Pergamum (158-138 B.C.), and
probably drawn up 144 B.C.,
would seem to corroborate this
assertion. Pansetius, whose
pupil he is elsewhere called
(Suid. 'A-rroK\6S.~), was himself a
pupil of Diogenes' successor,
Antipater (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6),
and can hardly have been older
than Apollodorus.
Another grammarian be
longing to the School of
Diogenes is Zenodotus (Ding.
vii. 30), supposing him to be
identical with the Alexandrian
Zenodotus (Suid. Znv4S). A

third is perhaps the celebrated
Aristarchus, whom Scymnus
calls a fellow-disciple of Apol
lodorus. A fourth, Crates of
Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv.
5, 16, p. 676, the instructor of
Panaetius, by Suid. a Stoic
philosopher, who in Varro, Lat.
ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus
against Aristarchus.
Antipater's pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (Diog. vii. 121);
Sosigenes (A lex. Aphr. De Mixt.
142) ; C. Blossius of Cumse
(Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8, 17 and 20;
Vol. Max. iv. 7, 1 ; Cic. Lael.
11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned
by Diog. vii. 39, appears to
belong to the time between
Chrysippus and Panastius.
Between Zeno of Tarsus and
Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names
a certain Apollodorus, the au
thor, probably, of the fragments
in Stob. Eel. i. 408 and 520.
Possibly, however, he may be
identical with the Apollodorus
mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 34,
93, and consequently a cotemporary of Zeno. In Diog.
vii. 39, he is called 'ATrn\x6Sapos
6 "Ecf>i\\os, instead of which
Cobet reads 'Airo\\6Bupos ko\
HWos. Apollodorus the Athe
nian, mentioned by Diog. vii.
181, is without doubt the Epi
curean, known to us also from
Diog. x. 2 and 25. Krischo,
Forsch. 26, thinks even that
the passages in Cicero refer to
him.
2
Chap.
62
Chap.
III.
THE STOICS.
The aSe f Diogenes of
Ptolemais (Diog. vii. 41), of
(Enopides mentioned by Stob.
Eel. i. 68 ; Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
together with Diogenes and
Cleanthes, and of Nicostratus,
mentioned by Philodemus irep!
8e<3v Siayayrjs Tab. I. 2 and per
haps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 8oh. is quite unknown.
Nicostratus, however, must have,
written before the middle of
the first century before Christ.
He is probably distinct from
the Nicostratus who wrote on
the Aristotelian categories in
an adverse spirit, and is re
ferred to by Simpl. in Categ.

Schol. in Arist. 40, a; 24, b,
16 ; 41, b, 27 ; 47, b, 23 ; 49, b,
43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b,
12 ; 83, a, 37 ; 84, a, 28 ; 86, b,
20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11 ;
89, a, 1 ; 91, a, 25; b, 21.
For this Nicostratus used the
treatise of a certain Roman
Lucius, whereas Roman trea
tises on the Categories can
hardly have existed before the
time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of Cicero. However, both
Lucius and Nicostratus appear
to have been Stoics.
AUTHORITIES FOR STOIC PHILOSOPHY.
53
CHAPTER IV.
AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY : ITS
PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.
To give a faithful exposition of the Stoic philosophy
is a work of more than ordinary difficulty, owing to
Chap.
IV'
the circumstance that all the writings of the earlier

Stoics, with the exception of a few fragments, have
been lost.1 Those Stoics whose complete works are
still extantSeneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius,
Heraclitus, Cornutuslived under the Roman Empire, and therefore belong to a time in which all
A. Aujtothe*
Stoiephil(ijj^.,-et0
of authorittet'
Schools alike exposed to foreign influences had sur

rendered or lost sight of many of their original
peculiarities, and had substituted new elements in
their place. The same remark applies to writers like
Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus, and
the commentators on Aristotle, who may be con
sidered as authorities at second hand for the teaching
of the Stoics ; but it is more than doubtful whether
everything which they mention as Stoic teaching
really belongs to the older members of that School.
1 Already Simpl. in Cat. xai f] SiticuricaKta Kal to ir\ft<rra
Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says : rwv avyypatip.&Tav tiriAe'Aoiirei/.
irapd rots 'Stw'Ckois, 2p <p' tj/xwi/
54
Chap.
IY"
THE STOICS.
That teaching can, however, be ascertained with
sufficient certainty on most of the more important
points, partly by comparing accounts when they vary,
partly by looking to definite statements on which
authorities agree for the teaching and points of dif
ference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno,
Cleanthes, Chrysippus ; partly too by consulting such
fragments of their writings as are still extant^. Yet,
when the chief points have been settled in this way,
many difficulties still remain. In the first place, it
will be found that only isolated points of their teach
ing, with at most a few arguments on which to base
them, are recorded ; but the real connection of their
tenets, and the motives which gave rise to them, can
only be known by conjecture. Had the writings of
Zeno and Chrysippus come down to us in their en
tirety, we should have had a much surer foundation
on which to build, and far less would have been left
to conjecture. An opportunity, too, would then have
been afforded of tracing the inward growth of the
Stoic teaching, and of deciding how much of that
teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysip
pus. That this work of discrimination can now only be
done very imperfectly, is the second difficulty, and it
arises from the nature of the authorities. It may be
ascertained without difficulty what the teaching of
the Stoics was since the time of Chrysippus, but
only on a few points are the differences between
Chrysippus and his predecessors known. For the
most part, the authorities do not hesitate to attribute
to the founder of the School all that was known to
AUTHORITIES FOR STOIC PHILOSOPHY.

them as belonging to its later members, just as Chap.
everything Pythagorean was directly attributed to
Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato. Still,
there can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was
very considerably expanded by Chrysippus, and
altered in many ways. But how considerable the
alterations were, and in what they consisted, are
questions upon which there is little direct evidence.
The path is thus marked out, which must be fol- (2) Uie to
lowed in giving an exposition of the Stoic philosophy. ^Mwrt
If full information were forthcoming respecting the tlet'
rise of the Stoic system and the form it assumed
under each one of its representatives, it would be
most natural to begin by reviewing the motives which
led Zeno to his peculiar teaching, and by describing
the system as it grew up. Next it would be right
to trace step by step the changes and expansions
which it received at the hands of each succeeding
teacher. In default of the necessary information
for such a treatment of the subject, it will be better
to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will
have to be treated as a whole, in which the contribu
tions of individuals can no longer be distinguished.
It will have to be set forth in the form which it as
sumed after the time of Chrysippus. The share of
individuals in constructing the system, and their
deviations from the general type, cannot be considered,
except in cases where they are placed beyond doubt
by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded
historical surmises. Stoicism will have to be de-
THE STOICS.
Chap.
IV.
scribed in the first place as it is traditionally known,

without having its principles explained or resolved
into their component factors ; without even consider
ing how they grew out of previous systems. Not till
this has been done will it be possible to analyse the
purport and structure of the system, so as to fathom
its leading motives, to understand the connection of
its various parts, and thus to ascertain its true posi
tion in history.
Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem
B.Problem
proposed of philosophy presented itself to the Stoics, three
to the Stoic
philoso
points deserve to be specially noticed. 1 . In the first
phy.
place, philosophy was determined practically by an
end in view. 2. The character of this end was
decided by the idea of conformity with reason ; and
8, this view was substantiated by intellectual proof.
(1) Its
The real business of all philosophy, according to
practical the Stoics, is the moral conduct of man. Philosophy
oliaraoter.
is the exercise of an art, and more particularly of the
highest artvirtue : 1 it is therefore the learning of
virtue. Now virtue can only be learnt by exercise,
and therefore philosophy is at the same time virtue,*
1 Pint. Plac. Pro. 2 : ol piv
oZv 2TOfVwoi itpaffav, t)}v fxiv
oo<plav tlvai Bciuv Tf Kal aj/6oujrtvwv toiffTfiptiv r^v 5e (pi\offotpiav &(TKrt<rLV re\vT]s eTriTrjSei'ou
itrtri^tiov 5' fTvcu fxiav teal apcuTaTW
tV ape-rfiv ' aptrhs 5e Tas yevtKoiraTas Tpels, QuaiKty, liQucty,
\uynd>v, k.t.K. See also Diog.
vii. 92.
1 In Seneca, Ep. 89, 4, wis
dom is the highest good for the
human mind, and philosophy
is a striving after wisdom :

wisdom is denned to be the
knowledge of things human
and divine ; philosophy to be
studvum virtutis, or studiitm
oorrigendce mentis. This striving
after virtue cannot be distin
guished from virtue itself r
Philosophia studium virtutis
est, sed per ipsam virtutem.
Seneca further observes (Fr. 17,
in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15) : Philo
sophia nihil aliud est quam
PROBLEM PROPOSED TO STOICS.

and the several parts of philosophy are so many dis
tinct virtues.1 Morality is the central point towards
which all other enquiries converge. Even natural
science, although lauded as the inmost shrine of
philosophy, is, according to Chrysippus, only neces
sary for the philosopher to enable him to distinguish
between things good and evil, between what should
be done and what should be left undone.2 So far
from approving pure speculation, which Plato and
Aristotle had commended as the height of human
happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live
for speculation is equivalent to living only for plea
sure.3 With this view of Chrysippus most of the
statements of the Stoics as to the relation of various
branches of philosophy to each other agree, although
there is a certain amount of vagueness about them,
owing to reasons which will shortly be mentioned ;
and on no other hypothesis can the internal structure
and foundation of their system be satisfactorily exrecta vivendi ratio, vel honeste
Vivendi scientia, vel ars rectse
vitaa agendas. Non errabimus,
si dixerimus philosophiam esse
legem bene honesteque vivendi,
et qui dixerit illam regulam
vitas, suum illi [nomen] red
didit. Pint, see previous note.
1 See Diog. vii. 46 : aMiv Si
tî/ SiaKeKTtKTjv avayKatav tlvai
icai aper^y 4v T5ei irtptexovo~av
aperctj, k.t.A.
1 Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9,
6 : 5c* yhp tovtois [sc. nois <pu<riKots] ffuv&tyai rby irepl aya9wv /col
kokup \6yovt ovk otjarjs &\\7}S apXVS ahrwv afielvovos auS' avtupopas,
ouS' aAAou Ttvbs ivtxey rrjs (putnKrjs
6ewplas irapoATjirT^s ot/fftjs 4) irpbs

t^v irepl ayaBwv % kokwv 5i<3 Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep.
3, 2 : oVcu 54 wco\ap.f3dvov(ri <pi\otrdcpOLS iirifidKhetv pAhiffra rbv
oxo\ao-TiKbv fitov air' ap\rjs, ourol
fioi hoKovfft dtafjLapTa.veii' {nropoovvres Staywyrjs twos evtictp Sciv touto
TTOititr % aAAou Tivbs rovroj wapaTrkT}<rlov, Kal top oAov [Slov ourw
Trees SteXKUcroi touto 5' corty,
o.v traipws Gewprjdjj, TjSews. Aiayuiyh
had, it is true, been treated by
Aristotle, whose school is here
referred to, as an end in itself ;
but Aristotle had carefully dis
tinguished SitryarvJ) from qSonJ.
THE STOICS.
plained. It is enough to remark here, as has been
done before,1 that the most important and most dis
tinctive points established by the Stoic School belong
to the sphere of ethics. In logic and natural science
the School displays far less independence, for the
most part following older teachers ; and it is ex
pressly noted, as a deviation from the ordinary
teaching of the .School, that Herillus, the pupil of
Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good,
thus making it the chief end in philosophy.2
This view of the problem of philosophy is more
precisely denned by the Stoic doctrine of virtue.
Philosophy should lead to right action and to virtue.
But right action is, according to the Stoics, only
rational action, and rational action is action which
is in harmony with human and inanimate nature.
Virtue consists therefore in bringing man's actions
into harmony with the laws of the universe, and
with the general order of the world. This is only
possible when man knows that order and those laws ;
and thus the Stoics are brought back to the prin p. 19.
tionem relinquerent. v. 25, 73 :
2 Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Ssepe ab Aristotele, a TheoHerillum, qui in cognitione et phrasto mirabiliter est laudata
scientia summum bonum ponit : per se ipsa rerum scientia.
qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, Hoc uno captus Herillus scien
vides quantum ab eo dissen- tiam summum bonum esse deserit, et quam non multum a fendit, nec rem ullam aliam
Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43 : Heril per se expetendam. Dioij. vii.
lus autem ad scientiam omnia 165 :"HpiAAos . . . rtlos tlrre r^y
revocans unum quoddam bonum i-Kiariia-nr. Ibid. vii. 37. With
vidit. iv. 14, 36: In deter less accuracy, it is asserted by
mining the highest good, the Iambi, in Stob. Eel. i. 918, that
Htoics act as one-sidedly, as if we are raised to the society
ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, of the gods, Kuril "HpiAAof, eiri
cognitionem amplexarentur, ac

ciples of Socrates, that virtue may be learnt; that
knowledge ia indispensable for virtue, or rather that
virtue is identical with right knowledge. They
define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice
as ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify
virtue with strength nf Wirl-J it is only because they
consider strength of will to be inseparable from
knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived
without the "other. Hence the practical study of
philosophy conducts with them to the intellectual;
philosophy is not only virtue, but without philosophy
no virtue is possible.1 Granting that the attain
ment of virtue, and the happiness of a moral life, are
the chief ends which the Stoics propose to them
selves, still the possession of a comprehensive
scientific knowledge is indispensable, as the only
means thereto.
These remarks prove the need for the Stoic3 of
that kind of scientific knowledge which has to do
with life, the morals and the actions of mankind, in
'
'
short, of Ethics. Whether further scientific knowledge is necessary, was a question on which the
earliest adherents of the Stoic teaching expressed
different opinions. Zeno's pupil, Aristo of Chios, held
.
.
.
that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue,2
and that the sole use of language is to purify
1 Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec
philosophia sine virtute est nec
sine philosophia virtus. Ibid,
63, 8 : We all lie in the slumber
of error : sola autem nos philosophia excitabit . . .. illi te
totum dedica.
2 Lact. Inst. vii. 7 : Ad
virtutem capessendam nasoi
homines, Ariston disseruit. See
Stob. Eel. 4, 111.
69
Chap.
'
(?) Posireardslogio
m*
natural
science.
(") -4"'"
to i vtetci.
THE STOICS.
the soul.1 This purifying process, however, is
neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in
natural science. ''Logic, as doing more harm than
good, he compared to a spider's web, which is as
useless as it is curious ; 2 or else to the mud on a
road.3 Those who studied it he likened to people
eating lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for
the sake of a little bit of meat enveloped in much
shell.4 Convinced, too, that the wise man is free
from every deceptive infatuation,5 and that doubt,
for the purpose of refuting which logic has been
invented, can be more easily overcome by a healthy
tone of mind6 than by argument, he felt no par
ticular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered
that excessive subtlety transforms the healthy action
of philosophy into an unhealthy one.7 Just as little
was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called encyclical
knowledge : those who devote themselves to this
knowledge instead of to philosophy he compared to
the suitors of Penelope, who won the maids but not
the mistress.8 Natural science would probably have
received a more favourable treatment at the hands of
Aristo, had he not shared the opinion of Socrates,
that it is a branch of knowledge which transcends
1 Pint. De Audiendo, c. 8, a&fyov a56(curTov chat.
p. 42: oBt6 -yap f3a\avdov, tyriaiv
6 See Dioff. vii. 163.
6 'Ap'httwv, otfre \6yov p.)) Kadal7 Aristo (in the 'OfioitifiaTo)
in Stob. Floril. 82, 16 : 6 ixxiStob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. fiopo* i\o<rxep'<rTtpos pXv \rj<p6els
vii. 161.
Stob. Floril. 82, 11.
Jbid. 7.
5 Diog. vii. 162 : niXurra 5e
' Stob. 1. c. 4, 110.

the capacity of the human mind ; 1 and having once
embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce
all physical enquiries useless. His attitude towards
other sciences has therefore been generally expressed
by saying that he excluded from philosophy both
logic and natural science, on the ground that both
are useless; the former being irrelevant, and the
latter transcending our powers.2 Even ethics was
limited by Aristo to moat fundamental notionsto
enquiries into good and evil, virtue and vice, wisdom
and folly. The special application of these notions
to the moral problems suggested by particular rela
tions in life, he declared to be useless and futile ;
proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children,
but not becoming for philosophers ; 3 wherever there
1 See following rote and Cic.
Sext. Math. vii. 13 : ko)
Acad. ii. 39, 123 : Aristo Chius, 'hpirrrwv 8e 6 X?os oil p.6vov, &s
qui nihil istorum (so. phy- (pa<rt, irapyre'iro rf)v re tpvo~iKriv
Kal Koytni)v dewp'iav 8m rb avieipesicorum) sciri putat posse.
' Dwg. vii. 160 : r6v ae <pv(Tt- Xes Kal irpbs kclkov rots tpiKoaoxbv rSnov Kal rbv \oytxbv avtfpei, tpovffiv virdpxeiv, aXXa Kal rov
\eywv rhv fiev elvai Inrep T]nas, riBiKOv r6irov rivas aviJ.irepieypa'i/e
rbv 8' ov5iv irpbs ypas, flavor 8c KaQdirep r6v re irapatvenicbv Kal
rbv Wiicbv elvai Tpbs was. Stob. rbv tiiro8eriKbv rAirov rovrous yap
Floril. 80, 7 : 'Aptarav eVprj ruiv els rirBas av nal iraiSayuyovs
fyrovfievay napa rots <pt\o<r6'(pois nimeiv (almost a literal
ra fiev elvai Tpbs fiftas, ra Se /xriSev translation is given of these
irpbs Tinas, ra 8' vrip r)p.Hs. irpbs words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13^
il/ias [lev ra riBtica, jut) Tpbs ijfias apKt(r8at 8 irpbs rb fuucapUos
be to StaAeKTiKci ' uri yap o~vn/3d\- fituvai rbv omeiovvra p.ev irpbs
\to-6ai irpbs 4irav6p9u<riv jSiou* aperrjv \6yov, airaWorpiovvra Se
inrep ripas be to rpviTlftA ' aovvara KaKtas, Kararpexovra be ruv
yap iyvuaQai Kal obbe Tapexeiv jutov robruv, TepX a of iroWol
Xptlav. Mimic. Pel. Ootav. 13, Tr07)9evtcs KaKo5aipovou<riv. Se^
and Lactant. Ins. iii. 20, at neca, Ep. 94, 1 : Earn partem
tribute this utterance to So philosophise, qua? dat propria
crates. According to Cic. De cuique persona) pracepta .
Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo ex- quidam solam receperunt ....
pressed doubts about the exist- sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario
ence of a God.
banc partem levem existimat
61
Chap.
IV.
62
THE STOICS.
Chap.
IV.
is a proper knowledge and a right disposition, such

particular applications will come of themselves with
out teaching; but when these are wanting, all
exhortations are useless.1
These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo,
(i) Views
of Zeno
and
as points in which he differed from the rest of
and Cleanthet.
his School ; and, to judge from his controversial tone,
the opposite views were those almost universally
entertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in
fact, appears to have been directed not only against
assailants from without such as the Peripatetics
and Platonistsbut far more against those members
of the Stoic School, who attached greater importance
than he did to special ethical investigations, and to
logical and physical enquiries. Among their number
must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for Zeno set
the example to his School of dividing philosophy
into logic, ethics, and natural science ; 2 witness
the titles of his logical and physical treatises3
et quaj non descendat in pectus
usque ; at illam habentem
pnecepta [? ad vitam beatam]
plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta philosophise constitutionemque summi boni, quam
qui bene intellexit ao didicit,
quid in quaque re faciendum
sit, sibi ipse prrecepit. This is
then further expanded follow
ing Aristo.
1 Seneca, 12, asks for
whom should such exhortations
be necessaryfor him who has
right views of good and evil, or
for him who has them not ?
Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus contraria
monitionibus tuis fama possedit ; qui habet exactum judi

cium de fugiendis petendisque,
scit, quid sibi faciendum sit,
etiatn te tacente ; tota ergo
pars ista philosophise subrnoveri potest. In 17, he con
tinues : A madman must be
cured, and not exhorted ; nor
is there any difference between
general madness and the mad
ness which is treated medi
cally.
2 Diog. vii. 39.
* Logical treatises, those
wtp\ \6yovand if there were a
rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the t'x!

and also the statements in reference to theoretical
knowledge and natural science which are expressly
attributed to him. Moreover, Zeno himself re
commended to others, and himself pursued, logical
enquiries.1 Indeed, his whole mental habit,2 with
its keen appreciation of even the subtleties of
the Megarians, bears testimony to an intellectual
type of thought which is far removed from that of
Aristo.3 It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that curt
and unadorned logical style, which is found in its
greatest perfection in Chrysippus.4 Logical and
scientific treatises are also known to have been
written by Cleanthes,5 who, in his division of phiphysical treatises, those irepl
S\ou and irtpl ovirlas, Diog. 4,
39.
1 Plut. Sto. Eep. 8, 2 : thve
5e <ro<plrTfiaTa teal r)\v SiaXeiCTifo^v,
us tovto iroi?i> $vvafi4vilv, 4k4\V
TrapaKapfidpttv robs fiadtirds.
That he occasionally not only
solved bat propounded sophisms
is proved by the fallacy quoted
Ibid. i. Conf. Diog. vii. 25
2 See above p. 36.
3 According to Diog. 32, he
declared at the beginning of
his Polity the tyicvK\tos naiSfla
to be useless a testimony
worth very little ; for it is a
moot point, in what sense Zeno
made this statement. Perhaps
he was only anxious to exclude
those studies from the narrower
sphere of philosophy (as Sen.
Ep. 88). Perhaps his Polity
was nearer Cynicism than any
other of his writings.
4 Proofs will be given later.
s The Catalogue in Diog.
174, irep! \6yov 3, B {Mohnike
Cleanth. 102, believes this work

was a treatise on life according
to reason. The title is against
this view, and it is also im
probable, inasmuch as treatises
by Sphterus and Chrysippus
bearing the same title, are ex
clusively logical), mentions
logical treatises 7repl \6yov,
irepl 4iri<TT'/]/A'r]S,'irep\ idtufyirepl tuv
airdpuv, irepl 5ia\e/CTiK?)s, irepl
KaTnyopn/idrwi'. To these may
be added, from Athen. 467, d ;
471, b, the rhetorical treatises
7repl rp6irwv and irepl p:eTa\î^cus.
Of greater importance were
the physical and theological
treatises : 7repl rrjs tov TA\vuvos
<pvaio\oytas (2, B) ; tuv 'HpoKKiWov e|7J7^tri$ (4, B) ; nphs
Avp.QKptTov, irepl Oeaiv, irepl p.avrt(ffjj (Cio. Divin. i. 3, 6); n(p\
yiydvTuv (in Plut. De Flum.
5, 3) ; and the uvhxa (Atlien.
xiii. 572, e), which is probably
identical with the apxaio\oyia
of Diogenes.
68
Chap.
IV.
64
Chap,
IV'
THE STOICS.
losophy, allotted separate parts to logic, to rhetoric,
and to natural science,1 and the name of Cleanthes is
one of frequent occurrence, not only in the natural
science, but more particularly in the theology of
the Stoics. Still more exhaustive enquiries into
logic and natural science appear to have been set on
foot by Sphaerus.8 These prove that the energies of
the Stoic School must have been directed to these
subjects before the time of Chrysippus, although
these branches of science were no doubt subservient
to ethics, whilst ethics held the most important and
highest place in their philosophy. At a later time,
when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the
Stoics in every direction, and especial attention had
been devoted to logic, the necessity for these sciences
came to be generally recognised. More especially
was this the case with regard to natural science, in
cluding ' theology.' All ethical enquiries must start,
according to Chrysippus, with considering the uni
versal order and arrangement of the world. Only by
a study of nature, and a knowledge of what God is;
can anything really satisfactory be stated touching
good and evil, and all that is therewith connected.3
1 D'wg. 41.
2 Ding. vii. 178, mentions (1)
logical and rhetorical writings :
irepl twv 'EptTpin>i> <pi\o<r6<pav,
irepl Siioiwv, irepl '6pav, irepl eewr,
irepl twv avriKeyonevwv (3, B),
irepl \6yov, ri%mt Sia\eKTi/c^ (2,
B), irepl KarriyoprifidTcav, irepl
itpMpif&okiuv ; (2) treatises on
science : irepl x6au.ov (2, B), irepl
GTOixtlwv, wepl OTrepfxaros, irepl
Tu%ris, irepl ikaxlffrwv, irpos ras
&T6ftovs no! ra el$o>\a, xepl

alo-0vTriplav, irepl 'HpaK\tfrou (5,
B), 7repl pairurijs. That Sphserus'
definitions were particularly
valued, has been already seen,
44, 2.
3 Chrys. in the 3rd B, irepl
8eZv (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4) ;
ou ydp lariv evpciv ttjs SiKaioavyris
aWijv apxh" out' &K\r\v ytvimv fj
tV 4k tov Atbs Kat t)]v efc rrfs
K0ivr\s <puo~ttes ' eVreOfle*' yap fie*

Less obvious is the connection between logic and
the ultimate aim of all philosophical enquiries. Logic
is compared by the Stoics to the shell of an egg, or
to the wall of a city or garden ; 1 and is considered to
be of importance, because it contributes towards the
discovery of truth and the avoiding of error.2 The
value of logic in their eyes is, therefore, essentially
due to . its scientific method ; its proper aim is the
art of technical reasoning; and thus, following
Aristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to
the doctrine of the syllogism.3 That the value
attached to logic must have been considerable is
proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus
kclv rb rotovrov rrjy p-pxty *X*lv>
ti juc'AAojueV n iptiv ntpl ayadwv
ital kokoiv. The same writer, in
ipixrtKaX Qtfftis (Ibid. 5) : ov ydp
io~nv ttAAws ov8' olnetdrepov &reAfleTv ivi rbv rwv ayaOwv Kal Kantov
\6yov ou5* rl ray aperas oub" e'jrl
ivbatpoviav, aAA' ^ avb rrjs Koivrjs
$v<rca>s Kal anb tt)s rov ndtTfiov
lioinfotus. Further details
above p. 47, 2.
1 Sext. Math. vii. 17 ; Diog.
40.
1 The chief divisions of the
logic of the Stoics {Diog. 42,
4t>) are considered important
for special purposes. The doc
trine irepl Kav6vwv Kal KpiTrjpltvv
is of use, helping us to truth,
by making us examine our
notions ; iputbv, because it leads
to the knowledge of things by
means of conceptions ; SiaAeictik)j (which includes the whole
of formal logic), because it pro
duces awpoTrruxria ( = 4irio-ri\fX7\
rvv ir6re Set o-vyKarariBevdai
nil
avtwadrris ( = iaxvpbs
\6yos irpbs rb eticbs, fijare fify

4i/5iS6va.LavTt$'),ai>\yia( = icrxbs
iv \6y([>, Strre /jl^j airdyfcrBai far'
avrov eis rb avrtKetfievov), afxatokJttjv ( = c|is ava<pepouo-a -ray
t/>arra<n'as 4trl rbv bpBbv \6yov).
Its value is therefore chiefly ne
gative, as a preservative from
error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9 :
Proprietates verborum exigit et
structuram et argumentationes,
ne pro vero falsa subrepant.
Sext. Math. vii. 23 : iixvpmriKbv
5 tlvai rr)s Hiavnias rbv Sta\Krmbv r&rtov ; Pyrrh. ii. 247 : rl
r^v r^xvyv TV SioAeffTtK^v <pa<riv
uipfjLTiKfvai ai SmAeKTt/col (the
Stoics), olx an\us imkp rov
yvtbvoX rt k rivos avvayzrai,
a\Ka vporiyoufj.fvws vivhp rov 5i'
curob'eiKrtKwj/ \6ywv ra &A.TJ07) Kal
Ta l/ef5?) tcplveiv enlo~rao~Bat.
3 This may be sfien in Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 134-203, 229; Math,
viii. 300 ; as well as from the
catalogue of the writings of
Chrysippus in Diogenes.
66
Chap.
IV.
C. Dirisions of
philotophy.
THE STOICS,
devoted to the subject ; 1 hence, the Stoics would
never allow, in dispute with the Peripatetics, that
logic was only an instrument, and not a part of phi
losophy. To later writers that stiff logical mode of
description, regardless of all beauty of language,
appeared to be a peculiarity of the Stoic school,2 and
hence that School was characteristically known as
the School of the Reasoners.3 Frequent instances
will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for
dry argument and formal logic ; 4 in Chrysippus this
fondness degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of
taste.5
The foregoing remarks have already established
the three main divisions of philosophy6 which were
universally acknowledged by the Stoics7Logic,
1 The only part which is Aia\6<TiKol is their ordinary
censured by Chrysippus (in name. It is also found in
Pint. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the Pint. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008.
sceptical logic, which leaves Cio. Top. 2, 6 ; Fin. iv. 3, 6.
contradictions unsolved : rots
4 After the example of the
fifv yap inoxty ayovai irepl irdvruv Megarians, the Stoics were in
iirifidWei, tpljirl, tovto iroieti/, .vol the habit of putting their
UW(py6v iari ffpbs h fiovAovrai ' arguments in the form of
rots 5' itriffTTiixrjv ivtpya&iiii ois, questions. Hence the terms
KcctT $)p &fio\oyouu4vws &iu(r6fjLe6a \6yov iparav (Diog. vii. 186),
ra ipavr'ia (TTOtxetouv.
interrogatio (Sen. Ep. 82, 9 ;
2 Cic. Parad. Procem. : Cato 85. 1 ; 87, \Y),interrogatiuncitla
autem perfectus mea sententia (Cic), which are employed
Stoicus ... in ea est haeresi, even when the arguments
qua; nullum sequitur florem were not in this form.
orationis neque dilatat argu5 See p. 48, 1.
jnentum : minutis interroga* Called fitpv, according to
tiunculis, quasi punctis, quod Diog. 39 also Tiiiroi, efSi), yivi\.
proposuit efflcit. Cio. Fin. iv. 3,
' Diog. 39 : Tpifiep?) <pa<rtv
7 : Pungunt quasi aculeis inter- tivai rbv koto tpiKoffotplav \6yov '
rogatiunculis angustis, quibus elvat yap avrov rb tiiv ri tpwiicbv,
etiam qui assentiuntur nihil rb 5 ijQiKbv, rb 5 \oyin6v. o0t
commutantur animo. See also 5e irpuros SietAe Z-fjvuv 6 Kiticus
Diog. vii. 18, 20.
iv t$ irepl \6yov Kal Xpvffnrtros iv
8 In Sextus Empiricus, t o' vtpl \6yov Kal iv rp o'
DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.
67
Natural Science, and Ethics. As regards the relative Chap.

worth and sequence of these divisions, very opposite
views may be deduced from the principles of the 0) T^ree.
, .
.
fold divibtoic teaching, lhere can be no doubt, and, indeed, 'gum,
all are agreed in allowing, that logic was subservient
to the other two branches of science, being only an
outpost of the system. If therefore in arranging
the parts the advance is from the less important to
the more important, logic will hold the first place.
It will occupy the last place if the opposite mode of
procedure is followed. But the relation existing
between ethics and natural science is an open ques
tion. On the one hand, ethics appears to be the
higher science, the crowning point of the system,
the subject towards which the whole philosophical
activity of the School was directerl ; for philosophy
is practical knowledge, and its object is to lead to
virtue and happiness.
On the other hand, virtue
and the destiny of man consist in conformity to the !
laws of nature, which it is the province of science to
investigate. Therefore, natural science has the
higher object. It lays down the universal laws
which in ethics are applied to man. To it, therefore,
in the graduated scale of sciences, belongs the higher
rank.
In attempting to harmonise these opposite consi
derations, the Stoics did not always succeed. At one
T&v <pv<rticu>i>, koI 'Airo\\65wpos i Ep. 89, 9 ; 14. The six divi"E<piA\os iv t!f Trpirif tuiv tis to, sions enumerated by Cleanthes
Siyfiara tloaywyav, xal EKSpofios (Dior/. 41)Dialectic, Rhetoric,
iv tj; iidiKfi Toixe6<rei, ol t to- Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theo7*i>iis i Ba$v\<ivios, xal UoatiSd- logy (Dwg. 41) may be easily
was. Sext. Math. vii. 16. Sen. reduced to three.
THE STOICS.
68
time natural science is preferred to ethics, at another

time ethics to natural science,1 in the enumeration
(2) Rela of the several branches of philosophy. In the com
tive im
portance parisons by means of which their relations to each
of each
other were explained,2 ethics appears at one time,
part.
at another time natural science, to be the aim and
soul of the whole system. Different views were even
entertained in reference to the order to be followed
1 According to Diog. 40, the logical part may form the con
first place was assigned to clusion, only refers to the order
Logic, the second to Science, in which they ought to be
the third to Ethics, by Zeno, taught.
Chrysippus, Archedemus, Eu In Diog, 89; Seat. Math,
demus, and others. The same vii. 17; Philo. Mut. Nom.p.1055,
order, but inverted, is found in E. Hosch. (589 M) ; De Agricul.
Dirgenes of Ptolemais, and in 189, D (802), philosophy is
Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. The latter, compared to an orchard, Logic
however, observes (Nat. Qu. represents the fence, Science
Prol. 1) that the difference be the trees, Ethics the fruit ;
tween that part of philosophy so that Ethics are the end and
which treats about God, and object of the whole. Philo
that which treats about man, sophy is also compared to a
is as great as the difference fortified town, in which the
between philosophy and other walls are represented by Logic,
departments, or even asbetween but in which the position of the
God and man. On the other other two is not clear ; to an
hand, Apollodorus places Ethics egg, Logic being the shell, and,
in the middle, as also Cleanthes according to Sextus, Science
does, and likewise Pansetius and being the white and Ethics the
Posidonius, if it is certain that yolk, but the reverse according
they began with science. This to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with
appears, however, only to have this comparison, Posidonius pre
reference to their order in dis ferred to compare philosophy
cussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, to a living creature, in which
probably on the authority of Logic constitutes the bones
Posidonius). A few (Diog. 40) and muscles, Science the flesh
asserted that the parts could and blood, and Ethics the soul.
be so little separated, that they But Diogenes has another ver
mi^st be always treated to- sion of this simile, according
gerher. The statement of to which Science represents the
Chrysippus (in Vint. Sto. Rep. soul ; and Hitter iii. 432, con
9, 1), that Logic must come siders the version of Diogenes
first, and be followed by Ethics to be the older of the two.
and Science, sq that the theo
Chap.
IV.
DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.
in teaching these sciences.1 In describing the Stoic
system, preference will be here given to that arrangement which begins with logic tvnd goes on to natural
science, ending with ethics ; not only because that
arrangement has among its supporters the oldest and
most distinguished adherents of the Stoic School,
but also because in this way the internal relation
of the three parts to each other can be most clearly
brought out. Allowing that, in many essential
respects, natural science is modified by ethical
considerations; still, in the development of the
system, the chief results of science are used as
principles on which ethical doctrines are founded ;
and logic, although introduced later than the other
two branches of study, is the instrument by means
of which they are put into scientific shape. If the
opportunity were afforded of tracing the rise of the
Stoic teaching in the mind of its founder, it would
probably be possible to show how the physical and
logical parts of the system gradually gathered around
the original kernel of ethics. But knowing Stoicism
only as we do from the form which it attained after
the time of Chrysippus, it will be enough, in analys
ing that form, to proceed from without to within, and
to advance from logic through natural science to
ethics. When this has been done it will be time to
go back over the same ground, and to explain how
from the ethical tone of Stoicism its peculiar specu
lative tenets may be deduced.
1 See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13.
CO
Chap.
iy"
70
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER V.
LOGIC OF THE STOICS.
Chap.
Under the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the

term after the time of Chrysippus, a number of
A. General intellectual enquiries are included which would not
remarks.
(1) Field uow ke considered to belong to philosophy at all.
oflujic.
One common element, however, characterised them
allthey all referred to the formal conditions of
thought and expression. Logic was primarily divided
into two parts, sharply marked off from each other,
roughly described as the art of speaking continuously
and the art of conversing. The former is known as
Rhetoric, the latter as Dialectic.1 To these two was
added, as a third part, the doctrine of a standard of
1 Diog. 41: rb Si Ao7iko<'
fitpos <pao\v evioi tls Suo $taipi<rOai
iTri<rri)nas,fls(ir]TopiKiiyKalSia\fKtik^v . . iiiv t j)TopiitV iirio-riifiTiv oiaav tov eS Kiyeiv ircpX twv
tv Sieffiip \6-yav koXt^v 8io\e/cTiV rod opBUs UtaXtyeuBai ictpl r&r
iv ^>i)tt)(7i ko! airoKplaei \6ya>v.
Sen. Ep. 89, 17 : Superest ut rationalem partem philosophise
dividam : omnis oratio aut continuaestautinterrespondentem
et interrogantem discissa ; hanc
8iaAfKTiK))>'| illam priToputty pla-
cuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17;

Orat. 32, 113. Quintil. Inst. ii.
20,7. According to these passages, Rhetoric was by Zeno
compared to the palm of the
hand, and Dialectic to the fist:
quod latins loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. The Stoics agree
with Aristotle in calling rhetoric ivriaTpofos t;7 StakeKTucrj
{Sop. in Hermog. v. 15, Walz ).
See Prantl, Gesch. der Log. i.
413.
STOIC LOGIC.
truth, or the theory of knowledge ; and, according
to some authorities,1 a fourth part, consisting of
enquiries into the formation of conceptions. By
others, these enquiries were regarded as the third
main division, the theory of knowledge being in
cluded under dialectic.-'1 By rhetoric, however, little
1 DU>g. 41 : Some divide
logic into rhetoric and dialectic :
rives 81 Kal els rb SpiKbv eJbos, rb
wepl navSvwv Kal Kpiryptwv evioi
8i rb dpixbv irepiatpovai. (We
have no reason to read as Men
age does irepiSioipoCffi, or to con
jecture, as Meibom and Nicolai,
De Log.Chrys., Lib. 23,do,irapaSiaipoOtrt.) According to this
passage, bptxbv must be iden
tical with the doctrine of a
criterium. In a subsequent
passage, however, the two are
distinguished ; the doctrine of
a criterium is said to be useful
for the discovery of truth : ko!
rb dpwbv Be bfioiws vpbs evlyvutrtv
T7js a\i)6eias 5m yap ray eiivotwv
ra trpdy/xara Kapfidverai. We
may therefore suppose that in
the passage first quoted the
words should be rb bpiKbv e'lbos
Kal rb rrepl Kav6vwv, k.t.A. In
this case, we may understand
by Sptxbv not only the theory of
definitiona theory to which
Aristotle devoted a separate
section at the end of his Ana
lytics (Anal. Post, ii.)but be
sides a theoretical disquisition
on the formation of definitions,
a collection of definitions of
various objects. Such collec
tions are found in the treatises
of Chrysippus (Dieg. 199, 189):
ntpl rwv opwv '. bpatv SiaKeKriKwv
ur . bpwv ruv Kara ytvos C'. bpwv
ruv Kara ras &\Kas Terras a'.
opwv rwv rov iurrtlou bpwv rwv

rov (fav\ov j8'. bpwv rwv avafj.eawv
$' ; besides the further treatises
trepl rwv ot/K 6p9ws rois bpois avrt\eyofievwv \ Tlidava els robs
Spovs jff. The treatise irtp! elSwv
Hal yevdv may also be included
here ; perhaps also that irepl rwv
KarT}yopi>pArwvirpbs M-r]rp6bwpov i'.
irpbs Tldo-vhov vepl Karrjyoprifidrwv
S', Diog. 191.
2 No description of their sys
tem can dispense with this fun
damental enquiry, which iiad
been already instituted by Zeno.
It appears, however, to have
been treated by several writers
as a branch of dialectic. Diog.iS
says that the branch of dialectic
which treats of aniJ.aiii6ii.eva may
be divided els re rbv vepl rwv tpavraaiwv rbnov Kal rwv 4k roinwv
vtpio-rapevwv \eKrwv. (SeeAzicoIai
p. 23.) Compare with this the
words of Diodes, in Diog. 49 :
af.effKei rois "ZrwiKois vepl ipavrao~ias Kal alo~04io~ews vpordrreiv
\6yov, KaB6rt rb Kpwfjptov $
aKrtdeia rwv vpayfxdrwv yivwffKerai, Kara yevos (pavrarrla Iffrl Kal
Kaddri b vepl o~vyKaraOeffews Kal
6 vepl KaraX-tityews Kal vo4\<rews
Abyos vpodywv rwv aXKwv ovk avev
tpavraaias o~vv\o-rarai. Accord
ing to this passage, the branch
of dialectic which treated of
tpavraala included the theory of
knowledge. Diog. 53, Peter
sen's conjecture is singular
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
else was meant than a collection of artificial rules, of
no philosophical value ; 1 and dialectic was in great
measure occupied with enquiries referring to precision
of expression. Dialectic is defined to be the science
or art of speaking well ; a and since speaking well
consists in saying what is becoming and true,3 dia
lectic is used to express the knowledge of what is
(Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25) that
the theory of knowledge may
have been understood by Chrysippus under the name rhetoric.
1 Our information on this
head is very small. In the
words : faropiit)) verba curat et
sensus et ordinem, a division of
rhetoric is implied by Seneca,
whioh differs in little, except in
the position of the chief paris,
from that of Aristotle. A fourth
part is added to the three others
by Diog. 43on Delivery
cleat S1 airrrjs t^v Siaipfotv efr t
r^y tilpefftv Kat eis T^jy (ppdffiy, /col
Diogenes also claims for the
Stoics the Aristotelian distinc
tion between three ways of
speakingtrvufSovXcvriicbs, 5ikoytKbs, tyKvptcuT'TiKdsand four
parts in a speech : wpoolpiov,
bvftyTio-ts, to irpbs tovs apTidiKovs,
M\oyos. Definitions of Sufonins
and irapaSeiy/io are given from
Zeno by the anonymous author
in Sj/engel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23;
447, 11. The same author {Ibid.
454, 4) says that, according to
Chrysippus, the eVfAoyoj must
be povoiupriit. The Stoic defin'tion of rhetoric has been already
given, p. 70, 1. Another
Tex**7?
n6fffiOV Hal elp-qfjLuuv
x6yov riîv is attributed to
Chrysippus by Plut. Sto. Rep.
28, 1. Cie. Fin. iv. 3, 7, ob

serves, in reference to the Stoic
rhetoric, and in particular to
that of Chrysippus, that such
was its nature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil
aliud legere debeat that it
dealt in nothing but words,
being withal scanty in expres
sions, and confined to subtleties.
This neglect of the truly rhe
torical element appears already
in the quotations from Plut.
Sto. Rep. 28, 2. We have not
the slightest reason to complain,
as Prantl does, p. 413, of the
purely rhetorical value of dia
lectic with the Stoics.
2 Seep.70,l,yl&a>.Aphr.Top.
3: ot /xiv anb ttjsStoos &pi6[ievot
t^jv Sta\enriKhv iiriffTîxriv tov tZ
\rynv Apifavrcu, rb 5i tZ Xiytiu
iv T$ oAi)0q wcu Tcpoa^Kovra \tytiv>
elvai TiBefxevoi, rouro 5e Xdiov
riyotifxevoi tov <pi\oo~6{pov, Kara
rrfs tAo>totijs <ptAotro(ptas <p4povtnv avrb Koi 5ia tovto /x6yos 6
<pt\6troQos kot' outous SiaAektik6s.
Aristotle had used the term
dialectic in another sense, but
with Plato it expressed the
mode of procedure peculiar to
a philosopher.
8 See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W. : o{
2tu!ko1 Si rb eS \4yay ?\eyoi/ t5
0X7)87) \eyttv.
STOIC LOGIC.
*8
true or false, or what is neither one nor the other,1 Chap.

correctness of expression being considered inseparable
'
from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts (2) Words
are, according to this view, the very same things ^^,<4
regarded under different aspects. The same idea
(\6yos), which is a thought as long as it resides
within the breast, is a word as soon as it comes
forth.* Accordingly, dialectic consists of two main
divisions, treating respectively of utterance and the
thing uttered, thoughts and words.3 Both divisions,
1 Diog. 42 : S6ev Kal ovrws
awTjjv [rîv SiaXeKTtKV] 6p'i(ovTai,
iriariifi-ny a\ii6v Kal tyevBav Kal
ouStTf'paic. (The same, p. 62,
quoted from Posidonius, and in
iiext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid.
AtaAejmKVj.) ovBerepuv being pro
bably used, because dialectic
deals not only with judgments,
but with conceptions and inter
rogations. Conf. Diog. 68.
2 This is the meaning of the
Stoic distinction between K6yos
ivbta&uos and npoQopiKbs, a distinctionsuhsequently employed
by Philo and the Fathers, and
really identical with that of
Aristotle (Anal. Post i. 10, 76 b,
24) : ou Ttpbs rbv
\6yov, aAAa
irpos thv iv rfi i/fuxp. On this dis
tinction see Heraclit. Alleg.
Horn. c. 72, p. 142 : 8i7rAo0s <S
\6yos tovtuv 5' ot <pi\6ffo<poi (t he
Stoics are meant) top /iiv ivBid.Betov KaXovtrt, rbv Be irpo<popiK6v.
6 fit v oZv tov evBov KoyirrfiSiv itrriv
iîyyehos, & 5' inrb Tois arepvois
KaBupKTcu. Qatrl Be rovrtp XPVaiai Kal rb f>etoi>. Scxt. Math,
viii. 275 (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76):
oi Si Aoyp-ariKol . . . <pa<rlv uti
&v9pwjros ov%l t$ vpotpopiK$ \6yw

Bta<pepet ray a\6ywv Cvwv
aAAa r<$ IvStaBtTtf, The Stoics
alone can be meant by the veiiTfpot in Theo. Sniyrn. Mus. c.
18, who are contrasted with the
Peripatetics for using the terms
\6yos evBidderos and TrpoipopiKds.
They are also referred to by
Pint. C. Prin. Phil. 2, l,p. 777 ;
to 5e Keyetv. oVi Buo \6yoi elalv,
6 fxev ivBiaderbs, 7]yep.6vos 'Epfiov
B&pov, d 5' iv wpotpop^, Btdjcropos
Kal hpyaviKos 'ev\6v iari. The
double form of Hermes is ex
plained by Heraclitus as refer
ring to the twofold \6ys
'Epfirjs Xddnos represents Aoôv
ivSt&Berov, and the heavenly
Hermes (Sioktooos) represents
the TrpofopiK6v. The distinction
passed from the Stoics toothers,
like Pint. Solert. An. 19, 1, p.
973 ; Galen, Protrept. i. 1.
3 Diog. 43: t^k SiaXeKTtKhv
BtaipetcrBai ets t tov ircpl rtov *ttjfiatvofxevuv Kal rris (pwvys t6ttov.
Ibid. 62 : ruyxdvet 5' o&ttj, us b
Xpv&nrirds (pt\<riy irepl trri/Malvovra
Kal artfjLiivdfieva. Seneca 1. c. : 5taKfKTtKfj in duas partes dividitur,
74
Chap.
V.
. THE STOICS.
again, have several subdivisions,1 which are only
imperfectly known to us.2 Under the science of
utterance, which was generally placed before the
science of things uttered,3 are included, not only in
struction as to sounds and speech, but also the theories
of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under
the head of the voice and of sound on purely external
considerations.4 What is known of the teaching of
the Stoics on these subjects, consisting, as it does, of
a mass of definitions, differences, and divisions, has
so little philosophical value, that it need not detain
attention longer.5 Two parts only of the Stoic logic
in verba et sigriificationes, i.e. ence of the words in Sext. Math,
in res, quse dicuntur, et voca- viii. 11 to the parts of logic is
bula, quibus dicuntur. The unhappy. Xicolai (De Logic.
distinction between rb <rr\p.a2vov Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with
and rb ffT]fiaiv6ix*vov, to which greater caution, but even much
t!> Tvyxdvov (the real object) of what he says is doubtful.
must be added as a third, will
3 Diog. 55.
4 Diog. a : tlvai St ttjj 5zbe hereafter discussed in an
other place. A much narrower KfKTtKrjS XZiov r6nov Kal rbv irpoeiconception of dialectic, and pTtfiiVOV TTifii ai>T7JS T7JS (pWVWS, iV
more nearly approaching to
that of the Peripatetics, is to be Kal riva Ta rov \6yov juep?], Kal
found in the definition given TCpl XTo\OlKl(TfLOV Kal fiap&apiofloV
by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The Kal froirjLLaTWP Kal aLUpi&oKiwv real
division there given is also ircpl ifitttAovs tpwvris Kal vtpl fiovfound in the Platonist Alcinovs, (TiKijS kcu irepl Sptitv Kara rivas
Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has Kal Biatpeatojv Kal Ke^cav. The
pointed out. It appears, there theory of the determination
fore, not to belong to the Stoic and division of conceptions
School, but, at most, to a few occupies such an important
place in the section 7rep! (poiWjj,
of its later members.
1 Seneca continues : Ingens that we might feel disposed to
deinde sequitur utriusque di- suppose some mistake in the
visio, without, however, giving authority. Still, from the later
authorities, pp. GO-62, it is seen
it.
2 There is much which is that by many it is usually so
open to doubt in Petersen's represented.
attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund.
5 Further particulars may be
221) to settle these divisions. obtained in
Stoicorum
At the very beginning, his refer Grammatica (Halle, 1839) ;
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
76
possess any real interestthe theory of knowledge,

and that part of dialectic which treats of ideas, and
Chap.
V"
which in the main agrees with our formal logic.

The Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the
nil
enquiry for a criterion or standard by which what is
true in notions may be distinguished from what is
false.
Since every kind of knowledge, no matter
what be its object, must be tested by this standard,
it follows that the standard cannot be sought in the
B- Theory
of knowledge.
(l) Geneyacter of
tkufheory.
Zerteh, Sprachphilosopbie der

Alten ; Steinthal, Gesch. der
Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265-363 ;
Nicolai, De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31.
This part of dialectic began
with enquiries into the voice
and speech. Voice is defined
to be sound and speech, to be
air in motion, or something
hearable afyp neir\7]yfx4vos % to
"tiiov ai<T0rrrbi> axorjs ; the human
voice as Zvapdpos Kal airb Stdvotas
iKirffiironevn, is distinguished
from the sounds of other ani
mals, which are ahp virb tpîris
KewXtryiiivos (Dioq. 55 : Simpi.
Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39;
Gell. N. A. vi. 1 5, fi). That the
voice is something material is
proved in various ways (Diog.
55 ; Plut. Plac iv. 20, 2 ; Galen,
Hist. Phil. 27). The voice, in
as far as it is (vapBpos, or com
posed of letters, is called Af'Jis ;
in as far as it expresses certain
notions, it is \6yos (Diog. 56 ;
Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar
national mode of expression
(A'IS K*XaPayi**'r') iSv'KWS T KOI
'EWtjvikws 1) Aeiy Ttorairj)') was
called SidXtmos (Diog. 56). The
elements of \4(is are the 24
letters, divided into 7 <pavi*>,
6 &(pava, and 1 1 semivowels

(Diog. 57); the Aôshas 5 parts,
called d-Toixeta by Chrysippus
ovofxa, irpotryyopia, fitf/ia, avvhtaH'is, SpBpofto which Antipater
added the fuadrvs, or adverb
(Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat.
et Plat. viii. 3 ; Lersch, ii. 28 ;
Steinthal, 291). Words were
not formed by caprice, but cer
tain peculiarities of things have
been imitated in the chief
sounds of which they are com
posed. These peculiarities can
therefore be discovered by ety
mological analysis (Orig. c.
Cels. i. 24 ; Avgustin. Dialect,
c. 6; Opp. T. I. Ap. 17, a).
(Chrysippus, however, observes
(in Varro, L. Lat. ix. 1) that
the same things bear different
names, and vice versa, and (in
Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every
word has several meanings.
See Simjjl. Cat. 8, f. Five ad
vantages and two disadvantages
of speech are enumerated Diog.
59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and
poetry (Diog. 60), various kinds
of amphibolia(i)/i7. 62; Galen,
De Soph. P. Diet. c. 4), the for
mation of conceptions, and divi
sion, are treated of.
76
Chap.
THE STOICS.
subject-matter of notions, but, on the contrary, in
their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes
therefore identical with anotherthe enquiry as to
what kind of notions supply a knowledge that may
be depended upon, or what activity of the power of
forming conceptions carries with it a pledge of its
own truth. It is impossible to answer these ques
tions without investigating the origin, the various
kinds, and the value and importance of notions.
Hence the problem proposed to the Stoics is reduced
to seeking by an analysis of notions to obtain a
universally valid standard by which their truth may
be tested.
Whether this enquiry was pursued by the older
Stoics in all its comprehensiveness is a point on
which we have no information.
Boethus, whose
views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus,
had assumed the existence of several standards, such
as Reason, Perception, Desire, Knowledge. Others,
in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Right Reason
(opdbs \6yos) as being the standard of truth.1 Hence
it may be inferred that before the time of Chrysippus
the Stoics had no distinctly developed theory of
knowledge. Nevertheless there are expressions of
Zeno and Cleanthes still extant which prove that the
essential parts of the later theory were already held
by these philosophers,2 although it is no doubt true
1 Ding. vii. 54.
1 The statements of Zeno
and Cleanthes, for instance, in
reference to QavTatrla, prove
that these Stoics deduced their
theory of knowledge from

general principles respecting
notions. They therefore started
from the data supplied by the
senses. A passage in Zeno, ex
that it first received that scientific form in which
alone it is known to us at the hands of Chrysippus.
Chap.
V"
The character of this theory of knowledge appears

mainly in three particulars :-(1) In the importance
attached by the Stoics to the impressions of the
m .
.
rA
senses. This feature they inherited from the Cynics
and shared with the Epicureans. (2) In the exalta
tion of expression into a conception-a trait dis
tinguishing this from either of the two other
contemporary Schools. (3) In the practical turn
given to the question of a criterion or standard of
truth. We proceed to the expansion of this theory
in detail.
The origin of all perceptions (<f>avTacriat,) may be
referred to the action of some object ((ftavTacrrbv) on
the soul,1 the soul at birth resembling a blank page,
,
,
. .
-, .
,
.
and only receiving definite features by experience
from without.2 By the elder Stoics, this action of
(2) PromtffiT""*'
theory of
knowledge.
plaining the relations of various forms of knowledge, shows

that even Zeno required progress to be from perception to
conception and knowledge, and
that he distinguished these
states only by the varying
strength of conviction which
they produced.
1 Pint. Plac. iv. 12. Diog.
vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Horn. 76.
tavraaia is irdSos ev >J<ux# yiv6Htvov, ivStiKvififvov iam6 t Kol
ri ireiroujKcis, in the same way,
it is added, that light shows
other things as well as itself ;
(patrrafTrbv is rb iroiovv rfyv <bavraaiav, and therefore nav 8 ti
hv Svi/Tfrai Kivtiv rty tyvxhv.
Qavracrla is distinguished Irom
(pavraffTucdv, because no <pavtaorbv corresponds to <f>avra<mit6ir

it is Stdtcfvos thKmrubt, irdflos lt>
rf >KX!>
oiSevbs fyavraa-rov
yiv6/j.evov and the object of such
an empty perception is a <pdvraafia. Compare also Sext.
Math. vii. 241 : Stdxtms i\Kvafibs
is called <pavra(ria tSov iv 7]uiu
vaSiv. Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual prrceptions, are called by Diog. 51,
ifiipdtreis at &<rave\ iirj uirapx^"toiv yivdfttvai. In a wider sense,
<pafrcuria means any kind of
notion.
2 Pint. Plac. iv. 11 : o22tIko(
tpaffiv ' Stov yfvtnjQrj 6 &v8tiutros
*x(t T^ Wlfpovmbv p.tposriis'iivxy'
O) Per'
tfo nm.lt
of imprest'
from
without.
78
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
objects on the soul was regarded as grossly material,
Zeno defining a perception to be an impression
(rvirmffis) made on the soul,1 and Cleanthes took
this definition so literally as to compare the impres
sion on the soul to the impression made by a seal on
wax.* Being himself a very exact pupil of Zeno,
Cleanthes probably rendered the views of Zeno cor
rectly in this comparison. The difficulties of this
view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly
defined a perception to be the change (irepoicoais)
produced in the soul by an object, or, more accu
rately, the change produced thereby in the ruling part
of the soul ; 3 and whereas his predecessors had only
wanip x&priis (x<4pT7| as Galrn, many different forms, if it had
H. Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), to retain different notions at
tvfpywy eis OLiroypoupriv. (is rovro the same timeainbi olv tyv
\xiav (KaffrrtP iwv tvvoiwv 4yairo- Tviraiffiv tlprfrQat virb tov TA\v<avos
ypdcpfrat ' Trp&ros 5e b rrjs awoypa- VTrevSa drrl ttjj Tepuf<Ta>j,
<prjs rpbiros 6 5io rwv attrfl^trewv. &tt d;<at toiovtov -rbv \6yov
See p. 79, 2. Orig. o. Cels. vii. 37, tpavratrlo. iorXv ircpolwo-ts i^x^s.
720, b, says that they taught Objection had, however, been
aitrd'r](rei KUTaXauPdveo-Qai Ta kol- raised to this definition, on the
ra\afjL$av6ixva Ka't iratra*' KardKTj- ground that not every change
ripry]xrdai rStv aWB-qcewv.
of the soul gives rise to a per
1 Plut. Comm. Not. 47 : <f>n>/- ception, and therefore the
Tafl-ia TUTaxm iv tyvxy. The Stoics had defined a perception
same in Diog. vii. 45 and 50. more accurately : (pavratria iatl
That this was also the view of Tujrajffis 4y tyvxV &5 k*' ^v 4*UXP>
Diogenes appears from what which was equivalent to saying
(pavraaia itrrlv knpoioaffis Tiyefollows.
2 Sent. Math. vii. 228 : unviKw or else in Zeno's de
KKidvSjjs fxiv yap %KOvtre t^k finition of tpavraaia as Tiijr&xrty
rvvccatv Kara elvoxjiv T6 koX ir tyvxfi they had taken ^"x^l m
a restricted sense for to riyt/ioviytvo/x4vr]y tov KTjpov Tinravtv. kov, which really comes to the
Conf. Ibid. vii. 372 ; viii. 400. same thing. Even this defi
3 Sext. vii. 229, continues : nition had, however, been found
Xputniriros 5 &towov rfyttro rb too wide, and hence irfpoiaiais
toioOtov according to this was limited to change in
view, it would be necessary for feeling (tTtpoitarrts Kara Tctffiv).
the soul to recei?e at once But the definition is still too
considered sensible things to be objects, he included
among objects conditions and activities of the
mind.1 The mode, however, in which the change
was produced in the soul did not further engage his
attention.
It follows, as a necessary corollary from this view,
that the Stoics regarded sensation as the only source
of all perceptions: the soul is a blank leaf, sen.
,
.
sation is the hand which fills it with writing. But
this is not all. Perceptions give rise to memory,
repeated acts of memory to experience,2 and con
clusions based on experience suggest conceptions
which go beyond the sphere of direct sensation.
These conclusions rest either upon the comparison, or
upon the combination of perceptions, or else upon
wide, as Sextus already re
marked ; for a perception is
not the only feeling of change
in the soul. A more accurate
definition has already been
quoted, 77, 1. The statements
in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii.
400; Dwg. vii. 45 and 50;
Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b;
Boctli. De Interpret, ii. 292
(Schol. in Arist. 100), are in
agreement with the above re
marks.
1 Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep.
19, 2 : ori /xiv yap cu<t0ijt< tori
TkyaQa. Hal to kuku. Kal rovrois
itcitotti \4yttv ' ov yhp u6pou to
irddif iffrlv aiffOriTa ffhp rots
tXhtffiv, dlov \vttt] Kal rp6lSos Kal
rb jrapairX-fio'ia, aWa Kal KKoirris
Kal /xoixîas Kal twv dfxoiuv tanv
alfdetrBai ' Kal KaOoKov aQpoavvris
Kal 5eiAias Kal aWutf ouk b\lyuv
Hatcitbv ' oilZi ahvov x-P~1^ Kai *vepyemaV Kal aWwv noWuv KaropQwfftw, hAAu Kal tfrpovqaews Kal
a^Spefas Kal tu>v \onruv aperuv.
This passage must not be under
stood to mean that the concep
tions of good and evil, as such,
are objects of sensation (Hitter,
iii. 558). The only objects of
that kind are individual moral
states and activities. The
general conceptions derived
from them are, according to
the Stoic theory of knowledge,
only obtained by a process of
abstraction.
2 Pint. Plac. iv. 11, 2 : (uVflav6pevoi yip rivos oXov \cukov
a.Trt\Q6vros auroD fjLffifiijv txovfrlvi
orav Si 4/xOt3f?? iroAAal p.vi\txai
ytvuvra t6t6 (paclv ixtlv Âreipia*.
79'
Chap.
Y'
(*) Conforlled*
from perceptwns.
80
THE STOICS.
analogy;1 some add, upon transposition and contrast,2The formation of conceptions by means of these
agencies sometimes takes place methodically and
artificially, at other times naturally and spontane
(a) Koiral ously.3 In the latter way are formed the primary
conceptions, irpokr)"ty-eis or Koival evvoiai, which were
formed
naturally. regarded by the Stoics as the natural types of truth
and virtue, and as the distinctive possession of ra
tional beings.4 To judge by many expressions, it
Chap.
V.
1 Diog. vii. 52 : r) Si KaTa\7)J/is

ylverat far' avrobs alofH]ati jU^"
ois \euKotfKai u.e\dvwv Kal rpax*o>v
Kal
\6ytp Si twv ot* airoSe1ea>j (TvvayofifvWf, 55cr7rep rh 6t6bs
th'ai Kal trpovotiv rovrovs ' r&v
yap voovfxtvtav ra /tee Kara ireplTTwaiv (immediate contact)
4vo-fi0T], Ta Si ko6' dwot^TTjTa, ri
Si ifor1 &.va\oylav, ra Si Kara
fieradeffiv, rh Si naia avvQeatv,
Ta Si kot' ivavr'ioxrw . . . pourai
Si koI Kara fieTdâo-iv (transition
from the sensuous to the supersensuous) rtva, us ra Xcktci Kal b
rdjrot. C'ie. Acad. i. 11, 42:
Oomprehensio
[ KaTa\T/|/ts]
facta sensibus et vera illi
[Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur :
non quod omnia, quae essent in
re, comprehenderet, sed quia
nihil quod cadere in earn posset
relinqueret, quodque natura
quasi normam scientise et principium sui dedisset, unde postea
notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid. Fin. iii. 10,
83 : Cumque rerum notiones in
animis riant, si aut usu (expe
rience) aiiquid cognitum sit,
aut conjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis :
hoc quarto, quod extremum
posui, boni notitia facta est.
Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393)

also agrees with the Stoic doc
trine of the origin of con
ceptions, in saying that all our
ideas arise either tot' ipriXaniv
twv tvapyuv or Kara r^v atrb run
ivapywv ufrafiaatv (ct. Diog. vii.
68), and in the latter case
either by comparison, or actual
combination, or analogy.
2 Diog. 1. c. Compare the
passage quoted from Seneca,
81,2.
' Pint. Plac. iv. 11: toV '
Ivvoiwv at juer tputrtKal yivovrai
Kara robs cipt]}j.i'vovs rpSrrovs (ac
cording to the context, this
must mean by memory and
experience, but perhaps the
author of the Placita has been
careless in his extracts here)
Kal ai/etriT6)fi^Tt5 at 5' fjS-rt St1
TjfjLCTcpas SiSao~Ka\ias Kal 4nifitA< ius ' aurai p.iv o?iv (Woiat KaKovvrai fx6vai, VeTpat Si Kal
npoXyipeis Diog. vii. 51 : [tmc
i!>Ta(na>i'] at fjiev eifft Tex*/"ca^
at Si &Texvot4 Plut. Plac. iv. 11 : 6 Si
\6yos Kad' ov 7rpoo~ayopev6fx(da
\oyiKol 4k Tie irpoKfiipeaiv a'.ifxirKrjpovaBai Xtyerai Kara r$]V
wpvmv i&SopdSa (the first seven
years of life). Comm. Not. 3,
might seem that by primary conceptions, or Koival
svvoiai,1 innate ideas were meant ; but this view
would be opposed to the whole character and connec
tion of the system. In reality, these primary con
ceptions, or Koivai evvoiai, are only those conceptions
which, by reason of the nature of thought, can beequally deduced by all men from experience ; even,
the highest ideas, those of good and evil, having no.
other origin.2 The artificial formation of conceptions
I, says that to the Stoics be
longed rb Trapa ras tvvoias Kal
tos vpo\4ityets Tas koivcls <pi\offoiptiVi a<p' uv nd\ttTTa t$jv a'lpetrty
. . . Kal fJL6vqv &fio\oyelv rr, 'pviTtt
Xfyovaiv. Sen. Epist. 117, 6:
multum dare solemus prsesumtioni (tt/xSatiîs) omnium hominum ; apud nos argumentum
veritatis est, aliquid oinnibas
videri. Frequent instances will
occur of appeals to communes
notitise and consensus gen
tium.
1 Diog. vii. 53 : cpiKTucSs Se
votirai &ucat6v ti Kal ayaddv. 54 :
?<rri 5' rj Trp6\rj^LS ivvoia <pv<rit<}i
tu>v Ka$6\ov, In the same strain
Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep.
17) speaks of efuph-roi irpoK-qtytis
of good and evil. In Plut.
Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V.
487 Wytt., the question is
asked, How is it possible to
learn what is not already
known 1 The Stoics reply, By
means of tpvcriKal evvoiai.
2 Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10 :
hoc quarto [collatione rationis]
boni notitia facta est ; cum enim
ab iis rebus, qufe sunt secundum
naturam, adscendit animus col
latione rationis, turn ad noti-
tiam boni pervenit. Similarly

Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the
question, Quomodoad nos prima
boni honestique notitia peivenerit? observes, Hoc nos
natura docere non potuit : semina nobis sciential dedit,
scientiam non dedit . . . nobis
videtur observatio collegisse
[speciem virtutis], et rerum
ssepe factarum inter se collatio :
per analogiam nostri intellec
tual et honestum et bomim
judicant. The notion of mental
health and strength has grown
out of corresponding bodily
notions; the contemplation of
virtuous actions and persons
has given rise to the conception
of moral perfection, the good
points being improved upon,
and defects being passed over,
the experience of certain faults
which resemble virtues serving
to make the distinction plainer.
Even belief in a God was pro
duced, according to Diog. vii.
52, by hw6Sîi. See p. 80, 1.
Conf. Stoh. Eel. i. 792 : ol iitv
StojVkoI \eyovtri /u.*v evQiis 4/ii(pve~
ffQai Tbv \6yov, vfttepov Se ovva8poizcrdat anb TtSv ala94)aeiBV Kal
(payTaffiwv irepl SeKareffaapa eri\.
81Chap..
Y'
82
Chap,
V"
THE STOICS.
gives rise to knowledge, which is defined by the
Stoics to be a fixed and immovable conception, or
() Know- system of such conceptions.1 Persistently maintainfurmed

ing; on the one hand, that knowledge is a system of
all^"11'
artificial conceptions, impossible without a logical
process, they must, on the other hand, have felt it
imperative from this platform that knowledge should
agree in its results with primary conceptions,2 agree
ment with nature being in every department their
watchword. For them it was as natural to derive
support for their system from a supposed agreement
with nature, as it was easy for their opponents to
show that this agreement with nature was imaginary,
and that many of their assertions were wholly opposed
to general opinions.3
O) BetaPerceptions, and the conclusions based upon
Options*' tflem)4 being thus, according to the Stoics, the two
1 Stoh. Eel. ii. 128 : eha, SI
T77P dnta-T-i)fitly KwrdXTltyiv a(r<pa\rj
tea- afifrdnroiroy >'nrb \6yov ' krepav
Se 4m<jTT)l>LT1V (TVfTrrjfJLa t| 4tTI(TT7)/jiaiv rotovrwy, oXov 7j ray Kara
jUe'pos KoytKî iy t^j atrovSaiy \mdpXovtra ak\r\v Be ^vart\y.a 4
4jri(rrr]pLwy rexVLKUV >l avrov *xov
rb fitfiaiov us ixov<TiV a* apsrai'
6a\tjj/ 5e(knowledgeinarelative
sense) e\iv <pavra(Tiuv SeKriK^v
afxtrdirrurov imb \6yov, H\ynvd
tftatrty 4y r6vu koX Suvd/xa (sc. rris
iûxfl 0 Kr8". Diog. vii. 47:
ailT7}V T r^V 4iriaTiipLT\v (parly ^
Kardkrityiy aa(pa\Tj ?) '4iv 4y <pai>raffiuyirpoffSeêi apierdirrwroy inrb
Xiyov. (This explanation, which
Herillus used according to
Diog. vii. 165, certainly belongs
to Zeno.) ovk &vtv Si rrjs SiaXeKriKris Otwptas rby tro<pbv &tttoitov

ecreffdat 4y \6yu,
See p. 80, i.
3 This was the , object of
Plutarch's treatise irepl ray
Koivwy fwoiwy. In the same
way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr. Ev. vi. 8,
10) throws it in the teeth of
Chrysippus that, whilst ap
pealing to generally received
opinions, he is always going
contrary to them, and that he
considers all men, with one
or two exceptions, to be fools
and madmen.
4 Diog. 52 : r\ 5e KardKyptyis
yiyerai Kar avrous ai<rdf)<Ti /xey
\cvKwy, k.t.A.. \6yu 8e twv St*
sources of all notions, the farther question arises,
How are these two sources related to each other ?
83
Chap.
V'
It might have been expected that only perceptions and conwould be stated to be originally and absolutely true,
since all general conceptions are based on them.
Nevertheless, the Stoics are far from saying so.
Absolute certainty of conviction they allow only to
knowledge, and therefore declare that the truth of
the perceptions of the senses depends on their rela
tion to thought.1 Truth and error do not belong to
disconnected notions, but to notions combined in the
form of a judgment, and a judgment is produced
by an effort of thought. Hence sensations, taken
alone, are the source of no knowledge, knowledge
first arising when the activity of the understanding
is allied to sensation.2 Or, starting from the relation
&To5cf(6a>s o~vvayofieyu>y, Sxrirep rb
Btovs that, k.t.\.
1 Sext. Math. viii. 10 : ol Si
atrb T7)s ffrous \eyovat fj.iv ra>v re
aloBvruy rtya Kal rwv vot]Tuv
aA7]0Tj, ovk 4 ei>6elas Si to cuVfhjTei,
aWa Kara dva<popav r^v wj e-iri
to irapaKfiaeya rovrots yoyrd.
2 Sext. I.e. continues: aXiides
ydp ion /car' avrovs rb inrdpxoy
Kal ai'TLKt !UF v6v Tirl, KQl tyfllSoS
rb ^ imipxov Kal juJj (this /J.)] is
obviously redundant as appears
from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi.
220, where the same definition
is given without the /ut;) avriKelpeySv rivt, oirep a<rd>uaroy
a^lwfia Ka$eo-ri)s yorjrby elvai
every sentence containing an
assertion or negative, and there
fore being opposed to every
other. Ibid. viii. 70: ^lovv ol
St&ukoI kolvws ey XeKrqi rb aKydis

elvat Kal rb ipevSos ' KeKrbv Si
inrdpxeiv tyaffl rb Kara KoytKhy
<payrao-lay ittpurrdueyoy \oyiK7}v
Si elyai fyavTaffiav Kaff V rb
(payraadiy etrri A6ytp trapa(Trr}tTai.
rwv Si KeKrSiy ra piv 4\hurTi
Ka\ovo~t rh be avroreKrj (con
ceptions and propositions ; couf.
Diog. vii. 63) . . . -Kpoaayopevovoi
Serivar&v avrorehwv Kal atjuaTa,
airep Keyovres tfroi akTjdetiopLev 7)
}fievS6fie6a. Ibid. 74 ; Diog. vii.
65 : aijiatyta 5e eariy, 8 effny
aArjSes t) lj/eOSoj (see (He. Tusc.
I. 7, 14) fiTtpayp.a (better \eKrbv
as Gell. N. A. xvi, 8, 4 reads)
aitrorehis ano<payrby bffoy e(p'
eaorcp ' as d Xpvffnrnds <pr}(Tiv iv
roty bta\KriKo?s opois. Aristotle
had already observed that the
distinction between false and
a2
84
Chap,
Y'
THE STOICS.
of thought to its object, since like can only be
known by like according to the well-known adage,
the rational element in the universe can only be
known by the rational element in man.1 But again,
the understanding has no other material to work
upon but that supplied by sensation, and general
conceptions are only obtained from sensation by con
clusions. The mind, therefore, has the capacity of
formally working up the material supplied by the
senses, but to this material it is limited. Still, it can
progress from perceptions to notions not immediately
given in sensation, such as the conceptions of what is
good and of God. And since, according to the Stoic
teaching, material objects only possess reality, the
same vague inconsistency may be observed in their
teaching as has been noticed in Aristotle2reality
attaching to individuals, truth to general notions.
This inconsistency, however, is more marked in their
case than in that of Aristotle, because the Stoics so
far adhere to the Cynic nominalism 3 as to assert that
no reality attaches to thought.4 Such an assertion
true first appears in judgment.
See Heller, Philosophie der
Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1
1 Sext. Math. vii. 93 ; iis rb
pev <pusf <pi]a\v S Tloaeitiuvios rbv
XlKdratvos Tifjuiiov 4^7jyovfjLevos,
vitb rrjs (paroettiovs êai? KaraXapfiaverai, 7) tie <patv^ xnrb rris
aepoeLtiovs clkotis, oUtco Kal rj rwv
S\uv (pvtris inrb avyyevovs o(pei\ei
kara\a/j.f$dveo'6ai rod \6yov. Conf.
Plato, Rep. vi. 508, B.
2 See Zeller's Philosophie
der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.
' Ibid. ii. a, 211.
4 Diog. 61 : ivv6iip.a (object

of thought) S4 e<rri <pdvra<rna
tiiavolas, oUre t ov otfre voibv,
ixxavel tie ri ov Kal unravel voUv.
Stob. Eel. i. 332 : rb. ivvotyiwri
<p7)tri fi-f^ri riva. ejvai fxfat Trota,
ucavel 5e riva Kal iiaavel ttoiu
QavraGfxara tyvxrjS' ravra tie v-wb
roiv apxatojv Itieas irpoffayopeibeffdat . . . ravra [ravras] tie oi
XrwtKol tpi\6<ro(poi 'paalv uvvirapktovs eJvat, Kal riav [lev evvovfidrwv
ixerextw fip.as, rS>v tie irriiaeav,
as tiii irpoa-rryopias KaKovai, ruyX&W- Although defended by
makes it all the more difficult to understand how
greater truth can be attributed to thought, unreal as
it is said to be, than to sensations of real and material
objects. Do we then ask in what the peculiar cha
racter of thought consists, the Stoics, following
Aristotle, reply that in thought the idea of univer
sality is added to that which presents itself in sensa
tion as a particular.1 More importance was attached
by them to another pointthe greater certainty
which belongs to thought than to sensation. All the
definitions given above point to the immovable
strength of conviction as the distinctive feature of
Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, tion of ideas, but that they
the last words as they stand asserted that these ideas were
do not appear capable of any- only ivv<A\\uara an assertion
passable meaning and are which had also been made by
most probably corrupt. Pint. Antisthenes. Compare what is
Plac. i. 10, 4 : oi airb lA\vwms said on p. 92 respecting the un
SrwtKol ivvo^mara Tjfiertpa ras reality of the \kt6v, likewise
iSt'as itpaaav. Sim.pl. Categ. 26, what Sext. Math. vii. 246,
e : Xpvfftwjros atropei irepl rrjs quotes, as belonging to the
ISeas, ei r^Scn^jftjiTCTai. irvîtra- Stoics : ofire Si a\i)9e?r oUrt tyevpaKijtrTtov 5e Kal r^v ffvvi]Q*iav 5ts eiVij' at yeviKal [(pafTatrtat] '
toiv ~2.TO!tKotv irepl r5>v yevittSav %>v yhp ra ?57j Tola ^ rota Toxyutv
koiSiv ttws at m^KTfis tear* ai/Toi/s ra yivn o&re rola ottre Tola ' if
Kpofytpomai Kal ttus o&riva to mankind be divided into Greeks
icoiva trap1 avruts \4yerai. Syrian and barbarians, the yeviKbs
on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen's Spflptoiros will be neither one
Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): &s nor the other. The further
&pa TCt efdn . . . o&re vpbs T"t)V therefore a conception is re
pija-iv rrjs ray ovofiaWatv ovvrjQelas moved from individual limi
irapiiyiTO, us XpvtTiirjros Kal 'Apx'~ tations, the further it is removed
S77/XOS Kal ot ir\etovs TaV Stou/cup from truth.
iiarepov (piidyffav . . . oil pA]V ouSe
1 Dwg. vii. 54 : tan 8' fi irp6vo^juaTCt fitrt irap' avrois at iScai, Kutyis tvvoia (pvffiKh rav KaQ6\ou.
is KAaV07fS Tjffrepov tip^/ce. Exc. e Joan. Damaso. {Sttib.
Prantl, 1. c. takes objection to Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr.
what Stobseus and Plutarch 34 : XplKTiiriros to p.iv yeviKbv
here say ; yet this view is not rjth voiyrbv, rb 5e eldmbv Kal
that the Stoics regarded their TrpocninTov ^8t| {Petersen, 83
conception of the lvvo-np.a as without cause suggests rfiv)
identical with Plato's concep alaBuriv.
86
Chap.
V.
(d) The
standard
oftruth.
(a) Prac
tical need
of such a
standard.
THE STOICS.
knowledge ; 1 and of like import is the language
attributed to Zeno,2 comparing simple sensation with
an extended finger, assent, as being the first activity
of the power of judgment, with a closed hand, con
ception with the fist, and knowledge with one fist
firmly grasped by the other. According to this view,
the whole difference between the four processes is
one of degree, and depends on the greater or less
strength of conviction, on the mental exertion and
tension.3 It is not an absolute difference in kind,
but a relative difference, a gradual shading off of one
into the other.
From these considerations it follows that in the
last resort only a relative distinction is left whereby
the truth of notions may be tested. Even the general
argument for the possibility of knowledge starts
with the Stoics by practically taking something for
granted. Without failing to urge intellectual objec
tions and often most pertinent ones4 against
Scepticism, as was indeed natural, particularly since
the time of Chrysippus,5 the Stoics nevertheless
1 See p. 82, 1.
8 Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.
' Stol. Eel. ii. 128: Know
ledge is defined to be ffis <pavraaiuv 5e/fTiK^ auerdTTTUTos vwb
\6yov, 1)vtiv6. (patrtv Iv Tovaj not
Sura/iti K<?<r0ai.
4 Here may be noted the
objection mentioned by Sext.
Math. viii. 463 ; Pyrrh. ii. 186 :
The Sceptics cannot deny the
possibility of arguing without
proving their assertion and
thereby practically admitting
the possibility. Also another
one urged by Antipater against

Carneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28 ;
34, 109) : He who asserts that
nothing can be known with
certainty must, at leasts believe
that he can with certainty
know this. The replies of the
Sceptics to theseobjections,anct
the way they turned them in
their own favour, will be found
in Sext. Math. 1. c. and vii. 433.
5 Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, ac
cording to the view of the
Stoic School, that Carneades
specially took up their stand on one point, which
was this, that, unless the knowledge of truth were
possible, it would be impossible to act on fixed
principles and convictions.' Thus, as a last bulwark
against doubt, practical needs are appealed to.
The same result is obtained from a special enquiry
into the nature of the standard of truth. If the
question is asked, How are true perceptions distin1 .
'
t
i
guished from false ones? the immediate reply given

by the Stoics is, that a true perception is one which
represents a real object as it really is.2 You are no
was refuted by anticipation ;
and it was considered a special
favour of Providence that the
labours of Chrysippus had occu
pied an intermediate place
between two of the most im
portant Sceptics. Plut. Sto.
Hep. i. 4, p. 1059. Diog. 198
mentions a treatise against
ArcesiJaus.
1 Plut. Sto. Eep. 10 (see p.
66, 1) ; Ibid. 47, 12 : Kal phv fr
yc rots vpbs rof'y 'AkoStj/jmikuvs
aywffiv 6 irAciaros avjtp Tf XputrItttcw Kal 'AprnrdTpcp ndvos yeyove
irepi tov jUTJTe irpdrTfiv pfae bppav
&o~uyKaTuOeTt0S, dAAd it\axrpjtna
Ktyetp Kal Kevds inrodtocis rovs
dioOiras oiKeias tpavracrias ysvoptvris evBvs opp.au p.)} (tâvias p-nte
(TvyKaTaTidcpuvovs. IMd. adv.
Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: tijv oi irepl
irdvTwv 4iroxVv ou5' oi iroAAd npaypaTtvadptvoi Kal KararetpavTes >s
tovto ffvyypdupara Kal \6yovs
iKlirriffav ' dAA' 4k Tijs 2roa$ avrrfs
TtKtvTwyres aioirfp Topy6va t$]p
airpaîav tirdyovrts avriydpevaap.
Ejiict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15)
quietly suppresses a Sceplic by
saying: ovk &ya <rxoAV vpbs
toSto. Following also the Stoic

line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10-12, makes
Antiochus argue that Scepticism
makes all action impossible.
1 In Sext. Math. vii. 244,
aK-qQtis (pavraaiai are, first of
all, literally explained to be
qiavraoiai. tfv iaTiP dAijfli} Karijyopiap TorfiffaffSat then, under
the head of true tpavrao-lai, the
ifara\i}WTtKai and ov KaTaATjirnKai
are distinguished, i.e., notions
which are accompanied by a
clear impression of being true,
and such as are not ; and, in
conclusion,tpapraffia KO.TaA?jTTtK^
is defined : y dirb tov inrdpxovros
Kal kcit' out!) to VKapxov 4panoptpaypevr\ Kal 4vairea<ppayi(rpfPTi,
diroia oi)K av yivono a-nb pi} tmdpXoptos. This definition is after
wards more fully explained.
The same explanation is given
Ibid. 402 and 426 ; viii. 85 ;
Pyrrh. ii. 4 ; iii. 242 ; Augustin,
c. Acad. ii. 5, 11 ; .Cic. Acad. ii.
6, 1 8. Diog. vii. 46 : ttjs 5e <pwraaiai tV pep KaToATjirTlKrjv ttjp
5e aKard^rjirjov ' KaTaX-niniKy]p
pip, %v Kpiriipiov *lvat tup npay~
fi&Twy <pao~l, rrjv "jivopfPTjp avb
87
Chap.
V'
W Trreperceutumtth*
standard
of truth.
88
THE STOICS.
further with this answer, and the question has again
to be asked, How may it be known that a perception
faithfully represents a reality ? The Stoics can only
reply by pointing to a relative, but not to an abso
lute, testthe degree of strength with which certain
perceptions force themselves on our notice. By itself
a perception does not necessarily carry conviction or
assent (o-vyicaTd&ecns) ; for there can be no assent
until the faculty of judgment is directed towards the
perception, either for the purpose of allowing or of
rejecting it, truth and error residing in judgment.
Assent therefore, generally speaking, rests with us,
as does also the power of decision ; and a wise man
diners from a fool quite as much by conviction as by
action.1 Some of our perceptions are, however, of
imdpxovros Kar' aitrb rb vnapxov positam et voluntariam. Ibid.
4i-airt(T<ppayio-p.ivnv koI tvartoae- ii. 12, 37 ; De Fato, 19, 43,
fiayfievTjv ' aKaTd\rircrov oi rrjf fiti Chrysippus affirms : visum oboirit inrdpxovros, r) atrb virdpxovros jectum imprimet illud quidem
p.iy, jut; Kar' avrb 5c rb tmapxovt et quasi signabit in animo suam
rhv ju$f rpavr) jU7j5 iKrimov. Ibid. speciem sed assensio nostra erit
in potestate. Pint. Sto. Rep.
60.
1 Sext. Math. viii. 397 : tan 47, 1 : rr/v yap fyavraoiav 8ou\6fjLfv oZv r) air(J5ei|is, ais <tti reap' fifvos [6 Xpv(wncos~\ ovk ov&av
avruv aKoveiv, KaraATprTiKTjs <pav- ai/roreXr) rrjs ffvyKaradiacais
raaias <TvyKardQeo-is, r)ris $nr\ovv alriav airooeiKvtietv ttpriKtv in '
%oiKev tivat npayfia Kal rb fiev ri fSAdtyovffiv oi o~o<pol tyevdu'i <pavraCX*IV clkovgiov, rb 5e tKofolov Kal trias cfiTeotovvre?, av at tpavratrlal
4vl rii r)fitrtpq Kpijn Keififvinf. rb iroi><riv avrort\ws ras ffvyKarafxiv yap <pavraaiwBr)vai ajSovAijTov Beo-eis, K.r.\. Id. 13: aSflis Se
r)v Kal oiiK 4vl rtp irdffxovri e/ceiro ipT)(Ti Xpucrnrwos, Kal rbv 0ebv
a\\' iirlTqi (pavrafftouvrt rb ourutrl tyfvoeis 4fjLTToieu/ (pavrafflas xal
8ioT0T)vat . . . rb 5e avyKara- rbv aocpbv . . . r)nas ot <pav\ovs
64(rOat rovrtp rip Ktvr)fiari cutiro ftmas (rvyKararideffoai rats rot4irl Ttp rrapa<ifX0tJ-*vV ri\v (pavra- avrais (pavraaiats. Id Fragm.
iriav. Diog. vii. 51 ; Cie. Acad, De An. 2 : ovx V ipvx?l rpitret
i. 14, 40 : [Zeno] ad hsec quae eavrtiv tis rr\v rwv rcpayndrwv
visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensi- Kard\ri^/iy Kal andryv, Kara robs
bus assensionem adjungit ani- bxb tjjs aroas. Epictet. in (jell.
morum : quam esse vult in nobis N.A. xix, 1, 15 : visa animi, quas
89
sucli a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on Chap.

them assent, compelling us not only to regard them _ V.
as probable, but also as true 1 and conformable to
the actual nature of things. Such perceptions pro
duce in us that strength of conviction which the
Stoics call a conception ; they are therefore termed </
conceptional perceptions. Whenever a perception
forces itself upon us in this irresistible form, we are
no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination,
but with something real ; but whenever the strength
of conviction is wanting, we cannot be sure of the
truth of our perception. Or, expressing the same
idea in the language of Stoicism, conceptional or ir
resistible perceptions, fyavracriai, KaraXrfTTTiKal, are
the standard of truth.2 The test of irresistibility
tpavTaaias philosophi appellant visis ( = <pavra<rtais') non omnibus
. . . non voluntatis sunt neque adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum,
arbitrariae, sed vi quadam sua quse propriam quandam habeinferunt sese hominibus nos- rent declarationem earum recitandse ; probationes autem, rum, quae viderentur : id autem
quas avyKa-rafiiatis vocant, qui- visum, cum ipsum per se cerbus eadem visa noscuntur ac neretur, comprehensibile (aradij udicantur, voluntarise sunt \i)7rTifc^ <pav7a<ria). Ibid. ii.
fi untque hominum arbitratu : 12, 38 : ut enim necesse est
the difference between a wise lancem in libra ponderibus imman and a fool consists in positis deprimi, sic animum
truyKaTarlBetrffat and irpoatmdo^d- perspicuis cedere . . . non po
Qav. The freedom of approba test objectam rem perspicuam
tion must, of course, be so non approbare. Conf. Fin. v.
understood in harmony with 26, 76 : percipiendi vis ita deStoic doctrine of the freedom finitur a Stoicis, ut negent
of the will.
quidquam posse percipi nisi
1 On the difference between tale rerum, quale falsum esse
the conception of e6\oyov and non possit. Dion. vii. 64;
that of KaTa\TyrrriK7i fpavraala, Sext. Math. vii. 227 : Kpirfiptov
the latter alone being unerring, toIvvv (pafflv aXtjddas ttvai ol
see Athen. viii. 354, e ; Diog. &v$pes ovtoi t^v KataXyyimK^v
<pavTafflav. It was a departure
vii. 177.
2 Compare besides p. 87, 2, from the older Stoic teaching,
Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41 : [Zeno] to refuse, as the later Stoics
90
Chap.
V.
(7) Pri
mary con
ceptions a
standard,
as well as
irresistible
percep
tions.
THE STOICS.
(KardXrpJrii) was, in the first place, understood to
apply to sensations from without, such sensations,
according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the
material for knowledge. An equal degree of cer
tainty was, however, attached to terms deduced from
originally true data, either by the universal and
natural exercise of thought, or by scientific processes
of proof. Now, since among these derivative terms
somethe primary conceptions (icoivaX svvoLai), for
instanceserve as the basis for deriving others, it
may in a certain sense be asserted that sensation
and primary conceptions are both standards of truth.1
In strict accuracy, neither sensation nor primary con
ceptions (Trp6\7]tfrets) can be called standards. The
did, to allow a conceptional
notion to be considered a test of
truth, except with the proviso
that no contrary proof could be
adduced against its truth. Sext.
253 : aWa yap oi fiiv apxal^7fP0L
Tai/ %twI'kuv tcptriiptdv (pafftv tlvat
TTjy aKr]6eias t^jv KaraKTjirriK^v
Tavr7]V tyavTaffiav ' oi Se vetbrepoi
irpoo~eT'iQe(rav al ri> fj.rfSey eôuirap
Ifffrriua, since cases could be
imagined in which a faulty
view presented itself with the
full force of truth. This was
equivalent to overthrowing the
whole doctrine of a criterion ;
for how could it be known in
any particular case that there
was not a negative instance 1
But it is quite in harmony with
the Stoic teaching for a later
Stoic {Ibid. 257) to say of con
ceptional perception: avrri yap
4vapy$}s oZca Kal -n-X^KTiK^ fiovovouxl ruv Tptx<^v, (pant, \o,uj8tverai KaracFnuo'a rjpus els (Tvyxa-
rideaiv Kal SXAou pTjSevbs Seofie'i/q

els to rotaVTT) irpo<nriVreij', k.t.K.
Hence Simpl. Phys 20, b :
aWipovv ra aAAa . . . irA^p ra
ivapyq.
1 Dioq. vii. 54 : xpiriiptov Si
TTts a\l)Qtlas <pao-\ rvyxaveiv tt\v
Kara\7fiTTiKî' (pavTaffiaf, tovt<rrt T^v airb virapxovros, nad&
<pT)ai ~X.pvo~nriros Iv rrj Soj5K(tt7
tuv tpvaiK&v Kal 'Avrlirarpos Kal
'AiroWoSupos. 6 fj.ev yap Borjdbs
Kpniipta ir\eiova airoXeiiret, vovv
Kal aiffB-qiiy Kal ope^tv Kal 4ttidriifn)v (this looks like an ap
proximation to the teaching of
the Peripatetics) ; i Si Xpiaimros
Sia(pep6/j.euos Trpbs axnbv iv t
irpwriy Trepl \6yov Kpir'fjpiti <t>r\ffiv
elvai aXffBi\triv Kal irpoKriîiv . . .
5e rives rwv apxaiorepav
jZtwikwp rbv bpQbv \6yov Kptr^piov
anoKeitrovo'tv, a*s 6 Tloaeio'&rios 4v
tw Trepl KpiTTjplov (p-qo'il'. See
above p. 76.
real standard, whereby the truth of a perception is
ascertained, consists in the power, inherent in certain
perceptions, of carrying convictionto KaTaXr/irriKov
a power which belongs, in the first place, to sensa
tions, whether of objects without or within, and, in
the next place, to primary conceptions formed from
them in a natural way koivcu svvoiai or irpokrj^sis.
On the other hand, conceptions and terms formed
artificially can only have their truth established by
being subjected to a scientific process of proof. How,
after these statements, the Stoics could attribute a
greater strength of conviction to artificial than to
primary conceptions ; 1 how they could raise doubts
as to the trustworthiness of simple sensations,2 is
one of the paradoses of the Stoic system, which prove
the existence, as in so many other systems, of a double
current of thought. There is, on the one hand, a
seeking for what is innate and original, a going back
to nature, an aversion to everything artificial and of
human device, inherited by Stoicism from its ances
tral Cynicism. On the other hand, there is a desire
to supplement the Cynic appeal to nature by a higher
culture, and to assign scientific reasons for truths
which the Cynics laid down as self-evident.
The latter tendency will alone explain the care
1 See above p. 82, 1.
2 See above p. 89, 2, and
Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque
eos (the Academicians) contra
secsus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici,
qui multa falsa esse dicunt,
longeque aliter se habere ac
sensibus videantur. Chrysippus
had enquired into the truth of

the perceptions of the senses,
and of the notions derived from
them, in his treatise wepl avvi\Betas, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections which he quoted against
the theory. See p. 46, 2.
92
Chap.
THE STOICS.
the
and forms
precision
andwhich
rules the
which
Stoics
govern
devoted
intellectual
to studying
pro
cesses. Attention to this branch of study may be

noticed in Zeno and his immediate successors at the
first separation of Stoicism from Cynicism.1 Aristo
is the only Stoic who is opposed to it, his whole
habit of mind being purely that of a Cynic. In
Chrysippus it attained its greatest development, and
by Chrysippus the formal logic of the Stoics reached
scientific completeness. In later times, when Stoicism
reverted more nearly to its original Cynic type, and
appealed directly to the immediate suggestions of
the mind, it lost its interest in logic, as may be
observed in Musonius, Epictetus, and others. For
the present, however, let it suffice to consider the
logic of Chrysippus, as far as that is known to
as.
c. Formal
The term formal logic is here used to express
those investigations which the Stoics included under
ance in
the doctrine of utterance.2 The common object
general.
0f ôgg, enquiries is that which is thought, or, as
the Stoics called it, that which is uttered (Ksktov),
understanding thereby the substance of thought
thought regarded by itself as a distinct something,
differing alike from the external object to which it
refers, from the sound by which it is expressed, and
from the power of mind which produces it. For
this reason, they maintain that only utterance is
not material ; things are always material ; even the
process of thought consists in a material change
1 See p. 60.
2 See p. 73, 3.
FORMAL LOGIC.
within the soul, and an uttered word, in a certain
movement of the atmosphere.1 A question is here
1 See Seat. Math. viii. 1] : oi
airb ttjs aroaSf rpia tpd/jtzyoi <ruuaXK-hXois, r6 t af\y.axv6^vov
kcu to ffupxui-ov Kal to rvyxdvov.
Siv <T7]fJ.atvoyi*.ev eival rty ipmifyv . . .
ffyffuupAfttyov Se outo to irpayfxa
to utt' auT7js 5t)\oij^6voi' . . . ruy\6.VOV 5 TO KTOS VTCOKilfXfVOV . . .
touto!*/
5lJo /uv elyat o"c6/iaTa,
Kadairep tt/v (pwv^jy Kal to T07Xctô^, ** Sc atraVaTop, $OTrep to
tnjfiatv6fjieyov vpuyfia ko.1 Ae/rroV.
&. Ep. 117, 13, giving it ex
pressly as the teaching of the
Stoics, not as his own : Sunt,
inquit, naturae corporum . . .
has deinde sequuntur motus
animorum enuntiativi corporum
for instance, I see Cato walk
corpus est, quod video. . . .
Dico deinde : Cato ambulat.
Non corpus est, inquit, quod
nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum
quiddam de corpore, quod alii
effatum vocant, alii enuntlatum,
alii edoctum. Compare also on
the AeKToV Sext. Math. viii. 70
(above p. 83,2); Pyrrh. iii. 62.
Various arguments are used by
the Stoics to prove that the
voice as opposed to utterance
(\tKrbv) is material, as has been
said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of
the distinction between utter-,
ance and the process of thought
is the assertion (in Sext. Pyrrh.
ii. 81) that certainty as being
a definite condition of the soul
is material, but that truth it
self is not material: Atytrai
Situptptiv rrjs a\T}0elas to ahTjBhs
rpixus, ovtrlq, owTaVei, ouvdfiei'
ovoiq fiet/, tirel to [lev a\7]&s ao-t*>Har6 iariv, a^lwfxa yip i<m Kal
\txrhv, fi Si aA<i0ia amino,, fort
yap imtTTiifni fidvrav aKv\QCiv airo<pavTini]t 7J St imtTT^fj.-q irus *xav

riytHoviK6s> (Id. Math. vii. 38,
a similar statement is expressly
attributed to a Stoic) ; likewise
a similar statement which Sen.
Ep. 117, discusses, and at length
declares to be a mere quibble,
but not till after a lengthy re
futation : sapientiam bonum
esse, sapere bonum non esse.
The statement rests on the as
sertion that nothing can be a
good which does not make it
self felt, and nothing can make
itself felt which is not material ;
wisdom is material, because it
is mens perfecta, but sapere is
incorporale et accidens alteri,
i.e. sapientiEe. Accordingly,
\cktov (as Amman. De Inter. 15,
b, remarks) is a fi4aoy toC t
po^jUClTos Hal rod irpdytAaros' if,
however, j>6riua be taken to ex
press the thought itself, and
not the process of thinking, it
becomes identical with \tier6v.
Conf. 8im.pl. Cat. 3, a, Basil. :
TCi 5e Xey6îfva Kal Ae/CTa Ta voi]fiaTd sgtiv, ojs Kal rots 2twiko7s
(S6k(i. In Pint. Plac. iv. 11,4,
a definition of v6jip.a or lw(n)\ia.
is given similar to that of Akroy in Sext. Math. viii. 70 : <pdvTatrfxa Sidvotas \0yiK0v <pov. See
above p. 84, 4. The statement,
however, of Pkilop. Anal. Pr.
lx. a, Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2,
cannot be true, that the Stoics
called tilings rvyxdvovTa,
thoughts iKipopiKa, and sounds
A./cra, whereas eK<popiNOpmay be
used of thoughts in the same
sense as Xe/tToV.
T3
Chap.
V.
94
THE STOICS.
suggested in passing, which should not be lost sight

of, viz. How far was it correct for the Stoics to speak
of thoughts as existing, seeing they are not material,
since, according to their teaching, reality only belongs
to material things ? 1
Utterance may be either perfect or imperfect. It
is perfect when it contains a proposition ; imperfect
when the proposition is incomplete.2 The portion
of logic, therefore, which treats of utterance falls
into two parts, devoted respectively to the considera
tion of complete and incomplete expression.
(2) InIn the section devoted to incomplete expression,
complete much is found which we should include under gram
expression,
mar rather than under logic. Thus all incomplete
(a) The
grammar expressions are divided into two groupsone group
of words.
Chap.
V.
1 See p. 84, 4. This question

waa raised in the Stoic School
itself. Sextus at least, not hesi
tating to attack the Stoic teach
ing from this side (Math. viii.
262). speaks of an Itrhvuros ju^X"
in reference to the Siropjis of
\tKTa, and he remarks (viii.
258) : ip&fitv 5e us etci rives of
&v7ipf]K6res t^v 8napii> tuv \k~
twc, Kol obx 01 Tp(55o|o: tiSvov,
oTov ol 'EniKotipeioi, aAAa Kal ol
SraiKol, us ol neplrovBao-iKe'ib'Tiv,
oTs 5o jUTjSep fXvui âufxarov.
Probably the question was first
raised by later Stoics, when
pressed by their opponents.
Basilides was the teacher of
Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise
the existence of Xtxrh was
spoken of as quite natural.
* Sext. Math. viii. 70, see
above p. 83, 2 : tuv be XiktHv to
fj.it> (AAnrT) KoAoGtr* to b~i auro-
TeXrj. Various kinds of proposi

tions are then enumerated as
being oiToreX^. Following the
same authority, (Diocles? see
Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says : <po<rl
hi to XtKTOv eJvat rb Kara, tpavraaiav Xoyin)]V v<pLo~Tdfj,evov. tuv
Si \ktwv to fJ.iv \eyovo~iv eTvai
aiiToreKrj ol Stulkoi, to 5f i/Wnrrf.
4\\iwTj fj.ii/ oZv eari to ai/o7rapTiffroy %xomo. t))v iictpopav, oiov
Tpdrpei- 4iriQrjT0vfj.ev 700, Tis ; avtotAt) S* ô"t! to amjpri(rfj.vriv
txovra t^v ittrpopav, oXav Tpo\<peL
2ojpt(T7)5. Prautl in saying, p.
438, that the Stoics divide judg
ments (aJiup.oTo) into complete
and incomplete, is inaccurate.
Only A.C/CTO are so divided, but
Xticrbv has a wider meaning
than that of a logical judgment.
aîunaTa. are only one form of
Ackto auroTeXij.
FORMAL LOGIC.
includes proper names and adjectives, the other in
cludes verbs.1 These two groups are used respec
tively to express what is essential and what is
accidental,2 and are again divided into a number of
subdivisions and varieties.3 To this part of logic
1 Pint. Qu. Flat. x. 1, 2, p. oijrt ov oijrf rrcûa, aWa avfifZtfiT).
1008. A judgment (rrpAraois or xbt Kal Karriydprifia. Hence for
h^lvfta) i bv6p.aros na\ ffiuaros the latter the names trvpfSaiia
ffwiirrriKev, Siv rb fxiv tvtgviv oi and rtapa<rvfi$aiia. See follow
StaAfKriKol, rb Si Karriy6prifjia a- ing note.
\ov<riv. ThetermS7TTiris and xa' In nouns the cases were dis
TTjy6prifia belonging to the Stoic tinguished, the nominative, ac
terminology, the Stoics must be cording to Amnion. 1. c. being
meant by ol StaAfKriKol. In the called ovo/xa, and the other five
first class of words they dis cases rmiofis - a statement, how
tinguish ovofia and rrpoaryyopla, ever, which does not agree with
limiting Svofia to proper names, the common use of those terms.
and understanding by npoai\- In Diog. 65, the cases (yevixb,
yopia all general terms, whether Sonar}, airiariK^ are called rrhdsubstantives or adjectives {Diog. yiai irrirortis. Chrysippus wrote
58; Bekker'$ Anecd. ii. 842). a distinct treatise on the five
According to Stob. Eel. i. 332, cases, Diog. 192. Similar were
mains was only used to express the divisions of the Karriyoprifia.
wpoo-rryopia. Diog. 192, mentions Accordingto Diog. 65, the Stoics
two books of Cbrysippus irepl distinguished between transi
TuvvpocriyopLKui/. For the mean tive verbs (ipeh), such as SpS,
ing of Karriydprifia or ^rjjua, the SiaAeyerai' passive verbs (wfTta),
verb, consult Diog. 58 and 64 ; such as ipufiai- neuter verbs
Seat. Pyrrh. iii. 14 ; Cic. Tusc. (ov$(rpa), such as ippovtiv, mpiiv. 9, 21 ; Porphyr. in Ammon. rrartiv and verbs which, with
De Inter. 37, a. According to a passive form, do not express
Apollon. De Construct, i. 8, a passive relation (AvTiirenwSofrrina was used in strict accuracy T), Ketpeadai, irfiQeir&ai, &c.
only for the infinitive, other Consult on this point Philo. De
forms being called Karri yopiip.ara. Cherub. 121, c ; Orig. C. Cels.
2 The distinction between yi. 57. On the ivSa and Birrm,
Svofxa and Karrrydprj/xa was some also Dionyt. Throe. 15, p.
what bluntly referred to this 886, Hekk. ; Simpl. Categ. 79,
logical and metaphysical anti a, f ; Diog. 191 ; and respecting
thesis by the Stoics, as may be all three divisions, Zersoh. ii.
seen in Stob. Eel. i. 336 : airion 196 ; Steinthal, Gesch. der
5* d 7A\vwv <prjo~iv flvai Si ov Si Sprachw. i. 294. They also dis
airion (j-u/ifJe/StjKiSs Kol rb fliv tinguished between o-U|Uj3a|Uaand
aXriov trwfia, ov Si atriov Karrjy6prj- vapaavfiBaftaa verb, when used
fia. . . . Hoo-eiScavios , . . rb ftiv with a nominative, being called
aXriov ov Kol oapia, ov Si airiov Tvpfiaô. or Karriy6pr]/j.a, and
96
Chap.
V.
96
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
investigations into the formation and division of
conceptions, and the doctrine of the categories, pro
perly belong ; but it cannot be said with certainty
what place they occupy in the logic of the Stoics.1
Certain it is that these researches introduced little
new matter. All that is known of the Stoic views in
reference to the formation, the mutual relation and
the analysis of conceptions, differs only from the
corresponding parts in the teaching of Aristotle by
the change of a few expressions, and a slightly
altered order of treatment.2
wapwrv/ifiapa when used with an
oblique case ; 7rej>iaTei is a trtJjttfiafia, ueTaueAet a napaffvpLâpLa,
Kcpiiraru requiring a nominative
(SoncpoTTjs), fi6Ta/i'\i requiring
a dative (SaiKpctTei). If an ob
lique case is necessary to com
plete a sentence, besides the
subject, the verb is called
iKarrov t) tri'pLfiafia or eKarrov t)
KaTny6pi}na, as in the sentence
TlKirwv <piAe?, (pihet is so called ;
for these words only make
a complete sentence by the
addition of an object thus :
IWdray <pt\et Afovo. If this is
necessary with a *a.pa<rifif3a.na,
it is called tharroy fi jrapaatlifiiiixa. such, for instance, is
the word jue'Aet, for to complete
the sentence it is not enough
to say HuHpdrei pLc\ei, but the ob
ject must be added, as inthesentence: 2KpaTei juerojueAei 'AAf/SiaSous. This difference is ex
plained by Porphyr. in Ammon.
1. c.,36,b,whomZerscA. ii. 31, mis
understands and then blames.
See Ding, 64 where the text is
evidentlycorrupt. Withoutgreat
t emerity we might substitute for
the meaningless oXov rb Sick

Tpas TrXeii/ret 5e napanunfiauara,
which at least gives a better
meaning than the proposals of
Ii. Schmidt, Sto. Gramni. 06, W 1 ,
and Lersch. 1. c. 33. Apollon.
De Const, iii. 32, p. 299 ; Bekk. ;
Suid. ffi}/iôâ(very inaccurate) ;
Priseian, xviii. p. 1118, who, in
his equally inaccurate account,
has ocri/fi/3a/iaTO. The example
which lAician. Vit. Auct. 21
employs to ridicule the Stoic
hair-splitting anent trvpifiapia
and Trapaaiml3a.ua proves, of
course, nothing.
1 There is nothing whatever
on record which serves to show
the position held by the cate
gories. By several, definition
and division were treated of
most improperly under the head
of language.
2 According to Ding. 60,
Eeklter, Anecd. ii. 647, Spos was
defined by Chrysippus as tSi'ou
(which must be read in Diog.
in place of ko!) airdSoiris by
Antipater as \6yos hot' &vd\vai>>
(Anecd. avdyK-qv') anapri^yrus
iK<pep6nwos, i.e. a proposition in
FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.
07
Of greater importance is the Stoic doctrine of the Chap.

categories.1 In this branch of logic, the Stoics again
'
follow Aristotle, but not without deviating: from him (*) The
...
.
.
Stoic, Cat
in three points. Aristotle referred his categories to gone*.
no higher conception, but looked upon them severally
which the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. 'Op.ap.bs gives in detail what tvona gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, j3).
An imperfect Spos is called
imoypaupii. Instead of the Aristotelian rl fa thai, the Stoics
were content with the rl fa of
Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m).
Like Prodicus, they laid great
stress on distinguishing accurately the conceptions of words
of similar meaning, xaP"i T6'p<fiis, fjSofii, ev<ppo<rvirr) (Alex. Top.
9K). The lelation of yevos to
elSos is also explained : yevos is
defined to be the summing up
of many thoughts (arcupcupeTwy
ivvorifiaTwy which might mean
thoughts which, as integral
parts of a conception, cannot
be separated from it ; only this
explanation would not agree
with what follows, according
to which one would more likely
think of the different species
included in the genus. Prantl
p. 422 suggests hva<popT\Tav,
which, however, requires explanation) ; flSos as t!> bwb toO
yevovs irepiex'fy"''0'' (Diog. 60).
yw.tc&TaTov is o ytvos hv yevos
ovk (x(t ' tlSucdrceroy o eitios ov
tlSos ovk <Tx1 (Diog. 61 ; conf.
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 138). As to
SieUparis, hroSiaipea-is, and avrttiialptcris (division into contradictories) nothing new is stated;
but /ipurnbs has a special notice
Ding. 61). Lastly, if Sext.

Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the previous definition of dialectic is found,
as was stated on p. 73, 3, in
Aleinous Isag. 3, and he also
mentions c. 5 three of the four
kinds of division, giving two
others instead of the fourth)
refers to the Stoics, four kinds
of division are enumerated.
The reference of the 8 Sicuptire is mentioned by Prantl, p.
423, on the authority of BeltIter's Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic
source is much more doubtful.
There is little that is new
in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be
said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100,
J3and5; 101, c ; 102. fH quotes
from Chrysippus (irpl ray Kara
crreptiatv Xeyonevwp) on the subject of trrlpriais and ejir. Conf.
Diog. vii. 190.
1 Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36-144, is invaluable for its careful collection of
authorities, but in its attempt 'o
construct the Stoic system on the
categories it indulges in many
capricious combinations. Trendelenbvrg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217;
Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i.
426. Our authorities for the
knowledge of the Stoic doctrine
of the categories are besides a
few notices in other writers
principally Simplicius, on the
Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1 , 25-30.
H
98
Chap,
Y'
THE STOICS.
as the highest class-conceptions ; the Stoics referred
them all to one higher conception. Aristotle enu
merated ten categories ; the Stoics thought that they

could do with four,1 which four only partially coincide
with those of Aristotle. Aristotle placed the cate
gories side by side, as co-ordinate, so that no object
could come under a second category in the same
respect in which it came under the first one ; 2 the
Stoics placed them one under the other, as subordi
nate, so that every preceding category is more
accurately determined by the next succeeding one.
(o) HighThe highest conception of all was apparently by
ception *ne older Stoics declared to be the conception of
Being.
Since, however, speaking strictly, only
Something, what is material can be said to have any being,
and many of our notions refer to incorporeal and
therefore unreal objects, the conception of Something3
1 The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being
too numerous, and endeavour
to show that they do not inelude every kind of expression
(as if,rejoined Simpliciiisfiateg.
5, a, this were the point at all),
Compare Sim.pl. Categ. 5, a; 15,
8; 16, 8, who quotes these as
objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former
of whom lived in the time of
Augustus, the latter in the
reign of Nero. Observations of
these writers on some of the
Aristotelian categories are
given, IHd. 47, f, 91, a.
2 That this was intended by
Aristotle to be the position of
the categories appears by the
way in which he introduced
them; and also by his observation3 (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motionwhich are
based entirely on the view that
the categories are coordinate,
3 It will thus be understood
how the ancients could at one
time speak of hv, at another of
tt, as being the highest eonception of the Stoics. The former
is found in Diog.61: yeviKuTaroy Si iartv h yepos %v yivos ovk
?x1>
T^
Sen. Ep. 58,8:
N unc autem genus illud primum
qucerimus, ex quo ceterse species
suspense sunt, a quo nascitur
omnis divisio, quo universa
comprehensa sunt; after noticing the distinction between
what is material and what is
immaterial, he proceeds : quid
FORMAL LOGIC: THR CATEGORIES.

was in later times put in the place of the conception
of Being. This indefinite Something comprehends
alike what is material and what is not materialin
other words, what has being and what has not being ;
and the Stoics appear to have made this contrast
the basis of a real division of things.1 When it
becomes a question, however, of formal elementary
conceptions or categories, other points are emphasised
which have no connection with the division into
things material and things not material. Of this
ergo erit, ex quo hzec deducantur 1 illud . . . quod est [to
ty] . . . quod est aut corporate
est ant incorporale. Hoc ergo
genus est primum et antiquissiuiuru et, ut ita dicam, generate
[to ytvtKtt>TaTov\ It is, how
ever, more usual to find rt.
Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: koivbv Tt KOi 7ri irdvTuv ty yevos
\aitBdrowri. Alex. ApJirod. Top.
155; Schol. 278, b, 20: oiha
SetKvvois ay Sti fi}j KaX&s rb rl ol
avb areas ytvos rov vvtos (t! as
the genus, of which b is a
species) rldtyrai ei yap t1, Srj\oy
Sti kclI ov . . . aAA' 4x7yot yo~
fioBeriicravTes avrois to ov koto
trwfidTuv p.6i'riiv \tyetrBat Siacpzvyoify ay to fiwopijfjLfi/ov * Sia touto
yap to t! yevitcdirepov avôv (paffiv
tlvai KatTjyopoufievov ou koto ffaipua-rcov fiivov aAAa Ka\ iurcoftdray.
Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext
Pyrrh. ii. 86 : to rl, oVep (paulv
ejyai icavTtev yeviKtiraroy. Math,
x. 234 : The Stoics affirm tw
Tivuy to. p.*v eTcai adfiara ra. 5e
aaiifnaTa. Sen 1. c. 13 : Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale . . . primum genus Stoicis
quibusdam videtur quid, for in

rerum,inquiunt,natura quasdam
sunt, quEedam non sunt : ex
amples of the latter are cen
taurs, giants, and similar no
tions of unreal things. Bitter,
iii. 566, remarks, with justice,
that the older teaching must
have placed the conception of
Being at the1 head ; otherwise
the objection could not have
been raised, that what has not
being is thus made an object of
thought. Probably the change
was made by Chrysippus, al
though it is not definitely proved
by Stob. Eel. i. 390. Petersen
confuses the two views, in
thinking (p. 146) that the
Stoics divided Something into
Being and Not Being, and sub
divided Being again into what
is material and what is not ma
terial. In other respects, too,
he confounds the Stoic teach
ing with the consequences,
whereby Plotinus 1. c. and Pint.
Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute
it.
1 See previous note and p.
92, 2.
h 2
99
Chap.
V.
100
THE STOICS.
Chap.
V.
kind are the four highest conceptions,1all subordi

nate to the conception of Something, viz. subjectmatter or substance (to viroKsifisvov), property or
form (to irotbv), variety (to ttws e%ov), and variety
of relation (to irpos tI ttcos e%ov).2
(0) Cate
The first of these categories3 denotes the sub
gory of
ject-matter
of things in themselves (to inroKsi^svov),
subjectmatter or the material of which they are made, irrespective of
substance.
any and every quality,4 the something which under
lies all definite being, and which alone has a
substantial value.5 Following Aristotle, the Stoics
1 The Stoics appear to have
regarded them as yevMoiraTa or
rpara yeirn, rather than as cate
gories. Conf. Simpl. Categ.
16, 8 (in other places as 51, |8 ;
79, B, he is speaking for him
self and not of the Stoic cate
gories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14;
Karriyopia did not suit them so
well because of their use of
KaT7]y6pTifj.a. See p. 95, 1.
2 Simpl. 16, S : ol Se ye Sru'iKol els IXarrova ffv&reWeiv 4iOVffi rbv ruv Trp&Twv yevotv apidpidv
. . . iroiovvrai yap tt\v rop.k\v els
Te<r<rapa ' els vrroKeip.eva Kal iroia
Kal irks exovra Kal irp6s H wees
^Xovra. Plot. En. vi. 1, 25 ;
Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.
3 Instead of inroKelfievov, the
Aristotelian category of being,
oii<ria, was substituted by some,
not only without the School,
but also by Posidonius, who in
Stob. Eel. i. 434 distinguishes
ovaia and voibs the change of
the one and the other. Simi
larly his fellow-disciple Mnesarchus.
4 Porphyn in Simpl. 12, 8 :
ft re yap avows v\7] . . . Trpotriv
eVrt rod uiroKeifievov ffrjfiaiv6fj.eyov.

Plot. 588. B : uiroKei/xeva fiey yap
trpwra raâvTes Kal tt)v SAtjp evTavOa tu>v aAXwv TcpoTciâvTes.
Galen. Qu. Qual. S. Incorp. 6,
xix. 478 : Keyoutri y.avT)v rrjy irpwtt}v v\rju attitov tt)v airoiov. Com
pare following note. It would
seem to follow, as a matter of
course, from the Stoic belief in
immaterial properties, see p.
106, 4, that the Stoics also
believed in immaterial sub
stances (Petersen, 60) ; but as
such a view would beat variance
with their belief that reality
only belongs to material things,
and is nowhere mentioned by
any authority, although obvi
ously inviting the criticism of
opponents, it is safer to suppose
that they never went so far as
to state the belief in words.
6 Simpl. 44, 8 : touct Stwikt]
tivi ffwrjOelq (rvveireaSai, oiiBev
&\Ko r) to biroKelflevov elvai vofx'i^W, ras Se irepl avrb Btacpopas
avvTroaTdrovs T)yovp.evos. Diog.
150. Stob. Eel. i. 322 (see be
low 101, 2) and 324 : tyyve Si S
Hoffeidiivios Trjf tuv iXltiv ovaiav

distinguish,1 in this category of matter, between
matter in general, or universal matter, and the particular matter or material out of which individual
things are made. The former alone is incapable of
being increased or diminished. Far otherwise is the
material of which particular things are made. This
can be increased and diminished, and, indeed, is ever
undergoing change ; so much so, that the onlyfeature which continues the same during the whole
term of its existence 2 and constitutes its identity, is
its quality.
KaX vXyv airoiov Kal a/xop<pov elvat,
koB' Strop oiSiy anoreraynevov
tStov <?xei <rXV"
iroidVjjTa
kut' avr^v [ko9' aurV] ' ael 8' %v
Tin axhpari
*oi6rt\ri tlvai.
Siatpepeiv Se tV oiiiriav rrjs S\ris,
rr)v olaav Kara r^v vn6(rra(Tiv,
irrtvola uovov. Simpl. Phys. 50:
to airoiov aw/xa rhv TrpwrltrrTiv
v\i)v ilval <paoiv. Further particulars on matter hereafter.
1 Porphyr.m Simp). Cat. 12,
8 : Sirr6v ^ctti to irwoKeinevov ob
/i6vov Kara robs airb rrjs <rrods
aWa Kara rovs irpeo-fSvrepovs.
Dcxipp. See following note.
a Diog. 150 : ovtriav Se <patri
rwv ovrwv airdvrwv rhv irpwrrjv
vXnv. So thought Zeno and
Chrysippus : vXy Se forte l\ %s
brtSfiirorovv ylverat. KaXetrat Si
Sixws ovff'ia re Kal t/A?j, 5} re rwv
navrwv Kal fi rwv M uepos. f)
fiiv oiv rwv SXav utre nXetwv
udre iidrrwv ylverat, ^ Si rwv
4irl fitpovs cat irXe'twv Kal iXarrwv.
Stob. Eel. i. 322: (Zfywvos-)
ovffiav He elvat rr>v rwv ivrwv
livrwv npwrt\v Sxriv, ra{iri\v Se
iraoav aiStov Kal oire nXe'tw yiyvolieviiv oUre ixdrrw, rk Se pepy
ravrys ouk ael touto Siapeveiv,

a\\a Siaipeia-dai Kal <rvyxet(r0at.
The same was held by Chrysippus, according to Stob. Eel. i.
432, who says : Posidonius held
that there were four varieties
of change, those koto; Siaipeotv,
Kar aWoiwoiv (water to air),
Kara ff&yxv0~LV (chemical combination), and Kar kvdKvaiv, rhe
latter also called tV
i\wv
p.erafioXi\v. toutuh/ Se t$)x Kar'
a\Xoiwo~iv nepl rfyv ovtrlav yiyveaSai (the elements, according
to the Stoics, changing into each
other) ras Se &\\as rpeis irepl
robs tioious Xeyop.evovs robs 4*1
rris ova'ias yiyvouevovs. aKoXovBws Si roirots Kal rhs yeveoets
avixfiatvetv. rhv yap ovaiav oftr'
aill-eodai otire fittouadat . . . itrl
Se rwv iSiwS notwv (which may
be understood, not of individual
properties, but of individually
determined things) otov Aiwvos
Kal ewvos, Kal aii^trets Kal fxetw(rets ylyveadat. (These words are
explained by Prantl, 432, thus :
qualitative determination admits increase or decrease of
intensity j but the use of the
101
Chap.
'
102
Chap.
Y'
THE STOICS
The second category, that of property 1 or form,
comprises all those essen ;ial attributes, by means of
(7) The
category of terms aS^rjais and oeloio-is, and
property indeed the whole context no
less than the passage quoted
from Diogenes, prove that they
refer rather to the increase or
diminution of substance in the
individual thing.) Sii> xai irapafiiveiv t^v k<(Ttou TToiSrrjTa diro
rrjsyevtfffaisnexpi Trjs ayatpto-eois.
. . . 4x1 5c Tuy ihltes icoitov Siio
likv tlvai (patrt ra Sgktiko. fjt6pta
(individual things have two
component parts, which are
capable of change), to ftey ti
koto T7)i/ T7js ovoias inrdaTatrty to
54 ti koto t-^v rod iroiov. to yap
[iSiais iroi&i/] us iroWaKts \4yofj.ev
ri]f aij^riaiv Kal T^y fteiacriv 4tti1S4~
Xô-Bat, Porpliyr. See previous
note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15,
Speng. : Cos 4<rrt to {nroKttfievav
dnrbv, ov u.6vov Kara tovs curb tt)s
(Troas aWa Kal Kara tovs irpeafivTtpovs, ty fliv To \ey6peyoy irpwtov bnoKflfxeyoy, &>s t\ anotos v\7j
, . . SevrepQy 5e VKOKelfxevov to
Totby d koivus ibtajs iKpiararai,
inroKsifA-evov yap Kal 6 xa^KOS Ka*
6 2toKpaTijs Plut. Comm. Not.
44, 4, p. 1083 (the Stoics assert)
Cos Svo rj^tuy %Kayi6s 4<rriv inrnKet/itva, to p.ev ovala, to 8e [iroidV],
Kal to fiev del fiet Kal oiepfTai, fi^r'
aii6fievoy fjL^jre fietov/j.fVov, jU^tc
b\a>s oX6v itrri Siojuepoc, to Sc
titafifvei Kal av^dverat Kal jueiauTcu
Kal Travra iraVxt Tavavria Qareput
ffvfjtveajvKbs Kal ffvyripp.ofru.4yov Kal
o-vyK*xuV'*t'ovi Kal Trjs Sia<popas Tif
attrS'ijo'et pr]tau.ov irap4xov atyatrQat..
The latter is the individual
thing itself, the former the mate
rial thereof, in reference to
which Plutarch had j ust said :
to hi)u.u.aTa ovyxupovatv ovtq.i,
rds [m^] ^v P*Pei xatras outrlas

fifty Kal tp4peo~9att to fity 4 avrSty
/iefleiVas, to Se irodfv 4m6vra
Trpoo~fiexou.4vas ' ots 5e Trpoaciat
Kal aTreiaiv api6u.o7s Kal irK-^Btatv,
ravra fify tap.4t>ttv, dAA.' erepa
yiyveirOat Tats tprj/x4vats irporr6~
Sots, fâWay^jy ttJs outria? Aajufiavoio-ris. That it should be
said of this perpetually chang
ing material /u<jt' av(,6u.eyoy
pd\Tt ij.uoiu.tvoy may appear
strange ; but the meaning is
this : it can only be said of an
individual thing that it. in
creases and diminishes in so
far as it remains one and
the same subject, an ib"ws notbv
during the change ; but the
material itself, which is ever
changing, cannot be regarded
as the one identical subject of
increase and diminution. This
idea is expanded by Aleio.
Apliro. Qua^st. Nat. I. 5.
1 Troibv or rrot6rr\s, and also
iroiiis (sc. \6yus). According to
Simpl. 55. a, many Stoics assign
a threefold meaning to iroioV.
The first, which is also the most
extensive meaning, includes
every kind of quality, whether
essential or accidentalthe iris
%xav as well as the itotiv. In
the second meaning itotbv is
used to expresspermanent quali
ties, including those which are
derivative and non-essential
the (rxfo-eis. In the third and
narrowest sense it expresses
tous dirapTf^'iyras (/caTd t^v 4kôpdi>) Kal 4ftfi6yo)$ (Was koto
Siacpopay irotobs, i.e. those quali
ties which faithfully represent
essential attributes in their

which a definite character is impressed on matter
otherwise indeterminate.1 If the definite character
distinctive features. The sub
stantive Troiinis is only used in
the last sense.
1 Nimpl. 57, (the passage
is fully discussed by Petersen,
85, and Trendelenlmrg, 223 ) :
of 8k 2twikoI rb KOLvbv rrjs iroi6ttjtos rb 4v\ Ttav ffafudruf \4yovui
oiaxpophv ftvat ovrrlas ovk airobia\7|ittV (separable, i.e., from
matter) Kad' iaurijv, aAV us %v
v6t)fxa Kal ldi6T7iTa [sc. juiay]
airoKfryovaav ofire XPVW otfre
iuxî uSoTrowvfievritfj aWh rn 4
avTrjs TotomirriTiy Ka0' %v itoiov
vipiffrwrai yiveuis. In place of
%v vivpa Petersen, 85, with the
approval of Trendelenburg and
Prantl (433, 96), reads 4vv6i)na.
To me, Brandts Schol. 69, a,
32, appears to retain it with
reason, the meaning being that
tcoi6tt\s constitutes no indepen
dent unity, but only a unity of
conception. Non-essentialqualities are by the Stoics excluded
from the category of voibv, and
reckoned under that of irais
The same distinction be
tween what is essential and
what is not essential is indi
cated in the terms f{is and
uxtuis' 5roi<iTr)Tes, or essential
properties, being called essen
tial forms (eeis or euro) ; non
essential qualities being called
features or varieties (ux>uis).
See Simpl. 54, y 55, e. In datermining essential attributes,
these, according to Simpl. 61,
(Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43),
are essential, not when they
happen to be permanent, but
when they spring from the
nature of the object to which

they belong : ras fihvyap oûtis
Tais 4ttik'H]tois ko.tojut6.uhsi xapaKT7)pi(eu6a.i to.s 5e c|ei$ Tais 4
kauriiv evepyelais. A more limited
meaning, that of local position,
is given to ax4uis in Stub. Eel.
i. 410.
The distinction between
fvcouis and uvva^ also belongs
here. That, the oneness of
which depends on an essential
quality, is r\vw)i.4vov everything
else is either uwrinnevov or 4k
SieuTdrm'. Sext. Math. ix. 78
(also in vii. 1 02) : t&v Tt uaâ.tu>v to. p.4v tUTiv TjvaifieyaTa Se etc
uvvaTTTOfxeyui/ tci 5e 4k SteUTW rwv
7]VWfUvOL fJLV C&V 4UTI TO. fab fllUS
exeats Kparovfitva, KaBdncp tpvTO.
Kal $a ' ffvvojpeia applies to
chains, houses, ships, &c. ; com
bination 4k oieUTiiraiv to flocks
and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6,
Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same,
Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143:
avdyKfj 5e Tb %v uwfia utto fiias c5s
tpaffiv efeaiF uuve\4u6ai [1. Uuv4.
Xûdat], Simpl. 55, e ; to.s yap
TTOl6Tf]TaS CKTCt \4yovTS ovroi [ol
2TGK/cot] 4irl Tc Tjvwfieywi/ p.6vuv
eKra anoXtiirovntv enlbcTUtv jcarck
uvvatpfy, oTov pe&s, Kal 4nl tSiv
koto. oiduTauiv, olov OTpaTov, firibev elvai 4>tTbv jLt^Se tvpiuKfudat
wtviiOTiKOv tl %v 4ir' atnwv jiiTjSe
'iva \6yov eXov o&trre 4-k'i Tiva
uiv6uTau v iKdetf Atas efceus.
Those i^ns which admit of
no increase or diminution (eViTaTts, and dveais) are called 8ia$4ueis or permanent forms.
Virtues, for instance, which,
according to the Stoics, always
exist in a perfect form where
Chap.
V.
104
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
be one which belongs to a group or class, it is called
a common qualitykoivSss iroiov or, if it be some
thing peculiar and distinctive, it is called a distinctive
qualityIBttosTroiov.1 Properties therefore combined
with matter constitute the special materials out of
which individual things are made ; 2 and quality in
this combination (ttoiov), corresponds, as Trendelen
burg has well shown,3 with the form (elBos) of
Aristotle.4 It may, in fact, like that, be described
they exist at all, are Sta94<rtis,
but arts are only effis. Simpl.
Cat eg- 61,0; 72,5; 73,0; Schol.
in Arist. 70, b, 28 ; 7(5, a, 12,
24 ; Stob. Eel. ii. 98 and 128.
Conf. Petersen 91. A different
view was taken by Aristotle
of the relations of these ex
pressions.
1 Syrian, on Arist. Metaph.
2 1 ,p.90 in Petersen : Kal oi Stcdikol
be robs koivovs ttoiovs irpb TwWStW
iroiuv airoridevTat. Stob. Eel. i.
434 ; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl.
De An. 61, a, explains ittcts Troths
by arofjiuiOky elbos. Dioy. vii.
138 ; Pint. C. Not. 36. 3.
2 Besidesthepassagesalready
ruoted in note 2 on p. 101, from
Plutarch and Ntobacus, see t-'ext.
Pyrrh. i. 57 : to mpvaptva (the
intermingling materials,the
question here is the possibility
of mingling) 4 ovoias Kal nowri)ra>v o-uyKutrdai tyaviv. Por
phyry in Simpl. Categ. 12, 8
disputes this view himself.
The Stoics, therefore, clearly
distinguish eir, or essential
form, from the subject to which
it be'ongs ; and Philo must
have been following the Stoics
when he said (Nom. Mutat.
] 063, D) : ifcis yap rwv kot*
CLVTCLS TTOIWV O.U.fivOVS, WS flOUOlKT}

liouatKov, k.7.\ They also dis
tinguish between a thing and
its ovo-la. Stob. Eel. i. 436 :
tivai T rovrbv t6 ri iroiov Ibiws
Kal ry\v ovoiav e tjs can rovro, fit)
fiffrot ye firiS' erepov, a\\a u.6vov
oh rabrov, bia. rh Kal fiepot clvai
TTjs ovo-ias Kal rbv avrbv 4Trexeiv
rbirov, ra b" eVepa rtvoiv \cy6fJLeva
btiv Kal rowtp KX<^pio8ai Kal fi-fjo'
iv fxcpei 0uoe?'!0at. Conf. Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336 :
oi 5e 2Ta)i0i oijTC (repay rov oKov
rh fjLtpos otirt rh avr6 tpavtv
hirdpxew and Seneca, Ep. 313,
i. Mnesarchus, a fellow dis
ciple of Posidonius, accord'ngly
compares the relation of an
individual thing to its ovola
with that of a statue to the
material of which it is com
posed. Since the /S(a>r Troths
distinguishes a thing from
every other, there follows as a
matter of course, what is as
serted circumstantially and in
detail by Chrysippus (in Philo,
Incorrupt. M. 951, B), on bio
tiSoTTotobs [ = ioiais irotobs] JttI tt)s
auTTJs ouoias afii)x'xvov o~uffr?ivat.
3 L. c. 222.
4 This may be seen from the

as the active and efficient part of a tiling.1 Aristotle's
form, however, expresses only the non-material side
of a thing, whereas quality is regarded by the Stoics
as something materialin fact, as an air-current.2
Hence the mode in which a quality is conceived to
reside in matter is that of an intermingling of ele
ments.3 The same theory of intermingling applies of
course to the union of several properties in one and
the same matter,4 and likewise to the combination of
passages quoted in note 2 on
the previous page.
1 Pint. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054:
r^v VKtjv apybv 4% âvrrjs Kal
a.KtV7}T0V vrroKitadai ra<s ttoi6t71<tiv
aitotpaivovat, Tas 5 TroioVTjras
Trvcfiora oi/ffas Kal t6vovs aepc*>Seis ofs.&v iyyevcovrai /te'petri tt}s
vKtis eifioTroieiv kKacra Kal o'xV/jLa~
r/ffiv. It is a carrying out of
the Stoic teaching (as Simpl.
57, f, remarks) for Plotinus to
reduce icoi6ttis to the classconception of 8-jva.fxis (Enn. vi.
I, 10, 574, j8). But the Stoic
definition of dvvafits (quoted by
Simpl. 58, atj TrKeidvwv erroiffTtK$i <rvfiirTWfj.dTu>v, with the ad
ditional words Kal KaTaKârovaa
twc ivtpyttuy does not directly
refer to ttoi6tt}s. X1oi6tt}s may
also be connected with the
\6yos <Titfpfxa.rtKos. See Plotin.
i. 29, 593, A : * 5e ra irota vKrjv
icoiav \4yi)iVy irpotTov fitv of \6yoi
avT.-Ts %vv\oi aAV ovk 4v vky
ycv6fivoi o~vv8$t6v rt woffjcrovo'iv
. . . ovk &pa aitTol eXdt) oy5 \6yoi.
Diog. vii. 148 : etrrt 5e <pv(rts e|ts
[ = iroi6rr\s~\ 4 atrnjs kiuov^vt},
KaTO (TTTtptiaTlKOVS KdyOVS <X7TOTKovad re Kal avvixovtra Ta e>
avrvSy k.t.K.
2 Pint. Ibid. 2: (X^rmvs)
4v rois irepl ?eu>v ovSiv aK\o tcls

e^ts ir\}fv aepas eXval tpiieriV imb
TOVTQJU yap (TuW^CTai TO 0"t>/tXT7,
Kal rov tcoibv tKatjTOV elvat aXrios
6 <r\>v*x<tiv bA\p 4o*tiv} hv ffKKt]p6T7}ra fikv 4v ffiS^ptp, iruviOTrjTa 51
4v Kldcp, KfvKSrrjra 5' 4v apyvp(p
KaKovvw. Simpl. G9, y: ij twv
'Ztwikwv Z6â Aeydvrwv, tj&fxara
elpai ra ax'hfxa'Ta &o"trcp to &KKa
noid. Ibid. 67, e ; 56, 5 : irws Sh
Kal irvVf.iariKV "h ovaia tffTat TWP
(TwfxariKwu ttoiot^twc avrov tov
TrviVfxaros <TVV04tov vvtos, k.t.K.
s Alffos. Aphr. De An. 143,
b : 7rws 8e fTa>^6vTi*>v 0*t1 t$\v irepi
Kpd(TWS KQlV^V TTp6Kf]\\/lV TO Ktyav
Kal 7$)v el-iv tchs exovfftv airrfyv
UifXlXQcU Thv <PV(TW TOiS (pVTOtS
Kal to <pws Tip aepi koI rfyv ^"X'0y
Ttf trw/iaTi. Ibid. 144, a, the
saying is quoted against the
Stoics : (j.fj.'ixOai tj? VKt) tov
4 Pint C. Not. 36, 3 : Ktyov(Tiv outoi Kal KhaTTQva iv 4irl fitas
ovtrtas St'o Iblws yevetrQai rroiovs
(this follows from their hypo
thesis, but it is distinctly denied
by Chrysippus in thesis. See
p. 104, 2) Kal tt\v avT))v ovalav eva
irotov (St'ojs %xouo~av 4tti6vtos erepou
Sf'xeffât Kal SiatyvKdrTtiv 6/xoieus
afx<poripovs.
105
106
THE STOICS.
several attributes to produce a single conception of
quality.1 In all cases the relation is supposed to be
materialistic, and is explained by the doctrine of
the mutual interpenetration of material things.2
This explanation, indeed, could not apply to every
kind of attributes. Unable to dispense entirely with
things not material,3 the Stoics were obliged to admit
the existence of attributes belonging to immaterial
things, these attributes being, of course, themselves
not material.4 What idea they formed to themselves
1 Simpl. 70, * : xal o'i 2Toi'icol
5 irotdrriras iroiOTr)rwv voioutrtv
eavruv (? fjcrwc) itoiovvtcs efcray
ets [1. tKTa KaX e6is or ets
only]. The context shows that
the meaning of these words is
that given above. The con
ception of a property is com
pounded of several attributes,
and, therefore, a property of
several subordinate properties.
If KevKbv is a xpvfjLa, the 5iaKpiTucbv uif/ea>? is the e{is, or form
of Keulcbv.
2 This follows of necessity,
quite independently of the
above-quoted language of Alex
ander, from the Stoic doctiine
of the material nature of pro
perties and of the mingling of
materials. For if that inter
mingling of materials in which
each one retains its properties
and Kpaais in contrast to
chemical combination irapaBeats
and avjxv<Tl5') 's defined to be
the complete interpenetration
of one material by another,
without passing into a third
( Stob. Eel. i. 37fi ; Alex. De
lixt, 142, a; Pint C. Not. 37,
2) ; if, moreover, properties are
said to be material ; and in all

cases when they are combined,
each property retains its own
peculiarity, and yet is inherent
in the subject-matter and in
every other property belonging
to the same subject-mat er ;
it follows that this relation can
only be explained by supposing
a mutual interpenetration of
propei ties with each other and
with their subject-matter.
* The proof of this will be
given subsequently. Meantime
compare the remarks, p. 92, 2 ;
94, 1 on the \&ct6v.
4 Simpl. 56, 8, and 54, $ : ol
5e iratKol twv juic awp-drwy nwpariKas, tup Se affaip.aTwv affu/idtous tlvau Ktyoutri tos Trot6riyras.
Only the traiuaTiKal toi(!tt)ts
are irvtv/iara, see p. 105, 2 ; in
corporeal properties are called
euro,, to distinguish them from
e(tis (essential forms). Dewipi>.
in Cat. 61. 17, Speng. : eaup.d(a>
he twv Xru'iKaip \wpi^6vruv 7 as
eeiy anb roiv kicrwv atrtaparayap
py] irapa5?x^/**'0' Ka"' *<*VTa, orav
ipetrxtkuv deiv p 4nt ra\ roiavras
$m\t}\l/eis epxc'T'- But this use
of terms appears not to have

of these incorporeal attributes, when reality was
considered to belong only to things corporeal, it is,
of course, impossible for us to say.1
The two remaining categories include everything
which may be excluded from the conception of a
thing on the ground of being either non-essential or
accidental. In as far as such things belong to an
object taken by itself alone, they come under the
category of variety (7ra>y '^Xov) 5 but wnen they belong
to it, because of its relation to something else, they
come under the category of variety of relation (irpos
tL irons exov)- Variety includes all accidental quali
ties, which can be assigned to any object indepen
dently of its relation to any other object.2 Size,
colour, place, time, action, passion, possession, mo
tion, state, in short, all the Aristotelian categories,
with the exception of substance, whenever they apply
to an object independently of its relation to other
objects, belong to the category of variety 3 (j7ra> s exov).
been universal among the Stoics
(Simpl. Categ. 64, 7), with
whom different views prevailed
touching the extent of the con
ception of (kt6v. According to
this passage it was Antipater
who wished to include under
KTa, the Koiva trvfnrrdfjtara
(Tcafidruv Kal affotfjidrwy.
1 Conf. Simpl. 57, , who
after giving the definition of
quality, quoted p. 103, 1, con
tinues : iv tie tovtois, ri fi^j ol6v
T Kara rbv tKrivtov \6yov kotvbv
rival trvfjLirrufxa (Ttefidicey T irai
lufaiidTuv, ovKtri effTai ycvos r)
noi6TTjs, aAA' kripus p.kv iirl twi/
(Tuudrwv krtpws 5e iirl tuv atrwfxdTuy aiirr} v<pc<ni)Ht.

2 Simpl. 4^, 5 : d 5e rr/p
irrdtriy Kal T7]V KdOuTiv jur/ irpo(riroiovfj.evos (including SC. rots
ohai) <H/ce 2t&i(KT/ Tivi ovvi}8riq
(TliveTrtoQaL oiiSkv aAAo ^ rb
unuKrifttvov rivai vofj.lfavt ras Se
Tept aitrb Statoopas avuTroGraTovs
riyov/xfvos Kal irois exovra aura
cnroKaX&v s iv vols vnoKet/xevois
tX0VTa abib tovto 7b vws *Xilv3 Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20,
Speng. : ri 54 tis ris rb tt&s %xov
tjuvrd-TTOi raj irAdffTas Karrjyop'tat, SifftrtQ 01 StohkoI wioioiv.
Plotin. vi. 1, 30, 594, A : iris Si
107
Chap
I
(8) The
gj^rietl
and^
rtlatimi'/'
108
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
On the other hand, those features and states which
are purely relativesuch as right and left, sonship
and fatherhood, &c.come under the category of
variety of relation {irpos rl ircos e%ov) ; and from
this category the simple notion of relation (irpos rl)
must be distinguished. Simple relation (irpos ti) is
not treated as a distinct category, since it includes
not only accidental relations, but also those essential
properties (jrota) which presuppose a definite rela
tion to something elsesuch as knowledge and
perception.1
ev rb trus %X0Vi woWijs $ia<popas
4v avrots oiftnjs ; irus yap rb
Tpi7T7JXW Kai TO Kevtcbv ftS V
[y4vos dtrtov], rov juiv iro&ov rov
Se TOiou uvros ; irws 5e rb itotc
teal rb wov ; ttws 5e <i\ws r&s
%Xovra T^ X9*s Ka^ Tu irepwi Kat
rb eV AvKi'ttp Kai 4u 'AtaSiifiltf ;
icai ftkws ttws 5e & xP&V0S irt*>s
%Xovi . . . to 5e irotctv ttus irks
*X0V . . . Kai 6 TC&ffXOV OV TTWS
%X0V tatas 5' &v fx6vov hpfx6au
4ir\ rov Keiadai rb irks *Xov Kai
rov Xet*' Îr' T0V *Xtv ov ir^,s
ixov
ixov- Sim.pl. Categ. 94,
e : The Stoics included exei*
under ttws exov- In saying as
Simpl. 16,5, does that the Stoics
omitted iroabv, time, and place,
it must be meant that they did
not treat these conceptions as
separate categories. What they
did with them Simpl. explains
1. C yap rb 7rd>s %X0V Vp'Lov(rii'
avrots to. rotavra weptKafx&dvctv.
Trendelenburg, 229, with justice,
observes that, wherever the
species-forming difference lies
in To<rbv as in mathematical
conceptions, there iroffbv comes
under xoioV.
1 Simpl, 42, e: Oi S StwVkoI

avQ"1 tvbs yiwovs b*vo Kara rbv r6vov rovror aptd/iovvratj Ta fxev 4v
roTs wp6s rt rtdevrcs, ra 5' iu rots
irp6s rl 7tw$ exi'<n, koI ra ptkv
irp6s ri avri$iaipovvrs rots Kad'
aura, ra 5e irpSs rl irais zx0VTa
rots Kara SiaQopdv. (Ibid. 44,0 :
oi 2tw'ko\ yofi(ovo~t 7rco*7js rrjs
Kara Statyopav tbt6rr}ros air7j\Xaxât ra irp6s rl vcas exovra.)
Sweet and bitter belong to ra
irp6s rt to the other class belong
5efjJ>, ircn-fy), &C, KOTot titatyopav
9c 4>am ret Kard rt eldos xaf)0Krnpi6fitva. Every Kad' avrb is
also Kara. Siacpopav (determined
as to quality), and every irp6$ rl
twj exov is also a irp6s ny but
not conversely. Conf. 43, . i
Se Set ffaptarepov fizraXa&ztv ra
\ey6uvat irpSs rt fxkv \4yovo~tv
8(To Kar' oiKetov xaPaKT^Pa 5iaKtlfitvd ttojs airuvevet irpbs erepov
(or, according to the definition
in Sext. Math. viii. 454 : -np6s
rt 4o~rl rb wpbs tripw voov[ivov)y
irp6s rt 84 -was i'xorra oca v4<pu
o-vu$aivfiv rtv\ Kai /xty avfxfiaivstv
&vev rys wept aura p.f.raQo\ris Kai
aWoiuxrews pera rov irpbs rb tKrbs

The relation of these four categories to one another Chap.
is such, that each preceding category is included in _ V'
the one next following, and receives from it a more (?) Beladefinite character.1 Substance never occurs in reality categories
without property, but has always some definite quality *" "e
another.
to give it a character. On the other hand, property
is never met with alone, but always in connection
with some subject-matter.2 Variety presupposes
some definite substance, and variety of relation sup
poses the existence of variety.3 It will hereafter be
dlro/3/\e7TiJ', &<ttc Srav juev Kara
Stafpopdv ti iiwatfitvoy irpbs srepot*
vevarj. irp6s ti fi6vov Tovro effTai,
its 7]
koI 7} iriffrijuT] Kal 7]
aftr07j(ris * orav Se p7) kotos TTjV
ivovarav Sta&opav Kara \\zt\7iv 6e
r^v irpbs ireoov ax**fw QewpyTat,
irpds tC 7TWS *x0VTa ÔTai ' b y&P
Vlbs Kal 6 6"flbs 6W TIVWV TTpoffot6vrai, irpbs .TTfV irx6tTTO.<nv ' h*ib
Kal fiTfiefxtas yivop.4vris Trepl avra
p.eraô\r}s yevoir' ay ovkcti narrip,
rod viov aTro6av6vros, & 8e Seôs
too napaKtiui'vov /xeraffrdyros ' to
8^ y\vKb Kal iriKpby ovk av aWoia
yevoiro i p.71 o~vp.p.*TafidWot Kal r)
*(pl aird SiWu-is. In this sense,
therefore, irpds ti belongs to
notbv, being composed (as Simpl.
43, o, says) of iroibv and Ttpis ti.
On the other hand, rrp6s tI rws
ixof only expresses, to quote
Heruart, an accidental relation.
PrantVt quotation (I. 437, 108)
from Simpl. 44, $, we have no
special reason to refer to the
Stoics.
1 Trendelenburg, 220, con
siders that these genera are in
so far subordinate to one an
other, that the previous one
continues in the next, but with
the addition of a fresh deter

mination ; a better name for
the second category would be
incoKetfxtva void for the third,
vnoKeipsva roic. ttws e\ovra' for
the fourth, \mont'ip,eva Ttoih. rrpos
rl trus ixovra" In support of
this, be refers to Simj/l. 43, a :
tVeTcu be ai/ro7s ko.kuvo aroirov to
o~vy9era woieiy ra yivr\ 4k Trporipuiv
nvwy Kal oevrtpmv ws rb irp6s ti
4k noiov Kal too irp6s T(. Pint.
C. Not. 44,6: TTTapa ye notoviriy
imoKelpLeva xepl fKaffrov, fiaWov
5e rirrapa hKaaroy rjpwy. Plot.
Enn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A : Utottos f)
5ialpeo~is . . . 4v 8artp(p rwv eibav
to krepov TiQeiaa, Siirirtp ay [eifj tis
biaipwv T7)V 4iri(TT7)u7IV tV M***
ypa/xptariKTiy Xtyoi^rriv 5e ypap.patikSjv Kal aWo ti ' if iroia are to
be v\y iroia, they are composed
of BAt; and eloos or A070S. See
p. 48, 2.
2 See p. 103, 1.
3 See p. 107, 2 ; Plotin. vi. 1,
30 : Why are iris ?x<"'Ta enu
merated as a third category,
since rrdvia irept tî> \>\r\v nils
txovTa ; the Stoics would pro
bably say that 7roio are irtpl tt\v
SAj| 7ri>j ixovra, whereas the
110
THE STOICS,
seen how closely these deductions, and, indeed, the

whole doctrine of the categories, depend on the meta
physical peculiarities of the Stoic system.
Passing from incomplete to complete utterance,
(3) Com
plete ut
we
come, in the first place, to sentences or proposi
terance.
(a) Judg tions,1 all the Various kinds of which, as they may be
ment.
deduced from the different forms of syntax, are enu-merated by the Stoics with the greatest precision.2
Detailed information is, however, only forthcoming
in reference to the theory of judgment (afttu/ta),
which certainly occupied the chief and most im
portant place in their speculations. A judgment is
a perfect utterance, which is either true or false.3
>$ Mx"Ta, in the strict sense 4fi<pepi}s 6 Povk6\os ! by Sextus
of the term, are irepl to noid. called n\elovfl dia>/ia). Amvi")i.
Yet since the iroik themselves in Waitz, Arist. Orig. i. 43,
are nothing more than 8A7j iras speaks of ten forms of sentences
tXu<r<*, all categories must bfi held by the Stoics, mentioning,
ultimately reduced to Saij.
however, only two, TrpoaraiCTiicbs
1 Prantlf Gesch. d. Logik, i. and (^ktik6s (so reads the MS.
440-467.
Waitz suggests itptmmbs, more
2 In Diog. 66 ; Sext. Math, probably it is ewcniciis). Divg.
viii. 70 ; Amnion. De Interp. 4, 191, mentions treatises of
a (Schol. in Arist. 93, a ; 22, b, Chrysippus on interrogatory
20); 8im.pl. Cat. 103, o; Boitk. and hortatory sentences. On
De Interp. 315 ; Cramer, Anecd. the relation of an oath to a\l<j>p.a
Oxon. iii. 267, conf. L 104, a light is thrown by Svm.pl. 1. c,
distinction is drawn between also by Chrysippus' distinction
a(iwfia (a judgment), ^jioTij/ta (a between a.\ri6opKeii/ and tvopKtiv
direct question, requiring Yes i/tvZopKtiv and iwiopicuv in Stob.
or No), irvafia (an enquiry), Floril. 28, 15.
s D'wg. 65 : a<Wa St iariv 3
vrpoaraKTiicbv, bpiembv, apartxbv
(wishes), ciiKTiabv (a prayer), iariv ixijfljj ^ i^cCSos. Questions
inroBfTiitbv (a supposition), iK0t- and other similar sentences are
rtKbv (as 6KtfiV0ci> evdeia ypafitxT}'), Deituer true nor false (Ibid. 66
irpoffayopevTiicbp (an address), and 68). This definition of a
BavîaffriKbv, tyeKTiicbv-, iirairopT}- judgment is constantly referred
Ttubv, atprjyri/xaTtKbv (explanatory to, see p. 83, 2, by Simpl. Cat.
statements), fytoiov ajidj/um (a 103, o ; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14 ; De
judgment with something ap Fato, 10, 20 ; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8,
pended, as : ws TifuÂ.idpffii' 8 ; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35.
Chap.
V.
FORMAL LOGIC: JUDGMENT.
Ill
Judgments are divided into two classes : simple Chap.

judgments, and composite judgments.1 By a simple
'
judgment the Stoics understand a judgment which
is purely categorical." Under the head of composite
judgments are comprised hypothetical, corroborative,
copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and causal
judgments.3 In the case of simple judgments, {a) Simple
a greater or less definitenesa of expression is sub- ^ """"*'
stituted in place of the ordinary difference in re
spect of quantity ; 4 and with regard to quality, they
The purport of the expression (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9
\6yos a-no<pavrtKbs, heKrbv kiro- Prantl, 446, says this passage
tpavrbr (in Diog. 65 ; . Qell, xvi. is not quite correct; it only
8, 4; Amman. De Interp. 4, a; implies that the term av^KouM
Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the was confined to a Copulative
judgment); for the alriaies,
same.
1 Sext. Math. viii. 93: t3j/ which is characterised by a
yap aîwfidrwv irpurt]v (TX^Sbv Kal 5ic!ti, and therefore is not iden
Kvpia>rarT\v 4n<f>4pov<Ti Siatpopav ol tical with the irapaffvjrrtfj.fievoi'y
hia\KTtHol Had' %v ra [itv 4anv Diog. 72 and 74 ; for the Siaavrwv air\a ra 5' oi>x air\a. Ibid. tratpovv rb p.a\\ov and the 5ia95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the tra<povv rb Jfrrov, Diog. 72 ; conf.
definitions of both.
Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188 ;
2 Sext. 1 . c, by whom Diog. Apollon. Synt. (Bekker's Anecd.
must be corrected, seep. 113, 3. ii.), 481. These are only some
* Diog. 69 : iv Si rois ovx of the principal forms of com
air\o7s rb ffvirrîu4ifOV Kal rb irapa* posite judgments, their number
(rvpt)nfitvov Kal rb (TvuTreTrKeyfitvov being really indefinite. ChrysKal rb alrixSss Kal rb Sieeuyfi4vov ippus estimated that a million
Kal rb Siaffatpovv rb /xaAAov Kal combinations might be formed
rb Siaaatyovv rb j\rTOV. Further with ten sentences. The cele
details presently respecting the brated mathematician, Hippar^
avv7]fi/x4yov andSie&iryjuc-Voi'. For chus. however, proved that only
the TtapatrvvntLtxfvova condi 103,049 affirmative and 310,952
tional sentence, the first part of negative judgments could be
which is introduced by ivsibi) formed withthat material( Pint.
see Diog. 71 and 74; for the Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p. 1047 ; Qu,
trvtntsTrhtyfiivoVi the charac Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).
teristic of which is the kui and
4 There is no notice of a
(col, see Diog. 72 ; Sext. Math, division of judgments into
viii. 124 ; Gell. N.A. xvi. 8 and general and particular. Instead
9; Ps. Galen, EiVery. 8io\. 13; of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96)
Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, SpeDg, ; distinguishes apur/iivu as o'uros
112
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
not only make a distinction between affirmative and
negative judgments,1 but, following the various forms
of language, they speak of judgments of general
negation, judgments of particular negation, and
judgments of double negation.2 Only affirmative
and negative judgments have a contradictory relation
to one another ; all other judgments stand to each
other in the relation of contraries.3 Of two proposiKdOijTai. a6pi(rra as tIs wa^TjTai, dictory &.vTi<pa<Tis, a contrary
and fifca as &v&pnnros Kdd-rjrai, EVa>"rc<iT7)s, putting both under
2a>Kpdr7]s irepnraTet. When the the class conception of ivTtKtisubject stoodin the nominative, fieva The Stoics reserved avb,piff[itva were called Karayopev- TuceiTiera for contradictories
rtic& (Ding. 70) ; the others /caT7j- (Simpl. Cat. 102, 8 and 102, C
yopucd ' a KmayopevriKbii is outos a Stoic discussion intended to
Trfpnrarei ' a KaT-qyopiicbv, Aiwv show that the conception of
vepiirare'i.
iv&iTiov is not applicable to
1 An affirmative judgment negative sentences and con
was called KaTatpaTiKbv, a nega ceptions), which is after all
tive a-rroipaTtKhv, by Chrysippus only a difference in termi
in the fragment about to be nology. 'Evavrtoy they also call
quoted, and Simpl. Cat. 102, S, lj.ax6ntvoi> (Apollon. Synt. 484,
. Apvl. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Bekk.). Otherwise, following
Oud. renders these terms by de- Aristotle, they di*tinguished
dicativa and abdicativa. For between ivavTtov and tvavrlcas
the manner in which they ex %Xy ' ivavrla are conceptions
pressed negative sentences, see which are in plain and imme
Bo'etk. De Interp. 373 ; Schol. diate contrast, such as (ppdrriais
and a(pp6vtiais ' ivayritcs exovra
in Arist. 120.
2 Diog. 69 gives an example are those which are only con
of a.pvi)TiKhv, ovSets irepiwaTti trasted by means of the ivivna,
one of particular negation, such as <pp6vip.os and &(ppu>v
(neprjTtithvcupi\tiv6pci)7c6s ^tiv (Sinpl. Categ. 98, 7). The
oZtos one of double negation, former, therefore, apply to abs
{nrepaTTocpaTLKhvas, ovxt Vêpa tract, the latter to concrete
notions. That every negative
OVK <TTt.
3 Sext. Math. viii. 89 ; Diog. judgment has an affirmative
73 : avTiKelpLeva are rb eVepoi/ judgment opposed to it is
tou erepou iariv bjrotytniKbv elaborately proved by a series
or (according to the outward of quotations from poets, each
treatment of these determina one of which is four times re
tions) O.-K0(p6.fftl 7T\60KX^6t aS, It peated in the fragment irfpl Airois day, and It is not day. Aris (paTiKuv first edited by Letronne
totle called such a contra (Fragments inedits,Paris,l838),

tions which are related as contradictories, according
to the old rule, one must be true and the other
118
Chap.
V'
false.1
Among composite judgments the most impor- (5) Comtant are the hypothetical and the disjunctive. As J^meau.
regards the latter, next to no information has reached
us.2 A hypothetical judgment (awijufiivov) is a
judgment consisting of two clauses, connected by the
conjunction ' if,' and related to one another as cause
and effect ; the former being called the leading
(rjyov/j,svov), and the latter the concluding or inferen
tial clause (\?j7oi>).3 In the correctness of the infer
ence the truth of a hypothetical judgment consists.
and subsequently emended, ex
plained, and with a great degree
of probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi
libro itepl airotpaTiKwv, Cassel,
1841, Gymn. progr.). In ex
plaining the fragment Prantl,
Gesch. <1. Log. I. 451 appears to
have hit the truth in one point,
where Bergk is not satisfied.
1 Simpl. Categ. 103, 0; Cic.
De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25,
70. Further particulars above
p. 83, 2; 110, 3.
2 Viz. that the members
of a disjunction, as well as their
contradictory opposites, must
also be contraries (adversa or
pugnantia), and that from the
truth of the one the falsehood
of the other follows. A dis
junction which does not satisfy
one or the other of these con
ditions is false (irapaSiefrvypie>w). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12;
Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191 ; Alex.
Anal. Pr. 7, b.
3 IHog. 71 ; Sext. Math. 109 ;

Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen.
ii. 16, vol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen,
Lia-ay. StaA. p. 15. The Stoics
distinguish most unnecessarily,
but quite in harmony with
their ordinary formal punc
tiliousness, the case in which
the leading clause is identical
with the inferential clause (ei
7i[i4pa iariv, fi/u.4pa eaTiv) and the
case in which it is different (ei
T]fx4pa 4<tt\v, (pws IV-rip). Con
ditional sentences of the first
kind are called $i<popovp.eva
<rwi\pLp.eva. Sext. viii. 281 ;
294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112;
conf. viii. 95; Bwg. 68. That
in all these passages dupopovjueeoc must be read, and not
$ia<popovixevov, appears according
to Prantl's (p. 445, 122) very
true observation from the re
marks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal'.
Pr. 7, b, on $t<popovfj.evoi o-i/AAoyiffuLui.
114
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
As to the conditions upon which the accuracy of an
inference rests, different opinions were entertained
within the Stoic School itself.1 In as far as the
1 Sent. Math. viii. 112;
Kotvus fitr ydp tpatrtv tLwavris ol
&ia\KTiKol vyies elval tTvvr/ifx^tvov,
Stow a.Ko\ov9y TqjS iv avrif riyovfieiftp rb v avr$ Krjyov. irepl 5^
tovv6t &Ko\ou0ei KaX was, (TTaaidav<ri irpis aWriKous Kal paxdfi.va
rijs aKo\ovdlas iKriBfvTai Kpni\pta.
Cie. Acad. ii. 47, 143: In hoc
ipso, quod in elementis dialec
tic! docent, quomodo judicare
oporteat, rerum fa.lsumne sit, si
quid ita connexum est, ut hoc :
Si dies est, lucet ; quanta contentio est ! aliter Diodoro aliter
Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet.
(The farther remarks on the
points of difference between
Chrysippus and Cleanthes have
no reference to hypothetical
judgments.) The Philo here
alluded tothe same Philo
against whom Chrysippus wrote
his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and
194) is the well-known dialec
tician and pupil of Diodorus,
who declared all conditional
sentences to be right in which
a false inferential clause is not
drawn from a true leading
clause. According to this view,
conditional sentences would be
right, with both clauses true,
or both false, or with a false
leading clause and true in
ferential clause (Sext. 1. c. viii.
245 and 449 ; Pyrrh. ii. 110).
According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii.
104, the view of Philo appears
to have gained acceptance
among the Stoics, perhaps
through Zeno, for whose connec
tion with Philo see Diog. vii. 16.
Put, in any case, the meaning

appears to have been (Diog. vii.
81), that, in the cases men
tioned, conditional sentences
may be right, not that they
must be right.
Others more appropriately
judged of the correctness of
conditional sentences by the
connection of the clauses, and
either required, for a con
ditional sentence to be right,
that the contradictory opposite
{avTiKeififvov) of the inferential
clause should be irreconcileable
with the leading clause, or that
the inferential clause should be
potentially (SiW/iei) contained
in the leading clause (Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 111). The first of
these requirements, which is
mentioned by Diog. 73 as the
only criterion of the Stoio
School, was due to Chrysippus,
who accordingly refused to al
low sentences in which this was
not the case to be expressed hypothetically ( Cic. De Fato, 6, 12 ;
8, 15) : it was not right to say,
Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur ;
but, Non et natus est quis oriente
canicula et is in mari morietur.
It may be observed, in con
nection with the enquiry into
the accuracy of conditional
sentences, that a true con
ditional sentence may become
false in time. The sentence,
If Dion is alive now, he will
continue to live, is true at the
present moment ; but in the
last moment of Dion's life it
1
115
leading clause states something, from the existence Chap.

of which an inference may be drawn for the state'
ment in the concluding clause, it is also called an
indication or suggestive sign.1
The modality of judgments, which engaged the (7) Moattention of Aristotle and his immediate pupils so j^g^ti
much, was likewise treated by the Stoics at con
siderable length; but of this branch of enquiry
so much only is known to us as concerns possible
and necessary judgments, and it is the outcome
chiefly of the contest between Chrysippus and the
Megarian Diodorus.2 It is in itself of no great value.
will cease to be true. Such

sentences were called aireptypd<pws fitravlvToyTa. because the
time could not be previously
fixed when they would become
false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a).
Chrysippus also wrote on the neTax'nrrovTa, according to Dionys.
Comp. Verb. p. 72 Schafer.
Diog. vii. 105, mentions two
treatises of his on the subject,
but characterises them as
spurious.
1 According to Sext. Pyrrh.
ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156,
the Stoics distinguished be
tween (7t)fitia vTrofit'ttfrriK^t and
<rr)fi(7a MtiKrued. The definition
of the latter was ivSeutriichv
tytWfJLa 4v vyiet trvvi)fifxivai Kadijyoifievoy (or irpoxadriyoifievoy')
iKKahvTTTitcbv rod KJiyoyros ' the
{ryies irvvijjxfidvov was a sentence
with both the leading and in
ferential clauses true. Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 101 ; 106 ; 115 ; Math,
viii. 249.
2 Diodorus had said that

Only what is, or what will be,
is possible. The Stoics, and
in particular Chrysippus, define
Svyarhy as what is capable of
being true (ri> briSfXrucbr tov
oA7)0is e?voi), if circumstances
do not prevent; iSirarov as b
ju^ eariy fVtSeKT ittbv rov aKyQts
elyai. From the Swarthy they
distinguish the ovk ivayxaloy,
which is defined as t> xal a\ri$es
4ffrt Kal t|/C8os 616v re elyat rwv
4ktvs fiTjSey 4vavTtovfj.ev(t)v (Pint.
Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76;
Boeth. De Interp. 374, Bas.
The same thing is also stated
in Alex. Aphr. De Fato, c. 10,
p. 30. Swarhv ilvai yev4o~0ai
tovto 8* vn oudtybs Kwhvera yevio~8ai kUv p.T) ytvqrai.) On the
other hand, avayKatoy is, what
is both true and incapable of
being false, either in itself or
owing to other circumstances.
Diog. and Boeth. There was
probably another definition of
12
116
Chap.
'
(J) Ineience.
THE STOICS.
By the Stoics, nevertheless, great value was attached
to it, in the hope of escaping thereby the difficulties
which necessarily result from their views on freedom
and necessity.1
In their theory of illation,2 to which the Stoics
attached special value, and on which they greatly
prided themselves,3 chief attention was paid to hypo
thetical and disjunctive inferences.4 In regard to
these forms of inference, the rules they laid down are
well known : 5 and from these forms they invariably
take their examples, even when treating of inference
ovk hvaynaiov, as % i//eu8os dl6v re

ttvai tS>v ^ktos fiî ivayriovfievwy
so that it might be said (Boetk.
429) that the ovk ivaryKcuov was
partly possible and partly im
possible, without contradicting
(as Boeth. and Prantl, p. 463,
believe) their other statement,
that the Smarbv was partly
necessary and partly not neces
sary. The conceptions of the
Possible and the Not-necessary
are thus made to overlap, the
former including the Necessary
and Not-necessary, the latter
the Possible and the Not-pos
sible.
To defend his definition of
the Possible against the Kvpieiwv
of Diodorus, Chrysippus denied
the statement, Swan-ip aSvvarov
ixii aKo\ov6e7v, without exposing
the confusion contained in it
between sequence in time and
causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr.
67, b ; Philop. Anal. Pr. xlii. b ;
Schol. in Arist. 163, a ; Cio. De
Fato, 7, 13 ; Ep. ad Div. ix. 4).
Cleanthes, Antipater, and Pan-
thoides preferred to attack

another leading clause of Dio
dorus, the clause that Every
past occurrence must neces
sarily be true (Ejnotet. Diss. ii.
19, 2 and 5). The Aristotelian
position in reference to a dis
junction, that When the dis
junction refers to something
future, the disjunction itself is
true, without either clause be
ing necessarily true, was not
accepted by the Stoics (_Svm.pl.
Cat. 103, 0).
1 Pint. Sto. Rep. 4fi, p. 1055,
justly insists on this point.
2 Prantl, pp. 467-496.
3 Diog. 45 ; Sext. Pyrrh. ii.
194, see above p. 65.
4 Both were included by the
Peripatetics under the term
hypothetical. In the same way
the Stoics include both among
the five avair&heuiToi. See below
p. 119, 2.
1 Chain-argument seems to
have been also treated of in the
categorical form. See p. 120,
FORMAL LOGIC: INFERENCE.
in
Chap.
in general.1 According to Alexander,2 the hypo
V
thetical and disjunctive forms are held to be the
only regular forms of inference : 3 the categorical form , 00 Hypo.
?,
,
.
.
thetieal
is considered correct m point ot tact, but defective inference
in syllogistic form.4 In hypothetical inferences a
T1'
form.
1 As shown by Prantl, 468, pressed in definite terms, for in
171 ; on Diog. 76 ; Sext. Pyrrh. stance, If it is day, it is light.
ii. 136 ; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. The arrangement of the clauses
279, Oud. The latter rightly (which were designated by
refers to the fact, that Chrysip- numbers, and not by letters, as
pus discussed the main forms the Peripatetics had done), was
of hypothetical inference at the called ip6iros- for instance, ei
very beginning of his doctrine rh irpanov, rb Sexnepoy. A con
of inference, Seat. Math, viii, clusion composed of both forms
of expression was a Koyirpoiros
223.
1 Anal. Pr. 87, b : St' (moBe- for instance, el fjj XIAiruy, ava<rews Se aWfjs, ais elirev (Arist. wet TlK&ToiP ahXa fjt}]v rb irpwAnal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) eXev &v tov rb apa Sevrepov. The pre
Kal otis oi vedyrepot (TvWoyurpovs misses were called Aû/iiara (in
fi&vovs fiovKofrat \eyetv ' ovtoi 5' contrast to &fa>/ui which ex
eialv ol Sta rpovtKuv, us <paffl, Kal presses a judgment indepen
rris Trpo\-i\êvs ytv6fj.evoi, rvvrpa- dently of its position in a syllo
irucoC !) ffvvvpfifvov (conditional) gism) ; or, more correctly, the
Sitos f) Siefevyptevov (disjunctive) major premiss was Xyppui, the
% ovinwrXeyiiivov (a copulative minor irp6<r\ntyts (hence the par
judgment suggesting partly ticles Si ye were 7rpo(rA7)irTi/cbs
hypothetical judgments like the aivSeajios, Apollon. Synt. p. 518,
<ruîreir\7/ieVoy in Sext. Math, Bekk.). The conclusion was
viii. 235, partly negative cate 4iriipoptl, also eirupopiicol crvvSefffiol.
gorical judgments which have Hid. 519. The major premiss
the force of hypothetical judg in a hypothetical syllogism was
ments, such as : it is not at tbe called TptmiK&v, its two clauses
same time A and B. Conf. being called, respectively, i\yobDiog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158 ; fievov (as by the Peripatetics)
Matt. viii. 226. Vic. De Fato, and Xyyov (by the Peripatetics
vi. 12). By the vedrepot, the inS/iei/ov'). Diog. 76 ; Sext.
Stoics must be meant, for the Pyrrh ii. 135; Math. viii. 301
terminology is theirs ; and the 227 ; Alex. 1. c. and p. 88, a
Peripatetics, to whom it might 109, a; 7, b; Philop. Anal. Pr.
otherwise apply, always con lx. a ; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2
sidered the categorical to be Amnion, on Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19
the original form of judgment. Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45
Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud.
See Prantl, 468, 172.
* Such an inference was Ps. Galen, E1V07. Sta\. p. 19.
called \6yos- when it was ex
4 Alex. Anal. Pr. 116,b,after
118
THE STOICS.
distinction was also made between such as are conr
nected and such as are disconnected.1 In connected
inferences the Stoics look principally at the greater
or less accuracy of expression,2 and partly at the
difference between correctness of form and truth
of matter.3 They also remark that true conclusions
do not always extend the field of knowledge; and
that those which do frequently depend on reasons
conclusive for the individual, but not on proofs
universally acknowledged.4 The main point, how
ever, to be considered in dividing inferences is their
mentioning intBiSat irepalvovrts
ovWoyur/iol, or inferences in
complete in point of form, such
as: A=.B,B = C, .-. A =. C, whioh
is said to want as its major pre
miss : Two things which are
equal to a third are equal to
one another. On these ifie96Sws irtpaivovTts of the Stoics
see 1. c. 8, a ; 22, b ; Alex. Top.
10, Ps. Galen, Els. Sid\. 59. He
then continues : otis Sri nit
Kiyovfft avWoyKTTtitws ovvdyeiv,
vyiws Keyoutri [ot yetfo-epvi] , . .
oVt
Tjyovurai 6fj.otous avrovs
tlvat rots KarryyopiKOiS ffvWoyio-fiois . . . tow Travrbs StaiAaprdvoutrtv.
1 trvvamiKot or irtpoirutol, and
affvfctKTiKol or anepavroi, or a<rt*A\6yi<TToi. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137 ;
Math.viii.303and428; Diog. 77.
2 Syllogisms which are con
clusive in point of fact, but
wanting in precision of form,
were called irepavriKol in the
narrower sense ; those complete
also in form, auWayurriKol.
Diog. 78 ; Ps. Galen, E1V07.
StaK. 58.
3 An inference is true (o\7j-
e^js) when not only the illation

is correct (671})$), but when
the individual propositions, the
premisses as well as the con
clusion, are materially true.
The A0701 trvmKTMoX may there
fore be divided into true and
false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138;
Math, viii. 310 and 412; Diog.
79.
* Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and
135 ; Math. viii. 305 ; 313 ; and
411 : True forms of inference
are divided into AjroSeiicraco! and
ovh aTroSeiKTiKol. diroSe(renvoi =
ot 5(d Tpohi\\oa/ &Stj\6v ri avvayomes' ovk airoSeiK-nKol when
this is not the case, as in the
inference: If it is day, it is
light It is day, It is light ;
for the conclusion, It is light,
is known as well as it is known
that It is day. The oiroStiKTiicol
may proceed either 4<poS(vrutSs
from the premisses to the con
clusions, or 4<po$ivTUi&s a/xa xat
iKHaKimriKus ' tipoSevriKas when
the premisses rest upon belief
(irtVns and /ai/ûtj) ; ^kkoAu7ttikwi
when they are based on a scien
tific necessity.

logical form. There are, according to Chrysippus,1
who herein adopted the division of Theophrastus,
five original forms of hypothetical inference, the ac
curacy of which is beyond dispute, and to which all
other forms of inference may be referred and by which
they may be tested.2 Yet even among these five, im
portance is attached to some in which the same sentence
is repeated tautologically in the form of a conclusion,3
which proves how mechanical and barren must have
been the formalism with which the Stoic logic abounds.
The combination of these five simple forms of in
ference gives rise to the composite forms of inference,4
all of which may be again resolved into their simple
forms.5 Among composite forms of inference, those
1 Accordingto Diog. 79, Sext.
Pyrrb. ii. 157, others added
Other forms of avair6SeMTot.
Cic., in adding a sixth and
seventh (Top. 14, 57), must
have been following these au
thorities.
2 Consult, on these five &vairoSeiKToi of Chrysippus (which
need not be given here more at
length, and are absolutely iden
tical with those of Theophras
tus) Diog. 79-81 (on p. 79 we
must read <Tv\\oyi<rriKay for
trvWoyuT/idiy. See p. 118, 2);
Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156-159; 201;
Math. viii. 223-227; Cic Top.
13 ; Simpl. Phys. 123, b ; Ps.
Galen, E1V07. Sia\. 17 ; Prantl,
473, 182 ; on the ireiiirros anardSeMros 5io irXtiovaiv Sext. Pyrrh.
i. 69 ; Cleomed. Meteora, pp.
41 and 47 ; Prantl, p. 475.
3 Two such cases are distin
guished, one in which all three
clauses, the other in which the
conclusion and minor premiss

are identical. The first class are
called SKpopoi/ifvof If it isday.it
isday; It is day,.-. Itlsday. The
second class, a5ia<p6pa>s itfpaivovtj It is either day or night ;
It is day, .", It is day. The
latter term is, however, applied
to both kinds. See Alex. Anal.
Pr. 7, a ; 53, b ; Top. 7 ; Schol.
in Arist. 294, b, 25 ; Cic. Acad,
ii. 30, 96 ; Prantl, 476, 185.
4 Cic. Top. 15, 57 : ex his
modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur. Sext. Math,
viii. 228, in which passage it is
striking that avan6ieinroL should
be divided into an\oT and oix
an\ot. It has been suggested
that aKoStiKTM&v should be sub
stituted for amiroSftxTan', but it
is also possible that the latter
word may be used in a narrow
as well as in a wider sense.
6 Diog. 78 : o'vWoyitnucol [\6
yoi] fikv oi'V titriv oi fjTOl aiairS
119
' CHA.P.
v.
(0) TU
five simple
forms of
hypotheti
cal in
ference.
(7) Com
posite
forms of
inference.
120
Chap.
V.
THE STOICS.
composed of similar parts are distinguished from
those composed of dissimilar parts ; 1 in the treat
ment of the former, however, such a useless for
mality is displayed, that it is hard to say what
meaning the Stoics attached to them.2 If two or
more inferences, the conclusion of one of which is
the first premiss of the other, are so combined that
the judgment which constitutes the conclusion and
premiss at once is omitted in each case, the result is
a Sorites or Chain-inference. The rules prescribed
by the Peripatetics for the Chain-inference are de
veloped by the Stoics with a minuteness far trans
cending all the requirements of science.3 With these
SeiKTOi
?) avoy6ixtvoi inl tovs
in cnoSe'iKTOvs Kara Tt Toav Oefidtwv fi tivo. According to Galen,
Hipp, et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224,
Chrysippus had taken great
pains in resolving the composite
forms of inference (Diog. 190
and 194). Antipater suggested
still simpler modes.
1 Sext. 229-248, borrowing
the example used by jEnesidemus, but no doubt following
the Stoic treatment. Prantl,
479. Such a composite infer
ence is that mentioned by Sextut 1. c. 281.
2 Sext. ; Prantl, p. 478.
8 Alex, on Anal. Pr. i. 25,42,
b, 5, after speaking of the So
rites, continues (p. 94, b) : iv Ttj
roia&rri tuv Trpordtreuv (Tuvex*'ta
t6 re ffvv0tTut6if $<tti Oedpijfxa
. . . Kal ol KaKovfjLcvoi uirb rSiv
vtatrfpuiv 4ntf}d\\ovTes T Kai tiriPa\\6/icvoi. The eviBfTixbv
6e<ipriua (or chain-argument),
the meaning of which is next
investigated, must be a Peripa
tetic expression. The same

meaning must attach to iirifSaK\ovt4s t Kal iwifioJOuintyoi,
which are to be found 4v this
vvvfX&s â/J-âvofxevaii irpuroffcffl
JGjpiS T03V (TVfXVtpaOH&TW fOT
instance, A is a property of B,
B of C, C of D ; .*. A is a pro
perty of D. iitiPa\\6nems means
the inference, the conclusion of
which is omitted ; iirt$d\\uii',
the one with the omitted pre
miss. These inferences may be
in either of the three Aristote
lian figures koto rb irapaStSofitvov avvQvriKbv 8et^prjfia. b ol
juev irepl 'ApHTTOTekTjv tj? XPe'la
TrapafierpTiaavTes irapiTiooav, 4<p"
b'o'ov ai/rî anf/rci, ot 5 airb tt)s
ruv [aroas] irap' ixelvuv \a$6i/res
Kal Ste\6yTS ^Tro'njffav e| ainov rb
KaXovfAtvov irap1 avrois Bfvrepop
Kal rpirov 6ep.a Kal reraprop, a/xeMjuarrey ntv tov xpV^ôv, trai/
5 rb itraicrovv Zvvdfxtvov \tye(rdat
eV tj? T010VT77 dewp'iq, Kav b\xpT\(rros
if, &reeA0<Ws T Kal fobtbo'avTes.
Keference is made to the same

composite forms of inference Antipater contrasted Chap.
other forms having only a single premiss,1 but it was
^
an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful (s) /worth. On a few other points connected with the fronl a
Stoic theory of illation, we have very imperfect in- *<wile preformation.2 The loss, however, is not to be regretted,
seeing that in what we already possess there is con
clusive evidence that the objections brought against
the Stoic logic were really well deserved, because of
thing in Simpl. De Ccelo ; Sohol.
in Arist. 483, b, 26 : fi Si toiixutt)
avaAvais toO \6yov, 7} rb ffufj.lrtpaafia \ap.fSd.i/ovaa Kcd -rrpotTKafJLBdvovtra &\K7jv vpOTaffiv, Kara rb
rplroy \ey6fjt.tvoy irapa rots 2t&jiKois depict urepatverai, the rule of
which is, that when a third
proposition can be drawn from
the conclusion of an inference
and a second proposition, that
third proposition can be drawn
also from the premisses of
the inference and the second
proposition. Both these pas
sages appear to have escaped
the notice of Prantl in his
summing up, otherwise so ac
curate. Or else the rpSnov,
titintpoVtTpWovwa&'TiTapTov Biîc.
mentioned bv Galen, Hipp, et
Plat. ii. 3, vol. v. 224; Alex.
Annal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly
suggest to him the various
forms of the arair<!5ti/cToi instead
of the formula? for the resolu
tion of composite conclusions.
The expressions 5ii Siio TpoiriKuv,
5ta rpiuv rpoTrtKuf, and the title
of a treatise of Chrysippus irepl
tov 5ia rpier (sc. rpn-niKtov or
Xriun&Twv conf. p. 117, 3) in
Diog. vii. 191; {Galen, 1. c. ;
Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to
refer to such composite infer

ences.
1 Galled pLovoA^p-fiaroi JsAAoyur/ioi. Such were rinepa tan,
(pus &pa toriv and ava-nveis, ps
Spa. fee Alex. Top. 6, 274;
Annal. Pr. 7,a, 8,a: Sext. Pyrrh.
ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul.
Dogm. Plat. iii. 272, Oud. ;
Prantl, 477, 186.
2 Compare the remarks of
Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii.
2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 63, b; Galen,
1. c. ; Ps. Galen, E1V117. 8iaA.
57. If Posidonius, according
to the latter passage, calls ana
logical conclusions avvaKTikovs KaTa Suya/xty aîdfxaros, and
the Stoics also, according to
Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed.
Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke of a kutu
Suva/iiv TpoTWtbv,we have already
met with the same thing, p.
119, 1, where an analogical con
clusion was included in the
ap.e96d(t>s irepaivovrts, which, by
the addition of an Afi'wâ, can
be changed into regular con
clusions. In the doctrine of
proof the t6itos 7rapi5o{os was
also treated of, according to
Prokl. in Euclid, 103, being
probably suggested by the ethi
cal paradoxes of the Stoics.
122
THE STOICS.
Chap,
V.
the microscopic care expended by them on the most

worthless logical forms.1
(c) MefuNext to describing inferences which are valid,
tatUm of
,
.
nil
i> i
fallacies, another subject engaged the close attention ot the
Stoics, and afforded opportunity for displaying their
dialectical subtlety. This is the enumeration and
refutation of false inferences,2 and in particular the
exposing of the many fallacies which had become
current since the age of the Sophists and Megarians.
In this department, as might be expected, Chrysippus led the way.3 Not that Chrysippus was always
able to overcome the difficulties that arose ; witness
his remarkable attitude towards the Chain-inference,
from which he thought to escape by withholding
judgment.4 The fallacies, however, to which the
Stoics devoted their attention, and the way in
which they met them, need not occupy our attention
further.5
1 Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95,
a ; Galen. See above p. 120, 3.
According to Ps. Galen, 1. c. p.
58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on ivWoykttikoI &xpv^roi.
2 Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which
can only have been raised for
the purpose of being refuted.
3 The list of his writings
contains a number o treatises
on fallacies, among them no
less than live on the tyevfidp.ei'os.
* Cio. Acad. ii. 29, 93 : Placet
enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim
interrogetur, verbi causa, tria
pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prins, quam ad multa
perveniat,quiescere,id est.quod
ab iis dicitur V"X^Ct"'- The

same remark is made by Srxt.
Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii. 253.
The same argument was employed against other fallacies
(Simpl. Cat. 6, 7). With this
\6yos iiavxAfav (Diog. 198),
Prantl. p. 489, connects apybs
\6yos (6'ic. De Fato, 12, 28),
regarding the one as the practical application of the other,
but apparently without reason,
The apybs \6yos, by means of
which the Stoic fatalism was
reduced ad absurdum, could
not of course commend itself
to Chrysippus, nor is it attributed to him.
h Prantl, pp. 485-496.
ESTIMATE OF STOIC LOGIC.
123
In all these researches the Stoics were striving to

find firm ground for a scientific process of proof.
Chap.
V'
Great as was the value which they attached to such

a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle had
done before, that everything could not be proved,
Here was their weak point. Instead, however, of
strengthening this weak point by means of induction,
and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory
of induction, they were content with conjectural
data, sometimes self-evident, at other times depend
ing for their truth on the truth of their inferences.1
Thus, their theory of method, like their theory of
knowledge, ended by an ultimate appeal to what is
directly certain.
No very high estimate can therefore be formed of
the formal logic of the Stoics. Incomplete as our
!>
$w "
-ky*
^2rrt-*
comings.
knowledge of that logic may be, still what is known is

enough to determine the judgment absolutely. We see
indeed that the greatest care was expended by the
Stoics since the time of Chrysippus in tracing the forms
of intellectual procedure into their minutest ramifi
cations, and referring them to fixed types. At the
same time, we see that the real business of logic was
lost sight of in the process, the business of portraying
the operations of thought, antl giving its laws, whilst
1 Sext. Math. viii. 367 : a\\'
oil 87, (pool, tr&vruiy aw6Setl-iv
oiTfiv, Tiya Si koI i{ imodtaem
\afi.0dvfivt iirtl ov 8vH)<ttcu irpofiulvtiv fit"" o \6yos, eav nil Suflfj
Ti Trt(rr6v ^| avrov rvyxdveiy.
Ilnd. 375 : aAA.' tidiQaaiv inroTvyxdvvvrts \iyeiv 'ort tr'toTts cVti
tov ippuaSai t^v inr6Btaiv t6

a^r/des tvpioKeo-ilai lutlvo rb rots
4 imo6iato>i Ki\(p9fiaiv iwuptpi.
fMcvof t yap to tovtois atcoXov0oCc ioriv vyiis, KaHt'iva oh aico\ov6ei aAi)07) Kal avaixtp'iKticTa
Ku64o-T7]Ktv,
(2) lu
valve-
124
Chap,
'
THE STOICS.
the most useless trifling with forms was recklessly
indulged in. The Stoics can have made no discoveries
of importance even as to logical forms, or they would
not have been passed over by writers ever on the
alert to note the slightest deviation from the Aristo
telian logic. Hence the whole contribution of the
Stoics to the field of logic consists in their having
clothed the logic of the Peripatetics with a new ter
minology, and having developed certain parts of it
with painful minuteness, whilst they wholly neglected
other parts, as was the fate of the part treating of
inference. Assuredly it was no improvement for
Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather than
the categorical as the original form of inference.
Making every allowance for the extension of the field
of logic, in scientific precision it lost more than it
gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The history of
philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of
the Stoic system, so carefully cultivated by the Stoics
themselves, and so characteristic of their intellectual
attitude. Yet, when all has been said, the Stoic
logic is only an outpost of their system, and the care
which was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus
indicates the decline of intellectual originality.
STUDY OF NATURE.
126
CHAPTER VI.
THE STUDY OF NATURE.
FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.
Of far more importance in the Stoic system than the

study of logic was the study of nature. This branch
of learning, notwithstanding an appeal to older views,
Was treated by them with more independence than
any other. The subjects which it included may be
divided under four heads, viz. : 1. Fundamental
positions ; 2. The course, character, and govern
ment of the universe ; 3. Irrational nature ; and 4.
Man.1
The present chapter will be devoted to consider
ing the first of these groupsthe fundamental posi
tions held by the Stoics in regard to nature ; among
1 Natural Science was
divided by the Stoics themselves (JD'wg. 132) : (1) fi'SmSs
into rSvot wepl (tuÂtqjv teal irepl
ipX* "a! uToixfiay xa\ 0c2v ko!
7repdTwi> /ccrl rdirou koI Kevov (2)
ffvmuis into three divisions,
irepi Ktftrôu, irepl aroix^w, and
the a'mo\oyM6s. The first of
these divisions covers ground
which is partly peculiar to natural science and is partly shared
by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in

Phys. 64, b, discusses at length
the difference between astronomy and natural science) ; and
the third, ground which is
shared by both the physician
and the mathematician. The
precise allotment, of the subject
into these divisions is not
known. At best, it would be a
very uncomfortable division.
Chap.
v '
THE STOICS.
Chap.
VI.
A. Mate
rialism.
(1) Mean
ing of the
Stoic ma
terialism,
(a) Mate
rial or
corporeal
objects.
(a) Reality
belongs to
material
objects
only.
which three specially deserve noticetheir Material

ism ; their Dynamical view of the world ; and their
Pantheism.
Nothing appears more striking to a reader fresh
from the study of Plato or Aristotle than the startling
contrast to those writers presented by the Materialism
of the Stoics. Whilst so far following Plato as to define
a real thing 1 to be anything possessing the capacity of
acting or being acted upon, the Stoics nevertheless
restricted the possession of this power to material
objects. Hence followed their conclusion that no
thing real exists except what is material ; or, if they
could not deny existence in some sense or other to
what is incorporeal, they were fain to assert that
essential and real Being only belongs to what is ma
terial, whereas of what is incorporeal only a certain
modified kind of Being can be predicated.2 Follow(see p. 05, 2) and 338 : Xpio-iviros
1 Soph. 247, D.
% Pint. Com Not. 30, 2, p. airiov tlvai \4yei 5t' 8. Kal rb
1073 : bvra yap p.6va ra ffwuara ficv aXriov bv Kal fftZfia, k.t.X.
KaXovtriv, 4rreibri ovros rb Troitiv ri Tlno'fiSitH'los bf ourus. aXriov b*
Kal ttdax^v. Plac. i. 11, 4: ol iirrl rivos Si t Ikuvo, t) rb apxv2t&hkoI iravra ra atria (TwnariKd ybv Troi-t)<reuiS, Kal rb aiy atrtov bv
Trvevîara yap. iv. 20: olbe^rai- Kal awfta, ov 5e atriov othe bv ofre
Kol cwaa tt)v <ptiiv4\v ' wav yap rb ffcopia, aWa (rvu&ePrjKbs Kal Karrjbpfafitvov t) Kal ttotovv tru/jia' rj 5e y6pr)ua. See p. 95, 1 and 2.
(ptcvrj notu Kal bpq . . . in irav Dhg. vii. 56 : According to
rb kivovv Kal ivo\\ovv aStfxd iffriv Chrysippus, Diogenes (see
. . . $ri Ttav rb Kivovuevov ffwad Simpl. Phys. 97, a), and others,
larip. do. Acad. i. 11, 39 : the voice is material, nav yap
[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur rb iroiow <rwfid fort. Ibid. 150:
quidquam effici posse ab ea oufflav 5e tpatri rwv bvroiv a.Trdvruv
[natura] quie expers esset cor TT)V Vp<ilTT)V U\7]V, 03S Kal Xp'uaiTTporis . . . nec vero aut quod rros (V rfi rrpwrr) rap tpvfftKwv Kal
efflceret aliquid aut quod effi- 2J)v<av vKtj 5e lo~nv, i\ t)s bribnceretur (more accurately: in ttotovv ytverai . . . (Twfta Se eV-rt
quo eflficerefur aliquid. Conf. kot' avrovs t] obffln. Hippolyt.
Hitter, iii. 577) posse esse non Refut. Haer. i. 21 : ad>nara S\
corpus. Seneca, see below p. iravra vireOevro, K.r.A.
128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Eel. i. 336
STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.
137
ing out this view, it was natural that they should Chap.
regard many things as corporeal which are not gene'
rally considered such ; for instance, the soul and virtue.
Nevertheless, it would not be correct to say 1 that the
Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity
a more extended meaning than it usually bears. For
they define a body to be that which has three dimen
sions,2 and they also lay themselves out to prove how
things generally considered to be incorporeal may be
material in the strictest sense of the term. Thus,
besides upholding the corporeal character of all sub
stances, including the human soul and God,3 they
likewise assert that properties or forms are material :
all attributes by means of which one object is dis
tinguished from another are produced by the exist
ence of certain air-currents,4 which, emanating from ($) Theory
the centre of an object, diffuse themselves to its %^m"wr'
extremities, and having reached the surface, return
again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.8
1 As do Hitter, iii. 577, and
ScWeiermacher, Gesch. der
Philos. 129.
2 Dioff. vii. 135 : <raua 5' tori
(ipyaXv 'AiroA\6Saipos iy rrj <J>i/<NKjj)
rb rptxi SicunaTbv, k.t.A.
3 See p. 98. The corporeal
nature of deity and the soul
will be subsequently discussed.
4 Seep. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7,
remarks, in reference to the
difference of ipapira' (see p.
103, 1): nullum bonum putamus
esse, quod ex distantibus constat : uno enim spiritu unum
bonum contineri ac regi debet,
unumesseuniusboniprincipale.
Hence the objection raised in
Plwt. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085 :

tAs Troiirtrras ovalai nal atlinara
Toiovaiv, and Ibid. 44, 4, the
statement discussed on p. 101, 2.
5 Pftilo, Qu. De. S. Immut.
p. 298, D (the same in the
spurious treatise De Mundo, p.
1154, E) : ?j 5e [eis = 7roi(!T7|s]
ia-r\ irvev/ia fama-rpsfyav l(p' eavr6.
Hpxrrai /xiv yhp hirb twv nirraiv
in\ t& nipma Teivc<r8ai, tyavaav
Sk &Kpas iirupavtias Araita/in-rei
1rrfA.11/, &xpis &</ ewl <rbv avi-bv a<plKr,Tai r6irov, cup' ou ib irparov
ap^laSt], <?ea>j 6 crvyexys oStos
Si'auAos tupOapros, k.t.A. Qu.
Mund. S. Incorr. 9ii0, D [De
Mundo, 1169, A]: y 5' [?{] <rrl
128
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
Nor was the theory of air-currents confined to bodilyattributes. It was applied quite as much to mental
attributes. Virtues and vices are said to be mate
rial,1 and are deduced from the tension imparted to
the soul by atmospheric substances therein subsisting.2
For the same reason the Good is called a body, for
according to the Stoics the Good is only a virtue, and
ircfujuaTiKls t6vos. There can
be no doubt that Philo is de
scribing the Stoic teaching in
these passages.
The same idea is also used
to explain the connection be
tween the soul and the body.
The unity of the universe is
proved by the fact that the
Divine Spirit pervades it. Furtherparticularihereafter. Conf.
Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a:
rjvufrSat p-i* vnoriQerai [XptfctTrTros] rfyv avfi-rraffav ovtrtav tvwuaroi Tivos Sia irdfff)s auT7)s 5if)kovtos, v<p* ov avvayerai re Kal
cujitjUfVet leal (rvfitraOfS iimv avrw
rb irav. (That must be the
reading, the next sentence con
taining rail/ Si, (f.T.A. Conf.
143, b). Alex. 143, b, carefully
denies the statement, that the
all-penetrating Breath keeps
things together.
1 Pint. Com. Not. 45. See
p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2:
Placet nostris, quod bonum est,
esse corpus, quia quod bonum
est, facit: quidquid facit corpus
est . . . sapientiam bonum esse
dicunt : sequitur, ut necesse
sit illam corporalem quoque
dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.
2 This is the conception of
r6vos, upon which the strength
of the soul depends, as well as
the strength of the body. Clean-
then, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, i, p.

1034 : irAirvT) nvpbs S vims i<rrl
kav tKCLvbs iv ti? tyvXV yimjrat
irpbs ti iirnc\tiv tci im&AWovra
l&xvs Ka\urai Kal Kpdros. Stob.
Eel. ii. 110: Sxnrtp i(rxbs rov
trwparos rdvos itnlv mavhs iv
vtvpots, ovTu Kal y ttjs if/u\rjs
iffxbs r6vo$ im\v iKavbs iv to7
Kpiveiv Kal trpdrretv Kal pj\. All
properties may be classed under
the same conception of tension.
See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not.
49, 2, p. 1085 : yrjv piv yap Xaaai
Kal vtiap oHt aura <rvv*x(lv othe
erfpa, irrcv/urruc^s 5e peraxfi, Kal
irvpuSovs fivvdptws r))v ivSr-ryra
5iO(l)uAaTT(l/ * aepaHe Kal Ttvp abtwv t' eivai ot cvroviav iKrartKa
Kal Tots bvfflv iKelvms iyKCKpaueva
t6vov itaptx*lv Ka^ T^ fidvi/xov Kal
oiiriwSts. Ps. Censorin. t'ragm.
c. 1, p. 75, Jahn : Initia rerum
eadem elementa et principia
dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt
tenorem atque materiam ; tenorem, qui rarescente materia
a medio tendat ad summum,
eadem concrescente rursus a
summo referatur ad medium.
Here tenor or t&vos is made
equivalent to irveOjua. Seneca,
however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi.
21, endeavours to show that
intentio belongs to npiritus
more than to any other body.
STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM..

virtue is a definite condition of that material which
constitutes the soul.1 In the same sense also truth
is said to be material, personal and not independent
truth being of course meant,2 that is to say, know
ledge, or a property of the soul that knows. And
since according to the Stoics knowledge consists in
the presence of certain material elements within the
soul, truth in the sense of knowledge may be rightly
called something material. Even emotions, impulses,
notions and judgments, in so far as they are due to
material causesthe air-currents pouring into the
soul (irvevfiaTa)were regarded as material objects,
and for the same reason not only artistic skill but
individual actions were said to be corporeal.3 Yet
1 Sen. Ep. 100, 4 : Bonum
facit, prodest enim : quod facit
corpus est: bonum agitat animum et qnodanimodo format et
continet, qu;e propria sunt cor
poris. Qua; corporis bona sunt,
corpora sunt : ergo et qua;
animi sunt. Nam et hoc cor
pus Bonum hominis necesse
est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis. ... Si adfeetus corpora
sunt et morbi animorum et
avaritia, crudelitas, indurata
vitia . . . ergo et malitia et
species ejus omnes . . . ergo et
bona. It is then specially re
marked that the Good, i.e. vir
tue, works upon the body,
governing it and representing
itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.
' Sext. Math. vii. 38 : tJ)k 8
aX-hQuav oiuvtoX Tivts, Kal udktara
ol anb ttjs ffroas, oia<p4pav raKri6ovs Kara Tpe?s rp 'movs . . . ovala.
fLtv irap ftffov T] a\v a\-t]deia naip.a
*Vti t6 5 h\ri&ls auwparov unyp-
X*. Kal uk6tus, (paori. tovtI fill/

yap ata>ud iffTi, rb Sh d|(a>,ua \eKrbv, rb 5e \eKrbv affw^mrov ' avdiraXiv 5 Tj aKi]0eia ffatud iffriv
irap' offov iri<rr-t)HTindvT(i>v ahridwv
aTrotpavTiKT) doKt Tvyxdvetv iracra
Se eirnrT^jUij iris ^X0I/ &7t1j/ Tjyt/xoviKbv . . . rb Se T)yspLOVLKbv
(TcHifxa (rcrrd rovrovs vKripx^- Simi
larly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92,
2.
3 Tlut. Com. Not. 45, 2,
p. 1084 : &TOTTOV yap eu juaAa, Tds
aperas Kal ras KaKias, Trpbs Se
ravrats Tas rexvas Kal rets ftvtifias
iratros, eVt 5e tyamaoias Kal iraBt]
Kal dpfias Kal (TuyKaradcffeis
frtifxara TroiovpLwovs eV piioivl
<pdvai KettrQai, k t.A. . . . ol S1 ot
fl6vov TCtS dpgTOS Kal TOS KOKias
$a flvai \eyov(ru>, ovok to irddrj
p.6vov, opyas Kal <pd6vovs Kal \vitas
Kal e-KixaipiKaKias, ou5e Kara\-f}tyeis Kalfpayrarria? Kal ayvoias ov5e
Tds Ti%vas ^CjT^J/ ffKVTOTO/XlK^V,
T^f xa^K0TV'!riK7lv ' d\Ad irpbi
129
Chap.
VI.
130
Chap.
VI.
(7) The
causes of
actions
material.
THE STOICS.
certain actions, such as walking and dancing, can
hardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any
more than being wise was called a body ; 1 but the
objects which produced these actions, as indeed
everything which makes itself felt, were considered
to be corporeal. To us it appears most natural to
refer these actions to the soul as their originating
cause ; but the Stoics, holding the theory of subjectmatter and property, preferred to refer each such
action to some special material as its cause, consider
ing that an action is due to the presence of this
material. The idealism of Plato was thus reproduced
in a new form by the materialism of the Stoics.
Toirois Kai tcls ivepytias trd/mra
Kai $atroiov<Tt,Tbvirep'nra.TOi' $ov,
t^v ipxtlffiv, T^v vn66e(Tiy, r^v
wpoaayipevffiv, rijy \oi5opiav.
Plutarch is here speaking as
an opponent. Seneca, however
(Ep. 106, 5), observes : Non
puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint . . . tanquam ira, amor, tristitia : si
dubitas, vide an vultum nobis
mutent : . . . Quid ergo ? tam
manifestas corpori notas credis
imprimi, nisi a corpore ? See
p. 129, 1; Stob. Eel. ii. 114:
The Stoics consider virtues to
be substantially identical (ras
auras tcaB' imoaTatxiv) with the
leading part of the soul (rrye/iorucbv), and consequently to be,
like it, <r<fyurra and ffa. Seneca,
Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more
plainly : Desideras tibi scribi a
me, quid sentiam de hac qua?stione jactata apud nostras : an
justitia, an fortitudo, pruden'ia
cetereeque virtutes animalia
sint. . . . Me in alia sententia
profiteor esse. . . . Quae sint

ergo quae antiquos moverint,
dicam. Animum constat animal
esse. . . . Virtus autem nihil
aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens : ergo
animal est. Deinde : virtus
agit aliquid : agi autem nihil
sine impetu (*/>,.))) potest. If
it is urged : Each individual
will thus consist of an innu
merable number of living
beings, the reply is that these
animalia are only parts of one
animal, the soul ; they are ac
cordingly not many (multa"),
but one and the same viewed
from different sides : idem est
animus et justus et prudens et
fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the
same letter, 23, we gather that
Cleanthes explained ambulatio
as spiritus a principali usque in
pedes permissus, Chrysippus as
principale itself.
1 See p. 92, 2, the extract
from Sen. Ep. 117.
131
Plato had said, a man is just and musical when he Chap.

participates in the idea of justice and music ; the
'
Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the material pro
ducing virtue is in him ; musical, when he has the
material producing music.
Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena (S) Wide
of life. Hence, not content with calling them bodies, ^ mufa.
the Stoics actually went so far as to call them living rial.
beings. It seems, however, strange to hear such
things as day and night, and parts of the day and
parts of the night, months and years, even days of
the month and seasons of the year, called bodies ; 1
but by these singularly unhappy expressions Chrysippus appears to have meant little more than that
the realities corresponding to these names depend on
certain material conditions : by summer is meant a
certain state of the air when highly heated by the
sun ; by month the moon for a certain definite period
during which it gives light to the earth.2 From all
1 Pint. Com. Not. 45, 5,
p. 1084 : Xpwiirirou nvrjixovevovrts
iv t$ trpaWtp r&v (putriK&v CnryfidTuy o5tw irpoffdyovros ' ovx y
fiev vv ffufid ivrtv, T) 5' ItTTre'po
Kal 6 dpBbs koi to ueo-oy rrjs vvtcrbs
aufiara ovk Zgtiv oiiSk tj fief
ijixtpa crSjfid tffriv, ovxl 5i Kal 77
vouîijvia trtcfia, Kal 7] 5eKaT7j, Kal
ircireKaio'eKan; Kal t\ rpiaKas Kal &
ftîv (Tafia ian Kal to Btpos Kal to
<pBiv6irapov Kal i iviavris.
1 Diog. 151 : xftP'*va H^"
dial' <t>aai rbv imtp yijs aepa kottyvyfitvov Sii, t^v toO i)\lov irp6au>
ttpotov, tap Si tV fixpatrlay toG
atpos Kara t)]v npis Tjfiasiropelav,
flepos Se Tin Imip yrjs &4pa Kara-
BaXirifitvov, k.t.X Stoh. Eel. i.

260 : Chrysippus defines cap
erovs &pay KfKpa/x4vrjv 2k x*ip&vos
airoAôpTOS Kal Btpovs apxofifvov
. . . Bipos 5e &pav t^)v /xcEAiot' a*?'
T]\lov SiaKeKavpcvrjv fierSirapov 5i
Sipav %rovs t^]v fiera Bepos ftivirpb
xciju&ros 5e KCKpauevriv ' xft^va
5e 8>pav ctovs t^c fidKitrra KaretyvyiiivyVt % TV Tcf Vfpl ywv aept
Kart^vyfiivuv. Ibid. : According
to Empedocles and the Stoics,
the cause of winter is the pre
ponderance of air, the cause of
summer the preponderance of
fire. Ibid. 556 : êlsS' fori, <pr)<rl
[Xpwniriros] to <patv6tievov rijs o"Kiirns irpbs ri/ias, tj trtAJivri uipos
K 2
J32
Chap,
YI'
THE STOICS.
these examples one thing is clear, how impossible
the Stoics found it to assign reality to what is not
material.
(b)TIiei>tIn carrying out this theory, they could not, as
ormm-al might be expected, wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic
material,
could not deny that there are certain things which
\
)
it is absurd to call material. Among such include

empty space, place, time, and expression (\sktov).1
Admitting these to be incorporeal, they still would not
allow that they do not exist at all. This view belongs
only to isolated members of the Stoic School, for
which they must be held personally responsible.2
How they could harmonise belief in incorporeal
things with their tenet that existence alone belongs
to what is material is not on record.
(2) Causes
The question next before us is : What led the
winch pro1
.
duoed the Stoics to this materialism ? It might be supposed
teriaUmi *ka* ^heir peculiar theory of knowledge based on
sensation was the cause ; but this theory did not pre
clude the possibility of advancing from the sensible
to the super- sensible. It might quite as well be said
that their theory of knowledge was a consequence of
their materialism, and that they referred all know
ledge to sensation, because they could allow no real
being to anything which is not material. The pro
bability therefore remains that their theory of knoweXO"<ra ipaivifitvov lrpbs râs.
Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four meanings of
nfo. In the two first it means
something material; in the
others, as a definition of time,
something immaterial.
1 Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Eel. i.
392; Sext. Math, x 218 and
237; "viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh.
ii. 81 ; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.
2 See p. 94, 1.

ledge and their materialistic view of nature both
indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that
both are due to the action of the same causes.
Nor will it do to seek for these causes in the
influence exercised by the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic
philosophy on the Stoic School. At first sight, indeed,
1
1 J
it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from

Heraclitus their materialism, together with their
other views on nature ; or else their materialism might
seem to be an expansion of the metaphysical notions of
Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied Plato's
distinction of form and matter to such an extent that
he would hardly allow form to exist at all except in
union with matter, might it not appear to others
more logical to do away with the distinction between
them in thought, thus reducing both to a property of
matter ? Were there not difficulties in the doctrine
of a God external to the world, of a passionless Reason?
Were there not even difficulties in the antithesis of
form and matter, which Aristotle's system was power
less to overcome ? And had not Aristoxenus and
Dicaearchus before the time of Zeno, and Strato im
mediately after his time, been led from the ground
occupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views ?
And yet we must pause before accepting this explana
tion. The founder of Stoicism appears, from what is
recorded of his intellectual growth, to have been
repelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any
other ; nor is there the least indication in the records
of the Stoic teaching that that teaching resulted from
a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic views of a
133
Chap.
VI
'
(a) The
terialism
mt
ex~
pansion of
Peripatetu> vieKt-
134
Chap.
YI-
() The
teriaUmii
ijM duetto
tu,_
'
(c) PracIfthVstoic
philosophy
THE STOICS.
double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition
that everything capable of acting or being acted
upon must be material, appears with the Stoics as an
independent axiom needing no further proof.
The supposed connection between the Stoics and
Heraclitus, so far from explaining their materialistic
views, already presumes their existence. Yet long
before Zeno's time the philosophy of Heraclitus as a
living tradition had become extinct. No historical
connection therefore, or relation of original depend
ence, can possibly exist between the two, but at most
a subsequent perception of relationship can have
directed Zeno to Heraclitus. Zeno's own view of the
world was not a consequence, but the cause, of his
sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the
Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first
impulse to Zeno's materialism, although they may
have helped in many ways to strengthen his views on
that subject, when already formed,
The real causes for these views must therefore be
sough* elsewhere, and will be found in the central
idea of the whole system of the Stoicsthe practical
character of their philosophy. Devoting themselves
from the outset with all their energies to practical
enquiries, the Stoics in their theory of nature occu
pied the ground of common views, which know of no
real object excepting what is grossly sensible and
corporeal. Their aim in speculation was to discover
a firm basis for human actions.1 In action, how
ever, men are brought into direct and experimental
1 See p. G6, 1.

contact with objects. The objects thus presented
to the senses we are brought face to face with
in naked reality, nor is an opportunity afforded
for doubting their real being. Their reality is
proved practically, inasmuch as it affects us and
offers itself for the exercise of our powers. In every
such exercise of power, both subject and object are
always material. Even when an impression is con
veyed to the soul of man, the direct instrument is
something materialthe voice or the gesture. In
the region of experience there are no such things as
non-material impressions. This was the ground
occupied by the Stoics : a real thing is what either
acts on us, or is acted upon by us. Such a thing is
naturally material ; and the Stoics with their practical
ideas not being able to soar above that which is most
obvious, declared that reality belongs only to the world
of bodies.
Herefrom it would appear to follow that only
individual perceptions are true, and that all general
conceptions without exception must be false. If each
notion (\sktov) is incorporeal, and consequently unreal,1 will not absence of reality in a much higher
degree belong to the notion of what is general ?
Individual notions refer directly to perceptions, i.e.
to things incorporeal; nevertheless they indirectly
refer to the things perceived, i.e. to what is material.
.
-tip
But general notions do not even indirectly refer to
anything corporeal ; they are pure fabrications of
the mind, which have nothing real as their object.
1 See p. 93 ; 132, 1.
135
Chap.
^1
(3) Care"^f^stuio
mate^
dividual
^âUme
true ; yet
truilias*9ned to
general
coneeytwits.
136
Chap.
YI"
THE STOICS.
This the Stoics explicitly maintained.1 It was therefore a gross inconsistency to attribute notwithstand
ing to these general conceptions, to which no real

objects correspond, a higher truth and certainty than
belongs to the perceptions of individual objects, but
an inconsistency which the Stoic system made not
the slightest attempt to overcome.
(*) Theory
The materialism of the Stoics likewise led to some
of waiver.
.
ml inter- remarkable assertions in the province ot natural
mingling. science_ jf t,ne attributes of things, the soul and even
the powers of the soul, are all corporeal, the relation

of attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body,
of one body to another body, is that of mutual inter
mingling? Moreover, inasmuch as the essential
attributes of any definite material belong to every
part of that material, and the soul resides in every
part of the body, without the soul's being identical
with the body, and without the attributes being
identical with the material to which they belong, or
with one another; it follows that one body may
intermingle with another not only by occupying the
vacant spaces in that body, but by interpenetrating
all its parts, without, however, being fused into a
homogeneous mass with it.3 This view involves not
only a denial of the impenetrability of matter, but it
Now, if each attribute is due to
1 See p. 84, 4.
2 See p. 105, 3.
the presence of some material
3 Let a piece of red-hot iron producing it, there is no avoidbe taken, every part of which is ing the conclusion that there
heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one must exist in the iron, and in
of these attributes can be con- each part of it, as many various
founded with another, or with materialsas there are attributes,
the iron itself, but each one without any one of them losing
runs through the whole iron, its own identity.

further supposes that a smaller body when mingled
with a greater body will extend over the whole of the
latter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal
intermingling (icpacris 8i' oXmv), and is alike different
from the ordinary view of mechanical mixture and
from that of chemical mixture. It differs from the
former in that every part of the one body is inter
penetrated by every part of the other ; from the
latter, because the bodies after mixture still retain
their own properties.1 This peculiar theory, which
1 Diog. vii. 151 : ko! tos
Kpdffets 5e 5t6\ov ylveffBat, Kadd
(piiaiv 6 XpiKTimros 4v Trj rphri
tp <pv<riKv, Kal
Kara itepiypatpijv koL irapddeaiv Kal yap e/s
veAayos dhlyos olvos f3\ii&els eiri
n6ffov avmrapeKTaB-fifferat elra
cru/MpBapiiotTcu. According to
Stab. Eel. i. 374, the Stoics
more accurately distinguish
jul|ts, Kpaffts, TrapdQtais, ovyxv(rtsTlapdOt&is is ffw/xdrav trvvcup}) Kara
ras 4m<pavetas ; for instance, the
combination of various kinds
of grain. MTu is iio fi not
fr\ei6vtav awfi&Tuv avjiiraptKratTis
5t' bAwv, inrofievouffuv twv trv/xQuuv
irepl aura irotor^raiv ; for in
stance, the union of fire and
iron, of soul and body. Such a
union is called M'?1S in the case
of solid bodies, xpavts in the
case of fluids. 'S,iiyxvats is W
% Kal wAei6i/wv iroioTi)rwv trepl rd
(Twuara /iTa#oA$f cts eTcpas 5ta(pepo6a"tis rovrutv ttoi6ttitos yeve^
o-ik, as in the making up salves
and medicines. Very much in
the same way according to
Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a,
Chrysippus distinguished three
kinds of |"{<s: irapdOeais, or
union of substances, in which

each retains its olKe'ta ovala or
ttoi6ttjs Kara t^c ncpiypajpiit/ ;
aiyX'"nst in which boih sub
stances, as well as attributes,
are destroyed (<p8elpca0at),
giving rise to a third body ;
Kpaffis = 8vo ^ /cal v\ti6v(ov rivwv
(TGifxaTUV bAuv 5t' oktuv avrnraptKTaatv aW^Kois outojs, a&aTe
tjaciv etiatfTov avruv 4v t$ jufêi
ttj TOiavrr] ri]V Te oinziav oiia'iav
Kal ray Iv avrfj Koiirryras. Mate
rials thus united can be again
separated, but yet are tbey so
united : d*s fn}8ev fx6piov Iv ainoh
elvai jU7j ii*Ttxov "ndvTtiov twv 4v t<
fityfiari.
For such a union to be pos
sible, (1) it must be possible
for one body to penetrate every
part of another, without being
fused into a homogeneous mass.
Hence the expression auua Sid
auparos dvrntapi\Keivf au/xa (rwuatos tlvai i6irov Kal trwua xwPe^v
5ia (rwjuaros Kivov ixt\htr4pov irtpUXovtos aKhd Toi) vAijpous tis rb
ir\7)p6v Ivdvoptvov (Ptut. C. Not.
37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b;
Tkemist. Phys. 37 ; Simpl. Phys.
123, b; Hippolyt. Refut. ,Hser.
137
Chap.
' VI.
138
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
is one of the much debated but distinctive features
of the Stoic system,1 cannot have been deduced from
physical causes. On the contrary, the arguments by
which Chrysippus supported it prove that it was ulti
mately the result of metaphysical considerations.2
i. 21); (2) it must be possible
for the smaller body to extend
over the whole size of the
greater. This is affirmed by
Chrysippus: ovStv aire\tti> <pdfievos, oXvou araAayfibv eva nepdacu
tV 6d.Aa.TTav, or even cis HAov
tov k6vhuv Zuvrivfiv Ty Kpdaet Thy
<rrakayii6i> {Pint. 10; Alex. 142,
b ; Dioff.). The greater body is
said to help the smaller, by
giving to it an extension of
which it would not otherwise
be capable. Nevertheless, the
bodies so united need not
necessarily occupy more space
than was previously occupied
by one of them (Alex. 142, b;
Matin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C.
Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The ab
surdities which this theory in
volves were already exposed by
Arcesilaus (Pint. 7), and in
detail by Alexander, Plutarch,
Sextus, and Plotinus, by the
latter in a whole treatise (Enn.
ii. 7) irepl Trjs St' oAwv Kpdrecos.
1 IloAXct /lev yap Ae-yerai irepl
Kpdaeus Kal ffxcSbv avhvxnoi Trcpl
tow TtpoKeififvov aKtfifjLar6s tlat
napa rois &.oyfiaTtKois aTdatis.
Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 66. See pre
vious note.
According to Alex. 142, a,
the following arguments were
used by Chrysippus: (11 The
argument from mural tyyouu
our notion of xpaats is different
from that of avyxvais or "P<6tais. (2) Many bodies are
capable of extension, whilst re

taining their own properties ;
frankincense, for instance,
when burnt, and gold. (3) The
soul penetrates every part of
the body, without losing its
properties. 8o tpiais does in
plants, and e'Jts does in all which
it connects. (4) The same
holds good of ere in red-hot
metal, of fire and air in water
and earth, of poisons and per
fumes in things with which
they are mixed, and of light,
which penetrates air.
The first of these arguments
clearly does nut embody the
real reason in the mind of
Chrysippus ; it might, with
equal justice, have been used to
prove anything else. Just as
little does the second ; for the
phenomena to which it refers
would be equally well explained
on the theory of simple inter
mingling (irapd$eais) or com
plete (avyxvais) mixing. Nor
does the fourth argument, taken
independently of the theory of
the corporeal nature of pro
perties, necessarily lead to the
idea of Kpaais as distinct from
napdOeais and aiZyxvais. ôr
heat, according to the Peri
patetic view, might be regarded
as a property of what is hot,
light as a definite property of
a transparent body (conf.
Alex. 143, a), irapddtats and
avyxvais sufficing for other
DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

We have, moreover, no reason to doubt it as a
fact, inasmuch as the materialistic undercurrent of
the Stoic system affords the best explanation of it.
Although the stamp of materialism was sharply
cut, and its application fearlessly made by the Stoics,
they were yet far from holding the mechanical theory
of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary consequence of strict materialism. The universe was
explained on a dynamical theory ; the notion of force
was placed above the notion of matter. To matter,
they held, alone belongs real existence ; but the
characteristic of real existence they sought in causa
tion, in the capacity to act and to be acted upon.1
This capacity belongs to matter only by virtue of
certain inherent forces, which impart to it definite
attributes. Let pure matter devoid of every attribute
things. Even the fact, greatly
insisted upon by the Stoics,
that things so mixed can be
again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143,
a ; Stob. i. 378), was not conelusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition
depended on isolated cases and
crude experiments, like the one
named by Stobseus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an
oiled sponge, it will absorb
the water and not the wine),
and as long as the substantial
change of elements, advocated
by the Stoics as well as by the
Peripatetics, was clung to, it
was no difficult matter for an
opponent to reply. On the
other hand, the relation of the
soul to the body, of property to
subject-matter, of 4><<rutoiJ>i/T!)<',
of God to the world, can hardly

be otherwise explained than it
was by Chrysippus, if once material existence be assigned to
the soul, to <piais, to ejis, and to
God. We have, therefore, here
the real ground on which this
theory .of Kpaais was based ; and
Simplicius rightly deduces it
herefrom (Phys. 123, b) : to Si
o&fia Siet aduaros xapitv oi juev
apxaiot ais impyis tnonov iAd/ifiavov, oi Se diri rijs oroSs vartpov
TtpooiiKavTo as inoXooiovv rats
otpav avrav vnodca-etriy . . .
a&imra. yhp \4ytiv tt&vto. Sokovvrts, not t&s iroidrriTas xal t^v
iJ'uxV, Bi& navros dpuvrfs roll
adparos /col tV "(""xV xa>P'''<1''
xal toss jroiorTjTas iv rats updo-eat,
trwcxcSpow o-u/ia Bio. o-iSjuotos
x^P""'Seep. 95, 2; 126,1.
139
chap.
V1,
B. Zfy"/fj^^
nature.
^dforee*
140
Chap
VI
[
THE STOICS.
be considered, the matter which underlies all definite
materials, and out of which all things are made ; 1 it
will be found to be purely passive, a something
subject to any change, able to assume any shape and
quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality and
unable to produce any change whatsoever.2 This
inert and powerless matter is first reduced into shape
by means of attributes,3 all of which suppose tension
in the air-currents which produce them, and conse
quently suppose a force producing tension.4 Even
the shape of bodies, and the place they occupy in
space, is, according to the Stoics, something deriva
tive, the consequence of tension ; tension keeping the
different particles apart in one or the other particular
way.8 Just as some modern physiologists construct
nature by putting together a sum of forces of attrac
tion and repulsion, so the Stoics refer nature to two
forces, or, speaking more accurately, to a double kind
of motionexpansion and condensation. Expansion
works outwardly, condensation inwardly ; condensa
tion produces being, or what is synonymous with it,
1 On &iroios uAij, as the universal vnoKelfitvov or ovala Koivii,
see p. 100. Seat. Math, x.312: i(
airolov litv ol)v Kal hbs ardfiaros
tV tGiv 'dKaiv faretrTriacLVTO yivefftv
oi StuikoI. apxb yap tS>v ivrav
kcit* avTOvs IffTiv ri airoios v\ri Kal
Si' Saiok Tpc7TT?), |iieTa|3a\\oiVi)s
re Tairris ylvtrat to Tetnrapa
(TTOixeia, wup, k.t.A. Plut. 0.
Not. 48, 2, p. 1085 : fj S\7) Kaff
ain)]v &\oyos o5<ra Kal airoios.
M. Aurel. xii. 30 : fiia oi/rrla
Kotj/J), Kav Snipyrirai iSias iroiois
odtfiaTi fivpiots. Diog. 137 : ra
5}j Terrapa arotx^ta iivtu 6fiov t)jp

faroiov ovfflav r^v vhrjf.
2 See p. 141, 2.
3 Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. Seep.
105, 1.
4 See p. 105, 1 and 2 ; 127,
5 ; 128, 2.
5 Simpl. Cat. 67, (Schol.
74, a, 10) : t> roivvv o~xvâ oi
StwikoI T7jv Tady irapexeffflai
Keyovaiv, Sxrirtp tV îtTaji) tw
ffri/xeiuv SidffTatTLv. Sib Kal ciffeia*
bpiôvrai ypafi^v t^v us &Kpov
reTafiei/iiv.

matter ; expansion gives rise to the attributes of
things.1 Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything
really existing must be material, they still distinguish
in what is material two component partsthe part
which is acted upon, and the part which acts, or in
other words matter and force. 2
The Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato
and Aristotle so far as to allow to formal and final
causes a place side by side with this acting force or
efficient cause. If in general anything may be called
1 Simpl. Cat. 68, t : oi 8e
2Ta*i'K0t Svvafiiv, r) fiaWov k'ivtjctiv
TT)V fiaVWTlKTIV Kai TTVKVWTIK^V
riflecTai, Trtv fiev litl to. fam, ttjv
5e eVt to
Kal tt\v \t\v tov
tivau, TTtV Se tov iroibv tivai V0fj.iovaiv alrlav. Femes. Nat. Horn.
C. 2, p. 29 : i 5e Xeyoisv, naddirep oi
XtwikoI, tovikt)v Tiva elvai Kivritrtv
TTp\ TO. (T&flClTa, tS TO <T a/J.a
Hal (Is to e|w Ktvoufi4vrtv, Kai ttjv
fi\v tls to fat fjLeyedwv Kai iroitiTijtouv airoTthtfTTiKîv eTvai, t)iv 8e
tls to eaai evwaears Kal ovnlas.
This remark is confirmed by
what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from
Censorinus, and by the language
of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28.
Schl. p. 425), in reference to
Chrysippus : xoAAdVis eipi)Ka>r,
8rt Tats els to avrr)s fitffov r) ov&ia
Kai toas aTcb tov abrrts fieaov dtotKeiTai Kai cwe'xeTat Ktvr)ffefft.
2 Diog. vii. 134 : So/tei 5'
avTols apxas elvai tvv $Aaip Suo,
TO TTOLOVV Kai TO Tr&tTX0V' T0
oZv ndo'xov slvai t\v hrrotov ovciav
TVfv V\riv, t5 8e notovv tov eV avTrj
\6yov tov 6(6v. toItov yap ovTa
atSiov 5ia irdo-ris avTys hrmiovpyeiv
tKOJTTa. Such is the teaching
of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus,
141
Chap.
VI.
(2) The
nature of
force.
{a) Force
limited to
the notion
of efficient
Archedemus, and Posidonius. cause.
Seat. Math. ix. 11 : oi iirb Tfjs
arToas 5vo KeyovTes apxas, Bfbv Kai
aitoLov v\rtv, tJ>v /lev Qtbv iroietv
xmtiK^fyavi, tV 8e S\rtv Trdvxctv
Te Kal Tpeireo-Qat. Similarly
Alex. Aph. De Mixt. 144 ;
Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E ;
Pint. PI. Phil. i. 3, 39; Stob.
Eel. i. 306 ; 322, according to the
passage quoted, p. 101, 2, from
Zeno respecting vXr) : 8ia Taints
8e Stadeiv tov tov iravrbs \6yov tv
%viol *lfiapp.vriv KaAovfftv, oldvnep
iv Tjj y6vr} to onepfia. Sen. Ep.
65, 2 : Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici
nostri, duo esse in rerum natura,
ex quibus omnia fiant : causam
et materiam. Materia jacet
iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa
autem, i.e. ratio, materiam
format etquocunque vult versat,
ex ilia varia opera producit.
Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid ,
deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa
est, illud materia. Ibid. 23 :
Universa ex materia et ex Deo
constant . . . potentius autem
est ac pretiosius quod facit,
quod est Deus, quam materia
patiens Dei.
142
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
a cause which serves to bring about a definite result 1
and various kinds of causes may be distinguished,
according as they bring about this result directly or
indirectly, by themselves alone or by the help of
others2in the highest sense there can be, according
to the Stoics, only one acting or efficient cause. The
form is due to the workman, and is therefore only a
part of the efficient cause. The type-form is only an
instrument, which the workman employs in his work.
The final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it repre
sents the workman's intention, is only an occasional
cause ; in as far as it belongs to the work he is about,
it is not a cause at all, but a result. There can be
but one pure and unconditional cause, just as there
1 Sen. Ep. 65, 11 : Nam si,
quocumque remoto quid effioi
non potest, id causam judicant
esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math,
ix. 228 : ei atri6v lanv o5 irapdvros yiverat rb cneorehtcrfia. This
appears to be the most general
Stoic definition. That given by
Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14rovro, Si' t>
ivtoyovv ylverai rb airore\e<rfjia
and by him said to express the
views of several schools, ex
presses a narrower conception
the conception of efficient
cause, which, however, for a
Stoic, is the only essential
one.
2 Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, dis
tinguishes between avveKTuta,
trvvairta, and avvtpya atria, all of
which are, however, subordi
nated to the Si' f>, which he is
there alone discussing. Seneca
1. c. maintains that, according
to the definition given above,
time, place, and motion ought

to be reckoned as causes, since
nothing can be produced with
out these. He allows, however,
that a distinction must be made
between causa efficiens and
causa superveniens. This agrees
with what Cicero (De Fato,
18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus
relative to causae perfectae et
principales, and causae adjuvantes et proximae, and with
the Platonic and Aristotelian
distinction of atriov Si' i and o5
ovk &vtv. See Zeller't Philo
sophic der Griechen. In the
same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47,
4, p. 1056 distinguishes between
atria avroTc\))S and rrpoicarapktik^. Alex. Aph. De Fato, 72,
blames the Stoics : o-îjcos yap
atrial/ KaraXiyovai, rk flip rrpoKarapKTiKa, ra Si trwalria, rk Si
eKTiKa, ra 84 awtKruta, ra Si &A\o
ti. Conf. Orelli ad locum.

can be but one matter ; and to this efficient cause
everything that exists and everything that takes place
148
Chap.
VI'
must be referred.1
In attempting to form a more accurate notion of (*) Okathis efficient cause, the first point which deserves Jj^f^f
attention is, that the Stoics believed every kind of
cause.
action ultimately to proceed from one source. For
how could the world be such a self-circumscribed
unity, such an harmonious whole, unless it were
governed by one and the same force ? 2 Again, as
everything which acts is material, the highest efficient
cause must likewise be considered material ; and since
all qualities and forces are produced by vapour-like
or fiery elements, can it be otherwise with the highest
acting force ? 3 Everywhere warmth is the cause of
nourishment and growth, life and motion ; all things
have in themselves their own natural heat, and are
preserved and kept in life by the heat of the sun.
1 Seneca, 1. a, after enu- Ttp&rov iroiovv % to apxvy^" mimerating the four causes of <rtus.
Aristotle, to which the Platonic
2 Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after
idea is added as a fifth, con- speaking of the consentiens,
tinues : This turba causarum conspirans, continuata cognatio
embraces either too much or rerum (<rvfnrd8cia r&v iKav),
too little. Sednos nunc primam continues: Hsec ita fieri omet generalemqusErimus causam. nibus inter se concinentibus
Hsec simplex esse debet, nam et mundi partibus profecto non
materia simplex est. Quserimus possent, nisi ea uno divino et
quae sit causa, ratio scilicet continuato spiritu continerenfaciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, tur See Sext. Math. ix. 78.
qua;cumque retnlistis, non sunt The same view is further exmultse et singulae causaa, sed ex panded in Sext. Math. ix. 78.
una pendent, ex ea, quae faciet. Conf. the quotation on p. 127,
Conf. Stab. Eel. i. 336 : alnoii 5, from Alexander.
5* i TA\va>v <pri<r)v efocu St' ft . . .
' According to the remarks,
XpuiriirTos olriov eivai \4yei S' t> p. 105 and 126, this requires no
. . . Tlotretfi&vios 8e outojs aXnov proof.
JT '4<ttI tivos 5t' & inetvo, fi to
144
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
What applies to parts of the world must apply to the
world as a whole ; hence heat or fire is the power to
which the life and the existence of the world must be
referred.1
This power must be further defined to be the soul
of the world, the highest reason, a kind, beneficent,
and philanthropic being ; in short, deity. The uni
versal belief and the universal worship of God prove
this, as the Stoics think, beyond a doubt ; 2 still more
accurate investigation confirms it. Matter can never
move or fashion itself ; nothing but a power inhe
rent as the soul is in man can produce these results.3
The world would not be the most perfect and com
plete thing it is unless Reason were inherent therein ; 4
1 Cie. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf.
iii. 14, 35), gives it. apparently
as the view of Cleanthes, who
alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All
living things, plants, and ani
mals, exist by heat : nam omne
quod est calidum et igneum
cietur et agitur motu suo.
Digestion and circulation are
the result of heat : ex quo intelligi debet, earn caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem
per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover : omnes partes
mundi . . . calore fultse sustinentur. There must be fire
in earth and stones, else it
could not be extracted there
from. Water, especially fresh
spring water, is warm, more
particularly in winter, and as
motion warms us, so the roll of
the waves does the sea. From
water likewise as it evaporates,
air derives its heat. . . . Jam
vero reliqua quarta pars mundi,
ea et ipsa tota natura fervida

est, et caeteris naturis omnibus
salutarem impertit et vitalem
calorem. Ex quo concluditur,
cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam
ipsum simili parique natnra
in tanta diuturnitate servari :
eoque magis ouod intelligi de
bet, calidum ilium atque igneum
ita in omni fusum esse natura,
ut in eo insit procreandi vis,
&c.
2 On the argument, ex con
sensu gentium, consult Pint.
Sto. Rep. 38. 3 ; Com. Not, 32,
1; Civ. N. D. ii. 2.5: Seneca,
Benef iv. 4 ; Sext. Math. ix.
123 and 131, where different
varieties of it are given, even a
particular one from Zeno.
3 Sext. Math. ix. 75.
4 Cie. N. D. iii. 9, 22 : Zeno
enimita concludit : quod ratione
utitur, melius est, quam id.
quod ratione non utitur. Nihil

nor could it contain any beings possessed of conscious
ness, unless it were conscious itself.1 It could not
produce creatures endowed with a soul and reason,
unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason.2
Actions so far surpassing man's power could not
exist, unless there were a cause for them in perfec
tion equally surpassing man.3 The subordination
of means to ends which governs the world in every
part down to the minutest details would be inexplic
able, unless the world owed its origin to a reasonable
creator.4 The graduated rank of beings would be
autem niundo melius. Ratione
igitur mundus utitur. The
same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and 12,
34. Sext. Math. ix. 104 : ti t4
Koyutbv rov ju^ KoyiKov Kpetrr6v
4artv, ovSiv $4 ye K6ffp.ov Kpetrrbv
4ari, \oyticbv apa S KSfffios . . .
rb yap voepbv rov fify voepov Kal
efityvxov rov fi$i 4fjL<i/vôv Kpelrrbv
itrriv oiihev ie ye kSguou Kpetrrov
voepbs apa koI eu^vx^s 4<mv &
icifffios. Likewise Diog. 142,
says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius agree
that the world is ftjov Kal \oyixhv
Kal fîipv\ov Kal voepbv ' rb yap
C$op rov ^tTj (pov Kpelrrov ovtie/
Be rod k6o~uov Kpetrrov Qyov apa
6 nSfffios.
1 Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22 : Zeno
affirms : Nullius sensu carentis
parsaliqua potest esse sentiens.
Mundi autem partes sentientes
sunt. Non igitur caret sensu
mundus.
2 Diog. 1 43 : e^vyoy Se [rbv
k6o~ixov], us &ij\ov 4Krr\S7)fxerepas
ûX^s inti&iv otio-ns anoo-irdtrmotos. Sext. Math. ix. 101 :
7A\vuv be b Viimevs bjrb "EevoQwvros r%v atyoppAiv Kafiuv oinuffl
orwepurip' rb trpoitfievov ffnepua

KoyiKov Kalairb KoyiK.6v4ffriv' bbe
k6<tuos Trpolerai unepua XoyiKov,
\oyiKbv apa tarlv 6 k6o-/m>s. The
same proof in Sext. Math. ix. 77
and 84 ; Cic. 1. c. Conf. ibid. ii.
31, 79; 6, 18, where also the
passage in Xenophon, Mem. i.
4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is
referred to.
s Cic. 1. c. iii. 10, 25: Is
[Chrysippus] igitur : si aliquid
est, inquit, quod homo efficere
non possit, qui id efficit melior
est homine. Homo autem hasc,
quse in mundo sunt, efficere non
potest. Qui potuit igitur, is
prsestat homini. Homini autem
praestare quis possit, nisi Deus 1
Est igitur Deus. The same,
only a little more fully, ibid.
ii. 6, 16. To this argument,
another favourite one of the
Stoics, based on the fulfilment
of prophecy, belongs.
4 Cleanthes made use of
arguments from final causes to
prove the existence of God.
Of this nature are all the four
arguments which he employs in
Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly
146
Chap
YI"
THE STOICS.
incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all
whose moral and intellectual perfection cannot be
surpassed.1 Although this perfection belongs, in the
first place, to the world as a whole,* nevertheless, as
in everything consisting of many parts, so in the world
the ruling part must be distinguished from other
parts. It is the part from which all acting forces
emanate and diffuse themselves over the world,3
whether the seat of this efficient force be placed in
the heaven, as was done by Zeno, Chrysippus, and
the majority of the Stoics ; 4 or in the sun, as by
the fourth, based on the regular
order and beauty of heaven. A
building cannot exist without
a builder; no more can the
building of the world exist
without a ruling spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the abovenamed argument of Chrysippus.
The same writer, N. D. ii. 32-66,
gives very fully the physical
theological argument for the
existence of providence, which
is given in a shorter form by
Cleomedes, Meteora, 1 ; Seneca,
De Provid. i. 1, 2-4 ; Nat. Qu. i. ;
Sext. Math. ix. Ill ; conf. Ps.
Censorin. Fragm. i. 2, p. 75,
Jahn ; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8 : belief
in gods grows out of considering the world and its beauty, an
argument also quoted by Sext.
Math. ix. 26.
1 See the expansion of this
thought by Cleanthes (in Sext.
Math. ix. 88-91) and the Stoics
(in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero
distinguishes four kinds of
beingsPlants, Animals, Men,
and that being which is altogether reasonable and perfect
deity.
* See p. 143, 2; 144, 1-4;

145, 1 and 2.
* Sett. Math. ix. 102, expandingZeno's argument given,
p. 145, 2 : iraV?)s yap (pvaeais ko\
if<ux^s V Kampxfl Tijs mWjo-eais
ylvr6ai Sokci dirii riyf/ioviKov koI
irSirai of eV! t& nipt) toS Saou
iâiroar(\\6ntvat Svvd,utn &s aw6
rtvos icTjyiis tov TjyepoyiKov fyaworreAXonai. Cic. N. D. ii. 29 :
according to Cleanthes, omnem
enim naturam necesse est, quse
non solitaria sit, neque simplex,
sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se
principatum [ = ^ytjuociic!'] ut
in homine meatem, &c. . . .
Itaque necesse est illud etiam,
in quo sit totius naturas principatus, esse omnium optimum.
See following note.
4 Cio. Acad. ii. 41, 126 :
Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis
asther videtur summus Deus,
mente prseditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14, 36 : (Zeno)
asthera Deum dicit. 15, 39 :
ignem prasterea et eum, quem
antea dixi, sethera (Chrysippus
Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii.

Cleanthes ; 1 or in the centre of the world, as by
Archedemus.2 This primary source of all life and
motion, the highest Cause and the highest Reason, is
God. God, therefore, and formless matterj are the two
ultimate grounds of things.3
138: ovpavbs 8e <ntv Sj ^ffxdrrj
vrepHptpeia, 4v f) irav Xb~pvTai Tb
dtiov. Ibid. 139 : Tbv b\ov k6o~pov
C$ov ovTa Kal %>vtyvxov Kal \oyitcbv
%Xelv wyepoviKbv fiiv Tbv ai64pa,
KaQa (pTjfTtv 'AvriiraTpos . . .
Xpvffiiciros 5' . . . Kal llocreiS'Jjvios
. . . rbv ovpav6v tpaoi rb f)ye/xo~
vittbv tov Koafwv. He continues :
6 fitVTot Xpucniriros Zia<pop<ZiT*pov
ir&hiv rb KaQapcirepov tov aidepos
4v TaUTQ? [ = Ttp Ovpdvai] b Kal
irpSnov Bebv Keyovtrtv, aio-OriTtKws
8>0"RGp KiXafn\K*vaL ^'^ rt/ *v &*Pl
Kal tiia tS>v Ctpwv arrdvrtcv Kal
<pvrwv, Sta 5^ ttjs yrfS ai/TTjs Ka&
siv. Arius Didymus, in Eus.
Praep. Ev. xv. 15, 4 : Xpvffiirnw
8e [rjyffiOviKbv tov k6(t}iov elvai
tfpeff~\ Tbv ald4pa rbv KaBap&TaTov
Kal clAifrpiWaTarov, are irdvTtov
evKivTfr6Tarov ovra Kal t^jv b\Tjv
irtpidyovra rod k6o~hov <p6aiv.
Ibid. xv. 20, 2 : According to
the Stoics, the air surrounding
sea and earth is the soul of the
world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8 :
Zeus dwells in heaven, ivil t6i
io'Ti rb KvpidnaTOV p-tpus rris tov
k6<t/j.ov tI/vxvs. Tertullian, (ArxA.
47; Ad Nat. ii. 2,4) inaccurately
attributes to the Stoics the
belief in a God external to
nature.
1 Cic. Acad. 1. c. : Clean
thes . . . solem dominari et
rerum potiri = KpaTtiv rwv ovtwv
putat. He speaks with less
accuracy (Krische, Forsch. 428)
in N. D. i. 14, 37: ether he
considers the original deity ;

for this does not exclude the
other. No doubt he identified
aleiip with calor (see p. 144, 1),
believing that it emanated from
the sun. Diog. 139 : K\fdv8ns
5e [rb T]yep.ovtKOV (pfiffi] Tbv ViKiov.
Ar. Didymus, 1. c. jjyeu.oviKbv
5 tov K6apiov KKedvBeL p.ev fipsfft
Tbv ijXiov fivai Sia Tb fxtyiffTov
twv affTptav \mdpx*iv koL 7rAet<7Ta
o~vp.$d\Xto~8ai irpbs t^jv tuv &\av
SloiKTlfflV, K.T.K. Stub. Ed.
i. 452 ; Ps. Censorin. Pragm. i.
4. According to Epipha >i. Exp.
Fidei, 1090, c, he called the
sun the SaSovxos to the universe.
2 Stob. 1. c. : 'Apx'Saûs (leg.
with Cod. A 'Apxe'5lf*os) T^ vyffiuviKov tov k6gu.ov v yfi uwdpxeiv
d7re(()77voTo : the same statement
without mentioning the name
in Ar. Didymus, 1. c. This re
minds one somewhat of the
Pythagorean doctrine of a cen
tral fire, and the view of Speusippus. The resemblance to
the Pythagoreans is greater, if
Si/mpl. De Coelo, Schol. in Ar.
505, a, 45, is correct in saying
Archedemus denied with the
Pythagoreans that the earth
was in the centre of the world.
3 See p. 141,2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14 :
o-Totxelov elvai <part [0/ 2twVkoi]
tS>v ovtwv Tb trvp, KaBdirep 'HpaK\eiTos, tovtov b" apxas il\iiv Kal
debv, ws TlhdTav.
148
THE STOICS.
Chap.
YI'
The language used by the Stoics in reference to

the Deity at one time gives greater prominence to
(3) Deity,
conception
of Deity
more aceurately
defined.
the material, at another to the spiritual side of their

conception of God. As a rule, both are united in expressions which only cease to be startling when taken
.
.....
in connection with Stoic views in general. God is
Sp0ken 0f as being Fire, Ether, Air, most commonly
as being Trvsv/u.a or Atmospheric-Current, pervading
everything without exception, what is most base and
ugly, as well as what is most beautiful.1 He is further
desciibed2 as the Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of
1 Fuller particulars p. 144, tosv aripiWTdrav. Tertullian,
1 ; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Ad Nation, ii. 4 : Zeno makes
Hser. i. 21: Chrysippus and God penetrate the materia munZeno suppose apxî" M" 9tbv twv dialis, as honey does the honeyttclvtcov, ffwfm <!>VTa rb Kadaptbrarov combs. See p. 105, 3.
(aether). Diog. 148 : Antipater
Clemens, Strom, v. 591, A:
calls the ovaia 6eov aepoetSits. tpcurl yap <rwua tlvat rbv 9ebv ol
Stob. Eel. i. 60 : Mnesarchus (a 2t<wko! ko! irvev/xa /car' ovalav,
pupil of Pansetius) defines God &<rirep a/x4kti /col tV 'f/vx'hv. Ibid.
to be rbv k6o-[lov t^v -nptiiTTiv ov- i. 295, c : (ot Srwi'/col) trufia tlvra
irlav tx0VTa ^ irvevfiaros. Sext. rbv 6ebv Sia ttjs aTifiordrris &\tjs
Pyrrh. iii. 218 : Stwi/coI 5^ [Ac- ve<poiTr]Kevai \eyovo~iv ov koKus.
yovai 6ebv~\ irvevfia SirjKov Kal Sia Protrept. 44, A : robs curb ttjj
rSv flSexBav (the adverse). <ttoSs, Sta irdVijs S\i)s, Kal Sia tt)s
Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, otiôtottjs, rb deiov SW)Keip Xe31 (Schol. in Ar. 607, a, 19): 7oj/tos. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71 :
tois curb tt}s (Ttous eSoêv 6 debs twv 'S.tu'lkwv (patTK6vrtjov tri b Qebs
koX rb KOi^riKbv alriov ev Ttf vyrj irvevfid iffTi Slot TrdvTwv Ste\7]\v6bs
elvai. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives Kal nam'' Iv kavr$ irepifx0'*'. Opthem credit: Trvev/iaTi >s Sia ponents like Origen, 1. c. and
vdvTuv SiiiKovrt avdirrtiv t6 -re i. 21, Alexander, De Mixt. 1. c,
elvai tKaffrov ica\ rb trd&crBai ko! and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48,
o-vfiufvetv. Compare the quota- naturally attack them for their
tions p. 127, 5 and De An. 145 : materialistic views.
[rbv vovv] nai iv toIs tpavKordTois
2 Stob. Eel. i. 58. See followelvai Btlov opra, as tois anb tt\s ing note. Diog. 138 (according
oroSs Soev. lucian, Hermot. to Chrysippus and Posidonius):
81 : aKovafnev 5c avTov \eyovTos, rbv Sfy k6o-[lov oiKtiaQai Kara vovv
&s Kal & $ebs ovk iv ovpavy eariv, Kal irp6voiav . . . els airav avrov
a\\a Sia irdvTwv iretpoWjiKev, oTov fiepos Si^kovtos tov vov tcaddirep
vhwv Kal \l6uv teal (<pwv, &XP1 Ka* ty' VfiWV TV$ tyvxfc- aAA' ffSi\ Si

the world ; as a united Whole, containing in Him
self the germs of all things; as the Connecting
up fiev /xaMov, Bi' Ziv Be ^rrov.
More popularly, ibid. 147 : Sebv
ilvai CtjToi' addvaTOV\oyiKbvr4\fiov
4) voepbv eV eu8atp.ovlqt KaKOv navrbs apeTrt'Be/fTOp, itpovor)riKbv koVfiov re Kal rwv eV tc6(Tfi(p, p.fy eivai
p.4vroi ai'Opano/jioptpuv. elvai St
rbv fiiv SrjpAovpyov r&v bKwv Kal
WGTTtp TTCLTfpa TrdvTWV KOlVtOS T
Kal 70 fitpos avrov *rb birjKov Bia
trdvrwv, o woXXots irpotrriyopiais
vpo(rovop.d(<T8at Kara ras bvvdfieis.
Phred. Nat. De. (P/iilodem. irep!
eu<rej3efas) Col. 1 and 6'tc. Nat.
De. i. 15, 39, quoting from him :
According to Chrysippus, Zeus
is Kotvtj x6~is> eijuapjueVi), avdyicT},
k.t.\. Ibid. Col. 3 : He con
sidered v6p.os to be deity. Cic.
1. c. : legis perpetual et reternse
vim . . . Jovem dicit esse.
Themist. De An. 72, b : rots atb
7A\vu>vos . . . Bia irdarjs ovtrias
Trt<pomiKiiiai rbv 8ebv ridtfievots,
Kal irov pAV elvat vovv% irov Be ^vXV, ttov Be tpviriv, irov Be e{if,
Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119 : No Stoic
can doubt hunc mundum esse
sapientem, habere mentem,
qune se et ipsum fabricata sit,
et omnia moderetur, moveat,
regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58:
ipsius vero mundi . . . natura
non artificiosa solum sed plane
artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque om
nium. ... As every nature
develops from its stock, sic
Natura mundi omnes motus
habet voluntarios conatusque
et appetitiones, quas bpuds
Grseci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut
nosmet ipsi, qui animis move-
mur et sensibus, on which ac

count the mens mundi is called
vp6vota. M. Awrel. iv. 40 : ks %v
$ov rbv Kdfffiov ptav ovaiav Kal
tyvxhv Mav eVexoy ffvvexus
eVtpoelj/ ' -Kus els aXff&i)<Tiv pXav ri]v
rovrav irdvra avatiiborai Kal Trees
opptijjnt$ irdvra Trpdaffei. Heraclit.
Alleg. Horn. 72. TeHnllian,
Apol. 21 : Hunc enim (\6yov)
Zeno determinat factitatorem,
qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum
vocari et Deum et animum
Jovis et necessitatem omnium
rerum. Ha?c Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quern permeatorem universitatis affirmat.
Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9,
1, 5. Epipkan. Hser. v. 1, p.
12: According to the Stoics,
God is vovs, residing in the
world as its soul, and permeat
ing the ficpLKal ovtTiat. Zeus is
also spoken of as being the soul
of the world by Cornutug, Nat.
De. 2 ; by Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2,
p. 1052 ; and hy Chrysippus,
ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050 : 8>i 8' rj
Kotvî (pvffts Kal & Kotvbs TTJS <p6trcus \6yos elp.app.evri Kal irpdvota
Kal Ze<5s 4crriv ouBe robs avrinoSas
\e\7jde' irovraxov yap ravra 6pvAeirai inr avriiv. Stob. Bel. i.
178 : 7A\vwv . . . [tt)p elp.appevj]v\
Svvdp.iv KivijriKriv rijs SAtjs Kara
Taura Kal waavruts, rjvriva p.rj Btabepeiv irp6voiav Kal (pvatv KaKeTv.
At: Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 15, 2 : God cares for man ;
He is kind, beneficent, and loves
men. Zeus is called Koo-fios as
olfnos toO fjjy, tifutpp.4yji, because
clpop.evq> \6ya StoiKCi all things,
abpdareia, on ovbiv itxrtv avrbv
149
Chap
VI.
160
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
element in all things ; as Universal Law, Nature,
Destiny, Providence ; as a perfect, happy, ever kind
and all-knowing Being ; nor was it hard to show that
no conception could be formed of God without these
attributes.1 Both kinds of expression are combined
diroSiSpctcreeiy, irp6voia, bWi irpbs
rb XP^'M01' oiKovopei eKcurra.
Arletocles (Ibid. xv. 14) : Pri
mary lire contains the causes
and \6yoi of all things ; the
unchangeable law and destiny
of the world supplies their con
nection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1 :
Quid enim aliud est natura,
quam Deus et divina ratio toti
mundo et partibus ejus inserta?
. . . Hunc eundem et fatum si
dixeris non mentieris. (Similaily Frag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii.
8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2 :
God or Jupiter may be equally
well spoken of as Destiny, Pro
vidence, Nature, the World.
Stob. Eel. i. 178 : 'An-iVaTpoj S
2twck6s 9ebv aireipijyaTO ttjv elpa'pliitrriy. Zeus is called Koivbs vi
nos by Diog. vii. 88 ; by Cleanthes at the end of his hymn
(Stob. Eel. i. 34) ; likewise Cic.
N. D. i. 14, 36 says of Zeno :
Naturalem legem divinam esse
censet, eamque vim obtinere
recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not.
32, 1 ; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7
(here following Antipater) : God
must be conceived of as /uueipios,
evTroniTlltbs, (piK&v&pwiros, KqSefxovixbs, axpeKipos. Muson. (in
Stob. Floril. 117, 8) : God is the
type of every virtue, ixeya.\6<t>pu>v,
euep7Ttlcbs, <pi\6.vBpo)iros, K.T.X.
Sen. Ep. 95, 48 : Qufe causa est
Dis benefaciendi? Natura.
Errat, si quis illos putat nocere
nolle : non possunt. Further

details respecting the beneficent
nature of the Gods in Sen.
Benef. i. 9 ; iv. 3-9 and 25-28 ;
Clement, i. 5, 7 ; Nat. Qu. v.
18, 13. On the divine omni
science ; Ep. 83, 1 ; V. Beat. 20, 5.
1 According to Cie. N. D. ii.
30, 75, the Stoics divided the
argument as to God's providen
tial care of the world into three
parts. The first part went to
establish that if there existed
Gods, there must also be a care
of the world; for Gods could
not exist without having some
thing to do, and to care for the
world is the noblest thing that
can be done. If, moreover,
deity is the highest being-, the
world must be governed by
deity. The same conclusion is
arrived at from the wisdom and
power of deity, which must
always busy itself with what is
best and highest. Lastly, it is
stated, that inasmuch as the
stars, heaven, the universe, and
all powers in the world are
divine, it is clear that every
thing must be governed by
divine reason. The second part
proved that the force and skill
of nature produced and sustains
all things. All the more reason
that a universe so skiliully
formed and so harmoniously
arranged must be directed by a
natura sentiens. And since, in
its parts, it could not be more

in the assertion that God is the fiery Reason of the
World, the Mind in Matter, the reasonable Air-Cur
rent, penetrating all things, and assuming various
names according to the material in which He resides,
the artistically moulding Fire, containing in Himself
the germs of everything, and producing according
to an unalterable law the world and all that is
therein.1
beautiful or adapted to its pur
pose, it must be true of it more
than of any human work of
art, that it owes its origin to a
forming reason. The third part
aims at proving, on pbysicotheological grounds, quanta sit
admirabilitas ccelestium rerum
atque terrestrium.
1 Stob. Eel. i. 58 : Aioyevrjs
Kal KAedVftys koI OlvoiriSris tt}v
tov k6<Tjj.ov ipuxV [Behv ktyovo't]
. . . Tloo'uSavios Trvedfxa voepbv
KaX 7rt/pc35es, owe %xov t&v fiop<p7)v
tiera@d\\ov 5 ets o f$ov\erat Kal
avveôfiotov/jievov icaffiv . . . lA\vwv 6 ^rtoiKds vovv k6o~/aov irrjpivov. lb. 64 ; Pint. Plac. i. 8,
17: ot 1fr<o'(Ko\ votpbv {[Pint.
Koiv6repov') Bebv airo<palvovrat nvp
Tfxvitcdv 65(f) &afiiov itrl yev*o~u
K6o~fiov (a similar definition of
nature is given by Zeno in Cic.
Nat, De. ii. 22, 57) 4nTrcpiu\ri<p6s
T -ndvras robs anepfiarikovs \6yOVS,
KO.9' ots &1TaVra(Pl.
KaBy ttfJMpfiivriv
ylverat, Kal6/COffTO)
irvevua
4vb"ir)Kov, 6Y oKov rov koV/aov, rhs
5t vpoorjyoplas peTaAap.f5dvov 5ia
TO.5 T7}S H\r}S, ftV %S KX^p7?K Jtra\\dus. Following the same
source,AtJienag.Leg. pro Christ,
c. 5, Schl : ei yap b /xev Bsbs irvp
T9XviKb*t k.t.A. (the same down
to yiverat) rb Skirvevna avrov St^-
ku oY 8Aou tow icdafiov * b debs fts

kot' avrobs, Zebs fxev koto to 4ov
rr\s
6vo/xa^6fievos, "Hpa 8h
Kara rbv atpa Kal to \otva Ka&'
cKaarov rrjs fj\7}S UpOS, St
Ktx&pyK*) Ko\Qvfxfvos. The latter
passage is explained by Diog.
147, who thus continues: Ala
flit/ ydp <pafft 6V ov ra vdvra '
Uqva ok KaKovo'i trap fto-ovrov pi
alribs iffTiv r) Sia tov jiv K^x^pV'
Kv. (This, too, in tkob. Eel. i.
48.) 'AQrivav 5 koto rfyv us
aiddpa otdraffiv tov T}ycfj.oviKov
avrov. "Hpav 5e koto rfyv eis dc'pa.
Kal "Htpatarov koto rfyv us rb
TexVLK^v '^p. KaX Hoo-u$G>va Kara
tt)v us rb vyp6v. Kal Ar)u7)rpav
koto rrjv tis yi)v ' bfiolus de Kal
ras fiAAas irpoffryyopias 4%6it4Vol
twos bfiot6rT}ros airehorrav. Pint.
C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085 : rbv Bebv
. . . aS/fta yoepbv koX vovv 4v ii\rj
iroiovvres. M. Awel. 5, 32 : tov
5io t^s ohaias Si^Kovra \6yov,
K.r.\. Porpliyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
XV. 16, 1 : rbv 5 Bebv . . . itvp
votpbv utt6vtss. Orig. c. Cels.
vi. 71 : Kara fxkv obv robs awb rrjs
aroas . . . Kal b \6yosrov Btov b
fxexpt avBpairwv Kalrwv iXaxicruv
Karafiaivw ovhkv &Wo 4ffrlv ^
irvev/xa (TojmotucoV. The same
combination of nature and mind
in the conceptions of God is
151
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
As used in the Stoic system, these expressions
generally mean one and the same thing. It is an
unimportant difference whether the original cause is
described as an Air-Current or as Ether, or as Heat
or as Fire. It is an Air-Current, for Air-Currents are,
as we have already seen, the causes of the properties
of things, giving them shape and connection. It is
also Fire, for by fire is only meant the warm air, or
the fiery fluid, which is sometimes called Ether, at
other times Fire, at other times Heat,1 and which is
expressly distinguished from ordinary fire.2 More
over the terms, Soul of the world, Reason of the
world, Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny
all mean the same thing, the one primary force pene
trating the whole world. Even the more abstract
expressions, Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the
Stoics an essentially gross meaning, implying not
only the form according to which the world is ar
ranged and governed, but also the essential substance
of the world, as a power above everything particular
found in the hymn of Cleanthes
(in Stob. Eel. i. 30), Zeus being
described as the apxnybs <piotas,
who directs the xoivbs \6yos is
5m Ttivraiv <potr&, by means of
nvp atifaov.
1 Stob. Eel. i. 374 : Chrysippus teaches thai -rb ov iri/cS/io
kivovv iavrb vpbs iavrb Kai Q iavtou, % -jrvtvfia iavrb kivovv irp6<Ttia
Kai enr'taw irvetifia Si ef\7iirrai Sia
t6 \iytvtw avrb itpa that xivoiptvov iriXoyov Si ylyvtoQat
fireira [? perhaps : aui-A.or : rrvpbs
^] aldtpbs, &ar* Kai tls xoivbv
x6yov mativ avrd. Diog. vii.
137 : avuT&ru pMv oiv thai t6 irvp

%v 87) aifle'pa naXuaSai.
2 Stob. Eel. i. 538, on the
authority of Zeno ; Cic. N. D.
ii. 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes.
Both state that the difference
consists in this : Ordinary (Stxvov) fire consumes things ; but
the irvp tcxvikov,' which constitutes tptiffis and tyvxfy, preserves
things. Heraclitus, too, in
making primary fire the basis
of things, did not mean flame,
but warmth, which may be
equally well described as atmospheric substance or as tyvxh.

and individual.1 If Nature must be distinguished
from Destiny, and both of these notions again from
Zeus,2 the distinction can only consist herein, that
the three conceptions describe one original Being at
different stages of His manifestation and growth.
Viewed as the whole of the world it is called Zeus ;
viewed as the inner power in the world, Providence
or Destiny ; 3 and to prove this identity at the close
of every period, so taught Chrysippus, Zeus goes back
into Providence.4
Upon closer examination, even the difference be
tween the materialistic and idealistic description of
God vanishes. God, according to Stoic principles,
can only be invested with reality when He has a
1 Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7,
2 : God may also be called
fatum : nam cum fatum nihil
aliud sit quam series implexa
causarum, ille est prima om
nium causa, ex qua ceteras pen
dent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1 : Vis
ilium fatum vocare ? Non errabis. Hie est, ex quo suspensa
sunt omnia, causa causarum.
The same applies to the name
of providence and nature. See
p. 162, 2.
2 Stob. Eel. i. 178 (Plut.
Plac. i. 28, 6) : nocrciSiivios [tV
elfiapfxevriv'] TplrTjv itwb Aids.
Tp&rov fxiy yh.p elvai Tbv Ala, 5ei5Tepoy 5e ttjv <pv(Ttv, Tplrrji/ tie t^jv
fijuap/tenje. Conf. Cic. Divin. i.
55, 125, where prophecy is de
duced, according to Posidonius,
(1) a Deo, (2) a fato, (3) a
natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p.
1077: \eyei yovv Xptiffnriros, ioiKfvai Tp fiev av6pt&Trt[) rbv Ata a!
rbv K6<rpov (instead of which
Heine, Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p.

25, apparently without reason,
conjectures : /cai t<? fiiv (riinari
rbv Kotrfiov), Tii 5e ipvxy tM" vp6voiav iray oZv e -Kvpuffis yiviyrai
p.6vov &(p8aprov ovra rbv Ala. twv
0wv avaxwpeiv
t^v irp6vtiiav,
e7ra Suov yevo/xeyuvs itrl fuas T7js
rod aldtpos ovfflas 5taT\eip ap.<por4povs. To this maxim of Chrys
ippus, reference is made by
Philo, Incorrup. M. 951, B,
where, too, itpoyota is equiva
lent to îvxh tou itdfffiov.
' According to Chrysippus.
A different view is taken by
Posidonius. With him Zeus
stands for the original force,
ipiais for its first, and ft/j.apfi4vi)
for its second production.
4 Pint. 1. c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16 :
[Jupiter] resoluto mundo et
Diis in unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit
sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus.
168
Chap.
VI.
154
Chap,
Y "
THE STOICS.
material form. Hence, when He is called the Soul,
the Mind, or the Reason of the world, this language
does not exclude, but rather presupposes, that these
conceptions have bodies ; and such bodies the Stoics
thought to discern in that heated fluid which they at
one time call the all-penetrating Breath, at another
Ether, or primary Fire.1 Each of these two deter
minations appeared to them indispensable,2 and both
became identical by assuming, as the Stoics did, that
the infinite character of the divine Reason depends on
the purity and lightness of the fiery material which
composes it.3 Seneca is therefore only following
out the principles of his School when he pronounces it
indifferent whether God is regarded as Destiny or as
an all-pervading Breath.4 Those who charge the
1 Compare, besides what
has been already quoted, Cie.
Acad. i. 11,39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam.
Diog. vii. 156: Soke? 8e auTois
tV piv ipiaiv thai trip Texvwbv
66$ f3aSioi> eis yiveaiv, onep 4trr\
irvtvp-a TrvpoeiSis xai tcxvociScs.
Stoh. Eol. i. 180 : XpfVunros
bvvafuv irufaTiKr)c tr,!! obalap
Tr\s slfiapfiivTjs Tciet tov iravrbs
SioiK-riTiK-fiv ; or, according to
another definition: cifiapfi4i>T]
Arrlv 6 tov K6ap.ov Kiym, tl \6yos
tup Iv rip K6tTpnp vpovoia Sioikovp.ivav, K.r.K. Instead of \6yos,
he also used aMjfleict, <piais,
ahla, iv&yKi), Sec.
2 See p. 143.
3 Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque
etiam mundi ille fervor purior,
perlucidior mobiliorque multo
ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hie
noster calor, quo haec qua? nota

nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent.
Absurdum igitur est dicere,
cum homines bestiaeque hoc
calore teneantur et propterea
moveanturac sentiant, mundum
esse sine sensu, qui integro et
puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. A r. Didymus, in
the passage quoted, p. 146, 4,
p. 105, 127.
4 Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id
actum est, mihi crede, ab illo,
quisquis formator universi fuit,
sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio,
ingentium operum artifex, sive
divinus spiritus per omnia
maxima ac minima fequali intentione [ = t6vos] diffusus, sive
fatum et immutabilis causarum
inter se cohaerentium series,
Conf. p. 153, 1. ^
155
Stoics with inconsistency for calling God at one time Chap

Eeason, at another Soul of the universe, at another
'
Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe,1
forget that they are attaching to these terms a mean
ing entirely different from that in which they were
used by the m.2
The more the two sides of the conception of God (*) God
the material and the idealare compared, the "matter1.
clearer it becomes that there is no difference between
God and primary Matter. Both are one and the same
substance, which, when regarded as the universal
substratum, is known as undetermined matter ; but
when conceived of as acting force, is called all-per
vading Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air,
Nature, Soul of the world, Reason of the world, Pro
vidence, Destiny, God. Matter and power, material
and form, are not, as with Aristotle, things radically
different, though united from all eternity. Far from
it, the forming force resides in matter as such ; it is
in itself something material ; it is identical with
Ether, or Fire-element, or Breath. Hence the dif
ference between efficient and material cause, between
God and matter, resolves itself into the difference
between Breath and other elements. This difference,
too, is no original or ultimate difference. According
1 Clc. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls
natural law divine, but he also
calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We
shall come back presently to
what he says as to the divinity
of the stars.) Cleanthes gives
the name of deity to the world,
reason, the soul of the world,

and ether ; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to
ruling reason, to communis
natura, destiny, fire, ether, the
universe, and eternal law.
2 Krische, Forsch. i. 365.
156
Chap.
VI.
C. PanHieism.
(1) God
identical
with the
norld.
THE STOICS.
to the Stoic teaching, every particular element has
in process of time developed out of primary fire or
God, and to God it will return at the end of every
period of the world.1 It is therefore only a deriva
tive and passing difference with which we are here
concerned. But taking the conception of Deity in
its full meaning, it may be described as primary
matter, as well as primary power. The sum total of
all that is real is the divine Breath, moving forth
from itself and returning to itself again.2 Deity
itself is primary fire, containing in itself in germ
both God and matter;3 the world in its original
gaseous condition; 4 the Universal Substance changing
into particular elements, and from them returning to
itself again, which regarded in its real form as God
includes at one time everything, at another only a
part of real existence.5
From what has been said it follows that the Stoics
admitted no essential difference between God and
the world. Their system was therefore strictly pan
theistic. The world is the sum of all real existence,
and all real existence is originally contained in deity,
which is at once the matter of everything and the
creative force which moulds this matter into particu1 See pp. 153, 2 ; 153, 4.
2 Chrysippvs. See p. 152,
note 1.
3 Aristocles. See p. 147,
note 3.
4 Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60.
See p. 148, 1.
5 Oriff. c. Cels. iii. 75, p.
497, A : ^tu'Ckwv 6*bv (pOaprbv
el(ray6vTuv Kal tt]v oixriai/ avrov
\iy6vrtav ff&im Tpeirrbif di6\ov Kal

aWoiurbv Kal jueTaj8\7]Ti>p kou
ttot iravra (p8tip6vTwv Kal fi6vov
rbv 6ebv KaTa\irr6vTtov. Ibid. iv.
14 : 6 t&v XtwCkuv Btbs Stc ffwfia
rvyx&vav 8t6 fiXv fjyefioviKbv ?xei
r^v o\t}v ovaiav '6rav t\ iicn{ipw<ris
ore Si 4irl /xepous yivirai auTTfS
'6rav j5 SioKciffjmjffis.
PANTHEISM: GOD AND THE WORLD.

lar individual substances. We can, therefore, think
of nothing which is not either immediately deity or
a manifestation of deity. In point of essence, there
fore, God and the world are the same ; indeed, the
two conceptions are declared by the Stoics to be ab
solutely identical.1 If they have nevertheless to be
distinguished, the distinction is only derivative and
partial. The same universal Being is called God
when it is regarded as a whole, World when it is
regarded as progressive in one of the many forms
1 Besides the quotations al
ready given from Chrysippus
on p. 153, 2, and Cleanthes on
p. 155, 1, compare Phasdr. Nat.
De. (Philodem. irepl ei(r*j3e(os),
Col. 5 : Aioyiviis 5' b Ha&vhuvios
iv rtp irepl rTjs 'Adijvas rbv Knau-of
ypd<pet T< Att rbv abrbv inrdpxetv,
% trtpitxtiv rbv Ala KaBdirep &vBpairoy \fiuxv". Ctc. N. De. ii.
17, 45 : Nothing corresponds
better to the idea of God, quata
ut primum hunc mundum, quo
nihil fieri excellentius potest,
animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34: Perfect
reason Deo tribuenda, id est
muDdo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3 ;
Vis ilium vocare mundum ?
Non falleris. Ipse enim est
hoc quod vides totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens vi
sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13: Quid
est Deus ? Mens universi.
Quid est Deus ? Quod vides
totum et quod non vides totum.
Sic demum magnitudo sua illi
redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest, si solus est
omnia, opus suum et extra et
intra tenet. Diog. vii. 148 :
ovtriav 5 fJeou TA\vu>v /teV (p7}<7i Toy
SAop nbfffiov Kal rbv ovpavdv. Ar.

Dldym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15,
1 and 3 : Shov Sk rbv k6g\iov abv
rots eavrov jufpeffi irpoo-ayoptvovo-i
&*6v. . . . dib 5i; Kal Zeis \4yerat
b xdcrp-os. Oriff. c. Cels. v. 7 :
o~a<pws 877 rbv 3\op n6<rp.ov \4~
yovctv elvai Qtbv StcuVkoI fj.ev rb
xp&rov. The arguments given,
p. 144, for the existence of God
are based on the supposition
that God is the same as the
World. The existence of God
is proved by showing the rea
sonableness of the world.
Aratus gives a poet's descrip
tion of the Stoic pantheism at
the beginning of the Pheno
mena : Zeus is the being of
whom streets and markets, sea
and land, are full, whose off
spring is man, and who, out of
regard for man, has appointed
signs in the heavens to regulate
the year. The same idea is
contained in the well-known
lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220;
iEn. vi. 724. The round figure
of the Stoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113,
22 ; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also
reference to the world as God.
Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.
167
Chap.
VI.
168
Chap,
VI'
THE STOICS.
assumed in the course of its development. The difference, therefore, is tantamount to assigning a
difference of meaning to the term world, according as

it is used to express the whole of what exists, or only
the derivative part.1
(2) DifStill this distinction does not depend only upon
trveen God our waJ of looking at things, but it is founded in the
morldtnlt/ nature ^ things- Primary force, as such, primary
relative. fire, primary reason, constitute what is primarily God.
Things into which this primary substance has changed
itself are only divine in a derivative sense. Hence
deity, which is ultimately identical with the whole
of the world, may again be described as a part of the
world, as the leading part (to rjye/u.ovi,ic6v), as the
Soul of the world, as the all-pervading fiery Breath.2
1 Stob. Eel. i. 444 : k6o-ôv V
elvai (pTitriv & Xpicwnros o-vorvfJ-a
e ovpavov Kal yrjs Kal rav iv rovTots <p6o~eav * ^ rb 4k dtwv Kal avdpc&ircav avffTqfia Kal 4k twv eVefca
tovtwv yeyov6rwv. Keyerat 5'
eVepci'S KdffpOS 6 debs, Kaff OV T)
diaKdo'uvo'ts ylverai Kal Te\*iovrai.
Diog. vii. 137 : \4yovo-i 5e Kotrpov
rpix&s' abroy re rbv debv rbv etc
rrjs airdtrTji ovalas i$la>s iroibv, bs
S-Jj &<p8apr6s 4(TTL koI ayevvnros
irjuiovpybs &v rrjs SiaKou~a^(rews
Kara xp6vtuv Ttvas irepi65ovs ava\Iitkwv ets eavrbv t^v a-Kaaav
overlay Kal ira\iv 4 eavrov yevvwv,
Kal avr^v fie
hta.K6fffif]<nv rwv
atnsptev Kocrfiov eJvai \4youtri Kal
rplrov *rb trvvetrTTjKbs 4% a/Mpoiv.
Kal fun k6itiios t) (according to
the first meaning of the word) S
(Sws irnibs T7js twv SAojc ovalas,
("universal substance in its de
finite quality) t) (second mean
ing) &s (pTJffl TlofftiadvlO? . . .

avffrrtâ 4i ovpavov Kal yrjs Kal
tZv 4v tovtois Qvo~ewv, ti (third
meaning) ffvo-rriua Ik 6euv Kal
avBp&Trtav Kal twc eVeica tovtwv
ytyovotmv. Ar. Didyin. in Eus.
Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 : k6o-/j.os is the
name for ri> 4k irdcnjs ttjs ovalas
irotbv, and for
Kara tt}v Siak6<tut](Tiv t))V ToiavTl\v Kal Sidraîv
%Xov. In the former sense, the
world is eternal, and the same
as God ; in the latter, created,
and subject to change. Com
pare also the quotations from
the mathematician Diodorus,
in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129,
b.
2 See p. 148. The two ideas
blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu.
Prol. 13, says God must be the
Reason of the world and must
also be the universe itself ;
and he continues : Quid ergo
PANTHEISM: EXCEPTION OF BOETHUS.

The distinction, however, is only a relative one. What
is not immediately divine is nevertheless divine de
rivatively, as being a manifestation of primary fire ;
and if the soul of the world is not identical with the
body, at least it pervades every part of that body.1 It
is a distinction, too, which applies only to a part of
the conditions of the world. At the end of every
period, the sum of all derivative things reverts to the
unity of the divine Being, and the distinction be
tween what is originally and what is derivatively
divine, in other words, the distinction between God
and the world, ceases.
Boethus alone dissented from the pantheism of
the Stoics by making a real distinction between God
and the world. Agreeing with the other Stoics in
.
.
.
considering deity to be an ethereal Substance,2 he
would not allow that it resided, as the Soul, within
the whole world, and, consequently, he refused to call
the world a living being.3 Instead of doing so, he
placed the seat of deity in the highest of the heavenly
spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, and made it
operate upon the world from this abode.4 The oppointerest. inter naturam Dei et
nostram 1 Kostri melior pars
animus est, in illo nulla pars
extra animum est. Totus est
ratio, &C.
1 The connection of the two,
like the connection between
soul and body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from
Zeno on p. 148, 1, is Kpams 5i'
oAuv. See p. 135.
2 Stob. Eel. i. 60 : B6r)9os rbv
alBepa debv aire<piivaTo.
3 Diog. 143 : B6r)8os $c q>ti<nv

oh cfocu ($ov tov K6ajiov. The
words of Philo, Incorrupt. M.
953, c^vxh Se tov K6o-fiov icari
robs civtto"oovvras 6 6ebsimply
the same, but these words evidently are not taken from Boethus.
4 Diog. 148 : Bo'ijflos 5e iy r-jj
irepl tpfotws ova-lav 6eov t)jv tuv
airXavwv a<pa!pav which must be
understood in the same sense
as the corresponding statements
169
Chap.
(3) Bob*%tfjmn
thepamtheism of
the Stoics.
1G0
Chap.
VI.
THE STOICS.
site view detracted, in his eyes, from the unchange
able and exalted character of the divine Being. How
anxious he was to vindicate that character will also
be seen in the way in which he differed from his
fellow-Stoics in reference to the destruction of the
world.
of other Stoics : the rrye/iovucbv of
the world resides in the purest
part of the ether. Yet, inas
much as the world is no living
being, nor is deity the soul of
the world, it must, according
to the view of Boethus, act upon
it from without. This is ex
pressly stated in Philo, Incor
rupt. M. 953, B, God is described

as the charioteer guiding the
world, and trapifrrifievos the
stars and elements. But this
passage, beginning at xai ufaor'
fMruss, is evidently Philo's
own expansion of what he has
just quoted from Boethus.
GENERAL COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.
161
CHAPTER VII.
THE STUDY OF NATURE. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.
By VIRTUE of a law inherent in nature, Primary
Being passes over into particular objects; for, involving as it does the conception of a forming and
.
.
.,
creating force, it must as necessarily develop into a
universe, as a seed or ovum must develop into a
r
plant or animal.1 Primary fireso taught the Stoics,
following Heraclitusfirst goes over into vapour,
then into moisture ; one part of this moisture is pre
cipitated in the form of earth, another remains as
water, whilst a third part evaporating constitutes
atmospheric air, and air, again, enkindles fire out of
itself. By the mutual play of these four elements
the world is formed,2 built round the earth as a
1 Diog. vii. 136: kwt' apx&s
ptlv oiv naff atnbv Svra [rbv Stbv]
rpVror t))c traaav ovaiav 5i' aipos
eis liSwp' Kai Siantp iv Tj yov-fj t6
trwipita irpi'xToi, oStoi xal touroy onfpnaTiicbv \6yor ivra toB
K6(rfiov rotovfc tnro\iv4ff6at Iv t
vyptf Ivfpybv avrtp votovvra tJjv
8X7)1/ irp!>s t))v tw |t)s ytvttriv,
k.t.A. Seneca, Nat. Qusest. iii.
13, 1: Fire will consume the

world : hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in
rerum natura, igne restincto,
quam humorem. In hoc futuri
mundi spem latere. Stob. Eel.
i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161,2;
164, 2.
2 Stob. i.370: Z*Vava 8e olkas
into(palvta6ai Siappi\ii)v toiainip/
M
Chap.
A- ^te
general
'course of
t!w uni~
verse.
(1) Origin
Jj^jJ
162
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
centre;1 heat, as it is developed out of water,2 mould
ing the chaotic mass. By the separation of these
5e^(Tet ttvat 4v irepi6Htp ri)v tov
t\ou Hta.K6(TfxT)(TW 4k tt)s olivias.
Zrav 4k trvphs rpotri) eis iJSwp 5i'
aepos y4vr\ratTbfx4v rt {MplffTa&Qat
teat yrjv ffwlffrarrdaiy 4k rod Xonrov
5e rb fi.lv Utafiivetv SSap, 4k 5e tov
orfxiofi4vov ae'pa yivo~0att &e twos
5e tov aepos vvp 4dirTiv. Diog.
vii. 142 : ylveo&cu 5c rbv k6o-(xov
Zrav 4k irvphs t) ovaia Tpairjj fit
aepos es uypoVr/Ta, e?Tft to 7raûftcplsairrovffVffT&v aTTOTeKtffdi) yij
rb 5e Aeirro/xepes 4aepw6f} Kal
tout' hrvw\4o Xeirrvvdtv irvp airoyevi/ô-?? ; ?ra Kara jufî^ e*K touTttfi' <pvrd re ko! ia al S\Aa ye'rTj.
Chrys. in
St. Rep. 41, 3,
p. 1053 : ij 5 iropos fj.Tafio\i)
4o*n toioOtj) * 5i* aepos s S5wp
Tp7T6TCU * KttK TOUTOU 77JS V<piara/xev^s afyp 4v8vfj.ia.Tat * AeTrrwvofj.4vou 5 toD ae'pos 6 ai'0$7p
vcpfx*' *w/fXy. The same
writer observes, in the Scholia
on Hesiod's Theogony, v. 459,
&V* KaOvypQjv ovtwv twv ZKw Kal
ofj.$pci}v KaTa<pepofJ.4va>v iroWav
Tl)v $KKpl<TlV TOVTWV Kp6vOV U>VQ~
pdo-0at. Conf. Clemens, Strom,
v. 599, c, and Stob. i. 312.
1 Stob. Eel. i. 442, also
affirms that the creation of the
universe begins with earth.
2 Stob. 1. c. : KAedV&V 8e
o&Vo? 7rer tpijo'tv ' 4K(p\oyto~64vTos
tov Travrbs ffwtfap Tb fieffov avrov
Trpwrov, eFra to 4%6}xeva atrofffievvvffBai $lj '6\ov. rov 5e ira^TOJ
4vypav9tvTos, to $o~xa-?ov tov
irvphs, b\vTiTViri}ffavTo$ a&T7}o-\v aljêadat

Kal apx^Bai HiaKOfffAeiv rb 8Aof,
Kal rotafoyp ireploHov act Kal 5ioKdfffX-qfflV TTOtOVfXfVOV rod 4v T1J
rStv Bhav oiro-ia r6vov (for this fa
vourite expression of Cleanthes,
see p. 127, 5 ; 128, 2) vafcaBat
[b'laKQO'fJ.otifjifi'Ov rb $\ov]. So*irep
yap kv6s twos tk fiipn vavra
<f>irerat 4k o"irepfj.dr<av iv tois KaOi)Kovcri xp&rou, OVTQJ Kal TOV '6\ov
ra p-e'p7/, 5>v Kal to. ftpa Kal Ttk
(pvrh ovra rvyxdvet, 4v rots Kadi)~
Kovo-i xpdvoi* <pvfTai. Kal &n-irep
Tires \6yoi r$>v fiepuv eis o"ir4pfXa
orvvt6vTS fxiyvvvrai Kal addis SioKpivovrat y*vo\x4vtev to>v fAtpwv,
oStcos i *v6s re vdvra yiyvw&ai
KoX 4k irdvTcov eis %v ffuyKplvwdat,
(conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1),
5 Kal avfAtydovcos SiefiotStrTjs t^s
ntprfSov. A few further details
are supplied by Macrob, Sat. i.
17. The myth respecting the
birth of Apollo and Artemis is
referred to the formation of the
sun and moon. Namque post
chaos, ubi primum coepit confusa deformitas in rerum
formas efc elementa nitescere,
terraaque adhuc humida sub
stantia in molli atque instabili
sede nutaret : convalescente
paullatim aethereo calore atque
inde seminibus in earn igneis
defluentibus (the connection of
Zeus, i.e., of Ether, with Leto,
the Earth) hsec sidera edita
esse creduntur ; et solem maxi
ma caloris vi in superna raptum ; lunam vero humidiore et
velut femineo sexu naturali
quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam ille
magis substantia patris con-
I
163
elements, a distinction between the active and the
passive powers of naturebetween the soul of the . Chap.
VII.
world and the body of the worldbecomes apparent.
The moisture into which the primary fire was first
changed represents the body, just as the heat 1 latent
in it represents the soul ; 2 or, taking the later four
fold division of the elements, the two lower ones
r
correspond to matter, the two higher ones to acting
force.3
As the distinction between matter and force has (2) End of
stet, haec matris. The state
ment that besides other things
plants and animals had their
origin in the intermingling of
elements (Stob. and Diog.) must
be understood in the sense of
generatio aequivoea. Lactant.
Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics
make men grow like sponges
out of the earth, and Sext.
Math. ix. 28 says the Stoics
speak of the earth-born men of
prehistoric ages.
1 There mustalways be some
remainder of heat or fire
avowed, or. else
,.~v there
.utic w^be
nuullt ue
no active life-power from which
a new creation could emanate.
Philo, Incorrupt. M. 954, C,
observes that, if the world
were entirely consumed by fire
at the iKiripaais, the fire itself
would be extinguished, and no
new world would be possible.
Sib Kal rives rwv arb rys aroas
. . . %<paffav, Zti fiera T^y 4kttvpaHTiv,
4iretdav 6 yeos K&fffLos fieWy
tn^n^M^&TiTZ
ob o-fievvv, itoah U tis abroS
nolpa fcroArfxwoi.
. 2 Chrys. in Pint. 1. c. 41, 6:
St6\ou ixkv yap Stv 6 n6<rfios *vp&- the world.

(to! T)yeflovtK6v. 8te Se fi(TajSaAi'C
fls T(> bypbv Kal rrjv (yairn\ei<plie7<Tav ipvx^v Tp6irov Tiva els ffSoua
Kal if'uxV (UTt'0a\ej/ &aT <tv~
3 Nemes. Nat. Horn. C. 2,
p. 72 : heyovtn 8e ol StoukpI, tuv
ffTOixdtuv ret fiev eivai dpatniKa
ra 5e iraffyrrKd' ' 5pa<rTiKa fiff
aepa Kal irvp, iraGriTiKa 5e yitv Kal
SSwp. Pint. Com. Not. 49, 2.
See above p. 127, u. From this
SdU^po^8
....o Stoic
[jujiilsphilo
con
nected with the
sophy, which have been already
discussed. It can no longer
appear strange that the active
power, or deity (and likewise
the human soul), should at one
time be called Fire, at another
Air-Current, for both represent
equally the acting force ; and
the statement that properties
inrdeeadmthePhewt,CU?entS-as'
are atmospheric currentsas,
indeed,
nrVi distinction
'
of
Si the
* Whle
of subject-matter and property
tling!8 m tU* view of
1(2

164
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
its origin in time, so it will also have an end in time.1
Matter which primary Being has separated from itself
to form its body is being gradually resolved into pri
mary Being again ; so that, at the end of the present
course of things, a general conflagration of the world
will restore all things to their original form, in which
everything derivative will have ceased to exist, and
pure Deity, or primary fire, will alone remain in its
original purity.2 This resolution of the world into
1 The Stoics, according to
Dion. 141, where, however,
there is apparently a lacuna
in the text, prove that the
world (SioKiJff/iinrij, not koV/ios,
in the absolute sense, see p.
158, 1) will come to an end,
partly because it has come into
being, and partly by two not
very logical inferences : 08 to
[vulgo oil re to, Cobet : oh rd re]
l*.cpri tp&aprd fori, Kal rb H\ov Tck
5i p.eprn too K6o-fjLOV <p$apra, els
&\\ij\a yap perafidWei ' <p8aprbs
&pa 6 k6o-[ios ' and tfrt 4iriSeiKr6v
larl T7js 4ir\ rb x*ipov p-erafioKrjs,
<p9apr6v fori ' Kal 6 K&fffios apa '
eâvxpovrai yap Kal (>ub'arovrai.
Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In
Plut. Sto. Eep. 44, 2, p. 1054,
Chrysippus asserts that the
oiiala is immortal, but to x6ap.os
belongs a S>airep a<p6ap<rla.
2 Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p.
1052 : [Xpvtwnros] Iv ftp Trpdsrtp
rcepl irpovoias rbv Ai'a, <bi}(rlv,
atfeff0ai fxexpts af els avrbv awavra
KaravaXtixrri. e*Trel yap 6 Qdi'aros
fiev dffn tyvxTis xwflfyôs ^to Tv
trdfiaros, t\ 5e rod koVîoo ijtvxb oo
Xtipifcrai fiey, atfêrat 5 <rvv*x&s
jxexpis av els avr^)y i%ava\tao"n
tt]V u'XTjf, oo prjreoy airoQviiffKeiv
rbv K6ajtov. Stob. Eel. i. 414
(according to Numenius: see

Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1) : TApnvi
Kal K\edv0et Kal Xpvoiinrcp apeoKei
ttjv ovalav /j.erapd\\eiy otov eis
<rTrepp.a rb Trip (Philo, Incorrupt.
M. 956, B, expresses himself
against this description) /col
ndXiv 4k rodrov rotavrrjv airoTe\eio6at rT\v StaKoVjUTjtn*' oTo TrpoVcpov 1\v. Seneca, Consol. ad
Marciam, gives a graphic de
scription of the end of the
world, which recalls the lan
guage of the Revelation. Com
pare, on the subject of eKiripuxns,
Diog. vii. 142, 137 (see above
p. 158, 1) ; At Didym. in Bus.
Pr. Ev. xv. 16, 1 ; Plut. Com.
Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2) ; Heraolit. Alleg. Horn. c. 25, p. 53 ;
Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii.
46, 118 ; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb.
i. 2 ; Alex. Aphr. in Meteor. 90,
a. In the last-named passage,
it is urged by the Stoics, in
support of their view, that even
now large tracts of water are
dried up or else take the place
of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii.
b; De Ccelo; Schol. in Arist.
487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13;
Justin. Apol. i. 20 ; ii. 7 ; Orig.
c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71.
Since at the iKtipwois every-
165
fire or ether,1 the Stoics thought, would take place, Chap.
VII
through the same intermediate stages as its genera'__
tion from the primary fire.2 Cleanthes, following
his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing3
force in the world, supposed that its destruction
would come from the sun.4
No sooner, however, will everything have re- (3) Cycles
turned to its original unity,5 and the course of the jj^j-p.
course.
thing is resolved into deity, jSaAeif us kam6v.
Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p. 1067,
5 It is expressly asserted
says : Urav 4icirvp(&(raxri rbv ttSapov that everything, without ex
ovtoi, Kanbv fiev ou5' Stiovv airo- ception, is liable to this deAt/irerai, rb 5' 8w ipp6vtfi6v 4an stiny ; neither the soul nor the
rriviKavra kolI <yo<p6v.
Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen.
1 Nuvien. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. Cons, ad Marc. 26, 7 : Nos
18, 1 : apeffKei be rots irpeaPurd- quoque felices animae et asterna
toij twv oTrb Trjs alpeaews rairns, sortitas (the words are put in
ilaypovaBai iriina. k<xt& vepidbovs the mouth of a dead man), cum
rivas ras fieylffras, els vvp alOepa- Deo visum sit iterum istamoliri,
8*s &va\vofj.4paitf irdtTup. Ac- labentibus cunctis, et ipsa?
cording to Philo, Incorrupt. M. parvaruina? ingentis accessio, in
954, E, Cleanthes called this antiqua elementa vertemur.
fire \6, avyi\, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5 : Some of
ibid. 953, B. The observations the Gods have come into being
on p. 151 respecting the iden and are perishable, others are
tity of irvp, Trvevp-a, atifyp apply eternal : Helios aDd Selene,
and other similar deities, have
here.
2 This is, at least, the im come into being ; Zeus is
port of the general principle eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt.
(assigned to Chrysippus by M. 950, A, Oriff. c. Cels. iv. 68,
Stob. Eel. i. 314) expressed by Pint. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com.
Heraclitus, that, in the reso- Not. 31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected
lution of earth and water into that, at the general conflafire, the same steps intervene, gration, the Gods will melt
in a retrograde order, as in away, as though they were
their generation.
made of wax or tin. According
to Philodem. irtpi 6euv Ztaywyris,
' See p. 147, 1.
4 Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10 : Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1,
limya:vi6p.fVos 6 KXtavBris rfj 4k- even Zeno restricted the happy
xupibatt \4yei t$]v (r*K4\vi)v al ra life of the Gods to certain
Xonrct &tTrpa rbv fyKtov 4oiioiS><ra.i lengthy periods of time,
[leg. -ciV] ndvra cavrtji nai /xera-
166
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
world have come to an end, than the formation of a newworld will begin,1 so exactly corresponding with the
previous world that every particular thing, every
particular person, and every occurrence will recur in
it,2 precisely as they occurred in the world prece
1 Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv.
19 : iirl roffovro Si wpuekO&nf &
Koivbs \6yos Kal KOtv)} <pV(TlS flfifay Kal v\tltov ytvoptvyi rtKos
avafyipdvocra trdvra Kal els tavri)V
ava\a$ouffa iv tj? irdrrri ovrrta
7<>'CTai (it occupies the room of
the whole substance) 4iravt\dovera eis rbv irpurov ^TjAcVra
\6yov Kal els avdffracnv [? KaraffTaaiy] iKelvrjv r^v irotovtrav
tviavrbv fbv p.eyi(rrov, natf %v air'
avrrisii6yrjs els avrfy ird\iv yiverat
ri itroKardmaais (the same in
PMlop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii.
Schl. p. 70), 4irave\8ovcra Se Slot
rdiv dtp oias ZiaKOfffxetv aurabras
%paT0 Kara \6yov irdKiy t\]v avtt\v Sie[aya>yfyv irote'tTai. See
p. 161. According to Nemes.
Nat. Horn, c, 38, p. 147, conf.
Cenmrin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the
imipcxris takes place when all
the planets have got back to the
identical places which they oc
cupied at the beginning of the
world, or, in other words, when
a periodic year is complete.
The length of a periodic year
was estimated by Diogenes
(Phit. PI. i. 32, 2; Stob. Eel.
i. 264) at 365 periods, or 365 x
18,000 ordinary years. Plut.
De Ei ap. D.*9, g, E, p. 389
mentions the opinion, Hirep rpla
irpbs ev, tovto t)\v itaKdiTfjirifftv
Xptvtp irpbs TT)V iK-nvptaffiv elvai.
Inasmuch as it had been pre
viously said that the duration
of K6pos (i.e. iKTtvpuKTti) was
longer, and that therefore

Apollo, who represents the state
of perfect unity, was honoured
nine months with the pasan,
whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces
by the Titans, the emblem of the
present world of contraries, was
only honoured for three with
the dithyramb, some mistake
seems to have crept in. Pro
bably we ought either to read
Sirep irpbs rpia ev, or to transpose
the passage from 5iaK6<rp.ri<rtv to
iKiripwrriv.
2 The belief in changing
cycles is a common one in the
older Greek philosophy. In
particular, the Stoics found it
in Heraclitus. The belief, how
ever, that each new world
exactly represents the preceding
one is first met with among
the Pythagoreans, and is closely
connected with the theory of
the migration of souls and a
periodic year. Eudemus, in a
passage which has generally
been lost sight of in describing
Pythagorean teaching, hail
taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173) :
el 5e tis iriffreitxete rots XluQayopelots, &s irdKtv ret avrd apidfuS
Kayi) fiv$o\oyiiffw ri) pafiSlov %xu3V
vfiiv KaQrifitvois aurat Kal to aA\a
H-aVra bpulus Sljci, Kal rbv xpdvov
e(\oy6p icrTi rbv avrbv elvai (in
that case the time must be the
same as the present time). The
Stoics appear to have borrowed
this view from the Pytha

ding. Hence the history of the world and of Deity
as, indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting
force, must necessarily be the caserevolves in an
endless cycle through exactly the same stages.1 Still
goreans (unless with other
Orphic-Pythagorean views it
was known to Heraclitus), and
it commended itself to them as
being in harmony with their
theory of necessity. Hence
they taught: jmtci tt\v (Kirvpaxriv
ira\iv irtivra Taurct iv Tff k6<t/acp
ytveadcu kot' apidfj.bv, its KaX rbv
iSlus iroibv trd\iy rbv avrbv Tip
rp6tr6eyelval tc koX ylveir8ai iKtivip
r<f Kiaiuf {Alex. Anal. Pr. 58,
b). tovtou 8e ovtois %xovTosi
ot)\ov, its oiiStv &5vvaroy, Kai rjfias
fjttra rb Tt\twi)<rat ndAiv irtpwowv
tivwv elKnp.pivo)v xpbvav els hp
vvv ea/xev Karaffri\fffff8ai trxypct
(Chrysippus, Tepl Xlpovoias, in
Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf.
Seneca, Ep. 36, 10: Veniet
iterum qui nos in lucem reponat
dies). This applies to every
fact and to every occurrence in
the new world, at the iraAi77tveaia or airo/caTa<rTains (as the
return of a formerage is called) :
thus there will be another So
crates, who will marry another
Xanthippe, and be accused by
another Anytus and Meletus.
Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1,
deduces his adage, that nothing
new happens under the sun.
Simpl. Phys. 207, b; PhUop.
Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70 ;
Tatian. c. Grsec. c, 3, 245, d ;
Clemens, Strom, v. 549, D ;
Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68 ; v. 20 and
23 ; Nemes. 1. c. ; Plut. Def .
Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other
lhings, the Stoics raited the
question, Whether the Socrates
who would appear in the future

world would be numerically
identical (Is apiBfup) with the
present Socrates or not 1 {Simpl.
I.e.)the answer being, that
they could not be numerically
identical, since this would in
volve uninterrupted existence,
but that they would be alike
without a difference (knapiWaKToi). Others, however, chiefly
among the younger Stoics,
appear to have held that there
might be noticeable differences
between the two. ( Orig. v. 20,
592, c.) This remark appears to
have given rise to the false no
tion (//i/>/rt>fy.Refut. Hser.i. 21;
Kpiphan. Haer. v. p. 12, b) that
the Stoics believed in the trans
migration of souls. The remark
made by Nemes., that the Gods
know the whole course of the
present world, from having sur
vived the end of the former one,
can only apply to one highest
God, who, however, does not
require such empirical know
ledge. The other deities will
not have survived the general
conflagration.
' Ar. Didym. 1. c. continues :
tup rotovrwv irept6$wv
aiotov
yivofievuv d*caTairaiJffT<w$. o#re
yap rrjs apxys aWiav Kai [del.]
naffiv ot6v tc ytvta&ai, otne rov
oioiKovvros aura, ovtrlav re yip
roisyivofievois ixptard.vaio'ti retpV'
Kuiav ava$4xe<r9ai tos jueTajSoAas
irrfffos Kai rb StifiiovpyTjtrov 4
auTrjj, k.t.A. Conf. Philop. :
diropi)crei 5' av tis, Ss <pi)<rtv
167
Chap.
VII.
168
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
there were not wanting, even in comparatively early
times, members of the Stoic School who entertained
doubts on this teaching ; and among the most dis
tinguished of the later Stoics some gave it up alto
gether.1 Besides the periodical destruction by fire,
'AXefavSpos, vpbs 'Api(TTOT4\ij. ei
y&p 7} U\tj r) avrr) ael SmjueVet,
%art 5e icol rb TTOlT\TlKbv atrtov rb
aitrb del, 5ick Trotav alriav ovxl
fcarcc irtploZ6v two. v\tlovo$ \p6vov
4k tt)s auTTjj S\7ii ret aura rrdKiv
kot' iipSfMbv imb twv ainSiv ifjTOA \
8irep Tipes (pa&i Kara Tf)v jraAfyycvtatav koX rbv txeya* 4viaurbv
auftficdveiv, ivy-K&vTWTtov avr&v
ciiroKaTcto'Tatris ylvercu. See M.
Aurel. v. 32.
1 According to Philo (In
corrupt. M. 947, C), besides
Posidonius and Panaetius, his
instructor (Diog. vii. 142 ; Stoh.
Eel. i. 414), Boethus asserted,
in opposition to the ordinary
Stoic teaching, the eternity of
the world. Philo adds that
this was also the view of Dio
genes of Seleucia in his later
years. Moreover, Zeno of
Tarsus, on the authority of
Numenius (in JSuseb. Praap. Ev.
xv. 19, 2), considered that the
destruction of the world by fire
could not be proved (ipcurlv
eVio'x''' irepl ttjs imrup&fftwi tSiv
SXaiv). But these statements
are elsewhere contradicted.
Diogenes mentions Posidonius
as one who held the destruction
of the world by fire. The
testimony of Diogenes is con
firmed by Pint. PI. Phil. ii. 9. 3
(Stob. Eel. i. 380; Ev*. Pr.
Ev. xv. 40. SeeAchill. Tatian,
Isag. 131, C), who says that
Posidonius only allowed so
much empty space outside the

world as was necessary for the
world to be dissolved in at the
iKvvoaan. The difference be
tween his view and the older
Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 68) deduces from
Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary.
Antipater, according to Dio
genes, also believed in a future
conflagration. Little import
ance can be attached to the
statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46,
118, respecting Pansetius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the
words of Stob. are : irtBcuiwTtpav
vofiiêt Ttjv cuSi<jT7JTa tov n6<Tp.ov ;
and those of Diog. : &<p9aprov
aireipi\varo rbv Koffpiov.
Boethus emphatically denied
the destruction of the world,
his chief reasons (in Philo, 1. c.
952, c) being the following :
(!) If the world were de
stroyed, it would be a de
struction without a cause, for
there is no cause, either within
or without, which could pro
duce such an effect. (2) Of
the three modes of destruction,
those Kark 8iaipe(rii>, Kara avaiptviv tt)s fVexo^ffTjs Troi6rr]Tos (as
in the crushing of a statue),
Kari. avyxvoiv (as in chemical
resolution), not one can apply
to the world. (3) If the world
ceased to exist, the action of
God on the world, in fact, His
activity would altogether cease.
(4) If everything were con

periodical destructions by floods 1 were also assumed ;
there being, however, a difference of opinion as to
whether the whole universe, or only the earth and its
inhabitants, were subject to these floods.2
sumed by fire, the fire must go
out for want of fuel. With
that, the possibility of a new
world is at an end.
The resolution of the world
into indefinite vacuum, attri
buted by Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 2, to
the Stoics in general, is no
doubt the same as the con
densation and expansion of
matter. Hitter, iii. 599 and
703, supposes it to be a mis
apprehension of the real Stoic
teaching. How Hegel, Gesch.
d. Phil. ii. 391, and Sehleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129,
in view of the passages quoted,
can absolutely deny that the
Stoics held a periodic destruc
tion of the world, is hard to
comprehend.
1 The flood and its causes
are fully discussed by Sen. Nat.
Qu. iii. 27-30. Eain, inroads
of the sea, earthquakes, are all
supposed to contribute. The
chief thing, however, is, that
such a destruction has been
ordained in the course of the
world. It comes cum fatalis
dies venerit, cum adfuerit ilia
necessitas temporum (27, 1),
cum Deo visum ordiri meliora,
Vetera finiri (28, 7); it has
been fore-ordained from the
beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and
is due, not only to the pressure
of the existing waters, but also
to their increase, and to a
changing of earth into water
(29, 4). The object of this
flood is to purge away the sins

of mankind, ut de integro totse
rudes innoxiseque generentur
[res humanfe] nec supersit in
deteriora prseceptor (29, 5) ;
peracto judicio generis humani
exstructisque pariter feris . . .
antiquus ordo revocabitnr.
Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo
inscius scelerum : but this state
of innocence will not last long.
Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the
destruction of the world by fire
will take place when all the
planets are in the sign of the
Crab, its destruction by water
when they are in the sign of
the Capricorn. Since these
signs correspond with the
summer and winter turns of
the sun, the language of Sene
ca agrees with that of Censorin.
Di. Nat. 1 8, 1 1 , evidently quoted
from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii :
Cujus anni hiems summa est
cataclysmus . . . sestas autem
ecpyrosis. Conf. Heraclit. Alleg.
Horn, c, 25, p. 53 : When one
element gains the supremacy
over the others, the course of
the world will come to an end,
by iKwipaxris, if the element is
fire; et 5' &8povv uSajp znpaytlri,
Ka.TOK\vff[iq3 rbv icdffpov airoAei2 For the former view, the
language of Heraclitus and
Censorinus tells, for the latter
that of Seneca.
169
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
170
r
Chap.
VII.
B. Oveemmeid ofthe
world.
(I) Nature
ofDestiny.
(a) De
stiny as
Provi
dence.
One point established by the generation and de

struction of the worldthe uncertainty of all par
ticular things, and the unconditional dependence of
everything on a universal law and the course of the
universeis a leading one in the Stoic enquiries
into nature?) All things in nature come about by
virtue of a natural and unchangeable connection
of cause and effect, as the nature of the universe
and the general law require. This absolute neces
sity, regulating all Being and Becoming, is ex
pressed in the conception of Pate or Destiny (ji
el/Mapfi^vT]).1 Viewed from the point of view of
natural science, Destiny is only another name for
primary Being, for the all-pervading, all-producing
Breath, for the artistic fire which is the soul of the
world.2 But again the activity of this Being being
always rational and according to law, Destiny may
also be described as the Reason of the World, as
universal Law, as the rational form of the world's
1 Diog. vii. ] 49 : naff ei'/uap/ic- se gignat. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 36:
Quid enim intelligis fatum ?
XpvatlTKOS, K.T.\.
5' LfJ.ap- existimo necessitatem rerum
liivr) curia tuv 6yruv tiponivr) ^ omnium actionumque, quam
\6yos Hatf tv 6 Kufffios Sie^dyerai. nulla vis rumpat. De l'rov.
A. Oell. vi. 2, 3 : (Chrysippus) 5, 8 : Irrevocabilis humana pain libro irep! irpovoias quarto riter ac divina cursus vehit.
tiuapiitiniv esse dicit <puoW,i> Ille ipse omnium conditor et
Tiva irwrofw tuv ftkav 4 aXSlov rector scripsit quidem fata, sed
Toiv iTtpwv rols kripois inaico- sequitur. Semper paret, semper
Kov&ovvtwv Kal fiera iroAv fiev oZv jussit.
airapafrarov otjo-qs T7js rotavTrfs
1 Conf. p. 152 and Stob.
ffvfnr\oKrjs. Oin. Divin. i. 55, Eel. i. 180 (Pint. Plac. i. 28),
125 (according to Posidonius) : Xpvffiwos hvvapiv nvevfiariKfyv
Fatum, or tlfutp/Utti, was called riflf ovalav ttjs eI/*ai|UeVi)S TCiêi
ordinem seriemque causarum, tov iravTbs fiwiKriTiKiiv.
cum causa causse nexa rem ex
GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

course.1 When regarded as the groundwork of na
tural formations, this primary Being or general Law
is called Nature ; but when it appears as the cause of
the orderly arrangement and development of the world,
it is known as Providence ; 2 or in popular language it
is called Zeus, or the will of Zeus ; and in this sense it
is said that nothing happens without the will of Zeus.3
1 Hence Chrysippus' defini
tion (Plvt. and Stob.) : einapptvri
iffrlv & rod Kiff/iov \6yos r) \6yos
{Plvt. v6y^%) rav iv r$ K^tr/xoti
wpovola oioiKOvp.4vav r) \6yos Kad'
ov toc p.\v ytyovira ytyovc, ra 5e
yiyv6y.tva yiyvtrai, ra Se ytvr\a6ftcva ytvj\atrai. Instead of hbyos,
Cbrysippus also used a\r)6eta,
atria, Qiffis, avayKri. Theodoret.
Cur. Gr. Aft. vi. 14, p. 87:
Chrysippus assigns the same
meaning to tl/tapfUvov and Karnvaynaanivov, explaining tlitapixivn) to be Kivriffts attitos <ruvfxhs
Kcd rtrayp.t'vri ; Zeno defines it
(as Stob. i. 178, also says) as
ovvap-is KivrtrtKTt rrjs CrA-rys ; also
as rpia-is or Trpôio; his suc
cessors as \6yos rav 4v r K6<r/xa
irpovola iioiKoup.4vav, or as up/tbs
atrial/. (The same in Pint.
Plac. i. 28, 4. Nem.es. Nat. Horn,
c. 36, p. 143.) Even rixo, he
continues, is explained as a
deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b,
has it as a Btiov koI Saip.6viov) ;
but this supposes it to be
essentially identical with tluapnirn. Chrysippus in Plvt. Sto.
Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050: ttjs yap
KotvTjs tpvfftas els vdvra otaretvova-ns, Se^ffei Taj* rb iwmffovv
yiv6fievov4vrf b"\a Kal rav fxopiav
draovv, war' 4Keivrjv ytvtaQat Kal
rbv 4Ktivqs \6yov, Kara rb 4rjs
b-Kahiras' 5i<k rb pJir' ({uffev
cTvai rb 4vffrr,<r6fjitvovrjj oiKovofiia

/x^re rav fitpav firjUhv ?xeiy 8tts
Kiv7)friiffrai 7i axfoci ah\as [^]
Kara rrjv Koivrfv (pvfftv. Cleanthes,
Hymn, (in Stob. Eel. i. 30) v.
12, 18 ; M. Avrel. ii. 3. See p.
151, 1.
2 It has been already de
monstrated that all these ideas
pass into one another.
3 Plut. Com. Not. 34. 6,
p. ) 076 : ei Si, as <p-n<ri Xpvcmnros,
ovSi rov\dxto~r6v 4<Trt rav fxepav
^Xfly^âs a\\' r) Kara, rrfv Aibs
fiov\r\aiv, K.r.K. Conf. Sto. Rep.
34, 2 : o&rw Si rrjs rav o\av
oiKovoftlas trpoayovaris, avayKatov
Kara rafa-nv, as av ttot' e^w/iei',
%XeLV VH-<*S> *T Tapa <pvaiv rriv
iSiav voaovvrts, tire Tre-nripa/xevot,
?tc ypa/xfj.aritfol ytyov6res r)
fiovffiKol . , . Kara rovrov Si rbv
\6yov ra irapair\r)(Xia 4povpLev Kai
vepl rr)s aperr)s rjfiuv Kal irepl rr)s
KaKlas Kal rb o\ov rav rexvav Kal
rav arexviav, as ^<pr,v . . . ovdiv
ydp lariv &\Xas rav Kara. p.4pos
yv4o~6ai, ovSi rovhdxto-rov, a.\\' r)
Kara rriv koivtiv (piffiv Kal Kara
rbv iKelvris \6yov. Ibid. 47, 4
and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15 :
o\>S4 ri ylyverai ipyov lirl xovl
ffovKarf
Sixa,
tiaifiov,Oeiov ttoXov otir'
oihe
alBtpiov
4vt ir6vru,
ttXtiv birSffa p'efavo'i KaKol trtperipriaiv avoiais.
171
Chap.
VII.
.172
Ghap.
VII.
() De
stiny as
THE STOICS.
In action as the creative force in nature, this uni
versal Eeason also bears the name of Generative
Reason (Xoyos cnrspfiaTtKos). It bears this name
more immediately in relation to the universe, not
only as being the generating power by which all
things are produced from primary fire as from seed
according to an inner law, but because in the pre
sent condition of things all form and shape, all life
and reason, grow out of it, in short, because pri
mary fire and reason contain in themselves the germ
of all things.1 In the same sense, generative powers
in the plural, or \6yot a-TrspfiariKot, are spoken of
as belonging to Deity and Nature ; and in treating
of man, \6yoi aTrepfiariKot denote the generative
powers as a part of the soul, and must be thought of
as bearing the same relation to the individual soul
that the generative powers of Nature do to the soul
of nature.2 By the term Generative Reason, there
fore, must be understood the creative and forming
forces in nature, which have collectively produced
tbe universe, and particular exercises of which pro1 See the quotations on Plut. Athenag. ; M. Aurel. ix. 1 :
p. 161, 1 ; 161, 2; 161, 2; 144, u3puLi)fffv [t] tyvais] ivl rtjvb'e rrjv
1 ; 148 ; 145, 2, from Diog. vii. SiaK6<TfjLi)(riv ffvWapovcrdt rivas
136 ; Stob. Eel. i. 372 and 414 ; \6yovs rcov iaofievuv teal Swdpeis
Cie. N. D. ii. 10, 28 ; 22, 58 ; yovifxous tupatpltraffa, k.t.\. Ibid.
Sext. Math. ix. 101 : M. Aurel. vi. 24 : Alexander and his groom
iv. 14 : 4vcuj>avi(r0^}(rri rqj ytvvi)- 4\i)tpQf](rav eis robs avrobs rov
ffavri, fiaWov $h ai/a\7i<p6rj(Tr] els k6o-{xov 0-Trepfj.aTiKobs K6yovs.
rbv X&yov abrov rbv o'vepfj.ariKby Diog. vii. 148 : f<rri Se <pvais
Kara perafio^v. Ibid. 21 : at eis e avrrjs Kivovpivfi Kara avtptyvxal . . . eis rbv rwv o\u>v fiartKovs \6yovs, K.r.K. Ibid.
o-trepfiariKbv \6yov ava\afiâv6~ 157 : ^prt\ St tyvxvs Keyovffiv
fievat.
o/fTaj, ras ireWe alffdrifftts Kat robs
2 See on p. 151, 1, the de 4v r)îv ffirtpiiariKobs \6yovs Kal rb
finition of deity from Stob. tpuprjriKbv Kat rb KoyiariK6v.
GOVERNMENT OF TilE WORLD.

duce individual things. These forces, agreeably with
the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the
173
Chap.
YI1' .
original material, or material germ of things. On

the other hand, they also constitute the form of
thingsthe law which determines their shape and
qualities, the \6yosonly we must beware of trying
to think of form apart from matter. Just as the
igneous or ethereal material of primary Being is in
itself the same as the forming and creating element
in things, the Reason of the world or the Soul of
nature ; so the atmospheric substance in the seeds
of individual things, in which the Stoics thought
the generative power (<nrep/j,d) alone resides,1 is in
itself the germ out of which the corresponding thing
is produced by virtue of an inherent law.2 The in
ward form is the only permanent element in things
amid the perpetual change of materials.3 It consti
tutes the identity of the universe ; and whereas
matter is constantly changing from one form to
another,4 the universal law of the process alone con
tinues unchangeably the same.
All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmis- (2) Argutakeably to the conclusion, not only that the world favour'of
as a whole is governed by Providence, but that every Provi
dence,
1 As the primary fire or Quaest. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it
ether is called the seed of the is defined as y6vos &5eJjs ytviworld (p. 161, 1), so, according (ros.
to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159),
3 See p. 101, 2.
the (Tirtpua in the seed of plants
4 This is particularly maniand animals is a h-mSô kut' fest, not only in the history of
ova-lay.
the world, but also in the
2 o-xtpumiKbs \6yos is also doctrine of the constant change
nsed to express the seed or the of the elements.
egg itself. Thus, in Pint.
174
Chap.
VII.
(a) Argu
ment from
thegeneral
convic
tions of
mankind.
(b) Argu
mentfrom
the per
fection of
God.
Argu
ment from,
the theory
of neces
sity.
THE STOICS.
part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws,
that no definite arguments would appear necessary
to establish this point. Nevertheless, the Stoics lost
no opportunity of meeting objections to their views
in the fullest manner.1 In the true spirit of a Stoic,
Chrysippus appealed to the general conviction of
mankind, as expressed in the names used to denote
fate and destiny,2 and to the language of poetry.3
Nor was it difficult to show 4 that a divine govern
ment of the world followed of necessity from the
Stoic conception of the perfection of God. Besides,
in proving the existence of a God by the argument
drawn from the adaptation of means to ends, a pro
vidential government of the world was at the same
time proved.5 Chrysippus also thought to defend his
theory of necessity in the same strictly logical man
ner. For must not every judgment be either true
or false ? 6 And does not this apply to judgments
which refer to future events, as well as to others?
Judgments, however, referring to the future can only
1 Heine, Stoicorum de Fato also Ps. Arist. De Mundo, c. 7.
Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29. The argument for Providence,
2 Compare what the Peri drawn from the consensus gen
patetic Diogenianus (in Ens. tium in Sen. Benef. iv. 4, fol
Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. lows another tack.
(Eel. i. 180) observe on the
3 Homeric passages, which
derivations of ctfiapfifyri, ircirpw- he was in the habit of quoting
liirn, Xpt&iv (Heine, p. 32, 1, in Bus. 1. c. 8, 1.
suggests on the strength of
* See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.
s The two are generally
Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect, vi. 11,
p. 87, 4, who transcribes the taken together. Compare the
quotation from Eusebius, rbv quotations on p. 145, 4.
See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aris
Xpivov KOTtt rbxpei". We ought
rather to read, according to totle and the Peripatetics
Theod. Gaisf., rb XP*"" Kara rb thought differentlv. See Simpl.
XP*os), Wlolpou, K\t*9u> : and the Cat. 103, $.
quotations p. 170, 1 ; 171, 1 ;
175
be true when what they affirm must come to pass of Chap.

necessity; they can only be false when what they
affirm is impossible ; and, accordingly, everything
that takes place must follow of necessity from the
causes which produce it.1
The same process of reasoning, transferred from (d) Arguthe outer world to the inner world of mirjd, underlies SJJJf "m
the argument from the foreknowledge of God.2 If in knowledge
the one case it is alleged that whatever is true, beGd'
fore it comes to pass, is necessary, so in the other it is
said to be necessary, if it can be truly known before
it comes to pass.
To this argument may be added a further one
to which the Stoics attached great importance-the
argument from the existence of divination.3 If it is
impossible to know beforehand with certainty what is
accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.
But the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim, that nothing can take place
without a sufficient cause, nor, under given circuinstances, can happen differently from what has hap
pened.4 This were as impossible, according to the
1 Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.
2 Alex. De Fato, p. 92,
Orel. : rb Si \4ytiv tUXoyor that
Toi/s Btotis rk taou-cva irpoetitvat
. . . /to! rovro \anfSdvovras Karatrutvifav neipaiBai Si' auToS t!>
itivra i aviyicris re ylvtaBat xai
itafl' *\\iap]i&v<\ii otfre aAijfles oStc
t$\oyov.
3 Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162 ; De
Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the
previous exposition is wanting) ;
Diogenian (in Em. Pr. Bv. iv.
(e) ArgutheêxU^'1
te!'ee f
tion.
(3) The
*p^Jj{
dence di
(a) Provi
dence em
3, 1): Chrysippus proves, by neoemUJthe existence of divination,
that all things happen nofl' tiuap/xemif for divination would
be impossible, unless things
were foreordained. Alex. De
Fato, c. 21, p. 96 : oi 5e vfivovrres
ri\v lUurriK^f nai Kara rbv ttvruf
\6yov fiovov fft&frffOai Xtyovrts
avr^v Kal rairn trlarti toD icivra
KaS' tluapixim\v ylntrBat xptSjuevoi,
k.t. \.
4 Pint. De Fato, 11, p. 374:
176
Chap.
VII.
(A) Provi
dence di
rected im
mediately
to the uni
verse, in
directly to
indivi
duals.
THE STOICS.
Stoics, as for something to come out of nothing ; 1
were it possible, the unity of the world would be
at an end, consisting, as it does, in the chain-like
dependence of cause upon cause, and in the abso
lute necessity of everything and of every change.2
The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct con
sequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power
which rules the world could not be the absolute uni
ting cause of all things, if there existed anything in
any sense independent of it, and unless one unchang
ing causal connection governed every thing.
Divine Providence, therefore, does not extend to
individual things taken by themselves, but only to
things in their relation to the whole. Everything being
in every respect determined by this relation, and
being consequently subject to the general order of the
Kara rbv tvavrlor [\6yov~\ fid\t- xnrb tpvoews SioiKOvfievov fariKijs
era p.ev Kal Trpuirop etvai 5(j|c( rb re Kal \oyiK7js Kal voepas ^Xlv
filjtiy avairlais ylveo&ai, a\Ka r^v rSjv ovrtav hiolK'notv atSioy
Kara vporyyovfieyas alrlas ' fiev- Kara elpfxSv rwa Kal rdtv wpotovrepov herb <pvoei OioiKeioBai r6v5e aav ; so that everything is con
rbv K6tTfiov, cvfxiryovv al ovpiraOrj nected as cau?e and effect, iWa
airbv airy Svfa. Then come rravrl re t yivoiUvy erep6v ri
the considerations confirmatory i-jraKoKovBelv, iiprij/xevov avrov
of that viewdivination, the aw' avdyKris as alrlov, Kal trav rb
wise man's acquiescence in the yiv^fxevov extv Tl
avrov, us
course of the world, the maxim airly ffvvfiprryrai ' firjSev yap avaithat every judgment is either rlws fifire ejvat fifire ylveoBai ruv
true or false. Nemes. Nat. Horn, eV rtf k6oimp 5ia rb fi-qb'ev chat 4v
c. 36, p. 139 : el yap rwv avruv avrtp anoKeKvfxevop re Kal Kexoipialrluv rtepieainiK6rwv, &s cpaotv <Tp.evovrwvtfpoyeyov6r<av ajraPTOJj'"
auTol, watra avtiytcn to aura yive- diacrvaoBai yap Kal SiaipeioBat Kal
adai.
jUijKeVi rbv k6o[xov eva fieveiv cul,
1 Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72 : KaTa /xlav rdiv re Kal olKovo/xlav
re elvat (paffi Kal ifiolus SioiKovpevov, el o.valri6s ris eiffdafivvarov to avairltas t$ ylveoBal yono Klrnois. See Cic. Divin. i.
ri 4k /j.-ti ivros.
55, 125 ; De Fato, 4, 7 ; AT. Aurel.
2 Alex. 1. c. p. 70: tpao~l Sii rbv x. 5.
x6(rfioy rivSt iya Svra . . . Kal
177
world, it follows that we may say that God cares not

only for the universe, but for all individual members of
the universe.' The converseof this may also be asserted
with equal justice, viz. that God's care is directed to the
whole, and not to individuals, and that it extends to
things great, but not to things small.2 Directly it
always extends to the whole, indirectly to individuals
throughout the whole, in so far as they are therein
contained, and their condition is determined by its
condition.3 The Stoic notion of Providence is there
fore entirely based on a view of the universe as a
whole ; individual things and persons can only come
into consideration as dependent parts of this whole.
The Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty
which besets every theory of necessitythe diffi
culty of doing justice to the claims of morality, and
of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility.
1 In Cm;. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the in our hemisphere, and for the
Stoic says: Nec vero universo men in each city. The argu
generi hominum solum, sed ment may be superfluous, but it
etiara singulis a Diis immorta- serves to show that the care of
libus consuli et provided solet. individuals was the result of
2 Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46 : Sin God's care of the whole world.
gulis non adest [Jupiter], et M. Aurel. vi. 44 : ei pi* olv ifiovtamen vim et causam et \ev<ravTO irepl ifiov koI ruy 4fioi
manum omnibus dedit. Cic. trvfi^rtfat o<pei\6vruv oi 0col, KaN. D. 66, 167 : Magna Dii cu- \ws IfiovXevffavro . . . ei 5e
rant, parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. &ou\eviravTO kot' ttilav irepl Ijuov,
35, 86 : At tamen minora Dii irepf ye tSiv koiv&v w&vtws ^jSounegligunt . . . ne in regnis XtioavTO, oh Kar* iiraKo\o{i9Tjaiii
quidem reges omnia minima Kal Tavra avpBalvovra ao-ndfaBat
koI crfpyeiv o<pe(\a>. Similarly,
curant. Sic enim dicitis.
* Cicero uses the following iv. 28. It will be seen that the
argument to show that the pro Stoics consider that the exist
vidential care of God extends ence of divination, which
to individuals :If the Gods served as a proof of special
care for all men, they must care providence, was caused by the
for those in our hemisphere, connection of nature.
and, consequently, for the cities
N
Chap.
VII.
(<) Diffi
culties
connected
Kith the
theory of
necessity.
178
THE STOICS.
This difficulty became for them all the more pressing

the higher those claims were advanced, and the more
(o) State severely they judged the great majority of their fel
ment of
low-men.1 To overcome it, Chrysippus appears to
several
difficul
have made most energetic efforts.2 The existence
ties.
of chance he could not allow, it being his aim to
establish that what seems to be accidental has always
some hidden cause.3 Nor would he allow that every
thing is necessary, since that can only be called ne
cessary which depends on no external conditions,
and is therefore always true ; 4 in other words, what
is eternal and unchangeable, not that which comes
to pass in time, however inevitable it may be.5 And,
by a similar process of reasoning, he still tried to
rescue the idea of the Possible, little as that idea
accords with the Stoic system.6
Chap.
VII.
1 As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly

observes.
2 The great majority of the
Stoic answers to iroAA.it hr^/iara
(pvfftKcL Te Kat ijOiKa KaX SiaAeKTi/cct,
which (according to Plut. De
Fato, c. 3) were called forth by
the theory of destiny, in all
probability belong to him.
3 See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus,
in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045.
He assigned as a general rea
son to yap b.vaX'riav SAcus av6~
aapKTOv elvai KaX rb avrduarov.
Hence the Stoic definition of
rtixv is airla birpuvoTyros Kat &briAos avOpwrivcp \oyuriltp in Plut.
De Fato. c. 7, p. 572 ; Plac. i.
29, 3 (Stob. Eel. i. 218) ; Alex.
De Fato, p. 24 ; Simpl. Phys.
74, 6. See p. 171, 1.
4 Alex. 1. c. The Stoics as
sert that things are possible
which do not take place, if in
themselves they can take place,

and 5ta touto <pairl /xtjS^ ra. yev6fxfva KaW eifjtapfAtvqv, Kalroi dirapojSaTws yivSfieva, i av&ytcris ylvetrdat, Sti e<rriv avTois bvvarbv
yev<r6ai koI rb avriKtliLevov. Cic.
Top. 15, 59 : Ex hoc genere
causarum ex seternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.
s Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32;
Cic. De Fato, 17, 39 ; 18, 41,
and above, p. 115, 2. Hence
Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes.
Nat. Horn. c. 39, p. 149) : tL/iiv
yap ttvai /car' avdyKrji', a be /cafl'
eipapfievTiy, a 5e Kara, irpoalpecii/,
a 5 Kara r^xVv> & 5e Kara, to
aiTOfiarbv, which is evidently
more explicit than the lan
guage used by Stob. Eel. i. 176,
and the statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.
8 See p. 115, 2. Opponents
such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46,
179
In reference to human actions, the Stoics did not Chap.

VII.
allow the freedom of the will, in the proper sense of
the term;1 but were of opinion that absence of W Moral
freedom does not prejudice the character of the will 'uMy'vin'
as a deciding power. For is not one and the same dicatedall-determining power everywhere active, working
in each particular being according to the law of its
nature, in one way in organic beings, in another in
inorganic beings, differently again in animals and
plants, in rational and irrational creatures ? 2 And
albeit every action may be brought about by the
co-operation of causes depending on the nature of
things and the character of the agent, is it not still
free, the resultant of our own impulses and decision ?3
Involuntary it would only be were it produced by
external causes alone, without any co-operation, on
the part of our wills, with external causes.4 Moral
and Alex., pointed out how il
lusory this attempt was. Ac
cording to the latter, he fell
back on the simple result,
maintaining that, in the case of
things happening icaS" tinappttn)v, there is nothing to prevent
theopposite fromcomingabout,
so far as the causes which pre
vent this from happening are
unknown to us.
1 See above, p. 171, 3.
2 C'hrytipp. in Gell. N. A.
vii. 2, 6 ; Alex. De Fato, c. 36,
p. 112.
Gell. 1. c. ; Alex. c. 13 ;
Nernes. Nat. Horn. c. 35, p. 138,
140. Alex. c. 33 (on which see
Heine, p. 43) gives a long ar
gument, concluding with the
words : irav rb Ka8' ipfifyv yiv6-
/j.voy 4ir\ rois ovtws ivtpyovaiv

eli/oi. Names, appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator, a
Stoic of the second century
A.D. Of him he remarks, that
he has consistently attributed
tJi i(p' hiui' to lifeless objects.
4 Cic. De Fato. 18, 41 : In
order to avoid necessitas, or to
uphold fate,Chrysippus distin
guishes causas principales et
perfects from causae adjuvantes,
his meaning being that everythinghappensaccordingto fate,
not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus.
Co-at.de. Top. 15, 59. Although
these causes may not be in
our power, still it is our
will which assents to the im
pressions received. (Enomaus
n 2
180
THE STOICS.
Chap, responsibility, according to the Stoics, depends only

! on freedom of the will. What emanates from my
will is my action, no matter whether it be possible
for me to act differently or not.1 Praise and blame,
rewards and punishment, express the judgment of
society relative to the character of certain personR or
actions.8 Whether they could have been different,
. or not, is irrelevant. Otherwise virtue and vice must
be set down as things not in our power, for which,
consequently, we are not responsible, seeing that
when a man is once virtuous or vicious, he cannot
be otherwise ; 3 and the highest perfection, that of
the Gods, is absolutely unchangeable.4 Chrysippus6 even endeavoured to show, not only that his
whole theory of destiny was in harmony with the
claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that
it presupposed their existence. The arrangement of
the universe, he argued, involves law, and law in
volves the distinction between what is convention
ally right and what is conventionally wrong, be
tween what deserves praise and what deserves blame.6
(in Em. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10)
charges Chrysippus with mak
ing a rinl$ov\ov of the will, be
cause he laid so great a stress
on its freedom.
1 Gell. vii. 2, 13 : do. 1. c.
2 Alex. c. 34, p. 108, puts in
the mouth of the Stoics : rb. uiv
rcov cpatv tvepyfjtTfi fi6voyt rh Si
irp(|et ra \oyiKa, Kal to iiiv a/xoprfoerai, ri Si KaropOd*<rci. raura
yip rotirois Kara <pu<riv uiv, Svratv
Si al kfiapnifi&Tuv Kal Karopduudruv, Kal rwv roiairwv fpvaetttv Kal
iroiorJirwv fx^j ayvoovuevwv, Kal

(traivoi fiev Kal ty&yoi Kal Tiital Kal
Ko\d<reis.
Alex. c. 26, p. 82.
4 Alex. c. 32, p. 102.
' The arguments usual
among the Stoics in after times
may, with great probability, be
referred to Chrysippus.
6 Alex. c. 35 : Xtyovai yap
ovk tffrt roiavrn iiiy ti el/xapu4vrj.
ovk %<rri Si irewpwfievri * (It never
happens that there is a ttfiapntpri
but not a irtwpoj/ieV))) ouSi (an

Moreover, it is impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to think of the world
without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely
good. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that
of goodness, which again includes the contrast be
tween virtue and vice, between what is praiseworthy
and what is blameworthy.1 If his opponents ob
jected that, if everything is determined by de
stiny, individual action is superfluous, since what
has been once foreordained must happen, come
what may, Chrysippus replied :There is a distinc
tion to be made between simple and complex
predestination ; the consequences of human actions
being simply results of those actions, are quite
as much foreordained as the actions themselves.2
From these observations, it appears that the
ireirpauivi), ovk iari 8t al<ra oiiSi second argument anb rijs avrris
%ari piv aloa, ovk [ou5e] coti 8^ iraAaio-rpas is the following :
vipeffiS' oiiK tart pXv veueffis, ovk ov rr&vra fitiy tart KttQ' eiftapuetniv,
tart 5e v6uos' otitic tan fiev v6fios, ovk tart 5e cucdiKvros Kal aitapeuovk tart be \6yos opdbs rrpoaraicrt- ir6btaros ri rov xdauov StoUijats'
kos fjthv &y vottireoy ctnayopevrtKbs oitbe tart uey toDto, ovk tart be
be Siv oviroiriTcov a\Aa airayopeve- xSafios ' ovbe tart fiev /cdffjuos, ovk
rat uey to afiapraySfieya, -npoarar- eial be 6eoi (for k<Jo>os, accordTtTai Si to Karop6<ifiara ovk apa ing to the definitions of Chrystart iiiv ToiaiiTT) ji tinapfiewr), ovk ippns, is the whole, including
tart Si ctuaprfifiara xal KaropBd- gods and men. See p. 158, 1)
uara' aAA* et tarty afj.aprijfia.ra ei be elat deal, eialv ctyaQol oiBeoi
Kal Karop8tt>uara, tartv aper^ Kal a\K* el touto, tarty aperij' aXA' ei
Kaxla cl Si TauTa, tffri Kakbv Kal tarty aperij, tart <pp6vriots " aAA'
olaxpb'y' a\Ka rb aiy KaXbv 4nat- ei rovro tarty tj i-KtarTjai] iroti)verbv, rb Si alffxpbv êKr6v ovk reuv re Kal ov rrottirewv aWa
apa tart roiavry) fiev T] eiuapueVTj, irofqrea fiiy tart ra Karopdtbuara,
oiiK tartbi i-natverbv Kai tyeKr6v. ov Kon\reabiraa.fiapr'tluara,K.r,\.
What is praiseworthy deserves ovk apa ir&vra uiy ylverai Kaff
rtuij or yepus afiwffiy, and what eiaapfj.evvv, ovk effri Si yepalpety
is blameworthy merits K6\aats Kal iTravopiovv.
or iiraydpBaats.
1 Cic. De Fato, 12, 28 ; Bio1 Alex. c. 37, p. 118 : A genian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8,
181
Chap
VII.
182
Chap.
Y11"
THE STOICS.
Stoics never intended to allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that held
by other beings. All the actions of manin fact, his

destinyare decided by his relation to things : one
individual only differs from another in that one acts
on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own
feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and
against his will, conforms to the eternal law of the
world.1
C. Nature
Everything in the world being produced by one
"world.
an<^ *ne same divine power, the world, as regards
its structure, is an organic whole, in respect of its
16) ; Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things
which were determined by the
co-operation of destiny alone
Chrysippus called ovyKadeipapixiva (confatalia). The argu
ment by which he was confuted,
which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i.
489, erroneously attributes to
the Stoics themselves, went by
the name of ipybs \6yos (ignava
ratio). Besides the ipybs \6yos,
Plut. De Fato, c. 11, p. 574,
mentions the 9eplfav and the
\&yos rrapa T7jv fl/MppJyriv as falfacies which could only be re
futed on the ground of the free
dom of the will. The last-named
one, perhaps, turned on the
idea ((Enomaus, in litis. Pr. Ev.
vi. 7, 12) that man might frus
trate destiny if he neglected to
do what was necessary to pro
duce the foreordained results.
According to Amnion. De Inter.
106, a, Lucian, Yit. Auct. 22,
the Bepifav was as follows :
Either you will reap or you
will not reap : it is therefore
incorrect to say, perhaps you

will reap.
1 <Se.(afterCleanthes,whose
verses in Epictet. Man. 62)
Ep. 107, 11 : Ducunt volentem
fata, nolentem trahunt. Hipj>olyt. Refut. Hsr. i. 21, has put
it very plainly : rb na6' tlpapfifVTjv tlvai TrtivTT] 8if3e&aiuaavTO
irapa.Sfiyp.aTt xpt)o~ap.*vui rotovrtp,
on Siatrep ox'hpaTos 4av jj ^tjpt?jpLevos kvqjv, 4av pkv fiovKrirai irT0CU, Hoi <E\KtTaL Kal {iTCTOI fKUV
. . . lav oe p.)i @ov\r}Tai tKta&ai,
irdvrus avayKaffQ-fiaeTai, to uvto
5-t)nou Ka\ 4nl to>v ai>8p(owu>v ' Kal
pn fSovkopevot yap anoXovQiiv avayKa(r6-t)(rovTai TravTtas eis rb irenpupivov tlo-i\8(ip. The same idea
is expanded by M. Aurel. vi.
42 : All must work for the
whole, ix lrepiovfflas 8e xal 6 p-tp.tyiptvo* Kal 6 avrifiaivtiv vtipwp.fvoi Kal itvaiptiv ra ytv6pcva, Kal
yap tov toiovtou exPvGft> & k6o~plos.
It is man's business to take
care that he acts a dignified
part in the common labour.
NATURE OF THE WORLDPERFECTION.

constitution perfect. The unity of the world, a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the Epicureans,
188
Chap.
VI*'
followed as a corollary from the unity of primary sub- (1) -ft*

stance and of primary force.1 It was further proved by ^rfec-^
the intimate connection, or, as the Stoics called it, timithe sympathy of all its parts, and, in particular, by
the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and
heaven.2 The perfection of the world follows generally
1 After all that has been
said, this needs no further con
firmation.
Conversely, the
unity of the forming power is
concluded from the unity of
the world. See p. 143, 1, 2.
Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p.
425. M. Aurel. vi. 38 : ir&vTa
aW^Xots îriTreVXeKTOi Kal irdvra
Ka-ra tovto <pl\a a\\ii\ois 4ffTt
. . . tovto 5e Sia t)]v tovik^v
KivT\fflV Kal ffvp.TTVOlaV Kal T^v
eyaxriv rrjs ovfflas. Ibid. vii. 9.
2 Sext. Math. ix. 78 : tuv
aajfidTatv to. fiev 4ffTiv TiintfUya,
Ta 5c 4k ffvva-KTop.4v(av, Ta Se 4k
StetrrdtTuv . . . eVel oZv Kal 6
K6cffios trwfid icTTiv, f\TOi jjyup.4vov 4ffrl ffwfxa t) 4k avvairrofityaiv J) 4k SieCT^Ttcv ' otlre 5e 4k
trvyavrofievuv ofae 4k oieffTtltTcov,
us StiKvv/xey 4k r5>y irepl avrbv
t ovjxiraBtlSiv ' Ktnb. yap TCts rfjs
fft\i]vyis avtf\ffeis Kal pdifftis iroWa
twvtc 4my(ia>v fypwvKat 6a\affff'iwv
tpdlyei Te Kal aiêra*, bfiiruTtis Te
Kal Tr\rinfivplif5 (ebb and flood),
trepl Tiya p.4pr} ttjs da\dacn]s yivovtoi. In the same way, atmo
spheric changes coincide with
the setting and rising of the
stars : 4i- ay ffvp.(paves, Sri r]vafjieyoy rt ffftjjua KafletTTTjKCy & n6ffp.os,
4irl fiiy yap tuv 4k ffvvawrofiivwv
^ SitffTwrwv oil ffvp.ir6.axa to jue'pij
aWfaois. Diog. vii. 140 : 4v Si

T( K6op.W pLTJokv ?vat KSVOV CtXV
7jvuff8ai avrby, tovto yap avayKafav T$]y twv ovpay'iwv rrpbs ra
4ir(yia ffvfnryoiav Kal ffwroviav.
Ibid. 143 : 8ti 9' eh eVri TA\vuv
t\ri\alv 4i> t$ irtpl tov SAov Kal
Xpvffnnros Kal 'ATroAAdSwpos . . .
Kai rioo-eiSiScios. A lex. De Mixt.
142, a, see p. 127, 5 ; Cio. N.D.
ii. 7, 19 ; Ejrictet. Diss. i. 14, 2 :
OL 8oKt (TOt, e<p7J, TJVWffOai Ta
Ttdvra ; AokcT, etprj' tI 54 ; trv/jjraQtiv Ta 4ir'iyeia to7s ovpavlois oil
SoKet ffoi ; Aukci, e<pTi. Cicero
mentions the changes in ani
mals and plants corresponding
with the changes of seasons, the
phases Of the moon, and the
greater or less nearness of the
sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From
all these passages we gather
what the question really was.
It was not only whether other
worlds were possible, besides
the one which we know from
observation, but whether the
heavenly bodies visible were in
any essential way connected
with the earth, so as to form
an organic whole ((<fov, Diog.
vii. 143).
The Stoic conception of ffvy.itiSeia was not used to denote
the magic connection which it
184
THE STOICS.
from a consideration of fundamental principles.1
But the Stoics made use of many arguments in sup
port of its perfection, appealing, after the example of
preceding philosophers, sometimes to its beauty,
and, at other times, to the adaptation of means to
ends.2 An appeal to beauty is the assertion of Chrysippus, that nature made many creatures for the
sake of beauty, the peacock, for instance, for the
sake of its tail3 ;and the dictum of Marcus Aurelius, that what is purely subsidiary and subservient
to no purpose, even what is ugly or frightful in
nature, has peculiar attractions of its own;4 and the
expresses in ordinary parlance,
but the natural coincidence be
tween phenomena belonging to
the different parts of the world,
the consensus, concentus, cognatio,conjunctio,or continuatio
naturae (67c. N. D. iii. 11, 28 ;
Divin. ii. 15, 34 ; 69, 142). In
this sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, ob
serves that like is attracted
by like; fire is attracted up
wards, earth downwards; beasts
and men seek out each other's
society; even amongst the high
est existences, the stars, there
exists a tvuats 4k 5i0't?;koYc0)', a
ffvpirdOem 4v SieoTuxri. Even the
last remark does not go beyond
the conception of a natural con
nection; nevertheless, it paves
the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no
longer a physical connection,
but as an influence felt at a
distance by virtue of a connec
tion of soul.
1 M. Aurel. vi. 1 : fi rav '6ha>v
ovaia (the matter of the world)
(virad^s KaX euTpeir^s* i SeTavrTjv
SiotKwv \6yos ovdefiiav 4v eavrcp

alriav 6Xi tov KaKOTroie'tv ' Kanlav
yap ouk Xt, oiiB4 Tt KaKws irotei,
ouSe j3AaTTTT<u Tl uir' 4Ketvov.
ndvra 5 kot' 4Kt1vov ytvcrai Kal
ncpalverat.
2 Diog. 149 : ravrriv 8 [tî/
$VfflV~\ Kal TOV ffVfJL<p4pOVTOS tTTOxdfyoSut koI rfiovTis, as iriKov 4k rffs
Toy av&pdnrov Stjixiovpylas.
' Phd. Sto. Eep. 21, 3, p.
1044 : el-nwv [Xpwrnriros] 8Vi . . .
<pt\OKa\e't>' . . . rip <j>u<n tjj
TOiKiXfa xafy,0<"' *'k6s coti,
Tairra kokcl \4ii/ efyr]Ke yivotro
5' av jUc\i(TTa roinov ifupaffts 4ttI
tt}s KepKov rov rati. Conf. the
Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18 : Jam
membrorum . . . alia videntur
propter eorum usum a natura
esse donata . . . alia autem
nullam ob utilitatem, quasi ad
quondam ornatum, ut cauda
pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque
barba.
4 M. A nrel. iii. 2 : It is there
proved by examples, Sri ral tA
4iriyiv6p.tva rots tpvffet yiyvopevois
NATURE OF THE WORLDPERFECTION.

same kind of consideration may have led to the
Stoic assertion, that no two things in nature are altogether alike.1 Their chief argument, however, for the
beauty of the world, was based on the shape, the
size, and the colour of the heavenly structure.2
The other line of argument is followed not so
much in individual expressions. But owing no
doubt to the pre-eminently practical character of
its treatment of things, the Stoic view of nature,
like the Socratic, has ever an eye on the adapta
tion of means to ends in the world. As, on the
one hand, this adaptation of means to ends is
the most convincing proof of the existence of
deity, so, on the other hand, by it, more than by
anything else, the divine government of the world
makes itself manifest.3 Like Socrates, however,
they took a very superficial view of the adaptation
of means to ends, arguing that everything in
the world was created for the benefit of some
other thingplants for the support of animals,
animals for the support and the service of man,4
?Xt ti 6x"P' koI ivayuybv . . .
crxeSbv oiSev ouxl Kal ray kot'
iTraKo\o{i9T\<rivavn8aiv6vTwvTife<is
iron tuurwiorturtai.
1 Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85 ; Sen.
Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes
this variety of natural objects
among the facts, which must
fill us with admiration for the
divine artificer.
2 Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: Ka\bs Sk
& nitrites SjjKoy 5' 4k tou axhfiaros Kal rov xP^/xaTOS Ka' T0"
ptyidovs Kal rris irepl rbv K6(Tfj.ov
rap aaiipwv noiKiKlas ; the world
has the most perfect form, that

of a globe, with a sky the most
perfect in colour, &c.
3 See the passages quoted
p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D.
ii. 32.
4 Plut. (in Porphyr. De
Abstin. iii. 32) : d\\' ixeivo
A(a toS Xpucrfa-irou wiBaybv jjv, &s
ii/ias airuv xat &Wfi\a>i> of flcol
XP"/ i*oi4\aamo, t)fui Se ra $a,
ovinroKtutip /ikv Xttkovs ko\ ovvBripevetv Kvvas, avipelas Si yvfivdtria
irapbd\tis /cat apKTovs Kal Aeoyras,
k.t.\, Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37 :
185
Chap.
Yj:i'
186
THE STOICS.
the world for the benefit of Gods and men 1not
unfrequently degenerating into the ridiculous and
pedantic, in their endeavours to trace the special
end for which each thing exists.2 But, in asking
Scite enim Chrysippus : ut
clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic prseter
mundum cetera omnia aliorum
causa esse generata, ut eas
fruges et fructus, quas terra
gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut
equum vehendi causa, arandi
bovem, venandi et custodiendi
canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22 : Placet
Stoicis, quse in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia
creari.
1 Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67 : Prseclare enim Chrysippus, cetera
nata esse hominum causa et
Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suse. N. D.
ii. 53, 133, in describing the
Stoic teaching : Why has the
universe been made 1 Not for
the sake of plants or animals,
but for the sake of rational
beings, Gods and men. It is
then shown (c. 54-61), by an
appeal to the structure of man's
body, and his mental qualities,
how God has provided for the
wants of man ; and the argu
ment concludes with the words,
Omnia, quse sint in hoc mundo,
quibus utantur homines, homi
num causa facta esse et parata.
Just as a city, and what is
therein, exists for the use of
the inhabitants, so the world is
intended for the use of Gods
and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad mundi cohEerentiam pertinent, tamen et
spectaculum hominibus pras-
bent. The earth with its plants

and animals was created for the
service of man. In Orig. c.
Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics
assert that Providence created
all things for the sake of ra
tional beings ; M. Aurel. v. 16
and 30 ; Gell. vii. \, 1. Hence
the definition of kSithos quoted
on p. 158, 1.
1 Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto,
Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how
useful fowls are ; the horse is
intended for riding, the ox for
ploughing, the dog for hunting.
The pig, Cleanthes thought
{Clemens, Strom, vii. 718, u),
was made to sustain man, and
endowed with a soul, in place
of salt, to prevent its cor
rupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160 ;
Fin. v. 13, 38 ; Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685 ;
Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20) ;
oysters and birds for the same
purpose also (Porpliyr. 1. a).
In the same way, he spoke of
the value of mice and bugs, see
p. 189, 1. The Stoic in Cic.
N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in
the same track, declares that
sheep only exist for the pur
pose of clothing, dogs for
guarding and helping man,
fishes for eating, and birds of
prey for divers uses. Epictet.
Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit,
speaks of asses being intended
to carry burdens ; for this pur
pose they must be able to walk,
and, in order to walk, must pos
sess the power of imagination.
NATURE OF THE WORLDMORALITY.
187
the farther question, For what purpose do Gods and Chap.

men exist ? they could not help being at length
carried beyond the idea of a relative end to the
idea of an end-in-itself. The end for which Gods
and men exist is that of mutual society.1 Or, ex
pressing the same idea in language more philoso
phical, the end of man is the contemplation and
imitation of the world ; man has only importance
as being a part of a whole ; only this whole is per
fect and an end-in-itself.a
The greater the importance attached by the (2) Moral
Stoics to the perfection of the world, the less were ^themmld.
they able to avoid the difficult problem of recon
ciling the various forms of evil in the world. By
the attention which, following the example of Plato,
they gave to this question, they may be said to be
the real creators of the moral theory of the world.3
The character of this moral theory was already
determined by their system. Subordinating indivi- t/
duals, as that system did, to the law of the whole,
it met the charges preferred against the evil found
in the world by the general maxim, that imperfec
tion in details is necessary for the perfection of the
whole.4 This maxim, however, might be explained
1 See p. 186, 1.
2 Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37 : Ipse
autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed
est quaedam particula perfecti.
Sed mundus quoniam omnia
complexus est, nec est quidquam, quod non insit in eo,
perfectus undique est.
3 We gather this from the

comparatively full accounts of
the Stoic theory of the moral
government of the world. Pint.
Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p. 1051, says
that Chrysippus wrote several
treatises irepl toO fxriSif 4ytc\ii)Tbi>
chat fiTjSe êjuTrj-bv it6<rn<p.
4 See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6) :
188
THE STOICS.
Chap.
VII.
in several ways, according to the meaning assigned

to the term necessary. If necessity is taken to be
physical, the existence of evil is excused as being
a natural necessity, from which not even deity could
grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the neces
sity is not a physical one, but one arising from the
relation of means to ends, evil is justified as a con
dition or necessary means for bringing about good.
Both views are combined in the three chief questions
involved in the moral theory of the world : the ex
istence of physical evil, the existence of moral
evil, and the relation of outward circumstances to
morality.
The existence of physical evil gave the Stoics
{a) Exist
ence, of
little trouble, since they refused to regard it as an
physical
evil at all, as will be seen in treating of their ethical
evil.
system. It was enough for them to refer evils of
this kinddiseases, for instanceto natural causes,
and to regard them as the inevitable consequences
of causes framed by nature to serve a definite pur
pose.1 Still, they did not fail to point out that
re\eov p.\v 6 K6fffi0s <r&pd iffTtr,
ov T6A.ea 8e tb K6tTfiov p-epij rep
vpbs rb '6\ov ireos ^xelv Ka*
avTa eivai. Compare also the
statement in Plut. Solert. An.
c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals
must be irrational, because the
irrational must be contrasted
with the rational.
1 Oell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7 : Chrysippus in his treatise irepl irpovoias,
discussed, amongst other things,
the question, e at rav avOp&irwv
v6aoi Kara tpvfftv yivovrai. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc
principale naturte consilium,

ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios . . . sed cum multa
inquit atque magna gigneret
pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agnata
sunt incommoda iis ipsis, qua}
faciebat cohserentia : eaque non
per naturam sed per sequelas
quasdam necessarias facta dicit,
quod ipse appellat koto irapaKO\ovii\aiv. . . . Proinde morbi
quoque et a^gritudines parta?
sunt dum salus paritur. M.
Aurel. vi. 36 : All evils are

many things only become evil by a perverted use,1
and that other things, ordinarily regarded as evils,
189
Chap.
VI1"
are of the greatest value.2

Greater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset (*) Existthe attempt to justify the existence of moral evil, ewalevil
and the difficulty was enhanced in their ease by the
prevalence and intensity of moral evil in the world3
according to 1}ieir view. I By their theory of necessity
they were prevented from shifting the responsibility
for moral evil from natural law or deity on to man,
which is one way out of the difficulty. In not alto
gether eschewing this course, and yet refusing to allow
to deity any participation in evil, and referring evil to
the free will and intention of man,4 they acted as other
i-niytvviifxaTa twv acfivwv Kal
Ka\a>y. Pint. An. Procr. c. 6
and 9, p. 1015 : atrroi Si (the
Stoics) KaKtav koI KaKo8ai[inv(av
Toaavrrjv . . . Kar' faaKoKovdntTiv
yryovtvai Xtyovffiv. Sen. Nat.
Qu. vi. 3, 1.
1 Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and
13 : Non ideo non sunt ista
natura bona, si vitio male
utentium nocent. ... Si beneficia naturae utentium pravitate
perpendimus, nihil non nostra
malo accepimus.
2 Chrysippus (in Plvt. Sto.
Eep. 21,4) remarks that bugs do
us good service by preventing
us from sleeping too long, and
mice warn us not to leave
things about. He also observes
(Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are as
useful as colonies, by prevent
ing over-population. See the
quotations, p. 185, 4 ; 1 86, 2. M.
Aurel. viii 50, makes a similar
remark in regard to weeds. In
the house of nature all the

waste has its uses.
3 A circumstance which
Pint. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067,
dexterously uses against the
Stoics.
4 Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17
(see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep.
33, 2: Chrysippus affirms, oij
TfSv altrxptoy Tb Ociov vapixirLov
ylveoBcu oiiK eB\oy6v iffrtv, law is
innocent of crime, God of im
piety. Id. (in Gell. vii. 2, 7) :
Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione
quadam necessaria et principal!
coacta atque connexa sint fato
omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum perinde sunt
fato obnoxia, ut proprietas
eorum est ipsa et qualitas . . .
sua sa?vitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta, et
in errores se ruunt. Hence
Cleanthes continues, in a pas
sage quoted in Greek by Gellius :
as riiv frhttfiHv e/caoToi? trap'
190
Chap.
VII.
THE STOICS.
systems of necessity have done ' before,1 reserving the
final word. The real solution which they gave to the
difficulty is to be found partly in the assertion that
even the deity is not able to keep human nature free
from faults,2 and partly in the consideration that the
existence of evil is necessary, as a counterpart and
supplement to good,3 and that, in the long run, evil
will be turned by the deity into good.4 *
aino7s yivo^vtav Kal Ka(?' 5puV
aitTtov afiapraviyrtav T Kal jSAairTOfievuv Kal Kara r))V aurwv Sidvoiav Kal irp6deo-iv. In Pint. Sto.
Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057, Chrysippus
says that, even if the Gods
make false representations to
man, it is man's fault if he
follows those representations.
Conf. Epictet. Ench. c. 27:
&<Tirep ffKowbs irpbs rb anorux^v
oil rlderou, ourws ou5e KaKou <pvms
(evil in itself) (v K6o-fiip ylnrcu.
Id. Diss. i. 6, 40. Such ob
servations bear out in some
degree the statement of Pint.
Plac. ii. 27, 3, that, according
to the Stoics, ret p.ev el/idpBai, ret
8e aya/iApBu. See above, p. 179,
3, 4.
1 Chrysippus felt this. Hence
he says (in Gell.) : It has been
also decreed by destiny that the
bad should do wrong.
1 Chrysippus in Pint. Sto.
Bep. 36, 1 : xaxlav 5e naBdXov
apai ofrrc Svi/arSv 4(T7iv otfr' exe*
Ka\as apBfjvcu. Id. (in Gell.
vii. 1, 10) : As diseases spring
from human nature, sic hercle
inquit dura virtus hominibus
per consilium naturse gignitur
vitia ibidem per afSnitatem
contrariam nata sunt.
3 Chrysippus in Pint. Sto.
Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2) :

ylveTai yap avri] ttws [tj KaKia'j
Kara rbv rys tp&o-fws \6yov Kal
%va ovtws i7tw ovk axp~f}<rrws ytverai irpbs to o\a, ouSe yap av
rayaBbv 9)v. C. Not. 14, 1 : As
in a comedy, what is absurd
contributes to the effect of the
whole, ovtoj ifecms av aiirijv 4<b'
eatmjs rijv Kaxiav toIs 5' &\\ots
ovk axpyards cariv. Similarly
if. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii.
I, 2 : (Chrysippus) nihil est
prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius,
qui opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem
mala : nam cum bona malis
contraria sint, utraque necessum
est opposita inter se et quasi
mutuo adverso quaeque fulta
nixu (Heraclitus' avri(ovn o-v/j.(pfpov) consistere : nullum adeo
contrarium est sine contrario
altero.
Without injustice,
cowardice, &c, we could not
know what justice and valour
are. If there were no evil,
tpp6v7i<ris as iiriffTûT) ayaBwv Ka\
KaK&v would be impossible
{Pint. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).
4 Cleanthes, Hymn. 18 :
d\\a trv Kal to. neptaffa, t-nlfnaffai
apria dtitcai
Kal Koapfiv to &Koo-[ia, Kal oil <plka
col <pl\a iffrly
191
The third point in their moral theory of the world,

the connection between moral worth and happiness,
Chap.
YI1,
engaged all the subtlety of Chrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would
have been to contradict the ordinary views of the
J
relation of means to ends. Besides, they were pre
pared to regard some part of the evils of life as divine
judgments.1 Still there were facts which could not
be reconciled with this viewthe misfortunes of the
virtuous, the good fortune of the viciousand these
required explanation. The task of explaining them
appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable
embarrassment, nor were their answers altogether
satisfactory.8 The spirit of their system, however,
^^'""j
tn-een
rteanfi
liappinett.
tLoe yap eis %v airayra ffWT]pp.0KaS

4<r0\a KaKotaiv
&<r$' eva ylyvt<r6ai ttavrmv \6yov
ativ iovra.
1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 35. 1 : rbv
Bebv K0\d(flV tpTJtTl ttjv Kaxiav KaX
ToAAck tcouiv 4irl KoKdffti rav irovrjpuv , . . irorh fxiv ra 5i5<rXPVO'Ta ffvpflaivetv tprftrl rots
ayadots oiix 8>o"nep tois <pav\ots
KoXdaecas x&PiV iAAi /car' aW-qv
otKovou-iav &(nrep 4v rals tro'Ktffiv
. . . [ret *foi] airovep.trat Kara
rbv rov Atbs \6yov ffroi liri Ko\daet ff /car' &\\riv lxovod-v
irpbs t& HXa oMovopiav. Id.
15, 2 : ravrd tprjcri rovs Otous noifiv
o-rrws tStv vovrip&v KO\aop.4vuv oi
Aonrol wapadtlyuaffi tovtois XP&fltVOl ^TTOV 4niXiptil(Tl TOLOVt6v Ti
irottiv. At the beginning of the
same chapter, the ordinary
views of divine punishment had
been treated with ridicule.
Conf. Quaest. Rom. 51, p. 277.
1 Thus Chrysippus (in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the

question, How the misfortune
of the virtuous is to be ex
plained, says: Tt&rtpov bjucAoupevaiv tiv&v Kaddirep tv oIkIuis
p.elo(TL Trapatr'nrTei Tlva nlrvpa Kat
TTotTot wvpol rives rw o\uv e3
otKovop.ovu.4vuv ' fj Sio. TO Ka&lOTa<r8at iirl ruv toiovtwv Satp6via
(pav\a tv ols t$ &vrt ylvovrat
tyic\7)T(ai ApiAaat; Similarly the
Stoic in Cio. N. D. ii. 66 :
Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt,hardly satisfactory ex
planations for any theory of
necessity. It is still more un
satisfactory to hear Seneca
(Benef. iv. 32) justifying the
unmerited good fortune of the
wicked as due to the nobility
of their ancestors. The reason
assigned by Chrysippus (in
Plut.)iroXh KaX to ri}s avdyaris
fieufx&aidoes not quite har
monise with Plut. C. Not. 34,
2 : oi yap ^ yt 8atj to Kaxbv 4
192
Chap
VII. ;
THE STOICS.
rendered only one explanation possible : no real evil
could happen to the virtuous, no real good fortune
could fall to the lot of the vicious.1 Apparent
misfortune will be regarded by the wise man partly
as a natural consequence, partly as a wholesome
training for his moral powers ; 2 there is nothing
which is not matter for rational action : everything
that happens, when rightly considered, contributes
to our good ; nothing that is secured by moral de
pravity is in itself desirable.3 With this view it
eavrrjs irapffrxvKev, Mlttoios yap
tan Kal wafras ftffas $exTal
(popas imb tov Ktyovyros avrfyy Kal
axntnaTifyvTot %<rxey. Just as
little does Seneca'sNon po
test artifex mutare materiam
(De Prov. 5, 9)agree with his
lavish encomia on the arrange
ment and perfection of the
world. For, according to the
Stoics, matter is ultimately
identical with reason and deity.
These contradictions do not,
however, justify the doubt ex
pressed by Seine, Stoic, de
Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is
here not speaking as a Stoic.
For Chrysippus says very much
the same thing. See p. 190,
1, 2.
1 M. Awrel. ix. 16 : ovk 4v
iretffeiy &X\' ivepyetq, rb tov \oyikov Cvov kokov Kal ayaGby, fixrirep
ouSe 7] aperr) Kal KaKia ai/rov iv
Trelffet, aWa tvepyciq.
2 M. Av/rel. viii. 35 : tv
rp6nov iKtlvtl [yj <pvo~is\ tray rb
IvuTTa'utvov Ka\ avrifiaivov Intirfpnptirei Kal Karardiro'sl tls rfyp
clfjLapp.4v7]V Kal fidpos cavrjjs Troie?,
outws Kal rb XoyiKbv $ov Svvarat
Kay Kt&\vp.a 5Kt]y eavrov roiuv
Kal xpyvBat avr$ 4(p' otov ay Kal

8ipu.7]o~cy.
* Seneca's treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with
expanding this thought. In
it, the arguments by which
the outward misfortunes of
good men are harmonised with
the divine government of the
world are : (1) The wise man
cannot really meet with mis
fortune : he cannot receive at
the hands of fortune what he
does not, on moral grounds,
assign to himself (c. 2, 6). (2)
Misfortune, therefore, is an
unlooked-for exercise of his
powers, a divine instrument of
training ; a hero in conflict
with fortune is a spectaculum
Deo dignum (c. 1, 2-4. Conf.
Ep. 85, 39). (3) The mis
fortunes of the righteous show
that external conditions are
neither a good nor an evil (c. 5).
(4) Everything is a natural
consequence of natural causes
(c. 5). Similar explanations in
Epictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37;
i. 24, 1 ; Stub. Eel. i. 132 ; M.
Aurel. iv. 49 : vii. 68 and 54 ;
x. 33.
NATURE OF THE WORLD: MORALITY.

was possible to connect a belief in divine punishment, by saying that what to a good man is a training
of his powers, is a real misfortune and consequently
a punishment to a bad man ; but we are not in a
position to say whether the scattered hints of Chrysippus really bear this meaning.
The whole investigation is one involving much
doubt and inconsistency. Natural considerations fre
quently intertwine with considerations based on the
adaptation of means to ends ; the divine power is
oftentimes treated as a will working towards a de
finite purpose, at one time arranging all things for
the best with unlimited power, at another time ac
cording to an unchangeable law of nature ; 1 but all
these inconsistencies and defects belong to other
moral theories of the world, quite as much as they
belong to that of the Stoics.
1 Philodem. irepl Bewv Biayayijs, col. 8, Vol. Here. vi. 53 :
ifiiwTiKws airavros a(iT<p [0e<P]
56yafji.iv avaBevTfs, Stop imb tSiv
4Kcyxwv irteâivrat, t<Jtc /tara(peiyovaiv M rb Sii toOto <pdaxuv

to (TvvatrTtSiAeva(wh&tis suitable)
fx^ iroitLV, '6rt ou iraVra Zvvq.tou.
193
194
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER VIII.
IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS. THE UNIVERSE.
Chap.
Turning from the questions which have hitherto

engaged our attention to natural science in the
A. The
stricter sense of the term, we must first touch upon
"ral ideas a few characteristic questions affecting the general
on nature. conditions of all existence. In these the Stoics
hold little that is of a distinctive character. The
matter or substance of which all things are made is
corporeal.1 All that is corporeal is infinitely divi
sible, although it is never infinitely divided.2 At the
same time, all things are exposed to the action of
change, since one material is constantly going over
into another.3 Herein the Stoics follow Aristotle,
in contrast to the mechanical theory of nature,4
1 See above, p. 126 ; 101, 2 ;
Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Eel.
i. 410.
2 In Diog. 150, there is no
difference made between Apollodorus and Chrysippus. Stob.
Eel. i. 344 ; Plut. 0. Not. 38, 3,
p. 1079 ; Sext. Math. x. 142.
Similarly Aristotle.
3 Plut. Plac. i. 9,2: oiSroificoi
TpeirTriv Kai &A\oiwtV a! /uera/9\t|tV nal fytwnfy Satjv Si' fiAou
i%v vK-nv. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu.
iii. 101,3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aer, ex aere aqua,

ignis ex aere, ex igne aer ... ex
aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat
e terra ? . . . omnium elementorum in alternum recursus
sunt. Similarly Epictet. in
Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p.
101 , 2 ; 198, 3. This is borrowed
not only from Heraclitus, but
also from Aristotle.
4 They only called the first
kind icivriats. Aristotle under
IRRATIONAL NATURE.
and distinguish change in quality from mere motion
in space. They enumerate several varieties of each
kind.1 Nevertheless, they look upon motion in space
as the primary form of motion.2 Under the concep
tion of motion, they, moreover, include action and
suffering.3 The condition of all action is contact ;*
and since the motions of different objects in nature
are due to various causes, and have a variety of
characters, the various kinds of action must be dis
tinguished which correspond with them.5 In aE
stood by Klvri<ris every form o
change.
1 Sto6. Eel. i. 404, 408, gives
definitions of kJotjitis, of <popd,
and of /uoWj, taken from Ohrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl.
Categ. 110, J3 (Schol. in Arist.
92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds
of /leTojSoA^ see the extracts
from Posidonius on p. 101, 2)
distinguishes between nivtiv,
j^M/MtV, ri<rvx<i(eiv, a/tiwjTeii', but
this is rather a matter of lan
guage. Simpl. Cat. 78, j8, re
lates that the Stoics differed
from the Peripatetics in ex
plaining Motion as an incom
plete energy, and discusses
their assertion that Kiyti<r8ai is
a wider, xiytiy a narrower, idea.
2 Simpl. Phys. 310, b: ol SI
aitb rr)s ffToas xarh vaaav Kivr\oiv
$\eyoy {/Trtivai ttiv tottiktiv, t)
Kara peya\a 8ta(rHjjuaTa r) Karck
\6yv ttewpTjra vipt(rTafi4intv.
' Simpl. Categ. 78, $ (Schol.
78, a, 23) : Plotinus and others
introduce into the Aristotelian
doctrine the Stoic view : rb
Koivby rov -ffoteiv xaX tt4.<tx*lv tfrcu
tAj Kivr)<rtis.
* Simpl. 1. c. 77, P ; Schol.
77, b, 33. Simplicius himself

contradicts this statement. It
had, however, been already ad
vanced by Aristotle.
4 Simpl. 1. c. 78, 0 (Schol.
78, a, 28) : The Stoics who, ac
cording to p. 84, f, Schol. 79,
a, 16, very fully discussed the
categories, made the following
Statpopai ycywy: rb avrwv kivua6att its 7) fj.dxaipa rb ri/Wfiv 4k
rrjs olttelcLS ex6i KarairKtinjsrb
St' eavrov dvepyciv rfyv Klmjoty, us
at ipvtreis Kal al iarpiKal Sw&fttts
tJjv Tro'njaiv {nrepyd(,ovrai ; for
instance, the seed, in de
veloping into a plantrb &<p'
tavrov Koitiv, or avb lliias 6pfir)s
Ttoitiv, one species of which is
rb airo KoyiKris ip^Virb /car'
apei-V iytpytiv. It is, in short,
the application to a particular
case of the distinction which
will be subsequently met with
of ffis, (pvais, ^vxh, and tyvxh
XoyiKi). The celebrated gram
matical distinction of opOa and
uttio mentioned p. 95, 3 is con
nected with the distinction
between iroieiv and irdtrxeiv.
Conf. Simpl. p. 79, o, (; Schol.
78, b, 17 and 30.
o 2
195
Chap.
VIII.
190
Chap.
VIII.
THE STOICS.
these statements there is hardly a perceptible devia
tion from Aristotle.
Of a more peculiar character are the views of
the Stoics as to the intermingling of substances, to
which reference has already been made.1 With
regard to Time and Space, they found some innova
tions on Aristotle's theory to be necessary. Space
(tottos), according to their view, is the room occu
pied by a body,2 the distance enclosed within the
limits of a body.3 From Space they distinguish the
Empty. The Empty is not met with in the universe,
but beyond the universe it extends indefinitely.4
And hence they assert that Space is limited, like the
world of matter, and that the Empty is unlimited.5
Nay, not only Space, but Time also, is by them set
1 See page 135.
2 Stob. Eel i. 382: Zfoav km
ol an' avrov prbs p-iv rod k6o~p.ov
firjbev tlpat Kevbv
5' ahrov
Sf ipov (conf. Thcmist. Phys. 40,
b; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c.
20, beginning ol StwikoI Kal EnlKovpos). 5ia<ptpeiv 8e Ktvbv r6nov
Xcopav " Kal to p.(v ntvbv clvai
4p7]/xiav o~&[LaTos, tov o T&nov to
iiti-x6p.vov vnb ffditiaros, t^v 5^
X&pav to 4k fitpovs itrex^^yov
(Pint, adds, like a half-empty
vessel) Stob. i. 300: Chrysippus
defined t6ttos = t& Karex^p^vov
Si' '6\ov vnb (Wos, fi rb oiov KareX*o~&ai vnb ovtos Kal Si' Z\oy
KaTex^fi(vov e^TC vnb Ttvbs fire
vnb tivuv. If, however, only
one portion of the oT6v re KaTtX*o-8ai imb Svros is really filled,
the whole is neither wbv nor
r6not, but crep6v tl ovk avopLtxo-pivor, which may possibly be
called x&P"- Hence t6ttos cor

responds to a full, Kevbv to an
empty, x^Pa to a half-empty,
vessel. Seat. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh.
iii. 124, speaks to the same
effect. Cleomed. Meteor, p. 2,
4 ; Simpl. Categ. 91, 8. Ac
cording to the Stoics, napv4>laTarai toIs tr&fJMffW 6 t6vos Kal
Tbv Upov an' avTuy npo<r\ap.fi6.vei
Tbv fi^xt Totrouoe, KaQ6o~ov o~vp.n\T]povvrai [-oOtu] vnbrwv vojfxdToiy.
3 The Stoic idea of space is
so understood by Themist. Phys.
38, b ; Simpl. Phys. 133, a.
4 See previous note and in
Diog. 140 (where, however, in
stead of aatiuaTOV Be, we should
read Kovbv 5e) definitions of
Kev6v.
5 Stob. Eel. i. 392, quoting
Chrysippus.
THE ELEMENTS.
107
down as immaterial ; 1 and yet to the conception of Chap.

Time a meaning as concrete as possible is given,
in order that Time may have a real value. Zeno
denned Time as the extension of motion ; Chrysippus
defines it, more definitely, as the extension of the
motion of the world.2 The Stoics affirm the infinite
divisibility of Time and Space,3 but do not appear
to have instituted any deep researches into this
point.
In expanding their views on the origin of the B. Ehworld, the Stoics begin with the doctrine of the menUfour elements,4 a doctrine which, since the time of
Aristotle and Plato, was the one universally ac
cepted. They even refer this doctrine to Heraclitus,
1 See p. 131, 2,
2 Simpl. Categ. 88, f. Schol.
80, a, 6 : twv 5 ^tuXvwv Z-fjvwv
fiev ird(rris airbus Kirrjtrews Sidtrrrifia rbv xp^vov ej-rre (conf. Pint.
Plat. Quaest. viii. 4, 3) Xpbanriros
Sc SldtTTIIfia T7JS TOV KdtTfiOV Kivfjaem. Conf. Ibid. 89, o, j8 ;
Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full
is Stob. Eel. i. 260: iSi Xpianriros XP^V0V *frai Kiyfitretos 5itffTi)fxa Kttff 8 wot \4yerat fxerpov
rdxovs re Kal &paB6nyros, % rb
KapoKoKovQovv 5it<TT7fjiia rp rod
x6aiiou kivV". The passages
quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 {Pint.
Plac. i. 22, 2), 254, 265, 258,
and Diog. 141, from Zeno,
Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and
Posidonius, are in agreement
with this. In the same places
occur several other observations
on Time, which are, however,
of no importance, such as that
Time as a whole, and likewise
the past and the future, are un
limited, the present is limited ;

the present cannot be accu
rately determined, it is the
boundary between the past and
the future (Archedemus in
Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081),
lying partly in the one, partly
in the other (Chrysippus, ibid.
38, 8).
3 Sent. Math. x. 142 ; Pint.
Com. Mot. 41, p. 1081 ; Stob. i.
260.
4 For the conception of
(TToixeiov, which is also that of
Aristotle (Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8),
and its difference from that of
kpx*l, see Diog. 134 ; 136. The
difference, however, is not
always observed. Chrysippus
(in Stob. Eel. i. 312) dis
tinguishes three meanings of
aroixtiov. In one sense, it is
fire ; in another, the four ele
ments ; in the third, any mate
rial out of which something is
made.
108
Chap
VIII.
THE STOICS.
desiring, above all things, to follow his teaching in
natural science.1 On a previous occasion, the order
and the stages have been pointed out, according to
which primary fire developed into the several elements
in the formation of the world.2 In the same order,
these elements now go over one into the other. Yet,
in this constant transformation of materials, in the
perpetual change of form to which primary matter
is subject, in this flux of all its parts, the unity of
the whole still remains untouched.3 The distinctive
characteristic of fire is heat ; that of air is cold ;
Laisalle, Heraclitus, ii. fiiv ylyverat -xyffts els CSap, 5et5repa Si 4 uSaros els aepa, rplrti
2 See p. 161. As is there Si koI iax^"i\ e'ts irvp. On ac
stated, primary fire first goes count of this constant change,
oêr into water St' aepos (i. e. primary matter is called {Ibid,.
after first going over into air, 316, where, however, the text
not passing through air as an is obviously corrupt, and there
already existing medium, as fore only partially intelligible)
LassaUe, Heracl. ii. 86, inaccu 7] apxb Kal 6 \6yos Kal ij atStos
rately says), and water goes Svvapts ... els avrijv re trdvra
aur^s
over into the three other ele KaravaKiffKovaa Kal t2>
ments. In this process there ndKiv airoKaBiffraaa rerayfievtos
is, however, a difficulty. Fire al 65. Epictet. in Stob. Floril.
is said to derive its origin from 108, 60 : Not only mankind and
water, and yet a portion of animals are undergoing per
primary fire must have existed petual changes, iWa Kal to
from the beginning, as the soul 8e?a, Kal vrj At' aura ra rerrapa
of the world. Nor is it correct trrotxeta apw Kal Kara* rpeverat
to say, that actual fire is never Kal peTapdWet ' Kal 77) t( vSuip
obtained from water in the yiverat Kal tfSap a^p, ovros Si
formation of the upper ele vd\tv els alOepa fierafidWei ' Kal
ments (as ZasmUe, p 88, does). 6 aitrbs rpdiros rrjs fierafioKrjs
* Chrysippus, in Stob. Eel. i. &vaSev Kdrw. On the flux of
312 : irpin\s fiir ytyvo/ievris rrjs things, see also M. Awel. ii. 3 ;
4k irvpbs Kara abaratrtv els aepa vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Oie. N. D.
jiTa/3o\7}*, Sevrepas 5' airi> toiStou ii. 33, 84 : Et cum quatuor sint
tIs 68ap, rpWijs S' ifrt fiaWov Kara genera corporum, vicissitudine
t> 6.vd\oyov awifnafiivovTov vtia- eorum mundi continuata ( = <rwtos els 77ji>, irdKtp Si a?ri> ravrris exhs ; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2,
Stakvofiirris Kal Staxeouevrjs irpaT7j 2, continuatio est partium inter
84.
THE ELEMENTS.
that of water, moisture ; dryness that of "the earth.1
These essential qualities, however, are not always
found in the elements to which they belong in a pure
state,2 and hence every element has several forms
and varieties.3 Among the four essential qualities
of the elements, Aristotle had already singled out
two, viz. heat and cold, as the active ones, calling
dryness and moisture the passive ones. The Stoics
do the same, only more avowedly. They consider
the two elements to which these qualities properly
belong to be the seat of all active force, and
distinguish them from the other two elements, as
the soul is distinguished from the body.4 In their
se non intermissa conjunctio) each element as its distin
natura est. Nam ex terra guishing feature, assigning cold
aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex to water, moisture to air.
aere aether : deinde retrorsum
2 Thus the upper portion of
vicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere the air, owing to its proximity
aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic to the region of fire and the
naturis his, ex quibus omnia stars {Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is
constant, sursum deorsum, the warmest, the driest, and
ultro citroque commeantibus, the rarest ; but yet, owiog to
mundi partium conjunctio con- the evaporation of the earth
tinetur. See p. 194, 3.
and the radiation of heat,
1 Diog. 137 : that Si rb /iey warmer than the middle, which
irvp rb &tpp.bv, rb 8' lidup rb vypbv, in point of dryness and density
t6v t' kipa -rb tyvxpbv xal tV yrjv is between the two, but exceeds
vb vp6v. Plut. Sto. Eep. 43, 1, both in cold. See p. 146, 4.
p. 1053. The air is. according
3 Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314 :
8e irup rb TrupwSes iray
to Chrysippus, tpCcni (o<pepbs and
Trptinws if/ux/"f. Id. De Primo Hal aepa rb aepuSes Kai 6/xolus ra
Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Komi. Thus Philo, Incorrupt.
Galen, Simpl. Medic, ii. 20, M. 953, E, who is clearly fol
vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. lowing the Stoics, distinguishes
10; i. 4: Aer . . . frigidus per three kinds of fire : SvflpaJ,
se et obscurus . . . natura enim 4>Ai>, avyh. He seems, however,
aeris gelida est. Conf. Cic. only to refer to terrestrial fire,
N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four which, after all, forms only one
properties by the pairing of small portion of fire.
4 Pp. 128,2; 148,2; 151,1;
which elements arise, even
Aristotle had attributed one to 163, 2.
200
Chap.
VIII.
THE STOICS.
materialistic system, the finer materials, as opposed to
the coarser, occupy the place of incorporeal forces.
The relative density of the elements also deter
mines their place in the universe. Fire and air are
light ; water and earth are heavy. Fire and air
move away from the centre of the universe ; 1 water
and earth are drawn towards it ; 2 and thus, from above
to belowor, what is the same thing, from without
to withinthe four layers of fire, air, water, and
earth are formed.3 The fire on the circumference
1 This statement must be
taken with such modification
as the unity of the world ren
ders necessary. If the upper
ehments were to move alto
gether away from the centre,
the world would go to pieces.
Hence the meaning can only
be this : that the difference of
natural motions can only take
place within the enclosure hold
ing the elements together, and
so far a natural motion towards
the centre can be attributed
to all bodies as a distinctive
feature, anterior to the con
trast between heaviness and
lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in
Plut. Sto. Bep. 44, 6, p. 1054 :
The striving of all the parts of
the world is to keep together,
not to go asunder. oStgj Si rov
HKov ruvofievov eis ravrb Kal kivovfieyou Kal rStv fiopitoy ravri\v
tV KivTJCTlV IxOlVTWV 4k T7JS ToC
trd>ixaros (pvaews, rciOavbv, irao'i
rots aaifiairiv elvai tV Ttp&Tt\v
Kara (pvtm* kIvtigiv irpbs rb rov
k6(Th<iv ii4aov> rtfi fiev KStr/Mp ourtaffl Ktvovfiwcp vpbs avrbv, rots
&i pAptffiv ias av fjtiptffiv ofiaiv.
Achill. 'fat. Isag. 132, A : The
Stoics maintain that the world

continues in empty space, ^rel
ttoVto aiirov ra fiepTj 4irl rb fieirov
vivevxe. The same reason is
assigned by Cleoviedes, Meteor,
p. 5.
2 Stob. Eel. i. 346 (Plut.
PI. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406:
oi> ndvrics 8e ffa/xa &&pos %Xlvi
aA\' afiapr) tivai aepa Kal Trvp
. . . tpvffei yap avdxpotra ravr'
tlvat Sta rb piiBevbs fierex^ty
pdpovs. Plut. Sto. Rep. 42,
p. 1053 : In the treatise 7rep!
Kirt)ota>s, Chrysippus calls fire
a&apes and avoxpepes Kal rovrtp
TrapatrKfiaitas rbv aepa, rov fihp
ffiaros Tp 777 fiaK\ov irpo<rve[iOftivov, rod 5' atpos, ti Trypf. (So
too in Ach. Tat. Isag. i. 4 in
Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On
the other hand, in his *u<nical
te'x"cii, he inclines to the view
that air in itself is neither
heavy nor light, which how
ever can only mean that it is
neither absolutely, being heavy
compared with fire, and light
compared with water and
earth.
8 Diog. 137: avterdrca [itv ouv
thai rb Trvp b 87) a\6ipa KaKtiaBai,
THE ELEMENTS.
goes by the name of Ether.1 Its most remote por
tion was called by Zeno Heaven ; 2 and it differs
from earthly fire not only by its greater purity,3 but
also because the motion of earthly fire is in a straight
line, whereas the motion of the Ether is circular.4
Because of this difference of motion, Aristotle sup
posed a radical difference to exist between these two
kinds of fire, but the Stoics did not feel it necessary
to admit such a difference.5 They could always main
tain that, when beyond the limits of its proper
locality, fire tried to return to it as quickly as possible,
fftpdipav yevvaffdcu, Tto 7^j/ rwv

lrKaywfjLfvwv. fxeff %v rbv cUpa,
?ra rb lidaip, vToffrdd/jLtjv 5e ndprui/
r^v yrjv, fittnji/ avdvruv ofoav.
Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To
these main masses, all other
smaller masses of the same
element in different parts of
the world are attracted, be
cause all seek to reach their
natural place. Conf. M. Aurel.
ix. 9.
' l'Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2
(totum hoc coelum, quod igneus
sether, mundi summa pars,
claudit), and p. 198, 3, where
the same thing is called irvp by
Stobaeus, sether by Cicero.
See p. 146, 4. The same thing
is meant by Zeno, where he
says {Stob. Eel. i. 538, 554, and
Cleanthes says the same in Cic.
N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag.
133, c) that the stars are made
of fire ; not, however, of irCp
&rexvoyt but of irvp rtxviKbv,
which appears in plants as
</n}<ris, in animals as if^x^- See
p. 201, 5.
2 In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A,

he defines ovpavos as alBepos rb
iaX*T0i>, 4 ov al iv $ tor!
nivra ificpay&s. Similarly Biog.
138 ; Cleomed. Met. p. 7.
Otherwise the term is used in a
wider sense.
* See p. 146, 4.
4 Stob. i. 346 : rb p.kv irepiyetov (p&s kot' evSeiav, rb 8' ai64piov xepiQcpSs Kivetrai. See p.
202, 3. It is only of terrestrial
lire that Zeno can {Stob. Eel. i.
356) say, it moves in a straight
line. Cleanthes even attri
buted to the stars the spherical
shape, which on the strength
of this passage he attributes to
it. See Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 2;
Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag.
133, B.
5 They denied it, according
to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic.
Acad. i. 11, 39, says : Zeno dis
pensed with a quinta natura,
being satisfied with four ele
ments : statuebat enim ignem
esse ipsam naturam, quae quaeque gigneret, et mentem atque
sensus.
201
Chap.
VIII.
THE STOICS.
whereas within those limits it moved in the form of
a circle.
Holding this view of the elements, the Stoics, it
will be seen, did not deviate to any very great extent,
in their ideas of the World, from Aristotle and the
views which were generally entertained. In the centre
ofthe Universe reposes the globe of the earth ; 1 around
it is water, above the water is air. These three
strata form the kernel of the world, which is in a
state of repose,2 and around these the Ether revolves
in a circle, together with the stars which are set
therein. At the top, in one stratum, are all the
fixed stars ; under the stratum containing the fixed
stars are the planets, in seven different strata
Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, then the
Sun, and in the lowest stratum, bordering on the
region of air, is the Moon.3 Thus the world con1 The spherical shape of the
earth is a matter of coarse, and
is mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag.
126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1;
9, 3. Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives
an elaborate proof of it, for the
most part taken from Posidonius.
2 Heraclit. Alleg. Horn. c. 36,
and Diog. 145, also affirm that
the earth is in the centre, un
moved. The reason for this
fact is stated by Stob. i. 408, to
be its weight. Further proofs
in Ckomed. Met. p. 47.
8 Stab. Eel. i. 446 : rou Si
. . . k6(tixov rb flip tlvai Tept<pcp6fievov irep\ rb liioov, rb 5'
ifKop.ivovy Trepi<pp6fievov fi^y ibv
aldepa, vnofitvov 5e t^v yr\v koL to
eV aiiTrjs vypa Kai rbv htpa. The
earth is the natural framework,

and, as it were, the skeleton of
the world. Around it water
has been poured, out of which
the more exalted spots project
as islands. For what is called
continent is also an island :
fori 8e tou SSaros rbv hepa
(TtpatptKWS Kal 7TFpiKeX'V6ai, t K 5e
tovtov rbv oddfpa apaiorarov T
al eiA ixpivitrTarov. It moves in
circular form round the world.
Then follows what is given in
the text as to the stars, next
to which comes the stratum of
air, then that of water, and
lastly, in the centre, the earth.
Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B,
see p. 200, 3. The language of
Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is
THE UNIVERSE.
sists, as with Aristotle, of a globe containing
many strata, one above another.1 That it cannot be
unlimited, as Democritus and Epicurus maintain,
follows from the very nature of body.'2 The space
within the world is fully occupied by the material
of the world, without a vacant space being anywhere
left.3 Outside the world, however, is empty space,
or else howthe Stoics askedwould there be a
place into which the world could be resolved at the
general conflagration ? 4 Moreover, this empty space
must be unlimited ; for how can there be a limit, or
any kind of boundary, to that which is immaterial
and non-existent ? 5 But although the world is in
somewhat divergent. He places
the sun amongst the planets,
between Mars and Venus. That
Archedemus also refused to
allow the earth a place in the
centre has been already stated,p.
H7,2. Thelanguageof^6'A..?ii<.
Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is ambiguous:
As the circumference originates
from the centre, so according
to the Stoics the outer circle
originates from the earth ; when
compared with the quotations
on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.
1 Stob. i. 356 ; Plut. Plac. ii.
2, 1 ; i. 6, 3 ; Diog. 140 ; Cleomed.
Met. pp. 39 and 46 ; Heraclit.
Alleg. Horn. c. 46. Ibid, on the
perfection of this form and its
adaptation for motion. Com
paring Achil. Tat. Isag. 130, C,
Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 {Galen.
Hist. Phil. c. 11), with the pas
sages on p. 201, note 4, it ap
pears probable that Cleanthes
believed in a spherical form of
the earth. According to Ach.
Tat. Isag. 152, A, who probably

has the Stoics in view, the axis
of the world consists of a cur
rent of air passing through the
centre. On the division of the
heaven into five parallel circles,
and that of the earth into five
zones, conf. Diog. 155 ; Strabo,
ii. 2, 3, p. 95.
a Stob. i. 392 ; Sim.pl. Phys.
iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.
Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382;
Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4 ; Sext. Math,
vii. 214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff.
iv. 14, p. 58 ; Hippolyt. Eefut.
Hasr. i. 21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7,
observes that motion is possible
by means of cwnTrfpfffTacty,
without supposing the existence
of empty space. A number of
arguments against the exist
ence of empty space may be
found in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.
4 See p. 168, 1 ; Cleomed.
Met. 2 and 5.
5 Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392 :
The Empty and the Non-Mate-
203
Chap.
VIII.
204
THE STOICS.
empty space, it does not move, for the half of its

component elements being heavy, and the other half
light, as a whole it is neither heavy nor light.1
The stars are spherical masses,2 consisting of fire ;
(1) Stars.
but the fire is not in all cases equally pure,3 and is
sustained, as Heraclitus taught, by evaporations from
Chap.
VIII.
rial is unlimited, fiinrcp yhp

rb fiTjiev ovfteii ttjTL nepas, o&rw
ical toG fnjbevbs, o16v 4ffTi rb
nev6v. The Empty could only
be bounded by being filled. To
the same effect, Cleomed. p. 6.
On the unlimited beyond the
world, see Diog. 140 and 143 ;
Stob. i. 260 and 382 ; Pint. Sto.
Rep. 44, 1, p. 1054 ; C. Not. 30,
2, p. 1073 ; Plac. i. 18, 4 ; ii. 9,
2 ; Theodoret, 1. c. and p. 196, 2.
That Posidonius denied the in
finity of the Empty has been
already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the
world occupies the centre of
space, was therefore contra
dicting himself, as Plut. Def.
Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Eep. 44, 2,
observes.
1 Acliil. Tat. Isag. 126, A;
132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob.
i. 408. According to Stob.
i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and
10, p. 1073, Plac. ii. 1,6; i. 5,
1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix.
332, Ach. Tat. 129, D, the Stoics
had various names for the
world, according as the Empty
was included or excluded in
the conception. Including the
Empty, it is called rb irav
without it, B\ov (rb SXov, tA
S\a, frequently occurs with the
Stoics). The irav, it was said,
is neither material nor imma
terial, since it consists of both.
Plut. C. Not. 1. c.
2 Diog. 145; Pint. Plac. ii.

14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516;
540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D.
Compare the reference to
Cleanthes on p. 201, 4, with
which, however, the statement
in Stob. i. 554, that he con
sidered the moon iri\oei5jjs
(ball - like the MSS. have
h-tjAociSt)) does not agree.
* According to Cic. N. D.
ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Eel.
i. 314 ; 519 ; 538 ; 554 ; 565,
Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1 ; 21, 13,
p. 921, 935, Plac. ii. 25, 3;
30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15,
Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Aehil.
Tat. Isag. 124, D; 133, c, and
above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the
stars generally consist of fire,
or, more accurately, of vvp
Tcx""<bv, or Ether. The purest
fire is in the sun. The moon is
a compound of dull fire and air,
or, as it is said, is more earth
like, since (as Plin. Hist. Nat.
ii. 9, 46, without doubt after
Stoic teaching, observes) owing
to its proximity to the earth, it
takes up earthy particles in
vapour. Perhaps it was owing
to this fact that it was said to
receive its light from the sun
( Diog. 145), which, according to
Posidonius in Plut. Fac. Lun.
16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met.
p. 106, not only illuminates its
surface, but penetrates some
depth. Cleomed. 100, believes
THE UNIVERSE.
the earth and from water.1 With this process of
sustentation the motion of the stars is brought into
connection, their orbit extending over the space in
which they obtain their nutriment.2 Not only the
sun, but the moon also, was believed to be larger
than the earth.3 Plato and Aristotle had already held
that, besides the light of the
sun, it has also a light of its
own.
1 Dwg. 145; Stob. i. 532;
538; 554; Floril. 17,43; Pint.
De Is. 41, p. 367 ; Sto. Rep. 39,
1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac.
ii. 17, 2 ; 20, 3 ; 23, 5 ; Galen,
Hist. Phil. 14 ; Porphyr. Antr.
Nymph, c. 11 ; Cic. N. D. iii.
14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen.
Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2; Heraclit.
Alleg. Horn. c. 36, p. 74 and 56,
p. 117; most of whom affirm
that the sun is sustained by
vapours from the sea, the moon
by those of fresh water, and
the other stars by vapours from
the earth. The stars are also
said to owe their origin to such
vapours. Chrysippus, in Pint.
Sto. Kep. 41, 3, adds to the
passage quoted p. 161, 2 : oi $'
affrepes 4k 8a\do~(rris jue-rcfc rov
7j\lov 4v6.itrovrtu. ,Plut. Ibid. 2 :
%fi^vx<>v T\yeirai rov 9i\iov, itvpivov
Sjna Kal ysywr\p.4vov 4k rrjs avaSvfudatas tis irvp fteTa/3a*ov<ri)>\
Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084:
yeyovivai /cal rov %\iov tpfyvxov
\4yovo-t rov vypov jierafi&Wovros
els irvp voep6v.
2 Stob. i. 532 ; Oie. 1. c. ;
Maerob. Sat. i. 23, quoting
Cleanthes and Macrobius ; Pint.
Viae. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of
Apollonia hadalready expressed
similar views. Further par
ticulars as to the courses of the
stars without anything very

peculiar in Stob. i. 448 ; 538 ;
Plut. PI. ii. 15, 2 ; 16, 1 ; Diog.
144 ; Cleomed. Meteor, i. 3.
Eclipses are also discussed by
Dwg. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560;
Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p. 932;
Plac. ii. 29, 5 ; Cleomed. pp. 106
and 115, nor is there anything
remarkable. Quite in the or
dinary way are some observa
tions of Posidonius and Chry
sippus given in Stob. i. 518 ;
Achil Tat. Isag. 132, B ; 165, C.
The informationquoted from
Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor.
51 ; Proel. in Tim. 277, E ;
Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119re
specting observations of Canobus have no bearing on our
present enquiry.
' Stob. i. 554 {Pint. PI. ii.
26, 1). This statement, how
ever, appears only to be true of
the sun, to which, indeed, it is
confined by Diog. 144. That
the sun is much larger than
the earth, Posidonius proved ;
not only because its light ex
tends over the whole heaven,
but. also because of the spherical
form of the earth's shadow in
eclipses of the moon. Diog.
1. c. ; Maerob. Somn. i. 20 ;
Berael. Alleg. Horn. c. 46;
Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According
to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to
it an orbit 10,000 times as
large as the circumference of
205
Chap.
VIII.
206
Chap.
VIII.
(2) Me
teorology.
THE STOICS.
that the stars are living rational divine beings ; and
the same view was entertained by the Stoics, not
only because of the wonderful regularity -of their
motion and orbits, but also from the very nature of
the material of which they consist.1 The earth, like
wise, is filled by an animating soul ; or else how
could it supply plants with animation, and afford
nutriment to the stars ? 2 Upon the oneness of the
soul, which permeates all its parts, depends, in the
opinion of the Stoics, the oneness of the universe.
Most thoroughly, however, did the Stoicsand,
in particular, Posidonius 3devote themselves to inthe earth, with a diameter of
four million stadia. The Stoic,
in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103, only
calls the moon half that size ;
and Cleomed. p. 97, probably
following Posidonius, calls it
considerably smaller than the
earth. The other stars, ac
cording to Cleomed. p. 96, are
some of them as large as, and
others larger than, the sun.
Posidonius, according to Plin.
Hist.N.ii. 23, 85, estimated the
moon's distance from the earth
at two million, and the sun's
distance from the moon at 500
million stadia. He estimated
the earth's circumference at
240,000, according to Cleomed. ;
at 180,000 according to Strabo,
ii 2, 2, p. 95.
' Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441;
518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17,
43; Pint. Sto. Rep 39,1; 41,
2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20,
3 ; Diog. 145 ; Phcedr. Nat. De.
(Philodem. irepl ciatfitlas) Col.
3 ; do. N. D. i. 14, 36 and 50 ;
ii. 15, 39 and 42 ; 16, 43 ; 21,
54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr.

1. c. ; Aehill. Tat. Isag. c. 13,
p. 134, A. Hence, in several of
these passages, the sun is called
after Cleanthes and Chrysippus
a votpbv &va/j.fia (or ?a/jfui) iic
6a\diff(r7js.
2 Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, dis
cusses the point at length. See
also the quotations on p. 144, 1,
from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on
p. 151, 1, from Diog. 147.
Diog. vii. 152 and 138,
mentions a treatise of his,
called ^7wpo\oyiKi] or juerewpoKoytKî Grot iuxtis ; also, vii.
135, a treatise irtpi fxfTtwptav, in
several books. Alexander, in
Simpl. Phys. 64, 6, speaks of an
ifyiyritru fMTftepoK'ryiKav, which,
judging by the title, may be a
commentary on Aristotle's me
teorology. Geminus had made
an extract from this book, along
portion of which on the rela
tion of astronomy and natural
science is there given. Whether
these various titles really belong
to these different treatisesis not
THE UNIVE&SE.
vestigating those problems, which may be summed
up under the name of meteorology. This portion,
however, of their enquiries is of little value for
illustrating their philosophical tenets, and it may
suffice to mention in a note the objects which it
included, and the sources whence information may
be obtained.1 The same treatment may be given to
clear. Posidonius is probably
the author of most of the later
statements about the Stoic
meteorology. He appears also
to be the chief authority for
Seneca's Naturales Qusestiones,
in which he is frequently named
(i. 6, 10; 13 ; ii. 26, 4 ; 54, 1 ;
iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii.
20, 2 ; 4), particularly in his
meteorological treatises.
1 On the Milky Way, which
Posidonius, agreeing with Aris
totle, looked upon as a collec
tion of fiery vapours, see Stob.
i. 576; Plut. Plac. iii. 1, 10;
Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On
the comets, which are explained
in a similar way, Stob. i. 580
(Plac. iii. 2, 8.Whether the
Diogenes mentioned here who
looked upon comets as real
stars is Diogenes the Stoic, or
Diogenes of Apollonia, is not
clear. The former is more
probable, Boethus having been
just before mentioned) ; Arrian,
in Stob. i. 584 ; Diog. vii. 152 ;
and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu.
vii. We learn from the latter
that Zeno held (vii. 19-21 ; 30,
2), with Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are
formed by several stars uniting ;
whereas the majority of the
Stoics and, amongst their
number, Panaetius and Posi
donius (further particulars in

Schol. in Arat. v. 1091)con
sidered them passing pheno
mena. Even Seneca declared
for the opinion that they are
stars. On the phenomena of
light and fire, called nwywvlai,
5o/col, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i.
584 ; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1 , 14 ; 15,
4. On ireAas, consult Diog. 153 ;
Sen. i. 15 ; on halo (aKws), Sen.
i. 2 ; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol.
116; on the rainbow, Diog.
152 ; Sen. i. 3-8 ; on virgce and
parhelia. Sen. i. 9-13 ; Schol.
in Arat. v. 880 (Posidonius) ;
on storms, lightning, thunder,
summer lightning, cyclones,
and siroccos, Stob. i. 596 ; 598
(Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian, Ibid.
602 ; Sen. ii. 12-31 ; 51-58 (c.
54, the view of Posidonius) ; ii.
1, 3 ; Diog. 153 ; on rain, sleet,
hail, snow, Diog. 153 ; Sen. iv.
3-12 ; on earthquakes, Diog.
154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi.
4-31 (particularly c. 16 ; 21, 2) ;
also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102 ; on
winds, Plac. iii. 7, 2 ; Sen. v.
1-17; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29;
iii. 2, 5, p. 144 ; on waterspouts,
Sen. iii. 1-26 ; the Nile floods,
Ibid. iv. 1 ; Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, p.
790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32;
on tides, Strabo, i. 3, 12, p. 55 ;
iii. 3, 3, p. 153 ; 5, 8, p. 73 ; on
seasons, p. Ill, 2.
Chap.
VIII.
208
THE STOICS.
Chap,
the few maxims laid down by the Stoics on the subject of inorganic nature which have come down
to us.1 Nor need we mention here the somewhat
copious writings of Posidonius,2 on the subjects of
geography, history, and mathematics.
(3) Plants
Little attention was devoted by the Stoics to
mal^m'
world of plants and animals. About this fact
there can be no doubt, since we neither hear of
any treatises by the Stoics on this subject, nor
do they appear to have advanced any peculiar views.
The most prominent point is, that they divided
all things in nature into four classesthose of in
organic beings, plants, animals, and rational beings.
In beings belonging to the first class a simple
quality (efts) constitutes the bond of union ; in those
of the second class, a forming power (<pva-n) ; in
those of the third class, a soul ; and in those of the
fourth class, a rational soul.3 By means of this divi1 Thus colours are explained fiiv e|et SioiKeTrtu t& Si 4>i<rei, t4
as being irpwToi <rxTW""p'<rM<>i rVs
aKSytp if/uxfi, t Si Ka! \6yov
S\ns (Stab. i. 364 ; Plac. i. 15, ixâV Ka' hiroiw. Themist.
5) ; and sounds are spoken of De An. 72, b ; M. Aurel. vi. 14 ;
as undulations in the air by Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298,
Pint. Plac. iv. 19, 6; Dioa. 158. D; De Mundo, 1154, E; Leg.
2 Conf. Bake, Posidonii Alleg. 1091, D ; Incorrupt. M.
Rhod. Reliquise, pp. 87-184 ; 947, A; Plotin. Bnn. iv. 7, 8, p.
Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Grsec. iii. 463, c, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise
245.
Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p.
' Sext. Math. ix. 81 : rZv 146, 1). Respecting the dif{lyafiivuv (on tvuxrts see p. 103, ference of <fii<ris and <j>vxii, ipiais
1) (rwju(Ta)i/ rck fiiv virb ^/i\tjs is said to consist of a moister,
eêois <rvWx<rtu, t4 Si vrrh (pifftas, colder, and denser ir0/io than
ret Si im'b ^vxns * Ka* eo>s
^"xi ; but, on this point, see
its \i8oi koI {iXo, Qitreus Si, Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 ; Com.
KaSairep t& <f>uTa, ^vxos s* T^ Not. 46, 2 ; Qalen, Hipp, et Plat.
f<j5a. Pint. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi
451 : na86\ov Si tail tvTov outo! Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In
t tpaoi koI Sr\\6v ianv 8ti t<1 Diog. 139,
and vous, as the
209
THE UNIVERSE.
sion, the various branches of a science of nature were
mapped out, based on a gradually increasing deve
lopment of the powers of life. No serious attempt
was made by the Stoics to work out this thought.
With the single exception of man, we know exceed
ingly little of their views on organic beings.1
highest and lowest links in the
series, are contrasted. Ibid.
150, there is a definition of
(f>vffis = irvp rexyticbv bfiip j8a5foi/
tU yivtw, and (148) another
= fu ^| aurijs Kivovfiivif nark
tnrepfjLaTiKoiis \6yovs uiroT*\ov(Td
tc KaL trvyexovaa rh ^ a&Tijs 4v
wpiaixivois xpdvots Kal roiavra
Spwtrg a<p' otW bneicpidTi. It
hardly need be repeated that
the force is one and the same,
which at one time appears as
?{is, at another as tpiiats. Conf.
Diog. 138 ; Themist. 1. c. ; Sext.
Math. ix. 84.
1 The belief that blood cir
culates in the veins, spiritus in
the arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii.
15, 1), which was shared by
the Peripatetics, deserves to be
mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu.
ii. 15, 1 ; also the explanations
of sleep, death, and age in Plut.

Plac. v. 23, 4 ; 30, 5 ; the as
sertion that animals are not
only deficient in reason (on
this point see Plut. Solert. An.
2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963,
967), but also (according to
Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc.
et Plat. iii. 3; v. 1, 6. Vol. v.,
309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions
(or as Galen also says in 8vpbs
and ivitvpla), even in man lbe
emotions being connected with
the rational soul. Posidonius,
however, denied this statement
(Galen, p. 476), and Chrysippus
believed that animals had a
TiytHovtxiv. (Chalcid. in Tim.
p. 148, b.) He even discovered
in the scent of dogs traces of
an unconscious inference. Sext.
Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p. 223,
2.
Chap.
VIII.
210
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER IX.
THE STUDY OF NATURE.
MAN.
Chap'
IX. '
The Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting,

when it treats of Man ; and the line it here follows
A. The
is decided by the tone of the whole system.
On
soul.
the one hand, the Stoic materialism shows itself
(1) Ma
terialistic most unmistakeably in the department of anthro
nature of
tlw soul. pology; on the other hand, the conviction that
all actions must be referred to active powers, and
all the several active powers to one original power,
can not be held without leading to a belief in
the oneness and in the regulating capacity of the
soul. Not only does it follow, as a corollary
from the materialistic view of the world, that the
soul must be in its nature corporeal, but the Stoics
took pains to uphold this view by special arguments.
Whatever, they said, influences the body, and is by
it influenced in turn, whatever is united with the
body and again separated from it, must be corporeal.
How, then, can the soul be other than corporeal ? 1
1 Cleanthes, in Netties. Nat.
Horn. p. 33, and Tert. De An. 0.
5 : obStv &.<rd)ârov ffv[nrd<rx*i
(Tt^juari oiitl aaufidrtp trwjua oA\d
a-upa a&juni avfiiriax^ M y

tyvxh t$ ad/ian yoaovyri xol Tejuvo^vap koX to trwfia ry i/^x? '
alirxvyofidvys yovy ipvBpbv yiverax
THE SOUL: ITS NATURE.

Whatever has extension in three dimensions is cor
poreal ; this is the case with the soul, since it
extends in three directions over the whole body.1
Thought, moreover, and motion are due to animal
life.2 Animal life is nurtured and kept in health by
the breath of life.3 Experience proves that mental
qualities are propagated by natural generation ;
they must, therefore, be connected with a corporeal
substratum.4 As, therefore, the mind is nothing
but fiery breath, so the human soul is described
by the Stoics sometimes as fire, sometimes as
breath, at other times, more accurately, as warm
breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a
bond of union for the body,5 in the very same way
koI <po&ovtifV7is wxpvv o&p.a &pa
7) <f/vx^. Chrysippus in Kernes.
p. 34 : b 86.vo.t6s Ion gapicrjubf
iliuxys airb (Twjuotos ' oiiSiv Se
atrdrfiaTov airb aii/iaros xwP^CeTai'
ovSe yap 4<pdimTai <r<lipxi.Tos atrtSfia-TOV ri Si tyvxri Ka\ itpa-KTerai
KaX XuP^CeTal TV
' (TUUCL
&pa i) xlivx'h- The same is said
by Tertullian.
1 Nemes. Nat. Horn. c. 2, p.
30.
2 IHog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii.
14, 36.
3 Zeno, in Tertvtt, 1. c, and
very nearly the same in Cluilcid.
in Tim p. 306 Meurs. : Quo
digresso animal emoritur : consito autem spiritu digresso
animal emoritur : ergo consitus
spiritus corpus est, consitus
autem spiritus anima est : ergo
corpus est anima. Chrysippus
in Chalcid. 1. c.
4 Cleanthes, in Nemes. 1. c.
32 : oh fidvov 0/j.olol rots yovtvai
yit>6fie6a, Kara t!> eSifia, i\\a Kal

Kara. t)]v tyuxyv, tois ird letri, tois
rtQetri, thus SiaOcffttri' fft&piaTos Si
to ofiotov teal a.v6fXotov, ovxl Si
acrdfiarov (rup.a &parj tyvxh. The
same in Tertullian, 1. c.
s Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp,
et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287 : i)
tyuXV
itrri avpupvroi' ijfiiv
(ruvexis iravrl ry> (Twp.aTi Sir)nov.
Zeno. Macrob. Somn. i. 14 : Zenon
[dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum . . . Boethos (pro
bably the Stoic, not the Peripa
tetic of the first century, is
meant) ex aere et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p.
282 : to Ktvovv tov avBpwirov tos
Kvrh Trpoaiptffiv Kivf)ffLS ij/vx1**)
tIs tffTiv avaOvfilacts. Cic. Nat,
D. iii. 14, 36 ; Tusc. i. 9, 19 ;
18, 42 : Zeno considers the soul
to be fire; Pansetius believes
that it is burning air. IHog. L.
vii. 156, on the authority of
Zeno, Antipater, Posidonius,
p2
211
Chap.
IX.
THE STOICS.
Chap.
IX.
that the soul of the world is diffused throughout

the world, and forms a bond of union for the world.1
This warm breath was believed to be connected with
the blood ; and hence the soul was said to be fed byvapours from the blood, just as the stars are fed by
vapours from the earth.2
The same hypothesis was also used to explain the
origin of the soul. One part of the soul was believed
to be transmitted to the young in the seed.3 From
says that it is irvevfia trv/xtpvTov,
itvevna. ivBepjiov. Stob. Eel. i.
796 (Plvt. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornnt. N. D. p. 8 : Kal yap at Tj/ierepai i|/i>xal trvp tlffi. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, I :
Zeno calls the soul a1aBn<riv tj
avadvîaaiv (should be aindriTiV avaBviiiaaiv, conf. 2 and
Ps. Plvt. Vit Horn. o. 127 : r^v
tyvx^v oi ZZtco'CkoI bplfrvrcti irviVfia
rrvpupvts Kal avaBvfitaviv alffBtj'
TtK^jv avairrofi4vnv airb rav 4y
a&fian vypav). Longin. in Evs.
Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. Be An.
127, b : oi airh tt}s ffroas irvev/xa
aitT^v \4yovres chat avyK*incv6v
ircuj in re Trvpbs Hal aepos. Since,
however, every irvtvixa is not a
soul, a soul is stated to be
irvfvfia irks ^%oy (Plotin. Enn,
iv. 7, 4, p. 458, b); and the dis
tinctive quality of the soulelement is its greater warmth
and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep.
41 , 2, p. 1052 : Chrysippus con
siders the if/vxb t be apaiSrtpov
nvevfia tijs (pvtrews Kal \cirTop.epeo-Ttpov. Similarly, Oalen, Qu.
An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783:
The Stoics say that both <pv<ris
and tyvxh is irvtuô, but that the
vvfvua is thick and cold in
<p6<r. dry and warm in tyvxh.
1 Chrysippvg. See previous

note. This diffusion is further
explained by Iamb, in Stob. Eel.
i. 870 and 874, Themitt. De
Anim. f. 68, a, Plotin. iv. 7, 8,
p. 463, c, as being upatris, i.e. an
intermingling of elements. That
the soul forms the bond of
union for the body, and not
vice vers&, was a point vindi
cated by the Stoics against the
Epicureans. Posid. in Achil.
Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E ; Sext.
Math. ix. 72.
1 Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii.
8, p. 282, on the authority of
Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus,
and Diogenes ; Longin. in Eus.
Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3 ; M. Aurel. v.
33 ; vi. 15 ; Ps. Plut. Vit. Horn.
127.
8 Zeno described the seed as
nrevjua
vypov ^j/vx^js /xepos Kal
air6o-Trafrfm . . . fity/xa twv tt}s
tyvxys nepiiv (Arius Didymus, in
Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1), or as
ffvfifiiyfia Ka) KipMfta twv t?}s
<pi'XVs Svudfieav {Plut. Coh. Ir.
15). Similarly Chrysip., in
Biog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De
An. c.27. AccordingtoSphasrus,
in Eiog. 159, the seed is formed
by separation from all parts of
the body and can consequently
THE SOUL: ITS PARTS.
213
the part so transmitted there arises, by development Chap.

within the womb, first the soul of a plant ; and this
becomes the soul of a living creature after birth by
the action of the outer air.1 This view led to the
further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must be
in the breast, not in the brain ; since not only breath
and warm blood, but also the voice, the immediate
expression of thought, comes from the breast.2
Nor is this hypothesis out of harmony with the (2) Divinotions otherwise entertained by the Stoics as to ^j?0Tt!'e
produce all, as Democritus had
already said. Panastius (in Cie.
Tusc. i. 31, 79) proves, from
the mental similarity between
parents and children, that the
soul comes into existence by
generation. For the mother's
share in producing the soul, see
At. Did. 1. c. See above p.
127, 5.
1 Pint. Sto. Kep. 41, 1 and 8,
p. 1052 ; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084.
De Pnmo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946 : oi
StoukoI Kal rb Trvevfia \iyovaiv
iv rots adtfiao-L rwv fipttpvv rij
irepi\|/uet (TTOfj.ov<rBaL real /xerafidKKop 4k tpfotas yfvtffOat tyvx'fiv.
Similarly, piotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8,
p. 463, c. Conf. Hippolyt. Refut. Hser. c. 21, p. 40 ; Tertull.
De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac.
v. 16, 2; 17, 1 ; 24, 1) draws
attention to the inconsistency
of saying that the animal soul,
which is warmer and rarer than
the vegetable soul, has been
developed of it there by cooling
and condensation.
2 On this point, the Stoics
were not altogether agreed.
Some (not all, as Pint. PI. Phil,
iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the
brain the seat of the soul, in

proof of which they appealed
to the story of the birth of
Pallas. Sent. Math. ix. 119;
Diog. in Phedr. Fragm. De
Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Krixche,
Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, 1. c. iii. 8, p. 349.
It appears, however, from Galen,
1. c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5, iii. 1, pp.
185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De
An. c. 15, that the most distin
guished StoicsZeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Apollodorusdecided in favour of the
heart. The chief proof is, that
the voice does not come from
the hollow of the skull, but
from the breast. Chrysippus
was aware of the weakness of
this proof, but still did not
shrink from using it. Galen,
1. c. p. 254, 261. At the same
time, he also appealed to the
fact (ii. 7, 268 ; iii. 1, 290, c. 5,
321, c. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362)
that, by universal assent, sup
ported by numerous passages
from the poets, the motions of
the will and the feelings pro
ceed from the heart.
211
THE STOICS.
the nature of man. Plato and Aristotle had alreadyfixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower
powers; the brain they assigned to reason, with
the view of distinguishing the rational from the
mere animal soul.1 When, therefore, the Stoics as
similated man's rational activity to the activity of
the senses, deducing both from one and the same
source, it was natural that they would depart from
Aristotle's view. Accordingly, the various parts of
the soul were supposed to discharge themselves from
their centre in the heart into the several organs, in
the form of atmospheric currents.
Seven such
parts are enumerated, besides the dominant part or
reason, which was also called r/yefiovcKov, BiavorfiiKov, XoyiaTiicbv, or Xoyicrfios, These seven parts
consist of the five senses, the power of reproduction,
and the power of speech ; 2 and, following out their
view of the close relation of speech and thought,3
1 Aristotle had assigned no Diog. 110 and 157 ; Porphyr.
particular organ of the body to and Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836,
reason.
874, and 878 ; Chalcid. in Tim.
2 Pint. Plao. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, 307 ; Nicomachus, in Iambi.
c. 21 : The Stoics consider the Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there
fryeôvinhv to be the highest part was no universal agreement
of the soul ; it begets the <pay- among the Stoics on this sub
Tcurfai, ffvyKaTadiffets, aiaB-{\(Tets, ject. According to Tertull. De
and ipitctl, and is by them called An. 14, Zeno only admitted
A07i<r/i<fs; from it the seven three divisions of the soul,
divisions of the soul reach to whilst some among the later
the body, like the arms of a Stoics enumerated as many as
cuttle-fish, and are therefore ten ; Panastius only held six,
collectively defined as irvtvfm and Posidonius went still fur
8iaTtV0V
TOV TjyefiOVlKOV ther away from the view cur
(/xexp ts6<pda\fiwy, fixwv, ixvktt)- rent among the Stoics. The
pcov, y\(^rrrjsf i-Kttyavt'ias, irapv- remarks of Stob. i. 828, pro
0TC&TOIV, (pdpvyyos yk&TTi)s Kal bably refer to the Peripatetic
twv olKtluy hpyavav). Galen, Aristo.
a See p. 73, 2.
1. c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2 ;
THE SOUL.
great importance is attached to the power of
speech.1 At the same time, the Stoics upheld the
oneness of the substance of the soul with greater
vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had done.
Reason, or to ^js/movikov, is with them the primary
power, of which all other powers are only parts, or
derivative powers.2 Even feeling and desire they
derive from it, in direct contradiction to the teach
ing of Plato and Aristotle ; 3 and this power is
1 Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4 : et operas . . . non enim mem
iK ffov yap yevos 4ixp.iv i^s /ujU7j/*a bra sunt substantive animalis,
sedingenia (capacities). Iambi,
fiovvoi, 8tra cet tc Kal tpirei Byrjr1 in Stob. i. 874 : The powers of
iirl ya7av.
the soul bear, according to the
2 See p. 214, 2 and Cbrys. Stoics, the same relation to the
in Galen, 1. c. iii. 1, p. 287. soul that qualities bear to the
Conf. p. 211, 5 : toiJtjjj obv [rijs substance ; their difference is
partly owing to the diffusion
ray^cvov [we] fiopicp, rb hirjKov of the Tveinara, of which they
jtvTrjs els t^v rpax^tay apriiplai/ consist, in different parts of
>\>wvqv thai, rb 5e eh 6cpda\fj.obs the body, partly to the union of
tyfy, k.t.A. Kal rb cis opxîs, several qualities in one subjecttTp6f Til? %X0V TOIOVTOV \6yOV, matter, the latter being neces
airep/xaTiKbv, cis b Se ovu.@aivei sary, for iiyenovtKbv to include
irdvra Tavra, 4v Trj JcapSi'a elvat, ipamaala, ffvyKard&effis, vpfiii,
/itpos bv avTTjs rb 7jyeîoviK6v. and \6yos.
Pint. Plao. iv. 4, 2 : tuS fiye3 Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p.
flOVlKOV a<p' ov TOUTB TtaVTO. 4lTlT- 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo,
and
Chrysippus : vo/iffouoriy ovk
raKTai [ = TaTOt] Sia tu>v olicelwi/
opydvwv irpoffiptpws rats tov ttoKv- tlvat rb traJdrjTiKbv Kal aXoyov Statrob'os n\eKrdvais, Conf. Sext. (popif rivt Kal <f>v<rct tyvxys tov
Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr. \oyiKoii ZiaKCKpifiivov, ah\a Tb
(De An. 146) therefore denies ainb tt}S tyvxvs jUtpos, b 5^ /cathe Stoical assertion, that the Aor<ri Sidvoiav Kal riysiioviKbv,
<l/vx>icb Siva/its is only one, and 0l6\ov Tpcir6fXfvov Ka) fxsra&dWov
that every activity of the %v T Tots irddeffi Kal vats koto
soul is only the action of the %%iv <j Std6e<riv neraBo\a.7s KaKlav
t&s *xov T)y*v-ovw6v. Conversely T6 yivto-Qai Kal aperijv Kal fiTioev
Tertullian, De An. 14, speaking %X*lv aKoyov iv kavrip. Plac.
quite after the manner of a Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, 1. c. iv.
Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem 1, p. 364: Chrysippus some
non tarn partes animse habe- times speaks as if he admitted
buntur, quam vires et efficaciae a distinct Siva/us izidupririKi) or
215
Chap.
IX.
210
THE STOICS.
Chap.
IX.
declared to be the seat of personal identity, a point

on which former philosophers had refrained from
expressing any opinion.1
The individual soul bears the same relation to
B. The in
dividual the soul of the universe that a part does to the
soul wild
the soul of whole The human soul is not only a part, as are all
vers"'1' other living powers, of the universal power of life,
but, because it possesses reason, it has a special rela
tionship to the Divine Being2a relationship which
9vp.ofiii\s ; at other times, as if
he denied it. The latter is
clearly his meaning. Ibid. v.
6, 476: (5 5e XpvffnrTros oii0' erepov
tivai vop-lfet rb TrafhiTiKbv rrjs iû%ris toC \oyiO~rinov /cat r<av a\6ywv
fopa* cupaipetrai to. Tridv. See p.
209, 1. Iambi, in Stob. Bel. i.
890; Dioff. vii. 159. Orig. c.
Cels. V, 47 : Tubs dird tt)s aroas
apvovfievous rb rpifieph tt)s ipvxys.
Posidonius (in Galen, 1. c. 6,
476) endeavours to prove that
Cleanthes held a different view,
by a passage in which he con
trasts Bvfibs with \6yosbut
this is making a rhetorical
flourish do duty for a philoso
phic statement.
1 Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2,
215) : oStcoj Se kclI rb eyh \iyofiey
kot& touto (the primary power
in the breast) heinvvvres aurovs
iv Tt$ aTrotyaiveadat r^v fiidvotav
tlvai.
2 Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. ,
Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6 : at if/vxai
trvva<p6ts Ttp Qifp S.re avrov fxipia
odaai kal a7rocnrd(Târa. Id. ii.
8, 11. M. Aurel. ii. i, v. 27,
calls the soul fiepos air6ppoia,
dir<J(T7ro(Tfia 0eo5; and, xii. 26,
even calls the human roGj 8e6s.
Sen. Ep. 41,2: Sacer intra nos
spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorumbonorum, quis Deus

incertum est, habitat Deus. Id.
Hp. 66, 12 . Ratio autem nihil
aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus
mersa. Consequently, reason,
thought, and virtue are of the
same nature in the hum:in soul
as in the soul of the universe,
as Iambi, in Stob. Eel. i. 886,
states as a Stoic view. From
this relationship to God, Posi
donius deduces in a well-known
simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul's
capacity for studying nature,
and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24)
the universality of a belief in
God. All souls, as being parts
of the divine mind, may be col
lectively regarded as one soul
or reason. Mare. Aurel. ix. 8 :
els fiev Ta &Koya
fila t|/ux^
StjjpTjTar els Se rd KoyiKa pia
\oyuci) iûxÎ pciiipurrai. xii. 30:
V (p(t>S T]\i0U, KttV 6tfp7JTU TolÔlS,
Upetriv, &\\ols fivplois ' fila oitffta
Koiv^j, kav StelpyyTai iStws iroiois
a&fiaai fivplois * fila ^v^h, Kav
(pilffeffi Bieiprfrai fivplais Kal itilats
rrepiypa<pais. This oneness, how.
ever, must, as the comparison
shows, be understood in the
sense of the Stoic realism : the
THE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE.

becomes closer in proportion as we allow greater play
to the divine element in ourselves, i.e. to reason.1
On this very account, however, the soul cannot escape
the law of the Divine Being, in the shape of gene
ral necessity, or destiny. It is a mere delusion to
suppose that the soul possesses a freedom indepen
dent of the world's course. The human will, like
everything else in the world, is bound into the in
dissoluble chain of natural causes, and that irrespec
tively of our knowing by what causes the will is
decided or not. Its freedom consists in this, that,
instead of being ruled from without, it obeys the call
of its own nature, external circumstances concurring.2
To this power of self-determination, however, the
greatest value is attached. Not only are our actions
due to it to such an extent that only because of it
can they be considered ours,3 but even our judgments
are, as the Stoics thought, dependent on it. The
soul itself being open to truth or error, convictions
are quite aa much in our power as actions : 4 both
are alike the necessary result of the will. And just
as the individual soul does not possess activity inde
pendently of the universal soul, no more can the
individual soul escape the law of destiny. It, too,
at the end of the world's course, will be resolved
into the primary substance, the Divine Being.
universal soul, in the seDse of bonus, magnus, a Deus in corethereal substance, is the ele- pore humano hospitans.
ment of which individual souls
2 Further particulars, p. 174,
consist. See also Marc. Aurel. 180, 189.
viii. 54.
3 See p. 179.
1 In this sense, Sen. Bp. 31,
4 See p. 88, 1.
11, calls the animus rectus,
218
Chap.
IX.
THE STOICS.
The only point about which the Stoics were unde
cided was, whether all souls would last until that
time as separate souls, which was the view of Cleanthes, or only the souls of the wise, as Chrysippus
held.1
1 Diug. 156 ; Pint. N. P.
Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107 ; Plao.
iv. 7, 2 ; Ar. Didymus, in Eus.
Praep. Ev. xv. 20, 3 ; Sen. Consol, ad Marc. c. 26, 7 ; Ep. 102,
22; 117,6; Cie. Tusc. i. 31, 77.
Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2 ; Ep. 65,
24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42 ; Resurr.
Cam. 3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3 ; vii. 32 ; viii. 25, 58)
are only speaking kot' HyBpawov,
in seeming to doubt a future
life after death, in order to dis
pel the fear of death in every
case. It is, however, a mistake
of Tiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155)
to suppose that they, in many
passages {Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M.
Aur. ii. 17 ; v. 4, 13), supposed
the immediate dissolution of
the soul after death. It is, on
the contrary, clear, from M.
Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul
lives some time after death,
and is not resolved into the
world-soul till the general con
flagration. But even this is
a variation from the ordinary
view of the Stoics. According
to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam)
the souls of the good, as in the
doctrine of purgatory, undergo
a purification, before they are
admitted to the ranks of the
blessed ; and here this purifica
tion is no doubt required on
physical grounds. When the
soul is purified, both in sub
stance and morals, it rises up
to the ether, and there, accord

ing to M. Aurelius, united to
the ffvepfiaTiKbs \6yos rwv
it lives, according to the com
mon view, until the end of the
world. The ether is also al
lotted to the blessed, for their
residence, by Cie. Tusc. i. 18,
42 ; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20 ; Pint.
N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107.
The souls, as Cicero remarks,
penetrating the thick lower air,
mount to heaven, until they
reach an atmosphere (the juncti
ex anima tenui et ardore solis
t emperato ignes) congenial with
their own nature. Here they
naturally stop, and are fed by
the same elements as the stars.
According to Chrysippus (in
Eustath. on II. xxiii. 65), they
there assume the spherical
shape of the stars. According
to Tertull. De An. 54, conf.
Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place
is under the moon. Zeno, in
speaking of the islands of the
blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20),
probably only desired to enlist
popular opinion in his own
favour. The souls of the foolish
and bad also last some time
after death; only, as being
weaker, they do not last until
the end of the world (4r. Did. ;
Tlieodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v 23,
p. 73) ; and meantime, as it is
distinctly asserted by Sen,. Ep.
117, 6, Tertullian, and LactanUut, they are punished in the
FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY.
219
The effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above statements. They, how-
Chap.
IX"
ever, pervade the whole body of the Stoical views

T-i
o
on man.1 Jbrom one point of view, the theory of
necessity, and the denial of everlasting life after
c- Freedam and
imwrtalltV-
death, seem quite unintelligible in a system the

moral tone of which is so high ; yet the connection
of these theories with the Stoic ethics is very
intimate. These theories commended themselves
to the Stoics, as they have done in later times
to Spinoza and Schleiermacher, because they cor
responded with their fundamental view of morality,
according to which the individual is the instru
ment of reason in general, and a dependent portion
of the collective universe. Moreover, since the
Stoics admitted a future existence, of limited, but
yet indefinite, length, the same practical results
followed from their belief as from the current belief
in immortality. The statements of Seneca,2 that
this life is a prelude to a better ; that the body is
a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to
its own home ; his joy in looking forward to the day
which will rend the bonds of the body asunder,
nether world. Tertullian in
placing a portion of the souls
of the foolish in the region of
the earth, and there allowing
them to be instructed by the
wise, is probably referring to
the purification mentioned by
Seneca. For the supposed transmigration of souls see p. 166, 2.
1 The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as
belonging to the Stoicsani-
mam hominis magno pondere

extriti permanere non posse et
statim spargi, quia non fuerit
illi exitus liberwas not required by their principles, as
Seneca already observed. It
belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School,
2 Conf. Baur, Seneca und
Paulus, in Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift fur wissensch. Theol. i.
2, 221.
220
Chap.
IX.
THE STOICS.
which he, in common with the early Christians, calls
the birthday of eternal life ; 1 his description of the
peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the free
dom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of
knowledge which will there be shed on all the secrets
of nature ; 2 his language on the future recognition
and happy society of souls made perfect ; 3 his see
ing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence
1 Ep. 102, 22 : Cum venerit
dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini
humanique secernat, corpus
hie, ubi inveni, relinquani, ipse
me Dis reddam . . . per has
mortalis vitas moras illi meliori
vitas longiorique proluditur. As
a child in its mother's womb,
sic per hoc spatium, quod ab
infantia patet in senectutem,
in alium maturescimus partum.
All we possess, and the body
itself, is only the baggage,
which we neither brought into
the world, nor can carry away
with us. Dies iste, quern tanquam extremum reformidas,
ajterni natalis est. Ep. 120,
14 : The body is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does
not fear to lose. Scit enim, quo
exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit,
meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.
1 Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3 :
Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit
. . . ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et
sibi relictus. The body is only
a vessel, enveloping the soul in
darkness : nititur illo, unde
dimissus est ; ibi ilium asterna
requies manet. Ibid. 26, 7 : Nos
quoque felices animas et asterna
sortitas. Ibid. 19, 6 : Excessit
filius tuus terminos intra quos

servitur: excepit ilium magna
et seterna pax. No fear or care,
no desire, envy, or compassion
disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5.
Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8 : Nunc
animus fratris mei velut ex
diutino carcere emissus, tandem
sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et
rerum naturae spectaculofruitur
. . . fruitur nunc aperto et
libero coelo . . . et nunc illic
libere vagatur omniaque rerum
naturaa bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12 :
Tunc animus noster habebit,
quod gratuletur sibi, cum emis
sus his tenebris . . . totum
diem admiserit, et coelo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28 :
Aliquando naturae tibi arcana
ret egentur, discutietur ista
caligo et lux undique clara
percutiet, which Seneca then
further expands.
8 In Consol. ad Marc. 25, 1,
Seneca describes how, the time
of purification ended, the de
ceased one inter felices currit
animas (the addition : excepit
ilium coatus saaex Hanse rightly
treats as a gloss) and how his
grandfather shows him the hall
of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.
FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY.

will be pronounced on every one ; 1 his making
the thought of a future life the great stimulus to
moral conduct here;2 even the way in which he
consoles himself for the destruction of the soul by
the thought that it will live again in another form
hereafter3all contain nothing at variance with
the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach
to Platonic or even Christian modes of thought.4
1 Ep. 26, 4 : Velut adpro- bodies. Accordingly, the paspnquet experimentum et ille sage just quoted, and also Ep.
laturus sententiam de omnibus 71, 13, must refer to the
annis meis dies . . . quo, re- physical side of death, or else
motis strophis ac fucis, de me to the return of personality
judicaturus sum. Compare the after the conflagration of the
hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.
world.
2 Ep. 102, 29 : Hsec cogi4 Besides the definitions of
tatio (that of heaven and a aSa0r)(ris in Diog. 52, and the
future life) nihil sordidum remark that impressions are
ammo subsidere sinit, nihil made on the organs of sense,
humile, nihil crudele. Deos but that the seat of feeling is
rerum omnium esse testes ait : in the riyenovindv (Plut. Plac. iv.
illis nos adprobari, illis in 23, 1), the following statements
futurum parari jubet et aeterni- may be mentioned : Intheprotatem menti proponere.
cess of seeing, the ipa-rinbv
s Ep. 36, 10 : Mors . . . in- vvevna, coming into the eyes
termittit vitam, non eripit : from the fiyefioviK6f, gives a
veniet iterum qui nos in lucem spherical form to the air before
reponat dies, quern multi re- the eye, by virtue of its toi/ikt;
cusarent.nisi oblitos reduceret. xlvqais (on i6vos, see p. 128, 2),
Sed postea diligentius docebo and, by means of the sphere o
omnia, quae videntur perire, air, comes in contact with
mutari. iEquo animo debet things ; and since by this prorediturus exire. The souls can- cess rays of light emanate from
not return, according to the the eye, darkness must be
Stoic teaching, until after the visible. Diog. 158 ; Alex. Aph.
general conflagration, presum- De Anim. 149 ; Pint. Plac. iv.
ing that the same persons will 15. The process of hearing is
be found in the future world as due to the spherical undulain the present. See p. 166, 2. tions of the air, which comAs long as the world lasts, the municate their motion to the
better souls will cont nue to ear. Diog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv.
exist, and only the particles of 19, 5. On the voice, called also
the body are employed for fresh ipwvatv, see Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2 ;
Chap.
IX-
222
Cn\p.
THE STOICS.
Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his School
in one particular direction, in which it approaches
most closely to Platonism ; and, of all the Stoics,
Seneca was the most distinctly Platonic.
Excepting the two points which have been dis
cussed at an earlier time,1 and one other point re
lating to the origin of ideas and emotions, which will
be considered subsequently, little is on record re
lating to the psychological views of the Stoics.
21, 4 ; Diog. 55, and above
p. 214, 2 ; 74, 5. Disease is
caused by changes in the irvtvpa,
Diog. 158 ; sleep (iXvoyihov tov
alaBrirtKov t6vov irepl ri fryepovik6v, Diog. 158 ; TertvXl. De An.
43 ; and in a similar way, death
inhvojxivov tou t6vou kqX irapie-
ncvov, Iambi, (in Stob. Eel. i.

922), who, however, does not
mention the Stoics by name. In
the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of
life is only a liberation of
rational souls.
1 Page 77.
ETHIC OF THE STOICS.
223
CHAPTER X.
ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC
ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.
Whatever attention the Stoics paid to the study of CHAr
nature and to logic, the real kernel of their system '
lies, as has been already observed, in their Ethics ;
even natural science, that ' most divine part of philo
sophy,' was only pursued as an intellectual prepa
ration for Ethics. In the field of Ethics the true
spirit of the Stoic system may therefore be expected
to appear, and it may be anticipated that this sub
ject will be treated by them with special care. Nor
is this expectation a vain one ; for here the springs
of information flowing freely give ample data re
specting the Stoic doctrine of morality. Never
theless, respecting the formal grouping of these data
only vague and contradictory statements are forth
coming. Moreover, the Stoics appear to have fol
lowed such different courses and to have been so
little afraid of repetition, that it is hardly possible to
obtain a complete survey of their whole system by
following any one of the traditional divisions.1
1 The chief passage in Diog. Khv ntpos rrjs (pi\o<ro<t>Las Sicupovvii. 84, is as follows : rb 5e i)6i- aiv (Xs re rbv irtpl Sp/irjs koX eis
224
Chap
X.
THE STOICS.
Proceeding to group the materials in such a way
as to give the clearest insight into the peculiarities
rbv irepl ayaduv Kal kokuv t6ttov
Kal rbv irepl itadav Kal irepl apeTljy
Kal irepl re\ovs irepl re ttjs irptS>Tr\s
atfai Kal ruv irpa\euiv Kal irepl rSiv
KOdf\K6vT01V npOTpOTTWV T Kal &7TOTponwf. Kal outo) 5' viroo'iaipovmv
oi irepl XpiHTLmroi' Kal 'Apxe'SlJjuov
Kal Zrivuva rbv Tap<re'a Kal 'Ano\\6Saipov Kal Aioyevqv Kal 'Avt'i~
irarpov Kal Tloffeiodpiov 6 \iXv
yap KiTTteuy 7A\vo>v Kal b KKedvdijs
its av apxat&rtpot aipeXemepov
irepl twv wpayfj.a.Tuv 8te\a/3ov.
There may be doubts as to the
punctuation, and, consequently,
as to the sense, of the first sen
tence ; but the form of ex
pression seems to imply that
the five first portions contain
main divisions, and the six
following subdivisions. The
ethics of Chrysippus and his
followers would therefore fall
into the following main divi
sions : irepl dpi^rjs, irepl ayaB&v
Kal kok&v. irepl iraQwv ; but it
would be hard to assign to these
divisions their respective sub
divisions. The statement of
Epictetns, Diss. iii. 2, agrees in
part with this division. He dis
tinguishes in his introduction
to virtue three rdiroi : S irepl ras
6peets Kal ras eKKhlffets, called
also b irepl ra irddri ; b irepl ras
dpfias Kal a<pop/âs Kal ctirAw? b
irepl rb KaBifKoy ; and, lastly, b
irepl tV avaâiraTr\aiav Kal avetKat6Tt)ra Kal S\ws 6 irepl ras ffvyKOTafleVeis. The first of these
divisions would correspond with
the third of Diogenes, the
second with his first ; but the
division irepl iyaB&r Kal kokwv
does not harmonise with the
third of Epictetus (which, ac

cording to what follows, rather
refers to the critical confirma
tion of moral principles not
specially mentioned by Dio
genes), but rather with his first
division treating of ope'feis and
e'KKA.i'o-eu. Stobseus again differs
from either. In his survey of
the Stoic ethics (Eel. ii. c. 5),
he first, p. 90, treats of what is
good, evil, and indifferent, of
what is desirable and de
testable, of the end-in-chief,
and of happiness, in this sectiondiscussingatlengtHthedoctrine of virtue. Hethengoes on,
p. 158, to consider the KaBriKov,
the impulses, p. 166, and the
emotions (iradj, as being one
kind of impulse), appending
thereto, p. 186, a discussion on
friendship ; and concluding,
p. 192 to 242, with a long trea
tise on ivepyfifiara (Karopdci'~
funa, OLjUapr^jUaTa, ouSeVepa), the
greater portion of which is de
voted to describing the wise
man and the fool. Turning to
Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on
the authority of Posidonius,that
not only praaceptio, but also
suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and, moreover, causarum
inquisitio (which, however, can
hardly have been called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse
reads but astiologia) and ethologia, description of moral
states, are necessary. In Ep.
89, 14, the parts of moral
science are more accurately
given as three ; the first deter
mining the value of things, the
second treating de actionibus,
THE HIGHEST GOOD

and connection of the Stoic principles, the first distinction to be made will be one between morality in
Cuap.
X'
general and particular points in morality. In con

sidering morality in general, those statements which
give the abstract theory of morals will be distin
guished from those which modify it with a view to
meet practical wants. The former again may be
grouped round three points :the enquiry into the
highest good, that into the nature of virtue, and
that relating to the wise man.
The enquiry into the destiny and end of man
turns, with the Stoics, as it did with all moral
philosophers since the time of Socrates, about the
fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary to make up the highest good or
A. The
S^**
O) Mature
inchest
'Jood-
happiness.1 Happiness, they consider, can only be

sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking more
the third de impetu, uep\ ipfirjs.
Two of these parts coincide
indeed with those of Diogenes,
hut this is not the case with
the third, which is only one of
the subdivisions in Diogenes
(irepl tv irpdêav') ; and even
Seneca's first part more nearly
agrees with one of these (Vepl
T?}? Trpdrris a|as). Unfortu
nately, Seneca does not mention
his authorities ; and, accord
ingly, we are not sure whether
his division is a genuine Stoic
division, A similar division
will be subsequently met with
in the eclectic Academician
Budorus (living under Au
gustus). None of the divisions
quoted agree with the three
problems proposed by Cic. Off.

ii. 5, 18, or the three sections
enumerated by Epict. Knchir.
c. 61 (76), in which Petersen
(Phil. Chrys. Fund, p 260) re
cognises Seneca's three main
divisions of Ethics. In the
midst of such contending au
thorities, it seems impossible to
establish the main division of
the Stoic Ethics. One thing
alone is clear, that they were
themselves not agreed on the
subject. Petersen's attempt,
1. c. p. 258, appears to me a
failure.
1 Stoh. Eel. ii. 138: t?\oj U
(paffiv elvcu rb evficup.ovttj/, oS
eVcKa Trdura irp&TTeTai, avrb 5e
wpdrrerat fxty, oudeybs 5e epeKa.
Q
226
Chap,
X
THE STOICS.
explicitly,1 the primary impulse of every bein is
towards self-preservation and self-gratification^y It
follows that every being pursues those things which
are most suited to its nature,3 and that such things
1 Diog. vii. 85 ; Cie. Fin. iii,
6 ; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That
the two latter writers follow
one and the same authority
appears partly from their literal
agreement with each other, and
partly from their adopting a
uniform method in refuting
the Epicurean statement, that
the desire for pleasure is the
primary impulse. That autho
rity is probably the treatise of
Chrysippus irep! t4\ovs, since it
is distinctly referred to by
Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4,
quotes from it : as oiKcioi/xtSa
irpbs atnovs ti/dvs ysv6fAtvoi koL rh
H*pw teal t& eKyova kamuv. The
difference mentioned by Alex.
Apkr. De An. 154that at one
time self-love, at another the
preservation of one's own na
ture, is the impulseis unim
portant.
2 Diog. vii. 85 : tV irp&rriv
&puj)v (pairi ~b &ov Itrxeiv 4irl t&
rrjpeiv tavrb, oln'ioiJ(rr}S avrw
[afo-qj] tvs tpvfffas air' apyris, KaOi
tt>1](TlV 6 TtpitTlTTKOS iv Tto TrpdlTa
irtp\ rc\av, vparoy oIkciov ilvai
\4yav irdvTi (dtp tV avTov
ffTOLfflV Kttl TyV TO/'TTJS fJVVsfcl\(IlV.
oljTf yap aWorpiuffat eiicbs %v
avTov [Cobet incorrectly airb]
rb C<Povi oHt iroir/rrat av [1. ttoit}tratrav SC. t)]V <pintv~\ avrb ju^t'
aWorptaaai /h^t' ovk [must evi
dently be struck out] o/iceiaiirai.
a7roAf7reTot rolvuy \eyetv (Twtttjoap.ivT\v avrb olicdws irpbs cavrA
outw yap rd re fiKd-KTOvra. 5ta>-
6e?rat Kai tA oiKeia irpoaitTai.

Similarly, Cie. 1. c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced
the conception of the good to
that of oiKeiov, without the
fuller explanation. Here the
Academic theory of life accord
ing to nature, which had been
enunciated by Polemo, Zeno's
teacher, is combined therewith.
Some difficulty was nevertheless
caused by the question whether
all living creatures possess a
consciousness (<rw!5)jtris, sensus) of their own nature ;
without such a consciousness,
natural self-love seemed to
the Stoics impossible. They
thought, however, that this
question (according to Sen Ep.
121, 5, conf. Cie. 1. c.) could be
answered in the affirmative with
out hesitation, and appealed
for evidence to the instinctive
activities by which children
and animals govern their bodily
motions, guard themselves from
dangers, and pursue what is to
their interest, without denying
that the ideas which children
and animals have of themselves
are very indistinct, that they
only know their own consti
tution, but not its true con
ception (constitutionis (initio,
Sen. p. 11). Constitutio. or
triaraais, was defined by the
Stoics, Sen. p. 10, as principale
animi quodam modo se habens
erga corpus.
Cie. Fin. iii. 5, 17 ; 6, 20.
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

only have for it a value (a^la). Hence the highest
good the end-in-chief,1 or happinesscan only be
jfound in what is conformable to nature.2 / Nothing
can be conformable to nature for any individual
thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of
the universe,3 or with the universal reason of the
world; nor, in the case of a conscious and rea
sonable being, unless it proceeds from a recognition
of this general lawin short, from rational intelli
gence.4 In every enquiry into what is conformable
1 The terms are here treated
as synonymous, without regard
to the hair-splitting with which
the Stoics distinguished (Stob.
Eel. ii. 136) three meanings of
rcKos, between re'Aos and o-Kiiros.
2 Stob. ii. 134 and 138;
Diog. vii. 88 ; 94 ; Plut. C. Not.
27, 9 ; Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26 ; 10,
33 ; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3 ; conf.
Ep. 118, 8; Seat. Pyrrh. iii. 171 ;
Math. 3d. 30. In Stob. ii. 78
and 96, formal definitions are
given of ayaBbv, te'Aoj, and
(iSatjiovia. The latter is gene
rally paraphrased by tSpota fiiov,
as Zeno had defined it. Various
formulas for the conception of
a life according to nature are
given by Cleanthes, Antipater,
Archedemus, Diogenes, Panav
tius, Posidonius, and others in
Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. 416 ;
Stob. 134 ; and Diog., all appa
rently taken from the same
source.
3 Diog vii. 88 : 8io7rp rtXos
yivtrat rb a.KO\ov9a>s rfj tpwrei
i}v ' Zwtp inrl Kara re ri)v aurov
KCU Kara ttjv tot SAftjy, ouSev
ivepyovvras ZiV awayopeteiv etuBev
6 v6p.os & Koivbs '6o~irep iirrly 6
bpQbs \6yos 5ict irdvrav ^>x^Mr0?

b aiirbs &v t$ Ait . . . (hat 5'
avrb rovro rriv rod evtiaifiovos
aper^v Kal e&poiav f3iov, Urau
iravra wpdrrryrat Kara rrjv <rtf/i<pwvlav rov Trap' kttaarq b'aipLOVos irpbs
rrtv tov rotv ftXav fiioucrjTov #oi5\l\aiv.
4 Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158) :
Ulttus BewpeToSai r4\v re Iv rots
\oyiKo7s yiyvoiitv%v bpariv Kal r^v
iv rots a\t>yois ($ois. Diog. 86 :
Plants are moved by nature
without impulse, animals by
means of impulse. In the case
of animals, therefore, rb Kara
rhv <piaiv is the same as rb Kara
r\v bpixT\v. In rational creatures,
reason controls impulse ; and
accordance with nature means
accordance with reason. In
Galen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2,
p. 460, Chrysippus says : Tipas
otKeiovffOai irpbs p.bvov rb KaXbv.
M. Aurel. vii. 11 : r$ Xoytxf
71 avTTi irpa|ts Kara (pvo-iv 4arl Kal
Kara\6yov. Hencethedefinition
of a virtuous life, or a life ac
cording to nature : fp Kar inTvetpiav twc tpvffei ffvp.âtv6vrtav
(Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog.
87 ; Ctem. 1. c. ; also Diogenes,
Q 2
227
Chap.
X.
?28
Chap
X
THE STOICS.
to nature, all turns upon agreement with the essen
tial constitution of the being, and this essential con
stitution consists, in the case of a man, simply in
reason.1 One and the same thing, therefore, is al
ways meant, whether, with Zeno, life according to
nature is spoken of as being in harmony with one
self, or whether, following Cleanthes, it is simply
said to be the agreement of life with nature, and
whether, in the latter case, (pvais is taken to mean
the world at large, or is limited to human nature in
particular.2 In every case the meaning is, that the
Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius) ; and that of the good :
rb re\eiov Kara <pvffiv KoyiKov us
KoyiKov (JDiog. 94).
1 Sen. Ep. 121, 14 : Omne
animal primum constitutioni
suie conciliari : hominis autem
constitutionem rationalem esse :
et ideo conciliari hominem sibi
non tanquam animali sed tanquani rationali. Ea enim parte
sibi carus est homo, qua homo
est. Id. Ep. 92, 1 : The body is
subservient to the soul, and the
irrational part of the soul to the
rational part. Hence it follows :
In hoc uno positam esse beatam
vitam. ut in nobis ratio perfecta
sit. Similarly, Ep. 7P. 8. M.
Aurel. vi. 44 : avfxfytpti Be eKdffrtfi
rb Kara T^v eaurov KaratTKev^v
Kal tpvaiv' ri 5e
<$>6(ris XoytKî
Kal iroXiTiK^. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.
2 According to Stob. ii. 132,
Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics
were not altogether agreed as to
the terms in which they would
express their theory. Zeno, for
instance, is said by Stobseus
to have defined t4\os = 6/M>\cyovjufVcos C?" ! Cleanthes first added
the words rf <piaa, and Chry-
sippus and his followers aug

mented the formula by several
additions. Diog. 87 attributes
the words rij <piaei to Zeno,
adding, however, 89, that Chrysippus understood by (pvais, rftv
te Koivijv (cat iStas t^v kvBpwTrtvi)v,
whereas Cleanthes understood
t)]v Koltrqv fi6vrtv ovkgti Se /col rfyv
M /lepovf. These differences
are, however, not important.
The simple expression 6/io\oyoufiifas !jv means, without
doubt, aK6\ov8i>v ev @ia], the Cvv
Ka6' eva Kdyov Kal irvntptvvov (Stob.
ii. 132 and 158), the SfioXoyia
irafrbs rov $iov (Diog. vii. 89),
the vita sibi concors, the Con
cordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15 j
V. Be. 8, 6), the unum hominem
agere, which, according to Sen.
Ep. 120, 22, is only found in a
wise manin a word, the even
tenour of life and consistency.
Nevertheless, this consistency
is only possible when indi
vidual actions accord with the
requirements of the character
of the agent. Accordingly,
Stub. ii. 158, places o.ko\ov6us tt?
iauray <pvnei by the side of
&k6\ov8ov h flip. Cleanthes,
THE, HIGHEST GOOD.

life of the individual approximates to or falls short
of the goal of happiness, exactly in proportion as it
approaches to or departs from the universal law of
the world and the particular rational nature of man.
In a word, a rational life, an agreement with the
general course of the world, constitutes virtue. The
principle of the Stoic morality might therefore be
briefly expressed in the sentence i Only virtue is
good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue!]
If, however, following Socrates, the good is defined
as being what is useful,2 then the sentence would
therefore, in adding to the ex
pression bpoKoyovfxtvws the
words T7) (pd&ei, which, however,
according to Diog. 87, Zeno had
done before him, was only
going back to the next con
dition of 6po\oyovfieva>s Cyv. We
can, however, hardly believe
with Diogenes that Cleanthes
understood by <pi<ris only nature
in general, but not human
nature. He may have alluded
in express terms to xoivii <pias
or icoivbs vofios only, with the
praise of which his well-known
hymn ends, but it cannot have
been his intention to exclude
human nature, which is only a
particular form of nature in
general. Cbrysippus therefore
only expanded, but did not
contradict, the teaching of his
master.
1 Diog. vii. 30 ; 94 ; 101 ;
Stob. ii. 200 ; 138 ; Sent. Pyrrh.
iii. 169; Math. xi. 184; Cie.
Tusc. ii. 25, 61 ; Fin. iv. 16, 45;
Acad. i. 10 ; Parad. 1 ; Sen.
Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4;
74, 1; 76,11; 85, 17; 120, 3;
118, 10, where the relation of
the conceptions honestum bo-
num, secundum naturam is spe

cially considered. To prove
their position, the Stoics make
use of the chain-argument, of
which they are generally fond.
Thas Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto.
Rep. 13, 11): t6 ayaObv aiperiv
tJ) 51 alperbv apecrrSy rb 5' apetfrbv
4watj/er6y' rb 5' iiraiv^bv Ka\6v.
(The same in Cie. Fin. iii. 8, 27,
and iv. 18, 50, where I would
suggest the reading validius
instead of vitiosius.) Again :
tJ> ayaQbv xaP7^v ' Tb 8e xaPT^v
(refjLv6v ' rb S ffcfxvbv na\6y. (The
same somewhat expanded in
Cie. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii.
126 : trav ayadbv alperby eTpai,
apeffrbv yap zeal SoKi/jLacnby Kal
iiratveTbv inrdpxeiV irav be Kanbv
(pevTbv. Another sorites of the
same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.
2 Stob. ii. 78 ; 94 ; Diog. vii.
94 and 98 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169 ;
Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. Ac
cording to Cio. Fin. iii. 10, 33,
Diogenes reconciled this defi
nition with the definition of the
good and the perfect quoted on
p. 227, 4, by observing that the
useful is a motus aut status
natura absoluti.
229
Chap.
X.
230
Chap
X'
THE STOICS.
run thus : Only Virtue is useful ; advantage cannot
be distinguished from duty, whilst to a bad man no
thing is useful,1 since, in the case of a rational being,

good and evil does not depend on what happens to
him, but simply on his own conduct.2 A view of
life is here presented to us in which happiness coin
cides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty
and reason. There is neither any good independently
of virtue, nor is there in virtue and for virtue any
evil.
(2) The '
The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordi*evU
naiy distinction, sanctioned by popular opinion and
the majority of philosophers, between various kinds
and degrees of good ; nor would they allow bodily
advantages and external circumstances to be in
cluded among good things, together with mental
and moral qualities. A certain difference between
goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds
are mentioned by them in their formal division
of goods.3 But these differences amount, in the
1 Sext. 1. c. Stob. ii. 188 :
fafitva <pav\ov pA)re ><l>e\eia6tu
lUTjrj ixptAtiv. ehat yap rb a<peXeiK fox61" KaT' 4(><TVi Kal rb
avcKtiadat KivtiaBai kot' apeTtiv.
Ibid. ii. 202 ; Plut. Sto. Eep.
12; Com. Not. 20,1; Cic. Off.
ii. 3, 10 ; iii. 3, 11 ; 7, 34.
2 M. Aurel. ix. 16.
8 See Diog. 94 ; Stob. ii. 96 ;
124 ; 130 ; 136 ; Sext. Pyrrh.
iii. 169 ; Math. xi. 22 ; Cic. Fin.
iii. 16, 55 ; Sen. Ep. 66, 5.
Good is here defined to be
either a<p4\eia or ovx irepov a<peXelos (inseparably connected
with a<pe\aa, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is

connected with virtue, which
is a part of himself. See Sextus L c. and above p. 104, 2),
or, what is the same thing,
apei-i) fi rb êrexov opTijs. {Sext.
Math. xi. 184.) A distinction
is drawn between three kinds of
good : rb i<p' oZ fi a<p' ov ianv
ii$*\<TiaQai, rb naff % (rvfifiutvci
ixpeKet^Bai, rb 616v re a<pt\ttr.
Under the first head comes virtue, under the second virtuous
actions, under the third, besides the two others, virtuous
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods
are good and useful in themselves, others are only
subsidiary to them. The existence of several equally
primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at va
riance with the conception of the good. That only
is a good, according to their view, which has an un
conditional value. That which has a value only in
comparison with something else, or as leading to
something else, does not deserve to be called a good.
The difference between what is good and what is
not good is not only a difference of degree, but also
one of kind ; and what is not a good per se can never
subjectsmen, Gods, and de
mons. A second division of
goods (JDiog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.)
is into goods of the soul, ex
ternal goods, the possession of
virtuous friends and a virtuous
country, and such as are neither
(rb avrbv eavrtp elvai (nrovZatov
Kal (iSal/iova, virtue and happi
ness considered as the relation
of the individual to himself, as
his own possessions). Goods
of the soul are then divided
into SiaOtVeij (virtues), i'feir (or
îrtT^SeujuaTo, as instances of
which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes
pwruH) and <piKoye(i>ixeTpia, &c;
these are not so unchangeable
as peculiarities of character,
arid are therefore only
p.
103, 1), and those which are
neither t%tis nor SiiBtaeisac
tions themselves. A third divi
sion of goods (Diog., Cic. 1. c,
Stob. 80, 100, 1 14) distinguishes
TfAi/cci or 5i' avra cupsTb (moral
actions), ttohjti/co (friends and
the services they render), tAiko
and ironjTiKa (virtues them
selves) ; fourthly and fifthly,

|Uikt& (as cvTOcvia and evyripia),
and a7rAa or &/i<KTa (such as
science), and the ae! wap6vra
(virtues), and ovk iel vapStira
(olov xaP&> irtpixdniffis'). The
corresponding divisions of evil
are given by Diogenes and Stobaeus. The latter (ii. 126 and
136) enumerates, in addition,
the aya6a iv KiWjffti (x<<k> &c.)
and (v crxeirei (eoVaxTos riavx'a,
Sec), the latter being partially
iv {ei ; the d-yaflct ko.8' iamk (vir
tues) and irp&s t( itoj i\0VTa.
(honour, benevolence, friend
ship) ; the goods which are
necessary for happiness (vir
tues), and those which are
not necessary (xaf>*> invnfitijuaTa). Seneca's list is far more
limited, although it professes
to be more general. He men
tions, prima bona, tanquam
gaudium, pax, salus patriae ;
secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tanquam tormentorum
patientia ; tertia, tanquam modestus incessus.
231
232
Chap*
X.
THE STOICS.
be a good under any circumstances.1 The same re
marks apply to evil. That which is not in itself
an evil can never become so from its relation to
something else. Hence only that which is absolutely
good, or virtue, can be considered a good ; and only
that which is absolutely bad, or vice,3 can be con
sidered an evil. All other things, however great
their influence may be on our state, belong to a class
of things neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or
aBcdcfiopa.3 Neither health, nor riches, nor honour,
not even life itself, is a good ; and just as little are
the opposite statespoverty, sickness, disgrace, and
deathevils.4 Both are in themselves indifferent,
1 Cie. Fin. iii. 10, 33 : Ego
assentior Diogeni, qui bonum
definierit id quod esset natura
absolutum [airort^fs] . . . hoc
autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum
ceteris comparando sed propria
vi et sentimus et appellamus
bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis, dulce esse
sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo
agimus est illud quidemplurimi
aastimandum, sed ea aBstimatio
genere valet non magnitudine,
&c.
2 Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1 : Nec
malum esse ullum nisi turpe,
nec bonum nisi honestum.
Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88 :
7i fiiv aperii re Ktd r] ncucla fi6vai
KaT* aiiTovs tj phv ayaOhv rj 5k
Kcxiv. See p. 229 ; 233, 1.
3 Sext. Math. xi. 61, after
giving two irrelevant defini
tions of abiaQopov : Kara rpWov
5k Kal TeKtvratov rpdirov tpatrlv

aSidcpopov rb f*f}T npb? eiiSatfiovlau
frfire trpbs KaKo5aip.oviav avWap.fraviiifvov. To this category be
long external goods, health,
&C. $ yap etTTlv e5 teal Kanws
XPV<r8ai, tout' av 1tj a5id<popov
5ia iratnbs 5' aptrrj fikv kukws,
Kaicta Sk kikw?, vyttia 5k Kal rots
wtpl ffd>pMTi iroTf [iky e5 irork 5k
kok&s (on xpyvfa'- Similarly,
Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102,
who defines oiSeVepa as i<ra fir)*'
u<pe\ei fiiirf /3A(irTi. Stoi. ii.
142: a5ia<popov=^7b p.r)re ayaBbv
[i-fire Kcucbv, Kal rb fir)re alper6v
p.r)Te <pevKr6v. Plut. Sto. Rep.
31, 1 : $ yap tariv e3 xpâaa6ai
Kal KaKws rovr6 (paxri fi^T* ayadbv
tlvai fx^re kok6v.
4 Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9)
proves this of death by a pro
cess of reasoning, the accuracy
of which he appears to have
mistrusted : Nullum malum
gloriosum est : mors autem
gloriosa est (there is a glorious
THE. HIGHEST GOOD.
233
a material which may either be employed for good Chap.

or else for evil.1
_ X.
The Academicians and Peripatetics were most
vigorously attacked by the Stoics for including
among goods external things which are dependent
on chance. For how can that be a good under any
circumstances, which bears no relation to man's
moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at the
cost of morality ? 8 If virtue renders a man happy, /
death) : ergo mors non est ma
lum. In general, two considera
tions are prominent in the
Btoic treatment of this subject :
that what is according to nature
cannot be an evil, and that
life taken by itself is not a good.
Other arguments, however, for
diminishing the fear of death
are not despised. See Sen. Ep.
30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad.
Marc. 19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3;
viii. 58. And other passages
quoted in Baumliauer't Vet.
Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.
1 Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto.
Eep. 15, 4) : All virtue is done
away with, ttv t) ri)v riiov^v fi tV
iryitiav tj Tt tuv aWuiv, t fx$i kcl\6v
ioTiv, aya&bv airoKliTUHtv. Id.
(in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2) : iv t
Kar* apT^v fiiovv fi&vov iarl rh
cv$aip6vwst tuv &\\wv ouShv in/row
irphs ij/xas ovd' fit tocto avvepyovvtwii. Similarly, Sto. Kep. 17,
2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3 : The only
good is honestas, the only evil
turpitudo, cetera vilis turba
rerum, nec detrahens quicquam
beata? vitae nec adjiciens. Id.
Ep. 66, 14 : There is no differ
ence between the wise man's
joy and the firmness with which
he endures pains, quantum ad

ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter
ilia, in quibus virtus utraque
ostenditur . . . virtutem ma
teria non mutat. Ep. 71, 21 :
Bona ista aut mala non efficit
materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85,
39 : Tu ilium [sapientem] premi
putas malis ? (Jtitur. Id. Ep.
44 ; 120, 3 ; Plut. C. Not. 4, 1 ;
Sto. Rep. 18, 5 ; 31, 1 ; Chrys
ippus, in Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 12,
2 ; Diog. 102 ; Stob. ii. 90 ; Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 181 ; Alex. Aplir.
Top. 43 and 107.
2 Sext. Math. xi. 61. See
above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103 :
The good can only do good,
and never do harm ; oi /uaA&ov
8' <&4>EAt
$\dirTct 6 irhovros
Kal rj vylfla' oiiK ap' ayadbv
otire irKovros oVff iyleia. Again:
$ ttrnv e$ Kal KaKws %pri<r6ai,
tovt oiiK %ffTiv aya66v vKovrtp
Se al vyiilq tffriv eS Kal Kaxas
Xpy<r9ai, k.t.\. In Sen. Ep. 87,
11, instead of the proposition,
that nothing is a good except
virtue, the following arguments
are given as traditional among
the Stoics (interrogationes nostrorum), apparently taken from
Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38) :
(1) Quod bonum est, bonos
THE STOICS.
it must render him perfectly happy in himself, since
no one can be happy who is not happy altogether.
Were anything which is not in man's power al
lowed to influence his happiness, it would detract
from the absolute worth of virtue, and man would
never be able to attain to that imperturbable se
renity of mind without which no happiness is con
ceivable.1
facit : fortuita bonum non faciunt : ergo non sunt bona.
(Similarly in M. Av/rel. ii. 11,
iv. 8 : Whatever does no moral
harm, does no harm to human
life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est ;
opes autem et lenoni et lanistee
contingunt : ergo, &c. (So, too,
Marc. Awelius, v. 10.) (3)
Bonum ex malo non fit : divitiae
Hunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia :
ergo, &c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr.
Top. 107 : rb Sici kukov yiyvifjLtvov ovk %<T7lv ayaQ6v nhovros
5e koI 5iot icopvofroanias kcucov
&vTos yiverat, k.t.\.) (4) Quod
dum consequi volumus iu multa
mala incidimus, id bonum non
est : dum divitias autem conse
qui volumus, in multa mala in
cidimus, &c. (5) QuEe neque
magnitudinem animo dant nec
tiduciam nec securitatem, contraauteminsolentiam,tumorem,
arrogantiam creant, mala sunt :
a fortuitis autem (previously,
not only riches but health had
been included in this class) in
ha?c impellimur : ergo non sunt
bona. That riches are not a
good is proved by Diogenes (in
Vic. Fin. iii. 15, 49) ; that po
verty and pain are no evils is
proved by the argument, quoted

in Sen. Bp. 85, 30 : Quod ma
lum est nocet : quod nocet deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt :
ergo mala non sunt. The Stoic
proposition is also established
from a theological point of view.
Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11,
ix. 1, could never have allowed
that good and evil should
equally fall to the lot of the
good and the bad ; consequently,
what both enjoy equallylife
and death, honour and dis
honour, pleasure and trouble,
riches and povertycan neither
be good nor evil. On the value
of fame, see id. iv. 19.
1 This view is compared
with the Academician in Cic.
Tusc. v. 13, 39 ; 18, 51 ; Sen.
Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In
the last passage, the notion that
happiness can be increased by
external goods, and is conse
quently capable of degrees, is
refuteTr-by arguments such as
4, 24 : Quid potest desiderare
is, cui omnia honesta contin
gunt ? . . . et quid stultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis
animi ex irrationalibus nectere?
. . . non intenditur virtus, ergo
ne beata quidem vita, quae ex
THE HIGHEST GOOD.
235
Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, Chap.

X.
or be regarded, as it was by Epicurus, as the
ultimate and highest object in life. He who places (3) PUapleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue ;
he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real
conception of the good and the peculiar value of
virtue ; 2 he appeals to feelings, rather than to
actions ; 3 he requires reasonable creatures to purvirtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7:
Cui aliquid accedere potest, id
imperfectum est.
1 Cleanthes expands this no
tion, in rhetorical language, in
Cic. Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen.
Benef. iv. 2, 2 : [Virtus] non
est virtus si sequi potest.
Primse partes ejus sunt : ducere
debet, imperare, summo loco
stare : tu illam jubes signum
petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2;
13, 6 ; 14, 1.
* Compare on this subject
the words of Chrysippus on
p. 233, 1, quoted by Flat. Sto.
Kep. 16, and, for their ex
planation, Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4 :
Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod
omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et
hostis et longissime ab ilia
resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1 :
Pars honesti non potest esse
nisi honestum, nec summum
bonum habebit sinceritatem
suam, si aliquid in se viderit
dissimile meliori. According
to JPlut. 15, 3 ; 13, 3, Com. Not.
25, 2, this statement of Chry
sippus is at variance with
another statement of his, in
which he says : If pleasure be
declared to be a good, but not
the highest good, justice (the

Peripatetic view) might per
haps still be safe, since, in
comparison with pleasure, it
may be regarded as the higher
good. Still, this was only a
preliminary and tentative con
cession, which Chrysippus sub
sequently proved could not be
admitted, inasmuch as it was
out of harmony with the true
conception of the good, and
changed the difference in kind
(on which see p. 232, 1) be
tween virtue and other things
into a simple difference in
degree. Plutarch (Bto. Rep. 15,
6), with more reason, blames
Chrysippus for asserting against
Aristotle that, if pleasure be
regarded as the highest good,
justice becomes impossible, but
not other virtues ; for how
could a Stoic, of all philo
sophers, make such a distinc
tion between virtues ? Evi
dently the zeal of controversy
has here carried away the
philosopher beyond the point
at which his own principles
would bear him out.
3 M. Aurel. vi. 15 : 4 jutx
<t>i\6$oos aWorplay ivipyuav
ISiov i,yaGbv faoXapfi&vti d 5c
tptKffiuyos ISiav ntiotv i Si vovv
28Q
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
sue what is unreasonable, and souls nearly allied
to God to go after the enjoyments of the lower ani
mals.1 Pleasure must never be the object of pur
suit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is
invariably involved in virtue. That it no doubt is.2
It is true that there is always a peculiar satisfaction,
and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of mind, in moral
conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack
of inward peace ; and in this sense it may be said
that the wise man alone knows what true and lasting
pleasure is.3 But even the pleasure afforded by
moral excellence ought never to be an object, but
only a natural consequence, of virtuous conduct ;
otherwise the independent value of virtue is im
paired.4
'Slav irp|ii/. Conf. ix. 16 :
* Diog. 94 : Virtue is a
ouk f 7ret(Tei,a\X' eyepyeta, t2> tou good ; 4iriyevvlifxaTa 5e r^v T
\oylKOv iroXiTiKOv (fSou Kakbv Kal Xapav Kal tV eutppaavvriv Kal t&
vap<nr\i)(jia. Sen. Benef. iv. 2,
aya&6y.
1 Sen. Ep. 92, 6-10; Vit. 3 : It is a question utrum virtus
Beat. 5, 4 ; 9, 4 ; Posidonius, in summi boni causa sit, an ipsa
summum bonum. Seneca, of
Sen. Bp. 92, 10.
2 Taking the expression in course, says the latter. Conf.
its strict meaning, it is hardly- De Vit. Be. 4, 5 : The wise man
allowed by the Stoics, when takes pleasure in peace of mind
they speak accurately. Under and cheerfulness, non ut bonis,
standing by nSovh an emotion, sed ut ex bono suo ortis. Ibid.
i.e. something contrary to na 9, 1 : Non, si voluptatem prseture and blameworthy, they statura virtus est, ideo propter
assert that the wise man feels hanc petitur . . . voluptas non
delight (xaPK gaudium), but est merces nec causa virtutis,
not pleasure (ijSov^, lsetitia, vo- sed accessio, nec quia delectat
luptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2 ; placet, sed si placet et delectat.
Diog. 116 ; AUx.Aphr. Top. 96; The highest good consists only
the last-named giving defi in mental perfection and health,
nitions of xaP^> ytoy)), repifiis, in ipso judicio et habitu optXHppoffivT).
timse mentis, in the sanitas et
3 Sen. Ep. 23, 2 ; 27, 3 ; libertas animi, which desires
59, 2 ; 14 ; 72, 8 ; Vit. Be. 3, 4 ; nothing but virtue ; ipsa pretium sui. Ibid. 15, 2 : IJe
4, 4 ; De Ira, ii. 6, 2.
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with
virtue, as a part of the highest good, or be declared
to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure and virtue
are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be
immoral, and moral conduct may go hand in hand
with difficulties and pains. Pleasure is found among
the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good ;
virtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable ; pleasure
is grovelling, effeminate, fleeting. Those who look
upon pleasure as a good are its slaves ; those in
whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and
hold it in check.1 In no sense can pleasure be
allowed to weigh in a question of morals ; seeing
it is not an end-in-itself, but only the result of
an action ; 2 not a good, but something absolutely
indifferent. The only point on which the Stoics
are not unanimous is, whether every pleasure is
contrary to nature,3 as the stern Cleanthes, in the
gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum sit,
absoluti tamen boni pars est,
non magis quam lsetitia et
' tranquillitas . . . sunt enim
ista bona, fed consequentia
summum bonum, non consummantia. Here, too. belongs
the statement in Stob. ii. 184,
188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74):
n6.mil rbv bvrivovv wtpeKuTiyra
Y<T7)V atpeKetav airo\afifidyfif nap
avrb touto, for the reasons
stated, p. 230, 1.
1 Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and
10-12 ; M. Aurel. viii. 10.
Among the Stoic arguments
aeainst identifying pleasure
and pain with good and evil,
may be placed the inference in

Clem. Strom, iv. 483, c, which
bears great similarity to the
third argument, quoted on
p. 233, 2 : If thirst be painful,
and it be pleasant to quench
thirst, thirst must be the cause
of thispleasure: ayadovie von\rixbv rb Ktuchv ovk hv yevono, k.t.X.
2 Diog. 85: * Si \4yov<rt
Tiyes, irpbs Tjfiovfy' yiyvfcQai r^jy
vp'Jnvv 6pfx)]V rots $ots, t//eu5os
awoibaiyovtriy. imyevi>7ifi.a yap
<pa<rtv, ci &pa iirrly, T)$or)iv e?r<ai,
Srav avrfi KaB' avT^v fi (piiris
&rif>jT^<ra<ra to. iyapfi6(ovra T>j
ava-riad airo\d$rt.
3 Taking pleasure in its
widest sense. In its more re-
237
Chap.
_J
238
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is
_ such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure.1
Virtue, on the other hand, needs no extraneous ad
ditions, but contains in itself all the conditions of
happiness.8 The reward of virtuous conduct, like
Uie punishment of wickedness, consists only in the
_ character of those actions, one being according to
nature, the other contrary to nature.3 And so un
conditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue,4 that the
stricter! sense, they reject fitiorfi,
understanding thereby a par
ticular emotion. See p. 236, 2.
1 Sext. Math. xi. 73 : rhv
TjSovhv d pjkv 'Eirfoovpos aya&bv
rival <pi)<riv d Si eIviiv 1 /xavelijv
na\\oi> fi fitrSflvv ' (Antisthenes)
kokSv ' oi Si airb ttjs <xtoSs aSidtpopov kcl\ ofi irpoiYy^vov. aWa
K\eaV0rjj ixiv /u^re Kara <j>iaai
avriiv that fifre alav txtiv
avrhv iv t jSfqj, iraddwtp Si rh
ndWvvrpov Kara Qiitstv v-h thai '
6 Si 'Apxe'Sijjuos Kara tpvtriv /jtiv
that &s t&s iv nturx^V TP'XaJi
ovxl 8i Kal alav %yttv. Tlava'trtos
Si rtva piv Kara tptifftv inrdpxtiv
rtva Si icapa <p{t<rtv.
* Accordingly, it is also de
fined to be Ttxvri tvSatfioviasiroiT}tikA. Alex. ApTir. De An. 156, b.
' Diotf. 89 : rilv t' aptr^v
SidBtatv final 6/io\oyovnevrtv Kal
avrrjv 5t' avrfyv that atptrijv, ov
Std rtva tbo&ov ti iXirtSa % ri rwv
fu>9ev ' iv outt? t' that r\v tvSatfiovlav, St' ofiirp [-tjs] tytxV [-'J*]
irtvotvfiivr] \-ns~\ trpbs 6/jtokoylav
vavrbs rov j}iov. Sen. De Clem. i.
1, 1 : Quamvis enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec
ullum virtutum pretium dignum
illis extra ipsas sit. Td. Ep.
81,19. Ep. 94, 19 : Êquitatem
per se expetendam nec metu

nos ad illam cogi nec mercede
conduci. Non esse justum cui
quicquam in hac virtute placet
prseter ipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24 :
Maximum scelerum supplicium
in ipsis est. Benef. iv 12:
Quid reddat beneficium ? die tu
mihi, quid reddat ju9titia, &c. ;
si quicquam prseter ipsas, ipsas
non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42 :
rl yap ir\4ov OiXtts tZ vpifoas &v~
Bpwnov ; ovk aptcij roirtp, Sri Kara
tpvtriv r$]v trfjv rt &rpaay, aWa
roirov iiiaibv (tfrtts ; When man
does good, irtwoli)Kf trpbs i KareffKtiairrai Kal %xfl T^ tavrov. Id.
vii. 73 ; viii. 2. See pp. 230, 1 ;
236, 4.
4 JHog. vii. 127 : alrdpKri
that r)]V aperV irpbs tvSatfioviav.
Cic. Parad. 2 ; Sen. Ep. 74, 1 :
Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est.
This avrdpKtta is even asserted
of individual virtues, by virtue
of the connection between
them all. Of Qpivritris, for in
stance, in Sen. Ep. 85, 2, it is
said : Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans, est
et constans. Qui constans est,
imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia
THE HIGHEST GOOD.
230
happiness which it affords is not increased by length Chap.

of time.1 Rational self-control is here recognised asj^
the only good ; thereby man makes himself indepen
dent of all external circumstances, absolutely free,
and inwardly satisfied.2
The happiness of the virtuous manand this is Y4) Kegaa very marked feature in Stoicismis thus more l%artel"of
negative than positive. It consists in independence /happiness.
and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment
which moral conduct brings with it. J In mental
disquietudesays Cicero, speaking as a Stoic
consists misery ; in composure, happiness. How can he ;
be deficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage I
preserves from care and fear, and self-control guards
from passionate pleasure and desire ? 3 How can he
fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way depen
dent on fortune, but simply and solely on himself?4
To be free from disquietude, says Seneca, is the
est. Qui sine tristitia est,beatus
est. Ergo prudens est beatus,
et prudentia ad vitam beatam
satis est. Similarly in respect
of bravery (ibid. 24). This
avrdpKtia of virtue was natu
rally a chief point of attack for
an opponent. It is assailed by
Alex. Apkr. De An. 156, on the
ground that neither the things
which the Stoics declare to be
natural and desirable (wpoTryfitva), nor, on the other hand,
the natural conditions of vir
tuous action, can be without
effect on happiness, and that it
will not do to speak of the
latter as only negative con
ditions (v oiik Snu). See Plut.
C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.
1 Pint. Sto. Rep. 26; C.

Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is
charged with at one time deny
ing that happiness is aug
mented by length of time, and
at another declaring momen
tary wisdom and happiness to
be worthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14,
45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6;
Benef. v. 17, 6; M. Aurel. xii.
35. The Stoics are, on this
point, at variance with Aris
totle.
2 This view is frequently
expressed by the Stoics of the
Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs
will be found subsequently.
s Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14,42.
1 Parad. 2.
240
Chap.
X.
(5) The
highest
good as
lam. .
THE STOICS
peculiar privilege of the wise ; 1 the advantage which
is gained from philosophy is, that of living without
fear, and rising superior to the troubles of life.2 Far
more emphatical than any isolated expressions is the
support which this negative view of moral aims de
rives from the whole character of the Stoic ethics,
the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise man
sufficiently proving that freedom from disturbances,
an unconditional assurance, and self-dependence, are
the points on which these philosophers lay especial
value.
The Good, in as far as it is based on the general
arrangement of the world, to which the individual is
subordinate, appears to man in the character of Law.
Law being, however, the law of man's own nature,
the Good becomes the natural object of man's de
sire, and meets his natural impulse. | The' concep
tion of the Good as law was a view never unfamiliar
to moral philosophy, but it was cultivated by the
Stoics with peculiar zeal ; 3 and forms one of the points
on which Stoicism subsequently came into contact,"
partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the ethics
of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics
considered that the Reason which governs the world
1 De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18:
Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fiece in illud evadiruus
sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis
erroribus absoliita libertas.
Qnaris, qua? sit ista? Non
homines timere, non Deos. Nec
tnrpia voile nec nimia. In se
ipsum habere maximam po-
testatem : inasstimabile bonum

est, suum fieri.
2 Ep. 29, 12: Quid ereo
. . . philosophia praistabit 1
Scilicet ut malis tibi placere,
quam populo, . . . ut sine metu
Deorum hominumque vivas, ut
aut vinoas mala aut finias.
3 See Krische, Forschungen,
368 and 475.
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

is the general Law of all beings,1 so they recognised
Tn the moral demands of reason the positive and
negative aspects_of _the Law of God. 2J Human lav
comes into existence when man becomes aware of
the-divine law, and recognises its claims on him.3
Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands aBsolutely imperative on every rational being^yNo man
can feel himself to be a rational being without at
"the same time feeling himself pledged to be moral.''
1 See p. 148, 2.
2 v6/ios, according to the
Stoic definition (Stob. Eel. ii.
190, 204 ; Floril. 44, 12, and in
the fragment of Chrysippus
quoted by Martian in Digest,
i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of
Htrmogenes in Spengel Sway.
tcxv- 177, Kriiche, Forsch. 475)
= Koyos opObs TrpoaraKTlKb? fxey
rwv TTOtrjTewv, cnrayopeuTiKbs 5e ray
ob TroiTjTtap. It is therefore <nroudaiiv ti or &<TTt!uv, something of
moral value, imposing duties
on man. The ultimate source
of this \6yos must be looked
for in the \6yos tcowbs, the
divine or world reason. The
general law is, according to
Diog. vii. 88 (who here, ac
cording to the passage quoted
from Cic. N. D. i. 15, 40 on p.
148, 2, is apparently following
Chrysippus) = 6 opObs \6yos S.a
it&vtwv ipx6f*ws, b avrbs &v rep
Ait It is the ratio suuima
insita in natura, quae jubet ea
quEe f'acienda sunt, prohibetque
contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18,
conf. the quotation from Cic.
N. D. i. 14, 36, respecting Zeus,
on p. 150). According to Cic.
Legg. ii. 4, 8 and 10, it is no
human creation sed teternum

quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapiemia, the mens
omnia ratione aut cogentis aut
vetantis Dei, the ratio recta
summi Jovis (conf. Fin. iv. 5,
11, in the fragment in Lact.
Inst. v. 8). It is accordingly,
as Chrysippus 1. c. says in the
words of Pindar {Plato, Georg.
484, B), irdvroiv fia<rt\tvs deioiv T
Kut avdponrUwv -npayp.6.Ttt)V.
3 Cic. Legg. i. (i, 18 ; ii. 4, 8 ;
5, 11.
4 Or as Stob. ii. 184, ex
presses it, Sltaioi' is (pvffct Kol p.rj
06(761.
5 This is proved by Cic.
Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chainargument clearly borrowed
from the Stoics : Quibus ratio
a natura data est, iisdem etiam
recta ratio data est. Ergo et
lex, quae est recta ratio in
jubendo et vetando. Si lex,
jus quoque. At omnibus ratio.
Jus igitur datum est omnibus.
Upon this conception of law is
based the Stoic definition of
Ka.T6p8wp.ci. as ivv6pirina., that of
OjUopTtyua as a.idpiyip.a.
242
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
Obedience to this law is imposed upon man, not
only by external authority, but by virtue of his own
nature. The good is for him that which deserves to
be pursuedthe natural object of man's will ; on the
other hand, evil is that against which his will_rej;
volts.1 The former arouses his desire (opfirj), the lat
ter his aversion (a<$>op[Lrj) : 2 and thus the demands of
1 The good alone, or virtue,
is aiperdy ; evil is <pevKr6y. See
p. 229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob.
Eel. ii. 202. aiptrbv is, how
ever, Ibid. 126, 132, % uipetrm
(H\oyov nivu, or, more accu
rately, 7b bppS\s avTore\ovs ttivntik&v ; and atpirby is accordingly
distinguished from A?jin<(f
aiperbv being what is morally
good, Atjiit!)!' being every, hing
which has value, including ex
ternal goods. The Stoics make
a furl her distinction (according
to Slob. ii. 140 and 194) with
unnecessary subtlety between
aipfbr and aiper4oy, and simi
larly between bpticrbv and bptttreov, vnop.tverbv and iiicop.zveTeov\
using t lie first form to express
the good in itself (for instance,
tpp6vi)jis), the latter to express
the possession of the good (fi<r
instance, (ppotuv}.
* <Sp/u)j is defined by Stob. ii.
1G0, as <popa \pvxv^^î Ti' o.<pop^,
which is contrasted therewith
in Uj/ict. Knchirid. 1, 2 Diss. iii.
2, 2, 22, 36, as (according to the
most probable correction of the
text) ipopa Siavo'ia? atr6 rivos. See
p. 243, 8, A further distinction
(connecting herewith what may
be otherwise gathered from the
statements of Stobpeus respect
ing the Stoic doctrine of im
pulses) is made between the
impulses of reasonable beings

and beings devoid of reason.
It is only in the case of reason
able beings that it can be said
that impulse is called forth by
the idea of a thing as some
thing which has to be do> e
(<pa.ma.ffia Apnr]TtKij rov KaQ-nnSvroi) ; that every impulse con
tains an affirmative judgment
in itself (<ru7icaT<0e<nj), to
which has been superadded a
Kivr\Ttn6v ffvyKaTd$erfis apply
ing to particular propositions
(those in which truth and
falsehood consist. Seep. 110,3;
83, 2), whereas Spp.ii applies to
KaTT)7op4uaTa (i.e. activities ex
pressed by verbs. See p. 95,
1 and 2), since every impulse
and every desire aims at the
possession of a good. ' Opuh.
\oyiKri is defined to be </>opo
otavolas 4trl ti twi' iy TiZ irpdrretv,
and is also called 6pp.ii irpaKTiic))
(only a rational being being
capable of irpajis). Jf the rpoph
Siavoias refers to something
future, the 6pfiii becomes an
pis, for which the text twice
reads Ipovtris. Among the va
rieties of Spfii) lrpaKTiiai, Stob.
enumerates irp69iats, iwi&oXy,
TrapafTKew], iyxeipqffts, aipe/m,
irp6Btais, j3ouAtj(tii, 64\T]ffis, the
definitions of which he gives,
passing then to the doctrine of
EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

morality are called forth by the natural impulse
of a reasonable being, and are, at the same time,
also the object towards which that impulse is na
turally directed.1
However simple this state of things may be to
a purely rational being, it must be remembered that
man is not purely rational.2 He has, therefore, ir
rational as well as rational impulses.3 He is not
emotions, these being also a
kind of fip/i-h. It appears, there
fore, that activities of feeling
and will are included in the
conception of ip^, as will be
subsequently seen more fully in
the doctrine of emotions, the
conception of which likewise
includes both.
1 Stob. ii. 116, similarly
108 : TracTas yap avQp&irovs
atpoppas %x*ty 4k (pixnus irpbs
aper^y Kat oiove'l rb [1. T^y] tSiv
7]fiiafififialuy \6yov %Xetl/ K*Tcfc rbv
K\coli>0jiv, '69ev aTeAets [xev Sifras
clvat tpavKovs, TeAeitoflej/Tas Se
<T7roi/8aious. Dwg. 89, see p. 238,
3 : The soul rests on the
harmony of life with itself
(virtue); extraneous influences
corrupt it, tire! fi <pv<ris a<pnpp.as
SiSwatv aZta<TTp6<povs. Sen. Ep.
108, 8 : Facile est auditorem
concitare ad cupiditatem recti :
omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.
2 The one point, according
to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which
distinguishes man from God
is, that God is absolutely
rational and by nature good
and wise.
' Chrysippus (in Galen. De
Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v.
368 Kuhn): -rb \oyucbv ('?ov

aKoKovOrjTiKbv <pvaci 4<nlTcp \6yai
Kal Kara tov \6yov a>s av 7]y^fi6va
npatrik6v ' ttoW&kis jisvtoi Hal
fiAAwy <p4perat 4iri Tiva koX air6
tivwv (for so we must punctuate,
the reference being to ip/j.ii
and cupop/iî, according to the
definition, p. 242, 2) iwrfiflais t#
\6y(p w&ovp.evov 4irl ir\tiov, k.t.A.
From this, it appears that
Chrysippus' definition of dp^
(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = to0
av&pdmov \6yos TrpocraKriKbs
aiT(p tov iroieiv} must not be
understood (as in Baum/tauer's
Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte
voluntaria, p. 74) to imply
that man has only rational,
and no irrational impulses.
Chrysippus, in the passage
quoted, must either be referring
to that impulse which is pecu
liar to man, and is according
to his nature ; or else \6yos
must be taken in its more ex
tended meaning of notion or
idea, for all impulses are based
on judgments, see p. 242, 2 ;
and it is clear, from Cic. Fin.
iii. 7, 23 (' as our limbs are
given to us for a definite pur
pose, so 6p^ is given for some
definite object, and not for
every kind of use'), that ip/ii)
e2
243
Chap.
X.
B. Emo
tions and
virtue.
(1) The
emotions.
(a) Tlieir
nature.
244
Chap,
X.
THE STOICS.
originally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by
overcoming his emotions. Emotion or passion 1 is
a movement of mind contrary to reason and nature,
an impulse transgressing the right mean.2 The^
Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with nature, was flatly dgnjed by the
.Stoics.3 The seat of the emotionsand, indeed, of
all impulses and every activity of the soul 4is
man's reason, the i)js/xovikop.5 Emotion is that state
of the rjjsfioviKov in which it is hurried into what is
contrary to nature by excess of impulse. Like virtue,
emotion is due to a change taking place simultais not in itself rational, but
first becomes rational by the
direction given to it by man.
1 The term emotion is used
to express irdSos, although the
terms of modern psychology
are moie or less inadequate to
express the ancient ideas, as
Cic. Kin. iii. 10, 35, already
observed.
1 D'wg. vii. 110: ori Sc avrb
rb TrdQos Kara TA\vuiva. tj &\uyos
kgu napa (pvaiv ^VXT}S KIVT](TIS ^
bpu.)} ir\ovd(ov(ra. The same
definitions are found in Stob. ii.
36, 166, with this difference,
that &irei0}js ra> alpovvri \6ytfi
stands in place of &\oyos, as in
Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic. Tusc.
iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47;
Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp,
et Plat. iv. 2, 4 ; v. 2, 4, vol. v
368, 385, 432, 458 Kiihn, and
Id. in Pint. Virt. Mor. 10,
Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12.
A similar definition is attri
buted to Aristotle by Stob. ii.
3fi, but it is no longer to be
found in his extant writings.
If it was in one of the lost

books (Heeren suggests in the
treatise irepl traBiav opyrjs D'wg.
v. 23), was that book genuine ?
3 Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39 : Cumque eas perturbationes [ira07)]
antiqui naturales esse dicerent
et rationis expertes aliaque in
parte animi cupiditatem, alia
rationem collocarent, ne his
quidem assentiebatur [Zeno].
Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque judicio suscipi, et omnium
perturbationum arbitrabatur
esse matrem immoderatam
quandam intemperantiam. Fin.
iii. 10, 35 : Nec vero perturba
tiones animorum . . . vi aliqua
naturali moventur. Tusc. iv.
28, 60 : Ipsas perturbationes
per se esse vitiosas nec habere
quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium.
4 See p. 215, 3 ; 242, 2.
4 Chrysippus, in Galen, iii.
7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476,
and above, p. 215, 3.
EMOTIONS AN!) VIRTUE.

neously, not to the effect of a separate extraneous
force.1 Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into
being, as it does impdse in general.2 All emotions
arise from faults in judgment, from false notions
of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so
many words, judgments or opinions ; 3avarice, for
instance, is a wrong opinion as to the value of money,4
fear is a wrong opinion as regards future, trouble as
regards present ills.5 Still, as appears from the
general view of the Stoics respecting impulses,6 this
language does not imply that emotion is only a theo
retical condition. On the contrary, the effects of a
faulty imaginationthe feelings and motions of will,
to which it gives riseare expressly included in its
1 Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441
(the first part of this passage
has been already quoted, p. 215,
3, the continuation being)
K4ye<r9ai 5e [rb riycuoviKbi']
&\oyoy, otov
ir\tovdovTi tt}s
tpixris igxvP$ yeyo/x.4v(ft Kal KpaT-i)aavTi irp6s ti tSjv ardirwv napa
rbv alpovtrra \6yov 4Kfp4ptjTai'
K3.1 yap rb irddos, k.t.A. See
below, note 3.
2 See p. 242, 2.
3 Diog. vii. Ill: SoiceT 8'
avroh ra iraSr] Kpiceis tlvai, Kadd
fpqat Xpv(mrKos 4v irepl iraQwv.
Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441:
rb irddos eJvaL K6yov TroVf\pbv Kal
a.K6\a<TTOV 4k <pav\ris Kal SirinapTrifx4vT]S Kptaews <Tfpo^p6rt)Ta Kal
pa/ATli* TrpoaKa$6vra. Stob. ii.
168 : 4irl irdv7a>v Se iwv tt}s
if/uxTjs TraOwy 4irl 5oas aura \4yovaiv efoat [instead of which read
navTitv . . . naSciv fi6as aXrias
\4y. c7v.], Trapa\a[i$dve<r0at [add

54] t^j> 86ai> avrl Trts aadsvovs
viro\ii<fiea>s. Conf. Civ. Tusc.
iv. 7, 14 : Sed omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et
opinione . . . opinationem
autem volunt esse imbecillam
assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24:
Est ergo causa omnis in opi
nione, nec vero asgritudinis
solum sed etiam reliquarum
omnium perturbationum ? Fin.
iii. 10, 35 : Perturbationes
autem nulla naturae vi oommoventur ; omniaque ea sunt
opiniones ac judicia levitatis.
Acad. i. 10, See p. 244, 3.
4 B'wg. 1. c.
5 do. Tusc. iii. 11, 25; iv,
7, 14. Posidon. (in (rale/?,, iv.
7, p. 416) : Chrysippus defined
apprehension (Jatrri) as S<ia
Ttp6rr(paros KaKou irapouo~ias.
6 See p. 242, 1.
245
246
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
conception ; 1 nor is it credible, as Galenus states,2
that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.3 The Stoics, therefore, notwithstanding their
1 Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed
quse judicia quasque opiniones
perturbationum esse dixi, non
in eis perturbationes solum
positas esse dicunt, verum ilia
etiam, quse efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aagritudo quasi
morsum quendam doloris efficiat : metus recessum quen
dam animi et fugam : ltetitia
profusam hilaritatem ; libido
elfrenatamappetentiam. Galen.
Hipp, et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377:
(Zr)vwvi Koi iroWois aXKois tccv
STWiKoV) oi OV T&S KpiffilS OVTOLS
rrjs \pux^s, a\\ct Kal [should
perhaps be struck out], ras eirl
ravrats a\6yovs ffvo~TO\as Kal
1an civ'dtaeis Kal 5efeis [both for
Sei'Jeis, and for A^|eis in the
passage about to be quoted
from Plutarch, Thwrot, Etudes
sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests
S4<reis $i)eis is more probable,
confirmed too by Cicero's morBUS doloris] iwdpatts t Kal
oiaxv&tis imo\afjL^dvovffiy tivai to.
njs ûx^' Trd6i\. Plut. Virt.
Mor. 10, p. 449 : raj inndiriis
tuiv -naBwv Kal ras trtpodpdrqTas oi/
tpatrt yhcaBal Kaia rriv Kplffiv, iv
rb a^.aprtjTiH.bVj aX\a tcls
Xr)*is rj5-êis] Kal ras aruffroXas
Kal rb ~qTTQV ax6ytp 5ex<tytVas.
The same results are involved
in the definitions of emotion
already given, p. 244, 2. In
reference to this pathological
action of representations, one
kind of emotions was defined
(Stob. ii. 170 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7,
14) as 8(f|a Trp6a(paTos, or opinio
recens boni (or mali) prsesentis,
Trp6o-<parov being KivTjTiKby ffuaToXrjs aXAyov 7) inrdpattos.

2 De Hipp, et Plat. v. 1,
p. 429 : Xpvanrnos pXv oZv 4v t<
vpdirep irepl TTaQwv airobtiKtfvvat
ireipaTai, Kplaets Kivas elvai tov
XoyifTTLKOV Ttt Trd07], TA\vu>v 5' oh
ras Kpiffeis aiiTas, aXXa ras iirtyiyvofxivas avrais avaroXas Kal
Awrets, 4irdprTts T Kal ras TTTwffeis
rrjs ^vxrjs ev6fj.iev tlvat ra nddrj.
Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3,
p. 377.
3 Dioff. Ill (see above, p.
245, 3,and the definition quoted
on p. 245, 5) confirms the view
that, in the passage referred to
by Galenus, Chrysippus ex
plained the emotions to be
Kpiffeis. Elsewhere Galenus
asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he
called Aiimj a ixc'iwffis irl tpevKTtp Sokovvti ; r)Sovri, an %napo~is
4<p' alpcrtp ZoKovvrt vTtdpxnv ; and
charges him' (iv. 6, p. 403),
quoting passages in support of
the charge, with deducing
emotions from OToi-la and a<r8evcia \f/vxr)s. That Chrysippus
agreed with Zeno in his defi
nition of emotion, has already
been stated (p. 244, 2). No
doubt, too, with an eye to Chry
sippus, Stobseus also (ii. 166)
defines emotion as nro/a
(violent mental motion), the
words used being naaav irroiav
TrdOos ilvai Kal rrdXiv TrdQos Ttroiav
and, in Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392),
Chrysippus says : oiKefois 5e
t tj> readuiv yfvet artoSiSorai
Kal ri TTTj/a Kara Tb ivfftô^rtfiivov
toOto Kal <j>ep6/ievoy {iKij. Chrys

theory of necessity, did not originally assent to the
Socratic dictum, that no one does wrong voluntarily.1
Younger members of the School may have used the
dictum as an excuse for human faults,2 fearing lest,
in allowing freedom to emotions, they should admit
that they were morally admissible and give up the
possibility of overcoming them.3 Nay more, as all
ippus even repeatedly insists
on the difference between
emotion and errorerror being
due to deficient knowledge,
emotion to opposition to the
claims of reason, to a dis
turbance of the natural relation
of the impulses (tt)i/ <pu<riK7>
ruv bpfxuv ovfifierpiav imep&alveiv).
He shows that both Zeno's de
finitions come to this {Galen.
iv. 2, p. 368, and iv. 4, p. 385 ;
Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere
explains (Plut. Vir. Mor. 10,
p. 450) how emotion takes
away consideration, and im
pels to irrational conduct. The
quotations on p. 246, 1 from
Cicero and Stobseus are an
explanation of positions of
Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is himself the source. And
were he not directly the source,
Galenus (iv. 4, p. 390) observes
that the view of Chrysippus on
the emotions was generally held
in the Stoic School after his
time. In designating the emo
tions Kplaeis, Chrysippus can
not therefore have intended
thereby to exclude the emo
tions of impulse and feeling.
All that he meant was, that
emotions, as they arise in the
individual soul (we should say
as conditions of consciousness),
are called forth by imagina
tion. This is clear from the

fact that the modes in which
the pathological character of
emotions displays itself are
appealed to as evidence. See
his words in Galen, iv. 6,
p. 409.
[1. t6] t yap Bvnqi
<pfpe<r8ai Kal i^ftTT'tjKfvou Kal ou
Top' eavrots ou5' 4v eaurois elvai
Kal iravff oaa rotavra tpavepws
fiapTvpet t$ Kp'itxtts clvai Ta irddij
Kav tjJ XoyiKTi Svvtifxet tt)s ^vxv^
avvi(na(r6ai Kaâirfp *al to ovtus
ixovra. On the other hand,
Zeno never denied the influence
of imagination on emotion, as
is perfectly clear from the ex
pression of Galenus, quoted
pp. 246, 2; 246, 1.
1 Stob. Eel. ii. 190 (Floril.
46, 50): The wise man, accord
ing to the Stoic teaching, exer
cises no indulgence ; for indul
gence would suppose rbv Tijxaprt\K^7a irap' ab-rhv ri/j-apTriKtvai
navTitiV afiapravSifTuv vapa tt]v
iSt'aw KOKiav.
E/netet. Diss. i. 18, 1-7;
28, 1-10; ii. 26; M. Awrel. ii.
1; iv. 3 ; viii. 14 ; xi. 18; xii. 12.
* This motive can be best
gathered from the passages in
Cicero already quoted, p. 244,
3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2,
1 : Anger can do nothing by
itself, but only animo adprobante . . . nam si invitis nobis
24S
Chap
X.
THE STOICS.
that proceeds from the will and impulse is voluntary,1
so too emotions are also in our power ; and it is
for us to say, in the case of convictions out of
which emotions arise, as in the case of every other
conviction,2 whether we will yield or withhold as
sent.3 Just as little would they allow that only
instruction is needed in order to overcome emoions ; for all emotions arise, as they say, from lack
_< self-control,4 and differ from errors in that they
y,< of
assert themselves and oppose our better intelligence.5
How irregular and irrational impulses arise in reason
was a point which the Stoics never made any serious
attempt to explain.
nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus
qui non voluntate nostra fiiuit
invicti et inevitabiles sunt,
&c.
1 See p. 1 79, 3, 4.
- See p. 88, 1.
3 Vic. Acad. i. 10, 39 : Ferturbationes voluntaries esse.
Tuso. iv. 7, 14: Emotions pro
ceed from judgment ; itaqne
eas defininat pressius, ut intellipatur non modo quam vitiosse,
sed etiam quam in nostra sunt
pot estate, upon which follow
the definitions quo1 ed, p. 246,
1.
4 do. Tuec. iv. 9, 22 : Om
nium autem affectionura fontem esse dicunt interuperantiatia (aKpareta), qua; est a tota
mcnte et a recta ratione deft'ctio sic aversaapncscriptione
rationis ut niillo modo adpetitiones anirna nec rcgi nee contiueri queant.
a Stui. Eel. ii. 170, probably
from Chrvsippus, of whom simi

lar remarks were quoted, p. 24H,
8 : itttv yap irdBos fiiatrrtK^v forty,
ws Kal ttoWolkis dpwvras robs iv
rots -ndQea~iv ultras ort (Tufttpipet
r6o ov Troiilv vnb rrjs (TtpoSpoT-nros iKtyepo/xivovs . . . avdyeo~6ai
irpbs rb noielv avrb . . . ndvres
5' oi iv rots TrdQs<rtv 5r a7rorrrpt<povrai rbv \o"yov, ov irapairA.7)<Weos 5e mis i^rinarrifiivots iv
brwovv, aXV iZta^6vru>s. oi
yap t]narr,fi4voi . . . SiSax^^vres
. . . atp'.aravrai rrjs Kulacws' oi
5' iv rots irdQtfftv uvrfs, Kav jua8a>n*i Kav [lerafiitiaxQô-iv, on ov
5ei \vire7(rSai 7) tpo^fitrfai q tiXws
iv rots TTaQsrrtv tivai tt)s >t/vxys.
Sues ovK at:i(Travrat rovroiv aW*
h\yovrat vnb rSjv TraBaiv (Is rb 'fvb
rovroiv KpartiaQai rvpavvtoos. A
different view is taken by
JS/iiotet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who a
pronotoi Medea remarks: ifa-trdr-nrat' 8e7nv aurfj ivapyws, an
|7jir(in)Tai, Kal ov toi^<7j.
249
Emotions being called forth by imagination, Chap.

their character depends on the kind of imagina^1
tion which produces them. Now all impulses are (*) Varie.
tics of
directed to what is good and evil, and consist either emoti,m.
in pursuing what appears to be a good, or in
avoiding what appears to be an evil.1 This good
and this evil is sometimes a present, and some
times a future object. Hence there result four chief
classes of faulty imagination, and, corresponding with
them, four classes of emotions. From an irrational
opinion as to what is good there arises pleasure,
when it refers to things present ; desire, when it re
fers to things future. A faulty opinion of present
evils produces care ; of future evils, fear? Zeno had
already distinguished these four principal varieties
of emotions.3 The same division was adopted by his
pupil Aristo,4 and afterwards became quite general.
Yet the vagueness, already mentioned, appears in the
Stoic system in the definition of individual emotions.
By some, particularly by Chrysippus, the essence of
emotions is placed in the imagination which causes
them ; by others, in the state of mind which the
imagination produces.* The four principal classes of
See p. 242, 2. The same
idea is expressed in applying
the terms aipe^bv and (ptunrbv
to good and evil (Stub. ii. 120
and 142; see p. 229, 1, and
232, 3).
2 Stnt. ii. 166 ; Cic. Tnsc.
iii. 11 ; iv. 7, 14 ; 15, 43; Fin.
iii. 10, 35.
3 According to Dlog. 110,
this distinction was found in
the treatise *tp\ vadav.
4 In Clem. Strom, ii. 407, A,

the words being; vpbs b\ov rb
TtTpdxopSov, rfiovhv, Autttji', <pdfiov, imtuntiw, iroXX^s Sci Tijs
itnrfio-eas Hal fidxys.
5 The definition of Xvwri or
&ffv (Cicero iegritudo; as 3<j{a
xpdtripaTos kmcoS irapouir/as is esplicitly referred to Chrysippus
(more at length in Cic. Tusc.
iv. 7, 1 4 : Opinio recens mali
prsesentis, in quo demitti con
250
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
emotions are again subdivided into numerous subor
dinate classes, in the enumeration of which the Stoic
philosophers appear to have been more guided by the
use of language than by psychology.1
In treating the subject of emotions in general,
far less importance was attached by the Stoics to
psychological accuracy than to considerations of
moral worth. That the result could not be very satis
trahique animo rectum esse
videatur), as also the definition
of <ptXapyvpia = vn6\-qtyis tou tJ>
apyvpiov kcl\ov elvat. See p. 254,
4, 5. In like manner jut'0<j, axo\aata, and the other passions,
were, according to Diog. 110,
defined. To Chrysippus also
belong the definitionsquoted
Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25of
rfiov^ (ketitia, voluptas gestiens) = opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo efferri rectum
videatur; of fear = opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing
with the upoaioxla <wov of Diog.
112; of desire (cupiditas, libido,
iiriSun'ia) opinio venturi boni,
quod sit ex usu jam prresens
esse atque adesse. It is, how
ever, more common to hear
Xtfrnj (Diog. Ill; Stub. 172;
Cic. Tuso. iii. 11) described as
<ru(TTO\ri tyvxys airetflfjs ^6ytfi,
more briefly owox?) &\oyos,
fear as tKKûris iwt(ft)s \6ytp,
7)Sovi) even according to Alex.
Aj/lir. top. 9fi, as S\oyos fwapirij
ttp' alptTif Sokovvti vr&pxtiv> two
different translations of which
are given by Cic. 1. c. and Fin.
ii. 4, ] H, 4iri9iifiia as tipîs direifl})s \6yip, or immoderata appetitio opicati magni boni. The
latter definitions appear to be

long to Zeno. They were pro
bably appropriated by Chrys
ippus, and the additions made
which are found in Stobasus.
1 Further particulars may
be gathered from Diog. vii.
Ill ; Stob. ii 174. Both in
clude under \iirrt subdivisions
as e\o?, <p86vos, Cf/\oy, y*o~
rvirla, &X0S* a.via, obvvi). Dio
genes adds iv6xkn<r>s and <riyXv<ris ; Stobieus ire'vfloj, &xott
&<n\. Both include under <p6&os,
ttifia, ukvos, aifrxvini, KirAij|iy,
66pvfios, iyavia ; Stobayus adds
Se'os and SufftSaipovla. Under
^So>^), Diogenes includes ichymris, ^wixoipfKaKiaty rtp^/is, SicXvitis ; Stobseus, iirixaiptKaKiai,
atrnwiotxol, yoyTciai al t& ofxoia..
Under tiriBvixla, Diogenes places
(TITtll'iS, fUfTOS, (/>lA0fiKfo, opy^t
tpvs, ^5)ns, 6vfi6s ; Stobseus,
opy$] kcll to. efSTj buttjs (Bvixbs,
Xôs, nyvis, k6tos, m/cp/a,
(f.T.X.), ZpwTfs crtpoipol, ir60ot,
Xîtpot. <pi\y$ovlcu, tpi\ow\.ovr(ai,
<J>iAo5oi'ai. Definitions for all
these termswhich, without
doubt, belong to Chrysippus
may be found in the writers
named. Greek lexicographers
may obtain many useful hinfai
from Stoic definitions.
251
factory, follows from what has been already stated.1 Chap.

X.
Emotions are impulses, overstepping natural limits,
upsetting the proper balance of the soul's powers,
contradicting reasonin a word, they are failures,
disturbances of mental health, and, if indulged mjj
become chronic diseases of the soul.2 Hence a Stoic
1 Pint. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449 :
iray fiiif yap uddos a/xapTia /car'
ouTOiis IffTlv Ktd irns 6 \vnovp.evos
fl tpo&oiptlfOS f) iirtQvfiwir afiaprdvti. The Stoics are therefore
anxious to make a marked dis
tinction in the expressions for
emotions and the permitted
mental affections, between
pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2,
fear and precaution (fv\a0ela),
desire and will (/3ouA7j<m, Divg.
116; cupere et Telle, Sen. Ep.
116,1), al^x^vn and alSilis (Pint,
Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 52!)).
2 On this favourite proposi
tion of the Stoics, consult Diog.
115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc.
iv. 10; whose remarkable
agreement with Stobaeus seems
to point to a common source of
information directly or in
directly drawn upon by both ;
iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp, et
Plat. v. 2 ; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. Ac
cording to these passages, the
Stoics distinguish between sim
ple emotions and diseases of
the soul. Emotions, in the
language of Seneca, are motus
animi improbabiles soluti et
concit"?ti. If they are fre
quently repeated and neglected,
then inveterata vitia et dura,
or diseases, ensue. Disease of
the soul is therefore defined as
5tJa ixiQvulaw 1pfrvr\tcvia. els tiv
Hal iviGKipfmiUfvi) ko.6' *) uiroAqu-
fSdvovtri ra /xî aipera <r<p6$pa

aiperi efoai (Stob. translations
of the definition in Cicero and
Seneca). The opposite of such
a Sif{o, or a confusion arising
from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inbaerens atque insita
de re non fugienda tanquam
fugiendasuch as hatred of
womankind,hatred of mankind,
&c. If the fault is caused by
some weakness which prevents
our acting up to our better
knowledge, the diseased states
of the soul are called opôxrT^âTa,aegrotationes( Diog. ; Stob. ;
Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 29) ; but this
distinction is, of course, very
uncertain. The same fault is
at one time classed among
piffoi, at another among ipjxao"H)/iaTti; and Cicero (11, 24;
13, 29) repeatedly observes
that the two can only be dis
tinguished in thought. More
over, just as there are certain
predispositions (êîrT<r(ai)
for bodily diseases, so within
the sphere of mind there are
fuKartupoplai eis irddos. Dior/.,
Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction
between vitia and morbi (Cic.
13) naturally coincides with
the distinction between emo
tions and diseases. The former
are caused by conduct at vari
ance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia, like-
252
THE STOICS.
Chap. / demands their entire suppression : true virtue can

* only exist where this process has succeeded. As
being contrary to nature and symptoms of disease,
the wise man must be wholly free from them.1 When
we have once learnt to value things according to
their real worth, and to discover everywhere nature's
unchanging law, nothing will induce us to yield to
y emotion.2 Hence the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not up
rooted, was attacked in the most vigorous manner
by these philosophers. A moderate evil, they say,
always remains an evil. What is faulty and op
posed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even
in the smallest degree.3 On the other hand, when
wise vitiositas in a habitus in
tota vita inconstans ; the latter
consist in corruptio opinionum.
It is not consistent with this
view to call xaxlai, SiafleVeis ;
and viao:, as well as apfaarfi/xara and evKaraipoplat, eeis(Stob.
ii. 100, on the difference be
tween ?Jt and 5u9e<m, see 102,
1) ; and, accordingly, Heine
suggests (De Font.Tuscul. Dis. :
Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on
this point, Cicero may have
given inaccurate information.
The unwise who are near wis
dom are free from disease of
the soul, but not from emo
tions (Sen., Cic.). The points
of comparison between diseases
of the body and those of the
soul were investigated by Chrysinpuswith excessive care. Po
sitioning contradicted him, how
ever, in part (Galen, 1. c, Cio.
10, 23 ; 12, 27) ; but their differ
ences are not of interest to us.
1 Cio. Acad. i. 10, 38 : Cumque perturbationem animi illi

[superioresj ex homine non
tollerent . . . sed earn contraherent in angustumque deducerent : hie omnibus his quasi
morbis voluit carere sapientem.
Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find
subsequently that the mental
affections, which cause emo
tions, are allowed to be un
avoidable.
1 Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.
Cio. Tusc. iii. 10, 22 : Omne
enim malum, etiam mediocre,
magnum est. Nos autem id
agimus, ut id in sapiente nul
lum sit omnino. Ihid. iv. 17,
39 : Modum tu adhibes vitio ?
An vitium nullum est non
parere rationi ? Ibid. 18, 42:
Nihil interest, utrum moderatas
perturbationes appro bent, an
moderatam injusiitiam, &c.
Qui enim vitiis modum apponit,
is partem suscipit vitiorum,

an emotion is regulated by and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term emotion
only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed
to reason.1 The statement of the Peripatetics, that
certain emotions are not only admissible, but are
useful and necessary, appears of course to the Stoics
altogether wrong.2 To them, only what is morally
good appears to be useful : emotions are, under all
circumstances, faults ; and were an emotion to be
useful, virtue would be advanced by means of what
is wrong.3 The right relation, therefore, towards
emotionsindeed, the only one morally tenableis
an attitude of absolute hostility. CEhe wise man
must be emotionless.4 Pain he may feel, but. not
regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction,
and know no fear.5 /He may be slandered and illtreated, but he cannot be injured or degraded.6 /feeing
Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum,
modice a?grotandum. Ep. 116,
1 : Ego non video, quomodo
salubris esse aut utilis possit
ulla mediocritas morbi.
1 Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2 ; particularly with reference to
anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10.
'* Full details are given by
Cic. Tusc. iv. 19-26; Off. i. 25,
88 ; Sim. De Ira, i. 5, 21 ; ii.
12; pai ticularly with regard to
the use of anger.
"
" In the same spirit Sen. De
Ira,i.9,l; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense
with anper by saying: Munquam virtus vitio adjuvanda
est, se contenta . . . absit hoc
a virtute malum, ut unquam

ratio ad vilia confugiat.
1 Divg. vii. 117 : (paa\ 5e xai
airafl^ fivai rbp a6<pov, 5ia rb
hvi^Twrov (faultless)- cTvot.
Fr. m the apathy of the w.se
man, absence of feeling and
severity, which are faults, must
be distinguished,
5 Chrysippus (in Stab.
Floril. vii. 21): &\yetv pii rbv
<r6(pv firj jWavifeaOai 5e- pri yap
tihib6vai tyvxfi. Sen. De Prov.
6,6; Ep. 85, 29 ; Cie. Tusc. ii.
12, 29 ; 25, 61 ; iii. 11, 25.
6 Plut. Sto. Bep. 20, 12;
Musonius (in Stoo. Floril. 19,
16); Sen. De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7;
12. The second title of this treatise is : nec injuriam nec con.tumeliam accipere sapientem.
253
Chap.
X'
254
Chap.
X.
(2) Idea
of virtue,
(a) Posi
tive and
negative
aspects.
THE STOICS.
untouched by honour and dishonour, he has no vanity.
To anger 1 he never yields, nor needs this irrational
impulse, not even for valour and the championship
of fight. But he also feels no pity,2 and exercises
no indulgence.3 For how can he pity others for
what he would not himself consider an evil ? How
can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake
of others, which he would not tolerate for his own
sake ? If justice calls for punishment, feelings will
not betray him into forgiveness. We shall subse
quently have an opportunity for learning the further
application of these principles.
Virtue is thus negatively defined as the being
exempt from emotions, as apathy.4 There is also
a positive side to supplemenT this negative view.
Looking at the matter of virtuous action, this may
be said to consist in subordination to the general
law of nature ; looking at its manner, in rational
self-control.5 Virtue is exclusively a matter of rea
son 6in short, it is nothing else but rightly ordered
reason.7 To speak more explicitly, virtue contains
1 See 253, 2 and 3 and Cio.
Tusc. iii. 9, 19.
* Cie. Tusc. iii. 9, 20 ; Sen.
De Clem. ii. 5 ; Diog. vii. 123.
Stob. Eol. ii. 190 ; Floril.
46, 50 ; Smi. 1.0. 5, 2 ; 7 ; Diog.
L c. ; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.
4 Ps. Pint. V. Horn. 134 : ol
5 See p. 193. Alex. Aphr.
De An. 156, b. Virtue consists
in 4H\oyij tuv Karct <pi>(riv. Diog.
vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c.
6, p. 24) : rf/y r* aptTrjv Siddtirtp

elvai 6no\oyov[iivT)v.
Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38 : Cumque superiores (Aristotle and
others) non omnem virtutem
in ratione esse dicerent, sed
quasdam virtutes natura aut
more perfectas : hie [Zeno]
omnes in ratione ponebat.
7 Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34 : Ipsa
virtus brevissime recta ratio
dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep.
113, 2: Virtus autem nihil
aliud est quam animus quodain

in itself two elementsone practical, the other speculative. At the root, and as a condition of all
' rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right
knowledge. On this point they are at one with
the well-known Socratic doctrine, and with the teach
ing of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural virtue,
or virtue acquired only by exercise, they reject alto
gether. After the manner of Socrates, they define
virtue as knowledge, vice as ignorance,1 and insist on
the necessity of learning virtue.2 Even the avowed
enemy of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was
on this point at one with the rest of the School. All
virtues were by him referred to wisdom,3 and, conse
quently, he denied the claims of most to be virtues
at all.4
However closely the Stoics cling to the idea
that all virtue is based on knowledge, and is in itself
nothing else but knowledge, they are not content
with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above
modo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1 ; 129,3.
1 The proof of this will be
found subsequently in the Stoic
definitions of various virtues
and vices Compare preliminarily 254, 6 and Diog. vii. 93 :
e?i-ai 5' kyvoias ras Kaitlas, av at
dpFTal îriorij/iai. Stob. Eel ii.
108 : toiJtos ptv ovv tAs (iriBdaas
aperas -rcAefas thai \4yov(ri irepl
Tii//3iovKa!(Tvj'6<jT7jicf'i'aieK06tt>p7jndrav. It is not opposed to these
statements for titob. ii. 92 and
1 10, to distinguish other virtues
besides those which are TfX"<"
and lit.oTTiimi ; "nor for Hecato
(in Diog. vii. 90) to divide vir-
tues into imarriiioptKal xal Seaprirural (aiarcuriv ixovarat ruv

6tu>p-nij,&Tut) and o0eeop?jToi ; for
by the latter must be understood not the virtuous actions
themselves, but only the states
resulting from themhealth of
soul, strength of will, and the
like. On the health of the
soul, in its relation to virtue,
see Cie. Tusc. iv. 13, 30.
2 Diog. vii. 91 (following
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and
others) ; Ps. Plut. V. Horn.
144.
8 See p. 260, 3.
* Pint. Sto. Rep. 7 ; Diog.
vii. 161 ; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.
255
Chap.
'
200
Chap,
*
THE STOICS.
practical activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done.
As we have seen already, knowledge with them was
only a means towards rational conduct,1 and it is
expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teach
ing of the School, that Herillus of Carthage, Zeno's
pupil, declared knowledge to be the end of life,
and the only unconditional good.2 Virtue may, it
is true, be called knowledge, but it is, at the same
time, essentially health and strength of mind, a
right state of the soul agreeing with its proper nature ; 3
and it is required of man that he should never
cease to labour and contribute towards the com
mon good.4 Thus, according to Stoic principles,
virtue is a combination of theory and practice, in
which action is invariably based on intellectual
knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge finds
1 See p. 56.
2 See p. 58, 2. Dior), vii.
1fi5, conf. 37: "HpiAAos 5c 6
KapxTjWios t\o? el7T t)}V eVigt4)ijl7)v, owep 0"rl Qjy ofi irai/TO
avatpipovra irpbs rb /act* Ttio*t^fj-vs rjv feat ^ rrj ayvola 8iacetv iv (pavraaiGiv xpoirSeêt a/xeTtxTZTGiTov vnb k6yov. On the
definition, see p. 82, 1.
" Cleanthes (in Pint. Sto.
Rep. 7) : When r6yos, on which
see p. 128, 2, is found in the
soul in a proper degree, l<rx"s
KaXtirat Kal Kpdros ' rj 5* Lrxvs
avTi) Kal rb KpaTOS orav p.ev irl
tis eiri<pavc(r<v û/tf^T6ots cyy4vr\To,i iyicpaTftd 4<rnt k.t.K. In
the same way, Chrysippus (ac
cording to Galen, Hipp, et 1'lat.
iv. 6, p. 403) deduced what is
good in our conduct from

ivTovia and Icrxvs ; what is bad,
from arovta Kal iffdiytta rrjs tyvXVs ; and (ibid. vii. 1, p 590)
he referred the differences of
individual vir ues to changes
in quality wi'hin the soul. By
Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is de
fined as health ; by Stob. ii.
104, as 5iaf)e<riy tyvxw frvfx<ptt3t os
avrrj ; by Diog. 89, as SidOitris
opLOXoyovp.vT\.
1 Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4:
Stoici nostri dicunt ; usque ad
ultiraum vitas finem in actu
erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, Sic.
Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo
nihil ante mortem otiosum est,
ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa
mors otiosa.

its object in moral conductit is, in short, power of
will based on rational understanding.1 This definition
257
Chap.
X'
must not, however, be taken to imply that moral

knowledge precedes will, and is only subsequently
referred to will, nor conversely that the will only uses
knowledge as a subsidiary instrument. In the eyes
of a Stoic, knowledge and will are not only insepa
rable, but they are one and the same thing. Virtue
cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor know
ledge without virtue.2 The one, quite as much as
the other, is a right quality of the soul, or, speak
ing more correctly, is the rightly endowed soul,
reason, when it is as it ought to be.3 Hence virtue
may be described, with equal propriety, either as
knowledge or as strength of mind ; and it is irre
levant to enquire which of these two elements is
anterior in point of time.
But how are we to reconcile with this view the (i) The
Stoic teaching of a plurality of virtues and their ls"^rallu
mutual relations ? As the common root from which
they spring, Zeno, following Aristotle, regarded un
derstanding, Cleanthes, strength of mind, Aristo, at
one time health, at another the knowledge of good
and evil.4 Later teachers, after the time of Chrys1 This will appear from the
definitions of virtue about to
follow.
2 See pp. 59, 1 ; 56, 2.
3 See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep.
65, 6, after describing a great
and noble soul, adds : Talis
animus virtus est.
4 Plut. Vir. Mor. 2 : "'Apitrrtav
81 6 Xtus T7) p.kv ovaiq fiiav koI
avrbs aperV faotet koI vyUiav

ivifytafe, k.t.X. Id. on Zeno,
see p. 260, 3, and Cleanthes, p.
236, 3. According to Galeuus,
Aristo defined the one virtue
to be the knowledge of good
and evil (Hipp, et Plat. v. 5, p.
468) : kciWiov oiv 'Apio-rav 6 XToj,
oCtc -noKhhs *7vat ras apcras ttjs
il/v^ris o.Tro<p^]v6.pnvos, oAAa jxiavj
THE STOICS.
Chap
X.
ippus, thought that it consisted in knowledge or

wisdom, understanding by wisdom absolute know
ledge, the knowing all things, human and divine.1
From this common root, a multiplicity of virtues
was supposed to proceed, which, after Plato's example,
are grouped round four principal virtues2intelli%v iwitrrîfajv ayaBav re Kal kokuv ing particular virtues as spring
uvai (pTjaiv. vii. 2, p. 595. ing from the essence of virtue,
vofiitra* yovi/ 6 'AptfTToJV, filav with the addition of a differen
thai TJ)> ifivxvs Swaptv, p \oyt(6- tial quality, he needed separate
Htda, Kal tV apeTTj** rris $uX0s terms to express generic and
t6tro /xiav. iniffT'iip.'tjv ayatiaiv Kal specific virtue. In Zeno's de
KaKwy. The statement that finition too, as later writers
Aristo made health of soul would have it (Plut. Vir. Mat.
consist in a right view of good 2), to <pp6vri(ns was given the
and evil agrees with the lan meaning of iiricrrîxr).
2 aperal npwrat. IHog. 92 ;
guage of Plutarch. Perhaps
Zeno had already defined Stob. ii. 104. In stating that
0p6v7jffis as ixHTT'hp.Ti ayadav ko\ Posidonius counted four
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and AnKOK&V.
1 Conf. p. 255, 1. <7ie. De tipatermore than fourvirtues,
Off. i. 43, 153 : Princepsque om Diogenes can only mean that
nium virtutum est ilia eapien- the latter enumerated the
tia, quam aotylav Gra?ci vocant : subdivisions, whereas Posi
prudentiam enim, quam Graeci donius confined himself to the
(pp6vri<jiv dicunt, aliam quandam four main heads of the four
intelligimus : quae est rerum cardinal virtues. Besides this
expetendarum fugiendarumque division of virtues, another,
scientia. Ilia autem scientia, threefold, division is also met
quam principem dixi, rerum with, see p. 56,2; 57, 1, that
est divinarum atque humana- into logical, physical, and
rum scientia. A similar de- ethical virtues In other words,
iinition of wisdom, amplified the whole of philosophy and
by the words, nosse divina et likewise its parts are brought
humana et horum causas, is under the notion of virtue;
found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. but it is not stated how this
85, 5 ; Pint. Plac. Procem. 2 ; threefold division is to har
Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may proba monise with the previous four
bly be referred to Chrysippus ; fold one. A twofold division,
and it was no doubt Chrysip made by Panietius and referred
pus who settled the distinction to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)
between aotpla and <pp6mi<ris, in that into theroretical and prac
the Stoic school, although tical virtuesis an approxima
Aristo had preceded him in tion to the ethics of the Peri
distinguishing them. Explain patetics,

gence, bravery, justice, self-control.1 Intelligence
consists in knowing what is good and bad, and what
is neither the one nor the other, the indifferent;2
bravery, in knowing what to choose, what to avoid,
and what neither to choose nor to avoid ; or, sub
stituting the corresponding personal attitude for
knowledge, bravery is fearless obedience to the law
of reason, both in boldness and endurance.3 Selfcontrol consists in knowing what to choose, and what
to eschew, and what neither to choose nor eschew ; 4
justice, in knowing how to give to everyone what is
his due.5 In a corresponding manner, the principal
1 The scheme was in vogue
before Zeno's time. See Plut.
Sto. Kep. 7, 1, and the quota
tions, p. 260, 3.
2 ^TTtffT^fnj ayaQwv Kal KaKwv
Kal ovSereptav. or eKdaruv $v
voitiriov Kal ou kolt\tov Kal oiiSetipav. Stoh. 102. Stobfeus adds,
that the definition needs to be
completed by the words, occur
ring in the definition of every
virtue, tp6ffL vo\itikov u>ou.
But this is superfluous, for only
in the case of such a being can
the terms good and evil apply.
Dioq. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170
and 246 ; ('Ac. 1. c.
3 4iritTT7)p.ri oeivatv Kal ov SttvGiv
Kal ovSereptvv (Stob. 104) ; ^7rxar^/iij &v atpereov Kal S>v u\ci/3tjt4ov Kal ovSerepuv (Dioff.') ; 4ttiar-iifni </ xpb 9a^K r) firi Bafipeiv
(Galen. Hipp, et Plat. vii. 2,
597). Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53,
conf. v. 14, 41 : (Ohrysippus)
fortitudo est, inquit, scientia
perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens
sine timore. The last-named

characteristic appears still more
strongly in the definition at
tributed to the Stoics by Cic.
Off. i. 19, 62 : Virtus propugnans pro asquitate.
4 iirtffTfjarj alperwv Kal <pumav -Kal obtivTipwi/. Stob. 102.
The definition of $p6irr)ffis in
Cicero i3 the same, word for
word. See p. 258, 1 ; that of
valour in Diogenes is not very
different. Since all duties
refer to ironjTea and ob inmjTea,
the definitions of the remain
ing virtues must necessarily
agree with those of <pp6vi\<ns.
b 4TriffT4ip.il airowpLriTiKri ttjs
ojfay (KaffTip, in Stob. Id. p. 104,
further enumerates the points
of difference between the four
virtues : intelligence refers to
koA^kovto, self-control to im
pulses, valour to imop.oval, jus
tice to avovtp:i)ffeis. See also
the distinctive peculiarities of
the four virtues in Stob. 112.
Below, p. 263.
s2
200
Chat.
X.
THE STOICS.
faults are traced Lack to the conception of igno
rance.1 Probably all these definitions belong to
Chrysippus.2 Other definitions are attributed to his
predecessors,3 some more nearly, others more remotely,
agreeing with him in their conception of virtue.
Within these limits, a great number of individual vir
tues were distinguished, their differences and precise
shades of meaning being worked out with all the
pedantry which characterised Chrysippus.4 The de
1 Diog. 93 ; Stnb. 104. The
irpwrat Kaniai are : a<ppoo~iyq, BetXia, aKoAatJict, a5ifcta. The defi
nition of acppoavi-q is &yvot*
ayaduv Kal kokwv Kal ovbtTepuv.
Bee p. 255, I.
- This fallows from the fact
that the conception of efia-nvii)
is the basis in all. See p. 258,
1.
Of Zeno, Pint. Vir. Mor. 2,
p 441, says 6pi6[jt.vos t^v
<pp6fi)(rtv eV u(V OTrovefi-qTeois Sinaioavvw eV 5' oupercois aw<ppoffvvr\v eV 5' u7rOjUreTois avSpiav.
The like in regard to justice in
Sto. Kep. 7, 2 On the other
hand valour is here termed
(pi-6ur}(ris tv ivtpyiiifois. He also
says, p. 440, that, according to
Aristo, T) aperi) iro^ria fiev eViCKOirov(Ta Kal fxn Tronjrta KeKArjrai
(poAyyjffis ' ZTriBvy.iav Be Koo~[*ovo~a
Kal rh iilrpoiv Kal ri> tijKaipov
ii> r)Sofais 6plQ>vo~at aoxppoivvT) '
KOivwvâuL Be Kal <rujj.$aXaiois
dpiXovaa toIs irpbs eTepous, 5tKaioavvT). Furl her particulars
as to Aristo may be found in
Galen. Hipp, et Plat. vii. 2, p.
595 : Since the soul has only
one power.the powerof thought,
it can enly have one virtue,
the iiritTTTinT] ayaQwv nal KaKxv.
OTav fxif oZv aipflaOal Te fifrj

rayadn Kal (pfvyetv to KaKa, ryv
iiriffr'fjix'qv TTjfBe AaAe? o~w<ppovvvf)v OTav Be irparreiy juej' rayatia,
irpdrTtiv Be ra KaKa, <pp6v7]<riv'
avSpciav Be bWav to juej/ 6ap{trj, ra
Be <pivyr)' OTav Be tB Kar' alav
iKaffrcp ve/j.7], 8iKaioa6vt)v ' kvl Be
\6yip, yiviijr, Kovaa juec 7] tyvxh
Xupls tov irpaTrew Tayafld' Te Kal
KaKa. o~o(pia t' o~t'i Kal eVtffTfjjUTj,
irpbs Be Tas irpae(S atyiKvovfievTi
rds Kara rbv ft'iov av6fjMTU irAela
Ka,u8dvei t& npoeipi}^.eva. We
know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7,
4, see p. 25G, 3, that, according
to Cleanthes, strength of mind,
orav fikv 4irl rots iirupaveatv ififj.i/Ttois iyytvrjTal, 4yKpaTetd
iffriv OTav B' eV rois vwofjLfveTt'ots. ctyBpela' ?repi ras aias Be,
SucaiO'ivvrj' Trepl tols tupeVets Kal
e/cKAiVei?, o-wq>poo-vvri. With him,
too, if Plutarch's account is ac
curate, iyKpdreia, or persever
ance, takes theplaceof <pp6vrio-is.
C'io. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, quotes no
less than three definitions of
bravery given by Sphterus. See
p. 259, 3.
4 Pint. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441 ,
charges him with creating a
O'/J.rjvos apeTftje oil (ruvv/fles ouBe
yvtiipLnov, and forming a xaPiev~

finitions of a portion of them have been preserved
by Diogenes and Stobasus.1 In a similar way, too,
the Stoics carried their classification of errors into the
minutest details.2
The importance attaching to this division of vir
tues, the ultimate basis on which it rests, and the re
lation which virtues bear, both to one another and to
the common essence of virtue, are topics upon which
Zeno never entered. Plutarch, at least, blames him 3
for treating virtues as many, and yet inseparable, and
at the same time for finding in all virtues only cer
tain manifestations of the understanding. Aristo
attempted to settle this point more precisely. Ac
cording to his view, virtue is in itself only one ; in
speaking of many virtues, we only refer to the va
riety of objects with which that one virtue has to
t<5ttjs, V0A(Jt7)S, fieyah6T7}s, Ka\61 Stub. 106, includes under
tj]S, iirtSî6rris, eiiairavT'qo'ia, eu- fpp6vyo~is, tv&ovXta, *u\oyirrTtat
TpoTeAfa, after the analogy of ay-îvoHL, volv^x^111: *vp.T\xavla ;
Trp^Tifs, avSpeia, &c. In Stob. under trwfppoo'vvrr)t evraîa, koo~ii. 1 18, among the Stoic virtues, fj.i6rr]s. aidiifjLOfrvvri, iyttpdrfia ;
is und an ipwriK^ as lirio-Ti}txr\ under avBpiia, KapTtpia. 6apâ\i6~
v4uv (typos svrpviav, &c, and a tvjs, [xtyaAoipuxtu, vi|/ixfa, <pt\oavfiTroTiici] as enTT'f]fJi7] rod rrws Kov'ta. ; under SiKatoo-vrr], evrriSei" i^dyeadai rd tru/xirdaia Kal rov /3fio (on which Diog. 119),
Trots Set &vp.Trivnv. An tpwTUi)} XpTlGTOi-ris, ei/Koipoivqaia, tvovvand (tv/mttotik^ a/>ET$j are also aAAafa. Dioff. 12l>, is slightly
mentioned by Fhilodem. De different. Ktobteus gives the
Mus. col. 15. Ac cording to definitions of all these virtues,
Atkea. 162, b (Vol. Here, i.), Per- and Diogenes of some. By
stttus, in his <rvp.iroTt.Koi HtdAoyot, Stobreus, they are generally
had discussed avinruTiK}) at described as inar^/uu; by Dio
length ; and since, according genes, as |eiy or 5ia0e<rets.
to the Stoics (ten. Ep. 12:j, 15: Otherwise, the definitions are
Stob. 1. a), none but the wise the same. A definition of euknow how to live aright and Tajia is given by Vie. Off. i. 40,
how to drink aright, these arts 142.
belong to a complete treatment
2 Diog. 93 ; Stob. 104.
3 Sto. Rep. 7.
of wisdom.
261
Chap.
X.
(;) Mutual
relation of
the several
virtues.
THE STOICS.
do.1 The difference of one virtue from another is not
one of inward quality, but depends on the external
conditions under which they are manifested ; it only
expresses a definite relation to something else, or,
in the language of Herbart, an accidental aspect.2
The same view would seem to be implied in the
manner in which Cleanthes determines the relations
of the principal virtues to one another.3 It was,
however, opposed by Chrysippus. The assumption
of many virtues, he believed, rested upon an inward
difference ; 4 each definite virtue, as also each definite
fault, becoming what it does by a peculiar change
in the character of the soul itself;5 in short, for
a particular virtue to come into being, it is not
enough that the constituent element of all virtue
should be directed towards a particular object, but
1 Plut. Vir. Mor. 2 : *Apl<rrtav
8* d Xios ri} fxtv ovaia ySav nal
abrbs aperfyu iiroiei zeal vyietap
dtv6fxa^m t< 5e irp6s Tt $ia$6povs
Kal 7r\iWay, coy tf rts Bc\ot t^v
fipaffiv ^x&jp AecKwj/ fifv avriKafifiavo/xv7)v \evKodtav KaAetV, jueAuvwv Se fA\av6eav % ti roiovrov
erepov, Kal yap ij apeT^, k.t.A.
See p. 260, 3. KaQditsp rb fiaXaiptov if fi4v <Trij/t
5e
&Wo Statpet' Kal rb irvp ivepyti
irepl 8\as Sicupdpous m$ (putm
XP(&fJ.VOU.
2 Galen. Hipp, et Plat. vii.
1, p. 590: yofxlêi yap 6 av^p
(Ktvos, fiiav ofiaav t^jv aptrfyv
ov6fj.aat irKtioffiv ouofxd^ffdat Ka-a
rfa np6s Tt o,x*tTlv- Conf. note
5 and Diug. vii. 161 : aperds t'
o6t ttoAAcls ctffyyev, as 6 Z-fjwov,
otfre ixlav woAAoty hv6â<xi Kakov-
pemiv, &s ot MeyaptKol, aAAa Kal

[1. fcaTCi] rb irp6s ri vus %%*tv
(scil. iroAAoiS 6v6/J.aai. /caAou8 See p. 260, 3.
4 Their distinguishing fea
tures fall under the category
of voibvy to use Stoic terms, not
under that of irp6$ tI iras exov,
as Aristo maintained.
5 Galenus 1 c. continues : &
rolvvv Xpv&nnros BctKwoiv, ovk
rfj irp6s Tt (TêVct yevdfievov rb
TT\.T)d0S TWV hpST&V TS Kal KaKlUV,
aAA' v Tats oiKelais ovalais vtra\\arroft4vais ttaTct tcis ttoiSttitos.
Pint. Sto. Rep. 7, 3 : Xpvfftiriros,
'Aplffrwvi ugv yKa\tov, hn fxias
aper^s (rx^Veis %Xeye ras &\\as
efoai. Id. Vir. Mor. 2 : Xpxxnvttqs fie Kara, rb irotbv apsrhv iS(a

to the common element must be superadded a fur
ther characteristic element, or differentia; the several
virtues being related to one another, as the various
species of one genus.
All virtues have, however, one and the same end,
which they compass in different ways, and all presup
pose the same moral tone and conviction,1 which is
only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and
ceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its
component parts.2 They are, indeed, distinct from one
another, each one having its own end, towards which
it is primarily directed ; but, at the same time, they
again coalesce, inasmuch asnone can pursue itsownend
without pursuing that of the others at the same time.3
1 Stob. ii. 110: ndaas Sh ras
aptras, baai imffrrjfiLal elai Kal
rfX""-' (compare on this addi
tions p. 255, 1) Koivd re etwpi)fiara exlv K<d t'Aos, ws etpijrat
(p. 108the same is more fully
set forth by Panaetius, p. 112),
rb ai/rb, bib Kal axwpltTTOvs eli/af
rbv yap filav tx0VTa vâs %x*lvi
Kal rbv Kara p.iav wpdrrovra Kara
Trdffas trpdrrety. JHoff. 125 : ras
5' aperas ktyovatv avraKoKovBeiv
ah\-i)\ais Kal Tbv pXav i\ovra
irdaas *Xtlf ' elvat yap aurwv ra
SeaipiinaTa Koiva, as Chrysippus,
Apollodorus, and Hecato assert.
rbv yap ivdperov decapTjriKov t'
elyai Kal irpaKrtKbv rtev Troiijreuiv.
to. 5e TOtTjrea Kal aipcrea carl
Kal virofjievTjTea Kal avovftxrirea,
knowledge and action including
all the four principal instincts.
2 do. Parad. 3, 1 : Una vir
tus est, consentiens cum ratione
et perpetua constantia. Nihil
huic addi potest, quo magis
virtus sit; nihil demi, ut virtus

nomen relinquatur. Oonf. Sen.
Ep. 66, 9. See p. 267.
3 Stob. 112 (cont. Diog. 126):
bia(pepeiv 5' aWijKwv rots KtpaKaiots. tppovhoews yap tjyat tie(paKaia rb fxiv dewpetv Kal tcpdrreiv
t iroil]TOl> irpoTiyovfitvus, Kara 5e
rbv bevrepov \6yov rb Qsajptiv Kal
a bit atrov4fieivt x^Pty
aStaTTTtinaS TCpa'TTitV t> TTOlT)TeOV
5e oat^poovvrjs Xbtov mtpdxatoit
lo~rt rb irapex^0~9at ras bpfxas eutrradits Ka'i Ota pziv auras wporiyoupLCi/ws, Kara 5e rbv bibrcpov Xoyov
ra vvb ras aWas aptras, i'*a
rov d5iairT(6Tws eV rats bppxiis avaarpetpeadai. Similarly of bra
very, which has for its basis
vclv & Set irnop-evw ; and of jus
tice, which has rb Kar' dl-lav
eK&o-rcp. Pint. Alex. Virt. 11 :
The Stoics teach that p.ia piv
dperh vpwrayojpto'ret irpdâis
6d(TT77S, itapaKaXti Se rets &\\as
Kal uvVTtlvit -npbs rb reXos.
263
264
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from
its other parts. Where one virtue exists, the rest
exist also, and where there is one fault, there all is
faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains all
other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the out
come includes in itself all the rest.1 What makes virtue
virtue, and vice vice, is simply and solely the inten
tion.2 The will, although it may lack the means of
execution, is worth quite as much as the deed ; 3 a
wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification
of that desire.4 Hence only that action can be called
virtuous which is not only good in itself, but which
proceeds from willing the good ; and although, in the
1 Stob. 1 1(> : ipwl 5e Kat -trdma
Toitlv rbv aotpov Kara irdffas t&s
aperd) ' trafrav yap wpa^ty T\etav
auTou thai. Plut. iSto. Hep. 27,
1, conf. Alex. Virt. 1. c. : tcis
apcrds (pyi [Xp'Vnnros] hvraKOXouQtiv aAAÂais, ov fidvov Tfp rbv
pXav %\ovra irdtras i\av, a\\a Kal
T< rbf Karafxiav briovv 4vepyovi>Ta
Kara irdaas ivtpytiv oirr1 &v5ja
tpV&l rd\eiov elvai rbv fiî trdtas
exuvTa Tas ape-ras, otjTe vpdiiv
reKtiav, %Tts oil Kara irdo~as -K^drTirai Tas aperis. If Chrysippus
allowed, as Plutarch states, that
the brave man does not always
act bravely, nor the bad man
always like a coward, it was a
confession to which' he was
driven by experience, contrary
to Sto c principles.
2 Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38 : Nec
virtntis usnm modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores (whom the
Stoic evidently wrongs), sed
ipsum habit urn per se esse praclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1 : Nec
enim peocat a reium eventu sed
vitiis homimira metienda sunt.

Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas
est, quie apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then
proceeds to illustrate by a par
able of t wo slaves, one of whom
diligently seeks for the man
whom he is sent to find nut
without success, whilst the
other taking it easy accidentally
comes across him. Ibid. i. 5,
2 : A benefaction is only ipsa
tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1 : Non
quid fiat aut quid detur refert,
sed qua mente.
3 Compare also theparadoxi
cal statement Qui libenter
beneficium accepit, reddidit
which Sen. 1. c. ii. 31, 1, justi
fies by saying : Cum omnia ad
animum roferamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.
4 Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril.
(i, 19:
Sorts tiri&vtx&v avex*T* ahrxpov
irpdyfxaros
outos Troefiost tout' 4av Kaipbv
Aafli).
EMOTIONS AND VIRTUF.

first instance, the difference between the discharge
and the neglect of duty (KaTopOwfta and a/j.dpTr)fia)
depends on the real agreement or disagreement of
our actions with the moral law,1 yet that alone can
be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty
which arises from a morally perfect character.2
1 On the notions of xar6p6fjLa and attdpryfia, see Plat.
Sto. Kep. 11, 1 : rb KaT6pBa>ix6.
<pa(n vofiov irpoffrdyp-a eivai, rb 8'
afidpTTjfjLa ydfiou anay6pev/xa. To
a had man, law only gives pro
hibitions, and not commands :
ou yap bwarat KaropBovv. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: nav naropBujxa Kal evv6p.rjfj.a Kal bucaioirpdyqfxd e'en. iStob. ii. 11)2 : en
be rwv evepyTifjidroiv (paal ra fiev
eivai Karop9fxara, ra 5' afxaprrjfiara, ra 8' oiiberepa (examples
of the latter are speaking, giv
ing, &C.) . . . irdvra be ra. KaropBivfiara biKaioTrpayf}fj.ara eivai Kal
evvo4\fiara Kal euraKrrmara, k.t.K.
ra be afiaprfi/iara ifc rwv avriKeifievuv abtni]p,aTa Kal dfOfjirjfiara
Kal braKr-ftpara.
2 It is to this view that the
distinct ion between Kar6pBwua
and KaBriKov refers from the one
side. A KadijKov (the concep
tions of which will be subse
quently more fully discussed)
is, in general, any discharge of
duty, or rational action ; Kar6pBaâ only refers to a perfect
discharge of duty, or to a vir
tuous course of conduct. Conf.
Stob. 158 : roiv be KaBt]K6vrwv ra
fief eivai <patTi reAeia, a bfy Kal
Karcpd^nara \eyeffdat, KaropBil>fxara 8' eivai ra /car' aperV' tvevyi}juara . . . rb be KaBrjKov reKeiwBev KarSpSuiua yiverBai. Simi
larly, 184 : A KaripSufna is a
KaB^Kov Travras enexov rohs apiBfioiis. do. Fin. iii. 18, 59:
Quoniam enim videmus esse
quiddam, quod recte factum
appedemus, id autem est perfectum offlcium ; erit autein
etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste
depositum reddere in recte
factis sit, in officiis (KaBi/Kovra)
ponatur depositum reddere.
Off. i. 3, 8 : Kt medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum ; the former is called Kardpdufia, the latter Katir/Kov. A
virtuous action can only be
done by one who has a virtuous
intention, i.e. by a wise man.
Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15 : If we under
stand by a life according to
nature, what is rational, rectum
est, quod Kar6pQu>fxa dicebas,
contingitque sapienti soli. Off.
iii. 3, 14: Mud autem officium,
quod rectum iidem [StoiciJ ap
pellant, perfect um atque absoiutum est, et. ut iidem dicunt,
omnes numeros habet, nec pra;ter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Uff. iii. 4, 16 :
When the Decii and Seipios are
called brave, Fabricius and
Aristides just. Cato and Laslius
wise, the wisdom and virtue of
the wise man are not attributed
to them in the strict sense of
the term : sed ex mediorura
officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.
266
THE STOICS.
Chap
3.
Such a character, the Stoics held, must either

exist altogether, or not at all ; for virtue is an indivi
Unit)/ sible whole, which we cannot possess in part, but must
uf rirtue.
either have or not have.1 He who has a right in
tention and a right appreciation of good and evil,
is virtuous ; he who has not these requisites is lack
ing in virtue ; there is no third alternative. Virtue
admits neither of increase nor diminution,2 and there
is no mean between virtue and vice.3 This being
1 See p. 263, 2.
2 In Sim.pl. Categ. fil, $
(Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the
Stoics say : ras ^tv '4eis imrelveadai 8vt>a<r$ai Kal avUtrBai'
ras Si 5ta64ats aveittrdrovs elvat
KaX av4rous. Thus straightness
is, for instance, a 5i<9f<rij, and
no mere |is. ovrwol 8e Kal ras
aperas biaQ4ffts elvai, ov Kara rb
/j.6vt/j.ov iblwfia, aWa Kara rb aveirlrarov Kal avenibtKrov rov juaA.Tiov ras 8e r4xvas> tfroi SuaKivfirovs ofoas fi urj (add ouk) eivai
StaSttTfis. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid.
72, 8 (Schol. 76, a, 12): ruv
Stwikwv, otrives bitKofiwoi xwP^s
ras operas airb r&v
rexvtt3t>
ravras otjre 4mrlvf<r0ai \4youaiv
oijre ayUffdai, ras be jueVas r4\vas
Kal iirtratrtv Kal avttriv b4xetr&at
ipaalv. Simpl. (73, a. Schol. 76,
a, 24) replies : This would be
true, if virtue consisted only
in theoretical conviction : such
a conviction must be either
true or false, and does not ad
mit of more or less truth (for
the same line of argument,
see p. 267, 1) ; but it is
otherwise where it is a matter
for exercise. It may be re
marked, in passing, that a fur
ther distinction was made be
tween aptrii and r4xvrithe

one being preceded by an it6Xoyos TrpoKowii, the other by a
simple 4irtrriS(i6rns {Simpl.
Categ. 62, 0; Schol. 71, a, 38).
There is ali-o a definition of
tx"1 attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. fur.
Philol. See Supplementb. xiv.
23y), to Zeno, Cleanthes. and
Chrysippus ; to Zeno in Stxt.
Pyrrh. iii. 241 ; Math. vii. 109
and 373 ; more fully in Lucian,
Paras, c. 4, Conf. C'ic. Acad. ii.
7, 22.
3 Diog. vii. 127 : ap4<tKti be
avrois ur\bev n4aov elvai aperris
Kal KaKias ' ruv nepiiraTririKuv
fiera^b aperrjs Kal Kaxlas elvat
\ey6vruv r))v trpoKmfiv ' us yap
be?v, tpaaiv, bpQov elvai 4t\ov fl
(TrpefiXhv, ourws SlKaiov 1) abiKov '
o&re be biKaitirepov aire abwurepov, Kal 4-xl ruv &\\uv duo'us.
Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18 :
Quod summum bonum est, supra
se gradum non habet . . . hoc
nec remitti nec intendi posse,
non magis, quam regulam, qua
rectum probari solet, iiectes.
Quicquid ex ilia mutaveris in
juria est- recti. Mob. ii. 116:
aperris be Kal Kotlas oiibev elvai
Herav.

the case, and the value of an action depending wholly
on the intention, it follows, necessarily, that virtue
admits of no degrees. If the intention must be
either good or bad, the same must be true of actions ;
and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing
bad, and a bad intention has in it nothing good, the
same is true of actions. A good action is uncondi
tionally praiseworthy ; a bad one, unconditionally
blameworthy, the former being only found where
virtue exists pure and entire ; the latter, only where
there is no virtue at all. All good actions are, on.
the one hand, according to the well-known paradox,
equally good ; all bad actions, on the other, equally
bad. The standard of moral judgment is an ab
solute one ; and when conduct does not altogether
conform to this standard, it falls short of it alto
gether.1
1 The much- discussed para
dox (Oic. Parad. 3 ; Fin. iv. 27 ;
Dwg. 101 and 120; Stob. 218;
Pint. Sto. Rep. 13, 1 ; Sent.
Math. vii. 422 ; Sen. Ep. 66, 5)
is this : on X<ra ret ctjuapTûaTa
Kol ra KaropB^puera. It was, acc irding- to Diog., supported, on
the one hand, by the proposi
tion, nav ayaObv iv futpov etvcu
alperhy koI ix^tc ayeffiy ptfiTC ^nriTatTiv 5*xt70a( on the other
hand, by the remark, to which
Sext. and Sim/A. in Categ.,
Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer:
If truth and falsehood admit of
no difference of degree, the
same must be true of the errors
of our conduct. A man is not
at tbe mark, no matter whether
he is one or a hundred stadia
away. Similarly, Stobteus :

The Stoics declare all errors to
be ftra, although not Smouz irav
yaprbêvSos iiria^s ipcOSos rrujUjSefSriKtv (a statement quoted as
Stoical by Alex, in Metaph. p.
258, 3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand)
every ifiaprla is the result of a
Sidtpevffis. It is, however, im
possible for KaTopfltiôTo not to
be equal toone another,if vices
are equal ; irdvra yap 4<tti Te'Aeta,
5n$irep otfr' iWîweiy o#0* uirepeX*iv SiWit' av a\\Tj\a)v. Cicero
and Seneca devoted particular
attention to this enquiry. The
investigations of Cicero in the
Paradoxa result in bringing him
to the passage quoted p. 263, 2,
from which it follows that no
thing can be recto rectius, nor
208
Chap.
'
C. 'ihi
wise man.
(1) WUfoMi/1
THE STOICS.
From what has been said, it follows that there can
be but one thoroughgoing moral distinction for all
mankind, the distinction between the virtuous and
the vicious; and that within each of these classes
there can be no difference in degree. He who pos
sesses virtue possesses it whole and entire ; he who
lacks it lacks it altogether ; and whether he is near
or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment.
He who is only a hand-breadth below the surface of
bono melius. The equality of
faults is a corollary from the
equality of virtues ; it also
follows from the consideration
that whatever is forbidden at
all is equally forbidden. De
Kin. : It is said, all faults are
equal, quia nec honesto quidquam hunestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. (16, 5) raises
the question, How, notwith
standing the difference between
goods (see p. 230, 3 end), can all
be equal in value ? and at once
replies : Is virtueor, what is
the same thing, a rightly
moulded soulthe only pri
mary good ? Virtue, indeed,
admits of various forms, ac
cording to the activities im
posed on it, but can neither be
increased nor diminished ; Decrescere enim sumraum bonum
non po est, nec virtuti ire retro
licet. It cannot increase,
quando incrementum maximo
ljon est : nihil invenies rectius
recto, non magis quam verius
vero, quam temperato temperatius. All virtue consists in
modo, in certa mensura. Quid
accedere perfecto potest ? Ni
hil, aut perfectum non erat, cui
accessit : ergo ne virtuti quidem,

cui si quid adjici potest, defuit
. . . ergo virtutes inter se pares
sunt et opera virtutis et omnes
honiines, quibus ilia; contigeie
. . .. una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est
ratio recta simplexque. Nihil
est divino divinius,"cuelesti coelestius. Mortalia minuuntur
. . . crescunt, &c. ; divinorum
una natura est. Ratio aut em
nihil aliud est, quam in corpus
humanum pars divini spiritus
mersa . . . nullum porro inter
divina discrimen est : ergo nec
inter bona. Ibid. 'A'2 : Om es
virtutes rationes sunt : rationes
sunt rectae : si rectaj sunt, et
pares sunt. Qualis ratio est,
tales et actiones sunt: ergo
omnes pares sunt : ceterum
magna habebunt discrimina
variants materia, etc. On the
same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71,
defended the equality of all
goods and of all good actions,
in particular p. 18, where to the
quotation given, p. 266, 3, the
words are added : Hi rectior
ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri,
nec quae ab ilia quidem fiunt,
alia aliis rectiora sunt.
THE WISE MAN.

the water will be drowned just as surely as one who
is five hundred fathoms deep ; he who is blind sees
equally little whether he will recover his sight to
morrow or never.1 The whole of mankind are thus
divided by the Stoics into two classesthose who are
wise and those who are foolish ; 2 and these two classes
are treated by them as mutually exclusive, each one
being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly,
among the foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible.3
The wise man is absolutely free from faults and mis
takes : all that he does is right ; in him all virtues
centre ; he has a right opinion on every subject, and
never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely
1 Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: va\,
(patrlv aWa. Sxrwep b irj\xvv
ctr-exwv Iv BaKaTTri rris innpave'ias
o-iZiv t]ttov Trviyerat rod KaraScXvk6tos dpyuias irevTaKOGias,
ovtus uitSe ol ne\davT*s apery
twv ixaKpav Ivrwv t)tt6v elaiv 4v
KzKia Kai tcaddwfp ol TvtpKol
rv<p\ol eiVl Kav 6\tyov Sffrepoy
ai/a/3A 7T6lf fJ.4\\w<TlP, OVTWS Ol
irpGKdtTui-Tzs &XPts ^ T^v aper)]v
cva\d$wo-tv avdnroi Kai p.ox6r}pitl
diap.4 ovtrtv. Dioq. 127 (see p.
26, 3). Stub. ii. 23 : -ndvTwv
re twv ap.aprrip.dTwi' icrwv uvtwv
Kai twv Ka.Topdwp.dTwv teal tovs
&<ppovas iivto~7)s ndyras &(ppovas
elvai t-ijv avTT)J Kai tativ %x0VTas
Siddeo-iv. Vie. Fin. iii. 14, 48:
Coiisentaneum est his quae
dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui
i'lum bonorurn finem quod appellimus extiemum quod ultinjnin crescere putent posse,
iisdem plaoere, esse alium alio
etiam sapient iorem, itemque
aliutn magis alio vel peccure
vel recte facere. Quod nobis

non licet dicere, qui crescere
bonorum finem non putamus.
Tnen fo low the same com
parisons as in Plutarch. Sen.
Kp. 66, 10 : As all virtues are
equal, so are omnes homines
quibns ilia; contigere. Ep. 79,
8: What is perfect admits of
no increase ; quicunque i'uerint sapientes pares erunt et
aequales.
Stob. ii. 198: iptCKei yap
Tw T6 T.rjvwvi Kai tois an-1 aifTuv
Stwikois (piKococpois, Suo ytVT) twv
avQpdnrwv ilvai, rb p.ev twv o~vouoaiwv to 8e twv (pavAwv Kai rb
ixkv twv ff-KOVoaiwv Sia TravTOS tou
fiiov xpwvQa' Ta's iperats to Se
twv (pav\wv rats wa/ci'ais.
3 Plat. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25 :
pL^re Ti <pav\ov apery wpoa-e'ivai
jUT/ê Kajaa xp^^rbv auw(Ttv, aWa
nd'sTws fxfv iv Traaiv afxaprwhbv
eivai tov a.p.aBr\, trepl navr*. 5' ao
Karopdovv rbv affre.cv.
209
CHAr
X.
270
THE STOICS.
an opinion. The bad man, on the contrary, can do
nothing aright ; he has every kind of vice ; he has
no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent,
cruel, and ungrateful.1
The Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfec
tion of the wise man, and contrasting with it the
absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in a series of
paradoxical assertions.2 The wise man only is free,
because he only uses his will to control himself ; 3 he
only is beautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and
attractive;4 he only is rich and happy (sutu^s),
because goods of the soul are the most valuable, true
riches consisting in being independent of wants.5
Nay, more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a
right view of everything has everything in his in
tellectual treasury,6 and he who makes the right use
of everything bears to everything the relation of
owner.7 The wise only know how to obey, and they
also only know how to govern ; they only are there
fore kings, generals, pilots ; 8 they only are orators,
1 Stub. Eel. ii. 116; 120;
5 C'c. Parad. 0 ; Acad. 1. c. ;
196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94,
117; 125; Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; 28; Sext. 1. c. ; Alex. Aphr.
ii. 20, 66; Pint. Sto. Rep. 11, Top. 79.
1 ; Sen. Benef. iv. 26 ; Sext.
8 Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2 ; 6, 3 ;
Math. vii. 434.
8, 1.
2 Compare the collection of
' Cic. Acad. 1. c. ; Diog. vii.
expressions respecting the wise 125.
and unwise in liaunihauer, Vet.
8 Cic. 1. c. ; Ding. vii. 122;
Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. Siob. ii. 206; Pint. Arat. 23.
On all the points discussed,
p. 169.
' Diog. 121 ; 32 ; Cic. Acad, Pint. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul.
ii. 44, 136. Parad. 5: Sti yudcos 16, p. 58 ; Tran. An. 12, p. 472 ;
S <ro<pbs iXiiBtpos al iras &<ppav Ps. Pint. De Nobil. 17, 2 ; Cic.
$ov\os.
Fin. hi. 22, 75 ; Hor. Ep. i. 1,
* Pint. C. Not. 28, 1 ; Cic. 106 ; Sat. i. 3, 124.
Acad. 1. c. ; Sext. Math xi. 170.
THE WISE MAN.

poets, and prophets ; 1 and since their view of the
Gods and their worship of the Gods is the true
one, only amongst them can true piety be found
they are the only priests and friends of heaven ; all
foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane,
and enemies of the Gods.2 Only the wise man is
capable of feeling gratitude, love, and friendship,3
he only is capable of receiving a benefit, nothing
being of use or advantage to the foolish man.4
To sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect,
absolutely free from passion and want, absolutely
happy ; 5 as the Stoics conclusively assert, he in no
way falls short of the happiness of Zeus,6 since time,
the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does
not augment happiness at all.7 On the other hand,
the foolish man is altogether foolish, unhappy, and
perverse ; or, in the expressive language of the Stoics,
1 Pint. Tran. An. 12 ; Oie.
Divin. ii. 63, 12!: Stub. ii. 122;
conf. Ps. Plut. Vit. Horn. 143.
Stob. ii. 122 and 216 ;
Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5.
Philodemus, irepi Be&v hiaywyris
(Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a
Stoic saying that the wise are
the friends of heaven, and
heaven of the wise.
' Sen. Ep. 81, 11 ; Stob. ii.
118.
* Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut.
Sto Rep. 12,1: C. Not. 20, 1;
and above, p. 230, 1 .
5 Stob. ii. 1H6 ; Plut. Stoic.
Abs. Poet. Die. 1, 4.
8 Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto.
Eep. 13, 2 ; Com. Not. 33, 2 ;
Stob. ii. 198. Seneca, Prov. i.'
5 : Bonus ipse tempore tantum
a Deo differt. Ibid. 6, 4 :

Jupiter says to the virtuous :
Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis:
ille extra patientiarn malorum
est, vos supra patientiarn. Ep.
73, 11 ; De Const. 8, 2; Cic.
N. D. ii. 61, 1 53 ; Ejrictet. Diss,
i. 12, 26; Man. 15; Horat.
Ep. i. 1. 106.
7 See p. 239, 1 ; Sen. Ep. 53,
11 : Non multo te Di ante
cedent . . . diutius erunt. At
mehercule magni artificis est
clausisse totum in exiguo.
Tantum sapienti sua, quantum
Deo oinnis astas patet. 73, 13:
Jupiter quo antecedit virum
bonum 1 Diutius bonus est, :
sapiens nihilo se minoris a?stimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio
breviore clauduntur.
271
Chap.
X.
272
Chap.
'
(2) Cmvernal depracitij.
THE STOICS.
every foolish man is a madman, he being a madman
who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most
closely affects him.1
This assertion is all the more trenchant because
the Stoics recognised neither virtue nor wisdom
outside their own system or one closely related
to it, and because they took a most unfavourable
view of the moral condition of their fellow-men.
That they should do so was inevitable from their
point of view. A system which sets up its own
moral idea against current notions so sharply as
that of the Stoics can only be the offspring of
a thorough disapproval of existing circumstances,
and must, on the other hand, contribute thereto.
According to the Stoic standard, by far the ma
jority, indeed, almost the whole of mankind, belong
to the class of the foolish. If all foolish people are
equally and altogether bad, mankind must have
seemed to them to be a sea of corruption and vice,
fiom which, at best, but a few swimmers emerge
at spots widely apart.2 Man passes his life such
had already been the complaint of Cleanthes 3in
wickedness. Only here and there does one, in the
1 tras fatyposv juafpeTai. 0'ic.
Pardd. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, lu; Diog.
vii. 124: Stub. Eel. ii. 124;
Horat. fiat. ii. .'!, 43.
2 The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in
ihis. Priep. Ev. vi. 8, 10) :
irs 9vv oittieva <p*?s" fotipamov, tts
oux* naiveffdai aoi 6oKti kot' ttrov
'OpeVTp Kal 'AAKjualcei/i, ttK^w tov
a&d>*u; eva. 8e ?i Svo p.6vovs <f>rjs
<r6(t>ou$ y*yov4vai. Similarly

Pint. Sto. Rep. 31, 5. '
" Seat. Math. ix. 90 in the
argument quoted, p. 146, 1 :
Man can be the most perfect
being, olov eiidtws, oti Sta Kaxtas
iroptuerai rbv iravra xp6vov, t 8k
pA\ ye, rhv TtKelvTuv Kal yap et
irore Trfptyevoiro aperris, tye Kal
irpbs Tats t&D fiiov Svcâis irepiyiveTai.
THE WISE MAN.

evening of life, after many wanderings, attain to
virtue. And that this was the common opinion among
the successors of Cleanthes, is witnessed by their
constant complaints of the depravity of the foolish,
and of the rare occurrence of a wise man.1
No one probably has expressed this opinion more
frequently or more strongly than Seneca. We are
wicked, he says ; we have been wicked ; we shall be
wicked. Our ancestors complained of the decline of
morals ; we complain of their decline ; and posterity
will utter the very same complaint. The limits
within which morality oscillates are not far asunder ;
the modes in which vice shows itself change, but its
power remains the same.2 All men are wicked ; and
he who has as yet done nothing wicked is at least in
a condition to do it. All are thankless, avaricious,
cowardly, impious; all are mad.3 We have all done
wrongone in a less, the other in a greater degree ;
and we shall all do wrong to the end of the chapter.4
One drives the other into folly, and the foolish are
too numerous to allow the individual to improve.5
1 This point will be again
considered in the next chapter,
Compare at present Sext. Mat h.
is. 133, who says: tlo'iv &pa
<ro<pol- Sirep oiix ijptirKe toTs airb
ttjs Stous, juXP' t"" "v" avtvptrov
ovros kot' ainoijs rov aotpuv.
Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p.
90 : rStv 5e avBptlnrav oi irXeTcrrot
inuiol, nviXKov Si cVyaflis piv eis ))
SeuTepos inr' airrwv yeyovivat
pvOtvercu, Siairtp ti itapdioôv
(<pov Kal irapa <pv<rtv, aicavuaTtpov
ruv oiVikos . . . oi 5e irdvres
kclkoi Kal t-niiTrjs aAAÂois rotovroi,
cos Hyfiev Sttupipew H\\ov &\Aov,

ixaivtadai f>\ &noius ndvras. Philodem. DeMus. (Vol. Here, i.),
col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot
take his stand upon the opinion
of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it
to be profane and impious.
2 Benef. i. 10, 13.
3 De Ira, iii. 26, 4 ; Benef.
V. 17, 3.
4 De Clemen, i. 6, 3 ; De
Ira, ii. 28, 1 ; iii. 27, 3.
a Ep. 41, 9 ; Vit. Be. i. 4.
273
Chap.
X.
THE STOICS.
He who would be angry with the vices of men, in
stead of pitying their faults, would never stop. So
great is the amount of iniquity ! 1
No doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded
ample occasion for such effusions, but his predecesFors must have found similar occasions in their own
days. Indeed, all the principles of the Stoic School,
when consistently developed, made it impossible to
consider the great majority of men as anything else
than a mass of fools and sinners. From this sweep
ing verdict, even the most distinguished names were
not excluded. If asked for examples of wisdom,
they would point to Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes,2
and, in later times, to Cato ; 3 but not only would
they deny philosophic virtue, as Plato had done be
fore them, to the greatest statesmen and heroes of
early times, but they would deny to them all and
every kind of virtue.4 Even the admission that
general faults belong to some in a lower degree than
1 See the pathetic descrip
tion, De Ira, ii. 8-10, amongst
other passages the following :
Ferarum iste conventus est :
. . . certatur ingenti quidem
nequitiaa certamine : major
quotidie peccandi cupiditas,
minor verecundia est, &c.
2 Diog. vii. 91 : Tew^piov 8e
rod vnapKrty elvcu rijy aperrju
(pyo'iv 6 Tlofftio'&vios r$ irpttrrq)
tov riQiKov \6yw to yei/tffdat 4v
wpoteoiy rovs irepl "XwKpaTnv, Atoy4vriv kcI 'Avrio-Bevriv. The limi
tation likewise contained herein
will be presently discussed.
Bpictet. Man. 15, mentions
Heraclitus as well as Diogenes
as 6t7oi.
3 See the immoderate lan
guage of praise of his admirer
Sen. De Const. 7, 1 : The wise
man is no unreal ideal, although,
like everything else that is
great, he is seldom met with ;
ceterum hie ipse M. Cato vereor
ne supra nostrum exemplar sit.
Ibid. 2, 1 : Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri
nobis Deos immortales dedisse
quam Ulixen et Herculem
prioribus sasculis.
4 Plutarch, Prof, in Virt. 2,
p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p.
265, 2.
THE WISE MAN.
27a
to others can hardly be reconciled with their principle Chap.

X.
of the equality of all who are not wise.1
The two moral states being thus at opposite poles, (3) /Jaiiver&iva.
a gradual transition from one to the other is, of course,
out of the question. There may be a progress from
folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom,2 but
the actual passage from one to the other must be
momentary and instantaneous.3 Those who are still
progressing belong, without exception, to the class
of the foolish ; 4 and one who has lately become wise
is in the first moment unconscious of his new state,5
1 Sen. Banef. iv. 27, 2 : Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant
Stoicos : quid ergo ? Achilles
timidus est ? quid ergo ? Aristides, cui justitia nomen dedit,
injustus est 1 &c. Non hoe
dicimus, sic omnia vitia esse in
omnibus, quomodo . in quibusdam singula eminent : sed
malum ac stultum nullo vitio
vacare . . . omnia in omnibus
vitia sunt, sed non omnia in
singulis extant (i.e., all points
are not equally prominent in
each one). It hardly requires
to be pointed out how nearly
this view coincides with that
of Augustine on the virtues of
the heathen, how close a re
semblance the Stoic doctrine of
folly bears to the Christian
doctrine of the unregenerate, ,
and how the contrast between
wisdom and folly corresponds
to that between the faithful
and unbelievers.
1 Pint. C. N. 10, 1 ; Prof,
in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep.
75. 8.
Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic.
Abs. Poet. Die. 2. The Stoics

are here ridiculed because, ac
cording to their view, a man
may go to bed ugly, poor,
vicious, miserable, and rise the
next morning wise, virtuous,
rich, happy, and a king. In
Prof, in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying
of Zeno's is given, that it is
possible to tell by a dream
whether we are advancing in
virtue.
1 See p. 266, 3 ; Pint. Prof,
in Virt. 1 ; Com. Not. 10, 2;
see p. 269, 1 ; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.
5 Pint. C. Not. 9, 1 : -rJjs
operas Kal rris evSaiu.ov/as irapaytvofievTis ttoWolkiv ou5' aio~6aveaQai rhv KTrftrdfievov oXovrai
8ta\\ri9eyai 5' avrbv on /UKpw
irp6o~6*v a6\idraTOS >v Kai axpovtffTOTOS VVV bfiOV <pp6vlflos al
fj.aKa.pios -yiyovev. So Sto. Rep.
19, 3. In explanation of these
words, Ilitter, iii. 657, aptly
refers to Stob. ii. 234 (ylyvteSat
8e Kal SiaKeXriddra Tiva o~otpbv
vofilôuat Kara rubs irpdorous
Xp&vovs), and Philo, De Agric.
p. 325 : Those yet inexperienced
T2
270
THE STOICS.
Chap.
*
The transition takes place so rapidly, and his former

state affords so few points of contact with the one on
which he has newly entered, that the mind does not
keep pace with the change, and only becomes con
scious of it by subsequent experience.
In this picture of the wise man, the moral idealism of the Stoic system attained its zenith. A vir
tuous will appears here so completely sundered from
all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all
the trammels of natural existence, and the indivi
dual has become so completely the organ of universal
law, that it may be asked, What right has such a
being to call himself a person ? How can such a
being be imagined as a man living among fellowmen ? Nor was this question unknown to the Stoics
themselves. Unless they are willing to allow that
their theory was practically impossible, and their
ideal scientifically untenable, how could they escape
the necessity of showing that it might be reconciled
with the wants of human life and the conditions of
reality ? Let the attempt be once made, however,
and withal they would be forced to look for some
means of adapting it to those very feelings and
in wisdom irapa tois <pi\o<r6<pots
5ia\(Ki]B6TfS thai \tyovrai aofyoltous yap &xp' atxplas &Kpas i\ti\atra? Kai Tar opiev avTtis ap-ri
irpinov atfiautmvs a^xavov tlitvai, <paa\, t))c iavribit TtKtiuiaiv.
Hil yap Kara tov axnov %pivov
apjpK avviaraa ftai ri}v re rpbs to
w4pai &<pt^v xa\ ti)v iris a<f>i^tws
KariKitîv, iA\' thai /itBdptov
ayvoiav, k.t.\. Sen. Ep. 76, 9,
likewise investigates the same

poiot, but ranges those who
have not yet attained the con
sciousness of perfection among
advancers, but not among the
wise.
PrantVs conjecture
(Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210),
that the aotpbs dia\t\rjdws is
connected with the fallacy
known as SiaAavflaKW, appears
to be questionable.
THE WISE MAX.

opinions towards which their animosity had formerly
been so great. Nor could the attempt be long de
layed. Daily a greater value was attached to the
practical working of their system, and to its agree
ment with general opinion. The original direction
of Stoic morality aimed at the absolute and uncon
ditional submission of the individual to the law of
the universe, yet, in developing that theory, the
rights of the individual asserted themselves unmis
takably. From this confluence of opposite currents
arose a deviation from the rigid type of the Stoic
system, some varieties of which, in the direction of
the ordinary view of life, deserve now further con
sideration.
THE STOICS^
278
CHAPTER XI.
THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY
PRACTICAL NEEDS.
Ch.sp. The Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely rooted in the
XI- _ proposition, that only virtue is a good and only vice
A. ^Things an evil. This proposition, however,, frequently brought
ferred and the Stoics into collision with current views ; nor was
esch-wcd. jj. wJthout its difficulties for their own system. In
the first place, virtue is made to depend for its

existence upon certain conditions, and to lead to
certain results, from which it is inseparable. These
results, we have already seen.1 were included by the
Stoics in the list of goods. Moreover, virtue is said
to be the only good, because only what is according
to nature is a good, and rational conduct is for
man the only thing according to nature. But can
this be so absolutely and unconditionally stated ?
According to the Stoic teaching the instinct of selfpreservation being the primary impulse, does not
this instinct manifestly include the preservation and
advancement of outward life ? The Stoics, there
fore, could not help including physical goods and
activities among things according to naturefor in1 See p. 230, 3.
THINGS TO BE PREFERRED OR ESCHEWED.

stance, health, a right enjoyment of the senses, and
such like.1 Practically, too, the same admission was
forced upon them by the consideration 2 that, if there
is no difference in value between things in them
selves, rational choiceand, indeed, all acting on
motivesis impossible. At the same time, they re
ject the notion that what is first according to nature
must therefore be perfect or good, just as in theory
they allow that the source of knowledge, but not
truth itself, is derived from the senses. When man
has once recognised the universal law of action, he
will, according to their view, think little of what is
sensuous and individual, and only look upon it as an
instrument in the service of virtue and reason.3
1 Cio. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Cell.
N. A. xii. 5, 7 : The primary
objects of natural self-love are
the irpaiTo koto <pvaiv ; and selflove consists mainly in this :
Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet [unusquisque],
ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Eel. ii. 142: Some
things are according to nature,
others contrary to nature,
others neither one nor the
other. Health, strength, and
such like, are among things
according to nature. Ibid. p.
148 : Twy 5e Kara (piiffiv atita<p6pwv
uvtwv ret u.v iffTi irpwra Kara
ipuaiv Ta 8e Kara (xeroxf/v. irpoira
p.eV 4/TTt Kara <pv<riv Kivqats 1)
oxeffts Kara rovs o~irepfj.a.Tiicovs
\6yous ytpofjLevrj, oiov iryicia hoX
ai(r$7t(Tis, Keyu> 5t t^jv KaT&KTjiptv
Kal itrxvv. Kara ueroxh" fie . . .
oiov x*tp apria Kal trafia bytaivov
Kal aio-d-fieets /x^ ireir^pw/AeVai
daoius Se Kal rwv irapa <puo~iv Kar'
uvd\oyov. Conf. Ibid. p. 60,

where the enumeration of the
irpwra Kara tpiaiv is also in the
Stoic sense, and above, p. 225.
* 1 Cio. Kin. iii. 15, 50 : Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse
diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone : nec
ullum sapientis munus aut opus
inveniretur, cum inter res eas,
qua? ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum delectum
adhiberi oporteret. The same
argument was used by the Stoa
against the theoretical aSiatpopia
of the Sceptics (see above, p. 37,
1), with which the practical
aSiCKpopia of Aristo is most
closely connected. It differs
only in name from the oVapa(a
of the sceptics, Aristo having a
leaning towards Scepticism.
See p. HI, 1.
3 Cio. Fin. iii. 6, 21 : Prima
270
Chap.
XI.
280
THE STOICS.
Chap.
XI.
Still, there remains the question, How can this be

possible ? and this is no easy one to answer. The
(^Second contemporary opponents of the Stoics already took
ary goodt. exception to the way in which the first demands of
nature were by them excluded from the aims of a
life1 according to nature; and we, too, cannot sup
press a feeling of perplexity at being told that all
duties aim at attaining what is primarily according
to nature, but that what is according to nature
must not be looked upon as the aim of our actions ; 2
since not that which is simply according to nature,
but the. rational choice and combination of what is
according to nature constitutes the good.3 Even if
the Stoics pretend to dispose of this difficulty, they
est enim conciliatio [oineiWis]
hominis ad ea qure sunt secun
dum naturam, simul autem
cepit intelligent! am vel notionem potius, quam appellant
evvoiav illi, viditque rerum
agendarum ordinem et ut ita
dicam concordiam, multo earn
pluris aastimavit quam omnia
ilia quas primum dilexerat :
atque ita cognitione et ratione
collegit ut statneret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis
per se laudandum et expetendum bonum . . . cum igitur in
eo sit id bonum, quo referenda
sint omnia . . . quamquam
post oritur, tamen id solum vi
sua et dignitate expetendum
est, eorum autem quae sunt
prima naturae propter se nihil
expetendum, &c. Similarly
dell. 1. c.
1 Pint. Com. Not. 4; Cic.
Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72 ; 29, 89.
1 Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22 : Ut
recte dici possit, omnia officia

eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae : nec tamen ut
hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis
naturaa conciliationibus honesta
actio. Consequens enim est et
post oritur.
' Pint. C. Not. 26, 2 : el yap
avra fxfv [to] TtpSyra Kara (pvaiv
cVyaflct fiii iffriv, 7] 8' thXoyiffros
ticKoyri Kal \rjypis avruv Kal rb
irdvra tce Trap 'tavrbv ironiv e/ca<ttov eVewa rov rvyxdveiv ruv
vp&roiv Kara, ipbaiv, k.t.A. elrrep
yap olnvrai, /it) (TTOxaofi4vovs
fifiS' ttpiefjLcvous rov Tvxtiv tueivov
rb rt\os X"' a\\' oS 5e* ^Kfiva
avatyipetj&ai, tt)v rovrwv iKXtrftv,
Kal jutj ravra. rt\os iikv yap rb
4ic\4yta6ai koI Aa/i/SaVei? liretra
tppovifitos' titttva S1 aura Kal rb
ruyxavtiv avrwv ou reAos, aAA'
(iiffirep &\tj rts uTTt/KeiTai rbv iKXtKriK^v aîav exowa. Cic. See
p. 279, 3.

Cannot, at least, fail to see that whatever contri.
.
butes to bodily well-being must have a certain positive value, and must be desirable in all cases in
281
Chap.
XI
'
which no higher good suffers in consequence ; and,

*
conversely, that whatever is opposed to bodily wellbeing, when higher duties are not involved, must
have a negative value (a-Kaîa), and, consequently,
deserve to be avoided.1 Such objects and actions *
they would not, however, allow to be included in the
class of goods which are absolutely valuable.2 It was
therefore a blending of Peripatetic with Stoic teach
ing when Herillus, the fellow -student of Cleanthes,
enumerated bodily and outward goods as secondary
and subsidiary aims besides virtue.3
Nor were the Stoics minded to follow the con- (2) Classes
temporary philosopher, Aristo of Chios (who in this $J^"^*
point, too, endeavoured to place their School on the ferent.
platform of the Cynic philosophy), in denying any
difference in value between things morally indif
ferent4 and in making the highest aim in life
1 Cic. I. c. 6, 20 ; Plut. 1. c. ;
Stub. ii. 142 ; Diog. vii. 105.
2 See p. 232. Stub, ii. 132 :
liiatpepeiv 5 Ktyovtriv aiperbv Kal
\riTrrbv . . nai koS6\ov rb ayaBbv rod a\iav $xOJ/TOS3 Diog. vii. 165: Herillus
taught SicupcpeivTeKos Kal uiroreA./8a COn this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) ttjs ptvyapKal
robs
<ro<pobs aroxdCeo-Bai, tov
Se jiivov rbv <ro<p6r. Hence Cic.
Fin. iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, because
he neither despises external
things, nor connects them with
the ultimate aim. Diog. 1. c,
however, says that he taught to

/ufToii aperrjs Kal xaxias adid<popa
thai ; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho
and Aristo, as upholders of
afiiatpopia. It would appear
from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from
true Stoicism. According to
Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic),
he had no followers after the
time of Chrysippus.
4 Cic. Le.s*g. i. 21, 55 : Si, ut
Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum
esse diceret quod honestum
esset malumque quod turpe,
ceteras res omnes plane pares
ac ne minimum quidem utrum
282
Chap,
XI.
THE STOICS.
consist in indifference to all external things.1 Virtue
with them bears, in comparison with the Cynic virtue,
a more positive character, that of an energetic will ;
they, therefore, required some definite relation to the
1 outward objects and conditions of this activity which
should regulate the choosing or rejecting or, in
other words, the practical decision. Accordingly, they
divided things indifferent into three classes. To the
first class belong all those things which, from a moral
or absolute point of view, are neither good nor evil,
> but yet which have a certain value; no matter
whether this value belongs to them properly, because
they are in harmony with human nature, or whether
it belongs to them improperly, because they are
means for advancing' moral and natural life, or
whether it belongs to them on both grounds. The
second class includes everything which, either by it
self or in its relation to higher aims, is opposed to
nature and harmful. The third, things which, even
adessent an abessent interesse.
Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47 :
Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre
aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas
praeter virtutes et vitia intra
<juas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13, 43 ; iii. 3,
11 ; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43 ; 25, 68 ;
v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42, 130;
Offic.Fragrn. Hortens. (in Noun,
Prsefract.) ; Diog. vii. 160 ; tjei-t.
Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually
places Aristo together with
Pyrrho.
1 Diog. 1. c. : Tf'Aoj ccpriaev
tlvai rb &Sia<p6pus %xovTa &"
Trpbs to fitra(b d/>Tr/s Kcd Kaxlas
jUtjS* t,vtivovv Iv avro7s irapaWaybv airoAtiirorro aAA' ^Triarjs 4irt

nivrav (xo"Ta- Cie. Acad. I.e.:
Huic summum bonum est in
his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem
moveri ; qua; aîcupopia ab ipso
dicitur. Chrysippus, in Pint.
C. Not. 27, 2 : Indifference to
that which is neither good nor
bad presupposes the idea of the
good, and yet, according to
Aristo, the good only consists
in that state of indifference.
Stnb. i. 920 ; Clem. Strom, ii.
416, C. See Cic. Fin. iv. 25,
68, for Chrysippus' attack on
this aliicKpopia.

in this conditional sense, have neither positive nor
negative value. The first class bears the name of
things preferential (Trpoijyfievov), or things desirable ;
the second is the class of things to be eschewed
(cnroTrporjyfiivov) ; the third is the class of things
intermediate.1 The last is called, in the strict sense,
indifferent, aSidfopov.^ It includes not only what
is really indifferent, but whatever has such a slight
negative or positive value that it neither enkindles
desire nor aversion. Hence the terms i7por^^vov
and airoTrpo^îEvov are defined to mean respectively
that which has an appreciable positive or negative
value.3 Under things preferential, the Stoics in
clude partly mental qualities and conditions, such as
1 Dioff. vii. 105: rwv a5iatp6pwv rd p.fv Keyouffi vpoTjyutva
to 8e diroirpor]yp.eva. Trpovyy/Atva
fAtv rd eôVTa a^'tav aironporiyjueVa 5 Ta dira^lav %X')VTa' By
a{i'a, the three meanings of
which are discussed, they un
derstand here neoi]v rivd bvyap.iv
^ Xptiav ffvfiliaWofjLtvrii' irpis rbv
Kara (pvfftv $tov. 107 : rSiv nporjryfitvaiv rd ju.ei St' aura rrporiiiraiy
rd 5* St1 Tpa, ra 5e 5i' aura Kal
Si1 Tepa. ... Si1 aura fxtv bWt
Kara <puiriy dtrri. 5i* Tepa 5t on
itepntoiei Xl'*'iai 0VK b\lyas.
^juoiws Si lxei Ka^ ctiroTrpoij-y/xeVov
Kara rbv ivavriov h6yov. Essen
tially the same account, only
somewhat fuller, in Stob. Eel.
ii. 142. Conf. tie. Acad. i. 10,
36 ; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72;
Si-xt.. Pyrrh. iii. 191 ; Math. xi.
60; Alex. Aphr. De An. 157.
Zeno (in Stob. 156 ; Cic. Fin.
iii. 16, 52) explains the concep
tion ipui\yp.lvov, and its distinc
tion from ayafloV : vporiypivov 8*

rivai Kiyovoiv, b dUtdtpopov or i*XtydpLfBa Kardiep&nyovntvoy \iyov
. . . ovo'iv 5e roiv dyaOtav tlvai
vportypevov, Sid to rr\v putyiari\v
dîav avrd ex***', rh 5* izponyfiivot r^)v oevrepav %6jQav ttal aîav
%X0V> ffuvtyyifciv ttws ry rwv
dyaGtiv ty&ffei oubi ybp 4v ai>\jj
rbv TrpoTyyovpLevov elvai rhv0a(TiX4a.
dh\d rbv fier' avrbv rerayptvov.
2 Stob. ii. 142 : dSicLpopa 5'
clrai \tyovo~i ra paraph rwv aya$&v Hal rstv fcaK&p, Stx&s rb a5ta<f)opof vouff8ai <pdp.evoiy Kaff eva
p.ev rpdirov to prfire dyaOhv pA\re
Kahbv Kal t6 piir* alptrbv p.i\re
(pei'KToV* KafT CTepov 8e rh prfire
ipfxrjs /x-fjre dtpoppr/s KivrjriK&v Ta
Kct0cira dStdfopa. Similarly
Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60,
distinguishes a third meaning.
It is, however, only a subdivi
sion of the second.
3 Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. F.
iii. 191 ; M. xi. 62.
28/1
Chap.
XI-.
281
Chap.
XI.
(3) Col
lision of
modified
and ab
stract
theory.
THE STOICS.
talents and skill, even progress towards virtue, in as
far as it is not yet virtue ; partly bodily advantage
beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external
goodsriches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c.
Under things to be eschewed, they understand the
opposite things and conditions ; under things indif
ferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our
choice, such as the question whether the number of
hairs on the head is even or uneven ; whether I pick
up a piece of waste paper from the floor, or leave it ;
whether one piece of money or another is used in
payment of a debt.1 Yet they drew a sharp distinction
between the purely relative value of things preferen
tial, and the absolute value of things morally good.
Only the latter are really allowed to be called good,
because they only, under all circumstances, are useful
and necessary. J Of things morally indifferent, on
the other hand, the best may, under certain circum
stances, be bad, and the worstsickness, poverty,
and the like may, under certain circumstances, be
useful.^ Just as little would they allow that the
independence of the wise man suffered by the recog
nition outside himself of a class of things preferential.
For the wise man, said Chrysippus,3 uses such things
1 J)iog.\n. 106; Stob. ii. 142;
Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51 ; Seset. 1. c;
Plat. Sto. Bep. 30. The Stoics
were not altogether agreed as
to whether fame after death
belongs to things to be de
sired. According to Cic. Fin.
iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Dio
genes denied it ; whereas the
younger Stoics, pressed by the
Academician Carneades, al
lowed it. Sen. Ep. 102, 3, even
quotes it as a Stoic maxim that
posthumous fame is a good.
But probably bonum is hers in
accurately used for npotryfi.evov.
' Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34 ; lti,
52 ; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p.
232, 3 and 283, 2.
3 Sen. Ep. 9,14: Sapientem

without requiring them. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred and to be
declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the
good. Between what is good and what is evil, a
third group is introduced, of doubtful character ; and
since we have seen the term aSid<j>opov is only ap
plied to this group in its more extended meaning, it
became impossible for them to refuse to apply the
term good to things desirable,1 or to exclude uncon
ditionally from the highest good many of the things
which they were in the habit of pronouncing indif
ferent.2 Nor was this concession merely the yielding
of a term, as will appear when particular instances
are considered. Not only may Seneca3 be heard, in
Aristotelian manner, defending external possessions
as aids to virtuenot only Hecato, and even Dio~
genes, uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted
nulla re egere [Seio-floi], et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse
[xpvfai].
Plut. Sto. Bcp. 30, 4 : iv Si
t<$ Trp&Ttp irtp! ayaSaiv rpixov
Ttva trvyxupei Kal SiSairi Tots
&ovKo[i4vois rh irpoTiyntva KaAeiv
ayaB&i Kal Kaicck ravavrla tchJtui5
ra!s Ate<ru>- effri, tt tis 0ov\tTait
Kara rat Toioiiraj irapiWayas
(with reference to the greatness of the difference between
KpoT\yp.ivov and ainmporiynevov)
t!> pir ayadbv avrmv \tyeiv rb Si
Kaxbn . . . 4v niv to7s <rr)fiaivoft4vots ov SiaTrlvTovTos avrov ra 5'
SAXo aToxa(o/ievou rrjs Kara rtis
ovonaolat <rw?)6e(as. See p. 284,
1 ; Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, and the
previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230, 3. Divg.
103, says that Posidoniu9 ioeluded bodily and external advantages among the aya6d. In
Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however,
expressly proves that they are
not goods.
2 Se7i. Ep. 95, 5 : Antipater
quoque inter magnos sectie hujus auctores aliquid se tribuere
dicit externis (namely for the
perfection of the highest good),
sed exiguum admodum. Seneca
here declaims, in the spirit of
strict Stoicism, against such a
heresy, but he himself says ( De
Yit. Be. 22, 5) : Apud me divitise aliquem locum habent, only
not summum et postremum.
But what philosopher would
have said they had this ?
* De Vit. Bea. 21.
265
Chap.
'
t>
( !
'*
.
>* *
tf
^
r
, .^1
TUB STOICS.
Chap.
XI.
and forbidden gains'not only Panastius giving

expression to much that falls short of Stoic severity 2
but even Chrysippus avows that in his opinion it is
silly not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from
pain,3 and that a statesman may treat honour and
wealth as real goods ; 4 adding that the whole Stoic
School agrees with him in thinking it no disparage
ment for a wise man to follow a profession which lies
under a stigma in the common opinion of Greece.s
He did not even hesitate to assert that it is better
to live irrationally than not to live at all.6 It is
' do. Off.iii. 12, 51 ; 13,55; condemned in the Alexandrian
23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Dio period, as they had been before,
genes of Seleucia says that it but still they were in bad re
is permitted to circulate base pute, and the second was par
money, knowingly to conceal ticularly so. Still more at
defects in a purchase from the variance with Greek customs
purchaser, and such like. He- was the course advocated by
cato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panse- Chrysippus (in Plut, Sto. Rep.
tius, thinks that not only will 30): ical KufiiffT^tTetv rpls eVl toua wise man look after his pro t Aaj8(Wa Td\avT9v. . Chrys
perty by means lawful and ippus himself (in Diog.) enu
right, but he believes that in a merates the objections to the
famine he will prefer letting his modes of life just named, and,
slaves starve, to maintaining in general, to all trading for
money, but his objections can
them at too great a sacrifice.
3 According to do. Off. ii. not have appeared to him con
14, 51, he would allow an at clusive.
Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and
torney to ignore truth, provided
his .assertions were at least 3. Com. Not. 12, 4 : kvaireKei
tjv &<ppova uaKKov ^ fj.^ f3tovv tchv
probable.
^5ttot6 ixfXKrj tppovi)afiv ; or, as
* Pint Ste. Rep. 30, 2.
it is expressed, Jl, 8: Heracli Ibid. 5.
5 According to Plut. Sto. tus and Pherecydes would have
Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, done well to renounce their
T)iog. vii. 1 88, Stub. ii. 224, the wisdom, if they could thereby
Stoics, following Chrysippus, have got rid of their sickness.
admit three ways of earning A prudent man would rather be
an honest livelihoodby teach a fool in human shape than a
ing, by courting the rich, by wi-e man in the shape of a
serving states and princes. The beast.
first and the last were no longer
PERFECT AND INTERMEDIATE DUTIES.

impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to
adapt their system to general opinion and to the
conditions of practical life, the Stoics were driven
to make admissions strongly at variance with their
previous theories. It may hence be gathered with
certainty that, in laying down those theories, they
had overstrained a point.
By means of this doctrine of things to be preterred and things to be eschewed, a further addition
was made to the conception of duty. Under duty,
287
Chap.
B- Per//.
mediate
duties.
or what is proper,1 we have already seen, the Stoics

understand rational action in general, which becomes ,
good conduct, or KaropOcofia, by being done with a
right intention.2 The conception of duty, therefore,
contains in itself the conception of virtuous conduct,
and is used primarily to express what is good or
rational. Duty thus appears to have a twofold
meaning, in consequence of the twofold characters
of things desirable and things good. If the good
were the only permitted object of desire, there would,
of course, be but one dutythat of realising the
good ; and the various actions which contribute to
this result would only be distinguished by their
being employed on a different material, but not in
respect of their moral value. But if, besides what
is absolutely good, there are things relatively good,
things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases
in which they may be pursued without detriment to
the absolute good or virtue if, moreover, besides
1 KadriKov, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to
Diog. 108. .
2 See p. 265.
288
THE STOICS.
vice, as the absolute evil, there are also relative evils,
which we have reason to avoid in the same cases
the extent of our duties is increased likewise ; a
number of conditional duties are placed by the side
of duties unconditional, differing from the latter in
that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred,
and avoiding things to be eschewed. From this
platform, all that accords with nature is regarded as
proper, or a duty in the more extended sense of the
term ; and the conception of propriety is extended
to include plants and animals.1 Proper and dutiful
actions are then divided into those which are always
such and those which are only such under peculiar
circumstancesthe former being called perfect, the
latter intermediate duties ; 2 and it is stated, as a
1 Diog. 107 : KaQriKov tpaclv
ftvat % irpaxQtv tHkoyiv ra? fcrx*
airo\oyi(Tfihv otov rb o.k6\ovQov iv
rrj 5<up (the same in Cicero),
Sircp Kal iirl tb <pvra Kal
SiaTehet ' dpaffBai yap kcltcI rointav
KaQiiKovTa. Stob. 158: opijTeTai
5 to KaQriKov rb ok6\ov8ov iv
o Trpax0ev eS\oyov airo\oylay
?X*i ' napa rb KaB%K0v 5e ivavriws.
rovro 5(OTti Kal els ra &koya
ruv
ivfpyti y&p ti na.K*iva
aKo\ov0ws rij eavruv tpvtret iiri
Si rwv \oytK&v CaW o&Vwy a7ro5t5oTOt, to ax6\uv$ov Iv flit?. Ka8vkov is, in general, what is ac
cording to nature, with which
ItKoXovBov coincides. (See p.
228, 2.) See JJiog. 108: lvipyt\)ta
5' aiirb [to Ka&VKOv'] fivai rati
Kara (pvo-tv KaraaKtvats ointiov.
2 Diog. vii. 109 : ray Ka6r\Kivruif ra /*cv del KaBijKei ra 5< ovk
att- Kal del uiy KaBJiKti rb kot'
aoerfy {fiv ' ovk del Si rb tywrav

rb awoKptvto~Oai Kal irtpvwafrttv Kal
ra Sfioia. Cic. Fin. iii. 17,58:
Est autem officium quod ita
factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex
quo intelligitur, officium me
dium quoddam esse, quod neque
in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis . . . quoniam enim videmus, &c. (see p. 265, 2) . . .
quoniamque non dubium est,
quin in iis qua? media dicimus
sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut
dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad,
i. 10, 37. Corresponding to
irpoijyfxffoy and a-n&irportyixcvov,
Zeno placed officium and contra
officium, as media quaedam be
tween recte factum and peccatum. Stob. ii. 158 : ruy Sk
KaQt)K6vrwy ra fiiy thai tpavt
PERFECT AM) INTERMEDIATE DUTIES.

peculiarity of the latter, that, owing to circum
stances, a course of conduct may become a duty
which would not have been a duty without those
peculiar circumstances.1 In the wider sense of the
term, every action is proper or in accordance with
duty which consists in the choice of a thing to be
preferred (j7rporj<yfiEvov) and in avoiding a thing to be
eschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only
fulfilled by virtuous action. A virtuous life and a
wish to do good constitute the only perfect duty.2
rc*Ac<a, a 8^ koX KaropQ&nara
KeyetrOai . . . oi/K elvai be KaropBdlxara ra fijj ovtws %x0VTa> & ^
oi5e TeAeta, Ka&ftlcovTa trpotrayopevowiv, aAAa jue'cra, olbv rb yafifLVy rb xpeafievtiv, rb bla\eyeffdai. ra roirots Zftoia.
1 Stob. lfiO. Diog. 1. c. : rh
fxev elvai Ka8i\KOvra avev trepiffTacrecos, ra be trtpiGTariKa. Kal
avev fxev trcpurrdaeais rdSe. vyeias
iiriuehetadai Kal ala&Tjrtjpiwi' Kal
to bfiota' Kara trapiffraffiv be rb
Tnjpovy eavrbv ko\ rvv Krrjtriv Siafifrnneiv. avdKoyov be Kal r&v
trapa rb Katr)Kov. This distinc
tion, of course, only applies to
ixiaov (toflf/Koy. The uncondi
tional duty of virtuous life can
not be abrogated by any cir
cumstances.
2 Compare, on this point,
besides the quotations on p.
265, 2, Diog. 108 : rav yap koB'
dpfi^jv êpyov/xevtuv to. uev Ka84iKovra elvai, rh be trapa ib KaBt)kov. to. 5* o&re KaB^Kovra aire
trapa rb KaBrjKov. KoB-r)Kovra
uev oZv eivai baa 6 \6yos cupel
(demands ; see p. 244, 2,
the alp&v \6yoi~) trote7v, &s^xel T^
yoiets Tijucjv, abe\tpobst trarpiba,
ffvutrepiQepetrBai tpl\ois' trapa rb

KaQriKov be bna jut/ alpel \6yos,
e g. neglect of parents ; otire be
KaB4]Kovra oiire trapa rb KaBrtKov,
Sera oW alpel \6yos vpdrreiv o6r
atrayopevei, olov KdpQos ave\e(rBai,
k.t.A. Combining with this the
passage previously quoted, it
appears that KaBriKov includes
not only actions which aim at a
moral good, but those which
aim at a simple trpoityiievuv ; and,
in view of the latter, KaBrtKov is
included among things inter
mediate, or &bid<t>opa in its more
extended meaning. Cic; see
p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that
those KaBiiKovra which are at
the same time KaropBiipiara, are
ovbe reKeia, aKXa fieffa . . . trapauerpelffBat be rb fxeffov KaBrjKov
abia<p6poi$ rinl Kahovaevots be
trapa <pi<riv Kal Kara tpvmv, rotaurt)V 8' ev<pvtav trpoa<pepop.evoLS,
&(rr' el fii) \ap.$dvoiaev aura if)
biat&oGfieBa atrepiirtrdfrrws (if,
without particular occasion, or
as Diog. 109 observes, &vev trepiordaewssee previous note
we despise or reject them) jui)
wtaifioveiv.
289"
Chap.
XI.
200
Chap'
XI'
C Bmo(l)*Perunited 1
affection.
THE STOICS.
Some confusion is introduced into this teaching
by the fact that in setting up the standard for dis
tinguishing perfect from imperfect duties, the Stoics
sometimes look at the real, sometimes at the per
sonal value, of actions, without keeping these two
aspects distinct. They therefore use the terms per
fect and imperfect sometimes to express the difference
between conditional and unconditional duties; at
other times, to express that between morality and
law.1 Far worse than the formal defect is the group
ing in this division under the conception of duty
things of the most varied moral character. If once
things which have only a conditional value are ad
mitted within the circle of duties, what is there to pre
vent their being defended, in the practical application
of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repug
nant to the legitimate consequences of the Stoic
principles ?
In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic
system sought in another respect to meet facts and
practical wants by abating somewhat from the aus
terity of its demands. Consistently carried out,
those demands require the unconditional extirpation
of the whole sensuous nature, such as was originally
expressed by the demand for apathy. But just as
the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified
by the admission of irpo7jj/j,sva, so this demand
was modified in two ways ; the first elements of
the forbidden emotions were allowed under other
names ; and whilst emotions were still forbidden,
1 In the latter sense naBriicov and Kwr6p9wim have been already
discussed, p. 2G4.
EMOTIONS.
certain mental affections were permitted, and even
declared to be desirable. Taking the first point, it
is allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels
pain, and that at certain things he does not
remain wholly calm.1 This admission shows that
their system was not identical with that of the
Cynics.2 It is not required that men should be
entirely free from all mental affections, but only
that they should refuse assent to them, and not
suffer them to obtain the mastery.3 With regard
to the other point, they propound the doctrine of
sviradsuai, or rational dispositions, which, as distinct
from emotions, are to be found in the wise man,
and in the wise man only. Of these rational
dispositions, they distinguish three chief be
sides several subordinate varieties.4 Although this
Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7 : When
3 Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2-4,
the wise man sees anything re- particularly the quotation in
volting, non . . . tangetur ani- Gell. from Epictetus: Even
mns ejus eritque sohto com- the wise man is apt, at terrible
motior 1 Fateor, sentiet levem occurrences, paulisper moveri
quendam tenuemque motum. et contrahi et pallescere, non
Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis opinionealicujus mali percepta,
quoque animo etiam cum vulnus sed quibusdam motibus rapidis
sanatum est, cicatrix manet. et inconsultis, ofhcium mentis
Id. ii. 2 ; Ep. 67, 3 ; De Const, atque rationis prasvertentibus.
10, 4 ; Stob. Floril. 7, 21 ; Pint. But what disiinguishes him
C. Not. 25, 5 ; Epictet. in Gell. from the foolish man is that
N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, only the foolish man and not
5, 6.
the wise man assents (o-iryica2 Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2 : TwriStTai, irpoo-e7ri5oaei) to such
Hominis naturam cum Stoicis impressions (fowom'oi).
vincere, cum Cynicis excedere.
Similarly Ep. 9, 3 : Hoc inter
nos et illos (Stilpo and the
Cynics in general) interest :
noster sapiens vincit quidem
incommodum omne, sed sentit :
iUorum ne sentit quidem.
D2
91
Chap,
_
29-2
Chap,
!
THE STOICS.
admission was intended to vindicate the absence

of emotions in the wise man, since the permitted
feelings are not emotions, still it made the boundaryline between emotions and feelings so uncertain that
in practice the sharply-defined contrast between the
wise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disap
pear altogether.
(2) ModiThis danger appears more imminent when we
âpathy.
observe the perplexity in which the Stoics were placed
when asked to point out the wise man in experience.
For not only do opponents assert that, accord
ing to their own confession, no one, or as good
as no one, can be found in actual history who alto
gether deserves that high title,1 but even their own
admissions agree therewith.2 They describe even
Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes as not completely
virtuous, but only as travellers towards virtue.3 It was
of little avail to point to Hercules or Ulysses,4 or,
iiayrlan <pa<riv ttvm rii $oi\ri<rtv
2 Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4 : Ubi
oiaav t(>\oyov up*ty.
Sub- enim istum invenies, quern tot
divisionsof /SouAijmjare : tBvoia, seculis quaerimus ? (the wise
tiy.tveia, aairavfibs, &7<iT7j<m ; of man.) Ep. 42, 1 : Scis quem
ei AajSeia : ai'5i>s, ayvtid ; of xaP& nunc virum bonum dioam 1
Tiptyis, evippocrvim, tvivpia. The Hujus secundae notae. Nam ille
same three euiraflemi are men- alter fortasse tanquam phoenix
tioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, semel anno quingentesimo naswith the remark that they only citur, see p. 273, 1, just as
belong to the wise. See Stob. everything great is rare. But
92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14 ; 72, 4 compare p. 274, 3.
ar.d 8, respecting the wise man's
3 Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and
cheerfulness.
p. 274, 2.
1 Besides the quotations,
4 Hos enim (says Sen. De
p. 271, see Pint. Sto. Rep. 31, Const. 2, 1, of the two named)
6 : Kai ii%v oB6' avrbv 6 Xpitnirnos Stoici nostri sapientes pronunattotpaivti (TTtovZaiov, ofat Tivh tuv tiaverunt, invictos laboribus,
aiiov yvwptfiav KaDt]yefj.6vwv. etc. Further particulars in
Cir. Acad. ii. 47, 145 ; Quintil. Heraclit. Alleg. Horn. c. 33
Inst, xii. 1, 18.
and 70.
EMOTIONS.
with Posidonius,1 to the mythical golden age, in
which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures
293
Chap.
X1'
of those heroes would have to be changed altogether,

to bring them into harmony with the wise man of the
Stoics ; and Posidonius might be easily disposed of
on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and
wisdom are things of free exercise, and, since free
exercise was wanting in the case of the first men,
their condition can only have been a state of uncon
scious ignorance, and not one of perfection.2 If, in
reality, there are no wise men, the division of men
into wise and foolish falls at once to the ground : all
mankind belong to the class of fools ; the conception
of the wise man is an unreal fancy. It becomes, then,
difficult to maintain the assertion that all fools are
equally foolish, and all the wise are equally wise. If,
instead of producing real wisdom, philosophy can
only produce progress towards wisdom, it can hardly
be expected to take such a modest estimate of its
own success as to allow that there is no real distinc
tion between a zealous student and a bigoted despiser
of its doctrines.
It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwith- (3) The
standing their own maxims, found themselves com- state "J
0
'
prvgreu.
pelled to recognise differences among the bad and
' Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these
wise men of the old world
Posidonius traced back all
lands of useful discoveries,
Posidonius is probably meant
by the ' younger Stoics ' (Sext.
Math, ix. 2fj), who say that
they introduced belief in the
Gods.
2 Sen. 1. c. U : Non dat

natura virtutem, ars est bonum
fieri . . . ignorantia rerum in
nocentes erant . . . virtus non
coutingit animo nisi instituto
et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto.
Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc
nascimur, &c.
204
Chap,
'
THE STOICS.
differences
system
these
among
differences
the good.
were, In
indeed,
reference
madetototheir
de
pend in the case of the bad upon the greater or
less difficulty of healing the moral defects, or, in the
case of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent.1
It was also natural that they should so nearly iden
tify the state of irpoKOTTrjor progress towards wis
dom, the only really existing statewith wisdom that
it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there
is a stage of progress at which a man is free from
all emotions, discharges all his duties, knows all that
is necessary, and is even secure against the danger of
relapse,2 such a stage cannot be distinguished from
wisdom, either by its want of experience or by the
1 Stob. Eel. ii. 236 : ttray Se
ftinwv twv afjLapTTjfidraiv Aval Tivas
iv avTOis $.a<popa?, ko.B6<jov to fiev
avToiv aicb ffKArjpas Kal SufftaTOv
5ia0(Tca>s ylytrat, Ta 5' oh. (See
p. 251, 2, for the difference
between emotion and disease of
the soul.) Kal twv (nrovSaioty ye
aWovs &\\wi> TrpOTpeirTtKarepovs
ylyvfffdat Kal irtartKoiTepous %ti 5e
Kal ayxipovtrripovs, Kara to jxtaa
ra 4fj.irept\aâv6ûa TaV eV(Tco-iwv a-vuliaivovffaw, i.e., virtuous
men are not all equally secure.
These differences of degree do
not, however, apply to wisdom
(nor on the o> her hand to folly),
which admits of no increase,
but only to such properties as
are included in the whole moral
state, but are not themselves
of moral nature. See Cio. Fin.
iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.
2 Stob. Serm. 7, 21 : 6 V eV
anpov, tprjol [Xpuemnros] 7rpoK(Jjr-
icvv anayra Travrats airoMSwtrt to

KaQrjKovTa Kal ovoev irapakeiirn
tov Se toi5tou |8toi> ovk elval ttoj
fprjfrlv evSa'ifjLOva dX\' ev lytyveadat
auT$ T^f euSaifxoviav orav at /icVai
jrpdîs aural irpoaXd&iaat to j8efiaiov Kal tKTiKov Kal IS'iav -nrjl^v
riva XaBvaiv. Chrysippus was
probably the author of the divi
sion of progressers into three
classes, which is discussed by
Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who
have reached the highest stage
it is said, omnes jam affectus
et vitia posuerunt, quse erant
complectenda didicerunt, sed
illis adhuc inexperta tiducia
est. Bonum suum nondum in
usu habent. Jam tamen in ilia
quae fugerunt recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est
retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se
nondum liquet et . . . scire se
netciunt.
EMOTIONS.
absence of a clear knowledge of oneself. For has it
not been frequently asserted that happiness is not
increased by length of time, and that the wise man
is at first not conscious of his wisdom ? 1 If, how
ever, the highest stage of approximation to wisdom
is supposed still to fall short of wisdom, because it
is not sure of its continuance, and though free from
mental diseases, it is not free from emotions,2 how,
it may be asked, do these passing emotions differ
from the mental affections which are found in the
wise man ? Is there any real distinction between
them ? If the progressing candidate has attained
to freedom from diseased mental states, is the danger
of a relapse very great ? Besides, the Stoics were by
no means agreed that the really wise man is free from
all danger. Cleanthes held with the Cynics that
virtue can never be lost ; Chrysippus admitted that,
in eertain cases, it is defectible.3 After all this
1 See pp. 239, 1 ; 271, 7.
s Sen. Ep. 75, 10 : Quidam
hoc proficientium genus de quo
locutus sum ita complectuntur,
ut illos dicant jam effugisse
morbos animi, affectus nondum
(on this distinction, see p. 251,
2), et adhuc in lubrico stare,
quia nemo sit extra periculum
malitise nisi qui totam earn excussit. The same view is up
held by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.
3 Ding. vii. 127 : tV aptr^v
Xpfonriros fiev airo/3\r?T^y, KAeavdnis 5e a.va.-K6$\t]'TOv ' 6 p\v, airoBKtjt^v, Stcfc fi46vv Ka\ /xeKayxo\tav d 5e, avanSfSXtlTov, Sta
SeBalovs KoroXîf/eis. The latter
view was that of the Cynics.
Although departed from by
Chrysippus, it belongs to those

points in which the original
relation of Stoicism to Cyni
cism was weakened by him.
Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in
the spirit of Cleanthes, says
that he considered a candi
date of the first class secure
against relapses. On the other
hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, a, B
(Schol. in Arist. 86, a, 48 ;
b, 30), says first that the Stoics
declared virtue to be indefec
tible, but subsequently limits
this assertion by saying that,
iv xoupois (the reading teapots is
better) koI nt\ayxM&'S, virtue,
together with the whole rational
life (\oyiKî ?{u), is lost, and
succeeded, not indeed by vice,
295
296
THE STOICS.
Chap,
admission is only one among many traits which prove
Y T
' _ that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the ori
ginal severity of their demands.
but by a e(is fif'ar). A similar
question is, Whether the wise
man can become mad ? which
is answered in the negative by
Diog. vii. 118, though not with-
out some modifying clauses,

Alex. Aphr. De An. I06, b, also
combats 1he view that the wise
man will act virtuousty when
in a frenzy.
APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.
297
CHAPTER XII.
All that has hitherto been stated has regard to the
general principles only of the Stoics touching the
end and the conditions of moral action. Whether
the mere exposition of principles be enough, or
whether the practical application of these principles
to the special relations of life does not also form part
of moral scienceis a question as to which the Stoic
School was not originally unanimous. Aristo, a
Cynic on this as on other points, was of opinion that
this whole branch of moral science is useless and
unnecessary ; the philosopher must confine himself
exclusively to things which have a practical value, the
fundamental ground of morality.1 Within the Stoic
School, however, this view did not gain much
1 Further particulars have
been already given, p. 61.
Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the
subject of applied ethics, which
Aristo rejected, parsenetice, or
parsprseceptiva. Sextus speaks
of twordwoia irapaixeTi/ciis and
a viro8eTiit6s. Both terms, however, appear to denote the same
thing; for uwo$(Tihbs is denned
by Muson. in Stob. Floril. 117,
8, as TrapaivfTm6s. He who is
himself insufficiently educated
will do well (rirwv \6ywv bitoitiv
inroQeriKwv iraph twv irtTroivfievwv
ipyov tiSfvai rim fitv QAaficpd
riva Si a<piKipa avBpdirois. InroBtrutbs t6ttos is therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65).
See p. 223, note 1.
Chap.
'_
298
THE STOICS.
Chap, support. Even Cleanthes, who otherwise agreed

J_ '__ with Aristo, did not deny the value of the applica
tion of theory to details, provided the connection of
details with general principles were not lost sight of.1
Nor can there be any doubt that, after the time of
Chrysippus, details engrossed much of the attention
of the Stoic philosophers. Posidonius enumerates, as
belonging to the province of moral philosophy, pre
cept, exhortation, and advice.2 His teacher, Panajtius, had discussed the hortatory side of morality3 in
three books on duties, which are imitated in Cicero's
well-known treatise.4 The division of ethics attri
buted to Diogenes,5 and by him referred to Chry
sippus, leaves place for such discussions ; 6 and, not
to mention Aristo's opposition, which supposes the
existence of applied moral science, the example of his
fellow-student Persasus, whose precepts for a science
of banqueting 7 have been already referred to, proves
1 Sen. Ep. 94, 4 : Cleanthes
utilem quidem judioat et hanc
partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab
universo rluit, nisi decreta ipsa
philosophise et capita cognovit,
2 Bee p. 223, 1.
"
s See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7 ; 3, 9 ;
iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said
that he chiefly followed Pansetius (irtpl tw KaBi\K.6vTmv), not
as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See
p. 300, 2.
4 CAc. Off. i. 3, 7 : Omnis de
officio duplex est quaastio: unum
genus est, quod pertinet ad
finem bonorum : alterum, quod
positum est in praeceptis, quibus
in omnes partes usus vitse conformari possit. He would de-
vote his attention to official

quorum pracepta traduntur.
Cicero then goes fully into
particulars. He treats of
amusement and occupation
(i. 29, 103) ; of the peculiar
duties of the young and the
old, of officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34) ; of outward
appearance, gait, conversation
(i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Pansetius must have given a similar
treatment to the subject,
s See p. 223, 1.
* Particularly in the portions treating irepl tu>v kuBtiK^v-rav and irepl TrporpoTruv t nal
oiroTpoiroic.
7 See p. 260, 4.

how early practical ethics had obtained a footing
within the Stoic School. Moreover, the elaborate
theory of virtue propounded by Chrysippus and his
followers 1 can hardly have failed to include many of
the principal occurrences in life. Thus a number
of particular precepts are known to us, which are
partly quoted by other writers as belonging to the
Stoics, and are partly to be found in the pages of
Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and in
Cicero's treatise on duties. Indeed, the Stoics were
the first who went at all deeply into the subject of
casuistry.2 At a later epoch, when more general
questions had been settled by Chrysippus, the pre
ference for particular enquiries within the domain
of applied moral science appears to have increased
among the Stoics.3 Probably none but the later
members of the School advanced the unscientific
assertion4 that we ought to confine ourselves to
1 See p. 260, 4, and 2G1, 1.
2 According to Cic. Off. i.
2 ; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Panastius,
in the third chief division of
his treatise on duties, intended
to discuss cases of collision beiween apparent interest and
duty, but his intentions were
never carried out. It appears,
however, from Off. i 45, 159 ;
iii. 12, 50 ; 13, 55 ; 23, 89, that
these cases were frequently
discussed, not only by the
pupils of Pansetius, Posidonius,
and Hecato, but by Diogenes
of Seleucia and Antipater of
Tarsus.
3 The Treatise of Paneetius
appears to have been used as a
chief authority, not only by
Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a cotemporary

of Cicero, had added discussions on the care, of health
and wealth {Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86) ;
and Hecato, in his treatise on
duties, had added further
casuistical investigations {(Ho.
iii. 23, 89). Brutus, too, who,
like his teacher Antiochus, was
devoted to a moderate Stoicism,
and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45,
reports that he had laid down
rules for the relations of
parents, children, and brothers
in his treatise irepl toD ko0^kovtos, may have followed
Panaatius.
4 Sen. Ep. 94, 1 ; 95, 1.
209
Chap.
'_
300
THE STOICS.
precepts for particular cases, since only these have
any practical value.
In this extension of the moral theory, besides the
desire for scientific completeness, the endeavour may
also be observed to subordinate all sides of human
activity to moral considerations. In the virtuous
man, as the Stoics held, everything becomes virtue ; 1
and hence everything is included in moral philo
sophy. Thereby, without doubt, the Stoic School
contributed in no small degree towards settling and
defining moral ideas, not only for its immediate con
temporaries, but also for all subsequent times. Never
theless, the more the teaching of the School entered
into the details of every-day life, the more impossible
it became to prevent practical considerations from
overriding the natural severity of Stoic principles,
or to keep the strictness of scientific procedure from
yielding to considerations of experience.
The order and division which the Stoics adopted
for discussing details in the hortatory part of moral
science are not known to us ; nor, indeed, is it known
whether that order was uniform in all cases.2 It
1 Stob. ii. 128 : iv eei (not
only 4v oê'cei, see p. 230) Be ou
Il6vas tlvai t&s aperks a\ka Kal
Tas &Was r4xvas ras eV a-jruvSaitii aiSpl, ak\0La)6ci(ras itnh tt}S
dtpeTTjs Kal yevopLtva* o^teTaizTtfitous, oiovil "yap aptras ylyetffdat.
2 The treatise of Pantetius
we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9 ;
iii. 2, 7 ; 7, 33discussed its
subject tirst from the platform
of duty, and then from that of
interest. The third part, which

Pansetius proposed to himself
the collision between duty and
interestwas never fully car
ried out. Cicero adds discus
sions on two questions, which
of two conflicting duties and
which of two conflicting in
terests must be preferred (i. 3,
10, c. 43 ; ii. 25). Otherwise
he appears in his two first
books to follow the order of
Pansetius.
THE INDIVIDUAL.
301
will be most convenient for the purpose of our pre- Chap.

xij
sent description to distinguish, in the first place,
those points which refer to the moral activity of the
individual as such, and afterwards to go on to those
which relate to social life. Subsequently, the teach
ing of the Stoics on the relation of man to the course
of the world and to necessity will engage our atten
tion.
/ It was in keeping with the whole tone of the a. The in/Stoic system to devote, in ethics, more attention to d^dj^"
the conduct and duties of the individual than had portance
\ been done by previous philosophy. Not that pre- Sj^, {,(.
vious philosophers had altogether ignored this side, dividual.
Indeed, Aristotle, in his investigations into indivi
dual virtue, had been led to enquire carefully into
individual morality. Still, with Aristotle, the in
fluence of classic antiquity on the border-land of
which he stands was sufficiently strong to throw the
individual into the background as compared with *
the community, and to subordinate ethics to politics. '
In the post Aristotelian philosophy, this relation was
exactly reversed. With the decline of public life in
Greece, intellectual interest in the state declined
also ; and, in equal degree, the personality of the in
dividual and circumstances of private life came into
prominence. This feature may be already noticed
in some of the older Schools, for instance, in the
Academy and Peripatetic School. The Peripatetic,
in particular, had, in the time of its first adhe
rents, travelled far on the road which the founder
had struck out. Among the Stoics, the same
302
Chap,
Xl
THE STOICS.
feature was required by the whole spirit of their
system. If happiness depends upon man's internal
state and nothing external has power to affect it,
the science which professes to lead man to hap
piness must primarily busy itself with man's moral
nature. It can only consider human society in as
far as action for society forms part of the moral duty
of the individual. Hence, in the Stoic philosophy,
researches into the duties of the^ individual occupy
a large space, and there is a corresponding subordi\ nation of politics. These duties form the subject of
by far the greater part of the applied moral science
of the Stoics ; and it has been already set forth 1 how
minutely they entered in that study into possible
details. At the same time, the scientific harvest
resulting from these researches is by no means in
proportion to their extent.
Confining our attention to the two first books of
Cicero's work, De Officiis, to form some idea of the trea
tise of Panastius on duties, we find, after a few introduc
tory remarks, morality as such (honestum) described,
according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues
(i. 5-42). In discussing the first of these, intelligence,
love of research is recommended, and useless subtlety
is deprecated. Justice and inj ustice are next discussed ,
1 See pp. 260, 298. Amongst
other things, as we learn from
the fragment in Athen. xiii.
665, a, Chrysippus discussed
the question of shaving ; and
Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes,
in illustration of the useless enquiries of the Stoics, iy rois
irtpl ko.97ik6vtuiv, an enquiry

whether it is proper to take
the largest portion before
one's father at table, and
whether it is proper to cross
the legs in the school of a
philosopher,
THE INDIVIDUAL.
in all their various forms, due regard being liad to the
cases of ordinary occurrence in life. Liberality, kindness, and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of
justice ; and this leads to a consideration of human
society in all its various forms (c. 16-18, GO). Turn
ing next to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher draws
attention to the fact that bravery is inseparably con
nected with justice. He then describes it partly as it
appears in the forms of magnanimity and endurance,
regardless of external circumstances, partly in the
form of energetic courage ; and, in so doing, he dis
cusses various questions which suggest themselves,
such as the nature of true and false courage, mili
tary and civil courage, and the exclusion of anger
from valour. Lastly, the object of the fourth chief
virtue (c. 27) is described, in general terms, as what
is proper (decorum, Trpsirov), and the corresponding
state as propriety, both in controlling the impulses
of the senses, in jest and play, and in the whole per
sonal bearing. The peculiar demands made by in
dividual nature, by time of life, by civil position, are
discussed. Even outward proprietiesof speech and
conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in be
haviour,1 honourable and dishonourable modes of
lifedo not escape attention.2
In the second book of his work, Cicero considers
the relation of interest to duty ; and having proved,
1 eura{(a, cuKatpfa, talis ordo
2 i. 43. We omit Cicero's
actionum ut in vita omnia sint treatise, this section not being
apta inter se et convenientia. found in Panaetius.
i. 40, 142 ; 144.
303
Chap'.
204
THE STOICS.
vantageous is brought on us by other men. he turns

to the means by which we may gain the support of
others, and by which affection, trust, and admiration
may be secured. He reviews various kinds of ser
vices for individuals and the state, and embraces
the opportunity to give expression to his abhor
rence of despotism and republican servility to the
people. The principles on which this review is con
ducted are such that objection can rarely be taken
to them from the platform of modern morality. Yet
the Stoic bias is unmistakeably present in the con
ception and support of the rules of life, and parti
cularly in the definitions of various virtues ; few of
the moral judgments, however, are other than might
have been expressed from the platform of the Pla
tonic and Aristotelian ethics.2 The same remark
holds good of some other recorded points by means
of which the Stoics gave a further expansion to their
picture of the wise man.3 Revolting as their tenets
at times appear, there is yet little in their applica
tion that deviated from the moral ideas generally
current.
1 Panaetius still more diffusively, 5, 16.
2 Such, for instance, as the
prohibition against being angry
with enemies (i. 25, 88), which
recalls at once the difference cf
the Stoics and Peripatetics on
the admissibility of emotions.
See p. 252.
' Ding. 117 says: The <r<S<(>o$
or (rjrouSaius is free from vanity
(Studios), is earnest (oioTijpis),
frank (&tclf)$T)\os), and with no

inclination to preteDce. He
stands aloof from the affairs of
life (jntpiyiiav), lest he should
do anything contrary to duty,
See p. 323, 1. Slob. ii. 240,
says : The wise man is gentle
(Trpooj), quiet (ri<rix'os), and
considerate (icdtrpios), never exciting angry feelings against
others, never putting off what
he has to do.
THE INDIVIDUAL.
3C5
More peculiar, and at the same time more start- Chap.

XII '__
ling, is another feature about the Stoics. Let not
too much be made of the fact that they, under certain (2) Oyni t
, hit
ci
cismoft/te
circumstances, permitted a lie.1 Were not Socrates stoics.
and Plato,' at least,' of the same opinion
? And,' to W^P"*'.
1
ncmxon if
be frank, we must admit that, although in this re- Stoics with
spect moral theories are strict enough, yet practice Cynics.
is commonly far too lax now. Very repulsive, how
ever, are many assertions attributed to the Stoics,
respecting the attitude of the wise man to the
so-called intermediate things. Was not the very
independence of externals, the indifference to every
thing but the moral state, which found expression
.in the doctrine of things indifferent and of the wise
1 Chrysippus, in Pint. Sto.
Hep. 47, 1 : $\d<liuvuv oi <ro<po\
ij'CuSeiS rpavraalas ipiwotovyrtv, ay
at tpavraifflai noiuiaiv aiiroreAais
Tflcs o~uyKara0<reis * TnWdKis yap
oi o~otpo\ t{>6u5f( xpwvrai Tphs robs
ipauKovs Kal tpavrariav wapiffratri
vtdaW/r, oil p-h* airiar tt/s cuyKaTaBifft&s ' tifti Kal rrjs uvoKJityeus
airia rvs tyevSuvs iarai Kal ri}S
airaTTjs. Stob. 1 i. 230 : fJ.7] tyevoeaQai
rbv o6tpop oA\' iv ttuitiv a\r)8tvnv
oil yap 4ii Tip Kiytiv ri i//e05os rb
tfrcuSecrtfcu inrdpxeiVi &AA' iv xij>
Siatyfuarais rb tyfvoos \iyttv Kal
dwl oxarr; rwv irKrurioti.
fxivtoi i^tuSci ttotI ffuyxpyirao'dat
[1. -(recrtfa/J vopLiQivirtv aiirbv Kara
TtiKKtibs rp6novs avtu avyKaraeffeaiy Kal yap Kara trrparijy:av
irpbs rwv airiir&Kaiv, Kal Kara rr]V
rod (rvpupipovros npo6paatv (which,
however, may not be translated
as Ritter iii. 662 does ' for the
sake of advantage ' ; it rather
refers to such cases as those
mentioned by Xen. Mein. iv. 2,

17, and Plato, Rep. ii. 382, c.
389, B ; iv. 459, c, in which the
interests of another or of the
community require deception)
Kal kot' aWas QlKOVOfiias rov
filov iroWis. In accordance with
this passage, too, the statement
of Procl. in Alcib. (Op. ed.
Cous. iii. 64)that the Stoics
ditler from their predecessors
in that they reject all lies
must be exp'ained : aire yap
iârarav ion SiKaiws k<xt' aiirobs
o&T /3ioe<r0cu o&Te avoffrepe'iv,
aA\' K((TT7J rwv irpa'^twv roiratv
anb noxdypas irp6eiffiv e&ais Kal
fiSiicds ia-riv. The poi.it here in
di.-pute is simply verbal ; the
Stoics were, in reality, at one
with Plato, in not calling per
mitted falsehood untruth or
deceit only for the reasons
quoted by Chrysippus and Stobseus.
X
306
Chap,
THE STOICS.
man's apathy, at the root of that imperfection of life
and principle which is so prominent in the Cynic
School, the parent School of the Stoics ? Granting
that in the Stoic School this imperfection was toned
down and supplemented by other elements, still the
tendency thereto was too deeply rooted from its ori
gin, and too closely bound up with its fundamental
view of life, to be ever properly eradicated. It did
not require, indeed, a Cynic life from its members ;
nay, more, it avowed that, except in rare cases, such
a life ought not to be followed ; 1 still the Cynic's
life was its ideal ; and when it asserted that it was not
necessary for a wise man to be a Cynic, it implied
that, if once a Cynic, he would always be a Cynic.2
Stoicism took for its patterns3 Antisthenes and Dio
genes quite as much as Socrates ; even those who
held, with Seneca,4 that a philosopher ought to ac
commodate himself to prevailing customs, and, from
regard to others, do what he would not himself ap
prove, did not therefore cease to bestow their highest
admiration on Diogenes's independence of wants, not1 Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68 : Cynicorum autem rationem atque
vitam alii cadere in sapientem
dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte
casus incident, ut id faciendum
sit, alii nullo modo. The latter
must, however, have been in a
minority.
2 Vioq. 121: Kvvitiv i ' outIii'
\rbv ao<p6v~\ thai f*p rbr Kvvta/iby trvnTOfiov iir' aperiiv SSbv.&is
'Awok\65wpos [on whom, see p.
SI, 1] fV rp ifliitp. Stob. 238:
Kvvteiv re tbv ffo<pbv \4-)0u(riv,
ttrov
4mp(vtiv rtf nvviafx'?, ou
uV <ro<)>bv vvt' &c &pla<r6ai tou

nvnio/iou.
3 See p. 274, 2. According
to the epigrams of Timon, in
Diog. vii. 16, Athen. iv. 158, a,
Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno's
School must have presented a
very Cynical appearance. I'robably, the description is partially true of the earlier history
of that School; still I would
attach no great value to it as
illustrating the system.
4 Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 10,
in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.
THE INDIVIDUAL.
withstanding his eccentricities.1 More consistent
thinkers even approximated to Cynicism in their
807
Chap.
XI1"
moral precepts,2 and in later times a School of

younger Cynics actually grew out of the Stoic School.
Bearing, as the Stoics did, this close relationship (b) In
to the Cynics, it cannot astonish us to find amongst ^"^/otm
them many instances of the most revolting traits in
Cynicism. Their contempt for cultured habits and
violation of right feelings fully justify the righteous
indignation of their opponents. Chrysippus regarded
many things as perfectly harmless in which the reli
gious feeling of Greece saw pollution,3 and pleaded
in defence of his opinion the example of animals, to
show that they were according to nature. The
care for deceased relatives he not only proposed
to limit to the simplest mode of burial, but would
have it altogether put aside ; and he made the
horrible suggestion, which he even described in
full, of using for purposes of nourishment the
flesh of amputated limbs and the corpses of the
nearest relatives.4 Great offence, too, was given by
1 See, on this point, Tranq.
An. 8, 4 ; Benef. v. 4, 3 ; 6, 1 ;
Ep. 90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1,
does not, however, agree with
the Stoic custom of sowing ex
hortations broadcast.
1 As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.
' Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the
question being as to the pollu
tion of the temples by the
contact with the dead or lyingin women or unclean foods) ;
in other cases indeed, as Plu
tarch objects, he would not

allow these considerations.
4 Besides Dwg. vii. 188, and
Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see Chrysippus's own words, in Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193).
The majority of the Stoics
appear to have limited canni
balism to cases of extreme
necessity. See Diog. 121. Chry
sippus had probably been
speaking, in the context, of the
different modes of treating the
dead among various nations
THE STOICS.
the Stoics, and, in particular, by Chrysippus, in their
treatment of the relation of the sexes to each other ;
nor can it be denied that some of their language on
this subject sounds exceedingly offensive. The Cynic
assertion, that anything which is in itself allowed
may be mentioned plainly and without a periphrasis,
is also attributed to the Stoics.1 By his proposals for
the dress of women, Zeno offended against propriety
and modesty,2 and both he and Chrysippus advocated
community of wives in their state of wise men.3 It
is, moreover, asserted that the Stoics raised no ob
jection to the prevalent profligacy and the trade in
unchastity,4 nor to the still worse vice of unnatural
crime.5 Marriage among the nearest relatives was
held to be consonant to nature by the leaders
of the School ; s and the atrocious shamelessness of
Diogenes found supporters in Chrysippus,7 perhaps,
too, in Zeno.8
It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great
injustice to take these statements for more than
theoretical conclusions drawn from the principles
(Cio. Tusc. i. 45, 108), in
tending to prove that no uni
formity of practice prevailed.
1 (He. Off. i. 35, 128, with
the limitation: Cynici aut, si
qui fuerunt Stoici psene Cy
nici.
2 Diog. vii. 33 : Kal dtrBriri Si
Tfl auTjj KeAetyt i xpi)a6ai Kal avSpas
Kal yvvaixas Kal ^vqSiv jx6piov a-noKcKpvtpBai. The latter act is
only conditional, and allowed
in certain cases, such as for
purposes of gymnastics.
Diog. 33; 131.
' Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.

' Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200 : 245;
Math xi. 190; Clement. Homil.
v. 18.
8 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii.
205; 246 ; Math. xi. 191 ; Pint.
Sto. Rep. 22 ; Clement. Horn,
v. 18.
7 Plut. 1 c. 21, 1.
8 Sextus, however (Pyrrh.
iii. 206), attributes to him, as
the representative of the School,
what properly only belongs to
Chrysippus : t6 re alaxpovpyuv
. . . 6 7d\vtnv ovk airoSoKi/xifci.
THE INDIVIDUAL.
to which they were pledged. The moral character
of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is quite above
suspicion. It seems, therefore, strange that they
should have felt themselves compelled to admit in
theory what strikes the natural feeling with horror.
It cannot, however, be unconditionally accepted that
the statements laid to their charge as they used them
imply all that historians find in them. Far from it; of
some of their statements it may be said not only that
they do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral,
but that they are directed against actions customarily
allowed, the argument being, that between such
actions and actions admittedly immoral there is no
real difference. This remark applies, in particular,
to Zeno's language on unnatural vice.1 It was not,
therefore, in opposition to the older Stoics, or a
denial of their maxim that love is permitted to a
wise man,2 for the younger Stoics to condemn most
explicitly any and every form of unchastity, and, in
particular, the worst form of all, unnatural vice.3
1 His words (Sext. Math. xi.
1!)0; Pyrrh. iii. 245 ; Plut. Qu.
Con. iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows :
Biafivp'iêtv 5e |U7]5ei> pakkov y-riSe
T/CT0W iratfiLKO. 3)
7Tai5lKCt /A7)5
(NlKea fi &p(Tva ' oil yap akka TraiSikois fiii iraiHticns oiiSk PijAefais
ft apfeo-iv, ak\a ra auTa npen^t rt
Kal Tpfwoirrd Ioti ; and : Sia/ie/*-^piKas rbv 4pt*>fievov ; oiiK Zyuye '
nir^poif oZv ejre0ujU7]<rws airrov Siafinpltrai ; Kal fidka. akka. tirtQvfirjoai -napaix*'" aoi avTO'>
6<pof3ii8i)s icekevtrat ; flit AV. akk'
e/cAWTas; Kal fidka. ?t' oi>x
\mrtpfT-r)ffe trot ; ov y&p. The
form of expression is certainly
very Cynic-like, but the mean

ing is not what Sextus supposes.
Zeno's object is not to justify
unnatural vice, but to show
that those who allow any form
of unchastity cannot forbid this
form, and that the wi.-h and
the attempt are morally on a
par with the deed.
2 See the following note.
3 Musonius, in Stob. Serm.6,
fil (couf. Cie. Fin. iii. 20, 68) :
Ne amores quidem sanctos
alienos a sapiente esse volunt.
According to Diog. vii. 129,
Stob. ii. 238, love is only direc
ted to beauty of soul. By Diog.,
309
810
Chap.
XII.
THE STOICS,
In the same way, the language permitting marriage
between those nearest of kin, when examined, is
very much milder than it seems.1 And Zeno's pro
position for a community of wives may be fairly laid
to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the chari
table excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit.2
Taking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic
propositions, there are enough of them to arouse ex
treme dislike, even if they could, without difficulty,
be deduced from the fundamental principles of the
system. A moral theory which draws such a sharp
distinction between what is without and what is
within, that it regards the latter as alone essential,
the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches
1 Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv.
Stub., Alex. Aplir. Top. 75, and
Cie. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is de 45 : The Stoics made good and
fined to be &ri/9oAij <pL\owoitas evil depend on the intention
Siu KctAAos 4fitpaiv6fjLtvoy ; and, alone, and declared external
according to flut. C. Not. 28, actions, independent of inten
eu(paxris icdWovs is an incentive tions, to be indifferent: ebtov
to love; but these statements oiv iv Tip irepl aBiatp6pav t6tc(p
are guarded by adding that the Sri tb Itiitp K6y(p (the action
bad and irrational are ugly, taken b- itselt) ivycnpiat p.lywand the wise are beautiful. It a6ai afitdcpopSv iartv, ei Kal fity
was probably in imitation of Xph to?s KaQeffTclxrais iroMTtiais
Mat. Sym. 203, E, that the lit TOWinOV TTOltlV. KCU iTO0(7CJS
Stoics nevertheless stated tovs X^-ptv . . . TFopaX'fjtpafri tov o~o<pbv
4pa<r6tvTas alfr-^puiv iraveirdai Ka- jue-ra ttJs dvyarpbs fx6vris KaraAe\tov ytvoixtvoiv. Love is excited \eip.u.it>oviravTbs tov TWvctvdpuinuv
by a sensation of ebcpvia irpbs yivovs 5t<p6apfitvt>v, kcl\ r)Tovatv
&peTV, its object is to de- i Ka6r]6vT03S 6 Trorrrp oweAeuvelope this capacity into real cerai irj duyarpl yirep tov fify
virtue. Until this end has been airo\icrdai . . . to irav tu>v avattained, the loved one is still &p&noiv yivos.
2 How strictly he respected
foolish, and therefore ugly.
When it has been attained, the chastity and modesty in wom>-n
striving, in which Eros con is proved by the fragment, pre
sists, has reached its object, and served by Clem. Pasdai?. iii. 253,
the love of the teacher to his c, respecting the dress and
pupil goes over into friendship conduct of maidens.
between equals.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGIN.
311
no value to anything except virtuous intention, and Chap.

places the highest value in being independent of .
everything such a moral theory must of necessity
prove wanting, whenever the business of morality
consists in using the senses as instruments for ex
pressing the mind, and in raising natural impulses
to the sphere of free will. If its prominent features
allow less to the senses than naturally belongs to
them, there is a danger that, in particular cases in
which intentions are not so obvious, the moral im
portance of actions will often be ignored, and such
actions treated as indifferent.
The same observation will have to be made with b Social ^
regard to the positions which the Stoics laid down re-atwnsin reference to social relations. Not that it was
their intention to detach man from his natural rela
tion to other men. On the contrary, they hold that (i) Origin
the further man carries the work of moral improvement in himself, the stronger he will feel drawn to () Origin
society. But by the introduction of the idea of society,
opposite tendencies arise in their ethicsone towards
individual independence, the other in the direction
of a well-ordered social life. The former tendency
is the earlier one, and continues to predominate
throughout; still, the latter was not surreptitiously
introducednay, more, it was the logical result of
the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an Epicurean
must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism.
In attributing absolute value only to rational thought
and will, Stoicism had declared man to be indepen-^
dent of anything external, and, consequently, of
THE STOICS.
his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches

to rational thought and intention,' the freedom of
the individual also involves the recognition of the
community, and brings with it the requirement that
everyone must subordinate his own wishes to the
wishes and needs of others. Rational conduct and
thought can only fcllea exist whea the conduct of the
individual is in harmony with general law. General
, law is the same for all rational beings. All rational
beings must therefore aim at the same end, and
recognise themselves subject to the same hw^ All
must feel themselves portions of one connected whole.
~3Ian must not live for himself, but for society.
This connection between the individual and society
* is clearly set forth by the Stoics. VThe desire for
, society, they hold, is immediately involved in reasoni
By the aid of reason, man feels himself a part ofa
whole, and, consequently, is bound to subordinate
is private interests to the interests of the whole:^
As like always attracts like, \ this remark holds
true of everything endowed with reason, since the
rational soul is in all cases identical. I From the con
sciousness of this unity, the desire for society at once
arises in individuals endowed with reason.2 ?sThey
1 Cie. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundnm autem censent regi numine
Deorum eumque esse quasi
communem urbem et eivitatem
hominum et Deorum ; et unumquemque nostrum ejus mnndi
esse partem, ex quo illnd cont sequi, ut communem utilitatem
nostras anteponamus.
2 -V. Avrel. ix. 9 ; xii. 30.
Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole

world is a unit ; membra sumus
corporis magni. Naturanos cognatosedidit. Her ce mutual love,
love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep.48,2: Alteri vivasoportet,si vis tibi vivere. Haecsocietas . . . nos homines hominibus
miscet et judicat aliquod esse
commune jus generis humani.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGIN.

are all in the service of reason ; there is, therefore,
for all, but one right course and one law,4and they
all contribute to the general welfare in obeying this
law^ The wise man, as a Stoic expresses it, is never
a private man.^
At other times, social relations were explained by
the theory of final causes.3 Whilst everything else
exists for the sake of what is endowed with reason,
individual beings endowed with reason exist for the
sake of each other. Their social connection is there
fore a direct natural nnmmand.4 Towards animals
we never stand in a position to exercise justice, nor
yet towards ourselves.5 Justice can only be exercised
towards other men and towards God.6 On the
1 Cic Legg. 12, 33 : Quibus i. 7, 22 ; Sen. Clement, i. 3, 2 ;
enim ratio a natura data est, Benef. vii. ], 7; M. Avrel. v.
iisdem etiam recta ratio data 16, 30; vii. 65; viii. 5!; ix. 1 ;
est : ergo et lex, qua? est recta xi. 18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext.
ratio in jubendo et vetando Math. ix. 131.
* Hence, according to 676'.
(see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus
quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only &xptKi\igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. fiara and /8Ad/i/noTo (moral good
7, 23 : Est igitur . . . prima and evil), but (bxfloT^tuxTa and
)iomini cum Deo rationis so- Swrxpi^T^ôra (other advan
cietas. Inter quos autem ratio, tages and disadvantages) are
inter eosdem etiam recta ratio common to all men.
communis est. Quas oum sit
5 According to Pint. Sto.
lex, lege quoque consociati Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that
homines cum Diis putandi a man could wrong himself. If,
sumus. Inter quos pcrro est in other passages, he seems to'
communio legis, inter eos com assert the contrary, this appa
munio juris est. Quibus autem rent inconsistency is probably
haec sunt inter eos communio, due to the double meaning of
et civil atis ejusdem habendi hZutCiv, which sometimes means
sunt. Ps.-Plvt. V. Horn. 119: ' to wrong,' sometimes simply
The Stoics teach 'iva. fniv thai 'to harm.' Strictly speaking,
rbv k/ktixov, avutroKneviffQai Se iv a relation involving justice can
oyTqS 0eouy KaX itvQpuirovs, Hinato- only exist towards another.
aivr]s jueTcxopTas tpvtrei.
See Cic. on p. 315, 2.
1 Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.
6 Towards the Gods, man
' Cic. Fin, iii. 20, 67 ; Off. stands, according to the above
313
314
Chap,
JXII
THE STOICS.
combination of individuals and their mutual sup. power over nature. A single man
port rests- all their
by himself would be the most helpless of crea
tures.1
The consciousness of this connection between all
rational beings finds ample expression in Marcus
Aurelius, the last of the Stoics. (The possession of
reason is, with him, love of society! (vi. 14 ; x-2)Rational beings can only be treated on a social
footing (kocvo)vik<os) (vi. 23), and can only feel
happy themselves when working for the community
(viii. 7) ;Wor all rational beings are related to one
another (iii. 4âll form one social unit (ircikiTitcbv
ava-Trjfia), of which each individual is an integral
part (avixTfKrjpmriKOs) (ix. 23) ; one body, of which
every individual is an organic member (fisXos) (ii. 1 ;
vii. 13). fHence the social instinct is a primary
instinct in man (vii. 55^J( every manifestation of
which contributes, either directly or indirectly, to
the good of the whole (ix. 23).
Our fellow-men
ought to be loved from the heart. They ought to
be benefited, not for the sake of outward decency,
but because the benefactor is penetrated with the
joy of benevolence, and thereby benefits himself.2
Whatever hinders union with others has a tendency
passages, in a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a justice
towards the Gods, of which
piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a
part.
1 Sew. Benef. iv. 18.
1 M. Aurel. vii. 13 : If you
only consider yourself a part,

and not a member, of human
society, othra awi> KapSias cfiAeir
tovs avSpdvovi ofmm at koto\rjirTinvs eiKppaivti rb tvepyertTv
%ti y npivov avrb iîAif voteis
otiitce ws avrbv tit votwv.
SOCIAL RELATIONS : JUSTICE.
315
to separate the members from the body, from which Chap.

XII '
all derive their life (viii. 84) ; and he who estranges
himself from one of his fellow-men voluntarily severs
himself from the stock of mankind (xi. 8). We shall
presently see that the language used by the philo
sophic emperor is quite in harmony with the Stoic
principles.
In relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental (2)Juttice
points are insisted on by the Stoicsthe duty of mm
justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero, without
doubt following Panaetius,1 describes these two
virtues as the bonds which keep human society
together,2 and, consequently, gives to each an
elaborate treatment.3 In expanding these duties, the
Stoics were led by the fundamental principles of their
system to most distracting consequences. On the
one hand, they required from their wise men that
strict justice which knows no pity and can make no
allowances ; 4 hence their ethical system had about
it an air of austerity, and an appearance of severity
and cruelty. On the other hand, their principle of
the natural connection of all mankind imposed on
them the practice of the most extended and unre
served charity, of beneficence, gentleness, meekness,
of an unlimited benevolence, and a readiness to for1 See p. 298, 3.
tutis splendor est maximus, ex
2 Off. i. 7, 20 : De tribus qua viri boni nominantur, et
autem reliquis [virtutibus, the huic conjuncta beneiicentia,
three others besides under- quam fcandem vel benignitastanding] latissime patet ea tem vel liberalitatem appellai i
ratio, qua societas hominum licet.
inter ipsos et vita; quasi com3 Off. i. 7-13; ii. 14-17.
munitascontinetur,cujuspartes
* See p. 254, 2, 3.
dnse sunt : justitia, in qua vir-
THE STOICS.
'
give in all cases in which forgiveness is possible.

This last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears prin
cipally in the later Stoicsin Seneca, Epictetus,
Marcus Aurelius, and Musonius ; 1 and it is quite .
possible that they may have given more prominence
to it than their predecessors. But the fact is there,
that this aspect is due, not only to the peculiar
character of these individuals, but is based on the
spirit and tone of the whole system.2
The question then naturally arises, how these two
opposites may be reconciledhow stern justice may
be harmonised with forgiveness and mercy. Seneca,
who investigated the question fully, replies : Not
severity, but only cruelty, is opposed to mercy ; for
no one virtue is opposed to another : a wise man will
always help another in distress, but without sharing
his emotion, without feeling misery or compassion ;
he will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and
improve ; he will not remit punishments in cases in
which he knows them to be deserved, but, from a
sense of justice, he will take human weakness into
consideration in allotting punishments, and make
every possible allowance for circumstances.3 Every
difficulty is not, indeed, removed by these statements ;
still, those which remain apply more to the Stoic
demand for apathy than to the reconciliation of
1 We shall subsequently
have occasion to prove this in
detail. It may here suffice to
refer to the treatises of Seneca,
De -Beneficiis, De Clementia,
and De Ira. On the value of
mercy, he remarks (De Clem.
i. 3, 2) : Nullam ex omnibus
virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit nulla humanior.
2 Conf. Pana3tius, in Cic.
Off. i. 25, R8.
3 De Clem. ii. 5-8.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: FRIENDSHIP.
317
the two virtues which regulate our relations to our Chap.

XII.
fellow-men.1
The society for which all rational beings are in (^Friend
ship.
tended will naturally be found to exist principally
among those who have become alive to their rational
nature and destinyin other words, among the wise.
All who are wise and virtuous are friends, because
they agree in their views of life, and because they
all love one another's virtue.5 Thus every action of
a wise man contributes to the well-being of every
other wise manor, as the Stoics pointedly express
it, if a wise man only makes a rational movement
with his finger, he does a service to all wise men
throughout the world.8 On the other hand, only a
wise man knows how to love properly ; true friend
ship only exists between wise men.'4 Only the wise
man possesses the art of making friends,5 since love
1 Among the points cha
racteristic of Stoicism, the cen
sure deserves notice, which Sen.
(Ep. 7, 8 J 95, 33. Tranq. An.
2. 13) passes on gladiatorial
shows and the Roman thirst
for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The atti
tude of the Stoics to slavery and
the demand for love of enemies
will be considered hereafter.
' Stob. ii. 184 :
re 6^6voiav inaT^Tiv tivtxi koivwv
ayaBuy, bib Kal rovs ffvovbaious
iravras bpovotiv a\hi]Kois bin nb
(Tvfxtpuvtiv tv rois Kara rbv filov.
Cie. N. D. i. 44, 121 : Censent
autem [Stoici] sapientes sapientibns etiam ignotis esse
amicos, nihil est enim virtute
amabilius. Quam qui adeptus
erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a
nobis diligetur. See Off. i. 17,

55. Conf. p. 309, 3.
Pint. C. Not. 22, 2. The
same thought is expressed in
the statement (ibid. 33, 2) that
tte wise man is as useful to
deity (the universe) as deity is
to him.
4 Sen. ISenef. vii. 12, 2; Ep.
81, 11 ; 123, 15 ; 9, 5; Stob. ii.
118 ; see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124.
According to Diog. 32, Zeno,
like Socrates, was blamed for
asserting that only the good
(mrouScuoi) among themselves
are fellow-citizens, friends, and
relations ; whilst all the bad
are enemies and strangers.
5 He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5,
puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum artifex.
318
Chap,
XII
THE STOICS.
is only won by love.1 If, however, true friendship is
a union between the good and the wise, its value is
thereby at once established ; and hence it is distinctly
enumerated among goods by the Stoics.2
On this point, difficulties reappear. How can this
need of society be reconciled with the wise man's
freedom from wants ? If the wise man is self-suffi
cient, how can another help him ? How can he stand
in need of such help ? The answers given by Seneca
are not satisfactory. To the first question, he replies,
that none but a wise man can give the right induce
ment to a wise man to call his powers into exercise.3
He meets the second by saying, that a wise man suf
fices himself for happiness, but not for life.4 Everyr
where the wise man finds inducements to virtuous
action ; if friendship is not a condition of happi
ness, it is not a good at all. Nor are his further
observations more satisfactory. The wise man, he
says,5 does not wish to be without friends, but still
' Si vis amari, ama, says Kara. t!ij/ $1ov, xPMMf'"t>"' VP^"
Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.
rots tplAoty as iavrois (Diog.
1 We have already encoun- 124). Similar definitions are
tered friendship in the Stoic given by Stub, o varieties of
list of goods. See p. 230, 3. friendship : yvupin6rr)s,avvriStia,
Stob. 186 says, more accurately, k.t.\. On the absolute comthat friendship, for the sake of munityof goods among friends,
the commonwealth, is not a see Sen. Ep. 47, 2 ; 3, 2 ; Benef.
good, Sia rb firjSev 4k Sietrr-rjKOTaiv vii. 4, 1 ; 12, 1 .
iyaebv that ; on the other hand,
5 Ep. 109, 3 and 11.
friendship, in the sense of
* Ep. 9, 13 : Se contentus
friendly relations to others, est sapiens, ad beate vivendum,
belongs to external goods ; in non ad vivendum. Ad hoc
the sense of a friendly dis- enim multis illi rebus opus
position merely, it belongs to est, ad illud tantum animo
intellectual goods. On the sano et erecto et desjiciente
value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. fortunam.
Friendship is defined as tcowavla
5 Ep. 9, 5.
film) (Stob. 130); KOivwvla ray
SOCIAL RELATIONS: FRIENDSHIP

he can be without friends. But the question is not
whether he can be, but whether he can be without
loss of happiness. If the question so put is answered
in the negative, it follows that the wise man is not
altogether self-sufficing ; if in the affirmativeand
a wise man, as Seneca affirms, will bear the loss of
a friend with calmness, because he comforts himself
with the thought that he can have another at any
momentthen friendship is not worth much. More
over, if a wise man can help another by communi
cating to him information and method, since no
wise man is omniscient,1 is not a wise man, if not
in possession of all knowledge, at least in possession
of all knowledge contributing to virtue and happi
ness? If it be added, that what one learns from
another he learns by his own powers, and in conse
quence of himself helping himself, does not this addi
tion still overlook the fact that the teacher's activity
is the condition of the learner's ? True and beautiful
as is the language of Seneca : Friendship has its value
in itself alone ; every wise man must wish to find
those like himself; the good have a natural love for
the good ; the wise man needs a friend, not to have
a nurse in sickness and an assistant in trouble, but
to have some one whom he can tend and assist, and
for whom he can live and die 2nevertheless, this
language does not meet the critical objection, that
one who requires the help of another, be it only to
have an object for his moral activity, cannot be whollydependent on himself. If friendship, according to a
1 Sen. Ep. 109, 5.
2 Ep. 109, 13 ; 9, 8 ; 10, 12 ; 18.
320
Chap.
XII.
(4) The
family
and JW
uoliUral life.
THE STOICS.
previously quoted distinction,1 belongs to external
goods, it makes man, in a certain sense, dependent
on externals. If its essence is placed in an inward
disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends
on the existence of those for whom it can be felt.
Besides, it involves the necessity of being recipro
cated, and of finding expression in outward conduct,
to such an extent that it is quite subversive of the
absolute independence of the individual.
Nor is the friendship of the wise the only form
of society which appeared to the Stoics necessary
and essential. If man is intended2 to associate with
his fellow-men in a society regulated by justice and
law, how can he withdraw from the most common
institutionthe state ? If virtue does not consist
in idle contemplation, but in action, how dare he
lose the opportunity of promoting good and repress
ing evil by taking part in political life ? 3 If laws
1 See p. 318, 2.
s Stab, ii. 208 : rbv yap v6ftnv
(Ti at, KaPanifj dirop-ev, airovtiaiov,
ufioiws (V kclI rfyv it6\iv. iKavws
if Kal KKttifBris irfpl rb awoutiaiuv
tlvai tt)V -k6Klv \6yov fjpr7fff
tovtov ' it6\is piv ci (wrongly
struck out by Meineke) (ariv
oiK-nrhptov KaTaaKtvaa/xa us t>
Karacpeiyovras tUTi ZiKTfV bovvai
Kal \af3t?v, oitK aoTtittv 5}/ ir6\is
itrrly; Floril. 44, 12. See pp.
223 ; 241, 3.
' Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3 : Chrysippus recommends political
life, placirg fSlos axoâanhbs
on the same footing with Pios
ti$ovik6s. Ihog. vii. 121 : itoKiTtvttrQai (patriv rbv ffotpbvav fxf)ri
KeuAiJjt, &s (p7]<ri Xpvatiriros iv
nptxry irepl Qiwv Kal yap ko.kIo.v

itpf^ttv KaX iw aptr^v ttpopfiijtrtiv
Sen. De Ot. 3, 2 : Kpicurus ait :
non accedet ad rempublicam
sapiens, nisisiquid intervener it.
Zenon ait : accedet ad rempublicam, nisi si quid impedierit.
Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68 : Since man
exists for the sake of other
men, consentaneous est huic
natunE, ut sapiens velit gerere
et administrare rempublicam :
atque.ut e natura vivat, uxorem
adjungere et velle ex ea liberos
procreare. Stab. ii. 184: t6 rt
o'lKaiSv (paffi tpvaci tlvat Kal p.ij
0<rt. in6pnvov 5^ tovtois inrdpX*w Kal t2> noMTtVMrdai rbv irotpbv
. . . Kal rb vop.o6(Tiv T6 real ircuSevctf avOpiinrovs, k t \.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: THE FAMILY.

further the well-being and security of the citizens,
if they advance virtue and happiness, how can the
wise man fail to regard them as beautiful and praise
worthy ? 1
For the same reason, matrimony will
command his respect. He will neither deny himself
a union so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive
the state of relays of men nor society of the sight of
well-ordered family life 2 Hence, in their writings
and precepts, the Stoics paid great attention to the
state and to domestic life.3 In marriage they required
chastity and moderation. Love was to be a matter
of reason, not of emotionnot a yielding to personal
attractions, nor a seeking sensual gratification.4 As
1 Cio. Legg. ii. 6, 11.
2 Diog. Ibid. : Keel yan^ffeiv,
a>s & 7A\vwv <py)ff\v iv vohiTeia. kcu
7rai8o7rot^(re(r0at. Jbid. 120:
The Stoics consider love of
children, parents, and kindred
to be according to nature.
Chrj'sippus (in Hieron. Ad.
Jovin. i. 191) : The wise man
will marry, lest he offend Zeus
ra/i-fi\ios and rfv46\ws. Antipater (whether the well-known
pupil of Diogenes of Seleucia,
or the younger Stoic Antipater
of Tyre mentioned by Cio. Off.
ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob.
Floril. 67, 25 : Wife and child
are necessary to give com
pleteness to civil and domestic
life ; a citizen owes children to
his country, and family love is
the purest. Musonius {Ibid.
67, 20, Conf. 75, 15) : A philo
sopher ought to be a pattern in
married life, as in every other
natural relation, and discharge
his duties as a citizen by
founding a family ; love for

wife and children is the deepest
love.
3 Pint. Sto. Rep. 2. 1 : <W
Toivvv iroAXcfc fikv, ws ttf \6yois,
TTtelara 5e Xpvaimrcp yeypa/ifjLej/a.
rvyxdva ntpl xcXtrefos koi rov
Kol fntropeieiv. Conf. the titles
in Diog. vii. 4 ; 166; 175; 178.
Diogenes's list contains no poli
tical writings of Chrysippus.
It is, however, known to be
incomplete ; for Diog. vii. 34 ;
131, quotes Chrysippus's trea
tise irepl jroXiTelaj, a treatise
also quoted by Pint. Sto. Hep.
21 (1, 8, 5). According to Cic.
Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and
Panaetius were the only Stoics
before his time who had en
tered into particulars respecting
legislation, though others might
have written much on politics.
* Conf. the fragment of Sen.
De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad.
Y
321
Chap.
322
Chap,
1
THE STOICS.
to their views on the constitution of a state, we
know1 that they prefer a mixed constitution, com
pounded of the three simple forms, without objecting
to other forms of government. The wise man, ac
cording to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling of
a prince, if his interest so require, and, if he cannot
govern himself, will reside at the court and in the
camp of princes, particularly of good princes.2
The ideal of the Stoics, however, was not realised
in any one of the existing forms of government, but
in that polity of the wise which Zeno described, un
doubtedly when a Cynic,3 but which was fully set
forth by Chrysippus4 a state without marriage, or
family, or temples, or courts, or public schools, or
coins5a state excluding no other states, because all
differences of nationality have been merged in a
common brotherhood of all men.6 Such an ideal may
show that, for the Stoic philosophers, there could be
no hearty sympathy with the state or the family, their
ideal state being, in truth, no longer a state. Indeed,
Jovin. i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase,
which, like the Kssenes, requires absolute abstinence from
pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also
preserved of Chrysippus's treatise on the education of children. See Quintil. Inst. i. 11,
17; 1, 4 and 16 ; 3,14; 10.32;
Dagiiet, De Chrys. (Annal.
Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen.
Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for
neglecting the first germs of
education, particularly those
previous to birth.
1 Diog. vii. 131.

2 Plut. Sto, Rep. 20, 3-5 ;
7 ; 30, 3 ; 0. Not. 7, 6.
* Diog. vii. 4.
4 Diog. vii. 131.
s Diog. 33 : koiv&s rt yip
yvvaiKas SoyixaTi(cu> iîolus tr rij
noAwe/if kbX kotA robs SiMnxrious
(rrixovs, piiS' itpa ^ti StKuirriipia
/i^re yvfivdaia iv rats *6Xfffiv
oifco5o/rflai . . . v6jj.iaiia. 8' oifr'
aWayrji ivetuv oUa-tiat Se7y koto<nrcv4fi> oCt' ajro5i)/ios. Ibid.
131.
* Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: PUBLIC LIFE.

the whole tone of Stoicism, and still more, the circumstances of the times to which it owed its rise
and growth, were against such a sympathy.
If
Plato could find no place for a philosopher in the
political institutions of his time, how could a Stoic,
who looked for happiness more exclusively in seclusion from the world, who contrasted, too, the wise
man more sharply with the multitude of fools,
and lived for the most part under political circumstances far less favourable than Plato ? To him the
private life of a philosopher must have seemed be
yond compare more attractive than a public career.
An intelligent man, taking advice from Chrysippus,1
avoids business ; he withdraws to peaceful retire
ment ; and, though he may consider it his duty not
to stand aloof from public life, still he can only
actively take a part in it in states which present an
appreciable progress towards perfection.2 But where
could such states be found ? Did not Chrysippus state
it as his conviction that a statesman must either
displease the Gods or displease the people ? 3 And
did not later Stoics accordingly advise philosophers
not to intermeddle at all in civil matters ? 4 Labour
1 Pint. Sto. Rep. 20, 1 : ohai
yap 70)76 rbv cppoi'tunv nal airpdyixova tivat Kal oKiyoirpdy/xova Kal
ra avrov rrpdmiv, 6p.oitcs tt}s re,
avrovpayias Kal 6\iyowpayp.offvvTjs
aarelttiv ivrwf . . . rip yap iirri <palverai 6 Kara rr\v r\avxiav filos amvSuy6v re Kal ao~<pa\es %X*lv> K.T.X.
2 Stob. Eel. ii. 186 : iro\iTfi5eo-0ai rbv ao<tbv Kal p.d\itrra e*v
rats rotavrais rroMrtlats rdis
4p.<paivov<rais rivh TrpoKowfyv irpbs

ras re\elas rroKirelas.
' Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In
answer to the question, why he
withdrew from public life, he
replied : titdri el p.ev irovt\pa iro\ireierai [<TTat], rots deois airapeVei, et 5e xpTjara, rots noKirats.
* Sen. Ep. 29, 11 : Quisenim
placere potest populo, cui placet
virtus ? Malis artibus popularis
y 2
328
Chap.
XII ' t
"I
>'h
!j!
j.!
'.
[
i
324
Chap,
XU'
THE STOICS.
<
for the commonwealth is only then a duty when there
is no obstacle to such labour ; but, as a matter of
fact, there is always some obstacle, and in particular,

the condition of all existing states.1 A philosopher
who teaches and improves his fellow-men benefits
the state quite as much as a warrior, an adminis
trator, or a civil functionary.2
(*) PracFollowing out this idea,3 Epictetus dissuades from
timitolT' matrimony and the begetting of children. Allowing
political
' ''
that the family relation may be admitted in a community of wise men, he is of opinion that it is other
wise under existing circumstances ; for how can a
true philosopher engage in connections and actions
which withdraw him from the service of God ? The
last expression already implies that unfavourable
times were not the only cause deterring the Stoics
from caring for family or the state, but that the
occupation in itself seemed to them a subordinate
and limited one. This is stated in plain terms by
favor quteritur. Sirnilem te
illis facias oportet . . . conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor
turpium non potest.
1 Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p 320, 3 :
It needs a special cause for de
voting oneself to private life.
Causa autein ilia late patet : si
xespublica corruptior est quam
ut adjuvari possit, si occupata
est malis ... si parum habebit
[sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut
virium nec ilium admissura erit
respublica, si valetudo ilium
impediet. Ibid. 8, 1 : Negant
nostri sapientem ad quamlibet
rempublicam accessuruin : quid
autem interest, quomodo sa

piens ad otium veniat, utrum
quia respublica illi deest, an
quia ipse reipublicse, si omnibus
defutura respublica est ? (So
we ought to punctuate.) Sem
per autem deerit fastidiose
quaerentibus. Interrogo ad
quam rempublicam sapiens sit
accessurus. Ad Atheniensium,
etc. ? Si percensere singular
voluero, nullam inveniam, qua;
sapientem aut quam sapiens
pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.
- Athnnndor. 1. c. 3, 3.
Diss. iii. 22, 67.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: PUBLIC LIFE.

Seneca and Epictetus : He who feels himself a citizen
of the world finds in an individual state a sphere far
too limited, and prefers devoting himself to the uni
verse ; 1 man is no doubt intended to be active, but
the highest activity is intellectual research.2 On the
subject of civil society, opinions were likely to vary,
according to the peculiarities and circumstances of
individuals. The philosopher on the throne was more
likely than the freedman Epictetus to feel himself
a citizen of Rome as well as a citizen of the world,3
and to lower the demands made on a philosophic
statesman.4 At the same time, the line taken by the
Stoic philosophy cannot be ignored. A philosophy
1 Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas
respublicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere
publicam, qua Di atque homines
eontinentur, in qua non ad nunc
anguluin respieimus aut ad il
ium, sed terminos civitatis nos
tra cum sole metimur : alteram
cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it not seem like
reading Augustin's De Civitate
Dei ? Some serve the great,
others the small state ; some
*erve both. Majori reipub.icaa
et in otio deservire possumus,
immo vero nescio an in otio
melius. Ep. (58, 2 : Cum sapienti rempublicamipsodignam
dedimus, id est mundum, non
est extra rempublicam etiamsi
recesserit : immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in majora
atque ampliora transit, &c.
Kjiict. Diss. iii. 22, 83 : Do you
ask whether a wise man will
busy himself with the state ?
What state could be greater
than the one about which he
dpes busy himself, not consult

ing the citizens of one city
alone for the purpose of obtain
ing information about the re
venues of a state, and such like,
but the citizens of the world,
that with them he may con
verse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery 1
TrjAtKouTTji/ Tro\i/Tiai' iro\iTtvoafiiyou avQptlyxov, trv juotflwdaV??, ei
iroKtTtvffeTcu ; irvdov. fiov Kai, ti
aj>et * ird\iv ipu <roi ' nupl, iroiav
- Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6. 4.
3 Marcus Anrelius, vi. 44:
ir6\is Kai Trarpls us fxtv 'Ayrwylpas (ppivrtfc an&apws us 'PupaZos Kai &ppqv.
4 Ibid. ix. 29 : Spfirjffov eav Si8uTat Kai fjLî TrtpifihtTcov el tis
sXffCTai urjtit t})" UKdruvos tro\iTetav Attj^*, aAAa ipicov e* rb
fHpaxvTaTov wp6furi.
325
Chap.
XI 1.
THE STOICS
326
Chap. I which, attaches moral value to the cultivation of

XI1" | intentions only, and considers all external circumI
I
I
*
stances as indifferent, can hardly produce a taste

or a skill for overcoming those outward interests
and circumstances with which a politician is chiefly
concerned. A system which regards the mass of
men as fools, which denies to them every healthy
endeavour and all true knowledge, can hardly bring
itself unreservedly to work for a state, the course
and institutions of which depend upon the majority
of its members, and are planned with a view to their
needs, prejudices, and customs. Undoubtedly, there
were able statesmen among the Stoics of the Roman
period ; but Rome, and not Stoicism, was the cause
of their statesmanship. Taken alone, Stoicism could
t form excellent men, but hardly excellent statesmen.
And, looking to facts, not one of the old masters of
the School ever had or desired to have any public
office. Hence, when their opponents urged that re
tirement was a violation of their principles,1 Seneca
could with justice meet the charge by replying, that
the true meaning of their principles ought to be
gathered from their actual conduct.2
(c) CUi
The positive substitute wherewith the Stoics
tenthip
thought to replace the ordinary relations of civil
norld.
society was by a citizenship of the world. No pre
ceding system had been able to overcome the diffi
culty of nationalities.
Even Plato and Aristotle
shared the prejudice of the Greeks against foreigners.
1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.
2 De Otio, 6, 5 ; Tranq. An. 1, 10.
SOCIAL RELATIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM.

The Cynics alone appear as the precursors of the
Stoa, attaching slight value to the citizenship of
any particular state, in comparison with citizenship
of the world.1 With the Cynics, this idea had not
attained to the historical importance which after
wards belonged to it ; nor was it used so much with
a positive meaning, to express the essential oneness
of all mankind, as, in a negative sense, to imply the
philosopher's independence of country and home.
From the Stoic philosophy it first received a definite
meaning, and was generally pressed into service.
The causes of this change may be sought, not only in
the historical surroundings amongst which Stoicism
grew up, but also in the person of its founder. It
was far easier for philosophy to overcome national
dislikes, after the genial Macedonian conqueror had
united the vigorous nationalities comprised within
his monarchy, not only under a central government,
but also in a common culture.2 Hence the Stoic
citizenship of the world may be appealed to, to
prove the assertion, that philosophic Schools reflect
the existing facts of history. On the other hand,
taking into account the bias given to a philosopher's
teaching by his personal circumstances, Zeno, being
only half a Greek, would be more ready to under
estimate the distinction of Greek and barbarian than
any one of his predecessors.
However much these two causesand, in parti1 See Socrates and Socratic indicated by Plutarch's groupSchools, p. 324.
ing the Stoics and Alexander
2 This connection is already together.
328
Chap.'
XII.
THE STOICS.
cular, the firstmust have contributed to bring
about the Stoic ideal of a citizenship of the world,
nevertheless the connection, of this idea with the
whole of their system is most obvious. If human
society, as we have seen, has for its basis the identity
oF reason in individuals, what ground have we for
limiting this society to a single nation, or feeling
ourselves more nearly related to some men than to
others? All men, apart from what they have made
themselves by their own exertions, are equally near,
since all equally participate in reason. All are members
of one body ; for one and the same nature has fashioned
them all from the same elements for the same de
stiny.1 Or, as Epictetus expresses it in religious lan
guage,2 all men are brethren, since all have in the
same degree God for their father. Man, therefore,
I who and whatever else he may be, is the object of
our solicitude, simply as being man.3 No hostility
and ill-treatment should quench our benevolence.4 No
1 Sen. Ep. 95, 52 ; M. Aurel.
See p. 312, 2 ; 313.
' Diss. i. 13, 3. Seep. 331,2.
3 Son. Ep. 95, 52', continjes
after the quotation in p. 312, 2:
Ex illius [naturaa] constitutione
miserius est nocere quam lsedi.
Ex illius imperio paratse sint
juvantis manus. Ille versus et
in pectore et in ore sit : homo
sum, nihil humani a me alitnum
puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus
prodesse natura me jubet, et
servi liberine sint hi, ingenui
an libertini, justse libertatis an
inter amicos datas quid refert ?
Ubicumque homo est, ibi benefieii locus est. De Clem. i. 1,
3 : Nemo non, cni alia desint,

hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.
4 Sen. De Otio, i. 4 : see p.
256, 4 : Stoici nostri dicunt . . .
non desinemus communi bono
operam dare, adjuvare singulos,
opem ferre etiam inimicis. We
shall subsequently meet with
similar explanations from Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus
Aurelius' In particular, Sene
ca's treatise, De Ira, deserves
to be mentioned here, and es
pecially i. 5, W: Quid homine
aliorum amantius ? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium
mutuum genitus est, ira in exi
SOCIAL EELATIOXS: COSMOrOLITAXISM.

one is so low but that he has claims on the love and
justice of his fellow-men.1 Even the slave is a man
deserving our esteem, and able to claim from us his
jigh~EI7
In their recognition of the universal rights~oF
mankind the Stoics did not go so far as to disap
prove of slavery. Attaching in general little value to
external circumstances,3 they cared the less to throw
tium. Hie congregari vult, ilia nes admittit, omnes invitat, indiscedere. Hie prodesse, ilia genuos, libertinos, servos, reges,
liocere. Hie etiam ignotis suc- exules. Non eligit domum nec
currere, ilia etiam carissimos censum, nudo homine contenta
perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1 : It is est. Slavery, he continues,
not so praiseworthy to return does not affect the whole man.
injury for injury, as benefit for Only the body belongs to his
benefit. Illic vinci turpe est, lord ; his heart belongs to him
hie vinoere. Inhumanum ver- self, c. 20. The duties of the
bum est . . . ultio et talio. slave have limits, and over
Magni animi est injurias de- against them stand certain de- .
spicere. Conf. do. Off. i. 25, finite rights (c. 21. Conf. De
88 : Violent anger towards ene Clement, i. 18, 2). He enu
mies must be blamed : nihil merates many instances of selfenim laudabilius, nihil magno sacrifice and magnanimity in
et preeclaro viro dignius placa- slaves, and concludes by say
bilitate atque dementia. Even ing : Eadem omnibus principia
when severity is necessary, eademque origo, nemo altero
punishment ought not to be ad nobilior, nisi cui rectius ing>~
ministered in anger, since such nium . . . unus omnium parens
an emotion cannot be allowed mundus est . . . neminem deat all. têe p. 254, 1.
spexeris . . . sive libertini ante
1 Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines : eri328, 3. Cie. Off. i. 13, 41.
2 Cio. 1. c. : Even towards gite audacter animos, et quicslaves, justice must be observed. quid in medio sordid] est tranHere, too, belongs the question, silite : expectat vos in sumruo
discussed in full by Sen. Benef. magna nobilitas, &c. So Ep.
Hi.. 18-28, Whether, a slave can 31, 11 i V. Be. 24, 3. See p.
do a kindness to his master 1 328, 3. Conf. Ep. 41 : Rank and
He who denies that he can, birth are of no consequence,
savs Seneca (18,^2), is ignarus and p. 270, 3.
3 Only the wise man is
juris humani. Hefert enim cujus animi sit, qui prsstat, non really free ; all who are not
cuj us status : nulii praclusa wise are fools.
virtus est, omnibus patet, om-
330
Chap.
XII.
THE STOICS.
down the gauntlet to the social institutions and
arrangements of their time. Still, they could not
wholly suppress a confession that slavery is unjust,1
nor cease to aim at mitigating the evil both in theory
and practice^Jlf all men are, as rational beings, equal,
all men together form one community. Reason is the
common law for all, and those who owe allegiance to
one law are members of one state.3 If the Stoics,
therefore, compared the world, in its more extended
sense, to a society, because of the connection of its
parts,4 they must, with far more reason, have allowed
that the world, in the narrower sense of the term,
including all rational beings, forms one Community,5
1 Diog. 122, at least, calls and Pint. Com. Not. 34, 6, who
Sfffirortia, the possession and makes the Stoics assert : Tbi/K6<rgovernment of slaves, some fioy eivat tt6\iv KaX voAiTas Tovt
ao-repas. M. Avrel.x. 15 : Cocoy
thing bad.
2 According to Sen. Benef. . . its iv vbAei ry Kbtrfio). iv,
iii. 22, 1, Cic. 1. c, Chrysippus 3 : b xbfffios wcaveX irbKis.
s M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16.
had denned a slave, perpetuus
mercenarius ; and hence infer Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67 : Chrysippus
red that he ought to be treated asserts that men exist for the
as such : operam exigendam, sake of each other; quoniamque
justa prasbenda. Sen. Ep. 47, ea natura esset hominis ut ei
expresses a very humane view cum genere humano quasi civile
of treating slaves, contrasting jus intercederet, qui id consera man with a slave : servi sunt; varet,eum justum, qui migraret,
immo homines. He regards injustum fore. Therefore, in
a slave as a friend of lower the sequel : in urbe mundove
rank, and, since all men stand communi. See 331, 2 and p.
under the same higher power, 312, 2. Sen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7 :
speaks of himself as conservus. Nefas est nocere patriae : ergo
3 M. Aurel. iv. 4 : el rb voepbv civi quoque . . . ergo et horjfiiv Koivhv, KaX b \6yos Kaft' tv mini, nam hie in majore tibi
KoytKOl IvfJitV K0iv6s el TOVTO, KaX urbe civis est. Musonius (in
b TTpOffTOKTlKbs TUV irot7)TeW % fATJ Stob. Floril. 40, 9) : vo/tt(ei [b
Abyos kou/6s ' el tovto, KaX b vbfios lirteiK^s] eivat ttokIttis Tys tov
Koivbs. el tovto, iroAlTal tapei/ Aibs v6\ews % avveffTTjKey 4 avel TOVTO, TTO\tTeVfiCLT6s TIVOS jUT- Bpdiruv te KaX Seuv. Epict. Diss,
XOfjiev el tovto, b k6o"[ios waaveX iii. 5, 26 ; Ar. Didym. in Bus.
Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.
4 See pp. 312, 1, 3 ; 325, 3,
SOCIAL RELATIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM.

to which individual communities are related, as the
houses of a city are to the city collectively.1 Wise
men, at least, if not others, will esteem this great
community, to which all men belong, far above any
particular community in which the accident of birth
has placed them.2 They, at least, will direct their
efforts towards making all men feel themselves to be
citizens of one community ; and, instead of framing
exclusive laws and constitutions, will try to live as
one family, under the common governance of reason.3
The platform of social propriety receives hereby a
universal width. Man, by withdrawing from the
outer world into the recesses of his own intellectual
and moral state, becomes enabled to recognise every
where the same nature as his own, and to feel him
self one with the universe, by sharing with it the
same nature and the same destiny.
But, as yet, the moral problem is not exhausted,
1 1HC. Anrel. iii. 11 : HvSpumov
Tfo\irr)P ovra tt6\zu)S rr]s avtordT1}S fjS at Aoi7rai 7T($Atis waTrep
oinlai tiaiv.
Sen. De Ot. 4 ; Ep. 68, 2.
See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and
5 : Unum me donavit omnibus
[natura rerun)] et uni mini
omnis . . . patriam meam esse
mundum sciam et prsesides
Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4 : Ideo
magno animo nos non unius
urbis mcenibus clusimus, sed in
totius orbis commerciurn etuisinius patriamque nobis mundum
professi sumus, ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dare.
Ejnct. Diss. iii. 22, 83. IUd.
i. 9 : If the doctrine that man
is related to God is true, man
is neither an Athenian nor a

Corinthian, but simply K&ajuos
and vibs @eod. Muson. 1. c. :
Banishment is no evil, since
k6(tij.os (arti*. It is, says Civ.
Farad. 2, no evil lor those qui
omnem orbem terrarum unum
urbem esse ducunt.
3 Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p.
32!) : KaX p}\v it no\v davfxaop.4i/r)
TroXntia tov t})i/ ^rw'iKaiv dlptctiv
KaTa&aWopevov Zilvaivos tls %v
tovto aupTtivn K(pa\atovt 'Lva fify
Kara w6\eis juifSe koto Stjjuous
oiKOifxiV. i5ms eKanroi 8twpi<r/xVoi
SiKalots, a\Ka TTavras avQpdi-novs
riycbfieda Stjju^tos leal noK'nas, (is
5e /3(oi i5 Ka* kAitixos, wairep ayeKrjs
ovvvdfxov v6ptp Koivtp rp((po{jivris.
331
)).)
Chap.
XII.
C. Man
and the
course of
the world.
(1) Submission to
the course
<if nature.
THE STOICS.
Eeason, the same as man's, rules pure and complete
in the universe ; and if it is the business of man to
give play to reason in his own conduct, and to re
cognise it in that of others, it is also his duty to
subordinate himself to collective reason, and to the
course of the world, over which it presides. In con
clusion, therefore, the relation of man to the course
of the world must be considered.
Firmly as the principles of the Stoic ethics in-
sist upon moral conduct, those ethics, judged by
their whole tone, cannot rest short of requiring an
absolute resignation to the course of the universe.
This requirement is based quite as much upon the
historical surroundings of their system as upon its
intellectual principles. How, in an age in which poli
tical freedom was crushed by the oppression of the
Macedonian and subsequently of the Roman dominion,
and the Roman dominion was itself smothered under
the despotism of imperialism, in which Might, like a
living fate, crushed every attempt at independent
actionhow, in such an age, could those aiming at
higher objects than mere personal gratification have
any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to
the course of circumstances which individuals and
nations were alike powerless to control? In making
a dogma of fatalism, Stoicism was only following the
current of the age. At the same time, as will be
seen from what has been said, it was only following
the necessary consequences of its own principles.
All that is individual in the world being only the
result of a general connection of cause and effect
MAN AND THE WORLDS COURSE.

only a carrying ont of a universal law^-what remains
possible, in the face of this absolute necessity, but to
yield unconditionally ? How can yielding be called
a sacrifice, when the law to which we yield is nothing
less than the expression of reason ? Hence resigna
tion to the world's course was a point chiefly insisted
upon in the Stoic doctrine of morality. The verses
of Cleanthes,1 in which he submits without reserve
to the leading of destiny, are a theme repeatedly
worked out by the writers of this School. The
virtuous man, they say, will honour God by resigning
his will to the divine will ; the divine will he will
think better than his own will ; he will remember
that under all circumstances we must follow destiny,
but that it is the wise man's prerogative to follow of
his own accord ; that there is only one way to happi
ness and independencethat of willing nothing ex
cept what is in the nature of things, and what will
realise itself independently of our will.2
1 In Mpiclet. Man. c. 53 :
more fully. Ibid. Diss. iv. 1,
131;. 4, 34; and translated by
Sen. Ep. 107,11. Seep. 182, 1.
The verses are :
&you $4 fi S Zfi xai aiy' j) Tlfirpujute?)
ojtoi iroff i-iur elfu SioTero^/xiros
is e<|,ma( y &okvos- %v Si jij)
BtKui
K<uc&5 ywi/iaios otiZtv \ttov ei|/oliai.
1 Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and : Boni
viri laborant, impendunt, impenduntur, et volentes quidem,
non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.
. . . Quid est boni viri ? I'rie-
bere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5 :

Deuru sequere. . . Quse autem
dementia est, potius trahiquam
sequi ? . . . Quicquid ex universi constitutione patiendum
est, magno excipiatur animo.
Ad hoc sacrameutum adacti
sumus, ferre mortalia. ... In
regno nati sumus : Deo parero
libertas est. Ep. 97, 2 : Non
pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex
animo ilium, non quia neces.se
eat, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20 ; 7(>,
23 ; 107, 9. Epictet. Diss. ii.
16,42: r6Kp.r\aov &i/af>\tyas wpbs
thy dtbv tWtiv. 8ti xp<* M01 a<"vbv (is 4 hv BtKys' ifioyvas/xova
(roi, <tos ei/ui. oiSiv irapoiTuiuai
333
Chap.
XI1,
THE STOICS.
Chap.
XII.
Similar expressions are not wanting amongst

other philosophers. Nevertheless, by the Stoic philo
sophy, the demand is pressed with particular force,
and is closely connected with its whole view of the
world. In resignation to destiny, the Stoic picture
of the wise man is completed. Therewith is included
that peace and happiness of mind, that gentleness
and benevolence, that discharge of all duties, and
that harmony of life, which together make up the
Stoic definition of virtue.1 Beginning by recognising
the existence of a general law, morality ends by un
conditionally submitting itself to the ordinances of
that law.
The one case in which this resignation would give
tuv aoi SoKoivTW Swov OeAeis,
&ye. i. 12, 7 : The virtuous man
submits his will to that of God,
as a good citizen obey* the law.
iv. 7, 20 : KpuTTuv yap q-yov/ucti t
6 Bfbs idehfi, f) [4] iyd. iv. 1,
131, in reference to the verses
of Cleanthes : aShq r) iSbs iir'
iKfuBtpiav ayet, outt) /i6vv dira\\ayh Sov\elas. Man. 8 : S4\f
ylveadut ra ytvdneva is ytvtrtu
wo! eipoVs. Similarly Fragm.
134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. M.
Aurel. x. 28 : luivy rip \oyiic$
tpip St'SoToi rb iKouatws iwf<r(ai
tuis yivopivoa ' rb Si ireirflo
\pi\bv naaw avayKaiov. Ibid,
viii. 45 ; x. 14.
1 Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does
mankind arrive at the conception of virtue ? and replies, By
the sight of virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et
decor et constantia et omnium
inter se actionum concordia et
magnitudo super omnia efferens

sese. Hinc intellecta est ilia
beata vita, seoundo defluens
cursu, arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis
adparuit? Dicam : Nunquam
vir ille perfectus adeptusque
virtutem fortunae maledixit.
Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et
militem credens labores velut
imperatos subiit. Quicquid
inciderat, non tanquam malum
aspernatus est, et in se casu
delatum, sed quasi delegatum
sibi. . . . Necessario itaque
magnus adparuit, qui nunquam
malis ingemuit, nunquam de
fato suo questus est: fecit
multis intellectum sui et non
aliter quam in tenebris lumen
effulsit, advertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter aequus, &c.
MAN AND THE WORLDS COURSE: SUICIDE.

place to active resistance to destiny is when man is
placed in circumstances calling for unworthy action
or endurance.1 Strictly speaking, the first case can
never arise, since, from the Stoic platform, no state
of life can be imagined which might not serve as an
occasion for virtuous conduct. It does, however,
seem possible that even the wise man may be placed by
fortune in positions which are for him unendurable ;
and in this case he is allowed to withdraw from them
by suicide.2 The importance of this point in the
Stoic ethics will become manifest from the language
of Seneca, who asserts that the wise man's indepen
dence of externals depends, among other things, on
his beiug able to leave life at pleasure.3 To Seneca,
the deed of the younger Cato appears not only praise1 Conf. Bawmliaver, Vet.
Phil, prsecipue Stoicoruui Doct.
de Mor. Volunt. : Ut. 1842, p.
220.
* Dioff. vii. 130: tv\6yas re
<paniv iâytiy cavrbv tov fi'iou rhv
ootphv (Jâywyii is the standing
expression with the Stoics for
suicide. Full references for
this and other expressions are
given by Baumhauer, p. 248).
Kal virep ^ff^StS^TaC'vTrTp^ptKwv
k%.v iv (TK\vporepa yevyrat aA-yrfS6yi 1) irrfpd(T((rtf t) v6aois avidrois.
Stob. Eel. ii. 226. Conf. the
comoedian Sopater, in At/ten.
iv. 160, who makes a master
threaten to sell his slave to
Zeno itr tluyuryrj.
' Ep. 12, 10 : Malum est in
necessitate vivere. Sed in ne
cessitate vivere necessitas nulla
est. Quidni nulla sit ? Patent
undique ad libertatem viae mul-
tae, breves, faciles. Agamus

Deo gratias, quod nemo in vita
teneri potpst. Calcare ipsas nacussitates licet. Id. Frov. c. 5, 6,
makes the deity say : Contemnite mortem quae vos aut rinit
aut transfert. . . . Ante omnia
cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos.
Fatet exitus. . . . Nihil feci
facilius, quam m<>ri. Prono
animam loco posui. Trahitur.
Attendite modo et videbitis,
quam brevis ad libertatem et
quam expedita ducat via, Sic.
Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies
the right of committing suicide
non videt se libertaiis viam
eludere. Nil melius seterna lex
fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit,
exitus multos. Ep. 65, 22 ;
1 17, 21 ; 120, 14 ; M. Anrel. v.
29; viii. 47; x. 8 and 32; iii. 1 ;
Ejrictet. Diss. i. 24, 20: iii. 24, 95.
336
Chap.
XII.
THE STOICS.
aye
Chap,
XI1"
worthy, but the crowning act of success over destiny, the highest triumph of the human will.1 By
the chief teachers of the Stoic School this doctrine
was carried into practice. Zeno, in old age, hung
himself, because he had broken his finger; Cleanthes,
for a still less cause, continued his abstinence till he
died of starvation, in order to traverse the whole
way to death ; and, in later times, the example of
Zeno and Cleanthes was followed by Antipater.2
In these cases suicide appears r.ot only as a way
of escape, possible under circumstances, but abso
lutely as the highest expression of moral freedom.
Whilst all are far from being advised to adopt this
course,3 everyone is required to embrace the oppor
tunity of dying with glory, when no higher duties
bind him to life.4 Everyone is urged, in case of
need, to receive death at his own hand, as a pledge
of his independence. Nor are cases of need decided
by what really makes a man unhappymoral vice
or folly. Vice and folly must be met by other means.
Death is no deliverance from them, since it makes
the bad no better. The one satisfactory reason which
the Stoics recognised for taking leave of life is, when
1 De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, will of God. ii. 15, 4. Conf.
M. Avrel. v. 10.
2 In the passages already ' 4 Slusori. in Stofi. Floril. 7,
quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1 ; 50, 24, says : fipTrofe rb Ka\wt <bro2.
dviidKtiv ore t^tart, fti) /iifTa /j.t See Epictetus's discussion xplv vb /nee airo0W).iKeu< troi 7ropp,
of suicide committed simply t4 Ji Ka\us fij)KTi
; and,
in contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, again : He who by living is of
10), against which he brings to use to many, ought not to
bear the rule (in Plato, Phasd. choose to die, unless by death
til, E ) to resign oneself to the he can be of use to more.
16.
MAN AND THE WORLD'S COURSE.

circumstances over which we have no control make
continuance in life no longer desirable.1
Such circumstances may be found in the greatest
variety of things. Cato committed suicide because
of the downfall of the republic ; Zeno, because of a
slight injury received. According to Seneca, it is a
sufficient reason for committing suicide to anticipate
merely a considerable disturbance in our actions and
peace of mind.2 The infirmity of age, incurable dis
ease, a weakening of the powers of the mind, a great
degree of want, the tyranny of a despot from which
there is no escape, justify us-and even, under cir
cumstances, oblige usto have recourse to this
remedy.3 Seneca, indeed, maintains that a philoso
pher should never commit suicide in order to escape
suffering, but only to withdraw from restrictions in
following out the aim of life ; but he is never
theless of opinion that anyone may rightly choose an
easier mode of death instead of a more painful one
in prospect, thus avoiding a freak of destiny and
the cruelty of man.4 Besides pain and sickness, Dio
genes also mentions a case in which suicide becomes
a duty, for the sake of others.5 According to another
1 M. Aurel. v. 29: Even
here you may live as though
vou were free from the body:
ikv Se \i?t\ &nTp67r&)<n, r6re KaX
tov
Ml-i8i o&tws fitVTOi, us
lirfiiv KOKbv irdffxw.
2 Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3.
Clem, gtrom. iv. 485, A, like-wise calls the restriction of rational action> sufficiently decisive reason : avrtaa eij\oyoy
ttayuyfyv t$ trirouSaiy avyxaift0*>a'L

koI oi (pi\6vo<poi (i.e. the Stoics),
elf rts rov irp&a<reiv avrbv outus
Ttip'tiffetev [1. outoj (TTepvaei^p^f
us firjKeTi faroAeXefydai aury jtnjSe
iKrlta T7js irpci|eoij.
3 Ep. 58, 33; 98,16; 17,9;
De Ira, iii. 15, 3.
4 See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.
5 See p. 335, 2.
mS
Chap,
XI1,
THE STOICS.
authority,' five cases are enumerated by the Stoics
in which it is allowed to put oneself to death ; if,
by 80 doing, a real service can be rendered to others,
as in the case of sacrificing oneself for one's country ;
to avoid being compelled to do an unlawful action ;
otherwise, on the ground of poverty, chronic illness,
or incipient weakness of mind.
In nearly all these cases, the things referred to
belong to the class of things which were reckoned
as indifferent by the Stoics ; and hence arises the
apparent paradox, with which their opponents im
mediately twitted them, that not absolute and moral
evils, but only outward circumstances, are admitted
as justifying suicide.2 The paradox, however, loses
its point when it is remembered that, to the Stoics,
life and death are quite as much indifferent as all
other external things.3 To them, nothing really good
1 Olympiod. in Phtvdr. 3 o5' o\ws, <pao-iv, oXtrai Seip Xpv~
(SCfinTTWSrist. 7. b, in), xne amros odrt \iov\v iv rip $l<f tuis
favourite comparison of life to dyaQots, otjr* iâyajyriv rots koko7s
a banquet is here so carried trapap.erpeiv, aWd rots p.4aots
out, that the five occasions for Kara tpvo-iy. 5ii> /cat rots euSaisuicide are compared with five p.ovovo~t yivtrat work KaBrjKoy
occasions for leaving a banquet. Qdyttv kavrobs, Kal uu eic avBts
- Pint. C. Not. 11, 1 : rrapa 4v rep fair rots KavoSatîovovo-iv.
ri)v tvvoiav ianv, avBpatrov <J Ibid, li, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5 :
x&vra r&yaQd ndptari Kal ptri Simul atque occurrunt molesta
Sky tvSe? irpbs ti/Sai/iofiav Kal rb et tranquillitatem turbantia,
fiandptov, rovrtp KaBfaeiv Qdytiv emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in
iavriip- J?ti Sk ptaKKov, $ fi-qSiv necessitate ultima facit, sed
aya96i/ iart puiS' iarai rd Sk Setvk cum primum illi caepit suspecta
vdwra Kal rh Svax^PV KO' Kcutit esse fortuna, diligentercircumwdpetrrt Kal irdpearat Sid r(\ovs, spicit.numquid illodie desinenroirip
KaBr)Kftv airo\4yecr6ai dam sit. Nihil existimat sua
rbt> (Slav an ptii ri rJj Ala r&v aSta- referre, faciat finem an accipiat,
<p6pwy auTqJ irpoffyivrtrai. Ibid, tardius fiat an citius. Non
22,7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; tanquam de magno detrimento
Alex. Aphr.DeAn. 156,b; 158, b. timet: nemo multum ex stilli3 Pint. Sto. Rep. 18, 5 : aKK' cidio potest perdere. Conf.77,6.
MAN AND THE WORLD'S COURSE.

appears to be involved in the question of suicide,
but a choice between two things morally indif
ferentone of which, life, is only preferable to the
other, death, whilst the essential conditions for a life
according to nature are satisfied.1 The philosopher,
therefore, says Seneca,2 chooses his mode of death just
as he chooses a ship for a journey or a house to live
in. He leaves life as he would leave a banquet
when it is time. He lays aside his body when it no
longer suits him, as he would lay aside worn-out
clothes ; and withdraws from life as he would with
draw from a house no longer weather-proof.3
1 A very different question, however, it is, whether
life can be treated in this way as something indif
ferent, and whether it is consistent with an uncon
ditional resignation to the course of the world, to
evade by persona.1 interposition what destiny with
its unalterable laws has decreed for us. Stoicism
may, indeed, allow this course of action. But in so
1 C'ic Fin. Hi. 18, 60: Sed
cum ab his [the media] omnia
proticiscantur officia, non sine
causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes ; in his
et excessum e vita et in vita
mansionem. In quo enim p] ura
sunt, quae secundum naturam
sunt, hujus officium est in vita
manere : in quo autem aut
sunt plura contraria aut fore
videntur, hujus officium est e
vita excedere. E quo apparet,
et sapientis esse aliquando offi
cium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita,
cum sit miser. . . . Et quoniam
excedens e vita et manens
aaque miser est [stultus], nec

diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa di
citur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita
manendum. Stob. 226: The
good may have reasons for
leaving life, the bad for con
tinuing in life, even though
they never should become wise :
o&re -)hp tV ttpeTV Kar4xftv iv
TqS f}v, oT T^y KaKiav IKfi&WtlV
rois Si Kafi-finoucri koI rots irapa rb
Kadrjicov /xeTpeiffBat Tît re fail?
Kal jbi/ Q&varov.
2 Ep. 70, 11.
3 Teles, in Stol. Floril. 5,
67, p. 127 Mein.
z2
340
Chap.
VTf
'
THE STOICS.
doing does it not betray its ill-success in the
attempt to combine, without contradiction, two
main tendencies so different as that of individual
independence and that of submission to the uni
verse ?
STOICISM AND RELIGION.
341
CHAPTER XIII.
THE RELATION OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.
It would be impossible to give a full account of the
philosophy of the Stoics without treating of their
Chap.
XIII.
theology ; for no early system is so closely connected k.General .

with religion as that of the Stoics. Founded as is o/!sfei!-"'"
their whole view of the world upon the idea of one
Divine Being, begetting from Himself and contain
ing in Himself all finite creatures, upholding them
by His might, ruling them according to an unalter, able law, and thus manifesting Himself everywhere,
their philosophy bears a decidedly religious character.
Indeed, there is hardly a single prominent feature
in the Stoic system which is not, more or less, con
nected with theology. A very considerable portion of
that system, moreover, consists of strictly theolo
gical questions ; such as arguments for the existence
of deity, and for the rule of Providence; inves
tigations into the nature of God, His government,
and presence in the world ; the relation of human
activity to the divine ordinances ; and all the
various questions connected with the terms freedom
and necessity. The natural science of the Stoics
begins by evolving things from God ; it ends with
342
Chap,
.
THE STOICS.
resolving them again into God. God is thus the begin ning and end of the world's development. In like man
ner, their moral philosophy begins with the notion
of divine law, which, in the form of eternal reason,
controls the actions of men ; and ends by requiring
submission to the will of God, and resignation to the
course of the universe. A religious sanction is thus
given to all moral duties. All virtuous actions are
a fulfilment of the divine will and the divine law.
That citizenship of the world, in particular, which
constitutes the highest point in the Stoic morality,
is connected with the notion of a common relation
ship of all men to God. Again, that inward repose
of the philosopher, those feelings of freedom and
independence, on which so much stress is laid, rest
principally on the conviction that man is related to
I God. In a word, Stoicism is not only a system of
philosophy, but also a system of religion. As such
it was regarded by its first adherents, witness the
fragments of Cleanthes ; 1 and as such it afforded, in
later times, together with Platonism, to the best
and most cultivated men, wherever the influence of
Greek culture extended, a substitute for declining
natural religion, a satisfaction for religious cravings,
and a support for moral life.
1 The well-known hymn to kul tov Xoyov rod rrjs <pi\oo-o<ptast
Zeus, in Stob. Eel. i. 30, and Mavus niv âT-yeXXeiK Swapeiov
the verses quoted p. 333, 1. to 8eia khI avSpdiriva, /ujj ?x"TOS
Nor is the poetic form used by Be tyi\ov twv Be'icov ncyeQotv Ae'eis
Cleanthes without importance, olxtlas. t4 iierpa koX ri h(\t\ ko\
He asserted, at least according rohsp'vBuovs&s na.Xto-raTrpoa-iKve'ito Philodem. De Mus Vol. Here. fffcu irpis tV aXijBeiav rfij t&v
i. col. 28 : afxeivovd ye elvai rk Belay Btap'tas.
ironjTiKa Kal novatKa trapaBtiyfiara
i!43
This philosophic religion is quite independent of Chap.

the traditional religion. The Stoic philosophy con111 ' _
tains no feature of importance which we can pro- (l) Connounce with certainty to be taken from the popular ntoililiJ
faith.
The true worship of God, according to their witk ,
popular
view, consists only in the mental effort to know God, faith.
and in a moral and pious life.1 A really acceptable'
prayer can have no reference to external goods ; it
can only have for its object a virtuous and devout \
mind.2 Still, there were reasons which led the Stoics
to seek a closer union with the popular faith. A
system which attached so great an importance to
popular opinion, particularly in proving the existence
of God,3 could not, without extreme danger to itself,
declare the current opinions respecting the Gods to
be erroneous. And again, the ethical platform of
the Stoic philosophy imposed on its adherents the
duty of upholding rather than overthrowing the popu
lar creedthat creed forming a barrier against the
1 Compare the celebrated
dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D.
ii. 28, 71 : Culms autem Deorutn
est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut
eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneiemur ; and more particularly
JCpict. Man. 31,1: t5js irepl robs
deobs eu<re#eas iffdi Sti rb xvpiirarov Ikuv6 iartv, opBas utoA^cu
nepl avrwu xe v . . . teal ffavrbv
ciy rovro KaTOTCTaxevat, rb veldtffOai avrois KaX eticeiv Iv iraat
rots ytvoiAei/ois, k.t.A. Id. Diss,
ii. 18, 19. Further particulars
on p. 315, 2.
2 M. Aurel. ix. 40 : We ought

not to pray the Gods to give us
something, or to protect us from
something, but oily to pray ;
tlt6vat aurovs rb /A^re <pof}e?(r6ai
rt rovrwv jU^jre îrtflu/ieii/ rtvosrovrav. IHog. vii. 124 : We ought,
in fact, only to pray for what
is good.
3 See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math,
ix. 28, says that some of the
younger Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the
primitive condition have been
already mentioned, p. 293, I)
traced the belief in Gods back
to the golden age.
.'544
THE STOICS.
Chap,
*
violence of human passions.1 The practical value of

the popular faith may, then, be the cause of their
theological orthodoxy. Just as the Romans, long
after all faith in the Gods had been lost under the
influence of Greek culture,2 still found it useful and
necessary to uphold the traditional faith, so the
Stoics may have feared that, were the worship of the
people's Gods to be suspended, that respect for God
and the divine law on which they depended for the
support of their own moral tenets would at the same
time be exterminated.
(2) Free
Meantime, they did not deny that much in the
ofpopular popular belief would not harmonise with their prinbelief.
ciples ; and that both the customary forms of reli
gious worship, and also the mythical representations
of the Gods, were altogether untenable. So little did
they conceal their strictures, that it is clear that con
viction, and not fear (there being no longer occasion
for fear), was the cause of their leaning towards tradi
tion. Zeno spoke with contempt of the erection of
sacred edifices ; for how can a thing be sacred which
is erected by builders and labourers ? 3 Seneca de
nies the good of prayer.4 He considers it absurd to
1 In this spirit, Epict. Diss,
ii. 20, 32, blames those who
throw doubts on the popular
Gods, not considering that by
so doing they deprive many of
the preservatives from evil, the
very same argumentum ab utili
which is now frequent!}' urged
against free criticism.
2 Characteristic are the
utterances of the sceptic pon-
tifex Cotta, in Cic. N. D. i. 22,

61; iii. 2.
3 J'lvt. Sto. Rep. 6, 1 ; Diog.
vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.
4 Ep. 41, 1 : Non sunt ad
ccelum elevanda? manus nec exorandus redituus, ut nos ad
aures simulacri, quasi magis
exaudiri possimus, admittat :
prope est a te Deus, tecum est,
intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35, 1 :
346
entertain fear for the Gods, who are ever-beneficent Chap.

XIII.
beings.1 God he would have worshipped, not by
sacrifices and- ceremonies, but by purity of life ; not
in temples of stone, but in the shrine, of the heart.2 \
Gf images of the Gods, and the devotion paid to
them, he speaks with strong disapprobation ; 3 of the
"What is the meaning of expia
tions, if fate is unchangeable 1
They are only a3gra3 mentis so
latia. See p. 343, 2.
1 Benef. iv. 19, 1 : Deos
nemo sanus timet. Furor est
enim metuere salutaria nec
quisquam amat quos timet.
Not only do the Gods not wish
to do harm, but such is their
nature that they cannot do
harm. De Ira, ii. 27, 1 ; Benef.
vii. 1, 7 ; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly
needs remark, how greatly these
statements are at variance with
the Roman religion, in which
fear holds such a prominent
place.
Ep. 95, 47 : Quomodo sint
Di colendi, solet prscipi : accendere aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam
nec lumine Di egent et ne ho
mines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus
matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum : humanaambitio istisotticiis capitur : Deum
colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles ferre et specu
lum tenere Junoni : non quaerit
ministros Deus. Quidni 1 Ipse
humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus prassto est. . . .
Primus estDeorum cultus Deos
credere. Deinde reddere illis
nwjestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, kc. Vis Deos propitiare 1
Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit,
quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123

(in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3) :
Vultisne vos Deum cogitare
magnum et placidum . . . non
immolationibus et sanguine
multo colendumqua3 enim ex
trucidatione immerentium voluptas est ?sed mente pura,
bono honestoque proposito.
Non templa illi congestis in altitudinemsaxis extruenda sunt :
in suo cuique consecrandus est
pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3 :
The only worthy temple of God
is the universe.
In Fr. 120 (in Laat. ii. 2,
14), Seneca shows how absurd
it is to pray and kneel before
images, the makers of which
are thought little of in their
own profession. On this point
he expressed his opinion with
great severity in the treatise,
De Superstitione, fragments of
which Augustin. Civ. D. vi. 10,
communicates (Fr. 31 Haase).
The immortal Gods, he there
says, are transformed into life
less elements. They are clothed
in the shape of men and beasts,
and other most extraordinary
appearances ; and are honoured
as Gods, though, were they
alive, they would be desig
nated monsters. The man
ner, too, in which these Gods
are honoured is most foolish
and absurd ; such as by morti
fication and mutilation, stupid
THE STOICS.
unworthy fables of mythology, with bitter ridicule ; 1
and he calls the popular Gods, without reserve, crea
tions of superstition, whom the philosopher only in
vokes because it is the custom so to do.2 Moreover,
the Stoic in Cicero, and the elder authorities quoted
by him, allow that the popular beliefs and the songs
of the poets are full of superstition and foolish legends.3
Chrysippus is expressly said to have declared the dis
tinction of sex among the Gods, and other features
in which they resemble men, to be childish fancies ; 4
and immoral plays, &c. The wise
man can only take part in such
acts tanquam legibus jussa, non
tanquam Diis grata. This view
of worship had been previously
set forth by Heraclitus, who
otherwise was so much admired
by the Stoics.
1 Fr. 119(inZac.i. 16,10):
Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas salacissimus Jupiter desierit
liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius factus est, et illi lex
Papia fibulam imposuit ? An
impetravit jus trium liberorum?
An . . . timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno ? Simi
larly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. 1. c.) ;
Brevit. Vit. 16, 5 ; Vit. Be. 26,
6, the ineptiaj poetarum which,
as in the stories of Jupiter's
many adulteries, give free rein
to sins.
1 Augustin. 1. c. Fr. 33 : Quid
ergo tandem ? Veriora tibi videntur T. Tatii aut Romuli aut
Tulli Hostilii somnia 1 Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit Deam,
Picum Tiberimimque Romulus,
Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem, teterrimos hominum adfectus. . . . Haec numina potius
credes et coelo recipies ? Fr. 39 :

Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo aevo
longa superstitio congessit, sic
adorabimus ut meminerimus
cultum ejus magis ad morem
quam ad rem pertinere.
3 N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia
quoque ex ratione et quidem
physica fluxit multitudo Deorum ; qui induti specie humana
fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt
hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. Atque
hie locus a Zenone tractatus
post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo
pluribus verbis explicatus est
. . . physica ratio noninelegans
inclusa est in impias fabulas.
Still stronger language is used
by the Stoic, c. 28, 70, re
specting the commentitii et
ficti Dei. the superstitiones
paene aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthro
pomorphic legends.
4 Phmdrus (Philodemus).col.
2 of his fragment, according to
Petersen's restoration. Conf.
Cio. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii.
147; both of whom assert that
the Stoics do not think of the
STOICISM AND RELIGION. ,

Zeno to have denied any real existence to the popular
deities, and to have transferred their names to natural
objects ; 1 and Aristo 2 is charged with having denied
shape and sensation to the Deity.3
The Stoics were, nevertheless, not disposed to let
the current beliefs quite fall through. Far from it,
they thought to discover real germs of truth in these
beliefs, however inadequate they were in form. They
accordingly made it their business to give a relative
vindication to the existing creed. Holding that the
name of God belongs, in its full and original sense,
only to the one primary Being, they did not hesitate
to apply it, in a limited and derivative sense, to all
those objects by means of which the divine power is
especially manifested. Nay, more, in consideration
of man's relationship to God, they found it not
unreasonable to deduce from the primary Being
Gods bearing a resemblance to men.4 Hence they
distinguished, as Plato had done, between the eternal
Gods as human in form ; and
Lactcmt. De Ir. D. c. 18 : Stoici
negant habere ullam . formam
Deum.
1 The Epicurean in Cic. N.
D. i. 14, 36.
1 Cic. \. c. 37. Conf. Krische,
Forschung. i. 406 and 415.
* Clem,, indeed, says (Strom,
vii. 720, D) : ov$e alaOêtav <xut<
[tc de$~\ Sei", naQdtrtp ijpecre tols
'XriaiKois, fid\iara cwotj? KaL oêus'
fiy yhp MvaaQai totc kreptas clvti\afi$dvi<r9ai. But, according to
all accounts, this must be a mis
apprehension. Clement con
founds what Stoic writers have
conditionally asserted, for the
purpose of disproving it, with

their real opinion. Conf. Sext.
Math. ix. 139.
4 Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a de
scription of the Stoic theology,
evidently borrowed from a good
source : The Gods have been re
presented as being like men :
Si6ti tuv fxiv aicdmwv rb 6etuv
KuptdiTaroy, Twy Hi C4WV &v&pwos
KakXiffrov Kcd K*Ko(Tfxrin4vov aperij
5ta(p6ows Kari r^jv rov vov trvvtffTafftv, (rb Kpdriarovprobably
these words should be struck
out), TOLS oZv opi(TTVOV(Tt rb
tcpdrurrov 6fj.o'tws teal Ka\ws xe"'
318
Chap.
XIII.
(3) The
truth in
Poly
theism.
THE STOICS.
and immutable God and Gods created and transi
tory,1 between God the Creator and Sovereign of
the world, and subordinate Gods ; 2 in other words,
between the universal divine power as a Unity
working in the world, and its individual parts and
manifestations.3 To the former they gave the name
Zeus ; to the latter they applied the names of the
other subordinate Gods.
In this derivative sense, divinity was allowed to
many beings by the Stoics, and, in particular, to the
stars, which Plato had called created Gods, which
Aristotle had described as eternal divine beings, and
the worship of which lay so near to the ancient cultus
of nature. Not only by their lustre and effect on
the senses, but far more by the regularity of their
motions, do these stars prove that the material of
which they consist is the purest, and that, of all
created objects, they have the largest share in the
divine reason.4 And so seriously was this belief held
by the Stoics, that a philosopher of the unwieldy
piety of Cleanthes so far forgot himself as to charge
Aristarchus of Samos, the discoverer of the earth's
motion round the sun, the Galilaao of antiquity, with
impiety for wishing to remove the hearth of the
universe from its proper place.5 This deification of
the stars prepares us to find years, months, and
1 PUt. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Deorum, and whom ministros
Not. 31, 5 ; Def. Orao. 19, p. regni sui genuit. Sen. Fr. 26,
16 (in Laot. Inst. i. 5, 26).
420.
2 The numina, quse singula
3 I)io,;i. vii. 147.
adoramus et oolimus, which are
4 See p. 206. 1.
dependent on the Deus omnium
'- Plat. Da Fac. Lun 6, 3.
STOICISM AXD RELIGION.

seasons called Gods' as was done by Zeno, or at
least by his School. Yet, it must be remembered,

that the Stoics referred these times and seasons to
heavenly bodies, as their material embodiments.2
As the stars are the first manifestation, so the
elements are the first particular forms of the Divine
Being, and the most common materials for the exer
cise of the divine powers. It is, however, becoming
that the all-pervading divine mind should not only
be honoured in its primary state, but likewise in
its various derivate forms, as air, water, earth, and
elementary fire.3
All other things, too, which, by their utility to
man, display in a high degree the beneficent power
of God, appeared to the Stoics to deserve divine
honours, such honours not being paid to the things
themselves, but to the powers active within them.
They did not, therefore, hesitate to give the names
of Gods to fruits and wine, and other gifts of the
Gods.4
How, then, could they escape the inference that
among other beneficent beings, the heroes of anti
quity in particular deserve religious honours, seeing
that in these benefactors of mankind, whom legend
commemorates, the Divine Spirit did not show Him
self under the lower form of a efts, as in the elements,
1 Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.
1 See p. 131.
' Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39 ; ii.
26 ; Diog. vii. 147.
* Plut. De Is. c. 66 ; Cic.
1. c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38,
where this view is attributed,
in particular, to Zeno's pupil

Persseus. Krisclie (Forschung.
i. 442) reminds, with justice,
of the assertion of Prodicus,
that the ancients deifitd everything which was- of use to
man.
349
Chap.
XIII
'_
350
Chap.
XIII.
THE STOICS.
nor yet as simple <f>v<ris, as in plants, but as a rational
soul ? Such deified men had, according to the Stoic
viewwhich, on this point, agrees with the wellknown theory of Euemerusgreatly helped to swell
the number of the popular Gods ; nor had the Stoics
themselves any objection to their worship.1 Add to
this the personification of human qualities and states
of mind,2 and it will be seen what ample opportunity
1 Plurdr. (Philodemus),Nat.
De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15,
38, attribute this assertion spe
cially to Persaeus and Chrysippus. Id. ii. 24, (>4, after speaking
of the deification of Hercules,
Bacchus, Romulus, &c, con
tinues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque set emirate
fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti,
cum et optimi essent et aaterni.
IHog. vii. 151. Seep. 351, 1.
* This is done in Plut. Plac.
i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is
there said, is held in three
formsthe physical, the my
thical, and the form established
by law (theologia civilis). All
the gods belong to seven classes,
675t; : (1) t! 4k tuv tpaivofievtev
xa] fitredptev : the observation of
the stars, and their regularity
of movement, the changes of
season, &c, has conducted
many to faith ; and, accordingly,
heaven and earth, sun and
moon, have been honoured. (2
and 3) ?b 0\dirTov xal uxpc\ovv :
beneficent Beings are Zeus,
Here, Hermes, Demeter : ba'eful Beings are the Erinnyes,
Ares, &c. (4 and 5) updyiiara,
such as 'EAw'iy, Aimt, Ei/vofiia ;
and wd07), such as "Epas, 'A<ppoSIttj, Xl66os. (6) rb inrb rwv
Ronyriov TreirKaVfievov (rb pLvQiicbv'),
such as the Gods invented by

Hesiod for the purpose of his
genealogiesCoios, Hyperion,
&c. (7) Men who are honoured
for their services to mankind
Hercules, the Dioscuri, Diony
sus. This list includes not
only things which deserve
divine honours, but all things
to which they have been ac
tually given : hence it includes,
besides the purely mythical
Gods, things which the Stoics
can never have regarded as
Gods, such as the baleful Gods
and emotions, on which
see p. 345, 1 ; 346, 2. On the
other hand, they could raise no
objection to the worship of
personified virtues. In the
above list the elementary Gods,
such as Here, are grouped, to
gether with the Gods of fruits,
under the category of useful.
Another grouping was that fol
lowed by Dionysius (whether
the well-known pupil of Zeno
see p. 44, 1 or some later
Stoic, is unknown), who, ac
cording to Tertullian (Ad Nat.
ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods
into three classes : the visible
the sun and moon, for in
stance ; the invisible, or powers
of nature, such as Neptune
(that is, natural forces as they
351
the Stoics had for recogTiisins' everywhere in nature Chap.

. . agencies
. and powers,
XII]
and in the world of man divine
and, consequently, Gods in the wider sense of the
term.1 When once it is allowed that the name
of God may be diverted from the Being to whom
it properly belongs and applied, in a derivative
sense, to what is impersonal and a mere manifesta
tion of divine power, the door is opened to every
thing ; and, with such concessions, the Stoic system
could graft into itself even exceptional forms of
polytheism.
^/
With the worship of heroes is also connected the (4) Dno
doctrine of demons.2 The soul, according to the ^motm"
Stoic view already set forth, is of divine origin, a
part of and emanation from God. Or, distinguishing
more accurately in the soul one part from the rest,
divinity belongs to reason only, as the governing
part. Now, since reason alone protects man from
evil and conducts him to happinessthis, too, was
the popular belief reason may be described as the
guardian spirit, or demon, in man. Not only by
the younger members of the Stoic School, by Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, are the
popular notions of demons, as by Plato aforetime,3
make themselves felt in the &Tro\e\oiira<rt ir\yv fi6yov rov Aibf,
elements and in planets) ; and tls by vdyras KarayaKlffKovffi tous
those facti, or deified men.
1 Conf. Wachsmuth, Die
1 Plat. Com. Not. 31, 5:
a\\a Xpvffiniros ol K\edv87js, Ansichten der Stoiker iiber
Mantik und Damonen (Berl.
\6ytp Qewv rby oitpwby, T^y yyv, 1860), pp. 293'J.
s Tim. 90, A.
rby aepa, ryv 6i\array, ovbtva
tuv toisovtwv &(p0apTov ov5' atSioy
So-2
Chap.
XIII.
THE STOICS.
explained in this sense,1 but the same method is
pursued by Chrysippus, who made siSai/xovia, or
happiness, consist in a harmony of the demon in
man (which, in this case, can only be his own will
and understanding) with the will of God.2 Little
were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations,
they were attributing to popular notions a meaning
wholly foreign to them. But it does not therefore
follow that they shared the popular belief in guar
dian spirits.3 Their system, however, left room for
1 Posid. in Galen. Hipp, et
Plat. v. 6, p. 469: t!> SJ; ray
va8uv aXnov, Tovreffrt tt)s re
avofioKoyias Kal tov naKofial[iQi>os
fiiov, rb fiij Kara irap kireoBai Ttp
4v aur^j daifiovi oiiyyeyet re qvti
Kal tt\v hfxolav tpvfftv %xovTL T$ T^v
oKoy K6(Tfiov Sioikovvti, t$ 5e
Xeipovi Kal fadidei itore <rvvenKkiyuyras <pepe<r6at. Sen. Ep. 41,
2, according to the quotation,
p. 344, 4 : Sacer intra nos spiritus
sedet, malorum bonorumque
nostrorum observator et custos.
Hie prout a nobis tractatus est,
ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31,
11: Quid aliud voces bunc
[animus rectus, bonus, magnus]
quam Deum in corpore humano
hospitantem? .lust as Kant
calls the moral idea, a primary
notion which mankind has em
braced, the moral tone a good
spirit governing us. Mpict.
Diss. i. 14, 12: iirlrpoirov [6
Zeus] eKd&rcp irap&TTTftre rby
e/ca<TTOu SalfjLOva, Kal irape5aj(
<pv\daaetv avrbv auTtp Kal rovrov
aKoifjLTjTOv Kal airapakSyiffrov. He
who retires within himself is
not alone, AW i debs fvSov iarl
Kal 6 iuerepos Saifiuy 4<rri. To
him each one has taken an

oath of allegiance, as a soldier
has to his sovereign, but ixe?
fiev ofivtiovtriv, aiirov
Trportfi-f]êiy ertpov 4vrav0a 5* avrovs
andvrmv; so that the demon
is lost in the avrbs within.
M. Aurtl. v. 27 : & Sa't/iuy,
fry koVtcu itpoffrdrtjif Kal ijyep.6va <5 Zeus eSciiKev, airdo'irao'p.a
eaurov. ouros be eariv <5 eKjurrou
yovs Kal \6yos. See ii. 13 and
17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12, 16;
v. 10 ; viii. 45.
2 See the passage quoted
from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3.
(Dingvties had only just before
named Chrysippus irepl rekovs,
as source), which receives its
explanation (if it needs one)
from the above words of Posidonius.
* In this sense, the words of
Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be under
stood : Sepone in prassentia
quaa quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum paedagogum
dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris
nota? . . . ita tamen hoc seponas
volo, ut memineris, majores
nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoicos
S10ICISM AND RELIGION.

believing that, besides the human soul and the spirits
of the stars, other rational souls might exist, having
a definite work to perform in the world, subject to
the law of general necessity, and knit into the
chain of cause and effect. Nay, more, such beings
might seem to them necessary for the completeness
of the universe.1 What reason have we, then, to
express doubt, when we are told that the Stoics be
lieved in the existence of demons, playing a part in
man and caring for him ? 2 Is there anything ex
traordinary, from the Stoic platform, in holding that
some of these demons are by nature inclined to do
harm, and that these tormentors are used by the
deity for the punishment of the wicked,3 especially
fnisse: singu'is enim et Genium
et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the
old Romans, not the Stoics.
1 Conf. Seat. Math. ix. 86.
Amongst other things, quoted
p 146, 1, it is there said : If
living beings exist on the earth
and in the sea, there must be
vueph
in the air, which is so
much purer; and these are the
demons.
2 Diog. vii. 151 : (pairl 5' eimi
Kai Tivas daifiovai avdpunroiv <ruuirddeiav ?xol/Tcty itr6mas tuv ayQpwntiuy Trpayfidrwy ' ai rjpaias
t<zv &ro\t\tififieyas rwy cnroub'a'iajy
tyvx&s. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360:
Piato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates,
and Chrysippus hold, with the
old theologians (amongst whom
Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly
thinks of the Orphics), that the
demons are stronger than men,
from which the language used
of them by Chrysippus does not
follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420:
The Stoics believe demons to

be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2 : a\ijs,
Ilv9ay6pasf Tl\druy, oi 2TaW,
Saiuovas virdpxtiv ovalas tû^t/cas.
A special treatise irepl Tjpuuy al
SaijuiW'c proceeded from the pen
of Posidonius, probably, as was
his wont, containing more
learned than dogmatic state
ments, an extract from which is
given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, con
taining the etymology of Salûw.
3 Plut. Qusest. Rom. 51, p
277 : naddircp oi 7repl Xpvcrnrirov
otovrai tpi\6ffotj}0i (pavKa Satudvia
irepiyoo~Tc7y) ols oi Qeoi S-qfxioa
XP'jivtgu Ka\ao~Tai5 ^7rt tovs avuaiovs Kai aSiicovs ayQpdtirovs. Id.
Def. Orac. 17, p. 419: QavAovs
. . . Baifxovas ovk 'EjuTreBoKA^s
fx6vov . . . airA.i7rej/, aAXa. koX
YlXdjuv koX s,tvKpdTT)s Kai Xpvtirrirosa statement which, par
ticularly as it is extended to
Plato, would prove little. The
baleful Gods of mythology (p.
AA
354
Chap.
XIII.
B. The
AiUnorising Spirit.
(I) Alle
gorical
inter
pretation
vf myths.
THE STOICS.
when in such a strict system of necessity these de
mons could only work, like the powers of nature,
conformably with the laws of the universe and with
out disturbing those laws, occupying the same ground
as lightning, earthquakes, and drought? And yet
the language of Chrysippus, when speaking of evil
demons who neglect the duties entrusted to them,1
sounds as though it were only figurative and tenta
tive language, not really meant. Besides, the later
Stoics made themselves merry over the Jewish and
Christian notions of demons and demoniacal posses
sion.2
Even without accepting demons, there were not
wanting in the Stoic system points with which the
popular beliefs could be connected, if it was necessary
to find in these beliefs some deeper meaninsr. It
mattered not that these beliefs were often so dis
torted in the process of accommodation as to be no
longer recognised. The process required a regular
code of interpretation by means of which a philoso
phic mind could see its own thoughts in the utter
ances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as
by their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of
interpretation was found in the method of allegorical
interpretationa method which received a most ex350, 2) were explained as being from Stoicism, but from Plato
evil demons by those who did (Rep. x. 615, e) and the Neonot deny their existence alto platonists.
gether. Those demons, how
1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See
ever, whicli purify the soul in p. 191, 2.
* Tertull. Test. An. 3, after
another world (Salluxt. De
Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and whom speaking of demons, add* :
Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, Aliqui Chrysipf.i sectator il!ureminds of), are not borrowed dit ea.
THE ALLEGORISING SPIRIT.

tended application, in order to bridge over the gulf be
tween the older and the more modern types of culture.1
Zeno, and still more Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their
successors, sought to discover natural principles and
moral ideasthe \6yoi tyvcriicoi, or physicas rationes,
in the Gods of popular belief and the stories of
these Gods,2 and supposed that such principles and
ideas were represented in these stories in a sensuous
form.3 In this attempt, they clung to the poems of
1 The Stoics are not the first Lampsacus, and other followers
who resorted to allegorical ex of Anaxagoras (according to
planations of myths. Just as, Hesych. even Agamemnon was
before philosophy had broken explained to be the ether). It
away from mythology, a Phere- appears to have been a favour
cydes, an Empedocles, the ite one in the time of the
Pythagoreans had, whether con Sophists (Plato, Theait. 153, C ;
sciously or unconsciously, veiled Kep. ii, 378, D ; Pluedr. 229, C ;
their thoughts in the language Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg.
of legend, and even subse 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as ap
quently Plato had used a veil of pears from Euripides and Hero
poetry ; so, now that the breach dotus. It follows naturally
between the two was open, from the view of Prodicus on
many attempts were made to the origin of belief in the Gods.
conceal its breadth, and indi Plato disapproved of it. Aris
vidual beliefs were represented totle occasionally appealed to
as the real meaning of popular it to note glimmers of truth in
beliefs, it being always sup popular notions without attri
posed that the original framers buting to it any higher value.
had an eye to this meaning. The founder of Cynicismand his
Thus a twofold method of followers pursued it zealously.
treating the myths resulted From the Cynics the Stoics
that by natural explanation, appear to have taken it. They
and that by allegorical inter carried it much fuither than
pretation. The former method any of their predecessors, and
referred them to facts of history, they, too, exercised a greater
the latter to general truths, influence on posterity than
whether moral or scientific. the Cynics.
Both methods agreed in
2 Cie. N. D. 24, 63 ; iii. 24,
looking for a hidden meaning 63, see p. 340, 3.
besides the literal one. This
$ Th definition of allegory :
method of treating myths had 6 yap aWa jUv ayopcuwv rpdiros,
been already met with among trepa 5 S>v Atyti <jf\p.aivvav, eVaithe older teachers, such as vvpLWS aWTjyopta FcaAetVai (HeraDeinocritus, Metrodorus of clit. Alleg. Horn. c. 5, p. 6).
aa 2
855
Chap.
XIII.
356
Chap.
THE STOICS.
Homer and Hesiod, the Bible of the Greeks,1 without, however, excluding other mythology from the
sphere of their investigation. One chief instru
ment which they, and modern lovers of the symboli
cal following in their footsteps, employed was a
capricious playing with etymologies of which so many
instances are on record.2 Like most allegorisers, they
also laid down certain principles of interpretation
sensible enough theoretically,3 but proving, by the
use which was made of them, that their scientific
appearance was only a blind to conceal the most
capricious vagaries. Approaching in some of their
explanations to the original bases of mythological
formation, they were still unable to shake off the
Accordingly, it includes every
kind of symbolical expression.
In earlier times, according to
Pint. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, it was
termed \m6vouu, which term is
found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D,
conf. Io. 530, D ; Xen. Symp.
3, 6.
' In this way Zeno treated
all the poems of Homer and
Hesiod (Dio C/irtjsost. Or. 53,
p. 275 ; Diog. vii. 4 ; Krische,
Forsch. 393), and so did
Cleanthes (Ding. vii. 176 ;
Phadr. [Philodem.] De Nat.
De. col. 3; Pint. Aud. Po. 11,
p. 31 ; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003 ;
Krische, 433) and Persasus.
Chrysippus explained the stories
in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus,
and Musecus (Phird. col. 3 ;
Galen. Hipp, et Plat. iii. 8,
vol. v. 341), Krische, 391 and
479), and was followed by
Diogenes {Phad. col. 5 ; Cic.
N. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also

Pint. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and
respecting the theological lite
rature of the Stoics Vilhdsiii on
Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the
Romans, the same method was
followed by Varro (Preller,
Rom. Myth. 29), and from his
writings Heraclitus (living
under Augustus; derived the
material for his Homeric Alle
gories (edited by Mebler), and
Cornutus for his work on the
nature of the Gods edited by
Osann from Villoisin's papers.
Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.
Corn. c. 17, p. 80 : SeT 5e
ju); ffvyxetv robs nvBov-,
e'
Irepov tA ordfiara tip' trfpov
pcTatyeptiv, jUtjS' ft ti Trpotwrkdadri
Ta?s /car' avrovs irapaZiZo^xivais
ysveoXoyiais inrh rSiv ^ gvv*vtwv
& aXvWrovTtxi K(xpT)p.evmv 5' oituis
ws rots irKatrixaaiv, ak6ya>s r'i8to-flai.

curious notion that the originators of myths, fully
conscious of all their latent meanings, had framed
357
Chap.
XIII.
them as pictures to appeal to the senses ; 1 and, in

innumerable cases, they resorted to explanations so
entirely without foundation that they would have
been impossible to anyone possessing a sound view
of nature and the origin of legends. To make theory
telly with practice, the founder of the School
following Antisthenes, and setting an example after
wards repeated by both Jews and Christiansmain
tained that Homer only in some places expressed
himself according to truth, in others according
to popular opinion.2 Thus did Stoicism surround
itself with the necessary instruments for the most ex
tended allegorical and dogmatic interpretation.
Proceeding further to enquire how this method (2) Interwas applied to particular stories, the first point which
*
attracts attention is the contrast which they draw myths rebetween Zeus and the remaining Gods. From their J^wf
belief in one divine principle everywhere at work, it
followed as a corollary that this contrast, which else
where in Greek mythology is only a difference of
degree, was raised to a specific and absolute differ1 Proofs may be found in
abundance in Heraclitus and
Cornutus. Conf. Sen. Nat. Qu.
ii. 45, 1 : The ancients did not
believe that Jupiter hurled his
thunderbolts broadcast ; sed
euudem, quern nos Jovem intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, aniinum ac spiriturn mundi, &c.
2 Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p.
276, R. speaking of Zeno's cornmentaries on Homer, says : & 5e

Zr)piv ovSfv tow toS 'Oyehpov
Ae'7ei, a\\a Sntyov/xevos ko.1 diddakkp, Sti tA /ice Kara S6ây, ra 8e
(terra a\riBeiav yiypcupev. . . .
b 5e \6yos vvros 'Aptiadeyei6s
4ari irpdTepoc . . . a\\' d /xiy ovk
ifcipyaaaro avrbv ovSt kotA tup
M ixipuvs iSfiXaatp.
358
THE STOICS.
Chap. ence. Zeus was compared to other Gods as an inXIII

.
L corruptible God to transitory divine beings. To tlie
Stoics, as to their predecessor Heraclitus, Zeus is the
one primary Being, who has engendered, and again
absorbs into himself, all things and all Gods. He is
the universe as a unity, the primary fire, the ether,
the spirit of the world, the universal reason, the
general law or destiny.1 All other Gods, as being
parts of the world, are only parts and manifestations
of Zeus only special names of the one God who
has many names.2 That part of Zeus which goes
over into air is called Here (arip) ; and its lower
strata, full of vapours, Hades ; that which becomes
elementary fire is called Hephaestus ; that which be
comes water, Poseidon ; that which becomes earth,
Demeter, Hestia, and Rhea ; lastly, that portion
which remains in the upper region is called Athene
in the more restricted sense. And since, according
to the Stoics, the finer elements are the same as
spirit, Zeus is not only the soul of the universe,
1 Special references are
hardly necessary after those
already quoted, p. 148, 1 ; 153,
2; 164. 2; 165, 5. Conf. the
hymn of Cleawthes ; Chrysippus,
in Stob. Eel. i. 48 ; Arat. Phaen.
Begin.; Plut. Aud. Poet. e. 11,
p. 31 ; Varro, in August. Civ.
D. vii. 5 ; 6 ; 9 ; 28 ; Servius,
in Georg. i. 5 ; Heraclit. c. 15,
p. 31 ; c. 23, 49 ; c. 24, 50 ;
Com. pp. 7 ; 26 ; 35 ; 38, where
Ztf/s is derived from Qv or
fc6/ and Aihs from 6u>, 8n $i'
avrhr ra Ttivra ; conf. Villoisin
and Osann on the passage of
Cornutus, who give further anthorities in their notes on the

respective passages. The same
on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the
derivation of Bds from Beeiv or
riBivai ; of aifljjp from oXBeiv or
4el 8eew. A portion of these
etymologies is well known to
be Platonic,
2 noXvcbvvixos, as he is called
by Cleanthes v. 1. Conf. Diog.
147; Corn. c. 9 and 26. The
further expansion of this idoa
may befound inthe Neoplatonic
doctrine,

but Athene, Eeason, Intelligence, Providence.1 The
same Zeus appears in other respects as Hermes, Dionysus, Hercules.2 The Homeric story of the binding
and liberation of Zeus3 points to the truth, already
established in Providence, that the order of the world
rests on the balance of the elements. The rise and
succession of the elements is symbolised in the hang
ing of Here ; 4 the arrangement of the spheres of the
universe, in the golden chain by which the Olympians
thought to pull down Zeus.5 The lameness of He
phaestus goes partly to prove the difference of the
1 See Dwg. 1. c. ; Cic. N. D.
ii. 26, 66 ; Plued. (Philodem.),
Fragm. col. 2-6 ; Heracl. c. 25,
p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl.
c. 15 anci 41, p. 85 ; Corn. c. 3;
on Hephaestus, Heracl. c. 26,
55 ; 43, 91 ; Corn. c. 19, p. 98 ;
Pint. De Is. c. 66, p. 377
(Diug. 1. c. perhaps confounds
as Krische, p. 399, supposes,
common fire with wCp Texwb",
' but it is also possible that the
artificial God of mythology
may have been explained nowone way now another in
the Stoic School, which is not
always uniform in its interpre
tations) ; on Poseidon, Heracl.
c. 7, 15; c. 18, 77 ; c. 46, 117;
Corn. c. 12 ; Plut. De Is. c. 40,
Schl. p. 367; on Hades, whom
Cicero 1, c. makes the repre
sentative of terrena vis ; Heracl.
c. 23, p. 50 ; c. 41, 87 ; Corn. 6 ;
on Demeter and Hestia, Corn.
c. 28, p. 156 ; Pint. 1. c. ; on
Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39 ; c.
28, 59 ; c. 61, 123 ; Corn. c. 20,
103. It is only by a forced in
terpretation of a passage in
Homer, that (Heraolit. 25, 53)

Athene is made to be earth.
That even Zeno treated indi
vidual Gods in this way, as
parts of one general divine
power or Zeus, is rendered pro
bable by Krische, Forsch. 399,
by a comparison of P/itedr.
col. 5, with the passages quoted
from Cicero and Diogenes.
2 Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1 : Hunc
[Jovem] et Liberum patrem et
Herculem et Mercurium nostri
putant. Liberum patrem, quia
omnium parens sit. . . . Her
culem, quia vis ejus invicta sit,
quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura.
Mercurium, quia ratio penes
ilium est numerusque et ordo et
scientia. The solution of Helios
into Zeus (Macrob. Sat. i. 23)
appears also to be of Stoic
origin.
* Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf.
II. i. 395.
4 Heracl. c. 40, 83 ; 11. XV;
18.
s Ibid. c. 37, 73; II. viii.
18.
359
Chap.
Xl11
"CO
THE STOICS.
earthly from the heavenly fire, and partly implies
that earthly fire can as little do without wood as the
lame can do without a wooden support ; and if, in
Homer, Hephaestus is hurled down from heaven, the
meaning of the story is, that in ancient times men
lighted their fires by lightning from heaven and the
rays of the sun.1 The connection of Here with Zeus2
points to the relation of the ether to the air surround
ing it; and the well-known occurrence on Mount Ida
was referred to the same event.3 The still more
offensive scene in the Samian picture was expounded
by Chrysippus as meaning that the fertilising powers
(\6yoi <nrsp/j.aTcicol) of God are brought to bear upon
matter.4 A similar meaning is found by Heraclitus
in the story of Proteus,5 and in that of the shield of
Achilles. If Hephasstus intended this shield to be a
representation of this world, what else is thereby
meant but that, by the influence of primary fire,
matter has been shaped into a world ? 6
1 Herael. c. 26, 5-1, who ap
plies the same method of in
terpretation to the legend of
Prometheus (otherwise inter
preted by Corn. c. 18, 96),
Corn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness
of Hephtestus, Pint. Fac. Lun.
5, 3, p. 922.
2 According to Eustath. in
II. p. 93, 46, probably following
a Stoic interpretation, Here is
the spouse of Zeus, because the
air issunounded by the ether ;
but does not agree with him,
because the two elements are
opposed to each other.
3 Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf.
Pint. And. Po. p. 19), where
this explanation is given very

fully. The occurrence on Mount
Ida is said to represent the
passage of winter into spring.
Here's tresses are the foliage
of trees, &c.
A See Diog. vii. 187 ; Prooem.
5 ; Orig. con. Gels. iv. 48 ;
Theophil. ad Autol. iii. 8, p.
122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
s c. 64. Proteus, according
to this explanation, denotes
unformed matter ; the forms
which he assumes denote the
four elements
8 See the description. Alleg.
Horn. 43-51, p. 90, of which
the above is a meagre abstract.

In a similar way, the Homeric theomachy was
explained by many to mean a conjunction of tlie
seven planets, which would involve the world in great
trouble.1 Heraclitus, however, gives the preference
to an interpretation, half physical and half moral,
which may have been already advanced by Cleanthes.2
Ares and Aphrodite, rashness and profligacy, are op
posed by Athene, or prudence ; Leto, forgetfulness,
is attacked by Hermes, the revealing word ; 3 Apollo,
the sun. by Poseidon, the God of the water, with
whom, however, he comes to terms, because the sun
is fed by the vapours of the water ; Artemis, the
moon, is opposed by Here, the air, through which it
passes, and which often obscures it ; Fluvius, or
earthly water, by Hephasstus, or earthly fire.4 That
Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon, no one
doubts ; 5 nor did it cause any difficulty to these
1 According to Heraclit. 53, pretation given by Heraclitus
to Homer's deopax'ta is quite
2 We learn from Ps. Pint. in the style of tue interpre
De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that tation of the legend of Her
Cleanthes wrote a fltoôx'o, a cules, and was probably bor
small fragment of which, con rowed from Cleanthes.
taining a portion of the Pro
3 Further particulars on
metheus legend in a later Hermes, Alleg. Horn. c. 7f
and evidently apologetically 141.
moulded form, is there pre
4 Alleg. Horn. c. 54.
served. The theomachy des
5 Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11
cribed by Cleanthes (the Stoic Corn. 32, p. 191 ; 34, 20(> ; Cic
Cleanthes seems to be meant) N. D. ii. 27, 68 ; Plwdr. (Philois, however, not the Homeric, dem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2
theomachy, but the struggle of In Phadrus, too, col. 2 (tovs Se
the Gods with the Giants and top 'AirdAAw), if $)kiov seems too
should be
Titans, described in the book wild, perhaps
7repi yvyavrtav (Diog. vii. .175). substituted for tovs, for Apollo
Perhaps on this occasion he cannot well symbolize the
may have di.-cussed the other. earth,
At any rate the moral inter
112
301
Chap.
Xlll.
362
Chap.
XIII.
THE STOICS.
mythologists to find the moon also in Athene.1
Many subtle discussions were set on foot by the
Stoics respecting the name, the form, and the attri
butes of these Gods, particularly by Cleanthes, for
whom the sun had particular importance,2 as being
the seat of the power which rules the world.3 The
stories of the birth of the Lotoides and the defeat
of the dragon Pytho are, according to Antipater,
symbolical of events which took place at the forma
tion of the world, and the creation of the sun and
moon.4 Others find in the descent of two Gods from
1 Pint. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p.
922. The Stoics address the
moon as Artemis and Athene.
2 See p. 147, 1.
3 The name Apollo is ex
plained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17, ws Air' &\Acii/ nod
aAAwp r6iru>v tcls aparoAas ttoiovixcvov ; by Chrysippus, as derived
from a privative and iro\vs, as
ovx' Twy iroAAwe Kal tpavXav
avfffjiv rov irvpbs tWa. The latter
explanation is quoted by Plotin.
v. 5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean,
and Chrysippus may have taken
it from Pythagoras, or the later
Pythagoreans from Chrysippus.
Cicero, in imitation, makes his
Stoic derive sol from solus. The
epithet of Apollo, Loxias, is
referred by Cleanthes to the
cAwct Aoa! of the sun's course,
or the OKTiVes Aoal of the sun ;
and by (Enopides, t > the Aofiis
kukAos (the ecliptic). The
epithet Avkios is explained by
Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque
humorem eripit radiis; Anti
pater, air?) tov AfvKaiveodai iraVra
(puilôvTos rjKiou. In the same
author Macrobius found the

derivation of iriiflior from irvBeiv
(because the sun's heat pro
duces decay). Other explana
tions of these as well as of
other epithets of Apollo, of the
name of Artemis and her
epithets, of the attributes and
symbols of these Gods, are to be
found in abundance in Cornutu-s, c. 32, 34, and in Macro
bius, 1. c, who probably got
most of them fromStoicsources.
4 The nrst of these stories is
explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
down to the most minute de
tails, in the sense of the
cosmical views already given,
p. 162, 2, and likewise the
story of the slaying of the
Pytho, the dragon being taken
to represent the heavy vapours
of the marshy earth, which were
overcome by the sun's heat
(the arrows of Apollo). This
interpretation being expressly
attributed to Antipater by Ma
crobius, it appears probable
that the first one came from
the same source. Another like
wise quoted by him, according

Leto the simpler thought, that sun and moon came
forth out of darkness.1 In the same spirit, Heraclitus, without disparaging the original meaning of
the story, sees in the swift- slaying arrows of Apollo
a picture of devastating pestilence ; 2 but then, in an
extraordinary manner, misses the natural sense, in
gathering from the Homeric story of Apollo's recon
ciliation (II. i. 53) the lesson, that Achilles stayed
the plague by the medical science which Chiron had
taught him.3
Far more plausible is the explanation given of
the dialogue of Athene with Achilles, and of Hermes
with Ulysses. These dialogues are stated to be simply
soliloquies of the two heroes respectively.4 But the
Stoic skill in interpretation appears in its fullest
glory in supplying the etymological meanings of the
various names and epithets which are attributed to
Athene.5 We learn, for instance, that the name
TpiToysvsia refers to the three divisions of philosophy.6
to which the dragon represents
the sun's course, is perhaps also
Stoical.
1 Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points
to this in explaining Leto as
Ar)0ii, and referring it to night,
because e /erything is forgotten
in sleep at night.
2 c. 8, especially p. 16, 22,
28. Ibid, c 12, p. 24, 28. the
clang of Apollo's arrows is ex
plained to be the harmony of
the spheres.
a c. 15, p. 31 ,
4 Ibid. c. 19! 72, p. 39, 141.
5 See Corn. c. 20, 105, and
Villoitin's notes on the passage.
The most varied derivations of
Athene are given : from aBpeiv

by Herael. c. 19, 40; Tzetz. in
Hesiod. 'Ep. no! 'H,ue. 70 ; Etymol.
Mag. 'ABriva from flrjAus or Br\Xa&tv iÂQi]vri = aQ4}\T} or a6t)Ka
= r\ yAi 0r)Adfou<ra), by Pluedr.
Nat. D. col. 6 ; Athenag. Leg.
pro Christ, c. 17, p. 78from
Seivu, because virtue never
allows itself to be beaten
from aifljjp + va(, so that 'Aetjvaia
= Aidtpouaia.
6 This explanation had been
already given by Diogenes, ac
cording to Pluedr. col. 6. Cor
nutus also mentions it (20, 108),
but he prefers the derivation
from Tpuv.
363
THE STOICS.
Heraclitus discovers the same divisions in the three
beads of Cerberus.1 Chrysippus, in a diffuse manner,
proves that the coming forth of the Goddess from the
head of Zeus is not at variance witb his view of the
seat of reason.2 It has been already observed that
Dionysus means wine, and Demeter fruit ; 3 but, just
as the latter was taken to represent the earth and its
nutritious powers,4 so Dionysus was further supposed
to stand for the principle of natural life, the pro
ductive and sustaining breath of life ; 5 and since
this breath comes from the sun, according to Cleanthes, it was not difficult to find the sun represented
by the God of wine.6 Moreover, the stories of the
birth of Dionysus, his being torn to pieces by Titans,
1 c. 33, p. 69.
2 It is to be found in GaUn.
Hipp, et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349353, but, according to Pkadr.
(P/iiludem.) 1. c, conf. Cic.
D. I. 15, 41, was already
put forward by Diogenes. For
himself, he prefers the other
explanation, according to which
Athene comes forth from the
head of Jupiter, tiecause the air
which she represents occupies
the highest place in the uni
verse. Cornut. c. 20, 103. leaves
us to choose between this ex
planation and the assumption
that the ancients regarded the
head as the seat of the rtyenovmov. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states
t he latter, Eustath. in II. 93,
40, the fo mer, as t he reason.
3 p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.
4 See p. 359, 1, Pint. De Is.
c. 40, Schl. p. 367 : Demeter
and Core are rb 5ia rrjs yws ical
TwuKixpntiiv bSiKov nrfvua. Pkci'dr.
col 2 : ry\v Ai)y.t]fpa. yyv 3) ri> 4v

aiirrj y6vuya [ydvifiioi/ Trretûa].
On Demeter as yrj \^Tr\p or
Atj&j /x^rijp, see Corn. c. 28, p.
156, and Villoisin on the pas
sage.
5 Pint. 1. c. : Dionysus is rb
ySvifiov wtvua /cat rpofpiôv.
" Maerob. Sat. i. 18 : Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus
from fiiavvoai, because the sun
daily completes his course round
the world. It is well known
that, before and after his time,
the identification of Apollo with
Dionysus was common, and it
is elaborately proved by Macrobius. Serrius, too, on Georg.
i. 5, says that the Stoics be
lieved the sun, Apollo, and
Bacchusand likewise the
moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno, and
Proserpine to be identical.
Other etymologies of AtSvvnos
are given by Corn. c. 30, 173.

his followers,1 no less than the rape of Proserpine,2
and the institution of agriculture,3 and the names of
the respective Gods, afforded ample material for the
interpreting tastes of the Stoics.
The Fates (fj,olpai), as their name already indi
cates, stand for the righteous and invariable rule of
destiny ; 4 the Graces (^dpirss), as to whose names,
number, and qualities Chrysippus has given the
fullest discussion,5 represent the virtues of benevo
lence and gratitude ; 6 the Muses, the divine origin
of culture.7 Ares is war;8 Aphrodite, unrestrained
1 Com. 30, discusses the Plat. Sto. Rep. 47, 5 ; Corn.c. 13,
point at large, referring both p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.
the story and the attributes of
5 According to Sen. Benef. i.
Dionysus to wine. He, and 3, 8 ; 4, 4, he bad filled a whole
also Heracl. c. 35, p. 71, refer book, probably of a treatise not
the story of Dionysus and Ly- otherwise mentioned on kind
curgus to the vintage.
deeds, with these ineptiasita
1 Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who ut de ratione dandi accipiendi
also refers the legend and reddendiquebenericiipauca adworship of Demeter, in all par- modum dicat, nec his fabulas,
ticulars, to agriculture ; and sed hasc fabulis inserit. A
the rape of Persephone, to the portion of these was made use
sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. of by Hecato in his work on
N.D. ii. 26, 66. According to this subject.
Pint. Dels. 66,p. 377, Cleanthes
6 Chrysippus, in Phcedr.
had already called Xlepirt<p6rn. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further
rb Sitk ruv KapirCiv <ptp6p.tvov ttal particulars in Sen. 1. c, and
<povev6fievov wtvfjia. A somewhat Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar
different explanation of the is the explanation of Aito(
rape of Persephone is given in (Corn. 12. 37; Heracl 37, 75),
a passage of Mai's Mythograph which at best are only casual
vii. 4, p 216, quoted by Usann. personifications,
on Cornutus, p. 343.
1 Corn. 14, 43, who, at the
3 The legend of Triptolemus same time, mentions their
is explained by Cornutus, 1. c. names and number ; Philodem.
p. 161, as referring to the dis- De Mus. Vol. Here. i. col. 15 ;
covery of agriculture by Tri- Erato indicates the importance
ptolemus.
of music for eponiKT} aperr). Ibid.
4 Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes; 29,
180; Bus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 171, on the Horoi.
'Theodoret. Car. Gr. Aff. vi. 14,
8 Heracl. 31, 63; Pint. Am.
p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. 13, 15, p. 757.
365
Chap.
XIII.
366
Chap.
xrn.
THE STOIC'S.
passion, or, more generally, absence of control.1
Other interpreters, and among them Empedocles,
consider Ares to represent the separating, Aphrodite
the uniting, power of nature.2 The stories of the two
deities being wounded by Diomedes,3 of their adul
terous intrigues, and their being bound by Hephaestus,*
are explained in various waysmorally, physically,
technically, and historically.
In the case of another God, Pan, the idea of the
Allnear was suggested simply by the name. His
shaggy goat's feet were taken to represent the solid
earth, and the human form of his upper limbs im
plied that the sovereign power in the world resides
above.5 To the Stoic without a misgiving as to these
and similar explanations,6 it was a matter of small
> Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62,
4 In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p.
and above, p. 360.
19, the connection of Ares and
2 Ibid. 69, 136. In this Aphrodite is explained as mean
sense, Aphrodite might be iden ing a conj auction of the two
tified with Zeus, which was planets. Herael. 69, 136, gives
really done by Phecdr. Nat. De. the alternative of referring
col. 1 : av&Koyov tvv . . . Oat this connection to the union of
[Petersen suggests liivouetaBat, <pt\ia and i>(7kos, which produces
but probably it should be harmony, or to the fact that
brass (Ares) is moulded in tl e
koiv^v irdvTwv (pvatv Kal ciftap- fire (Hephajstus) into objects
aivrjV Kal avdyKtiv Kal tV avr^v of beauty (Aphrodite). The
slvat Kal ~E.vvop.iav Kal Aiktjv Kal latter interpretation is given
'Op.6votav nat Elphvriv Kal 'Acppo- by Corn,. 19, 102, who also ex
5/ttji* al to Trapan\i}0~iov irav.
plains the relation of Ares to
3 The story of Ares, vsIatov Aphrodite to mean the union of
is Keveava, means, according to strength and beauty.
Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes,
5 Corn. 27, 148 ; Plut.Krat.
$tt\ toi Ksva. T7/s rwv avmrdXwv 408, c.
rdfeois irapetaeK8i>v, defeated the
6 His lewdness was said to
enemy ; that of Aphrodite indicate the fulness of the
crwtpuaTMol
x6yot in nature ; his
(cHpDOffvvri, ibid. 30, 62), that,
by his experience in war, he sojourn in the wilderness, the
overcame the inexperienced solitariness of the world.
troops of barbarians.

difficulty to make the Titan 'IdirsTos stand for lan
guage or 'lafaros, and Kotos for quality or ttoiott]?.1
Add to this the many more or less ingenious expla
nations of the well-known stories of Uranos and
Cronos,2 and we are still far from having exhausted
the resources of the Stoic explanations of mythology.
The most important attempts of this kind have, how
ever, been sufficiently noticed.
Besides the legends of the Gods, the legends of
the heroes attracted considerable attention in the
Stoic Schools. Specially were the persons of Hercules
1 Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann
ad looum, who points out similar
interpretations, probably of
titjic origin, in the Scholia to
the theogony, and also in
Etymol. M.
4 Besides the etymologies of
oiipavbs in (Joru. c. 1, and the
observation of Pint. PI. i. 6, 9,
that heaven is the father of all
things, because of its fertilising
rains, and earth the mother,
because she brings forth every
thing, the words in do. N. D.
ii. 24, 63, on which Krisclie,
Forsch. 397, comments, deserve
notice. Itis there said, probably
after Zeno : Uranos is the Ether,
and was deprived of his vitality,
because he did not need it for
the work of begetting things.
Cronos is Time (the same is
said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who
sees in Rhea the ever flowing
motions), and consumes his
children, just as Time does
portions of time. Cronos was
bound by Zeus, the unmeasured
course of time having been
bound by the courses of the
stars. A second explanation is

given by Com. 7, 21, after
making (c. 3, 10) vain at
tempts at etv mological inter
pretations of Cronos and Khea.
Cronos (from /cpa(veic) stands
for the order of nature, putting
an end to the all too-violent
atmospheric currents on earth,
by diminishing the vapourmasses (compare the quotation
from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2),
and he is bound by Zeus, to re
present that change in nature
is limited. Macro!). Sat. i. 8
(who betrays that he is follow
ing a St"ic example by quoting
Chrysippus's definition of time :
certa dimensio quae ex coeli conversione colligitur, conf. p. 197,
2), gives anoiher explanation :
Before the separation of ele
ments, time was not ; after the
seeds of all things had flowed
from heaven down to the earth
in sufficient quantity, and the
elements had come into being,
the process came to an end, and
the different sexes were left to
propagate animal life.
367
Chap.
XIII.
(3) Alle
gory ap
plied to
heroic
myths.
THE STOICS.
Chap,
and Ulysses singled out for the sake of illustrating

the ideal of the wise man.1 But here, too. various
modes of interpretation meet and cross. According
to Cornutus,2 the God Hercules must be distin
guished from the hero of the same namethe God
being nothing less than Reason, ruling in the world
without a superior ; 3 and the grammarian makes
every effort to unlock with this key his history and
attributes. Nevertheless, with all his respect for
Cleanthes,4 he could not accept that Stoic's explana
tion of the twelve labours of Hercules. Heraclitus
has probably preserved the chief points in this
explanation. Hercules is a teacher of mankind,
initiated into the heavenly wisdom. He overcomes
the wild boar, the lion, and the bull, i.e. the lusts
and passions of men ; he drives away the deer, i.e.
cowardice ; he purifies the stall of Augeas from filth,
i.e. he purifies the life of men from extravagances ;
he frightens away the birds, i.e. empty hopes ; and
burns to ashes the many-headed hydra of pleasure.
He brings the keeper of the nether world to light,
with his three headsthese heads representing the
three chief divisions of philosophy. In the same
way, the wounding of Here and Hades by Hercules
is explained. Here, the Goddess of the air, repre
sents the fog of ignorance, the three-barbed arrow
1 See p. 292, 4, and Sen.
Benef. i. 13, 3.
C. 31, 187.
3 Pint. De Is. 44, Schl. p.
367 : He is t!> n\i]iniKhv nal
SiaipTi/cl' Tvevfta. Sen. Benef.
iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2,
and what Villoinin quotes on

Cornutus, p. 366, from Schol.
Apollon. Among the natural
philosophers, i.e. the Stoics,
Hercules symbolises strength
and intelligence,
* Pen. Sat, v. 63.
369
PROPHETIC TO WEBS.
undeniably (so thought the Stoics) pointing to philosophy, with its threefold division, in its heavenly
flight. The laying prostrate of Hades by that arrow
implies that philosophy has access even to things
most secret.1 The Odyssey is explained by Heraclitus in the same strain, nor was he apparently the
first so to do.2 In Ulysses you behold a pattern of
all virtues, and an enemy of all vices.3 He flees from
the country of the Lotophagi, i.e. from wicked plea
sures ; he stays the wild rage of the Cyclopes ; he
calms the winds, having first secured a prosperous
passage by his knowledge of the stars ; the attrac
tions of pleasure in the house of Circe he overcomes,
penetrates into the secrets of Hades, learns from the
Sirens the history of all times, saves himself from
the Charybdis of profligacy and the Scylla of shamelessness, and, in abstaining from the oxen of the sun,
overcomes sensuous desires. Such explanations may
suffice to show how the whole burden of the myths
was resolved into allegory by the Stoics, how little
they were conscious of foisting in foreign elements,
and how they degraded to mere symbols of philoso
phical ideas those very heroes on whose real existence
they continually insisted.
The -Stoic theology has engaged a good deal of
our attention, not only because it is instructive to
/
compare their views, in general and in detail, with
similar views advanced nowadays, but also because
1 Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who,
in the introduction, expressly
refers to doKifiwTaroi %Tw'iKwv.
- C. 70-75.
3 C. 70-73, p. 137.
BB
Chap.
L
c. Prol'fletia
powers.
;j;o
Chap,
XI1 '
THE STOICS.
it forms a very characteristic and important part of
their entire system. To us, much of it appears to
be a mere worthless trifling ; but, to the Stoics,

these explanations were solemnly earnest. To them
they seemed to be the only means of rescuing
the people's faith, of meeting the severe charges
brought against tradition and the works of the
poets, on which a Greek had been fed from infancy.1
TJnable to break entirely with these traditions, they
still would not sacrifice to them their scientific and
moral convictions. Can we, then, wonder that they
attempted the impossible, and sought to unite
contradictions ? or that such an attempt landed
tbem in forced and artificial methods of interpreta
tion ?
(1) DiriIllustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards
natwn.
positive religion are their views on divination.2 The
importance attached by them to the prophetic art
appears in the diligence which the chiefs of this
School devoted to discussing it. The ground for the
later teaching having been prepared by Zeno and
Cleanthes, Chrysippus gave the finishing touch to
the Stoic dogmas on the subject.3 Particular treatises
1 Conf. the way in which Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9) ; Phot.

Heraclitun, 74, 146, expresses Amphiloch. Quaest. (Monthimself as to Plato's and Epi- foncon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347);
curus's attacks upon Homer.
Philodemus, irepi Seuv Starywyris,
2 Conf. Wachsmuth'x treatise Vol. Here. vi. 49, col. 7, 33;
mentioned above, p. 351, 2.
and from which Cicero has
3 Cio. Divin. i. 3, 6. He borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii
there mentions two books 17, 41; 49, 101; 16, 35; 63
of Chrysippus on divination, 130; and perhaps De Fato, 7
which are also referred to (as Chrysippus also wrote a book
Waohtmvth, p. 12, shows) by jrepl xf"l75<' ( Cie. Divin. i. 19
niog. vii. 149; Yarro (in 37 ; ii. 66, 116 j 65, 134 ; Suid
PROPHETIC POWERS: DIVINATION.

respecting divination were drawn up by Sphaerus,
Diogenes, Antipater, and, last of all, by Posidonius.1
The subject was also fully treated by Boethus, and
by Paneetius from a somewhat different side.2 The
common notions as to prognostics and oracles could
not commend themselves to these philosophers, nor
could they approve of common soothsaying. In a
system so purely based on nature as theirs,3 the sup
position that God works for definite ends after the
manner of men, exceptionally announcing to one or
the other a definite resultin short, the marvellous
was out of place. But to infer thenceas their
veoTrSs) ; and one nepl bpttpuv dications of a storm. Cic.
(Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, Divin. i. 8, 14 ; ii. 21, 47. On
144 ; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27, Panastius's objections to juovtikJ)
66 : Said. TtptcpovvTos). In the a word will be presently said.
3 Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118 :
former, he collected oracular
responses ; in the latter, pro Non placet Stoicis, singulis
iecorum fissis aut avium cautiphetic dreams.
1 Diog. vii. 178, mentions a bus interesse Deum ; neque
treatise of Sphaerus irepl /iapTi/trjs. enim decorum est, nec Diis
Cic. (Divin. i. 3, 6 ; i. 38, 83 ; dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto
ii. 17, 41 ; 43, 90 ; 49, 101) men potest. JUd. 58, 132: Nunc
tions a treatise having the same ilia testabor, non me sortilegos,
title as that of Diogenes of neque eos, qui quaestus caiiMi
Seleucia, and two books of An hariolentur, ne psychomantia
tipater irtpl liavriKrjs, in which quidem . . . agnoscere. Simi
many interpretations of dreams larly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 2
were given. The same writer (see p. 374, 3), the difference
(Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, between the Stoic view and
83 ; 54, 123 : ii. 70, 144 ; 15, 35 ; the ordinary one is stated to
49, 101) mentions a treatise of be this, that, according to the
Posidonius irepl navrucris in five Stoics, auguries non quia
books, Diog. vii. 149 ; Cic. significatura sunt fiant, but
Divin. i. 3, 6 ; 30. 64 ; 55, 125 ; quia facta sunt significent.
57, 130 ; ii. 15, 35 ; 21, 47 ; De In c. 42, it is said to be an
Fato, 3 ; Boiith. De Diis et absurd belief that Jupiter
Prsesens (in Orelli's Cicero, v. 1) should hurl bolts which as often
hit the innocent as the guilty
p. 395.
2 Boethus, in his commen an opinion invented ad coertary on Aratus, attempted to cendos aLiimos imperitorum.
determine and explain the in
BB 2
371
Chap
XIII.
THE STOICS.
opponents, the Epicureans, did that the whole art
of divination is a delusion, was more than the Stoics
could do. The belief in an extraordinary care of
God for individual men was too comforting an idea
for them to renounce ; 1 they not only appealed to
divination as the strongest proof of the existence of
Gods and the government of Providence,2 but they
also drew the converse conclusion, that, if there be
Gods, there must also be divinatioD, since the bene
volence of the Gods would not allow them to refuse
Vto mankind so inestimable a gift.3 The conception
1 Conf. Diogenian, in Eng. Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint,
Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5 : tS xpciuSes esse qui divinent. Arcem to
avTtjs (divination) Kal $iai<pt\h. quidem Stoicorum, inquam,
5t' h Kal nd\i(TTa Xpvffnnros Soku Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38,
vfjtvuv
fiavriicriv ; and M. 82 : Stoic proof of divination :
Aurel. ix. 27 ; God shows his Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant
care for the wicked by means of hominibus quae futura sunt, aut
non diliyunt homines, aut quid
prophecies and by dreams.
2 Cio. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where eventnrum sit ignorant, aut
among the four reasons from existimant nihil interesse howhich Cleanthes deduced be minnm, scire quid futurum sit,
lief in Gods, the first is prce- aut non censent e:-se sua; majessensio rerum futurarum, ex tatis priEsignificare hominibus
traordinary natural phenomena qua; sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi
pestilence, earthquakes, mon quidem Dii pra;significare po-sters, meteors, 4ic, being the sunt. At neque non diliûnt
third. Ibid. fi5, 105: The no, &c. >'on igitur sunt Dii
Stoic says of divination : Mihi nec significant futura (ovk Spa
videtur vel maxime confirmare, eitrl juev 6eo\ ou TcpoaTifxaivovai 5
Deorum providentia consuli the well-known expression
rebus humanis, Scxt. Math. ix. of Chrysippus for ei Btol tiaiv,
132 : If there were no Gods, all oil irpotrrifJuUrovffi, conf. p. 1 1 4, 1 ) ;
the varieties of divination sunt autem Dii : significant
would be unmeaning ; these ergo : et non, si significant,
are nevertheless universally ad nullas vias dant nobis ad signimitted, die. Divin. i. 6, and the ficationis scientiam, fiustra
enim significarent : nec, si dant
quotations on p. 175, 3, 4.
do. Divin. i. 5, 9 : Ego vias, non est divinatio. Est
enim sic existimo : si sint ea igitur divinatio. This proof,
genera divinandi vera,dequibus says Cicero, was used by Chry
accepimns qxKeque colimus, esse sippus, Diogenes, Antipater.
PROPHETIC POWERS: DIVINATION.

of destiny, too, and the nature of man, appeared to
Posidonius to lead to the belief in divination ; 1 if
all that happens is the outcome of an unbroken chain
of cause and effect, there must be signs indicating
the existence of causes, from which certain effects
result ; 2 and if the soul of man is in its nature
divine, it must also possess the capacity, under cir
cumstances, of observing what generally escapes its
notice.3 Lest, however, the certainty of their belief
should suffer from lacking the support of experience,
the Stoics had collected a number of instances of
verified prophecies ; * but with so little discrimina
tion, that we should only wonder at their credulity,
did we not know the low state of historical criticism
in their time, and the readiness with which, in
all ages, men believe whatever agrees with their i
prejudices.5
In what way, then, can the two facts be cornIt may be easily recognised as
belonging to Chrysippus. Cic.
ii. 17, 41 ; 49, 101, again reverts
to the same proof. Conf. id.
i. 46, 104 : Id ipsum est Deos
non putare, quae ab iis significantur, contemnere. Ding.
vii. 149 : koX p/qv Kal fxavTiKty
i/tpeffT&vai iraa&v <pa<riv, t Kal
rpdvotav efocu. Home read $ koi
irpovoiav tlvai, in which case the
argument would be reversed,
not from providence to divina
tion, but from divination to
providence.
1 Cic. Div. i. 55, 12.5:
Primum mihi videtur, ut Posi
donius facit, a Deo . . deinde a
fato, deinde a natura vis omnis
divinandi ratioque repetenda.
2 Cic. 1. c. 55, 126.

' Ibid. 57, 129.
4 See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.
5 Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid.
TijUai/joGcToj), ii. 65, 135 (Suid.
vtoTrds), ii. 70, 144, quoting
from Chrysippus ; i. 54, 123,
quoting from Antipater ; i. 30,
64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posi
doniusgives instances of
stories to which the Stoics
attached great value, whilst
their opponents either pro
nounced the stories to be false,
or the prophecies to be de
ceptive, or their fulfilment to
be accidental (Cic. Divin. i.
19, 37 ; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De
Fato, 3, 5).
374
THE STOICS.
f'HAP.
XIII '
binedthe belief in prophecy, on the one hand, and,

on the other, the denial
. of unearthly omens arising
(2) Proplained by
a reference to
natural
from an immediate divine influence ? In answering

this question, the Stoics adopted the only course
which their system allowed. The marvellous, which,
>
'
'
as such, they could not admit, was referred to natural
laws,1 from which it was speculatively deduced. The
admirable Panastius is the only Stoic who is reported
to have maintained the independence of his judgment
by denying omens, prophecy, and astrology.* Just
as in modern times Leibnitz and so many others
both before and after him thought to purge away
from the marvellous all that is accidental and super
human, and to find in wonders links in the general
chain of natural causes, so, too, the Stoics, by as
suming a natural connection between the token and
its fulfilment, made an effort to rescue omens and
divination, and to explain portents as the natural
symptoms of certain occurrences.3 Nor did they
1 Aristotle, in a somewhat
different sense, had explained
the marvellous by a reference
to natural causes, even allowing
the existence of presentiments
within certain limits.
2 C'ic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after
the passage quoted : Sed a
Stoicis vel princeps ejus disciplinae Posidonii doctor discipnlus Antipatri degeneravit
Panstius, nec tamen ausus est
negare vim esse divinandi, sed
dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7,
12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33,
107; Diog. vii. 149; EpipJian.
Adv. Hasr. Cicero appears to
have borrowed from Pansetius,
as Wachsmuth rightly observes,

this denial of Astrology (Divin.
ii. 42-46'), and he allows, c. 42,
88 ; 47, 97, that Panajtius was
the only Stoic who rejected it.
3 Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3 :
Nimis ilium [Deum] otiosum et
pusillae rei ministrum facis, si
aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit.
Ista nii.ilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennse
avium reguntur nec pecudum
viscera sub securi formantur.
Alia ratione fatorum series explicatur. . . quicquidfitalicujus
rei future signum est . . . cujus
rei ordo est etiam praedictio est,
&c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after
PROPHETIC POWERS: NATURAL CAUSES.

confine themselves to cases in which the connection
between the prophecy and the event can be proved.1
They insisted upon divination in cases in which it
cannot possibly be verified. The flight of birds and
the entrails of victims are stated to be natural
indications of coming events ; and there is said to
be even a formal connection between the positions
of the stars and the individuals born under those
positions.2 If it is urged, that in this case omens
must be far more numerous than they are supposed
to be, the Stoics answered, that omens are countless,
but that only the meaning of a few is known to
men.3 If the question is asked, how is it that,
in public sacrifices, the priest should always offer
those very animals whose entrails contain omens.
Chrysippus and his followers did not hesitate to
affirm that the same sympathy which exists between
objects and omens also guides the sacrificer in the
choice of a victim.4 And yet so bald was this hypothe passage quoted, p. 371,3:
Sed ita a principio inchoatum
esse mundum, ut certis rebus
certa signa prajcurrerent, alia
jn extis, alia in avibus, &c.
Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see
p. 373, 2). Nor was the meaning
otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15,
33 ; 69, 142) were based on a
(rvpiriBeia r?,s <pvaews (on which
see p. 183, 2), an opponent not
without reason doubting whether it existed, for instance,
between a rent in the liver of
a victim and an advantageous
business, or between an egg in
a dream and treasure trove.
1 As in the passage quoted

from Boethus on p. 371, 2.
- Conf. p. 374, 2; 370, 1,
and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 00, according to whom Diogenes oE
Selencia conceded so much to
astrology as to allow that, from
the condition of the stars at
birth, it might be known quali
quisque natura et ad quim
quisque maxime rem aptus
futurus sit. More he would
not allow, because twins often
differ widely in their course of
life and destiny,
3 Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.
* Cic. 1. c. ii. 15, 35 : Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posi-
375
Chap.
XII
._ _I
376
THE STOICS.
thesis, that they had, at the same time, a second
answer in reserve, viz. that the corresponding change
in the entrails did not take place until the victim
had been chosen.1 In support of such views, their
only appeal was to the almighty power of God ; but,
in making this appeal, the deduction of omens from
natural causes was at an end.2
The Stoics could not altogether suppress a
suspicion that an unchangeable predestination of all
events has rendered individual activity superfluous,3
nor meet the objection 4 that, on the hypothesis of
necessity, divination itself is unnecessary.5 They
quieted themselves, however, with the thought that
divination, and the actions resulting from divina
tion, are included among the causes foreordained by
destiny.6
donius assert : Ad hostiam
deligendam ducem esse vim
quandam sentientem atque divinam, qua? tota confusa mundo
sit, as was explained i. 52,
118.
1 Cio. ii. 15, 35 : Illud vero
multum etiam melius, quod . . .
dicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52,
118): cum immolare quispiam
velit, turn fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut
supersit : Deorum enim numini
parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.
2 Cio. i. 53, 120, defends
auguries somewhat similarly by
arguing : If an animal can
move its limbs at pleasure,
must not God have greater
power over His? (his body ac
cording to them being the
whle world).
s See p. 181,
4 Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20 ; Diogenian, in Ens. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5;

Alex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.
5 Upon the use of divination
depends the whole argument
for its reality, based on the
divine kindness Cic. i. 38, 83,
and above, p. 372, 1.
e Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38,
2 : Effugiet pericula si expiaverit prasdictas divinitus minas.
At hoc quoque in fato est, ut
expiet, &c. This answer pro
bably came from Chrysippus,
who, as it appears from Cio.
Divin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem.
irfpl 6eS)v diayuyjjs, Vol Here. vi.
col. 7, 33, defended the use of
expiation. In the above-quoted
and more general form it is
found in Alexander arid Ensebius, probably also taken from
Chrysippus, see p. 181.
PROPHETIC POWERS: CAUSES.

Divination, or soothsaying, consists in the capacity
to read and interpret omens ; 1 and this capacity is,
377
Chap.
XI11,
according to the Stoics, partly a natural gift, and (3) Gautet

partly acquired by art and study.2 The natural gift of tion.
prophecy is based, as other philosophers had already
laid down,3 on the relationship of the human soul to
God.4 Sometimes it manifests itself in sleep, at other
times in ecstasy.8 A taste for higher revelations will
be developed, in proportion as the soul is withdrawn
from the world of sense, and from all thought re
specting things external.6 The actual cause of the
prophetic gift was referred to influences coming to
1 According to the definition
in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which
Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, attri
butes to Chrysippus, it is an
inurr-h/ir) ( Cic. more accurately :
a vis = Siva/iis, since besides
scientific there is also natural
divination), 6ep7jTiici) xal iltrpiriH^ twv urrb dtiiv avdpt&irots 3i5ofjLevur tTTHfifiuy. Stob. Eel. ii.
122 and 238; Eiit. Pr. Ev. iv.
3, 5.
2 Pint. Vit. Horn. 212, p.
1238 : [tt}s jucwtikijs] ri> ixtv
Tt\viK6v (pcuriv elvai oi XroffKof.
nlov itpoffKOwlew Kal owvovs kcu rh
irepl <p^/xa5 (cai KXrjbSvas Kai <rvfxfio\a, anep avWfifiSTjv TexvtKa
vpoa7jy6piv(rav ' rb 5e aTXvov Ka*
adiSanTov, Tovrimiv 4yuwvia Kal
ivdovffiaafiovs To the same
effect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34 ;
ii. 11, 26.
* Conf. the fragment quoted
in ' Aristotle and the Peri
patetics,' p. 300, which throws
light on old and well-known
views in the spirit of the
Platonic Aristotelian philo
sophy, without, however, de

fending them.
* Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64 ; ii. 10,
26 : The naturale genus divinandi is, quod animos arriperet
aut exciperet extrinsecus a
divinitate, unde omnes animos
haustos aut acceptos aut libatos
haberemus. Plut. Plac. v. 1 ;
where, however, the words Kara
Bu6Tr\Ta ti)5 ifivxys are only a
gloss on the preceding words
Kara rb ivQsov, k.t.K. Galen.
Hist. Phil. p. 320.
5 Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and
Plut. Compare the many
Stoic stories of dreams and
presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56 ;
30, 61 ; ii. 65, 134 ; 70, 144.
8 See besides the passages
just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49,
110; 50, 113; 51, 115; and in
particular i. 57, 129. Hence
the prophecies of the dying
(ibid. 30. 63, according to Posidonins; conf. Arist. 1. c), and
the statement (ibid. 53, 121;
see p. 380, 1) that true dreams
come of innocent sleep.
878
THE STOICS.
the soul partly from God or the universal spirit dif
fused throughout the world,1 and partly from the
souls which haunt the air or demons.2 External
causes, however, contribute to put people in a state
of enthusiasm.3
Artificial prophesying, or the art of foretelling the
future, depends upon observation and guess-work.4
One who could survey all causes in their effects on
one another would need no observation. Such a one
would be able to deduce the whole series of events
from the given causes. But God alone is able to do
this. Hence men must gather the knowledge of
future events from the indications by which their
coming is announced.5 These indications may be of
every variety ; and hence all possible forms of fore
telling the future were allowed by the Stoics ; the
1 Conf. the quotations on Posidonius can only have spoken
p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. of Gods in condescension to
JO, 26; 15,35; and his remarks popular views ; as a Stoic, he
on the instinctus afflatusque would only know of that con
divinus. Cic. i. 18, 34.
nection with the soul of the
2 According to Cic. Divin. i. universe which is referred to in
30, G4, Posidonius thought pro the first mode.
phetic dreams were realised in
3 Amongst such external
one of three wajTs : uno, quod helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin.
pnevideat animus ipse per sese, i. 50, 114; 36, 79, enumerates
quippe qui Deorum cognitione the impression derived from
teneatur ; altero, quod plenus music, natural scenery, moun
aer sit immortalium animorurn, tains, woods, rivers, seas and
in quibus tanquam insignitse vapours arising from the earth.
notse veritatis appareant ; tertio, But it is difficult to understand
quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus how, on Stoic principles, he
colloquantur. Of these three can have attached value to
modes, not the first only, but also oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or
the second, corresponds with justified them otherwise than
the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in the way mentioned on p.
in Stob. Eel. ii. 122, 238, irnvrixh 375, 4.
is defined = immiini\ (fewpTjri/c))
4 Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.
<ri]p.t'iuv tSjv &tt? BtGiv $ Zaip.6v(iov
5 Ibid. i. 56, 127.
trpbs avQp&mvov $lov ffvvTttv6viti3if.
PROPHETIC POWERS: CAUSES.

inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and
other natural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and
omens of every kind.1 Some idea of the mass of super
stition which the Stoics admitted and encouraged
may be gathered from the first book of Cicero's trea
tise on divination. The explanation of these omens
being, however, a matter of skill, individuals in this,
as in every other art, may often go wrong in their
interpretation.2 To make sure against mistakes tradi
tion is partly of use, since it establishes by manifold
experiences the meaning of each omen ; 3 and the
moral state of the prophet is quite as important for
scientifically foretelling the future as for the natural
gift of divination. Purity of heart is one of the most
essential conditions of prophetic success.
In all these questions the moral character of Stoic
piety is ever to the fore, and great pains were taken
by the Stoics to bring their belief in prophecy into
harmony with their philosophic view of the world.
Nevertheless, it is clear that success could not be theirs
either in makingthis attempt, or indeed in dealing with
any other parts of the popular belief. Struggling with
1 Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously
(i. 33) treated them separately,
Similarly, Ps. Pint. V. Horn,
212. See above, p. 377, 2,
Stoh. Eel. ii. 238, mentions
tentatively, as varieties of
juarriKT) t6 re civetpoKpiTtitbv, koI
rb olvvooKOTUthv, koX 6utik6v.
Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If
there were no Gods, there
would be neither imvtm)) nor
9to\7)m inh, ikOTpoixavTiicii nor

XoyiK^ irpipfaais St' oveipav.
Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives
a theory of dreams ; but in how
far it represents the views of
the Stoics, it is impossible to
say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41,
clearly distinguishes the discussion of natural omens from
the doctrines of philosophy.
2 Cic. i. 55, 124 ; 56, 128.
3 Ibid. i. 56, 127.
879
CuAr.
_
THE STOICS.
indefatigable zeal in an attempt so hopeless, they
proved at least the sincerity of their wish to recon
cile religion and philosophy ; but they also disclosed
by these endeavours a misgiving that science, which
had put on so bold a face, was not in itself suffi
cient, but needed support from the traditions of
religion, and from a belief in divine revelations.1
Probably we shall not be far wrong in referring to
this practical need the seeming vagaries of men
like Chrysippus, who, with the clearest intellectual
powers, could be blind to the folly of the methods
they adopted in defending untenable and antiquated
opinions. These vagaries show in Stoicism prac
tical interests preponderating over science. They
also establish the connection of Stoicism with Schools
which doubted altogether the truth of the under
standing, and thought to supplement it by divine
revelations. Thus the Stoic theory of divination
leads directly to the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic
doctrine of revelation.
' Cie. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur
qui se tradet quieti pneparato
animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance,
nourishment; conf. c. 29, 60;
51, 115) ad tranquillitatem
accommodatis, certa et vera
cernit in somnis ; sic castus

animus purusque vigilantis et
ad astrorum et ad avium re
liquorumque signorum et ad
extorum veritalem est paratior.
STOIC SYSTEM AS A WHOLE.
381
CHAPTER XIV.
THE STOIC FHILOSOrHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTO
RICAL POSITION.
Having now investigated the Stoic system in detail,
we are in a position to pass a definite judgment
chap.
XIV'
on the scope of the Stoic philosophy, the import A. Inner

and the relation of its various parts, and its his- rf'the m
torical position. Its peculiar character manifests Stoic V*"
itself before all things in the three points to which
attention was drawn at the outset:1 its pre-emi
nently practical tone, the determination of this
practical tendency by the notions of the good and of
virtue, and the use of logic and natural science as a
scientific basis. Speculative knowledge is not, as
we have seen, to the Stoics an end in itself, but
only a means for producing a right moral attitude ;
all philosophical research stands directly or indi
rectly in the service of virtue. Both in the earlier
and in the later days of its existence the Stoic
School advocated this principle in the most deter
mined and exclusive manner, nor was it even denied
by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its science
and learning.
1 See p. 46.
THE STOICS,
382
Chap.
If it be then asked what is the right moral attiXIV '_ tude, the Stoics
reply : action
conformable to nature
(l) Ethir
cal side irf
Stoicism. '
and reasonin other words, virtue. Virtue, however,

.
_ ,
......
implies two things. On the one hand it implies the
resignation of the individual to the universe, obedi
ence to the universal law ; on the other hand it
implies the harmony of man with himself, the domi
nion of the higher over the lower nature, of reason
over emotion, and the rising superior to everything
which does not belong to his true nature. Both
" statements may be reconciled, because the law of
morality is addressed only to reasonable beings,
and is the law of their nature, and can only be
carried into execution by their own exertions. Still,
\
in the Stoic ethics, two currents of thought may be
\ clearly distinguished, which from time to time come
\ into actual collision ; the one requiring the individual
to live for the common good and for society, the
* other impelling him to live for himself only, to eman. cipate himself from all that is not himself, and to
console himself with the feeling of virtue. The first
of these tendencies impels man to seek the society of
others ; the second enables him to dispense with it.
From the former spring the virtues of justice, socia
bility, love of man ; from the latter, the inner free
dom and happiness of the virtuous man. The former
culminates in citizenship of the world ; the latter
in the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far
as virtue includes everything that can be required of
man, happiness depends on it alone ; nothing is good
but virtue, nothing is evil but vice ; all that is not
CONNECTION OF T&E SYSTEM.

connected with the moral nature is indifferent,
the other hand, in as far as virtue is based on human
nature, it stands on the same footing with all else
that is conformable with nature. If its own peculiar
value cannot be surrendered, no more can it be required
that we should be indifferent to its couformityto nature,
that it should not have for us some positive or nega
tive value, or in some way affect our feelings. There
with the doctrine of things indifferent and the wi:
man's freedom from emotions begins to totterJ Lastly,
if we look at the way in which virtue exists in man,
we arrive at different results, according as we look at
its essence or its manifestation. Virtue consists in
acting conformably with reason, and reason is one
and undivided ; hence it appears that virtue forms an
undivided unity, and must be possessed whole and
entire or not at all. From this proposition the con
trast of the wise and foolish man, with all its bluntness and extravagances, is only a legitimate conse
quence. Or, again, if we look at the conditions upon
which, owing to human nature, the acquisition and
possession of virtue depends, the conviction is inevi
table that the wise man as drawn by the Stoics never
occurs in reality. Hence the conclusion is unde
niable that the contrast between wise men and fools is
more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus
all the main features of the Stoic ethics may be simply
deduced from their one fundamental notion, that
rational action or virtue is the only good.
Not only does this view of ethics require a peculiar theory of the world to serve as its scientific basis,
388
Chap.
XIV.
(2) SeientiUcsideof
384
THE STOICS.
Chap,
X1V'
but it has a reflex action also, influencing alike the

tone and the results of theoretic enquiry. If the
the Stoic
system.
duty of man is declared to consist in bringing his

...
.
actions into harmony with the laws of the universe,
it becomes also necessary that he should endeavour
himself to know the world and its laws. The more
his knowledge of the world increases, the greater
will be the value which he attaches to the forms of
scientific procedure. If, moreover, man is required
to be nothing more than an instrument of the uni
versal law, it is only consistent to suppose an ab
solute regularity of procedure in the universe, an
unbroken connection of cause and effect, and ulti
mately to refer everything to one highest all-moving
cause, and to include everything under one primary
substance. If in human life the individual has no
rights as against the laws of the universe, then all that
is of individual occurrence in the world is powerless
against universal necessity. On the other hand, if
in the case of man everything turns upon strength
of will, then likewise in the universe the acting power
must be regarded as the highest and most exalted.
There arises thus that view of the world as a series
of forces which constitutes one of the most peculiar
and thorough-going characteristics of the Stoic view
of nature.1 Lastly, if such excessive importance is at
tached to practical conduct as is done by the Stoics,
that sensuous view of the world which finds its crudest
expression in the Stoic Materialism and reliance on
the senses,2 will most nearly accord with speculation.
1 See p. 139.
2 See p. 132.
CONNECTION OF THE SYSTEM.
385
At the same time the Materialism of the Stoics is Chap.

XIV
limited and corrected by the conception of the uni'__
verse and of a divine all-penetrating power and
reason, just as their appeal to the senses is by the
demand for the formation of conceptions, and the
general application of the process of demonstration ;
the truth of knowledge itself is based on a practical
postulate, the greater or less certainty of which is
measured by the strength of personal conviction.
If these elements proved too contradictory to be
harmonised ; if the Materialism of the Stoics was
at variance with their view of the world as a series
of forces ; if appeals to the senses were obviously in
conflict with logical method, it was at least thereby
clearly established that a practical and not a
purely intellectual interest lay at the root of their
system.
This statement must of course not be taken to (3) pon~
neotxon of
mean that the Stoics first developed their ethical the moral
principles independently of their theory of the uni- ^
'*
verse, and afterwards brought the two into connec- menu.
tion with each other. On the contrary, it was by the
peculiar connection of theory and practice that Stoi
cism itself first came into existence. The leading
thought of Zeno consists in the attempt to vindicate
the supremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of
the laws of the world ; and he becomes the founder
of a new School only by bringing to Cynicism those
scientific ideas and aims which he had learned him
self in the School of Polemo, Stilpo, and Diodorus,
or otherwise gathered from a study of ancient philoCC
386
Chap,
XIV'
THE STOICS.
sophy. These elements are not therefore accidentally
brought together in Stoicism, but they are co-exten
sive, and dependent one upon the other. As in the
natural science and theory of knowledge of the Stoics,
the experimental basis on which their system was
built may be easily seen, so the peculiar development
of their ethics supposes all those positions respecting
the universe and the powers therein at work, which
form the most important part of their natural science.
Only by a scientific treatment of this kind was
Stoicism at all able to improve upon the imperfection
of the Cynic ethics, so far at least as it really did
so, and to accommodate itself to the wants of human
nature, so far as to be able to exercise an influence
at large. Upon this union of ethics and metaphysics
that religious attitude of the Stoic system reposes,
to which it owes in a great measure its historical
importance. Thereby it occupies so influential a
position in an age in which intellectual power was
indeed declining, but in which the interest for
science was keen. But that Stoic physics and
metaphysics should have adopted this line, and no
other ; that Zeno and his followers, who draw on
former systems for their own on the most extensive
scale, should have borrowed from these systems these
and no other positions, and expanded them in this
and no other direction ; these results are, doubtless,
ultimately due to their moral attitude. All that
bore on the subject of ethics, and supported it, they
appropriated ; all that was opposed thereto they
rejected. The Stoic system as such owes its rise to
RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS,
887
a union of ethical and speculative elements, in which Chap.

XIV.
both were more definitely determined by one another;
still the ethical platform is the one on which its
formation commences, and which primarily deter
mined its course and results.
In order to obtain a more accurate notion of the B. Relarise of Stoicism, the premises on which it proceeds, t^J^nl
and the grounds on which it is based, we must take to previous
a glance at its relation to preceding systems. The *^ er^'
Stoics themselves deduced their philosophical pedi- lotion to
gree directly from Antisthenes, and indirectly from
Socrates.1 Clear as is their connection with both Cynics.
these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a mis
take to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism,
still more to regard it as a simple following of Socrates.
From both it undoubtedly borrowed much. The selfsufficiency of virtue, the distinction of things good,
evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of the wise
man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world
within the precincts of the mind, and the strength
of moral will, are ideas taken from the Cynics. In
the spirit of Cynicism, too, it explained general
1 Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the
Cynics, was following a Stoic
authority or not (vii.), is a
moot point; nevertheless, the
view comes to us from a time
in which the relations of the
two must have been well
known, and the quotation from
Posidonius on p. 274, 2, quite
accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi. 14, speak-
ing of Antisthenes, says : Sonet

5e Kal ttjj a.vipa>Sein6.Ti\s STwi'iojs
Karipât . . . ovtos rryhcraTo Kal
Tijs Aioyivovs airaBeias Kal tt)s
Kp&Tyros tyKparrfas nal Trjs
TA\vuvos xaprepias, aurbs inodipevos tij ir<i\t -ra BtfiiKia : and
Juvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic
dogmas a Cynicis tunica (the
common dress in distinction to
the tribon) distantia.
cc2
383
Chap
XIV"
THE STOICS.
ideas as simply names. Not to mention many
peculiarities of ethics, the contrasting of one God
with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical
explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed
from Cynicism. The identification of virtue with
intelligence, the belief that virtue was one, and could
be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit
of Socrates and also in that of the Cynics. The
argument for the existence of God based on the
subordination of means to ends, the whole view
of the world as a system of means and ends, and
the Stoic theory of Providence, are views peculiarly
Socratic ; 1 and the Stoics followed Socrates in ethics
by identifying the good and the useful.
And yet the greatness of the interval which sepa
rates the Stoics even from the Cynics becomes at
once apparent on considering the relation of Aristo
to the rest of the Stoic School. In refusing to
meddle with natural or mental science, or even with
ethical considerations at all, Aristo faithfully reflects
the principles of Antisthenes. In asserting the unity
of virtue to such an extent that all virtues are merged
in one, he was only repeating similar expressions of
Antisthenes. In denying any difference in value to
things morally indifferent, and in placing the highest
morality in this indifference, he was, according to'
the older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet.2 Con
versely in denying these statements, as the great ma
jority of Stoics did, the points are indicated in which
Krische, Forschungen, i.
= On Aristo see p. 59 ; 260;
363, and above, p. 145, 2.
281.
RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

Stoicism differed from Cynicism.1 In the feeling of
moral independence, and in invincible strength of
will, the Cynic is opposed to the whole world ; he
needs for virtue no scientific knowledge of the world
and its laws ; he regards nothing external to him
self ; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and
attaches value to nothing ; but, in consequence, he
remains with his virtue confined to himself; virtue
makes him independent of men and circumstances,
but it has neither the will nor the power to inter
pose effectively in the affairs of life, and to infuse
therein new moral notions. Stoicism insists upon
the self-sufficiency of virtue quite as strongly as
Cynicism, and will allow quite as little that anything
except virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of
the term. But in Stoicism the individual is not
nearly so sharply opposed to the outer world as in
Cynicism. The Stoic is too cultivated ; he knows
too well that he is a part of the universe to ignore
the value of an intellectual view of the world, or to
neglect the natural conditions of moral action, as
things of no moment. What he aims at is not only
a negationindependence from externalsbut a posi
tive positionlife according to nature ; and that life
only he considers according to nature which is in
harmony with the laws of the universe as well as with
those of human nature. Hence Stoicism is not only
1 Aristo cannot, therefore,
be considered (as he is by
Krixc/ie, Forsch. Ill) the best
representative of the original
Stoic theory. On the contrary,
he only represents a reaction

of the Cynic elementin Stoicism
against the other component
parts of this philosophy.
THE STOICS.
890
Chap,
.XIV
far in advance of Cynicism by its intellectual atti moral philosophy
tude, but its

also breathes a freer
and milder spirit. Let only the principles of the

Stoics on the necessity and value of scientific know
ledge be compared with the sophistical assertions of
Antisthenes, destructive of all knowledge ; or the
cultivated logical form of the intellectual edifice of
the Stoics, with the chaotic condition of Cynic
thought; or the careful metaphysical and psycho
logical researches and the copious learning of the
School of Chrysippus, with the Cynics' contempt for
all theory and all learned research, and it becomes
apparent at once how deep-seated is the difference
between the two systems, and how little Stoicism as
a philosophic system can be deduced from Cynicism.
In ethics, too, the difference of the two Schools
is also fully apparent. Stoic morality recognises, at
least conditionally, a positive and negative value in
external things and circumstances ; the Cynic allows
to these absolutely no value. The former forbids
affection contrary to reason, the latter any and every
kind of affection.1 The former throws the individual
back upon human society, the latter isolates him.
The former teaches citizenship of the world in a posi
tive sense, requiring all to feel themselves one with
their fellow-men ; the latter in a negative sense, that
of feeling indifferent to home and family. The
former has a pantheistic tone about it, due to the
lively feeling of the connection between man and
the universe, and a definite theological stamp owing
1 See p. 290.

to its taking a stand by positive religion ; the
latter has a rationalistic character, owing to the
enfranchisement of the wise man from the prejudices
of popular belief, with which it has exclusively to do.
In all these respects Stoicism preserves the original
character of the Socratic philosophy lar better than
Cynicism, which only caricatured them. Still it de
parts from that character in two respects. In point
of theory the Stoic doctrine received a systematic
form and development such as Socrates never con
templated ; and in natural science, it cultivated a
field avoided by Socrates on principle, however much
its doctrine of Providence, and its view of nature as a
system of means subordinated to ends, may remind of
Socrates. On the other hand, interest in science,
although limited to the subject of ethics, is with
Socrates far deeper and stronger than with the Stoics,
the latter pursuing scientific research only as a means
for solving moral problems. Hence the Socratic
theory of a knowledge of conceptions, simple though
it may sound, contained a fruitful germ of unexpanded speculation, in comparison with which all
that the Stoics did is fragmentary. The Stoic
ethics are not only more expanded and more care
fully worked out in detail than those of Socrates,
but they are also more logical in clinging to the
principle that virtue alone is an unconditional
good. There are no concessions to current modes of
thought, such as Socrates allowed, who practically
based his doctrine of morals upon utility. On the
other hand, the moral science of the Stoics also falls
.'{91
Chap.
'_
392
THE STOICS.
far short of the frankness and cheerfulness of the

Socratic view of life. If in many respects it toned
down the asperities of Cynicism, still it appropriated
its leading principles far too unreservedly to avoid
accepting a great number of its conclusions.
Asking in the next place in how far the Stoics
(2) Rela
tion to
were
induced by other influences to change and extend
Megarians
and He
the platform of the Socratic philosophy, we have for
raclitus.
determining the practical side of their system,
besides the general tendency of the post- Aristotelian
philosophy, the example of Cynicism. Its specu
lative development, on the other hand, is partly con
nected with the Megarians, partly with Heraclitus ;
to the Megarians the personal connection of Zeno
with Stilpo points, to Heraclitus the fact that from
him the Stoics themselves deduced their views on
natural science, which they expanded in comment
aries on his writings.1
(n) T7te
Probably the Megarian influence must not be
Megarated
too high. Zeno may have thence received an
rians.
impulse to that reasoning habit which appears with
him in a preference for compressed sharp-pointed
syllogisms ; 3 but in post-Aristotelian times, contact
Chap.
XIV.
1 Apart from the testimony

of Numenius (in Em. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 5, 10), to which no great
value can be attached, the ac
quaintance of Zeno with Hera
clitus is established by the fact
that not only the ethics, but
also the natural science of the
Stoic School owes its origin to
him. See pp. 40,3; 62, 2, 3;
126, 2; 141, 2; 144, 4; 145, 1.
2; 146, 4; 148,2; 151, 1. Ding.
mentions treatises of Cleanthes,

vii. 174; ix. 15, of Aristo, ix. 5,
of Sphairus (vii. 178; ix. 15)
treating of Heraclitus ; and
Phtcdrtis (Philodem.), Fragm.
col. 4, says that Chrysippus ex
plained the old myths after the
manner of Heraclitus.
2 Instances have often oc
curred. See p. 144,4; 145, 1,
2; 232, 4. Conf. Sea. Ep.
83, 9.
308
with Megarians was no longer wanted for this, and Chap.

the greatest reasoner among the Stoics, Chrysippus,
appears not only to have had no personal relations to
them, but his logic is throughout a simple continua
tion of that of Aristotle.
Far greater, and more generally recognised, is the (*) //eraimportance of the influence which the views on nature
of the philosopher of Ephesus exercised on the Stoics.
A system which laid such emphasis on the subordi
nation of everything individual to the law of the
universe, which singled out universal reason from
the flux of things as the one thing everlastingly and
permanently the samea system in many other ways
so nearly related to their own, must have strongly
commended itself to their notice, and offered them
many points with which to connect their own. If to
us the view that life is dependent for its existence on
matter is repulsive, it was otherwise to the Stoics ;
for them this very theory possessed special attrac
tions. Hence, with the exception of the threefold
division of the elements, there is hardly a single
point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which' the
Stoics did not appropriate :fire or ether as the
primary element, the oneness of this element with
universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny,
God, the flux of things, the gradual change of the
primary element into the four elements, and of these
back to the primary element, the regular alternation
of creation and conflagration in the world, the one
ness and eternity of the universe, the description of
the soul as fiery breath, the identification of the
391
Chap.
_
THE STOICS.
mind with the demon, the unconditional sovereignty
of the universal law over individualsthese and
many other points in the Stoic system, originally
derived from Heraclitus,1 prove how greatly this
system is indebted to him.
Nor must it be forgotten that there is nothing
in Heraclitus analogous to the reasoning forms of the
Stoics, nor can their ethical views be referred to his
few and undeveloped hints.
With all the im
portance the Stoics attached to natural science, it is
with them only subordinate to moral science ; and
the very fact that it is referred to Heraclitus as
its author, proves its inferior position, and the
want of any independent interest in the subject.
It is also unmistakeable that even in natural science
the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus, and
that principles taken from Heraclitus often bear
an altered meaning when wrought into the Stoic
system. Omitting minor points, not only is the
Stoic doctrine of nature in a formal point of view
far more developed, and with regard to its ex
tension far more comprehensive, than the corre
sponding doctrine of Heraclitus, but the whole Stoic
view of the world is by no means so completely
identical with his as might be supposed. The
flux of things, which the Stoics teach equally
with Heraclitus,2 has not for them that over
whelming importance that it had for him. The
1 Besides ' meteorological Heraclitus' attitude towards
and other points of natural the popular faith also belongs
science, which the Stoics may here,
have borrowed from Heraclitus,
2 See p. 101, 2.

matter of which the universe consists may be always
going over into new forms, but, at the same time,
it is for them the permanent material and essence
of things.1 Individual substances, too, are treated
by the Stoics as corporeally permanent.2 Moreover,
from the material they distinguish the active prin
ciple, Reason or deity, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the same distinction is carried
into individual things in the contrast between matter
and quality. Thereby it becomes possible for them
to contrast much more sharply than their predecessor
had done the reason of the world, and the blindly
working power of nature. Heraclitus, it would ap
pear, confined his attention to observing nature and
describing its elementary meteorological processes.
But the natural science of the Stoics includes the
idea of means working for ends. It sees the object
in referring the whole arrangement of the world to
man, and it pursues this line of thought exclusively,
neglecting in consequence science proper. Hence
the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had
not the same meaning in the minds of both. Hera
clitus sees this reason, primarily and chiefly, in the
ordinary sequence of natural phenomena, in the
regularity of the course by which to each individual
phenomenon its place in the world, its extent and
duration are prescribedin short, in the unchanging
coherence of nature. Without excluding this aspect
1 See p. 100, 4, 5; 101, 2;
140, 1.
s As an illustration of the
difference, take Heraclitus'
statement of the daily extinction

of the sun, which every one
must admit would not have
been possiblein the StoicSchool.
895
Chap.
396
Chap,
THE STOICS.
in their proofs of the existence of God and the rule
of Providence, the Stoics attach the chief importance
to the serviceableness of the order of nature.

The
reason which rules the world appears in Heraclitus
primarily as a natural power ; in the Stoics, as intel
ligence working with a purpose. For Heraclitus
Nature is the highest object, the object of indepen
dent and absolute interest ; and hence the infinite
Being is no more than the power which forms the
world. The Stoics regard nature from the platform
of humanity, as a means for the wellbeing and ac
tivity of man. Their deity accordingly does not work
as a simple power of nature, but essentially as the
wisdom which cares for the wellbeing of man. The
highest conception in the system of Heraclitus is
that of nature or destiny.
Stoicism accepted this
conception also, but at the same time developed it
to the higher idea of Providence.
(3) ConShall we be wrong if we attribute this modificanection
f.jon Qf
Heraclitean theory of nature bv the Stoics
nnth Arts'
"
tvtle.
partly to the influence of Socrates' and Plato's theory
of final causes, but in a still greater degree to the
influence of the Aristotelian philosophy ? To Aris
totle belongs properly the idea of matter without
qualities, no less than the distinction between a
material and a formal cause. Aristotle applied the
idea of purpose to natural science far more exten
sively than any other system had done before ; and
although the mode in which the Stoics expressed
this idea has more resemblance to the popular theo
logical statements of Socrates and Plato than to

Aristotle, still the Stoic conception of a natural
power working with a purpose, such as is contained
in the idea of artificial tire and \6yoi a-wsp/jiariKol,
is essentially Aristotelian.
Even many positions
which appear to be advanced in opposition to Aris
totle were yet connected with him. Thus the exist
ence of ether as a body distinct from the four ele
ments is denied, and yet in point of fact it is asserted
under a new namethat of artificial fire. The Peri
patetic doctrine of the origin of the rational soul is
contradicted by the Stoic theory of development, and
yet the latter is based on a statement in Aristotle
to the effect that the germ of the animal soul lies
in the warm air1 which surrounds the seed, warm
air which Aristotle distinguishes from fire quite as
carefully as Zeno and Cleanthes distinguished the
two kinds of fire.
Even the point of greatest
divergence from Aristotelian teachingthe trans
formation of the human soul and the divine spirit
into something corporealmight yet be connected
with Aristotle, and, indeed, the Peripatetic School
here comes to their assistance. For had not Aristotle
described the ether as the most divine body, the stars
formed out of it as divine and happy beings? Had
he not brought down the acting and moving forces
from a heavenly sphere to the region of earth ? Had
he not, as we have just seen, sought the germ of the
soul in an ethereal matter ? And might not others
go a little further and arrive at materialistic views ?
and all the more so, seeing how hard it is to conceive
1 iryeDjua as with the Stoics.
397
Chap.
XIV.
388
Chap,
'
THE STOICS.
the extra-mundane intelligence of Aristotle, at once
as incorporeal, and yet touching and encircling the
world of matter, and to make personal unity in the
human soul accord with an origin in a reason coming
from above ?
The way for Stoicism was more directly paved
by the Aristotelian speculations as to the origin of
notions and conceptions. Here the Stoics did little
more than omit (in conformity with their principles)
what their predecessor had said as to an original
possession and immediate knowledge of truth. It
has been remarked on an earlier occasion how closely
their formal logic followed that of Aristotle ; they
contented themselves with building on Aristotelian
foundations, and even their additions have more
reference to grammar than to logic. The actual
influence of Peripatetic views on those of the Stoics
appears to have been least in the province of ethics.
Here the crudity of the Stoic conception of virtue,
the entire suppression of emotions, the absolute
exclusion of everything external from the circle of
moral goods, the distinction between the wise and
the foolish man, the attacks on a purely speculative
life, present a sharp contrast to the caution and
many-sidedness of Aristotle's moral theory, to his
careful weighing of current opinions and their prac
ticability, to his recognition of propriety in every
shape and form, and to the praise which he lavishes
on a purely speculative life. What the Stoics chiefly
owe to Aristotle is the formal treatment of the
materials and the psychological analysis of individual
399
moral faculties. On the other hand, the province of Chap.

xiv '
ethics must be looked to for traces of the teaching
which Zeno received from Polemo, perhaps even from
Xenocrates.
The speculative portions of Plato's teaching could (4) Conoffer no great attractions to practical men and materialists like the Stoics, either in their original form Plato.
or in the form which they assumed in the older
Academy under Pythagorean influence. On the
other hand,such points in Platonism as the Socratic
habit of making knowledge the foundation of virtue,
the comparative depreciation of external goods, the
disparagement of all that is sensual, the elevation
and the purity of moral idealism, and, in the older
Academy, the demand for life according to nature,
the doctrine of the self-sufBcingness of virtue, and
the growing tendency to confine philosophy to prac
tical issuesall these were questions for a Stoic full
of interest. Unfounded as the notion of the later
Eclectics is,1 that the Stoic and Academician systems
of morality were altogether the same, the Stoics,
nevertheless, appear to have received suggestions
from the Academy which they carried out in a more
determined spirit. Thus the theory of living accord
ing to nature belongs originally to the Academy,
although the Stoics adopted it with a peculiar and
somewhat different meaning. Besides influencing the
moral doctrines of the Stoics, the attitude assumed
1 See particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in many pas
sages. See above, p. 39, 2.
400
Chap.
IV"
THE STOICS.
by the older Academy towards positive religion may
also have had some influence on their orthodoxy ;
their most prominent representative, Cleanthes, is in

his whole philosophic character the counterpart of
Xenocrates. Although later in its origin than
Stoicism, the new Academy was not without im
portant influence on that system, through the person
of Chrysippus, but this influence was at first only of
an indirect kind, inasmuch as it obliged the Stoics
by its logical contradiction to look about for a more
logical basis for their system, and therewith to
attempt a more systematic expansion of their teach
ing.1 Somewhat similar is the effect of Epicureanism,
which by its strong opposition in the field of ethics
imparted decision and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine,
and thus indirectly helped to form it.
C. The
By the aid of these remarks it now becomes posphilowphy S1ble to give a satisfactory account of the history of
as a whole. Stoicism. Belonging to an age of moral debasement
hi\or* I anc^ poetical oppression, its founder, Zeno, conceived
position. the idea of liberating himself and all who were
able to follow him from its degeneracy and slavery
by means of a philosophy which, by purity and
strength of moral will, would procure independence
from all external things, and unruffled inward peace.
That his endeavours should have taken this practical
turn, that he should have proposed to himself not
knowledge as such, but the moral exercise of know
ledge as the object to be realised, was in part due to
1 See p. 40, 1, 2.
STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE.

his own personal character, and may be in part
referred to the general circumstances of the times.
On nobler and more serious minds, these circum
stances weighed too heavily not "to call forth
opposition and resistance in place of listless contem
plation. The sway of the Macedonian, and after
wards of the Roman Empire, was far too despotic to
allow the least prospect of open resistance. Nor
must it be overlooked that philosophy itself had
reached a pass at which satisfactory answers to
speculative problems were no longer forthcoming ;
hence attention was naturally directed to questions of
morals.
Haunted by this longing for virtue, Zeno must
have felt attracted by a system of philosophy which
had at an earlier period followed a similar course
with marked success, viz. the system of the Cynics,
and what he doubtless identified therewith, the old
Socratic teaching.1 Anxious to find a positive mean
ing and scientific basis for virtue, he strove to appro
priate from every system whatever agreed with the
bent of his own mind. By using all the labours of
his predecessors, and keeping his eye steadily fixed
upon the practical end of philosophy, he succeeded
in forming a new and more comprehensive system,
which was afterwards completed by Ohrysippus. In
point of form this system was most indebted to the
1 The story in Diog. vii. 3 thought, he was referred to
bears out this view, that Zeno Crates. According to the
was lirst won for philosophy by quotations on pp. 274, 2 ; 387,
Xenophon's Memorabilia, and 1, the Cynics were regarded in
that on asking who was the the Stoic School as genuine
representative of this line of followers of Socrates.
D D
4(1 L
Chap.
XIV '
402
Chap.
XIV"
THE STOICS.
Peripatetic philosophy ; in point of matter, next to
its debt to the Cynics, which has been already men
tioned, its chief obligation was to Heraclitus. But

the moral theory of the Stoics was as little identical
with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the
Stoics was with that of Heraclitus. If the diver
gence was, in the first instance, due to the influence
of the Stoic principles, still the influence of the Peri
patetic teaching is unmistakeable in the natural and
speculative science of the Stoics, and the influence
of the Academy in their moral science. Stoicism
does not, therefore, appear simply as a continuation
of Cynicism, nor yet as an isolated innovation, but, like
every other form of thought which marks an epoch,
it worked up into itself all previous materials, and
produced from their combination a new result. In
this process of assimilation much that was beautiful
and full of meaning was omitted ; everything was
absorbed that could be of use in the new career on
which the Greek mind was about to enter.
(2)ftsoneIt was the fault of the age that it could no longer
sidednent.
.
come up to the many-sidedness ot an Aristotle or a

Plato. Stoicism, it is true, approximates thereto
more nearly than any other of the post-Aristotelian
systems. But in its practical view of philosophy, in its
materialistic appeal to the senses, in its theoretical
self-sufficiency, setting up the wise man as superior
to the weaknesses and wants of human nature ; in its
citizenship of the world, throwing political interests
into the background ; and in so many other traits it
is the fit exponent of an epoch in which the taste
for purely scientific research and the delight in
STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE.

ethical speculation were at an end, whilst out of the
overthrow of states, and the growth of freedom, the
idea of humanity was coming to the fore. Stoicism
represented most powerfully the moral and religious
convictions of such an age, yet not without onesidedness and exaggeration. -By exercise of the will
and by rational understanding, man is to become
free and happy. This aim is, however, pursued so
persistently that the natural conditions of human
existence and the claims of individuality are ignored.
To man, regarded as the exponent of universal law, as
little freedom of will is allowed by the Stoic natural
science in face of the inexorable course of nature as
freedom of action is allowed by the Stoic ethics in
face of the demands of duty. The universal claims of
morality are alone acknowledged; the right of the
individual to act according to his peculiar character,
and to develop that character, is almost ignored.
The individual, as such, dwindles into obscurity,
whilst a high place in the world is assigned to
mankind collectively. The individual is subor- .
dinated to the law of the whole ; but by regarding
nature as a system of means and ends, and intro
ducing the belief in Providence and Prophecy, the
universe is again subordinated to the interests of
mana view against which a more careful research
has many objections to urge. In both respects
Epicureanism is in decided contrast to Stoicism,
though agreeing with it in the general tone of its
practical philosophy and in its aim to make man
independent of the outer world and happy in himself.
Dd2
403
Chap.
XIV'
PART III.
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XV.
EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL.1
Chap.
XV.
A. Epi-
Epicurus, the son of the Athenian Neocles,2 was

.
born in Samos3 in the year 342 or 341 B.C.4 His
arly education appears to have been neglected ; 5
1 Consult, on this subject,
the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in Ersch and Gruber's
Encyclopedia, sect. i. vol. 35,
pp. 459-477.
2 Diog. x. i. He is fre
quently mentioned as an Athe
nian, belonging to the Sijuos
Gargettos. Diog. I.e.; Lvcret.
Nat. Rer. vi. 1 '; do. Ad Fam.
xv. 16 ; MUcm., V. H. iv. 13.
3 Diog. i. ; Strabo, xiv. 1,
18, p. 638. According to these
authorities, and die. N. D. i.
26, 72, his father had gone
thither as a KXripovxos. That
this happened before his birth
has been demonstrated by
Steinhart, p. 461.
* Apollodorus (in Diog. x.
14) mentions 7 Gamelion, 01.
109, 3, as the birthday of Epi
curus. It was observed (Epi

curus' will, Diog. 18) rj? rporfpa
SeKa-rp rod Tafir]\t&vos. Gamelion being the seventh month
of the Attic year, the time of
his birth must have been either
early in 341 B.C., or the last
days of 342 B.C.
5 His father, according to
Strabo, was a schoolmaster,
and Epicurus had assisted
him in teaching (Hermippus
and Timon, in Diog. 2 ; At/ten.
xiii. 588, a). His mother is
said to have earned money by
repeating charms (/coflapîoi),
and Epicurus to have assisted
in this occupation (Diog. 4).
Although the latter statement
evidently comes from some
hostile authority.it wouldseem
that his circumstances in early

EPICURUS.
and his knowledge of previous philosophic systems
was very superficial, even at the time when he first
came forward as an independent teacher. Still he
can hardly have been so entirely self-taught as he
wished to appear at a later period in life. The
names, at least, of the individuals are on record
who instructed him in the systems of Democritus
and Plato ; 1 and although it is by no means an
ascertained fact that he subsequently attended the
lectures of Xenocrates,2 on the occasion of a visit
to Athens,3 no doubt can be felt that he was
life were not favourable to a
thoroughly scientific education.
H is language in disparagement
of culture would lead us to the
same conclusion, even were tlie
express testimony ofSewt. Math,
i. 1 wanting : iv ttoWois yap
aâ6^}S 'En'iKovpos Keyx*T&',
4v rats Koivais SptXlats (in com
mon expressions, corif. the cen
sure passed on him by Dionysi as
of Halicarnassus and Aristo
phanes in Diog. 4, 13) xaBapeiav.
Cie. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem
equidem, aut ipse doctrinis
fuisset instructorest emm
. . . non satis politus in artibus,
i] ua.s qui tenent eruditi appellanturaut ne deterruisset
alios a studiis. Athen. xiii. 588,
a : iyKvK\iov iraiSf(os afivtjros &v.
1 According to his own
statement (Diog. 2), he was not
more than fourteen (Snid. 'E7ri/c.
has twelve) years of age when
he began to philosophise, i.e.
to think about philosophical
subjects ; probably about chaos,
following the suggestion of
Hesiod's verses. He subse
quently boasted that he had
made himself what he was

without a teacher, and refused
to own his obligations to those
shown to be his teachers. Cie.
N. D. i. 26, 72 ; 33, 93 ; Sext.
Math. i. 2, who mentions his
disparagement of Nausiphanes ;
Diog. 8, 13; Pint. N. P. Suav.
V. 18, 4; conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3.
It is, however, established that
in his youth he enjoyed the in
struction of Pamphilus and of
that Nausiphanes, who is some
times called a follower of De
mocritus, somelimes of Pyrrlio
( Cie. ; Sext. ; Diog. x. 8 ; 13 ; 14 ;
ix. 64 ; 69 ; Prooam. 15 ; Suid.
'Ettik. ; Clem. Strom, i. 301, D).
The names of two other sup
posed instructors are also men
tioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (Diog. Prouem. 15 ; x.
13), but they almost seem to
be corruptions for Pamphilus
and Nausiphanes.
2 According to Cie. 1. c, he
denied the fact. Others, how
ever, asserted it, and, among
them, Demetrius of Magnesia.
Diog. ' 3.
3 Whither he came, in his
405
Chap
XV.
406
Chap.
XV.
THE EPICUREANS.
acquainted with the writings of previous philoso
phers, from whom he borrowed important parts of
his system 1 and more particularly with those of
Democritus.
After having been engaged as a teacher in several
Schools 2 in Asia Minor, he repaired to Athens about
the year 306 B.C.,3 and there founded a School of his
own.4 The meeting-place of this School was the
founder's garden,5 and its centre of attraction was
eighteenth year, according to
Heraclides Lembus, in Diog. 1 .
Conf. Strabn, 1. c. : rpoQfiycu
<t>amr ivBdSt (in Samos) no! ev
Tc(p /fed ttpTi&evffai 'ABiivrifft.
1 According to Hermippus
( THoy. 2) DemoiTitus first gave
him the impulse to pursue
philosophy ; but this is only a
conjecture. Besides Democri
tus, Aristippns is also men
tioned as a phdosopher who-e
doctrines he followed (Diog. 4).
Kpicurus is even said to have
expresseda disparaging opinion
of Democritus (Cir. N. D. i.
33, 93 ; Diog. 8). Nor is this de
nied by Diog. 9 ; but itprohably
refers to particular points only,
or it may have reference
to the attitude of later Epi
cureans, such as Colotes (Pint.
Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108). Plut.
1. c, says, not only that Epi
curus for a long time called
himself a follower of Demo
critus, but he also quotes pas
sages from Leon tens and Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus'
respect for Democritus. Philodem. irepl najlfirifftas. Vol. Here,
v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to
expressions of Epicurus which
excuse certain mistakes of De
mocritus. Lncret. iii. 370, v.

020, also speaks of Democritus
with great respect ; and Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Here. i. col.
36, calls him hfîp ov QwrioXoyiito.tos fi6vov tSbv kpxatvr a\Ka
teat Tfi>v iaTOaou/xtyw ovbtvhs t}tToy woXvwpd.-^^wv.
1 Ding. 1, 15 mentions Colo
phon, Mytilene.and Lampsacus.
Strahn, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also
aftirms t hat Epicurus resided ' or
some time at Lampsacus, and
there made the acquaintance
of Idomeneus and Leontous.
* Diog 2, on the authority
of Heraclides and Sotion. Ac
cording to him, Epicurus re
turned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates, 307-6 B.C.
In that case the numbers must
beslightly reduced in the state
ment (Diog. 15) that he came
to Mytilene when 32, and taught
there and in Lampsacus for
five years.
4 Not immediately, how
ever, since Diog. 2 says, on the
authority of Heraclides: ftivpt
txiv vivos kot' npiffap tois &\Aots <pl>yotTO<pc7v, firerT1 i5la lrws
t^v an' al'TQti K\r)8eio~av air"-<.i
<Tvo-Ti]tTac6ai.
1 On this celebrated garden.
EPICURUS.
the founder himself, around whom a circle of friends
gathered, knit together by a common set of principles, by a common affection for a master whom
they almost worshipped, and by a common enjoyment
of cultivated society.1 Opponents charged the Epicu
reans with gross impropriety, because they admitted
not only women,2 but women of loose morality,3 to
this circle of philosophic culture; but in the then
state of Greek society, such conduct does not appear
extraordinary. Here Epicurus laboured for six and
thirty years, during which he succeeded in impressing
a stamp on his School which is now seen definite
and unchanged after the lapse of centuries. In the
year 270 B.C.4 he succumbed to disease, the pains
and troubles of which he bore with great fortitude.15
Out of the multitude of his writings6 only a few have
after which the Epicureans
were called oi curb -ri>v Kfamv,
see Ding. 10, 17; Plin. H. N.
xix. 4, 51 ; Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65 ;
v. 1, 3 ; Ad Fam. xiii. 1 ; Sen.
Ep. 21, 10; Stemhart, p. 462,
45; 463,72. Epicurus had purchased it for 80 minas,
1 This subject will be discussed at a later period.
2 Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus
{Diog. 5 ; 25 ; 26 ; Clem. Strom.
iv. 522, D).
3 Diog. 4 ; 6 ; 7 ; Cleomed.
Meteor, p. 92, Balfor. ; Pint
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 4, 8 ; 16, 1 and
6 ; Lat. Viv. 4, 2. The bestknown among these cTatpai is
Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of Epicurus
(Diog. 6 ; 23), and wrote with
spirit against Theophrastus
(Cw. N. D. i. 33, 93; Pint. Hist,

Kat. Prsef. 29). Conf. Diog. 5;
Philodem. ittpl irapjrnalas, Vol.
Here. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii.
593, b, tells a fine story of selfsacrifice of her daughter Danae.
4 01. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his
seventy-second year. Diog. 15;
Cio. De Fat. 9, 19.
5 Diog. 15; 22; Cic. Ad
Fam. vii. 26 ; Fin. ii. 30, 96 ;
Sen. Ep. 66, 47 ; 92, 25. That
he put an end to his own life
(Baumhauer, Vet. Philo. Doct.
De Mort. Volnnt. 322), 'Termippus {Diog. 15) by no means
implies.
" According to Ding Pro.
1 6, x. 26, be was, next to Chrysippus, the most voluminous
writer of the ancient philosophers, hio writings rilling 300
407
Chap.
XV"
408
THE EPICUREANS.
Chap
XV.
come down to us, and these are for the most part
unimportant ones.1 On the whole, these fragments 2
bear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents
have expressed with regard to his style.3
B.Seholan
Among the numerous scholars of Epicurus4 the
of Epi
best known are Metrodorus 5 and Polyaenus,6 both of
curus
rolls. The titles of his most
esteemed works are given by
Diog. 27. Conf. Fabric. Bibi.
Gr.'iii. 595, Harl.
1 Three epistles in Diog. 35 ;
84; 122; and the Kvpim 56ai,
an epitome of his ethics, men
tioned by Cie. N. D i. SO, 85,
and 139. Of his 37 books irep!
<pv<rea>s, fragments of books 2
mid 1 1 have been edited (Vol.
HercuX. ii ).
2 fragments in Ding. 5 ; 7.
Besides the testament and the
letter to Tdomenens (Di<g lfi22), many individual expres
sions of Epicurus have Been
preserved by Seneca.
3 Aristophanes (in Diog. 13)
calls his style idtuTuccardTTj.
Clenmed. Meteor, p 91, com
plains of his awkward and bar
barous expressions, instancing;
arapKb? ei/ffraOrj KaTaffTrifiaTa' rh
irtpi Tatmis nimh iXTr'iff/xana'
\ittiifffia b<pfto.K/j.a}V Upa avattpavydtrpLara ' yapya\iff/xoi/s acb/iaTos.
In this respect, Chrysippils may
be compared with him. See
above, p. 48, 1.
4 See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii.
598, Harl. They were.no doubt,
very numerous. Ding, x. 9,
probably exaggerates their num
ber in saying the friends of
Epicurus would till towns. Cic
Kin. r. 20, 65, speaks of magni
grebes amicorum. Pint. Lat.
Viv. 3, 1 also mentions his
friends in Asia and Egypt. In
Greece, however, on his own

testimony, and that of Metro
dorus {Sen. Ep. 79, 15), they
attracted little notice.
5 A native of Lampsacus
{Strain, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and,
next to Epicurus, the most
celebrated teacherof the School.
Cicero, Fin. ii. 28, 92, calls him
pasne alter Epicurus, and states
(Fin. ii. 3, 7) that Epicurus
gave him the name of a wise
man {Ding. 18 ; Sen. Ep. 52, 3).
Further particulars respecting
him and bis writings in Din//.
x. 6; 18; 21-24 ; Fhilodem. De
Vitiis, ix. (Vol. Here, iii ), col.
12 ; 21 ; 27 : Athen. vii. 279 :
Pint. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 1 ;
1 2, 2 : 1 fi, fi and 9 ; Adv. Col.
33, 2 and 6 ; Sen. Ep. 98, 9 ;
99, 25. Fragments of the letters
are to be found in Plutarch,
Seneca, and Philodemus. Whe
ther the fragments of a treatise
iTfp! w<j(>t)twv in vol. vi. of Vol.
Hercul. belong to him, is very
uncertain. According to Ding.
23, he died seven years before
Ei'icurus, in his fifty-third
year, and must therefore have
been born 330 or 329 B.C. For
the education of his children
probably by Leontion, whom
Diog. 23 calls iraAAafcij, and Sen.
Fr. 45 in Hieron. Adv. Jovin.
i. 191 calls his wife, provision
is made by Epicurus in his
will {Diog.'l9, 21).
* Son of Athenodorus. like
SCHOLARS OF EPICURUS.
whom died before their master; Hermarchus,1 upon
whom the presidency of the School devolved after
the death of Epicurus ; 2 and Colotes,3 against whom
Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise.
Many others are also known, at least by name.4 The
wise a native of Lampsaeus
(Diog. 24), a capital mathema
tician, according to Cic. Acad,
ii. 33, 100 ; Fin. i. H, 20. Ding.
1. c. calls him e'jrie<icj)s ol cpiKîkoos; Me rndorus, in PMlodem.
ircpl irapfnifflas (Vol. Here. V. a),
col. 6, diropOey/xaTtas. Sen. Ep.
6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus, and
Hermarchus, viros magnos.
Pbilodemvs (vol. v. b), Fr. 49.
praises his frankness towards
his teacher. A son of his is
also mentioned in Epicurus'
will (.Ding. 19), whose mother
would appear to have been a
courtesan, according to Plut.
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 6.
1 This individual's name,
formerly written Hermachus,
appears as Hermarchus in the
modern editions of Diogenes,
Cicero, and Seneca. The latter
form is now established heyond
doubt, by the Herculanean frag
ments from Philudemiu (ftpl
6ewv 81(170)77)5, vol. vi. col. 13,
20: De Vitiis, ix. vol. iii col.
25, 1), and the inscription on a
monument to him (Antiquirat.
Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace
was Mytilene, Agemarehus beiiisr his father. (Diog. 17, 15,
24.) Diog. 24 gives a list of
his books. Epicurus (Ding. 20)
describes him as one of his
oldest and most faithful friends,
in the words : fitra rov (rvyKaraye'rjpotc6r>is iâtv 4v (pi\o(ro{f>ta.
On his character, see Sen. Ep.
6, 6.
2 According to what is
stated in the testament of Epi
curus. Diog. 10.
3 Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. Diog. 25. Further par
ticulars about him may be ob
tained from Plut. Adv. Col. 17,
5 ; 1, 1 ; N. P. Suav. Vivi, ], 1 ;
Marrob. Somn Scip. i. 2. Vol.
Hercul. iv. Introd. in Polystr.
p. iii.
4 In particular, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the
brothers of Epicurus (Diog. 3,
28 ; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, o, 3;
where 'Aya860ov\os is evidently
a copyist's error ; 10, 3 ; De
Lat. Viv. 3, 2) ; Idomeneus, a
native of Lampsacns (Dion. 25;
22 ; 23 ; 5 ; Plut. Adv. Col. IS*,
3 ; Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589;
Athen. vii. 279 ; Pllilodem. irepl
7rapp7jir(as. Fr. 72, Vol. Here. v.
2 ; Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7 ; 22, 5 ;
Phot. Lex.; and Suid. UvBia na\
i<An), from whose historical
writings many fragments are
quoted by Miiller, Fragm. Hist.
Gr. ii. 489 ; Leoi.teus, likewise
a native of Lampsacus (Diog.
5; 25; Plot. Adv. Col. 3, 3;
Strabo, 1. c.) ; Herodotus (Diog.
4 and 34) ; Pythocles (Diog. 5
and 83 ; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,
12, 1: Adv. Col. 29, 2; Pllilo
dem. irept Traty-n(rlas, Fr. 6) ;
Apelles (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,
12, 1); Menceceus (Diog. 121);
Nicanor (Diog. 20); Timocrates,
the brother of Metrodorus, who
afterwards fell out with Epi-
409
Chap
X^ '
410
Chap,
'
THE EPICUREANS.
garden which Epicurus in his will left to the School 1
continued after his death to be the external rallyingpoint for his followers. Hermarchus was succeeded
by Polystratus,2 With whom Hippoclides is also
mentioned 3 as joint-president. Hermarchus and
Hippoclides were succeeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius again by Basilides.4 Protarchus of Bargylium,5
ourus {Ding. 4 and 6; 23 and standing thereupon, and at
28; Cic. N. D. i. 33. 93; Plut. that time in ruins (parietinaj),
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, !l ; Adv. was in the hands of C. MemCol. 32, 7; Comment, in Hesind. mius. a distinguished Roman,
Fr. 7, 1 ; Philodem. inpi ira^rj- to whom Cicero wrote (Ad
(Wet?, Vol. Here. v. a, col 20). Fam. xiii. 1), conf. Ad Att. v.
This Timocrates must not be 11, begging him to restore it
confounded with the Athenian to the School. Whether he
Timocrates, whom Epicurus was successful is not known
appointed his heir, jointly from Sen. Ep. 21, 10.
with Amynomachus (Diog. 16;
2 Diog. 25. dues not fay that
Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). The Polystratus was a personal distwo last named were probably ciple of Epicurus, but it seems
pupils of Epicurus. Other probable. Fragments of a
pupils were : Mithras, a Syrian, treatise of his irtpi i\6yov xaraan official under Lysimachus (ppuc^tTEcos in the fourth volume
(Li>g 4 and 28; Plut. Adv. of Vol. Hercul.
Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav. Viv. 15,
* According to Valer. Max.
5) ; Mys, a slave of Epicurus, i. 8, ext. 17, both these indivion whom he bestowed liberty duals were born on the same
{Diog. 21 ; 3; 10; Gell. ii. 18, day, and passed their whole
8; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; the lives together with a common
ladies mentioned on p. 407. 2, 3; purse. Lysias, according to
likewise Anaxarchus, to whom the older text of Diog. x. 25,
Epicurus addressed a letter, and was a cotemporary, at whose
Timarchus, to whom Metro- house Hermarchus died, as
dorns addressed one (Pint. Adv. Fabric. Biol. Gr. iii. 606 beCol. 17, 3); Hegesianax, who lieves, ai>d who is stylerl in
died early (Plut. N. P. Suav. Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of TarVivi, 20, 5) ; the poet Menander, sus. Cobet, however, reads
whose wondrous epigram on irapa\iVti instead of vapb Aun'a.
Epicurus is to be found in the
4 Diog. 25. The Dionysius
anthology ; and probably Dion}'- referred to can hardly be Diony
sius u liCTaBtfievo!. (See above, sius S neraSiueyos (see p. 44,
p. 44, 1.)
]), or Diogenes would have
1 Diog. 16. In Cicero's said so. Besides the chronology
time, the plot of ground, to- forbids such an assumption,
gether with the tenement
5 Strabo, xiv. 2, 20, p. 658.
THE ROMAN PERIOD.

and his pupil, Demetrius the Laconian,' appear to
belong to the second century before Christ ; but the
time in which these philosophers flourished cannot
be established with certainty ; and the same remark
applies to several others whose names are on record.2
Before the middle of the second century B.C.
Epicureanism is said to have obtained a footing in
Home.3 It is certain that it existed there not long
afterwards. C. Amafinius is mentioned as the first
who paved the way for the spread of Epicurean doc
trines by discussing them in Latin ; 4 and it is stated
He is probably the Protarohus
whose sayings are quoted by
Simpl. Phys. 78, a; Themist.
Phys. 27, a.
' According to Slrabo, 1. c,
Dioq. 26, Sext. Bmpir. Pyrrh.
iii. 137, Math. viii. 348, x. 219,
Erotian, Lex. Hippocr. KhayytiSri, Demetrius was one of the
most distinguished Epicureans.
Whether a treatise on mathe
matics, illegible fragments of
which are found in Hereulanum (Vol. Here. iv. Introd. in
Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or belongs
to another Demetrius men
tioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 1 6,
p=>ge 548, it is impossible to
say.
2 Both the Ptolemies of
Alexandria (Diog. 25) ; Dio
genes of Tarsus (Diog. vi. 81 ;
x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138);
Orion {Ding. 26) ; Timagoras
(<7ic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); and
also Metrodorus of Stratonice,
who went over from Epicurus
to Carneades (Diog. 9) a very
rare thing for an Epicurean to
domay be named among his
pupils.
" According to Athnn. xii.

547, a, jElian, V. H. ix. 12, two
Epicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Home,
in the consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see
Clinton's Fasti), because of
their evil influence on youth.
Although the story is obviously
taken from a hostile authority
and in Suid. ('Eir!/coi>pos, vol. i. b,
419 Bern ), it is told with such
exaggerations as toinspire grave
mistrust, it can hardly be alto
gether without some founda
tion. Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 19,
4, says, that in some cities
severe laws were passed against
the Epicureans, and just at
that time there was a strong
feeling in Rome against inno
vations, witness the well-known
enquiry into the Bacchanalia
instituted 186 B.C.
4 According to Cic. Tusc.
iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to
have come forward not long
after the philosophic emhassy
of 156 B.C. : nor is this at
variance with Lucr. v. 336,
who claims primus cum primis
411
Chap.
XV.
C. Epi
cureans
of the
Roman
period.
412
Chap.
XV.
THE EPICUREANS.
that these doctrines soon found many supporters,
attracted partly by their merits, but more often by
the simplicity and the ease with which they could
be understood.1
Towards the close of the second century Apollodorus, one of the most voluminous writers on philo
sophy, taught at Athens.2 His pupil, Zeno of Sidon,
the most important among the Epicureans of that
age, laboured for a long time successfully, both orally
and in writing.3 About the same time Phaedrus is
to have set forth the Epicurean in Fin. i. 7, 25, the question :
teaching in Latin. His works Cur tam multi sint Epicurei ?
marie a great impression at the
2 Surnamed b KfiTrorvpavvos,
time, according to Cie. 1. c. the writer of more than 400
(oujus libris editis commota books. Diog. 25 ; 2 ; 13; vii.
multitudo contulit se ad earn 181.
s Diog. vii. 35, x. 25, and
potissiruum disciplinam). Ac
cording to Acad. i. 2, 5, he Procl. in Euclid. 55, says that
pursued natural science, care Zeno was a native of Sidon,
fully following the views of and a pupil of Apolloionis ;
Epicurus. Cicero then com nor can these statements be re
plains of him and Rabirius, ferred to an older Zeno, as some
we know not which one is previous writers maintained,
meant, nor whether he was an believing Apollodorus to lu
Epicurean, qui nulla arte ad- called in error a pupil of Epi
hibita de rebus ante oculos curus by Diog. x. 25, instead of
positis vulgari sermone dis to the one mentioned by Cicero.
putant: nihil definiunt, nihil For no trace of such a one
partiuntur, &c. Conf. Tusc. ii. exists ; and Dioe'enes vii. 35
3. 7. Cassius, too (Cic. Ad would then have passed over the
Fam. xv. 12), calls him and teacher of Cicero without notice,
Catius (see p. 414, 3) mali ver- although the latter cannot
borum interpretes.
possibly have been unknown to
1 Cie. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post him. Accordi ngto Cic. Acad.i. 1 2,
Amafiniurn autem multi ejus- 46, Zeno attended the lectures
dem asmuli rationis multa cum of Carneades and admired them ;
seripsissent, Italiam totam oc- and since Carneades died not
cupaverunf, quodque maxumum later than 129 B.C., Zeno can
argumentum est non dici ilia not have been born much later
subtiliter, quod et tam facile than 150 B.C. If, therefore,
ediscantur et ab indoctis pro- Zeno was really the successor
bentur, id illi firmamentum of Apollodorus, the latter must
esse discipline putant. Conf. be placed entirely in the second
THE ROMAN PERIOD.

heard of in Rome and Athens,1 and at a little
later period Philodemus 2 and Syro or Sciro in
century. But this fact is not Fin. i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; Legg. i.
sufficiently established. Cicero, 20, 53) had also studied under
in company with Atticus, at him in Athens, and previously
tended his lectures ( Cie. 1. c. ; in Rome, where Phasdrus must
Fin. i. 5, 16 ; Tusc. iii. 17, 3S. then have been residing (Ad
In Cie. N. D. i. 21, 58, Cotta Fam. xiii. 1). He was old when
says the same of himself), on Cicero for the second time was
his first visit to Athens, 78 or brought into relations with him.
79 B.C. ; conf. N. D. i. 34, 93 ; According to Phlegon, in Phot.
but this cannot possibly be the Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a, 17, he
same Zeno or Xeno (as -Krische, was succeeded by Patro (01.
Forsch. 26, maintains) whom 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the head
de. Ad Att. v. 10, 11 ; xvi. ship of the School, after holding
3 mentions as living in 50 it only for a very short time ;
and 48 B.C. Cie. N. D. i. 21, butthisis nota well-ascertained
calls him princeps Epicureorum fact. Cicero 1. c. praises the
(and Philo of Larissa, cory- character of Phasdrus. He calls
phaaus Epicureorum); Tusc. I.e., him nobilis philosophus (Philip,
acriculus senex, istorum (Epi v. 5, 13). It is supposed that
cureans) acutissimus. Dioy. x. Cicero's description (N. D. i. 10,
25, calls him wo\vypa<pus
25 ; 15, 41), and that the frag
From Procl. in Euclid. 55 ; 59 ; ments first published by Drum60, we hear of a treatise of mond (Heroulanensia: London,
Zeno, in which he attacked the 1810), and then by Petersen
validity of mathematical proofs. (Phaadri . . . de Nat. De.
Philodemus1 treatise irep! -na^prrj- Fragm.: Hamb. 1833), and
aias (Vol. Here. v. a) seems, illustrated by Krische (Forfrom the title, to have been an schungen), were from a treatise
abstract from Zeno. Cotem- of Pliaedrus on the Gods, to
porary with Zeno was that which perhaps Cie. Ad Att.
Aristio, or Athenio, who played xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel
a part in Athens during the (from the He'culanean rolls,
Mithridatic war, and is some Philodemus irtp! cvaffidas. Abh.
times called a Peripatetic, and d. Munch. Akad. Philos-philol.
sometimes an Epicurean {Pint. Kl. x. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De
Sulla, 12; 14; 23). See teller's Philodemi libro . . . de pietate.
Pljilosophie der Griechen, vol. Gott. Lections verz. fiir Somii. b, 759, 2. Perhaps to the mer, 1864) have shown that the
time of his despotism the state Neapolitan (Vol. Here. Coll.
ment may be referred {Deme Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are
trius Magnes in Athen. xiii. right in regarding these frag
611, b) that the Stoic Theo- ments as the remains of a
timus, who wrote against Epi treatise of Philodemus irepl
curus, was killed at the instance tucrejfjfias.
2 Philodemns (see Vol.
of Zeno.
' Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93 ; Here. i. 1 ; Grus, Philod. Rhet.
418
chap.
414
Chap.
x^r'
THE EPICUREANS.
Rome,1 and Patro,2 the successor ofPhasdrus, in Athens.
The number of Epicureans at Rome, known to us
chiefly from Cicero's writings,3 is not small. No one of
"*
cxii. ; Preller, Allg. Encycl.

Sect. III. Bd. xxiii. 345) was a
native of Gadara, in Casle-Syria
(Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 769) He
lived at Rome in Cicero's time,
and is mentioneil by Cicero as
a learned and amiable man
(Kin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Pison.
28). Besides philosophic works,
he also wrote poems (Cic. In
Pis.; Hot. Sat. i. 2, 121). A
number of the latter, in the
shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical
works mentioned by Ding. x. 3 ;
21, no fewer than thirty-six
books were discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the
most part, been published (Vol.
Here. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii )
so far as they were legible.
Spengel and Gros have separately edited Rhet. IV. Sauppe,
De Vitiis X.; and Petersen and
Sauppe, the fragments rrepi
ewre/3e(as.
1 Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106 ; Fin.
ii. 35, 110; Ad Fam. vi. It.
According to \"vrgil, Catal. 7, 9 ;
1 0, 1 , Dnnat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv.
Ad Eel. vi. 13, JEn. vi. 264, he
was the teacher of Virgil. Tne
name is variously written as
Syro, Siro, Soiro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the grammarian
Pompilius Andronicus, from
Syria, who, according to before,
Illust. Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome
at the same time as Gnipho,
the teacher of Caesar (Hid. c.
7), and gave up his profession
for the Epicurean philosophy,
and afterwards lived at Cnmae.
'* Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad
Atf. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint.

Fratr. i. 2, 4, where besides
him an Epicurean Plato of
Sardes is mentioned, and above,
pp. 410, 1 ; 413, 1.
3 Besides Lucretius, the
most important among them
are T. Albutius, called by Cic.
Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cut. Brut. 20, 102 ;
Tusc. v. 37, 108: N. D. i. 33,
93 ; Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Oral. iii.
43, 171]; In Pison. 38, 92;
Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator, 44,
149: In Cascil. 19. 63; Provin.
Cons. 7, 15 ; De Orat. ii. 70,
281), and Velleius, who, as
Krisclie (Forsch. 20) proves, by
a gloss on Nat. De. i. 29, 82 and
Cie. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf.
Divin. i. 36, 79), was a native of
Lanuvium, and was considered
the most distinguished Epicurean of his time (Cic. N. D.
i. 6, 15 ; 21, 58 ; conf. De Orat.
iii. 21, 78). Other Epicureans
were : C. Catius, a native of
Gaul, spoken of by Cicero (A 1
Fam xv. 16) as one long ago
dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 1 24, lie
is called levis quidem sed non
injucundus tamen auctor; and
the Comment. Cruqu. in Hut.
Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote
four books De Rerum Natura et
De Summo Bono;- -C. Cassius.
the well-known leader of trie
conspiracy against Cassar (f'ic.
Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Pint.
Brut. 37) ; C. Vibius Pan.â,
who died as consul at Mutioa
in 43 B.C. ( Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12 ;
xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii.
26); L. Piso, the patron of
THE ROMAN PERIOD.

them has obtained a higher repute than T. Lucretius
Carus.1 His poem, carefully reproducing the Epicu
rean notions on natural science, is one of the
most valuable sources for the knowledge of their
system. Contemporary with Lucretius was the cele
brated physician Asclepiades of Bithynia,2 who resided
at Rome, but to judge by the views on nature attri
buted to him, he was no genuine Epicurean, although
connected with the Epicurean School.3
Philodemus ( Cic. in Pis. 28, see
above, p. 413. 2; 1. c. 9, 20; 16,
37 ; 18, 42 ; 25, 59 ; Post Ked.
6,14); Statilius ( Pint. Brut.
12); a second Staiiliusappears
to be meant (Oat. Min. 65);
L. Manlius Torquatus, to
whom Cic. Fin. i. 5, 13 dele
gates the representation of
the Epicurean teaching. T.
Pomponius Atticus, the wellknown friend of Cicero, ap
proached nearest to the Epi
curean School, calling its
adherents nostri familiares
(Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3) and c 'ndiscipuli (Legg. i. 7, 21). He was a
pupil of Zeno and Phaadrus and
a friend of Patro's ; but his re
lations to philosophy were too
free to entitle him properly to
be ranked in any one School
(Cic. Fam. xiii. 1). The same
observation applies also to his
friend, L. Saufeius (Ncpos,
Att. 12; Ck> Ad Att. iv. 6).
Still less can C. Sergius Orata
(Cic. Fin. ii. 22,70; Off. iii. 16,
67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L,
1'horius Balbus (Fin. 1. c), and
Postumius (Tbid.) be called
Epicureans. Nor can anything
be stated with certainty re
specting L. fapirius Ptetus (Cic.
Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26), not even
from the chief passage Ep. 25,

or respecting C Trebatius from
Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Metnmius (from the way in which
he is spoken of by Cic. Ad Fam.
xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as
a member of the Epicurean
School, although Lnoret. De
Ker. Nat. i. 24 : v. 9, expressed
the hope of winning him.
1 Horn, according to Hieron,
(in Bus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he
died in his 44th year, or 51
B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659
ought tl ere "ore to be substi
tuted for 6yy A.u.c. It is clear,
from Nepos, Att. 12, that he
was dead before the assassi
nation of Cassar. Teuffel (in
Paultfn Realencycl. iv. 1195)
justly disputes the statement of
Hieronymus, that he commit
ted suicide in a fit of madness.
2 According to Sext. Math,
vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of Ascalm, whoso lan
guage towards him is there
quoted, and reckoned by Galen.
Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among
the leaders of the logical
School of Physicians. His medi
cal treatises are often referred
to by Galen. Plutarch in his
Placita often names him.
* Known for three things
415
Chap.
XV.
THE EPICUREANS.
In the following century several supporters of
the practical philosophy of the Epicureans are known
to us,1 but no one apparently approaching Zeno or
his theory of atoms, his theory
He differs entirely from
of the acquisition of knowledge, Epicurus in denying the exist
and his resolution of the soul ence of a sijul apart from
body, and in referring every
into matter.
All bodies, he held, consist kind of notion, including the
of atoms, which differ from soul itself, to the action of the
the atoms of Democritus in senses (Sext. Math. vii. 380 :
that they owe their origin to Pint. Plac. iv. 2, 6; Cwl.
the meeting and breaking up Aurelian. 1. c. in Fabric, on the
of greater masses, and are not passage of Sext. ; Tertnllian. De
in quality alike and un An. 15). What is elsewhere
changeable (oirofleij). Sext. stated of Asclepiades, leaving
Pyrrh. iii. 32 ; Math ix. 363 ; alone his medical views, for
x. 318; viii. 220; iii. 5; Galen. instance, that with Heraclitus
1. c. 9, p. 698 ; Dionys ; Alex, he believed in a perpetual Mux
(in Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4); of things, is not at variance
Caul. Aurelian. De Pass. Acut. with Epicurean principles.
i. 14. See Fabric, on Pyrrh.
1 quint Inst. vi. 3, 78,
iii. 32. The latter is probably names L. Varus as an Epi
in error in describing the pri curean, a friend of Augustus,
mary atoms of Asclepiades as perhaps the individual who
without quality, differing only according to Uonat. V. Virg.
in size, form, number, and 7'J, Sere, on Eel. vi. 13, attended
arrangement. Although in this the lectures of Syro in com
respect he resembled Hera- pany with Virgil. Horace, not
clides, with whom he is gene withstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was
rally classed, and applied, like no Epicurean, but only a man
him, the name hyicm to atoms, who gathered everywhere what
still it is probable that his he could make use of (Sat. i. 5,
knowledge of Heraclides was 101). In Caligula's time, a
traditionally derived from the senator Pompedius was an Epi
curean (Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1.
Epicureans.
He also asserted, with Epi 5); under Nero, Autidius Bassus,
curus (Antiochus, in Sext. Math, a friend of Seneca (Sen. Ep.
vii. 201) : Tcfcs \jXv ala(H\a*ls 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the
uvTtos /cat &\t\8ws avTt\r)fyeis elvat, e'der Celsus (Ori/j. c. Cels. i. 8),
\6ytfi 8^ fnjSiV SAcos Tinas Kara- and Diodorus, who committed
\a/jL$iveiti. At the same time suicide (Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1);
he maintained that our senses under Vespasian or his sons,
cannot distinguish the com Pollius (Stat. Silv. ii. 2, 113).
ponent parts of things, but In the first half of the second
even Epicurus and Democritus century, Cleomeiles, Met. p. 87,
admitted as much in respect complained of the honours paid
to Epicurus. In the second
of atoms.
THE ROMAN PERIOD.
417
Phaedrus in scientific importance. Rehabilitated

under the Antonines by the establishment of a public
chair in Athens, the Epicurean School outlived most
other systems, and continued to exist as late as the
fourth century after Christ.1
half of the same century lived
Antonius, mentioned by Galen.
De Prep. An. Affect, v. 1, and
Zenobius, who, according to
8impl. Phys. 113, b, was an op
ponent of Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the
third century lived Diogenes
Laertius, who, if not a perfect
Epicurean himself, was at
least a friend of the Epicureans.
Amongst other Epicureans, the
names of Athenaius (whose
epigram on Epicurus is quoted
bv Diog. x. 12), Autodorus
{Ding. v. 92), and Hermodorus
(Ludan, Icaromen. 16) may be
mentioned ; but Diog. x. 11
does not justify us calling

Diocles of Magnesia an Epi
curean.
1 Diog. x. 9, in the first half
of the third century, writes : %
Tt SiSuxh Tatrur (rx8&p eic\tirovauv rSiv &K\u3v eVaei 3ia/xvouaa Kal njplS/iavs apâ?
air"\6ov<Ta &\\ijv e &\\tjs tup
yvuipifiuv. The testimony of
Lactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the
wide extension of Epicurean
ism is not so trustworthy,
although he treats it as an
existing fact. It may be that
he is only following older
writers, as Cicero does. See
above, p. 412, 1 .
KK
Chap.
XV.
4 '.-5
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XVI.
CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN
TEACHING : THE TEST-SCIENCE OF TRUTH.
Chap.
XVI.
The scientific value and capacity for development of

Epicureanism are out of all proportion to its exten
A. Cha
racter of sive diffusion and the length of time during which
Epicurean it continued to flourish. No other system troubled
si/stem.
itself so little about the foundation on which it
(i) iu
power of rested ; none confined itself so exclusively to the
self-pre
servation. utterances of its founder. Such was the dogmatism
with which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such
the conviction he entertained of their excellence,
that his pupils were required to commit summaries
of them to memory ; 1 and the superstitious devotion
for the founder was with his approval 2 carried to
1 Cie. Fin. ii. 7, 20: Quia from him : ws KoXAttjs liIv aitrbv
enim vestrum non edidicit Epi- (pvtrioXoyovvra TrpoaKvirhfffitv yocuri fupfas 5<ias 1 Dwg. 12 v6.twv wfyd.fj.fvos' NokAt}s h( 6
(according to Diocles). Epicu adeKtpbs eirdbs tic naiStav airotpa'irus often exhorted his scholars voito fjL7i$4va aocpJirtpov 'Eiwcovpou
(Ibid. 83 ; 85 ; 35) to commit to yeyovevat îtjS' <7ycu* Tf 5* ju^TTjp
memory what they had heard. irtifxovs %o~x*v c-v avrr, rocravras,
His last exhortation to his oTai avv{\6ovo~ai ao<pbv hv 4yevfriends was (Dwg. 16): tuv vi\oa.v. Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 10,
SoyfA&TWv fxefivrivdai.
p. 487 ; Adv. Col. 17,5; Clsomeii.
1 He speaks of himself and Meteor, p. 89 Not only was
Metrodorus in Cie. Fin. ii. 3, 7, Epicurus' birthday observed by
a? wise men. Pint. N.P. Suav. the Epicurean School during
Vivi, 18, 5, quotes, as coming his lifetime, but the 20th of
CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM.

such a length, that on no single point was the slight
est deviation from his tenets permitted. Although,
even in Cicero's time, the writings of Epicurus and
Metrodorus found hardly a reader outside the School,1
yet it is asserted that as late as the first and second
centuries after Christ the Epicureans clung tena
ciously to their master's teaching.2 Probably it was
easier for an Epicurean than for any other thinker to
act thus. Like his master,3 he was indifferent to the
every month was celebrated as
a festival in honour of him and
Metrodorus. In his testament
Epicurus especially ordered
this twofold observance for the
future. Ding. 18; Vic. Fin. ii.
31, 101 ; Pint. N. P. Suav. Viv.
4, 8; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 5.
Allien, vii. ?98 d: 'EmKoiptiis
tis n'(fo8iiTT7)s. Epicurus' pic
ture is constantly referred to
<Cio. Kin. v. 1, 3; Plin. 1. c ).
The extravagant importance
attached to Epicurus in his
School is proved by the hi^h
eulogies in Lveret. i 62 ; iii. 1
and 1040 ; v. 1 ; vi. I. Metro
dorus, in Plut. Adv. Col. 17. 4,
praises ri 'EiriKovpov uis a\r}8w$
6e6(pavTa opyia.
1 Oie Tusc. ii. 3, 8.
2 Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares
the scientific independence of
the Stoics with the Epicurean's
dependence on the lounder:
>ôn sumus sub rege : sibi
quisque se vindicat. Apud istos
quicquid dicit Hermarchus,
quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum
refertur. Omnia quae quisquam
in illo contubernio locutus est,
unius ductu et auspiciis dicta
sunt. On the other hand,
Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
5, 3), little as he can agree

with their tenets, commends
the Epicureans for faithfully
adhering to their master's
teaching, a point in which only
the Pythagoreans are their
equals. Of the Epicureans, it
may be said : fir]S' avrois tivttu
ttw haviiov o&rt a\?>ii\ois otht
'EjrtKovpy fi7j5(v [^7)?e|/o] tts
urttiip, oron icai fjunjffdrivai &wy,
&AX' imw avTuts trapavd/jLi^fxa,
fxaWop 5e hnifiriim, Kal Kartyvwffrat rb Katvoro/jLTiSei/. Thus
the Epicurean School resembles
a state animated by one j- pirit ,
in which there are no divisions
of parly.
* It has ,been already ob
served, p. 405, 1; 406, 1 * that
Epicurus ignored his obligations
to his teachers Pamphilus and
Nausicydes, and only confessed
his debt to Democritus. All
other philosophers provoked
not only his contempt, but
likewise his abuse. THog. 8,
probably on the authority of
Timociates, communicates his
remarks on Plato, Aristotle, and
others. Cic. N. D. i. 38, :
Cum Epicurus Arisrotelem
vexarit
contumeliosissirr.r,
Phsedoni Socratico tnrpissime
e f. 2
420
THE EPICUREANS.
("hap.
*
labours of other philosophers, or unable to appreciate

their merits.' For us this conduct of theirs has one
advantage : we can be far more certain that the
Epicurean teaching reflects that of the founder
than we can that this is so in the case of the
Stoics. But this philosophical sterility, this mechanical
handing down of unchangeable principles, places the
intellectual value of Epicureanism on the lowest
level. The servile dependence of the Epicurean
School on its founder can neither excuse its mental
idleness nor recommend a system so powerless to give
an independent training to its supporters.
(2) Aim of
The want of intellectual taste here displayed
^rrordfng appears also in the view taken by Epicurus of the
totheEpi- aim and business of philosophy.
If among the
rureanjs.
Stoics the subordination of theory to practice was
frequently felt, among the Epicureans this subordi
nation was carried to such an extent as to lead to a
depreciation of all science. The aim of philosophy
was, with them, to promote human happiness.
Indeed, philosophy is nothing else than an activity
helping us to happiness by means of speech and
thought.2 Nor is happiness, according to Epicurus,
maledixerit. Pint. N. P. Suav.
Vivi, 2,2: Compared wiih Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes
is polite; to yap iv avBpiimois
aJ<Tx"TTa fiiifiara, fia/iohoxias,
XjiKuBtanovs, k.t.k. auvayaydnrts
' ApioroTf\ovs xal luKpirmit koX
nyBay6t.ov koX T\pa>ray6pov koI
&to<pp&<TTov koI 'HpaxKeliov Kal
'IirTrdpyou, xtd rinns yap ovxl rav
^KHpavStv, KciTe/riteSaTap.
1 Civ. N. I>. ii. TZ, 73 : Nam
vobis, Vellei, minus notum est,

quem ad modnm quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis,
vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Ibid. i.
34, 93 : Zeno not only despised
cotemporary philosophers, but
he even called Socrates a sourra
Atticus, Mar.rob. Somn. i. 2
(Colotes ridiculing Plato's Republic).
2 Sext. Math. xi. 169 :

directly promoted by knowledge, but only indirectly
in as far as knowledge ministers to practical needs,
or clears away hindrances to their attainment. All
science which does not serve this end is superfluous
and worthless.1 Epicurus, therefore, despised learning
and culture, the researches of grammarians, and the
lore of historians, and declared it a piece of good
fortune for simplicity of feeling to be uncontaminated by learned rubbish.2 Nor was his opinion dif
ferent respecting mathematical science, of which he
was wholly ignorant.3 The calculations of mathema
ticians, he maintained, are based on false principles;4
Kitupos eAeye rhv <pi\'}<rotyiav eVepyttav eTrai \6yots kcu SiaKo~yifffjLOis
rhv (vSaifiova ftiuv Tr*pnroiov<iav.
Conf. Kpic. in D'wg. 122: The
demand to study philosophy in
youth, as well as in aye, is sup
ported on the ground that it is
never too early nor too late to
be happy.
1 It was mentioned, p. 408,
3. that Epicurus' own education
was defective. Not content
therewith, he upholds this de
fectiveness on principle. Nullam
eruditionero, says the Epicurean
in Cie. Fin. i. 21, 71, esse duxit,
nisi qu;e beataj vita; disciplinam
adjnvaret. In poets, nulla
solida utilitas otnnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music, geo
metry, arithmetic, astronomy
et a falsis initiis profeota vera
esse non possunt, et si essent
vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i. e. quo melius viveremus.
2 Cie. Fin. ii. 4, 12 . Vestri
quidem vel oplime disputant,
nihil opus esse eum, philosophus
qui futurus sit, scire litems.
They fetch their philosophers,

like Uinciinatus, from the
plough. In this spirit, Epicurus
(Ding. 6; Pint. N.P. Suav. V, 12,
1) wrote to Pythocles : ircuSeicw Be
iratrai^the ircuScfa iynvKAios. the
learned culture), ftandptt, (pevye
rb ant&Ttov apdfievos ; and to
Apelles (Plut. 1. c. ; Athen. xiii.
588, a): fiaKaplâi <re, Si outos,
ttrt KaBapbs waffr]? al;ias (f-'lttt.
explains it : r^v /iaB-nfidr-uy
anorrx_6fitvos) eVl tpiAo&tifplav
&pfjLfiaas Metiodorus asserted
(Pint. 1 c.) that it need not be
a source of trouble to anyone,
if he had never read a line of
Homer, and did not know whe
ther Hector were a Trojan or a
Greek. The art of reading and
writing, ypaîxarmh in the limi
ted sense, was the only art. lecognised by Epicurus. Sext.
Mth. i. 49.
s Sext. Math. i. 1 ; Cie. Fin.
i. 6, 20.
4 Cie. Fin. i. 21 (see p.
421, 1), which probably only
means,.that mathematical ideas
421
Chat.
XVJ.
422
Chap.
XVI
THE EPICUREANS.
at any rate, they contribute nothing to human
happiness, and it is therefore useless and foolish to
Trouble oneself about thein.1 The theory of music
and poetry he likewise found exceedingly irksome,
although he took pleasure in music itself and the
theatre ;2 and rhetoric, as an artificial guide to elo
quence, seemed to him as worthless as the showspeeches which are the only result of the study
of it. The power of public speaking is a matter of
practice and of momentary feeling, and hence the
skilful speaker is far from being a good statesman.3
The greater part of logical enquiries fared no
better in his judgment. -Himself no logician, he
set little store by logic. Definitions are of no use ;
the theory of division and proof may be dispensed
with ; the philosopher does best to confine himself
to words, and to leave all the logical ballast
alone.4 Of all the questions which engrossed the
cannot be applied to pheti'i- of the 4th Book, Vol. Here. i. ;
raena. Hence Acad. ii. 33, in particular rejecting the
10 > (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20): Po- notion that it has a moral
lyaenus . . . Epicuro adsentiens effect, see col. i. 24, 28. He
tot am geometriam falsam esse was even opposed to music at
credidit. Conf. Procl. in End. table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was
p. 85.
in Pint., 1. c ). The statement
1 See p. 421, 1 ; Seast: Math, of Diog. 121, that only the wise
i. 1 : Epicurus rejects ninths- man can give a right opinion
inatics iis tu>v fuiSniidruy nr)Sln on poetry and music, is not at
avvpyovvTo>v irphs ffoiplas t\uij- variance with these passages.
<ru>. According to Diog. 03,
3 Philodemns, Oe Rhet. Vol.
Epicurus calls astronomy tos Here. iv. col. 3 ; 12. The sanie
oc5pairo?><65ets ray affTpo\6ywy polemic is continued in the
Texv'Ttlas. Conf. D;m/. 79.
further fragments of this trea' Pint. 1. c. 13, 1. PhUo- tise. /bid. V. Col. 6.
demus, in his treatise vtpi
4 Cie. Fin. i. 7, 22 : In logic
lUovtriKrjs, had discus-ed at is'evesterpiane.utmihiquidem
length the value of music, as videtur, inermis ac nudns est.
we gather from the fragmeuts Tollit definitiones : nihil de

attention of Stoic logicians, one only, the theory of
knowledge, was studied by Epicurus, and that in a
very superficial way.'
Far greater, comparatively, was the importance
he attached to the study of nature,2 but even natural
science was deemed valuable not so much for its
own sake as because of its practical use. The know
ledge of natural causes is the only means of libera
ting the soul from the shackles of superstition ; this
is the only use of natural science. If it were not
for the thought of God and the fear of death, there
would be no need of stud} ing nature.3 The investi
gation of our instincts is also of use, because it helps
us to control them, and to keep them within their
natural bounds.1 Thus the onesided practical view
dividendo ac partiendo docet.
Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit, non qua
via captiosa solvantur. ambigua distinguantur, ostendit.
Ibid. 19, 63 : In dialectica
a utem vestra nullam existimavit [Epic ] esse nee ad melius
vivendum nec ad commndius
disserendum viam. Acad. ii.
30, 97 : Ab Epicuro, qui totam
(lialecticam et conteumit et
inridet. Diog. 31 : ttiv fiia\*KTiFcJfi/ us irape\Kouuaj/ aTro5oK<juaovffw " ap<iv yap tous (puaacuvs
X<*>p&v Kara rovs itav trpayfiaruy
ipb'o'yyous.
1 See p. 424.
2 Cie. Fin. i. 19, G3 : In
physicis plurimum posuit
[Epic.]. Ibid. 6, 17: In phy
sicis, quibus maxime gloriatur,
primum totus est alienus.
* Epic, in Diog. x. 82 and
85 :
&K\o Tt re\os 2k rrjs "jrepl
fxereupuir yywo~eus . . . V0/jlIuv
Set elvat fjirep a/rapaîav Kal iriimv
Bifiatov Kaddwep Kal eVl ruv \otnuv. Ibid 112 : el ^njdkv rjnas
aincp} Ttvf fjLCT fdiptov fao^'lal Tjfu\\ouv KaX at 7repl 6a.v6.rov . . . oiiK
hy 7ruoo-eO6fxeda <J>vmoKoyias ; but
this becomes necessary, since,
without knowledge of nature,
we cannot be perfectly free
from fear. The same in Pint.
N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7 ; conf.
D%og. 79 and 143; Cic. Fin. iv.
5, 11 ; Lucret. i. 62 ; iii. 14 ; vi.
9.
4 In Cie. Fin. i. 19, 63, the
Epicurean speaks of a fivefold,
or, excluding Canonic, of a
fourfold use of natural science :
firtitudo contra mortis timorem ; C"nstantia contra metum religionis; sedatio animi
omnium reruin occultarum ig-
423
Chap.
(24
TEE EPICUREANS.
Chap.
XVI.
of philosophy which we have already encountered in

Stoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme
length.
THriNor is it otherwise than in harmony herewith
ritnu of
that
logic did not receive a fuller or more perfect
philnso*
phy.
treatment in the further development of their
system. Even the study of nature, going far more
fully into particulars than logic, was guided entirely
by practical considerations, all scientific interest in
nature being ignored. Following the usual method,
however, the Epicureans divided philosophy into
three parts'logic, natural science, and moral
science. Limiting the first of these parts to one
branch of logic, the part which deals with the
characteristics of truth, and which they therefore
called neither logic, nor dialectic, but Canonic, they
really reduced this part to a mere introductory
appendage to the two other parts,8 and studied
Canonic as a part of natural science.3 Natural science
noratione snblata ; moderatio
natura cupidilatum generibusque earnm explicates.
1 IHofj. 29 : SiaipfTrcu ro[vuv
<pt\0(rutfiia] (is Tpla, i6 re
Kavovwhv Kai tbvmKhv Kai %]&ik6v.
Canonic was also called trepi
KpiTTipioV Kai ap\T)S Kai ffTOlX*<-<*Titciv ; natural science, irtp!
yeyfVeeus Kai <p0opay Kai irepi
tpvo-ttvs ; ethics, irepl aipertov Kai
QfVKTWV Kai TTfp!
Kai t4\ous.
8 Diwj. HO : tJi /jili> oZv KaioviKhv 4tp6oous tvl t)h> TrpayfxaTfiav
s Diog. 1. c. : ettidao-t fxtvrot
rh KavoviKhv Afiov too <pvo ik$ trvvTOTTeii'. tic. Fin. i. 19. See
p. 423, 4. Hence Sext. Math,

vii. 14 : Some reckon Epicurus
amongst those who only divide
philosophy into natural and
moral science ; whilst, accord
ing to others, he adhered to
a threefold division, at the
same time rejecting the Stoic
logic. Sen. Ep. 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophise
putaverunt esse, na uralem
atque moralem : rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis
rebus cogerentur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie vcri
latentia coarguere, ipsi quoqne locum, quem de judioio et
regula appellant, alio nomine
CANONIC.
moreover was so entirely subordinated to moral
science, that we might almost feel tempted to follow
some modern writers1 m their view of the Epicurean
system, by giving to moral science precedence of the
two other parts, or at least of natural science.2 The
School, however, followed the usual order, and not
without reason ; 3 for although the whole tendency of
the Epicurean Canonic and natural science can only,
like the Stoic, be explained by a reference to moral
science, yet moral science with them presupposes the
test-science of truth and natural science. We shall,
therefore, do well to treat of Canonic in the first
place, and subsequently to prove how this branch of
study depends on Ethics.
Canonic or the test-science of truth, as has been
observed, is occupied with investigating the stan'
1
D
dard of truth, and with enquiring into the mode of
acquiring knowledge. The whole of formal logic,
.
.
.
the doctrine of the formation of conceptions and
conclusions, is omitted by Epicurus.4 Even the theory
of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with him a
very simple form. If the Stoics were fain, notwith
standing their ideal ethics and their pantheistic
speculations, ultimately to take their stand on
materialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same ?
In seeking a speculative basis for a view of life
which refers everything to the feeling of pleasure
rationalemindux runt:sedeum
2 Steinhart in the treatise
accessionem e^se naturalis par^ often referred to.
tis existimant.
3 Diog. 29;iSeatf.Ma1h.vii.22.
1 Hitter, iii. 463; Schl ier4 lie. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p.
macher, Geseh. d. Phil. p. 123. 422, 4.
425
Chap.
X^ j"
b. Ctmnnio
vr thetrttscience of
truth.
W Sensation and
pereep*""*
426
Chap.
J
THE EPICUREANS.
or pain, he appealed far more unreservedly than
they had done to sensation. Now, since the senses
can alone inform us what is pleasant or unpleasant,
and what is desirable or the contrary, our judgment
as to truth or falsehood must ultimately depend on
the senses. Viewed speculatively, sensation is the
standard of truth ; viewed practically, the feeling of
pleasure or pain.1 If the senses may not be trusted,
still less may knowledge derived from reason be
trusted, since reason itself is primarily and entirely
derived from the senses. There remains, therefore,
no distinctive mark of truth, and no possibility of
certain conviction. We are at the mercy of un
limited doubt. If, however, this doubt is contradic
tory of itselffor how can men declare they know,
that they can know nothing?it is also contradictory
of human nature, since it would do away not only
with all knowledge but with every possibility of
actionin short, with all the conditions on which
human life depends.2 To avoid doubt we must allow
that sensation as such is always, and under all cir
cumstances, to be trusted ; nor ought the delusions
of the senses to shake our belief; the causes of these
1 Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext.
Math. vii. 203. If, according
to Dwg. 31, and Cic. Acad. ii.
46, 142, Epicurus named three
criteriairpSKvîs, altrO-qats, and
naSninstead of the above two,
it must be an inaccuracy of ex
pression ; -np6\Ttî%, as we have
seen, is derived from sensa
tion.
- Epicurus, in D'tog. x. 116;
Liter, iv. 467-519 ; Cic. Fin. i.

19, 64. Colotes (in Pint. Adv.
Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic scepticism by saying:
fi^l $vvao6at ffiv fiySt XP^ffât T0's
Trfiynaaiv. In this case, as in
the case of the Stoics, the dog
matism in favour of the senses
is based on a practical postu
late, the need of a firm basis of
conviction for human life.
427
CANONIC.
deceptions do not lie in sensation as such, but in our
judgment about sensation. What the senses supply
is only that an object produces this or that effect
upon us, and that this or that picture bas impressed
our soul. The facts thus supplied are always true,
only it does not follow that the object exactly corre
sponds with the impression we receive of it, or that
it produces on others the same impression that it
produces on us. Many different pictures may emanate
from one and the same object, and these pictures
may be changed on their way to the ear or eye.
Pictures, too, may strike our senses with which no
real objects correspond. To confound the picture
with the thing, the impression made with the object
making the impression, is certainly an error, but this
error must not be laid to the charge of the senses, but
to that of opinion.1 Indeed, how is it possible, asks
Epicurus,2 to refute the testimony of the senses ?
Can reason refute it? But reason is itself dependent
on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against
that on which its own claims to belief depend. Or
can one sense convict another of error? But different
sensations do not refer to the same object, and similar
sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, there
fore, but to attach implicit belief to every impression
of the senses. Every such impression is directly
' Epic, in Diog. x. 50. and
147; Stxt. Math. vii. 203-210;
viii. 9; 63; 185; Pint. Ady.
Col. 4, 3 ; 6. 2 ; 25, 2 ; Plac. iv.
fl, 2: Lucr. iv. 377-519; do.
Acad. ii. 25, 79 ; 32, 101 ; Fin.
i. 7, 22 ; N. D. i. 25, 70; Tertull. De An. 17. Further par

ticulars below respecting senseperception.
Diog. x. 31 ; Lucr. iv. 480.
Chap.
XV
428
Chap.
XVI.
(2) AdHons.
THE EPICUREANS.
certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus clear
evidence (ivdpysia).1 Nay, more, its truth is so
paramount that the impressions of madmen, and
appearances in dreams, are true because they are
caused by something real,2 and error only becomes
possible when we go beyond sensation.
This going beyond sensation becomes, however,
a necessity. By a repetition of the same perception
a notion (7rp6Xrjyjri,i) arises. A notion, therefore, is
nothing else than the generaUpicture retained in the
mind of what has been perceived.3 On these notions
retained by memory depend all speaking and think
ing. They are what commonly go under the name
of things ; and speech is only a means of recalling
definite perceptions 4 to the memory. Notions are
1 Sext. Math. vii. 203 and av iqT4\<raêv ib farovfievov, ei
216. In Diog. x. 52, instead of fii] Trpb-repnv eyv^KitfiiV avrb . . .
eVepye.as. we should read with ov5' h.v wvo^tiaaîv tl fxi] irporcpov
('itbi't dvapyzlas. Besides -this avrov Kara irp6Kr}^/iv rbv tvttov
peculiar expression, Epicurus pa66vres. Hence the exhorta
uses sometimes <rf?o-07)<ns, some tion in Epicurus' letter to
times <pai>ra<xia {Sext. 1. c), for Herodotus (in Diog. x. 37) :
sensation. An impression on irparov fi.(v oZv to utr'jrfrayfjitva
the senses, he calls (papTaariKlj rois tpdbyyus Set zi\T\<ptvai. birtes
V.j8oArj. Diog. 50.
av tb boââtva tl ^jjrovîeva 1)
imopovutva txafxfl/ (IS ^ avdyovrts
2 Diog. 32.
3 Diog. 33 : r^v 8e irp6\7ityiv iir.Kpivtiv, k.t.\. Every impres
kiyovviv olovti KaT6.\i)îiv 7) t6av sion must be referred to definite
6p9ijv fi ivvoiav r} KafiuhtK^v v6ri<jtv perceptions ; apart from per
4v0.noK*ip.CVr\V, TOUTttTTt ^LiTJfXTJf ceptions, no reality belongs to
rov noWaKts QwBtv (pat/ivros By our impressions ; or, as it is
the help of this passatre, Cicero*s expressed Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 107,
description, N. D. i. 10, iS, must Math. viii. 13, 258 : The Epi
cureans deny the existence <{
be corrected.
4 Dwg. 1. C. : afia yap tw a \tKrbv, and between a thing
p'yOrji'ai &vdpwiros eu6v> Kara fl><j- and its name there exists a
Xtjîc ko! b TVTtos avrov vozirai third intermediate something
vpoTYyovp.*v(av Tttf aind'haiwv. a conception. See also Sext.
jraviX oliv bv6fxaTL rb irpdt'ws {/no- vii. 267.
maynivov tvapyis 4ffTi ' Kal oi/K
CANONIC.
429
presupposed in all scientific knowledge.1 Together Chap.

with sensations they form the measure of the truth
of our convictions ; 2 and it holds true of them as it
did of sensationsthat they are true in themselves
and need no proof.3 Taken by themselves, notions,
like perceptions, are reflections in the soul of things
on which the transforming action of the mind, chang
ing external impressions into conceptions, has not
as yet been brought to bear.
For this very reason notions are not sufficient. (3) OjriFrom appearances we must advance to their secret mon"
causes ; from the known to the unknown.4 Far too
little value was attached by Epicurus to the logical
forms of thought, or he would have investigated more
accurately the nature of this process of advancing.5
Thoughts, in his view, result from sensations spon
taneously, and although a certain amount of reflec
tion is necessary for the process, yet it requires no
scientific guidance.6 The thoughts arrived at in
1 Dxoq. 33. Sext. Math. i.
57 (xi. 21): o6rt t}t*iv oOre
anoptiv ti(TTt Kara, rbv ff6tpOf 'EwtKovpov avtv npo\'t)fyf(iis. Ibid
viii. 337, p. 621; Hint. De An.
6 : The difficulty, that all learning presupposes knowledge, the
Stoics met by tyvntttal IVvoiai,
the Epicureans by prpoAîeu,
which accordingly are the
natural test of truth.
2 See p. 426, 1. Diog. 1 c. :
4vapye?s otv rlfftv al i*po\ii$eis
Kal rb boâcrbv airb irporipov
rivbs tvajyoi s ftymjTO!,
o at aipfpavTts Kiyop.iv.
a See previous note and
Epiu. in Diog. 38 : aydyKT) yap
rb itp&iov ivvSriua Kaff (kcuttov

<p66yyuv fSXiirtadai ko\ ixri&ev airu5e/e&>s TrpoaoeirrQat, ffntp ionv
rb farovnevov ^ airopovpavov koI
SoâQifievov i<p' % ava$ow.
4 Ding. 33 (conf. 38, 104):
rrepl rwv dSri\wif awb rwv tpatvofitvwv xpv irrifitiuvaBat.
5 See p. 422, 4. Steinfiart,
p. 466, goes too far in saying
that Epicurus denied all law
and rule in thought.
6 Diog. 32 : Kal yap Kal iwlvotal iraccu arrb tow aladyiatwif
yey6yaffl.Kard re ireptnTwfflv(jprobabty: the coincidence ofseveral
sensations which must be distinguished from theircrwfleirisoi
430
Chap*
THE EPICUREANS.
this way do not stand as a higher genus above
perceptions, but they are only opinions (virokrpp-is,
Bogd) without a note of truth in themselves, and
depending for their truth upon sensation. That
opinion may be considered a true one which is based
on the testimony of the senses, or is at least not con
trary to the senses, and that a false opinion in which
the opposite is the case.1 Sometimes we suppose that
upon certain present impressions other impressions
will follow : for instance, tliat a tower which appears
round at a distance will appear round close at hand.
In that case, if the real perception corresponds with
the assumption, the opinion is true, otherwise it is
false.2 At other times we suppose that certain ap
pearances are due to secret causes: for instance, that
empty space is the cause of motion. If all appear
ances tally with their explanations, we may consider
free combination) Kai avaKoyiav
Kal dôt6rrira Kai avv&taiv, ffufifiaWonfi/ou n Kai rod \oyio~fiov.
Conf. p. 422, 4 ; 429, 1, and the
convsponding doctrine of the
Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching
of Epicurus, on the genesis of
thoughts from sensations.
1 Diog. 33 : xa\ to b~oâo-rbv
aitb vpoTtpov nubs Ivapyovs %ptt)rat . . . tV 8e S6âv koI im6Ki)i,w
Kiyovaiv. a\r)8rj re <pa<ri Kai
\j/(vSri ttv niv yap iTnaaprvprirai
tj /xi) avTtnapTvprjTai aArjS^ tlvai
iav Si
^mâpTi'pTjTai fi acnfiapnpTiTaiif/fvSriTvyxai'eif. S*zt.
Math. vii. 211 : tiv $owv Kara
rby 'EirtKovpoy ai fiiy a\i)0eis eto-iy
ai 8e *l/fv5(is' aAjjfltis pen a" t
apTiuaprvpoufiei/ai Kai om avn[iapTvpovfiiV(*i vpbs rrji ivap-
7fi'oy, ^fuSeTs 5e a't Tf avrtfjiapTvpovfxevai Kut oiiK iirtfiapTupovfievai

irpbs ttjs tvapyetas. Hitter, iii.
486, observes that these statements are contradictory. According to Sextus, an opinion is
only then true when it can be
proved and not refuted ; according to Diogenes, when it can be
proved or not refuted. The
latter is, however, clearly meant
by Sextus, and is affirmed by
Epicurus in Diog. BO and 51.
- Epicur. in Diog. 50 ; Ibid,
33; Setct. vii. 212. The object of
a future sensation is called by
Diog. 38, t!> wpoa^tyoy. Diog.
x. 34, himself givs a perverted
explanation of this term, which
probably misled Steinhart, p.
466.
CANONIC.
our assumptions correct ; if not, our assumptions are
incorrect.1 In the first case tlie test of the truth of
an opinion is that it is supported by experience ; in
the latter that it is not refuted by experience.2 Have
we not here all the leading features of a theory of
knowledge based purely on sensation ? The Epi
curean's interest in these questions was, however, far
too slight to construct with them a developed theory
of materialism.
Little pains seem to have been taken by Epicurus
to overcome the difficulties by which this view was
>
beset. If all sensations as such are true, the saying
of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each indi
vidual that is true which seems to him to be true, that
contrary impressions about one and the same object
are true, and that deceptions of the senses, so many
instances of which are supplied by experience, are
really impossible. To avoid these conclusions, Epi
curus maintained that for each different impression
there is a different object-picture. What imme
diately affects our senses is not the object itself, but
a picture of the object, and these pictures may be
innumerable, a different one being the cause of each
separate sensation. Moreover, although the pictures
emanating from the same object are in general nearly
alike, it is possible that they may differ from one
1 Sext. 1. c. 213. '
can be allowed to be true ; our
2 The two tests of truth, impressions of the secret causes
proof andabsence of refutation, of these appearances must not
do not, therefore, as 8extus ex- be refuted The former test
pressly says, refer to the same applies to opinions regarding
cases. Our assumptions in re- -rh Ttpoaîvov ; the latter, to
spect of external appearances opinions regarding tJ> iStiKov.
must be proved, before they Drug. 38.
431
Chai>.
XVI-
f4) Standardof
truth subjective.
432
Chap,
V
THE EPICUREANS.
another owing to a variety of causes. If, therefore, the
same object appears different to different individuals,
the cause of these different sensations is not one and
the same, but a different one, and different pictures
must have affected their senses. If our own sensa
tions deceive us, the blame does not belong to our
senses, as though they had depicted to us unreal ob
jects, but to our judgment for drawing unwarranted
inferences from pictures 1 as to their causes.
This line of argument, however, only removes the
difficulty one step further. Sensation is said always
to reproduce faithfully the picture which affects the
organs of sense, but the pictures do not always re
produce the object with equal faithfulness. How
then can a faithful picture be known from one which
is not faithful ? To this question the Epicurean
system can furnish no real answer. To say that the
wise man knows how to distinguish a faithful from
an unfaithful picture2 is to despair of an absolute
standard at all, and to make the decision of truth or
error depend upon the individual's judgment. Such
a statement reduces all our impressions of the pro
perties of things to a relative level. If sensation
does not show us things themselves, but only those
impressions of them which happen to affect us, it
does not supply us with a knowledge of things as
they are, but as they happen to be related to us. It
1 Compare the passages in
Sext. vii. 206, quoted p. 427, 1.
1 do. Acad. ii. 14,45: Nam
qui voluit subvenire erroribus
Kpicurus iis, qui videutur con-
turbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a

perspicuitate sejungere, nihil
profecit, ipsius enim opinionis
erroreui nullo modo sustulit.
CANONIC.
was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this theory
of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour belongs
to bodies in themselves, since some only see colour
in the dark, whilst others do not.1 Like his pre
decessor, Democritus, he must have been brought to
this view by his theory of atoms. Few of the pro
perties belong to atoms which we perceive in things,
and hence all other properties must be explained
as not belonging to the essence, but only to the
appearance of things.2 The taste for speculation
was, however, too weak, and the need of a direct
truth of the senses too strong in Epicurus for him to
be able to turn his thoughts in this direction for long.
Whilst allowing to certain properties of things only
a relative value, he had no wish to doubt the reality
of objects, nor to disparage the object-pictures which
furnish us with sensations.3
1 Plut. Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob.
Eel. i. 366 ; Lucr. ii. 795) : i
'EtriKovpos ovk tivat \4yaiv rot
XpdbfjLaTa ffuntyvri tois cwfiOffiv,
dWd yevvaaOai Kara voids rivas
rdêis Kal Oeceis vrpas tJji' oiluj/.
For says Epicurus, ovk olSa Situs
Set to. 4v o~K6rti tu.vto.ovto. (pr/o~ai
XpoiâTO. ?xe'". Often some see
colour where others do not ;
ov fia\Av olv ^xetv %
%X*tv
XpaifjLa.p'i)dilo'eTaiTa>i' aw/A&ruv e/ca0~TOV.
2 Simpl. Categ. 109, 0 (Schol.
in Arist. 92, a, JO) : Since De
mocritus and Epicurus attribute
all qualities to atoms except
those of form and mode of com
bination, tmyivtoQai Xeyovat Tas
HiWas Trot6niTas, Tds tc airXas,
oioy.BipfxOTTiTas Kal AeidTijTas, Kal
TO.S KOTO. XPÎJLWra KOaTOVS Xvt*-0VSLucret. 1. c.

3 Compare the passages al
ready quoted, on the truth of
the impressions of the senses,
and the words of Epicurus, in
Diug. 68 : aWa ftfa teal tcl ex'h'
fxaTa Kal to. xpt*>t*aTa KalTafieyedr}
Kal to. fidpea Kal b(ra aWa kottjyopeiTou Koôt tov o~d>pia.TGS ws av
els airrb ê$tjKora Kal -naaiv iv&vto, $i toIs bpaTols Kal KOTO. t))v
ato~0rio~ii/ ai/T^y yv&O'TOts, obd' us
Ko.6' eavTas not <pvaets 5oa<rr*W
(ov yap Svyarhv 4iritnjrio~ai tovto),
otj& o\ws ws ovk elo~tv, otib* d>s
'eTepd Tiva TrpoffvndpxofTa tovtu>
ao~<6/j.aTa offi ais popLa tovtqv,
dK\' us to o\ov ou/xa Kad6\ov /xev
(*K TOl/TOIV TrdvTOlV T^V iaVTOV
(pVffLV t\OV &.101OV, K.T.A.
434
THE EPICUREANS
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE.
Chap.
XVI1-
If Epicurus arid his followers underrated logic, to

natural science they attached a considerable value.
A. General
nature.
(l) Object,
rtUod/
ikedudy
This value was, however, exclusively derived from a

sense of the practical advantages which a knowledge
of nature confers in opposing superstition. Without
such an object the study of nature would have
seemed wholly superfluous.1 Such being their atti
tude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might have
been expected, indifferent about giving a complete
and accurate explanation of phenomena. Their one
aim was to put forward such a view of nature as
would do away with the necessity for supernatural
intervention, without at the same time pretending to
offer a sufficient solution of the problems raised by
science.2 Whilst, therefore, he devoted considerable
attention to natural science,3 Epicurus does not seem
1 Epic, in Dwg. 143: ovk ?jv
rbf tpo&ovfievov irepl tojv Kupiatrdtwv \uiv fii] Karfi56'ra t'is 7] rod
avfivavros tpvcris aAA' inronrevSptev6v ti toiv Kara tovs fivBous.
5(ttc ovk %v fUeu tpvaioKoyias
dfcepafas Tas yfiovas airoSaufidvetv.
For further particulars, p. 422.
2 ov yap Btj ItiioKoylas xal

Kevris S6ris b /3(0S Tifi&v ?xl
xp^^t aWa tov aQopvfiais ^/*as
rjv. Epic, in Diog. 87.
' Diog. 27, mentions 37 books
of his vepl Qvatus, besides
smaller works.
GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

to have considered certainty to be of importance, or
even to be possible, in dealing with details of scien
tific study. Of the general causes of things we can
and ought to entertain a firm conviction, since the
possibility of overcoming religious prejudices and
the fears occasioned by them depends on these con
victions. No such result, however, follows from the
investigation of details, which, on the contrary, only
tends to confirm prejudices in those who are not
already emancipated from them. In dealing with
details, therefore, it is enough for Epicurus to show
that various natural causes for phenomena may be
imagined, and to offer various suggestions which
dispense with the intervention of the Gods and the
myths of a belief in Providence.1 To say that any
one of these suggestions is the only possible one, is
in most cases to exceed the bounds of experience
1 Epic, in Diog. 78: not juV retveiv (how very different from
xol tV bnip tuv Kupwrdrav at- Aristotle I See Zeller, Philosoriav eaKpi&a>aai <pv<rio\oylas Ip- phie der Griechen, ii. b, 1 13, 3 ;
yov ef.vat Bel vopifaLv Kal rb 114,3; 359, 2), aAA' SumIws rails
paxaptov iv rij nepl ra>v p.ereu>po>v tpofiovs tx*lv robs ravra KartB6vyvtbaci ivraiBa irenrwKevai Kal ras rives ot a/ (bvaeis ayvoovvras
iv TqJ, rives <pvo"eis at deoipovfxevai Kal rives at Kuptdtrarat alriattKal el
Kara ra fxeriapa raurl, zeal 8Va (as if) nî vpoffrfBeaav ravra, rdxa
a~vyyevi\ vpbs rfyv els ravra anpi- Be Kal icKeious, Brav rb OdfA&os iK
fietav ?Tt 5f Kal rb TrKeovax&s iv rrjs rovrwv TtpoKaravofoetes uri
rots rotovrots ejvat [evidently /u^ BvvT\rat tV Kvtriv XaufSdveiv Kara
ervotmustberead], KalrbevBexo- r)}v irepl rwv Kvpturdruv oIkovolievas Kal &\\as iras ixf,vt
(Conf. Liter, vi. 50 ; V. 82.)
airKws fi$i elvat iv atpvdprq) Kal Bib B$ Kalv\elousalrlas ejplffKOfxev
fiaxapia tpvtrei Twr StaKpivtv vrto- rpoiriav, K.r.A. Kal ou Be? vop.ieiv
0aKK6vraiv tl rdpuxov ptrjdev Hal r^v inrep rovrwv xpelav aKpifietay
rovro KaraKafcelv rfj Btavoia %<rrtv fify a.Tret\T)<pevaioffri npbs rb ardpaair\as ovrus etvat. rb 8' 4v rfi xov Ka^ paKapiuv ri/xav <rvvreivett
loropla xenraiKbs tt/s Bvtrews Kal k.t.A. Ibid. 104 : Kal Kar' aAaiaro\T}s Kal rpowris Kal eKêl^twi \ovs Be rpAirous r\elovas ivBexeKal Sea avyyevri rovrots fiijdiv %r rat ttepavvovs avoreKeiffdat. [i6va
wpbsrb fiaKdpiovrrisyv^ffetcs cvv- a fivOos avevrw.
FV2
433
Chap
XVI I.
43(5
Oimp.
XVI1-
THE EPICUREANS.
and human knowledge, and to go back to the capricious explanations of mythology.1 Possibly the world
may move, and possibly it may be at rest. Possibly
it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or
have any other shape. Possibly the sun and the
stars may be extinguished at setting, and be lighted
afresh at rising. It is. however, equally possible
that they may only disappear under the earth and
reappear again, or that their rising and setting may
be due to yet other causes. Possibly the waxing
and waning of the moon may be caused by the
moon's revolving ; or it may be due to an atmo
spheric change, or to an actual increase and decrease
in the moon's size, or to some other cause. Possibly
the moon may shine with borrowed light, or it may
shine with its own, experience supplying us with
instances of bodies which give their own light, and
of those which have their light borrowed.2 From
these and such-like statements it appears that
questions of natural science in themselves have no
1 Ibid. 87 : irima fiiv oiv ceed on suppositions chosen at
yiytrat atrelffrus nark inivTwv, random (ai(vfiaTa Ktvh koI voaokoto Tr\fOvaxbv Tp6irov 4KicaBatpo- $t<ritu. Epic. 1. c. 86). Conf. SH ;
fidvuy aufKptivus tois tpaivofitvois, 104; 113. Lucret. vi. 703.
Stov tis rb TriBapoXoyoi/ievov inrip
' Epic, in Diog.SS; 92-95.
at/Taw Stdrrus Ka.To\Uri. irav Si Many other similar irttances
tis rb piv airo\'nrri, ib Se 4Kpd\T) might be quoted. In support of
tpolws aviHpwvov 'ov tw ipmvoixivy the view that the sun was exSt)\ov 8ti koX 4k iravrbs iKirlwTeX tinguished at setting, Epicurus,
iputrioAoyiifiaTus 4ir\ Si ibv nvQov according to Cleomed. Meteora,
naradp'tt. Ibid. 98 : ol Si -rb ip p. 89, is said to have appealed
\a/j.pdyovTft (those who allow to the story (respecting which
only one explanation for every Posidonius in Strabo, iii. 1, 5,
phenomenon) tois tc tpaivomivois p. 138) that, as it sets, the hisslidxvtal Ka' r0" T' SvvdTbv in- ing of the ocean may be heard
epw-rrw 6ewpyo~ai Siaire-mdiKao-iv. In on the sea-shore,
investigating nature, they pro-
437
value for Epicurus. Whilst granting that only one Chat.

natural explanation of phenomena is generally pos
sible, yet in any particular cabe he is perfectly indif
ferent which explanation is adopted.
Great stress is, however, laid by him on the (2) #,
,
_
......
ehameiil
general explanation. In contrast with the religious eXpian<iview which regards
the world as a system
of means nature.
0
J
leading to ends, the leading business of the natural
science of the Epicureans is to refer all phenomena
to natural causes. To an Epicurean nothing appears
more absurd than to suppose that the arrangements
of nature have for their object the well-being of
mankind, or that they have any object at all. The
tongue is not given us for the purpose of speaking,
nor the ears for the purpose of hearing. As a matter
of fact, it would, indeed, be more correct to say, that
we speak because we have a tongue, and hear because
we have ears. Natural powers have acted purely
according to the law of necessity, and among their
various products there could t not fail to be some
presenting the appearance of purpose in their ar
rangement. In the case of man there have resulted
many such products and powers. But this result is
by no means intentional ; it is an accidental con
sequence of natural causes. In explaining nature
all thought of Gods must be put out of sight. For
their happiness would be inconceivable, on the sup
position that they cared for man and his welfare.1
1 The principle is thus ex- Ordine se suo quseque eagaci
panded by Luoret. i. 1021 :
mente locarunt,
Nam certe neque consilio pri- Neo quos quseque darent mot us
mordia rerum
pepigere profecto ;
4.'S8
("HAP.
XVII.
THE EPICUREANS
Confining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did,
entirely to this general view of things, he was all
the more inclined, in carrying it into details, to rely
upon some older system. No system, however, ap
peared to correspond better with his tone of mind
than that of Democritus, which, moreover, commended
itself to him not only by absolutely banishing the
idea of final cause, but by referring everything to
matter, and by its theory of atoms. As Epicurus
places in each individual thing taken by itself the
ultimate end of action, so Democritus had theoreti
cally made all that is real to consist in what is
absolutely individual or in atoms. His natural
science, therefore, seemed to present the most naSed quia multa modis multis
mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita
plagis,
Omne genus motus et ccetus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hsec rebus consistit
summa creata.
v. 156:
Dicere porro hominum causa
voluisse [sc-il. Deos] parare
Prieolaram mundi naturam, &c.
Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largirier
emolument!,
Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur 1
Quidve novi potuit tanto post
ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem ? . . .
Exemplum porro gignundis re
bus et ipsa
Notities hominum, Dis unde

est insita primum ; . . .
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?
Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419.
In these views, he is only fol
lowing Epicurus. Heavenly
phenomena, says the latter, in
D'lOg. 76,
\lTOL-pyOVVT6s Tlros ifOfxifav Set yiveaQai Kal 5iordrrovros oiaTalavros teal &pa
ttjv iratrav ftaKapiSr-qra fx0,'T0,
ju*t' atpdapffias' ov yap ffufxtpuifovffi
wpayfJLaTfiat Kal tppovrlfifs Kal
opyal Kcd x^ptrfs Tjf fiaKap.6rTjri.
aAA' atrdtveia Kal <p6fitv Kal irpotrSeijirei rwv irXriviuv ravra yiverat.
Ibid. 97: rj 0*ia tpvtris vpbi ravra
jui}5a/4r) trpoffayctrBw, a\K' a\ffirovpyriTOs BiarriptlaO* Kal tv ttJ
naari /xaKaptirrtri. Ibid. 113.
With these passages Cic. N. D.
i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7
(likewise ii. 3, 2 ; Stub. i. 442),
are quite in agreement.

tural basis for the Epicurean Ethics. If the Stoics,
in their views of nature, closely followed Heraclitus,
439
Chap.
X '*
Epicurus in his followed Democritus still more

closely, and hence, with the exception of one single
point, the additions made by Epicurus to the theory
of this philosopher are of no philosophical impor
tance.
With Democritus Epicurus agreed in holding (3) Atoms
that there is no other form of reality except that "^^'"^^
of bodily reality. Every substance, he says in the
words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be
affected by them ; and whatever affects others or is
itself affected, is corporeal. Corporeal substance is,
therefore, the only kind of substance 1 The various
qualities of things, essential as well as accidental
qualities, are accordingly not incorporeal existences,
but simply chance modes of body, the former
being called by Epicurus crvfifisfiri/coTa, the latter
a-vfnrrd>/j.aTa.2 But a second something is necessary
1 Lticr. i. 440 :
Praterea per se quodcumque
erit aut faciet quid
Autaliis fungi
debebit agentibus ipsum,
Aut erit, ut possint in eo res
esse gerique.
Atnulla
facerepotest
et fungi
res, sine corpore
Nec prasbere locum porro nisi
inane vacansque.
Ergo prater inane et corpora
tert'apotest
per sererum in numero
Nulla
natura relinqui.
îrl rod Kctfov. rb 5e Kti/bv oUre

T,oliiffc" o8.Te "* Sivara,,a\Ka
Klm"Ilv ^">" Sl *au!ov, s aaf"! P*Xr. **
'?f"" TX+U?,V 'iaTa"'
ov,Bt' ?*P *" ^v"aJ "
*" f" raa^"' "7.
, who expresses
68 ! 40-cv^îra
*49'
^ conjuneta and ^râ
by eventa Among the latter
Lucretius, 459 reckons Hme,
because in itself it is noth"iii""
fnf, on}y c0es l? our Jnow\t(*ge through motion and rest.
Likewise hpicurus, in Diog. 72
Kpic. in Diog 67 : ko9' iamb St (coni. <SW>. i. 252), shows ihat
ovk iari voriuai rb dff^jLtaTor w\tjj/ time is composed of days and
THE EPICUREANS.
besides corporeal substance in order to explain phe
nomena, viz. empty space. That empty space exists
is proved by the differences of weight in bodies.
For what else could be the cause of this difference ? 1
It is proved still more conclusively by motion, mo
tion being impossible without empty space.2 Mind
as a moving cause, however, seems to Epicurus
altogether superfluous. Everything that exists con
sists of bodies and empty space, and there is no
third thing.3
Democritus had resolved the two conceptions of
body and empty space into the conceptions of being
and not being. True to his position, Epicurus dis
pensed with this speculative basis, and clinging to the
ordinary notions of empty space, and of a material
filling space,4 he simply proves these notions by
nights, and their portions, of
sta' es of feeling or unconscious
ness, of motion or rest, and
hence that it is only a pro'iuct
(nv^.TTTaifia)ot these phenomena;
and these being again <rvpurTttp-ara, time is defined by the
Epicurean Demetrius (Sext.
Math. x. 219; Pyrrh iii. 137):
trvp.irTwp.0. avix^rairdruiv napenSfiivov fyfiipcus t koI vu\ Kai Sapais
Kal ndOtffi Kal aKattsiais Kal Kivrjatai koI /tortus Thedistinsii n
between abstract, and sensuous
or undivided time (Steinhart,
1. c. 466) does not appear to
exist in Diogenes. His XP^"0'
5ia
6ttapT)To\ (Diog. 47)
are imperceptibly small divi
sions of time, tempora mnlta,
ratio quae comperit e?se, which,
according to Lucret. iv. 792. are
contained in every given time.
' Lucret. i. 358.

* Lucret. 1. c. and i. 329;
Piog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math,
vii. 2J 8 ; viii. 329. Most of the
remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and
532 point to the same funda
mental idea : Without vacant
interstices, nourishment cannot
be diffused over the whole
bodies of plants or animals,
nor can noise, cold, fire and
water penetrate through solid
bodies, or any body t>e broken
up into parts. The same in
Themitt. 40, b; Simpl. De Coelo,
Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.
" Liter, i. 440; P'wg. 39;
Pint. Adv. Col 1!, 5.
4 Body is defined by Epi
curus (Sext. Math. i. 21 : x.
240 ; 257 ; xi. 226) as to rpixv
ZiajffTinttv /tero. avTiTVTn'aj, or as
<rvyoSos xari a6/>uio7tbv /trytSovs

the qualities of phenomena. For this very reason
Democritus's division of body into innumerable pri
mary particles or atoms appeared to him most
necessary. All bodies known to us by sensation are
composed of parts.1 If the process of division were
infinitely continued, all things would ultimately be
resolved into the non-existentin this Epicurus and
Democritus agree ;and conversely all things must
have been formed out of the non-existent, in defiance
of the first principle of natural science that nothing
can come from nothing, and that nothing can be
resolved into nothing.2 Hence, we must conclude
Kal ax^lP-aT0S Ka' a'"TiTu7rtas al
fiipovs. Emptiness is (accord
ing to Sext. x. 2) <pu<r.j avcupip
or Zptifios 7rarrbs <rJ>fj.aTos. When
occupied by a body, it is called
tAitos ; when bodies passthrough
it, it is x<pi ! so that all three
expressions, as Stob. Eel. i. 388
rightly observes, are only dif
ferent names for the same
thing. To the same effect is
the statement in Plvt. Plac. i.
20.
1 Hence, in Diog. 69, fiflpoitrfm and Gvpireipopimivov are used
of bodies ; in Diog. 71, all
bodies are called avfiTrTufictTa ;
and according to Epicurus
(Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes
in bodies are due to local dis
placement of the atoms. Plat.
Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes
that Epicurus deals with arpî
and aufjLTrKoK^t, but never with
tv6rris.
2 Epic, in Diog. 40 : ran awfidrwu to [x.4v etm trvytpitreis to. 5'
4 f at ffvyKpiasis TTinoii\VTaL '
Tavra 54 iffrtv aTOjUa KaX djucra-
j8.\7?ra efrrep ja^ fleKKet wdfTa els

rb fxTj %v <p9ap-fi<Te<r6ai, aAV l<r\vovra incoiievtiv ev reus SiaK/rtreai
twv ovynplaewv . . . clxrre ias
apx&s ardfiovs avayxatov eivai aulidrajv (pvtrets. Ibid. 56 ; Luc-".
i. 147 ; ii. 551; 751; 790. Fur
ther arguments for the belief
in atoms in Lucret. i. 498 :
Since a body and the space in
which it is are entirely dif
ferent, both must originally
have existed without any inter
mingling. If things exist com
posed of the full and the empty,
the full by itself must exist,
and likewise the empty. Bodies
in which there is no empty
space cannot be divided. They
may be eternal, and must be so,
unless things have been pro
duced out of nothing. With
out empty space, soft bodies
could not exist, nor hard bodies
without something full. If
there were no indivisible parts,
everything must have been
lono since destroyed. The re
gularity of phenomena presup-
441
i
Chap.
XVII.
443
Chap,
XVII.
THE EPICUREANS.
that the primary component parts of things can
neitner have come into existence nor cease to exist,
nor yet be changed in their nature.1 These primary
bodies contain no empty space in themselves, and
hence can neither be divided nor destroyed, nor be
changed in any way.2 They are so small that they
do not impress the senses, and as a matter of
fact we do not see them. Nevertheless they roust
not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the name
atoms being assigned to them only because their
bodily structure will not admit of division.3 They
have neither colour, warmth, smell, nor any other
property ; properties belong only to distinct mate
rials; 4 and for this reason they must not be sought
in the four elements, all of which, as experience
shows, come into being and pass away.5 They pos
sess only the universal qualities of all corporeal
things, viz. shape, size, and weight.0
poses unchangeable primary ix. 219; x. 318; Stob. Eel.
elements. All that is compo- i. 306 ; Plut. PI. Phil. i. 3,
site must ultimately consist of 29.
simple indivisible parts. If
2 Epic, in Diog. 41 ; Lucret.
there were no indivisible parts, i. 528; Sim.pl. De Coelo, Schol.
every body would consist of in Arist. 484, a, 23.
innumerable parts, as many in
3 Diog. 44 and 55 ; Lucret.
the smaller as in the greater i. 266, where it is proved, by
body (conf. Epic, in Diog. 56). many analogies, that there may
If nature did not reduce things be invisible bodies ; Stob. 1. c. ;
to their smallest parts, it could Plut. 1. c. ; Simjrf. Phys. 216, a.
not make new things. These
4 Diog. 44 ; 54 ; Liter, ii.
arguments, very unequal in 736 and 841 ; Pint. 1. c. See
value, were borrowed by Lucre- page 433, 2.
tius from Epicurus. Plut. in
5 Lvcret. v. 235.
But. Pr. Ev. 1, 8, 9, quotes, as
6 Diog. ; Plut. Plac. i.' 3, 29.
an Epicurean irinciplf, that The statement tdere made, that
unchangeable Being must be Democritus only allowed to
at the bottom of everything.
atoms size and shape, and that
1 Epicurus and Lucretius, Epicurus added weight, is not
1. c. Lucr. i. 529 ; Sext. Math, correct.
44%
Not only must atoms, like all other bodies, have Chat.
.
XVII
shape, but there must exist among them indefinitely _~
many varieties of shape, or it would be impossible
to account for the innumerable differences of things.
There cannot, however, be really an infinite number
of shapes, as Democritus maintained, in any limited
body this is intelligible of itselfnor yet in tbe
whole universe,1 since an unlimited number would
make the arrangement of the world impossible,
everything in the world being circumscribed by
certain containing limits.2 Again, atoms must be
different in point of size ; for all materials cannot be
divided into particles of equal size. Yet even to this
difference there must be some limitation. An atom
must neither be so large as to become an object of
sense, nor can it, after what has been said, be in
finitely small.3 From difference in point of size
the difference of atoms in point of weight follows.4
In point of number atoms must be innumerable, and
in the same way empty space must be unbounded
also. For since everything bounded must be bounded
by something, it is impossible to imagine any bounds
of the universe beyond which nothing exists, and
hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence
1 Diog. 42 ; Lncr. ii. 333
and 478'; Pint. Mac. i. 3, 30
(where, however, it would be
against the sense to substitute
tl for /nrj as Steinhartl. c. p. 473
note 94 does) ; Alex. Aphr. in
P/iiloj). Gen. et Corr. 3, b ; Cie.
N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not,
however, appear that Liwret.
ii. 333, made the variety of
figures as great as the number

of atoms. (Hitter, iv. 101.)
2 Lvcret. i. 600.
Diog. x. 55; Lvor. ii. 381.
4 See the passages quoted,
p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The
text of Siobieus, Eel. i. 346,
must be corrected by the aid of
these passages. Pint. Flac. i.
12, 5.
444
Chap.
XVIT.
B The
world.
(1 ) The
swerving
aside of
atoms.
THE EPICUREANS.
of bounds must apply to the mass of atoms quite as
much as to empty space. If an infinite number
of atoms would not find room in a limited space,
conversely a limited number of atoms would be lost
in empty space, and never able to form a world.1 In
all these views Epicurus closely follows Democritus,
no doubt agreeing with him also in explaining the
qualities of things by the composition of their atoms 2
In deducing the origin of things from their
primary causes, Epicurus, however, deviates widely
from his predecessor. Atomsso it was taught by
bothhave by virtue of their weight been eternally
engaged in a downward motion.3 That all bodies
' Epic, in TYiog. 41 : hwh.
fihf Kal rh irav an*ip6v iarf to
yap TrtTrepao'ufvoi' clkpov Iyer to
B' anpov 7rap' Tep6v ri dftujeirai.
<TT oi/K %xov &'<pw ire'pas ovk
ex*', Wpas 5' ovk %xov kxsipov av
%T] KOi Oil TTeTTpa(TfXVOt/. The
same argument is used by Lueret. i. 951 ; 1008-1020. He
continues 984, 1021 : If space
were limited, all bodies would
collect towa'ds its lower part
by reason of their weight, and
their motion would cease. Un
less the quantity of matter
were unlimited, the amount
lost by bodies in their mutual
contact could not be supplied.
Conf. also Pint. Adv. Col. 13,
3 ; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9 ; Plac.
i. 3, 28 ; Alex, in Simpl. Phys.
107, b. who mentions the abovequoted argument of Epicurus
as the chief argument of the
Epicureans.
* We have but little infor
mation ; but it has been al
ready shown p. 433, 2, and
follows too as a matter of

course, that he referred all the
properties of bodies to the
shape and arrangement of the
atoms. Whenever he found in
the same body different quali
ties combined, he assumed that
it was composed of different
kinds of atoms. For instance,
he asserted of wine: ovk elvai
deppbv auTOT\ws Thy olvov. iXA1
%Xftv Ttvas clt6ixovs eV aura Oepfxaoias airOTeAeffTtKas, eVepas 8'
tyvxp6Ti)Tos. According to the
difference of constitution, it
has on some a cooling, on others
a heating effect. Pint. Qu.
Conviv. lii. 5, 1, 4 ; Adv. Col.
6. This agrees with the re
marks made on Democritus in
vol. i. 597.
3 Diog. 43 ; 47 ; Cio. N. R.
i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus
formed to himself of motion
we are not told. We learn,
however, from Themist. Phys.
52, b, that he replied to Aris
totle's proof of motion, that no
THE WOULDATOMS.
should move downwards in empty space seemed to
Epicurus a matter of course ; for whatever is heavy
must fall unless it is supported.1 He was therefore
opposed to the Aristotelian view that heaviness shows
itself in the form of attraction towards a centre,
and consequently to his further supposition that
downward mode of motion belongs only to certain
bodies, circular motion being for others more natural.'2
The objection that in endless space there is no above
or below he could meet only by appealing to ex
perience;3 some things always appear above our
heads, others beneath our feet.4 But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their downward motion
meet together, thus giving rise to a rotatory motion,
no such view commended itself to Epicurus. Nay
rather in his view all atoms will fall equally fast, since
empty space offers no resistance, and falling perpen
dicularly it is impossible to see how they can meet.5
To render a meeting possible he supposes the
constant quantities can be com- curately groups Epicurus togeposed of indivisible particles ther with others (Pemocritus
(Phys. vi. 1), bysaying: What- and Sirato). The same point,
ever moves in a given line according to Sbmpl. Phys. 113,
moves in the whole line, but not b, was a subject of contention
in the individual indivisible between Alexander of Aphroportions of which the line con- disias and the Epicurean Zenosists. With reference to the bius, at the close of the second
same question, tbe Epicureans, century after Christ.
accordingtojSimj!^. Phys. 219, b,
3 As Aristotle had already
asserted that everything moves done.
equally quickly through indivi4 Diog. 60 ; conf. Plut. Def.
sible spaces.
Orac. 28, p. 425.
1 Cio. Fin. i. 6, 18: Lticret.
5 Epic, in Diog. 43; 61;
i. 1074.
Luer. ii. 225 ; Plut. C. Not. 43,
2 Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text i. p. 1082. This objection was
being faulty) ; Sim.pl. De Coelo, borrowed from Aristotle by
Schol. in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, Epicurus,
a, 7. The latter writer inac-
Chap.
XVII
440
THE EPICUREANS.
smallest possible swerving aside from the perpen
dicular line in falling. This assumption seemed to
him indispensable, since it would be otherwise im
possible to assert the freedom of the human will.
For how can the will be free if everything falls
according to the strict law of gravity ? For the
same reason this swerving aside was not supposed to
proceed from any natural necessity, but simply from
the power of self-motion in the atoms.1 In con
sequence of their meeting one part of the atoms
reboundsso Democritus also taught ; the lighter
ones are forced upwards, and from the upward and
downward motions combined a rotatory motion
arises.2 When this motion takes place a clustering
of atoms is the consequence, which by their own
motion separate themselves from the remaining
mass, and form a world of themselves.3 Atoms
being eternal and unchangeable, the process of
forming worlds must go on without beginning or
end ; 4 and inasmuch as they are also infinite in
number, and empty space is infinite also, there must
be an innumerable number of worlds.5 In the
1 later, ii. 21G; 251; Cut.
4 die. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p.
Fin. i. 6, 18 ; N. 1). i. 25, 69 ; 444, 3.
Ite Fato, 10, 22; Plut. An.
5 Ding. 45; 73: Lucret. ii.
Procr. (i, 9, p. 1015; Solert. 1048 ; Plut. Plac. ii. I, 3. It
Anim. 7, 2, p. 964 ; Plac. i. 12, need hardly be remarked that
5 ; 23, 4 ; Stob,eus, Eel. i. 346, by worlds world-bodies are
not meant. In Diog. 88, Epi
394.
1 Diog. 44 ; conf. 62 ; 90 ; curus defines the world as a
Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5 ; Fac. Lun. part of the heaven, surrounding
4, 5, p. 921 ; Stub. i. 346; Lu- the earth and stars, having- a
definite shape, and, towards
cret. v. 432.
Dioq. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. other parts of the heaven,
See above, p. 437, 1 ; Plut. Uef. bounded.
Or. 19, p. 420.
THE WORLD ITS OTlIGiy.

character of these worlds the greatest possible variety may be supposed, since it is most unlikely
447
Ohap.
X^ IL
that the innumerable combinations of atoms all

brought about at random will fall out alike. Equally
impossible is it to assert that all these worlds
are absolutely dissimilar.
In general, Epicurus
assumed that they are extremely different both in
point of size and arrangement, and that here and
there one may be similar to our own.1 Moreover,
since eternity affords time for all imaginable com
binations of atoms, nothing can ever be brought
about now which has not already existed.2 In one
respect all worlds are alike ; they come into existence,
are liable to decay, and, like all other individual
elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and
decrease.3 So we might have assumed from other
positions in his system. Between the individual
worlds both Democritus and Epicurus insert in
termediate world-spaces, in which by the clustering
of atoms from time to time new worlds come into
being.4
The origin of our world is thus described. At a (>) Orig
certain period of timeLucretius5 believes at no "f
"
world.
very distant perioda cluster of atoms of varying
1 Diog. 45 ; 74 ; 88 ; Plut. world is elaborately proved ;
Plac. ii. 2, 2 ; 7, 3; Stul. i. 490; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 21. Stob. i. 418 ;
Cic. N. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. Epicurus makes the world de40, 125.
cay in the greatest variety of
1 Plut. in Em. Pr. Ev. i 8, ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.
9 : Epicurus says, Sti ohVtv \iviv
4 Diog. x. 89.
foroTfAetrai iv tw travrl irapcc rhv
1 v. 324, arguing that his*j57j -yeyeiritxiuov xpivov &weipov. torical memory would other* Diog. 73 ; 89 ; Lucret. ii. wise go much further back, and
1105; v. 91 and 235, where the arts and sciences be of much
transitory character of the greater antiquity.
44rf
(Ihap.
XYn-
THE EPICUREANS.
shape and size was formed in this definite portion of
space. These atoms meeting, there first arose from
the pressure and rebound of the quickly falling
particles motions of every variety in every direction.
Soon the greater atoms pressing downwards, by dint
of weight forced upwards the smaller and lighter
atoms, the fiery ones topmost and with the greatest
impetus to form the ether, and afterwards those
which form the air.1 The upper pressure ceasing,
these masses, under the pressure of particles still
joining it from below, spread forth sidewards, and
thus the belts of fire and air were formed. Next
uprose those atoms out of which the sun and stars
are formed into the heights, and at the same time
the earth settled down, its inner part being partially
exhausted in those places where the sea now is. By
the influence of the warmth of the ether, and the
sun-heat, the earth-mass was bound together more
closely, the sea was pressed out of it, and the surface
assumed an uneven character
The world is shut
1 On this point see Lucret.
ii. 1112. The principle that
similar elements naturally con
gregate is there explained in
this way.
2 Lvcr. v. 416-508 ; Plut.
Flac. i. 4. The latter view has
been referred, in vol. i. 604, to
the Atomists. It would i ow
appear that it must be deduced
from Epicureanism, and its
agreement with the views attri
buted to Leucippus in other
places explained by the wellknown connection bet ween Epi
curus and Democritus. The
views of Epicurus on the for

mation of the world do not
entirely agree with those of
Democritus. It was probably
with an eye to Democritus
(compare the extracts in vol. i.
608 from Or'ig. Philosoph. p.
17) that Epic urus, in Diog. 90,
denied that the world could be
increased from without, or that
sun and moon could be possi
bly absorbed in our world.
Zvcret. ii. 1105, however, sup
poses an increase of the world
from without to be possible.
THE WORLDITS ARRANGEMENT.

off from other worlds and from empty space by those Chap.
XVI f
bodies which form its external boundary.1
Asking, in the next place, what idea must be (3) Ar
rangemetU
formed of the arrangement ot the world, we are met 0y the
by the two principles which Epicurus is never weary
of inculcating ; one, that we must explain nothing
as an intentional arrangement by deity, but refer
everything simply and solely to mechanical causes ;
the other, that in explaining phenomena the widest,
possible room must be given for hypotheses of evejy'
kind, and that nothing is more absurd than to abridge
the wide range of possible explanations by exclu
sively deciding in favour of any one.2 Thereby the
investigation of nature loses for him its value as
such, nor is it of any great interest to us to follow
his speculations on nature into detail. On one point
hedogmatises, protesting that the framework ofheaven
must not be considered the work of God,3 nor must
life and reason be attributed to the stars.4 Other
wise, on nearly all the questions which engaged the
attention of astronomers at that time, he observes
the greatest indifference, treating the views of his
predecessors, good and bad alike, with an easy super
ficiality which can only be explained by supposing him
altogether indifferent6 as to their truth. The state
1 On these moenia mundi,
* In Diog. 77 ; 81 ; Lueret.
which, according to Lucretius, v. 78 and 114, where the concoincide with the ether or fire- trast is more fully brought out.
belt, see Kpic in Diog. 88 ; Id. By 2a ovpivia, in Plat. Plac. v.
vtpl (pva-eas, y.i. (Vol. Here, ii.) 20, 2, we must by no means
col. 2 ; Pint. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. think of the stars,
i. 73; ii. 1144; v. 454.
* Examples have already
1 On this point see page 434. been met with, p. 436. A com* See p. 437, 1.
plete review of the Epicurean
QG
450
("HAP.
XVII.
THE EPICUREANS.
of his own astronomical knowledge can, moreover,
be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion1
that the sun, the moon, and the stars are either not
at all, or only a little larger, and may possibly be
even less than they appear to be. The Epicureans
also thought to support their theory that the earth,
borne by the air, reposes in the middle of the world
a theory which on their hypothesis of the weight
of bodies is impossible 2by the gradual diminution
in weight of the surrounding bodies.3 It would be
impossible here to go through the treatment which
they gave to atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena,
particularly as the principle already indicated was
most freely used, and many explanations were given
as being all equally possible.4
astronomy is not worth our with fire. According to Lxtcret.
while. It may be studied in v. 471, sun and moon stand
the following passages : For the midway between ether and
substance of the stars, consult earth in point of density.
Pint. Plac. ii. 13, 9; for their
2 It is still more difficult to
rising and setting, Diog. 92 ; imagine the world as stationary,
Lucr. v. 648 ; Claimed. Met. p. which is tacitly assumed. It
87 ; for their revolution and would then be bounded by end
deviation, Diog. 92; 112-114; less space, and soon come into
Lucr. v. 509 ; 612 ; for the ap collision with other masses.
' Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic,
pearance of the moon, Diog.
94, and Lucr. v. 574, 703 ; for in Diog. 74, and irtpl <piotws, xi.
eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. col. 1. In tl.e latter passage,
96 ; Lucr. v. 749 ; for changes Epicurus appeals to the fact
in the length of day, Diog. 98 ; that the earth is equidistant
from the bounds of the world.
Lucr. v. 678.
Diog. 91 ; Cic. Acad. ii.
* Further particulars : on
26, 82 ; Fin. i. 6, 20 ; Sen. Qu. clouds, Diog. 99; Lucr. vi. 451 ;
Nat. i. 3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. Plut. Plac. iii. 4, 3 ; on rain,
1 ; Pint. Plac. ii. 21, 4 ; 22, 4 ; Dioa. 100 ; Lueret. vi. 495 ; on
Lucr. v. 664. The body of the thunder, Diog. 100; 103; Lu
sun was considered by Epicurus eret. vi. 96 ; on lightning, Ding.
{Pint. Plac. ii. 20, 9; Stob. i. 101 ; Lver. vi. 160; on sirocco,
530) to consist of earth-like Diog. 104 ; Lucr. vi. 423 ; Plac.
and spongy matter, saturated iii. 3, 2 ; on earthquakes, Diog.
MANKIND: THE IS OBIGIN.
451
Out of the newly made earth plants at first grew,1

and afterwards animals came forth, since the latter,
Chai\
XVH.
according to Lucretius, can by no possibility have

fallen from heaven.2 In other worlds, likewise, living
beings came into existence, though not necessarily in
all.3 Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously supposed,4 all sorts of compo
site or deformed creatures. Those, however, alone
continued to exist which were fitted by nature to find
support, to propagate, and to protect themselves from
danger. Romantic creatures, such as centaurs or
chimaeras, can never have existed here, because the
beings of which they are compounded would require
conditions of life5 altogether different.
Aiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining
the origin of men and animals in a purely natural
manner, they likewise tried to form an idea, equally
(4) Plants
mau.
c. Mankl,ul
of\ke^m
according to nature, of the original state and his- human.

race.
torical development of the human race. In this
105 ; Liter, vi. 535 ; Plac. iii.
15, 11 ; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5 ;
on winds, Diog. 10G ; on hail,
Diog. 106 ; Plac. iii. 4, 3 ; on
snow, thaw, ice, frost, Diog.
107-109 ; on the rainbow, Diog.
109 ; on the halo of the moon,
Diog. 110; on comets, Diog.
111; on shooting-stars, Diog.
1 14. Explanations are given
by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi.
639), of the overflow of the
Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus
(vi. 738-839), of the magnet
(vi. 906-1087), of the reputed
chilling of the springs in summer (vi. 810).
1 Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780.
Otherwise, we learn that the

Epicureans were as far as the
Stoics from attributing to
plants a soul. Plut. Plac. v.
26, 3.
2 Lwer. ii. 11 55 ; v. 787, giving further particulars as to
the origin and maintenance of
living beings, and the subsequent abatement of the produetive powers of earth.
3 Epic, in Dwg. 74.
4 Anaximander, Parmenides,
Anaxagoras, Diogenes of ApolIonia, and Dewocritus, all
taught the procreation of living
beings from earth.
5 Lucr. v. 834-921.
g g 2
4b-2
Chap,
XVil
THE EPICUREANS.
attempt they ignored all legendary notions, and, notwithstanding their leaning towards materialism, they
on the whole advocated perfectly sound views. The
men of early times, so thought Lucretius, were
stronger and more powerful than the men of to-day.
Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the woods
in a perpetual state of warfare with the wild animals,
without justice or society.1 The first and most im
portant step in a social direction was the discovery
of fire, the learning to build huts, and to clothe
themselves in skins ; then began marriage and do
mestic life,2 and speech, originally Dot a matter of
convention, but, like the noises of animals, the na
tural expression of thoughts and feelings, was deve
loped.3 The older the human race grew, the more
they learned of the arts and skill which minister to
the preservation and enjoyment of life. These arts
were first learnt by experience, under the pressure of
nature, or the compulsion of want. What had thus
been discovered was completed by reflection, the
more gifted preceding the rest as teachers.4 In ex1 v. 922-1008. Conf. Plato,
Polit. 274, B; Arint. Polit. ii.
8, 1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i.
3, 99, appears to have had an
eye to Lucretius.
! Liter, v. 1009-1025.
" Epicurus, in Diug. 76, thus
sums up his views on the origin
of language : t4 bv6pnTa e"{
apxys
Btaei ytveaBcu,
aura? t&j <pi<rets ray avBpanray
xaff eicooTo iSin) XSia ircurxoiaas
vdOri Kal iSta \ap.fiavoboas ipavTfio/xaTa tSfws rbv aepa *Vire>iirti'
. . iurepoy Be KOtyui Kaff exaara
ri IBuri t4 ISta Teflôi rpbs t>

rhs Sti\i!s{tcis t\ttov a.u<pi&6\om
-yevtadai kKK^Koit koI <rwroâ>tipms Sr)Koufi4yas. He who invents any new thing puts, at
the same time, new words into
circulation. Lucret. v. 10261088, explains more fully that
language is of natural origin.
On the voice, Hid. iv. 522 :
Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.
* Epic, in Diog. 75 : i\Ka ur,"
inro\r]irToy Kal ri}V ruy kvBpdyruv
ipvffiy iroWa Kal Tcayrola Inrb tup
ainyy TrtpuartaTwy vpaypAruy li-
MANKIND; THE SOUL.
453
CFAI-.
actly the same way civil society was developed. Indi
XVII.
viduals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers.
In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they
were massacred. To crush the anarchy which then
arose, magistrates were chosen, and order established
by penal laws.1 It will subsequently be seen that
Epicurus explained religion in the same way by na
tural growth.
The apotheosis of nature, which has been appa (2) The
mid.
rent in Epicurus's whole view of history, becomes
specially prominent in his treatment of psychology.
This treatment could, after all that has been said, be
only purely materialistic. The soul, like every other
real being, is a body. In support of this view the
Sax^TJâ^Te koX avayKaadriyai' rbv
5e Koyinfjcbv T<3t t/nb TavTT)S naptyyurjBfVTa Kal varepor ivcucpifiovv
koX npoac^tvpioKetv, 4v ixfv tigi
Garruv Iv 5e thtc fipa&VTepov.
Ltier. v. 1450 :all arts
Ususetimpigras sitnul experientia mentis
l'aulatim docuit.
Ibid. 1103:
Inque dies magis hi victnm. vitamque priorem
Coinmutare novis monstrabant
rebu' benigni
Ingenio qui praestabant et corde
vigebant.
In harmony with these pre
mises, Lucretius then tries to
explain various inventions. The
first fire was obtained by light
ning, or the friction of branches
in a stoim. The sun taught
cooking (v. 1089). Forests on
fire, melting brass, first taught
men how to work in metal (v.

1289-1294). Horses and ele
phants were used for help in
war, after attempts had been
previously made with oxen and
wild beasts (v. 1295). Men
first dressed themselves in
skins ; afterwards they wore
twisted, and then woven ma
terials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416).
The first ideas of planting and
agriculture were from the na
tural spread of plants (v. 1359).
The first music was in imitation
of birds ; the first musical in
strument was the pipe, through
which the wind was heard
to whistle ; from this natural
music, artificial music only gra
dually grew (v. 1377). The
measure and arrangement of
time was taught by the stars
(v. 1434); and, comparatively
late, came the arts of poetry
and writing (v. 1438).
1 Lucr. v. 1106.
454
Chap.
xvlr-
THE EPICUREANS.
Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations of the
body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the
Stoics.1 The body of the soul, however, consists of
the finest, lightest, and most easily moved atoms, as
is manifest from the speed of thought, from the in
stantaneous dissolution of the soul after death, and,
moreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as
heavy as the body in which there is a soul.2 Hence
Epicurus, again agreeing with the Stoics, describes
the soul as a material resembling fire and air,3 or,
more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire,
air, vapour, and a fourth nameless element. It con
sists of the finest atoms, and is the cause of feeling,4
and according as one or other of these elements pre
ponderates, the character of man is of one or the
other kind.5 Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that
the soul-element is received by generation from the
parents' souls,6 and that it is spread over the whole
body,7 growing as the body grows.8 At the same
time he makes a distinction somewhat similar to
that made by the Stoics in their doctrine of the
1 Lucr. iii. 161 ; Diog. 67.
See p. 43!), 1.
2 Lucr. iii. 177 ; Ding. 63.
3 Diog. 63 : tj tyvxh <rt*>f*<i ^<rrt
Ketrrofxepts Trap S\ov to StQpoiffpa
(the body), Ttapeo"tcapnivov trpotTefJi<pep(rrTarov 8c irvfVfxaTi Bepfiov
riva Kpatrtv %xovrl- 66 : i ardfj.vt'
avTTjv avyKtiaQai Kftordroiv koL
(TTpoyyu\OTaTQiv iroAA< rivi 5ia(pepoutracv rivv tov wvp6s.
4 Lucr. iii. 231 : 269 ; Pint.
Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf.
Alex. Ajjhr. De An. 127, b.
s Liter, iii. 288.

6 According to Plut. Plac. v.
3, 5, he considered the seed an
atr6<rvaiTfia ij/vx^f Ka^ ffw/xaros ;
and, since he believed in a fe
minine o-nepua, he must have
regarded the soul of the child
as formed by the intermingling
of the soul-atoms of both
parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.
7 Diog. 63 ; Lucret. iii. 216 ;
276; 323; 370.
8 MHrodor. trcpl ahB-qTuiv
(Vol. Here, vi.), col. 7.
MANKIXD: THE SOUL.

sovereign part of the soul (f)<ye/j.oviic6v).i
Only the
irrational part of the soul is diffused as a principle

of life over the whole body ; the rational part has its
seat in the breast.* To the rational part belong
mental activity, sensation, and perception, the motion
of the will and the mind, and in this latter sense life
itself; both parts together make up one being, yet
they may exist in different conditions. The mind
may be cheerful whilst the body and the irrational
soul feel pain, or the reverse may be the case. It is
even possible that portions of the irrational soul may
be lost by the mutilation of the body, without detri
ment to the rational soul, or consequently to life.3
When, however, the connection between soul and
body is fully severed, then the soul can no longer
exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of the
body, its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to
their lightness ; and the body in consequence, being
unable to exist without the soul, goes over into cor
ruption.4 If this view appears to hold out the most
1 Inter, iii. 98, contradicts
the assertion that the soul is
the harmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied
(in Philnp. De An. K. I ) to one
of the objections urged against
it by Plato.
2 Divg. 66 ; Lucr iii. 94 ;
136 ; 396 ; 612 ; Pint. Plac. iv.
4, 3. Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and
the irrational part anima. The
statement, PI. Phil. iv. 23, 2,
that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the TjyffinvLKbi> was feelingless, can hardly be correct.
3 Diug. and Lver. In sleep,

a portion of the soul is supposed
to leave the body (Lucr. iv.
913, conf. TertvU. De An. 43),
whilst another part is forcibly
confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant
by Diog. 66.
1 Epic, in Diog. 64. Lucr.
iii. 417-827, gives an elaborate
proof of the mortality of the
soul. Otl'er passages, Pint.
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 27, 1 and 3;
30, 5 ; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly
need to be referred to. Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In
.hap.
XVII.
THE EPICUREANS.
gloomy prospect for the future, Epicurus considers
that it cannot really be so. With life every feeling;
of evil ceases,1 and the time when we shall no longer
exist affects us just as little as the time before we
existed.2 Nay, more, he entertains the opinion that
his teaching alone can reconcile us to death by re
moving all fear of the nether world and its terrors.3
Allowing that many of these statements are na
tural consequences of the principles of Epicurus, the
distinction between a rational and an irrational soul
must, nevertheless, at first sight seem strange in a
system so thoroughly materialistic as was that of the
Epicureans. And yet this distinction is not stranger
than the corresponding parts of the Stoic teaching. If
the Stoic views may be referred to the distinction
which they drew in morals between the senses and the
reason, not less are the Epicurean ethics marked by
the same contrast between the general and the sen
suous side of the mind. Hence Epicurus shares the
Stoic belief in an ethereal origin of the human race ;*
Stoicism, the soul keeps the
body together ; in" Epicurean
ism, the body the soul. In
Stoicism, the soul survives the
body : in Epicureanism, this is
impossible. In Stoicism, the
mind is a power over the world,
and hence over the body ; in
Epicureanism, it is on a level
with the body, and dependent
on it.
1 Epic, in Dior/. 124-127, for
instance : rb tppiKaBcaraTOv oZv
Twr tcaKtav 6 GdrtiTos ouSev irpbs
yi*as ' îreiSifTrep 6rai' flip T]uei<,
&fiew & Bavaros oit ir&petnLV
orav Se 6 Q6.vo.tos wapy t68' iyicii
ovk ia>iiv. Id. in Sext. Pvrrh.

iii. 229 (\.\lex. Aphr. Anal". Pri.
117, Top. 9. GeU. N. A. ii. 8,
1 ; Stob. Serm. 118, 30) : o Bdvatos ovfifv irpbs fiinas ' rb yap 5<a\u6iif avai(Tdt)TLt rb oh ayaitrOrjtouv oifbiv vpbs rjmas. Lucr. iii.
828-975.
2 Liter, iii. 830.
3 Diog. 81; H2 ; Lucr. iii.
37.
* Lucr. ii. 991 :
DeniquK caelesii somas omncs
semine oriundi, Sec.
999:
Cedit item retro de terra quod
i'uit ante
MASKIND: SENSATION.
457
snd although this belief as at first expressed only Chap.

i
XVII
implies that man, like other living beings, is
composed of ethereal elements, yet there is connected
with it the distinction already discussed in the case
of the Stoics between the higher and the lower
parts of man, which ultimately comes to be simply
another mode of expressing the difference between
mind and matter1.
Among the phenomena of the soul's life sen- (3) Senna
sation is made to harmonise with the general prin
ciples of the Epicurean view of nature by the aid
of Democritus's doctrine of atom-pictures (elhwka).
From the surface of bodiesthis is the pith of that
doctrinethe finest possible particles are constantly
being thrown off, which by virtue of their fineness
traverse the furthest spaces in an infinitely short
time, hurrying through the void.1 Many of these
exhalations are arrested by some obstacle soon after
coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into confusion.
In the case of others the atoms for a long time
retain the same position and connection which they
had in bodies themselves, thus presenting a picture
of things, and only lacking corporeal solidity. As
these pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various
organs of sense, our impressions of things arise.'2
Even those impressions, which have no corresponding
In terras : et quod ruissum est
ex letheris oris
Id rursum coali rellatum templa receptant.
1 Democritus, from whom
Epicurus has borrowed the rest
of this theory, makes them

mould the air.
2 Epic, in Dun. 46-50; 52;
and in the fragments of the
second book irtpl (pvat^s ; Lvcr.
iv. 20-2G6; Vli\ vi. 921 Cic. Ad
468
THE EPICUREANS.
real object, must be referred to such pictures present
in the soul.1 For often pictures last longer than
things themselves ; 2 and often by a casual combina
tion of atoms pictures are formed in the air resembling
no one single thing. Sometimes, too, pictures of
various kinds are combined on their way to the
senses ; thus, for instance, the notion of a Centaur is
caused by the union of the picture of a man with
that of a horse, not only in our imagination, but
already previously in the atom-picture.3 If, there
fore, sensation distorts or imperfectly represents real
objects, it must be explained as being due to some
change or mutilation in the atom-pictures before
they reach our senses.4
In thus explaining mental impressions, the Epi
cureans do not allow themselves to be disturbed by
the fact that we can recall at pleasure the ideas of
all possible things. The cause of this power was
rather supposed to be the circumstance that we are
always surrounded by an innumerable number of
atom-pictures, none of which we perceive unless our
attention is directed to them. Likewise the seeming
Famil. xv. 16 ; Pint. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2 ; Plac. iv. 3, 1 ;
19, 2; Sext. Math. vii. 206;
Gell. N. A. v. 16 ; Macrob. Sat.
vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr.
iv. 267 ; 5(58 ; Pint. Plac. iv. 14,
2, on reflected images and the
echo belong likewise to the
doctrine of idola.
1 For instance, the impres
sions in the minds of dreamers
and madmen. Diog. 32; Lucr.
iv. 730.
2 Pint. Uef. Orac. 19, p. 420 :

tl Se XPV ytMiv if <pt\otTu(ptq -ret
etSvAa yi\aariov ra xwtpa Hal
rv(p\a .fat aij/uxa, a iroifiaivovtriv
[sc. oi'EiriKOvpfiot'] arKirovs srwv
tr(pi6$ovs i/jupouvifieva Kal wtpivoffTOVVTa TFiXVTT] TO. fiP %Tl fovTM
ra 5e ndKat Kwrvxalvrw ^ /coraira-Ktvrwv a.trup'frvtvra.
' Lucr. 1. c.
* Sext. 1. c. ; Lucr. iv.
351.
MANKIND: THE WILL.

motion of forms which we behold in dreams is
explained by the hasty succession of similar atom-
459
Chap.
XN 1L
pictures, appearing to us as changes of one and the

same picture.1 But besides receiving pictures sup
plied from without, spontaneous motion with regard
to these pictures takes place on our part, a motion
connected in the first instance with the soul's motion
when it receives the outward impression, but not to
be regarded as a simple continuation thereof. This
independent motion gives rise to opinion, and hence
opinion is not so necessary or so universally true as
feeling. It may agree with feeling, or it may not
agree with it. It may be true or it may be false.2
The conditions of its being true or false have been
previously investigated.3
Impressions also give rise to will and action, the (4) Will.
soul being set in motion by impressions, and this
motion extending from the soul to the body.4 Into
the nature of will, however, Epicurus does not
appear to have instituted a more careful psycho
logical investigation. It' was enough for him to
assert the freedom of the will. This freedom he
considers absolutely indispensable, if anything we
1 Lucr. iv. 766-819 ; and on
the incessant streaming forth
of images, v. 141 ; Diog. 48.
2 Epic, in Diog. x. 5'Z : rb 5c
5irip.apTnp.4vov ovk av {nrrjpxcv, el
p.i) tAap.0ivop.tv xal a\\t)v Tivi
kivtjo-iv eV tjuiv avrois o~uvrip.p.evriv
per, Sia\riif/iv [al. SuEAeii^y] 5'
t-Xowav Kara 5e ravrriv ttjv
crvvripp.4vrtv tti (pavraoriHrj eVi0o\fj [impression on the senses],
SLaKrityiv V %xoxto~av &v ^v H-h
iiripapTvpriUri t) &vTip.apTvpT)0fj ri
tyevdus yivtrai, iav 5e emp.aprvpnSy i)
avTipapTvp-nOf) rf>
a\n84s.
3 As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Pint. Plac.
iv. 8, 2, Diog. 32, called the
faculty of sensation aladrio-is,
and sensation itself, iTrato-Bvpa.
4 Lucr. iv. 874 ; conf. Galen.
De Hipp, et Plat. v. 2, vol. v.
367, K.
THE EPICUREANS.
do is to be considered our owe, unless we are
prepared to despair of moral responsibility alto
gether, and to' resign ourselves to a comfortless and
inexorable necessity.1 To make freedom possible,
Epicurus had introduced accident into the motion
of atoms, and for the same reason he denies the
truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to the
future.2 In the latter respect, he, no doubt, only
attacked the material truth of two clauses, without
impugning the formal accuracy of the disjunction,3
i.e. he did not deny that of two contradictory cases
either one or the other must happen, nor did he
deny the truth of saying : To-morrow Epicurus will
either be alive or not alive. But he disputed the
truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied the
truth of the sentence, Epicurus will be alive ; and
equally that of its contradictory, Epicurus will not
be alive ; on the ground that the one or the other
statement only becomes true by the actual realisation
of an event at present uncertain.4 For this he
1 Dwg. 133 : t> Se imp" r/fxas
hêcr-norov na\ to [XffjLTrrbv nal
rh ivavTlov irapa.KoKov6t7v irefuKtv.
inel Kpttrrov "fiv Tip wcp\ Bcaiv fj.v9aj
KaroKoXou&etv i) tt} TWy (puauidiv
- (Me. N. D. i. 25, 70 : [Epi
curus] pertimuit, ne si concessuni esset hujusmodi aliquid :
aut vivet eras aut non vivet
Epicurus, alterutrum fieret necessariurn ; totum hoc ; aut
etiam aut non negavit esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97 ;
De Fat, 10, 21.
3 Steinhart, p. 466.
4 Vic. De Kato, 16, 37, at
least says, referring to the above

que>tion : Nisi forte voluiinus
Epicureoruin opinionein sequi,
qui tales propositiones nec veras
nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum
id pudet illud tamen dicunt,
quod est impudentius, veras
esse ex contrariis disjunctiones,
sed quae in his enuntiata essent
eorum neutrum esse verum.
Cicero indeed adds : 0 admirabilem licentiarn et miserabilem
inscientiam dicendi I but he
has no reason for this exclama
tion ; for the proposition :
Either A or B must follow is
not identical with the proposi
MANKIND: THE WILL.
461
deserves little blame. Our real charge against him Cfap.

is that he did not more thoroughly investigate the __XVIIp
nature of the will and the conception of freedom,
and that he treats the subject of the soul as scantily
and superficially as he had treated the subject of
nature.
tion : It may be stated either of allow the former and deny the
A or of B that it will follow, latter. In so doing he is really
Epicuruscould,therefore,justly following Aristotle.
402
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XVIII.
VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.
Chap.
XVIII.
A. Criti
cism of
the gods
and the
popular
faith.
Satisfied with the results of his own enquiries into

nature, Epicurus hoped by his view of the causes of
things not only to displace the superstitions of a
polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the prejudice
in favour of Providence. Indeed, these two objects
were placed by him on exactly the same footing.
So absurd did he consider the popular notions re
specting the Gods, that instead of blaming those who
attacked them,1 he believed it impious to acquiesce
in them. Religion being, according to Lucretius,
the cause of the greatest evils,2 he who displaces it
to make way for rational views of nature deserves
praise as having overcome the most dangerous
1 Ding. x. 123: ohm 8' co>robs [rovs 0eoi)s] oi iroAAol yofiiov<rtv ovk tifflv oit
cpv\dTrovffiv avrobs olovs VOfilÔVCtv.
aoefifys 5e ov\ & rovs ruy iroAAwp
Oeobs itvaipuv aAA' o'rcts rwv ttoKAwv &6as foots TcpoadiTTojy. Conf.
Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.
2 iii. 14 ; vi. 49 ; and. spe
cially, the celebrated passage
i.62:N.
Humana ante oculos fosde cum
vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione,

Quas caput a coeli regionibus
ostendebat
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus insians, &c.
as far as to 101 :
Tantum relligio potuit suadere
malorum.
Conf. Epic, in Diog. 81, and
above p. 423, 3 ; 437, 1.
THE GODS OF POPULAR FAITH.

enemy of mankind. All the language of Epicurus
in disparagement of the art of poetry applies in a
still higher degree to the religious errors fostered by
poetry.1 Nor is it better with belief in Providence
than with the popular faith. This belief is also
included in the category of romance ; 2 and the doc
trine of fatalism, which was the Stoic form for the
same belief, was denounced as even worse than the
popular faith.3 For how, asks the Epicurean, could
divine Providence have created a world in which evil
abounds, in which virtue often fares ill, whilst vice
is triumphant ? How could a world have been made
for the sake of man, when man can only inhabit a
very small portion of it ? How could nature be in
tended to promote man's well-being when it so often
imperils his life and labour, and sends him into the
world more helpless than any animal ? How can we
form a conception of beings ruling over an infinite
universe, and everywhere present to administer every
thing in every place ? 4 What could have induced these
beings to create a world, and how and whence could
they have known how to create it, had not nature
supplied them with an example ? 8 In fine, how
1 Heraclit. Alleg. Horn. c. 4: Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean
['Eitfitoupos] aircurav bfxv itoitjti- calls np6voia anus fatidica, to
kV Siawep oAe'flpiov niOuv $4\eap which it was often reduced, no
itpoo-toipcvos. Ibid. c. 75.
doubt, by the Stoics.
2 Plvt. Def. Orac. 19, p.
3 See p. 460, 1.
420: 'ETTtKovptlwr Se x*fua0>">ta
* Lnicr. v. 196; ii. 1090;
KaiyiKanas otjTMpofSrrrtov oh 70A- Pint. Plac. i. 7,10. Conf. the
ixwai xpTiaOat Kal Karh rrjs irpo- disputation of the Stoic and
voias pSiSov airiiv i.TroKa\ovmfs. Epicurean in Lvcian, 3 up. Trag.
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: StafldA- c. 35, and especially c. 46.
Aovtcs riiv irpiiioiav Siavep jraiirly
5 Lucr. v. 165 ; conf. p. 437,
"Efiirovaar f) Xloiv^v nAm/puiSr) 1 ; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.
Kai T/xryiieV tTrr/vypa.)i.p.ivriv. In
463
Chap.
XVI11'
464
Chap.
XVIII.
THE EPICUREANS.
could God be the happy Being He must be if the

whole burden of caring for all things and all events
lay upon Him, or He were swayed to and fro together
with the body of the world ? 1 Or how could we feel
any other feeling than that of fear in the presence of
such a God who troubles himself about everything ? 2
B. Ths
With the denial of the popular Gods, the denial of
god* ac
cording to demons,3 of course, goes hand in hand ; and, together
Epicwrut. with Providence, the need of prayer4 and of prophecy
( 1 ) Hea- is at the same time negatived.6 All these notions,
*on*for
hi* belief. according to Epicurus, are the result of ignorance
and fear. Pictures seen in dreams have been con
founded with real existences ; regularity of motion in
the heavenly bodies has been mistaken by the igno
rant for the work of God ; events which accidentally
happened in combination with others have been
regarded as portents ; terrific natural phenomena,
storms and earthquakes, have engendered in men's
minds the fear of higher powers.6 Fear is therefore
the basis of religion ; 7 and, on the other hand, free
dom from fear is the primary object aimed at by
philosophy.
For all that, Epicurus was unwilling to renounce
1 Diog. 76; 97; 113: seep.
5 Digg. 135 ; Luer. v. 379;
437, 1 ; 67c. N. D. i. 20, 52 ; Pint. Plac. v. 1, 2 ; Cio N. D. i.
20,55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; 'Ser
Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7.
toli. De An. 46.
Cio. 1. c. 54.
Plict. Def. Orac. 19 ; Plac.
Liter, v. 1159-1238; conf.
iv. 33 ; vi. 49 ; Sext. Math. ix.
i. 83.
* Conf. the captious argu 25 ; vi. 19 ; Diog. 98 ; 1 15.
ment of Hermarchus, in Proel.
1 This view is especially
in Tim. 6fi, E: If prayer is ne prominent in Lucretius. See
cessary for everything, it is p. 462, 2. Conf. Plut. N. P.
nucessary for prayer, and so on, Suav. Vivi, 21, 10 ; Cic. N. D. i.
ad infln.
20, 54.

belief in the Gods,1 nor is it credible that this unwillingness was simply a yielding to popular opinion.2
The language used by the Epicureans certainly gives
the impression of sincerity ; and the time was past
when avowed atheism was attended with danger.
Atheism would have been as readily condoned in the
time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most
unreservedly the popular faith. It is, however,
possible to trace the causes which led Epicurus to
believe that there are Gods. There was first the
general diffusion of a belief in Gods which appeared
to him to establish the truth of this belief, and hence
he declared the existence of Gods to be something
directly certain, and grounded on a primary notion
(TrpoKTj^ris).3 Moreover, with his materialistic theory
of knowledge he no doubt supposed that the primary
notion which convinces us of the existence of Gods
arises from the actual contemplation of divine beings,
and from the perception of those atom-pictures from
which Democritus had already deduced the belief in
Gods.4 And in addition to these theoretical reasons,
1 He drew up separate trearises nepl 0OJi/and7repi 6<n6Tr]Tos.
Ding. 27 ; Cic N. D. i. 41, 1 15 ;
Plut. N. P. Suav. 1rivi, 21, II.
1 Posidonius, in Cic. N. D.
i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii.
1, 3 ; Pint. 1. c.
3 Rpic in Ding. 123: fleol (i-ev
yap tlcri ivapylis f*iv 'yap 4<ttiv
avTwv tj yvtaais. The Epicurean
in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 48: Solus
enim [Epicurus] vidit, primum
esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipja njtura. Qua? est enim
gens aut quod genus hominum

quod non habeat sine doctrina
anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat irp&Xiftyiv
Epicurus, &c. Tbese statements
must, however, be received with
some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own views
as to innate ideas. Inasmuch,
however, as he expressly reters
to Epicurus' treatise irtvl Kai 6vos, we may assume that belief
in Gods with Epicurus rests on
a general irp6\rityis.
4 In support of this view,
H H
46 o
Chap.
466
Chap.
XVIII
THE EPICUREANS.
Epicurus had also another, half a3sthetical, half reli
gious the wish to see his ideal of happiness realised
in the person of the Gods,1 and it is this ideal which
determines the character of all his notions respect
ing them. His Gods are therefore, throughout,
human beings. Religious belief only knows beings
such as these, or, as Epicurus expresses it, only such
beings come before us in those pictures of the Gods
which present themselves to our minds, sometimes
in sleep, sometimes when we are awake. Reflection,
too, convinces us that the human form is the most
beautiful, that to it alone reason belongs, and that
it is the most appropriate form for perfectly happy
baings.2 Epicurus even went so far as to attribute
to the Gods difference of sex 3 At the same time
everything must be eliminated which is not appro
priate to a divine being.
see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is na esset et beatissima . . . et
there said of the form of the metus oranis a vi atque ira
Gods : A naturahabemus omnes Deorum pulsus esset. Ibid 20,
omnium gentium speciem nul- 56 : We do not fear the Go-ls,
lam aliam nisi humanam Deo- et pie sancteque colimus narum. QuiB enim alia forma oc- turam excellentetn atque pnecurr t utnquam aut vigilanti stantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen.
cuiquam aut dormienti ? <puaiK^} lienef.iv.19, 8 : Epicurus denied
wpSx-tiifns is here referred to sen- all connection of God with the
sations derived from (t3uKa. world, nut, at the same time,
Ibid. 19, 49; and Liter, vi. 76: would haie him honoured as a
de corporequte sancto simu- father, propter majestatem ejus
lacra feruntur
eximiam singularemque natuIn mentis hominum divime ram.
nuntia form-e.
- Cic. N. D. i. 1 8. 46 : Divin.
1 Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. ii. 17,40; Sent. Pyrrh. iii. 218 ;
17, 45 : Si nihil aliud quserere- Pint. PI. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stoh. i.
mus, nisi ut Dens pie coleremus 6(i); Pkicdr. (Philodem. ) Kragm.
et ut super3titione liberarenmr, col. 7: Metrodnrut, nep\ h'ktBt)satis erat dictum : nam et pne- tuv (Vol. Here, vi.), col. 10;
stans Deorum natura h imitium col. 16, 21.
pietate coleretur, cum et ajter' Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.
407
The two essential characteristics of the Gods, Chap.

according to Epicurus, are immortality and perfect
happiness.1 Both of these characteristics would be (2) jVaimpaired were we to attribute to the bodies of the the EpieuGods the same dense corporeity which belongs to our rean S-"lssown. We must, therefore, only assign to them a
body analogous to our body, ethereal, and consisting
of the finest atoms.? Such bodies would be of little
use in a world like ours. In fact, they could not
live in any world without being exposed to the tem
poral ruin which will in time overwhelm it, and,
meantime, to a state of fear, which would mar their
bliss. Epicurus, therefore, assigns the space between
the worlds for their habitation, where, as Lucretius
remarks, troubled by no storms, they live under a
sky ever serene.3
Nor can these Gods be supposed to care for the
world and the affairs of men, else their happiness
would be marred by the most distressing occupation ;
but perfectly free from care and trouble, and abso
lutely regardless of the world, in eternal contem
plation of their unchanging perfection, they enjoy
the most unalloyed happiness.4 The view which the
1 Epic, in Tliog. 123 : irpaiTov
ply Thy 0ebi> Qfov HtpBaprov koX
fxaKajiov vonifav . . . /i7]5ee fi^rc
rrjs anOapffias a\\6Tpiov î]Tf rj}s
iLCLKzpiSTriTos itvo'itceiov aura irp So-oirrt, kt.\. Ibid. I'M. Vie. N. L).
i. 1 7, 45 ; 19, 51 j Lucr. ii. GtU ;
v. 1G5.
2 Cio. "N. D. ii. 23, 59 : i. 18,
49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii.
17, 40; Lucr. v. 148 ; Metrodor.
irtf>! aiV07jTiii') col. 7 ; Plut. 1. c.
Epicurus has, as C'cero re

m irks, monograminos Deos ; his
Gods have only quasi corpus
and quasi sanguinem. They
are perlucidi and perflabiles, or,
according to Lucretius, tenue.s,
so that they cannot be touched,
and are indestructible.
3 Vic. Divin. ii. 17, 40 ; Lver.
ii. 64(1; iii. 18; v. 14G ; Sen.
Benef iv. 19, 2.
1 Kpic. in Diog. 77 ; 97 ;
Hh 2
468
Chap.
XVIII.
THE ETICUREANS.
School formed to itself of this happiness we learn
from Philodemus.1 The Gods are exempt from sleep,
sleep being a partial death, and not needed by beings
who live without any exertion. And yet he believes
that they require nourishment, though this must, of
course, be of a kind suited to their nature. They
also need dwellings,2 since every being requires some
place wherein to dwell. Were powers of speech to
be refused to them, they would be deprived of the
highest means of enjoymentthe power of convers
ing with their equals. Philodemus thinks it pro
bable they use the Greek or some other closely allied
language.3 In short, he imagines the Gods to be a
society of Epicurean philosophers, who have every
thing that they can desireeverlasting life, no care,
and perpetual opportunities of sweet converse. Only
such Gods,the Epicureans thought,4need not be
feared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and wor139 ; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51
(amongst other things : nos
autem beatam vitam in animi
securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus, both
of which features must therefore be attributed to the Gods) ;
Legg. i. 7, 21 Lucr. ii. 64K ;
iii. 1092; iv. 83; vi. 57; Sen.
lienef. iv. 4, 1 ; 19, 2. Conf. p.
43r> : 4(>4. 1 ; -Kiti, 1.
1 In the fragments of his
treatise irept Trjs t<*v 8tav evtrroXovnivris Stayayfis, Kara Ziivuva,
col. 12.
2 The K\i'<na discussed by
Hermarchus and Pythocles, col.
13, 20, had reference to these,
and not to ordinary feasts.
3 Col. 14 : The reason being
assigned that Kiyoirai ^jj no\v

Siacpepo'-o-ais koto Tas apSpdaeis
xpvaâL #<oj-cuf. /ca! fiivov oltautr
yeyoviras Beotis 'EW-qyiSi yKwrrr)
xpuiuivous. The fust statement
teems to refer to the words of
the divine language quoted by
Homer ; the second statement,
to stories of appearances of the
Gods. For the whole tone of
ti e system militates against
our thinking of men who have
afterwards become Gods. The
sceptical question, Whether
the Gods possess speech ? raised
by Carneades in Sejrt. Math. ix.
178, appears to refer to this
fxv6o\oyia 'Eirwou'pou.
* Out. N. D. i. 20, 54 ; Sea.
Bener. iv. 19, 1.

shipped because of this very perfection.1 Moreover,
these Gods are innumerable. If the number of
mortal beings is infinite, the law of counterpoise re
quires that the number of immortal beings must not
be less.2 If we have only the idea of a limited num
ber of Gods, it is because, owing to their being so
much alike,3 we confound in our minds the innume1 Phifadem. De Mus. iv. (V.
Here, i.) col. i, says that the
Gods do not need this worship,
but it is natural for us to show
it : fiaMtrra fjiv dalais npo\iityeo~iv,
(Trtna Se koX tqis Kara. Tt> ir&Tpwv
wapaStSofxivois kitaaTtp tuv Kara
2 Cic. 1. c. i. 19, 50, the sen
tence, et si qu:e interimant,
belonging, however, to Cicero
only. For Epicurus cannot
have described his ease-taking
Gods as sustainers of the uni
verse.
' Cic: N. D. i. 19, 49 : (Epi
curus) docet earn esse vim et
naturam Deorum ut primum
non sensu sed mente cernatur :
nec soliditate quadam nec ad
numerum, ut ea, qua? ille prop
ter tirmitatem anpifipta appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine
et transitione perceptis: cum
infinita simdlimarum irnaginum species ex innumerabiliims
individuis exsistat et ad Deos
(probably instead of Deos,
which gives no sense, we should
read nos. See the commenta
tors in the editions of Moser
and Kreuzer) affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas ima
gines mentem intentam iniixamque nostram intelligentiam
capere qua? sit et beata naiura
et asterna. The meaning of
these words appears to be, that

ideas of the Gods are not formed
in the same way as the ideas of
other solid bodies, by a number
of similar pictures from the
same object striking our senses
(nec soliditate nec ad numerum,
Ding. x. 95), but by single pic
tures emanating from innumer
able divine individuals, all so
much alike that they leave be
hind them the iiupiessions of
perfect happiness and immor
tality. The passage of Diog.
x. 139, ought probably to be
corrected by that in Cicero.
It runs : iv &\\ois 5e (p-offL, rovs
6evs \6ya> dtuprjTovs dyat ' ovs
fiev Kar apiBphv iHpetTraiTas, ovs
6e Kara OfiOfiHiav 4k tvjs avvex^s
ivippvffews tup bfxoidiv el8u>\(iv eirl
rit aitrb airoTereXeafifyovs aydpaTriifiSios. The similarity of most
of the expressions leaves no
doubt that Diogenes followed
the same authority as Cicero
(probably the same as Pint.
Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in
the words ois^tvK.T.X. ,it asset ts
the very opposite of this and
the Epicurean teaching. There
must, therefore, be some error
here, either due to Diogenes
or a copyist. This error does
not apparently belong to the
words war' apiBfxbv, which Cicero
renders ad numerum, so that
469
ClTAP.
XVIII.
THE EPICUREANS.
rable pictures of the Gods which are conveyed to our
souls.
Priding themselves, in contrast to the Stoics, on
their agreement by means of this theology with the
anthropomorphic views of the popular belief, and
even outdoing polytheism in the assumption of in
numerable Gods,1 the Epicureans were willing to
join in the customary services of religion,2 with
out being nearly so anxious as the Stoics to prove
themselves in harmony with the popular creed.
Whilst the Stoics in their anxiety to do this had
plunged head over heels into allegory, no such ten
dency is observed on the part of the Epicureans.
Only the poet of the School gives a few allegorical
interpretations of mythical ideas, and he does it with
more taste and skill than is usual with the Stoics.3
SteinJiart'i suggestion, p. 477,
/ca(T apixbv or *ca#' apuovs, is clearly
wrong. It is more probab y to
be found in the words nis ntv
06s Sh We might suggest
for ovs [xev, ou uevroi.
1 In P/itedrvs (Philod*m..
irtpl ti/irc3e(aj), Fragm. ool.7( 1 0)
it is said in answer to the Si oics :
etriSeiKyvtrdwaav rois TroAXots cva
fi6vov \^6tuv\ anavra Keyovrts ovSe
Trdvras bffous 7} koiv}] <pr)fin TrapeSwkcv, %ixoiv ov fi6vov bffovs <pao\v
o'i TiaviWnves aWa nal TtKtiovas
flvai \ty6vraiv eireid' 'on toiovtous
oiibe fiefxiiKafriy anoKeiireiv, otovs
(TefiopraL irdvres Kal rifius 6fxo\oyovfxev. avtipancoeib'f'is yap Keivoi ov voiuôvaiv aKKa aipa Kal
trveupara koX cudepa, Shtt' cywye
Kal Te8appr]KdTti>s tliraifit to-Stovs
Aiay6puu uxtWov n\wu/*\tiv. It
is then shown how little the
natural substances of the Stoics

resemble Gods (col. !) : to 9e7a
rotai/ra KaraKeiTrovatv & Kat yevvr)7a teal (pQapra {pa'tverai, tois 5e
iraotv r,fjLis aKt*Xovf)a>s a'idtovs Ka(pBdprous clvai 5oyfj.aTiou.cv. Here
we have a phenomenon wit
nessed in modern times, Deists
and Pantheists mutually accus
ing one another of atheism,
the former missing personality,
the latter missing activity in
the deity of their ipponents.
2 See p. 4(i, I .
3 Luer. ii. 598. explains the
Mother of the Gods as meaning
the earth, ii. 655, he allows
the expressions, Neptune, Ceres,
Bacchus, for the sea, corn, and
wine. iii. H7(i, he interprets
the pains of the nether-world
as the qualms now brought on
by supt rstition and folly.

On other points the Epicureans, not excluding Lucretius, observe towards the popular faith a negative
attitude, that of opposing it by explanations ; and
by this attitude, without doubt, they rendered one
of the most important services to humanity.
471
Ohap.
472
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS.
PRINCIPLES.
Chap.
XIX.
A. Plea
sure.
(1) Plea
sure the
kif/hcst
good.
GENERAL
Natural science is intended to overcome the preju

dices which stand in the way of happiness ; moral
science to give positive instruction as to the nature
and means of attaining to happiness. The specula
tive parts of the Epicurean system had already worked
out the idea that reality belongs only to individual
things, and that all general order must be referred
to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The
same idea is now met with in the sphere of morals,
individual feeling being made the standard, and in
dividual well-being the object of all human activity.
Natural science, beginning with external phenomena,
went back to the secret principles of these pheno
mena, accessible only to thought. It led from an
apparently accidental movement of atoms to a uni
verse of regular motions. Not otherwise was the
course followed by Epicurus in moral science. Not
content with human feelings alone, nor with selfishly
referring everything to the individual taken by him
self alone, that science, in more accurately defining the
conception of well-being, ascertained that the same
PLEASURE THE HIGHEST GOOD.

can only be found by rising superior to feelings and
purely individual aims, in short by that very process
of referring consciousness to itself and its universal
being, which the Stoics declared to be the only path
to happiness. It is for us now to portray this deve
lopment of the Epicurean philosophy in its most pro
minent features.
The only unconditional good, according to Epi
curus, is pleasure ; the only unconditional evil is
pain.1 No proof of this proposition seemed to him
to be necessary ; it rests on a conviction supplied by
nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our
doing and not doing.2 If proof, however, were re
quired, he appealed to the fact that all living beings
from the first moment of their existence pursue plea
sure and avoid pain,3 and that consequently pleasure
is a natural good, and the normal condition of every
being.4 Hence follows the proposition to which Epi
curus in common with all the philosophers of plea1 Epic, in Ding. 128 : t\v t$ovîv apxw Kal reKos \4yofiev iivai
rov fiaKapiws Cfjv . . . ttpGnov
hyajQbv tovto /cat <TvpL<f>uroy , . .
na<ra odv ijSoi^j . . . aya96y. . . .
KaBdirep Kal d\yriSuv vaaa ko.k6v.
Ibid. 141. Cie. Fin. i. 9,29;
Tusc. v. 26, 73 : Cum prEesertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum voluptate.
2 Diog. 129: Tavnjv yap dya&bv
rptvroy Kal vvyysvtKbv cyywfiev
Kaldirb rauT^s KaTapx6fJ.tda irdaTjs
aipifftcas Kal (pevyfis Kal 4tI Tavnjv
KaTavTWfiev ws Kav6vi tw nddft
rb ayadbv Kpivovres. Pint. Adv.
Col. 27. 1.
* Diog. 137; Cie. Fin. i. 7,
23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext.

Pvrrh. iii. 194 ; Math. xi. 96.
4 Stob. Eel. ii. 58 : toCto 5'
[the tc'A.os] oi Kar' 'EntKovpov
<pi\oao<povvTes ov vpoffSexoyrai
\eyetv ii-epyovfievov, bid rb iraBr}TiK-bv inTOTidenBai rb TeAos, ob
npaKTiK6y ' Tjtioy^ ydp ' '69ev Kal
i)]v tvvviav iirotiitioaffi rov rtKous,
to oixtiws SiaTfdeiffdai e| eaurov
irpbs avrby XUP^S
e>lr' dkKo T
oiroo-r)s imfSoXrjs. Alex. A/jhr.
DeAn. 154, a: tois Si irtpl 'Ett( Kuvpoy ytioyi) rb npSirov otKetoy
?Soî/ elvat a?rA&>s trpoX6vruv tie
tiiapQpovadai TauTrjy TTjv Tjtiovfiy
tpaJi.
478
474
Chap.
XIX.
(2) Free
dom from
j>ain.
THE EPICUREANS.
sure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of
life.
At the same time, this proposition was restricted
in the Epicurean system by several considerations.
In the first place, neither pleasure nor pain is a simple
thing.
There are many varieties and degrees of
pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which
pleasure has to be secured by the loss of other plea
sures, or even by pain, or in which pain can only be
avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost
of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have
the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully
weighed, and in consideration of the advantages
and disadvantages which tbey confer, would under
circumstances advise the good to be treated as an
evil, and the evil as a good. He would have plea
sure forsworn if it would entail a greater correspond
ing pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the
prospect of greater pleasure.1 He also agrees with
Plato in holding that every positive pleasure pre
supposes a want, i.e. a pain which it proposes to
remove ; and hence he concludes that the real aim
and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining free
dom from pain,2 and that the good is nothing else
1 Diog. 129 ; Cie. Fin. i. 14,
48 ; Tusc. v. 33, 95 ; Sen. De
Otio, 7, 3.
2 Epic, in Diog. 139 (Gell.
N. A. ii. 9, 2) : opos tov jueyetfous
to>v fiSovaiv 7] iravTQS tov ahyovvtos virfaipt(ns. Id. in Diog.
128 : tovtwv yap \roiv iiriBvfuuv]
forAap^s dewpia naffan a'ipe<riv Kol
tpuy^v liravayaysiv oiSev inl rijy
tov trctfjuoTos vyUtav Kal t$)v ttjs

tyvxws aropaîav. i-nel tovto tov
lianaptu/s
4(tti t4\os. tovtou
yap \apiv hnavTa TrpdrToîev uirws
/xt}T aKyoifxtv pAiTSTapfiuifxtv irav
5e a7ra tovto irepi t}jU"* yivrrrai
KreTat nets d Trjs tyvxys Xfl/l&i'
ovk Zx0lT0s Tv Cvov fia^Kflv ^s
Trpbs ivfttov tl . . . t6tc yap
^5cy7fs xpelav eÔjuei', brav Ik tov
PLEASURE IS FREEDOM FROM PAIN.

but emancipation from evil.1 By a Cyrenaic neither
repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle
motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed
as the object of life ; and hence happiness was not
made to depend on man's general state of mind, but
on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But
Epicurus, advancing beyond this position, recognised
both the positive and the negative side of pleasures,
both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion.2
Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on
the same footing in his system. On the contrary,
the essential and immediate cause of happiness is
repose of mindaTapaljia. Positive pleasure is
only an indirect cause of arapaîa in that it re
moves the pain of unsatisfied craving.3 This mental
repose, however, depends essentially on the character
of a man's mind, just as conversely positive pleasure
in systems so materialistic must depend on sensuous
attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part
of Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the
highest pleasure ; and conversely Epicurus was no
fi^l Trapeivai t}\v riSov}}v a\ytener
'iyrav 5f \a] iXyaifiiv o<Wti Tijs
r/Sovris Seouffla. Ibid. 131; 144 ;
conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3,
!0; Stvb. Serm. 17, 35; Lucr.
ii. 14 ; C'io. Fin. i. 1 1, 37.
1 Epicurus and Metrodorus,
in Plut. 1. c. 7, 1.
2 Diog. 136,quotes the words
of Epicurus : t) niv y&p &Tapa{i'a
Ka\ unupia ffaTa<TT7ijuoTiKai t'tviv
7|8oval, fi 5e xaf KO' (v<ppoaivri
(caret h{vii<tiv ii/tf/ytiq fixiirovrai.
Hitter, iii. 469, suggests instead
of tvtpyt'ia ivapyeiq, but tvfftyeiq

gives a very fair meaning : they
appear actually in motion. Sen.
Kp. 66, 45 : Apud Epicurum
duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit,
animus sine perturbatione.
3 Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14,
2 : Cum Epicuro quiescere.
lienef. iv. 4, 1 : Qua} maxima
Kpicuro felicitas videtur, nihil
agit.
475
c^rAJ
XIX.
476
Chap,
THE EPICUREANS.
less
mind.
consistent in subordinating it to gratification of
In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says

Epicurus, we do not mean the pleasures of profligacy,
nor indeed sensual enjoyments at all, but the free
dom of the body from pain, and the freedom of the soul
from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, nei
ther the lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions,
nor the joys of the table, make life happy, but a sober
judgment, investigating the motives for action and
for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of
B. Intel- our peace, prejudices. The root from which it springs,
'kapjAness anc^> therefore, the highest good, is intelligence.1 It
(1) Intel- is intelligence that leaves us free to acquire posses
sion thereof, without being ever too early or too late. a
Our indispensable wants are simple, little being ne
cessary to ensure freedom from pain ; other things
only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quan
tity is not increased, or else they rest on a mere sen
timent.3 The little we need may be easily attained.
1 Ding. 131. Similar views <pav . oSre yhp &upot ouSei'j lirrir
are expressed by Metrodorus, oUre irdpuipos irpbs rb Ktna tyvxyv
in Clement, Strom, v. 614, B, in vyiaivov. He who says it is too
praise of philosophers who early or too late to study philoescape all evils by rising to the sophy means npbs evât/j.oviav ?)
contemplation of the eternal ii4}irci> -napeivat t)\v Stpav /} fjLrtKtri
KaQapol Kal CLGTipavToi Toirov, t eivai. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7 :
vvv aaifiairepKpepovres 6vofid(ofifv. Philosophias servias oportet, ut
Id. in Pint. Adv. Col. 17, 4: tibi contingat vera libertas.
woffi<rufi4v Tt Ka\bv 4vl KaKuts,
3 Epic. in Dwg. 127 : tvv 4tifi6vov ov KaTafivvres rats d/xotona- Bvfiiwy at p.tv fiat ipucriKal al bt
Beiats Kal airaAKayevres 4k tou Kevai ' Kal twv <pvffiKvv al ficv
Xapal $'tov ets to 'EiriKovpou us ava.yKa.7cu at 5e <puo~iKal ttivov. rav
a\r]dti>s Biotpavra vpyia.
S avayKaluv ai fiev irpbs eiioai2 Epic, in Ding. 122 : fifire v4os fiaviav eifflv avayKaiat, al be irpbs
rts t>v ueAAfTw (pikoariHpuv fi^re t\v tov tr&p.aTO1; do^\7/Tt'ai/, at Se
yipuv utrdpx^y KOffiaTw duXotro- irpbs avrb rb rjv. Ibid. 14y,
INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS: INTELLIGENCE.

Nature makes ample provision for our happiness,
would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting what she gives in thinking what we desire.1
lie who lives according to nature is never poor ; the
wise man living on bread and water has no reason to
envy Zeus ; 2 chance has little hold on him ; with him
judgment is everything,3 and if that be right, he
need trouble himself but little about external mis
haps.4 Not even bodily pain appeared to Epicurus
so irresistible as to be able to cloud the wise man's
happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the
Stoic's insensibility to pain,5 still he is of opinion that
the wise man may be happy on the rack, and can
smile at pains the most violent, exclaiming in the
midst of torture, How sweet ! 6 A touch of forced
sentiment may be discerned in the last expression,
and a trace of self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest
even in the beautiful language of the dying philo
sopher on the pains of disease.7 Nevertheless, the
further particulars are given as
to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lvcr.
ii. 20; Cio. Fin. i. 13, 45 ; Tusc.
v. 33, 94 ; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,
3, 10 ; Evstrat. Eth. N. 48, b ;
Sen: Vit. Be. 13, 1.
1 Sen. Belief, iii. 4, 1 : Epieuro. . . qui adsidue queritur,
quod adversus prceterita simus
ingrati. Epic, in Sen. Ep. 15,
10 : titulta vita inprata est et
trepida, tot a in futurum fertur;
and Lvcr. iii. 929.
* Diog. 11 ; 130; 144; 146;
Stnl. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34;
Sen. Ep. 2, 5 ; 16, 7 ; 25, 4.
' Dirg. 144 : $paxâ aoipS
7vxn TraptjUTri'irTtj, to 5e fiiyiara
(cal Kvpidra-ra 6 Ao7r,u!>s 5ia!/r7iire.

The like in Stob. Eel. ii. 354;
Cic. Kin. i. 19, G3;Sen. De
Const. 15, 4 ; Epicurus and
Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc. v. 9,
20, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.
* Ding. 135 : Kpt'mov thai
>0|u(w euAu-yi'o-Tios aTuxuv 9 a\oylcrTus tvrvx*'".
5 Pint. N. P. Suav. Vivi,
20, 4.
Diog. 118; Pint. 1. c. 3, 9;
Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic.
Tusc. v. 26, 73.
' Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30,
96 ; Tusc. ii. 7, 17 ; M. Avrel.
ix. 41 ; Sen. Ep. 66. 47 ; 92, 25 ;
Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, IS, 1, the
477
Chap.
'
478
Chap,
XIX"
(2) lien*rinngr
THE EPICUREANS.
principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony
of the founder. The main thing, according to Epi
curus, is not the state of the body, but the state of
the mind ; bodily pleasure being of short duration,
and having much about it to unsettle ; mental enjoy
ments only being pure and incorruptible. For the
same reason mental sufferings are more severe than
those of the body, since the body only suffers from
present ills, whilst the soul feels those past and
those to come.1 In a life of limited duration the
pleasures of the flesh never attain their consum
mation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited
nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life
complete in itself, and not standing in need of un
limited duration.2
At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent
with their principles, could not deny that bodily plea-
mperiorto sure is the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate

' *ense"- source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his
favourite pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this
admission; Epicurus declaring that he could form
latter perverting Epicurus'
words to a terrible extent.
' DlOff. 137 : ti vpbs tovs Kupl}ra?ofrs Sia(p4pcTai. oi fxiv yap
Xftpous ra? trwuaTinas aKyrjb'oi'as
\iyou(Ti Tfijc iûX'kwv . . . o 5e
ras iJ/t'X'Kois. T$]v youv trdpica 5ia
to irapov pJtvov xti<iaetv, TVy 5e
Kal S.ct to *apt\dbv Kal to
TTZpbv KaX TO H(\\0V OJTOiS OVV
kol paiîvas 7/8o*as tlvat tt/s tyoX"s. Farther particulars in
l'lut. 1. c. 3, 10 : Civ. Tunc. v.
33, 90. The Epicureans spoke

of bodily pleasure by 7;5*<x0:n,
mental by x^*""- l'lut. J. c.
5, L. .
1 Dioff. 145. Epicurus ap
pears to have first used oapf to
express the body in contrast to
the s'>ul : . in his system,
includes the soul. See Ding.
137 : 140; 141 ; Metrorlor. in
l'lut. Colot. 31, 2. {Pint, in
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9 ; Plut. has
yao-rpi instead uf tra/,Kt.)
INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS.
no conception of the good apart from enjoyments 1
of the senses ; Metrodorus asserting that everything
good has reference to the belly.2 For all that the
Epicureans did not feel themselves driven to give up
the pre-eminence which they claimed for goods of the
soul over those of the body. Did even the Stoics,
notwithstanding the grossness of their theory of
knowledge, ever abate their demand for a knowledge
of conceptions ; or cease to subordinate the senses
to reason, although they built their theory of morals
on nature ? But all definite character has vanished
from these intellectual joys and pains. The only
distinctive feature which they possess is the addition
either of memory, or of hope, or of fear 3 to the present
feeling of pleasure or pain ; and their greater import
ance is simply ascribed to the greater force or dura
tion belonging to ideal feelings as compared with the
attractions which momentarily impress the senses.4
1 Ding. x. 6, from Epicurus
rep\ re\ovs : ou yap eyxys ?xw rt
von\au i-ayadby atpaipoliv fity ras
5ia xy^" ^5ui as, a(patpwy 5e Kal
ras St1 iuppo^MTiw kxi ras 81 aicpoau&rwv /cat -ras 5.a fiopcpas (-î).
The like, in a more expanded
form, in Cic. Tuso. iii. 18, 41.
2 Pint. 1. c. 16, 9 : is /cal
tX&pnvKal itonuruvAixuvtTt ip.a9ov
wjip' 'E.TLKtiipou ApSws yaiTTpl(see
pr^vious note) xP'Ce<r^ttl ; and:
-rep! ya<TTepa. yap, > (putrwKoye
TificiicpaTes,
dyaS6y. Conf.
ibid. 3, 1.
3 Bee p. 478, 1, and Epio. in
Pint. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: -rb
yap tvarzdis traptcbs KaraffTTipa
Kal rb nepl ravrqs Trttirby lAiricr/ia
tV aKWTi-ri\v xaoav Kal fZefiaiorarrfy ex^t rots irriAoyifaatlai Zvvafxfyois. Ibid. 5, 1 : *rb iazv fj?>6~
fiivov ttjs trapxbs Toi xa*-P0VTL TVS
ifuxw* vrtptiSoyres, auOts 8' 4k tov
xaipovros els rb r)86[ievov rp
i\ntSi TtAeuTtuj/Tas.
4 Coif., besides the extracts
on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i.
17, 55 : Animi autem voluptates
et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus ;
it is only" a misapprehension on
the part of several Epicureans
to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may therefore
be the stronger ones for the
reasons assigned above.
479
Chap
XIX.
480
Chap.
XIX'
THE EPICUREANS.
Incidentally the remembrance of philosophic discourses is mentioned 1 as a counterpoise to bodily
pain ; properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains

are not different from other pleasures in kind, but
only in degree, by reason of their being stronger and
more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape
the admission that we have no cause for rejecting
gross and carnal enjoyments if these can liberate us
from the fear of higher powers, of death, and of
sufferings ; 2 and thus the only consolation he can offer
in pain is the uncertain one that the most violent
pains either do not last long, or else put an end to
life ; and the less violent ones ought to be endured
since they do not exclude a counterbalancing plea
sure.3 Hence victory over the impression of the
moment must be won, not so much by mental force
stemming the tide of feeling, as by a proper estimate
of the conditions and actions of the senses.
(3)Virtiie.
In no other way can the necessity of virtue
be established in the Epicurean system. Agreeing
with the strictest moralists, so far as to hold
that virtue can be as little separated from happi
ness as happiness from virtue,4 having even the
testimony of opponents as to the purity and integrity
1 In his last letter (Diog.
22), after describing Lis painiui illness, Epicurus continues :
<lvtiirapirdmro 5e irao~i tuvtois
rb Kara yûx^lv xa^P0V
TV
yeyovoiuv tj/xiv Sia\oyLaixwv p.i4\f>v.
2 Diog. 142 ; Cic. Fin. ii. 7,
21.
'
' Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin.
i. 15, 49 ; Pint. And. Po. 14, p.

30 ; M. Avrel. vii. 33, 64.
' Diog. 140 : ovk tartv rjSfas
&nv tuv <ppovifxa>s KoX Ka\ais
Kai 5ucai'a.'S, oube <ppovifJLO)S leal 5iKai'a-s &i ev rod rfifus. The same
p. 132, 138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9,
Z6; Kin. i. 16, 50; 19, 0'2 ; Sen.
Ep. So, 18.
INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS.
of his moral teaching, which in its results differed
in no wise from that of the Stoics ; 1 Epicurus, never
theless, holds a position of strong contrast to the
Stoics in respect of the grounds on which his moral
theory is based. To demand virtue for its own sake
seemed to him a mere phantom of the imagination.
Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real
object in life.2 Virtue has only a conditional value 3
as a means to happiness ; or, as it is otherwise
expressed,4 Virtue taken by itself does not render a
man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exer
cise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system
does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled,
1 Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf.
12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia sum (invitis nec nostris
popularibus the Stoics dicam), sancta Epicurum et rec
ta praecipere, et si propius accesseris tristia : voluptas enim
ilia ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem
dicimus earn ille dicit voluptati
. . . itaque non dico, quod
plerique nostrorvtm, sectam
Epicuri flagitiorum ministram
esse, sed illud dioo : male audit,
infamis est, et immerito. Ep.
33, 2 : Apud me vero Epicurus
est et fortis, licet manuleatus
sit. Seneca not infrequently
quotes sayings of Epicurus, and
calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus,
Hermarchus, and Polysenus,
magnos viros. Conf. Cio. Fin.
ii. 25, 81.
' Epic, in Plvt. Adv. Col.
17, 3 : iy&i $' i<p' rfiovks <rvv(X('!s
rapaKaXu, Kai ovk îr' aperas, Kevas
xalfiaralas KalrapaxtiSeis 4x^ffas
' Diog. 138: Si& Si rijyriSoiîv

teal ras dpt-ras Set* aipciaQcu ov Si'
auras* &ffirtp t$jv larpiK^jtf Sta
iiyletav, KaBa. <fnjffi Kal A-tryeirjs.
Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att.
vii. 2) : Istie enim vestrae eximiae pulcraeque virtutes nisi
voluptatem emcerent, quis eas
aut laudabiles aut expetendas
arbitraretur ? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius
artis sed bonas valetudinis causa
probamus, &c. . . . ; sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda
est , non expeteretur si nihil efficeret ; nunc expetitur quod est
tanquam artifex conquirendas
et comparandae voluptatis.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b :
ipT^] -wtpi t))V 4K\oyf)y iari riiy
7*5eW KCLT 'E-HlKOVpOl>.
' Sen. Ep. 85, 18 : Epicurus
quoque judicat, cum virtutem
habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam
virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat
voluptas quEe ex virtute est, non
ipsa virtus.
II
481
Chap.
XIX.
482
Chap,
XIX
THE EPICUREANS.
or of virtuous action, but in the freedom from dis
quiet, fear, and dangers, which follows as a conse
quence from virtue. Wisdom and intelligence con
tribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear
of the Gods and of death, by making us independent
of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching
us to bear pain as something subordinate and pass
ing, and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and
natural life.1 Self-control aids in that it points out
the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and
pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment
and the minimum of suffering ; 2 valour, in that it
enables us to overcome fear and pain ; 3 justice, in
that it makes life possible without that fear of Gods
and men, which ever haunts the transgressor.4 To
the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but
only a means to an end lying beyonda happy
lifebut withal a means so certain and necessary,
that virtue can neither be conceived without happi
ness, nor happiness without virtue. However un
necessary it may seem, still Epicurus would ever
insist that an action to be right must be done not
according to the letter, but according to the spirit
of the law, not simply from regard to others, or by
compulsion, but from delight in what is good.5
1 Diog. 132 ; Cic. Fin. i. 13, v. 1152: The criminal cannever
43 ; 19, 62.
rest, and often in delirium or
2 Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.
sleep betrays himself. Epicurus,
' Cic. 1. c. 13, 49. Diog. however, refused to answer the
120: tV Si avtipelav tpvtrei /xii question, Whether the wise man
ylycaScu, \oyurii$ Si roxi <rvfi<pc- would do what is forbidden, if
povros.
he could be certain of not be* Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. ing discovered? Plict. col. 34,
144 : Pint. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1 ; 1.
Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Xucr.
' Philodemut, De Rhet. Vol.
THE WISE MAN.

The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on
behalf of his wise man as the Stoics had urged on
behalf of theirs. Not only does he attribute to him
a control over pain, in nothing inferior to the Stoic
insensibility of feeling, but he endeavours himself
to describe the wise man's life as most perfect and
satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from emotions,
and in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of
the soul such as compassion, the wise man finds his
philosophic activity in no wise thereby impaired.1
Without despising enjoyment, he is altogether master
of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by
intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful
influence on life. He alone has an unwavering cer
tainty of conviction ; 2 he alone knows how to do the
right thing in the right way ; he alone, as Metrodorus observes,3 knows how to be thankful. Nay,
more, he is so far exalted above ordinary men, that
Epicurus promises his pupils that, by carefully ob
serving his teaching, they will dwell as Gods among
men;4 so little can destiny influence him, that he
calls him happy under all circumstances.5 Happi
ness may, indeed, depend on certain external condiHerc. v. a, col. 25 : The laws
ought to be keptfif ^ra Siupicrtx4va fiivov, awk koI to t^v SfioeiSeuxv abroU ?xo"Ta !a^XrfrTeiy, K&iccira fj-h fi6vov avvtiSorwv,
a\Ka ntu> lavBavoi/ifv airoâiroi'Tas, koI /*60' T}Soyrjs, ov Si' av6.yKT]vy
(cal fSefimws, iW ov aaKevofievas.
1 Diog. 117 ; 118; 119.
* Pint. Adv. Col. 19, 2.
' Diog. 118 ; Sen. Ep. 81, 11.
The Stoic assertion of the

equality of virtues and vices
was, however, denied by the
Epicureans. Diog. 120.
* Diog. 135; conf. JPlut,
K. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3 ; Lucr. iii.
323.
5 Cic: Fin. i. 19, 61 ; v. 27
80: Semper beatum esse sapientem. Tusc. v. 9, 26 ; Stob
Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.
484
Chap,
THE EPICUREANS.
tions ; it may even be allowed that the disposition
to happiness is not found in every nature, nor in
every person;1 but still, when it is found, its sta
bility is sure, nor can time affect its duration. For
wisdomso Epicurus and the Stoics alike believed
is indestructible,2 and the wise man's happiness can
never be increased by time. A life, therefore, bounded
by time can be quite as complete as one not so
bounded.8
Different as are the principles and the tone of
the systems of the Stoics and of Epicurus, one and
the same tendency may yet be traced in boththe
tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian
philosophythe desire to place man in a position of
absolute independence by emancipating him from
connection with the external world, and by awaken
ing in him the consciousness of the infinite freedom
of thought.4
1 Diog. 117.
1 Diog. 117 : rhv 5a| yiv6fitvov oo<pov /h]Kti ri]v ivoyrlmy
Sideeffii/ |i)5' i-rrahhaTT6iv ixivTa. The latter words
appear to admit the possibility
of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through madness.

* Diog. 126 ; 146 ; Cic. Fin.
i. 19, 63.
* See also page 476, 2.
485
THE INDIVIDUAL.
CHAPTER XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED : SPECIAL POINTS.
The general principles already laid down determine
likewise the character of particular points in the
chap.
XX'
moral science of the Epicureans. Epicurus, it is A. The intrue, never developed his moral views to a systematic divUlualtheory of moral actions and states, however much
his pupils, particularly in later times, busied them
selves with morality and special points in a system of
morals.1 Moreover, his fragmentary statements and
precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that
is known corresponds with the notion which we must
form in accordance with those general views. All ^
the practical rules given by Epicurus aim at con
ducting man to happiness by controlling passions
and desires. The wise man is easily satisfied. He
sees that little is necessary for supplying the wants J
1 We gather this from the
fragments of Philodemus' treatise irepi KaKubv Kal t&v avrtKifiV(av aya9ut> Kal iwv 4y oJs
ei<ri Kal Kept S. The 10th book
of this treatise gives a portrait
of the irtpii(pa.vos, and kindred
faults, after the manner of
Theophrastus ; the 9th, a mild
criticism of Xenophon's and

Aristotle's o'movohm6s. It is objected to the latter that the
master of the house is there
made (col. ii. 30) to rise earlier
than his servants, and to go to
bed later than they do, such
conduct being Ta\ai*wpov koX
avointiov <pi\o<r6<pov.
486
Chap
XX.
THE EPICUREANS*
of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that
imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches
required by nature may be easily acquired ; 1 that
the most simple nourishment affords as much enjoy
ment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time
far more conducive to health ; 2 that therefore the re
striction of wants rather than the increase of posses
sions makes really rich;3 and that he who is not
satisfied with little will never be satisfied at all.4 He
therefore can like Epicurus live upon bread and
water,5 and at the same time think himself as happy
1 Dwg.Ui; 146; 130; Stob.
Floril. 17, 23 ; Sen. Ep. 16, 7 ;
Lucr. ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115;
Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12 : tpt\ocr6<p(ft 5} dffrl irKoirov puKp6v 6
irapeSwKo/iev aKo\o66a>s [for thus
and not by tbnalpus must the
defective -u>s be represented]
rois Ka6rryep6o'ii' iv toIs frtpl
ir\oirov \6yois. Conf. p. 476,
3; 477.
2 Diog. 130.
Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37 ;
Sen. Ep. 21, 7 ; 14, 17 ; 2, 5 :
Honesta, inquit, res est lseta
paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis
parasse divitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.
4 Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf.
Sen. Ep. 9, 20 : Si cui sua non
videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tarnen
miser est.
s Diog. 11 ; Stob. Floril. 17,
34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen.
Ep. 25, 4. Epicurus lived very
abstemiously. The charge of
luxury brought against him
was fully disposed of by Gastendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic. 153.
Timocrates, on the strength of
one of his letters, asserts that

he spent a mina every day on
his table. If this statement be
not a pure invention, it must
refer to the whole circle of his
friends. It could otherwise
only have happened at such a
time as the siege of Athens by
Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a
modius of wheat cost 300
drachmas, and when Epicurus
counted out to his friends the
beans on which they lived.
Pint. Demetr. 33. The further
statement of Timocrates
{Diog. 6) ainbv Sis rijs r/fiepas
4/xtii> airb rpvfris)is certainly
an unfounded calumny. The
moderation of Epicurus is ad
mitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4 ; 13,
1 ; and Epicurus flatters him
self, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non
toto asse pasci, Metrodorum,
qui nondum tantum profecerit,
toto; and, in Diog. 11, because
he was satisfied with bread and
water. Ibid, he writes : Trinbov
fioi Tvpov KvQvlov, 1v' brav fioi7roAyT\cuiraa'0ai, Svyaifiai.
Still less have we any reason
to connect the diseases of which
THE INDIVIDUAL.
as Zeus.1 He eschews passions which disturb peace
of mind and the repose of life ; considering it foolish
to throw away the present in order to obtain an un
certain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means
of life, seeing he can only once enjoy it.2
He
therefore neither gives way to passionate love, nor to
forbidden acts of profligacy.3 Fame he does not
Epicurus and some of his 1, not only discusses the most
scholars died (as Plut. N. P. suitable time for the enjoy
Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein fol ment of love, but quotes as the
lowing Timocrates in Diog. 7) words of Epicurus : i yipwv 6
with their presumed luxurious- aotpbs &v Kal fi$i dvvafjieias tt\tj<rtdîv %ti rats rwv kclKwv a<pa7s
1 Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See Xafp ital tyri\a<pi)<reaiv (N. P.
Suav. V. 12, 3). These enjoy
p. 477, 2.
* Epicurus and Metrodorus, ments, according to Epicurus,
in Stob. Floril. 16,28; 20, Conf. are only then allowed when
Plut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: i they do not entail any bad con
tt\s aiipuiv ViKurra $t6uevos, SSs sequences {Diog. 118), or pro
(prjatv 'EinKoupoj, ^Surra vp6aet(u duce passionate states of feel
vpbs t^k atiptov.
ing. Hence he not only forbids
3 Serious charges on this unlawful commerce {Diog. 118),
head, against which Gassendi but declares ovk ipaoiiiataOai
defends him, are preferred rbv ao<piv. Diog. 118; Stob.
against Epicurus by Timo Floril. 63, 31. Eros is denned
crates, in Ding. 6 ; but (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = oivrovos
neither the testimony of Timo 8peis atppoHLo-'iwy. Conf. Plut.
crates, nor the fact that a Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is con
woman of loose morality (see sequently a passionate and dis
above p. 406) was in his society, turbing state, which the wise
can be considered conclusive. man must avoid. The Stoics,
Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, on the contrary, allowed Eros
31, calls Epicurus avatairtros. to their wise man. The same
Epicurus is, however, far below view is taken of Eros by Lucre
our standard of morality. Thus, tius, who cannot find words
in the quotation on p. 479, 1, strong enough to express the
he reckons rfioraX Si' &^>poSi<ritnv restlessness and confusion en
among the necessary ingre tailed by love, the state of de
dients of the good. By Ewstrat. pendence in which it places'
in Eth. N. 48, such pleasures man, and the loss to his fortune
are included among tpvatxal (see and good name. His advice is
p. 476, 3), not among 7)5ocal to allay passion as quickly as
irayxaiai. They are treated in possible by means of Venus
the same light by Luer. v. 1050; volgivaga, and to gratify it in
and Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, a calm way.
487
Chap.
XX.
488
XXP
!
JHE EPICUREANS.
cove*; 5 an<^ fr the opinions of men he cares only so
far as to wish not to be despised, since being despised
would expose him to danger.1 Injuries he can bear
with calmness.2 He cares not what may happen to
him after death ; * nor envies any one the possessions
which he does not himself value.4
It has been already seen how Epicurus thought
to rise above pains, and to emancipate himself from
the fear of the Gods and death.6 And it has been
further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of
his principles the same independence and happiness
which the Stoics aspired to by means of theirs. But
whilst the Stoics hoped to attain this indepen
dence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content
to restrain and regulate them. Desires he would not
have uprooted, but he would have them brought into
proper proportion to the collective end and condition
of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect re
pose of mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own sim
plicity, Epicurus is far from disapproving, under all
circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life.
The
wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar.6 Care
for business he will not neglect; only he will not
1 Diog. 120 ; 140 ; Cio. Tuso.
ii. 12, 28; Iaict. iii. 59; 993.
1 Sen. De Const. 16, 1.
Diog. 118 : ou5e raffis ippovrittv.
* Lucr. iii. 74.
See pp. 479, 455. A further
argument may, however, be
here quoted. In Pint. N. P.
Buav. Viv. 16, 3, he says : 8ti
y6<T(? voaSiv dffKiTjj Tivhs euTtdVct?
<pl\av ffwriye, al ovk i<p66rti -nis

irpoffaywyiis rov vypov t vtipuiri,
nal tcov i<rx^Ta"' NeoitAf'ous K6yu
pfp.vT)iiiv6s eHjKero Ty fiera 5aKpvwv ijfiovfi. It is true that a
certain mawkishness and selfconceit may be detected in this
language.
Diog. 119 ; Philadem. De
Vit. ix. 12 ; 27, 40.
THE INDIVIDUAL.
trouble himself too much about it, and will prefer
the business of education to any and every other.1
Nor will he despise the attractions of art, al
though he is satisfied when obliged to do without
them.J In short, his self-sufficiency will not consist
in using little, but in needing little ; and it is this
freedom from wants which adds flavour to his more
luxurious enjoyments.3 His attitude to death is the
same. Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he
has no other mode of escaping unendurable suffer
ing, he will resort to suicide if necessary, but the
cases will be rare, because he has learnt to be happy
under all bodily pains. The Stoic's recommendation
of suicide finds no favour with him.4
1 Diog. 120 : icHjffc&JS ttpovai\treaBai Kal rov fieWovros. 121 :
XprmariffeffBai re o.irb fi6vrjs cotpias
kiropi)oaiira. The limitation im
plied in the text would, however,
seem to require p6vris. Philodem. in the same sense 1. c. 23,
23, says that Epicurus received
presents from his scholars.
Conf. Plict. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also
15, 31.
1 Diog. 121: tucivas recWfl^ffciv i %Xot' &fi*<up6pus c'êip hv
/til axoiri (Cobet, not intelli
gibly : i.iia<p6pus 4 <rxofj)i).
* Epic, in Diog. 130 : koX t)iv
aitripKctav 5<f byaObv fieya yo/xl~
(opei* oux Iva. travrtas rots ohlyois
Xptit^da, o\\' Sirens 4iw /xh %X(atleI'
to noWct rots 6\lyots xp&fieOa
Kentiafitvoi yvrnriws 8ti fyZtffra
woAureXci'as aicoKavovtriv oi fjmffra
ainfjs Seofievot.
4 The Epicurean in do. Fin.
i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint
[dolores] feramus, sin minus,

aequo animo e vita, cum ea non
placeat, tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic, in Sen. Ep. 12,
10 : Malum est in necessitate
vivere, sed in necessitate vivere
necessitas nulla est. On the
other hand, Ep. 24, 22 : Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui
mortem concupiscunt, quam
eos, qui timent, et ait : ridiculum est currere ad mortem
tsedio vita?, cum genere vitae ut
cnrrendum esset ad mortem
efteceris. Diog. 119, the older
editions read : Kal ir7jpa>9ls toj
ttyeis nfdffciv ainby rov fiiov.
Cobet : fierdêtv avrbv rov fiiov.
Instead of mjpwBets V7jpw64vra is
read, or, as we might prefer, in
stead of lUfToJtii' jufTcln. Sui
cide was only allowed by Epi
curus in extreme cases. In
Seneca's time, when an Epi
curean, Diodorus, committed
489
Chap.
490
THE EPICUREANS.
Chap.
XX'
However self-sufficing the wise man may be,

still Epicurus will not separate him from connec-
B. Civil
and. the
family.
(1) Civil
tociety.
tion with others. Not, indeed, that he believed with

the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational
beings.1 Yet even he could form no idea of human
...
.
....
life except in connection with human society. He
does not, however, assign the same value to all forms
of social life. Civil society and the state have for
him the least attraction. Civil society is only an
external association for the purpose of protection.
Justice reposes originally on a contract entered
into for purposes of mutual security.2 Laws are
made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent
their committing, but to prevent their suffering in
justice.3 Law and justice are not, therefore, bind
ing for their own sake, but for the general good;
nor is injustice to be condemned for its own sake,
but only because the offender can never be free from
fear of discovery and punishment.4 There is not,
therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable
justice. The claims of justice only extend to a
limited number of beings and nationsthose, in
fact, which are able and willing to enter into the
social compact. And the particular applications of
justice which constitute positive right differ in difsuicide,his fellow-scholars were
unwilling to allow that suicide
was permitted by the precepts
of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).
' Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6 : 'fciriKoupos tnav avaipttv 0f\T) r))v
<puaiKT]V Koivuviav ayBpuirou irpbs
dWÂous, k.t.K.
1 Diog. 150; 154. From

this point of view, Luor. v.
1 106, gives a long description
of the rise of a state.
Stob. Floril. 43, 139.
4 Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149;
Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15 ; Plut.
Adv. Col. 35. See p. 482, 4.
SOCIAL RELATIONS.
ferent cases, and change with circumstances. What
is felt to be conducive to mutual security must pass
for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inex
pedient it is no longer binding.1 The wise man will
therefore only enter into political life in case and
in as far as this is necessary for his own safety.
Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects
from harm. He who pursues it, without thereby at
taining this object, acts most foolishly.2 Since pri
vate individuals live as a rule much more quietly
and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the
Epicureans should be averse to public affairs ; public
life, after all, is a hindrance to what is the real endin-chiefwisdom and happiness.3 Their watchword
is Adds fiubaas.* To them the golden mean
seemed by far the most desirable lot in life.5 They
only advise citizens to take part in public affairs
when special circumstances render it necessary,6 or
when an individual has such a restless nature that
1 Ding. 150-153.
1 IAog. 140.
PUt. Adv. Col. 31 ; 33, 4 ;
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9 ; Epictet.
Diss. i. 23, 6; Luor. v. 1125;
do. pro Sext. 10, 23. PMlodem.
Ttp\ ^TopiKTjs (Vol. Here, iv.)
col. 14 : ovSe xpi]<rljuiv Tfyov^fQa
t^)v TToKiriK^y Hvvafuv, o&t' clvtols
rots KeKTTjjucroty, otherats Tr6\tiriti,
aurV Ka9' avrffV a\\a tcoWokis
curiae Kal ffvfltpopuv hvt]Kt(nwvt
when combined with upright
ness, it benefits the community,
and is sometimes useful; at
other times, harmful to states
men themselves.
4 Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T.

Pomponius Atticus is the true
type of an Epicurean, on
whose conduct during the civil
war and withdrawal from public
life, see Nepos, Att. 6.
4 Metrodorus,iniYt>i. Floril.
45, 26 :
v6\et prfiT* ws AeW
&.vatTTp4<pov /i^re &s Kuvwty * rb
fjLfv yap iKTaretrai to 5e KaipotyvKaKeirai.
' Seneca well expresses the
difference on this point be
tween Epicureans and Stoics in
the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.
491
Chap,
XX"
492
Chap,
'
THE EPICUREANS.
he cannot be content with the qniet of private life.1
Otherwise they are too deeply convinced of the
impossibility of pleasing the masses to wish even to
make the attempt.2 For the same reason they appear
to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and
unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found
its political expression in the unbending republican
spirit, so often encountered at Eome. Naturally the
soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter
under a monarchical constitution. Of their political
principles one thing at least is known, that they did
not consider it degrading for a wise man to pay court
to princes, and under all circumstances they re
commended unconditional obedience to the powers
that be.3
Family life is said to have been deprecated by
Epicurus equally with civil life.4 Stated thus baldly,
this is an exaggeration. It appears, however, to
be established, that Epicurus believed it to be gene
rally better for the wise man to forego marriage and
the rearing of children, since he would thereby save
himself many disturbances.5 It is also quite credible
1 Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p.
Quam regere imperio res velle
466.
et regna tenere.
1 Epic, in Sen. Ep. 29, 10 :
* Mpict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against
Nunquam volui populo placere ; Epicurus): Starl aro<rv/t/9ovAcvcis
nam quae ego scio non probat Ttji &o<p$ rtKVOTpo(f>iv; ri fo&j
populus, quae probat populus f*r/ 5ta toOto tj Aviras *^nreo*it ;
ego nescio. Similar expressions ii. 20, 20 : 'EÛovpos to pi* ofrom Stoics hare been pre- ipbs irdVr* oitckôto kol to oIkoviously quoted*
5c(nr($Tou ical tptKov. The last
* D'wg. 121 : not nivapx0"
words prove with what cauKcuptp BepaTteuaftv [rby oo<p&i>~\. tion these statements must be
Luor. v. 1 125 :
taken.
Utsatius multo jam sitparere
s Diog. 119. The passage
quietum,
is, however, involved in much
FRIENDSHIP.
483
that he declared the love of children towards parents Chap.

to be no inborn feeling.1 This view is, after all, only
a legitimate consequence of his materialism ; but it
did not oblige him to give up parental love altoge
ther. Nay, it is asserted of him that he was any
thing but a stranger to family affections.2
The highest form of social life was considered by c. FriendEpicurus to be friendshipa view which is peculiar
in a system that regarded the individual as the
atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes
more value to a connection with others freely en
tered upon and based on individual character and
personal inclination, than to one in which a man
finds himself placed without any choice, as a mem
ber of a society founded on nature or history. The
basis, however, on which the Epicurean friendship
rests is very superficial ; regard is mainly had to
its advantages, and in some degree to the natural
effects of common enjoyments; 3 but it is also treated
obscurity, owing to a difference
of reading. The earlier text
was : koI pAiv xai ya^.T)ota> teal
tckiwoiîtci* rbv oo<pbv, as 'Ett(Kovpos iv reus Siarroplats koI Iv
tois 7rpl tpwcus. Kara Tttpio-Ta.au>
S< iroTt /3(ou ou 7ofi^<rM. Cohet
reads instead : Koi /ui;St yaiii)ofiy
tirjoi TtKvo-noiTimiv rbv ootybv . . .
KaTCi vtpiaraoiv 5f itot fitov
yapftoeiv. What the MS. authority for this reading is, we are
not told. In sense it agrees
with Uieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 191,
quot ing from Seneca, De Matrimonio : Epicurus . . . raro dicit
sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia
multaincommodaadmixtasunt
nuptiis. Like riches, honours,

health, ita et uzores sitas in
bonorum malorumque confinio,
grave autem esse viro sapienti
venire in dubium, utrum bonam
an malam ducturus sit.
1 Pint. Adv. Col. 27, 6 ; De
Am. Prol. 2, p. 495 ; Fjrictet.
Diss. i. 23, 3.
2 IMog. 10 : $ re vpbs robs
yovtas tvxapiorla Kal tj vpbs robs
a5e\<f>obs evroita. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus' testament, ibid. 18.
' Diog. 120 : eal tV <pi>dav
Sii ris XP*'"* [yiv*c9ai] . . .
ovvloraoBat Si abrr/v Kara, xotvav'tav iv rais ifiovats. Epic. Ibid.
494
Chap,
THE EPICUREANS.
in such a way, that its scientific imperfection has no
influence on its moral importance. Only one section
of the School, and that not the most consistent,
maintained that friendship is pursued in the first in
stance for the sake of its own use and pleasure, but
that it subsequently becomes an unselfish love.1
The assumption that among the wise there exists
a tacit agreement requiring them to love one another
as much as they love themselves, is clearly only a lame
shift.2 Still, the Epicureans were of opinion that a
grounding of friendship on motives of utility was not
inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem.
Friendly connection with others affords so plea
sant a feeling of security, that it entails the most
enjoyable consequences ; and since this connection
can only exist when friends love one another as
themselves, it follows that self-love and the love of a
friend must be equally strong.3
Even this inference sounds forced, nor does it
148 (also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68) :
koX TTjv iv avrois tois &>pi<rfivois
ao-0a\eai> (pi\lai lidMara Krijcrei
Sc<-yoplfiy <rvint\oviJLiirriv.(Cobet,
however, reads : tpiKiat iiAhtan
KartSeiy tlvai ffwrt\vfiiin\vt in
which case $>i\(a should be substituted for <f>iXias or else rîrei
for KaTiSeiV.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8 :
The wise man needs a friend,
non ad hoc quod Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter
in which Stilpo's cynical selfcontentment is blamed), ut
habeat, qui sibi asgro adsideat,
succurrat in vincula conjecto
vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipse regro adsideat,
quem ipse circumventum hostili

custodia liberet. Cic. Fin. i.
20, 66 : Cum solitudo et vita
sine amicis insidiarum et metus
plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis
confirmatur animus et a spe
pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest, etc. On the
same grounds, Philodem. De
Vit. ix. (V. Here, iii.) col. 24,
argues that it is much better
to cultivate friendship than to
withdraw from it.
1 Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.
2 Ibid. 70.
* Ibid. 67.
FRIENDSHIP.
495
fully state the grounds on which Epicurus's view of .Chap.

the value of friendship reposes. That view, in fact, xxwas anterior to all the necessary props of the system.
What Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The
first conditions of such enjoyment, however, are in
ward repose of mind, and the removal of fear of
disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate
and dependent on externals to trust his own powers
to satisfy these conditions.
He needed the sup
port of others, not only to obtain their help in
necessity and trouble, and to console himself for
the uncertainty of the future, but still more, to
make sure of himself and his principles by having
the approval of others, and thus obtaining an inward
satisfaction which he could not otherwise have
had. Thus, the approval of friends is to him the
pledge of the truth of his convictions. In sympathy
with friends his mind first attains to a strength by
which it is able to rise above the changing cir
cumstances of life. General ideas are for him too
abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers
individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as
absolutely true, cannot feel quite happy and sure of
his ground, unless he finds others to go with him.1
The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment
of his own cultivated personality; and wherever
this standard prevails, particular value is attached
1 The same need finds expression in the advice given by
Epicurus {Sen. Ep. 11, 8 ; 25,
5) : Let every one choose some
distinguished man as his pat-
tern, that so he may live, as it

were, perpetually under his
eye. Man requires a stranger
to give him moral support,
496
Chap.
THE EPICUREANS.
to the personal relations of society, and to friend
ship.1
Hence Epicurus uses language on the value and
necessity of friendship which goes far beyond the
grounds on which he bases it. Friendship is uncon
ditionally the highest of earthly goods.2 It is far more
important in whose company we eat and drink, than
what we eat and drink.3 In case of emergency, the
wise man will not shrink from suffering the greatest
pains, even death, for his friend.4
It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus
and his followers was in harmony with these pro
fessions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less
celebrated than the Pythagorean.5 There may be
an offensive mawkishness and a tendency to mutual
admiration apparent in the relations of Epicurus to
his friends,6 but of the sincerity of his feelings there
1 As illustrations in modern
times, the reunions of the
French freethinkers, or the
societies of Rousseau, Mendels
sohn, Jacobi, may be mentioned.
It deserves notice that in these
societies, as amongst the Epi
cureans, an important part was
played by women. This is
quite natural, when philosophy
is confined to cultivated inter
course and conversation.
* Diog. 148 : S> y ootpia itapaffttevdêrai eis tV rov SKov plov
HtucapioTqra -woKv fieyurr6v iarir
il Trjj <pi\lai kttjctis. Ous. Fin.
ii. 25, 80: Epicurus exalts
friendship to heaven. In Diog.
120, Cobet reads instead of the
usual <j>i\ov re ob$eva Krh<re<r6at
[rbv ao^hv], which is altogether
untrustworthy, <pi\uy re oiSiy

Krii<re<r9<u.
* Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the
addition : Nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est.
4 Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7 ; Diog.
121. We have no reason to
suppose, with Sitter, iii. 474,
that this was not the expres
sion of a real sentiment. That
it is inconsistent we can well
allow.
4 The Epicureans in Cic.
Fin. i. 20, 66 : At vero Epi
curus una in domo, et ea quidem
angusta, quam magnos quantaque anions conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum
greges ! quod fit etiam nunc ab
Epicureis. Ibid. ii. 25, 80.
Instances have already
FRIENDSHIP.
can be no doubt. One single expression referring to the property of friends,1 is enough to prove
what a high view Epicurus held of friendship ; and
there is evidence to show that he aimed at a higher
improvement of his associates.2
In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation
of being a kind, benevolent, and genial companion.3
His teaching bears the same impress. It meets
the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting
on compassion and forgiveness,4 and supersedes
its own egotism by the maxim that it is more
been quoted, p. 418, 2. of the
extravagant honours required
by Epicurus ; nor did he fail
to eulogise his friends, as the
fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and Pytbocles
(Diog. 6) pruve. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the
release of a captive friend, Epicurusapplaudedhim(.Ptet N. P.
Sua. Vivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2) :
ais ei> T Kal veavtKvs c| atrntas
aAaOF KaTCjSr) WltOptp Ttp 2t''/a.' fioyO-fiaav. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses
his thanks for a present : Sottas
Te Kal fieyaAoTrpeira-s &rejUA^07jT
f/fiuv ra irtpl t^v rov tjlrov Koat5t?c, Kal ovpavtifi'fiKTi ffTj/zem tv848fiTrjs trpbs ejue euvolas. He
wrote of Pythocles before he
was 18 : ovk clvai (puffiv iv SAp
7?; 'EAAc5f awiw, Kal rtpariKws
ainbv ei5 a-KO.'yyiWtiv, Kal trdtrxftv
a&* to ribv yvvatKUV. evx^flevos ave^.ta-rira efrai travra Kai aven'ttpBova
rris inrepfioKris tow veavitjKuv
(Pint. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and
he also said (Pkilodem. irtpl
napfaatas, Fr. 6, V. Here. v.
2, 11) : is 5(4 XluQoKhia. rvxyv
BftixTft Tiapa rb TcBc/jLur/xevov.

Compare the remarks on p.
488, 3.
1 Diog. 1 1 : iiv re 'Eiriicovpov
ju^ atovv *S TO KOivbv KCtTOTifleadai Tas oiitrlas Kaddirep rbv T\v6ay6pav Koiva tcc t&v tp'tKwv
\iyovro-, airlffTovvToiv yotp eivat rb
rotourov ti 5' WKlffruv ou5
<pl\U)V.
2 Pkilodem. irepl Trappntxias
(V. Here. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73,
mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial
frankness towards friend-j.
Probably the words in Sen. Ep.
28, 9initium salutis est notitia peccatiare taken from a
moial exhortation addressed to
a friend.
' Not only does Diogenes
9, praise his unequalled bene
volence, his kindness to his
slaves, and his generalgcniality,
but Cicero calls him (Tusc. ii.
19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin.
ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et comem et humanum.
4 Diog. 118 : o6t KoKdtrftv
oiKeras A^ffiv fxivioi, Kal ovy*
K K
497
chap.
XX"
498
Cftap.
XX,
THE EPICUREANS.
blessed to give than to receive.1 The number of
such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited ; never
theless, the whole tone of the Epicurean School is
a pledge of the humane and generous character of
its moral teaching.2 To this trait that School
owes its chief importance in history. By its theory
of utility it undoubtedly did much harm, partly
exposing, partly helping forward, the moral decline
of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away
from the outer world within himself, by teaching
him to seek happiness in the beautiful type of
a cultivated mind content with itself, it contri
buted quite as much as Stoicism, though after a
gentler fashion, to the development and the exten
sion of a more independent and more universal
morality.
yv<iny riA ftu> -run mroi-SaiW.
121 : itrfxapla-taBai rwi 4nl r<j>
Siop0<6yuaTi.
1 Plut. N. P. Puav. Vi. 15, i
(similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3,
2, p. 778) : aurol Se Sîrou \iyovotv its rb c3 Troieiv $i$t6v i<m rod
niaxt'v. Conf. Alex. Aphr.
Top. 123. A similar maxim is
attributed by JElian, V. H. xiii.
13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf.
Acts xx. 35.
Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et
ipse bonus vir fuit et multi

Epicurei fuerunt et hodie sunt,
et in amicitiis fideles et in omni
vita constantes et graves nec
voluptate sed officio consilia
moderantes. Atticus is a wellknown example of genuine
human kindness and ready selfsacrifice, and Horace may be
also quoted as an illustration
of the same character. See
Stcinliart's remarks, I. c. p. 470.
COHERENCE OF THE SYSTEM.
4'M
CHAPTER XXi;
THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE ; ITS POSITION
IN HISTORY.
It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is deficient both in coherence and
CHAr.
XX1, ,
consistency. Nor is this objection without founda- A. Inner

tion. If we come to the study of it, looking for a 0fthe
complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical ^pw"f
development, we shall certainly be disappointed.
J
It is not difficult to show in what contradictions
Epicurus was involved ; in professing to trust the
senses wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond
the senses to the hidden causes of things ; in
despising logical forms and laws, and at the same
time building up his whole system on deductions ;
in holding that all sensations are true, but yet
maintaining that a portion of the realities which
they represent as belonging to things is only
relative. Nor were these the only inconsistencies.
At one time only natural causes and laws are
acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and
imagination is ignored ; at another, by the doctrine
of the swerving aside of atoms and of the human
will, unexplained caprice is elevated to the rank of
law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily
II 2
500
Chap.
XXt'
THE EPICUREANS.
sensations, and yet mental states are called higher
and more important; nay, more, even from a basis
of selfishness rules and precepts of humanity, justice,
love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It
ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics,
to whom the claim of clear and consistent thought
cannot be denied, were involved in similar difficul
ties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational
system on a basis of the senses. They, too, con
structed an ideal theory of morals on a material
groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared
that universal law is the only active power, whilst
they maintained that reality belongs only to the
world of matter. They, too, deduced a strict theory
of virtue from the principle of self-preservation ;
not to mention the inconsistent attitude which they
assumed towards the popular religion. To deny
to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of system,
because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies,
would be felt to be doing them an injustice. And
can Epicureanism be fairly condemned, when its
faults are essentially of the same kind (though a little
more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single
extenuating circumstance which can be urged on its
behalf?
The strongest argument in favour of Epicureanism
is that the development of the system does not
pretend to rest upon an intellectual platform. Epi
curus sought in philosophy a path to happiness,
a school of practical wisdom. For him knowledge
has only a secondary value, because it contributes
COHERENCE OF THE SYSTEM.
501
to this end ; indeed, both the tone and the c,,^1>results of his intellectual activity were determined
'_
by a reference to this end. In the case of the Stoics,
however, it has been already seen that the compara
tive subordination of Logic and Natural Science to
Moral Science, the going back to the older view of
nature, the vindication of the truth of the senses
and of the reality of matter, grew out of their pecu
liarly one-sided view of the scope of philosophy. In
the case of Epicurus the same results appear, and all
the more markedly, since Epicurus did not, like
the Stoics, look for happiness in subordination to a
universal law, but in individual gratification or plea
sure. For him the recognition of a universal law
had not the same importance as for the Stoics ; and
consequently Epicurus did not feel the same need of a
scientific method as they had done. He could there- N-//
fore more exclusively content himself with the im
pressions of the senses, and regard them as the only
unfailing source of knowledge. No necessity com
pelled him to advance from pure materialism to a
view of matter in which it is described as possessing
a soul, and made to be the bearer of reason. In fact,
the more exclusively everything was referred by him
to mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard
the individual as independent of all superhuman
forces in his pursuit of happiness, and left entirely
to himself and his natural powers. No system in
ancient times has so consistently carried out the
mechanical view of nature as that of the Atomists.
None, therefore, afforded such a strong metaphysical
THE EPICUREANS.
support to the Epicurean views of the absolute
worth of the individual. It was as natural for Epi
curus to build on the teaching of Democritus as for
the Stoics to build on that of Heraclitus. But Epi
curus, influenced probably more by practical than by
scientific considerations, allowed himself, by his theory
of the swerving aside of atoms, to destroy the con
sistency of the theory of Democritus.1
It is hardly necessary to notice here how the dis
tinctive features of the Epicurean morals were deve
loped out of their theory of happiness, in contrast
to the Stoic teaching. The happiness of Epicurus,
however, does not depend upon sensual gratification
as such, but upon repose of mind and cheerfulness
of disposition. His theory of morals, therefore, not
withstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a
nobler character, which is seen in its language as to
the wise man's relations to the pains and passions of
the body, to poverty and riches, to life and death,
quite as much as in the mild humanity and the
warm and hearty appreciation of friendship by the
Epicurean School. The rationalising spirit of that
School was undoubtedly opposed to any religious
belief which supposed an intervention of God in the
course of the world, or the world's influence on man
for weal or woe ; but its appeal to the senses without
criticism placed no objection in the way of admitting
divine beings, from whom no such intervention need
be feared. Nay, more, this belief seemed the most
natural ground for explaining the popular belief in
1 See p. 445.
HISTORICAL POSITION.
Gods. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly felt
want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion,
and a standard by which to test the accuracy of moral
ideas. Hence, notwithstanding scientific defects and
contradictions, the whole system of Epicurus bears a
definite stamp. All the essential parts of that Sys
tem are subservient to one and the same end. The
consistent working out of a scientific view of nature
is looked for in vain ; but there is no lack of consis
tency arising from an undeniable reference of the
individual to a definite and practical standard.
Looking to the wider historical relations of the
Epicurean system, the first point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to Stoicism,
The contrast between the two Schools is obvious ;
attention having been already drawn to it on all the
-r m
11 i
more important points. It is likewise well known
that a constant rivalry existed between the two
Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics
looked down on the Epicureans, and circulated many
calumnies with respect to their morals. For these
statements proofs may be found in the preceding
pages. Nevertheless, the two Schools are related
in so many respects, that they can only be regarded
as parallel links connected in one chain, their differences being -varieties where the same main ten
dency^ exists. Both agree in the general character
of their philosophy. In both practical considerations
prevail over speculation. Both treat natural science
and logic as" sciences subsidiary to ethicsnatural
science especially in view of its bearing on religion.
503
Chap.
.XXI/
B. BU
^^tio
of Epic nm se{a.
t!fn t0
Stoicism.
,^***
meiit.
504
THE EPICUREANS.
Chap. Both attach more importance to natural science

XXI
Ll than to logic. If the Epicurean neglect of scientific
rules fornis a contrast to the care which the Stoics
devoted thereto, both Schools are at least agreed in
one thingin displaying greater independence in
investigating the question as to a test of truth.
By both this standard w as placed in the senses ; and
to all appearances both were led to take this view
by the same cause ; appeals to the senses being a consequence of their purely practical way of looking at
* things. Both, moreover, employed against scepticism
the same practical postulatethe argument that
knowledge must be possible, or no certainty of action
would be possible. They even agree in not being
content with the phenomena supplied by the senses
as Such, although Epicurus as little approved of the
Stoic theory of irresistible impressions as he did of
their logical analysis of the forms of thought. With
such appeals to the senses how could there be any
other result than materialism both in the Stoic and
Epicurean systems ? But it is strange that the ma
terialism in both Schools should be based on the
same definition of reality, corresponding with their
practical way of looking at things.1
(ft) Points
In *ne unfolding and detailed exposition of
of differ- their materialistic views the systems diverge, more
widely, perhaps, than the philosophers themselves,
whose leading they professed to follow. These di
vergencies appear particularly on the subject of nature,
the Stoics regarding nature as a system of design,
1 Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.
505
the Epicureans explaining it as a mechanical product!^ Chap.

Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God
XXI\
everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms, ,
and the theory of necessity. Whilst the Stoics were
speculatively orthodox, the Epicureans were irreli
gious freethinkers. Both meet again in that branch
of natural science which is most important in re
spect of moralsthe part dealing with man. Both
hold that the soul is a fiery atmospheric substance,
Even the proof for this view, derived from the mutual
influence of body and soul, is common to both.
Both distinguish between the higher and the lower
parts of the soul, and thus even the Epicureans in their
psychology allow a belief in the superiority of reason
to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.
The arena of the warmest dispute between the V
two Schools is, however, ethics. Yet, even on this
ground, they are more nearly related than appears
at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be
possible than that between the Epicurean theory of
pleasure and the Stoic theory of virtue ; and true it
is that the two theories are diametrically opposite.
Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and
the same end the happiness of mankindbut the
conditions of happiness are also laid down by both
in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue, ac
cording to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only
good ; but the former in making virtue consist essen
tially in withdrawal from the senses or insensibility ;
the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of mind or
imperturbability, are expressing the same belief.
606
THE EPICUREANS.
Chap. Man can only find unconditional and enduring satis' ~ '__ faction, when by means of knowledge he attains to a
condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to an
independence of external attractions and misfortunes.
The same unlimited appeal to personal truth i3 the
common groundwork of both systems. Both have
expanded this idea under the same formthat of
the ideal wise manfor the most part with the same
features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we have
seen, superior to pain and want ; he enjoys an ex
cellence which cannot be lost ; and he lives among
men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus,
when worked out into details, the difference in the
estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and
Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can
separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean
separate virtue from happiness.
But, whilst recommending a living for society,
both systems take no real interest in social life. 'The
recognition of a natural society amongst mankind,
of certain positive relations to state and family, above
all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world,
characterise the Stoics^ The pursuit of friendship,
and the gentle humanity of their ethics, characterise
the Epicureans. Together with these peculiarities
one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have
J renounced the political character of the old propriety
of conduct, and diverting their attention from public
life, seek to find a basis for universal morality in the
simple relation of man to man.
The united weight of all these points of resem
507
blance is sufficient to warrant the assertion that, Chap.

notwithstanding their differences, the Stoics and Epi
cureans stand on the same footing, and that the (fi) There.
.
latiomhip
sharpness of the contrast between them is owing to greater
their laying hold of opposite sides of one and the JjuSJ^^
same principle. Abstract personality, and self-con
sciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both
the highest aim. Compared with it not only the state
of the senses, but the scientific knowledge of things,
and the realisation of moral ideas in a commonwealth,
are of minor importance. Tn this self-consciousness
happiness consists. To implant it in man is the
object of philosophy, and knowledge is only of value
when and in as far as it ministers to this end.
The point of difference between the two Schools is
their view of the conditions under which that cer- /
tainty of consciousness is attained. The Stoics hope *
to attain it by the entire subordination of the indivi/
dual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other v
hand, are of opinion that man can only then be con
tent in himself when he is restrained by nothing
external to himself. The first condition of happiness
consists in liberating individual life from all depend- /
ence on others, and all disturbing causes. The *
former, therefore, make virtue, the latter make per
sonal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By ^
the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived
as of a purely negative character, as being freedom
from pain, and is referred to the whole of human
life. Hence it is always made to depend on the
moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills,
508
Chap.
XXI.
( >) Rela
tion to
Aristijj-
THE EPICUREANS.
and the state of the senses, on intelligence and
actions conformable with intelligence, in short, on
virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the Epicureans
arrive by a roundabout coufse at the same result
as the Stoics the conviction that happiness can
only be the lot of those who are altogether inde
pendent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward
harmony.
Towards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears
nearly the same relation as Stoicism. True it is that
Epicurus and his School would not recognise their ob
ligation to either one or other of their predecessors.1
1 It has been already stated,
p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus ad
mitted his debt to Democritus,
but not without some reserve ;
otherwise he claimed to be en
tirely self-taught, and to have
learned nothing from the an
cient teachers, and expressed
himself with such conceit and
scorn as to spare neither them
nor their writings. Ding. 8,
besides mentioning his abuse of
Nausiphanes(sup.342, 1), refers
also to his calling the Platonists
AiovuffoxdAoicar, Plato himself
in irony the golden Plato, Heraclitus KuKjjT^y, Democritus AijpSKpnov, Antidorus 2aivl$a>pov,
the Cynics fyBpobs ttis 'EA\d5ov,
the Dialecticians ro\v<f>6oi-4pous,
Pyrrho afiaOrjv and iuraifcvTov,
and charging Aristotle and Pro
tagoras with vices in their
youth. Diogenes refuses to
allow that any of these state
ments are true, Epicurus'friend
liness being well known. But
the devotion of Epicurus to
his friends and admirers does
not exclude hatred and injus

tice towards his predecessors
(see p. 418. 2), of whom a fair
estimate was rendered impos
sible by the superficial nature
of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view.
Sext, Math. i. 2, attests rbv irpos
tout irtpl Xl\dra:ya Kal 1Aoi(TTot\?i
Kal tovs dfioinvi tvff/itytuuf ; Pint.
Adv. C"l 2B, 1, mentions a
false objection to Arcesilaus ;
and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says :
Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phsedoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes
mentioned by Diogenes are in
harmony with a man whom
Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo
non aptissimus ad jocandum
minimeque resipiens patriam.
On these jokes he apparently
prided himself as well as on
a certain bombastic elegance.
See p. 496, 6. In this Epicurus
was followed by his pupils. Cic.
N. D. i. 34, 93, says of Zeno :
Ncn eos solum, qui tunc erant,
But far from disproving the influence of previous
systems on his own, this conduct only shows the per-
609
Chap.
x^*'
sonal vanity of Epicurus. Epicureanism, like Stoic

ism, starts with the object of bringing down science
from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form of
a practical science of life. Both systems of philo
sophy, therefore, turn away from Plato and Aristotle,
whose labours they notably neglect, to Socrates and
those Socratic Schools which, without more exten
sive meddling with science, are content with ethics.
Circumstances, however, led Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes. Not only j/
in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of plea
sure from the Cyrenaics ; he likewise derived from
them his theory of knowledge, that the sense-im
pressions are the only source of ideas, and that
every feeling is true in itself. Nor can he alto
gether deny that feelings only furnish direct infor
mation respecting our personal states, and respecting
the relative properties of things. With the Cyrenaics,
too, he taught that true pleasure can only be secured
by philosophic intelligence, and that this intelli
gence aims, before all things, at liberating the mind
from passion, fear, and superstition. At the same
time, he is by no means prepared to follow the
Cyrenaics unreservedly. His theory of morals differs,
as has already been seen, from the Cyrenaic theory
Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem
ipsum . . . scurram Atticum
fuisse dicebat (according to
Vic. Brut, 85, 292, Epicurus
had already expressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic

irony), Chrysippum nunquam
nisi Chrysippara vocabat.
510
THE EPICUREANS.
in this important particular, that not sensual and

individual pleasure, but mental repose and the whole
state of the mind is regarded as the ultimate end,
and the highest good in life. It was thus impossible
for him to be content, as the Cyrenaics were, with
feelings only, with individual and personal impres
sions. He could not help requiring conviction which
reposed on a real knowledg3 of things, since only on
such conviction can an equable and certain tone of
mind depend.
Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from ArisO) Rela
tion to De tippus with regard to feelings, by referring all feelings
mocritus.
to impressions from without, of which he considered
them true representations, but he felt himself called
upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of
nature, just as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic
contempt for science. To the physics of Democritus
he looked for a scientific basis for hisêthics/ just as
they had looked to the system of Heraclitus. But
the closer he clung to Democritus, owing to the
weakness of his own interest, in nature, the more it
becomes apparent that his whole study of nature
was subsei'vient to a moral purpose, and hence of a
purely relative value. Accordingly, he had not the
vleast hesitation in setting consistency at defiance,
by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the
freedom of the will. It is not only altogether im
probable that Epicurus was but a second edition of
Democritusfor history knows of no such repetitions
but as a matter of fact it is false. Closer obser
vation proves that even when the two philosophers
Chap.
XXI.
611
agree in individual statements, the meaning which Chap.

they attach to these assertions and the whole spirit, _____
of their systems are widely divergent. Democritusj
aims at explaining natural phenomena by naturall
causes. He wishes, in short, for a science of nature I
purely for its own sake. Epicurus wishes for a view
of nature which shall be able to avert disturbing
influences from man's inner life. Natural science
stands with him entirely in the service of ethics. If
in point of substance his system is borrowed from
another system, yet its whole position and treat
ment supposes an entirely new view of things. The
Socratic introspection, and the Sophistic resolution
of natural philosophy into personal rationalising, are
its historical antecedents ; and it owes its existence
to that general dislike for pure theory, which consti
tutes the common peculiarity of all the post-Aristo
telian systems.
Excepting the systems named, Epicureanism, so W Belafar as is known, is connected with no other previous Aristntl?.
system. Even its attack upon those systems appears and Plato.
to have consisted of general dogmatic and super
ficial statements. Still it must not be forgotten
that Epicureanism presupposes the line of thought
originated by Socrates, not only as found in the col
lateral Cyrenaic branch, but as found in the main line
of regular development by Plato and Aristotle. The
view of Plato and Aristotle, which distinguishes the
immaterial essence from the sensible appearance of
/
things, and attributes reality only to the former,
is undoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno,
512
Chap.
THE EPICUREANS.
on metaphysical grounds. Practically, however,
he approaches very much nearer to this view in
all those points in which his teaching deviates
from the Cyrenaic and resembles that of the
Stoics.
It has been observed on a former occasion that
the indifference to the immediate conditions of the
senses, the withdrawal of the mind within itself, the
contentment with itself of the thinking subject,
which Epicurus no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics required, is itself a consequence
of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Even the
materialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it is
said, was by no means a going back to the old preSocratic philosophy of nature, but a one-sided
practical apprehension of that idealism. These
systems deny a soul in nature or a soul in man,
because they look exclusively to consciousness and
to personal activity for independence of the senses.
The correctness of this observation may be easily
proved from the Epicurean teaching, notwithstand
ing the severity and harshness of its materialism.
Why was it that Epicurus relentlessly banished
from nature all immaterial causes and all idea of
purpose ? And why did he confine himself ex
clusively to a mechanical explanation of nature ?
Was it not because he felt afraid that the admission
of any other than material causes would imperil the
certainty of consciousness ; because he feared to lose
the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invi
sible forces, and to expose human life to influences
beyond calculation if he allowed anything imma
terial ? Yet in his view of life, how little does he
adhere to present facts, since his wise man is made
to enjoy perfect happiness by himself alone, inde
pendent of everything external. The same ideal is
reproduced in the Epicurean Gods. In their isolated
contemplation of themselves, what else do they re
semble but the God of Aristotle, who, aloof from all
intermeddling with the world, meditates on himself
alone ? No doubt the independent existence of the
thinking mind is held by Aristotle in a clear and
dignified manner. By Epicurus it is pourtrayed
in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form.
But the connection of the views of both cannot be
ignored. There is a similar general relation between
the Epicurean philosophy and that of Plato and
Aristotle.1
Little as the former can be compared
with the latter in breadth and depth, it must not,
therefore, be regarded as an intellectual monstrosity.
Epicureanism is a tenable though one-sided expres
sion of a certain stage in the development of the in
tellect of Greece.
1 Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus
on p. 476, 1.
514
THE SCEPTICS.
PAET
IV.
THE SCEPTICSPYRRHO AND THE OLDER

ACADEMY.
CHAPTER XXII.
PYRRHO.
Chap.
XXII.
Stoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect :

they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite
A. His
dogmatic statements. The Sceptic Schools, however,
torical
position of attempt to reach the same end by denying every
Scepti
dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be,
cism(1) Its re- the result is in all cases the same ; happiness is made
lotion to
to consist in the exaltation of the mind above all
cotem
porary
external objects, in the withdrawal of man within
dogmatic
his own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere
si/stems.
as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aris
totelian Scepticism takes a practical view of the
business of philosophy, and estimates the value of
theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state
and happiness of man. It moreover agrees with
cotemporary systems in its ethical view of life ; the
object at which it aims is the same as that at which
those systems aim, viz. repose of mind, andimperturba
515
bilitv. It differs from them, none the less ; for the Chap.
*
Epicureans
and Stoics made mental repose to depend XXII
on a knowledge of the world and its laws, whereas , ,
the Sceptics are of opinion that it can only be ob
tained by despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with
the former morality depends on a positive conviction
as to the highest Good ; with the latter, morality
consists in indifference to all that appears as Good
to men. Important as this difference may be, it
must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism
generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and
Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to
knowledge, and all interest in the external world,
it is only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of
man into himself which we have seen to be the com
mon feature of these Schools. Not only, therefore,
do these three lines of thought belong to one and
the same epoch, but such is their internal connec
tion that they may be regarded as three branches of
a common stock.
More than one point of departure was offered to (2) Casrs
Scepticism by the earlier philosophy. The Mega- Pducl'iy
rian criticism and the Cynic teaching had taken up
a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and
of all knowledge. Pyrrho, too, had received from
the School of Democritus an impulse to doubt.1 In
1 Democritus bad denied
all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone
was more strongly apparent in
Metrodorus (Aristocl. in But.
Pr. Ev. xiv. 1H, 5; Sext. Math.
vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid.
1088, A, although he cannot be

considered a full Sceptic, notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views
of Democritus (Plut. in Eus I.e.
i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3,
p. 928; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19).
ll2
516
Chap
XX.II
*
\'~\<
THE SCEPTICS.
particular, the development of the Platonic and Aris.
.
totelian speculations by those who were not able to
follow them, had made men mistrustful of all speculation, until they at last doubted the possibility of
all knowledge. Not seldom do Sceptical theories
follow times of great philosophical originality. A
stronger impulse was given in the sequel by the Stoic
and Epicurean systems. Related to Scepticism by
their practical tone, it was natural that these systems
should afford fuel to Scepticism. At the same time
the unsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were
built, and the contrast between their moral and
physical teaching, promoted destructive criticism. If,
according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular
Scepticism appears to have
passed from him to Pyrrho,
Anaxarchus being the middle
man (see p. 518, 2, 3), and
herewith may be connected
the Sceptical imperturbability.
This doctrine of imperturba
bility being held by Epicurus,
the pupil of Nansiphanes, it
might be supposed that before
Pyrrho's lime a doctrine not
unlike that of Pyrrho had been
developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was
borrowed by Epicurus. The
connection is, however, uncer
tain. We have seen that the
doubts of Democritus extended
only to sense-impressions, not
to intellectual knowledge. The
case of Metrodorus was si
milar. His sceptical expres
sions refer only to the ordinary
conditions of human know
ledge, that of ideas derived
from the sensps ; greater de

pendence is, however, placed
on thought. We must there
fore taVe the statement on
irct' Ta im\v % fir tls voijacu sub
ject to this limitation. Anax
archus is said (Sext. Math. vii.
87) to have compared the world
to a stage-scene, which involves
no greater scepticism than the
similar expressions used by
Plato as to the phenomenal
world. However much, there
fore, these individuals may
havecontributed to Pyrrhonism,
a simple transference of Scep
ticism from Democritus to
Pyrrho is not to be thought of.
And as regards imperturba
bility, Epicurus may have torrowed the expression from
Pyrrho, whom, according to
IHiig. ix. t>4 and 69, he both
knew and esteemed.
HISTORICAL POSITION: TYRUIIO,
517
and the universal elements in the personal soul, the Chap.

isolation of the individual as an independent atom,
"
and his being merged in a pantheistic universe, are
contrasted without being reconciled ; among the
Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality.
Neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can
claim our adherence ; neither the unconditional value
of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of virtue ;
neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of
rational knowledge ; neither the Atomist's view of
nature, nor the Pantheistic view as it found ex
pression in Heraclitus. The only thing which remains
certain amid universal uncertainty is abstract per- / <A
sonality content with itself, personality forming at
once the stai ting-point and the goal of the two
contending systems.
The important back-influence of Stoicism and
Epicureanism upon Scepticism may be' best gathered
from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide
extension and a more comprehensive basis in the
New Academy after the appearance of those systems.
Before that time its leading features had been indeed
laid down by Pyrrho, but they had never been deve
loped into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor
given rise to an expanded theory of doubt.
Pyrrho was a native of Elis,1 and may therefore (s)pvrr/w
have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and a"'1
followers.
1 Aristocl. in litis. Pr. Kv.
xiy. 18, 1; Dimj. ix. 61. We
are indebted almost exclusively
to Diogenes for our information respecting Pyrrho. Besides
Antigonns the Carystian, Apo'lodorus, Alexander Polyhistor,

Diocles, &c, are the chief au
thorities drawn upon by Diogenes.
518
Chap.
XXII.
THE SCEPTICS.
Megarian criticism that criticism, in fact, which
was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. It can,
however, hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor.'
To Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached
himself, and accompanied that philosopher with Alex
ander's army as far as India.2 . Perhaps, however, he
is less indebted to Anaxarchus for the sceptical than
for the ethical parts of his teaching.3 At a later period
1 Attention has been drawn expression. According to other
to the chronological difficulties accounts, he belonged to the
in ' Socrates and the Socratic School of Democritus. Plut.
Schools,' p. 255, note 1 (2nd Tianq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer.
edition). Either Pyrrho is Max. viii. 14, ext. 2, he pro
falsely called a pupil of Bryso, pounds to Alexander the doc
or Bryso is falsely called the trine of an infinite number of
son of Stilpo. The former worlds; and Clemens, Strom, i.
seems more probable, D'mg. ix. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in
61 , having derived his statement which, agreei"g with Demo
from Alexander's SiaSoxal, and it critus, he observes that iroAuis quite in the style of the c m- HaBia is only useful when it is
pilers of the SiaSoxai to assign a properly made use of. Like
Megarian teacher to a Sceptic Epicurus, Anaxarchus followed
whose connection with that Democritus, calling happiness
School was sufficiently obvious. the highest object of our de
1 D'wg. ix. 61 ; Aristocl. 1. c. sire ; and this assertion prob
1-8, 20 ; 17, 8. We gather from ably gained for him the epithet
them that Pyrrho was origi i evSai/xnviK6s (Clemens, 1. c. ;
nally a painter. 8mdas,1lvppaii>, Atken. vi. 250; xii. 548, b ; JKl.
only copies the present text of V. H. ix. 37). In other re
Diogenes with a few mistakes spects, he differed from Demo
' Besides the passage quoted critus. For first he is charged
from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 54S,
little known, we have no proof b, with a luxurious indulgence
of the sceptical tone in Anax far removed from the earnest
archus which Septus, Math. vii. and pure spirit of Democritus ;
48, attributes to him, and since and according to Plut. Alex.
the latter quotes no proofs, it 52, he had, when in Asia, re
may be assumed that he had nounced the independence of a
none. Anaxarchus appears to philosopher for a life of plea
have been unjustly included sure; Timon also in Pint. Virt.
among the Sceptics, like so Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led
many others who were called away by <pC<ris jfiovmr\ty con
Sceptics by later writers on the trary to his better knowledge.
strength of a single word or Again, he is said to have com
HISTORICAL POSITION: PYRRHO.

he resided in his native city,1 honoured by his fellowcitizens,2 but in poor circumstances,3 which he bore
with his characteristic repose of mind.4 He died, it
would appear, at an advanced age,5 between 275 and
270 B.C., leaving no writings behind.6
Even the
ancients, therefore, only knew his teaching by that of
his pupils, among whom Timon of Phlius was the most
Diog. 66 ; 62.
mended in Pyrrho (Diog. ix.
63) an indifference which went
* Examples in Diog. 67. It
a good deal beyond the imper sounds, however, highly im
turbability of Democritus ; and probable ; and doubts were ex
Timon commends him for his pressed byjKnesidemus whether
Kvvtubv fiiyos. He meets external his indifference ever went to
pain with the haughty pride the extent described by Antiexpressed in his much-admired gonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting
dictum under the blows of Ni- out of the way of carriages and
tocrcon's clubDing. ix. 59 ; precipices, so that he had to be
Pint. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449 ; preserved from danger by his
Clemens, Strom, iv. 496, D ; friends. He must, moreover,
ValtT. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4 ; Plin. have enjoyed a special good
Hist. Nat. vii. 87 ; TertuU. Apol. fortune to attain the age of 90,
50; Dio Chrysos.Ot 37, p. 126, notwithstanding such senseless
E. But he treats men with conduct.
the same contempt; and whilst
5 All the dates here are very
meeting the Macedonian con uncertain. Neither the date of
queror with an air of indepen his death n r of his birth is
dence, he spoils the whole by given, and the notice in Suidas
adroit flattery. Conf. Pint. that he lived after the 111
Alex. 52 ; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, Olympiad (336-H32 B.C.) is inde
p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; finite. If, however, as Diog 02
JEl. V. H. ix. 37; Athen. vi. says, he attained the age of 90,
250. His indifference was, at and if he joined Anaxarchus at
any rate, very much lacking in Alexander's first invasion of
nobility. Respecting Anaxar- Asia, being then between 24
chus see Zusac. Lect. Att. 181. and 30, the statements above
1 Diog. ix. 64 ; 109.
given are true.
According to Diog. 64,
8 Ding. Pro. 16; 102; Aristhey made him head-priest, tocl. in Pus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are
and, on his account, allowed to better authorities than Sext.
philosophers immunity from Math. i. 282, or Pint. Alex.
taxation. According to Diocles Fort. i. 10, p. 331. Neither
{Diog. 65), the Athenians pre does Sextus say that the sup
sented him with citizenship for posed poem on Alexander was
his services in putting a Thra- extant. The whole statement
cian prince Cotys to death.
is evidently untrustworthy.
519
Chap.
XXII.
THE SCEPTICS.
distinguished.1 Besides Timon several other of his
pupils are known by name.2 His School, however,
was short-lived.3 Soon after Timon it seems to have
1 Timon (see Wachimvth, latter, p. 51, has collected the
De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, fragments.
1859) was a native of Phlius
2 Diog. 67-69, mentions, be
{Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer sides Timon, a certain Euryat first {Ding. 109 ; Aristocl. in lochus as his pupil, who, how
Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when ever, was not very successful in
tired of this mode of life he the wa}rof keeping his temper;
repaired to Megnra, to hear also Philo, an Athenian, HeStilpo {Diog. 109). otilpo being catasus of Abdera, the wellalive in the third century, and known historian (on whom see
Timon's birth having happened Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384) l
approximately beiween 325 -315 and Nausiphanes, the teacher
B.C., the connection is not so of Epicurus. The last asser
impossible as Wachsmuth, p. 5, tion is only tenable on the sup
and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et position that Nausiphanes ap
Rom. 398, suppose, though in peared as a teacher only a few
ihe uncertainty of chrono years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho
logical data it cannot be posi cannot have returned to Elis
tively sta ed. Subsequently before 322 B.C., and Epicurus
Timon became acquainted with must have left the School of
Pyrrho. and leaving his staunch Nausiphanes before 310 B.C.
admirers {Diog. 109, 69; Aris- See p. 406, 3. According to
tool. 1. c. 11, 14, 21), removed Diog. 64, Epicurus must have
with ) is wife to Elis. He then become acquainted with Pyrrho
appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes.
and, having amassed a fortune, Nausiphanes is said not to have
concluded his life in Athens agreed with Pyrrho, but only
{Diog. 110; 115). It appears to have admired his character
from Diog 112 and 115, that {Diog. 1. c), so that he cannot
he survived Arcesilaus (who properly be called his pupil. The
died 241 sc.), having nearly mention of Numenius, by Diog.
attained the age of 90. His 102 (conf. 68), among Pyrrho's
death may therefore be ap o-uWjeeis, is suspicious, because
proximately fixed in 230, his .iKnesidemus is named at the
birth in 320 B.C. For his life same time. It may be ques
and character, see Diog. 110; tioned whether he as well as
1 12-1 1 5 ; A thm. x. 438, a ; JFA. jEnesidemus does not belong
V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous to a later period of Sceptici.-ni.
* According to Diog. 115,
writings, the best known is a
witty and pungent satire on Menodotus (a Sceptic belong
previous and cotemporary phi ing to the latter half of the
losophers.
Respecting this second century after Christ)
satire {Diog. 11(1) consult asserted that Timon left, no
Wachsviuth, p. 9 and 3. The successor, and that the School
TEACHIXG OF PYBRIIO.
become extinct.1 Those who were disposed to be
sceptical now joined the New Academy, towards whose
founder even Timon made no secret of his grudge.2
The little which is known of Pyrrho's teaching
may be summed up in the three following statements : We can know nothing as to the nature of
i-i
i
" '
things : Hence the right attitude towards them is to
withhold judgment : The necessary result of suspend
ing judgment is imperturbability. He who will live
happilyfor happiness is the starting-point with
the Scepticsmust, according to Timon, take these
things into consideration : What is the nature of
things ? What ought our attitude to things to be ?
What is the gain resulting from these relations ? 3
To the first of these three questions Pyrrho can only
reply by saying that things are altogether inaccessible
to knowledge, and that whatever property may be
attributed to a thing, with equal justice the oppowas in abeyance from Timon
to Ptolemasiis, i.e. until the
second half of the first century
B.c. Sotion and Hippobotus,
however, asserted that his pupils
were Dioscurides, Nicolochus,
Euphranor, and Praylus. His
son, too, the physician Xanthus,
followed the father. (Diog.
109.) That Timon was himself
a physician, as Waehtmrrth,
p. 5, supposes, cannot be coneluded vith certainty from the
words iarpiKhviSiSa^f, since these
words only imply that he had
received instruction in medicine. On the other hand, according to Said, nvppw, the
second Pyrrho, called Timon's
pupil, was a changeling. If
Aratus of Soli was a pupil

(Suid. "Aparos; conf. Diog. ix.
1 US), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43. 2.
' In Diog. 110, Eubulus is
called a pupil of Euphranor, also
on the authority of Sotion and
Hippobotus. If Ptolema;us was
the next one who is said to
have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho's aywy^ can
have been known for 150 }'ears.
2 Diog. 114.
' Aristocl. in But. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 18, 2 : 6 S4 ye /âB-qT^s uvtov
Tifxwv <f>rjiri St7y thv îWovja euSaifiovro-av tit rpia ravra Ac
vcli> ' irpanov fiiv Siroia 7re<pune to
irpdyij.aTa Sevrepov Si, rlva xph
rp6noy 7jjuas irpbs avra StaK(7a6af
621
Chap.
*
B. Teach"^'f/,o.
Wlmptatibility of
knowledge.
THE SCEPTICS.
site may be predicated.1 In support of this statement
' Pyrrho appears to have argued that neitherJ:he senses
nor reason jfurnish certain knowledge.2 The senses
do not show things as they are, but only as they ap
pear to be.3 Rational knowledge, even where it
seems to be most certain, in the sphere of morals,
does not depend upon real knowledge, but only upon
tradition and habit.4 Against every statement the
opposite may be advanced with eq^JaTûstieer5If,
irowever, neither the senses nor reason alone can fur
nish trustworthy testimony, no more can the two
combined, and thus the third way is barred, by which
we might possibly have advanced to knowledge.6
ttow many more of the arguments quoted by the later
Sceptics belong to Pyrrho it is impossible to say.
The short duration and diffusion of Pyrrho's School
renders it probable that with him Scepticism was not
TiKciTciiov 3e rl nepieffTai rots Sffeaior oGrt &Sikov, koX 6/ioims iwi
TrdlfTwv, firtîv tivai tt? a\r)Beia,
1 Aristocl. 1. c. : t4 ply olv v4u<p 5e al 0et irdvra tous olvirpdyfiard tprioiv avrbv (Tyrrho) dpwnovs TrpaTTfiv, oif yap fidWov
artxpaltftiy iwlarfs ditdupopa ko\ r6Se % T<S5e elvai iKaarov. Sej-t.
aorafl/ATjTa Kai ayeiriKpira, Sid Math. xi. 140: oUrt dyaS6v rl
tovto [t>] jU^t6 rds a\<TdT\<jeis io~rt (pvtret ofae KaKbv, a\\a irpit
hixaiv /litre ray 56a$ dhydeveiv avQptii-Kwv raura v6(p KfKpnai Kara
tyevSto-6ai. Diog. ix. 61 : oil t6v Tifitava.
yap jUaAXof r6Se 4} T<J5e elvai
* In this sense the words of
Wo/nov. Gell. xi. 5, 4 : Pyrrho is .lEnesidemus, in Ding. ix. 106,
said to have stated oi /Auk\w o&- must be understood: o'vSiv ipriaiv
rois lxf1 rdSe % iictlvus % oudeTepws. bpifatv rbv Xlvpbwva aoyfianKus
2 See the above-quoted pas Sid ii}v dmiXoyiav. See note 1.
sage of Aristocles and Diog. ix.
' Diog. ix. 114, on Timon:
avvex^s rt iiriKiytiv eu&fei wp&j
114.
* Timon, in Diog. ix. 105 : robs rds atadijo'tis /lex' ivifjiaprvto jueA.i tyri iffrl y\vKv oil Tt'07j/xi ' povvros tov vov iyKpivovras ' *rwto 5' Sti (paiverai 6fio\oyu.
rj\dti> 'ATTtâs t xat Novfiiivtos.
1 Diog. ix. 61 : oiSiy yap (i<pa- The meaning of this proverb
tnttv otnt KaKbv o&Tt aiff^phv otire has been already explained.
TEACHING OF PTRRHO.
523
far advanced. The same result appears to follow Chap.

from its further development in the Academy. The
ten Tpo-rroi, or aspects under which sceptical objec
tions were grouped, cannot with certainty be attri
buted to any one before Ênesidemus.1 Portions of
the arguments used at a later day may be borrowed
from Pyrrho and his pupils,2 but it is impossible to
discriminate these portions with certainty.
Thus, if knowledge of things proves to be a (2) withfailure, there only remains as possible an attitude of hol'li"S f
. .
.
.
judgment.
pure Scepticism ; and therein is contained the answer
to the second question. We know nothing whatever
of the real nature of things, and hence can neither
believe nor assert anything as to their nature.
We
cannot say of anything that it is or is not ; but we
must abstain from every opinion, allowing that of all
which appears to us to be true, the opposite may with
equal justice be true.3 Accordingly, all our state1 Diog. ix. 79 refers t' ese
rp6iroi to Pyrrhu, but inasmuch
as he was ihere describing
Sceptic views, the author of
whicli to his mind was Pyrrho,
nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36 generally attributes them to the
ancient Sceptics, by whom, aocurding to Math. vii. 345, he
understood jEnesidemus and
his followers. Aristoclcs, 1. c.
\H, 11, refers them to iEnesidemus, and they may easily
have been referred to Pyrrho
by mistake, since A'lnesidemus
himself (Diog.ix.. 106) and subsequent writers CFavorin. in
Gell. xi. 5, 5 ; Phiiostr. Vit.
Soph. i. 491) call every kind of
sceptical statement \6yoi or rp6wot Xlvpfxiyfioi. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the
form in which the}' are presented by Sextus and Diogenes
is clear, since they obviously
refer to later views,
2 Srxt. Math. vi. 66; x. 197
quotes an argument of Timon
against the reality of time, and
further states (Math. iv. 2) that
Timon, in his conflict wuh the
philosophers of nature, maintail ed that no assertion should
be made without proof : in other
words, he denied dogmatism ;
for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another
proof, and so on for ever.
* Axistocl. I. c. 18, 3: Jick
524
Chap,
XXII.
THE SCEPTICS.
merits (as the Cyrenaics taught) only.express individual opinions, and not absolute realities. We can
not deny that things appear to be of this or the
other kind ; but we can never say that they are so.1
Even the assertion that things are of this or the
other kind is not an assertion, but a confession by
the individual of his state of mind.2 Hence, too,
the universal rule of indecision cannot be taken as
an established principle, but only as a confession,
and, therefore, as only problematical.3 It must, how
ever, remain a matter of doubt how far the captious
turns of expression by which the Sceptics thought
to parry the attacks of their opponents come from
Pyrrho's School. The greater part, it is clear, came
into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, and
are not older than the development of the Stoic
tovto ovv tti)5e iriaTeveiv avrais
Seiv, a\\: abotdo~Tovs Kal a.K\tvus
Kal aKpabdvTovi elvai nep\ evbs
e/caOTou KeyovTas ori oil p.a\\ov
eaTIV $) ovk 4otii/, >) hat io~rL Kal
oilK 4ffTiy. o6t ioTlV ofc'ovK
foriv. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76:
ov fjtaWov means, according to
Timon, rb U7f5ei> 6pieiv aKXa
aTrpoadeTeiv.
1 ^nesidem. in Diog. ix.
106: oiibev bpietv tbv Hvpbuia
Suy/jALTiKus bta rhv avTi\oylav,
to?s be <paiyofi4vOiS anohovOeti'.
Timon, Ibid. 105. Seep. 522, 3.
2 Dwg. ix. 103 : ireoi p.ei> uy
us dvBpuTTOi ircujxouev bixoXoyovuev
. . . nepl be uv oi hoynaTiKo't Sta$e$aiovvTai tu \6yu <f>dp.eyoi aTetKT}(pBai en4xop.ev nepnovTuv us
abiiKuv i*6va b'e Ta ir&dn yivuaxofiev. Tb fiev yip Sn Spifien <5uo\oyovfxev KaX Tb otl ToSe voovp.ev
yivtSiffKOftev. irus V Sputter % vus

voovnev ayvooifxev ' Kal on t6S(
KevKbv tpaiverai btr}yr]fxaTiKus \4yopev oit bta/iejiaiir'.fjievoi el teal
tfTUS 4o~tI . . . Kal yap tb tpaiyofieVuV Tldtfieda oux US Jfal TOtOVT ov
tv koX OTinvp ralei aio6av6p.e6ael be tpvciy e^t KavoTiici}v, 4ir4* Diog. I. c. : wfpl be tt\s Ovbev
optfa <pwvr,s Kal ruv biiaiuv \eyofiey us ov boyuaTuy ' ov yap eiatv
5uo<a ti \4yeiv Btl trtpaipocibris
4aTiv 6 KiffpLOS' dWa yap rb fiey
&b-n\oy, ai Se i%op.o\oyi)ous eitriv.
iv obv \4yofiev fivbey apiêtv
ouS' aiiTb tovto bpityfitQa. Diog.
gives this view in its later
form, probably following Sext.
Pyrrh. i. 197, but agreeing in
substance with the qU' tations
from Timon and 1'yrrho.
TEACHING OF PYRRIIO.
theory of knowledge by Chrysippus, and the criticism of Cameades to which it gave rise. In this
despairing of anything like certain conviction con
sists d<j>aaia, dKaraXvyjrca, or irro^r], the with
holding of judgment or state of indecision which
Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude
in speculation, 1 and from which the whole School
derived its distinctive name.5
From this state of indecision, Timon, in replv to
.
.
the third question, argues that mental imperturbability or drapagla proceeds, which can alone conduct
to true happiness.3 Men are disturbed by views and
prejudices which mislead them into the efforts of
passion. Only the Sceptic who has suspended all
judgment is in a condition to regard things with
absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire.4
1 Diog. ix. fil and 107; Aristncl. 1. c. The expressions tupaall, oKaraArjJ/fa, iirox>\, invariably mean the same thing.
Later writers use instead of
them, afyetyla, ayvwala rr\s aKvveias K.r.\. If, according to
Aristocles and Diog. 107, Timon
first mentioned aQatrla in dealing with the third of his questions, this statement is obviouslv inaccurate.
- Uup^wv^tot, (TKfTTTiKol, aTropTjrucul, 6</>e/cTtttoi, îrrnTKol. Conf.
Vuxj. 69.
Anstocl 1 c. 2: to,,
oiaKeLfitPOis ovtu wcpteffetrQcH Tilupcurlav
inura 8' arapallay. Diog. 107 :
t4\os 5* ul rrKeirriKol <paai tV
Apathy is substituted for ataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad.

ii. 42, 130.
* I'imon, in Aristocl. 1. c. 18,
14, speaking of Pyrrho :
olov rby &Tv<poi> iyk i5oi> j)
aod/Mnrroy
ttuo'iv, btrois S-i/ivavrat Sftws &(pa~
to! tc (parol re (conf. Wachsmuth, p 62)
\a>i> %8vea xov<pi, SSapwintv' lv8a
ku\ <v&a
irafleW 5<Jtjs re noi elfcafojs vojUO0^7JS.
u in g xt Mathi xj j . The
g ;c Uve9_
t
(
,
P!"r
n<rXW
a,t' **P<^'fl nol i<^Ti
. KaTa Tavri
9eT f) a-rapajfa, 5s tpaaw o'l itsul

tropins.
toy Tlpuya (cal Kivtalb'iiiiov. Id. in ZJi.^. 65.
525
Chap.
XU'
(3) M<'ntal
imperturuaUUtg.
,
520
Chap.
THE SCEPTICS.
He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one
external condition is preferable to another.1 In reality
only the tone of mind or virtue possesses value.2 Thus,
by withdrawing within himself, man reaches happi
ness, which is the goal of all philosophy.3 Absolute
inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic
will act on probabilities, and hence follow custom ; 4
but at the same time he will be conscious that, such
conduct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction.5
The province of uncertain opinion includes all posi
tive judgments respecting good and evil. Only
in this conditional form will Timon allqw_ of.good
ness and divine goodness as standards of conduct 6
The real object of Scepticism is, therefore, a purely
negative one indifference. It cannot even be
proved 7 that Pyrrho's School so far accommodated
1 Cic. Fin. ii. 18, 43 : Qua; To 4>atv6fjLyov TavrX trBivti o&rcp
(externals) qu< d Aristoni et av e\8p. (Gmf. Stmt. Math,
Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro vii. 30 ) Ibid. 10, of Pyrrho :
nihilo. ut inter optime valere rots 8e <paivti(t4 ois 6\koX vdtiv.
et gravissime segrotare nihil See p 519, 4.
prorsus dicerent interesse. iii.
1 See p. 524, 1, 2.
Srtt. Math. xi. 20: nark Si
3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et Aris"b
tpaw6p.evov
rotWwv eKaarov %\otone qui omnia exiequent.
Acad, ii 42, 130: Pyrrho autem pnv eflos ayatihv ?j Kaxbn v) o5idea ne sentire quidem sapientem, tpopov vpnaayopeveiv Kaddvep Kal
qua; airc0eia nominatur. Epicttt. 6 Tifioiv iv rots hfSakfMts ioiKc
Kragm. 93 (in Stub. Serin. 121, tiy\ovy orav <J)j?
28) : Tlvppuv tKeytv p.iib'iv 5*a<p- ^ yap iytnv iptw Ss /uoi icaTa<ai'pttv Cfjv v) Tetivdvai.
cfTOi thai
* Cic. Kin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho
fiv$ov
d\7|8(ijl opBbt'tx0"' Ka*&~
. . . qui virtute constitute nihil
va
omnino quod appetendurn sit
rov dtlov T levins Kal Tayarelinquat. The same Ibid. ii. us 7] 0ov
o/el,
13, 43; iii. 4, 12.
e
ui>
I(7(Jtotos yiyvfrai ivSpl
* See p. 521, 3: 525, 3.
0ios.
* Dirg. 105 : d Ttfiuv iv r$
Xlvda'vi <pT)(ri uh eVjSejSTiKEyai [to*
' According to an anecdote
Tlrpfrotva] rriv auvhdeiav. Kal ip preserved by Antigonus of CarJis iviaXfiois ovrw \tytl ' aAAd rystus (Aristocl. 1. c. 18,
TEACHING OF PYRRHO.
itself to life, as to make moderation rather than
indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable
actions and desires. In this direction the School
seems to have done but little.
Diog. ix 66), Pyrrho apologised
for being agitated by saying :
It is difficult to lay aside huinanity altogether. This language only proves what his
aim was. and that he had
found no mediating principle
between the apathy required

by his system and practical
needs. Neither do the remarks
of Sitter, iii. 451, prove that the
doctrine of moderation belongs
to Pyrrho and his school,
527
Chap.
"
528
THE SCEPTICS.
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE NEW ACADEMY.
CHAr.
xxiii
Plato's School was the first to put Scepticism on a

^'
~~~
.
.
1
firm footing, and to cultivate it as a system. It
A. Arccti- nas been already remarked that after the time of
lavs.
.
( i ) Denial Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculafedg"' tive enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics. To this
new tendency it consistently adhered, when, shortly
after the beginning of the third century before Christ,
it took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of
simply ignoring theoretical knowledge, as it had
hitherto done, it assumed towards knowledge an atti
tude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and
s happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossi
bility of knowledge. How far this result was due
to the example set by Pyrrho it is impossible to
establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself pro
bable that the learned originator of this line of thought
in the Academy should have ignored the views of a
philosopher whose work had been carried on at Elis
in his own lifetime, and whose most distinguished
pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then
working at Athens as a prolific writer.1 The whole
1 Conf. D'wg. ix. 114. Ten- iv. 100), that Aroesilaus arrived
nemann's view (Gesch. d. Phil, at his conclusions indepen
AltCrSJLAUS.
tone andcliaracter, moreover, of the Scepticism of
the -New Academy betrays everywhere the presence
of Stoic influences. By the confidence of its asser
tions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without
itS being necessary to seek an explanation by impro
bable conjectures as to the personal relations of Arcesilaus and Zeno.1
This connection of the New Academy with Stoic
ism can be proved in the case of its first founder,2
Arcesilaus.3 The doubts of this philosopher aredirected
dently of Pyrrho, does not ap
pear to be tenable.
1 Numen. in Evs. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 6, 10 ; 6, o, says that Zeno
and Arcesilaus were fellowpupils under Polerao, and that
their rivalry whilst at school
was the origin of the later
quarrels between the Stoa and
the Academy. The same may
have been stated by Antiochus,
since Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24,
76, appeals to him to prove that
they were together at school.
Still the assertion is valueless.
There can be no doubt that
both Zeno and Arcesilaus were
pupils of Polemo, but it is
hardly possible that they can
have been under him at the
same time ; nor if they were,
could the intellectual differ
ences of the two schools be re
ferred simply to their personal
relation.
2 Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68;
Diog. iv. 28 ; Jius. Pr. Ev. xiv.
4, 16 ; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Cle
mens, Strom, i. 301. c, calls
Arcesilaus the founder of the
New (second or middle) Aca
demy.
3 Arcesilaus (see Geffers,

De Arcesila, Gott. 1842, Gymn.
Progr.) was born at Pitane, in
ôlia (Strabo, xiii. 1 , 67, p. 614 ;
Diog. iv. 28). His birth-} ear is
not stated ; but as Lacydes
(Diog. iv. 61) was his successor
in 240 B.C., and he was then 75
years of age (Diog. 44), it must
have been about 315 B.C. Hav
ing enjoyed the instruction of
the mathematician Autolycus
in his native town, he repaired
to Athens, where he was first a
pupil of Theophrastus, but
was won for the Academy by
Crantor (Diog. 29 ; Numen. in
Evs. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor
he lived on the most intimate
terms ; but as Polemo was the
president of the Academy, he is
usually, called a pupil of Polemo
(Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67 ; Fin.
v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the
death of Polemo, he was pro
bably a pupil of Crates ; but
it is not stated by Diog. 33,
or Numen. in Eut. 1. c. xiv.
6, 10, that he was a pupil
of either Pyrrho, Menedemus,
or Diodorus. If Eusebius
seems to imply it, he may have
MM
Chap.
xxiii.
630
Chap.
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
not only to knowledge derived from the senses, but
to rational knowledge as well.1 The principal object
of his attack was, however, the Stoic theory of irre
sistible impressions ; 2 and in overthrowing that theory
Arcesilaus, it would seem, believed he had exploded
every possibility of rational knowledgej for the Stoic
appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible
form of a theory of knowledge, apd the theories of
misunderstood the statement
that he made use of their
teaching. Fortified with ex
traordinary acuteness, penetra
ting wit, and ready speech
(Diog. 30; 34; 37; Civ. Acad,
ii. 6, 18 ; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6,
2; Pint. De Sanit. 7, p. 126;
Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7 ; ii. 1,
10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein.
iv. 193, 28), learned, especially
in mathematics (Diog. 32), and
well acquainted with native
poets (Diog. 30, who mentions
his own attempts at poetry,
quoting some of his epigrams),
he appears to have early dis
tinguished himself. From Pint.
Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121. it appears
that in Epicurus' lifetime, con
sequently before 270 B.C., he
had propounded his sceptical
views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to
have placed his career too early
(Diog. 45), in making his &k/uJ)
between 300 and 296 B.C. On
the death of Crates, the con
duct of the School devolved
upon Arcesilaus (Ding. 32),
through whom it attained no
small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p.
15 ; Diog. 37 ; Numen. in hus.
xiv. 6, 14). From public mat
ters he held aloof, and lived in
retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed

even by opponents for his pure,
gentle, and genial character
(Diog. 37; quoting many indi
vidual traits, 44; vii. 171 ; ix.
115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Pint.
De Adulat. 22, p. 63 ; Coh. Ira,
18, p. 461. JUicm, V. H. xiv.
96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Pint.
De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no
writings (Diog. 32 ; Pint. Alex.
Virt. 4, p. 328).
1 Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67 :
Arcesilas primum ... ex variis
Platonis libris sermonibusque
Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit,
nihil esse certi quod aut sensi.
bus aut animo percipi possit :
quern ferunt . . . aspernatum
esse omne animi sensusque ju
dicium, primumque instituisse
. . . non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod
quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the
calumniandi licentia with which
Augvttin, herein doubtless fol
lowing Cicero, c. Aead. iii. 17,
39, charges him, contra omnia
velle dicere quasi ostentationis
causa.
s Conf. Numen. in Ens. Pr.
Ev. xiv,6, 12, andabove,p.86,4.
ARCESILAUS,
Plato and Aristotle he ignored altogether. Indeed,
no peculiar arguments against knowledge are referred
to him. The old sceptical arguments of Plato and
Socrates, of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus,
Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are repeated,1 all of
which apply only to the knowledge of the senses, and
not to rational knowledge. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus
aimed at overthrowing the latter along with the for
mer.2 The opinion that he only used doubt to pre
pare for or to conceal genuine Platonism,3 is opposed
to all credible authorities. It appears, however,
established that, he deemed it unnecessary to refute
the theory of knowledge existing independently of
the senses.
The Stoic arguments in favour of irresistible im
pressions Arcesilaus met by asserting that an inter
mediate something between knowledge and opinion,
a "kind of conviction common to the wise and the
unwise, such as the Stoic Karakri-ty-is, is inconceivable ;
the jwise man's conviction is always knowledge, that
of the fool is always opinion.4 Going then farther
into the idea of (pavTacria KaraXrj-n-TiK^, he en
deavoured to show thatjt contained an internal con
tradiction ; for to conceive (Kara\i}^ts) is to approve
1 Phit. Adv. Col. 26, 2 ; Cic.
Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter's view
of thel atter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities
of philosophic teaching by way
of refuting it (iii. 478), appears
to be entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its
uniform resemblance by way
of overcoming doubt.
8 Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See

p. 530, 1.
8 Seat. Pyrrh. i. 234 ; Biocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in
Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 5 ; AvguMin,
c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy,
4 Sext. Math. vii. 153.
H it 3
Chap.
532
Chap.
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
(crvyKaTaffso-is), and approval never applies to sensa
tion, but only to thoughts and general ideas.1 Lastly,
if the Stoics regarded force of conviction as the dis
tinctive mark of a true or irresistible conception, and
as belonging to it in distinction from every other, the
Scep_tic rejoined that such conceptions do not exist,
and that no true conception is of such a nature, but
that a false one may be equally irresistible.' If no
certainty of perception is possible, no knowledge is
possible.3 And since the wise manfor on this
point Arcesilaus agrees with the Stoicsmust only
consider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing re
mains for him but to abstain front all and every
statement, and to despair of any certain conviction.4
1 Stunt. Math. 1. c. 154.
2 Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno
asserted : An irresistible or
conceptional perception is such
an impression of a real object
as cannot possibly come from
an unreal one. Arcesilaus en
deavoured to prove nullum tale
visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset
esse. The same view in Seset.
1. c, To these may be added
discussions on deceptions of the
senses and contradictions in
the statements of the senses
in Seset. vii. 408, and others
attributed to the Academicians.
Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70 : TJrgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum
ipse falsa omnia diceret, qua?
sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem nonnulla visa esse falsa,
non omnia. To these attacks
on Zeno Pint. De An. (Fr. vii.)
1, probably refers : 8ti ov to
(mffTinitY O."a^0P Tl/S t7r((JT^jU7)S lis
'AptceffiAaos. ovtqj ykp at ifTTKTTTJflOffVinj

^1TI<rT^Jt7)y aiTta
ârfiToi. All that is here attri
buted to Arcesilaus is the asser
tion that iirurTririv is the cause
of cVio-Wj/Mj, and that it is so
when it produces a <pavTa<rla
KaToKifKruc-ff. The connection
in which these statements were
made by Arcesilaus was pro
bably this : If there is such a
thing as knowledge, there must
be objects which produce it.
These objects, however, dn not
exist, there being no object
which does not admit a false
opinion equally well with a true
one.
8 Sext. 155 : ju-Jj ofays 5e KaTa\7y1rTtKris <pavTao-'ias ouS KardAijipis ytvfiatTaf ^tt yap KOT0A77jmiff tbavraaia o'vyKarddtais'
aKaraXyirra.
4 Sext. 1. c. ; Cic. Acad. i.
12, 45; ii. 20, GC ; Pint. Adv.
ARVESILAUS.
It is therefore impossible to know anything, nor can
we even know for certain that we do not know any
thing.1 It was quite in accordance with this theory
for Arcesilaus to_jay down no definite view in his
lectures, but only to refute the views of others.*
Even his disparaging remarks on dialectic,3 sup
posing them to be genuine,4 are not at variance with
this conduct. He might consider the arguments of
the Stoics and the sophisms of the Megarians as
useless, whilst, at the same time, he was convinced
that no real knowledge could be attained by any
other means. He might even have inferred from
their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as
little as the senses. There is no real difference
between the result at which he arrived and that of
Pyrrho.5
Col. 24, 2 ; Eat. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4,
16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i.
233, it is thus expressed : Ar
cesilaus regards itoxh as being
a good in every case, avyiuna.6i<ris as an evil.
1 Cie. Acad. i. 12, 45.
2 Cio. Fin. ii. 1, 2 ; v. 4, 11;
De Orat. iii. 18, 67 ; Ding. iv.
28 ; conf. Pint. C. Not. 37, 7.
3 Stob. rioril. 82, 4 : 'Apxeal\ans b (pt\6ao<pos etpTj tovs 8ia\K~
tikovs ioiKevat tois tyr)(ponaLKTa.LS
(jugglers), ofrtves xaPt*vrt*>slTaPa~
KoylfapTai ; and, Ibid. 10 (under
the heading : 'Apice<Ti\dov Ik t&v
seem to be more appropriate to

the Chian Aristo (see p. 59)
than to Arcesilaus. Still, if
Chrysippus condemned the dia
lectic of the Sceptics (according
to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may
very well have condemned that
of the Stoics and Megarians.
Does not even Cic. Acad. ii.
28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to
dialectic, because it furnishes
no knowledge ?
5 This fact is recognised
not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr.
Ev. xiv. 6, 4, but by Sext.
Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference
\&ctik)jv 8e (f>eDy, vvyKvKa. T&fu which the later Sceptics draw
between themselves and the
4 The authority is a very un Academicians, viz. that they
certain one, particularly as Arce assert the principle of doubt
silaus left nothing in writing, tentatively, whereas the Acade
and the remarks quoted would micians assert it absolutely,
533
Chap.
534
THE SCEPTICS.
Chap.
XXIII.
If opponents asserted that by denying knowledge

all possibility of action is denied,' Arcesilaus declined
(2) Proba to accede to this statement. No firm conviction is,
bility.
as he maintained, necessary for a decision of the will ;
for an action to come about a perception influences
the will immediately, leaving the question as to its
truth entirely out of sight.* In order to act sensibly
we need no knowledgejjFqr this^purpose^probability
is quite enough ; any one can follow probability, even
though he is conscious of the uncertaintyof all know
ledge. Thus probability is the highest standard for
practical life.3 We are but scantily informed how
does not apply to Arcesilaus (see
p. 533, 1). Even Sextus says
the same, but with some diffi
dence (irA^y 6i fijj \eyol Tis '6ri
(c.t.A.). On account of this
connection with Pyrrho, the
Stoic Aristo called Arcesilaus
(following II. vi. 181) : wp6aBe
Ai68a>pos. Sext. 1. c. ; Numen.
in Eiis. Pr. Ev. xiv.5, 11 ; Biog.
iv. 33.
1 It has been already seen
that this was the key to the
position which the Stoics and
Epicureans took up against the
Sceptics.
2 Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, de
fending Arcesilaus against the
attacks of Colotes, says : The
opponents of Scepticism cannot
show that iiroxh leads to inac
tivity, for TraVra iretpaVt Kal trrpetpovffiv ahrots oi/x vnijKOVfrev 7j
dpfii] yevcadai (TvyKarddeo'ls oiiSi
ttjs poirTjs apxfa ^5eaTO t^v aia0j]atv, aAA' 4 lauTTjs ayuybs iirl
ras Trpdîs e(pavq ju^ deofievrj tov
jrpoorffleo-flai. Perception arises
and influences the will without

(ruyicaTdBeiris. Since this state
ment was controverted by
Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. Rep. 47,
12. See above 87, 1), there can
be no doubt that it was pro
pounded by Arcesilaus.
' Sext. Math, vii 158 : AaV
licti fiera ravra ?5ei Kal Tcepl rijs
rov Bi'ou hifâyaiyrts frirtiv ij tis
oil XWP^J KpiTTjplov ire<f}uKf ajroSi'Sotrfai, atp' ov Kal tj eiiHai/iovla,
Toureo-Ti to rov jSfou t4\os, iipTiipMm\v %xel r^lv "kLo'tiv, (pTjatv &
*ApKeffl\aos, tin b ircpl tt&vtuiv
iirextoP ttavoviei toj alpfffets Kal
<pvyas Kal koivus tus vpdêis T'
evXdytp, Kara, tovto* t troofpxofitvos to KptT'fjpiov ieaTop8tbo~ft
t^v f/Ltv yap euSatiAOviav trepiyiveaBai 5ta ttjs <ppov4\o~t&s, t^v 5e
tppAvTiaw KLVlO-0at iv TOiS KaTOpQoifiatri, to Sk Kar6pBuifia elyat (ac
cording to the Stoic definition)
8irp trpax^v eV\oyov %xfl r^ly
avoAoytav. 6 irpo(Texuv TV fv"
Adytp KaTopB&ffei Kal euSai/lopêt.
It is a mistake to suppose, with
Numen. in Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6,
CARNEADES.
Arcesilaus applied this principle to the sphere of
morals, but a few of his utterances are on record.1
535
Ch\p.
XXIIJ-
All bear witness to the beautiful spirit of moderation B Cwrin the moral theory of the Academy, which was
otherwise exemplified in his own life.2
Comparing with the theory of Arcesilaus that
which was propounded by Carneades a century later,
the same leading features are found to be underlying ;
but the points have been more carefully worked out,
and the theory placed on a wider footing. Of the im
mediate followers of Arcesilaus 3 it can only be stated
4, that Arcesilaus denied pro
babilities.
1 In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub
fin. p 470, he gives the advice
rather to devote attention to
oneself and one's own life than
to works of art and other ex
ternal things. In Stob. Floril.
95, 17, he says : Poverty is bur
densome, but educates for vir
tue. Ibid. 43, 91 : Where there
are most laws, there are most
transgressions of law. Plut.
Cons, ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has
a saying of his as to the folly
of ihe fear of death. Id. De
Sanit. 7, p. 126,- Qu. Conv. vii.
5, 3, 7, records a somewhat
severe judgment on adulterers
and prodigals. Quite unique
is the statement in Tertull. Ad.
Nation, ii. 2 : Arcesilaus held
that there were three kinds of
Gods (in other words he divided
the popular Gods into three
classes) : the Olympian, the
stars, and the Titans. It implies
that he criticised the belief in
the Gods. It also appears by
the language used in Pint. C.
Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic
theory of a (tpains Si' S\ov, that

his criticism of dogmatism ex
tended to natural science.
' Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.
3 (fe/fers, De Arcesilae Successoribus (including Carnea
des) : Gott. 1845. Arcesilaus
was succeeded by Lacydes of
Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after
presiding over the School for
26 years. In his lifetime (pro
bably shortly before his death)
he entrusted it to the care
of the Phocaeans Telecles and
Euandros (Diog. iv. 59-G1).
The statements made in Diog.
1. o , Numen. in Ens. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 7, Pint. De Adul. 22, p. 63,
JElian, V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x.
438, a. xiii. 606, c, Plin. H. N.
x. 22, 51, refer to individual
peculiarities which he appears
to have had They must be
received with caution, par
ticularly the gossip which
Diog. 59 mentions casually and
Numenius dwells upon with
intolerable garrulity. Diog.
calls him ivilp amviiaros nal
oiiK 6\iyovs ^0"x?JKCt>s ^rjAwTas '
tpl\6nov6s T i>C VtOV Kai TT6*7JS
836
Chap.
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
that they clung to their teacher. It may be pre
sumed that they did little in the way of expansion,
since the ancients are silent as to their labours ;
Carneades 1 is only mentioned as the continuer
fitp, etixapis 5'
Kal ev6u.i\os.
To his admirers belongs Atta
ins I. of Pergamum. A visit to
his court was however declined
in skilful language (Diog. 60,
which Gejfers, p. 6, clearly mis
understands). In doctrine, he
deviated little from Arcesilaus,
and, having been the first to
commit to writing the teaching
of the New Academy [Suid.
Aart. : Sypwjie $i\6(ro(pa. Kal irepl
tpio-fwsthe latter is somewhat
extraordinary for a Sceptic), he
was by some mistake called its
founder (Diog. 69). According
to Diog. vii. 183, see p. 46, 1, he
appears to have taught in the
Academy during Arcesilaus'
lifetime. Panaretus(.4</<cre. xii.
652, d ; JKl. V. H. x. G), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Eodelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat.
5, 7) are also called pupils of
Arcesilaus. The most distin
guished pupil of Lacydes, ac
cording to Eus. xiv. 7, 12,
was Aristippus of Oyrene, also
mentioned by Diog. ii. 83.
Another, Paulus, is mentioned
by Timotheus, in Clemens,
Strom. 496, D. His successors
were Telecles and Euander,
who jointly presided over the
School. Euander, however, ac
cording to Via. Acad. ii. 6, 16,
Diog. 60, Ens. 1. c, survived his
colleague, and was followed by
Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. 1. c.)
or Hegesilaus (as he is called by
Clemens, Strom, p. 301, C). who
was the immediate predecessor
of Carneades. Respecting these

individuals nothing is known
beyond the names.
1 Carneades, the son of Epicomusor I'hilocomus, was born
at Cyrene (Diog. iv. 62 ; Stralio,
xvii. 3, 22, p. 838 ; Cic. Tusc.
iv. 3, 5), and died, according
to Apollodorus (Ding. 65), 129
B.C., in his 85th year. Lnciaii,
Macrob. 20, assigns to him the
same age. With less probabi
lity Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer.
Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age
to 90, making his birth-year
213 B.C. Later admirers find
it remarkable that his birth
day, like Plato's, occurred on
the Carnean festival (Pint. Qu.
Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is
known of his life. He was a
disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time re
ceived instruction in dialectic
(Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the
Stoic Diogenes, and studied
philosophic literature with in
defatigable zeal (Diog. 62).
more particularly the writings
of Chrvsippus (Diog. 62 ; Pint.
Sto. Rep. 10. 44 ; Ens. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took
part in the well-known associa
tion of philosophers, and pro
duced the greatest impression
on his Roman hearers by the
force of his language and the
boldness with which he attacked
the current principles of morals.
Shortly before his death, pro
bably also at an earlier period,
he became blind (Diog. 66).
CARNEADES.
of the Academic Scepticism. The importance of
Carneades is therefore very great, whence he is in
consequence called the founder of the third or New
Academy ; 1 and it is justly great, witness the ad
miration which his talents called forth among cotemporaries and posterity,2 and the flourishing condition
He left no writings, the pre
servation of his doctrines being
the work of his pupils, in par
ticular of Clitoniachus (Diog.
66, 67; C'ie. Acad. ii. 31, 98;
32, 102). Respecting his cha
racter, we may gather from a
few expressions that, whilst
vigorous in disputation (Diog.
63; GeU. N. A. M. 14, 10), he
was not wanting in a repose of
mind which was in harmony
with his principles (Diog. 66).
That he was a just man, not
withstanding his speech against
justice, we can well believe
(Quintil. xii. 1, 35).
The quotation in Diog. 64
(tj ffva-rtia-aca tpvtris Kal SiaAiitrci)
does not indicate fear of death,
but simple resignation to the
course of nature. Still less
does his language on Antipater's suicide, and also what is
quoted in Stvb. Floril. 119, 19)
that he made a faint-hearted
attempt to imitate him which
he afterwards abandoned. It
was only a not very clever way
of ridiculing an action which
appeared to Carneades emi
nently mad.
1 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus.
Fr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12 ; Ducian,
Maorob. 20.
2 His School held him in
such esteem, that it con
sidered him, together with
Plato, because of his birthday
(unless the idea grew out of

his name), to be a special
favourite of Apollo. Tradi
tion says that an eclipse of the
moon (Sitid. Kapv. adds an
eclipse of the sun) comme
morated his death ; ovuirMtiav,
us av iinot ns, cdviTTOixevov rod
jUefl' î\lov koWiittov tuv &ffrpuy
(Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22,
p. 838, says of him : oItos Si
ruv e 'AffaS^jutos aptffros <pi\oa6<puv dfxokoyuTau. There was
only one opinion among the
ancients as to the force of
his logic, and the power and
attraction of his eloquence.
These gifts were aided by un
usually powerful organs (see
the anecdotes in Pint. Garrul.
21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf.
Diog. 62; do. Fin. iii. 12, 41 ;
De Orat. ii. 38, Kit ; iii. 18,68 ;
(fell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen.
in liusebiuit, 1'r. Ev. xiv. 8, 2
and 5; Laetaiit. Inst. v. 14;
Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter,
speaking of his success at Rome,
says: juaAHrraS' rj KapPct8oi/x<*pis,
flsSwap'is Te TrKeiffrrt Kal 5<J|aT?}$
8uvdfj.(i}s ovk airoSeouca . . . us
Kal \6yos KaT^xev> us av))p''E\\riv
us %tcir\rittv 6jrp<po}js, iravra Kt]~
\uv Kal x*ipovinvos, epura Ssiv'bv
j/x0ljSAl7KC tois veots.
ov tu>v
&k\wv r)Sovu>v Kal tiiarpiPuv 4kTT(t6vT6S 4v0ovaiU(Tl ITepl <pl\OffO*
<plav.
637
Chap.
xxm.
538
THE SCEPTICS.
Chap, in which he left his School.1 Himself a pupil of

XX11I L Chrysippus,
and resembling
...
him in tone of mind,2
Carneades expanded not only the negative side of
the Sceptical theory in all directions with an acuteness entitling him to the first place among the ancient
Sceptics, but he was also the first to investigate the
positive side of Scepticism, the doctrine of proba
bility, and to determine the degrees and conditions
of probability. By his labours in both ways he
brought the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest
scientific perfection.
(1) NegaAs regards the negative side of these investigaAi> teach? tions, or the refutation of dogmatism, the attacks of
in9Carneades were directed partly against the formal
possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief
actual results of the knowledge of his day. In both
respects he had mainly to do with the Stoics,3
though he did not confine himself to them.
(a) Denial
To prove the impossibility of knowledge in
ll t~f Se*"'ral> ê aPPeals -sometimesjfca experience. _ There
formal
is no^kind of conviction which does_not sometimes
knowledge. ,}eceive us . consequently there is none which guaran
tees its own truth.4
Going then further into the
1 Cie. Acad. ii. 6, 16.

See p. 536, note.
* Sext. Math. vii. 159: toCto
koI 6'n.picealKaos. i $k Kapve&Svs
ou ii6vqv rois 2tuiko7s oAXct (to!
iraffiToisirpb ainov an-i8ieTd<rtrTo
xepl rod npnriplov. In Math. ix.
1, iêxtus charges the School of
Carneades with unnecessary
diffuseness in discussing the
fundamental principlesoi every
system. The Stoics were, bowever, the chief object of his

attack. (He. Tusc. v. 29, 82;
N. D. ii. 65, 162; Pint. Garrul.
23, p. 514; Auguxtin. c. Acad.
iii. 17,39.
4 Sext. 1. c. : xal 8^ wpAros
/iiv a.injB (to) xoivbs npbs itoitoi
iar\ Xd-yos mb" 4p napiaraTai Jti
ovScv iariv air\Sis iKriSclat npiriipiov, ou \6yos olm a1o6ri<rti oi <pav
CARNEADES.
nature of our notions, he armies, that since notions
consist in the change produced on tbe soul by impressions from without, they must, to be true, not
only furnish information as to themselves, but also
as to the objects producing them. Now, this is by
no means always the case, many notions avowedly
giving a false impression of things. Hence the note
of truth cannot reside in an impression as such, but
only in a true impression.1 Jtt is, however, impossible
to distinguish with certainty a true impression from
one that is false. For independently of dreams,
visions, and the fancies of madmen, in short, of all
the unfounded chimeras which force themselves on
our notice under the guise of truth,2 it is still un
deniable that many false notions closely resemble
true ones. The transition, too, from truth to
falsehood is so gradual, the interval between the
two is occupied by intermediate links so innume
rable, and gradations so slight, that they impercep
tibly pass one into the other, and it becomes im
possible to draw a boundary line between the two
opposite spheres.3 Not content with proving tbis
raaia ovk &\\o ti tav imam'
n&vra 7&P thOto ov\\i]f&rpi Sia^cuScrai Tjfias.
1 ijert. 1. c. lfiO-163.
2 Conf. Sent. vii. 403 ; Cic.
Acad. ii. 15, 47 ; 28, 89where
Carneades is undoubtedly
meant, although he is not mentioned by name. For the other
sceptical arguments which
Cicero mentions tally with those
which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antio-
chus refnte them, who was tlie

immediate adversary of Carneades.
"According to Cic. Acad.
ii. 13, 40 ; 26, 83, the Academic
system of proof rests on the
four following propositions :
(1) that there are false notions;
(2) that these cannot be known,
i.e. be recognised as true ; (3)
that of two indistinguishable
notions, it is impossible to know
the one and not the other; (4J
Chap.
!
540
Chap
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
assertion in regard to impressions of the senses,
Carneades went on to prove it with regard to general
notions based on experience and intellectual concep
tions.1 He showed that it is impossible for us to
distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is to
another; that at a certain distance the painted surface
seems raised, and a square tower seems round ; that
an oar in the water seems broken, and the neckplumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in
the sun ; that objects on the shore seem to be moving
as we sail by, and so forth ; 2 in all these cases
the same strength of conviction belongs to the false as
to the true impressions.3 He showed further that this
applies equally to purely intellectual ideas ; that
many logical difficulties cannot be solved ; 4 jthat no
that there is no true notion by quidem et conjectura ulla res
the side of which a false one percipi possit. Ha;c autem unicannot be placed indistinguish versa etiam concidunt minutius.
2 Sent, vii. 409 ; Cic. Acad,
able from it. The second and
third of these propositions are ii 26, 84; 7, 1; 25,79; Nu
not denied at all, and the first men. in Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5.
is only denied by Epicurus in Therewith is probably con
regard to impressions on the nected the statement in Galen,
senses. Hence all importance De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K,
attaches to the fourth proposi that Carneades persistently de
tion, to which Sextvs, vii. 164 nied the axiom that two things
and 402, and Numen. in Ens. that are equal to a third are
Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4, look as the tqual to one another. His
most important argument.
assertion probably comes to
1 Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42 : Divi- this, that it may be possible
dunt enim in partes et eas to distinguish two things as
quidem magnas : primum in unequal, which cannot be dis
sensus, deinde in ea, qua? du- tinguished from a third, that
cuntur a sensibus et ab omni therefore two things may ap
consuetudine, quam obscurari pear equal to a third without
volunt (the <rvvi)0eta against being or appearing equal to
which Chrysippus already di one another.
Sext. 402 and 408.
rected severe attacks. See p.
46, 2 ; 91, 2). Turn perveniunt
* The fallacy called \ptvtiad earn partem, uc ne ratione ixtvos is carefully investigated
CARNEADES.
absolute distinction can be drawn between much and
little, in short between all differences in quantity ;
and that it is the most natural course in all such
cases to follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the danger
ous inferences which may be drawn by withholding
judgment.1 Arguing from these facts, Carneades
concluded at first in regard to impressions of the
senses, that there is no such thing as âvraaia
KaTaXrjTrriKrj in the Stoic sense of the term, in other
words, that no perception contains in itself cha
racteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be
inferred with certainty.2 This fact being granted,
the possibility is in his opinion precluded of there
residing in the understanding a standard for the
distinction of truth from falsehood. The under
standingand this belief was shared by his oppo
nentsmust derive its material from the senses.3
Logic tests the formal accuracy of combinations of
thought, but gives no insight into their import.4
Direct proofs of the uncertainty of intellectual con
victions are not therefore needed. The same result
may also be attained in a more personal way, by
raising the question, how individuals obtain their
in Cif. Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Car* Cie. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who
neades as he says, 98), as an here appears to be following
instance in point.
Philo, and, subsequently, Car1 Sext. 416 ; Cic. 1. c. 29, 92. neades as well. Carneades also
J Since Chrysippus tried to meet gives utterance to a similar
the chain-argument, it may be view of dialectic in Stob. Floril.
supposed that this fallacy had 93, 13 (conf. Pint. C. Not. 2,
been used by Arcesilaus against 4), comparing it to a polypus
the Stoics.
consuming its own tentacles.
* Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. It is able, he conceives, to
c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.
expose fallacies, but not to dis3 Sext. 165.
cover truth.
542
THE SCEPTICS.
Chap.
XXIII.
knowledge. He can only be said to know a thing

who has formed an opinion respecting it. In the
mean time, until he has decided in favour of some
definite opinion, he has still no knowledge. And
what dependence can be placed on the judgment of
one who has no knowledge ? 1
(b) Attack
In these formal enquiries into the possibility of
on the
scientific knowledge, Carneades had chiefly to deal with the
Stoics, with whom he holds a common ground in his
of the
appeal to the senses. The Stoics were also his chief
time.
(a) The
opponents in his polemic against the material results
of the dogmatic philosophy. Natural science having
views of
the Stoics throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian phi
attacked.
losophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise
engaged more attention at the hands of Carneades
than science.2 In as far as he studied Natural science,
he appears to have been entirely opposed to the Stoic
treatment of the subject, and to this circumstance
we owe it, that better information is forthcoming
regarding his scientific, or rather his theological, in
vestigations than regarding his moral views. The
Stoic theories of God and of final causes s afforded
ample scope for the exercise of his ingenuity, and
from the ground he occupied it was not difficult
for him to expose the weak points of that theory.
1 die. Acad. ii. 3G, 117. Car
neades is not mentioned by
name, but there can be no
doubt that the reference is to
some Academician, and it is
probable that it was the work
of Carneades.
2 Diog. iv. 62.
3 Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a
brief description of the Stoical
views of Gods : Contra quos
Carneades ita multa disseruit,
ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.
CARKEADES.
The Stoics had appealed in support of the belief
in God to the consensus gentium. How close at
hand was the answer,1 that the universality of
this belief was neither proved to exist, nor as a
matter of fact did it exist, but that in no case could
the opinion of an ignorant multitude decide anything.
The Stoics thought to find a proof of divine provi
dence in the manner in which portents and prophe
cies come true. To expose this delusion, no very ex
panded criticism of divination was necessary.2 Going
beyond this, Carneades proceeded to call in question
the cardinal point of the Stoic system the belief
in God, the doctrine of the soul and reason of the
universe, and of the presence of design in its arrange
ments. How, he asks, is the presence of design
manifested ? Whence all the things which cause
destruction and danger to men if it be true that
God has made the world for the sake of man ? 3 If
reason is praised as the highest gift of God, is it not
manifest that the majority of men only use it to
make themselves worse than brutes ? In bestowing
such a gift God must have been taking but little
1 Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii.
4,11. Here, too. Carneades is
not mentioned by name, but
the reference to him is made
clear by Cicero's remark that he
is quoting the Academic view.
4 Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.
* The Academician in Cic.
Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these argum ents were usedby Carneades
is clear from Plut. in Porphyr.
De Abst. iii. 20, where, t raversing the arguments of the
Stoics, he justifies the existence

of vermin, poisonous plants, and
beasts of prey. In answer to
Chrysippus' assertion, that the
final cause of a pig is to be
killed, Carneades argues : A
pig, therefore, by being killed,
must attain the object for which
it was destined; it is always
beneficial for a thing to attain
its objecttherefore it must be
beneficial to a pig to be killed
and eaten.
543
Chap.
"
544
chap,
XXIII
THE SCEPTICS.
care of this maiority.1 Even if we attribute to man
.
.
L direct blame for the misuse of reason, still, why has
God bestowed on him a reason which can be so much
abused?2 The Stoics themselves say that a wise
man can nowhere be found. They admit, too,
that folly is the greatest misfortune.
How, then,
can they speak of the care bestowed by God on men,
when, on their own confession, the whole of mankind
is sunk in the deepest misery ? 3 But allowing that
the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon
all, they could, at least, have taken care that it
should go well with the good. Instead of this, the
experience of hundreds of cases shows that the upright
man comes to a miserable end ; that crime succeeds ;
and that the criminal can enjoy the fruits of his
misdeeds undisturbed. Where, then, is the agency
of Providence ? 4 The facts being entirely different
from what the Stoics suppose, what becomes of their
inferences ? Allowing the presence of design in the
world, and granting that the world is as beautiful
and good as possible, why is it inconceivable that
nature should have formed the world according to
natural laws without the intervention of God ? Ad
mitting, too, the connection of parts in the universe,
why should not this connection be the result simply
of natural forces, without a soul of the universe or
a deity ? 5 Who can pretend to be so intimately
1 CAc. N. D. iii. 25, 65-70.
It is here presujned that the
lending thoughts in Cicero's
detcription belong to the School
of Carneade*.
iii.
* Ilnd. 31, 76.

3 Ibid. 32, 79.
' tic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.
5 Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D.
11, 28.
CARXEADES.
545
acquainted with the powers of nature, as to be able Chap.
XXIII
to prove the impossibility of this assumption ? Zeno
argued that rational things are better than things
irrational, that the world is the best possible, and
must therefore be rational. Man, says Socrates, can
only derive his soul from the world ; therefore the
world must have a soul. But what, replies the
Academician,1 is there to show that reason is best
for the world, if it be the best for us ? or that there
must be a soul in nature for nature to produce a
soul ? What man is not able to produce, that, argues
Chrysippus, must have been produced by a higher
being by deity. But to this inference the same objec
tion was raised by the Academicians as to the former
one, viz. that it confounds two different points of
view. There may, indeed, be a Being higher than
man. But why must there needs be a rational
man-like Bein^? Why a God? Why not nature her
self ? 2 Nor did the argument seem to an Academi
cian more conclusive, that as every house is destined
to be inhabited, so, too, the world must be intended for
the habitation of God. To this there was the obvious
reply : 3 If the world were a house, it might be so ;
but the very point at issue is whether it is a house
constructed for a definite purpose, or whether it is
simply an undesigned result of natural forces.
Not content with attacking the conclusiveness (3) Tluoof the arguments upon which the Stoics built their %fjt ^
belief in a God, the scepticism of the Academv
Staie*
" attaelieih
1 Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21 ; 10,
2 Ibid. 10, 25.
26 ; 11, 27.
' L. c.
N N
THE SCEPTICS.
61G
Chap,
XXIIt-
sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself

is an untenable one. The line of argument which
CarneaHesTitfuck out for this purpose is essentially
the same as that used in modern times to deny the
personality of God. The ordinary view of God re
gards Him as an infinite, but, at the same time, as
a separate Being, possessing the qualities and living
the life of an individual. To this view Carneades
objected, on the ground that the first assertion
contradicts the second ; and argues that it is impos
sible to apply the characteristics of personal exist
ence to God without limiting His infinite nature.
Whatever view we may take of God, we must regard
Him as a living Being ; and every living being is
composite, having parts and passions, and is therefore
destructible.1 Moreover, every living being has a
sense-nature. Far, therefore, from refusing such a
nature to God, Carneades attributed to Him, in
the interest of omniscience, other organs of sense
than the five we possess. Now, everything capable
of impressions through the senses is also liable to
change, sensation, according to the definition of
Chrysippus, being nothing more than a change of
soul. Every such being must therefore be capable of
pleasure and pain, without which sensation is incon
ceivable. Whatever is capable of change is liable to
destruction $ whatever is susceptible to pain is also
liable to deterioration, pain being caused by dete
rioration, and is also liable to destruction.2 As the
' Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14,
34.
2 Cic. N. D.iii. 13,32. More

fully Sext. Math. ix. 139-147.
CARSEADES.
jcapacity for sensation, so too the desire for what is
in harmony with nature, and the dislike of what is
opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life.
Whatever has the power of destroying any being is
opposed to the nature of that being, everything that
lives being exposed to annihilation.1 Advancing
from the conception of a living being to that of a
rational being, all virtues would have to be attri
buted to God as well as bliss. But how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God ? Every
virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which
it consists. He only is continent who might pos
sibly be incontinent, and persevering who might be
Indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to
danger ; to be magnanimous, he must be exposed to
misfortunes. A being not feeling attraction for
pleasure, nor aversion for pain and difficulties, dan
gers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue.
Just as little could we predicate prudence of a being
not susceptible of pleasure and pain ; prudence con
sisting in knowing what is good, bad, and morally
indifferent. But how can there be any such know
ledge where there is no susceptibility to pleasure or
pain ? Or how can a being be conceived of capable of
feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling pain, since
pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain,
and the possibility of increasing life always supposes
the possibility of lessening it ? Nor is it otherwise
Here too G'arneades is expressly the same person was being
mentioned. But were he not referred to.
mentioned the agreement of
1 Cic. ; Ibid. Further proofs
the argument with that given of the transient nature of all
by Cicero would show that earthly beings are there given.
N n 2
THE SCEPTICS.
with intelligence (evftovXta). He only is intelligent
who always discovers what will subserve his purpose.
If, however, he must discover it, it cannot have been
previously known to him. Hence intelligence can
only belong to a being who is ignorant about much.
Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later
something will not cause his ruin. He will there
fore be exposed to fear. A being susceptible of plea
sure and exposed to pain, a being who has to contend
with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and
fear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite
and destructible. If, therefore, we cannot conceive
of God except in this form, we cannot conceive of
Him at all, our conception being self-destructive.1
There is yet another reason, according to Car
neades, why God cannot have any virtue ; because
virtue is above its possessor, and there can be nothing
above God.2 Moreover, what is the position of God
in regard to speech ? It was easy to show the ab
surdity of attributing speech to Him,3 but to call
him speechless (acjxovos) seemed also to be opposed
to the general belief.4 Quite independently, how1 Sext. Math. ix. 152-175,
quotes the same argument for
(Ttt'pyoffiVT), and so does Cio.
N.U.iii. 15,38. Neither mentions
Carneades by name, but since
both writers introduce these
proofs in the same position in
a longer argument, in which
Carneades is expressly men
tioned both before and after,
tnere can be no doubt that to
him they refer.
- Sext. ix. 176. The argu
ment has a look of soDhistry

about it. It alludes to the iinportantquestion which engagi d
so much attention in the middle
ages, viz. How is the universal
related in Deity to the indi
vidual ? Are goodness and
reason a law for God inde
pendent of His will or not .'
* As Epicurus did. See p.
4G8, 3.
1 Sext. 178.
CARNEADES.
ever, of details, the inconceivableness of God appears,
so soon as the question is raised, whether the deity
is limited or unlimited, material or immaterial. God
cannot be unlimited ; for what is unlimited is neces
sarily immovable because it has no place, and
soulless because by virtue of its boundlessness it can
not form a whole permeated by a soul ; but God we
ordinarily think of both as moving and as endowed
with a soul. Nor can God be limited ; for all that.
is limited is incomplete. Moreover, God cannot be
immaterial, for Carneades, like the Stoics, held that
what is immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling,
nor activity. Neither can he be material, all com
posite bodies being liable to change and destruction,
and simple bodies, fire, water, and the like, possessing
neither life nor reason.1 If, then, all the forms
under which we think of God are impossible, His
existence cannot be asserted.
Easier work lay before the Sceptics in criticising
polytheistic
views of religion
and their defence byJ
r J
the Stoics. Among the arguments employed by Carneades to overthrow them, certain chain-argu
ments are prominent, by means of which he
endeavoured to show that the popular belief has no
distinctive marks for the spheres of God and man.
1 Sext. I. c. 148-151 ; 180.
That Sextus here refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29-31 ;
14, 34. Cicero introduces his
remarks with the words : Ilia
autem, qua? Carneades afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis ?
Sextus himself seems to refer

not only individual arguments,
but the whole series of them,
to Carneades, when he continues, 182 : ripwrrivrai Si teal tub
toD KopyfdSov koI craipiTiKuis rtvtt
k.t.K.
540.
Chai\
xxi
_ 1 11
(7) puiy.
newt attacfod.
THE SCEPTICS.
If Zeus is a God, he argues, his brother Poseidon
must likewise be one, and if he is one, the rivers and
streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a God, the
appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must
be a God ; and, consequently, month, year, morning,
midday, evening, must all be Gods.1 Polytheism is
here refuted by establishing an essential similarity
between what is accepted as God and what is avow
edly not a God. It may readily be supposed that
this was not the only proof of the acuteness of Carneades' reasoning.4
Divination, to which the Stoics attached especial
importance,3 was vigorously assailed.
Carneades
proved thnt no peculiar range of subjects belonged
thereto, but that in all cases which admit professional
judgment experts pass a better judgment than divi
ners.4 To know accidental events beforehand is impos
sible ; it is useless to know those that are necessary and
unavoidable, nay, more, it would even be harmful.*
No causal connection can be conceived of between
a prophecy and the ensuing realisation.6 If the
Stoics met him by pointing to fulfilled prophecies,
he replied that the coincidence was accidental,7 at
1 Sext. 182-190. More fully
in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also observes, 190: ol &\\ovs
Sri ToiowTOM trwpfiras ipuT&aiv
ol wipl tov Kapveutinv tis rb p-T)
thai Beois.
* To him, or probably to his
School, belongs the learned argument given by Cie. N. D. iii.
21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he
proves the want of unity in
traditional myths by the multi-
plicity of Gods of the same

name. The whole drift of this
argument shows that it was
borrowed from some Greek
treatise.
* See Cie. Divin. i. 4, 7 : 7, 12.
* Ibid. ii. 3, 9.
* Ibid. v. 13; hut Carneades is not here mentioned by
name.
Ibid. i. 13, 23 : 49, 109.
* Cie. I.e. and Divin. ii.2 1,48
CARNEADES.
the same time declaring many such stories to be
without doubt false.1
551
Chap.
XXIIL
Connected probably with these attacks on divina- (*> Moral

tion was the defence by Carneades of the freedom of t^ stgia
the will. The Stoic fatalism he refuted by an appeal attached.
to the fact that our decision is free ; and since the
Stoics appealed in support of their view to the law
of causality, he likewise attacked this law.* In so
doing his intention was not to assert anything posi
tive respecting the nature of the human will, but
only to attack the Stoic assertion, and if for his
own part he adhered to the old Academic doctrine
of a free will, he still regarded that doctrine as only
probable.
Less information exists as to the arguments by
which Carneades sought to assail the current prin
ciples of morality. Nevertheless, enough is known
to indicate the course taken by his Scepticism in rela
tion thereto. In the second of the celebrated speeches
which he delivered at Rome in the year 156 B.C.,3 he
denied that there is such a thing as natural right :
all laws are only positive civil institutions devised by
men for the sake of safety and advantage, and for
the protection of the weak ; and hence he is regarded
as foolish who prefers justice to interest, which after
1 de. I. c. ii. 11, 27.
2 6Vc.De Fato, 11,23; 14,
31. The freedom of the will,
lie there says, may be asserted
even granting that every motion is referred t > a cause, for
it is not necessary that this law
should hold good of the will.
He will therefore confine it to

bodily motion, and not allow to
it unconditional validity.
* Lact. Instit. v. 14, following die. De Rep. iii. 4 ; Pint.
Cato Maj. c. 22 ; Quintil. In" stit. xii. 1 , 35.
THE SCEPTICS.
Chap,
XXI1
all is the only unconditional end. In support of

these statements he appealed to the fact that laws
change with circumstances, and are different in dif
ferent countries. He pointed to the example of
great nations, such as the Romans, all of whom
attained to greatness by unrighteous means.
He
impressed into his service the many casuistical ques
tions raised by the Stoics, expressing the opinion
that in all these cases it is better to commit the
injury which brings advantage^for instance, to
murder another to save one's own lifethan to
postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred
that intelligence is a state of irreconcileable oppo
sition to justice.1
This free criticism of dogmatic views could not
fail to bring Carneades to the same result as his
predecessors. Knowledge is absolutely impossible.
A man of sense will look at everything from all
sides and invariably withhold judgment, thus guard
ing himself against error.2 And to this conviction
1 Lactant. 1. c. 16 ; Cic. De ittiov, vphs Ta&Tt\v ydfi tpairiv r,fias
Kep. iii. 8-12 ; 14 ; 17 ; Fin ii. oiictUts %xelv ^P^tt]v, fiffre pifSiv
] 8, 59. On the above casuisti vpoatnaieiv. attpofTnTuaia or avpo'
cal cases see De Off. iii. 13 ; itrmrla is, according to the Stoic
23, 89, and above, p. 299, 2. detinition (Diog. vii. 4G) = ^*iProbably Carneades was the <rT^jU7j tov it<(t Set ffvyKarariBt'
cause of the study of casuistry <r9a, kciI /til. It consists, there
fore, in not giving a hasty
among the later Stoics.
2 Vic. Acad. ii. 34, 108 ; conf. assent to any proposition. Ac
31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he cording to the Sceptics, this is
compares this iiroxh to the only possible, and you are only
drawing up of a charioteer, or then safe from error, when you
to the guard of a pugilist. No give assent to none whatever.
doubt it is with reference to &Tpo<rirTii>ffia becomes then iden
tTroxv that Alex. Aphr. De An. tical with eVox^ or fiyi/oia, which
154 a, says : The Academicians JUtue. Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks
consider anrutria the irpaToy oi- of <as the ultimate end of Car
Carneades.
he clings so persistently that he altogether refuses to
tisten to the objection that the wise man must be
at least convinced of the impossibility of any firm
chap.
xx[l[-
conviction.1 The earlier Sceptics, far from attrii .

, .
t
, i
butmg on this ground an equal value to all notions,
had not dispensed
1 .
, with reasons for actions and
thoughts. This point was now taken up by Carneades, who, in attempting
the conditions
**
^~ to establish
-*
and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain a clue
to the kind of conviction which might be still per
mitted in his system. However much we may
despair of knowledge, some stimulus and ground
work for action is needed. Certain things must
therefore be assumed, from which the pursuit of
happiness must start.2 To these so much weight
must be attached that they are allowed to decide our
conduct, but we must be on our guard against con
sidering them to be true, or to be something really
known and conceived. Nor must we forget that
neades. Hence Cameades, as esset, si probabile nihil esArcesilaus had done before him, set, et sequitur omnis vitae
spoke for and against every . . . eversio. Ibid. 101 ; 32,
subject without expressing a 104 : Nam cum placeat, eum
decided opinion. (Ho. N. D. i. qui de omnibus rebus contineat
5, 11 ; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. se de assent iendo, moveri ta
li. 72, 150 ; Rep. iii. 6, 8 ; Tusc. men et agere aliquid, reliquit
v. 4, 11 ; Ens. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, ejusmodi visa, quihus ad ac12.
tionem excitemur, etc. Hence
1 Cie. Acad. ii. 9, 28.
the assurance ( Ibid. 103 ; Stob.
2 Sext. Math. vii. 1K6 : 4o- I'loril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that
Totificvos St teal air6s [i KapveiS-qs'] the Academicians do not wish
t< KfitT-hpiov np6s re tV tov fliov to go into the question of per5iea7t7V xal irpbs Tr)x Ttjs (!>- ception. They accept it as a
Sat/iovias ireplxTri<riv Zvvauw air- phenomenon of consciousness
avayKa(iTU Kol Kafl" atrrhv ntpl and a basis of action, but they
Toirou SiarJiTTtffBat, kt.\. Cic. deny that it strictly furnishes
Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitoma- knowledge. The senses are
chus) : Etenim contra naturam fiyicTt, but not dxpiflels.
('-)
tire aide of
tlmteaek,
Carueades.
^ 'fiieory
qfprobai/il'itics
554
THE SCEPTICS.
Chap, even the nature of true ideas is similar to that of

'_ false ones, and that the truth of ideas can never
be known with certainty. Hence we should with
hold all assent, not allowing any ideas to be true,
but only to have the appearance of truth (akrjdrj
<f>aivecr6ai) or probability {sfiâais, Tridavorrjs).1
In every notion two things need to be considered,
the relation to the object represented which makes it
either true or false, and the relation to the subject
who has the notion, which makes it seem either true
or false. The former relation is, for the reasons
already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our
judgment; the latter, the relation of a notion to
ourselves, falls within the sphere of consciousness.2
So long as a notion seemingly true is cloudy and in
distinct, like an object contemplated from a distance,
it makes no great impression on us. "When, on the
contrary, the appearance of truth is strong, it pro
duces in us a belief 3 strong enough to determine us
to action, although it does not come up to the im
pregnable certainty of knowledge.4
1 Sext. and Cie. 1. c
2 Sext. 1. c. 167-170.
3 Ibid. 171-173; or, as it is
expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii.
24, 78 : It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is
of no importance that Philo
and Metrodorus said Carneades
had proved this statement,
whereas Clitomachus had stated,
hoc magis ab eo disputatum
quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48,
148; 21 ,67, attributes the statement to Carneades, without any
qualification, adding only : Ad-
sensurum (aliquando, as the

latter passage add>) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum sapientem.
4 Conf. Avgvttin. c. Acad,
ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point
of matter and probably in terms
following Cicero) : Id probabile
vel verisimile Academic! vocant, quod nos ad agendum
sine adsensione potest invitare.
Sine adsensione autem dico, ut
id quod agimus non opinemui
verum esse aut n>n id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To
CABNEADES.
Belief, however, like probability, is of several
degrees. The lowest degree of probability arises
when a notion produces by itself an impression of
truth, without being taken in connection with other
notions. The next higher degree is when that im
pression is confirmed by the agreement of all notions
which are related to it. The third and highest
degree is when an investigation of all these notions
results in producing the same corroboration for all.
In the first case a notion is called probable (iridavrj) ;
in the second probable and undisputed (iridavrj xai
airspicnraaTos) ; in the third probable, undisputed,
and tested (iriOavr) ku\ airepicrnracrTos koX irspio>Sevfiivr)).1 Within each one of these three classes
different gradations of probability are again possible.'
The distinguishing marks, which must be considered
in the investigation of probability, appear to have
been investigated by Carneades in the spirit of the
Aristotelian logic.3 In proportion to the greater or
less practical importance of a question, or to the
accuracy of investigation which the circumstances
allow, we must adhere to one or the other degree of
probability.4 Although no one of them is of such
a nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this
circumstance need not deprive us of certainty in
the same effect, Evteb. Pr. Ev. cemunt, omnia se reddere inxiv. 7, 12 : Carneades declared certa, quod nolunt ; ea dico init impossible to withhold judg- certa, quae &$ri\a Grasci.
ment on all points, and asserted
1 Sext. 1. c. 173; 175-182;
Tttira fiiv thai dicoTa\T)7rTa, oi Pvrrh. i. 227 ; conf. (He. Acad.
*&vto. Si it57)\a. Conf. Cic. ii. 11, 38; 81, 99 ; 32, 104.
Acad. ii. 17, 54, where the ob' Sext. 1. c. 173; 181.
jection is raised to the new
* Ibid. 1 76 ; 183.
Academicians: Ne hoc quidem
* Ibid. 184.
555
Chap.
"Y"YTTT
'
656
the scurries.
Chap.
XXIII.
respect to actions, provided we have once convinced

ourselves that the absolute certainty of our practical
premisses is not possible.1 Just as little should we
hesitate to affirm or deny anything in that con
ditional way which is alone possible after what has
been stated. Assent will be given to no notion in
the sense of its being absolutely true, but to many
notions in the sense that we consider them highly
probable.2
Among questions about which thejjreatest possible
(i) Moral
and recertainty
is felt to be desirable, Carneades, true to
lif/WNS
view of
his whole position, gave a prominent place to prin
life.
ciples of morals^3 life and action being the principal
things with which the theory of probability has to
do.4 We hear, therefore, that he thoroughly dis
cussed the fundamental questions of Ethics, the
question as to the highest Good.5 On this subject he
1 Sext. 1. c. 174 j Cic. Acad,
ii. 31, 9!).
Cic. 1. c. 32, 103 ; 48, 148.
This explanation does away
with the charge of inconsistency
which is brought against Car
neades in Cic. Acad. ii. IS, 59;
21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on
the ground that he allowed, in
contradistinction to Arcesi'aus,
that the wise man will some
times follow opinion, and will
give his assent to certain state
ments. Numen. in Eng. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he
expressed his own convictions
to his friends in private ; but
this assertion is no more true
of him than of Arcesilaus (see
p. 53 1 , 3), as may be seen from
the passage on p. 557, 2.
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 22fi : ayaBhv

yap rf <paatv tlveu oi 'AxaiiifiaSnA
Kal KCUibv, ov% &cir*p ûeTy, dAAa
ueva rou wevuaQai Sti niBewip
iffTi fiaWov h Xiyowriv elvat aya6bv virdpxeiv ^ rb ivavTiOv ; ical
iir\ tov kclkov Afiolus.
4 See p. 553, 2 ; 554, 4.
5 Here the question arises,
Whence does the Sceptic derive
his conviction as to probabili
ties in morals ? and as percep
tion is not available for the
purpose, Geffers concludes ( De
Arc. Successor. 20) that Carne
ades assumed a peculiar source
of conviction in the mind. For
such an assumption, however,
our authorities give no proof.
It cannot be gathered from the
hypothetical language respect
CARNEADES.
distinguished jsix^ or relatively four, different views.
If the primary object of desire can in general only
consist of those things which correspond with our
nature, and which consequently call our emotions
into exercise, the object of desire must be either
pleasure, or absence of pain, or conformity with
nature. In each of these three cases two opposite
results are possible : either the highest Good may
consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the
activity which aims at its attainment. The latter is
the view of the Stoics only, and arises from re
garding natural activity or virtue as the highest
Good. Hence the six possible views are practically
reduced to four, which taken by themselves, or
else in combination, include all existing views re
specting the highest Good.1 But so ambiguously
did Carneades express himself as to his particular
preference of any one view, that even Clitomachus
declared he was ignorant as to his real opinion.2 It
was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting
the Stoics, that he propounded the statement that
the highest Good consists in the enjoyment of such
things as afford satisfaction to the primary impulses
ing the freedom of the will in
Vic. De Kato, ii. 23. See p.
551,2. Nor is it, indeed, necessary that Carneades, who never
pretended to hold any psychological theory, should have had
any opinion on the subject,
Supposing he did have it, he
might have appealed to experience quite as readily or
more so than the Stoics, and
have been content with the
fact that certain things are far

more agreeable or disagreeable,
and either promote or disturb
happiness.
' Cio. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23;
. conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84 ; Hitter,
iii. 686, has hardly expressed
with accuracy Carneadea' division, or he would not have
accused it of being inaccurate
and superficial,
* Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.
Chap.
XXI*1-
THE SCEPTICS.
of nature.1 Nevertheless, the matter has often been
placed in such a light as though Carneades had
propounded this statement on his own account ; and
the statement itself has been quoted to prove that
he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses
apart from virtue as an end in itself.2 It is also
asserted that he approximated to the view of Callipho,
which does not appear to have been essentially dif
ferent from that of the older Academy.3 The same
leaning to the older Academy and its doctrine of
moderation appears in other recorded parts of the
Ethics of Carneades. The pain caused by mis
fortune he wished to lessen by thinking beforehand
of its possibility ; 4 and after the destruction of
Carthage he deliberately asserted before Clitomachus
that the wisfi man would never allow himself to be
disturbed, not even bx_the_downfall of his-country.5
1 Cio. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non
qu> probaret, sed at opponeret
Stoicis, summum bonum esse
frui iis rebus, quas primas na
ture conciliavisset (oixeioJi').
Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20; Tusc.
v. 30, 84. This view differs
from that of the Stoics, because
it makes the highest Good con
sist not in natural activity as
such, but in the enjoyment of
natural goods.
s Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita
tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri
(pleasure), alter Hieronymi
(freedom from pain), Carneadis
tertius (the satisfaction of na
tural instincts). Conf. Ibid. v.
7, 20 ; 8,22.
' Cic. AoaJ. ii. 45, 139: Ut

Callipbontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiara Carneades ita
studiose detensitabat, ut earn
probare etiam videretur. Cal
lipho is reckoned among those
who consider honestas cum aliqua accessioneor, as it is
said, Fin. v. 8, 21 ; 25, 73 ;
Tusc. v. 30, 85, voluptas cum
honestatethe highest Good.
4 Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p.
476.
1 Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let
it be observed that this view
of Carneades is specially placed
under the head of conviction
on probabilities. It is said, he
attacked the proposition, videri
fore in asgritudine sapieotem
patria capta. The other state-
CARNEADES.
Putting all these statements together, we obtain
a view not unworthy of Cameades, and certainly
quite in harmony with his position. That philo
sopher could not, consistently with his sceptical
principles, allow scientific certainty to any of the
various opinions respecting the nature and aim of
moral action ; and in this point he attacked the
Stoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency
in calling the choice of what is natural the highest
business of morality, and yet not allowing to that
which is according to nature a place among goods,1
was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is
said to have been brought to admit that not the
objects to which choice is directed, but the actual
choice itself is a good.2 He even asserted that the
Stoic theory of Goods only differed in words from
that of the Peripatetics ; to this assertion he was
probably led by the fact that the Stoic morality
appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory
therewith connected of things to be desired and
things to be eschewed.3 If there were any difference
between the two, Stoicism, he thought, ignored
the real wants of nature. The Stoics, for instance,
ments of Carneades on ethics,
such as that in Pint. De Adulat.
Ifi, p. 51, have nothing characteiistic about them.
1 See p. 279.
2 Plut. 0. Not. 27, 14 ; Stob.
Eel, ii. 134. Plutarch, however, only quotes it as the
opinion of individuals. It appears more probable that it was
an opinion of Chrysippus which
Antipater defended against
Cameades. Cameades even

practically attributes it to the
Stoics.
* Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41 : Carneades tuus . . . rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit,
in omni hac qusestione, quae de
bonis et malis appelletur, non
esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.
65!
Chap.
XXIII.
500
xxifi
.
THE SCEPTICS.
caêi^ a g& name a thing indifferent ; Carneades,
_ however, drove them so much into a corner because
of this statement that they ever after (so Cicero
assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a
good name at least a secondary value among things
to be desired (Trporjy/Msva).1
Chrysippus, again,
thought to find some consolation for the ills of life
in the reflection that no man is free from them. Carneades was, however, of opinion that this thought
could only afford consolation to a lover of ill ; it
being rather a matter for sorrow that all should be
exposed to so hard a fate.2 Believing, too, that
man's happiness does not depend on any theory of
ethics,3 he could avow without hesitation that all
other views of morality do not go beyond pro
bability ; and thus the statement of Clitomachus, as
far as it refers to a definite decision as to the highest
good, is without doubt correct. But just as the
denial of knowledge does not, according to the view
of Carneades, exclude conviction in general on
grounds of probability, no more does it in the pro
vince of ethics. Here, then, is the intermediate
position which was attributed to hima position not
only suggested by the traditions of the Academic
School, but remaining as a last resource to the
sceptical destroyer of systems so opposite as Stoicism
and the theory of pleasure. The inconsistency of at
1 Fin. iii. 17, 57.
2 Cic. Tuse. iii. 25, 59. '
3 IMd. v. 29, 83 : Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quaecumque dissentientium pbilo-
sophorum sententia sit de finibus, taruen virtus satis habeat

ad vitani beatam pras.-idii, quod
quidem Carneadem disputare
soiitum accepimus, etc.
CARNEADES.
one time identifying the satisfaction of natural in
stmcts with virtue, and at another time distinguishing it from virtue, which is attributed to Carneades,
is an inconsistency for which probably Cicero is
alone responsible. JThe real meaning of Carneades
can only be that virtue consists in an activity directed
towards the possession of what is according to nature,
and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be
separated from accordance with nature.1 For the same
reason, virtue supplies all that is requisite for happi
ness.2 Hence, when it is stated that, notwithstanding
his scepticism on moral subjects, Carneades was a
thoroughly upright man,3 we have not only no reason
to doubt this statement as to his personal character,
bat we can even discern that it was a practical and
legitimate consequence of his philosophy. It may
appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation of
absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct ;
nevertheless, it is an inconsistency deeply rooted in
all the scepticism of post-Aristotelian times. That
scepticism Carneades brought to completeness, and
in logically developing his theory, even its scientific
defects came to light.
For the same reason we may also give credit to
1 He explicitly says, Fin. v. cording to nature, the prima
7, 18, that as each one defines secundum naturam are als.0
the highest good, so he deter- prima in animis quasi virtutum
mines the honestum (the KaKhv, igniculi et semina.
virtue). The view of the Stoics,
2 See p. 5(30, 3, and Pint.
he says, places the honestum Tranq. An. 11), p. 477, whe e,
and bonurn in activity aim- however, the greater part seems
ing at what is according to to belong to Plutarch,
nature; adding that, according
' Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 36.
to the view which places it in See above 536, 1, end.
the possession of what is ac0 0
681
Chap.
XXII r
'
THE SCEPTICS.
the statement that Carneades, like the later Sceptics,
notwithstanding his severe criticisms on the popular
and philosophic theology of his age, never intended
to deny the existence of divine agencies.1 On this
point he acted like a true Sceptic. He expressed
doubts as to whether anything could be known about
God, but for practical purposes he accepted the be
lief in God as an opinion more or less probable and
useful.
Taking all things into account, the philosophic
importance of Carneades and the School of which he
was the head cannot be estimated at so low a value
as would be the case were the New Academy merely
credited with entertainiDg shallow doubts, and Car
neades' theory of probabilities deduced from rheto
rical rather than from philosophical considerations.2
For the last assertion there is no ground whatever ;
Carneades distinctly avowed that a conviction resting
on probabilities seemed indispensable for practical
needs and actions. On this point he is wholly
in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only
with the New Academy, but also with Pyrrho and
the later Sceptics. He differs from them in the
degree of accuracy with which he investigates the
varieties and conditions of probability ; but a
1 do. N. D. iii. 17, 44 : Hebc God, but that he finds the arCarneades aiebat, non ut Ueos guments unsatisfactory. Liketolleretquid enini philosopho wise Sextus, Pyrrh. iii. 2 : rj
minus conveniens? sedutStoi- ntv fHa KtncucoKovdovmts i5oacos nihil de Diis explicare con- <ttws (pap'tv thai Stout xai aifiovinceret. In this sense the utv Btovs xal vpovottv avroi/s <pa~
Academician in Cicero (i. 22, fitv.
62) frequt ntly asserts, that he
a Sitter, iii. 730, G94.
would nui- destroy belief in
SCHOOL OF CARKEADES.
question of degree can least of all be urged against
a philosopher. Nor should doubts be called shallow
Chap.
xxln"
which the ancients even in later times could only

very inadequately dissipate, and which throw light
on several of the deepest problems of life by the
critical investigations they occasioned. No doubt,
in the despair of attaining to knowledge at all, and
in the attempt to reduce everything to opinion
more or less certain, indications may be seen of
the exhaustion of the intellect, and of the extinc
tion of philosophic originality. Nevertheless it must
never be forgotten that the scepticism of the New
Academy was not only in harmony with the course
naturally taken by Greek philosophy as a whole, but
that it was pursued with an acuteness and a scientific
vigour leaving no doubt that it was a really im
portant link in the chain of philosophic develop
ment.
In Carneades this Scepticism attained its highest c. School
growth. The successor of Carneades, Clitomachus,1 vfie^s
1 Clitomachus was a native
of Carthage. Hence he is called
by Max. Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, i A(/8uj.
He originally bore the name
of Hasdrubal. At home he
devoted himself to study, and
wrote several treatises in his
mother tongue (jfi Itltf <pwvii iv
rfi irarpiSi i<piAoa6<p(t). When
40 years of age (according to
Steph. Byz. De urbe Kapxv&ix''28), he came to Athens, was
initiated by Carneades into
Greek philosophy, and devoted
himself to it with such zeal and
success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17;
31,98; Athen. ix. 402, c) that
he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous writer

(Diog. iv. 67) Treatises of
his are mentioned by Cic. Acad,
ii. 31, 98 ; 32, 102 ; Diog. ii.
92. He died (according to
Stob. Floril. vii. 55) by suicide,
not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt
remarks, Ueber d. philosoph.
Bchulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl.
Akad.,Jahrg. 1842. Hist. Philol.
Kl. p. 67), since, according to
Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L. Crassus, during his qusestorship,
which falls at the earliest in
this year, met. him at Athens.
He must then have been very old.
oo 2
set
CHAP.
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
is known as the literary exponent of the views taught
by Carneades.1 At the same time we hear of his
being accurately acquainted with the teaching of the
Peripatetics and Stoics ; and although it was no
doubt his first aim to refute the dogmatism of these
Schools, it would appear that Clitomachus entered
into the connection of their doctrines more fully
than is usually the case with opponents.2 As to his
fellow-pupil, Charmidas (or Charmadas),3 one wholly
unimportant utterance is our only guide for deter
mining his views.4 For ascertaining the philosophy
of the other pupils of Carneades,5 nothing but the
1 Diog. iv. 67 ; Cic. Acad,
ii. 32, 102.
s As the peculiar observa
tion in Diog. iv. proves: ivhp
iv Tats rpifflv alpttreat Sicarpi^/as,
iv re T7? 'AJcaSijjualK]} Kal IlcpfiraTffTtKj? KaX 2tIKJ7.
3 According to Cic. Acad. ii.
6, 17 ; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Ora
tor, 16, 51, Charmadas was a
pupil of Carneades, whom he
followed not only in teaching
but also in method. He must
have survived Clitomachus,
since he taught at the same time
withPhilo. Seep. 566, 1. Philo,
however, according to Clito
machus, undertook the presi
dency of the School (Em. Pr.
JEv. xiv. 8, 9). According to
Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360. Tusc.
i. 24, 59, he was remarkable
for a good memory.
4 Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84:
Charmadas asserted, eos qui
rhetores nominabantur et qui
dicendi prascepta traderent ni
hil plane tenere, neque posse
quenquam facilitated! assequi
dicendi, nisi qui philnsophorum inventa didicissent.

Math. ii. .20, also mentions the
hostile attitude of Clitomachus
and Charmadas towards rhetori
cians, and says that both he and
the School to which he belonged
were engaged in disputes with
them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise, accord
ing to Quintti. ii. 17, 15, entitled
' Charges against the rhetori
cians.' Ritter*s inferences, that
Charmadas recommended phi
losophy as the only way t o elo
quence, and thus betrayed the
object of the philosophical doc
trine of probability, iii. 695,
make far too much of a casual
expression which means no more
than what the Stoics, and before
them Plato, had said.
4 In addition to Clitoma
chus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad,
ii. 6, 16, mentions Agnon and
Melanthius of Rhodes, the for
mer of whom is also referred t o
by Quintilian. (See Athen.
xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that
SCHOOL OF CARKEADES.
scantiest fragments have been preserved. The state
ment of Polybius that the Academic School degene
rated into empty subtleties, and thereby became an
object of contempt,1 may deserve no great amount
of belief ; but it does seem probable that the School
made no important advance on the path marled out
Metrodorus of Stratonice passed
for a friend of Carneades ; he
had come over from among the
Epicureans (Dim/, x !)) to join
him. This Metrodorus must
neither be confounded with
Metrodorus of Skepsis, the pupil
of Charmadas (see p. 56(i, 1),
nor with the Metrodorusdistinguished as a painter, 168 B.C.,
whom Êmilias Paulus brought
to Home (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11,
185). The former must have
been younger, the latter older,
than Metrodorus of Stratonice.
A pupil of Melanthius (bioy.
ii. 64), and also of Carneades
in his later years (Plut. An
Seni. s. ger. Resp. 18. l,p. 791),
was Êschines of Naples, ac
cording to Cic. De Orat. i. 11,
45. who was likewise a distin
guished teacherin the Academic
School towards the close of the
second century. Another pupil,
Mentor, was by Carneades for
bidden the Scaool, because he
was caught with his concubine
(Dwg. iv. 63 ; Numen. in Eus.
Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7).
1 Exc. Vatic, xii 26 : al yap
iKflvav [twc iv 'AKaSij/xia] rives
f3ov\6fitvot xepi re rwv Trpo<pava>s
KaraATjTT&p eJvai SnKovvrwv Kal
irepl twv oKaTaK^Trrojv els airopiav
&yeiv rovs irporr/xaxojuei'ous Tota"Tats xpvvrat TrapaSoloXoyiais Kal
TOiavras euwopoiai iridavdrtiTas,
8>o~re Siairopeti/, a.iiivar6v [1. el 5uvar6v~] itrriy tows iv 'Aureus ovras

u(r<ppaive<rBai rtov 'eôp.ev<ov wuiv iv
'EtpfO'cn, kou Sifrra^tv, pM ir<e Ka&
hv Kaipbv iv 'AfcaSTjuta SiaAeyovral
vepl tovtwv o\t% vicep &AAwv ap iv
oXn(p KaraKtip-evoi tovtovs 5iaWdevrat Tobs \6yo"5 il- 6>v Si' imepftoAfyv rrjs napadoôAoyias els 8tafioAhv $xafftTbv Satjc a.'ipetriv.Sio'Te
Kal ret KaAus anopovfitva trapa rots
avOpdnrots els aviariav %xVai> Ka^
Xapls TTjs ISias a<TTox'ias Kal rots
veois Totovrov ivrer6naat ?iAov,
Same tuv p.ev ii6iK&v Kal wpayfiatikwv \6ywv juTjSe r^v rvxovoav
iirlvoiav icoiet<r9ai, 5t' iiv Avrjais
rots aakofftHpovfi, irepl 8e toes aea><peAe?s Kal vapaS6ô^s eupeatAoyias
Kevoôôvvres KaraTpi/3ou'Ti rovs
$ious. In the time of Carnea
des, whose cotemporary was
Polybius, to whom the language
as to the enthusiasm of youth
for Sceptical teaching refers,
such depreciatory remarks could
not have been made of the
Academy. The historical value,
therefore, of the whole passage
is suspicious. It bears besides
the mark of exaggeration so
strongly that it is of no greater
use for giving a view of the
Academy than are the carica
tures of opponents for convey
ing an idea of modern German
philosophy.
Chap.
XXIII.
566
Chap.
XXIII.
THE SCEPTICS.
by himself and Arcesilaus. It did not even continue
true to that path for very long. Not a generation
after the death of its most celebrated teacher, and
even among his own pupils,1 that eclecticism began
to appear, the general and simultaneous spread
of which ushered in a new period in the history of
the post-Aristotelian philosophy.
1 Among these pupils the
tendency to lay stress on the
doctrine of probabilities in re
lation to Scepticism was already
strong. Proof may be found
not only in the accounts already
given us of Clitomachus and
jischines, bat also in the
circumstance that many of the
older writers made the fourth
Academy date from Philo and
Charmadas, the fifth from Antiochus (Setet. Pyrrh. i. 220;
Hut. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a
still earlier date, Metrodorus is
said to have departed from the
platform of Carneades. Auguntin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after
speaking of Antiochus and his
renunciation of Scepticism,
says : Quamquam' et Metro
dorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse
confessus, non decreto placuisse
Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra
Stoicos hujus modi eos arma
sumsisse. Probably Augustin
borrowed this passage from a
lost treatise of Cicero; hence
it may be relied upon. The
Metrodorus referred to is pro
bably Metrodorus of Stratonice
(see p. 5G4, 5), mentioned by

Cie. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metro
dorus of Skepsis might also be
suggested (Straio, xiii. 155, p.
609; xvi. 4, lfi, p. 775: Pint.
Lucull. 22; Ding. v. 84; Cie.
De Orat. ii. 88, 360 ; HO, 365 ;
iii. 20, 75 ; Tusc. i. 24, 59 ; Plin.
Hist, Nat. vii. 24, 89: Quint-l.
x. 6, 1 ; xi. 2, 22 ; MiMer, Hist.
Gr. iii. 203), who first learned
rhetoric at Chalcedon, after
wards entered the service of
Mithridates, and was put to
death by his orders, B.C. 70, at
an advanced age. Cie. De
Orat. iii. 20, 75, calls him an
Academician ; and he is men
tioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45, as a pupil
of Charmadas. The language
quoted by Augustin may have
come from the treatise irtpi
avmiedas (Straio, p. 775). He
is otherwise only known as a
rhetorician and politician. The
same uncertainty prevails as to
the Metrodorus referred to in
Oe. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p.
554, 3). We do not know
who he is, but it may be in
ferred that it is the same
Metrodorus who is mentioned
by Augustin.
INDEX.
ACA
,
ACADEMIC, Scepticism, 537;
School, 560, 565 ; decline of,
565.
Academician, 377 ; view of rea
son, 545 ; systems of morality,
399
Academicians attacked by Stoics,
233 ; objections to Chrysippus,
545.
Academy, HOI ; influence of, on
Stoics, 402; older, 399, 400, 558;
Middle, 46, 528, 535 ; New, 26,
409, 517, 521, 523, 528 ; scepti
cism of, 529, 545, 562, 563; con
nection with Stoicism, 529 ;
Third, 537.
Achasan League, 13.
Achasans, 13, 14.
Achaia, province of, 14.
Achilles, shield of, explained, 360 ;
staying the plague, 363.
'A5ia<f>i>pa, 232, 283.
/Enesidenius, a later Sceptic, 523.
yKtolians, 13.
Affections permitted, 290.
Air, God as, 148.
Air-currents, Stoic theory of, 127,
129, 148, 152.
'A/caTa\7)i^ a of Sceptics, 525.
Alexander of Macedon, 518.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 117.
Alexandria, 351 ; influence of, on
philosophy, 28 ; birthplace of
Platonic School, 28.
Alexandrian period, 17.
APH
Allegorical interpretations of
myths, 354.
Allegorising, the spirit of, among
the Stoics, 354.
Amafinius, a promulgator of Epi
cureanism at Home, 411.
'A/uapTTi/ua, Stoic view of, 265.
Anaxagoras, sceptical arguments
of, 631.
Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, 518.
Animals, Stoic views on, 208 ;
Epicurean views on, 451.
Antonies, the, 417.
Antoninus' view of demons, 351.
Antigonus Gonatus, 39.
Antipater of Tarsus, 336, 371 ;
a later Stoic and president of
that School, 50 ; inference from
a single premiss, 121 ; follows
Zeno's example, 336 ; interpre
tation of myths, 362 ; views on
divination, 371 ; views on
moral choice, 559.
Antisthenes quoted as an exam
ple, 274, 292, 306 ; followed by
Stoics, 357, 387, 388 ; by Zeno,
609 ; reflected by Aristo, 388 ;
sophistical assertions of, 390.
Anthropomorphic view of nature,
8.
Apathy, Stoic, modified, 2l'2.
'Ajraia, 281.
'A(paa-ia of Sceptics, 525.
'A<poptiii, 242.
568
INDEX.
APH
Aphrodite, Stoic interpretation of,
361, 365, 366.
Apollo as the sun, 361 ; arrows of,
explained, 363.
Apoliodorus, an 283.
Epicurean, 411.
yAirovpoijyfiivov,
Applied moral science, 279.
Aratus, a Stoic, and pupil of Zeno,
43.
Arcesilaus, a Sceptic, 29, 528 ;
belonging to Middle Academy,
46 ; account of, 528 ; not con
nected with Zeno, 529 ; op
ponent of Stoic theory, 531,
532 ; agreenieut with Stoics,
532 ; views on probability, 534 ;
followers of, 535 ; compared
with Carneades, 535, 565.
Archedemus of Tarsus, a Stoic, 50 ;
view of the seat of the centre of
force, 147.
Archipelago, Stoics in, 36.
Ares, story of, 361, 365.
Aristarchus of Samos, 348.
Aristippus considers bodily grati
fication the highest pleasure,
475 ; relation to Epicureanism,
508 ; followed by Epicurus, 509;
but not wholly, 510.
Aristo, the Stoic, 40 ; pupil of
Zeno, 41; wins over the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes, 49 ; views
on logic and natural science, 59,
62 ; a native of Chios, 59, 255,
281 ; opposed to encyclical
knowledge, 60 ; ethics of, 61 ;
peculiar views of, 62 ; differs
from Zeno, 63 ; objects to study
of mind, 92, 298 ; divisions of
emotions, 249 ; an enemy of
speculation, 255 ; on the one
ness of virtue, 261; not followed
by the Stoics, 281 ; follows
Cynics, 297; followed by Cleanthes, 298 ; view of the common
source of virtue, 257, 261; denied
sensation to Deity, 347 ; relation
of, to Stoics, 388.
ABI
Aristotle, merits and defects of,
1 ; connection with Greek cha
racter, 6 ; idealism of, 2, 512;
criticism of Plato, 2, 133; in
consistencies of, 3, 84, 133 ;
generic conceptions of, 19, 85 ;
commentators on, 53 ; commen
dation of speculation, 57, 256,
513; teaching of, 96; followed
by htoics, 97, 100. 194, 196, 202,
396, 397 ; categories of, 97, 98,
107 ; perfections of Greek philo
sophy in, 1, 11 ; mistakes in
natural science, 3 ; prominence
given to dialectic method, 4 ;
did not go far enough, 5 ; system
of, connected with (ireek cha
racter, 7 ; failing to distinguish
two sides of ideas,8 ; the child of
his age, 10; speculations of, 18;
bridges over chasm between
thoughtandits object, 18; makes
reason the essence of man, 19;
metaphysics of,22 ; developes the
doctrine of the syllogism, 65 ;
views on conceptions, 96 ; on
the modality of judgments, 115;
the study of, ) 26 ; metaphysical
notions of, 133 ; distinguishes
matter and form, 104, 105 ; view
of two kinds of tire, 201 ; view
of the world, 203 ; of the stars,
205 ; of the seat of life, 214 ; of
the soul, 215; places knowledge
above action, 256 ; followed by
Zeno, 257 ; investigations into
individual virtue, 301 ; preju
dice against foreigners, 326 ;
relation of Epicureans to, 509,
511 ; logic of, 123 ; followed by
Chrysippus, 393; philosophy of,
126 ; theory on time and space,
196 ; doctrine of the four ele
ments, 197, 199 ; on the regula
tion of emotions, 252 ; under
the influence of Greek ideas,
301; view of Gods, 513; moral
theory of, 398 ; many-sidedness
IXDEX.
ARI
of, 402 ; developed Socratic
thought, 511 ; ignored by Arce.silaus, 531 ; formal and final
causes, 141 ; commentators on,
53.
Aristotelian, logic, 124, 555 ; ori
ginal teaching, 3 ; categories,
105 ; ethics, 304 ; spirit of, 555 ;
manner, 285 ; view of heaviness,
445 ; speculations, 516 ; philo
sophy, 396, 397.
Aristoxenus, 18, 133.
Artemis, explained as the moon,
361.
Asclepiades, an Epicurean of Bitbynia, t6o~.
Asia, emigrants to, from Greece,
14 ; the birthplace of Stoics,
36 ; Epicureans in, 406.
Assent, Stoic view of, 83.
Assos, bir hplace of Clearthes, 40.
'Aropafi'a, in the Epicurean system,
475 ; of Sceptics, 525.
Atheism, 465.
Athene, Stoic interpretation of,
358, 359, 361, 363.
Athenian, 404.
Athens, 528 ; brilliant career of,
9 ; seat of all Schools, 29 ;
foreign teachers at, 35 ; visited
by Zeno, 36, 528 ; appreciates
him, 39 ; visited by Epicurus,
405, 406 ; Epicureanism at, 412,
413, 417 ; visited by Apollodorus, 412 ; rivalry with Sparta,
1 1 ; the playball of rulers, 13.
Atomists, system of, 501 ; view of
nature, 517.
Atoms and empty space, Epicurean
view of, 439 ; deviation of, 444.
Augeas, 368.
Authorities for Stoic philosophy,
53.
'Ai'a,
227.110.
A{(u/io,
BARGYLITJM, birthplace of Protarchus, 411.
5C9
CAT
Basilides, an Epicurean and pre
sident of the School, 410.
Being, the Stoic category of, 98,
SS, 126 ; primary, 161 ; divine,
217, 341, 349.
Blthynia, birthplace of Asclepiade> , 415.
Boe'thus, a Stoic, 49 ; inclining to
the Peripatetics, 49; attacked
by Chrysippus. 76 ; dissents from
Stoic pantheism, 159 ; views on
divination, 371.
Bosporus, birthplace of Sphaerus
the Stoic, 44.
Bryso, not instructor of Pyrrho,
518.
Byzantine imperialism, 33.
OALLIPHO'S view, 558.

Canonic, the Epicurean, 425.
Care, Stoic view of the causes of,
249.
Carneades, a Sceptic, 535 ; his debt
to Chrysippus the Stoic, 56, 53i ;
a thoroughly upright man, 561 ;
on formal knowledge, 539, 540 ;
scepticism of, 563, 538 ; ethics
of, 558 ; negative views of, 538 :
positive views of, 553 ; a century
later than Arcesilaus, 536 ;
founder of the Third Academy,
537 ; denied ipavravia KaraATjimj, 541 ; common grouDd with
Stoics, 542 ; strictures on Stoi
cism, 543; views of God, 546550; defends free will, 551;
denies knowledge, 552, 560 ;
theory of probabilities, 553, 555 ;
views on morals, 556-559 ; im
portance of, 562 ; pupils of, 564 ;
School of, 563.
Carthage, birthplace of Herillus,
42, 256 ; destruction of, 558.
Carus, T. Lucretius. Son Lucre
tius.
Categories, the Stoic, 97, 99 ; re
lation of, 109.
570
INDEX.
CAT
CLE
Cato quoted as an example, 274 :
295 ; division of ethics, 298 ;
death of the younger, 335, 337.
shocks the feelings of cotemCause, God the highest, according
poraries, 307 ; moral character
to Stoics, 148.
of, 309 ; his polity of the wise,
322 ; view of demons, 352, 354 ;
Centaur, 458.
view of divination, 370, 375 ;
Cerberus, 364.
Chieronea, results of hattle of, 13.
explains omens, 375 ; vagaries
Chain-inference, 119, 122.
of, 380 ; follows Aristotle's
Charmidas, 564.
logic, 393 ; completes Zeno's
Charvbdis, Stoic explanation of,
system, 401 ; developed Stoic
369.
theory of knowledge, 525, 401 ;
Chemical comHnation, 106, n. 2.
48, 55 ; on superhuman powers,
545; definitinns of sensations,
Chios, birthplace of Aristo, 41, 59,
255.
546 ; on destiny, 180 ; on adap
Chiron, 363.
tation of means to ends, 184;
Christian ethics, 240 ; view of
on punishment, 193 ; on faulty
demons, 354 ; modes of thought,
imagination, 246 ; on emotions
and
virtue, 260 ; on the wise
221.
Christianity, success of, 34 ; in
man, 284, 286, 322. 323 ; view of
fluence of, 9.
the Gods, 346,\364, 545 ; ex
Christians, earl}-, 220 ; follow
planation of mythV 365 ; regards
knowledge as a meftos, 381 ; in
Zeno, 357 ; ethics of, 240 ; ex
fluence of, 400 ; contemporary
ample of, 357.
Chrysippus, 54, 55, 57, 64. 65, 69 ;
of, 48 ; unadorned style of, 63 ;
first founder of later Stoicism,
s-holars of, 49, 375, 538, 541;
time of, 64, 69, 70, 86, 257 ; sub
45 ; attended lectures of Arcetlety of, 191 ; view of tvSai/iovia,
silaus, 46 ; differed from Cleanthes. 47 ; a voluminous writer,
352.
47, 86 ; formal logic of the Cicero, 53 ; speaking as a Stoic,
Stoics fully developed by, 92,370 ;
239, 346 ; follows Panarius, 298,
contest between, and Diodorus,
315 ; account of Sceptics, 560 ;
115; distinguishes five original
treatise on duties, 298, 299, 302 ;
forms of hypothetical sentences,
on divination, 379 ; account of
Epicureans, 414 ; responsible
119; exposes current fallacies,
122 ; narrows the field of logic,
for Sceptic inconsistencies, 561 ;
124 ; materialism of, 131 ;
time of, 419.
teac hes upaffis Si'lAcer, 138 ; his Cilicia, birthplace of Chrysippus
view of the world, 146 ; view of
the Stoic, 45.
the resolution of the world, 153; Circe, house of, 369.
appeals to general conviction, Citium, birthplace of Zeno the
174 ; the theory of necessity,
Stoic, 36.
178, 180 ; definition of time, Citizenship of the world, Stoic,
197 ; view of separate existence,
326,
219 ; phics the essence of emo Civil societv, Epicurean view of,
tions in the imagination, 249 ;
490.
theory of virtue, 299 ; defini Class-conceptions of Stoics, 99.
tions of virtue, 260 ; on plea
Cleanthes the Stoic, 40 ; stern,
sure, 286 ; on virtue being lost,
237 ; a representative Stoic,
571
CTB
Consensus gentium, appealed to
by Stoics, 543.
Constantine, 32.
Conversion, Stoic theory of, 275.
Conviction or assent, 88.
Cornutus, a Stoic, 53, 368.
Cosmopolitanism of Stoics, 35, 326.
Course of the worl 1, 332
Crates the Cynic, 37; teacher of
Zeno, 40.
Criticism of popular faith by
Stoics, 344.
Cronos, 367.
Cyclopes, 369.
Cynic, appeal to nature, 91 ; Epi
curean view of life, 488 , life,
306; Zeno at one time, 322;
strength of will, 389 ; contempt
for theory, 390, 510 : view of
wise man, 488 ; idea", 40 ; teach
ing. 515 ; a precursor of Scepti
cism, 515 ; nominalism, 84 ;
School, precursor of Stoicism,
17 ; onesidedness of, 306 ; philo
sophy. 28 ; followed by Aristo,
281, 297; virtue, 282; ethics,
386.
Cynicism, 43, 91, 92, 238 ; of the
Stoics, 305 ; instances of, 307 ;
a consequence of Stoic princi
ples, 308, 385. 387, 389, 390;
attraction of, for Zeno, 401.
Cynics, 223, 239, 273, 277, 288,
308 ; meagre teaching of, 37,
255 ; appeal to nature, 92 ; con
nections of Stoics with, 291,
317, 323, 389, 390 ; followed by
Aristo, 297 ; precursors of Stoics,
327.
Cyprus, Citium in, 36.
Cyrenaic, 48; School, 44, 511 ; a
precursor of Epicurean, 17, 511 ;
view of pleasure as the object
of life, 475, 510.
Cyrenaics, theory of pleasure fol
lowed by Epicurus, 509 ; con
tent with feelings, 510; view
of language, 524.
INDEX.
400 ; instructor of Sphaerus the
Sroic, 44 ; views of, 62 ; holds
later theory to some extent, 70 ;
view i f perceptions, 78 ; view
of life according to nature, 228 ;
fad view of life, 272 ; view of
the seat of efficient force, 147;
view of the destruction of the
world, 1 65 ; view of separate
existence, 218; holds that all
pleasure is contrary to nature,
237 ; d 'terraines the relations
of the virtues, 2(i2 ; Herillus a
fellow-student of, 281 ; teaches
indefectible virtue, 295 ; agrees
with Aristo, 298 ; moral cha
racter of, 309 ; submission to
destiny, 333 ; death of, 336 ;
view of Stoicism, 342 ; seeks
for moral ideas, 355 ; explana
tion of myths, 361 ; distinguishes
two kinds of Are, 397 ; a coun
terpart of Xenocrates, 400 ; al
legorical interpretation of my
thology, 361, 362, 364, 368;
preparation for later teaching,
370; teaching of, 44, 45, 46, 54,
62; logical treatises of, 63;
view of the common source of
virtue, 257 ; moral view of life,
272 ;' the successors of, 273 ;
specially honours the sun, 146,
1 65, 362 ; views on the soul,
217.; view of divination, 370.
Cleomenes, Spartan reformer, 44.
Clitomachus, 557, 558, 660, 563.
Colotes, an Epicurean, 409.
Composite judgment of Stoics,
113 j inference, 1 19.
Conceptions formed from percep
tions, 79 ; truth of, 135; relation
to perceptions, 83 ; primary, a
standarrlof truth, 90; highest.of
Stoics, 98 ; Socratic theory of, 9.
Condensation, a cause of being,
140.
Connection, inner, of Stoic system,
381.
572
INDEX.
DEI
ENC
DEITY, the Stoic conception of, Dionysus. Stoic view of, 359, 364.
148 ; as original matter, 155. Divination, Sioic view of. 370 ;
Demeter, Stoic view of, 358, 364.
attacked by Sceptics, 550 ; a
Demetrius, an Epicurean, and
proof of Providence, 175 ; causes
pupil of Prorarchus, 411.
of, 377.
Democritus, 518, 531 ; view of the Divine Heing. 216, 217, 341. 348.
world, 203 ; known to Epicurus, Dogmatic. Schools of po.-t-Ari.-totelian philosophy, 25 ; Scepti
405, 433, 438; his pupil Anaxarchus, 518; on being and not
cism, 26.
being, 440 ; view of atoms, 433, Dogmatists, struggle with Scep
tics, 524.
445, 447, 441, 443, 444; system
of, 405, 502; doctrine of atom- A(i{a, the Epicurean, 430.
pictures', 457, 465 ; physics bor Duties, perfect and intermediate,
rowed by Epicureans, 510 ; sug
287.
gests doubt to Pyrrho, 515; Dynamical theory of nature, held
sceptical argument of, 531 ; rela
by the Stoics, 1*6, 139.
tions of Epicureans to, 502, 510.
Demons, Stoic views on, 351.
Depravity of nature, 271.
JUST, the, 17, 28; nations of,
Desirable things, 278.
Desire, 249 ; a standard, 76.
Eclecticism, 28 ; practical, 29 ;
involves doubt, 30.
Destiny, God as, 150; nature of,
170, as Providence, 170 ; as gene Eclectics, 22 ; later, 399.
rative reason, 172 ; as fate, 170. Efficient cause with Stoics, 143;
naiure of, 143.
Dialectic, a branch of Stoic logic,
'Hye/uoxiicdv, 158, 214, 215, 244,
70.
Aiolvot]tik6v, 214.
455.
Dicsearchus, 133.
'Hyovfitvov, 113.
Diocletian, 32.
Egypt, Greek emigrants to, 14.
Diodorus, the logician, teacher of Egyptian customs, 28.
Zeno, 38; a Megarian, 115; E?5oj of Aristotle, 104,
Et$w\a, 457.
captious, 38 ; School of, 385.
Diogenes Laertius, 53, 261, 337.
Ei'iiiapjUfVj; of Stoics. 170.
Dicgenes of Seleucia, a Stoic and Elean criticism, 518.
pupil of Chrysippus, 49 ; suc Elements, the four, 197,
ceeded by Antipater, 50 ; defini Elis, birthplace of Pvrrho, 517,
tion of virtue, 261 ; an example
528.
of wisdom, 274, 306 ; on for Emotions, 290; varieties of, 249 ;
bidden gains, 285 ; division of
and virtue, 243 ; nature of, 243.
ethics, 298 ; on suicide, 337 ; Empedocles, his view of Ares,
views of divination, 371.
366 ; on the origin of animals
Diogenes the Cynic. 294, 306;
451 ; sceptical arguments of,
531.
shamelessness of, 308.
Diomedes, 366.
Empire, attempt to revive the, 31 ;
Dionysius, a Stoic, and pupil of
a loose congeries of nations, 32.
Zeno, 43 ; joined Epicureans, Empty, the, 196, 439.
44 ; president of the Epicurean 'Eyapyem, 428.
School, 410.
Encyclical knowledge, 60.
INDEX.
END
End-in-chief of Stoics. 187
'EvSeiKTUcbv irr}fie7oy, 1 15.
'EvSiafleTOj Arf-yox, T2, n. 2.
"Evkuw icoiyal of Stoics, 81.
Epaminondas, 11.
Ephesus, birthplace of Heraclitus,
393.
Epi^tetus, 299 ; a freedman, 325 ;
native of Phrygia, 36 ; a Stoic,
53. 92 ; of later limes, 316 ; dis
suades from matrimony, 324 ;
r*-ligi< ms language of, 328 ; view
of demons, 351
Epicurean, 415, 419, 431, 437, 463,
489: view of Stoicism, 311;
philosophy, 499 ; divisions of,
424 ; antecedents of, 16 ; system,
character of, 418, 425, 432, 472,
474, 480, 481, 504, 510 ; outlived
others, 417; developed, 500;
historical relations of, 503 ; selfcontentment, 17 ; imperturbabi
lity, 21 ; School, 29, 44, 415,
420 ; tone of, 498 ; appreciates
friendship, 502; doctrines, 411 ;
theorv, 517 ; inner connection
of, 499 : ethics, 439, 456 ; friend
ship, 493, 495, 5u6 ; Gods, nature
of, 467; canonic, 415 ; views on
nature, 434, 457 ; view of virtue,
481, 482; moral science, 485;
theory of pleasure, 505, 481.
Epicureanism, 26, 400, 403 ; scien
tific value of, 418; intellectual
value, 420 ; grows out of Cyrenaic teaching, 17 ; power of
self-preservation, 418 ; estab
lished in Home, 411; historical
position of, 503 ; relation to
Stoicism, 400, 403, 503, 508, 514,
515 ; relation to Aristippus,
508 ; relation to Democritus,
510; to Aristotle and Pjato,
51 1 ; to older philosophy, 508;
aims at a practical science of
life, 509 ; vindicated, 500, 513.
Epicureans, 412, 414, 420, 458;
of the Roman period, 411 ;
573
EPI
regard individual side in man,
25 ; distinguished from Stoics,
183, 372 ; points of agreement
with, 507, 508, 515, 516; charged
with impropriety by opponents,
407 ; view of divination, 372 ;
aim of philosophy, 420 ; divide
philosophy into three parts, 424 ;
indifferent to explaining pheno
mena, 434 ; refer them to natural
causes, 437; consider the earth
the centre of the universe, 450;
on the relations of body and
soul, 454, 479, 505 ; negative at
titude oF, towards popular faith,
471 ; averse to public affairs,
491 ; build a ritional system on
a base of the senses, 500 ; hold
theory of atoms. 505 ; irreligious
freethinkers, 505 ; practical phi
losophy of, 416; onesidedness
of, 424 ; explain man's origin
naturally, 451 ; materialism or',
456 ; sincerity of, 465 ; view of
the Gods, 468 ; on bodily plea
sures, 478 506 ; moral science
of. 485 ; friends of monarchy,
492 ; view of friendship, 494.
Epicurus, school of, subordinate
theory to practice, 19 ; view of
the world as unlimited, 203,
409 ; of empty space, 445, 446 ;
life of, 404 ; writings unread in
Cicero's time, 419 ; desp;sed
learning, 421, 501 ; theory of
knowledge, 423 ; on certain 'y
of the senses, 427 ; on standard
of truth, 431 ; a voluminous
writer, 47 ; views on colour,
433 ; undervalues logic, 434,
425; undervalues naturelscience,
436, 438, 511; and mind, 440,
513; relations to Democritus,
439, 414, 502. 510 ; does not in
vestigate psychologically, 459 ;
does not give up belief in Gods,
465, 466; position of, contrasted
with the Stoics, 481, 456, 484,
674
INDEX.
BPO
504, 512 ; view on friendship,
495. 496 ; system of, bears a de
finite stamp, 503 ; dogmatism
of, 418 ; explains phenomena,
435 ; and the origin of things,
444 ; view of history, 453 ; of
the soul, 454 ; moral science of,
472, 485 ; on the wise man, 483,
506 ; connection with others,
490 ; deprecated family life,
492 ; his apotheosis of nature,
453 ; view of pleasure as the
hiahest good, 235, 420, 473, 474,
475, 477, 478, 480, 488, 505,
5()9 ; difficulties of, 499 ; view
of philosophy, 500 ; objection
to predecessors, 508 ; personal
vanity of, 509 ; labours of, 407 ;
writings of, 419; death of, 409;
garden of, 410; School of, 21,
406, 501 ; scholars of, 408.
'TLtroxh of Sceptics, 525.
Eratosthenes, a Cyrenaic, 48 ;
gained for Stoicism, 49.
Eschewable things, 278.
Esprit de corps of Greeks, 15.
"Erfpoia<ris, 78
Ethics, 67 ; Stoic views on, 213,
382 ; Epicurean views on, 423.
Ether, God as the, 148, 154, 201.
Eu/3ouX/o, 548
EuSaiuoj'ia, 352
Eueiuerus, rationalism of, 350.
EiiAio, 291.
Eirvxis, 270.
Evil, existence of physical, 188 ;
of moral, 189 ; compared with
good, 230.
E,s, 208.
Expansion, cause of, 140.
Expression of Stoics, 132 [tee
Utterance] ; incomplete, 94 ;
perfect, 94, 110.
FAITH, popular, and Stoicism,
343.
Fallacies, Stoic refutation of, 122.
GEE
Family, Stoic view of, 320 ; Epi
curean view of. 490.
Fate or destiny, 170 ; fates, 365.
Fear, 249.
Fire, God as, 148, 154.
Fluvius explained by the Stoics,
361.
Folly, 268.
Force and matter, 139 ; nature of,
141.
Foreknowledge, an argument for
Providence, 175.
Form, Stoic category of, 102. 104;
antithesis of, and matter, 6,
173.
Formal logic of Stoics, 92.
Freedom, Stoic views of, 219; of
will defended by Carneartes, 551.
Friendship, Stoic view of, 317 ;
Epicurean view of, 493.
GALENUS, 246.
Galilaso, Aristarchus of Samos, the, of antiquity, 348.
Generative reason, 172.
Germanic character, 9.
God, conception of, 84, 343, 344,
347, 349; Stoic view of, 147;
as original matter, 155 ; identi
cal with the world, 156 ; Epi
curean view of, 465, 466 ; criti
cism of, 462; nature of, 466;
as Providence, 403 ; Sceptic
view of, 548.
Good, Stoic conception of, 84, 128;
Stoic view of, hinhest, 225 ; and
evil, 230 ; and pleasure, 235 ; as
law, 240; secot-dary, 250; Epi
curean view of highest, 472 ;
discussed by Carneades, 557,
558, 561.
Graces, Chrysippus' view of, 3C5.
Grammar of words, 94.
Greece, state of, 13, 407 ; help
lessness of, 16 ; a Roman pro
vince, 27 ; loss of nationality,
34 ; intellect of, 10, 27, 29, 513;
INDEX.
QBE
Stoics in, 3G ; change in views
of, 8 ; mental tone of, 9 ; bril
liant career of, 9 ; political de
gradation of, 10 ; philosophic
spirit of, 23 ; influence of Home
on, 27 ; common opinions of,
286.
Greek, 327, 370, 402 ; culture, 34,
342, 344 ; mind, 2 ; propriety of
conduct, 8 ; all branches of,
family, 10 ; religion, 34 ; mytho
logy, 357, 370; philosophy, 563,
9 ; the offspring of freedom, 15 ;
lent itself to Eclecticism, 28,
setting of, 34.
Greeks, 15, 127; national exclusiveness of, 8 ; and foreigners,
14 ; the Bible of, 356.
HADES, Stoic interpretation of,
358, 368, 369.
Happiness connected with virtue,
191 ; negative character of, 239;
intellectual, according to Epi
cureans, 476.
Heeato, 285.
Helios, claim of, to be a God, 550.
Hellas, seat of learning, 14 ; reli
gion of, 8 ; the playball of
changing rulers, 12 ; denuded
of her population, 14.
Hellenism, age of, 35.
Hepluestus, Stoic view of, 358,
359, 361, 366.
Heraclea, birthplace of Dionysius
the Stoic, 43.
Heraclitus, of Ephesus, 393, 531 ;
relation of Stoics to. 133, 161,
197, 358, 392, 393, 402, 439, 502,
510; views on cosmogony, 197.
204, 393, 394 ; not the cause of
Stoic materialism, 134 ; scep
tical arguments of, 531 ; pan
theism of, 517; flux of things,
394 ; physics of, borrowed by
Stoics, 510 ; view of Zeno, 358 ;
of Proteus, 360; of Apollo, 363;
of Cerberus, 364.
575
IND
Heraclitus, a Stoic philosopher,
53 ; explains the Odyssey, 369.
Herbart, 262.
Hercules, 292 ; Stoic view of, 359,
367.
Here, legend of, explained, 358,
361, 368.
Herillus the Stoic, 41 ; of Carthage,
42, 256; approximates to Peri
patetic School, 43 ; declared
knowledge to be the chief good,
58 ; and the end of life, 256 ;
fellow-student of Cleanthes,
281.
Hermarchus, an Epicurean, suc
ceeded Epicurus as president,
409.
Hermes, Stoic view of, 359, 361,
363.
Hesiod, appealed to by the Stoics,
356.
Hestia, Stoic view of, 358.
Hippoclides, an Epicurean, 410.
Homer, appealed to by the Stoics,
356 ; interpretation of, 357.
Homeric, Theomachy, 361 ; story
of Apollo's reconciliation, 363.
Hypothetical judgment, 111, 113;
inference, 119; sentences, five
original forms of, 119.
IAIIET02, 367.
Ida, Mount, 360.
Idealism of Plato, 130 ; and Aris
totle, 2, 9.
Ideas, 75.
'iSlWS KOIOV, 104.
Immortality, Stoic view of, 219.
Imperfect expression of Stoics, 94.
Imperialism, liyzantine, 33.
Imperturbabilitv, mental, of Scep
tics, 18, 525. "
Impressions the basis of percep
tions, 77.
Incorporeal, the, 132.
Indefinite, the, the highest con
ception, 98, 99.
INDEX.
576
IND
India, 518
Indicative sign of Stoics, 115.
Indifferent things, 281.
Individual, the, Epicurean views
of, 485 ; relation of, to Provi
dence, 177; importance of, 301.
Inference, Stoic, 1 16; hypothetical,
117; composite forms of, 117;
from a single premiss, 121.
Innate ideas, 80
Intelligence, 359 ; Epicurean, 476.
Intermediate duties, 287.
Intermingling, universal, Stoic
theory of, 136
Irrational parts of nature, 204.
Irresistible perceptions, standard
of truth with Stoics, 87 ; this
theory attacked by Sceptics,
530.
Italian allies of Greece, 13.
JEWISH notion of demons, 354.
Jews, ethics of, 240; follow
Zeno, 357.
Judgment, Stoic, 110; simple,
111; composite. 113; modality
of, 115; Sceptic, withholding
of, 523.
Jupiter, 202.
Justice, 315.
"IÂTAAHVIS, 90, 531.
JV KaTa\TjtrTtK6yt 91.
KardpOwtia, 265, 287.
Knowledge, Stoic theory of, 75 ;
general character of, 75 ; parti
cular points in, 77 ; artificially
formed, 82 ; a standard, 77 ; im
possible with Sceptics, 521 ; de
nied by Arcesilaus, 528 ; denied
by Carneades, 538, 541 ; Epi
curean theory of. 426.
Koiral (vvoiai of Stoics, 81, 90.
Kotv&s wot6v, 104.
Koioj, 367.
Kpa<ris, 106, n. 2 ; Si' IAm>, 137 ;
denned, 137, n. 1.
See alto C.
MAT
T ACONIAN, 411.
i-J Lacydes, a philosopher of
Middle Academy, 46.
Aatff fiuivat, Epicurean watchword,
491.
Latin, 411.
Law, Universal, God as, 150, 170;
Highest Good as, 241.
Leading clause, 113.
Leibnitz on the marvellous, 374.
Af/crik, the Stoic, 92, 132, 135.
Artyov, 113.
Leto, Stoic view of, 361.
Logic of Stoics, 70 ; formal, 75,
92, 119, 123; estimate of, 123;
an outpost of their system, 124.
Aoyurfi6s, 214.
AoyiOTiii6vs 214.
A6yos 4vtid6eTOS, 13 ; trwepfiariK6s,
172, 360, 397 ; QvitikoI \6yoi of
the Stoics, 355.
Lotoides. birth of, explained, 362.
Lotophagi explained, 369.
Lucretius, an Epicurean, 415 ;
view of atoms, 447 ; view on the
origin of animals, 451 ; view of
religion, 462 ; view of the Gods,
467.
MACEDONIAN supremacy, 12,
13, 332 ; conqueror, 327 ;
empire, 401.
Macedonians, 13.
Man, Stoic views on, 210, 332;
and the course of the world, 332 :
Epicurean views on, 451 ; origin
of, 457.
Marcus Aurelius, a Stoic, 53, 184,
299 ; the last of the Stoics, 814;
a later Stoic, 316.
Mars, 202.
Material, 100, 172; reality belong
ing to, 1 26 ; causes of action,
1 30 ; wide extension of, 131.
Materialism, Stoic, 126, 210, 381,
385, 425; nature of, 126; cau>es
of, 132 ; consequences of, 136 ;
MAT
not an expansion of Peripatetic
views, 133.
Materialistic nature of the soul,
210.
Matter, antithesis of, and form, 6,
101, 155; and force, 139; iden
tical with God, 155 ; resolved
into primary being, 164.
Mechanical combination, 106, n.
2.
Megarian criticism, 518.
Megarians, fallacies fostered by,
122; teaching of, 255 ; sophisms
of, 533 ; logical accuracy of,
38 ; subtleties of, 62, 533 ; rela
tion of Stoics to, 392 ; criticism,
515.
Mercury, 202.
Mercy, 315.
Meteorology, Stoic. 206.
Metrodorus, an Epicurean, and
pupil of Epicurus. 408 ; writings
unread in Cicero's time, 419 ;
favourite pupil of Epicurus, 478 ;
asserts that everything good
has reference to the belly, 479 ;
on the wise man, 483.
Might, 332.
Mind, God as, 148. 154.
M?{is, 106, n. 2; Stoic theory of,
136 ; definition of, 137, n. 1.
Mnaseas, the father of Zeno the
Stoic, 36.
Modality, Stoic, of judgments,
115.
Moon, 202.
Moral, responsibility, indicated,
179 ; theory of the world, 186 ;
evil, 188 ; science applied, 297 ;
connection of, and scientific ele
ments in Stoicism, 385 ; view
of Stoics attacked, 551 ; of
Sceptics, 556.
Muses, 365.
Musonius, a later Stoic, 92, 316.
Myths, interpretation of, 354 ;
Stoic interpretation of, 356,
359, 362, 367.
PAS
NATURAL science,67; of Stoics,
125.
Nature, Stoic study of, 125; God
as, 150 ; Epicurean views of,
434 ; object of study, 434 ; me
chanical explanation of, 437 ;
general ideas on, 194 ; the same
as primary being, 171 ; irra
tional parts of, 204 ; submission
to the course of, 332.
Necessity, a proof of Providence,
174; meaning of, 188; dif
ficulties of theory of, 117.
Negative character of happiness,
239.
Neocles, father of Epicurus, 404.
Neoplatonic School, 135 ; doctrine
of revelation, 380.
Neoplatonism produced by a real
interest in knowledge, 23 ; on
the same plat form as other postAristotelian philosophy, 24 ; of
Alexandria, 28; transition to,
31 ; united previous element?,
32; the intellectual reproduction
of Byzantine Imperialism, 33.
Neopythagorean doctrine of reve
lation, 380.
Neopythagoreans, 22. 23.
Nominalism, Cynic, 84.
Non-material, the, of the Stoics,
132.
Notions, Epicurean, 428.
ODYSSEY, explained by Stoics.
369.
Olympians pull down Zeno, 359.
Opinion, Epicurean, 429.
Oriental modes of thought, 14,
28, 35; emperors of Rome, 31 ;
despotism, 33 ; mysticism, 33.
Original or primary being, 158.
'OpBds \6yos, 76.
'Oprf, 242.
PAIN, freedom from, 474.
Pan, 366.
r P
INDEX.
PLA
PAS
Panaetius, a later stoic, and scholar aPTCtffiai, 77 ; KaraK-rjirriKai, 89,
of Antipater, 51 ; not a severe
531, 541.
Stoic, 286 ; teacher of Posi- Phsedrus, an Epicurean, 413, 414,
417.
donius, 298 ; treatise of, 302 ;
followed by Cicero, 315 ; trea Philo, a pupil of Diodorus, 38.
tise on divination, 371 ; denies Philodemus, an Epicurean, 413,
468 ; view of the Gods, 468.
omens, 374.
Pautheism of Stoics, 126, 156, Philosophy, Stoic divisions of, 66 ;
517 ; dissented from by Boethus,
Epicurean divisions of, 424.
Phlius, birthplace of Timon, 519.
159.
riapetoeo-ir, 106, n. 2; defined, 137, Phrygian, Epictetus, 36.
*iaa, 228, 350, 209.
n. 1.
Parmenides, sceptical arguments nifloi/^, 555.
T\t6cw6rrjst 555.
of, 531.
Planets, Stoic view of, 208 ;
I'atro, an Epicurean, 414.
Epicurean view of, 451.
Peloponnesian war, 10.
Plato, 55, 126, 305, 323, 509, 511,
Peloponnesus, 13.
613, 531 ; perfection of Greek
Penelope, suitors of. 60.
Perceptions derived by Stoics from
philosophy in, 1 ; the study of,
impressions, 77 ; the basis of
126; example, 187; many-sided
conceptions, 79, 83 ; a standard,
ness of, 402 ; merits and defects
76 ; irresistible, the standard of
of, 1 ; idealism of, 2, 9, 130; flaws
truth, 87 ; sole source of truth,
in teaching of, 3 ; dialectical
135 ; Epicurean view cf, 425.
exclusiveness of, 4 ; antagonistic
currents in, 45 ; general con
Perfect duties, 287.
ceptions of, 18 ; denies virtue in
Pericles, age of, 9.
great men, 274 ; view of demons,
Peripatetic School, 29, 301 ; ap
351 ; theory of final causes,
proached by Herillus the Stoic,
396 ; system of, connected with
43 ; on the human soul, 397 ;
Greek character, 7 ; doctrine of
materialism, 133 ; view of emo
tions, 253 ; goes back to earlier
the four elements, 197 ; view of
the stars, 205 ; of the seat of
view, 301; philosophy, 133;
life, 214 ; view of the soul, 215 :
debt of Stoics to, 402; notion,
on the regulation of emotions,
i44 ; doctrine, 397 ; views, 398,
252 ; permits a lie, 305 ; pre
281 ; view of goods, 559.
judice against foreigners, 326 :
Peripatetics, opposed to the Stoics,
view of pleasure, 474 ; places
. 62, 66 ; the Sorites of the, 120 ;
logic of, 124 ; ground occupied
knowledge above action, 256 ;
advocates community of wives,
by, 133 ; view of emotions, 253 ;
310 ; distinguishes supreme ami
teaching of, 49, 398, 564: theory
popular gods, 348 ; known to
of goods, 659 ; attacked by
Epicurus, 405 ; sceptical argu
Stoics, 233 ; not the cause of
ments of, 531 ; pure speculation
Zeno's materialism, 134.
of, 57 ; metaphysical notions
Persaeus, a Stoic and pupil of
of, 133; example of, 187, 258:
Zeno, 43 ; fellow pupil of Aristo,
time of, 178; teaching of, 252,
298.
399, 405: formal and final
Persian war, 9 ; Greek dependence
causes of, 141 ; relation of
on empire, 12.
IXDEX.
570
PRO
PLA
Stoics to, 399 ; relation of Epi
392, 484, 542, 566 ; causes pro
cureans to, 511 ; view of the
ducing, 17, 35 ; character of, 19 ;
subordinates theory to practice,
stars, 205 ; view of the soul,
19 ; peculiar mode of dealing
213 ; School of, 528.
with practical questions, 21 ; its
Platonio, 55, 133, 221, 304, 516;
development, 25 ; unlike that of
theory of conceptions, 5 ; sys
Socrates, 18; times, 392, 561;
tem, 31 ; speculations, 516 ;
systems, 402, 512; Scepticism,
School at Alexandria, 328.
514, 561 ; commoncharacteristics
Platonism, 342, 399, 531 ; Seneca's
of, 19 ; subordinates science to
resemblance to, 222 ; a religious
ethics, 542 ; refers man back to
system, 342.
himself, 19; includes Stoicism
Platonists, 22, 30, 61 ; apologetical
and Neoplatonism, 24 ; variously
writings of, 25 ; School of, con
modified, 24 ; personal cha
verted to Scepticism, 2!) ; op
racter of, 33 ; reverses relations,
posed to Stoics, 62.
301 ; practical tendency of, 392 ;
Pleasure, 249 ; and the good, 235 ;
aims at independence of man,
Epicureans, 472 ; freedom from
484 ; common characteristics of,
pain, 474.
511 ; materialism, 512.
Plotinus, 23.
Plutarch, 53, 261 ; treats virtues Predestination of the Stoics, 376.
as many, 261 ; treatise against Preferential things, 278, 289.
Colotes, 409.
Pre-Socratic philosophy, influence
of, on Stoicism, 133.
nvci/toTo, the Stoic, 129, 148.
npea-or, 303.
iWy, 100, 104.
Tloi/nris, 367
Primary conceptions a standard
of truth, 90; being, 161, 170;
Polemo, a teacher of Stoic Zeno,
fire, 172, 198.
32, 399 ; School of, 385.
Political life, 318 ; Stoic aversion Probability, Arcesilaus' theory of,
534 ; Carneades' theory of, 553.
to, 324.
Polyaenus, an Epicurean, pupil of npOTry/teW, 283, 289, 290, 560.
Epicurus, 408.
Progress, state of, 293.
UpoKOirli, 294.
Polybius, as an authority, 565
Polystratus, third president of the TlpoKtytis, Stoic, 80, 90; Epi
Epicurean School, 410.
curean, 428, 461.
Polytheism, truth in, 348 ; at Property, Stoic category of, 102.
Prophecy, Stoic explanation of,
tacked by Sceptics, 549.
374, 403.
Pontus, birthplace of Dionysius
Prophetic powers, Stoic view of,
the Stoic, 43.
369.
ITj tx', 100, 107.
Poseidon, Stoic interpretation of, Tlpocpopitcbs \6-yos, 73.
358 ; claim of, to be a god, dis Proposition, 110.
tlp6s ti rws ixov< 100, 107.
cussed, 550.
Posidonius, the Stoic, 206, 208, Proserpine, rape of, 365.
293, 298 ; popular notion of Protagoras, language on truth,
431.
demons, 357 ; views on divina
Protarchus, of BargyIlium, an
tion, 371, 373.
Epicurean, 411.
Possible, 178.
Post-Aristotelian philosophy, 301, Proteus, story of, explained, 360.
pp 2
C80
INDEX.
BCH
PRO
Providence, 156, 171, 359, 403; Rhodes, a centre of philosophy.
God as, 150 ; in the Stoic system,
35.
341 ; Zeus as, 359 ; Stoic argu Roman, period, 17, 326 ; world,
31 ; province, 27 ; jurisprudence,
ments in favour of, 173, 372;
240; character, 32; dominion,
argument from general con
viction, 174; from God's per
332 ; Empire, 401.
fection, 174; from necessity, Romans, 521 ; uphold traditional
174 ; from God's foreknowledge,
faith, 344.
175 ; from divination, 175 ; the Rome, 325, 413, 414, 415, 492,
551 ; relations between Greece
idea of, 175 ; as necessity, 175 ;
and, 27 ; a centre of philosophy.
relation to individuals, 176 ;
difficulties of, 177 ; rule of,
35 ; statesmanship in, 326 :
Stoicism in, 492 ; influence of,
331 ; Stoic theory of, 388, 396,
on philosophy, 27 ; conquests of,
403 ; Epicurean denial of, 435,
13; decline of, 31; Hods of,
462, 463 ; denied by Carneades,
544 ; criticism of, 542.
32 ; Epicureans in, 411, 413.
Ptolemy Soter, 28.
Ptolemsean dynasty, 28.
Pyrrho, the t-ceptic, 517, 562 ; SAMIAN picture, 360.
Samos, 348; birthplace of
teaching of, 51*, 519, 520-525 ;
Epicurus, 404.
agrees with Arcesilaus, 533 ;
and his followers, 517 ; receives Saturn, 202.
from Democritus an impulse to Sceptic, 525, 526, 562; imper
turbability, 17 ; suspension of
doubt, 515 ; example of, 528 ;
judgment, 525 ; Schools deny
teaching of, 521 ; School of,
every dogmatic position, 514.
524, 526.
Sceptical theory, 516 ; Schools,
Pythagoras, 55.
Pythagorean, 55, 399 ; School at
27.
Alexandria, 28 ; system, 31 ; Scepticism, 26, 29, 514, 515, 628,
551 ; influences producing, 27 ;
friendship, 496 ; influence on
involves electicism, 30; intel
the older Academy, 399.
lectual objections to, 86 ; pure,
Pytho, defeat of, explained, 362.
523 ; object of, 526 ; dogmat ic,
26; historical position of, 514 :
T)EASON, 133, 359, 36 ; exrelations to dogmatism, 514 :
of New Academy, 529, 537,
,EL ternal to man, 6 ; a standard,
563; School of, 517; positive
76.
side of, 538 ; starts from earlier
.Reason, right, 76 ; generative,
philosophy, 515 ; causes of, 515;
172; of the world, 170; iden
relations to Epicureanism awl
tical with God, 147.
Reasoners, School of, 66.
Stoicism, 515, 516.
Sceptics, 512, 517, 549 ; School of
Relation, category of, 108.
Keligion of btoics, 341 ; of Epi
the, 19 ; opposed by Stoics, 21 :
New School of, 22 ; happine**,
cureans, 462 ; of Sceptics, 556.
Republic, last days of, 32.
the Starting-point with, 521 :
ethics of, 556 ; later, 562 ; more
Rhea, Stoic view of, 38.
Rhetoric, a branch of Stoic logic,
ancient, 538, 553.
Schlciermacher, 219.
70.
1XDEX.
581
SCI
STO
mitted a lie, 305 ; sceptical
Sciro, an Epicurean, 413.
t-cylla, Stoic explanation of, 369.
arguments of, 531 ; on the deri
vation of the soul, 545 ; rela
Secondary goods, 280.
Seleucia, birthplace of Diogenes,
tions of Stoics to, 387, 391, 396.
Socratic, old, teaching, 401 ; dic
49.
tum, 245, 247 ; introspection,
Seneca, 219, 239, 285, 299, 30C,
511 ; views, 388 ; theory of con
316, 319, 325, 326, 335,337,339,
ceptions, 9 ; teaching, 255 :
351 ; a Stoic, 53 ; in harmony
philosophy, 392 ; School, 509.
with the Stoics, 154 ; opinion
on wickedness, 273 ; defends Soli, birthplace of Chrysippus,
45 ; of Aratus, 43.
external possessions, 285 ; views
on customs, 306 ; age of, 274 ; Something, the highest conception,
a later Stoic, 316 ; his views on
98.
friendship, 318, 319 ; on the Sophists, practical philosophy of,
wise man's independence, 335 ;
18 ; fallacies fostered by, 122.
on suicide, 337, 339 ; denies the Sorites, the, of the Peripatetics
developed by the Stoics, 1 20.
use of prayer, 344 ; view of
Son], parts of the, 213 ; nature of,
demons, 351.
210; the individual, 216; God
Sensation, Epicurean view of, 425,
as, 148 ; Stoic views of, 210 ;
457.
Epicurean views of, 453 ; mate
Senses, Epicurean superiority to,
rialistic view of, 210.
478.
Septimius Severus,Emperors after, Space, 196.
Sparta, rivalry of, with Athens,
32.
Sextus Empiricus, a Stoic autho
11, 18.
Spartan reformer, Cleomenes, 44.
rity, 53.
Sidon, birthplace of Zeno the Spartans, 14.
2irfpfjia.TiKo\ \6yoi. See A6yos.
Epicurean, 412.
Simple judgment, 110, 111.
Sphsrus, a Stoic and pupil of
Sirens explained, 369.
Zeno, 44 ; from the Bosporus,
Social relations, Stoic view of,
44 ; logical researches of, 64 ;
treatise on divination, 371.
311.
Society, origin and use of, 311 ; Spinoza, 219.
Epicurean views on, 490.
Standard of truth. See Knowledge.
Stoic, 86; need of, 86; irre
Socrates, 274, 292, 305, 306, 501,
509, 511 ; definition of the good,
sistible impressions, 87 ; pri
mary conceptions, 90 ; Epi
229; of virtue, 59, 255; scep
curean, 431. See Canonic.
tical arguments of, 531 ; view
of natural science, 60 ; line of Stars, Stoic view of, 204.
Stilpo, combined Cynic and Methought presupposed by Epi
garian teaching, 37 ; School of,
cureanism, 51 1 ; philosophic
385 ; connected with Zeno, 392.
ideas of, 2 ; practical philo
sophy of, 17; differs from past Stoci voikiK4\, 38, 327.
Aristotelian philosophy, 18 ; Stobaeus has preserved extracts
view of means and ends, 185 ;
from writings of Teles, 48 ; and
time of, 225 ; defines the good
definitions of virtues, 261.
as the useful, 229 ; an example Stoic, 49, 132, 251, 313, 324, 346,
374, 517, 531 ; apathy, 121 ; doc.
of wisdom, 274, 292, 306 ; per-
582
INDEX.
STO
trine fully expanded by Cbrysippns, 47, 48 ; appeal to the
senses, 530; assertion, 185; bias,
304 ; citizenship of the world,
327, 3287307 ; notions of Provi
dence, 177, 388 ; conception,
397 ; theory of the good, 290,
559 ; wise man, 335 ; enquiries,
170 ; M/iies, 249, 278, 383; two
currents of thought in, 382 ;
main features of, 383 ; explana
tion of myths, 367, 368 ; fatal
ism, 175, 551 ; influence of,
529 ; insensibility to pain, 477 ;
KaTi\n<\its, 531 ; virtue, 398, 334,
58, 505; apathy, 316; pan
theism, 176 ; morality, 229, 333,
390, 342 ; necessity, 176 ; philo
sophers, 298, 322 ; material
ism, 384, 385 ; Philosophy, 334 ;
authorities for, 53 ; divisions of,
66 ; practical character of, 134 ;
scope of, 381 ; as a whole, 400 ;
Solitical antecedents of, 16;
ocErfne expanded, 47 ; problem
proposed to, 56 ; enquiries into
duties, 302 ; practical character,
56 ; necessity for knowledge,
58 ; position towards logic and
natural science, 59 ; relative
importance of parts, 68 ; onesidedness of, 402 ; place in his
tory, 400 ; theory of interming
ling, 137; of irresistible impres
sions, 530; Logic of, 70, 121;
iield of, 70 ; words and thoughts,
73; formality of, 75, 92, 119;
estimate of, 1 23 ; categories, 97 ;
theory of illation, 121 ; Know
ledge, theory of, 75, 525; pro
minent points in, 77 ; prophecy,
379 ; platform, 335, 353 ; point
of view, 48, 90 ; polytheism,
549; preference for argument,
l>5 ; principles, logical result of,
311; principles, 153, 219, 225,
256. 293 ; propositions, 310, 551 ;
views on nature, 194; Scltool,
STO
29, 62, 64, 69, 168, 274, 286, 297,
299, 300, 307, 336, 351, 388;
founded by Zeno, 36 ; Chrysippus president of, 45 ; a School
of reasoners, 66 ; Qavrcurla, 541 ;
severity, 286 ; skill, 363 ; specu
lation, 173 ; Si/stem, 91, 394, 68.
91, 125, 138, 152, 173, 223, 249,
277, 301, 351, 354, 381, 394, 504,
516, 543 ; inner connection of,
381; teaching, 55, 59, 67, 69,
84, 133, 221, 257, 316, 456; theo
logy, 545 ; treatment of science,
542.
Stoicism, 2fc, 69, 326, 339, 357,
380 ; growing out of Cynicism,
17, 91, 392, 402; relation of, to
previous system, 387 ; related to
Cynics, 387 ; to Socrates, 387 :
to Aristotle, 396 ; to Megarians,
392; to Heraclitus, 392; to
Plato, 399 ; later, founded by
Chrysippus, 45; historical in
gredients of, 400 ; form fixed,
48 ; Eratosthenes won for, 48 ;
as traditionally known, 56 ;
features of, 239 ; a religious
system, 342 ; essentially practi
cal, 380, 385 ; insistson self-suffi
ciency of virtue, 389 ; preserved
original character of Socratic
philosophy, 391 ; stern tone of,
498 ; and the theory of pleasure,
560 ; entered the Roman world
under Pansetius, 51 ; declared
man independent of his fellows.
311 ; makes a dogma of fatalism,
332 ; connection with religion,
341 ; with popular faith, 343 :
ethical side of, 382 ; scientific
side of, 383 ; elements combined
in, 386; relation of Epicurean
system to, 503, 508, 509, 514,
517.
Stoics [see Table of Contents], 276.
3 1 4, 393, 398, 5 1 2 ; of t he Roman
period, 36, 326, 492 ; School of
the, 19 ; feel the need of philo-
INDEX.
583
T0
8TO
sophic speculation, 20 ; history
classes, 269; the wise man of,
of, 35 sg. ; take their name from
270, 271, 291, 295, 304, 317, 383;
Stoa irouciX^, 38 ; highest con
influenced by Academy, 399 ;
ception of, 99 ; look at accuracy
agrees with Arcesilaus, 532 ;
of expression, 118; seek a stan
opponent of Carneades, 542,
dard of truth, 20 ; demand a
564 ; driven into admissions,
knowledge of conceptions, 479;
287 ; compelled to recognise
differences of degree, 293 ; con
logic of, 96,97, 123,223; sorites,
120 ; did little for natural
nection with Cynics, 305, 307,
science, 20 ; opposed to Scep
308, 327, 388, 402, 510; insist
on^justice and mercy, 315T pay
tics, 21 ; teach original unity of
human family, 21, 490; apologreat attention to domestic life,
getical writings of, 25 ; regard
321 ; view of suicide, 336, 338 ;
universal element, 25 f" belief
of lying, 305 ; ethical principles
of, 385 ; aim at independence,
fromidea, 36 ; develop the
488 ; inexorable sternness of,
doctrine of the syllogism, 65 ;
problem proposed to, 56 ; view
497 ; subordinate logic and
natural science to moral science,
of virtue, 59, 128, 272, 300 ;
607 ; adhere to fatalism, 505 ;
unity of virtue, 266 ; differ
generally from Aristo, 62 ; their
appeal to consensus gentium,
views expanded by Chrysippus,
543 ; theological views of, at
tacked by Sceptics, 545 ; view
64 ; make three divisions of
of the soul, 211, 214, 215,
philosophy, 66 ; development of
222 ; supposed connection with
teaching, 69 ; their view of
Heraclitus, 1 35, 394 ; materialism
thoughts and words, 74 ; had no
of, 139, 210, 385, 425 ; hold one
distinct theory of knowledge
primary
force, 143, 146 ; view of
before Chrysippus, 76 ; âttach
importance to the senses, TT;
Deity, 148, 152, 154; view of
popular Gods, 358, 362, 366, 368,
make perceptions the source of
notions, 82, 91; Afktw of, 92;
369, 549 ; identify God and the
world, 156, 348, 349; theology
consider material objects alone
of, 341 ; pantheism of, 159 ;
real, 84, 94 ; admit the existence
view of nature, 194, 223, 351,
of immaterial attributes, 106 ;
373 ; view of the resolution of
enumerate sentences, 110; dis
the world, 165, 203 : view of the
cuss modality of judgments,
seat of generative power, 173;
115; attached great value to
view of divination, 175, 370,
the theory of illation, 116 ;
377, 550 ; prophecy, 373, 374,
strive to find firm ground, 123 ;
375, 378 ; view of relation of
their view of knowledge, 129;
man to destiny, 182, 301 ; view
ground occupied by, 134, 135 ;
of the unity of the world, 183,
deny the freedom of the will,
231 ; of the perfections of the
179, 217 ; distinguished from
world, 187 ; of physical evil,
Epicureans, 183, 470 ; agree
188 ; view of moral evil, 189,
ment with, 454, 481, 484, 500,
191 ; inconsistencies of, 193 ;
507, 508, 516 ; follow Aristotle,
view .of time and space, 197;
194 ; do not explain irregular
hold two active elements, 179,
impulses, 248 ; classify errors,
261 ; divide mankind into two
231 ; consider the stars living,
584
INDEX.
UTT
STR
206 ; meteorological investtea- Sympathy of nature, 183.
tinns of, 207 ; view of plants Syria, Stoics in, 36.
and animals, 208 ; view of man, Syro, an Epicurean, 413.
225, 490 ; view oT good and
evil, 230, 233, 269, 293 ; view of
pleasure, 237 ; of emotions, 244, TARSUS, a philosophic centre,
35 ; birthplace of Zeno the
245, 248, 253, 473 ; theory of
pupil of Chrysippus, 49 ; birth
necessity, 246 ; classification of
place of A ntipater, 50.
errors, 261 ; highest good, 657 ;
collisions with current views, Teles, a Stoic, and cotemporary
of Chrysippus, 48.
278, 292, 296, 347, 352 ; on se
condary goods, 280; orTThings Test-science of truth, 425.
indifferent, 281, 338 ; things Thebes, 11.
preferential, 283 ; views of ac Theophrastus, followed by Chry
sippus, 119.
tions, 290 ; casuistry of, 299,
552 ; moral science of, 302 ; on Theory, modification of Stoic, 284.
unchastity, 309 ; view of social Thoughts, Stoic view of, 73.
relations, 311 ; relation of indi Time, 196
vidual to society, 312; friend- Tirnon of Phlius, 519 ; a follower
of Pyrrho, 519; jealous of New
. ship of the wise, 320; on the
Academy, 521 ; Scepticism of,
rights of man, 329 ; citizenship
521 ; places true happiness in
of the world, 326. '506'; view of
arapatia, 525.
demons, 353 ; allegorical inter
pretation of, 354 ; on predestina Titans tear Dionysus to pieces,
364, 367.
tion, 376; encouraged supersti
tion, 379 ; neglect scientific TcSiros, 196.
knowledge, 381, 391 : philoso Trendelenburg on Aristotle, 104.
phical pedigree of, 387 ; expand Tpnoy4veta, 363.
Socratic philosophy, 392 ; know Troad, the birthplace of Cleanthes,
40.
ledge of conceptions, 479 ; spe
culativelyorthodox, 505; mental TpAmu, the, of the Sceptics, 523.
repose of, 515 ; law of causality, Truth, Stoic standard of, 86.
Tiixoxrir, 78.
651.
Strato, 133.
Subject-matter, Stoic category of,
"YAH Stoioi, 100, n. 4 ; 140, n. 1.
98.
Ulysses, 292, 363, 368 ; a
Substance, Stoic category of, 98 ;
pattern of all virtues, 369.
universal, 156.
Universal depravity, 272.
Suggestive symbol, 115.
Universe, course of, 163 ; nature
2u7KaT<te<rij, 88, 532.
of, 202 ; Epicurean arrangement
2iyXv(ris, 106, n. 2 ; 137, n. 1.
of, 449.
Suicide, Stoic view of, 335, 489.
^PfflMrefpervr, 100.
2i7i/3f/3ji<iTa, of Epicureans, 439.
Tir6\r)ifits. Epicurean, 430.
2ujiirT<S|iutra, of Epicureans, 439.
Tiro/u'T)o-TtK!$j, 115.
Zvvalria, 142. n. 2.
Uranos, 367.
2vr6KTiKa! atnai, 142, n. 2.
Utterance, the Stoic theory of, 73,
SiWpya atria, 142, n. 2.
92 ; complete, 108.
^vyrf/ifityov, 113.
INDEX.
VAB
VARIETY, Stoic category of,
107 ; of relation, 107.
Venus, 202.
Virtue, connection of happiness
and, 191 ; emotions and, 243 ;
Stoic idea of, 254 ; positive and
negative aspects of, 254 ; vir
tues severally, 257 ; mutual re
lations of, 261; unity of, 266;
Epicurean, 478.
WILL, Epicurean views on, 459.
Wisdom and folly, 268.
Wise man, Stoic, 268 ; Epicurean,
483.
Words, Stoic view of, 73 ; gram
mar of, 94.
World, Stoic view of as identical
with (iod, 15B ; origin of, 161;
en<\ of, 163 ; cycles in, 165 ;
government of, 170 ; nature of,
182 ; unity and perfection of,
183; moral theory' of, 187;
course of, 331 ; Epicurean view
of, 444 ; origin of, 447 ; arrange
ment of, 448.
XENOCRATES, 41 ; influence on
Zeno, 399; Cleanthes, his
counterpart, 400; known to Epi
curus, 405; time of, 528; a
teacher of the Stoic Zeno, 38.
ZENO the Stoic, 36, 54, 58, 62,
246, 370, 400; of Cytium, 36 ;
founder of Stoicism, 36 ; son of
Mnaseas, 36 ; only half a Greek,
327 ; death of, 336, 337 ; living
at Athens, 36 ; a pupil of Crates,
37 ; views on logic and nat.ual
science, 62 ; relation to Heraclitus, 134 ; materialism of, 134 ;
definition of time. 197 ; places
force in heaven, 146 ; pupils of,
686
ZEU
40, 41 ; time of, 134 ; uncer
tainty as to motives of, 55 ; in
fluenced by Peripatetics, 133 ;
polity of the wise, 322 ; views
on divination, 370 ; vindicates
the supremacy of virtue, 385 ;
connected with Stilpo, 392 ;
strictures on Aristotle, 511; not
connected with Arcesilaus, 529 ;
estimate of rational things, 545 ;
deification of seasons, 349 ; lead
ing thought of, 385 ; debt to
Megarians, 392 ; debt to Polemo,
399 ; views on causation, 86 ;
view of the world, 146 ; view of
Ether, 201 ; of life according to
nature, 228; distinguishes emo
tions, 249 ; Herillus, his pupil,
256; view of virtue, 257, 261;
offends against propriety, 308 ;
on unnatural vice, 309 ; advo
cates community of wives, 310 ;
contempt for religion, 344, 347;
seeks moral ideas, 355 ; draws
on former systems, 586 ; distin
guishes two kinds of fire, 397 ;
aim of, 400 ; attracted by Cynic
ism, 401 ; regards virtue as
highest good, 401, 505.
Zeno, of Sidon, an Epicurean, 412,
416.
Zeno, of Tarsus, a Stoic and scholar
of Chrysippus, 49.
Zenonians, original name of Stoics,
38
Zeus, 171, 271, 348, 364, 487, 550 ;
distinguished from nature, 153 ;
the will of, 171; happiness of,
enjoyed by the wise man, 271 ;
distinguished from other Gods,
357, 358 ; legends of, inter
preted, 358, 359 ; not envied
by an Epicurean, 477, 487 ; cri
ticised by Sceptics, 650.
Spottistcovtit Jb Co. i'i inters, H^x-street Square, London.

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This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

WORKS BY DR. E. ZELLER.

TRANSLATED FROM T ItjE GERMAN 0?

NEW AND REVISED EDITION

The present translation aims at supplying an intro

To the moralist and theo

logian no less than to the student of philosophy this

B. Perfect and intermediate duties

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS

A. Inner connection of the system .

Ai Coherence of the Epicurean teaching .

sophy of conceptions grew into elaborate systems,

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

given. New ideas had penetrated every branch of

MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

origin and worth ; and they had this unconditional

MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

the antithesis between form and matter, it ends in

PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

methods and means then in vogue. The fashion of

PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

and embracing all the results of previous enquiry

PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

declined also. The growing pursuit of the art of

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

ance in their bearing on the character of the post

1 Conf Arist. Metaph. I, 2, 282 b, 19.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

de corps, weaned from the habit of working for

CAUSES OF POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

selves, to entrench themselves within the safe barriers Chap.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

with what is not, or by placing God outside of and in Chap.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

natural as well as their positive theology bears ample ,

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

tion to the followers of the old Schools, Eclectics are

POST- ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

his successors. These philosophers are not lacking Chap,

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

virtue ; the Epicureans in individual independence

predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in

intermixture. After the middle of the second

century a gradual change may be observed, breece

families of high birth ; others living in their own

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks

calling itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean,

cumstances it would never have come about bad not

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

scientific knowledge as at attaining certain results

This mental habit, which is connected with Plato