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    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34 TH Infantry Division

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    GV Smith
    The document provides lessons learned by the 34th Infantry Division over 400 days of combat operations in North Africa and Italy between November 1942 and September 1944. It covers topics such as infantry operations, artillery employment, combined arms tactics with tanks and engineers, communications, supply, intelligence, and personnel management. The division suffered heavy casualties learning lessons at locations like Hill 609, Monte Cassino, Anzio, and along the Volturno River. The summary is intended to highlight subject areas covered rather than specific lessons due to the loss of detail over time and combat.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34 TH Infantry Division

    Uploaded by

    GV Smith
    407 views103 pages
    The document provides lessons learned by the 34th Infantry Division over 400 days of combat operations in North Africa and Italy between November 1942 and September 1944. It covers topics such as infantry operations, artillery employment, combined arms tactics with tanks and engineers, communications, supply, intelligence, and personnel management. The division suffered heavy casualties learning lessons at locations like Hill 609, Monte Cassino, Anzio, and along the Volturno River. The summary is intended to highlight subject areas covered rather than specific lessons due to the loss of detail over time and combat.

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    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34 Th Infantry Division

    Original Title

    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34 Th Infantry Division

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    The document provides lessons learned by the 34th Infantry Division over 400 days of combat operations in North Africa and Italy between November 1942 and September 1944. It covers topics such as infantry operations, artillery employment, combined arms tactics with tanks and engineers, communications, supply, intelligence, and personnel management. The division suffered heavy casualties learning lessons at locations like Hill 609, Monte Cassino, Anzio, and along the Volturno River. The summary is intended to highlight subject areas covered rather than specific lessons due to the loss of detail over time and combat.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    407 views103 pages

    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34 TH Infantry Division

    Uploaded by

    GV Smith
    The document provides lessons learned by the 34th Infantry Division over 400 days of combat operations in North Africa and Italy between November 1942 and September 1944. It covers topics such as infantry operations, artillery employment, combined arms tactics with tanks and engineers, communications, supply, intelligence, and personnel management. The division suffered heavy casualties learning lessons at locations like Hill 609, Monte Cassino, Anzio, and along the Volturno River. The summary is intended to highlight subject areas covered rather than specific lessons due to the loss of detail over time and combat.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 103
    At a glance
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    The documents discuss lessons learned from military operations, including the importance of flanking maneuvers and not relying too heavily on artillery. Speed and initiative were emphasized over waiting for orders.

    The commander recommended taking towns from deep flanks and rear instead of battering them with artillery. Units should leave roads more and make wider envelopments. Combined arms should be used more aggressively.

    It was reported that armored columns often remained inactive on roads while waiting for infantry support instead of deploying tanks more widely. This wasted significant time that could be reduced through initiative and mobility.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    HEAD~RrERS

    APO 19

    II COEPS

    U.S. AllMY

    In the Field
    16 June 1944

    353/91 (OG)
    Subject:

    Lessons Learned.

    To

    Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.

    1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance


    from the GlRIDLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at
    an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compila
    tion, 1 wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the
    present tr~ining period.
    a.

    Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.

    b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery

    serves little purpose and is extremaly wasteful of ammunition and time.

    c. The delay caused .8 by small enemy detachn:er.ts is out of all


    proportion to the nUlllbers and means at oW' disposal. Among other errors
    committed is our failure to leave roads ~ enou~h and to make a ~ enough
    envelopment or by-pass.
    d. The combined use of armored and infantry units haS been too
    cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire pewer of tl'.nk" dllring the period
    when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of ar~or haa not been
    overcome and motility has not been restored to its pr.)pe1' ~.:rr9artallce ill the
    emplgyment of tanks. ~oo often a column of tanks has re:ll8be'l inactive on
    a road, held up by a Single 5P or A.~ gun. ~he time lost >iai t~ng for infantry
    to arrive, deploy and attRck the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by
    a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a "ide envelopment which
    would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun.
    Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a
    small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a roe.d. Again, the tlme
    wasted waiting for the arrival B.nd action of tanks co\tld have been materially
    reduced by early and wide deployment.
    e. Not enough use lw.s been mnde of Air Opls for reconne.iesance ::pur':'
    poses. Inasmuch nS artillery targets have been rele.tively few during this
    pursuit phase, there should he.ve been constlUlt Cub air reconnaissance avail
    able to all leeding elements.
    .. ,

    f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over
    the roads or flat lands,

    ..

    g. Too often commanders of all eohelons. waited for orders. The


    rapid advance ~de the mai~tenance of communications difficult ~~d result8d
    in instruction.s being iasu'BdMd received based on out of Q..."lte information.
    Under such cond.i ti9ns commanders mst act on their own responsibili ty, ini"'
    tiative and .judgmelft. Inactivity is inexcueable.

    - 1 ...

    UNCLASSIFIED

    C 9 ?J 7

    UNCLASSIFIED

    a -, -I L
    2 I *i
    -L
    - .-a-U- --

    ,.
    2., We MUst be, prepared mentAlly and tactically for a cMn~e in the
    cMracte,r of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong
    and bitter resistance. At Borne date or place the German may ssekto make ~
    stand but our constant preuure should greatly hamper him from getting sot.
    The main bo~ieB following our mobile advan~ detachments must be kept 80 in :
    hand that they can be employed rapidly in ace~rdauce with Simple and prepared
    plans.

    3. speed, not basts,

    i8 still the great factor.


    /

    ./

    K<~:;.J-

    i'--~";Gt~1~~/'j
    y

    "

    ,,

    Major General, U.S"':.,


    COJ:llMnding.
    ])1STli,I1lU'rI ONI
    .ri]ff

    16 June 1944:

    200

    - 2.

    ! ! I _ 7!!I::::IZ! i .!)!

    UNCLASSIFIED

    HE.;J)Q,U.J'iTEr-lS '1" IFTH


    ~

    ...1.

    .l.D

    0 ~ IT':+V,
    ~I '4

    ~Jll',,{

    u s 'oI...rmy
    Il

    8 October 1944

    ;,G 334-Y
    SUBJECT:

    Lessons Learned in Combat by 34th Infantry Division.

    TO

    See Distribution.

    1., "lessons Ler,rned in Comhet, November 7-8 1942 to September


    1944", published by Eead<;.ucrters :3L,th Infentry Division, is l1ereby
    forwarcled for your information and interest.

    2.: It should be une.'9retood tMt tl:e vieclS expressed in this


    document t though interestbe, 0.0 not r.ecess2rily represent an official
    sanction by this Head"uarte:'s of the principles or doctrines outlined
    therein.
    By

    command of Lieutenn.nt Ge1'J.or.1 CL...PK:

    1 Incl:
    lEol #1-1138sons Lee.rnod in Ccr:~~JC!.t_ /
    DISI1UBUTIOH:
    .34 Inf Div.
    Transp
    CIS,
    .:FHQ. (2)
    G-l
    ;~.I (2)
    G-2

    G-3 (12)

    BEF

    G-4

    85th Div
    88th Div
    91st Div .
    92nd Div

    ..

    ~.rty
    .

    ~.

    Engx'
    Ord
    Sllrg

    1st

    "~rmd

    Vi'IT
    BocU'a (2)
    Eq Repl Cmd (2)
    Ti Corps
    Sev3nth ~.rruy

    ..C]'

    C",l[)

    Historian
    'I,M

    Sig

    rIC

    j,f,;.

    :F;j ghth

    PM

    13 C91'PS
    Bri& Stayner

    PRO
    leG (Less I)lCl)

    )..3~
    43-3- 105

    .y/'

    .\rwy

    ! ,
    .

    , ' - , ,.

    '~_'l/"

    i; II

    i _ !? 2

    I :-

    !,._=>~.fv
    -C'._.
    ",

    ',"'!'

    .1 (\,J,' .'

    _::-,.:~

    - ..:.

    UNCLASSIfiED

    .QOPdf"IOE Ij II Ab

    ~~s LEf\R}JED

    LES

    I~;

    COIVillBl\T

    NOVEMBER 7-8, 1942 ....,..,..,,~ SEPTEMB ER !944

    /.

    I.

    '

    'j

    ;ALGIERS - FONDOUK
    //,
    ~I '/t:"":SSiNQ~ANZIO-~OrvE'
    HtLL6C9 SfJ'JEVENTO.%iM . . ~
    CIVJTAVECC~'AI
    V:JLTURNO RtVER ~ l{ll;'
    ~f//; CECtNA-RC,ISIGNANOj'
    i MT PANTANO
    '\ I
    \
    :/
    .
    UVORNO
    }oJ',',......'

    _---.,.

    ......

    ','

    "

    :..

    ' . ._~. _ __

    Ii"E /-\I)QUARTER S

    3 L1thlf~PANTRYDIVISiO~J
    APO 34 L.J:> ARMY

    SEPTEMBER 1944

    ITALY

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Thi~ summary of "Lessons Lac-rnod in Comr ..t" hf3 been written by the
    iDen of the 3t,th Infantry Division f,nd is pre,sentsG. in their words.

    The Divil;>ion entered co:.'bat first at AlGIERS, NCRT" ft1'RiCA on 7..8


    November 1942 and elements Of the Division were engar-ed EI.llllost continuously
    from tl)at dnt.e until th3 German sur:render II IIRY 1943. LAnding in Italy on
    21 September 1943, the Di.vision has been coltlI!itted to action in eVflry major'
    engagement of the campaign to date.
    Elements of tho Division have b93n in active c~at with tte enemw
    aver 400 days since the inithl landirgs in Africa. and the Division its.plf has
    been in oommand of a sector for 330 de.ys,

    . llany of the "Lessons L(>"-I'ned" are net presented in this


    Ther were lost, unfortunr;;tely, Vlgh t.Le l;te!'oes of the Division at
    FONDOUK, at Hill 609, at BEl!EVENTJ, .:l~ ~he VU:./fURNO River and MT.
    CASSINO and ANZIO. at ROI"IE, CI'l':TAVECCfJ:A. CZGIN.A, ROSIGNANO, and

    s1llJllllSl'Y.

    ALGIE1l.S, at
    PANTJ'.NO, at
    LIVCHND.

    CHARIE.C; L. BOLtE ,

    Major General, U. S. Ar~1


    Commending.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Chapt.er I ........................................
    Infantry
    .1 ..................................... ..
    Shock Action
    b ..................................... .
    Street Fighting
    c ..................................... ..
    Counterattack
    . ..................................... .
    Lountain l'iarfare
    ~ ...................................... .
    i'ight Attack
    f ........................................
    River Crossings
    !Z ..................................... ..
    Patrol Operations
    11 ......................................
    Defensive Operations
    1. ...................................... .
    CP - OF Operations
    j ..................................... ..
    Air - Grot:.nd Liaison
    ~ ........................................
    Cover, Concealment and Disperaitffl
    1 .................................... ..
    Infan~ry reapons
    Machine Gun
    (2 f'iiort.ars
    (3) Infantry Cannon

    (ll

    (4) 57M!!J AT Gun

    (5) Grenades
    E). , ...................................... ..

    Infantry Medical Detacl\ment

    1J ...................................... ..
    Remarks (Mise)

    Chapter I I

    .... .. ,,-It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

    ..

    Artillery

    2- ........................................ ..
    Ocerations
    " (1) Employm~nt of Liaison Officmrs
    (2) ForrJard Obs ervers

    (3) Reconnaissance
    \if} Se1ection and Occup.u,ion of

    Positions
    (5) Observed Fires

    (~) Unob~erved Fire~

    (7) Tanks and Tank Destroyers for

    Indirect Fire
    Intelligence - Counterbattery
    (1) Shellrepa
    (2) Counterbattery
    (J) 1-'0 Fire Line
    (4) Observation
    .Q ...................................... ..
    Sroploymem of Artillery by the Infantry
    2 .......................................
    . .'.
    .
    ;Jefens i ve Fires

    12 .........

    AI
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

    Chapter III ........................................


    Infantry-Tank-Tank Destroyer ~eam
    .oJ. .................... ~ ................ ..
    Combined Training
    12 ...................................... .
    Tank-Infantry vs Infantry-Tank
    .. ..................................... ..
    The Tank Destroyer
    Chapter IV .................................. " ....
    Engineers
    ~ ...................................... .
    Divisional Enginee~ Operations
    Infantry A and P Platoons
    .2
    ........

    .................. .

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    ........... .. .... ..

    ...........................
    . .

    Chapter V
    ,.
    ,.
    ,"[",,1 Comr.lUnicutions
    iJ. ....................... ..
    -~;8sJ.ge Center

    :2
    .
    . H:-idio Communications

    ,. ,. . Lers Communications,
    ~

    ........................ .

    D'1pply

    ,s. - ............... .
    Eutio]js'

    . . ~ _
    ,.
    ~

    CLa pt or VII
    ~

    ..

    lotting and Equipment


    ................ ,. ......... .
    Transportatj.on
    Forward Dumps
    0

    ......................
    ........................ .

    ................................
    .......................... .

    Ar.urcunition
    IntEl~liGence'

    ...............................

    ill Interrogation

    Plwto Intelligence'
    . ................................ ..
    Partisan Corrtr'ol
    Q ..................................... .
    Psychological. Warfare'
    Ord~ of Battle
    ~ ....,
    , ... -; ..., ............ .

    .b

    ...

    Personnel
    ................................ .
    replacement
    Procedure

    .. ........ .......... ...


    b ..................... ,.

    . ~

    ;.,

    ...

    '.'~',."

    ...... , , , , . , . - ' " . e'


    :le dac ')IDe nt' .'Training
    . ............... ,.,. .......... .
    'J,':orale
    ~

    ........................ .
    Appointment,

    Promotion, Awards, Reclass


    'ification

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    be

    1. Infantry Oill'l:~toiOl:',. No c.ttemI;t 1:1i11


    m"de to discuss t8c'~ics since
    the basic principles emrlo;'ed by Ghengis Khan are still in vogue today.

    11- Sho.'Jk .:~ioll. T:l~ )romrt Iollo,;,{-up of


    is of paramount importance.

    shock ection by Inf2ntry

    Uln nwny i!1Jtqn~c;:: C1.:.r 'sroops h8ve not token a.dvar~tage of


    s!:.ock action ~:_nd i t b:;s c-()[rt r8 IT!El1Y cR.s"Ualties. By the terr..":
    SHOel': ACTION I mean r.rt.i 11erf c:)DCentrEtions, rnort~n~ fire, bomb
    inC; ctkcYs, tr.nk 8r TD fire, bazoo],a fire and ".and cc"en"des. All
    rD1l.st be fol~o:.7~d_ c:.ggressively and ::d t~i no del~y. LrtiJ Ip.ry C0l1Cel1
    -Cr&tiOl~s' "and bnrr~g8~, l),rfJ practically useless unless thBY .qre. fo1
    lorled closely ADoUg': S,j t.~_Y:1t tt.8 rifl:~man can close with tho GnRmy
    bef'ol'8 -~h8 encrr.y front lir:e soldier realizes t~at tbe fire h[',s
    lifted and rl1ll2, ;)&ck to Clan h5s ,'ms. In follO'::in~ th8 artillery
    closr:ly you mRY hsve saLle C.:-l.s,:'~,ltips i'l""om YOl~r OVJI't artillery, but
    in tl'le J.Ol'l~ rnn ;.rOl.;:r catn:al ties ....rill be much lo1.'Jer. Fror!: my exper
    iGncc in C:"~SSIl'~O I lea:"'ll.d V-:at the GeI'P.l9.ns ttook up i~he sl.3ck t
    the rlOiCent he found it "las there. On3 de,yat Cr,2Srl10 r:e eccd o.
    coo:r'dinatcd att.ack. p~'-anned to f~8t Company' "11' acrOS3 the m~" in street
    to r;cin Q foothold on t~!~,t si(lc of town. Tanks "\'YO!'C: to Lire 2. prc
    lJ~l'f:'j~ion on knmrm 2nd s~~spoct~,d t[!r~~:cts and, as a sig!J.al to the
    ri~~'lemo!1 that thn tanks v.1:~re to cease firir'g, the corr;~and t::.nk 'F\rns
    to firt: four rou~ds in n door1Ha:r that ',~ms "';.~isibln to aJ.l. ThE,n "eha
    inf'antrymen' lN8r0 to dash across the street irllI!1ediately and g~.in
    entrance to th(, o1'lildin"G ~_'eforG tn,: cnCI!!V had rcco7c;r:~,d. .Horrever,
    tho riJ lemen vr.ited 10 ;'jnvtos 'opfo-ro they started L.nd by th"t time
    the Germ"ns v.'erG hsck on th3ir FUns and stopped tJ:e &ttcck. Ihoro
    is no fire more dov:1stat;.ng c.nd moralo shattering th'J.n '.Coll-direct
    ed tank firo~ Lt C:i,sSINO tho C'-ermanG kneH th-' locati.on oj.' my bo.t
    tali'on obscrvatio!l post ~.nd tried continuGlly wi~ho~Jt success t.o
    knock it out \T1.th r.t".chi!:.c S":.Jn, n:ort!Jr and o.rtillory firo.
    Gcrm8n tanks g8.ve 1)S "T]er:l' little trouble in CASSn;O but p_t
    dnwn one I!orrinf t.bc,:v drove; up' ono TJc:trk VI and started firing G.t my
    OP. Needless to 5~'Y I :,-,r~,S ~cc.rod 2.nd wns sitting in a cornor SDY
    ing my praY8rs ,.nd tryi. '''c to ellll the. artillery. I st~yed in that
    c0X'llur, too, until f'i.-V-~ :.i1n1J.-';/;:; 8.~.,te:r the 1r st round. rm.s firm). bo
    foro I went beck '10':in t,]C t"'dl ,;ith thee phona to try to .spI icc it
    on the line. i)l1r:,n,' those five minutes the enemy could hnvc come;
    in the buUding 8nd fom,d ::In in tho corner \:ith very little fight
    loft.
    In C,~SSINO tf:C, k.tkli.cn l,'sod, on the! avenge, 500 grenados
    G dr_y.
    Onr' of our ill /..:.hods of ::.dv::ncing y!as to thrO~.'1 a grenade into
    -

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    a room ;'-nd ti!~,n to Get into +,:c:,-' ro:)m ",-:-ith ~" 1fommy-gun r1ght after
    t~~:.. ,.;'rU1l.-J.dc 1.7(.nt. off.
    If t~~, :!",'-. ~,-'r:.:~"~<:_~ :~,_ny Gcrmr :18 in th( roor:1, tLose
    ;:Ti-:6 \.~rrL still :.lbt" ,_;,",~-:,,~: f01U":i J~,-ir,.g 0n ttc floor r:i+,h r::o fight
    J~ccft. 11

    1:!.

    ~!:r..9Gt_fi,d~ti~).<I

    T'x

    "-;~-:t~nr: ::!i~C') cf

    the 34th Infr,ntrv'Divis:i.on in

    Itnly has ;)''-c,~ '~~1:'-'~ ~.h{.i ,~:n,mJ d.c~!'cr.,Js ~o--'ns ~.Dd ino(lrpor~,tr::s bu11diY2gs into his
    defenso sys-~":];'li3 ',:"!LCl1('Ncr :;:::'()sf.ibl<;,. '~:_:hil'~-, t!:.) co.rdinl"'.l principle is to b;'fr-i)2;SS
    and cut off ',:,,'j(: d8i'::,lxli.nr; fo~('cris, the D7i~;cnci0s 0":" 'tb-; s:i.twJt-ton may dCmen(1 a
    frontal att,-"c];-. If trw l~:lttc:r' h:.:: t!'~:~,:, tl:.u.tG is no oas:" 8.nS";7Cr to ttl'.; problom.
    Tho 8nemy cen only be uvict(;d Ly b?Td ~:~ork.

    11 Aft8r one,; enc.er -;_ -l' ~~


    vi ll~gc a s"t:t:.ong pofnt should -or! es~'
    -Gnb1is!1Cd pith ,'-~11 --~ _ _ O' '".-] r,...;'n:t.;c;. In .the:
    . . , c["so of a vlatoon yoU
    .~

    enD then sond Ol]t

    8!"1.r

    J:

    (.'.J:'

    l".ni.ts fron: thls strong poi.nt to l'!_C'l..:.i

    date other bu:i..ld~.;:1Ei:J n::i:lr 1);,"', ~i,::'lile beir.:; covored -:)y f~T8 from

    tLc ~~\tronG po:~nt. _'~s ~:,O('l: as [,11 hu:i.ldi~:;~s in the; vicinity ]~2V(~"
    boon thorouch1y cJ.car~d 0:: tnt'; ("P8my '~bCD the- platoon yen rncroup
    at another stro:lp;' ~o:1:'1t "'~~d ernt~nuf.' 'tho .~o'b . This '.7.;'8 tL:; method
    cmployod by OHr pJ.atccm in t~l:' 2.tt:lek on ?J~G=Gn t, EO and provcll to ;)0
    very sucCCSSf'll. In this ~:c:,mc (;r~gnF;cmq1t ',7.0 (.',180' found tr-r t t.~-'.0
    usc of to.nl:D t:.ro 8,- 3rc..--"t ~J,~~l~:~, i::: stro(;t fightjng. A fCYT blast;:;
    fro!;;. D. 75 b::to r: b:dldlne- l.-,ril} eit'Jer kill the enemy or shake '~;'-lom
    up so b(~dl;:r t~lr't t.h__ ::lr c<-j.'t.'J.r(~ bCCOID(')S quit '._) L.:?SY provided r,7C 1'01
    101.7 up closcl-.r. Of co'C.~rs(>, it, rf"-.st te rCnl( ~nf)crc:,d th[l'~ tre.n1::s Arc
    ""lury e;OOu. teTccts .Lor tJ ,:'! '_::1CTa~_1 bazqok::. m~.n, arid 80
    rosult. t~'Hjy
    IDnS-c. Lc given f!dr--;cj"lJ"1tn r'I'ot~;ctj or.... b:Jr tb(- infantry. 11
    .

    SC;rt;02r.,:~ l\P,TELJE R.

    'JOR:.l:'d\T, IJ.3rd Infn.ntry.

    !II Em cxpcric!nccq y.lostly in vi_l1~'_s:() fightir:g. T~1n mr'.in thi-nr,


    if, not to miss a l-101..1S .....:::, i'n0. \-:l~on YOt:.. p,'o iY2. to tc,kc' it ji"O'~ 17Qnt to
    b{;

    cortf1.in_ not to mj s~ L '1"00:-:1, or any othar placo a p::rson Cfm bide.


    t:J C :\lO;l~~n ~r01J ".'''lnt to go to tho side '.,:hers thoro
    -::'Lndo _7s ':r:d-,-,j-::.or) J,'Ol: hn.vo tho most covcr. lI

    a~-~(-n ~.-O-l go up
    ,;_J..'C! "cl,o fc:.'c;:;,~

    ,n:r:h'is" irlcidsnt to~}~ 1Jl;-0':~ 'le the bt?t~lc: fo~.:' C.;~SSINO eround t~G
    r.rl.dc11o.. Of::'0.-C:"v;-~"y 194":". --r1 11:./t'c '.'TC'TO tncnt-;t of Uf.:' gro-J.pcd toccGr:cl'"
    in ouo bl':iJ.di:~rr. It':3 f:iX!'-~ t;) h'lVi; H f:''''icl-::.d dr' t,'.70 1,7ith ~;-ou, ;)rJt
    in t~:i. s C'::-~DC, t::.JY'0 1'.'?:':-; -l~.l:-=-,': too rr:.].ny for on') building.. ~to 0'~'d_ld
    i:lg ~:T\S f:.:;lic.lluc. :';" t~jU \~;L"" ~)lJryir;g all of '18. I ~:.T.S poarL'}? my
    hnlm<;'c, ll:cki:ly, n'C t:- t.i.:';;,. -.--Lien Sfl-;od niy lifo. r_~:r friC':'1Js
    rlorcn't so fO-;,."'tl~~f~tC. e!f tl~'~ t;.-:-urty, about one-thIrd ::ot Oilt :'1lj.vc.

    - :?

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    the IT,:;'',ldle of -J(,_tobcr 19/..3. ~~.1r; h,:,.Q !"<..:.liIost cJonrcd th(~ toy;n ftnd
    built ovr li~;; "n its no:rtb ~:I'n ":;d[fO., S OT-:(-:10~-, someone; i'r:.ilod t.o
    r021izc the 'r,'1'Oortr1!1c. O~: n. ro~d block., E'lrl~T the! a,"-'xt Il0rt!ing,
    tr.ro Jerry hCt:'Lf l:.:Lc'cks ,'_~rd on.:; 2-}~ ton -;:..rucl.r: ro:Ll"d ~_::-/(.O J~l1c- rr5.ddle
    of to-::n 1.7i til t':1e int.~Dtio:;. of "o~:_oY~~~_ng D. bridgQ ~ TJ.-.lQ t:r"'.ck nE'S
    lo;~.dcd ,l.i ~.''1 'T'~,~.~ ~
    ~ T.C~ iJ 7; .L.L"Y ~-:[;.s & S j;lU-Jli S"J.:::/ri. ~cd (i. G -:10 ",,'oro,
    :::0 ]-:0 ;-:itbdrr,,-- :"_,-, ~o_ hi ~ h -,l-r",r"lck'"' af'ter 'f'""-' Cr:-..-'t1U'r-,~ ~-11'\ tr"rk

    In my ~stim:1t-~o~,"-~~-?~jo:-~ ~.~;.~~~ "lf~oc~ ~1-Cl.lJ~j h~~vc -~r~v:'l~t~-l"tbi;-'a;ld


    -::'0 opon Ut~j -',70 \iould n?vo suffored pl"nty of

    if Jerry hrrl. d8(;id:~d


    c2sualtiDSg.!1
    Cr.ptnin REID B.

    neFF J

    135'::.,h I:"1.1'nntry"

    nCc:at.J.ct b:~ T.'"j ~YJal 'l~:"!.l:"S '>1:' ;.~;:-.'-lio 1-s ~;8snntit;,1 in strnct
    fightiLg "us ~" .T'r'::L ~'l~it;::; r1-:'.'~: -:'L{! ".:,r.ro1_" ~7il "toy"n J n (tf::""~: [''''nt sector s.
    At ,~jf~~J V~'l'T,r!KS Cc:mlC'.,~~:;" Hr i l,',:;,s told "'up 4 bo:'T'S by friendly fil"e
    from Company TlXI1 Ir
    t

    IIIn disc-JS8~_r;g 5~':':L""-:ct .'c~i:;:1t'-L1L in Tt~l~-'" t~e reo.o8I' must first


    realize -:ha~ F.0:- ~ of tt,:) It.alian t.O~.7I1E' do not hav.-:' rcgl:}ar ~,.TGll
    lc~id out st:,cc":.;., ~'Ld t~11'_t r~.=-l t~c ~Alil6~, n?;:..::; -:'I'G cl~se -~,o;:,ct;"'_~r 2.nd
    hnvC' thick ~-)tonc ~.n' JIG il !l,G. .. s'~""lly Vr-::l-Y fe--.r drwrs 2" !:Ll '!'.(Lndor.TD ~ In
    CASSINO t:ho G~;r;r~2.n[ bui '-:Vd~~"J . :1'.i:.Ciir:g :-: n -t~b8 li~() 0:::' our c'.c:. .r; '.r:.CG
    f'ortifiedlol

    Gun GTr.::=--l-'1cE-'")Jn<....-D"ts 8.=:..so r.T::' (

    cAmDl.1fl~' ~tJd ~i,!l ::)ll-.;~~ 0.1"

    rubLl,-) prosuP.1B.bl,y Gr'Jf..~t,:;c:. b;'l Our o,;-:n <r-d,l~ ~rJ ~ll1d tf;.r~-;: f_:2.~o" Their
    fires f.-ere ~:;GIJ. pliJ.r.?}:X~ &nd coordi!:.'1tcd so -:',hr'.t (;r..ch gu..t1 1'i:,':'.S ~ov~',rod
    by n)1othor.

    ':'0 gain our r'j.r8'-::~ f0ot:lcld in t!lC to:-m ,:;1'") used smo1(o dnd tcmks
    support8d by inf'J.ntry. J.-~v.> i :-:-/--'o.n-':,ry unncr uno-usorv0d firo rOillovod
    n:.inC:':1 Lna. fi~~l;::c.~ lL nr~t:i.-t~~Lk :::"i'tc.'r]()~; to &3sist ~he advancQ 01 tho
    t(~.nkG.
    On r[;,i',in~ the r'::'J~3t 'ootb..clJ ',?C got tbo men in. hailjj,nr,n
    and. cons01ic.n:!>~;d OY,T po Git~_0r: ~j ~.-_-i
    prxt:1_ ell: '?_r attnntion to gotting
    b2~,-:ool;:ns :' ~1 1,q...~pc: nll;::b~;-:':- pl.',;.,:;--::d. it. tL3 r.o.:;t fOT:7crd p0;Jit.::l_on;::.;.
    G(.n-m~.n tenks i~! t~:_~ s scctoJ' l-=. <~ c''';cn gi"',Tinq us trm.J.~)lG,. but tllO
    G::;rr-'."n nrmor ,'_n_c~! t i~otr:.:- r "'..~s ~_!: :-::.l~SSlN() becr,usn ',-,TC~ h"d S:") rr~_n~r
    h:1 z,coL_- S v:'32.1 fu:::""'r.:i"rl
    ~'h,:" ::"',~;00~:_:' rlro7c'd to be e. vGr:i c.-r'f ('cti vo
    r.~c;['.pon in strc-,"-;t .r'ighti'1[',.
    It 1.':".5 tIle ;3CUJG. lr-r.QC23I d:trcct fire
    o.r-'~il::"()r:r n,nd -:'Ji t::-) V:-1'7' J.:.-'-.:, '1:,1~; i~':!i3tl"uction ;- nd DJq: ('~rion(!o C[:i1 to
    fi-,~"~
    --,i.1.h
    ''''''rnr",~jn,~~
    , ..... -'~'r'c-,.
    ,C'.,l'nC( . .-.:]
    ~nd lO","or
    v.~ir.'.do<\.'s
    ...
    .'. v_. '-'v
    J.. .... _
    "'0
    r. ....
    ..... _
    ,)..
    __'--" 0.001"8 <,.
    ,
    l,-.~crc covcr(:d by l'i-~" D.-:~ t.i~c;-3 ~'~':::' L:-~d to m.. . . kc':-: ot!FT cntr2ncoS t.o
    t~1(;SO -~"J.ildirgs ttrc'-_:~'h ~J:ic}': stor:.::' ~:."e.l~s.
    If tZiYlks coulr"} co manou
    vored to shoot tc:'_._- s in tlv:c,::' '.',-.'--115 , it ';-,','J..:) d.)Jl.c.. Otb..::r;:isc.1 t.hu
    b8.zooka Y,;~'-:8 u,;'Y'.d. I~;, O~'l,_, ~LL2tnrC'.t..: it, took r.il'h .['ounds to !,(:t 2. hole
    big onol\;h to ;;0 :'hr.n.-,g~"l. :"_f':.cr en cr.tr,'-'TIcn -17".8 fo~md or I"'cudo a
    gron-,,~do o_lrm,ys rrGc;:'l~_'d t.h,_: i::.lJ';-:,ntrymr.n i!'!to tI-:;t~; rOOD if t:::or'J rrr.s
    cny 'l'Jossibility of G-C!"IT:':r:G ~':--,i~:g the'ro. 1;-1 ccso..<j ~,:huro a llOU:-:iC
    cOU1d not bo ";'rroGch(d, t"rJ<: ;-i.r.; ',ins -Jsod to L;vcl tho building
    to thn grounci.- Of course, this s~_~vo th,_ G0rrn.~:n8 SOr:lC \,vondurful

    -cr.

    '-'~_

    j __'

    ~-,

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    rubble piles to huild c~mouflrg~d cmplncoments but thoy lost the
    overhend cevGr "'or crtLllc:r:y rnd mortar fire. 710 "Iso used nn 8"
    h{H7itzor on sornj buildings,.
    cni!' bo fired ,"dt:b. precision 2nd
    chnngos as small os ten ~>c,:'ds c".n be mrde so ',70 used it on t",rgots
    uithin 50 yards of 01T 0',[; troo)'s. '10 onlloo. it sniping "lith nn
    Sf! hOT;. ~':lorto.rs c-rQre not .too effoctiVa :c,gr.inst the buildings and
    Horo used m,".inly ~,~ ho:cr:ss end Ld:erdict pr,ths.
    Snip8rs nerc; ,jf:ploy:;d fI'c(>ly by .poth sid8S nnd sometimes I
    em inclined to tl~.:~~J.~ th~ -1:.. th8 GormClns h~d morc SUCCess than v,e did.
    During the lulls our mon "ot c".roless Qnd b'ec"mo excGllent targets.
    On the beachhead at 1',EZrO th,c opposite soemod to hold true.
    In tho house-:~o-hollse fil!?hting or room-to--room fighting most
    of tho fil8n preforrod the Tomrry.gun "nO. because of its size profor
    rod tho cc.rbine to thr rifL for ,.;orking in close qutcrtcrs. For
    didcnso, mQchinu G11ns, Goth light tend hCC0cVy, and Bfll's '.7e1'O pltcced
    '.7ith tho for'72rJ. eloments.
    ",ne n '.70 VI8rc in C!,SSINO the nights \Vere very d"l:'k so l it1ile
    offensive 2ction 1,7CS attomptcd. At times VIe vtould have
    vc,iy ..
    limitod objective of S'lY the next houso. In mnny cuses 'No I,bn's
    Lnnd l consisted of about n liJ-yard spewe between t",ro houses; this
    YJns ic.oal for playing cntch ',lIth gronc.dos. A grcne.de th"t; oxplodos
    on' in:pact could heve boon usee" tit night we r;ould make rcndjust...
    ments, l"olioj's, brin!; up sU'P?lios, nnd Dv['.cunto killod Rnd \"Jourldod.
    Th8)~1J'_:'1d cnrry ~7D.S onJy 8.~out 200 yr.rds.
    Except in tho most fOr\7nrd
    positions movcrecnt :ms compocl'r,tivcly snfe.
    C1e hnd no 3,00 rocdios r,t this time end the 536 17ns usoless but
    ~'.ro us_ed sotmd po'::or peones to nIl pl,'ltoons and outposts,
    'Hiro nuS
    being knocked out contir:Clclly by "'rtillory nnd mort:cr fire so line
    men end 'runnoro T!Cre; kopt busy.lI

    rc

    .. ~crattaclf. 3vu"J solciicr cctj voly enr,ngcd 8.gninst tho Gorm,~n


    Arrrry kno"s its method of countc'rnttnck lc.t" irc ty" eftcrnoon to disorgcnizo our
    forces prepc.rntory to executing n ,;,-ith;':r.i7[,l under tho covor of'darknoss. Tloo
    principle of ! counternttncking t':!c cOl"~G!'(l.t';;c,ck" hr.s been ovolvod in the Di vi
    sion with excellent ros'luts.
    Captnin RICHl,,'W 3. ::;llG:JlS, 135tb Inhntry.
    "In nUJr."rous ir.cidcnts riC hrvo boon too Sl017 in tnking c.dvnn
    tngc of our onCITy". One of tt.es0 tiT;'l(;s rT"LS in tbe vicinity of
    CM'IT'O LEOHE, Itnly. Tho ,3it11r:tion hrd been stnbilized by 'pito t.
    number of Gcrmc.n in?ancrv nnj trnks rnd ',m hnd bc;en in QPproximntely
    tho snmo position :Iur M, hours. During th"t time thero ':Tero h"c.v'y
    exchr,ng8s' of "rt',llcry [.nd rr,ork,y- firo plus mf.chino gun end snip~r
    firo l",rhGne:vor r 301dinr CXl')osod r.imsclf.
    Just nt dl<"k on the socor:d cvenine Jerry had decidod ho h,~d
    tc,kc~ enough puntsh1'lent ("-8 n() lom-ncd later) "nd ;-:,,,.0.0 [\ '.'1ithdrr.wal.
    Tl"e genoral method thnt he U30S to thl'ou us off b.~lcnce is to T'lr.ko
    tno or three sl'l".ll "ttncks fle cOl'lDcnio:l by r:uch artill8ry. Thi s
    po,rticul~r evoning ho hit 11S 1... i th t,:!O simultaneoCls att[\cks ench

    - 4

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    COr'lposc!d of cFpr':::Jx:1.:?1..~t,-~l:.~ Olln p1.~'.-toon oj infnntr~T i'nd one tC!1k. He


    dTOVC in our 01Jtposts "nd tho crm,ry infsntry cnmo r~g.ht to OlIT I:ITR
    boforo it rno stoppod. Th":l1 }L~ i:_1Eudi l.tcly 1.7ithdro':.: out of the
    zone. of our c.c;fcnsivc fir~s. '='bc 171101e oporation did not to..kc: 15
    r~.i:i.ll.Jtl:8 ['Lt th;, rnost.
    T~"}(; confl:S:l..0n r.nd excitemont thnt fol1or:s
    ;- vory i.ttrtCK b~r the cnr.:?:lY ;.7~.S intensifiod by the darknoss, 0nd,
    nGcrll~- ss to SQv, i t :-r,~.S ~-:_t this tir.w th.::"t thn lJDC!!:Y cor.ol:/ccd tis
    Y.:itLdrL:.r.r[~l. In s:;.itc of' OU1~ ccntin'l~.l hoavy h,'-'rr;psmnnt* t::c: Gor)1.;:.ns
    r~.-_::c:C;' U to t0kc 211 their cquipm~nt !l.nd ':roun.dod rd th thcm, n.lthoug11
    thi..Y left S'~bout 100 dc:;d on tho fiold"
    At tl:e t.i:-ill; tho -::;n.ttnlion hs.d .-::;lrefldy cOTr:mitted its reservo
    ~l1(1. dUL to th~; strCnl.lOU3 fi0btin~ in the: last fe'.; d,'"!.ys ~;JC 1:Jere: tm
    ~~ol() to roorgc:nizc fend p1;.rSl'.C -'c,hr: anomy vJith n. nigh-':. ettr:ck nhich
    T'o'l'ld h"''18 r,ccl)'-.plisYlcd "\.:.1':0 m~,3sj.on3. FiT3t f1.ccor.::pltshm':'>:J.t -.7m}~d
    bo the cc.pt"JI'i:'l[ a!' y;mc:1 Ground l:-ri.th t:1C minimum amount of off ort
    duo to thn disorg' ~:i.zr't .'.0D of tt,~; CDOIT:Y. Second, fIG ',-:ould h',.\,""::,
    doniod hir.1 th'J opport"n~_~~~/ of t;.s,t,';)lj.shinC p,noth0r defcmse liLC ..
    I believ0 tiL' :::,Ol,;_1~:~,~:.~: of this is prior pl,:.nning by bc.ttalion
    cnd regiY:1ontnl CO'TIlD:-:J.OY':":. K:,~,c;pir~s:'n nind the ?o.ssitili'c,ic3 of
    this tY'P8 o.f C:1Cr.~:.'" ,'~ctior1, ~onl:'l,""nclers shotL.d hold 0. rescr18 2nd mr-.l(.G
    tho noceos,',:,"'Y dc.ylig~:.t l'ccC:l'n:.":if;s:J.L~C. ~:uch cr.n bG rc~('mplishe.d to
    insnre: the'! success of tl1~ to type of r:ctior, by tr''':.ininf in the com
    pc.ny night "ttnck. It. ;:,J-'ou"!cl b: or::'oh~_sizcd thf'.t sm"_ll groups -must
    e,ttc.ck ~,_ limi toe. o'.:;,j (::-ct:i,_-,}"_~~ :.:'r:.'.:J_t,.n-(;m..1s~.y ".nd rcorgnniz,c into thci:r-"
    company orgr.nizLtion npor: r(,o.G~;.ine the ob,j",JctlvG. Th("rc ofton ,.. .ro
    not:. ,~noUGh trn.inr:d ~:,!'l r:!'T'''':Gl~; of g'~i('ing gro,.1.ps nc:!:'oss st.r,~.nc:o
    gr01.uld l.i.1d of re:c()j-"1nizin.:r their ob~ ccti vc in tbe dnr},,::. Conscy'w.ont
    i y , 'GIlo fe-I; Me::'l tll'-~t t'.I'C 'cn~,,:,.o:tc h,;vr to do moet of the fighting
    for n compD.ny "I.::hil:-: th~ ".""cs~. of the unit cC\r~h:8 along in 0. colt J'l!:D of
    trms, cr~.ch rl'"',n keeping 20 clO~F! to thf: I!l"n in front of hiM th,,,.t ;-w
    [,k;:,8 on his hc,cls :lor fc,cr thd, h" and nll trw Clen behind LLYn ,:,,:ill
    get lost if he i:Jrc"lks c'.Jnt.rtct. 1I
    r

    T~',jor

    r;crSD H. LIFFUCCI, 135th Ir,fnntry.

    lIlt is roc()r:~cndcd th . -d~ i:::-~edi ...., tnly follo;':ing '""!ny' such spoil..
    ins 2.t':c.r:ks the n!lUP'-"Y ho:, f1:r[lW:.:d -\d.gorousl:7 either by lJf'.Ssi.r:g
    t!1I"ou;;h t.h(; disorg~~l:izod ,,-'ss,'.ultine troops ',':ith ,1, reserve or by C'.
    r:'.~id rcorg,<:'"niz,..-,tioc.
    7his!, I b-:12.cnTO, r.lill ('n",b~_c us to P('ss
    thl'ouGh, in, or ~!.rol.md tho rotrc'nting enemy forcos ':.nd '.~:ill prevent
    hiD f'rOl'l cstc.blish:n2' hiT"1so:'i' on r.. nt)y{ torrr,.:In i,'r)!".t"(;ro. Such
    1
    " " " t? 0 f iL_.':>J..
    "(\0"G1I"!'"
    C' ~,
    l.lT,;_C~:S
    m:l d 0 \oy t",,hlS ',' ror;-';" rf!C'~1 t "In ~h
    ..... C VlClnl
    ~lL "0 reS1}1'"t.re d
    in our troops '__.r~~1k:i~g tt.Y'Ol"t), ,_"-,, CDC:r1Y position "'.Yld cstf'_hlish:1.ng

    thatl-!solvG(J upon th(' h-ir;:t rrov...rld to the QYlC:Yl:r rC'-',r r:ithout s-L:fi'ori:'1g
    one. cr:.su:clty., \':h(.~L"'~Y.G it h,'"]d :::ccn j.rlposs5_o1c to gr.,in nn:r grolL""ll~
    \':h,~.tsoQvGr d'urir:g th-' h()~'-:::,;?~ of li,-S!t. 1I

    g. r.tountr.in ~"l['.rr[lr~: lli.vc::vnc Yl() T1' _Y.f ';:)~~,ic principlc$ "rid in r:1ost in
    stnnces in It[tl~T htl.s not required Gr(-~cj -"-~l troops. It cions rc~cp1.iro SOlJG spcc,i~l
    oquipJ!lcnt - particulr.x'l;r ,.r~rr.:c:: c] ()t~-:i.nG f'_~d light Vdf~pons. The Gxtr(;~Gly
    - :5

    U NCLA551 FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    difficv~ t tcr:r." in .-- r ~':J','!1t':"r .)0. in th !")0~J:t" i:cs re:l1Ji2:"OS nC'~ to vnclcrgo c}:
    trono h' rdf,}!:L'~'; ."y:d r:cc:-;~JS~:.. t-:tc.G t.:!:~ ~hy~;ic'-',l c(\r.di tion.

    liThe ~r tt"ll_on rc:~ j.Vi .,J. til' ~-:'!1.G01.on of t.---king Ht. P/}TT~'~:\TO ~~nd
    it:. It -'<'-'s to 'l.Y
    dr.~.';_: ..-~tt,~'_ck.
    r',::.: oxpl."-l1&tion 1"_r:LII st.::'.rt
    r~X'tLr t}.!~~ obj, Ct:i_V0 :b~d bf<:lJ. t,,:~>:nn.
    Inllortr,nt f oct;] obs-;J.'v (~ ,~.:r'-'t,,~;r ob5ect,i~J:_: h,"-,d heen t".l;;:cn~
    (,r:.) ,',F"':tmition ':m 8 'l( r::.r 1iY"1tc.'d~ of)r~cict:LJy hlne Grcl1':'.c1,. f: o.t:.c:
    to the fc:ct th"""t, clir::oiri t; :ld "!Jr'.~n~ c'-usr~s the r:cn to lose tl::~)]".
    (t) }'OClG. '.7.'":'.8 r:.ot n 7':lnjor ~.tcr_ 'ur'C,'~J.H::;C m~-n h .... d. no desire: to
    o['.t in -l:::;rr"".J c:"tv,.:;:.ti-tic[) '.. :1-_iJ f:! g:hting&'
    ho1d.jn/:~

    (c)

    W,').t~r 2~.:prlv r_:,o"1.:; V,.. I';,T J5:]jt d due to In.ck of ,::,".t:-;r c,"-x::s
    :'hllJ" i."ound,....:d I:";!1 :r..,:",dcd ',7r.ter for Tlcd.lc--:.l trcv.i:.-

    in 8:',ch cor.~p'''''.ny.

    mont.
    (d)

    L-kdic:J. s,}p~=-,liu:; .;;-'-:r:;

    "\t:Jl'Y J..imit(;d dno to the f,:'.ct the


    ",id .r:on :'.nd for;,'..-:trd ",id st~.tiol1
    17hlCh Yli:S CD. thc~ hi]1 l:c:d c[1.rri(;d JOGS thnn uS:!tl,l.
    Tho bi'3" problom
    il'~ this liLa ',::;'0 litt,:}r bCGr~.'rs.
    The tine ;}st:tJ':1Dt(;d to (!V~'.Cl;:'''l,(,: c.
    pCltiC'n.t from tIL :ro~)nt.':j r: ,:":r'~3 ,---,'uo~.(G t-\,.-o prtic::~t8 l-~,nr Ii ttor sc~t1n.d
    pur d::'~.T. Th-~rofore~ fW'.n:' r'(n~ "':7oro t"lkr:'n fror: rifle c0JYJp[',nics, ':.rhi.ch

    torrr'in nCB vnr;:,r

    r9F[;~1 ~:1C1 t~,-

    ucc.kcnc;d our' line,.


    (0) RfJ::3"TIT8 ;:11i_ppcrt - The ob.1cctivG '::'"'.;3 nl;;'ost lost due to tho
    l . . . ck of p:cop.:;r r(;col":n.',j ~_L~:'--_r;C'--. bC'fore str;rting on tho rriist3:i.on. He
    G~.oulc1 h~_v(; hed l".r!::cr i:-:0. 1_) IT!.lTS "l1d r.:tO::::'0 !'1,~p;J p:::r comp.... ny.
    "'.-, ',- fJ tL:~;:rG ':,'(n"~ f,'C-.L, t:o':.") ,:';L,,)!!!Y behind th~~ objnctivu tL'"',n

    f'c~ct

    Tho

    cs

    tiELtod. In this ~~Yr:~ 0', t\-_':~rr'_in GnorlY aro concQ0.J.cQ -,:nd G:::,~,-ct
    p07,rcr :'::0 nevor knO-,.m -~mt.tl cl..ose cont"'ct is g-'linc~d.
    OnE' o1:s(;r"'i-:)(~ i'''"l:lt. .:':lie}l ',-_~nS navor cor}.~ectnd on thio !:Lis$ion
    \7-~,S the, USc of :,(l."Cti-rl<) i;~~X.. D.
    Tho h0T!Y ~:~c::rpont; comp2,ny shoulrl
    i"J,~.7r',:YS h~~vc; Guft'ic:l.\:-nt r.:':, .113 for trf"I:sport'L1f t~"oir ~'1CC;V~-.f ric:.-:pons.

    In this

    n~if;si.on tLUlc8 -'012~:"C

    L.. . '.TD

    ~yon

    the:

    :1Ds:;ur"

    If

    tLc~Q

    is no

    nCf'.l1S of tl'.:;.nsport-.~ng -:.-c- pons cxc'~mt to :-crrry tLQn, tton the: hc(t.vy
    lfc::-'.l)OtlS cOrlpnny El:orlJ C~l"TI.fu \")"'lcT i'ror.--.. ~f,-t0.r cool()d gun~ to the
    light J:"c1::j_!},.:; 6{,; :--':3 ['uch '~.;"-~ the rii'll. Gomprm5,(;E h~~vG. 1fl'hcn the bf'.t...

    tc.l:i.CJ'r1 j S 0:1 -tb.-) defonci1/I'; i~l I~:Ol:.r.t[:.i;J. to.r~r:.in th~n hu,-V)'"" [~uns might
    bo nGed ~: :,.~ _in.
    T~l(; l.':-.tt~~l:,o:n 8-.4 ,s'"1orlcl ~l,'-'V':: one lieht T:l:' chino glUl p'-=.r CC"JE
    pr-,n:- on n'''nd --t n.Jl t.inen" ;','lr.~'}y "1'C lest due. to CDom;? ,'-\ction e
    '.r:-w ob5~J~t~.vo \,'GS t_''..k,.r, -.-.ith very littl rGsict.<'~tlce. Thio ''-;:'3
    duo t.o r 3l-:rnT'irx; ;-,;t.tnck .' :r:ld tIl') C'meJ:lV Y!C;ro not in t~(;ir pon:i.tionB.
    l!..bout r'_Y:. hcu~ :-:l'to~ ob.~ L'(;'~i v,.' '-.'~',n :':'0,'" ~chod. f:nd secured, ',::,h(' lX<)I-.'iJT"
    cQuntorc.tt,LC1Ai t.o rep;;~i1[ th~'_ n~::,~o'!.lnd but f'"'.iled" Th,.::y :'11:-,':'.1 .;it,h
    drO'.7 to tl:,_) b:-:.so 0:"" th(~ l'ji21 ""~<l -':JlJ DODn rccci-v(':d :--D nrtillory b:--.r
    r~,g() follorJcd by morto.r r'j r':' , They then tricd to rCW'i!' 't;,d,r lost
    ground, cur.tlnuin[i t1.1_:ir ""tt'_CY.. G Boven J.lffot',::nt t:i;r'.CD dr'I'ing tbo
    dey on tho S,:1rlG P:Tt, of' o:1.r, line.
    We r'lr;ost lO[it ou::, o'::;jc)cti.rc: {'or scvor."l .!.'o-;,sons: l::-r;k of
    ,~~T!1r:.1mition :~.l'}cl h::l'ld f!~~urc.dos ,"n.d t'~dJ.ilr:c
    cc,'lT'luni~,--:tion8 to tho
    .o.rtHl.ory. For niGht ',',brk 010 " Fount::cin, it is .vGry-ir.portc,nt to
    hevo flo,rcs.

    of

    - 6

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    AftGr "',11 '.Jt"-,('.kG h" d f- il,'d for tnc- C;'lorrr i!'l this GC1'?,tor, tho,,;r

    triad to out-fl",r2, the; 'nozt po"mt.in 'nd th',n put rnchi,;o :;un ~,nd

    obsorvc~d tlorto,r fire on O.~2." .sidc of thiJ hj.J.J,


    It is Y1r:;c'('so:--ry,

    theroforo, to ,'_~l:-,-r;ys ::[:.v,- r.o!';-,v;et~YJZ:: files 1.7.Lth ".11 fl'"lnk uni-Gs :J.nd

    close; ccnJvt~ct. ~i;.T8 h'~ld' S"lch cOY":.t c~t on thi's r::Lssion. 1l

    Fi rst Scrgc.:.:nt GLl,;~LJ ~. CSYGCH, 135th Info.J:.try

    !!~~ou c::tnnot sr:okc vcr7 of-:'cn cs jro'lr '.-:ind. br:comes cut.


    Tl~:E n(;gloc~~

    of the feet l:y:ds to t:!:'en8hfoot~ The S0C;C8 h.~,vo


    to be dl'ied, if' p02C!iblc J ,!l(~. crl::::'WCc1. Even thour,b tho shbc,iJ, :-'.re
    d2.;np or ':!Ot, dry 30cks "'.nd ~tJ-'D fact. drind by rubbtr;E;r.'oll. '-Tith fl.
    tOluJ end n:csc.-:r,inr; ';dth J:':nCs, fuel nucb Dct:tGT 'nd blood circle
    l~:.tos '~G':".in t}-j~~j tf:kir.g ttl? coJ,~~ '"'r::.d r-in (out; of thr;!?l6
    HClT neD or ropl.:1C!0IT'.cnts ~'~0 tho persons ",-.rho l1rVu tile j;Ioct

    troublQ .
    The elo~hir:.g,. y-'h'::n -:{(!t, sl:ould be ~;rrung ou-f:. f' or. 0. d- ,::-,p picco
    of clothing' is net ~:::Lr 2i~j l!lis,'T'"Li.-;lt; '-'cd disc:)?,:fort,i~g "::; n. oo('.ki~g
    not, pineo.
    I~or the tod, inst.c2d of 1;,'"tn:1 on the cold, dr.I"lp g:rOUD(I., ~,~OU
    "l' gotb
    ,. -r~'
    "'+ ... ~, 1_ong gra ..c,.J 0 __ . C~l.... (l)(),- .... ,.-\. lJ'l-'O~n -'-hl'
    "h
    C '_.~
    '-' '~L-'T up dv>"\~
    ",J 1"
    ,,,1_:.;It.:o.:o,
    ~.Jr,_:""
    '. .c
    \ '.
    tlC'.r:.kots c::-:.n t.:~ pl':euL, Tt.~.3 >80~JS tbc: cold from P:~;llc~r,~,ting tho
    <"!.,...

    "O(1V
    t1l"S
    cnuol',-a
    U
    l.,
    j u.
    ~,--,
    ~J
    1:

    rc}),
    ,,~ ......,-.'

    ""'d
    P"]
    .;,..
    ~,L,'
    '
    . .J_,,)

    'r'll"
    ~ U

    --, ,'-'.,

    .."",:;

    -.,-

    coSos
    of'
    01"; II
    d...
    ~: T'10U,..,,,tl'
    J.',
    ,,',
    ,::)J.'.

    'c.

    Corpo;rlCl CH:.RES
    qCii,'; ':', 135th In1'~ntTY.

    Tocbnici8.n Fifth Grc.Qo ~= r :)!'!L' C. HILLE.sT~\D, 1.35th Infnntry.

    IIIn the h:.r,dl~,xs~ of "~;~l>"~~~ 1r: th~~ ffiountnins, they should. hover
    bo rlwhcQ -{.'horo t:1C gOf~2:: i;] t;JP~-::l1.. Th3 r.'_ul.;~,: r.:111 'J.su:-:11:,'" slip
    und '0.11, U:1scttJn,:,,' til':' ,,,,,t.ol,:, lo'J.ci ..
    During- on{-) 8X!-~LTicnc,; of tti s ki!'"d, ':"JG :;:e!"e t~k~"ng P. rnulG
    t.ro..i.n ,'-'.cross c.. !"1udd~" strC"'tch of grol;nc1 ':7hich, ['~t one tir.'}c, h:-f1 eGcn
    r:. cord"To:r rond. r+t~~:-tj.-"-"g ;cross nt ,~ hurY'i"'rl I':'Ge, !"'. Yll~rr.1J8r of
    tho 1:1U1('8 \"Jore pusl:cd of:'. 7,'1(- ::'0.:1::1 n.::xl bec~m(; I::irocl rC8\J_ltLr,,~ in
    J:lll.cll t.ime boing lo~t in I'C'1.no"'d:~r.9: i,nd getting unjer Wt:l.y.H

    !tCf '"'.11 t:iJo" Ie'soons l~;'~rn':-cl on tho fiol;~. ~Jf co~brtt, cr.,en only'
    cm~l::',sj.Z8t': th.:.: t(j,'1(::h'"ir~gs fo"~d ire the 'field rr:~1.Lu:tl8.
    EYDry tir::o ("
    cr.rciinr 1 I'ul~_ _ ".i~,2 broknn .:: C:'"',3-:1'---.1t.~.r resulted.
    .
    !)"L~rine on,:,' r~Y'.3'G of t~l' J~ol1.nt~,in flcLting my plr,tbon (.h.~;~~in
    in the v~_ci~j_t"/ (;'~ r. nroninn::t tr~il ~uneti()n. T}::.:-,t CV"mi!lE; ',Jetty
    thrcF some 170":0 :-,.+, ~ h,~..:t tr,-;.il ">~rrGt i;!1 ~ r'.II~~ ul['.toon. s-;..~-f' c"od threo
    C(',su~lt,iG}3. Rr.;2ults could }V-':'-.r,"]"cc!un \-.'orsc. Lecsor:. lc ..,;,.. Y'.c;c1 - ['.void
    :""'Cl' "".' 'T"'o<::""'~'ol" ",,'J '-rC"IJ'V"\"l'1t lO-l,J ~.
    JCr'l~-:~
    hev0
    <,..'.:-~
    .....
    ;,1. ,...lrs
    __..
    'J ~"hich
    _
    0'. i-}j,((1t
    C
    I zcro,:::c. iIi', s\ll~l:. G'[' Grose. rc-~,.J3, trr~il. '"'.L.d ro~.d j"L:,:clctib~r:.s, 'm".in
    ,.L.<",1

    .. ;

    ,.,.~~J._

    .'~

    j..,

    _.~

    . . d'~_.'

    L.~:..t

    J.

    o.'_,.,-t,'o
    ,on.."

    o ' t ' -.a<.,


    "l'l
    r
    . . ':
    .
    , _
    ,.na
    J.,~C.
    ' , '
    "'.~
    .
    In mountr:in f{{-"11tinL~, .TcrY':'~ n:i n>3 ti:.::\":s out of' t'J!l:, sr::ts up hi s .

    ,,.,c,,... CCL1

    f''-

    l.c.cbino ,g.1:'.llS to cO''''<''~1d .tr'lil


    :dccp i_;nllioG '-';1d T'f',V":tncs. By ~riding
    the ridgoc f thOSD poi~t:= of rC:Jist~.n,::o m... ., y bc ou.tf'1"'.nkcd o.:1d r;J.pod

    out. 11

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED
    Tochnic[',l 30rgo:1nt

    E:LDCn~

    P. SYl:'JI, 135th

    Inf,::ntry~

    !tIf the tcrr'dn is (.. sp':::'c1"J.l~:r stecp end the going conpIicr.tod
    by ~. Duddy tr-.il, th~ DQ!l"rC 'rot to 10s8 conto,ct, This esrccinlly
    npplios to r!8~~.paY.!s plo:tooY:s "'vi conpf~!lie$. Unit CODY:1D.nctors s'10uld
    tccko into conciderc.tion hu,-,~n linit,to.o!lS on such difficult """rehos
    0.8

    thes().1f

    ~. ,Nir;l1t !~tt2C!s..
    ISxtrorncly (~i:f'ficult to c~,rry out., G niGht "".ttc~ck is
    nevertheless -c.hc only T:lotllOd "ss1Jrcd of rn6.-:;AYl'R.blB SUcCess ncrass opel:. croUllC1 ~.nd
    Ggninst tho Gcrr.}:'n m'"'_stcrs ~).f't.~::!'rni!.:. Tho Division, onCQ br'ttJ.c S(;Qsonoo., ~-!['.s
    nlwo,ys prcfc:!-"l'cd this type of' ':.tt,~~ck ~Jdor t~l_e ,':'.bO"J8 circumstf1:lces, Clut ec.rJh ~2n
    queried onph"s:LzGs tho necessity for strict control to losson the possibility of
    lost contt~ct >[/(,' "een ::::tto.cki:lf:; (::lomf;n-:'s. ~"_ttnck pl',_ns must be the 8$SSDCC of siro..
    plicity. He otGr::':r concoi vod double cnvelop'.1(,nts gor.or;elly only r8cult in friendly
    forces shooting i-l!=, 8~.ch ott:E]r"

    Licu"Gono.nt Colanol JOE L. 3Cl8n~, lGSth Inf,"J.ntry.

    liThe points conc~;r~~ Le the :-iflo bn.tt'}lion conducting nig":'t


    '"'n b2V ~ 'c, ~., 'cd ...'" _.c. follono.

    onc~-tio]'lO

    ~J

    --.

    (~) -~.r:_ttr.~k ~n~~ ;~~~" n:~-,;r~~' front;~~~.

    (b)

    Usa of ~~ut,om~_t"lc ~7ccrpons.

    (c)

    I'.':inG Fields.

    (d) CO::lJ~.unico.tiQns.
    Yh h,']ve found it sor:".;";timos ~JivC'.nt~gcov.s to lo.uncp..:} night
    nttack in 8. coluFn of cO!'".p,~.:aics. TLis method h'ls been q...lito 8f
    factivo whon the, roginc,Lt ho.d 'ocen stoppod in d"ylight o,tk,cko, ;end
    ['.ftor the en071.Y opposition h".cl :,ec~~iv(;d '\ PUT::'r.181ing from our c.rtil
    lery, cr-,nr.on T'.nd mort'1r fir0 du~ing the dnyligl--.:t :"tt,'lck. L s~ocific
    oxc.TJplo of this type of nttc.ck \;- s th,', .,,-ctian of' tho bO,ttc,lion
    "gcdnst L!.IWVIO. The b,tkHon f'orl'cd UP'lt night, moved off using
    ,.., ro~'_d cs its guiding [txis for ;.dvo.ncc, sr_oulder8d it.s pry througb
    opposi t.ion to tbe high grour:d in b".ck of LLNUVIO bcforo dr.ylight.
    Tho r'.ction cctught tl:c cnc::-:.y :T:l surpris8, iI,nd by rapid d8plo:yr.~orlt,
    1'!0 '"lora c.:-)lo to button u? the obje,ctivo rend hold it GfliJc othcr
    friondly troops ~jopPQd up ,md !:loved into position to continuo the
    ,~.c1vc.nco upon nO!'lli.
    /i!lotbcr ()xClmpl., of' this tctt-.lion using the se.r.l0 ",(,ttod oc~
    clJ.rTQd in its nigr,t ilction ~.gr,inst COLLE /~LD:RTI (high eround (;r'_st
    of LCR:L~HZ!~i';/~). Pric,fly, -t-,hc sitU("tion for this r.ction '.7",8 C.S fo1
    101:S: The' 3rd B",tklion, 168th Infnntry RCcgimont hn.d been stopped
    in its ctt[Lck on LCEE~~ZI;],'" by cnorlY opposition locr.tod in I,ORE:i.\TZf.. Hf..
    r-.llct tlL; high ground or: COLLE tLBrnTI. In thi s instnnco tho h'--',ttn.l
    ion gc.in ,~ttc.ckcd :i.n 0 colu",l1 of canpe.nics, shouldering its He,y
    through to tl,,, obJ:,cti vc, cCltcrcing tho cnol'W by surprise '~.nd o.t
    d[,yUght buttoninc: HD the ob}, ctivc~. Tho criticrl timn for both of
    those: ".tt:lcks \"P"'.s" t):_~t pc:::iod. \7~1Cn lcadin~ clomonts of the b,"',ttc.lion
    ly"d ro,'--',chcd tho ob}::octi ~~ -; '--l1c1 orgn.nized '_', rapid deployncnt to mop
    up cGhc cncomy th~t hod h"I' b:7 -p".fJsed or th"t rrd.ght be locded iCl
    ccny direction. Upor; thc' cir.'3t r,ws of sunlight thee bC,ttcclion

    - 8

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    viforously stnrt',;d it3 r:10P-'.1P a.ction, c;,.tctinc mr.ny enemy by sur


    prise .".Dd (!c:-r.l='J 0":'-' =.:" b ..:~, :UJ~Gi'cd. The poi~,t '-'0 ":fish. to brin~ out
    is th~,t by ,n.tt,~.cki!1g ::m :': "'v~ory n,.-.rro':"J fro~"J.t8ce nnd in n column of
    compr.nil3s 1.7(; r.rore ,').'016 to r"QV"G up rcC!'Uirod strength to disp0se of
    enoiW oppositlon oncotl.'1tercd, or to p'lsh it '.sido flnd contLme on
    to tho objective. 0:110 fCl'ry,tio:: is n.sy to control, h08 D'iOct '""pth
    in the ntkck, emd, bvcn thouV11 en~ny nre by-pnssed, the cOT1plete
    surprise c,nd bo-;,ilder?:lunt of the enemy y/hen vmking up in tho Dorning
    nnd finding the.'" is oppClsit:lon surrour.ding then, cspcci"lly ie,
    their recr, is :'jighly d()I:J.o:l.'"'nlizing, uith tho rOGult tl~...,t thc; Cl1G1UY
    hns surrendored ,.".'it!lOut too fmeh of " fire fight. Tho successful
    nttnck on COU,:;;; LLBERTI G~"blcd tb 3c-d IJ,-tklion to t"ke itG ob
    j l:c'cive, the torm of LJREi'~Zl~lL', ,~.Ed f.Jr the rr,gimcmt to continue
    on tOT:~rds its rGf,'il'10ntr:l objr:ccivc.
    'i/e b-31i'Ne, by (xpLriGnce, ~. ,:ood rule to follO\', is to so pl"n
    your night l".OV81'1c.nts t.h-t thoyiEeludo nttachl10nt of"t least ono
    hO"Ty m,~chine gun plr.toon to thn cot,p[>.ny. It is highly imporV,nt
    to get yoU!' nutorne.tic '.7C'1pom, in e~.rly r'1d koop them in l".te. 110r
    k.rs should ho in pInee so t:lrt thGy ccen fire at d.-v:Tl c.nd if no co So
    sc.ry. to fire "t derk oven t"!ol'gh they hnve hr.d to disp}Clce to .:cn
    ontiroly nom posit.ion dl7r:lrg the night. 1I0rtnrs enn successfully be
    fired from m',,!, dc:t,. Y'i ttout c.r-t'Y.l obscrvntion; Tho C".nEon cOr!pf.ny
    c.l1d <:.rtillcry should be rcn<1:r to firo by rw.p dnt.C\ even though they
    cr.nnot observe. If the fire of tho mort~rs, cnnnon compo.nyenel
    "rtillery is re"dy on cnll to b, l"'id \"loll in front of tho obj cctive
    nnd t'fpronches on tho flc.nk, countorClttncks by the enel1Y \':ill be
    brokon up bofor:J they eV:T get started, l,gnin tho criticnl time
    to t,"v(- c.ll t]-,is 1C""lF d,~t-. rropcrly coordir,[>.ted .-nd rcndy for uSc is
    during thnt mop-up p~ric.Q .just proccdircg full dDylight.
    The brst 1,,:<3. "l"ns of !'lico ,'nel ncn often run agaft no,., r.nd
    then. Eino ficl(,[; f.!'d L~,"h7 treps sometimes cnuso m~ny ch-~ngos in
    c. preplr'.nned night oporction. :.n "tt.'lck seldom progresses oxc.ctly
    c.s plnnned; therofore, you must hwc flexibility. You "bsolutcly
    co.rmot blindly disregOl:'d mine fields. You must probe end try to
    got ",round, "void th8 minos if possibl". When there is no other ,-my
    out they must be ro,""oved. Rcomovnl of mines in the dD.rk "t night is
    not n simple little tclsk. AmIl'unition "nO. Pioneor Platoon persor.nel
    o.nd ongineors ,:<_th proper equ:i.pmcnt o.re sometimes nbsoluto neces
    sities. Sometir.",s the cns,.:or to thr problem is to h[\vo speci"lly
    treincd men with the compcnics,
    Let us '1g[\in point out tho.t th" c.ttnck on D. very n".rrO'.' front
    nge, shoulderi.ng your \''eX trrough, so to spenk, is perh"ps on" of
    the bost methods of paGsing through c. mine fiold. Sometiros civil- .
    inn pnrtisnns he.v" provon invc.hlC',blG for tho loc"tion of 1:1ine fields.
    !, specific ox"r,ple of ttis "ne tte bnttnlion I s night operCltion in
    estnblishing n bridgehon,d C.cross the CECH/A River to the north of
    MONTESCUDAIO, Italy. The bClttnlion I s first opor.ction ,;"s to S';/8ep
    the south side of the bnnk clenr of. onCI1Y n.nd this \Jns accomplished
    previous to midnight. Civilir.ns living in the ".rea informed us of
    mine fields in th8 river bnnk, in the rivor 0.nd surrour,ding net,lork
    of roeds. p"trols carofuJ:'y investigated nnd marked ~.pproc.ch8S

    - 9

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED t hrough

    ~ine fields in sovGrhl~different points of thp river. The


    1x;lttnlion, Ins," em,} c~lll'IY. 11".~ ~,ble to cross the r,iver, estr:blish
    roadblock$ nnd IIceure bi~' g2'0Ulld to the Ilorth, qf'the rive:;-. other
    eloments of the rogil':;ont '1'/61"0 \'l.blato JI(1SIl~~'jW!t,pr1or to,,"
    dayligbt nncl cemtin'l.iO ~,nt:tnck,. , , ' ,
    ', ,'
    ,, ' , ' '
    Thq, hea1't ,'lllciJWlelJ 'surr01.ll1d1ng, 1111 U!ghi; ,op~rnt1ons we nnvehad
    to dcteis ~OI!U!',unf r:\IJ,tign" We b\ll1eve in using 'pllinty of Wire (lnd
    h.",vingthe fronto-l'tne :ele~nt.s utrlrig ~r!:reo.s*'1le1 progress.' This
    DI(lY tl'ke, 0. Uttle !'1oretime, ,but thE! 9vernll, ,advrin~!lge" 'go.ined, we
    believe, me.kes for ~ epeed1;er ~ !!lOre 8yccel1&t"ul. qperationas 11
    rrhole .."
    '
    '

    Cl1ptnin Fat-Nt '16. coCn:TT, 16Sthlfift\ntrt~

    " ":rt is 'tl'IY' l?ol1a:t:. and others share the some opinion, thnt some
    men are afraid of the dark. To belei't(".lone and lout ill nerve ,
    breaking.
    ,"
    T'o estnbU...h collfidenee in personnel, sm,,,l1 ,groups should, "tart
    out into the h1l1~ unfAiUlhr,to thf111'. and indi1!ciud;lybe sent oo.clt'
    to 8 dU'f'erent place., this will notanly inilttil dOnfid~coin men
    but will t.Fain them in 'rounding up'
    the detaU;s thtit lIIl'ke for
    individual trcJ.n1ng."
    " ,
    ,

    c,n

    Co.ptnin

    WILL~i.M

    H. IL'.RRIS, 16Sth Infantry.


    ,"

    "About the ,28th of June in the vidnity Of MONTEVmDI, Itdy,


    fifteen lIIell nnd on.a'otf'ic..- f~om CoII\pnw"A" bo.d run into 0. fire
    fight while at teq>t1,ng to eCltnbllBh n l:'oad blqek 1500 ytlrdll to the
    north. . The rood blo,e!c' WIlS held .ott nnd ~he of'flo~r mmm'led. " "
    .
    Durlngtbe tiigbt Compcrq "B" tro,sgivel') the td~sion of clenrl.ng
    the way for the ..road 1:>lock, nr.d ptlssingon to Po hill 1500 ytlJ'ds po
    yond. We had: a heavy MMhine gun platoon tlnd tuo'guides to thO rond
    block. It vISe noc~ssary:, tp move i'orwn;'d in Il singlefilo, nnd etcy
    closed tlp. The ranson being, .theterro.invms ver:' rough, thick
    undergrowth ruld 4itcbes p"'eydling. Severnl time:f 1't '7c.S necel/llI'lrr.
    to belt, nnd wnit :for th" comp,':\ny to close tlp. The,tVeLpons platoop
    and ll\nchine. g1lIIs 'qore near, the front. 1;- fel.ttho.t the reetcould'
    keep up' with th"ir progress. tho only way to, kn!,w ~ben there w.s 0.
    break wns to check: bnck ~ voice along th" col=" or wtl'en the reM'
    p~,ssed tlp uord to wo.it we know th~e had been 0. break. Vie .,ere about
    four !',nd, one-holf hours covering, the distlUlce ,to the rond,block.
    Points I learned from. tl11,SI ,.
    ."
    "

    (0.) . If poasj,ble se.e the ground in. lk.yl1gbt. before ,moving over
    it.

    f~om

    (b) If 1101'king
    mo.pe, 0. l/25000is. much better tillUll/50000
    . (c) It is n.ecesso.ry to a llow ample tiMe. .
    .' .
    (d), . The rOOl" must keep oontMtwith tho front,..
    "
    (e} It. ia hol'fU.y possib;Le in hetlVY underbrush. to put, out flOllk

    security without ~. it.


    {f) The ,536 l'adio worb. Wl!ill . 1nsOI!1G ;spota; in oth~ait \1Orke
    very poorly.n
    ,10.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    SocondLioutonnnt. SANTO LIl- BELH, 135th Intnntry.


    "I UttS ordered to ~tt'lck, c, cortain hill with MY p10toon r.t
    daylight. The terrain vms wid.e> open. Vie h~.d no~ovcr 17hatsoovor.
    The enenv~l1o.md MY pl-.toon to proceed about half 'IIoy across the
    valley floor, thenopen<:d up \lith Mortars, artillery, rnnchine gun
    and 20rrJll fire. 1{V. plr:toon dis]:,ors(ld, I lost control and the plc.
    toon was scr.ttereq ur.til dark.
    When attacking ren objective, if there isn't C.ny cov(lred route
    approaching tho objective, the attack should be held off until d~k.!
    Sergeant GEORGE' P;;PROS, 135th Ini'rnt:ry.
    "Th~ success of r.ight r.ttacks deponds on the indiYidur.l 60ldio!!
    mrtintainint,:: contacte.nd co~l",te silence on moving Up."

    First Lieutennnt.JII%IIE NCR'l'H, I35th Infnntry,


    .

    ,__

    c ,,;;rr'

    -k~

    "L heavy c~nceritr:ltj,on of smdl 'nrMS firo is demoralj.ztn~ c.t

    nigr;t. If youeari get a man to pull the trigger, the sound or his
    rifle c.nd the rifle on the right and on the loft v!ill give him
    sufficient confidence to pUll him right up to.-the objoctive."

    !. Riyer Crossin"'s. The 34th Infc.ntry Div:i.sionhns made four success


    ful lll'ljor river crossings';(Three over the VOLTURNO, and one over the R,\PIDO).
    Careful plnnning, thorou1',h recormnissance, surprisl). I1nd night attacks D.ll plElyed
    their part in tho success of' these oper~.tions.
    ..
    Captain FR.'JICIS J. KENYON, 168th Infantry.
    liOn October ) ..3, 1943, the bnttalion he.d the mission to cross
    tho VOLTURNO River ~nd secure the high .ground int.lodiatoly to the
    North. This mission );,113 given to' the bntta:lion cO!!lID'lnding officer
    throCl da~s prio'r to tho attnC:c so he could make hi s reccnno.isscnce.
    I1'1l1lcdintely !lfter recching these orders the bc..ttalion comnanding
    officer lllI'.de his rccor",,\{ssc.nco of the objective and then took his
    conpany crmmnndin~ officers to tho ap, to observe nnd study tho tel'.
    rain. He M.d this in "mpl'3 time so that the compr>ny cO!!lID,mdors
    could toke their plntoon loaders to the OF mld plnn their .cttr.ck,
    On thesenig:lts previous to October 13, the battalion coy,mc.nct.
    ing officer hnd reconnaissance of th" river bed me,ds by tuo officerl'
    and six enlisted men. On't.hesc nights t.he rliesion 'IIc-B.to find Co
    crossj.ng for th-:' ir..f!lnt!"'j' nntl. the 'locnt',on to set u;:> 1J9me support
    ing rlOc.ponSj Blrran mortc'!'s, hS"lV'j'lJlllchine guns, otc, ..'"
    Thes., night reconnciissllllces found the J.oc:ltion for th", sup.
    porting wenponsnnd 'llso decided thG best pIneo to cross the river
    '.7~S r.t the, most unlikely spot, t>is being the de!"post rleter ...nd
    tl18 highest bcmks. Thoy hm:>. found thnt nll t.he best crossing s;oots
    wero ,COvered by enem:l' nutom"t 10, artillery nnd Mort,,:.' fire.
    To rlnko the cross::tng ~.t the pIncs oh08("n the eneineers were
    needed to clenr a Inne om this side. and string n rope ncross the

    - 11

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    riv8!'. On October 12, 1943, tho bc,ttnlion cOlC","nding officer vms


    [;ivcn the H-Ho11r ,nnd C',llr,d r,Jl officers to n moeting '1nd show:d
    them Nlrit:!l ,hotos, m"ps rend fin,,1 pltmsof ntt'\ck.
    Irmodintoly ,?fter drrk on Octob~r 12, lC)43 the rcconnnissCLnco
    group st"rtcod fC'r th~ river. ;1ith thnm Hero tho engineers Qnd
    snpporUng uap,pons. They hod the 8uP}lorting vl8npons phecd ".nd dug
    into p05ition nnd these ~svl_pons . . . long r.lith riflemen covered th(; re
    eonnl.issnnec ryau}' ?nd engineers .,hile they strung the rope Hcross
    the river, /,11 this netio;, \1.'15 completed by 24 0 r] hours cnd Tlithout
    beine henrd or obsorved b,r the cner.JY.
    Tho H-Hour 17.8 0215 '1.nd the attn.ck nc.s to be preceded by a 15
    minute nrtillery b o rrag8. :~t 121)0 hom's, tho bnttr.lion moved to the
    river bC.nk 0.nd vrs in position bY 013'1 hours, to stnrt tl18 ,n.ttnck in
    a column of eOI!'p:mil3s in a c01u:m of plntoons.
    At 0200 hours the "rtillory bnrrn ge strrted nnd the l'3o.ding
    platoon moved slo17ly ,ocross the river. Although the artillery shells
    'Iere lc,nding on the opposite aank close to the river it wns decided
    to tnke thn.t risk "nd slli" surprise on the enemy.
    EvernJ m,?n, doem to the privnta, kneiJ the situfltion nnd his
    mission nhen once on the other side of the river. Althoush tholoe
    no.s mino fiolds, J1'[;-in 'lUtoT1ntic weapons covering thr bn.nks of the
    river the bnttnlion r;cS or: ',ts objective before do.ylight nnd tho
    only casun.lty wr.3 ono 'enD kEled by 111"1chine gun fire.
    In my- 0l):~nion t1-is SUCCUSS PGS due to Q good study of the

    terrain, det1.il.c:;d rccol1r,eiSS2nce of ths river on ooth sides CJld the

    USe of sand t"blos so ttnt every man knmi drlily the situn.tion. With

    nny of the :.oove missing I'm .n.lmost sure the crossing "/ould not have

    uorked so smoothly '1.5 it did nith so few cnsu"lties.


    On the night of Novonber 1, 1943, the br.ttnlion corrunrcnding
    officer "/.".8 told th"t his bo.ttnlion PJn s to be prep'1red to nttllck,
    in .'l dnys, r.cross the VOLTIIRIW Ilivor cmd secura the tm:n ,~nd bigh
    ground in the vicinity of S. lamIA OLIVETTO.
    T,:!,n.t seeme night he too;, bis corepnr.y comn::nding offiGors c.nd 8
    enlisted mon dO'711 to tLe river honk to mnko c. roconnniss"nco. This
    rocorcnniss".nce ',1".S to find" sbnllo" crossir.g for tho troops "....ld to
    seo tbe objectivo. On th8 I'lClrn'l'lg of Nov8rebcr 2, the t.,tto.lion
    COY.li"::'.nding officor '.7D.S told thnt H-Hour YoJi,S pushed up ;1.no the nt...
    tnck ,ould t,kc pI n.ce nt 24'lrl hours Novenber 2.
    :'0 14"0 hours, Novcrrb8r 2, 1943, th,, h\ttrclion co!O"v.ndlng of~
    ficer k.d n. mootl.ng ';;ith "ell officers "cnd sho'!od thorn rn ~,orbl
    photo nnd ",n.ps of his pl nr! 0.:' ".ttnek. It 17."lSn' t prnctic::ll for D.
    roconnniss[Cnco to r.ctu~11;,' OOSGrve tho tcrrnin dUD t.., enemy obscr~
    v:::.tion.
    Lt 2000 hours the: b::ttcl:;.on moved to r, for\'iard nssenbly ".ron
    ,",nd hold up philo tho coI!'pc.n;)' con1tl,~nding officers tool: t:oo plc.toon
    lenders tothc rj.v0r b~.nk r.nd sho'J:od th8rl thdr objoctivus. f.t
    2400 hot;l's the nrtillery sk.rtcd end troops noved ncross tho river
    in a colu..lID of compc:nios ire C\ colunn of pl,'\toons.
    On ronching tbu oDposi tc iy.~k tho connClnding offIcers took up
    nn att2.ck f'or"1~.tion nnd sk.rtcd cor the high ground. To ro:cch this
    objoctive tho troops hn.d to cross 21)10 y'lrds of flr.t ground dotted
    hore cend there ''lith orch,":'ds .
    12

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    The le~d pl-.toon loc.d. r' d.dd.cd to usc en orchcerd to concor.l


    his novor:0nt rH;q r:hfm tt t;;7 r(:,'"'<ct.,>'"'d the cor;tor of' it, sonr: OD.:.. S-COI>
    pod on n series of 1'l1nes. Of this plntoon ~ll nco's ':!er" sc.rionsly
    Foundod, or killed, '::ith the ,.1c:toon lc"dor c. Jitter cc.so; cpproxi
    n"tely 8 m.n cnm': out 'Jnscc.tl1od.
    Tho folloViing 'Olr.toor; than took tho L ,d end lXlvod crowd to
    tho left of tho orchrrd. This plc.toon ".lso rnn into nines c'ounding

    r d scvc~r"J_ r1E":n.
    T'lC th:l.rd pl,~toon In linc t1:()n took the lc-d end s'71mg "-lry
    irol:] th-.t "rece moving :l.n .' ,,):l.do circle "nd nfter moving apuroximate
    lr 1000 ynrds this platoon ~lso ran into minos, wounding tiL pln
    toon lerder, killin" t}".: conpr.r", 'cor:;:\~nding officer nnd rloundd
    . . J:d killed !!loro T!:fn
    .'.t this point, r:h\t \,,.s left of tho ".ss-.ult compnny reverted to
    o.-.tk.lion roser';c' ".nd ".r.ot],er ccr.:p',r.y took t;:lC lead. Th"y strung
    'Go th0 right .".nd Ggr.in oncounto:rud mlnr" ".101Ulding 3 officers ,".nd
    s~voral <enlisted men.
    It rinG then diy,idod to pull b'\ck 0. little
    o.nd try to get through on the Lft, but once moro tho lend plGtoon
    rr:n irto minos, vlOundinf mora enl ist-od m.:..-:n.
    Tl1f: t.nt kHon c01:1r:lt.nd1ng officer so.\1 th~.t dnylight nns not
    far off nnd docidod to du." b'.ok c.:ld try ',nother route far off to
    tho ll;ft. In this "re'1 t'18 bn"tt,lion moved to the b::.se of the obo
    jective cmd cnmo 1-1nder mnchine gun fire. FhE)n tho mrtchino gun nns
    he~.rd Q sigh of rolief ,'E)l)t throng'" all the men e.s they kno1J the.t the
    battnlion he,d clec.red tl!o mi.ned '~!'oe. nnd lias st:->rtQd.up into high
    ground.
    Tho b~.ttalion cont':.nucd up the hill in tho face of this mGchine
    gun cnd mortar fire "nd scctJrcd its ob.iective, cD.pturing 15 enlisted
    men r.1l1d 1 officer. Tho r'.;nson the bette.lion "ttcck vms so fierce
    we.6 thnt nIl mon "!ore "nxio1J.s to be on the high ground nnd get into
    the onell\Y's positIon, for they knrJ'CT there ,;oren't .nny' mines there.
    The opinion ,;116 thnt '.f r:e had h9.d more time to prepGro for the
    ~,ttack, po.trols could hr.ve f'oclXd thu mined flrU1S '1nd m".rked them.
    \7e could hnve then .k.d sC)mc lr,r.es cleared by the; engineers c.nd L &
    P plntoon or hr,d 60110 trclcs prc-;Gcde 1:8 witl, the inff\l1try follol1tng
    in tho tr.nk trr.eks, ,:itJ-; t.ho !:lined nref, cll'l1red the bntklion could
    h:-o.ve s.:!ovc:d mnny of the cas1.:.oJ.tics that we rccedvod. 1I
    tho pl,~toon luC'dur

    l"irst Lieutenant GEOF:GE C. GR/CE, 16eth Inft'ntr'J.


    "Ll'proxinr.toly fi7e drys Friol- to .".ctunl oporntion, the of
    ficors v/ere notiflcd th,t th" k.ttalion "'ould force n crossiloc; of
    the; VGLTT!1UW R:l.vi,r SouthG-.st of' the to"m of C:.J.hZZO and seize the
    hiGh "round E'":;t of Cf,J',ZZG. Ev"x;r offj.C<Jr :in the bo.ttnlion vms
    kkcn for,,'crd to tho high :;rol.c.d over-loo]~ing the ground over Yihich
    t:::o D{'-.ttf'l.lion '.'J['.5 to opurc:.tc. T~'.:D ~;,ll' f~;',:iJ_i-:l.rized ourselves 0:--.8 well
    ::'.s possib:lc vJith the tc!"r~-:in.
    f. number of pntrols were 5'2nt dml!). to tl)c i r"ver to determine
    such things GS depth, spe;.'d of current, river bottom, height of
    rivor bnnks r.nd to trv
    to loc::.to onEJIl\Y position:;;.
    ...
    "f,>
    I

    - 13

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    q-F(r~_ir -:.';-,f; """~('n '~"1.~,"f, J.." O~-tC'Xj:r ~lo43. Tho batt~-tIi "i'l :~10vod
    au';::. from:::'to bi V01bC 2)..r('"j~~_ e. J.:,. c..usk 12 Octobor c,l1d rlovod ir:t ... a i"G..:'T
    D.8sombly urea. Ec.re tho of':f'icors chdcked t~Gir men and (;quip-t,;o!r~~
    for such t1:iT2G"S t~o-: ~~r,~t,[:;-~_;~ to a y-j.F:;ht opr;T t:ton. Rl.dios ',:,-.TQ
    cl:ocl;:ud ':::.lso.

    Tho r}[!:. -')f ,,:'::,t::'-.cl..:: '.~.-:t.G for 111.'~n Com:pn.ny, fol1o"l,-'cd by l1CII .z:.nd
    to w<>-__ ': tf:.0 ;,:; in ,):t:,"'ort. 'IB't Company ~:'r,s to cross
    $,')(1 y'i.rds sP.st of bB-t.:tJlion and cr-G8.to a disturb:.~cG

    H~:[j Cu~.~-",:_:,,"d'.. :J
    '~::,~)~-'oxi,!:>,tely

    t:--, r:~oc~j.. 1TD the (!r-.JJ!C"".

    I:~' t~wy cor~_d 1l1f:k0 t:1G crossinIT all ri~~'ht,


    ~..
    +'- . + I ......
    T.p
    ~U~:::l J o;u:.. ,-,_iC J~( vvB..LJ..on.
    ..!
    not , ~.
    lonoy \,"fJX'O
    b..~.nl,,: !'.;nd C!':JS2 '::::",>r;:; t~c rGst . of -bhu battuJ.ion IE.a. cros;~'od"

    _-0,
    -co
    .: -,_.

    "(.'-0""

    !l'"

    to

    Co::-;

    '.l

    ..!-.,

    .....(.

    -i
    s-, ......
    q~

    ..,

    f'+

    ..l.::.~""

    .J...

    oJ

    ;:::.::;.tt,:~J i~n, 16f~t1: Infr~.ntry '.".lo..S to supp0rt tho c..t


    prov:1 ;'~.'c~.y sc10ct,y~ :::ositions.
    'j-hc; 2nd ~l"tt",.= ion . s" on <'t:..'-.. r-t-:;ht flar:. Bc:t:-Jo::n 0111' lcf"-('
    :;jJ."th, 3:rd Divisior:: t:bcrc ,-:'::;.8 ~l gap of approxim0..l~oly one

    1f;:Ff, 3r(

    c~.c; <fOD

    fJ.u,n~,~

    Li:I_C

    III

    T~c arti~llc17 c(,)!lc")ntr~;.tLjno- "_-,;1'0


    ~~.,.r:jrJr ~;~ivc:

    to be 11.ftcd 100 yards

    ronutr;s.

    TriG crossir.:g ~-:e.s t<~ ~(; n:Ldo --~i th the assistance' of infan-cry
    ,',s::ault. bosts.
    J~s it turn'_x} 0:'t, these; bOr:'l-ts :7oron 1t necessary ~ as
    i":, -'-.f;-l_G fO".lnd tb::lt tLc: r::'vcr U:)').. J1 '0(; _forded.
    OncD t~;() \'>j."I,r~r '.: _.s crc,s::__ ~(l t11c comro.niU8 -.-TQTC to follor: C,n
    ,"',zin-..: th to a prcdcsi.gnC'.t :~c. ~"1-r!:1 ~;.:juc'C), 'l".hicb ':_'[' S en [.,sscmblJ,r ~")oi2.!t.
    Tille

    o:~-,"~C'.c\:

    to .tho ::'dC~l g.to-~::.:.~~--'~. ':;.[; to r:-an-1:.inlw from th()ro.


    At ')20(: J-::Ol1'."'s, -Z>::. >_~+,-:J.~_~,n f:iOV:;2 O~1t ~-::itb l1A" COf;lpCl~'"
    lcc:.c1inS. T::(; -:-~ctl).'.l cr"-: 8 ."-]-~~-'X '":--: ~'. ~:~""dL r-i.th Ii+.tlc d --i.. fficl::..lt~?" T'Qc;
    ba-c,t.c.lic)n did T;,1CLiv0 SO!"E(; r:.i.i~_c .'.-,::lCt T.""::<:c};jnc gun firo, .but it did
    !lot GC;J::'i0'L1s1~r hU1I1t:.ur tho cr::)s;~-ir.2'. 113" CGffinc.ny rJc.s ablu to cross
    nnd il~~n0d t!1("~n~+~~'inr
    ...''"'~~ ~, "~~:'d
    ~t
    v
    J. JO
    un't"~
    l_ 0 1D[~ tt c, J"
    .1.O n \:.::'$
    GeroeS th~ river b;r d.{.,.:~} ic..:::~t.
    T'l:c ruIn cor''1y~_ni_.8 ti1(~r :~uV. ("~ ()\~t [__.cross the flo.t grol-;.l1cl
    le:'_0"il1~~ to the or-.<~(.:ct1,"1,; .: .,
    'Lj '-:':r:~; c:,"G.g:__ _"7.r in .,:,_ ccmbi!1[,_tinn of :c'iflc,
    Yllr~c~lin!J Z"1.l..Yl unci mortcr ~~iI'C;.
    Tnc ;..':'ir:; !:.,~ .1(~ t:p th~) bntt::J.ion for
    tbo bc~tcr p,-_~rt of tho d:.':.y.
    CO!?lIX'IlY J/D~', 1..!l~i~J-:. c('cld :10"::' noVe forr.T1.rd duo to t~c rifJc
    con :...... nics ~)oir:g hul~l iJ:t=', ~uB in :~J. on," ~ho ri,\7'Qr t:',~klll T,:'o 81lTh"'T!
    J!1o:c;-,[..rs ',.'ore r;;ct up r-.nl G0mO fil~O . :'"rrs delivr:.:rcd. The comrrn.micr._tion
    '....,-'.8 "~ct -::,'orkinn" vCrJ'" offoct~_v(:l~r [.nd- thi-s hamp -rcd. tho 31 fire as
    it -." s n,"_.ccsE:>::ry felr the r::flc cOIn"iYni,;s tc adjust the firo. Tee
    n.::;'"if;',r ;lV chine gut:::' . 'nrc ::.::.:..'t ur ,Ione th~"; rive!' bc;.nk, but did not hc~_vo
    CC."'

    <J

    t]~c o.'~

    .....

    '.'

    _.'

    "_""'

    'J' ... '__ .

    .'

    ,_

    '" ,"

    .'

    j:,ortrmi t;y to .fir+.).

    L:" c...~lc;:::,"' CT!"',-:)~,:;: SCl'" ..r. ~f.~ld do~::n on O"Ll!' left fl~nk CC: 1.1Se:d
    sor_~.O c~nCory;. ,2nd th::; ~;j ~"'rJ ~[,. ,~b-'i_f'_0 r;uns
    ;'To c~:nrgc;d to covor t!2is
    t~_~Tr..: :-t., ;::-'fc.
    c;1-;nt:.::'ru""' t~ c}: d "Il.::::lopcd.
    Gor:.PQnir-~o Hi'fI ,.::}"} IJ'"r, 1--:~.'" -\'":--:,ri'1.:s llG.hc:'I"tOr's dtxiDC '~h0 day,
    fGrc<;:: ':~h(_ unGutV
    ,.-:ithd:-.- .'.-" to -the.: hi:.~hc::, g:r'C't:!xl. This Elc.tion took
    '~~itL; Dome: tl:!lC: ::',5 tlL _,n,.,r--:~r r~::-'c:-::in0 guns 1-07"0 '.'_'011 :plncod -:nd could
    ;~':'''\/'::"l'' iJ.is front vc'r:. T -::oll.
    Durint; this period W)!l CO:!1:pany .f11.:~:3h.,d L group of (.'cbov.t 40
    :In\...;!''.l\r iP":-:') tho o~c:<_:n. Th,:,;!.: th~ ~~_lf G T.Tcnt to ':.-:or!.;: and vur:l I(rt of

    no

    to

    t:_~o Cl!U-;TI"J

    got 2..::o.y.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    ;'}r,on d.'-:..rkn r 's:.l fell, t}y f'ttC1~ki.ng cOl"lpnnir-,s r:!OYod up to tho


    obj c,ctivo ,en,: s(,~urod it, liD" CorOP":1Y "nd Bnttnlion HOGC1U,"rters
    th,)L lJov"d up on:} th~ bo,tt"':;':i on orf'~ni.zGd the defonso of the ob
    joctivoG"

    (/1

    "I' or th.. crossing of tho VOLTUKW "i vor, Uctob:or 13, llt 0200
    hO'J.rs, F got svorything .orrc'1god end drill"d th.) pl~nned ,.Vcnck
    or~~Clr iLto every ;n:;n IS rlind on 12 October.
    c',lJ, Sllpp0rt r.,:,.cLin~; )~l:J1S
    ':.'0": p)1lcod n.r:d rr,y sectior, ~ttocho,~ to the "ss"ult cmp''.llY of riflc~
    r.'en. ':','"c cro3scr~ t~8 riv8r '.-,rbich 17[1,S ['.bout 15(') y[trds ~,-Tido .".nd up to
    4l feet deep. It 17-\S ~lC'lrY' s',7ift c'.u'r'Jnt 'l.cI ':.'0 li,'1U to string ~ Ii:::._',:
    to 'kcop from r,ottinc "il'" shed CW";",I'11 str'J'~.r.,. The M"in tiling 1.78 gninLc1.
    't7r.s ~u1!2,riso.
    M{'st~y by cro~'slne 'diu]"; ~TE:rry m[.snft cxpcctj,l1E;' US
    ,-,nee C10E:8 artillery S1l}:po"t, -,m5.cb fell ,.,ithin 10'1 y.~rds u!,strect\
    fro;: us [',11 the tfhtlr: ~~;c crar,SDrl ..
    It r:tl8 ver;/ succ~saf1;J. and we b~d gained the ob5ective about
    1500 y:::rds on tlle otl:Jr 3'.de of th,-, d ver, "llthout Jerry getting
    cor.1plot81y organ] zer1. F 1st Movement rmd very good contr01 of c.rtll~
    lory uith cloDe in suprort, to kee,p Jorr~T dorm unt:tl r:e ~-.erc r~gl-.:t
    on him, ';7ns mr.inly rosponsiblo for t]l,:: s'~ccc;Jsf'1.i.l I;d.soion. Tho
    no.chino [(un pIe,toons' cnrrl.ed bec.vy mnchina g1lns ct t~at tiTT!C ""~ld. it
    '\1::1.$ very harr.l t.o keep up to n fast movj ng f.t3SnuJt te,~n.
    L~t.or "'.:8
    chc.nred to lid-:t ~.ncr..in(. gvns for B8so:!11t l.nd ,.. ttnck rl07Gr.:ents
    and the~l' V1L~~!'e mu~h (~D.si(;r to l:'lndle anc~ j'_~st r..S good fire parler 11
    v70 UGe ther~ nIl ~,he ti''10 !}Q1,7.
    Thu h:nvy m'-~chinG ,t!UTIS .:Ire co:rri-d in the clnttr lion supply
    trc.in r.nc1, TIC [J,ctur'll;r }y'.vo ncve.t~ usee.. tr.OI11 sir.ce, ()}::cept on de.r cn
    siv(J lCos;.tions ',C; the bCSlc!-b('rd ,".t tNZIO. ThGre ,;8 corld h,'vG 1.'Sec1
    l1.g:l1ts jli.St P.S i:;nll- rLncl it seeMS th.'":! hanvy m,'1ch{ne guns PTG jns~"
    e:-:eC3S lug8nge in this typu o..:~ war. n

    E.. r.t,E.Qd J-rQ;:,'"',i.~~"2!l2. Th,--, I;Cl.tr:Jl in t::K, "'''ir.tr1,:_ nn'11;rs Lfl is th(: m~ j or
    source of' enCJi1,\' il~forr-;"t2.o:n, l:1ti.l(~ t.l.d)Y'(; r<,re lini,!,,-,tioLs it is tlv r,...~,trol ':7no
    verifi(;s tho En.' ~T,j 1'1 re'Oorts or. t,1~('; t~r01JIld. Irl the curly (:nys on t::1C .'l~ZIO
    Ber~ch~efl.d, Tlho<:'c '~ILtr{Jllin~ lP"1;;; 'most G1!:"~,pn'1iv-), ;.t ~.7ns i'o'lnc.1 th~t ~\..thx:s used
    18ft mFc~1 to b.~ c:ucircc1. V(jr~J f3W D:ci50!"'r::..\.-~ Il.~'i br.,'!? tr.k:-n '1nd th'3I'c ',:ore
    large ~(a:~-r'O.c8 'Jr. 'tJrB di\risior:.'Y front" for ,hiC'h }';C1 ~_n.f0rmr-tion hrj b3en fortpcofIill{
    for as m1l~h --'s T,l::'[,cc ':'60k,s~ :1:0 rfn~e:t\Y tL? citJ..:.F1.t:::'on r'- SpGCii'c:.. pn.tro::' ,'!I'OUP rf[,S
    orgc.~ni~.,jGQ in 2r.c> :c~eg:.rn(c;t of 701~.:nt''-:'Qr [~on. GivC:D lwmC2 ;;UC!:' [\.8 t~c lC8tL
    ln~nntry hct-~l(::Gn'"'.LC's, tllO l33:L"d Inf,'lnt'.~ :lad Lr:',_.ers "'Xtd thr; 13~th 1nPr.~-::.ry
    BIilG Dovll.:;, t-:ll. ::tl::!J J.5v<.Jcl ;-"nd reh0nrscJ. tl1('ix' c':Ier:.itions if' ttc: rOf'..r ,:-'.re:.:::.. In
    n relntiv':'l;J sllOr't time tree new or[:r,nizections rr;.wcd their r:orth end provided
    tho di"is;on y,itL " ',7GL.lth of ir.i'OI'M"Ctior,.
    Fh',,'::' LLoutun,mt HfJWLD C. BIGEOP, lG8th Inf::mtrJ.

    !lIt j.s of err.t ir-;Fort,.. . nce in de:'cnsiv0 pOSitions to gr.in in


    telligonco thro~_lgh rAcon~'''.iss~ncc Qnr1 conbrtt po.trols. The follm1
    in,~ f:""ults WEJTG COE.mOll '7i tt JTI,"_:1y of 'lur pr,t: 'ols:
    - 15

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    1. C'lre1ussncss in moving for;~rJ, resulting in discover;: ty

    cncL'7 f'.t rlist~ nees of 'l,S T'ri.:;~h :<:l.S ;?,()O yerds.

    2. Lr;ek of il.ggrcssi -1('L8SS, p'lrt17 du,;:; to f~'ar of :~p I\'Ii::l(;c, or


    of "noP'.f (r:11)1.<8"., 'end purt1y dOl'. tc 1r.ck of orien'.;rtlon of pntro1
    monbers by p~'trol l~-)n_dors, r081;..1-sing in doubt es to mission C'.11c1
    mothn:~8!t

    3. 1n:,bilIt"' to c ,.ptllre prlsonrrs, ChlL to tb- nbovo fC'ctorE'.


    Recor.mendc:tior.s:
    (.'1.) :=npL.. . . sis on r.ight trl1.~_ntl1g, ~,nd USc of SITU::} lor

    p~~tJrols.
    R,:::con~l~iss'1rlCe. pn;:"'rols of ;; to 4 men, combn.t pf:l.trols or

    rdds of 10 to 1~ !!len nre sufficifJnt, ".. il considur'loly so.fer in c

    mo.jority of cn~ies.

    (b) Th" r01'1o','e1 of petrels fro;n fr-'nt line,s to rec.r


    ["r(y's t'7enty-four tours .. prior t.o the tiMO the patro]. is to dep['.rt.'iI
    F irst

    Liell~trJnant

    ";F,1C B. RO:E".'aD l JP , 16Sth

    1nfan~ry.

    "On 2 :pril 1944, j.n the viGir:ity of 1201,/ BELLA, Italy, a


    pr,tro1 of 12 m<;1" m"ce Cl rn:Ll 01" em "nemystrong point at j'.I',Nf,CO
    r::}i ch ,-TeS lO"~.trd c bo"t 300 yards in front of oux' front Uno posi
    tiOES. Our "Yd. s[.ion V!t:.S to Gc~ncrQ:,ly raj.s8 hJl1 ...,d.t~ J3rry. Vie
    Pl'oc()cded t" VJithtn 5;) ynrqs .of g:.;",CO ,dtl1out being detected. '],he
    riflE: grcnndioX' f'::re.1, O!}0 ;,~OU"1(t ".t til. roof of' the house .c[1.UsinG n
    sm:..11 1'-L..:'8 [:nd enOMY ~oafl~.aio:l. l~c ths cneITJ trird -to cxt5.ngl'!.isD
    t'18 f ir-8 -nJ met!' -~'b_eiT' ".'J{:n.pe,ns, ":.:0 OT'C~D~c1 fire witl1 rifle, J ..'J'~ ,..,.nd
    tonIY-f;1IDC c'-usin~ thc.:n ~-,n ~'Yldf'te;--m.ined )1U"!lf.ler of c,'lsu'llt:l.0s. At
    th:L~ tirrw, dX.Vlh 't';''1C o:':'c""l.ldn,; '1.119_ ',.'8 ~.~~'ot:eedec1 1:,0 roturn ta OUl' OTjr
    liy:.cs under C07e1:' of sJ'r'1kc. f:i.red by t:h;-: bnttn:ion 81r1.r.'l rnortc.rs. 1,78
    slL'.fe:,:'cd no Cnsu~::2:ti,)f1 on trds r.".id nnd ~.n outpost .n-t. ISOL', EFL~
    OOG;: rvr-d t.h,:~ enrm.f pir.king 'l}) p\r-,ny C,~.5u.f\lti(;s. Tr:e outpost inf'15.ct
    cd t.~-'O more c~ sncJ:!,',ieo i.rith ani. pe:':'" fire.
    I r8co'1lr:encl tL"t in'~81,ilpncC) of'f iGors of' e.11 'mits inforrr
    p2trol_ lc;:,dGrs of L.. rnis si~n ct le:-,st f oJ.r llours in :"1odv n.nce of tho
    ti:;18 th8~,'" p,ro to begin. Thie '.l1o'lld g5 va tho petrol J. 0,'~~cr time to
    m:clw ;J1c.i1f', ori"n~ his petrol n:j l'rocurc nny (;xt,.~. equippnnt tLr.t
    is ;'1oec1.ed. t1

    "On M['.~r 13, It.'4,~, I r.ovrd ou~ \7it,. r. fiv.G-r:.:"~'1 p:'"'-:202., C~O'71'~ I"',
    deep JY"['.-:; TJ.nr.ing. !Jcr"'cnrl:tcu..l~r to thr" 8:!"l8i:1:" lines. '1:1.15:::; :::x,trcl
    i,"'Q.S DO+ n bntt.J. 1.io'1 O'Y'\~,J~"'" but iL,J,0"t:en(~pn~~ !"1.cttop of "the pl.. . . -;,ot)n.
    r:e ~'_OV" d n ..:.t in f'"1. ~lr_"":.-_r ,,;hic'1 r:~_r: -.~ri~~i'1 rnJ Gffol"c1eJ good CO:1C6,"'.1
    l.t;"_" -1..... "1" .. ':~J-_'C.i.~li_.1,
    I irLe:'p- If-d Ly rtc.?l thnt OlT r-i;:!zior \/r'[; +,0 in
    V8,3"~i.~~,t'J t~i:.;: d:L'(,,.' for .n.~rl'OYi..'1r_tol:f Bnp y!:tr(:s r,.nd fighc on!;l if
    ne~eS3nr~/ ..
    It .-:,~,C my r1csir8 to .i,...:l.P~"JrL n GO:Y'mn:r.., jf possiblG, .~~nd I b.e
    lic1!od oot tb~t ~iElq of' d~.y hu ;'oul(L !:.ct -De ~1,lG:::"t 3ince there neve:;,.'
    ~f) 1tJW' dfl~rti;je r.ct2.vity on tL-::-~ lJG~/.::t'1o,.,d.
    \"0 pI'ocoocitJd iT'. a:tnt;ID fjlc Q.o,:n tho d.rrYf for . .:pptorir.t~.toly
    600 ~!'-'.r(}s until i.<le C'1me to n. Lenc: 1.r. tL,G c.rr.n,~r nfter whic'h it

    - 16

    U NCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Btr::.i[fhtr>nod OlJt ::' :'l?:" ,~'C;01~t 15'1 ~r'"'-rds... .'.t th:)_G point, I observod n
    Gormeu":. cr,.'l'_'] inr. .i.x~~o .., ~~."C~::Lll'-' G~1:1 ro,si tim: "lP on tht) side of the
    bnnk rtbout 151) ;/ _:.~- :~3 r:_, __ ~.y. I J.r:.:'t three :::on be~l:i..n:t ,,,t this point
    in position to p.?J~cr; fi_l'C O!l th-;.t ~~_m 8hol~J.d th<r open up. ~:ly

    scrgo"nt c.nd I l'"ocncrk,i on 'lo::n t';, dr e.,:, I instnlcted the )jon I


    lcrt bc:-:.ind I:.ot to ~ir:- l..J.!llr.3S the encrmy firoc.1, or unless I opened
    fire. Usil1B' th,' ,"'.' '.il.-""'bl,-: CCI'V(T '" nd cc"'\nc9~-1r>Jcnt '.70 ,'"Id~l~mcod ta r.rith
    i:~ 50 yr;rds of tile ~:1 'r1 nmp;. ,:_corr.G~t. .~~ t this tine, onr' of t)y msn
    opened f:Lro T:,~ith f' t:)r:rr::t... glJn. I f01~nd ou.t lctol' he; h~.d done so bG
    c~.nso :!8 snv; n -.:or1'2-"D rise '1Jp r_nd !'"tim ~: rifle., in thE": directior.:. of
    t~1.(o sergcnnt r:Lf_~ f1Y3f~lf. nn- hit tho Germ~1n, 'U:lt ,~,t this point. Zerry
    o~:;enod c:p pit!J crossing tr':~Lir:e ~n fire r'_nd , ,. rr::i!~ of potC'.to
    m,"_,'7,J.lcrs. 7hc fir::::t rror.,~,jc ''.'o1.:!'i(lcd r:;,:,: in th,: Qrc ,'"'.:r..d log, ~~"cnder
    inc; B.Y right arrl 1:"80J.e83. 1'h: 3c;rgnr~~}t w.. . s }"'.i t in the log '"'_11c1 could
    n It '.-,-::'.lk.
    'ihcre ~-:-erc ~},prc:'i~-:y\tcJ..~r J1;. Gcr~:,ns iT". this position '"'nd they
    1''-Jtn{:f;sed our r;,p}Jro.~'.ch -nd .s',;.ck'-;d UE in. They cr'_~o out of their
    position r1fld got in bO:1irL~ L.~ {':nr1 :lrovo off my ttree mon. ri'con
    thsy st;-.rted to-.7o.rd 11S e~:.,'J.rcl:';~Jg throurrh the gr'1Ss.
    -"8 (~ocidcd l.'W d:.::1n't Lcv~; i'. chf'.nco to fight OlJr l7o.y out "ncl
    r'''.tbcr then s1U'rnr~091' '\'-iC 'ic.c:L::"od to t,.....ke 01Jr ch~'\nce on thoir not
    find5_IlC us. The~l 1.7~lk('d tLrcl;C~1 us but dic.1. not find us. When
    thoy h~(: ,0.11 :core, t, de t~ t)',coir l'osi tions co c.eci.jc"d Tie ',lOuIc'.
    b'.vc to st:-~y unt.L~ d'"'.r:{ t(;(':--c!1se ~:'o Ferf) 1701.:.i.1c1od rnd could not fight
    eff ccti vely if ob;'e~~",;,T("~,:l r_o"":.. . i:..p Q1,t. Too, thDrc lJ.-::'S no r:ir:d blo1;.:ing
    o.nd trying to ern'.'l cut t>l'OU;j:', t<'"":,ll gr.'l.sG ',7oull h~.vc o.t"tro,ctej
    r.ttGDtion. 1Ve l,"'_y still, e-.te;.1 In Of clock tl~ . . _t nigllt, f'.t l.::hich ti:1o
    170 got out scfel~r c~,- ..,..(_,tnT;"~'cl ir~tC"l our 1ines. 11

    First Lieuten:mt 1,:"'::3:l '::)'1)12), 135th Inf'.entry,


    ITPn.trol ,'-~ct:~.CYl 12 ~~: of th~' ?i1ost iTIportf'.nt t!1ines in combc.t
    ['I.ne. t\-O sID'!,ll p.;t:-c'ols "_:'C :".'ot-:,cr tt-,T' one If'.l"gc onc~ i:' they ;-"rs
    constantly in cO:lln::]~ic"".-~,ion --1"iC~ terr.".in pr;r::::its then to be mr,tu-'"'lly
    supportins-. Eecor:.~~~,i[,J,:'::;cc 01' loY'.:~ v-::.ll,:;ys '-,r.d high ground on both
    fl,ri_nl:s is pessiblr -It trJ; '::~<:18 t~ [':0.
    sch I s no. 53(. n.r3 8xcnll~:nt for p,""trol ~"!ork of this ty!>o.
    p t:i:'ols Or,8!'-:.ti.}":~ "lc'n:~ th:- ~1~.f,~1 gT'01mc:, on either sido of ~. v~,lle.y
    cr.n ""1i~i1.1.r'11~' s- 'V(,Y ~ 11 t~c t,::..rr- in r:.nC: ~y'.sil~1' pick up ftny encr,~y
    :~lOVC:T1(.nt in. the' :3cc+..or,
    ~~:" :1;:,;i l'}g thi S 3y stOrI prisoners DC,V:J bonn
    t,'-.kC~l nithout n. shot toin~; fir\:-l. II

    C;rkin HSID B. Hll"'F, 135th Inf'lDtr;i.

    //
    I

    ilBo c'"',rcf-:_J. in CC1c:." n'--; ~J'~tt'0J.S ~'lonf5 5.'1:-'10 ::'oute. EXf'.t1plo~


    ~_ ..? \IITTOHS, ItC'.ly. :".ivc- or" sjx p"'."-Jrol.s '.",'c'r;: sunt into tho term
    fron"! ~.'~ on diff e:~ont OCCt:.;.'Jio~ s. r~~er. n.tt~,ck T",':::'S P1::.dc .''g,<'1.inst t:1G

    to:n, t~lC. !."'ight conp"''',n;; f'J~ 1,Y';cj th(; Sr:L,~; ::-outo. Tl-.e onony h,,,.d
    con c(;ntr: tuc-1. m0n In th t. .'Ject, or. T~l\)Y stopp'::::d. '"'.n entire C01!1pc.ny
    in <i:)1c first st"_gc. of [lttl.ck.
    O~_l!" :r,ft comp,'"'.ny noved QV'Jr 110177
    territor;y" ,:-dthout rcceivi!1_:.: fire or cont'"'ct."

    - 17

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED Second

    Licutc~".d TIT'.~ffiY E'. ~H:,NO':T. 13~c1 Ir:f".ntry.

    lilt hr.s b~on !Tf ozporL.l'co th.-.t in t':!o' tYre of -ction enCOD.n
    te!'ou in tho lClst phC'.so. i. G., r del ~yi.ng nction by c. snell Dedy
    or 1y ". lone snipar, th"t to scouts nre not stl'ficicnt. I used
    fror' thruc to five ,"on lS".n ",dVCl"CO pc.trol, pic':ed for thoir
    coolnosE "-nd '::':!~T(~csi-:,~'.:n'-':'8~, in p-octic'.l:L:r e"'lcr"'j' f"I.dv".uco r.1,.... d.c ~
    !Tf plntoon
    . E'or ,'n :i,nstc:'lce, r s ...." cntro!'od tbe torin of. (JR'.TORIO, bordE;r~
    inL; OIl the ~:HNO E:;:vc.;r, an tr,.( ?L~th of J1..J.:!.Y, '"::(~ were .in G. colunn of
    plc.toons, my pl"t-oC'n, thn ")":'!G., lo"'ding. ThE,; "\f('J~cror..tionBc1 point
    pO-trol of, fi'ro !"fCD, 2~rr'8d ,:,ith ~uo-mc,.chin( c:uns nnd tto rC1'lc.inder
    r:ith II,'I-l ri.fles, eL'-:>jro~l tho tur:-n :':1p:)ro:~in2~tsly 40 ynr.;is. ,. . . he'J.d of <
    the pletoon. /.8 "'c~':oy n'-~;:',r0d t~J; ~o-:.rn sqv.-:.re, th:.oy wore fired 1.:pon
    by f'. sniper ""r:':1r.c:. . i~jh '1 p"'-;cl:i:-;c pi.st('l. Ir.T"l8ci--:.toly., they took
    cover r.nd 1 ~id "r ~C.'. l-.,wy volus8 e>f fire on th8 ponition forcio:1g
    the sniper to wj.tlY~r.'"':l" ~=i' th(: C'_ls:tOl:l~~' 'J. scoutc hf.'.d be-en uced,
    it Trould n.ot h:-~,;ro be,.,.]"'.. :Y'Issi..!J].') .to b'.lilr1 'up s::lffi_ci911t fireporrer
    d.thout duployir:g -:b p]" .tu,,~ 'ndlocin" vc,lLi""lblo time.
    This fort'l"',tjo.:~ is . . lr,o tls::.yful i!l hOf'.viIy J100dcd soctions,
    '.7hero t\,:o men C.""T.l1ot m;:p.iy r(;cor~noiter r9utos 'for17flrd, thereby'
    c101~~,ying thu ndvr.. nce .. If
    Skff 8ercennt >~IC::.'.EI, D. C')1jRTEil.'_Y, 13Jrd Inf,{ntry.
    "Dur.in, tlJe perioc. of J1'ly 7 to July la, ISM, ilL" conp-.ny
    WC.G moving thr'Jug~1 r.ttr.ck <"\~:Cter '1ttf!.C'lr., ~::e kert i.cv1.ng ~.S these
    nCV';-.ncc~ 'r/err:; r . . . pid.
    Llse 't7C 'l.!"lre c :ught"in quito 0. ferl t~:-;-.p:J.
    This brings up tho point of scouts. Tho scouts, in t;l' :point of
    vioi.- r,tp;r,e no"':.:f~~r .c!::")"lJ.gh out r;.ncl 1icn't rc~Jl:T t::.ke time to look

    at

    t~~G

    terrnin.

    Ey 'suggestion ls to cive: - m"n mora tr~.ining in scoutine ~.nd


    .pr.trolling. CCOD.tS 1.rc ~. verry i,!!lpC'!"t;-n:" f-n'cto!" in a fCl.st moving
    r:0."t'.nco. r.. men y;ho knor.rs l'.rbr.t to look for onn snv:c m...'1nJi livon. 1t

    Extrr.ct Hietori.ccl

    N,'1IT~:.t-!VG & ..Tourn~l,

    / C of S, G-.3,

    ~~pril

    1944.

    "Tho 34ti1 Inf Div '7[\5 ~:hoJ.ly on the defensive '~hr,'ug:1out April.
    At no time in itc combc.t 'cistor" .r'.d '1.0 '':'i'!ision be3n on t:l0 defensive in
    such unfcvor.':\blo torTnin. rkC.C.:l~~ o:~ th': c::;rr:"' E r.dYm:k.e8 jn obsorvction,'
    movement in tho regi~ont"l nrrcc:3 'T.e .'"st-rictEd. to tho ho1:I's of dr:rkncss, und
    even the most ror.:Y":'nrd ollJ1'2nt,: cf t'h8 Di"i.,i.on ,;eC'8 dug in."

    "'~OT-"
    16"t
    .
    t L'"
    l.e'!vcnc,n: r..:.:..
    ,~, '-..I. n:"CHCP
    'i ..P-' ~ ,
    _ '- 1..;' T'"
    r.. . . nnt z:y:..

    F lrs
    oJ

    "The rc.com:'lcnlr.t:or.s J'":c.dc in tbo follor.'ing p:oper .Ill"e 'bnsod


    on ezperionc". IPir.od
    9't"l;1"C\."fensi78 position 'on thG .'NZIO.
    Be;::clc.heccd bet,-;oen i!".rc"~nd llr(y,: F'44.,,".nd to n certain cxtunt, in
    c. defencivc position in t"8. vic~nity of SI.iI"l;., ISric2,in !.Ie.rel,

    in ".

    1943.

    -.le:

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    One of :'hc most negl,'c"t,Qc: rroblG!lls, r:er.;lccted out of n,:.cossity J


    (l. dl1fensivu position or~ tho
    individurl soldier. In o!':' :bf,ens;,veposition, the; men lUV.l3t r'orn~in
    for lo~g ;loriods at thd!' nssi ,,:1 c d st".ti.;ms. In -, positio'l r:'101'o
    the ov:,my is in dosE" p!'o:d"Ji,ty (3',0 y~rds to 600 ynrds) it is
    nt.cosse,r'.' for th'H'C. to' rcmdn i:1 thejr tlittrenchesthrougl';out
    tho hours of i>VJi;o;':t, r'nrl to sky iri tho immcdi''1.tr V'j,cinity ,.t
    night. l'lv nccc:.si~y <)1 eF;g co.nstnntJ", rlort priocludes tho' pos
    si':,.i=-it:,r of slr,ep n:: nj,,.,1:r:', or ')f ,nllch divo'!'s1.0n t1uring drylight
    ..' .:'. sto.L) G CclCCl3}'V,c ,ositIon rQ"uirts 'c,n entirol"J different
    tJrp~ of t!'Hinlr:;; fln(1 or, -nizrttlonth'\n is t\ltWlredfor offensive
    ;.ction. Rifleru8n shcuL'. Dc trnined to' rri:'n m;chinc guns r.S it.,:ull
    or'c'ir-rj,l:r J:,. Ih)<1QSSnr;' t" ol!l]',loy more thnn thr o:("'(l.inrry nunbor of
    171:'c;'",1"10 f".lY's. I+, it) 'lso volur"loto hove r:Lfl" cOmouny POl'so:.mel
    trc.:incd in fil'o ucl.just];lr.'nt methods. ,', 10rCGr, more cOll'prcr18J'CSivo
    corr:y,unicrtir']. fYot0m 'is used: :,l] infc.ntry brttnlion mc,] 17811 usc
    .'-,r; :nr.LY r.S 4'1 t31cpilo!J.e8 of v"rious tyI"'s,
    Improv<omc'Lt of l'ositions' JT!1wt becontimlOU". En"h man must
    h."vn c, fox ho:'.", ,( stn,ndi.ng-type) for fi.ghting puo'Poses. :. slit
    trench ::s m!Jc;~ loss so.tisfc.c~or:T ~nd offers lcss protuction, '"'.1
    though it is t~dvisnl;le to h:'_78 ane in th0 ~ mrncdinte vicinity 0:';:' the
    fox hole, fer the finr to slsop in. In ann inst"'l~.CG, men v:erc U{'inf
    slit trenches ~7hich ,:err:: c(worod, eJ>:cept for thr fOI"':lo,rd Gnd. The
    pasition ',7"8, pCJnetr;',tc'd by ,"',n encnw p~trol, "!Jut our m'JfJ. '~~ounc~ thoy
    could not fir) to t,,-(; rOe.:r ,7ithout gotthg out of their trencbos.
    !nothor position lof3et commonly fOU110 HOS th.' dist-.nce bo
    tU80n barbed 11ir,'; a11d for;;erd l)ositions. r'ire, we s somt,tlmcs 150
    yards frcm for"'li"" p"s!,t.ions..,~s 75 Y'lrd8 is probntly , l"oro
    off 80tiVc; f i i s t c n c o . '
    .
    It is of l<tmust j"lpnr'v1"l.Me th i r':;'nl1 :"ricndly mil10fields 'be
    D.ccm"'o.t,;ly ch'-',rtjd, . 0.1"1 t!10 sketcbco .b..:: put JC'rln to camp':nul')s. If
    t:ds is not d0no,men ~nd knkk ,!iUbe iQst."
    i~ t1:o pnysic.. . l -;,nd mcnt"'J cffo"nt 0f,.

    Socond Lieutenr.nt L;,'''R3''CE ;,. c:n ;.lEY; 168th Inf'.ntry.


    HOn 5 Je'ly 1':44, Camp,Hiy "B" Irs mov'.ng fC!'wf'rG to some high
    :cbeut 13"0 y~rcs !"outh of C:,S'i'E:'U:n.. Our :nirsion 7.'.0.5 to
    oJ.':i nJ.ze I.nrl hold [,bod 1000ycrds of this hir:;hr;rounJ.
    Tho cOrnpnny %;';lm',' 'cr j'ut the let platoon on: the left, the 3rd
    plc.toon on the ri:;ht or l h91d : tho 2nd. p:c~toon inthc roar e.s [',
    mowil" support. Theli"ht mr,tlhiu(l gm\. section WI'S put in th0 con
    t:Jl' oi' tiw P0mprn:{ linn
    de:~nnse and. trio Mort!1.r s8ctlon '.i<':'.S
    pl:'co,.'. in ru.r' of i-.he hieh r::ro11!ld nnrt ",bout centored tiL compe.ny.
    me chino' i-}J~ pi,.toon .fron Cornpcny "D" r8portetl. to us .- s we
    Y.IO:"C r'.bo~'r~ f;o ~o ir:t,..., positiol).
    D0cr:,\isc . it. ''1''1,'S' !"rt.ptdly bccont:.ng
    d['.~"k tbe. CO;'1p~:1Y COl'!'_"")<"" r.-18r Pt~t 'eno 86ctfon 'y,rith' Dnch of t!1U frcnt
    li!lC ple'toOtls (md told us to s8leet posit'ons for thom.
    Tr:e first pbtoon, of rrtieD I .'1min eor.m"nd, I'm,s .'1 short di~
    t[!.nc8 to' ,the; rc '.r ,--hi:'n I, -.d tl1 rr:r n')sS'31.igGl--, stnrt~Jd to solect
    positions.' I tl."c1dod to ploce th squnds '.7011 fOrT.erd on the slope
    nnd form OO:!lbnt streng pobte .cross tho front. The Ilror. I he'xl to
    g::,oUc'1('~

    of

    - 19

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    cower "cs so :'ro[,t th"t I cou],1 r:0t 'oopo t.)

    r'w', liN) of

    f'ou~;'c: thrc;c pl'-~cns fr','T:~ .-.'t:'ic~ ":!c ~('l'._11:J. COYor our

    ~.n.

    cntirG frOl'"!t ;-:.y

    fire ~nc~ nft(;]" sond..r np f,"'r the G,~1;_~:~1 Ic~~rlcrs, h~~:t thr:i'1 :nl.f".CC tLoir
    sq:),.. . . (~S in tl1::;~;_O rosi.tiQn~~.
    ~l.'~l'(. hC:n'1,-::i "1'\r'.cJ~i.:n'3 -'J,It ;::;(.ct-:~c'n' c ..... :::c f()r.1~.rd . . . nd I split it,
    plr.cin:: one gun 01:. tl::, l:-Jf-t. l~,';r,-" trey cOlll_~ cross f ire ~:.it.h_ the
    l;l!.it on our loft (80"':p ...-,.r:y i!111, 1../ Q t}! Irf) n.ncT CO"'lor Oil!' front. The
    ot'b.or I put o:r tr(..: 'f'i :,;llt -,-,'hrn'(; it CC-U~I~,: COV(or OlIT' front '''.IlIJ ::'.180
    crosr:; fire nith both -t,l..':: ~.j~~ht i1.!'c~'ll~n g'll1S'- on ny rigLt ".nd t,'::_
    othor henV'J. The hill slop.,.., T,ry ur.'fo~Mly '1'.:1 I estinc.to thnt
    tl::oy h:J.d ;:rrnzin~ fire for II. ,'In Y'lrdn i~l .'1~_1 'Jir8ctions but our right,
    ','Jlore :~~ nosn inturf orr-;d -:.~ i ;,h our fire,.
    We; au ~'F03tod e.':wh of tl1n str':)n:'~ p0ints, '~r:r t1l1!"!CU visitint.;
    p~,trols, ,~n., sport '11 ni.,);t rQst:;",;:; "loi ',',~i ting. f()r "n ,".tt:'.ck.
    :'10 cnony :- ct ~_ vity '1.ur~.ng th~_t night.
    nozt Jl1_o~;--'ning n.h01lt tY;~OO hours anery r".trols of :-!.:"1out :[ iva
    or six non h0gen hittine us ::tt G<,vC'rrl points in the c')mp"n;r linG.
    Tho sqUf'c"i 1(j~d8r cf' ry '(-.~i:rc1 i:3qurd c~_m'~ rllnni.ng to TTJ OP, rd.'ter ono
    p".rticul.-:rly !1e;,r':v:r n.tt, .": on !Y!y l'i/S:1t n.nd repor"tcd th.. . ,t his Gqtlr,c}
    rr's rin:~Gd dO': 711 hy firs <"DC: onC' of ovr li;;ht !n'1chine :~uns h~',(~, '.x~Gn
    Jiri::'.:~: on it.
    ',:T O i:1VC-[3ti'~r-,.t-:,:j. "thr L"'chinc Z-u.TI first "'nd .fo"UD(~ tJ:-.~.t
    {".n Gl1GTl"::' - pEtro].. ~Jf"'.d kr. 1c1< "il it out ':.ri th '1 hnnd gronc.de ':.nd, ~.7C
    bnlieY8, fir'- c1 it for ,r,. ''-:'~-ltJ ,; ::'I.;forn bt.'inrs discovorcd I".nd driven
    off.
    ;-"r., n('":,'X'C took b."llf nf tb0 sqy!.pJ forning the CB!lter strons

    Thoro

    ',H.S

    1'11C

    POi:"l'S "n(~ pJ..::.r:sl.l tL-:;n ~7it,l-t roy ::Jr:;jE,l]np:er "',~1d rr~dio "rl,-'.n ,."..here "Ljley
    C'. 11.1\.~ cover 1;.s
    !lci the.: tr".pr,~d C',qyn.c1. Tho scp.J.lJ..J l,=,[+,der ~n:-1~ I
    t~2("11 J:':':"OCO:)~1.C_~ c1(Y-'fl 'I-,C t,l-..:.", s:llX",-l.
    Or. th'.' T~ny l.-n SL10t tv.'O JeT-Tics
    r

    "11('.

    ':!ith tllC help of fir, fro") th'

    cov~rin;

    force, forced tLroe

    mOl~C, ::'0 sur::..'on~ler ~


    (;v(":TQl Oth6TS :"~ot ~,vm.~;-. lJp0~rl lQokinf; t[~c:
    S~~ . ~l;" t1 on 0\1"0")-'> I JC liov,) t~-~,nt tr . -: C~1(;m='" S.~(,D,~':{ ,J throl.l.~b tb_- [;t'p

    nc I1~c:r.i.n,j guY' "1":'_ :--"c_.:r kr:ocyc::l oJ..-1...., "l:.~.J. :tit. mt


    riC}}t .f'l;-,.nk.
    In this C~',So thC) scrl~c('1 ler,.der's courn!30 5,n (':cn-ttLctin~ me nhon
    his squad WC.s tral',-cl. prok.11:r DC.VOrl nar:y :.bros ~,,,d saved the cor.:
    pnny fret) seriolls tr:n:(bl"" F ~r t"0 tJ")8 of' t(Jrrain T'8 r:ere in our
    front,'J.ces ';;--oro much ~oo l.'!i:18 ..... nG.. "1.'"/6 h.-:3. [. ~;reD.t dO""'.l of c1ifficcl..ty
    c::,o[<:c~d
    S:.~l'-.:-

    ..~'r:;n

    ..J.::..

    t~.le

    J. en

    c~of 8l1dinf! thcm~

    Another thine; which I beHove s".ould be trtkon into consL,era


    tion is that a couple 'of weeks of combc:t wenk~ns a platoon consid
    erably and it i.s 'lifficl1l ~ to (:X()cvt,,) c. MisGion th"t is nJrl"~.::'ly
    nssi211ed n full plotoor; ",ith it."
    S~rgeant

    RICELRD J(1EHSOil), 135th Infantry.

    1f~7e hed l'oen . . \tt~'"ckinG (lny t"'.:~c:r (}''1..Y with our

    cnsunlties

    mountingl;t
    The obj r.cttvo one, ""'tornoon y:r.G to attack nnd clerer three
    buildings, nnc1 hold.~'hf3 atk.ck '.'lent beautifully with. su;:,port
    ing light tanks an:, rnccdiums be'lLni th"m. Our objoctive ':!rlS
    rec,ched in loss them 15 m4.nutcs. Our mistnko',xes In setting up
    - 20

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    a "half-baked" defensive behind the houses. V!ithin an hour a


    amnll force of Germans eoTmternttecked and WIlS upon us before we
    knew uhat was hapnening, which resulted in a hasty withdrawal and
    a completelY disorganized unit."
    Captain REID B.

    HUFF. 135t.'1 Infantry.

    "In temporary defensive positions be sure that outposts are


    estnblished fa~ e~lOu:5h 1l7/llY f:::-om main body so that sufficient
    warning ffk1Y be gi~en if ouhposts are attacked.
    One platoon of Oomparl,T L was ca:.>tured at ~mNTIQUIL\. Italy
    because the outposts Vlere l"ss than 50 yc.~'cls from remainder of
    platoon and timely warning could not be given to alert the platoon."

    i. OF - OF Qperations.The CP is the center of all operations and the


    OF is a business establishment for the purpose of observing and destroying tho
    ene~. Established observation posts should not be subjected to the careless
    ness of commanders and their staffs.
    Maj or ALLISON A.

    cm:t.t'J),

    135','3 Infantry.

    "Control of movement in and around an OP must be continuous.


    Even in a unit
    as bnttle-schooled as this '.)ne, I have seen occasions when ex
    cessivemovement around an OF (and in one instance, a cp) brought
    immediate en~ fire which cnused unnecessnry casualties. Visit
    ing firemen who i;:)si3t on d:.':"vil!g '-1' to your front door instead of
    perking at a reasonnble c.istance and advnncing on foot under Clover
    are the worst offenders. V'Jhicle dismounting .point must be clslI.rly
    marked and guarded twenty-four hours II day. Less movement at the
    DAnnsless work for the GR~
    It is fatal to relnx ~his caution for one moment.

    Gf

    Technician Fifth Grade ERNEST J. L:.NGIE, 135th Infantry.


    "',-,'hl1e under combat fire, one can never feel too safe. In
    one instrnce our battalion had moved up and relieved another unit
    c.nd nfter the unit hrld oriented us as to the situation ~.t h0.nd fle
    settled down for the night feeling quite safe as they had informed
    us that the enomy haldn' t shelled the immediate vicinity of th" CP.
    Thoy he.d been there for 30 some dnys .without their CF beine shell
    ed. Hell,thE next day the 1st Sel'gennt r.nd other non-corns COll'.
    meneed to instruct tho men Clot to do emy unnecessary walking r.rounq
    r.nd not to he.ng out their t017cls, shirts or nl:(Ything thnt could be
    observed ~ the enemy.
    ~iG stayed in this CF for two woeks ~Iithout drnwing 11 single
    sholl, but finally a fow of the men apparently forgot or disregard..
    ed their instructions nnd hung out n couple of white towels to dry,
    nnd swaat shirts also. As n result our OF drew ene~ artillery
    fire, costing the lives of three men."

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    First

    Licuton~.nt

    H:.-ROLJ C. BISHOP, 168th Infc.r.try.

    "Brttf'.lion ~'nd conpf'l.ny OP I s, in stnblo dcfcnsiv..; positions,


    can ['.nd should bt_~, Dot U?J .til ";j'_"sin'-ssliko st~lc, oven if t.hey ['.rc
    ~ unc1cr~round.
    /~de.c:..untc:: files sl1(n;1(~ be set up for th':""' nbundr:ncc of
    intelligonce c.nd' opor'ltionrl m-cterir.l. such~s' p"trol reports,
    overl.cys of friendly"nri .etomy ctispositions, counterbc.ttory end
    ccUntcrr.,ttr:ck pInns, e-s,c. i'j IJ~.g .:)ys-!~cms must bo set up i!!J.m.ec1i[l.tely,
    or vl.luuble ::lr'.teri!1.1 ',7ill be lost.!!
    .
    Privets First Clc,ss LIoI:.!'! "CODHOn, 135th Infnntrj'.
    ''From my exporienc~s.r.s an F. ,0. i.n '1n nf'antry'combr:e" bnt~
    talion,- I h~vo found out 8evcrn: i~-portnnt points through sad ex
    perionce First ,0;[' '111 p'e',t c,-.r:c <"'l stoe t:"'.konif rtppronchinc; en
    OP in the dnyligl:t; to koop fJ"')rn being observed by tho enemy. He:
    usually hns 0.1] tb O:"1-D/,vDt'Lon nyoo,,,, cTil"if he sees you he 'crill
    fire on yon, no m.r:.tt.<:::c' Lo"! .:r.~\7 or m.~ ~"('l th8!"e rre in the p:1rty.
    One", the OF hns bVT (",r':,-'blj.sh'jd, don't disclose your position. If
    you cnn see tl-o enor,:", hi, ceo"t,'linly c"'.n see you. Do the things you
    h::;ve been tc.ught to (0 r.:rh(;n ub,sorv::ne-..
    .
    Here nre t,,o incidents '.:hich '~lctur lly occured in eombnt.
    Thr.ee men C!8reo in" 'Cn OP on tho FIde of ,0. mour,tnin.. .ThE"! only covor
    wC'.s f'-. sm~.11 wn11 :-,.oou.t t~1rOQ fc(,t hish ':-"nd s:tx f'c'Ct long. One mnn
    . 'stood uP'to urinp.to.' "'ittin thr88 minutes r. do'zen rounds foU in
    the g8.nercl vicinity. Ho not only cnc1.l1nGcrod himself, but "lso
    his :)uddics. Toclny thct m,".n is do:-v:l. You 300-, he Ilk'1do one, more
    mistrJ<:e. "f. sorgonnt l"/''1S observing from Cl ,,,ir.do'.7 in n prominent
    building. ,Some wise guy in tho noxt roon bOG"n to snipo "t somo
    Gormc~s much too fnr"-cmy for "ny 'l1ccurr,cy, but ho caused enough
    commotion to drQYY "tt"'ntion to the c.roc.. Th,; sergeant movBclll"itil
    clos8 to th", "lindo',,! to 7"t " better vie17 '.nd rl,';.s shot through tho
    eye. Tho' scrgo~nt '::~cc.'c fruIt for getting too close to the ~;a.n
    dorT, but sniping from ~,n UP should b;', altogcther discouraged.
    Use :your hoad. Informrtion is no good if the informer c~nnot
    deliver tho inform"tion to tho sourco Yiho C'ln make use of it."
    r

    .1. :,ir - Ground Linison. Close support .~8r:Fl bOMbardment. hr.s not in
    all cases proved. completely sntisfnctory, b'.lt tho pot:mticUtics' of the VICapOl1
    for infdntry sUpport are' great.
    LioutEinnnt C~lon81 l;l:~'lK T. Il"RTIli, JR., fcC of S, G~3. 34th Infr.n~
    t").'Y Division.
    "I reported on 6 [,pril 1944 for duty uith 445t.h Bonbnrdmcnt
    Squadron (I'l), 321st BOl,bnrd!!lont Group (11).
    .:
    During tour of c:uty I 0.ttcn0.ou thr(3C 'briefings' prior to
    missions, nccomp~niGd OGe mission t.o its ter;;et'16 n [llSsenger in
    .tho leading' elemont of threo pl".llon, c.ccO',1p r niod th:' Squ~dron
    Commc.ndor on ".. I chn.pcfon I flight to t;-,c "1o<"b S"fo Line on r second
    mssion nnc1 took p'1rt in. informd disouscions \iith the SqUQdron
    - 22

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Contl':ndor

    C:~(~

    tho; 3.2.1st Gr('up

    Cpcr~tionG

    Of,cicor.

    O~.sf;rv~,ti0n3 r:~.~;.c; (~uI'ih,_~ tl-.:is ~)rj C"f por:ioc~ St;.~f.,;c3t thr.t t~c
    prc~cr.:.t c;xchr!.::'l;-;'-:' .of '_ir ~-n.l (:-'-:-11.-.~.~: T'orco porsonl1"'l IX,; contl':11J.(~d ,~n(1

    thct, ";hel" prn.ctic.cl; c:::'forr~, 'oe r".de to <'.ssuro th".t. afflnol'G bo


    o~,~ch<rlWjJ. ('sr' ci"-J.J~/" (~1~T'i{)"" 'Pcll::(~.s ',',-!:on '~ir opor.""'t:ionD nrc ~n
    Direct Supp0r-~ c:' Gr'",'.:'", J. 'ct.'tons. It if bclicN8{1 tL.. t ,"',ir c0rp3
    o:L~'ic(!r~ Cd-;er"'_11~~ ::~:)~ ..: '-'I,-:r . . t u over s",lch extensive- fronts th"'.t j.t
    iG ~l- possible i,',~:r t:_ ,:"' <1:.:~,.:,.8 to to fi:rdli;".r. in ~. suffici:,nt.
    c1EJ~:~'~'GC ,:;j_t"Q t.he. t,~rr- :in J.)'1",:!~~(L:+[ltcl:v to tho front of ('l"1.1!' i~:~:'C~Dtj:-;,::-.
    '''1,,1,
    1
    t rl~:J:J l'G
    . , -"OU 1"u '1.p-penr, .el.Dce
    .
    '1'
    f'1..
    .L:}_S .LS (;.:fPE.:C':'~.!..._'.Y
    tloS t "
    i,.~y.lnc'; 01
    eel'S ~.r, I;2_;u:'.;)r~nt3 or C '.pt~ir;3 \~itl~, f1. CO:r.lp[1.r~.tivoly [~bort :_'6r::'ou
    <

    01' ti'f'.i:i1:ine i~.l L'P "'n( ,..G)... i<~. pboto r8"'.c~ing; ". CirC1)m8tr:nce no
    in. tr.8 Gro'_F:d 1Torces.. UnIikG grou'1xl officors., i":ho r.,':'.Y
    81":.. nd :' cCllsidorlJ.~.-:-J. .:: :-TIOt~nt ot t:1.r"lt"C! in m.r'<p stud:! to dcrL8I'"I:d:'1.G
    loc:~,tiorw, L(J'?'~J v,:1r, .Jr Co::ps ofti cars nr,. por~i tt3d C:OL:P.'''T,~~ti velJ'"
    C'. to
    s:;c(-~cls to rccogniz:J t~.1,::i-r' t".rr-et n"l1'::~. ;:'0 ;.;et "x:f1..y, tr,ci::;o oorr.D3.
    It 18 r,!:?ri.y~i~l.t''d tlYi.t upon r.;:"'.ny occ~cior,s l].ndcr conc1it.io~l3
    0-:'': f'll::.i~l. 1",-.rf.:-:~!'f; th,..: szet :ego of :.ir '1,ne: Gr01J.!ld p3rEonr.01 before
    missions is i~:rr'.'"ctic~'.l. ?1'1~~ in(!.ic... to~l. m-;"::.horl is r0commOEaCc.1 for
    tried, p:ej,or to rl)s-"']"lFtion "f thr offon"iv0 in the present s:ctor,
    the graun;:; ,,1'.1' ).C:ViD(! :,0'''' for"1u1c.tcd c.nJ tho initir.l c,llotl'lO'1t
    of ./.~2..:r. GUrI)Ort }:,,,-vj ~g tOC~l n!:':'.c:c:
    It is su:::rootcc..1:
    (c,). T:r,~.~ 'flie~1t L0f~(:'(~r[; Diyl Nnvir:;ntors visit tll:; :Jivision to
    bo sU:Fportud prior to f"tnd -:-lll.r:_ng [''cir opor."ti~wtS r'.nr1 tl:~.t ttLis p(;r
    sonnel be orier:.tcc: 02': t}:;c~ L;rOl"Jld [lnc1 b~t flig::lts in Di 7i.sion air
    l(;~_is tr"Ll~"

    OP!

    s.

    (b) That G""'OB.::lCL 0f::'cers :'rc:-1 the s'3ctors concC:l"nt';d visit


    tho _'~i~ Groupf~ end .'1Gsist in briefinc fj'light Lcc.dcrs ~'.~-::j n'~~v:i ~'2torl3
    r.ccoPF"m:Ting fligl",tz il1 "-'.:::1 o.Qvisory Cf.\pr.city i f th..-,."0 "be c1csiroc1.
    (c) Tho.t on:'~ D ...... vir;t.tcT' "'!}::1 on"-, flight lu:.dcr fron oc.ch .." ir,
    Group. vi;:.,it the clivitio~ YThic~~ is. to bo support d j)ri'Jr to bus-in
    ning o"C'3ro.tior'.G.
    (cl)Thct 0:'10 ~,ivi_sion s~~[~ff .officer visj t rach Group 1:.rh.ich
    is to fly in m..l fPcrt; ~)--.ing presont for th(~ briofing p!"iar to
    . ;i;..~i ti.~ 1 ri@f~ions"
    . (o") IIr-:nt th,~ e::c:-':-'n'-.~,-' 0:: o:fficers DO' mf'.::lG
    dl.u'ir: tLo J:-:::r;iod ~'-:'Jcn 0sp"~ci:::)1~r c+.ose s:1pport t'J.. ssion.s c.rc c~esir['."blc. tI
    I.D ['"t'~~CF,~}t in thi-J i~1(;D-t0r b.,.s bC(J!J rl<\.clG to dovolop' clorr) liaisoYl ':Tith
    tho ostr.blishm0nt of lHorsQfly', :'.. 3~:r:::.t. ",m i-n ;:Thinr, cub pl;'.l'.c's l,"mro U.SfJC~ to
    orient bOLDor pi] nt{;: o:voY" t~6, tr:T::"ct ttr-c:n~. It' W""lS discardod BB 1.U'1sc.tisf~ ctory
    t~ftE)r lOGil1~.: s~'v,-.r~'_l. CU~)G n,::d. ~CC.:."llSq t;':~, .'.. ir. Cc~:,ps did not cor.sic.0r t'c,~ tcr
    gots :romljJlC~::'Lti v(;. :Di vis19!1 _Obf,8rvct'S. rc::;,ort th t careful t,l,"iofir.g is tbr-; koy
    fo.ctor, ~\"nd th' p:!~lcts T.'c;p?rt tlJ'-'.,t 1::0 sUJ.=::?lcmert tri9flrg Goo:i.ng.,thG Ground
    prior to the rrdssion T"OllJ (~ bo. T"!,c'st ~olpfcl. Tr~i8 cn~8f\.'1 b:~~;~fing couplod r.rith
    visunl aids suet ['.:3 colo!"'c:.J. .,snqkn ovor 'f::be t,'}rg;?t .hn,S p:covud GllcCGs;.;ful.

    - 23

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    First Lie"tenp,nt 3URTO}T E. IS;::T':r:RG, J68th Infantry.
    "In January lC;44 the liSPtt Infantrv was in the vic-tnity of
    CERVAIW, aft0r "'Eking SPAct'lCuler progres", l'rom just north of V8i.J~FIW.
    On 11.January I was on i:1_~_1 o')serv&tion post on Hill 496, a~]Jroximately
    1500 yards east of CE.:'lV,'RO. 0;: t11e Darning of the 11th, we received
    y/ord tl1c:.t, at l?nn hours thp Air force ~,'r('uld strafe ~nd bomb the to'i."m
    of CEHV!.;J.LtO, also th;- t frior::dJ-y art~_11pry WOL:ld Iny red smo~;:~ 111cl.r~;::Gr:3
    on tbe tar(;et to aid the f~ir Corps. That morning I observed enemy
    activity iI' the town of CEWT!;;:O. I adjusts,; Slmm mortsl' firn on
    ene:;ry perconlCel mo'ri,ng ~ bout t'le town. I c Iso observed patrol" of
    ou.1' regimelCt moving about in t,CJE' olive orchards north and e"st of the
    town. At approximately 1155 hOllrs 01Jr oem ",rtillery fi~ed 1'e,2 smoko
    nlal'kers on the town. FX8ctly Rt 1?00 hours the first formation of
    11-3C:, 1 s Pl'peared iror1 til" south ond circled &round to OUi' rear nnd
    st[w08d their dive on CERVAHD from the east" 'i:hey strafed pnd
    l)om'-'ed sir",ltaneot'sly. .uter the first flight had pas sed ov,,"o the
    t,,'r:;(;t they owung I1ro md to th8 south and cirded back to the east
    [>~~.iDinc.~ e.ltitnde.

    They

    t:.. . Ch

    made ~nother dive on the te,r?et, but

    this time, they strafed only and did r..ot homb. Each succeodi:1()
    fl:lZ"t rJp.pt trrour:h the SEem" procRdure. The closoo:lr support at
    tack on CEEV~lW lasted for approximately one-t,alf h01Jr. All ~JOm0S
    "FTCl."C released with cxtl1eme :!.CC:lracy and found the target wi tl1
    me.ximl:rn eff0ct~ Aided by t:!is bombing, the second battalion of the
    l~'~;'Gh Infantry attacked the town.
    On tho fonowing day C:3P,VARO
    ':~as

    ours."

    ITAir supr-art is a vex!"y important factor. If our stTnfLc:~


    effects Jerry as hie does us, onr plaDl?s do not necess.arily ne -d
    to cause casl1f:.ltios" It olso boosts our mOl'ale to'see our plcnes

    overhead

    go

    11

    If. COY.cr.J.Q!!9~D.l.I!!P_~..E'p.3_T2.iF2ga~ton. ~he besic principles of tho


    subject rnattor ;-lEVO been t}'crourhl~r discl.".E8CQ :1.L the field D12nl;als irrec.p6c~ive
    of bra!1ch. The rclctive ebs6Dcc of tt:e G0rnan Lu.('tvmffo ar.d the ap:9aren'G sbort
    age of c;1emy artillery amrcuniti_on as the ca=a~gn progr:rss0d created at t}~'es !'\
    a false senso of sOCUl'it] rosul'i;lng in l(l1m"~s tina sometimes outrtght careless';'
    ness 4

    "It is urmsn"l for thc' <neT:('{ to call artillery or mortar; ire


    on '.7011.. d:l.sporseci. troops in a ste.bilized situation. Too often e.
    8e1130 of false security (ieSC8nds upon us p,fter a lull in GDcr.,y
    i'ix'.n [,.nd -;18 begin to group up forming tarGots for fire "ivhich is
    l1rought. dov;n r?i th

    dp~\no\St.ating

    off eet ~

    Duringtl::p atkck at S. r%'HA OLIVETO, 4 Nov8mber 1"43, the


    CN'y"r'uding officer, Company __ , __ Infantry assembl"d his pl2.toon
    leaders ~nd key KCDI s to plan thE' continuance of tilE' attack.

    - 24

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Short.Jy pft.pr- nssomblin~, $ hCI):'t:ry ~ncmy' mortar bcrrnge fell t1.pon


    tllO position resulting in r.ll of th0 officers and the maj ority of
    th(; HCO's becoming c~.su"lt~cs, '"itll no leadors th'J entire company
    .
    ,jecr.:nc disorgf:lizDd p.nd d:':;hdrCl".'''
    S0cond LieutenFlnt CL.41n~'lCE E. SPIEE, l3Jrd Infantry.
    "It h"8 boen Il\)' ex;cm'j.cnce ..011 tho 'ough the Italian Campaign
    that the Amorican so::'6.Lr tsinclincd to 'bunch Up' in gro)1ps. The
    doughboy of this ilEr S80Il'S to think th'l.t as long ashe has D. number
    of his companions close tn him he is fairly safe.
    In Octobor 1943' ;,e "ere adV'ancir.g on BEHEVENTO, Ita:!.." in the
    approach march. It ,:as a :"ai",J.y dark night find the men were wa1k~
    ing on each otters hr.Jels l1ihr;;;.n th0Y should l1a17r- been spread out.
    Suddenl", I~Thoom' - a l.,rgo c,~Jiber shell hit the column and rriped
    out the maj ority of u whole platoon of Compar\'! "K". Had the men
    been at proper interv[ 1 damag" vro1:ld have been a great deal less."
    Staff Sereo['nt E.1c'1.0LD F. J,<I'JSCHAHP, 133rcl Infantry.
    "One losson I have lCQrmd in combat iil 'there is no fox hole
    bottor th!'.n the ono you nre in'."
    T8chili.cinn Fourth Grs:J.o JOHN

    I!AYffiCH~.K,

    135th Infantry.

    "Some of "V buddies and I wore injured jt tho third crossing


    of the VOLTURNO. 1:1e were ar)hind a. hndgerow when Jerry opened up.
    The first shell wonndod many of us slightly. I went for lrw fax
    holc ~r.d some of tho othrors did .Eke':7isG, but tho remc.ind>3r took
    off :.ncl in Jerry's n8xt be.rrago the majority of these ?/8ro sovers"
    ly injlcr()d. A sholl landed 17ithin.6 fet of me, but 11''; fox halo
    ;,'c..id VE'r'J' good di vidonds."
    Sorgeant SHELDON G. JOffilSTONE, 135th Infantry.
    "Thoso Fho ':'81'e on tho ANZIO Beachhead soon found that unless
    both men Rnd positions ,wron 't. kopt out of' sight or cnmouflngcd
    so gS t.o mako it he,rd. or imDossiblo to be snon they wouldn't lest
    long. 1"0 had a vc~y Good o~['.mrlo of how important cr,mo,ulc.;;o is.
    Our first positions ~ro!"e s"ndlJe.gged positions on top of' the
    ground because of ,fotnoss. 1'ho mon -.7ho 'fW!'o thore bofore us ho.d
    takon avmy their nt;ts, vihich ~,"'G:rc tr.. c only c[',mo"tJflr--.gc possi'!,)10 in
    thnt case. Ot:l' nots ,/Orn unsuitable for th" torrain End c01.~d be
    usod morely to breakthr- ('utline. We received (l.irect f<.re. ktar,
    rTO put our orm position in an alfalf~. fiuld. TIo used alfalfa alor,g
    l:ith thE! nets and tested th" job by going only': few ycu'ds ,o.m::y.
    We Horked on it until sl1tisf:iod that no obsoI'V'A.tion post on tho
    Jerry sido cou.ld possibly'pick tIS put. Tl:e result w~stha~,. rcga!"cl~
    less of [ \ E the sholling th.)y did at nearoy ronds, gun POSJ.tJ.OllS,
    houses, etc ~, ':[0 neVGr l'ocei-vod. p~ clgse ror!ld."

    - 25

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    III livPS t:~D,pped r.dth m~l-' pl::;.toon leader in n small .1itch. I


    had to l.?y flat. on r:r;,T i~t,011[lGL t" ku,"'p nnder CQ"llOr of th3 macl':ine
    gun irin '!. [it 113.. J...I":,rr.;rytir:c J ;-no7r;d ~{}lilo cTa:.'J.inrt bf"!c]{n~lrds i
    stuck GOTT;O p~'lrt of rw body U~j ~1.nd '.',~[~S fired upon. --'r iei~i "'in that
    C:.itch for? l10urs try-in.!; to r:r2,-,-:1 b~.ck phen uri' J.)latoc)l~ sergeant
    ;{ollcd to ~J9 cir()ct::'lF!; mc out 0:: t.hl! trc..p.1f

    p;'t Gf\.SSINO onn niv,ht '70 !11oved our o.nti-t2~k platoon lor\,'ard,
    i'~"ir}-y close to the front li:!cs,
    Ol:.r guns '.7oren Tt n'2oded t:12.t
    n_izl_d~, so ~-.T0 01.U; in behind a si"x-fnot bnnk.
    Tl1Dro ~-.~(}ro trG':s on

    "COP (;f the: b~',l:lk, so "'.,T'? dug do'--n . . . !!d 1-"lndor t~lC ':;~'_r:k b(Jc[,~.J..so if sb81::,
    h~:d hit i:'! the treos it ',::onlJ br.'ve 'be:::!! -tb8 snl':O ;)0 !:terial imrsts,
    c'.hll by liigging thc_:t ~.''1Y 1;;0 ~lso 1"<:"1.d oV"r;rhc'ad pr0tnctior. :~:--.Gbine
    e:;l;n l~~tJ_IJ ct:.c ~..rcr() bu?'zing oVe!"f.:cnd, '.ihich gr.vc 11[:, morc -.-.ril1poomr to

    dig.
    J~_

    p[i.ssing sold_i.cr GO'!':' cllric)"u.8 to $8-:' 1.7~i.~.t -aas going on. Ho


    pair of' fiolt.l glf's,]os nnd crc.',,:l.ed on tC? of tne bar'k. Ir::
    stoc.cl of bcL1g c,u'o;'v]. r.ncl gQtting in n 3hr.d:r spot 0:' by " tree,
    ho {~ot right in th.:; Op0j; iYl r'.:.'I.i::; sight. r:t::erc; tho sun reflected on
    the glassos. SO!1CO~c"; cF;.utioncd l~iTI .'l,nd bo hr.::.d .~ust got into c. fox
    bole 1Thcn <-Terry t.hro~".r .in '!, b'1r:r.~:-,c. T~lOJlks to tbe good :~ox holes
    no ono ~:,ras sO:'i 0:':.31:." t,- Tt, ho' :c"'"n::r, our ';qr.. :lr-ment lying outside of
    tho f o;{ boles ~":8rc t.0r~1 to s:lrods. 11
    gr.~bted B.

    1. Inf0ntrv Wcc::'Jor..s. T!",- - rr:p~.:'J:Tj'.c~nt. oX infantr;.r snpport ~;.TJ0.pons,


    dictntcd by t~I'n:Ln r.'Wi;;:}~di ty of novc:>~1:t, hrtG ,,_l".Tl~rs beon ~'. sU:Jj iC~ of COL
    troversy uithiD the Di-v'ision. T~(; GlJ.g,'3(;stio:'}s 'l.nd idoe.s submitted 1y:t"ci;J rGprs
    88nt tho thougllt of' all

    Y,(Q[~pOn8

    ;:y",n basad lJ.:[',On

    :'1r'ny T:'ont!-13

    of 8ct,:nl opore_tion

    against tho onor.1Y.

    S~:jCLff

    ,Serf! :r,r..t

    HICH~~D ~.:-r.

    FRS:JEICF30N, 13.3rd Infnntry ..

    IIp,$ a f:1gchin.' :~lln sccti on l,adnr, it };8 boen ~2.ny times ~l1J1'
    to 'bo f'.ttr.ch:'d to ~1. rifln unit, SOIi.Gtin::;s uEDccom~';:"'"~niQd
    b' [:'1 oC-rieur, Althc)ugl) i:lt. ;cdbg to inpl.y no criticisM of the
    rii Ie l..mi t! S ,h..o,C;L;r;nt or "\~W inn'Jili ty on its p2rt, I be! fOl.:'nd.
    t:-:t;---:G occ".sioTl".lly Q clrtsb i2 unnvoidr.blo concernil:g cort,-d.r: dcciz
    ii):-::s:, S('T'lutinc8 J:.hc rifle unit con!";l,.. . r~der is not t.hormJ;~t.I:;?' c!'cc..l~2.i:;:Y:
    od l:-:l"::.h tn, tnctic:_1.1 l;m~loY'Tjj - nt of h'JQ',,,;/ 1.'.Tonpons (' .".e;c,j.n, (' cUff Lr
    (;nco of opinion on ~ !:!:i_nor !:l(~ttet"; ':lsu,:,~lly QS n. Yi0n-cf'\~_TlizsiQllCd
    oLI.icor ::rJ opinion holds littl(; ~-Toight in sll'cL CC.8.'J$. I bB.v,::.. lc;[;r~-,
    ad t: l':l.t IJ.n NCO ':.-i th ~1. soct~:,:'on ;;.ttnc;1<,d to f', riflo unit J1Itwt JO
    d.ouLl~T D.r;grrissivc, coT1e o"Li-t ~"dth l:'is docisioDS ar opinions, C'.nd
    many tim:,;-s ~ct on his 0-:-.11 iLit:5.fltivc or judgment bsforo roccivins
    orders, D.-S it is rir,t'Jrr~l t11.':",t Go~(;times hn '.'ill ~JQ forgottun (;n'circ~
    10' or neglocted; Qsp~clul:r ic; the nttnck."
    ,r,Gf.;i;~p::1cnt

    - 26

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    in t}F:

    _~fric,':-.n C;lmp8~tgn

    th'"',t if YlO
    :'.1"c in cloG~) support o~ ,'1.. x'ifl'_~ ~lG.toon [.nd nrc cnllc:d on to fire G
    -;'"J~.r(?ct Coucr. ,'"',S '''!. Ik~~~lltl l'~ne:':':::_'UJ gun that .not morc than 2 m:..n
    carryinG tho gun erL '1 chest of rmm11ni tj.on should crrF:l- to (', svi t
    Lblc positio;."! f!:"oITI. ~_-."hici"'-. to fl:r:'o to try for accu'rRcy end sur-prise.
    LftL,r f'i.ripp; ~:TC th(~l1D.('lV'-_l L/,.CY SOOYl t'.S 'possible to cover fS in most
    cases. tT(~)rry soon cov.--rs t21-~ r.ref~ rrith :[,1.ro. tile have dono this
    on numerous OC~8rlOr:S ',"HI: good effect. Shortly before LE'~liOr'i~, '::0
    pickod" up a 'kr,'1"kt 1 m'i,c:h::LU gun by sOl~nd End observ[tt:i,on that hrd
    r\ rifle p12toon I=i1-J.T::~/_ '~io~-:-r:. ';\-; ,:,tntched th8 position until the
    'krr,uts i GUUf'!.ed j.ntcE.l~ C!'l ;,; '~utbi:;}g 01s8 to tbei -y. front, t.~1cn
    quickly S9t up our ['1'1 ",r:d:'ir~d S8v,)rnl long burst~ \:hich silenced
    tho t krtJ.:tl"'c. I gl:_n. Our {~l;:nr".~rs inT1lodiatoly \}('nt ta:ck to bottor cov(:r.
    In b. very short t:~mc IJLrn-,.J,t l fire r.r.qs pl~~cod on our YScs.tod posi
    tion. Surprise firo on n (~ount(;r~J.ttack by 1,-,7aiting lUltil you C[.l1
    firo on s.omo of
    "-rClt s! f'lrthcr back first hc.s provod to bG
    quite domorp,lizi.ng, ~:-L~rticularly if ::"OU arc; firing from rc fle.nk :l,S
    :-r..:, bD.d occDsicn to do l_tCr: Cc::-rpc.ny !I.t." on onr loft ~7:,:,:G being cOVl:.tcr
    nttacl<;:cd. ':Lh~~ qr::'-'''l~tGr 3CnnCQ r.t a 1()8G.,.~bt~tto do [nd ~:K;rG soon dis
    l-';:~~:'2Ld by c~:r or:t. o.rt:tl} l~~r flr0. r1
    ill:C

    h-'"'v,-;

    f01Ll1d

    Di::;c::' c' -r1:/'

    te,,,

    . ,

    "l

    , ..

    "Combine th.; lig}lt ;::1pchino gun and Bfll best-: {'~;nturos to mt.kc
    r. lit~:'rt rnn,chiDc, gun (s:-:oul:ior T.70rrpon t, belt fed, cmployir g n ',Jipod)
    c,-,.,t. Cf!.n be cc.:.-riud 'uy one men. Tho GermPD mo.chinc elm 43 is c
    C],.':)f.iC '- nproximE1tion :".8 fC1T flG looks ~:.rG GonccrLcd but tho nen dc
    ci:n sl!ould rot",in the rr:r,[,:c ccnd Ilccuracy of the light m!lcl1i.ne gun.
    _~liT~li:nr,tc ths ~3.';H and L?,,~S from ttl) infantr:r comp~.ny f.1.!'d give uC',ch
    scrl(~d ono L~m of the n.e':! d(".'s:ign.
    FoOrf!nnize the r!onpons plo.toon t.o
    :i nclvdo fotU' 60nm r'10rtrrs only. ,TI":o to be GJll.ployod on tho attack,
    four to bo employed on tho defcnso."

    U!)

    i1ort8rs.

    First LiGutoncYlt ROPEi~T 3. GCC:3FTT, 168th Ini'[,ntry.


    I:' irst. Lieutonant R~\LF=-1 D.! ~-{OVDT~I~, 168th Ini'.. . ntry.
    "Sight,- :,'-!,-Tr, 'iC"(:s',nt Sl:;UOl nortr:r sig':lt II-I\: i.s adocuc,tc
    2nd is Pi. C;ood s:'gh~..
    ,~.: ,1J,-.:-""' , tl.l~)rc nro t"o p.doptatiohD ':;l"licil
    r.rould be 1101pful~ F ir['t, ~~ ~irl~or nttachm;1nt tfj~rm:13r to the; GCJr
    n12,n 81mm mort:- yo sigbt -1:.0 Dn1:.1.,::: .the gunno~ to sight on nil niminf,
    point to his rcc_a.. 'it}:. IT:Crtur3J' just ;).:3 y:,ith etrtilJ.c3.:':::,:-, the, :_~r\":'lt08-(' GCcurpcy of fire ii_, ott'.lir:C:Jd 1.:;-11on tIE (liming stn}::o Is f~rthost
    fran tho gun. Bccn.u3'~ :::a:rt",.r;,s-_ aT;;: norrn!l.1.Jy in positions in doii
    lndo or 'in bnck of bu'ldillfls, it. is oft~'n .nccDssnJ"J to hnvc the
    air:ting stGkns clasu -!:"'a t~1::-' f,i~T., thus cutting do::n our accurc.cy.
    VIi tb tho mirror o.ttnclm(;nt: it \7oli.ld,.: -0.:, poss'ible to .plGCO the; '_ilning
    st,'.kcs GO"'U dist,~ncu "'X,1 :t<!L,th, , rGnr or <cv<'n tn the flar:k of the

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    gun. Second, rt night lighting dovice, both for thcsight c.nd for
    'ell, <iming stnkDs. I.t present, '.:0 nr,' improvising ,.,ith flc.shlights,
    but they cut dO'.;n tho rtccur"cy "nd sp,'od of, th" gumior becauso tho
    f:uni1~r nust hold ono light in his hand \7hilo opcro.ting tho gun 1',1. th
    tho either. J\ 'nlght sight sir-dlnr to crmnon company would bo suit
    ablo. Occasion"ll:' one of tho micromctor knobs 'slip' and do not

    r/- :'-(,

    ~ h~-_

    t:,.- _

    ~,~nc..LI.~. Ll,'

    r ,_, ~''-' ~_~ ",, . t..h.

    01.). yt-. t_,:""

    J.f-:-.:t,(

    :"'t.s

    thn f8JJl t,\;,. si ,,,lit

    bcc8,use the knob' turns '&00 easily but' som 0 times not before hn;'i.ng"
    fired part of the mission. Possibly a lock washer thRt r:ould hold
    these knobs secure could be made.
    Fire Control -"We have been very successfully using n method of
    fire contrel and direction similar to that of nn artillery fire
    control center. Our' first' attempt with this method. was fln exper..
    iment at AN'ZIG Beachhead ana. it proved itself so sffective that
    Vie have been using it ever since. The only two items necessary to
    operate thisC~P. set-up "hieh are not T/E are 1/25000 artillery
    grid sheets and a 1/25000 rangefan.
    As soon as our g\lIls lire in polition, the position 111 plotted
    on the grid sheet lInd II base-point registered for all guns. It is
    then unbelievably simple for the platoon C.P. to fire on any given
    coordinate quickly and accurately Qy using the' range fan which i~
    mediately gives the true range of the target and correct defluction
    from the base-point. Therefore, any p",rson in the battalion can
    call in the map coordinates of a'target and the' target can be fired
    .E.,curately and' immediately. This method has bren extremely valuo,ble
    in firing targets where observation WIlS difficult nnd even more so
    for night firing. All of our NCO' 5 h.v" worked wi tb this metbod and
    ATe thoroughly trCcined to tClke OVGr op6ratio~ of the C.p., if the
    plc,toon sergeant should become 0 c,:sunlty."
    Mouton/mt 'Colonel JOE L. BOURlm, 168th Infantry.
    "It .ls suggested that at least" platoon or company of the
    chemice.l morters (4.2) be provtd8d for each infe,ntry r8gimont Y'hilo
    in combat in tcrr'linsuch "s ',7e hf1Ve in ItalY I And for terrain tJ:ll'.~
    TiO Fill undoubtedly have to conduct, future operatione over.
    -,
    TIK chemical marter proved itllolf q.highlY valunble ,>,bapon on
    thG /.:17IO Beachhoad. It hae gIl' atcr, rangG thEn ,our 8lrrn ma~tllr.
    T:"". result of its fire is high4" deJIloN!l~zJng ta ellcmytroOpEl.
    Garre,cn pri.sonor/j refer ttl tho 412 JIlori;ar a~ the ! silent doa,th!,
    bcco.u.so the frngments of thee shell npPElI'cntly splinter up much'
    finor than our 81mm mort"rs nnd a ~JlIf\lJ. sliver cian pass th;'>''Igh a '
    man's bcicl;y nlmost Vii thollt IBrwing n mnrk, 'j'ho 'Qorrnr'.lls do no~ like
    the chomioal'mortar. .
    .
    .,
    :
    Iti~rGa+izedthat the oJlOJ'lical r:ort"r i~p.n organic part
    of' Qur arm,vcher.uonl, ;;:e,rfllro section" but 71e are firmly convincod
    ii< ~all llo useq to g~c3t advantage tlith tho infantry rogir.lOnt
    .
    oithei' uttachedor preferEbl.' to bncome 0. pnrt of the TIE orgnm..
    zntiQ!wl ~ct-up ot: nil, infantry regiment ,"

    28 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    First Lieutenant D,WID B. [,'lEES, 135th Infcmtry.


    "The 60mm mortcr is c. fine, little) I7capon. It [.,Quld help if
    thore nere smoke shells Flv~il":Jlo; they ,could bo issucod on the
    bGsis of t',70 per !'tortar in tile be.sic lond."
    Coptain HUGH S, JACOBS, 133rd Infantry.
    "Mortars he,v" not b'en uSEd ns much ns th,w could be, ospoci
    clJy 60mm. I found the follmdng systom grontly speeded up usc of
    my mortnrs: In rifle compmw commHnd group, I always hnd tho mor~
    tal' section sorgNmt find one mrm with n roll of 13d wire. Tho mor~
    tan USually follo',;cd the nttacking plntoons and vlhon on" of the,
    lot.dine platoons wns tGld up, vlhiL, I pointed out the target to tho
    mortc.r sorgo ant , tho rdrC't'If'.n 17m3 rolling Tliro bnck to tho morte.rs.
    By the time tho sergco.nt hnd figured his range to the target, the
    mortc,rs nere in communication ,:ith him nnd the first round on its
    nay. This savod vo.lu"b18 tine, in thnt I didn't hnvG to send bnck
    for the observer.
    The 60mm illuminnting nortnr shell vas found to be by far tho
    best flnre for night Ylork. In defensivo positions nt night, they
    should bo sighted so as to coYor the entire front nith flnres ~nd
    the reserve compnny TIOrt'lrrl should be attached to the AT guns so as
    to afford illul"inntion for night firing against "nemy armor. We
    tried this in pr[lctice and found it to be very successful."
    Sergennt GEORGE E. CHRISTm1SEN, l33rd Info.:1try.
    liThe 60mm mortar is of very little value against vlell-prepared
    positions. When setting your glffi up, neVer set it up on the forymrd
    slope of a hill, nor in a drr,y/ "8 these nro usually zeroed in by
    enemy artillery or morto.rs.
    !hnte veT you do use ~ littlo common sensel"
    Sorg0::mt LOWELL W. HfJlTSFIELD, 133rd Infnntry.
    "During our last phase of combat, thr, 60lr.m mortcr section,
    of pj1ich I nm n meTIbor, l'Ient into th", lin" under n neVI set-up 17hich
    '.'JCS worked out 17ithin tho platoon by the platoon leader.
    This rln8
    be. sed on former combat oxperience and proved to be highly efficient
    o.nd highly successful.
    T!Jc first [md second sou~ds of the section were equipped o.s
    they hf'd nhmys berm. Tlrt "is, they cnrried two mortnrs nnd six
    bne:s of nmmunition. Thu third squad, however, cnrrirod no gun but
    cr.rriod four bngs of amTIunition while the sqUad loader carried
    clenning equipm;nt consisting of c. cl"nrti.ng stnff, V1aste [cnd r.g,
    nnd oil. It l'Ia s also tho responsibility of the. third sqund lc"der
    nnd his sqund to kOGP th" gun supplied with arnmunition during an
    nction by bringing nmmunition from the supply point to tho guns
    whenever it nas needed. Thus , it can be summed up b,y' stnting thnt
    instead of the usunl TIE of three guns nnd nine bags of ammunition,

    - 29

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    our soct.iol:, y:;nt into' ~ction "."i+,h


    tion. CP no~ cnnc fro:"; tL(' 'c,bi-::'c1

    vuns

    ~,'-o
    .,~u :d. 1I

    ~:l1d

    tan

    b1.g~

    of

    ('.DP.1Ul1i

    lI~xpcri(mc,) has tp.,ugr:t Uc tr:",t th:.-; qncIYI;:v- ~~ill C0untCyr 60r:ltl


    morto.r fire T-,~tth .much lcr:;cr guns, In.'lking it n. ;-rr.v~~ to hnv::1 c~tor....
    nc.to pardtions ct aJJ tin:' s. l~lr.tD.Ys Ice.vG the position ,J'Ol1 h:':\ro
    just firod from im~,odi&tcly HpO~1 firii:1;r :rour nissibr:.. n.nd move to
    -;:,h0 2.1 tcrn~1 t'C;. ,Th:; T!".ovPYlent ):lust ;.)0. don,] r\ridly for th'J onoD-Y is

    qui.cli: to return
    :.~:llcn

    o~r fire.
    E11_t,~;:!:"nn.t;" .f ir ~

    nz posi ti on8 ~TC not IJ.vn.iln.'.Jlo, posi...


    tions ,'lffording- ,G'ooc~ cove,'!"' shcm2d-"h; .found, and y,Thcn t1 fire !"rl:!. 3sion
    io. ?~mplotcd. n~"iT~; ~o t~.!:l"'"'. .I_'tor ~h;:. cn:my b(l.s fir:d returr.. to Y01}r
    Ol"l.~~;ln~'l pOS1.tlon ~:1.\:t ~'JX',:) t~.L D8Xt ml~[2l0n, ropontlng the f);':.rJ.o
    l=,roccchu'o nf:tqr ot::ch ~.im:3ion. 'Tr.is r:-.E.-.thod hf"!s' be.cn 'l.lG,:...d v~'ry- (:1"'
    f(;ctiv\.~ly, csr;coic~lly rrL:~n -re; wore in th:' to'.:n 'of CfL30T:', o.lon,,::"; the
    rB~'!O '!:i vcr.
    In tbrc'o c1c::tG ~.70 fiy:.:d J!!or\'~ thnL 1,000 rou.'1ds (,l1d
    :coc~.;5_v( a sarno v;.~ry }:(;[1;':'I (10'1' t.:;r :firo, including- 170 1 s.
    On 1_ of
    O'l'.r cun5'''~''7f'.S 1:.nockr;e. out '-~ld on; s~,gh-t, ')ut ':7(:-; hj'"",d no pcrsonr:.cl
    cr'.C'UL.ltic:s. "
    "f:ood

    Thn infantry C[1.rnor~ conp,-~11i s of this DJvision l1nvc


    ,').T"] {)qldrp .. d ~7ith. tb, 75mm Pr.ck Ho~.Ti tzar.
    hf'.vin;; ('.
    g~,:'(.;!.::tcr r[~ng:, t'.nd morl; t1f'.'1clT"'I?(:r~,.bili t:'7 t11r'n tr.:r' present l'-'5i.1D lloy,'
    it.z.cr, ~,l3, it hf\;:, mudo u-s: ,ro:::' its lcc-sor P\;.~'.ch by grCF'.tcr o.CCllTCCY
    f.~ld rapidity of' fir.:;.
    (3)

    C;~nton.

    prc.fc:rI'c~c1 r'nd

    UIn nw opin:l.on th,; 75!:'J':, l;~.~.ck H~'Y;itzcr is th" ?1.1n ~o:'? r.:1.1 cr.n
    non cOP.1prmins. ~his f~l.ct CC'.:1 8::\sily bi~ confirmed 'oy Si:11"Jy chock
    ing Ot'.!' rOGords. II

    }I'irst Licuten0.nt DE ,"X: C. r-::::LLC1!?S, IJ5tl~ IrJ'Entr~r.


    "Tonc:} the inf'i.nt::oy rGf"":_E'.(~t ho~~ to shoot f'.rti} lory. C:"'.nnon
    company jO':l is to suppo:"t, Lut L:t tl:,' infnnt."Y 'h~lp. "'"nch FO
    !:1,,;,thoc: of cond~~c-c of firu, T.~}.'8 th'.' DOl.;ghbo:r1' ant to ,'3crv5"c-.~ pr:'.c
    tico, mnk~) CC1.cl~ Dr.ir of Gyc~) ::. ll~O.
    fr,c'(;oT'ily n.c..j'l~:rt.{~~d by tL ~. Yrfc~rrtry
    d~.lring combr,t ..

    'ri:--,o -PJrc h . . is b: en vU17 ~,,;;:o.ti3officer;] in this rogi;'" :.. :at

    linl~

    1< i...:(;[t C~.L110n co~:rp"'.!i::": l..rhcl~,r ',-i e~ntr,J. cOlJ.trol. ".l1y ho."\te hr.lf
    tho g1.1'~;3 idle, (".Thon th,.:.::),' ClOl.!.~d be l::.s{:d. ;'~ Dimple FDC '.7i11 \.:'o:rk
    ~..rondcrs.
    Th,.~ p,'1ck 75n:m EO~.'.~itr:c-r bn~s 200() Yrir(ls [:.or~, r:-:-.ng,; ,:,nd .200
    mils lJO:'.~C ,-,lcv[;.t.-Lon ~hnn t:J.:, =.05Y.1r1 !{3. 2000 y,':'!.:rds rnon:us ttrJ c1.iffer
    G~CG of cov>..:ring the snctol' or not. Ttis ~,TI.S ~~ruc at MONTIQUILA,

    - 30

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    PANT!..l~O, C!llSINO 11M JJ'IZXO.

    rho loll is lighter but you Clln CC'.l'ry


    more of them. High r:ngl"s of 6ito I'\re vary frequent in tho moUJloo
    to.ins. :.t PliNT/JlO they ran as high as 150 mUs. 75mm o.lso has a
    fl~,sh h:!.der that florks. Wo have shot 17hon the fiold artillery
    couldn't. The pack C1:'.n bo tabon down into. at' least eight pi,)cos
    nOO neighs lCOO pounds loss than 105m. We ,should have spJ.it trnil
    75mm hck H o v , i t z e r . , , '
    '
    Give us the 2i.. ton 6x6. It will go throUgh the mud end up the'
    hills, , It Tlill pull out Tfhero tho It-ton vehicles rJill be left. If
    you c!ln't get int,o position yO\! cnn1t shoot.
    !<Irke B1;U'O the Doughboy knows' hOW to communicato ir.l.th the C['jj~
    non company_ With thn redias notf in tho r"giment it is simple. Use
    wire where you can. Lay doublo Unes when you can. OF lines give
    a more reliuble fire serv:i:ce. Also it is better for security sNte.
    Hills pIny hell with the- 31)0 series radio. Radio "ms all thnt was
    used at PfJlTANO, CtSSTIIO and L1JrUVIO."
    First Lieutenant HlJlFCRD C.EVE,
    JR.. 135th Infantry.
    ,
    '

    liAs soon liS the battalion wit.h nhich you are working takes a
    nel1 pooition it is our job to, register several points around the
    position ,at once and :1;0 get eoncentrationnUlllberll on the point!!. If
    you do this it will enable you to get firo on almost any'point in the
    battuUoll. sector in about one,.half' the time it "auld te.kc if' you
    called, for the fire by co-ordinateB~ This procedure haa helped me
    quite a few times in,oounterattacks."

    Corpctl'al MORRIS WILSON,' 135th Infant17'


    "I have found it ;is a gOod practice tihen in the field to

    ah7ays ret!l-in, oDough powder charges in n convenient phce, p:r:ofer..

    ably nn oflpty shell CM!;), in order that no time be lost ana nou

    'fire lJll.ss.ion.Jn, which another charge or two is req,rirod. If' \"e are

    !iring say char~e onu and have tl19nty rounds prepared. to fire, I

    mGke surc,llV ammunition 1l'<81;l ~f! t\7entyeharge two, three and f01.1r

    poridor Pt'.gs.' woere' theyl!lP~'.bcgotten on an instant notice. Thon

    ovonoh tlie da:rke.43t' night itrs asimpla mll,tter to replace thern in

    tho" shell cr ~:tng if needed, ~nd get the r,ounds out there in the

    shortest~possible, '\;iDEl.
    ',.
    ".',
    .. '
    .
    ,

    --

    I,

    FirstLieM~.eIlaI\t ~DW. p.~,.o! mIEN. l33rci Inf'~ntry.

    ~:~~i~Q;t'tf~~i~fe~!~ 'tfhi~~:~~t~6~;~ei~e:Ii;d

    poai
    country '~lw1111.mq:r'l,f~v~l;ab,l'f,.,peIT~il'j~, tn the campaign bel,tipning
    e.round the first p~.rt"~f "rrU:&',' -tltt-ough' 'the' hlllsto the, ple~n beo
    , forotl;le IJlN(J River, I \Ws an observer for acOl!t))lll'lY of 75mm cnn
    nons, Time and again units on tho right and left reported thom..
    selvqa. ah,e,ed df vtherq, t.nw !lctually were. BY taking their given ,
    positiollil and !lllciiving'l'
    t.qUi'l'W safety miJJ;'g:!.n
    for firing a lot 01'
    . . .'
    .
    , -

    31

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    enemy te.rgotll on our flanks, th~t \191'0 hllresaing


    been neuu-alilled, oore rElfU50d. II
    .

    UII

    and could have'

    (4) 57rnm AT Gun.


    Private First C:;'I\SS

    M:~T:[N

    F. VOIGm, 133rd Infantry.

    liThe rlheel segments on our 57mm LT guns should be taken off as


    they catch cOl'11l1Ullic'.ltion I'lires and it has beenpro,'cn that with the
    br1lkes set the gun can be fired: just as aceuro.teJy."
    Captain EDWD{ LEWIS, Headqunrters 34th Infantry Divisio,n.
    "57mm AT guns can do II greet job on machine gun emplacements

    direct support ertill'lry if we had more HE ammunition. f,bout

    60% 1.1' and 4fY/. HE170uld be right."


    .

    I).S

    First LiGut'lne.nt SIGURD OlSON , 133rd Infll.ntry.


    "I believe that gun crerrs should be trainod in riding the tanks
    viith the LT guns in too, ?nd the!ll!Jl!l1mi tion and 'lquipment on the
    tr.nk. This nffords a means of getting the guns into position uhen
    it is impossiblEl to get there vlitb a truck. Tra.ining in OUll rest.
    nroas has shov.'ll us this cl:'n be done quitG ensiJy. The IGsson lias
    Larned at CECINI. during the day of 1 July. Company 'iF" of this
    battalion assa~ltGd the tOlTa, riding on and advancing with. tho
    tQ.nks. TbGy by-passed SOmE> enell\)' mschine guns which remained si~
    lent when tho tenks were nco.r, but Jrh1ch opened up aga:tn \'Jhen they
    had passed. Their fire suept thG only road open into the tOml and
    thon fired on any movement. If Vie had Deun able to go in l'lith thG
    tanks i7e could have given tho riflE> .troops /,lome bndlY needod.' T
    protection. 1,s it vms, r,;e were forced to wait ti:l the gun!? TlerG
    silenced, wiLtch nas about dusk, before we could get into tho tOlm.
    I believe that -ehe gun cr8WS should be trained in night fir~
    ing ''lith the aid of 60rlm flares. At L!.lt! on 16 July our guns \7ero
    far forward and 8ighted to cover from thDflank$the two roeds
    loa<).inl'. into our battalion Be.etor. .That night enemy armor wt:\S
    henrd moving along, these roads but the gunn01's were .unable to fire
    because of darkness. With this thought in mind, WG worked up P,
    method to enablGus to fire at night. Tho guns shOUld move into
    position during daylight, if pOSSible, to give tho gunners E. look
    at the terrain in front of them. Coordinate firo with one of the
    60mm squads so thoy will be able to fire their :flnres diroctly over
    tho tC'rget upon call. If firing at these flares is continued at
    the rat" of onG every 20 or 30 sE'lcol;lde tbctargot. pre". is very Vlell
    lit up.. and the gunners, during our oxerci se, were able. to see the
    cross hairs 'lnd IGad me.rkings in their sight very plainl;;'. They
    m,re able to pick up nnd track,suo.cessfulJy, their targot. The
    disknce to the target vms I;Ibn'lt 6110 yards and tl:lC target was a
    pe~l? meving across the tGlT'lin. The gunnel's and squ~d leadGrs c,ll
    t'.groo that the method is simplG enough and that it is workabh. 1I

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    ( 5) Grone.do s.
    First Lirutcnnnt JOHN C. ,',rL":2, l33rd Infantry.
    "It is !'V opinion thc,t moro onphasis should br plac<'Jd on the
    usc of the rifl" grenc.do. On ,,'oout 28 June, tienr C!.STLGNETO, c,
    right fl:crlk platoon ,;,as pnrtinl1.y surround:d l:(y nbout 50 Gormr.!ls
    o.r1Kd '.lith machine funs, nachino pistols "end rifles. This plf1toon
    \"ICeS in a dry rivel' bod" n!).d tho a,\lrroundl;ng cou.'1try TIaS very flat
    uitl~ a netrlOrk of draillflge and irrigation ditches' thc,t ,~org somo\7hct
    groml up "ith brush. Th,~ Gerf.!ClnS were abort 100 yctrds from our
    positions flO thnt we were \ill[(ble to ol'lploy our mortars. Tho pla
    toon hed no grenede lnt'llch'_'rs, ~,nd ,me unablo to dislodgo the Ger
    r.lnnsby smell "-I'l"S firo. It is lI\V opinion that these, machinG Guns
    could have been knocked out Or forced to withd:r'm7 if rifle grelli'Bes
    hnd beon used on them. n
    Captain /,LBE1l1' J. HOIHJELIE, 135th Infantry.
    "A "hito phosphorus rifle eren!'lde can bo lI1D,de from a rcgul~r
    LT rifle gr0l1cde "no. " ''1' hand ::;renade. Those "ere used to e, good
    advantage at :.NZIO. TLoy should be m'lde by an ordnr.!\ce compo.ny. If

    "The b"ttdion Lid ~-::."tion mr.rks tho point v:here first echelon
    medic"l service erds"ud second echelon r.1edicr.l servtcr, beg:i.ns. In
    ;peacutime on mr,net:vers, in barrflcks 11f0 1 and during rest periods,
    this is a logical definition of c.et:!.vity. In combat, hO'70v"r,
    tHs &yctcm 1'11.11 not c,nd he.s lievor r;o~ked out. Collecting comprn
    ics, <'s constitut0d, do not ;cerform t"e func-cion outlined for
    them in thu field m,muc.ls. In ord9r 'GO SQI"TG the. traops most
    offici, ntly within the frnr.e'iork of the, prescnt Tlo .'lnd tactical
    doctrinos, t110 follor:ing he.s been nacoss,~_rry:
    . (0.) Glose liaison bct,';ccn t.be rcgim~ntc.l surgeo:! and tho col..
    l"cting cO!:1tll'tny com.'1V'nQor
    (b)'.inbull'lncos rr,ew be()Bpl(jY;'d~sfnrll~ns bnttnlien dd
    . ,
    sk.'.;ions, or it r;lf'Y b~ j.m1Jo~s:_b!o to got ,m "rnbul'lnce to uithin
    miles of the' brtklion "id sl;:-.tlon, Enoh of theso bituations poses
    a difforE.nt t"cticnl prooLm nnd ch".ngc(s the rol~.tionshi,:, oDtweon
    first, nnd scc0nd echLlon l'wdical ,s<Jl'vioes, and: thus c~l\nges tho
    rQsponsibllit;: of tllC rogimc~tc,l SU.l'g"on n.nd the; c0JI.:cttn;:; compc,ny
    con'mc,)ldol". . Tho tpctic.,,J situation itsulf che;r-goB rrpicUy 'c.nd for
    o8,ch batt~lion lid st~tion, tho situction nay be difforont. Thus
    it cnn be soon th,.- t thcl old d'.vi(lien b,)tw00n fi ~st Dnd second
    ocholon ncdical s0rvice is ~n "rbit""l':i' one, ,In tho p';st; mc,ch .dis
    ngrcomc}1t '1.nd dishnrmc..u- dovelQ1)c:d br.o':l.tlsQ o~ this. Tho reo.l
    sepl'lrntion betm)~n :irst "nd S,'ce)nd ochelon medicr,l service hns
    boen found to be at thi:ct point v:h~re n casualty ceases to be
    - 33

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    tro.nsportcd by }1,'l.nd end ('D.n be' put, into nn f'nlml -:ncn. No nr:t'~cr c.t
    uhc,t point fl2.ong tl-'.n rOute ':1i' r:vnr:un::':'ion this OCC1;:-L'S, -!.t is ~. cloer
    cut n~_'lcl dcfhli"L .jl~nctioL" 'r~
    cc:J J .. ct~.ng CO:JP'1:1Y thw.7J b~;co:J.CG in
    ror.li ty, {'!.n tLIi.hul . . . l1cG (;(" ;p"r::;.~. It ~ringA it.s ."m(JuL1Yl.CUf:: e.o closo to

    tho field of' h,.ttlc :~S ros3iclG~ rr!;c rcgimcn-Gc.l Gv:~~cr:;on ,"',~d ~!is
    o.sststnnts tl,us h,'l'.cl:' t.tL" rG~1:QY1f.ibiJ5ty of c\!~~.cuD.ting tht3 1cttlc
    field, rend:~r1r1[" thJ ~\;it~l ~u::"l.c;~1 o.~"d !l.ocQssr~_r:T itt th'J nid st,':'.tioYlS,
    2nd t1-)cn brir;.gir:g t1108u Fot~.e!1'~'S ~o tho \"J.r:.iting ~mb~llnncos ..
    In ordor to :::=,crfor rr, t,1::..L.[! job, the: reg~imentnl s,urgGon must
    boyo in his cO!""1t:;--')l -:-.].2. thc"") littsr bOQrers ~orP.1,'l.lJy nss5"gl1r:d to the
    collecting conp'-'~n~,~, pl"t.13 r;;:1<'J,tovor (,delitiortfll_ Iitt,'r bearers he Cnn
    ObtC.1.L. Fe 1"1ust. p,'-'}::,:: [: t,hO!'C1~}?h st1Jdy of the tncticn1 situr.tion
    c1d ~.n QCC"Jl~~t(; cst:;.;rt__ t,: cf' ~--'hrt r:il: be; needod ~.nd then n.et LC....
    coy'dingl:,r, ,~.r.d ~':~~ rms'0 do t~lis, not c;ft,:::r.the casunltir::s occur, but
    IJ.C~r,(i' l 1C 'U:'"'8 l)(;f . . n-'e

    '.

    .-'

    ?iLi (3 D'.~ vis5_o:~ h~',G :f'ol~CLt in mo:mt':!,inou8 tcrrnin during mostof t,~~1 ItclL-m Co.:--;p-":ip:n,, On mal::.:'" occ{',si.O::1S, it hr-s beer: ir:po.ssii,)lc
    to Dripg f'n ,""m,__ :':l~-';'lc'_' '-n~7,:",-11nr.5 norror thnn 2 - 5 milos to tho bnt
    t~lj_on ,~:id staV_ons for ":8:::>1-:'8 r',t .-. time.
    It h~s been nccessQI'Y to
    or.'::::-,nizo ';"l "(,~~or !';:)~ [-,Y8 c~1ns::_st:.r,~ of t'.S Jl1[1ny ns 16 rel,"'.ys, orr:ploy
    in:; ~-::',1~dY'cd~;: of litt01' bCJc'Y'8rs, bctnben ttr.;: fr0ntlino t.nd tho \7r5t
    in' G'Td':_;;': DO;0G. On ";V(1~":.' 'Jnc of th8S0 OCC:_'.fJiQr:s, it has boen t:1(:
    r81,:,;iillo.__ ntr.1 ;3'Jr~:,~'on ~nd i'd_G ::.s~]l,~_,-:"r,_nt8 ':TflO org::'mizod 'UJC~lC relr,ys c..Dd
    kept '~b8m funCt7011~.ng, u;:',inr~ t~c litter LC[,rCrs assignGd to the;
    col1G8~_,inc: cor:lp--n'I v!hcn_.:"?ct' [1::: Sf'---; fitQ
    Y!Q of t:'1is ref:!'iment. hevo
    boon f'ort~0.to- in'" ULV,:..] or;in~; ::t. ci~sc li,,:ison '__, :it:'} o'ur ~upportir..z
    collucting COfrlI""n:r so th' t "~h~ fUl}ct:~on of CGsu~'.lty ;;vncuo.tion hr.s
    procooded sYJoC~jhl~r r~nd ':::dTieir-mtly.
    If tbo rcg:inont:"l.l J1.1r,~.,';on tr'.d tr.k~m the E'.ttitl1doto !!',~!cll~ th~_;

    F~'-l E'-:tys tL'1t th:: c911cct:'_11P,' cO!'"tpnny ""ill (!v[~cunt~ the: f1.id stC!.tionll,

    end then tad S,'It beck r~n':l :::'.it,~ d for thnm, t'r..oro Y,rQ'Jld h:-,_vo been

    li to:r~~ll:.r h',wdY>,._ d.s of r'~-::'iGnts stj.1J. lyi.nff on the mallc':~Clin sides

    of l(>.ly or els{; ,)V;tcu.n.t.;~,d Ly tl:.f7; GT~.S. The. 3rd crossinr~ of tIlE';

    VOLl'URNO, tho bntt] c of I'it. n:FRONE, tho hins


    VE~'fYIW, [:nd

    tho o.d"'rnnco frot'. ':}I~ CSSBT0 to tbo PJGJO ,-:;rr; il~Lustrct lons of th,:,

    Eboyo.[!

    ,,""'18

    ilIt is

    f1,

    dci'.:Lnitr: TJort'.lc .fr;ctor to

    i.nf~.ntry troops to

    knol':

    rtS

    tl'lcy ;;0 into corbnt t\.... t if ~_:l1C~y ~,rc ',:'oun.dcd they v.ri:l not bnvG to

    }.:"1 out or: the fi.::~:l ~" ~X't';l ,', 1'01' :, long period of time.
    Tho

    'LVo:Cr',f;C ir,f,':'.:1tr:,~::1"'ll h:,s .-~ fco:i.'" of this '"Tbich .is so stronr: :.j,t,hin
    hir:. t:-:,t t tl~' T::l_::-ll,t,:, 11C 1.;.; 1.-.;Ul)nu~:d ]-10 t.hink's only of yelling 'medics 1
    or Il~. t'\JT sq'l::.D.!. fI

    ilU~lKJ l:r i;-~ ",n i'.id Gt.;:-,~t.i c:. ',~;~-::nr..


    ensue1,] t~l OCf!Urs conf'w:lon
    o.rtscs ,:'1Q "'.b01.1.t :I::Lv~; r-~ln t:cy -en jn t}~,:.; ~ob of ;2 neD. In our ',~.id

    sto,tior.. 0, c~Jrtain nl],r1~Y';r c, !:'~cr;, "'.l'e) on duty ('ct r.~ cr"rt:::5'11 ti:~IC. If

    ;t

    - 34

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    oe c,'\rcd foY' by the !:len r.lrcudy


    on juty the ot"'"r l'1e" .oro or lIed to help during th;) rU3h. In tl-J.s
    ':;C'.y ',-.;C ,'-'voiC. r'c'2h cor:i'usioL~!1
    t~ ~c...rc c:.ro norc p1.ticnts tb'-n C:-;E

    11~..'llilc n tccbnici -::.n ir ~~ bntto.Iion n:i..d stc:.tion I ho.v(; ObS01'vcd


    !ni'.ny ti.r.1C'S t.1~() Dcc:")ssit.~. . 0.[' hr.viD~ n ninosV,roc;per n"!lniJQbl(~' to -t,ho
    b['.ttolioL mcdies .t:o ;:,id in the. c'lC',cu[1.tion of :.301diors vlOunded in

    fioldso
    J', good 8xR.oplG of tr'e; oit,,,o.tion took ';)1c'co 6 Novembor 1943.
    T-,;o soldiors ':.'pr,,; s(,vor01~,r '.'ioun.drd i:t1 n mir.~diold" Thr,:'B litt r
    "ocnrors ViorA sent into t}-J\; I"'.ir:.p.field t.o bring them out. "'-.t1ilc in
    tho ['.ct of doir:.;; to, t':"JO of tl-"J~ ~?0rC {:Iso scv8:L..... el:r "\:;ro1.mded. E8t~er
    than sC'.cr:ifice more Ii tt" .r LeDr'(TS in thr "" ttr~l?1pt to bring the:n
    out (~n ordor ~aa3 sc~t tc the ::',~;tt2,lion P al-:d L st,~tion for uine
    S1-;GCp8rS ':,it,o ;-:~r:; 8t t>: t. ~ rT,'~ ):,_~pV'" il :1l]l-; bOCt'_~130 of oth8r rTcrk.
    Thore '.-]as fl dcl,::y ai' ."':" :-j ll:T -,)c::oro p. pc,tb to thr ''ounded cocld be
    cloared . ',11 of thi.c :.ct~!ic:, took pIc.ce vithin 2nD :'flrcls 01 C.n
    [tid stn tioD ',":r:e:t8 tho:-. -:-'o~,nc\:d ~01].lJ. hG-:,?o 1'8coivod proT1pt p.t-:'ention
    ii' there bn.d beon i!lin8R'_-;E'~cr:crs {>."',~c;ilublc.!l
    rD.YW

    fI~"~ ['"."'11 "tdr;inistcrirr nid j.!1 '_isur>ll:.r n'}t drm7 fire oven tho:Jgh
    he '.x~ in open t,~]r:-:-o>iL.. On. tiv:,', othnr h, nd) t;1rco or four men gc:tho:c
    in?; 0Vor Q, r.round .~d cOT:lpLtdon oftc:'; :-c-;su] tJ~; il~ thf', entire ~:roup bo
    cC'Hi:r..g C1J..sr,['t1tios. 11

    1J7t:crl3 ly,.v(: l:',-' -r.. too r:-,--_n.:r instr:r:.ccc of :r'1.}srd!1e into, :- si tw--:
    tion \,tith01..:t ';ulJ._ k-,m-;J.ed,:;': of ",}bat is rnppsnjng.
    ',:.;(3 ha'vc cJg!(,Jri.:l!ccd 3~tun,tiorlG Y:~10re a Tittle eorc tim~ ;'..ll1d
    pr!?~)nration "..,~ould npvo s,:---,v,'d tiT7Jc, r:,~tcrj ~1 !'nd lives"
    F.:)r instA.nce:,. I:1plOPCr.. roc()nneisSancE) causing ~. bnttalion 011
    ~rucks, to dQt,r~J,r.Y '7',Ld fi,~tt f():", ,'1:!l P.sC8ITlt.ly areA::.
    Or: The difL,rGlct rmDl)'C1. not: J:~ving tine to rimch their
    (iGsie;nated nro[\s prGpnr9.t::-:ry to tt_: ettr:~k. Tl1cn ttG ettaci{. is
    1'r
    "........... T'" t.1.1..-,
    ~ '-.
    to be sot -:Jrtck as r.r'JcY: [tG six
    ."'l'
    , x~u'
    ....... 1:), ~t nd t'}
    ., '--.'
    .J"Lu}-,-('I,_:L
    1 ."t'::;
    _
    .

    or oight hours.
    Or~

    'I'h~~: r.::::cklcss r.''l-y in <.7hich mined

    nr08.S

    :l.rc treated.

    '.-:8'

    hE:VG seen vch'i_clcs :"nd c>::;"1ipPlcnt oloY,'n lJ~ on ro,:'.ds Dnd trcils SD2.t

    nre ~l"inly mc.rlud' '.i tIc t', 'Cc.r:c.n mine 3itn.


    is tukon, it cn.n c"'; 8f"_:Jil;, d,--,t,:;.rT"~_"l.::-~G 'f.rr:c;tLcr

    If "littl( cc.ution
    r0ad ho.s iJ;:'8D

    t}lJ

    ; 1 X", ,:,.dy trn '.J' 1_~'(1 it.


    '
    Plenty of' time for ,'T~~C()Y;~~'~.is[;'":".r:-'>3, P!'(;p:"3Tr:tio:n, . . nd pr,3Gi~g on
    to tho troops nl1 ini'orIT.,",+,im' ~,,_,1_c~Ll:_ t;l~,~ ,:.ri.l~_ insure ,", bettor chr.ncc
    of S1}CCess. EV8:t!. i~' t!'lC :::it:__1C.t/ on lS pre8f,inc, HLook boforo you

    8TJop"I.i or vehiclcG hr .vt::

    - 35

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    (' ptr.:ln PICE".i'!)

    r.

    :7IL1{PlSON,

    13_~rc1 Il1fr.,nt~J.

    T1:;tc 0ki:~g s'!ivc,ls Sh01.:ld b~ roroovcd. Thc,y catch in the Grush


    ,.. (,;' to thn naiso in ni~tht r.ttncks.
    i',:'-L"; USc of dr~l.',TS ~,S -:.. ~ut,cs of npproQcb cnuses many casuo.ltios
    from ~rti.reI':.- ":101 mork,' fire in mourrtai.n fighting. By using
    m01ll1t.".:'.ns O'.We hi.ll. sldee; s J.ectinr thG best cover f,,1'1 casualtics
    rC:';:l~.11~. c~ lro:'rj rrti.lJ ~.lIT OX' mortr:..r fire,~
    f.s T!"!ost drFlW"s arc COVG1~c:d
    'i)J' n2:';:J":.>:..;ry fir,
    thc:y r:~~:kt. poor routos of n~;pr(l2.ch.
    It is bost to carry ",ortar begs ovor your shoulder p.s it is

    or. si cr tc :]i t . tb-.... g~Ol}.l1(-l c,<),rryinG tr OM th[l.t Hay.

    (}jl;.:: 1. Gl~r.IS fil"


    c"nst: f, fm7 cnsualties SO look up 1'lS often QS
    :)l'l:~si'ol t.) see l:rhnt is going on.
    Ph~!n your head is' down you soe
    11()t'1.~~r!,g -- -:"hlm it is up it is onl:,r t~.'w inches higher, you can SOG
    t,~l' f,i;:'n\t:~.0:,) ';}1fl pr('lt"~et ~/ours8lf 'r.nd YOtJ.r cOIIp.'"ad:os."
    ~nc

    .k~':;C"'.nt IT.'l\5Y C, V:J.iEREK, 13Jrd Infantry,

    "1:1 ':oU'.:05 up on the; HE." I h<"'1o ,,itncss~d mAnY fellow GIl s


    i:,] ,"'J.<ion. In ont, c,. SO l.~.rc: 1.~.r8Te going t,hr'''Iugh th() brush in the
    m01:c.l-:-,,'i.1')S n:J !'., l:lf~chitw-pistol opcnod up Dn us from our fle.nk Clnd
    '",> :,',11 l:it tlk, g"cl';:;.d.
    r.'~ [:.0.':':;' '1 fa>:: n(;l,',~ r,18n r.. ith us thAt hr>.d just
    C()l!1C iri.
    1~(1 one lJf'::L tq t,')J.l th:t1 to get do':!n, they lust did.
    I
    :t8>3C. one lr.tur 11C'I':1 C'O;!l("' 11!: got dO':.:n and h(; s[_id it came natur,c> 1.
    ]8 ':~t:'ok CD'!C:-:- f'nd :"~o0d cover. i1'-~ Got -ochind f_:, big rock, but the
    t:~0ublc 0;'1'10 'ft':;l' t:'ot.
    r... Got ctO'::n end th:m stnrtedtryfng to
    f:l"~ur(.; ,jl-.st ":hGr . t.:loS :f'irr) r.'''~s cor-dr.?: fran.
    Ho '17cnt around tho rock
    t<.:ic~, uhti.J :: fj,Lc.. ']y ,-ot close cncl1,[;h to point out tho dirco'i;ion
    in ;,. . ~d,Qb t:k' ~1.1J"1,"'t8 'i'.\_;Y"l, comin,s froJ::. I, rryself hnd :the Same ex
    pcrienco . . . .hr'n I ::'ir.st. c~'"":~o in t :'1--l h.-"c~ to lCQrn tly- hard Yl<'Y.
    Y,:hrt I tIdn}:: i::; tt:;y ;Jb01:,l.d c'JtJ d01.-.:n on running thes0 'Keop
    dOYTl1 cou..rS(';f,jl : nd five ~.r:!J fel] o~.' .. s in tho st"',tns more of r cr[~clc
    G;':ui thu'l"'1,p 1 It 13 cten h::.~::-d _r"'or .- n nxpurionced ~.;oldior to pick out
    t~,C srot r.;'-18r _: t~Hj :C'ir ia C.l~:1.~_g fr(~m ':"i'tr'out assuming thnt nG11
    feJ10Y;s call. 1I

    ilene of -Jur !Tl:-'Yl is d:'n.d ':"'odny :);)C-'1t1.S8 he pi,cked up ~. Germ,'n


    m.-chinc "'UlOC,.:Ot !' " ; j hd c\,-iv,n ofF th, enr;my nnd ho c[\rri8d it to
    ,Y,,,',:' ,'"' SL '<_,ly poi::tt ,,'lY". o:-)po3it;,"~ .::.d[;tj of thf: hi2.1 17hcre he ."\irnd it to
    S(j~, if' it ~:orkc;d.
    ~.~ G;.;~r:,[.'--::, '-"'1' .',P.1cricnn tcnk h'c'nrd it and zeroed
    i:~ on Yir':.
    Th _ sncond nhC'~ 1 "":'r.;~t C~Jne ir! exploded him r,11 over
    t:'lL ~)1[,

    co.

    about som~ of th0


    lu,t fnll~/ r:nr~{.:,d r.rith their
    >"': .,;'.~ '-:nd -i.r,.)~ Tl:csc i:;~:,otc 1::crCl to.::"l -ith unmo",-x,d gr~ss, nhercus
    t' L:r~'.l:2 ir 'Vh; , l]lf'";.nl'rj }:' )rt;.ons of th," s:--..m; fiolds rU1S mO\7od.
    ph: ff'1 ,:Or.'!. -tin';-- thl~ -'Ol_"~U ',x; ."!. vc:11J~bl'7; :,it of knowledge for 0.
    ;:::!(;,,t ['c1"'.~:-',nr'~ ",,'-~ :1.. ( f~ll G::"'t;~' l.j'ldrc the:.) GorI:".D.DS hnvG )1.~.d time to re
    SOY:. tLcir l.'"chb.l! ~" ~1}in"~'L I ~j~_ (Tn S n.nd barbed Tlire, rmtch out for
    t.'~.ll cJ..ovc,r fi()~ ,,J. H

    ~j'Ur Sq1J;"'.J :1-":2';:: nDi::"2:' ,".D :i..ntc;:"-8~~r:,-: ff"'.~t

    j'r-',;"8flLldf ~"tich t;-:~: Jc~r]'L.~J ;1rv,.;

    - 3(

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Socond Lioutencnt DELN P. H::ULTON, 133rd Infrmtry.

    v1

    "r"ly cor'pany 17GS ordor,~d to "dvanco ono Ilftornoon and along '::i th
    th" order came InfoI'l1l\tion thrtt the high ground to our l~ftm'.$
    occupied 1:1<.( friendly troops. ,'Ie n.dvllncfld with thllt assurl1ncc, cnd
    1701'0 caught in " hc'lVy fbnking fire from that supPQsedly occupiod
    grot1!ld ~.nd had to dthdrm: or to trapped.
    '
    Tho lesson I lonrncd ;Prom th,,1; on.. sxperi8nce is never dqpond
    on reports, no m~.tter hOfl off~.cir.l, for protection of your flonks.
    f,lTlays tuke it for granted th,o,t both flanks aro open and occupied
    by enomy."
    First Lieutonant .TOHN V. PEfu"J.!lRG!.3T, 1.35th
    ,

    Inf~.ntry.

    "In severpl J.nstances ",hore nw platoon i7as adVancing through


    vineyards where visibility ':!as Hmited to 15 or 2() ynrds, ,Te forced
    the onenw to surrender eVOl) though we hed never soon him. After
    being fired on' from positions !:ldden from our viol'l \70 1'lould open
    up with every ava.iIable '.':oapon in that general direction nnd ".<1
    vnnce abreast in t.h"t m'.nnc;r". On snvorp.l occnsi,'ns th, GerI!l~ns
    l7v.vod \lhite flr.ge and (iilm(' out with their hands up si.!!lp1-v beceuso
    ere threH ~o much lend norr his positions that he was ,fraid to ox
    ilos,_ himself to fire at us. t. man also forgets ~,bout being afraid
    i f you ce.n got him to stprt shooting."
    .
    Tccclmicd Sergoant ROY 17LLKER, l35th Infnntry.

    "On'tho night of July 7, 1(1/+4, Compnny "G" ,o.ttnck"d ,md'ook


    ",," imlnedintoly bogc.n
    'co die; in th:: hllrd roe-l{ for dn'."Il ,;ould soon ovortnk0 us. Dmm
    broke and everything 1;"S quiet, too quiet.
    To cur front rI single Jerry 51.l'llpcd L'Pf stnrted running Uk"
    11:,;:;11' tahis lin0s. Ono of our riflemon firod nnd missed. Then
    nl.eth<;r took upon himsoLf to f1.ro. Soon tho whole cO!!1pnny rlo.s
    pl~.ctng its '::holo firo tJo,','o):' on t~c' single Jorry. Tho ,mole Jerry
    nrrw lot 100so '::i t]:, sLnil nI';:]S 'md 88 1 s, resulting in !'l2.ny cr.slli'l
    tics :;tnd d' nths just bOc!:V.SD 'TO hud ,:~.., 1:; !2way O"..lI' position,
    strength mid fire po.:er on o. sir-glo Jerry.
    "TC Ine.rned by experien0c to hold c.nd control your fire until
    it is noeded."

    Bin 163, corr,p'letoly surprip,ing tho Jorries.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    CI1AFTER II - APTILLERY

    1. In most instances the Infantr'J-Art.cllury tean has bean developed to a


    fh,e point during current operat; ons. It has oeen ob$erved that newer lmits
    coming inca combet eHher tave net teen ,-n:are of seme ph"ses of b.fantry-Artil
    lery coordination or ha1re no+, )-,.,d snff'idont tr,dning herein due to ammunition
    limitations. The greatest single !.'1~.ctor is tIle creation of an "s;:'Pl'i.t de Regi..
    mental Combat Team", where mutual confidence and respect have developed to a high
    degree. True, the l'eali2;"tion of this e"prit will come only after co~;bat where
    true valu'Js o.re revealed, bolt muc}-: can be d0!~3 in training t.o ha.sten its arrival.
    The lessons learned in t.rain:Lng provGd to be sOl:nd in principle and furnished
    the artillery of the 3/.,.th Ini'P.lltl'Y Divis ton a workuble bas i.s for operation
    against the en8JlljT. Throu,1ho'lt ()J;.!' part :.n ~J:8 camp'lign in Africa and in Italy
    the varied situations that cenfront.ed us ha"e res'.!lt8o in the observation listed
    beloV!.
    11-

    Oper~,t.ions;

    Captain WOODP.OW

    ~i.

    SMITH, 3/fth Division ;"rtillery .

    J.. 1!EmploYll'er.t of Lt".tson Officers: 'In garrison too often


    the selection of office,"s for Li"lison dtlty PaS not indic"tive of
    the importance of that ?nrtic,,::C,!' c.ss~.gnment. In action t.'1e de
    mands on the Liai~lOn ofi'k,.)rs 17E)re such that only very reliable
    men Vlere cntrust.ed wit.h t.ha work. nelnftlIltry commEndors sool;)
    learned to rely o.p. their qrt:_1J or:'" nnvisors f'or noceS,Stlry fire
    support. Close coopernt.1.on w~c o(,tcd.ned witho'lt tiny impetus in
    tho form of writt~n ordGrs, Lic..ison offIcors were cCtlled upon to
    ,solect dofensive fires, hc.r'.,esi.rg Ir~ssiors, preparation concen
    tration concentrat.ions and to reDart Infantry dispositi~ns. At
    times they wore also calJ.ed upnIl to .., djllst i'ire. Physical sta.mino.
    is osscnti(ll. The Li~.ison nn.r~,ios are at t.imos obliged to operate
    under the most adverso conUtiona.
    2. Forward Obs(;r'v"Gr3: TLo Artillery observers rr.ust be
    centrally cont.rolled. '"e found it ,"\dvisablo for t.he Bo.ttnUon
    S-2' s to coordir:s.to o"bscn'v::tt j,O!1 ~~n their OWf! co;nbnt team soctors,
    thereby elimi.natinf, the ;;ossi"o~_li ty of dlLplic'ltiol1 of oE:fort.
    ~bF observers are prone to be over enthusi~stic if not qar0fully
    instr'lcted. It is a natcl.r~,l tondonc;r for inexpe:cionccd officers
    to VJo.ndor off on pat.rol m~saions, to becomG .separated fxom their
    support8d Inf::nt.ry and theroby fet out of touch with the situa
    tion. The observers are tl'lB onl?7 tangiblo t,ouch you. havo ':Jith
    the front llno .:Jlomunts. ;. l'ol'".'ard observer who inv.C\rilbly gets
    pinned dOlan -by Qncrw :-ir3 j s 'l:o:rt.1:;~_es~ ~ Ono Artillery B[,!,ttalion
    lost tl:ro obserV0rs to GLUWj" <'1.cticn in q:..d ck s'.lccession dv.rj.ng
    th:) fig!,t o.round !ill'. PAN~'ANJ. Ipvestigo.tion revealed that the
    t1'iO officers r.ad ple.eec themrel"os in pOf i ti?ns "here observa
    tion we.s secondary to person::l defense. The pext obser'ler sent
    out was instrv.c-ted to look for observat1.on somewhat to. the rear
    of t.ho site of the two previous misfort.1IDc:l;es. The support af
    forded our d8fenc.ing Inf. n:t...,-.y, ;.~as noticeably improved by this move.
    J

    ....7

    ,.. 38 ..

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    3. Reconnaissance:
    Reconnaissances ":ere as varied as they

    lIe"o numerous. In a rc.pid moving situation we found it necessary

    ,to maintain contimlOus reconnaissance by at least one officer in

    the- Division Artillery. Many times the infantry pushed on just

    before dark, thereby necessitating a last minute move of direct

    support artillery~

    4. Selection and occup.~tion of positions: The ideal Fort


    Sill battery position can seldom be found. Many times the posi
    tions available are very difficult to occupy. Battery commanders
    in training 8hould learn to tell at 11 glance i f any given location
    .Jill serve as a bat tory position. In the mountainous terrain around
    COLLI, pioces "ere ,winched into positions that presented almost in~
    surmountable obst'l.c.les. :Cn mnny inst,mces the pieces were spread
    over ,a front coverii-'.g 4Q.J yara"" "lith each piece on a slightly dif
    ferent elevation. There is no get-rich~quick solution to occupa
    tion of a gun position. jTrequently the positions that presented
    the most hazards 'during the actual occupation, later proved to be
    tho most secure.
    In It.11y, 'many of our units put their CP I S in houses. This

    prQctice is fr.ovmed upon in the texts but it worked out very sat

    isfactorily in action. The reason is obvious. The houses in

    .Ituly are extremely sturdy :1nd are so numerous that they have lost

    ,the lone-house-on-a-h5.ll ~SPGct. It is essential that an artillery


    CF be reasoniloly comfort:lble. }'atigue and discomf"ort breed errors
    in firing datn. The artillery technician must do everything in
    his power to eliminClte mi2.tCll:8s.
    5. Observed fires: TI,,, for-;'ard observc<tion method of ad
    ,iustment vms usod nlmost o:clusively. Observers too often fired
    for effect bofore :1 sure br,:ccket. 7'as verified. This practice
    bElcnml3 shnrply ,2pPl'.rent'\t CASSINO, where the majority of the tar":
    gets dem2nded pr8cu8sion methods. 'I'here we found it necessary to
    insist on methodic0.l 0.djustmc.nts. Another pitfall "as the selac~
    tion of tllrg0ts. The inoxpa:-i.3nced observer is apt to be stampeded
    into shootinG at v,~guo and unremunerative locations before he has
    taken time to c:lrefully nscartain the most profitable course of
    action. When the ~UpPQrT.cd inr.'lntryman flro insisting on artillery
    fire in front of thorn thu obeGrver must make every 'effort to lo
    cate the offending r"sis+' nc~. Use harassing and area fire only
    '''''-8 "::'\." l"'cs.-t; Y'Jsort ..
    6 .. ''-_Tno~~'s>3~vc:l fires:

    :tT::~w:'T:J.tion fires T,!hen prop3rly


    solect3d cend control13cl C1.r,, ir3nlwlblc to tho infantry attack.
    '7e found through pr'\ctico thrlt I, series, ofphas() lines, perpend
    iculc,r to the nxis of c:dv'"nc) \:i th selected concentrations in
    OGqh ph,flao, g~.VO the) b~st ro~ults. This type of preparation is
    oasilycontrollcd ,'wd IY,-~y t.G chnngod rO:1dily to conform to the ad.
    vanco of the, infnntry. !IoriGV(;C', a dense preparation did not pro
    vide a.n I open-sesame I to tl'e im"antI"J. At LANUVIO the Division
    ArtillerY shot a preparation through to completion ahd then re
    ceiVed calls for f'hes in tl]8 initial phase line. The infantry
    ',7aS held up by- elos o-iJ' s-:.rong points "hich had weathered the
    .
    , .
    nl'eDa."ration fire e
    . ' '. T .C.T. shoots ore -;'ort" ,,1'.ile '1hen a quick and intense volume
    of fire is deei:'ed. "'his t"'Je of concentrat'ioncovers an area of
    considerable depth at:c1 ~:ic't': ar;d theref'ore cannot be used close in
    to friendly troops.

    .... 39

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    T "'j}':"
    "o:d l--:"'c,['si"g fir]s 'Ire definitely 17orth17hile.
    :J.t CL=1.\il-~>\ r,riticf',l points '.:,-erc s81~cted from map and ::Lir' photo
    study: ~,nd from 8 -2 re"lerts. ;:l'lmps, 'mloading <points ,defiles. ,
    critic",'l int"rS0ct:i,en~ dc! n',anr.td:1 rC):;d", transf,t>T points (truck
    to p~c:: 'O'),Jo; were OlE qoyered. 3xper.dhures for ,the Division
    ,~rUllcry varied from I,ood to 6000 rocmJs' per nigt>t~or :f01:ir
    nighto. P;:' s te.kon 3.fter ~orr::plction of the progra:mJ. .st:ited they
    ha=:J y~,)t b".c: p,nytbing to eat fO,r severc.l days.
    ..
    ,
    7. Tan::s and tan!\: destroyers for indirect fire:' Fe used'
    r<ttachod tan's".nd tank dostro:;ors mainly for interdiction and'
    hnrc.Gsing. ~hey '3.re excellent for tho roving-gun type of harassing.
    Only limited USe 'CIUS made, of tLom for pr8paration fires because
    of thoir extremely fla.t t,Y'l,i cct.Dry at the shorter ranges ,"

    "

    h. Id,(111;qo".cc', Coun+,crl,at+.er", .I,ll reports by battalion 8-2'8 and


    .Jj7:~sion ~~Ttil2.8ry;S-2 ~~'~-;er1;-;1,-;;::jttGn re~9orts havi.ng been discarded early
    j 11 tt,) campaign.
    G-2 poriod:!.c'lls uhich ,,,,d '1 (;.aily di,stribution dmm to bnt~ ,
    ter;,8S "'"de other nritten' r'eports a duplication of effort., 8pecial reports to
    G-? "'~b~od a ,stunlllr,ry of 'enemy artiller:r 2ctivity four tirtlt,)s daily and a
    . .
    ':''''',tl,'''r rc:'" once ada:; t,rtll:S!'litted' bo' tolio,ph.one.
    '.he. dc~t.ias of Division ArtElor'J 8,-2 eV8ntuc.11y evolved to that 'of
    O"T'sion 8EO, alr:lost all other duti"s be"l"'g subordimtecl. The most important,
    ,c:' ~i~l() i tm1 of inform'ltj on passil"'g thrGUEr, ,ois hands proved to be enemy shelling
    ~'C- ':-rts.
    As front-l~ne troops :hcld r21ver teet'} 'indo~trin~ted '~ith the basic
    '
    ;:r'ir.ciplGc of report.ing infDrrr,:c+.bn,,~cct enomy 8he11in:;, consider.ublc difficulty
    VJaS expcriencGd' initially with gett.ing; .my 0:', ttis type of i(lformation.
    A pro
    l~r'JJ:l r;[18 sto.rted to rDi.:od~'" tr:iiJ C8.:8C*. d-lri~,:"g tte first rest period Clnd the
    "cslJlts ~::ere nbt=-c;3T.blc .::'It once. [;qbsoq~.-..eL-:'Jy, during Gaeh rest per.iod, th!3
    ':roblam h<cs been attaclted from q dHfcrGl:t "ngle '.;jth good res,ults G,'lch time
    ' 0 t.ho closn coopcorc.+,io" c,<':ni'c.'1),r;r 3~2' s.
    It \1,2s mado; Di.vision SOP that
    ,.IJ_ :.'1l0rn~,T sb.::;ll~ng be reported direc-'u to Division Artillery-. S-2 ,through artil

    lery channels.

    vi
    \,

    " (1) She ' ,lro]::s: ,n'ob~b1;;' 0110 of tr,'e. most uncomfortabl", son
    sa-:}.;)~S ~rou '~:'ill 3VCT expor-i.s:'1CC if t.}-,:1t of' b~i~ spottod in tho
    .ofcrn b~rJ crry art:'J.l:.JTY. Yo~:t f8el QS thoufSh there :i,!3'I'. n:othing y~u
    C::t:~ do nbo'lt it buts'C',+ it out.
    Your first rO,<Bt,10n ~7ill bo t'!l
    1:.ug thE; -grouL:l Gnd pr'_-,y -l:.h'1t .nJth:.ng C0!I18S ,yo'J.r'~r~~y.",. .T'hut mistake
    isfreq'10r:t1~'

    fnt;::tl.

    The) Lrs't tl,ing to do is. to ,got the holl

    'o.'.7a.:r f:ro:n '.:her J ~. ),1 q:r.? b:::.f.Jr-::. tbc K:-:'El.ut i3 rGgistered on you. ..Hs
    " is g~!for~ll:r 0. r[L"'-'t.h0di~al ..j 0(3 '.'xi pill ccntil:rll,e t.Q regis tor on tho
    . ~ Q:J.O -pi.1.ce ~1hGn. [.f~u::r, tj]()1- _) .:" 3 Lotr-~ing there. , 'npe. ~SJxt thing to
    do is lco11Sr for' ;c'lp." cTy:lxD YO',l h:h'e ; the ,JerrY,gun s,potted cold
    .'thoro is cnl:,r O~'1b
    in t; .:)- AY'I':_:/ r.:bo :C 'J.rl , heJp you sii~rlCo thiJ.=t
    so-nnd-so r.lho SOG21~; t'J c.->.Y;~- '.'. IJerso:121 gr;J.dgG a,s;ainst you" That
    D3.n. is the countc:r,,":b(1'tt.e:;:~,~ o:'f.Lcer...
    .:1
    From tho ."Q0gin!i5_ng 0.: ..>.t . CJpGr'1ticin the C.B. O. keeps' track of
    ,~.ll the o.htics of eLJ~1Zl .::tr:.:.:.ll.0ry by' r:Jear~s '"Of PW into~r6g.[ltion,
    p:1rtlsn.n rG~)'Qrts, ~i,r"'l=-'hctos ',?r.d ,:.etG~l.:tgg roports. .~Ie ,;g~norD.lly

    euy

    .. 40..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    has a pretty good idea '"h:rre Jerry has leis artillery or llbere be

    has his e,lternc.te p0fJ it i'.:;np. ~ You 3.rc the cnl:.- man T.7ho can tell

    hiT:. ',7Len Jc:-:ry is actlV<.), In or0_er t,o pi~ dorm the offending bat

    tery the f').1.1o-,.~t::g infc-,'P";;"'rf-.io:'l i;) .,r "'J'j~t:.l.l im)ox'tance;

    (a) PtE:L rJiI'C'ctlon i~~ [>0 f:l.ri.:lf '.I... o:J.? Tnis -.JJ.1.1 indicate
    the e:etore.l o.rea"
    ('1tl5 iLfOJ.'I",t:lt; Ob ia of no value unless the
    CEO knu.i's ',;rh9re ;~(2q ure). If yOl] Can see-' the flD-sh yon C(ln !'e'"
    port a fair=_y eccurate d:~_roc'i:j.o-:l t.o the encm3r gun or your trainod
    ear .1.1ill en~~.bl.e you' to :-:!st:_fila-:'e the direction if a flash cannot
    be GqGn~ If you get a ('.l:f:i:.i.(~8 to eX:':~Iili;'10 +,he shell cr,'1ter the furrml
    nay indica ~e tLP Gir8c~::"cn of ill'8 G cp-.JciallJ if tDe shell has
    gone through SOE'3 fO~jC.s8 bC';OX'8 J.anr~n~.-. '~Dnds I tJill sometin.es
    'give yOJ. rret'l:::r a::-::::p-r-'(;,t,e dir-actio!: of' fi.re ..
    (b) l7hat tiP.lc d..t d the ror,nois _come in? T'Il e CEO needs this

    dope so 1'8 Can tiE1' V~);JT re::.;ort into ot'ti8rs ho gets


    ri il:O or f:1oro

    reports on the S2.Le Gt'e::.J.L:,g ;:iay l~)cate- t;18 ene:n;;r gU]J,s 8,ccur,J,i'ely

    enough to hCg'in f:":c_ing iJ..l~ccDe::.-'ve:.l fir9 rigbt a\",:ay. This is very

    importa~t in t,he CnSC of' Sf g'..!DS becll.f1SG of their ability to char..ge

    positioJ1 [-:l Of-:~E~ t:::n.t t}-'3 eBD caD~ ('. keep +beffi loca1:,edl\

    (c) r;~'ler8 are tLe l'c)~lLds landing? ThG-'G.ns~.i,el" --to ttr:i,S" -keeps
    tho eDO pOS~:8? on r,'h:lt. n~o 8n,"~!.'Y is .lcr:"'ing to do~' FiX'3 falling on
    our frcnt~'l::_ne t:"OOpG Of+,Oi-:' r:' ')r:.:.":des 8. c011nteratiiaiJh:: and inforrna
    tion a:'iou't it, rfill 811able OL;'J.' rmit CUi S to al.ert the artiD.Gry to
    be preparsd -to fire in tt3.l sector... :i':'ire falJin~ on roads and
    trails indic-5. t,8 t!Flt -eYe; Cl1CI[."'/ rrr'obably th:_nks onr froY:t~line
    troops aTe br)i!":g t~o ",,01': 8l:TI)~,j.oc.l i7:' t"h !C i Tnti,:::ms, If the
    Jorr:'r:s r at+,en-t.ion io di.X'-:J~t(:rl, t!") Ollr arti:::'Jery :rou can b~1t that
    SOfie t=r8'rt dog-facG ~'Wf:, C'aJloJ 'l-lp his artill'8TY and nsked t.hem '.Jbat
    in holl t_~re yO'll S()inl~ t,:) do about t:10SG SOE~ s y;no are C"l"Ltt~Dg us to

    pieces" The 'an's-:]e:-:.~ p:r'J1y_t;].~,.. \'I'r's, ! :~~or: in hell do youse guys expoct

    us to fi!'o if yeu C0n r t ~Ut'l: in any f.;}-je.ll-2:'GP;::?~

    (cl) Hm',,; ~:<;::,~.r:';,~ r(n~nds ttl ~/e co:ao in? i::'o want to kn01'! this so ne

    C8,Y' T1c.~_:T'-,a-:~ tf:JT 2. f:-:,r :_ ::=','ltio and a180 t.o fi.lld out just 11m'} ser-

    i:)~LiS 11<3 lS <li~: ~,-.j~~. ~,f_:', .-.,~ ,-,=.,-:- 'L'.~~:_"J.s"


    Fc-(."),nlI;y, rIG -r.;,OSD back 2.bont

    .i.'lve t.ih1l3d the rr'i"l,,~_;:, c.:.~' .i.~.y[~.,,~,;; ~'~e t:'.Y(;'I':,'3 irj~

    (8)
    Ho\": E1CcllY gn:)s :.,ToJ .1. (i, ~1f! UL-1 1,Jla.t kir.d of guns are they?
    You Can tell ho\"; m;-.;.flY g-lJ.;.J.s -'_tre fir::cg by' 'J ist<:;r:ing to the guns re
    port or the rOl'i1ds stri:<:cng" If +,110:" a)"Cl rigl't tog Jtle'3r or if the
    ti"'8 b8'~+";ee'1 h'u",-I--~
    -'is
    'l"~~'''s"u'r+
    I"
    l'c
    1''''!
    mO:'~e fbao ann
    U'JU
    __
    '.'''0'
    ;1
    ,"
    .:>
    'v.L. ..','10"
    __,.j
    _.. . tortlJn' becat:.se yO'J. Je;.n Y:t fire Elfi n.r'sjJ.18J';.:" pioe:) like an !V~-l GV8r~ tJ:_ough it
    ::.:oniotiIT!88 880ms tl.:~~t 1,-.'((1_ EV'.J:('yonG kLO~-;G, tr;'Jt the round thJ.t lands
    clo,s,a !:;O!J!1.d;s ljJ-':G thi) ';'~PZi0 E:V},1,t'8SS f but dO:1':t lot' t:n.t fool you.
    Expc;:.ci"onc:c hc.s taught yC".1 to d~.Gt:,LG"li'3b t~3'~'.-,TGon l:lSht, mediu!u', or
    heavy o.rt.iIlsr:.r ~ ~ t,~~ s i ;-:c: of t.~_:(j .'::..~r, ;:':i.~ 'or sr:elJ: fr'<::lC'10nts sent,' in
    ni11 ',-~na.:-'lo th~J CT~C t.e, '-~'jt,';:::-'r:iL'3 c.iCC'llJ'''~''.;oly the, Giza nnd typ-J of
    r,l0GpOn that is G~lJ,~)~,::,!':Z :-~t 7'':u~
    Ii' tl:-J S'hcli comes labhing il1
    s.lovdy t:te c~:B,n'~~7;~ r'~rG t'r'~-G it colee;:; f.ror.:'.,a hm-;2.tz-3:'. Fast. travol
    ing Ghcl2..s cc::E-) f_:.~~,rE .~. f[tT:.. Tho !.:ind tl"v;.t. zip ovor your head before
    YOli hr:ar tnG - rei-or,1.: o' t{'G Lun car: CO::~-:O frO-ffi-:'lfl ~- ,..~ -i..'J.tili:..
    Ro
    p0rt thoFle f;tG h:gh v01oe~~tyo ~hc r'.J,:r3)OC0 of this is to enablu tho
    CEO to tio '~hG fi!'i~E~ in ~'.ith "tr:G T)fl.r'C";'culnr one of our friends (1),
    so -that hG ~a!1 bl-"l p::::;pE.:r:J..y !'erriLll:lbBred i7ith e bOUqV..9t of shells ..
    II

    __ c

    """

    ,-".

    ~,,-,

    1,

    - 41

    ~~

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Report any other usoful in:formation such as the :flash-bang time,


    whether he is using airburst, superquick, or delay fuze and any
    thing he is doing that is unusual. These are the things to remem
    ber about shell reports. Your location, dil'ection of fire, time
    of firing, the place shells are landing, number of rounds, ~ber
    and type of guns. Be pstient - a single shell-rep can't turn off
    the enemy firing like a faue8t but it will let us knoVi you are be
    ing shelled. Our flying OP's, fOTVlard observers and the CBO '!Jill
    be put to vlOrk 1'lith minimum delay."
    (;,) Counterbattery - Infantry-artillery teamwork in the ex
    ecution of counter-battery operations was developed to the highest
    degree while the Division was playing an active defensive role in
    the ANZIO Beachhead. There, enemy artillery was plentiful and
    room for dispersion extremely limited. In addition to a Corps
    coUnter-battery section a full-scale counter-battel"JT section vias
    set up in Division Artillery CP utilizing personnel from the sur
    vey section to maintain 24-hour operations. This was supplemented
    by the establishment of regimental counter-mortar sections. This
    accounted in part for the lightest casualty rate in the division
    history for a like period of active engagement. A departure from
    normal counter-battery procedure proved to be very effective. To
    provide maximum speed in reacting to enell!'J fire the following
    policy ""as adopted: When Sllellreps indicated that the enemy guns
    were active and the information reported was not sufficient to pin
    down the offending battery, the direct support artillery fired
    several concentrations on knovm enemy front-line installations ad
    jacent to the friendly area being .shelled. This proved to be ef
    fective counter-battery because it usually silenced. the enemy
    artillery. PN reports indicated th~t considerable pressure flaS
    brought to bear on enemy artil1ery units by their front-:-line units
    to refrain from firing unless necessary. II
    .
    Following are the instructions issued for establishing regi
    mental counter-mortar sections:
    Operational Instructions

    #14, Headquarters 34th Inf Div, 3 May 1944.

    "I. The enemy has made effective use of his mortars on for
    ward instalJ.ations, relieVing his artillerJ for other missions.
    This may be duo:
    ~.
    To a desire to conserve artillery ammunition to coun
    ter a major attack.
    J2. To utilize the relative mobility of mortars as com
    pared to artiller-J
    .. To the relative affiency of our counter-battery organ
    ization as compared to our counter-mortar or~~nization.
    2. Each inLllltry regiment will establish a counter-mortar
    section to utilize the methods developed by the field artillery.
    One officer "ill be detailed as regimental counter-mortar officer
    (CIAO)
    .il.. A counter-mor+ar chart (Scale 1/12500 or larger) will
    be set up at regimental headquart"rs.

    - 42

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    12. LOC0.t.ic~ cf l;nur:_~{ n:oy'l :J.n] from all sourceS U'Iortd:r

    re)orts, OPI s, Y:J.t~ol~, c,tc ~) ':?:Lll ~~~1 plotted 1:lc~ur:1tely on tho

    count0r-Elortr.r, chart.

    ~.
    A i'orL for rO!."3-;::J 1,.: .'Iort:lr Reports s~_f11ile_r to the

    present Stoll-rep form ldll b:; (~'-'I.opted.

    Q. A progr'lm"or idoctrinating !l12. front-lino troops

    YJith the pr~:.ncip10s, pUl~.r0DG, ~;~nj imrortance of ~ounteY'-mrJlt:ll~

    inforr.18.t~~_on rdlJ be ~tart-Gd"

    fu A rlu.r. fo1' ed6~..tiona]. communicat5.ons to f:lcilitute

    flov] of information will 0'3 dGvis8d, if fOcT-1i desirable

    .f. P"rsonnel of the CT artillery B!1s ,dll E"ssist in the

    establishment of counte:, ... m0rt~,r 3Gc"':.i0l1s.

    3. Tho followir;g ':':'iscussio:.t o:~ counter-mort-ar t1.02SUl'eS,


    prepared by the Division Counter-Batter:" Officer, is ptlbl~_.shud for
    the information "nd guidanc , of infar.tr,' commandors:
    R.
    The counter-mortar ct.art should be a scale of 1/12500
    or InrgOY-'lS a s::Ji?,11er nay lc'~.d -to j"naccu::ac2.Gs in plott-i.ng.
    12. rCqpons under reGiml-'.nte.l control or direct :::nlpport
    artillery genorally e.re eufftcient for all c(l1m~er-mortar miAsiO.tls.
    Counter-mortar programs ,;:h6r(31n 'l D"clmbcor of active !1'Drtar pocitions
    of knorm loc''.tion are ong'lged co.n be arr.mgGd through direct ccmtact
    tlith Division Artn: "r;i 1L)adquao.to::s.
    !!. YIhGl1 coordin~d.os of a kno 1."n or sus~,ect8d mo:::'tar J.=.osi
    ti9n have b0811 det')rminc) 1-:, shonld be n1lmbered fOl' enSj refe:renc3.
    A v'lriution of the s;; etc:: .'or nur.1h8ring cmemy batterios "llOY b8 "sed,
    o.g., Ii:AC 9733. The lptt;:.rs idont';.fy tho positicn and t.hG num
    . orals .indicatrJ tho rrid squae''', 1'1", letter lVI, in.'!~cc,ti;1g mort"ors,
    should be o.ddcd to provent confusion \;ith tho' Gnem;r onttory posi...
    tions. ... additio!1 :In actiyu mortar list ShOl11c< bo p:repJ.red pur
    ioaico.lly em'!. distrU"I'Led to ;!1tC'r'Gstoc PfTtios. 'Thi:o: list should
    sho':! tho number of the onerr" mort:lI', t.he accuro,to coordtl!3.tGs, tho
    height in metor;:i CJlevO(tirn ~bovc fua lC\T81), sou!"'co of infor:;'l1o.tion,
    and tho numbor and t,:rpo of mortars, i:' kno\'!n. T}":~.B -:;tll p-3rmit
    missions to be o.ssigned by m:moc"r rather thnr by ropoatil'g dl ill
    i'orm~tion.

    ,d.' A COllntde'-mortw officer and" qualified draftsm<ir,

    should. be on duty ,~t all tinesC\t th0 C01Jn~.8r-mort"r cor.tro1 con-

    tor,

    ~.
    OF's must bo oql:ippc](i pith some dovicc to perait 3C
    CUI'.'It.O ;r,.oasUre::1GIit of fln.s~~~, sound, or sIT,oka azimuth to ODO!:1J1"
    mort8.rs. A circlo of dc["r.J6s or nils inscri.h3d on '1 s;r,Qoth ~:~urfacG
    o:nd OqUi?D8d 11ith f';. movablo ~r::,on to indicJ.te di::-ection and or
    icmtCld by mo"ns of direction to '.' knonn point m8:lS Ul'Ed on the] n':lp
    is more n.CC1l1\1tc t1;;ln n compass. Th() :lccurncy of loc~tion of
    G:1env'" i:nsto.l1ations Ynries di:-:'octly as tho a~curacy of loci~ti('D
    0/ OP' '3. OP's should b" 10c ~: ,-,d by survey. Thoy may be locnted by
    inspoction if sufficiont map dntn.:il is pr0sent.
    f. OP loc'ltions nro nlottod on the chart. Whon 8. ;30U11d
    <1Zimllth
    Toccivod r.'~ short li~8 c.bout o.n inch in Ivngth is dra'lln
    at that azimuth fro:n tho OF reporting. An arrm; is drmJl1 to ind
    icato the dirGction of tho en',my mo-tar a'1d the number of the report

    i;

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLAS51 FI ED

    entered above 'U!-:: line; A. hmg rae' is dralrll: fot' nt'.Sll 01' snoke
    reportslj.nd tho Umo'o': r,)port :.8 ntored in addition 'b the report
    numb"r. Two or lilore) rays are nJ<"dJd to locate an er."my nnctar
    positbn but a."1ingleiray ofGon .. ill indicate an aetive knorm lo
    cation. Generally, a ooanb:'--v)r{al' m ss:.on will not be in:.tiated
    on the basIs of a S:!t,g'.6 soune repolt. A n':unber of sound reports
    may iJ;ldicate 'the ar"a t;hil+, i.s active. If enemy If.o:;:t~ing becomes
    serious, a ganerw. couliter-mort8l" p:ro~ram Jllay 0<:) Started.
    s; TLcre is a t"l'!d.3I1c;r. for observers to 'report only the
    mortEr fire .:'allir.g upon theln. Pers onnel must be trained to report
    all mort-ur fir" observed, As the observer gains confid(ll1Ce in tho
    pC'ssibilitJes of CO'.Ultor-mortar 1'1re the flor, of information ,Iill
    become moro rogular.
    h. '. The di;,~ction ot fire Or 3n el:l(lmy lllOt'ta:r O!lll be de
    termined from hnexamination of thO) orater. This <will be of SORe
    assistance :!,h locating mortar positions.
    " i," . Patrols, PW's; 'and. civilians. furnish much valuable
    information re~arding mort':r positions. Air photosand . . mosaic~
    are the beet ~edfum for eztracting accur~te lqoations received
    from thcseliouro;;,s.
    j.Betllj,uS"b! the tendency of :nortars t;:, move frequent];\"
    they rarely ar.e in tl'!e same position reported by phto interpreta
    tions. !$pcrt.s fr?m PI; however, are valuable for determin!ng
    Hkely' are a.s. .'
    .
    k. The Air' 01' can spot only :tn nctive morhr ,ma the
    appelil:'ance of ai::-cn.ft often oauses theoortar to ce"lse firirg.
    As enenv 1II0rt"r concentrattons are f;enec Illy of D'"01'.t c'ure.ti.on it
    is not practicable to fly spedallliork;c tlls~iot'.s . Alr OP's:e,re
    .at preaont Wlder Div::sicn Lrtilloty Hec.dquar"':ers control ,wd many
    times it b POi,,~.w.G toc<'>l+1;a<Jt plat.es iIi th" air'to obs;)rv, by ...
    calling Divis:..on Artillery lieadquarters.'
    1. As enemy ;;lor(;ar cr;jVrs aro known to liye av:,ay frem
    their mort"l"S .i.t 1.11 :\mport~.n,t to' eng"'J0 them ~,h5.1e tl18Y are c"ctive.
    Spf)ed is es~en1:ia,1 to cO\Ulre,,-mortal" Mt.ion. Tte CMO ,Illust have
    affici.,nt. ,commUnications an4cirvct call on 17ea56ns.best suited.
    tC' dei!i:lwitl'.enamy ~rl;ur~; II.:; _
    ..
    (3) A '!T6' nre Ltne',llil habitu'Il:lyesta':l:Hhed Oil th:., iiv
    i~ion.f:ront~; Thil!l rer4dt~ b"tta;.iollB othar than thG i:i.1'3Ct.
    .
    3ttpC'ort J:)'J:tt.,,1i9lle to fir" br gGts ofopport\Ulity. beyond thflt Une
    ,Ii.thout obtaining a cle&ra,r,ce from 1nfr.ntry comma!\el'8. The im
    portanco of maintaining ri.gid control over all artillory, c~;nnon
    compnni()s. TD ~ 8 nm tanks in rS./Jpect to g~tting clearance to fire
    within the 'No Fire Line' is best illnstrat<;ld by the following
    incidont:
    Extract, Journal, S-? 34t1'!

    D1vt~ion

    ;).rtHlery

    liTho 3rd Bat~.alion, l35th Infantry w."s in position n"ar LA"lUVIO,


    Italy, on 25 Ma!v' am began to 'I1cceivefriendly ar'~illery fire. A
    hur.ried oil;UtQ>D1vision .ArtillGry stoppd the fire :If divisj.on
    arUUeXjT IDl'itLa,lion$ . b'.J.t f!jiled. to stop the fire f'lEing on the 3rd

    - 1.4 ;.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    B,;th~ion,

    Cannon compallios ~I"re chGclrod but h'ld not. t1eG:'l .7l:ring.


    artU1Gry and the tllO lO-qighboring. diviSions- wero callod but
    pleaded uot guilty. Tho friendl:r firec<lntirnled. Later in the
    day after Air OP's I).ad eOQuted frillndly .territo~' thoroughly, an
    All. battory was <;l.i/loov()redfiring and it was thoaght th'ttth<l
    my~t0ry had been solved. Thp sheIle>! area re;na:lned poacoi'ul until
    the following day wnon fire comm.enced again, Frant:lc cnUs '.rbln the
    battalion 00 shut off all artillery in the corps sector twioe but
    the fire oo~rt;:l.nued to full, Finally .. in desper~tionj patrols were
    sent out to tile arc'!. from which the fil'G was eroana.Mng to see Hit
    Vlere possible tbt.tt an Qn!llllY battery had been by;'iassod in the,move~
    I!;ent forward.P:ltrolli dillcoV'rt'ed tho $fHID.,llt gun platoon of a
    frial'ldly ('?) tarJ): bu.tt&~.lon tbat h.d OGiin firi~g ind~J?.5ndQnt~
    f'or two days wi th.almoet comp-ll1t!) lMIc ot ]mo\l!i:,dge Of; the friendly
    sitllatioll. Proper action wa~ t41f~.l1
    . (4) . Art.Ularyol;\servlltion Wt>S ful'~shed primar:L1y by f(l:t'Ward
    ol'servers and Air Opt II. Ba1:.'\;ery Of "1':\ 1iIgre rare. flash OP's Viere
    sot up on the A~IO !!aaehhsad b:t ",11 u~t$ inc.luding the Division
    MP platoon').nd 34th aeconnaillsanc~ Troop.' Information from theee
    Opls ,\:1.\8 valuaHe in I!p$tting activ'i 1;lntteries bllt intersections
    genarally Tlere no'; <lCi)l~ate eno~ to pill, dorm new. location,,',
    Air OPI IS flew patrolmiliSiooll oon8tantly and pro,;,\)':' thei:rv'lJ.ue
    by silencillflenem;r ~tlleJ'S by. t!\e VQl'~' tect c4 the.r prooence.
    Cor.tinuu1 eO'l'enge of th" divie ion i'Nnt r!will daYlight hours by
    . Air OJ:> ;\$ ~"$.~,,, ~t... 1W_i;l.te .re.l!rtl!~o~ pb.@:rvora are
    stUl a problem. :tt. iac!C~ tM,'t. a lI.lj.t:!.sfMto:ry solution dU
    eVer bef'ound qUO to, rapid turnO'1e:l' or ;f'onard observers, but inprove'
    1'\eu1; can be gained by :l.ntal:lSive appl:l.oation ot bt;\sic principlos;:J.ur
    ing trai)ling.
    '"
    Tha iiwmeQ] ,of tttmScrbytQR IntaptD" j,s~f primary importaD c 0.

    oorps

    .s..

    ~rl~O~ ::!g~~ t: ~fi::;:tJ~f~:~uJo~~ ~~t~~e~:Uaii~na~~!;;';'~rO~::~i\:~1me

    1mltruc't <U') infant:CJ offioer Ql< enlisted !\lan on methodsClI Ildjustment.Evory


    of;f1oGr must be able to adjust, every linE) N::O, \lho\ll4 bo able 'to adjust

    ~nt'antry

    ana

    for best QPoration ev{)ry man should bave some kno111edge of' the subject.
    COlonel CARLEY L. MAllSHAU,

    ~"

    "Ive got a couple

    0;('

    CO"l1ll~nding

    Officer 133rdlm'in CASSINO.

    prtva.t,os spiping with the 8"

    howit~ors

    at the onemy-beld 1:::ouse;;l about 75 yards dovm the street."


    I .

    CClptll.in NELSON F, K!BLiR, Comm(lnding Oorow,my

    "v",

    1.35th Infantry.

    "It is kn01'ln that there Mv", beon' U1.lIllOrol.ls inetn;noes who!),


    if.\only tho ari111",ry bud been called togivo el!pf>oxtin :f:tre,
    muoh damage and destruction could ~ve been inflioted upon the
    ene~.

    '.

    One special !pstnnce was in NoJ'1;h J.frica when one of my

    of'tioers cllllec baolt to me bf I:'l.\dio tbat there ~Elre sl'>veTal trul'ltlJ


    unloading infMt:ryme!l to hiB lett t:\.I\llk at II dj stll.nclt of sevenl
    thousand ynriis. r told him that if he VI()~d adjust, artillerJ fu-6

    .. 45 :"

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    th"t I \'Iould CD,ll for it ~nd relay his senstng. His answer was
    tha,t he didn't kn(')w ho>! to adjust fire, By the time I reached his
    position, it was too l~te to call for the fire.
    On nnothtlr oec!)'sil;m, I \;US able to w~thdrnw two plClto,'ns rlhich
    ho.d been pinned down by enemy mahcine gun '100 mort~,r f:j.re by callini,
    fornrtill~ry, fire.
    The division is nt the present time scheduling
    periods for of C'ice1."s Clnd non-cooniosioncd offic,Jro in adjustmont of
    -r'.;illery fire ctnd I b"liovo is mO('lting 1'!ith the utmost success."
    Major ARTHUR J. PETEIlSON ,

    s-;a,

    34th Dtvision Artillery.

    "It is unnecessary to tell an experienc,ed foot-s.logging dog..

    face how important nrtillery support is to him when he needs it.

    When he run/l up .flg~5,mlt a Je7JTY strongpoint tbt is too to~h

    to crnck with infantry weapons the proper thing te de is yell for

    artUlery, He's got to be sure, however, that the target he SElBS

    is worth toasing a 10t. or cannonO.G1.ls at because cannonbe;lls are

    , the oillY reserve, tbe art'ill-ery has an<:Lthe',r CQst sweat and blood.
    A single Heinl.e 8unningMmself Cl"r an Eyetie mule and cart is not
    wo;rth B,n artillery conoentmtion. ' There' will: JllQst likely 'be an
    artillery forward obServer somewhere' in your oompany area who is
    in contact with the g'~' Look him UP, giVe ~imyourmtssion and
    he will fire it fOl: you if it is htUnanly possible. Remember, he
    is just as interested tn -k!1lil'g Krauts as you an~. Get acquainted
    with :Your art~llery FO aY!d his detail, Keep yeurself posted as to
    his location f,t all times so you can find him when y,ou needbim.
    He will fire fer t':1elo1'lliest dogface as quickly as for t,ho ragi
    mentd CO Or allJloet, If sometbing has happened tohiu ,r you can't
    find hiln:mq you c~m get. to your battlllion CP by radio or telephone
    the nrtiUery lia;i.son on-ieer there oan get fire on your target for
    you.
    .,' '
    Back in mediev,.l days when the artillery man wC,s ' iJ. civili(Ul
    mechanic with an eye for W'lr loot th"y tried to keep out;liders out
    of their union by covering up their activities with a lot of senrl.
    scientific mumbo-jumoo just like some professions still do. Artil
    len- singe thot day has become still morE) complicated and there are
    some teohnical problems that need special truining to h'lndlG.
    This need no'\; bothe. YO'lbec").tUlG 9.11 you want to do is 'loy :l lot
    of' scrap-iron on tl:ie pre'tizc,l-bEinders 100 you can qo it.
    The first th:!,ng to do is get a few rounds out in front of
    you where you can see them, The easiest '!lay to do th"t is by giv
    ing the artillery 11 point on the way at which to sheot. ('l'nis i"
    where the maF re':lding you le'lrn'3d in busic-training would come in
    hrcndy). The. nrtillar1 will com;;> oloser t,o hitting thr;t point
    than you thf/lk; S9 if the !rounds suddenly o.ppear about two milss
    to the right den' t !I'l5S out those SOB' s w~o can't re"d 0. map
    better take another look at your ewn mup. If the rounds l~nd close
    but still not wh",re you wllnt them try to put yourself where you
    thinl; Ue gun position is and sense th" ronnds accordingly - over
    e1' short, rIght or left. If you are using the battalion in direct
    support of your outrit it will normally be right behind you soIte
    wheN but it' your target is fln enemy gun or something that re

    - 46

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    quires medium or heaver ca".iber artillery the chances are that you
    'lion't kno", wherE' they aro f~.ring from. If tha-t is the case or i f
    for any reason yo'.1 are not sure of the gU!2 location:, the safest
    thing to do is ce.ll for a rnnge change. This. will do two tl:ings
    for y()U - first, by l'ell'Sl;lbsrj ng '!Illere the prev:!.ous r()unds fell
    . you v/ill have an .idea of tl:le direction of fire, and s ecotluly,
    you will have a unH of measure out tter", by remembering how much
    of an increa.~e ~"n ::ange :rcu as1--:ed for. When you tel::!. the gunners
    thA.t you are within 50 Y2rds of tbe targ@t, the fire dir _,ct\.Ol1
    Hill most lilcely" orde.' fire fo::- effect. IT:lless you are tmcom
    fortably close to ;r01J.l' t :"..::;:,+. it. is going -to be h"lrd i'01' you to
    judge hO\7 closs yOU!' adjllftir.g rour.da are. Ulnd'.ng. It is very
    important th~.t you \;r".cket tl':e target; get rounds that are over
    Elnd short, of the t(trget. Y->u will Jrncm then t)",at the correct
    l.'unge is somewhere betwe()U your over ahd e!lorl rounds."

    2. The inclusion of artillerr defensive fil:es tr. all infantry attack


    plans is axiomatic. In It.aly, tl-:.e Cermanl"I'ecti.ce of sill,,-ll scale c01mterattacks
    against the 34th Infantry Divisj.on has almost nroved abortive. Etrery objective
    is carefully chosen to invite 0:mnteI''ltt"ck ov()l'terrain faV"orable for com')leta
    artillery coverage.
    Colone: WILLIAM H. SCEILDHO?F, C01!ltla!1ding Offlcol", 133rd Infantry.
    It! cJ?ll it the m-..l.rde:r apaco.n

    Maj or HOBERT E. !1.cGMW, 135t:t Infalltry.


    tI~':hen . operating in t.orre.in th'lt is

    fl'lt and rlOoded to any

    e}(1:.er..t, the obser'Ve:tio:r., .-:i.nj thiJl'a.fo:tc tile effectiV'enes:s of artil


    lery support of the FO a,nc: 15.:d,80n officer becomes very limited.

    To make up for tLis lacJe of obscT,,,"tion, . prominent points along


    the axis of adv:tnce c'lr, he :\"'lgi~t81'ed by th-9 Air OP in advance.
    These points call t~]en he us :;ci1s successive base' points "-S the
    advance prcgrGssGs, and '.,ill give ,-,aequ"te artj.llery suwort and
    "lll02nS of rapid 'l.d~Ul3tment in t.erra:i,n gi..-ing limited Obser'lation.
    This sarno method c~n be ~p~lied to the objective, enabling
    unit c0mmn.nders to lEl"Y dm-;n fin5.1 defensive fires iwmed1.ately on
    occup;~.tion of a pOi! i tion .. 11

    - 1.{1

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    CHI:PTER III - IN!' rNTP.Y - T;,KK - T'.NK DESTROYER TEAM
    1.
    n.gG.in.

    Th~ offcctivenos'" of tLis t0~m \'0.S been demonstrnt"d ti'1c c.nd tin"
    F~..l..rs t

    L'1.eut onnnt .T"I"'~


    ~~
    L .;,

    __ ,

    -"'R"Y
    G _:.J, 1 33rd I'"
    11~ an t ry.

    .:'

    "On 8 Juno at 1<;3n n in th.- TiillQUINlf. aren our company l8nrn~d


    t;,c vC\lur of corobi"Gd inf,uitry 'tnd tu.nk op8rntions.
    Our ilm'lodintc objective ""s to cllpture " hill which ,-,as epprox
    L.,c toly 5ClO yr.rds to our' front. Betneon the hill ~.nd the point
    ft'Jffi rrhich TTC ;n.:.shGd off the; ter~!"\.in ';78.5 flp.t o.nd was covered i:JY'
    TJ'h":;O,t fi.- 1ds.
    '.:(; nttnck,,,)' lato in tho aftc'c:noCln .. i thout ~.ny support fire ex.
    C()pt 9ur aIm cO!1pj"Ir..y 1.ight f"1flc!'"!,in(: gtms. The nttack vms made 88
    tl"'icL.G [' :rrtilronc. ,..,hich split our sector.
    The second platoon Ff',S
    or, th"; left side of tLo -trc.cks, the first platoon on the right.
    'ife ~.dvanced IOn YClrds ovr ';.be, flct terr!).in towards our o;ojcctivo.
    At this poiEt otT sconts worG "irL'lt'd dmm by E;Deroy mo. chino gun
    fire. The first ulatooh vms n:r;cci on frr:!!l threee directions lJy
    machino gun fire, - the' second. p] r::t.1on likc..wiso Ylas fired on by cross
    ed oochine ~un fit"o. The, CJj:rr;(~ny ,70S . unable to "f1dv2.nce.
    The company cO"1'7l'.ndor :i'O;l.11o~ted tank support. !,t le30B three
    tanks e.rrtved. The pl.ot'oo11 l"1d"r or tho f:i.rst pJ.nt00n was able to
    poil1t out tho onoll(\' -;'tro'-16 pdntr> to the tnT'Jc com,mder bofore the
    attack Y1J:1,8 rcsuI:lod.
    ,~t 193% the ntt~ek "n~ r3smed with the tnYJks on lim 17itb
    tbo platoons. Tho t',mk'1on rir>.,d their turret guns at every anemy
    strong point shifting tbuir firr from one t&rget to "nother as
    tbey advanced.
    The rifle plr,.toono ".dvc:r..ci"g 'cdtb the tonks in a skir!11ish
    formation held thecr fir;} ,,!!til -dtbin effective range of the to.r
    e;ots; tben thc,y o!C~ncd fir", er,ch pl~.toon using its full firE; pO~ler.
    , Tho tpnks Ylere s"J.cCGf~sful i.n neutr8.1izing the enc!!t)f fire. Tho
    rifle platoons g"'inr.,.d fi)."() supo:*i.ority so that the; encm;y- cOl::ld not
    rctqrn th" fire r.nd OV(,rr::n the posit' ons in a l"inil'l1lTJ of time,
    This Obj6ctivo couJd hove bOlon t::ke11 07('" sooner h"d tho tC.n;'s
    \)C''CY' ''lith us in tbe ndt "tte::>pt to t~k" the hUl.
    Tbo t~.nk sup
    ;)ort c.lso Minimized t:1" ,,(\sUD1tins. Thor" m,ro nono in the; first
    })li'.Goon end trco in t,ho al3cOlld. 1";18 third pl::toon ,.,hieh nas com
    Ilut';;"d on rigLt of thfJ fi~st in tb" Sr)cond c.ttnek h~d one cc.sunlty.
    This p~rticulcr opcr. tiu, :1"8 givnn this compc,ny confidence .;n

    tnllics. 1f
    .!l;~. Comoir;od tr~ininG is " l'rnrom:isito to the suc~ess of an infnntry
    tn,rlk opornc:::.on. It connot be oX?oct..cd thnt inf""'.ntry, kno':ring r..rmor draws encmy
    fire, r;j,ll rcork successf"lly Tlith tc.rill:s "i tbout being femiUrr ';;itb tbem.

    - 48

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    il'ft Liel'ten'cnt LE'SLH: K. 11 ";,SBL, :;'35th Infantry.


    "At AH7IO there was .cD onemy strong point at house ';['. S8verel
    hell. "Deen rJ1Bde to +." 1<:e prisnne'Y's from this house ~:.:y ii.:f'bntry
    action alone without SUCC8es. The CO d<'c'-ded to use tan'(s and my
    platoon being cb05en to O:9cr;g,tp '''lith them, I W~_8 dosignl3.ted force
    commcnder. We were to USG 8. phtOOll ,.,f mfdium tanics (5 t"nl(s)
    from th'J 751st T,'lnk ~e.ttali.on~ 2 0:' t1.er: to act as i:-ase of i'ire,
    the other 3 carrying fonr il'..:fentrywp.T. on 08Ch. Also D"si.des thc 1~
    men ridin;; tanks i t ~.'i8.S .J.c:cldr-d t.o send an acteii tional 12 1:le...l'l UD a
    ditch to the 10ft of' ho',:, 'Y' ".ith trw m5.ssion of cuttir,g off' an"
    en6Iilf nttern.pt to OSCarG ., 'rom tlV; stron.~ point. ?end also of blc.cl~il1g
    ilL:. cner.:y nttmrrpt to reini'orr::e the st!'"oPg po1_nt d".lI'ing t~ D !'8.id.
    No one ill. t~le comp~n:l p::'ior t,,) this tl;ne had hR.o Eny cxreriencQ
    ,~th t.9.nks so wo ,~:ere giVHr. a 3-day PGri~)d to rehearse the opere
    ~:'ic.': fI'orr, begir:J.lir.g t ; ) ~nd.
    Dur:.ng this period thr-: men J"lr':c.J~icE.a.
    L"lo1..n-:d":,:Ll1f; and dismo'U!lting tanks at vO.rious spueds, and takin:~ p(;si
    t:1.on on the> bACY of the, tonk - tlJe mos-C 8ffici8nt positi on ;: olmd
    uraS prone. T') dism.n~.r..~ m.:D did H ",:,ush l':p and vav.lted off in such a
    m~.n~1(,r e.G to present a rri~r~ ffiW.' siJ :'10U~~ttG.
    CtiD strfl.ps of !'Flmc-"'lis
    t.'J0J.. clp.s~.:od under th~ chIn i'nr it lYas fonnd t>:ny 81wIJYs fell off in
    vC.lutijlg unless so ti: d. r~iD pick-3d out A.t: "'1.rep, thr,t ~orrBs})oncl.0d
    V(;:r" much "dth th& sit~.le.t.;_on on thr~ li.ne f:.nd rrn.cticod atta{;ki~':r, ~\
    simu:-;'2t"d 1100.130 '1"'. The:; dct:.F:.il~d pJ9.n '7f.S for one tank c8l"'r.. . :,ing
    ?"0.C, [I. Ge:t'mn speakii.lf! ser-gee.nt, ani t'~ro oth0r men to lead til';: c:.t.tack
    ~:nld hit t.he hOEse, frnntnl1~T.
    T~1P otb;)r tr:ro atta.cking tanks :7eTQ
    to ;novc in (;olmnp. until -th,:y bed arriv'-',d to ""'."it~;in 5'1 ya.rd.s of -Ghe
    1""101:30, tto 2ncl tp.nk to rigLt of. hOllZG end 3rd to left OI hcm.o0.
    Y..:len
    OL tl.. c J..st tank w~re t.o cl.' or t~t; fr0nt of t~Wl :'~OU3(; "'nd th,.; house
    pro};.kr, thD m.:'n on '~~h,' 20.1 tn.~ '~/t~1":0 to clear all area to right r:1d
    ruar of th" hll'su, and the] noon on tLc last tank were to clear "GO
    left c:.nd ronr of th0 hous..::. .'\lso a squ.r::.J. was to ~ji) Ufh:~d HS f'" O~,S8 of
    firG to the Ii"ft of thr, ho~-:?o in a dttcb to -cover our ~ttt.ck, tJ:c
    oscapc of the enmny c:.nd our !111.tha.ra"';"~el. Th(:}"~i had ?rith th_rn ' 536
    radio and n saun" p0wer phone 'lit 1..0 "!hleh -Ch,::" hnd direct CO:1t~,CG
    w:;' th the, battalion !JP.
    Tho:)' 1'1(;"'6 al$o to fir" (; rud fla:ce "hI"h
    WODlci bo a signal to t:12 ter.ks to '7";i thdraw aftlJr the ppt:rol hau
    returned on foot rJi t.1:. th,e ":~.riGonors Gnd takon cO'''"er. r.rhe te.!'~fS
    YJu:ce to romr,in anc: cover t'hc ~.nf~r.Lt.!'yl s 1\T:i.thdr~'i.fal "L:.ntil the fltxa.
    W2'.S fireD.. D1lring this +Y"~'.ining i t waG f')und t"he.t ~!!lfs n.nd tom;"~i
    ctt~;mrts

    r~~,.ms '."1(;:':'e -the most. suttb,'~;lu WGe,pons to usc.

    A J8,yonet on t:'10

    !n

    mcdc it difficmlt t:J cbtc.in C ",ood p(1siticlD on the back of~hG Gi:.nk
    "r.d:'ll [: trav0r;3ing turrwt. :.~."3aFons ~,.:ere h(:;:.ld tOl"mrd tly'~ center of
    tilL k.lli<: to minim:Lz8 loss i.n trc,nsit. t, tgrpaulin fraIl'. n 2-lr-ton
    t:;~",.-cl.: 1.iyc 8 tb.r"';7n 0VOl" the: :"JR,c}l: of t~G t[.nk
    m.~.k0 it <..8s'::er t,o st~.'::lY
    on" '.dtLout th0 tarpn.ulin, '?lstO},"' ~3:nd :zrt".n?S8 II1:"do thlj metE;]. BurL,.. " '000 diffiCc'lt to hold to. On the, 3rd and fin"l ciao' of train
    i:"1.r; -~1),-, ccmpl,..;tt.: dr~].ss r'-.~~1(A3.rsa.1 ':"it.}1 ",... 11 tho trirn;nings WP-.S mE.c~v.
    1"1:, 1"fap, l;d tnc'.ss.:::d by re:giIl.3ntal and ,mttalicn com!'1anr:l~3rs ",'Tho c1f1.imod
    t:.:~t rt that t'.m8 (mnrntng's first light) the infantry cOll1cl not be
    S(; . . . D on oack of t[tn}~3 pl"'oviddd t:-to..,.:y r,:~m[:dnc.(l motionleSs.

    t'o

    - 49

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    The morning of the attack tho souad th".t '7D.6 to act as baso
    of fire moved up u!1der cover of darjnless, took up their position to
    left of tho house, "nd cstaolished commuriication with the b&ttalion
    Ur. At 0540B, the tanks 17armcd up t',eir motors, At tho same time
    thero VISS a 10-miilUte crtillory proparation to sofkn tho eno!1\)'
    position and covor the no:1,se of our tanks. Smoke was a.160 firod
    to mask enomy observation~ At 0550B, the tanks movod out through
    friendly Y4ro that had boen proviously cut qy the A & P platoon
    and over a route that had b"en s,""pt for mines to Viithin 200 yards
    of the house. The instant that hOllse 'Y' came into vicw the tanks
    opened up 17ith 75' sand LllG' s and continued firing through the whole
    operation. Upon raising my head, just onough to take a look around,
    I could see a perfect semi~circlo of smoke laid by .our artillory end
    mortnrs that hid hOllse 'Y' frem view of main onnmy line. The 1st
    t.nk "loved acrose an anti~porsonnel mine field detone.ting several
    0;1.' same cnd cloe.red a path tl'l.rough a heavy barbc..q wire onto.ngloment
    that ht\d been expected in the front of the house. Within aboclt 50
    ya:;.'cls 0;1.' the flOuse tho load tank hit an AT mine which caused it to
    throF a 'to'eck e.nd tor~ out tho trnllsm:ission, but nopersonllel were
    i;ljUl'cd. Tho possibility 6': tl?l.s accident occurring had bean 'cx
    pockel f'.nd plans had boen [~'1de e,ccordingJy. The crew of the tank
    continued firing with 75' sand 30' s while Vl'3 jumped off the tnnlc am.
    skrtGd looking for tho OP0llT'J'. Tho 2nd Hnd 3rd knk3 CrlmG up a.s
    T,lo,mooel even though the '-ncl tF:nk had become wlmpor8rily stuck in a
    sboll :'010 and a man fell off. This man, hm:evor, recovored his
    pcsition on tho tank. From the timo Vie got v;ithin 100 yards of
    thQ houso thore rras a continual enor.(\' concentration of mortar firo.
    Tho tank killed anD en,;my who triod toescapo, one of our men killed
    >:motber with a hand grenade and six wc.re talwn prisoner. Tbo:'
    appeared to oe completely domoralized, undoubtodly b cause of the
    noise and fire power of tanks. Whon ,.'0 were certain that all Gnomy
    wore cloared we gave the signal for the petrol to nithdrcw \"lith tho
    prisoners. Whon thoy reached tho ditch 300 yards from ttlG bouso
    tho squad acting as baso of fire guve tho sign~l for th~ tquks to
    1".1. thdr3,w. 1'11.J crew of the tEnk which vms disabled by thf) min~ got in
    tho otllOr tanks and. Lt. LIl'GLE, tho tank platoon commnnder, des
    troyed tbo disabled tank nth thormito grtnadps and thon witbdrew.
    Wh~n tho patrol got in th<e covol:' of tho ditch the squad acting as
    b~,so of fire 1~as wi thdra':m. Durinz tho entire operation tbis. squad
    kopt up constant comnnmic"tion ,'dth battalion giving thorn "- nord by
    '.70rd do scription of the asss:ult. 7he ontiro operation from tho time
    17e 10ft and the. tanks mdirod through our front lin" until tho red
    siS'nd for tanks to withdrcri ',',as given took ,1lm;i.nutGs. Spoud, flO
    foul suro, T7aS onoo! tho mninfnctors in making this a succ()ssf1)~
    rcdd c.na which coUld 'only .havG been obtfl.ined,through cerqful r0- .
    h"ars21. In unde:rtukirig this "p0ration the first tbing ,-;e thought
    of '"ie,S teet tho t"nkl'!i'lOuld drc,v/ a lot of firo "'nd that no, riding
    on tb0 b[.ckS, rmuld. havo nochanc6.' Whilo ,thut feeling was nOVGr
    comp10tdy ovorcomo, .incr(Xs:tn~'C6nfid()no,j inuach.othor camo as
    O'L1r cssocic.tion gro\"!. n
    - 50 _.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    12. It DUst bo definitely understood 1'Jhether"(l conternplrlted (lctionis to.


    be undertakon m th infantry supported" -r:;;I tcIJ1:.e or wi_th tanks s'l],po"ted by in
    f.'lntry. In goneral, terrain wi.I1 dictate tn.) an~VJer < HO\,Jevor, in c~rtain in
    stances the strength of enemy l'0si_ttons will be the crit"rion ~ en outstunding
    eXllmple of 11hieh is quoted be] ow:
    Extract, Journ,J, AC of S, G3, 34th Infantry Division.
    "Ini_tially the '756th 'Cnnk Ba+.ta'_ion was ordered to sDpDort tho
    16$th Infantry' El at,tack te crOGS the RAP IDO Rivor at dexm on Z7
    Janudry. Li'-tJ_o ,;as ga~ned ane!. at dawn 29 Jqnuary tho 2nd Ba-,ot.'llion,
    168t]-, Infantry "as cornmitbd to support &n attack by the 756th Tonk
    B:ottnl:iol1o E'1gL1lJOrS finallY pr,'p"red a suitablecrossinE( .'lt 160eJB
    to 8~_10w tho m.'lss of tanks to roll .'lcross the river, throngh tho mine
    fiuBs to t)w foot of thu hills where: the inf~.ntry passe[ threugh,
    tL" tcn)(s remaining in sl,pportpositions."
    Li(m'Gc;nnnt Colonel JOHN L. ?OTIERS, I68th Infantry.
    "Tho morning of J.'lnunr"J 25th, th" B.'lttaFon CO "nd Batt.'llion
    S-3 ~"uported to regiment"l hco.dqur.,.rtDrs nnd roce1.ved orders to move
    thu bo.t'l;"lion to the vidn;'C"! of nc 893237. The batta.lion closod
    in 'l;h" now "ree, nt 2605'1'1 .~nun1'7. At 1500 hOl'rs tIle Battalion CO
    recoivod tho rugimn'l;el ott')ck ol'ders as follo,;s: 3rd Batta.Uon to
    att.'lck on tho right, 1st 'Jattli'.ion on thc loft with :<nd B.'lttalion
    in reserve. LD - Rl\l'IDO River. Timo - 27rY700 JnnUr1ry 191),. Ob
    jective ~ Hill 213. The 2nd Bc.tklion 1ms to occupy present 3rd
    Battalion assembl.v a:t'otl vicinity LTC 890235, 17hen th(J.t urell w.'ls vn
    c.'lted,
    At 270600 JdD11.'lry th Battalion moved dnd olosed in new ass:,m
    bly a!'8.'l vicinity l'C 8<;'0235 at 07~D hours. Bnttnlion CO roported to
    rogimontr,l for~.7Grd CP at n(}?0 ho'l1!'s, wbore h', wcs info:rmed tD<:;t -t,b:;
    butt[!lion wns to he preD,~rx, to move to nOll arD.'l vidnity 1''10 $74';35.
    Th" "ttuck :umped off on timo at ()?'lO h01~:t'S nnd -oatil 1st nnd 3rcl
    Bn"::'talions ran in-:'o hoc.vv small '1rms firo nnd intense mcrtel' end
    Qrtillory fire. !loth bntt.lions olso oneountcrGd (lnborQtc .'\1' mino
    fiolds<.l Cnsuo.lt.tcs poro hurv;,,-., 8!'}d thu a.tto.ck nns stoppod about
    200 ynrds west of tho RArmO R'.var.
    Petrols woro sent out '.dth the' mission 0.:' roconnoitoring

    .'lppro.o cb';8 to tho RAPIDO River, and (}.lso tll, crossin" sit~s us ,d ::.y

    th~ 1st ,~nd 3rd Il"tklions. Addition".l p'J.trols contr ctcd cOln:r[nj-~s

    :cd (cm"Ocnd posts of th0 [.ssr,\)~t Gr.ttclions to deterrrino ttoir 10


    cn-GionS 1 rnd nlso"locr,tions of knm~n mine [trolls. At 1730 hou:;~s, tho
    reck lion mov,od by infiltrntion to nn nss(lmbly D.rcn vicinity 1:C
    UI,::35, closinE( in c.t 2(')30 hours.
    Orders YiO!'O roc::)ivcd th:".t tho 2nd !3c.ttQlion nould ntkck y:ith
    knks 290730 J,lnunry. Ordor of :\tt'lck of th bc.ttrtlion to be ,.
    colt'TIJ,J."1 of compr..nius, F., F, G. Cor.tpo.ny irE" 17[1.8 to doliv~)r Dvcrhoo.d
    mnchine grn, nnd also give supporting mort'lr fir'_' from positions
    Qt F:iC 872238'. Fatrols '.7~~r,.; sent to Sorr.po.nif S HAn and "B" to (:.otcTrnine
    thoir locntions.

    - 51

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    At 290530 J"nu,ory, t 11G fO!"'7!'.rd CP rlOvod to !'C e65~4(). 1:t 0645


    hourp Comp'lny "E" liJft i ts ~,~sblnbl:j' area '1rid eros sod tLe LD .',t lf730
    hours. At !J?25 hoUI's, r,OI!!J"'''~' "I~" hud t,o plntoons o.cross tIW rive!'
    Ylhich 1701."3 pinLed dO'.7!l by bC/lvy !"io,chino gnn firo from tho vicinity .
    of thE: G0motory (nc .C55;'4~). On0 liti;ht find th:t'oo modium tanl<:s had'
    bean nb10 to get (lcross th", ::-i vc.'r, but pt tho time ,.";1."0 un!l01o to
    [',Bsist in thE mo-rom.mt of COClpa!ly "E". ~.~ortar fire on tho cenwtory
    y/2.13 cpll~d for_ by the Cp o.ft, CompEtlJ1' "Z". By 1130 hours, COr.lpe,n~w "Elf
    had terce plntcollS ~crOflS the riYer,
    At 1730 hourE, tho tanks ;;egan their crossingUi'1!llllla' nn:'l
    folloning closol;' b(lhincltho aasnulting olem,mts, Company "2"
    skrkd mO"!ing tOHa~d Hi!', 213. It "'ss necessary to folloH in the
    k.nks r trecks since tb ,ltiro aro" boing passod tLrouch VlD.:;l hc,,"vily.
    minod. ThtJ tl"'OOPS i"'QCOiVDQ 'vel--y 11ttlr- enemy machine E~un 1 ~1.re,
    sir;ce for the cn~r-:r tQ fir,. Y10uld me'an disclosing his position to 'the
    tunles. By 1840 hours, Campa.nj' "E" '.'as at the Dl'ISe of Hill 213,
    closoly follCl':md 11 CO"lpcmcs 'IF" p.nd "G". .'Lt 193'1 hours, CClIll,'2t:y
    nEtt GP.S ruporti-d on tlL~ objcctive i 8-1:'1(1 e.t 2300 hOl'lTS t\,fO comp;':~l1i_(;8
    ':1('1'8 consolidating their positions.
    TO" thu early morning hours of the 30th, connterattacks '."lerO
    1", ,tar of'.
    These ..,:':.tl1cks wcrG ~.'rinoipnlly from G"rm~nstrapllod ,'.nq
    CD,;irc.lcd by the rapidly r.. dvancing troops. llttnj' p:'isoncrs ,ron takon
    :.!1d "~ch cqd.pnent :lnd n!l''llunition cap.tured. Patrols ,Iere sent 011'"
    to "".kc contoct
    ,:''lits on 0UT l,ft ~.nd right. Tho p"trol that
    v::x,t to Hill 56 to contact t:10 1st Buttf,lic\n 'i:ent to the top D.nO
    rOl.'ne! ",iro cont"ngJ.oments and v~.cP.t,,1'i enoll\V posit:i,ons. At 13,~.5 )lours.
    the; 3rd Eattalion ';,":?S rcpo~t,~.:d to h:"t.v("' occupied thr tovm. of C:~_I.t1 ..A.. ,
    and 1st Battalion ems consolidating on Hill 56 to protect the l"ft
    flenIc of the ~<lgim"nt.
    The> "bOVil is strictlY t, i'CCtl'"l account of orders receivod,
    action tebcn, nnd rOilults ".chi.oved.
    F or a noro comp='.ut.} p~,ctlu'e of tho action ropo::ted Hoove con
    siderable elaboration o~ tho facts sta":.ed in tln r'lport is roouired.
    I sh'Olll el"oorate ''Pon thr>In, be.sod an lrty obs,)rvo,tton of th.:; :'ction
    2,3 tho battalion comJ]p.nd~r of th" inf[.ntry brttO-lion conc8rn,cd.
    First of ~ll, ":'. doscripti('fl of the encITlY d~fel1siv~) posi=t:i,.on is
    essontial. Th" first oos.tacl" to overcome vms th,~ nAP:!]):) Rlver' , a
    swift flov/ing str,'am, .,hieh vms fordablG b"; L::f'l:1tr:7 o.t most points,
    but which rms dofini':<eIy p,n ll:1ti-te.:1k obstacle. l~"st of '.;hE: R!:?IDO
    River anti-porsormol rni:1o :helds paTrillelcd tlx rhor to a dopth of
    thr<lo hundred y,,!'de. Fr(.., th" RAPIDO River to the base of Hill 2.13
    ley e,n nbpolutely fId c 'cin fro!:! wh;.ch 1111 vG,!otation had b en re
    movod in ordor to ..r!)yid._ ,". perf"'ct fiold of fire ["1." tho nt.'!'ULrous
    me.chin,; guns o!:1pl,}ced in pnrt"lJ10 etuel pillbuxDs PDd ole,boro.toly
    pr~Fc.:od bunkers ct th". bl1so of tIl{! hill . Thoro Y'e::'o c. for,; 'Juilding1
    0'0 this phin.
    \~()st of t.h,"m contniMd SP guns, urti-tnrk [luns, or
    ,; 2.cti!K gr:ns.
    P.bo\1t one hundred 711rds from thr' b"sc of the hill
    tlmrc, r:~s a cont:i,m:.ous knd of hieh bnrbed ,,;t"c o.pprc.xilc,nt',oly fif
    teen ;'crds in dCJpth. J'.lSt b<lhind th" pillbox:,s n bnrr;,or cOlls1~r"c-c
    cd of brush c.nd trues c,1)prr"~n.tly clv:,red froll'. th.. hill i tsolf form
    ed <' dond ,'''ntis. Just bolO1\' tlc T"ili tnry crest of the hill 8. bc,nd

    'it"

    - 52 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    of' double> npronwire protected a line of' individual foxholes which


    ~~d overhend Cover. Each foxhole had a small sign sunk in the

    ground beside it. Som" of the n".mbers I recall 'irere G-23. G-24
    On the crest of the hill was another band of doublo cpron
    wJ.re. On the west slope of' the. hil], were numerous dugouts, nppr,r
    cntly used for sleeping quarters for the garrison.
    The first lesson I learned from the operation was the neces
    sity of adequate enginear support for tanks in an action of this
    kind. Attempts were made by the tanks to get across tb,e river by
    their own means. At one point oVer one thousHnd 75mm HE shells
    VlGre fired point blank by various tanks in an Httempt to brosl, down
    the far bank sufficiently to form a ramp. This was unsuccessful. .
    The final crossing was at last prepAred by improving an old ford
    with rocks dumped in the stream. This work uas done by the 235th
    Engineers under heavy s.rtillery and small arms fire.
    As I see it, there were three main functions performed by the
    tanks of the ?56th Tank B~ttalion. The first was to provide a pas
    scgeway through the anti-personnel mine fields by driving through
    t;1Cffi s.nd exploding the AP mines.
    Tho infantry cOlUd follow the tank
    trTcks without setting off more minps. The Germans had apparently
    plQced considerable confidence in the ~APIDO as aR anti-tank obstacl~
    8.nd ,-,hile some anti-tank mines wore encountered and some tanks dis- '
    abled, many of the tanks which succeeded in reaching the river,
    crossing it under artDlery fir". and escape bogging down in the
    marshy ground~ alsp succeeded in reaching the base of Hill 213. The
    second main function of the tanks was to get the infantry through
    tho high barbed wire. Tho third and probably most important uas
    to scare 'hell' out of the Jerry machine gunners to such an extent
    tbey fired little for fear of' catching a 75mm shell at point blank
    rt.nge The1I)f'al1~ry In.turn aide~ the. tank.s by,giving..thqnpro- .
    tection agai~t.Sf'. gun.8 ~nd AT gUnF. Once an SP .was. <}efinit",ly
    lo.cated and foot. troops clolledinitdid not stay in tpat lo?ality
    .1'..$ SI rf>llult .. of thecomPined, i.nf'antry-t!lnkaQtion~ coinpeny "Eu
    liaS I'lt8,rting up ttJ.e.~11 just,aeti;,Oecamedark. Compapy "En rras_
    closoJ followed.by Company "F ". . Company." I" follow0d Coinpe.ny !IF If
    with 8. com!llBn(j. group of fourtern ofi'icers alld )ll"n: By that. timo..
    J"erryvlas well. zeroed on thr. crossing ll."d: ",sS pIe.ciug . considcr.cble
    artilleI"Jfire. on :the .flat gr9=d at the base of the hill. Of the
    fourteen in th",. command grqup, fiv.e of us rell.cha the bill, Com
    pany "G", the. reserve COmpllny, fo1lowedth" cOIlllll8J?d group. By mid
    night, wehad.tlie hill.pretty'~ll oran~zep.altho1.lgh tbere wore,
    still quite a few Germans still in. their. bupkers and holes "Iithin
    tho position. lboutan hour before daylight the. Jorriesskrted
    comit:tg ol,1't of their liOles, throwing hand grenades,!,nd doing some
    firing, $lld fo~ the next.two or throe hours wewereprotty bv.sy
    round.ing them up.ShQrtlyafter.daylight the tanks kn~?ked out o~!'
    or tuo SPguniS rtl1ich>rere til buildings on th~ plain b('h~nd us.
    ',''hilettose things were going 0;0 Jerl""J added to the. gene:-91 fe~-
    tivities .by dropping plenty of artiU.ery fire on th" plnJ,l1 behwd
    us - ~pparently dire.cted at the numarousdisabled tank.~ sprel!d out.
    a~d G-25.

    - 53

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    on it,

    T11u live tnnks ':I"r,' h"ddl;,fI leT' n,t the b,-s," of thu hill d1"rt
    he coulon I t q'_"!i t\~, get ~,_t t!h-:-~.. EO--'Gv',-:r, he aid d1:"op co~sidGrc.~~ll()
    Hort,.. r firo or. th; cr,_ st ,- nd ......, r_~t, :"31opo of tho hill.
    COf.1Jl1.unir:c.t ions to tb r:... ~_r '-.. Ol"o (P'i. tc diffi. cu] t.. 3,-;t, ,'c,:..::1
    fri, ndly t~I:~(S "'.Let -er,r;r1Y ;~rt-.~' 1,::ry, ',-drc just didn r t Gt~.l in. Th~;
    511 ..r...,::Uo
    d-id
    -:'10t
    ""i"t(.'r t;'-,jr
    r'c."nkin,...rr..;
    n,
    _. ...
    oJ
    -~~~t"1'"Qc""i'"Y'
    ~- .v
    ""-~ ,~"'"-., w..
    ~,
    .... e,
    .... n .,t.hu ,::! nl'''IDO
    ~\. r'_
    ...
    .L J'
    t.~:_;o p rtil:,.cr:'" rr-.di.oL .-.( TO l~-rine; soncplr-,ce out on tho pl,: in
    '~cgeth(;r ':":J_~.h their cpc::-.'"1.torr (Y:~ t~:c~' '.,odios of th,: opor.qt.ors. For
    Be,,?",' r'"l hr.l'~rs tb-' anl,v !Yl\..JlY.:S of cO'!Y'1unicr:ting t.o tho Toa!' :.IC D tl:o
    81 . '.. .' T<tC.r pJ'1tor:m lord.url ~ SGP, ::;..05 tb bis guns. MCS3n.~;OS l.'CI'l; re
    layed .:X'n'-<1 t:1e 'lort.~r positlor.. by snund p0.'{.'cr phone to COnp~!1Y ;<HiI
    . '1: .... ~,d from t:re~'e ~r t,":lcnLo!;r: to b[~ttD.l::Lon r.~.!J.r .CF or rG.(?i.1"~811~.
    :("l0j r . . rt of tJ;, ::tlTlQ t~, l,rirn frOM bn.ttHlion ra:-.r to r\~'~::ir:,U2 .. t '..'0.
    orc.. . .-:'10n thr:t '.':0S so, th'" ~,L'R 51,1 r;.'-'s used to commlmice,tQ r.:i.. th
    ::u;)_r,~'.8nt.. .
    'That rfter'1oo'1, light tonks crossed t.hc river carrying ~'P.s ('nd
    ;".T,1T"''nition for the r.1cdi1;InS. Jorry still heG thi: c:,ossin::~ COViT0d
    r.ftt~.l ~'n !"--T gun :JC'!1l.0 pIreo do':rn to tl-::.~ south of Hill 213..
    T',,'o l_ight
    trn!:~ ':;cnt up in fIc.mos i!!. P.b..,ut thirty soconds..
    !l"hr:.nks to th - SCR
    1S' 5 "'0 Leld the crossing snok0d by nur 81 mortars in 'ClbnClt threG
    T"!<., impaT't~_ricu of c0:1rr.'.1J;.~.cf'.tion b8t~:T,;en thc~ sppporti..nc; t:~.nk
    unit c;,r.not ~JC over strci3s,-:-.d. In this pnrt:tculn.r .e.ction, r-, lii",ison
    officor cq1'iprod "ilth r, sen 510 roport,~d to me fror; th,. tnn;:'x.:t..
    tr.lion. Whorl I r.1ov(;d out ~J"\t~7<.:;.:m thr- n.ss".ult. qnd rOSG.rvc cc!,"~p''''.nL:.' s
    I loft him Dt the bnttr'lion :!:'"cc:-,r C? ~;tit}:; ITOr S-3 for twp rc.r:so!ib
    one, to h~)ld doym the 3i z(:: of the: CO~)"'1.f".nd group End" to :n~lkc f;,UrG
    th~.t hD c.~d obis redia h[:d IJ. i'nir chrnco of cr1ntinJ.inG'to rom";il}
    operationn,l. S,')cGDcll:r, I L'd .~,lr"od;r providod mys:.li' 'lith r;y',m
    511, tj'y mort:--.1' Sell 1~?5} t~-o f:t-ti11crt seE ()l nT S f1,nd 'tYJO '.:.'ir,-:, :.~(;,~,!:-!S
    lr.yi:r:C 130 '.-:ir() folJ o':.;(:d
    P..

    '~.lj

    "8y lJ{)'

    ~,'TirD,>

    In

    t~is ~7P"'T

    obi.,ncc; .of f':lf:i.in-7.fdYlini~ 8om~; ki:~il' of -:-;o!Y':::lUnication 1.,.-[.'(.h

    f81-~,

    1" h?,d

    (t:.'} r,~;::.r

    .DirQ,fJ-G COTtllWno. lirdu':n bct"!~'8.:,'n mysclf B.nd the tan]: hIt -1:.:;.11.0':1 COli:...
    n:'::T.C!.cr pe3 o,lso or.played i~t !'!.~J f'1ry,:;>d tis COrnIflf.'1rld t:.. r,i': a~:.:(}:-.t fj.J~ty
    ~~r'r(':J froL1 trfJ C? on t~" bstSG of EilJ. 213..
    D~.rect r-ontact u ;t",:C0~,}
    pJ.c:tCLO}) end c0IDppn:;r cOJ"'JGf'.::c:.ers J1nd in(ii vidu~l te.nk 3nd tcn:.1< UL_~'~
    cc,r:r'~lr,ndc:rs r:ae 3: co ('mpl07"nd .. "
    .. 1:tl tOfl.n oporati01l t:'10 -(,~nl\ dostrC0,T.-)r shouJ.d DC-.'7C! ,~s its prii1~;:.'ry
    mission - ~]1.~F "urt oJ' tho tnrJ:s. p;";C[,'J80 of tt.e essig:C~Gd priMO,:!;';.' :nissi.on it, is
    Glll~~'.lJ.y f'-,1}.a~5_ou0 ;. or th.) tank Qc.strovcrs to assume t~Gy cr.rr,ot 9.ct ir. 0t:.2~;'L"
    r'Jl S D.S i'c i(~: J, 'I' .;~:~(; inf,~~t""Y corn:m!"",ndLr to G.isrogtTd th,. primu:;! I;li~jsion .. (JD
    tLi.>n-:"JT~
    If in~Ci~: oPf'ra-:-:ion ann elc.!"lect clf t~1(:: te"rm is r::bSO:1t or is forced to
    wit,hl~:'(J.~7, t:~o b:;'~1g:1~. :'f cnary pressU1:'e Inl1st be tnken up b~,T the other e1e!t1onts
    reg&!'d':;',~3.S of l.'~in:r!'Y' role.
    It"'. tr~9 LAl'JUV:LO [:'..ction the.191st Tank Be.ttr-:,lion
    and 894th T,::<.~~.: Dos'T,royor Ee:ttalioll were at.tnchod to. the ,Di7iB,i''")ntlt !hH 191st.
    lJ'ank Bat-Gali-on b3.75_iJ:SI lost r,,:-)st of its :"ff:i.cers 'o.!ld 8Y.'~:viqPpedc tt~n1~ c!:'o'.":~
    in :'. previous notion "DeS unt.\b'l ;:-1 t.o. f1_1n~ti[)r. r,..m daring the 894th, ~n.pk' Dostr-oyer
    B;3.tt"'tllC:~l ::illc1 "tho .34tth fJnv('.l;""'J: RUC(:rll1[J.iss::,,~nce Troop tp.Q ,o.nly ~v:).i~.ll)10' fore OS
    in 2 situc.ti-on dc:nnnding he:.IiTJ .armor..
    .

    - 54 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    r:On

    t~e

    ':'!

    /r~:niY>~~

    '-"'T"

    0~':'.9:L:3 V!pre t3~~ued '~':'

    ",'7

    tbe

    ~V+tl, c,~

    H:Jco!'l:.~,(::.sra],:1r:~) 1\-oc.n t"J '>:0';<-" th,'" Jiviston r s J.eft f'J..;:-.n1:: o.PQ 1-.'0
    develop (;l"'HEly rs~i ::;'~'P!i'~::-' '_!1
    L,:-_-;-. 'uhi~~b anpea:'("3d :l1i.l'inC tLe C.c_;,' 27

    ve,lr:--

    ?-:ay bet';7W;~, t.; ;~- I-ft fIF"r..~_~ ":'.l;':-~_ c}'r:; i)-5th I:r:.f~1ntr~,'" Di,1: lsion", Kht.le
    not ~J,-cle -:'0 ao:>;.:-<:;nr'-8 ( ..:.'T ... ~~< th~'. (i:-::r ?~'- ~':e.;r,r ;;V0r ter"ain Et"jboltrcr;ly
    . . OJ. I"',(JVFI' +;
    Co

    +
    t
    .,
    . .
    d- ev():-',G.
    ,.,;-~() .i.:rooi"": eLIe'. 09,:0:"1:"7 0'10 l'S De~-;'r]_\,y ill") S;..lJ.O::l, 3:;~
    POS8(-1_, ;":!.nd in th'-~ ':JC;:---:-, 0:' IT;?:..:- ~.1E-~e,yy C'1.8r1:i seJf-propel] ed, C:f,_-t.i

    "cc.nk Hnll a::otj,3.J 8:-.::- ~-irfJ.


    1.;'.7i~:b_ ,sJ 1. j Y',-~f':rl"-~'r::.r .:;l~;',:t?ilts
    (r,a/~''3-::l

    t.:

    and

    G::':.8 m.;-

    lil':;:, ul: c

    it

    t.o r-'" ~;:n

    ~f

    0.r~y :,"~ i!:l

    t.h:-; DIvision \t:"r:' h(S'"'lvil"'" ,,:IJ_


    Et;}1.inst "t.:}'"' S1:;l;.~; '. C.t-n d0i'0'"::1Se (~f

    C8GULe ref"<.(~i.!.._,- [I~ rfl_~"":ln-t, ty~t

    .~,E.:.ll;_ - .).f;C0~S2~:':"Y"

    ar:~'Or"'~(l

    ~'_:u:_'=~,or..l-J 'rrf18 vj.


    ':,h:: ~:r:Jo:r:

    I~ --::.~'lC, r>-,-3,::;LCp of s\tfi'iGie,~t llc'3'iY .:),r!Il('!'

    ':"-'.s cI\inrs,j t . : 3'-~.n:/;:'~(. t.n,:l a~~l;3.,~k of +';.,8 3rd P~-Lta=-i.on, 1?3i'l'::. .:Ln
    (:'ar=.:/ ;-::9 ;1t.cy. :rell 8'.H'-I'::' 0:"" i~,:,s vulner"')t:.dlity, it moy::..d
    '~.;_.(-'l.c oi the irf8.nt:L"'~'" ~.r.d. succeecled i~ destroyin~~ four t.o s:b: e~:.emy
    '~k- c"-;:',_]_,-: g~2HL' EL.:1 J ::ll'~ tct.:::d ::-,.n estil:1Fted I':?f-J::,~" CP,sur',lt1_8s lr~ Id.:.led
    [-1",(: c-)L,urecl.
    It, f'~1.rtJ-.,3~, lE.d t.he infan~ry ba:,t(-~lio~ t(.1 i-::"8 o~.,_
    j('C-~,jV8 ~,~d. \'1]"[1_[;, tb'~s, ~:,irf.;ctly respons:i.ble for th.; only substan
    tJal :: d~.rr':r.GA ,~[,d0 t2- tro -:1&\'3.
    e,Y": ]n ~""":/ t:-:,-" ~ro':JP ';;:::8 3.::o;;omblG::!. on the- In'-:' flnrk 23 8:jcrrit:y
    :i''--'_:::rl~.,y-

    aiLd 61:-:0 ['8 a rec,E'rVt"; ~ C'l!, cOi_;!"".t',;r[~.~:,tacl< 9,lTpns08.

    T:'; ;",;..f tsrYJ)')n. of ':;.1 ;"ky 2~'T\T the 1':oop arc,in o:-de:,:",Bd to le-?d
    -e)-r ;l1:J P[J.ttuJ.ion, 1';);- IrSantr::- i1: o.n nSSRrJ:G in tho s'~',me C/cnerc-.l
    r,r~ r;$ on :::'9 r-,:~,:.r.
    I"rn '.eGG:!.-'g in the fn~8 0),'--' o0sel'v~'d d::'r5::t rire
    hst:.vy c-,neJJY 8c.:_i ->ro:'..',e] ;.td g'"l)::1S -1:.1"18 ~lroor ''n,'1.~;J.0d t!1G
    ntr;{ to move;; f O;.-->l!T", :,_~c, ,~Yld :.trnpro','-e its pcsitions end -e.o }~oJ d the
    gro~Jnd gained.
    ~.fct\;.r:til'2tf!~~i:i:ng ,.. l:r10Ert fQ1.;r d-::-~:lR of cOEtin'....lOl':.S cc
    -):,iol1, tho 34 tYJ Cr:V,_}lr~r :=-: '<'C('.l'1m'.ifj;::B.n~e 'rY'00p ".Tl.S di..... ectly 1'8 spon
    s:l_bl,,,; for thE' o_::l:tj m,..,.~,:,oli:.::,: 8'Lin m",,-':e ;i.cros stile: D:" vL:;iq:n L::-o::Jt J~
    0.:':.

    J 1. Ve

    i~'1f'-

    Er:,d .31

    !~ay. If

    IITL8 LtrJ1.iVIC act ion ::ol3.s


    :],usenCG

    1
    c.(' +
    ,.,,'lL-S,

    .:J

    'Blu It:;;:.

    F8.r-I~ic-;11&r intE.::.-'('G~1

    '+ +"
    S:",~U(.'..,_,lO-n

    i:'1 thn,t, in -'cL::-:

    ~
    ~'n'''\"'(
    Q.f)ma?"JQ.l.
    _i..!::;8.,.r:;:r

    ""111
    8,I;.Lr,

    '-h,...
    C.-, "';:

    C94th Tarle r: 0stro~Tei:-' ~D t tn.} 1.0Y' i.'!:: S r;mp~_oyr' :'. ~ n p tpnk role. T}:c:
    Sl'.ccpss vrith ,.thiel: tLe 89L-~h ':'8.nk DGstrn7l:r =,atte1~.on pl~~'{:-~ i-ss
    pert 8.i(l,ed m&-~',er5_al!,-y i.e trit; c,~,~tu.Te of tl~8 7~iy:;.sion obl:=~ctLI:;O-.
    Conti,l'll.).::~llr C!.i;jpoG~d in th'_' f""ont lines r s clos0 sUi)port iJf
    t.r.e inf <.:r:try , tho bdtt(;:i.J iO::l J...""1dDrt,)ok ma::'l-Y smtlJ. 'Un~.t cpor,--:-.. t~_or:c
    cun:pJ.ot81;r foreigT: c(' it.s !':orma.l roJ.e. r.Y! t.he ir.l ~i;::l as,sc.l1:::':iJ en
    VIL~I\_ CRCCE~i:'A, T'lc..y ;:S, or-; c~ atoon of Corr:pany "C n cr5"ss-cI"'lGSC;cl
    r.n 0r:1.~;rr Z:i_,S-~o.6 trrn.ch ~"rft"T. ,f:.ri..rlg :.ts I!1,q~~bir~n J;UTIJ dOlNn "Lt,:;
    t,:~2iJ'_'~h ;~1"'id ki~li:1,7 ~'n ~"stir,;8-t:.(;d 8 il (I20;JV for th:; loss of on:; _C-10
    t..::..r\ dcstTOYSl' r,it!1 crs1r .; EleJY.'.:mts of Comr-any liP" on Jun(~ 1 movc;.,J.
    for-:":-:..rd. cf the f::"r)I;.t line.:; 01: thf: }'~ft fl~,r.>: of tIl'" Di"",;-ision :'~1:J. .
    -St. ~c ~-;,''',ct dir.rt fire_ on nnerrr:/ g-"(lns, 'Obse~v;:'ltion post,s -n(~ oi'lb'.'.r
    i::,::-,t,[1_11::.,tions. Or.;: .hine; 3,' Co~'::!''';;' HE;'.,; _d~.S.!)OSl~d 'rlan::; 2. liYle '.'lith
    8,"'~'1."',}::;.:i::1rtGly 4(1 Y[lI'G.f', ',jet'ij0r;n T,_qr"'lIJ tn::r.k destro~lf~r;J, cr.Tric:'.-1 t>.o
    8.c~:->&ncc elcme:"lts of it,,; .1 33rd ._InCi 8.n~r:..' on th0 destroyers to th~,

    - 55

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    regimental objective. The Rec()nm~ssance Company ""CIS GTDployGd


    durinG' th) entire ~ction on th" r1ght fhnk i:1 tho gnp botuoon
    tho 34th :;:nfm"try Div:i.si,ml'ld thJ 36+,h Infll.lltry Divisi':'ll, c.nd by
    conat".nt pctrcll:i!liz, o:"t:. djs;,'-'mtod, provented infiltration of
    enemy groups :;'c7,i-vo in tL t "'v... t~inity."

    flEerly ~'l!ly _~ the $G.'~th 'J:D BGttt.lion Das clispoSGd to block


    all roc.ds lor.,di~ south :'n+,,, t:,e SolwtY F'J.ctory "rco. ;,hilo tho
    Roconnaiss2nce ComjX'IlY, ?76~b Tn D~.ts,"li011 blucked to tho north ".00
    north'3,~st en tho rieht f.J.cnk.
    B0th br,t,e.1iolls, oporcting fir3t one
    than the otnor, , it1 the 34th CeTclry R8connniss'Inco Troop in support,
    coverod 0. fr"'nt of 8:l:n(. 3 kilorr,otors. The l'o':lli "lets, lx,rticulr.rly
    .
    jn the 80,~.th 1D Battn!iG::1 scct",r 'Gre; effEctivel:' bloc'wd by oxtot:~
    sivo domolH5.c.ns I'ihich nooGssit~t"dJPcl'."tion on fOJt to .1ccclInplish
    the missi0n of pr')tectin<.S the t'b.nks of th" 'livis1.on.

    - 56 .

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    CHf,!':'ER IV EHHNEER OPEIU''IOi'l:l


    In Itnly, a country criss-crossed ,d.th streams, nounta~.ns, dry '~Ia/lhes
    and marshland, the solutio!" to the problem 0': moving a .division mo:.'e 'i;baIl ever
    depends on the enginoer's ability and his resources, Over such diffict'lt
    terrain two distinct ro;.sstuus of divisional onginaors must be x-ecognizod
    (1) Close i3upport entailing Tee :>ru:ais sanee, mi no clearing and domolitiona in
    the assault and (2) !!laint'Jnance and c.evclopl\\Btt of' cOlilr.lunic"t.ions 6l;r~ailil1g
    road repair and bridging. In the attack bad weather at times has forced div
    ision ell&!ineors to the laM,er roias ion ontirely leavin!l the fox-mer to be carx-ied
    by the alx-eadY ovox-ly-bUX'dr.med infantr;.
    .
    Major CARL J. SI'JHIEFEl'tSTlJ::m. Executive Officer, I09th Engineer
    Battalion,
    "Bridging.
    '.!1. It has beco;r" :lncrsae~.ngly apparent that bridging
    operations by divisional engineer$ should be kept to a minimum.
    rtten bridging operaticlllS are necessary the divisional engineers
    should prepare approaches luld exits but the actual bridge con
    struction ShO'lld be done by special brid.ging units, thus releas
    ing tile divislonal engineers for supporting the advance of the
    division.
    2. DiviSional el!!gin0ersshould choose by-pass sights
    so that the by~pass rill not hinder future bridgine operations :of
    higher echelon engineers.
    ~.
    rt has bee~ found tha~ heavy portable cu:verts con
    str..lctecl in a rear n.re:'3. and then l:a:ulsd to the crcs@ir~ site a~
    then laid in place by the usa of the M-2 tank retriever is a
    very satisfactory method of making II crossing under direot er.smy'
    obsorvation. The t-Jt'e culverts usee:' '/Iere 4 "eet 6 inches wide,
    6 feet high and 14 feet lor.g consist,irig of four be:;ts of S inch
    timbers anf flooredl'lith .3 inchpl'l.rJrs. It is ?oSGj.ble to lay
    these culverts side by side to obtain ary desired length crossing.
    TUs type of' croasing 1I'e.S used at CASSINO.
    Roads.
    li. Traffic circuJ.atioll is very 5.tr.portf'.nt and it has
    been found that in Ital,' .wl:ere 1;l:,erc> are r::any o'1e-~ay ro"as th'l.t
    tTIO one-way. rClads wi.th pr01'6 . ' traffic control is just as good CIS
    a two-way road.
    h. ~he old maxim of' drain off th'3 water and throll on
    the rock' has been reaffirmsd b".lt 1,t has been found th.t the entire
    road surf'l.ce must be rocked ana not just the ruts and pit holes.
    Also, bypasses sl:ould be rock~.
    ~. ROads should be marked clearly by the use. o~ signa
    such as mi!'le cleared algi';, dirMtional si~ns and.town signa.
    Colllll!1Ul!cationa.
    ..
    "J,'; It haS beeni'ound that the 284 radio is not too sat
    isfactOS!1 for engineer cperations as th.e range is' not great enough.
    Also tll.y are not too dePelidable and it has always been the policy

    57'

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED oft~ia

    battalion to uti1:i:/:e both radio and field messages in


    a message.

    Miscellaneous.

    lie.
    In a static sitw,tion I,7hGreby mine fields are used
    in a. ~tensi"e position it is nec3ssary that inf~ntry security
    parties be obtained for. (ingine'lr working parties. On the A;<IZIO
    Beacr.hed. it n.S found th",t it "las necess".;t'7J to obtain both Security
    and carrying parties from the infantry as the amount of work WaS
    so grent that enginoer personnel alone could not have accomplished
    the work .in the allotted time.
    12. The; bull-'dozer is a valuable piece of equipt\GntJ1~
    great,. care must be ()xercised in the UBe '1l1d maintolmnce of it.
    Spare p~rts should be mad" a'!ailable hy higher headquarters so
    that in ellse of damage to tho b'ul-dozer it Can be readily re
    paired. Each compaq), sbould haye a loast three good bull-dozer
    oPerators so th:lt .the buU-doz'lr can be worked constantly.
    c.
    By-p.'lsSNl should never be constructed ;l.i.thout
    culverts. It is much mere difficult to put a culvel'~ in a by
    paSS that has been \?ashed out than it is to put one in originally."
    send~ng

    iiJ,.
    "hile no startlingly new methods of engineer proceduro,lerD evoivod
    during the campaign many 1iffic1ut probJ.9ins presented themselves. The solution
    to the following enabled the 34th Infn>,try Division to emplo;)' armor with a
    mimimum exposure to AT fire in CASSn,C without which the position gained in the
    town could not hairs baen held.

    Lieutenant Colonel nOBill}' E. COFFE!, Comman(:\ing, 109th Engineer


    Battalion.
    "During the month of February we were confronted "ith the
    problem of making a le\'81 crossIng for tsnksin the town of
    CASSINO. The normal demoliti.on method could not be used because
    tanks using the by-pass would be subj scted to close range anti
    tank fire.
    The Problem: To construct a Class '30' bridge across a
    drainage ditch 15 feet wide snd6 feet deep. The bridge site 'i'as
    under observation .and subject to all types of fire i.e., s11'.1.;11
    ar:ns, mort.r and artillery. The origi.nal crossj.ng Vias a concrete
    slab supported by five re::nforccd concrete stringars. About six
    feet of the origin'll slab was usable, in sr;ite of t.t,3 enemy <la~
    molition "hieh had cut all except six feet of tre sl"b on the
    near bank. .
    The Solutior.: To construct the bridge in sections in a roar
    arOa and move the sections to the site by truck 'and tank wrecker.
    Bridge section plans and construct.ion were com?leted during day
    light hou~s and ilie sections vlere en\plP.ced under cover of dark
    ness. Tho act,ual bridging operation Vias completed in t'IO hours
    after the sections were delivered t.o the ,assembly area Qne~half
    mile from the site. Cover for operating personnel was provided by
    old slab bridge and the only casualty Vias one soldier ,Ino suffered
    a slight fleSh wound. 'i'he woodon st;ructure rJas pla:c3d alongside

    . 58

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    tbe shb bridge making (l totnl !lsa.HG >lidth of 19 feet. Flooring


    ,:as plQcun. on th~ bottom of th~' sGction to insure adequate bear

    ing."

    . h. ,Tnf, 1'E:z :.

    z, P.11 ato~.

    In Itdy the A & P Platoons have had to


    in the advJ.nce. From
    ttoroughly trained ,::tS

    n!1c.~)rtC'~F:8 cngll'l::'-:Qr o:'--::rc.tl0!:lS t.o rrta7_ntctn the reginent


    obsarv,_~ti;-)ns made it is b~lj_iJved tllrJ~ s. sold=.G!, can be
    :J.n inL~.ntr:,Tmo.n or .1~ o.n ongJ ncar b...rL not nS both.

    l,'!t 11.;.:;~.rt..~';'1J?nt !RVIF 1:... !-::'!l'S~J, 1:~5th Inff.!ntTy.

    2r.'1 L:'.Ql't,)wmt '.'IAYNE E. ;,;: [J;:IJ.,N, 135th Infa.ntry.

    StD.f'f Sec-p;oant KSmrr::'I.c: F, hcAr;j)J.E, l3~th Infantr!,

    Scrg(:;,i.nt :jAK!:l.~ J:. LEErr, 135tL Iufar.tr:)':".

    Tc.::bnician Fifth Gr9.(k :,T..E::rtT J. FHANGHI, 135th Infantry.

    t1~'~.'tb t.he A &, r Sllot:!.OIl it je thll same old story - attempt


    ir:g to CO toe' nmch v:i tr too liO:.tle. W5.th reeards to this one of
    ovr greatest d~.f.f~ c~::lt.~.~")G ~l': St:JS \~.lr~n thE; s:i.tuation calls for
    i",J.~1-f.<).ic.r ~)~~:",~ ~:,~T" t:T'Ed21'Bd.
    :L:o bil Inere s'pacific: i'lo.ftDr crossing
    -rhe VJItraRNC hiver tb0 t}:i.T.'l t,-i.:;;c, our ~att!~:.lion had trouble ':dth
    t.l m.i.ne fic~.d, 01~G of tJ-.:; _l'l:",g-3=t ':"8 havo e-o:t0r oonta~ted.
    IJaturq,lly,
    tte ery- -:,-!ont ".1"0, I': b~~:'G ';.~.}-_o l;~~:'l' s the A & F 3ection? I
    I,~ tr.~t t.iJ,lll r;e .. er,: t"n:.bly hcll'dica?jJeJ,
    Out of 19 men
    ""ly ';lT~'e ~:Or3 sllf':flcj,mtl;v tr.imKi to tackle the job. Some
    of tt!:, ll,~n hed be."n tT,,,o.,,,d rrevioc.sly bl-'t they had long been left
    bo:li.nd, liTe ('lee".!,;:" t,j'at fbld; t'x,k our tudnine right thore, toot
    Pe \:GI'c:: f( rt1..~.n':.~e thA.~ +:.t.'-.;. Oth;::!' ~{;c-l:.io!'lS having the salnG trouble
    \:.;eJ:'L' !"l.(lt E"' fortun~:,.t.8, t c'~ ~nd 11 v'S.; v.'G:r>e lost.
    The point is this:
    F.u)'C.C"'""llct". n:l(:k:U.I X:.,liLt:'"- t,led for such technical and dangerous
    1,-:6::'1-:::, shonl:...~ r,'Jt be n.ssigi::Gd to s"'J.ch 'i:~Ol'l,:.1I

    J3t L::'cut~r,.r:t JE.rl.OME L. FL%T3R, I331'd :thfantry.

    "OnG 0f the th::'ngl> t;"lt I hay,", ,l.wnrood in actual comb,rt is


    .:,'" "", "CS'"](JC:l8r is 1'cl"tj.ve1.i inoffectj~ve crossing fields
    at rj~~L:.. ~he :")L!_Y 3af"~ f,;]C; posit.:vG Ylay' .is to probe and ~.'eel
    t.'i.~,h :,ho [',1'C' :,r!',' :m] 1:,,<',
    To jo this r~quires :attle technical
    s1::.11, b;.;t it (,03,' 1';:001)''''8 "em P"l'\etice and a groat deal of pa
    t.tcrce, LiDe comnc,ni"s ~ho\,ld ha'r" special members of each rifle
    tT~,

    pl:"t.';In21 -f~o:..:lgL~ to GO t}]:i.s

    It is 8xt',ero'lly cosUy to lJse pat.hs through ",ine fields if


    there is nn~' Jther poss'.l)lG route to reach your o[,jective. It
    is i',l))os",iblo to Jeploy ., n c,cse of a fire fight or an artillery
    0:" TJl't,,: barrage. ;,:'yonG (',nGht in a mincfiGld during a fire
    fi.ght 0-::' 0. bc.r:c.ge is stuc;c ti:cre, eJ'posed and helpless, until tbe
    firing iG lifteli.ll

    "Some 0.' m,; Q':1X:/~S: .":" i" :,.ctU:lJ. combat lire that'men, or I't\1'.rols
    mine fields shoUld give :l""1J1C1:'G detuiled

    c:~ o'!';'YC!1iJ ',-:~_c i":. !lds ;.,;.::'::;':33 : .. ;'~d

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    '/

    report of theJir findi.ngs. lif, men and I have at times gone on


    detnils to c.'.c;nr minos i.cd minD fields that have never been there.
    Thic hcp'~'ons becQuso GaIT.eor:') has seen tin cans or bottles and have
    not tc,:wn ti;ne to invost'.gc.to before sending their report.
    A,~C!tt8r thing is th1t I don't think fie got adequate pro
    tec~ic!,. ::O'or crr !Cork Ul:cder onomy action.
    At times we have had to
    bo our o',:Yl prvtoct5.on, cTI:.od only l:.ith carbines and trying to use
    a L"dno detector at tho sC\me time. I think we should have at least
    one B1-..R Qnd 2 riflemen. Tl:is ",auld give protection for our mine
    squad in .:'ront of our troops .. "

    (D

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLA551 FI ED

    1. 'l1his su'bj :)ct 'i~ill hi') 3pbd~,virl.c.d into tLrn0 si.:.ct.io~~. T!10Si:? C.Y'C ffi0SS. ~go
    cO!1"Gcr, ~ l.io, ';Fd ':.'ir.:: corrlimUlic'1.t~'_onft tll1(~ "11'0 furth',]l' subdivided to bri.ng out
    sp'Jcific lessGns loarnod by

    ~,bo

    vflrious diV2sinnal c()mponc:=1ts.

    ~. ~':D.J1U:~..
    Sig!1tJ. CO~ll.tJc.ny oper:.lt.i',-~,:)s ~.'ero pn.tt~"'!rned quito
    cl0301:/ o.ftor princip,_os se':, fori 11. in B:wic Fi.u]d Fcnuo.l Flvl 24-5, ISigml
    C0n11111:-nic'l.-t,i0n t No pnrtieul"'r pI'ob18PlS ~oro unColUltnred and tL-: succesci\l.l
    ol')ro:tic-ns crm best bG oxpla5,ned by er:uInur"t,ing t.he; specific tLi,'lgs ~ho.t be
    c"c'() SOP .",S oJl3l'-ticns prcceeded.

    First Li"ukrm:1t JOFN A. orR SGOI,U3o;. 34th Signal Compnny.


    itA: 1 nG\l replacGlt.8rJ.ts
    end :not-or !nossorgors evon
    CouEtor el:.::1"l~s. Tb5"s b'ls
    kn0nir,g more of thE.; h,:,s';.c

    ",;f'r-3 trn:itKtd. first [tS foot llGSSOUg'Ol'S


    tb0-lCh +.hoy welre to lutGr becomo eouo or

    n.:.sul.torl in thG toc:-:nicin!ls :J.l1d non....c')ills


    Tlk;SS ....;l:1g~r routin~."

    canst-nnt ct'1nf:"'"J.ng of relief d'l"i'l:Tcrs on niotor m0sscng-;r runs


    l:'~f:ul+ed in nlJ. dr::'v JJ s ~:!'o;:inG unit loc(!t~,ons for next schejulGd
    or spOCit,l runs. Our 0..)[; ~H.g- ;rs hc:'1!c 'll"r:ays ~.'[ttc}.<~d clos.Jly for
    D.1'l.::r troop mOVC:'18I:ts '~nd ~r.; .i:'1ct"'::"'~cted to stop and. Ul,".k0 inquirius
    of h.o ..lclqur~.rtor:J !1.101~g their rO~Jt..::s. T~is ir1o!'m~rtion is ~cported
    t,'" tho mosso.gG C,.C.l.:3r' cL~ uf l.lt"x'n rct"rn. Tt.. is mothod hi..s l:cpt oux
    I!'.:)8S~"\r:O oontsl." bot;t:)r pOE't.:)d on loc[tt.io!1s than VJI).S possiblo if they
    d,Jpondod up0r~ ~-:',:-::: SGctiO.'1E or lo~:''::~~ unitd to roport~ ".
    ,::0

    Li.(;ut(;I'.:\:lt Colonel 3':'"FLEY L. EURGHCFI'T, E"dqnllrtors 34th Inf'antry


    Division.
    "Durine r3rj.'Jds of co:~b ,t, pr5.'Jr:i.ty '":,Oc1 UTF,oJnt mossn.gos :,lero
    deJivc'T..)d irnrldd:: 2.t.l;T upon :r8CU:tp~. Ro~.l.tinG tr3.:'fic W::lS doliv(3:'Gd
    evory hO~lr on tJ,Q t~our. FJ:.on not in cO~)lb'1t priorl'tj" '3.no. '..lI'g.::nt
    tr,-:.ff:'c '"\7as de:~v,')rcd. irn..rtledi.';,tely 1.1)01'1. I'oceipt but. r0utino T::'"' .::?:tc
    ~1.S d01ivor,:;d OVC!'7,T bo~.;.r 0::1 t:1\j h01:_T frOF.. 0600 to ,2000 )'}OU)l':;" .
    OrigiYId.l1:r ',;"0 kopt all m(:ss~g,j c-:;nt.:;r r;jCoros fOT .J, pcr:'od c~'
    . S("3von dQYz. Th:'s :t~s nC'1f coon incr,:)i-~~:.:.,d. to thirty duys 2$ S ]'7Gr:"-,1
    DliJ8 G"fes, pflrt:lculc,rly of ~n "C;ministr:ltivo ntur". hlld to be) trnced
    after tPo soven d"y p'jriod.
    ",ho encodc'_ng of :\11 moss"-g(;S is chocked for cOJ;'roct.nGss.
    Urgan,. mOss:.g0s ,,"'0 pllssod to t,r'lnsmitting e.guney '\nd tYee chocKod.
    Priority i'nc rO'ltip$ m8SSrJ,g"S 'r.Td ~hockod oven be foro transmission
    star:.ts. This. unuses r~ slight ielny in the indiv1du,~l I!l8r.s~tg.e hut
    1:.o..s saved much tim,"] on tL~ tDt'""'.l :]1' IJncodcd traffic. A~l CTy~t0gr~cphic ;rl'ors th~t COP'8 to OU;'" o'cto:'ltiop
    ca,llcd to tho att3'l~
    tian of +,hG, ono lC'1king the "bt"ko :'1" 'soon .'l.S' possible.

    :,.0

    - 61

    UNCLA551 FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    No other. communiC'l.tion c.gcncy makes the usa;e of Signc.l


    Opor,')tio?1s !nf> t;:1.:,::tiO~JZ t:~-... ~ ;:'_'~,:'5:-1ge cen~-,er does ," The Div'ision
    mGOSD,ge C8rr:.'?-r }:.:.:e/-"B QU.... "_-, "It iJ ')~ .. '8 of" 81..L llJ"lits l.~ith r;hich C8n
    cer:ned
    ':l_'be DlC")S':'; -~,:7e t,...oS~~-:'t;;:r c.fii::Gr c-113cks ('o~1t;tantly to see that
    the curr(Jr:~ ~.~ld r)I~-:..- "<18 CJ.."rl'C'l~t .tt(~}Jd llTe in 1.:.se.~ All s1iperseded
    iteu:.;, c::,j ",c'}:'Lcd ec'les ,".:1(: vJjW:;;: c</?~(')gr"lPhic oquipment are
    prompoly d.J3ttOy:.d .q{Jd ropl)rts ren(8)"ed,"
    Captain L1O:'O 17. REISER, 3!,th Infantry Division i.rtillory.
    "Divisci-on ""tillery reports no dep"-L,ture from nO!'ll1al pro-'

    cGdures -til tt3 oper--.tion of their me~snf:e ~~eiltGr and Dlcss'e11ger

    personr;ol, Due 'GO the ir,'idcq'A:.i,e pe"f;or.nel boing allotted on tho

    T/O for sus~,niYlc;d ope::'T~ions. (11 L uniLs ~vlVe tr'?ined reldio oper~

    '?tors as code c_erks


    '.chis !1'lS helped considerClbly.

    1:~3rd

    GCtptain lIILLIAf,j D. PASKE,

    Inf:lntry.

    "All infa'ltry xeg:iJ:lents hw@ pl'lccd much import(1nce on the


    trc.im,ng c/ gOld foot mClbs8clg,,~'S, p,,-.'tieu:!.nrly on the bnt\,;ilion
    and CGiil(J~~1Y 1G";81 ,rF.hcse ~\:Ul~.lG...:'S t \VO ~Gl1 3l.Ven tra.ining in
    compass'rclI1dlng and on repo.'tlng "hat thL;f see, All ;'nfnntry units
    havo usod and pl:leod nlu'.lh Lonf1,QGllCe in '\.h~ir runners. 1I
    First Lieutennut EDGA.1't T> ADLEr.> 135th Inf"ntry.
    "Our r3g:'Jllonth~s "ttnched '1 1/4 ton C 8: R and tnC? lIlotor

    mossengers 1'l'om o:lch bn l;t.n:ie,l to the regiment. These mes,c.engers

    c[lrry tho trn.ffic to thQ2 r 'respectivG units,"

    Lieutonant GolonGl STANLEY L. BURGHARDT, Headquarters 34th Infantry"


    Division.
    "Tho AFCODE Nr'plied by hip:J:or headquarters for use r:ithin the
    Division isdi.3kicilt,cdto, romjxiny a.nd hG.tcory lovel of all aSfligned
    units, 'I'~G s.i.gc,C').'_ :,t'ficG 'epl'OS'l<:!Jfl ri oode sj,IllUar to digr:lph
    fal:" all u':'to.GLc{i ':uM''': ~ 'tJ<J, ~.';':. d(J~ t'?;J.,ye_~ c:..~ ("1':'l1e.: 8".lllporting troops.
    This is o.J>_O\I'(''''~ riG '0:) d.:>:~t:"~~':l"L"d drl'l;:n 'i:.o ~;b1.Lo;""oj,'" lov~l the ind..
    ividu~l llili t d:,:)ti.i~8S
    Cr.'ll'l/~ ~-'''ii::'''S'l of t.hJ.s ~~oc.~ ';7ill tn no' y}ay
    o.ffcc ~ tho :Jl-;r:i iJic)_"; A~'C ::;:.YE" r\,'J.1F Vi\,Tj fi lOi: cC.il no.J.1d net UEGS l. .rc
    produuca. C0C~C r.0t t(~:Jd OJ' ;3.J,):' {yt~1Fi1.' l1lii'IJ,' Liko1idse'r:. similar
    code if,; :fl:~'G\}Grf)c. {01' :~~13 ~:.{ ':;~~UG i7"J Ube of +..hc reconno.isso.nce. troop
    .S1ight:lj:~OJ;.Cl.c1 GlIS ",,'0 mc:dc. 1il thG YUc'):'-"'ulariGs of 1111 theso cop-os
    to includo \,'or~,,: mOr."'G n.ppl i':Tl.c:""e "Go '~ho OpGco.'tions."
    1

    First LiolJ.tencnt :\OBEltr J.

    emp,];,

    34tr. Sigml Comr".ny.

    "In rf.lpid moving situntJ.ons lIluch use is m'lde of AFCODE. 1Jhon


    tho front is skblo Qnd tlOVJment slo.: such QS CIt GASSINO and .i.NZIO,
    "'0 phce very little nust in the security value of AFCODE and ro
    sort :lImos t ontirely to tho 1!I"Z09. 11

    - 62

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    12. R:teJ.:l.Q..Q.c..J:,!!!nt.s:rt;il}. 'iho signal compr,ny operated in four nets.


    Th,:,)S0 wot'G tho Corp:) n" L, Di-ris ton C(Ytlrc~~.'1d nut I AI whicb. comprised thG infan
    try regiments nnd d:'vioion 2!'ti.~lery, Di7:'Lsion command net "B' which covered
    ~tt",chod ur-its and Ij.a~son not,
    T:,o '.i"~S011 11et W'1S comprisod of stations "t
    ene', infJ.ntI"J rsgim(;l't, flunking divisions 'lnd the Commanding General. All
    nets fl'lllctionod nell fro," en olJGr~tion skndpoint. However, the fact that wire
    con:~~lUnic:~.tion waS virt~lJ.y ClIYJays r in r rosulted in very little traffic being
    ,:""'.8sod by ra.dio. Tho Divis:.:m liaison not "as veT'J a.ctive at all times and
    ~\::sSGd 2. l:~rgo (~-:"'lc.ntity of traffic of inform..~tive valuo.
    LiclUtcno.nt Colonol STA1UY L. BTJlGEAPJlT. HGadquorters 34th In
    fantry Division.
    "Quit,,:,::"-- ,,'l'c)Lt,l;r, r,e>tnJ)le on tho ANZIO Beo.chhead, an SCR-193
    radio can bo used siltisf:.cctoril)," in the Corps command net. A
    single SCf-J,,9 is sufi'ic~8nt for the signal company. The radio
    link to Cor?s pr0ved vc.lu0,bl(), especit\lly during very rapid opera
    tions Vlhon Corps could not keep wire communications in. In one day
    +,128 Division COmrr-l'1r: Post mO-"'3d from 0. point slightly north of
    Rm!iE ir.to CIVITAVECCF:cF., c, distance of forty-one milos. On this
    day COTILlJ1ur!ic"ti l~S to Co:'ps wore maintained by a Division 1.ire
    linG plus Co""PS radio. (J"r foZ',~arC' com"land group nore in the
    hO,oit cf m[>.k~,-ng long :i:.DV:)S ':i~__ ti1.out tho Corps redia link. When
    thoso jl'1OVGS ~!cC8.r.le so long ttat rlire contac+, wn.s lost it became
    nGcos3~r,7 th~;t tho Corps l'::"j.(UO Qccompany them also.
    T1--e I'i'l".si'Jn comnari\ nC)t '1..' and liaison net resulted in a
    duplic::ctLn of sets "nd ;xrsonnel at all infantry regiments. The
    tr".ffic lo~d of both nets c auld -"ell be handled by a single net.
    Th:,sQ n:-:ts hio.V8 not..! been C:-QLi.binod, pursonnel increased in number
    n.rlcl 2::Jili.-ty, d-~iplic<.:ti on e:lir::inated
    .t~l]. TJ.dio ope1',~,tors h'.::~v~,; boen given concentrc.ted training in
    the use of Gophor Dev:i.c8 ;/'U9 and AFCODE. The combined net will
    Landle nIl Cryptogrnpl;,e r:n:l mns $,lg0 center dc:tbs to include de
    livering tnf'fic directl:; to Skff scctions. This will eliminate
    th:! i'1Gvitnblo 'rr3SS"l[,;0 c'~ntC'r! do~..'lY. PJ:l tr'lffic <lill be filed
    clith the unit m,]ssngo C,]y,t,~r e,t tho and of each t17enty-four hour
    P8I'iod. Th:..; t-,),r.n~s \;'ill 1;.0 ~(,m:noSGc1 of' four operators 8o.ch at
    out stC'.ticns. Lt tllf~ D~_~::rs~.cn 1':C~~ it is cOIil.posed of additional
    m0~So.~c center end c.rr;~n~:raph:"c p<..:r..:':"S-ODl.lc.:', _.
    Origir~l1y SCf-l'13 Joi:'.os mO'mt3d in 3/4 ton vehicles were
    attnchod to tL8 in-'mILry regi'!'.onts. V'hen the fOI"?ard cOl(lffi8.nd post
    is initially OGtc.~Ol03),G:l gJnc-":111y nothing J.arger than a 1/4 ton
    V0il~~ el,::; ie' J..._I.~,,-;,,~
    ,_"
    ,1:1. ~~i.; 'l,' r3sci ~ 1.:7h8n wire did f~il and radio
    eomrr,unic'ltio:_~ \,:"',8 n830cd.:; c;:.l::,~ the r".2.T (;O~l".r;"/l::J.d post could be req.ched.
    1

    7hG rogim'J~t'.-J

    C8tS

    h':0.l"::'; l:u ...;n ::_.;1sto.l2.cd in

    .;../4 ton vehicles and now

    -cr-lvol di::,,'cctly 1".'itl; '~tre S-2/8-3 acct.ions, giving us the deSired


    OntJl'gor..c y C:H.4:,"lni~;\}A:.or ".-:1' ";i1 T.~JiTG fails.
    Staff off jeers . eoL'!;iLu<l to be qnito umware of the capnbil
    itioscr:::l lil'1lto,ti8u{ c'f redia comrnunic3.tion and equoJ.ly ignorant
    !'cr;;-:rd::i..ng socurit:r ~ VlTt'''_".lly ;.\11 s;)curity breaches ~1:'C made by
    o':':,cc:;:'s atj :in mn:::}y (;::.3~.S '-)VUr thE: advice of radiO operators.
    It :'s boJicv,-,ct tr:.!t tnc' ~..:!'c<~cd-u.rcG ywuld correct the above failings.

    - 63

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    First all officors ShO'lld racdvo more trc.ining of the sub;! act hefore
    coming ~_nto _:lction. T!'is shcm1d be live and practical tr".ining and
    not thoClry or a 1ec+,urD. Socon:ily by Commnnd Action they should
    bo m:-_do to US3 tho r_1dio during trcd_ning periods and at regular
    intorvC\ls so th,-,t ':J10n the emorgency arose they lIould be prepared.
    Tbis should D0 fo110,cod UD c1cso1y by disciplinary _:lotion for
    SGouri ty bru,'J,r:< '.;,3.;1
    First Liouton:-nt HOBERT J. CORR<;, 34th Signal Company.
    "Division oOT;1r''1nd net 'B t is not. normnlly operated oxcopt Ylhen
    -:ir-::hUs or t!-o r()c_r echelon is out of range of field ,lire. A
    :lOtC1blo USe of t:'is r.et c:aE from the ANZIO Beachhead to the NAPLES
    n.ro~:..
    T,::o SCH-193 1 s ~'_'DrC used 11ith Iflo.t top1 ~Lntcnntls. An ::tvor:J.gc
    of ton r.!esc~1gC1::~ ;-:Gr:3 h[',nd~Jjd OVer 1:.;1:i8 not per day, for u period
    in 'J:-~CCSS of tl!O months. 'lhJ only other method of communica.tion ViTaS
    a t,,',-~t.Jr mossc;ngcr' r8q!~irlng thro0 daj-T's to make tho round trip.
    Tho not lias continued during tho breakout from the Beachhe"d and
    actuall:T ~\1ndj.onod lie11 bot'"ic;en ROfJE an,d NAPLES, _'1 distnnco far in
    o:::".eoss of th,-; sot.s !1crmal r::ttings. t1
    Crlpkin LLOYD F. REISEE,

    ~lL,_t::

    Division Artillery.

    "Div:'s-" en Lrt-il1c-IY r:O:'Di-"t the nec8ssity for keeping radiO


    sets S~F-2S4 ~H)m-.n\:fl'lt :t'cmo'.. ori. from gun positions as concussion
    bro2.1:s certnin tube.::: used if! tr.i~l 30t.
    A ~--,di8 rel:w Gyst:oc- LC_J l;"x;~ Qoveloped nnd oPerators given
    trc.:Ln.ing in r01 -:':ling 011 tll('~ 2h voice sets. In mountainous torrain
    much r,)l.,;.yi~,:r t'1S hlld to be l.!CD.8 ..
    fhon a for-:!'lrd observer is unable to carry his SCR-609!610 due
    t-, -:'IlTr,,-in or other lin:;' t'_Lg C:! :<"icu1ties, h", uses an SCR-536 to
    conk.ct his b"8e sot. Yr~'" thoro it is !'e1ayed to the fire direction
    c0ntc'r, It

    ":Iho infa.:1tr:' is m"k; "r-- -:_xi:"n t'3U 0;: the SCR-300 1 s. All
    attached t,nlc, t:mk destr0Y:-:::, ~);e'llical battalion or other support
    ing troops must bo -3~Uj_l);: lc1. "lith thdr own SeE-300 1 s for infantry
    -support. ';:ho ;_lli"_n-try T/:' Gor,s not a11e-., sets boing. supplied by
    thorn. t1
    First Li.out-cnoht LiJr};,n 1'. i.DL:J', 135th In:'c.ntry.
    "Th3 SSh-JGOt S :111VC} '_-"~!-i:J(\ oxcclJ ently bctt/cen tanks and in
    fnntry. 'l-;10 SCR-~09 rclTLisl:8d by the: tenk bc.ttalions to the irfan
    try is tC'o he'I'_'Y nnd have !'_ot lwrksd out nell. Onc regiment opor
    at-cd on S:;R-3'!O not CQmpos}d 'Of inf"ntry, tanks and a Cub plane for
    obs~rvation. haS'Ll] ts y} . . . r.;; V"Jed.
    In m:J' rogiment thruc_ of tPG SCR-536' s in the heavy \7ec.pons com
    p~ny arc oach on 3 cliffel' )rrt frequoncy (thf'.t of [1. rifle comp"ny).

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    'lInus 'TJhen r'~ 1'Tl.i,:_ch~ t",:} gl1~l p~_ :toon is .:?t-l-':1.ched to suppo:-t ,:"ny one com
    P=-l1Y, it dr:l.1iS tl:..a ~ ~R~ 53{ to -\;wyk i-}i-"'~h thc.t c0mpnny., This in
    sures much closP1' sl~p:?Ort.. lJ..'he other three SCR-.. 5'-::6~:3 of tho hon-vy
    ~'-oapons COIr.j9.'1DY ar;:; ',:.50:3 ~)y thn m01.' [9.:1' sections,.!1

    itA

    5Y

    ~J) +'

    i~c-a\.iY ~n,'ch::lJG

    grG.l p::"stQOO is very' -50oc1 bocause

    t.l.'.ore ',-,;ilJ be C:liilin;::.nie;'.lt:!.IAl \,i"i~ll the !.~dYo.rl~_ng n5SEult platoon or


    by CO -Lo ~.'31~ t~~0 m~:c;-::j.~':J g'lll platoon cf:t':~ CGr j pllen to givo support
    fjru 01' Ct;f,iS0 fire ~,S t.hG S-~'hL1tion mrty cz,ll i'or. This company
    Uf":X). tl is syst .) ,~l in 1-l1C ~1:~t::.'.('1~: :l_~ron GECI}:A to tl'lG ARi~C RiveT, cnd
    Vie hf1C~ IX ::.tCT Cr;:;IJ~yO_:. Q"Tler OtT!"
    s<?~q~_1.ently, \'It., ljOr'3 ~...~l.1.lG to g8t t!.>:3:J into

    I'uJ.nd ttat

    30 Dim;::tcG 2:)(\"r--)r t.:bau

    3.~~

    Q-::t:,_~.r:hed W'38.pons.

    Qctio!l f::com
    tim3 py.:....vious1y. II

    Con

    5 minutes to

    IlThc; cmn.TIlon SCii - 3nc cr'1m:cl fer ~,-1 8.ntj.-t-'J.n.l{ compani38 has
    viit!-ont dift' :_clllty
    COT:7i.., ve::.', ':: 9.ch rCJ!inont. shou:td ~la.v3
    :f'i'T,-; chal1'.-:"!el:-.~"
    C;ui to l'rCOI1..Jllt.].J- q:Ll tbrLO t8.f-,"~,al~ons aTe com~nitted,
    tl-::(; c '_:' _Don C;~'i-;-I'pJ.ny ITt" Jt 11:-,,"\:"",;; n S Cp.:1:r:J.-i.:e Or'8 !?nd ?lJ regiments OX8
    usin[ the SeIi.-3CQ ler an A_dJ.~tior~:3.2. ~orrc.:1and tl3t,lir::kl'n
    ~-'C:. 1. ~d

    Lioutennnt Colonel
    Division.

    STa:~ItG'Y

    Lo

    B~IRG~~.A.?Dl,

    lieRdquarters 3!+th Infantry

    "The in::'.l;1.tr:i :"-::,gj j:lOT"::'


    -;n ;?Tcfor tho l;.Sd of tho DCR-300 to
    tho 8CH-2ol:. ~'or t,}10 r8gi:-l0r~t,~=- CC;IF'lund net. It ha~ g5_ven oJ:ccllont
    rrnp.;c and ~ts light we_':_gh1:. m--:J~u8 it, much casior to t:rE~nsport, ,..:spcci-
    ,':,~J.13T 1n motill"tr::.l.i2.1CUS t..n~r'=t~:.n.
    i:"]:or'J d~st'l.nc:J or intervening terrain
    mukos the 5CR-3 0 0 inCl"pOr.'1.7j.vc, "thc ~)C?~"'2gL~ has b'.:- :H) 1150::1 e.nci 1'esu1. ts
    he,vo b,:HJn satisfHcsor-y. ~:l:.c 28,~ is u3cd cont"'ist.:;lltly h2t;;-~Joen regi
    mcn~ ano Bervic0 c::r-"l::3r'.: ~
    Many inst",nc~' 3 ,:()~" bro"f'.:'" UD i'lc'icGtl"g cnomy r:hoJ.ling due
    '--1"

    to d<,I'oction fin(Ll(.' .J1U:i:)~:L:,T~ ''It'vi 0.'1 o~"!r T'D.d~,o tl'ansmi':..-..tcl's. In


    oV0ry 81.nr::; '..0 en-' _,; i:1V8::J-~.
    t,_~d.:t ':e~"'. fc~_md ~t:.l.t the cause l~las not
    DoF. Cor;-:mtJTI ca'lS(.'S ,".'~~rc~
    CJ 'i/lsuLl si.gtt of t.l-:J 0P':"!'.'_:.tor!l ::.~:~.t'2YU-:;~1 or t.roop concontra

    tion.
    (::,) I.oc:'.tior.. nE:.aT" a \i:)r-thr,lhll..:: target :::.:3 ::: gun position
    or prominerlt croGsrc::d"
    . (c) ~r?.nEmiss=-o!l in t;-F:' C2.C f 1::' of frie::c~~y locat:~on;3 OJ:' mOVG

    ments,"

    lIfo~ir8 ,'":.nd T'1r:1.io men a:':"c, h'1rrpCTed :::'o.'ltIv \,rh:?n carrying tho
    a'.f,}1orizGd M-2. rifle. :it is r.8~o:rrT:,<t.. :-::ied th'1t carbines 3.110 pistols
    h,; i':'s"Qcd as suboti tutGS ~ Also tJ:-J use of 3. rr:usset.tc baG il1St8Ud
    0:( tlco full field p::tc:{ ",auld ccid the cOlnIDunic.st'Lons men who l1suc\lly
    h:Y"I"lC morc: equipillent to cG.rry than thv rii'lBmen.ll

    - 65

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    .Q. Ril'_C0.!!1!El1'2:j.~;;t'V."
    Tho sig~.11 col'lpa~ywiro personnel followod basic
    principles for ',liro conml1.:11icnti,ou. rtot.c,'mr,. itwB.s. loarned thnt ilidoly varying
    practices l'-nd to be ut3.cr~';";0d cLe'pQnd~J1g upon th0_ :~<...e2:':t8.:LD) rate of movement, number
    of units being sorvod end tnG r"ad n'l ~"ilo.,.k. This reu1l1tGd in tho I'.Gcessity for
    the devo~.\)pmont of c. v."):r:7 :C.iex.i'cle rtl!,J. <'i.zgras-Dive orgrn.i7Jo..tion. The no)d for
    very C].OB .. C00r,,;Tntio'{} t<;',~7':CiO~: l,j ::"0 ccn2 GTuc'tiol1 ~TI8n ,',nd srd tchbo~rd oporators
    was recogniZCld at rtn G~1.r:ty (i'Lt3~ IJ'bo 'Icnlint. G,-"'r:J.~'Yj_::;n to do.te has offorGd us
    four quito distinco tYIc~ oft w::'1'8 p1'obb:.1S. Those lIill be ha!ldled by phQSOS and
    the rrobloms "ill be dcs0rl: j .,,;od then tr"e Ill0 ~hod ,,;od to 801.\Ie each will be
    explained. In all casas good ',=-re C08!ll'mic.,tion rescli1;ed, although our mthods
    wero quito di.fforent in cnch,

    LLntonnnt Colonel STAGEY L.

    Bl,:?GEAi~T,

    Hendquarters 34th Infantry

    Di\T~"s ion.

    ''t'om tho point whero tlee Cliv~sbn rlUS first conmlittod south of
    BE\iEVlGi,l'O, through throo CY.:J3J::'ngs of the VOLTURNO River and on up
    to COLLI thGre VleTG :er good ro~.d3. Us,",,~lly not more than ono good
    road rlas found in t1:3 ~ntire Cli '."islo!} aTcn. Ofton this waS supplo
    mOlft3u by t.co.ils a:nd E.':::J.g:tn\1Gr~b1:.ilt Ioads. BGcause of mountainous
    tG~I."rain 'I!.d ['11 gr:)unc. 8~:S.,::;~:-,t T'oar1.s being D. mire of mud (from heavy
    rainfalls) r)::'.'8 l'lYlllg l.J~~'1r.le '.-ery roadbound. IV'h"3S \Jsre cncountered
    in gront quant'.ty ani ro,'c u8ua:' ly cleared only from t:1e MSR. It
    is os~im"ted that 90% of tho "irG construction wns confinGd to the
    rondside.
    '-'ben tho si.tu"tion "CiS sloy,' r.loving 0.11 lines \7ere ovorheadod
    1iJhonevor possible:. '2. his t,ini..!l2.zed tro1.1.ble from vohicula.r traffic,
    road ropuir "ork, E'ho~'t, cj.rc';c.~s 01' lino 108sos due to howy rains.
    F.h;:;n ~if'.o permit toe. thf.: origirLi] ipsc;,1~t_ti0n '7u.S ovorbeGded o.S
    laid but Ylhon ti.'llJ did not aJ.lm7 tris prnctico it "ss overhoaded
    at tho fh's t opportun.i.ty.
    Orly wiro ~'~IJ03 o;"s used by the cot8~ruction platoon. This
    type ui=o !Hope:i.'ly cons t:,,'uilted c.nd u%d II.\. ell r"'ilclllte:rS lJll!;..89 gave
    sufficient r"nge fc.>r overy problem that was encountered. On Jlk~ny
    occasions lines from tt"ont.y to t.w,inty six milGs long were made to
    t8..lk satisf'1ctorily. The ~lpO D.+: Spir{l.l :f:'Ol..U' 0J' long range field
    wire, ospociall:" in h(~r.vtly she::'led '1"8".8. is considered not practi
    cal bcco.usc of -',:,he difficulty ?f t;pl.ici:.lg ~s camp2.red to Y'!-J~OB.
    The J./4 ton '"ldele WIG used to 10J virtu"lly all the '"ire
    during tr'is phase. It woe,S tl,) ol"'~Y vel:icl(l that c',uld ope):"te on
    the highly congost.od and narrow roaqs ,iithout. causing trLCfi'i.c tie
    UpD, cenfus ion and I:cc:'.dents. Etlan"' L"rroW ruads rlOre mude ono way
    excopt for 1/4 ton ':,ire and mesEenger vehicles.
    Throughout this "nt"ire phase it was possible to maintain two
    liner to ",ach o~ the infantry r()gimon~s and to Divis ion Artillery.
    As tho Division Command Post, moved fon;ard the two trunks bost lo
    cated und thut hud given tha lenst trouble wore usod to connect a
    reur s,liten to handle . servico elemonts.
    Tho sO"0~,d phnsa c.nd 0.08 Bhich presented different problems uus
    that from CEPFAGNA thro):lghS;,N KIE~HO, SAN VJ;T'IORS, CBRVARO and into
    CAL'RA and CASSINO . In 'this-' sector ~. good road was available only
    1

    - 66

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    pc,rt

    ~7ny~

    ~.fu."l.G J-,,~"~'-;.113

    ",,'1"!1'8

    conve~t8d

    into peep trajls by the

    eY'.tgin8a:r'3 "buG ~::, "c- l::.].:~ ~_'::rgee 'Grs.ll a i'ec:}J could travel these;)
    tr.::!.ils.. Or_';! '-:;.:,:it(]8~: ;:. '~.. ,:~rt ri..:;h-t-, c-;cr" u _r~_,I_ Gh ani rnE,'ged mountain
    rr:cn;;8., TLI:~' QD,i~;- t "[!,,-U. 11-.-: ~.\..~ '~'I;3.S A. ~j'J(~Ol:'~'t "["2, te ).r.~.le pack onB
    DL'(,-~TI\. i-<ln (r '~'.'1.:.;; pr-,:::'.: f_'d. -U~,8 D:~v::.i.J~_(j.~:; :'1dd ~n additional reginent
    a"" ene"n6d J-J':) J:IJ '"
    ':\-~3 r',:';-i.~,~,.l "":;.~.ile f :.H:.. d_~") 1I'1(n'8 6JK::oU1l'(,;ered.
    .At the
    b0,~ir:ni!:!g '.... t' J,):, '.8 }J:~2";;~ P.,:.. ::'~-'e'.' .IJ,:.'J.i.~1i.'~_~1 Vt'Et8 I'ulj,G7ed and an
    ill

    8..tten"'1Y r, ;-1::,., ;~ld""


    tl_~ te,ke O~,;',-~:: T.~le e:t-iS-~I_-~:;'1fS rilr~'8 ;syst.em ..
    1o('! .~L.l~.:i ;8..1;:E~ n over f'':: om t.ne -o.1ni. i.. l'Gl:i.(-? riPe gave much trouble.
    ThiE\ "VJ8.S C'. J!:J ~'."fl .-':' _..... t,:; -i.:,r.l" . . i:-- ~laviL~ 0(; .;;21 CD. "t~Y0 gJ'o'I:~nd dur~.ng
    1";et 1.'"l(~at,hcl" :::"'or i'J0~1 ove;-- e ~".J:.":~"th..
    AIHO an eXC8SZ ~...,e. numbc~~'

    of lines h~~d c0Bn irs-ballc~t e:'ong th:-, .,: route and c&.bled togo~,hor~
    'Ir,;11 jJ.:.J shootiLg ~'Ja8 li2""('Y s.L'':;~"i r.:.nd d' ~.ficul't,.. Ne~,," l::1.nes r~Gl'e in',:,
    S-'':;H' i..~;d to OU.i"? !!lb.jOl' :;:\uborlj,;"lRv(;:;: l.:'i1:L~B~ d:::'essed 1(1811 aw3..Y from. the
    o::.i.gL"'ll ir.:s::2~la"ti(l~j~ F02"G"ULately t.hiti YJa,:3 d~":.l'ing a sloY\l moving
    opeI'r !.,ion Bnd we "{w! .~! abJJ.3 i:U d.,ras8 :lP and re::labilitate some of
    tha o:6c;ioal system for '~3" (,.r S(J'CvJ_ce elellents and a-ttacl:od units.
    ~he 1//, -:"J)n vehicle C0J:;tJ. ."~1':~8d to b,::; ti1G only practical one
    for vdre 18,JTing., ii~l.:Lch ';~.ire r."1"1.5 J.8,~:.d. ,;..c...2'3B cou:r..t~~r b:T ha.nd ~':;'l1d
    gave good sen1ice ci'"Le1" heir!g ili.S-+.Js.i.J.6CL Tr:-ubJ.e $ho:Jting on font
    'cre.S slo',:} bUi.:, the abnen:.e of VS'l.i.cu.ti.r t:raff:!.c ~er'1sQ to keep -;-dre
    1

    l'ailurc.:~! 10;,.1.,

    Appr09.ehi'1g
    SL~")l:':~-

    C~,.sS~:J\jO t~'I~:J

    1:1f8.:ntl"'Y positj.ons

    ITG;'S

    se!JDr,.lted from

    e0fr8J.I... ns &){'l "t1.1(J D;.vi~io}"~ :_jorFn~.:.nd PO&-t by a th:ree ... m.Lle

    val.ley Vl_~'tjh the RAP=::00 R.i.\~~JY' runc:L:~g through it,) '!'here \";~ere fre
    quen't a:r~~1..1J.o:::, y CO!1'~et:. tT~:l';"lf)L3 c:-~ t certain poJ.r~ts }~n the valley.
    Tbese criticeJ. flPO-t< . .'or. E,Dr i.e!::.!'nod a.~l:' the i'::l.re rG""Tou-ced
    uriay frcm t.b\.:m TO,:: .1.lt:")Q ~n :::::"~~ ".:.:_;.).t:L1g' muo~ troL"'.. ble, The re-rout.
    ing ~ 'f) don8 on ::.:'0;,.,
    ,,,,~sL1f. :c'c(:.i -:"':".. . --2'7 ..
    Com'TIul;ieat -: .~n. ~y r:,-~ i'C 8,C ros 3 t,ha vp..l].8;f 'i-/ns 8xtremely difficult.
    F~.ve ~"!"C11u.:~ ::"~~ni..::i r:.. cri7~ :.0: 1.'1 frcn U:.a ~jv:i . .J ir::;'[l Co:yeYland Post near
    C]j:s.~r.L.i.l.C to C~!t acl.vane.) DJ.-Jis:i.cn S"l7i':,::Jh:'ng c(;:n:.r0.J. locatod in CATIL!.\.,
    one and onG hal:' IT, '.lu8 Il()rt~ o.f (;:.~,S I~JG, :Sach line folloTIed "the
    samG gO!l8:;:'al :t:~ute cu-:;) ";.".13 se~:},ratcd fiVG to t1;:enty ygrds from the
    nC1.:ces t one of the fi'Tn. T8St polnt3 l.":erc ir..atalled in th:ree places
    alo.r.g thooe "t,l'1.P!ks r::' "G:t a ~.',dY'o ::hl'~'f, t.r~:ub:J'; ,,:",OO~?S and '[,ire :?er
    a

    sOTInel at <-J:..;.r:.h ;;. -tho

    J.....

    ,hrco :;;:la c: oS "

    Bacl:.. t,:")st po5_nt ma.intainod

    "7ir0 1:'-~J t,h rJ8Ys .'roi:'! that po.L1.t a i."lrl aded -:J:"on8.1 -tro:'lblo porso:nnel
    Tlor-}:oa from ihe .!..l_",.;.~:::U_on Cc.~:J;~;and PO.3t ;::.. _:"d t~le a,-=l. v &nco s1~it'J~1 ..
    After the fi~,:-e 1:Ll:38 ~ler:.; i:1f:t,:119d C()):'illlmicaticD 'J our ar}-:;J.ncG
    s"f..d.tch VIas IJst ohly OlJGO d.lt:'i.ng a. po:,,-:.od cf n0arly thirty days"
    Tb'.'j ~78.S for a pcr.Loc1. of less the.!J ti '.J hOU."(,B~ O::J.c test po~.r:.t
    Fa::.; ].o.2:a.tcd nalh75,Y be'hlGOn tile CClr.m.;.;.yld Post anel th8 advc.ricG
    S;JJ-(ch~
    At t):.i$ 10c2,i.io';1 r-elJenteTs KS-89 \1GTe il:stallod and mon
    itc}r,~.1 for CC!'"['l)(";t [_i,justLl8J:1.te
    l'his onqblsi.l tho Di\T:'sion Staff to
    t8:~~;: to tho advilHco R0gime~~a.1. CO!!L:2.~1d PO&'Gs of the 14.2nd, 135th
    and lcCth Inf:";.;tr:tt?s, 3.11 t"'lI'eO 0:: 1.7!lic!1 'r-GTe tlac. into tho CAlM
    bon,rd.. Wi.:::'Q distances of these uaits c.ver1.ged t",;enty millJs'l After
    8. pG'l::'iod of a ~,"Jcok i:~lG fenTe' most sui-c,.:.ble Ii.nos woro continl.18.d and
    tno rel'l(l:ining one abc,'lC.'jo-yL '['n,'oq,;hout th~ entir8 pGriod three
    lines r:e;.3 kt.~pt in L:}S"C of' th3 timo.
    .1

    - 67

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Tho usu of .!~hc) tf""::it ~oLTts ~ T.""riro chi8fs;1 ~nd trouble teams
    mr.d8 the di.:fe:'C"-;;llCG bu::'r:r.'< ~ :~El.i~::U:"3 ~L1C. 3-~-_ece,ss C!1 this operation.
    I:.~uch t:':'('Iuhl3 Eh~:.:tL1\:; ",JW: dGiie 0:) fuo"L f.t:'cTii these rojpts as oven
    the mO"'lo.fl)']11r, of u
    _ t
    Iloh~_c:J8 -,,'0'L::"C (lr9X.1 riTe.,
    W~_~e W-IJO
    ~.a.s :30~_r1.c ti:,"'~3 U:::I":" f.t J:'l~~, t t,() l'6p.: nco 0')01:1 d0;;'lH?;od sections in
    n 11", ).. :!t ',',i:~
    i'.',LC:(~ a:' ti:Cl f.i.:t:'},;:; o:ur.;or";:,u;lj.ty 'by Vl~llO ..
    In

    ttis i,.-"\st

    :,~_cu "',1 i

    .-~~'-i~.C; ~C01_-.t,-s

    -:.:81":) ~:ot. ne:::.o::;,s:;.J"y~

    'rhe avoidance

    of sr)GC~."::"
    ..C).:C"; J[
    """J."-,
    . .',:'1:I.e 1.::1d1' t1'3.f:'1_:; &ud a sl1ull amount o.f
    s:racin," -tJ:.~ f,.} :::>(.!\l ~.::;.~\-,;_, r,'o~:"l,~cd "'/8'l"Y .~oJ.:, ri'-~-:-c18 tho Same troublo
    toans c:tLd ~;oilit 3 CJuLl -t;,; '.13L~:d 011 3l.1 J..;.!:lCS ~
    TJlC! 1'~S..l.-::-_"'H1i<1~:" t~>-T':1;,3 '"0"!"C ",y[:..)Y'c.:ting 0V0r very rugged torrain
    brt by' il:~_GT',J2.E i;:;t": ~;-Jl-'8(il to ~-, ~~.t'.h (J lI!en o:l.ch and pUHhing the advanco
    s'..'itC:1 up to CAIF.A -L>J;Y- ;,\'C:"3 8'-:-~2.0 to k88~) ~:.i~:_!'8 in at all times. n

    Firct

    LiG"c.~tenc.

    nrrho advfJ.YlCc ,:xi one :".':'S' :_!""c:1.t for


    and o""v'"or a dirto.r.co of fi:i~,ser. !"',iJ.--,s

    period of n.-:"--Qut ton days


    foJ.lo;iJed 'oy a mulo equipped
    ~.T1L~:? tOD.;TI"
    A.t D='o.::;OS '~ho tl'c.il 'i.7a~ - .'.fficult 8"'v-eD for the mulos.
    It, :-~8 lO'l.rrnd in thi3 i!lst}..n~e t~lwt, thoGr: ;:-J:LrG lines h:l(:i. to bo
    1,,.:;,::1 ".'811 or:=- 'he ~f'~_ ~ls to avoid. +,rouble i'rcji1 the mules hoofs and
    shGJ' i.l'lg'J On P1o\..~nt .in t:::'nJ.ls it :i1(l.S fOlr.ld t03t to construct
    Ij;~os ,Jf1. the high 2:,de of tlY' tYf:.il as mC's'~ E.ny a0cidont or trouble
    th'lt QOI)"ol,Tfjod affected tl-o ~o"~~3r side.. Fr 3quGntly n. mv~e ~-;ou1d
    slip :f~om "LIJ.0 t""'Clil or su;:.r-.l::'08 -r;o"lJ.d be drODpGd o Naturally the
    fall would bre'l~' t'w -.-,ir3 E it h'lQ boon Installed bGlon."
    .q

    :..1.,s

    Lic}uton, ,;t CU:__ on ,1


    fc.ntry Divi.sion.
    1

    ;~TA1"C-:i

    ~~

    J JfCIE;a?.DT, Eeadquartors 34t.h In

    HAt tho ANZIC Bi..,[tcl-,-h,:?~.d ':.l8 '..'orD f:l.vored 1,,;d~r., 0; good road not
    dry \/8"11::.t en' ~ .::'I;..... . -.-,h(j h8.'~2.rQs '1'0'::1 rr::~!l<:-' fiolds "..:ere min

    'i"~orJ{ n:~1d

    imized af"t-Jol' th:} r8;~ ~ -:'ir.-'.; !1c:..c1 ~,.c'rJLl occu!Jj ':Jd for Q S~lort poriod.
    '1'1-.0 Divjsion took JVCI' :7_~1'r~r::.ct, "t.;'lC '.,':::ro sVft(~m 0:," tho nnit ro
    li'3"TJ("'2,., It '.1"8 ~',." '-,-,5 to h',:; "_A,::; -~:J:1,\'3 fa:!:"' 01:(1' needs o.nd l1carly
    h,'.).lf or tho 108R r;J~~.iab18 ~~~;.~8S trn:,:,o '-:rJ!1'-lG8;-"};;C~) Tho o.reJ.S of he,1.VY
    sholling hH\.."_i'l C1\:.-' r(x~d ::1...... ti~)n8 3n] g-m l)CS_~:~~ions soon bec:)IDo ap
    p2xont to \,;:i;~8 nC:-'30~~~',)1. ~~nd J L.lGS 1.:3:CG .)5,t~'lGr re-routcd or buried.
    llIany O~""" the _~OT",-:,':U~il :.. ',DCS coaId rot bo mu,iYlt.cinc2 during d-l~Tlight
    dvo to cnor1Y Obi3Gi: ']~,tj.cn 1.L:1 firo.
    Un0.0l'rrOl.'!ld or Qvr'i'3d l~',nes ;,'QYO l.~scd for ths first t5.::10 J~nd
    rJorkcd very '-'pJ l~ Lftcr i:'. s\ort poriod ~rouLd8 do--,:'olopod which pro
    hitdted t:-.l_~~,:,:, :,Ging :~impl;)Aad .r'--~'l~ teJ,OiIJ:"!~r41 "t":'lt they iiorlcod vary ;Jel'_
    lor tolGpIlYQ8
    '.i.-oct pointa "..'el~;J inst1,11ed eVGry q"x~l'tGr L!ilo c~nc1 T~', ,.
    I&:. Tcrnin".l S ,,-'J'-'_~:J;J ne ed. 1l1:' s p::rGQ.tJ." r f:l.cili i:,-:::ted tr(~ub10 shooting ~
    Burial l.-;r'lS "~',-~omp15_3.t,_c:d b;:r 1..:3 ....; of 3. cable p] O~'T borror:G~:3. from
    tho Corps Rigr!9.l battalion. It pr0\:"t~d 3. very .'3.rd-iJ.":)us and ttE10
    CCT1Sl.1mir:g t.~s~\. Ot~t p{:lid divirlords cc-.---~idor1-n.F the tiY.l8 tilcl.t '.:0.8
    r::'iJ~' . t. -';.n t,l:..o pos:."..ti','DS"
    Lll li:108 t~~_lt could!:"l.! t bu ro-rO"ctod
    ,~.- ':~~.,. f!"om sJY3c'~:f'ic t~=,rgct3 ,-;cr'a b:..ried.
    Or~l;r i~port':',nt t<:;.cticnl
    lin~:';;:: -.1Cr3 b:..rriod:t

    - E8

    U NCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    An advance s"itch WicS installed about three miles ahead of


    Division Command Post, Luri.ng on'o"hase treffic to the two regi
    ments in tho l:',ne was e:ctr'3we:y ::eavy ".nd three lines were in
    stalled to ead,
    On the Beac:1head elrr'cy per'c""t of l"ire fai:l.urs was .caused
    by shellfire, bO'"bs and falling fht. In one inste,nce all locals
    at Division Com~Dand Post ",ere lost by an A? bomb landing '.'ithin
    a few yards of the srdtchboard dngout. The locals had been buried
    to within a fe,.' feet of the s-:il.tchb08.rd, but were above ground
    just 8.S the~' Gntered the dugout. l'J::e AP bomb scat.terec'. s,,;t'ficiently
    to get this one STIls.ll vulnerable sont. 1iihere burial is needed
    henceforth it 1';i',l be~oIT-:Jlete.
    During t1;e breakoJt "'rom AFZIO Beachhead, follo"!ed by the pur
    suit through ROlfE to L2GhJPK e.nd FISA, we W8"'e favored "ith c, ;;ood
    road netcork and a well defined axis except in one brief instance.
    Artillery shelJ..ing ,"1\8 nil b'l't vehicular traffic plus tank .w.d tank
    destroyer moven;e~t ~reater'l a ha3ard to our lines, The chief ob~
    staeles wer" the speed of movement required, mine fields .and snipers.
    During the latter stag,lS 17ire SUTJply stocks became v3ry 10111 and
    much recove:;,y rad to be eff.;d,ed even durtng operations.
    Line const:ruction must be especially good when operating
    with tanks. Every concci7'lle crossing must be well overheaded
    or buried. Bl.rrial at CT()F' '.ClgS should exceed eigh.t inches to
    protect the wire from tan': 5. A,-l 'lj.re must be dr9$sed uell off
    the shot:lders and pref'2ra.:Ole up on ledges and banks.
    Wiremen in tt'elr' o.A.3:~a to COYlft:rr.ct good lines' often enter
    mine fields. Goad "iremen ct:'1't ':>0 replaced easily and it is Lest
    to Iteep them away from such. practicEs; The rlire cun be laid along
    the mine we.ruing siens for g:'ea,.er"a~et:', Gspc;cially in trol'hle
    srooting. .
    FreIn the BSB.chhead to ROME +,h 3 Dace was so rapid thf'lt 1:!e
    had to disca1:'d our .sOP of twa lips" to each regimdrct and reduce
    it to one each. Also additional use WI:;S made of a fOl'VClrd switch~
    ing central to tie in attnc:J8d 'lllits. Dtvision wire personnel laid
    wire as closely hehind the ac:va"lce conbat elements as tbey cculd.
    After leavjng lJ\'.JV:::O and un to RO;'}<, :orantically nO "ire ,:'as laid
    within the ir.::-antry regimdnk and Division Ar'ti1l8ry .
    As the Division left ROi,], ard l:eac"ed north til fourth regiment
    "!as added. Due to the rate of move and the number of subordinate
    units 'Lt ,las decided th,,-t if "ire 1iJ2,8 to be maintaineC: at all it
    Twuld he.ve to be on a reduced scale and by the USG of an advance
    sV.'itchilOg central. Wire teams ';18N r.'ith euchregiment. The signal
    company installed t,,;o "~110B c;i.rcuit.s up Highway tIl trl8nty miles
    north of ROME. Tho signal cO!!'.palOy t.eams ",ith the four regiments
    'cere instructed to tr,)vel c:tth the Regimental Command Post and edch
    time they set dOTm this team ,;ould tee-splice the Division cir
    cuits on highvlay and extend it into the :t'ogimental board. 'By
    close liaison and instructions t-,oo regiments v:ere kept on 8ach of
    the two lines. At any spot t'at Fl regj.. ment st.opped for even an
    hour they had wi,e communication to Division. As Division movod
    up they would morely cut a 3",itcl:bo<'.rd into the trunks and have

    - 69

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    communication both ~iays. j,t this time it became imposRible for Corps
    to keep their circu~t.s up to us so v'e displac,,-;d forv!ard using our
    oCin 1!~110 lines b",ck to ?\ll" re'1r Command Post and from there on into
    Corps on their circuit.
    At n !Joint .-:bout t 1:.;enty IlljJ.GS north of Rom3 the 17ire short
    age devoloped and t!1e pace of adv.3.nce increased. It rms decided
    to lay only one circuit for.7Qrd abng Higrl1'~Y #1. At this ti.me tl70
    regiments rlore adv'Incing in colLlllln ahead of the Division Commcmd
    Post and the other t,-:o r': '0 located ne"r Division. The ti70 le2,ding
    regiments '/ere tee-splic~d onto the single trunk and the two nOflrby
    regiments uere 12id to by a Division "iro team. At 0600 bours
    one morning wo U0ro told the,t tho Command Post Hould movo fiftoen
    miles that morning. By h~ving aggressively pushed our'"irehead foro:
    ward along pith ti'e TD nnd tal"k lmits ne had t'ilenty~siX mileD of
    17-110 laid M01:d of us. lis it dovoloped t.ho Command Post that day
    moved forty-one miles and right into CIVITAVECCHIA. Communication
    \ms maintained during this snit!'D day beti1een Corps, Division Command
    Post, four infantry rog.Lmsnts and the adv~nco Division Comm.cmd Post. :
    Prior to moving into CIVITAVECCHIA the advance Division Com.mrmd Post
    nas tnent.y-six miles f'roDl chG min Command P.-,st. An EE-89 repeater
    17[1S installed on this c~r'Ouit anC. it talked well.
    The Deputy Corps
    Commandor talked over this t,'lonty-six r.li:J,e Division circuit back to
    our main Comm:md Post then through Corps circuits to tbe Corps CDm~
    mnnder nnd reported the ilivi sian! s capturo of CIVITAVECCHIA. Af'ter
    the.t the advance group moved into town' completing a forty~on8 mil a
    movo for the day, actually the time inv0lved \Jas from 0700 hours in
    the morning until about 1500 hours in the fifternoon - ei"ht hom's.
    1,"hile tho town Has bdl1f: cleared the DiVision wire team com?lotod
    the last f:iteen miles Clnd whon the Commanding Goncn'al arrivod an
    EE.8 telephone was waitine for him and cOll1l"unic::ltion tins still in
    to all four r3giments.
    In constructing this circuit each regimontal kam had a 1/4
    ton and 3/4 ton vohicle. These 'Jere used to mako the tie-ins. Tho
    actual forty-one mile circuit \'las laid by fOllr 1/4 ton poops f'rom
    the signal company gr()up. Tho highrmy t'as divided .into t7JelvG mile
    s3ctions and each peep assicned three miles. The Division wiro
    officer and his assistant coordinated the joining of tho circuits
    and the tying-in of ":hoY )giments
    A wire dUl'lp of tVJenty-five to
    fifty miles Has kept as ",0ar to the wirOO83d as possible. The linos
    wero ,Jell dressed, as laid and very little trouble developed.
    Trouble shooters were stntirned at test points along tho line 1>8 1181]
    as at both ends. This enabled them to roach any trouble in :J. mini
    mum of time. Tba Division .!ire officer kept his reconnaissanco as
    far fornard [lS possible so th'lt he would bo porsonnlly infor::lGd of .
    movement, by-pass8s or anything thnt might alter tho wiro plan.
    From CECI~m through LEGHORN and up to PISA the Divjsion had
    five infantry regiments 1 t ..o t.nnk and two tcnk dostroyer bGttr.lions.
    One tr'\lrlt Has insk,llod and maintainod to o1lch of theso units in
    addition to artillery nnd service tmit comnmnicat.ions. During this
    period IIire supply bocaIne criticnl -end recovery ~as reqlured.
    0

    70

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    During Ju1y tho signal company recovered 897 miles of W-llO.


    The artiEery- recovered an additional 300 miles."
    First Lieutenant JOHN BONFORTE, 3/.th Signal Company.
    "In taking over lines from other units they should be re
    drGssed, prop~r1y tagged, bad s(lctions or W-130 replaced, re
    rcuted auay from target of traffic areas.
    Wire construction along roads has proved highly satisfactory
    by comparison to an attempt to lay it cross country. It is in
    stalled and maintained much more rapidly."

    ttIssUIj nf

    In'lpS

    to l:o:r

    ~'iTe

    non...coIDS and keeping them oriented

    on the situc:tion hJlpod very much. All 1lire personnel report


    Command Post changes or locat.ions as rapidly as learned. Recon
    nS,issance must al',:a;Ts be made ,'.'ell ahead of wire laying."
    first I,lentenant JOHN EONFO?:IE, 34th Signal COtlpany.
    !lBy using the same p3rsonnel to maintain a line that has origin
    ally installad it, the bitie.l pork ';las better inasmuch as the men

    kneri it 1101].16.. directl:;~ a,1:"':;'ect t1:e amount of nark tr..at would follow.
    Using tL,) 83.1:',,, men for a considerable length of time to maintain
    a group of c5_rcuits resuJ,tei 1'1 their becoming very familiar 17i th
    every -,'ea'-ners, nnd l1':ely trcu'?le point. Thus they could easily
    lociote tr,.. uble 'Lha-c did c,(Jv,Jlop e.n d they made ilnprovements each
    time 3. C'~"G of tro'clble apf<oQrej. After a fe\7 days, the ,circuit
    rmuld
    ~,?"8' trovblc freo .. U

    Captain LLO'LD W. RE:I3:Sf., 34th Division ArtillerY.


    "Arti:lery units -clS(": Tcry Ii ttlG W-130 except for formcrd
    observers. Glose cooper2.tion he'c.~een Division Artillery and signal
    cO'llpa'1.Y helped reduce the nclrtboT' Qf c:;r'c'~its and kept all units
    better i.,ied-in. HhE;r-, a "03~, point is i:1stulled by one Wlit all
    lin's rUlming past th'lt pvht 11p to the capacity of terminal strips
    should be cut in. Artillery D!'lcie "ide use of simplex talking
    circuits ::"or FDe and thus eliminated much wire laying."

    "Infant",.' r~girtents :or',~cr,"od to use Vi-lIO as much as possible


    ",nd laid :"-130 0nl:' Olf> Et Let resort. When they moved up on H-130
    liDOS ~:..be:r replaced them ,:/'itI-.. ~-110 as soon cs possible.
    It is not at all pr3.ctical for infantry units to recover
    ,;ire. The personnel r8QJj_T3d to i),stall and maintain their wire
    system is far gr81ter than t.Le number allotted on present T/ol s."
    - '/1

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    First Lieutenant RAUB H. HARAlJEN, 31.th Signal Compal'1Y.


    'lTn.e use of sr'itcning centrals often sllves communication
    from a con,plete failure. Most Staff officers do not understand
    the necessity ~or or reason behind the use of these switches.
    T1Ese officors be-::ome quite disgusted when two or three boards
    arc in the drcuit. Ho':evJr, there are times when IlJ.l subordinate
    units can bo tied into a for-.lard board and if only a single line
    romains in to the &dvconc8 switch all units can be contacted. It
    s~;ves grently on wire construction and facilitates trouble shoot
    ing, testing and maintenance toa high degree. It further allows
    certain elements to be y.opt in the wire system that couldn't
    possibly be kept in othol"l1ise. u
    Technician Sergeant RALPH J. OISON, 34th Signal Company.
    "Repeaters ~9 "er3 often loaned tq artillery for use on long

    circuits. Repeaters Viere kept in roadiness at all major switch

    board" and tier" plugged into the circuit to boost calls from dis

    tant points.1I

    First Lieutenant P.ALPE H. HARADEN, 34th Signal Company.


    UI,lonitoring of' c'.rc:IHs rovealed a tremendous .level of un
    c'1113 1\'ld io.13 c:;rJ_ter. It is recolllJ:lended th'lt an officer
    monitor pericc;..:cally and co;-tr01 cOlwersations of this type by his
    action or the action of Lis cm,.rfJ:~r:der. u
    r!-300S~8.r;

    Technicirw Fifth Grade ASP1):E GERECHT, l33rd Infantry.

    the

    "r08 found in tbe mO'.lnt~in fiction before CJlSSnrO, in


    RAPIDO River cross5nf;c, b tha LANUVIC action,. and at lAT. MAGGIORE
    t>[,t th" rrSG3nt b[.ttalin switchboard, BD 71 is unsuitable for
    batt.cclion fighting movGmcct. It .:lS most cumbersome, and easily
    da'~Qgcd.
    g co.nnot be o.'si'vl to any good advantage in the moun
    t'lins. 'iTe havo found t:,e G8r:!k~r. SViitchboard to be exceptionally
    noll-suited for action, i t being far simpler and lighter, one-fifth
    d,8 hGliv:..j t:-lG.P ours. n
    First Sergeru,t C;UFI.li'.'i V. BEEKHAN, 133rd Infantr,{.
    "PrC1 o::perie;,ce in carrying tlJe SCR-300 radio I have fotUld
    th(c;t tce ",rness.lhich sup:;;or~s the sot "hile carrying on the baok
    allo,'S the srarp -Lmdor edg) of the case to dig into the back of the
    opor:ltcr . r r . order tc icC2? t:1r, sot from shifting and thrm7ing the
    operater off balance thG c,n-rJ:'ng straps must be made vel"J tight.
    My (lompa!lY h&3 n,med5.ed tr')28 faults by mounting the set on a pack
    board ,.nd socuring it b;l rQPcG. 'X-hG 170ight of the set iacarried
    on the shoulders c.s beforo but tho car.'IUS on the inside of tho
    b0rird diifltr:;'butcs tho lord -to tho buck nnd the balance of the
    ojoro.tol' is F..oro e&sily Ir.ubtcSned. This is especially important
    in mount8.inous torrail:. 11

    - 72

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    First Lieutenunt JACK

    r..

    PARr,ISE.

    133rd :nflll'try.

    m.",11ilc T::) wore o:pGr'~lt:Lng in the :nountnins nortr~ of SAN LUGE


    rl'e had to supply the troops b:l p;~c~,:-mulG tl'nin. ,],h8 mGn returning
    to their compnnics. 38 "Jel1"s r'J,nmJrs 'l!'ld li-tter be"re::'s. uS1lally
    follo-.-md t.ha t'21~_'p'18ne ;:~i:C'G fj,nd pulled. tho ~;;iI'G ii1tO the trail.
    The mu2.e tro.tn~ f0J.ln-r;Jng C~lt th.~ .dre to riboGns ~ Th.] best method
    T.'O round to remody this -,-.:'.1S to put the ,~ir..J 0.8 high as possib1e
    und string a,rk0r tap" in pln,cGo C,ihere 0. POl'S on could. got off the
    tr3il. If

    73

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    CHAFTER VI - SUPPLY
    Std'f Sergoant LEWIS E. McKENZIE, 135th Infantry.
    Staff Sergc6nt JAMES R. GAV'.:3KE, 135th Infantry.
    "On tho first crossing of the VOLTURNO River '.Ie cnJr.e up after
    dark to the regimental CP end fOl'nJ thoro was no ',1ny to cross the
    river by truck, but r'ltions, Hater and ammunition hnd to get
    across. First ne tried a peep to carr;l a cable ovor, but the
    peep ,'mnt down stream,
    The next thing we tried nas '1
    ton 6x6 cargo truck by its
    winch, It ,"Jorked OK so we loo.dod a peep ".nd supplies 011 anel then
    dragged it across. l"8 kept that up until rle held four peeps across
    to haul the supplies out to the companies which l"'ere nbout n. mile
    auay. ~Te moved all of the r",tions and ammunition that night by
    the same process. "'e dsc took all of the casualties back across. 1I

    2t

    ~. R"tions. E1mry effort should be made to augment the 'C' or 'K'


    ration Which must of necessity be fed to the front line soldier. The 'C' or 'K'
    type r",tion is an emergoncy ration ailc: is not dosigned to feed troops over
    long periods of time. During January 'md February 1944 the 3rd Battalion, 135th
    Infantry established an improvised fiel,: bakery in the kitchen bivouac nroa and
    made doughnuts, fruit turnovers, cakes and cookies, ecnd in addition made sand~
    wiches of jellies c.nd jams and frosh meat vlhen it \1aS obtainablo, and made spreads
    for sandwiches froll canned meat. These "ore packed into r'ltion boxas, ammuni- .
    tion boxes and sent up to the troops by pack rllUlo. This aidod greatly in re
    ducing the monotony of tho ration, n.dded the necessary calories in tho diet
    which was deficient in the 'C' or 'K' ratio~. This food being moro palatable
    the troops ate more of it and their morale and physical condition l1as much
    b3tter than that of troops which Viero fod a steady diet of emergency r[ltions.

    Staff Sergeant JOHN DIAVASTES, 133rd Infantry.


    "While troops are on the line, kitchens should be able to draw
    materials to mnke pastry such as doughnuts, cookies, cake, otc.,
    to go with the men's 'K' or 'C' rations, whatever it may be. It
    builds up their morale and tells them that their kitchen ere" is
    thinking of them and not sitt:'.ng on thoir beds. II
    Technician Fourth Grade

    ALF~

    G. BLACK, 133rd Infantry

    ."A bottor rat5.on should bo given t'1e f:."hting mon r;hen they
    . are able to get a hot moal instead of the usual hash or stew menus.
    Pork and gra~- o~ beef and gravey takes no more time to prepare
    and is much better."
    Staff Sergo,,-nt DELBERT F.LEET, 1:;3rd Infantry.
    "When bringing ratif)"s up to the company al\lnys be sure not
    to bring fire down upon ,.ne ar<Ja, or vicinity of the company, by;
    pulling in too fast \lith the vehicles. Al",,-ys pick a secluded spot
    where the enemy cannot observe your moveIilent."

    - 74

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    LieutQTh".nt Co1onel D:A.N G. "'ALZ, Headquarters 34th Infantry


    Divi-"ion.
    "Roserve rc.tions - At present the r:'jviljion is using the fol
    lOWing pl":;'l) \7~.i~h is satiBf.)c 4.:ory.
    le Et.w kltc'i'l(:n ~::G.r:-i88 one day I s reserve of h3.rd ro.tion,
    e!.ther lC'; 'K! or -:n somo U1ltS 10.1, and the Division quarter
    m.'l.stG~ m2.illt -~':.ns Q :;.'esorV0 of o:ne day boxes l"s'Gion for the entire

    divisinn.
    G. ~'J'3 r3sec:-ve 'e' cr 'K' rat.ion cel'ried in the infantry
    kitchens eli;n:inated c:mfusion in cas" the unit is ordered into combat
    after a IB' rcti~n r."s t: ' j l i.53',,,d to the companios f~r the ne:,t
    dey's consnmption 0' the 'c81'Jh~",m has g0'18 in for the IB' r:ltion.
    111 such C1.S0S tho uui t us ,lS its reaerve ration and puts tho nonper:'. 'h'\b18 portic., "f tre ''3' rdtion in :'os"rV3, When the unit is
    again out of cC1.1bnt tho c,~'r-_pG.ni8r:; aro r.bIo to serve a 'B"' rntion
    even if the uni L hClc' dI'& c" Cl LJrr.al issue of h.'1rd ration.
    b. The r8~erve r4t~0n is ;.,130 to be used in emergency

    if for any reGs on tl"t(: uni-:' is lL'1ub2.e to riraIV t!:t8ir daily ration.

    C", ..I.t tim3S -.;Then tiler3 is a kn'Jiiln possibility of units not


    boi!Jg' abb t::> dra>; rc.ti()ns for a da:r or tno d3.Ys, the reserve is in
    creC\~eJ in the unit to cOVer t,;e atltic5.pated p"riod."

    P:riV[lto First.,hss WILLIAl,; E. ViOODhO"I, 135th Inf,antry.


    "The ihfantry soJdior ",hGTI going on an attack, usun11y ~C\rriGs
    either 'e' rations or 'K' r~ti'ms, r,nd sometimes a combination of
    tl:c thO. As for the 'c I uni tG all r ~an say is exporiment on dif
    ferent methods of carrying t.hora. 1've fo'cmd th."t three units fit
    nicely in a combat prcck. As for the 'KI retion, I suggest you open
    the r,OX3S ar'd break the cont8nts d:mrc. There may be things en
    C1030<': you "on't eat so wh~' carr;\' them. TtG r;ax box \,i11 hec.t
    a cup of coffee nicely. A 'Dr o(!r is always 11 good thing to c8rry
    in case of an emergency. Carry your rations in the most convenient
    place. ThElY can cause a lot of gri8f dv.ring e. long mlrch i f not
    packed ~1011. to

    Li.outonllnt Colonel IVAN G. r!ALZ, Headquurters 34th Infantry


    Division.

    "Durir.g tho Italkn co.mp"icn th8 carrying of barracks bags


    for ')orsonnel h,co ;r~ve'1 inl:r"ct,i~o.l, especially for combat in
    f'lntrJ" pcrsonn~l. T;lO Inc~c of transpork,tion to transport the bar
    racks bag m.'l?8G it necc8sn:r;r to stc:re thc~. under guard until such
    time IlS tho unit is not in combat, and then send transportntion
    bo.ck to them. By thio time the distanc0C'" the placo of storage
    is Gxcoodinc:;ly groat. This denies the inJividunl tho use of any
    clothing or personnl equipmont that he may need during combat
    ~

    75

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    ,;hich mrw be for poriooa of two to th'reG months. In nddition to


    this diso.dv:J.nt:1gc ~to f tOT-3d ba:!:'r'CH'"':ks (:HgS c(,,:tl'z,ain lQ::-go -nr:tounis
    of clothing YJl~ ich couJ.ci. he usod by hlgbGJ:' oc:helons for roplc:.cOf!lOl1t
    or for tho oper".tion of clotl,ing O:::2:'1Qllse units
    Ttis d_-f..-,,'is '_on c~~~ 3(';on-::i -.l\:toc1 tl:0 use of I:JTrrE' cks bngs in 0.11
    excopt IY) :,,':.: ... ~7.ed c:::..c.. U
    . '-1rlts ~ ~!l. 0, t, ..Ibci' 1':;1:3 arJ.d. r~a.s oporf'.ted YJithout
    tbl.~!G. S-1.Jclf:>i'"1'::l~ "il,V f)'v'2r sL1..:;e th.n"..iu{-:;l1 -the USa cf 2.rrny storili r:C!.
    tion, boo t,11 Tl'ld c.: . . : .I.ng G;::\~.h"'-_ Y!~~s "!..l!.5 ts~, f:.r..d n sy stem of clo'thil~g
    oX8}l,2~1ge 0f!-~:'[1, tC'~ 1::-:1 the (>;_v::.,:; lUn qunTterm1.G tor ~(J-:_}-J. in con~~ unc
    tion -rdth t!10 d~:lJision sh:JLlc:!:'s and on l.ii.rc,:~ exe;na>cge rdth units~
    Th'.c syst,c!", rel.co',,:s ," S'Cl'cl.:'n on the "lrea1y oVGrtnxed transport'~
    ti'JD -:7it~lin t!J'3 di',J~i.sior.c
    :.:T;l s-;jcrJ.l":';[!~.lC'".:!.' Dcrh .~,nrJ" clotJ.15ng e-{-.J'A..t.:.se vnits have proven
    tl grc It mora.lo l.Y)J8"~)!, ~IJd n. grcaG [.i8.~p ~_n the suppl;:r and nu-tinten
    r.nco 0::' indiviJnal ,.'}.t.<-.:r~.jl~ 'Plese u~1its Toiel'C: firftt used bythe 34th
    Infent:.-'Y Div:i.sion ,'"1.t P1E'")LV;I)i,tE D' J~LIPE t:..1 Dqceillhor 1943 after
    o.n oxtendod PC1:. :',00 of ""/CI or:-./s . .:L.;. cor;b,J.~. At" thr-.. t tine the faci.l...
    itios offered by the nJ.:i~ Cv!13:l.stod. of "b[l.tn, t01';'el, a cornplow
    ch:J.nge of unif-'Jrrn L':"ola tbu s}~il1 o-.1+,.? Utd.ct"~;0ar, socks., '.}oolen
    uni'oY'In;o fi0Jd 2c.. ci":(;
    if' rk1c,~8c::., Si.1:OG'S c.nd leggins) if noodod"
    Tho unit {1,c.;0('IW".1odA.~6d i'rou l,('JO to 20CO r.le~l 0. o.~.y"
    If QM .3teril
    iZ"l.ti"on, bo:t,'~., -..n3 cl,~\l:.b~.r"g ('xrh9J.!:;8 units c.ro m1,j,ntE:dnGd 0.8 close
    l"'.8 pO~js1.b:e.J no:riU8.;"ly f,L"'om ~. ';:":i l'J rr:'~.1~es behind tho front lino q ,
    it eliminates the noc8ss:-'-"r of -cho ~oJ_dj~er ca~ry~_. g nny oxtro.
    clothj.ng oxcept r.Jrh~ps r: c;l."-'n[;C" of UrdG.!:TJGnI' n,nJ. socks, as -:thon
    nll..'1it or Fccrt of '1 unit :'3 j .. n F, 1'~s,"r'i8 position and hilS nn op
    portr'~_ty to clo'JJ~ t.:.PJ t:1Gt t.J'l';.. '~ ~"n :_:e tJak:8n -:-,0 the S & B unit
    nnc1 giv~n Ci hot shY,;G~ c..1.d. "-'l0'l.r" r.:i_Q~~.nos and is bettor fit to go
    b9.ck into cco';in'"" ','1 :.' S.'. Uf".cr ti'Je, t):::>n ,:ould. be possible if'
    ll..l1it hnd to Te-equip ':.nroDg:l normu) SUP1Jly channels. i1
    Q

    t;

    C01'po:,,,1 RCLA}'D DX'SON, 135tt Ir.:antry.


    "Th(]ro is 0:16 pa!''tic~u~l'~ i +em ~"lhicb is :::leVGr mentioned back
    home 2nd is nevor iSS':.lGd in sufficie:::tt qucntity
    I u:n spoc;'" ~_ng of thG s:Llo.11 gJ.so':in3 Stov3 -v:h.ich Qnybodj~ wco
    spent a ~7i:tter ';'r: tra l;.ills of Italy Fill '~el1 you are .1. very
    def'inito impr:lV8m:jnt to life 'ilhich, at bost, is n"'~olutcly rw
    good."
    fI

    LiGutonant Colonel JOE L.

    K)u1<~'E,

    l68th Ini'ar;t:,:,y.

    "8xperi3nCG in c'cmb:1t to date "ould in1ica'!:o th.lt the In


    t.re~c':J..~.:cg Set, Irli'clnt:c-;{ ifJ.. J :.8 o:.rCOSS:'va to O~ nueds except
    ~hon 'the b2t't'[J.lion 1'1.'1$ to p:rJp:11'e ~ dQfsnsiv9 posit.ion.
    Our ex
    porience te dn teo hc.s iIldic,'tad thc.t tho tr.:msportltion allotted
    for this purpOS;J CD.n be pu~ to [!, bet ter use cnd service to tho
    bo:ttallon by helpinrs out l.;!ith the n.t:munitio!l i:1 n.ddition to cnr
    r:yiug th,;, TI,,1r::::::-tJ eqFi;n:-cent ll8eded for the A (.C ~:J pl.J.tocD, Tho sot
    should boo c:"lt'.:'ied. \T:th regim.~.nt, or un n.rrc.ngeffiGllt ';:orkod out ~:!h<3ro
    by battGlion cOI,lld ar'1\i r::. P'J..~t of this set should circumst::tnces
    iLdicnte G defensivo position."

    - 76

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    St~ff So?go~nt C!l~L

    C. RODDY, l35th !nfantry.

    nr'CV8 ~,
    [1 ;:.:C'3:~C

    ,/

    rog'll.1? iss Y 0" socks a'ld underwear at least once


    foX' tLs troops ";";h:.;n -:,he:r are on +,,he line. II

    "DiSlJOS8 01' tho b1r:nJeot roll In tic.8 daytime and let the kitchen
    force bring 1.]:"" u at nigh":.. 'fhe blanket is too bundlosome Gnd
    . p",vidcs Cc l:lrgcr target. Tho roll hinders movement going donn
    11')T017trr.lls flud thrOllgl; b:~sh8s. 11
    Li..)lttJno,::lt 8obnol JOE L. "lQL'Ri!.1E, 16"th Infl'cntry.
    ";'1'02.1"" ,'.' '--::;:. 1:. ,.,-.DC>, Clen r:ith fl rif10.
    It is be1ievGd
    t,h-'.t n. 1Jistol for tho r~-'s~"')o=':i !':l::'D'is much moro desir[~ble. Y:-c hl1ve
    :-:ctllccl::'j' C;.:"'l -:::lcc bCJsc'<;l~c. ;X:D pl.JtOc.s to cnrry fr= time to time.
    'l'l18 oojGcti',)ll of .tho ri.fle :,:_8 .!0h1. t it is a little too cumbersomo'
    to be C':1.::".i:'i"JCt ~'Y "J. r'1n ",11:0 ir .'lJ..sa c'~rrying tho b~zook8., ~nd, cs..
    :coci,nlJy so rhJn you cons::'j"r thnt the bD.zoeka lll"ln has a little

    (Ufforont nmnunHion

    pI'o"lo~l

    from

    t,'18

    ordinnry rifleman."

    n::bo rTC: c,L,~or or s,r-;'pl:, sorge':n't should stay with the COHl
    }Y\ll:r C? ~:o l~,s:::. itot.3 c..osir-::c.1 for tho next ovening's distribution.
    T:.:oSG itOLS CQ.I~O forr;'2.rd frr)J::. -1:,1'18 \i":.chan l.reQ with the folloHing
    Q,,"S r:,t;,c::B.
    r,~tionJ "d. 3up;>lLs for' detached pIa.toons should
    1:8 sc,nt :'):.th tho r,tion t.o".:,] 0:: the compllnyto which they are at
    tncbed. 1h'.s ?elf,S '003n o"r st'Ondal"d eperating procedure since 1'Ie

    first n:r-rivad in It'lly-.1t

    "?ac;: If.Clle t.nins - Dc:rilcg the fighting in Italy it has fre


    C;1Bnt::';r b'?COf'3 ,.,scoss.o.ry t) sunrly by pack t'.ule. The .34th Div
    j slon has had vc.ric-d cx!rrir.'nc,} YlitJ1 mulGs, using both organic
    Cll'~ attached pack rmlG t:'o.i:1s,
    In November 1943, it first became
    neoossa~T to "l.:':Sv m~~l':l;2 b'J.t ~hera \7er~ n'Jne c.vailable :from highop
    eC:lOlons and \';0 I,ore fcrc(ed to ruqllisiti.~n such J.ni:nals as could be
    found from d vi',l:l:',c auJ. cco-:;Bnize p;Dvisional paclC trains within
    L . . . ~) ':.1:-~:. t...:. r'. -; '" "-',;~ ,j_T'>3H. ',~2,: nf o:!:'genic pe:rsonnel which ~ere
    rCGc.ed elee~-;~ .:<>,:.:~ ana ~-'-='~'-I:v~ _G -:'::"a "1::.i ':1(:; ::.f 8.J_,iD:o.] bandlers, transr.. Q~t:.at::"cn of !:':::.~_-!";,-;~.)':">~,,:a '... nJ, ~~,.L:. 7.~" :::'~l:). nO';'lsidbr~blo supervis;Lon,
    ths p8::t'Sf)rr')~ :-11.:.0 ":1':::'~1,~ l~:)2:'-!: ::,:~:,ion for p!:li~h ia not available in- an
    iI:.fc:r:try i:."th.8 ~or. T:c:.8 C~T\J l:,Jnl .~aS not .2.t a::!..l satisfactory.
    In J anu:,r:,r 19j~.i:._ iJ_,.r>:~;(: .Lt,~,li3.n pc]ck r:~ulo groups '-.lero attached
    to tho divi3i.cn~ rr:ce~T :.C:) '.-,011 t;'3.~~!::ed, VJGll officered bu~ a.t .
    fir2t poorly equL',JZ:d, ('~D!b "!as lntGr remildiod). Duo to dif
    :'Cl~G!J.CB i:.: 2.~:_[!;::~gG8, c:.<..~,tcnc, an] tompar~ment, there was consider...

    - 77

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    able trouble at first in handling and use of the foreign pack
    trains. E~perience has shown that these Italian or other foreign
    pack kairrs can render valu~ble service i f handled properly and in
    turn Oew ;,e a lot of trouble i f not. The follol"dng ~ystem is used
    in the 34th Division.
    1. Upon attachment of a pack train, an officer is sent to
    the train "s liaison and if it is a foreign organization an inter
    preter is sent ,lith him. All dealings between units and pack train
    commanders are transacted through this liaison officer.
    2. These pack mule trains are commanded by competent officers
    and non-commissioned officera and are organized as any other unit
    into sub-divisions of squads, sections, etc. and work best uhen
    oper6ti~g under their own co~anders.
    Orders and instructions.
    therefore "re given to th" co=mer of the detail and not to ind
    ivid~~ls.
    Unsatisfactory rosults have occurred in almost every
    instance TIhere units attempted to take command of the mule leaders
    individually and not go through the cOlDl!iander as would be the case
    of a normally attached American unit.
    3., AWl generous act on the pert of units using attached fol'
    Gign pack trains, such as giving surplus candy and c~;rettes to
    the train, pays dividol'.ds.
    4. The pack train commander should be informed of the tact
    ical situation, just us any other attached unit, to enable him to
    intelligontly plan tis opcratiol'~."
    Serge!:\nt

    .hLE:':~~

    ;:L'"CIOLA, l33rd I!lf'antry.

    "In tl:.e past W<l hilYC beon marking and breaking trails, hours
    before the ration train leaves the ration dump. This is a.very
    good idea, and sr.ould be used in the future. 11
    LieutOllant Colonel IVAN G. 'i'ALZ, Headquarters 34th Infantry

    Div5.sion.

    HIt has frequently happened t.'l'lt tactical plans' are adopted


    which reqUire motorization of units from organic division trans
    portation beyond the ability of the division to support. In each
    such iust~.nce the follo,ring reactions occur:r8d.
    1. k,tion and ";,,ter supply 17ere insUfi'1c.,el:!.t.
    <iII>......
    2. Gas01ille ~upply t>ecnmo crUical"
    ,.,
    3. Drivers were overworked ana unduly fAtigued, anc, ihoO
    effici,ll,t \~h,m rclec,sed to norml functions.
    4. '.'oh"_c18 1lIainten:mco deteriorated. For any e~cept short
    definite mov.JS of not to exceed one regiment, vehicles for motor
    ization s~ould be ~xrnis~ed Crom sources outsid~ the division."

    ,S. . lror!7,!,ll;d

    DlX!i2.

    Lieuteu[cnt Colonol IVA:J G. WP.LZ, Hoa 'quarters )4th Infantry Div.

    ision.
    "During the .campaign due to terrain and traffic difficulties it

    - 78

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    boc,nme nGCGsso.:~y for the division sLpply services to Gstccblish


    forT rcl d=I*'" Tl1e .,IOs1; ::reqUEmt of thosu nero CIn.ss I n.nd tn
    t:'l~'~~;_. :o.ds established by t~3 qua.cte:cl.1aBtor..
    When road nots bc
    onma ccng'J,s'L r3d ani br1.d~e$ G_nC'. fO::""'js ~}GT'e u..'rlcortain thoso truck
    honds 'Fe"!:::.) 0~J'~--a~JJ5,s:n8d in Q~e,:ts T:'i-d,::h ~ t.hough in .'ldvnncG of 85.fe
    lo~at~i.,Jn8 ,~,f Yl'j;:'f<1i..I.:L supply in?:;taI1o:Lie>ns, reliovod congo,st.io.:.:. on
    reads a~1.::! :.l1S11Ted U~G sr,,/ith ::-101.;; of' s-cpp~ies in caso of bridges
    -:.l1d f cr;' t-:-~:.;:.. r.'!_~ ' ?" .,.Ii1.i.J,'::t':"'; ~:..G L).,. ;.-.ili...-:h QLa. s'~',:a,,:r-\II
    1xperler~ee. l-LaS p(."oper.. hO~\'G fer -t111) inndvis3.b:ility of n.ttempt...
    ing to pl'lf':'c- d:;vis-lor.: du.T~)S too far fO!,1jJ:J.:['d~ An inst8.nce is given
    :l,fl 0XamplJ
    1" ut:riJ1g th0 nttn.~l OIl CF.3SI::O in Jm1l'.a;:-y :~944. n forward
    q1J3Xterl:J,'1stor d:..cl:p '."''-',8 8;: L_5.0:'_:;:' .~-, od [~t rl~~ VILLA, -::].S intended to
    bo Q roservo dua:p (~0r06S the EA:-'ITJO Rlvo-r. This dump y~12s within
    Ion?: r\.nge mor{,::y.i; ';.~: .",.,:j }:c'hol~'iI~1.:C,:;r ,il~0f' Th3 ,,::nemy covered this
    drunp by fire Tlh3:0.e ~;G,~' .-;.,ny :' ,:di=-vl t.y t,ook l):aco in tho vicinity
    of tno d"!1~JP +,bu-:' d.c,~_d_r(; :1. tJ vse ,";.G a suvrly poj,nt
    The officer
    in charge r:',nd th::"tJo fiG_a ",'~(j::'0 ki.i.latl by ensmy fire., The dump
    p

    T!~~S u.b~1:ndo:r18~.L.

    2'l

    It. ~as b2,)~ fOlJl1d th-:-.t TIDCn 7eS:3rvo d'.lLlPS f;.l1.".1st be ostab

    15 shed fo"(' e;:r;; r8['.sc;r: In f().r~,-ard 8:~oas ~ t is adl7isnble for unit to


    build up snaIl for',iar:.1 durtlFS e-i. trGr by 7.'8giment or bQ:ttD-lion", il

    Cnptnin HAltOLD W. RODE,IT{J,::ER, IJJrd Inf'1ntry.


    UFrom thQ stal':d.pcint of proc::;dUT~. in sEp~~Jying nmnnmitior. to
    unl'u8 of nn infnrj'~ry roginont thoso principles Got forth in Par.
    211- I'~\J1 7-30, snt'vJ.ce company .'1n~ mod1.0nl dotacbmullt:s QrG busi'Jsl..q
    SOUJI'l"
    Ho'evor, an;" prococ1~0 in the supple' of Class V items !Just
    bo L c:dble.
    In the Garly sto.ges of the c2mp.~ign in 1tOlly the IJ3rd 1n
    fo.ntry co,aont team had the mission of pJ.r'suing n.nd lllQintaining
    conto.ct with the' enemy }_n a fla.ih::ing m~.118UV6:r~
    During this ph"lse, 8:'rpAndi turos of a:mDllmition T:,oro ver.l
    light r.:., -" trw 2~, ten." bx6 t.:':-'\l'Jks lo,'lded 1,-:ith the nmonrrtr "~Qd typos
    of n.l1UlIlL1ii;ion prese::ribed ':lOrs releClsed to b'1ttnlion control.
    Duri.ng ,(;,10 fol].owing rh[\S0S of the Mmpnign n.:l six of tho
    2~' ton S OYV-lCO camp ;:i.::::y tr~J :ks rere rett"lined U~1(!8r regimental con
    t~c'olo
    The regim'1n"t~l munJ~ti()ns offi0er pursorw~~ '"~. . sU!Jervisod th,G
    movement ~nd bi"vollncing of ~ 308 ,:wli as- th.3 load1~!.g n.na loads t,o
    bo cCLrried, He -:Ja~ 8_S3~ .:: t;3. by T.b:; ~1.L~i tion3 surgGnnt, the 881'
    go~nt truci.:"TI1ast.::'-' 3.:::-3. 011C pr1.-,-'!;;.t,G, (t~\o priv'"':itc being an undor
    s-GEdJ -:~or possib:i~!~) r0.plBceI!1cl1l: of :Ji.-~:-;er sorgeCtllt) ~ Tho 1"Jarrn.nt
    officor 51 TIll:,_:i.ci _ ~8 and Ord~1.9.11<;e, ~x:d the ;:,rl}.(;~{ driver T:ith the
    3/4 'ten r;eD.p.J71B C,'11'J.... lcr l.k'v3.11y stayed at thi"J sOl'vice company
    kitchC' n CC:0r:. ai1U h!:~ndled all ordnance. i tc.::::u:~ for Tepa ir, roplacG
    m8nt 01"' sal"J"agof' no TID.S Q}J;3istGd by a technical sel'gGant, smtlll
    fl.:oms Gyp31"C 9 poII qut'3.1i:~.ed to make naj or repairs on all sm3.11
    ::rms. 'Ibis technic"l se!'j!oant .,as in excess of the table of

    - 79

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    organiz9,tion, but preycd exaoedinG}Y v,'\luable to the rr)giment in


    Lf?l~U:h]g rOPclj:r rJero qui.f.:};.:;',? returned to combat l.lnits
    beco.uso eya~':.c" ,:_on to higher echolO'l.1s for rcpal.r r:as oliminv.tcc1. by
    [',n ostim..'1"l:ccd 9:..J;;<
    .G.'~tl()2: c.J.."" -~~~:mpRe
    Up,:;~ ont3J'inz ,combat, n:l veticles cC'.rried
    basic loQ':.s.. (h'f:t.Ll~ 3ati:)nr:...L "'Y(:i.hi~:,1e3 .,1- ton l;:rt:.ck) i ton t::'a.Jlcrs
    2n..1 p:.r:..t:~iS- mo"~e;:'8i aGI_.or:.pD,~iod -G_'lrJ 'L':':- .. ops as fa::- fon-;r'].rd as possible,
    :'~,::rC"~,li:g :t.o !J[:I.':ta-;.~,c:'l 0or..trol [.s soon as woapons and hnnd-carriGd
    [:.nLl'.Jnttio~l c.'tO -\-,al-:::er.. ~'or1,7[';.rd b;:T h~nd ..
    A't th5.2. tiT19 th..3 ba'.;t~.!.i:io:1 mo-to.'i:' pool becomGs the lcic':.tic;n
    of th3 h'lttnl.ion r:\mmllni hon QILJP. LO(1ds of armnunition "re MD
    solid:,tod and empty vehicles m.th tI"uibrs p.re rJturned to the
    rogimGntal (dYi./fa fo:;." rGf~.:"l ~o bas j".c load 3.1jd. roturn to bo:t.tctlion
    pool. Th~lS tho ":JJ.ttdlion is nS3urad a reserve of anunu.nition '..:hich
    is e.dequn~ie, mobi18 and ,'-:'l'::':.~ls ,1811 forr.:~lrd~ This motor pool nnd
    nmmi.Jn:t":.t;Jil' d;";jJ!}) '::'s . (;un~.r,):::"l'JQ rJY the battalion t-ransport,,?-,tion officer,
    assisted by JJ31'SOr:Ul01 from tne A & P plat.con of b8.ttnlion hG,:td
    qUJ.rtors CO!:_l~o.:::ly"
    The regimental n.mn~u...'Tl__ticn trf'_in;o or dump (ri1obile) in this
    regimont is tJ.'.Jr:ys lo::,::'tou. ~.iell f~'-;. ..-.'o.nl inj;ti~J.J_ly. gUIlG:c0.11y l1(3RI""
    the rear CF T.lhore t(..'!_op>~):~G CGt.L:'~u'i::c;,tion is ~vn~U.nble!i
    Juring the b'1"i}'t.Le llDD:t AL~Yii: nh8J:l the VGTJJ'Pl1NO Riiler formed
    D. no. ~"'::r'cl b3)',Tio('., ;:.:~lO :"c~r?i.jjlO!l:~,<l f'.ilLJ1'l':nj:ti')n train -:J(.l.S moved across
    th3 :rive~' us soon' flS u b:~idGe V![:S J."2. At this time the fOTl'ard
    olomel1ts cf tllC .cGf.':~.mont 'i-:,J::'~O r.PPT'C'xir:13.toly 1500 :'"o.rds ;-.'ost of
    ALIFE cnd the ummu.':l:i.t,-;on t""'"in moved into 'I grove of trees nbc'ut
    500 yards east and 7GU y.crdc S o',rth of ALII<'E und no"r u good roo.d.
    This D.ss\;red El. rO['L:;:!'VG of G.Eli1Yn~li tion in GV0nt the bl'idge :irlS knocked
    out.
    GoneI'Gl1y spoakIllg the nmrlUnH,ion dump of this rogiment is
    loc,~ted fl'c;n t\1u to ton mnes bch~nd t.he t:coops; moving fOTDard
    ~~s often flS mD.~ be re quir.od ~
    .
    In static sitc.atior.. s such as tho l"1ttlo pf CASSIr!O, the !'<'Jgi
    montal dWllP shou2 i be es tIlblished well fori1n:rd and Clll 2t ten t,rucks
    unloE'.ded and sent back to the sC'rvi.co ("Of,1puny nrGU under tbG centrol
    of' 'the trarlBporta tion sergear.'t.
    During the night prior to tho ascault on tho RAPIDO R:vol', ,Ie
    mo't,Hcd the reg1.!llont.o.l. c-su:n:Ziit.ion tl"ain to a pGir.:t about 600 yards
    south of SAN r'iJ.FJBELlS and unlo?,ded it, m2kl.~Jg n ground -dump. ':rhG
    tr'~,"(}KS rot\tr-r:.ed to the sorvice ccmI)any bi"t/oUG.c area which ".!?S in the
    vieinity of 0.i~.H V.~.CT0~{E. S t:"cks ~;J8re built up the follo~:ing n:.ghts
    ~nd uointained at the fo]~o~ir~:
    150,000 to 200,000 rounds caliber
    .30 uochino gcill; 75,000 rounds 8-rQund clip; 35,000 rou!lds c,o,rbine;
    25,000 Iouc.ds cnlib8:" ,45; l,500 rounds 6Gimn mort'1I'; 1,500 Iounds
    to 2,000 :;:'01~i,-is 8LTJ:J m.orr.(~.L 1:.:;11t.; 680 rOl1nds 81mm mor't.J.r omoko;
    1,000 rounds .hand. gl"'en['.do fr:-,. gmnn:t~t1_on; SCl0 ro"'.."l.nCl.s hand gren2de
    offensive; }')O smo.,zQ pot.s ~:;~,.P.; 300 -r-ounds hand 'gJ.~ornde smoke r~.p.;
    200 lounes hn..nd g.r-er.ndc ye llon; ,300 r(luuds sig'10,1 air crt.. f't, each
    eelor; 500 r~flo g:reM.d9':;';; AT ]1,,91'.2; 300 X'Clunds l::lcket HE AT I'll
    A-2. This stockr:\go prov,.,d Qdeq1liTce to supply this rogimen't by h,t
    to.lions os't3blishing f01'>;Jo:rd durnps [lnd to ,,-ssist othor regiments
    in supplying thoi." lmits
    ti,~()S ,ihen thoir trnins wore

    ch:1t iWa.P0T"i'3

    .,t

    So

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    doplotod or un ~ble to get f'arc;axd.


    Differont typos of . 11111itinn 17i11 be 'wod while in differont
    t.errain. In rolling COUll.' r:' nore Llort':'r 1'Iill be used while in
    m01mtaino11s terridn Jn0st:c:,>:",ondi tll1'es nill bo sDall aT':lS ".nd
    grenndes. Likc;',:'is0 fj.ghting i::. t-:jpns and citics will rGquire
    moro gron"des ",nd c,",libcl' .45:tnd SLID nort?r HE heon''Y th:1n fight
    ing in opon ccuut~v~
    This rogimer.t cwriGs tr.8 ~'BA pr,;scribod lond Vii tb tho YJeapons.
    On tbo ro(!imentc.l trn'.n, tho six,
    ton service oompany 6;:6.
    Follorling is tho lond carrbd:
    ch~bor of Rounds
    T7IQ
    33,000
    Cnl 30 carbil'1.G
    Gal. ;30 Ball 8 ro olip
    61,824
    30,000
    enl. ~30 Bull 5 rd clip
    72,000
    Gnl. ; 30 iii 011 ino Gun
    Olll 50 M~ch:i.ne Gun
    1,325
    10,000
    00.1'. .45
    60 111M HE
    972
    81 l:IM HE light
    900
    81 L'IM EE ho.'J,"tty
    150
    81 IIIH liE sr<oke
    150
    G:rono.dG, hand .of:'ene i vo W/fUS6
    250
    750
    G"'011.,\de, h'aJd frc.gl:\(nk.tion
    300
    GronndB, rifle HE AT
    200
    Rocket, HE AT M,2A2
    Signal Air Ornft, 120 rdG each color, r8d, .,)ereol: o.nd wh1ts.

    2t

    This lo~d h'\s proved adequ,:;to at all ti::1011 nnd in' OVGr 300
    dJ.Ys of actual comb"lt tho troops of this rcgir:tent helve nover b~on
    OUt. of" unrrl.Ll'lition of any t7J)G.
    It j.B reCOIlllllGndnQ t1l-' the

    2rr

    tor aml'mnition vohiclos bo


    retained under rGGiment~l control c.t all tilW8. This si:nplifies
    tho supply of all Cbes V itOl:lS by nnking nll six 1,,-:;3.8 cer.trdly
    locr.tod \lnd avo.il'1blG for issue to anyone or t,1O b"ttClli"ns.
    R3gi:1en'tnl control also I:lo.kcs r:-.oro trucl:s c.vnilnble for use in re
    supplying tho rog;_mont:cl dur.:p."

    - 81

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    1. Ex-perience ha.s sheJ':m t,hc;,t not on1y m1l2t the intelligence ar..d operations
    officers work in close cooperation, but t"cey MUS+' work at the same desk for best
    results. This applies to divlsion, reg5,mel't3! .',no. ~)"ttalion stnffs.
    !!. f.lLJ:J:l:!&r.r,o,aatiqp"
    Much he.s been le"rned in the employment of in
    terrogators and by the ;nterrogation p<3rBonnl'll ia the performance of "their
    job. In this division it has be~n i'etognizeJ that the closest cooperation must
    e7.ist between the comb'!t elements for whom informat:i.on is obt.ained and t.he
    interrogators obtaining that ir..format.ior... To be of the mnst value the ir..ter
    rogator must at all times be well inforL,ed as to the t"ctical situation and
    haye a good knowledge of i'utu:re plans. He must be able to seCUrO information
    as sreedily as possible and sse that it is promptly diss31ID.nated. The sooner
    the PW gets back to the interrogator the faster information ce.n be gotten and
    disseminated. This is comddered so impol,tant that lectures on this subject
    to all troops in this division are included in every training program.

    First Lieutenant F..ANS G. ,LAPPER, Headquarters 34th Infantry


    Division.

    'v1

    "While fighti"gonHill 593 northwest of CASSIN0 1 our troops


    were cohnterattackedby a c8mpanY in the early morning. This
    counterat'~ack was beaten back and only one pn was taken, a first
    lieutenant, who .ISS le'\di ng the attack. It "as evident that he
    was suffering fr,~m shocl,. He was :,:,ushed back to the regimelltal
    interrogator and was interrogated about 30 minutes after being
    oaptured, still under s}1ook. It is important to note that he was
    given no chance to relax, drink, eat or relieve himse~f, but was
    forced to'keep on the go tmtil he got to the interrogator. The
    interrogator, recognizing theconditioll the prisoner was under,
    did llOt waste much time wIth him, but &.slr.ed hi'1l some direct ques
    tion" which Were answered promptly. The prisoner stated that the
    com:oany msking this counterattack .,'ss a new unit in this sector
    which had becn slated to be committed against the AliZIO Beachhead,
    but suddenly was ordered to come south to the aid of the 44th
    Division Which was receiving it heavy beating. In fact a new bat- ,
    talion was thus i.denti:'ied, the II Battalion, 36l6t IR of the 90th
    light division, a motorized unit. 11e "ere able to learn from him
    that another company' of his battalion was going to make anot1er
    coullterattack the samB evenLlg, should his fail, also t.h:lt the I
    Battalion, 36l8t IR "as on its way down. He WaS finally evacuated
    to the division eage. By then shock had mostly worn off and he ",as
    on his "lay to regaining the 'station ,becoming a proud and stubbcrn
    member of the master raoe. !!ad this officen been given a' chanoo
    to recover from his shook'prior to:being interrogated, it no doubt
    would have taken much time to extract the information received
    and rle v!Quld have been Ul.,ble to obtain a good portion of it.
    Initially, interroglltion .ms performed b~' a 6-11'.an team at
    divisional and corps lovel. Hoo::evor, much valuable time nas lost

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    n.f ~'S r:::.d t,o br: (~VQcnu.tcd to di v~.sion beforo being interrogated.
    It ,7ail also ,,'GCElcl tk:t in t><s SGt-UD much detailsd information of
    tactic,'),l '\ral '.~'? tn rogih8n-{' -J.~ld lovwr -.wi ts -~-Je.s not exploited. An
    int(Jrror:t~_~-:r ~.:ork~::1g '()l' or] !,8gim~)nt only, can certainly do a more
    6Gta.:i.100 ,-'.T!d nccura.te :lc'2.~ C:1 the tacttcal situation in his regi
    mantel [,Gctor ,t~e"r:. a d:Lv':'f.lio~l interrogator ".7ho handles PFI s from 3
    r8gir.:.:3nts t'~.nd SOLlctimos 3".~EJn 5 rer;;::l.I!;9~ts" In our present set-up
    r.c hc~v'J 1 offic,er vri t.~:'l 2 :Clon-co;~uniGsiGned o:'ficers interrogating
    2~t o~.c!"'~ r3gj.-~n~t. :?~nd 1 or 2 ufflc'3r~ YJ5.t:h 2 non-commissioned officers
    at tbo di7ision cage~ 'I~e il1terrogc,tor at regiment YJorks strictly
    fer r".3.CO 2,'1d is dirGe'll:, respor.sitle to 3-2, Tho interrogator
    cL eli vis ion :.8 u:1der G-2 .' rid ,lOrks on all information of interost
    at tris lGV8J,. The"re ;'i.E bo some duplications and overlap, but it
    ht.;d knr. :i'u::nr..' tha,t th::,s ; appens rfrther seldom, and if it does a
    clouble-cD..')e;\: never hurts ~ The :i.r..formation obtainGd at regime'nt
    1:ill i,l1!;iG Untol:' b3 diss'3m:i.ndod. first to the battalion "ho cap

    tUT8d tto I'articular FW, t,,)n to the other battalions and to div

    ision. T:""c.lJ;' by ~he tiJ19 the P7' s get to division the interro

    gator ';t ',~ v:,sbn h"s


    :~nforrr.ej of t.'1e information gotten at

    rGgh'le~t 'Jr,ich "ill givo him an idea of riha:; else that particular

    PF can knon. T'1is sys"':",m ,;o::ck>3 out very well as long as 3-2' s,

    S ...Jt s, G--2, G-3 ar_./J t~:c i:::t:.rrog~.ctors at regiment and division work

    closely togeth3r. ThQ cihisi.on in~;Grrogator should make it a habit

    to nco at tl-e civ:'csion C'P r.t leaDt onc') a day and preferably more

    o:['ton.

    ];11.i19 b the begiDring ;:lOS:, interrogators worked with maps


    rIS :1<)"' in this dlvisLr: ':'ork ..ith all sorts of photos v;henever
    feas5.bJel' It is rE~l.ch ea,:l~_Gr to orient a FW on a photo especially
    on an oblic:u8" C10:..0 cO':)~'8rn,tion bctr,leen ~hc air photo interpreter
    .:,::::1 'tho PYF i::J~ err.:)' ;':. tol' >.25 prove!} of rr,uch value. When T.le do get
    so~netbiLg u':' -.;"-._~ '-:.:(, eftan h~-,-.-o ~ ji10t0 interpreter present during
    5.ntorrogatio!"1 \7110, [.rr.1":::O 1:i:5:~:1 the lat.est sc:ctiG flown, ";il'hich usually
    is c,ess t:Lrr t\ d~,y o.ed, aLecks the inforrr.a1:ion obtained immediately.
    ifany profitable targets .~or the artillery and the air corps have
    beGn obt3.ined in tI1,3.t, mQ.!2ner"
    At CASSn;O 0~)C pho Lr, i"te"Preter fO'..1nd an unidentifiable
    obj ee t on th6 s rY:.<.th 62.opo 0 -C ;i~o~as~~ry Hill. Interrogation of
    various pds"me~s fx'om tJ."j,s sector finally ident;,fied it as a very
    tlell-caLo;,ln~ged S? g'm, ,U.ch rillS r:o-c firing but being kept ready
    :::'l>e h:>.tte,Ho,1 C:J, II 3D, 132;'c IR nho pas very security conscious
    o::-rlL0"Dod Or'e i.<hoi:o r,r.~G;:e. '1. b'.:.tch ';,')0 ShO'?lCd him just A. little too
    long. Tbel'o ,,as onc.y one bowe on this oblique which TIe had sus
    pected t .:~ };i:~ CP.. 'l''h.is 0:: C'Y.TSe confirmed our suspicion. When
    ,-'0 fin:-.~l::l (;.)jJ.froLtOG l~~ LJ. ": i~t all the_ illformG.tion WG had of his
    pas :'ti:)l.S :-:..1':.1 his :-ogh c. nt ~ iJe ric,s EO sur-p-;.:iBed t:2Ln.t he:, Dade some
    cor:.~ec ~:i.Ol1S and also ga.v-o t:s r:_is battali-:>t.l is boundary rJhich we
    d:i_d:: ~ t :., 870.
    ..
    c~ .~:.,-~t~L)':r oc C::-.C _"'.
    ~ J:'3-0rter pho '30.5 unable to orient him
    self on C"I. r;:;e,p fir;alJy ;18 .'(Y,; ,;~rcc1 a f'a:niliar loc~ing tree on air
    photos and 1"CiS ,'luI" ::'r'c':' ."C'," to le:td us to his compar.yl s strong
    ,Joi'1t, s!:,O',J ,13 " Li 1.] :":':.~ c. -'.J". ;'rant- of it and the ditch their
    petrels nS'Jd '~o get tl"'C',lC;L ttis mir:e field, and vc.rious other

    "'"iL

    -.j

    .. 2-3

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    installations.

    ~e

    have orten been omazeQ how much ot the informa

    .,:iOll got:':.e1'l from PW's g'1d air photos ohooked. A comparison of the
    1.!lE. r,ll tt.e ANZ:() Beach"leac. an gotten from photos with the one ob

    te.ined from PVi l s "bowed hClrdly any variation.


    Another person lnth whom closest liaison should be maintained
    is the Order of a"ttle man at division. Most of his information
    comes from i.r'~."I'uga-;,ion of PW'.s, at the same time he will supply
    the interroga"tOr with much of tl,e information he needs in order to
    interrogate, It is the intsrrogator's job to supply these missing
    links for the O/Bls p:i.cture and he oan only do that i f ho. knows
    "hat is missing. Captured documents, too, are used to great ad
    vantage for this purpose. In fnct so much information has been
    attained from documents that all unita are reminded at every op
    !)ortunity to turn in imm9diately every piece ot paper found. Many
    Gorman gll.'l positiona have boen neutralii/:ed due to some seemingly
    obscure pieb of paper found on a dead German'or in an abandoned
    OP. Unfo.tunatoly, wo are still having occasional trouble uith
    sOlNenir htmi'.ers keeiJing enemy diaries an/! overlays.
    .
    Inton-ogation technique could only be improved by actual
    practice and much gas learned in this respect, especial~y after'
    1.e got /l. cle:tr pictur(l of what information 8-2, and G-2 are after,
    and just ~7here and hO\1 fie fit into the picture. We found that i"t
    very oft.en works out better if 2 interrogators nork on one Pi'I at
    the 8:lnlO til1lo, The ma~,n ~_dv:>ntage .being th."t it keeps the PiVon
    the top, net giving him too much time to think, and also 2 inter
    rogators can think of more than one. On the other hand we. found
    th:lt it o.ften lmrks out very "ell to interrogate 2 or more men from
    cino company at the same time. At SAN Vl'r'TORE one of our patrols
    brought in 4 PW's and, "hile their stories checked, every one of them
    gave us different loC,':!tions. We finally got all 4 Of them together
    nnd by letting them argue among themselves obtained the correct' ..
    information, 'lh1ch"as later confi.rmed. On another occasion 2 PW1e
    from tho 7th Company, 211th FGR .'ere brought in togetl:or. Sinca
    both had Polish nawes Vie took them on together. It turnod out that
    oro rlas a Polish Pole, hnti!1: the Germans and was forced to fight,
    '7hile the O"\od:' ,; ,nc::'dGl'ed himself German a:1d was art ardent Nazi.
    Our fea.rs 1.10::." tl;e J.!azi w')\lld ("xi L O,JT "'11::.11ng PW proyed unni9ces
    aary as the t"o wanted to show each other up and tried to out-do
    each other on the alJvunt and exactness of inf'oTI!lation they had~
    Only tmtncd inte:c'!ogatc!'s shadd be pe:rmitted to interrogate
    PWI S In 'one instance a PF, betng inter.roga'Led at a battalion OP
    by a German-speaking soldier/'said that he hea:rd the Germans tlere
    3:xp3cting our c.-te,,", !'.: any t:iJT,(l. The s'JJdier, 'knowing Germo.n, but
    not being l',~mil:Lar n~tn r.uEtc.l'Y eXP-'"Ol'J.]iOl.S, reported tlmt the
    Gerl:1cns ';Gre goin!i: to 'l~t[t"k. Since om' troops actually planned
    an attack (it "CIS thon n1EUt r:-2ClU'l" minus 6) it was cnll.ed off. ~
    WLen tho P? r'Alched re65n,cmt the irrcerrogator detected the mistake
    and aftar 'hig;ler ho:vlq'~"..r :;srs TIere notified. plans' for' our attack
    'Jore r"",,;I.lOQ. . Mu~;h va2.";"o:"le time 300 effor t could have been saved,
    h:;,d this Pl1 been immedic.t.'1.y evacuated, as directed. On another

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    occ:u~ion, a PEt s p:!;r"0.ook r!0,S cxar:i.r-E:d an~ the P.'! was rop0rtod ,~s
    be1.onging "GO a di;]j.:ii;-~n ",~;hi8h n t. -the t.:i.:n(;! "7aS sup:)osod to be in
    =ilis rIe,: idG2"ltif:1_c'~i.'t.:i6n ~'lbd e'rJ81'~!l:oj;T UD to co:r-ps c:'.nc1 h?-gher
    h02JJjl 1.fli."'':'''',_ '''1 J ~: 0:,";"-;_ t-~;,..~.:,. '.I,Jl.. ~;~'- -)-,he 28e~_j~F-jnt.sl intel"""'rcgJ.tor found

    RlfSSl.t1...

    out "ella s

    ..l,-,.:.~~.:;

    95 :;th IR

    '1r'~C''''

    ",J. '~"'j:l
    _

    -'

    l:).-t:1 ;1[:,(1 ';,b __u:c.l(-.r.Ctl

    J.~

    .'J-:-.
    .........,
    , ~.'--J.l

    to this uni+,

    b-.:t.

    ~.'ms

    "!'''''.':>''~~7
    1-.~ -Tn 'h"~t -.-Jor~'l'nu"!=!'"
    ............
    r-c.;.
    .....
    ~-c

    ,"c;.)

    '._~

    .L~,...

    nOiJ in the

    sector"
    ~

    h. Eg0+:.;~,~}Jt.,':~~~)L?~~-<1'=:':-' , ':'}--e:; "" ,)]3 .1.E8.:"'rl'.3J in rho'Go :.Etel1.igence


    embrace, for the pUt~:;r);J2 (J"{ ;~:,~s ]' 'l='.) " tHO tr ~.31s ?nd e",:'" aI'S directly af
    fecting interpxot'lti0r:.. :.~~ a di,ri::L.cn" Lt. is folL th'"'.t sUl"i'ic~.ent rJOrk has been
    done to permit recolTUJ1endaticns ~.-8 to r::~):--..,t '1S J::~l:"l omolo;,r:i:'lC:Tt of ~orsonnel ~.nd of
    aerial photos.
    Lioutenant Colonel H'J,j3},';'
    Division.

    n, 1)::::S 11kR,~IS,

    H:3adquarters 34th Infantry

    I1Aerl.::l phO-G'::'3 -viers not. 6xt.sD-"Jively userl by this division until


    the Italie.n, Cro\)rJt:3Jgt:, 'dU'3 to a~ SC',~t'0~ty 0";:->' trained grour).d force in
    tG1"pro-t'G':C3i~
    L-~tc.rpreti;'~ ~s ~,;,\~l'a:1 (~~:l' :':;ig -c:Je beg:iL"::l;i.ng of the ca,m
    ps.:i.:-gn,; af!3:\?;.'~'.:d -C') diylsiop.s, 11r!t1 .9.t- ri' l'7t8'!' uat3, by this div
    i.~ion:.

    Q:3sj.gned

    r.:lg:',,:nC),"2ts i:l ~11 i,~~te:(I:r1~~ to fulfil tho aim of'

    phot.o 'i'ntolJ";.go'nce :!'_'1 .i!J.:-uin'5' at, tt.3 ,I?,,1,.XiJlI.lIIl amount of rru1:it:~ry


    ini'crs~2tion ,i il" tho ;:i1rtimuEl {~l:.r:~~
    'r1;,lO." of:(~{!GI'S 2.n21 t~V10' enttf6t{3d ID8n '~l.ro' rcqulrod, 8.t division hGad
    qUo.rl-,0Ts~:. .7hose' duties ni'c't'o '~,HiG1J.re u;:, all ti!TO th:::.t'su'!Jcrdin:".te
    1L.V}its h.l'~,ro ,-::r..o F::'op,or';'J?hoto cever.:.:.go at .tho '.righ~, tirlo", They 'provide
    such ~;.n~C)r!1rot":~ion ~nr~. st~lc:iJS 'is rG,:~uirG,d by:r a,mT
    divisional unit,
    '.".1
    organi,_ o!' [',:tt~,ch~d~ \'i'l10 have 110 ~,~h PGrsonnel~,' Division artillBJ."Y
    hEm.dquo.Y't0rs req'ulro~ the sQr:!?c--,:~~'0f ,:1,n officor of sUDorior ability.
    hiE ;'lOrk "ill \Je,coordinc.tod ,;;th'divtsio:l hcc,dqnarters and 1"ith thE)
    couD,ter-bc:t;'c~:,;r section of co:-:rs .~91' ~o:cfirnntion ,9,71d corrGct:;d 10'
    cntlons. ClosfJ liaison ookenn Air D1" and photo officor should be
    SOP.. In ;}:.1S manner m'anr Uni:10n-tified objocl,;J on p1:~otos U?y pr:ove
    to be target,s cf ~.J:~luec
    In groat d8marld bj", the J.l,tillarY are 6-inc~1 v3l"'tic::tl photos,
    blor:l1 'T? 1:.0 0. L~~l';"G of ':/25/';00 i. ~h 3n o.rbi tr2.r~" grid$ These phot,os
    provo very vo.l-J.l.blo ;s f:i ~'L.l~ ch '1r ts.
    Each inf'~iT~":-Y reg1.;1et1.~ /1"'.8 "!. r.l'1n of suff:i.c::ont Gbilit.y to do re
    cognition, genoral tc,,",i;1 nt,xlios, aad h'lnd18 nhotos fo~' tho join
    i,tig of mosaics ~ As -:,0 ~..lh~Jt11GJ,'" tL~,_,'3 ::J1.n should be ~':'!1 officer or n
    9

    ,.;J.

    I ]

    non~'CCL _.i~si0nf;d oi,~': '.:";1'

    i3

    c'.~b:-::t.::!:le ~

    DU"C hd shculd be of sufficient

    Ga'4 h['l,b us,~d "V-';Y i. c;.l.D ;3;" ~dio8 to very good ,;,dv.~.LnCrtge. in detor
    mining '..'1--31".1'.18,(' ~15"8 SI1-Pp\y 0~nd' EY~7"~,cu:..tion ;-iill b9 D;!" truck, rule or
    mo.n. PF ir..-tf1:!.70g.. ~\:-,.:s n.ra oh'Co::..inj1.1g o.c0ur~,;.to iufo:'lYJ..':1.tion bo;y"'ond bG-'
    I'ief b:cT tho liS'3 0:' '1i..:' ph.:.:p~os, ,'J:id 5.n par-(,ie.-111.1!' the US;) of obliques.
    Tho use' of ''lir I11-:otot~, bv t:h -Vcyt:"cJ,l o.nd- oblique j 1,'!ith our o':Jn
    p.':'.trols c::.t.-:1;1.C"1t 1:-e over3~!lfhnsi3ed" ',TlJ.3Y p-::oovi,i2 b!y~h :J. good r.:ediu~'l

    for the rU0St::,oni' " of' tho p'l'crol upon its roturn, 'end for d'Wlight
    pe.trols to rccorc th.9ii.. routo Q.nd observ'ltions 1,7hilo on their f!:is;:1ion .. ,i

    - 85

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED
    Major ARTHL'RJ. I'ETERSON, 31+th D1.vision 'l.rtillory.
    A tr'1""nod air cor;:>s photo int8rprGter ':lns uttnched to divisi,:m
    c.rtillor" hoadqu"r'c,ers uJr1.ng t.ho oporatior.f, at, CASSINO. This in
    nov.:.i,tior:, .]Ol"~,\.(~d :-. ce.11C'lltJ.y T:com it.s i.nception :::nd definitely r-,roved
    tho V,"1'-'0 of }-;::lYing the plato ir:t81'pr(,tor in r:,ysical cont .'.ct c;ith
    t..~_O i:'-)opln ',;~~o GCGTd rC:lCt r.':~"'th mi~lirl}llir. del::::.y on his intorpreta.,.
    tions , A!'o,,,.,q m"'.0.8 susjJ8r;T.. by shellreps lJero r(~fc::rr8d ').t once to
    - the ph0to intoriJrotGr an-4 i~1 s-:)mo C'1SGS fir8 :72,S urought to bCQr
    on the onorrry b~'(:" tG.l~,T (Je.t\; "-8 it :~<ld c0'1.s;Jd firingn Tho intGT
    FcotGr \7 '.c nls0 of gN.ot \''111'3 to t.h3.S-2 in sclocti1'lg harf\ssing
    miSG~~ 'Jns, locat.1.~'.,; r. ')rt~).rs > (-:n,'.~_ in m:"l,k.ing torro.in studiGS for
    futur:J positiol1F .. !J

    Maj or EARFS C. KAL, Be'ltlq"arturs JI,.'ch I!!f:mtry Division.

    j
    f

    "Ever sirJce the ,,?'try of the 3!.th Divis:'on into ROME it bocnx.1(l
    npP2rJht tL l"t tl'8 Ptlrtisl'.r..s r.:ero n. probl~ to be dealt ii'ith if SGCu:r
    i ty :1.nc lex; [',.r.J" order f\lere to be t'.uintnined in di visional ~rClflS.
    Very little \,!l~ k~1'::~";,:1 of th0Jl1 ''l.t -the ti,,1G. They r.. erG ~n ovcrz0,,11ous
    group} CtlrrY'ing v'.ri0us seyts of arr.:18 ::~Yld without propor h'J.r:d.ling
    might be a Y:1en::tce to our s:)curit J" cor":unico.tions o;~ suppl)! as woll
    C'.S R. SOUTce of ter:::-or to civilians. .'.t becun'io necesso.ry therofore
    to d:.nl vith thorn 'cS suer.
    On or '1bOi~t 30 Jme 19M. t.ho CO'.lffia!'lding C:encr'l.l, 34th Infantry
    Diitisic!1, "Q.tL,:t~hod A"<Jnt GEL'RGE IV1E}GiI?~A.~J cl t:lO 34th Division CIC
    as 1Li~30n t'liGh MID Section, 34th Division, both to r.'ork dir(lctly
    nitl: the P'lrt.iJans through C;-.2 and Q-1 m:d to deal \Iith them ~s nn
    ind.ividuQI cU.I'isionalproclom. Tho method ~nd plc.n of procedure ,IUS
    l::lid do-m 'It 'l conference b0tY,een G-2 ::Ind G-1. It ~I:"S considered
    thr.t this urr::lngomcnt \1ould help t'.3.inta:.n security '::ithin di'.risional
    bour..d"'_ric~!< ri':1~.d: :"-"'18 Il'"'.t'Cl,l"'[,:.J..::l.: n. GIG function, o.nd would Q$c:;ist in
    m,int~injl1g l'",",nd ordor ~ruo:1g th" civil popul'ltion, Vlhich ;Jrs a
    nl1turlO.1 AUG f"Inct5.on. The Si,ihrity of coverage between AEG and
    GIe made 'Lhis an idec.l ::~T'r:.111g:-1ent"
    As soon as '] COF.;J:une .:.5 t .....'ken by our inf.. .ntry J :1nd in many
    c,';.ses sop3r~t8 frr.c't).ons :::~ corrrr'.1Jr..Js, rye hC':ld a TJ8eting '.-:ith 0.11
    re!C'lining offit'ia.ls '"s \"ell ClS ;,ith profess,ior,::\l men and othor 1cnd':'
    ing c i tiZOllS of .(,~.. .. u:-J[~u.n'J ~ Ii1c~nded in this twet.ing etra the
    leGdo,"G of the Pnr~i8,"ns '1r.d the CL:.T to whoM pe express the Commnnd
    ing GGnOl'~l' e ,'1Pl. .J.'G\..~i3tic1. fo:."' their o.ssist'1nco rtnd the hope th.':l.t
    they tJill co:rcinuo to 'lssi;::;t. -JS.. r'G explain our rasp8ctive mis
    sions, solicit t~'1eir c'.')op:3r;~,tion .'!nd tJ.k(~ the necessary d~.ta re
    quisit.o to the propoS/." functlo'1ing of hot:1 LiVe 1:nd GIG. 170 oxpl:.::.in
    th-.t tho C on"lu'1(~:;'ng Gener"l em} th" h11ied lJi1.li'cary Government ClrG
    responsible for tLe Government of thail' pe[>p'Q ".t this time and that
    tho P,'J.!"t,is."cG arq to 1 ny down th8il' a.rn~ in ordor th:\t penc3 rr,'lY
    bo rostcrGd once' :\gain to th'Jir peopl'3.. It is recognized 1 hOPGver,
    thnt in all ins ..:tnC3S in which 110 enter :l town there arE) eitl10r
    Gormnns in the urol] in hiding or Fascist enemies. Conscquently, wo

    - 86

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    l:e.vo kken '\ prr'octical vie,v Clf the problem rndh~ve permitted tho
    l' .'.rtisc.ns, for tactic,""l and military roasons, to retain their nrns
    u.ntil our CP moves be,'ond their town; On 9 July we inspectod tho
    entire roar bound,..ry of the LIVORNO Province nccompaniod by the lea..
    der of the P~rtis~ns and h'\ve found the Parti~ans in the rear arona
    dis2.rmed nnd without insignia, leading fairly normal lives, yet re
    taining their org::mizntion '."Thich enn be called into exiatence 2.ta
    moment's notice. However, most of their arms have been taken up and
    t,hoy do not ho.ve nccess to them. We have found, though, th~.t in
    communes closer to our fory,ard CP the Pr'ortisans in many instances
    rotc.in their r'ome in spite of the proclamation and the notices to
    tho contrc.ry. This should ]x, no cauae for nlarm, aince lllc".ny of
    '~hese l'r.rtisans nre c:ll18d upon for tactical missions with our
    combat troops or to mcJ<:c security nrrests. Moreover, the armed
    PC.rtis;cl1s J;!ove forrrrd ns tacticnl troops advance leaving merely a
    ,3!ne.ll skeleton policing g:"oup "Ihich IGys doml its nrms when the
    Carabinieri nre cstablishod.
    Aid given.us qy Partisans.can be divided into two phases:
    (1) Civilian; (2) Military. Under the civilian phase the Partisans,
    n:i. t;l the cooperation of the CLN, maintain an intermal police force.
    They make security e~rests ,and report known Fascists and suspects
    dan:;erous to the security nftha division. They sen4 squads behind
    our infantry or 1'Iith our infantry into embattled towns to prepare '
    the T:ay for us. In many instances they inf'iltrate into the towns
    under cover of darkness before the infantry arriveo, assist the
    infantry in their tactical mission, and thereafter maintain inter
    nal order. 'I';~e Pertisans and the eLN maintain offices in the com.
    J1ll.Ules'l.nd in eacn tOlm, for it is a rare occasion when the regular
    . officials are present. In short, the only government we meet as
    we enter newly fallen cOlD)Jl1.Ules is tbe goverruaent created by the
    Partisans and the CLN. The Committee of Liberation aelects the
    :nayor and supplies .us with t'Ce essential dnta. The Partisans
    assist ,dth the evacuation of civilfans fl'om embattled towns; they
    disinfest the civiliens; they bur,r the dead; they distribute food
    s>Gores and aid in the resettl?lTl13nt'of refugees. They assist in
    taking Care of thdr O"n: i';~unded and infirm by establishing and
    maintaining emergel"!.cy ini'irnari.es. They check on all refugees
    within a tOml rpr securHy purposes; they maintain lists of refu
    gees so that they rr~y be properly housed, fed, and given modical
    attention. While most of their 1"IOrk is not a highly finished type
    17hich l.s mtural to cont8lr.platc ina .\1e11 organized group, they
    successfully perform the set-vices we ,ask.
    From thfl mili+;ar:r sknrlpoint thoy. have boon of recognil!!ed as
    eis'i;anceto our dtvisiol1. TLo Partisans are selected by US to con
    tact their groups in ter:'itor;<r oc oU:;',i.vd by the Germans and inci
    dentally to gather positivo jnteEig~nce for our division. They
    ~,dvil3e the' :for':lprd PartisLns t.o, e;wect the coming of the Allied
    1'ili kry Government inth, fu.ture und they explain our mission so
    tI12.i; thEN n,.." preparciJ. ..'h',n '.".'e arrive. The Partisans h(lve
    ..gona 1'6ruaJ:'d u:1.th our tacticnlunitl): "I) ;3cQ1lts"fl-nd gtUtl~,
    nndmany np 1l"!.terProters . They 1!l!lintain gu,ei.'!illa, utdts itr
    tho mO\W.'tnins all, Il1!ss~or~ npo.rt i"rcm our otlO .d1visiontl3.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    t~ctical mission.
    to!J!lS'1g~inst the

    UNCLASSIFIED

    They maintain units for ~ighting in


    GormnllB. In PIOMBlNO, for example# i t ws
    estimated by their leaders that as a result of a pitched b~ttle
    betl1ee'n the Partisans and. the German forces over 150 Gerllians >"Iere
    killed. As previously stated, they maintain units for the internal
    poliCing of t01V1lS newly taken 'by' our troops and trose already oc
    cupied. Thoir sqUD.ds go fOrl"'l.I-d into areas uithin our divisional
    boundary, combing the territory for hidden Gerllians and wanted
    Fascists. ~e have found the Partisans of GUARDISTALLO, in VADA and
    in RESIGNANO SOLVAY in search of Germans and Fascists. They' ell:
    plained they were a Part of a roving !Squad. The Partisans are also
    used by our tactical units as anti-sniper squads and mopping-up
    squads. In CIVITAVECCHIA, for example, the. Partisans were put into
    cur i.n.fa~try ~~:w.ds to P:Ol' -lP :rel".a1.ning German elements. TlI!a Part
    isans beside<! scoutillS the countrYllio.e constantly, bring to us
    enemy prisoners of war and,return escaped Allied prisoners of war.
    Limitations on aid to be expected can be outlined as follo1'lsl
    a. They ,:ir" not highly organized so 'far as delegation of
    pm,er is concerned. Theil' leadors do -most of the work.
    b. The~are usually poorly clothed.
    c. For tactical missions they are inadequately armed and
    generally.short in 'ammunition.
    d. Their food supply is inadequate to maintain their organ~
    ization. For example, in VENrURINA their leader explained to us
    on 9 July that his ,organization disbanded not so much for lack of
    arms but because they had'no food source.
    0.' The tactical infornntion they bring to us is often
    tardy. This may be due to lack of transportation facilities or
    communication. The lack of transportation can be -said to hinder
    the entire organization as it no" exists.
    fo' Most le_aders of tho Partisans andCLN are not accustomed
    to municipal administration, and though therare eager to help us
    and their people they grope in confusion.
    g. Tho fQct that Germans hold civilians as hostages is
    a deterrontto the functioni!)g of thePa.rtisans~ For example,
    in MC1NI'ESCTJDAIO tho Germans Massacred 65 civilians . Vie saw the
    doad and four cameTP,S from G-l sect.ion recorded the scene of the .
    dead. The Paramount News c,meraman JOHN DORED, photographed the
    dead, and war correspondents on the scene have a record of the
    sarno. tt

    g.

    Psychological Warfnre.
    Major ARTHUR J. PETERSON, 34th Division Artillery.
    liThe division was comerned roth psychological warefare
    through the distribution of 1J'{'opaganda leaflets by light artillery,
    British 2-inch mori;nrs) Air- OP, and 9~tr,ols. Beginning shortly
    after the first -crossing 'Jf 1o"e VOL'! URNO hundreds of propaganda
    filled shells were directcd~t enemy positions with ,not'iceable re
    sults. A good percentage of P'J's had leaflets in their possession
    ':hen c3.ptured. In addition to direct!\ppeal leaflets, a weekly

    - 88

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    nC'.'SF'.D,.. r, Fr' ntpost, for G"rm'l'l sDldiors 1'.'"1S firod wcekly.


    The
    .fol'.o"h,g Lotos are a ;'08,,1 t of experience gained from firing var
    ious types of p:'op~.;:a21da sbBl1s;
    a . Ob:::;erTT!~d f:TO ShOtlld be used for firi.ng propaganda
    shells ).1' at all poss:tble because vari.able winds in the target
    area '11al:e it diffie111t to predict the area in TIhieh leaflets will
    fall.
    b~
    If it beeoro0s nGces~ary to fire propaganda shells 1.i3ing
    umobserved fi.re, the follo.-:ing -fadors,' gained fron observation
    ~."-' c 'y'~ ",-1-: n. :1f ,:: ex::t:ri :;"3Et a1 :'ir:ing, ]'!lay be used with a reasonable
    eoc)8cto.tbn of succe36 and i.n any case should be considered in
    prJparir.g ~nitial dda for observed f~r8s.
    (1.) The c1if:"ercnce iI, "eight between propaganda shell
    and norrcal shell must. be t,,'(on into 0'YC :'c'eration. This can be done
    by alloviing a dHference of cine square for each 6/10 pound dif
    foronce i~ .':eisht. Usnally ttis "'Iil1 vlork out to be minus 9 or
    1C sql1.s.rps for l05rrlTI shell. Tbts nppears excessi:ve for accurate"
    shoot.ing but has ';iorked o,t very satisfactorily' in practice. Shells
    must be weigtcd at the filling point for different sized..leaflets
    ,md the infor;~at.ion trivento tha 'mit f i r i n g . . .
    .
    (::::) Ir,itial cla+s. for shell fuzed Bith M-54 fuze may
    .
    be con,"ute:1 b:r apsl;rbg data for normal time shell for a height of
    .burst of 100 c'ards and using i'uz() setting from firing tables. Be
    yond time r&'llge fuze ill-54 ls.s bU3n fired on impaot .,ith varying
    J::osuJts, g011<)::'.qlly U!!s"tisfactorily. If the angle cif fall is steep
    enough leaflets are SO!.:-3tl:"NJ U,rocm into the air and an area about.
    50 yards i'n diru~eter covered. Ire one case tho leaflets failed to
    .sopar'lte and Vlere thro"n cut 'n a 8jngle bundle. The M-67 fuze has
    -l'Dvod sati s fl::ctory for l~ng range firing and it is believed that
    a large percentage of propa,J,p.rda shell packed should be issued
    r:ith !iI-67 fuzo. 1.5 se,cod" ad(ce>d to time of flight will give a
    fuze sotting that 'cd 11 "!ork for alr:lOst all ranges. Care must be
    uS2d in setting ',I-t7 :f'u.,s to insure good results.

    S3rgeant DAVID J.' JONZS. EEladquarters 34th Infantry Division.

    ":> ':':',:--r of pdtl8 3:,eci3H~~; s;oends all his" working t.ime learn
    in;:: '/;Y:'J.t th3 -cner:-;:r, ~)ut in. tl"<3 31~t:h Division the chief lesson
    ]:G,rnod by tha.t earnostst:ldentconceI'rling his metrods has. beon
    tho obvious one - namel:', tS focus. all intelligel)C8 sources on him
    .. ~JGlf :.:!.7.1d then to chcc~ onb. a~-::ai.nst: anctb8r~.'' "The second most impor
    t,:;.. :'lt J.3S8 on bas bea!~ t.o'l'l-:alize nO"':1 nbc,::ssai7' .it- is"; on occasion,
    to 812..:1 I I dontt kh~'!!i' ~ ;
    ",.' ....
    . ...
    .~t tha A}'ZIO B<:'achhead it is considered that the high degree
    q~' accuracy in the final !,ict-brG sho.cel'lthe soundness of these state
    ~10',t". start-tng .'dith th" information 'tl!ikenover, f:rom the relieved
    d:vkion ever;/ item vrt:'.ch could amplif,y 'our cknoViledge of. the enemy
    on 01];:" :'ror't r:as studied. F'rom th:> first, the closest contact lias
    kopt.:! b tb~ ;;hoto ~ntor2TGtors. Tho offices of tho two sections

    UNCLASSIFIED

    U NCLASSI FI ED

    adj oinod and the pel's~nal frien,dship of the persons ooncerned "as
    a great help. A cheerful yell from- the photo man' I've found tuo
    very h8fl-V;)" mortell's!' \lOuld at once stillll.llate the OB man to ans\"ler
    (if ho cou:I,d), 'Yeah, I told 'you the 8th Company of the 956th GR
    just mo-,:ed intb that aTea I . If he could ~ give ,such an answer,
    it u-,s un to hiE to find out, so he Vlent to see his pals in tho P1'I
    interrogation tG(\l1S, who 'Ciore frequellt callers, and briefed them on
    the dosired infon:::1tionagainst ,th8 time when the infantry c",ught a
    :->i80n;,r from tl:l<':i sector concerned. Radio intercepts, agent I s reo
    ,nr"i;n, inform tioll from 'pc;trols ,',nd 'deserttl"Swero sifted '"nd, by
    ,~H:mination, the gGpS in allr ltnowledgowere est{l.blished.
    In the couree of mnny conversations with G-3 personnel, missions
    rere arranged to find the m:i,ssing' items, and it 'ilas during th"," e
    talks that the phrase 1 I don't kmm' came most frequently from the
    OB man. Finally, as the time car;,3 to prepare the plans ~for the
    breakout, from, A:1Z:tO, the gaps had beon narror;od. 'I"donlt knOYi l
    had become 'I tilink so', and tbe final estimate of the f-inal esti
    mate of the sH'latiori ,;"8 publicbod.
    .
    ,
    Puzzles were plentiful - ,chiefly, that furnished by, a drunkard
    from tho 9th )"GR, 26 J'G Dj'Tision phose statements, 'under interroga
    tLm, on the movc;';~nt of his unit r1y,coda question mark on the map
    for Y'eeks.Y Jt on tJ::(l stre:Jgth m2rGly of' such' a report. it ,"auld
    have been hig\Jly dangero'.ls ,to nss;me as some did. that a Panzer
    division- h~vJ..on+.,::!'ed the line. "
    By good luck, tll" fir;',l result obtain0d Came very near t,he ,
    true pj.cture. as shown incQ ptured documents after the attack. E:ach
    sktemcnt or estimate mnde had S0::13 ovidence to support it and
    GuesserJ "~lore plainly stated to be 3'.1"h;
    Undoubtedly the most encQur,igitJg feature of the mole, phase
    ,-'as that, 'by. CO'1stant sr:appiDg of informatipn and b;y-frank discus
    sions ~'Jith all sorts of people', for example, ,battalion COl:llllanders
    and patrol leaders, some not fntellige'nce special-ists at all, it was
    pospible'to fallaH-up leads andqu'ite often, to arriVe at the cor
    roct ansrJer.
    By contrast with the jJg-saw puzzle method, outlined, above,
    at TJi.C(QUH1'lA 11e had adomomtre:ti<m of- the sudden death method.
    Eero, the origin 1;'lS a ";arning from higher hc"dquarters based on
    secret information, that the 20th Luft,laffe Division (a nel"; arrival)
    ",3 expectud to 0ppOS8 us.
    1"::thin a fo'il hours, prisoners had been
    .,)mn from almost 'every' cOJ:l::tpn,' in the one. regiment which was oper
    ,"ting in our sector and the Order of Battle picture ',Jas completed
    soc.ely from PW inter~og'ltion rJports overnight."

    .. SJ ..

    U NCLASSI FI ED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    CFJtPTER VIII - PERSONNEL


    1. The lessons prosented in the previous chanters have to do with operations
    and technique employed in fic;hting the war 'vlhilo this f1:1d ')':'lpt8~' has too do
    -;dt.h t.he individunl fip,hting rj',~n and h:i.s problecl~
    O:j(j of {lc r,':i.,jrcst lessons
    learned by the individual is th~t C0IJ"lrJ.:t1UOd disc0mfor "Li.; n-:;"t, e !\Ou8f:),k'::'"""
    requisite t.o g[lin tho status of a ')ut"'J.e-hardcnec con.bat ,~o:;i:i(Jl', T;,0 ad"ant
    ages of 0. feather bed in 0. villa over a pup..cent en the grouild arlO "onn 18<oogn
    ized as tho soldier loarns to pres ()rWl himse.Li for the period in whicc klrd
    ships are unaVOidable.
    ,il..

    Replac3mont Procedure.
    Lieutenant Colonol HfffiOLD L. 8T IPP, Headqunrters 34th Infantry
    Division.
    "Just prior to the st,"rt. of t.ho offe!lS',":,'1 to break out of the
    ANZIO Be'l.cbhead an ()ver-streagt:l of 150 officers and 750 enli~ted
    men was ass~gned to tho Diyision ine>nticip8.tion ot' fu1"i.tro lGf'ses.
    The purpose ,WetS to qeter:ni!:.3 1:co+lur this would ftlcilo.ta'c,e ):'c.pid
    repln.c8ment of br::.ttlo :.tosses ;-l21:1 t'1 dote,r'Y:::i.ne ,inet}-~e".:" cl1sh '1 mGt-hod
    of replacement rwuld bo nrnTe effGc'c,iv,~ ratllGI' ~hD.n reC:E;:i)t ai' ;;.:wall
    shipnents of green recrui+,s, Viith the resulting imme6,;,e to u:cili:OEl'
    tion in combC\t 'mits. Tho 750 onlistod. men >:ore nss'lg!l.ed G'{h".:~y to
    each infantry regimGnt ;:i th il)structions thC\t they be pl:\ced Ina",n:;.~'
    in rifle compnnies to insure battle innocubtion du:r:ing the Q(,foJls::'ve
    phasG, uoo just prior to the opsnl.ng of the offcnsi,0, inskuc;',ions
    wera issued to e'lch ragimentnl cotnmnndar to form El replacam':n+' co.:!..
    pany. Thosa replacoment co!opanies consisting of ap"roxim"t0Jy 25Q
    !Jon ,:ore withdra'.1n to regir.3nt L'').r ochelons, to bo held in redd
    inoss for L~ediate replacement of battle losses. Vhen bc.ttla losses
    occurrad, the regi::l8Ltal c cmr;u-,ndcr then drew upon his re'}lilccments,
    alwll;'s l'laintaining t.ho fiS'ht.ing stron"th of his regimont at or very
    noar tho authorized tabla of organiza.tion st"ongili.
    The extrn officors, consisting of about 40 per infantry regi
    mont, Vlor8 not a. prtrt. of tho reple,cement compc,ny but. were assigned
    to comp::tnics a.nd c..ct1:ally ntJ'+i3:Jd r.rith the companios in COrtlDc''j ..
    Th1.''!'ty "dditional offic8I'3 ino:'.uOing 20 arcillcrym3n, "Jero ,,-ssigned
    on tho basis of 5 f~:. 'J cutt<,bu; the otbor 10 being utiJ.b3d ::'n
    sorvice 01mnent.fl of '\~r:3 >:'CIL"!!~'1d -.Jt:cro thG need n.:J.d becoELo GVldo~lt.
    T110 numbor of u:Jliti,):l:,i oiY i 'lCl'S assig;:!ed to riflo cO!Jpani,)s should
    3 :frG~)~.rod,.
    ::f cr.Tlc:~v"'~_~.,'; .}~~Q i~;di~Tid'J~,l in D.ct"L:.o.l c0nb<1t for
    0. short period vlhor3 t~:J' +,~TPG of ,:tc+,l'Jn permits and then 'i.dtb-~:"a1J
    ing him to the regi'1c:~kl n,r ochelons for 'cltiliza,tion CIS loss ro
    pl~\corllB:1ts J; provGc:1. :)xt:ror,"'Jly s'].tie f;:l("toT.r and secIDGd to bo an iI::
    p:::rto.;J.t ndV[li1CG in rG:[lnc.JIDcnt p.rc,coduc.
    First, i-" is an i.w"ln'1blo 'l':'tl in tho training of roplacements
    in thGt. it providos then tr(\il'j,De ',1nd conditioning in the p:rusonco
    of bc.ttlG itself, co,:J!]on to t.he, conditions in lvhich thoy 1/ill fight.
    be 2

    (IS

    n.

    triini'".1.l'l[} --;;":""1;..,1

    ~bis by~tD:;n

    - 91

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSI FI ED

    S8condly, it :orc~\r~~d.e2 -f0T Emal..l re8erves to naintaJ.n combat

    strength and efi:ic).e:wy fc>r 'r,G'1Q:CaJ days 8rter in:i.tLtion of the

    attack .. ' vrren '-it is mest n8COG ~id!'Y t:;' r... ninta.:i.n d.r~';',9 a.nd momen-GUID.

    TtT'Cl~";~l.OU::; til] A:<:7.iCI ~~E:.ch["~e3.Q' ~:re,i}-:~..tfrf'ough a,no c oDtil!tir.~tion,


    of the, "advance -to, PI:"~~~_~ ~,dQiGloY:ial T'81>,_[j.C9~_:lel:'+,3 ':;reTe 2~tQi"1'Jd :1n
    groupe of 150 to ~-?:.j) ~ af\J E"_:b-- '::,lJ".o':!2-\;'sd '~~o regJ :~0i]'',j~, ma1.B.G0:'n :.ng
    in each anove:c-stl'ength of ?50, It is trUo th<lt i.n a'l extremely
    l'apide:dvp,.nce it is more c:if"l "'.LIt 'to maj n'tain l'epla"8ID'mt <.:o',lpanies
    2.$ such and one 01" t\:i'O mj.l1l)T broak-:J.OYinS O'JcuT.'x'ed in trH? ?r'o~cd\l.::'e.
    Tt:rou.gh ex,erience r;;.ined i.ll figLtJ~ng r~!1rl the r;l8.i.l~li~lg of opera
    tIon ofreplacm:,ent cc;np'.ni"s, it is con."i:ior})uthat a u~it of a
    tot:o.l strength of 750 enlIsted n;en, infan~"'J, attached 100 the l>i.v
    is ion, is t.he better p~.an ~)rov:..c.itlr the llecess:p"t:l overht!od J:o!'.30nnel;
    administ~~'>ati()-n f'!K1 ~.ai:r..ten~lnca eq1J.:'pment can ~G mc.de av-Hil!;;.ble t.o
    the Divis~_on Comm,.lnder... PreE.'~nt. -'r/:2 -alJ.owD,nc3S do not. perr-d.t the
    cpGr13.t:.or... aocl !taj.ll'SGhr:;.r;C{~ Q~ 'sn 1.,)Tg(3 a group a.s a sepx::'2.te unit.
    Officer persoll,")"J. J'Vf trdnine ad;ninist:'ation can be obtained from
    su:rplus a.ssi8)t'l9~l oif J_C8TS ~ i.f '~:~l]'J prr.:.n::ice of a. sur?lus i\~ t.~ ~e
    maintcd.p),1~
    F"~s~7..r ~~l1iB B,+ L~.cL.e,5 t'nit tr.e:i.."'e should be 3 replacement
    cotlp,~ni.8s - on;) d.l.lo~o.teo: to 'JnC~l :r3gL"hent..
    This provides the reg i
    me~tal.' co~~:~:.d'er 7'?5.tll .a~ OP~'?:T..U~~t;r to t?t&te m~n in a. s~c.te of
    ~3:ar ,8J:n.at'!.St:;.o:'l. ~ ~'c:=-l Cl,1g Tl,',:;' ',. :,i,.-.ll fr0sn man ,1',11.ih G:. m:::..illDr~l"D. nmount
    of .0,Q,tninj.strative det.~:,ils
    I~ p!";:; ~ ,~,. ;.:,.r' op:)Or~unity to t:;.J.in re
    plac(Jtl(mt groUps, 1.n thORO chbjec,t3 Y;L~ch are couaidoredlws t necos-..

    S8.ry for th:J.t :'egimont: "j, t. the t.i::'i.c; hO~;8or.1'3r, tbe unit r8Ir!13.71'...i!lg

    under' t,he -Divisioli COT::r.:.ant.L~rl S oentro:!.. I-c A.lso provides an op

    portunity for the men to becolYe ar'quainted with the regiment in

    .:hieh. th<;lY will ultimatClly ser-:r8."

    "It is dif:;:'ic:ll t f'or"n cf.Nee!" '.cUhout cOD;but mrporience to ta1{o


    0VG't comrflflnd of a pl;J.t.oon i~l ':: bD:!:.tlo w:!.se combat experi9nccd outfit.
    Ee ~_s subj Gct to his own dO'.-bt,' arid mis:;i7tngs- as 1',011 CLS to the
    doubts and miB~:"vir'fS of t,]:'1:"; !fl';';:l1 '.u1dGr .him.
    He may be fa.ced V"lj th tbe ~lJl'jblGln' of' taking' eomrn:"',nd of 0. rifle
    :IQ:t";"l~!f ill 0. '~i.i:13 CrJI:l:::'1.Dj .. rit,!1t in: tho' rn~.ddJG of tin ntt[l.'~k"
    His
    l~:i.'('di~f,.mol:t ~ny bo fa:!,:,tbnr .co;:~plioo.t~~d by tbo .fact t1:o.t c2.:. ~'.:"8 pnf't
    O.i:tJ~;.ri::.JJ.Y...' o ~1~~8 'Jee!'. l:''T:~tl)'l tb st[1.ff J.1("Jsitf.:::;ns or.' a Eo,l,dt:t~,~ucY.'s unit
    . ,.1.1.'.'.(-...0 L')t'rral t0nQr:,;1C./ .ti3 to" ,t:tsmpt to str~ss his !lbil~.ty by
    takinG J..:1rr{!o3.ia:~o 1::-.1'11.2,,;-1:5,,"0 in tl~f; attack;r an attitude of "iI'.j,
    sho.T-:::V.0U a'.~.l ~"~8 gryi:; '.','hr:"lt :::'1: trk.;9~. TtG rcsll.lt is gt':l1.3rally
    ono off"_clJ:' Ctl...:l";..-.a ':I~y - J.n.t~ fr '~ . ~1.~ :Jnt ly fd:i:..' ll.
    " ,";.B;amcjJ:IO~ ~~l,' 1 ~ ~'j':-') 1.;='~J.i\>~... -i .:....!(.:.::J Dom~!:~,t pL, '.toen c:x:pccir, tl "r..;'.'.l
    ri3cru~,:5I' -' t".d.:'.:.~ til~~l/ s ";1;']:( J:-~j ~3 -'-;'0 'bis" It.On - t.o p:::rson~:.ll:Y' bo the

    fhct Ir,np '';0 jomjlouT, - snd he,d the:issaul:t of tI:o r0gil,).JI;t on Hill
    ~ Ump cy .,:'JmrJ i."
    . '~ "
    ~-:..,~
    .:'~0 ::':i~?Cr:t.Llg ~-.i!1i 1/';, to '0,::3 Er:1.Jt1 :;.s ho is nnd qs SCJ.rod ns
    hq '. i~h L'(7. ~'1il!. . bo h;:>/t;ing "tJ:,:; g~outl.d overy tiFO he hears r:. srel1
    :g') over:,un~il.somCi b-"ck ",:c':'.v:te ~ c;isu:tlly ffi~ntior.s "It's OK Lieu
    ,tCinant'-.thoso o.~'e cn:.'6 '~s':.'r". "';J:" to 'gl'Get Jorry", Fell' bottor

    - 92

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    lot. hi;:;J. .... 'trl,ko' '1 df)Op br..::;:..;th - ST"'11!_O',i ha.rd for fi,re mtlutos
    forgot all the sal'~ting - 8.nci Gating outs and ohm,ings - ho usod to
    bo so good CIt hick in th,; Skt.os - Gnd tknk tho Ind. Lot him find
    out nho ~mcnf{ tis n0:1-C()[1S [:'-""': thn most combat exporienco - '1:;ld
    loetrn U.oir sscr ,t.s. l~iYJ t!'om fn:}. ~'. - donI t bo :.fraid to
    t:J.::o and ask th',,:'.r ,~dv:'.c:,.Donl t try to' be ::1 ;:orld buettor - tho
    first for'! dnys" - tl.ke it o,:.~.sy - .~Sk 3 lot of quest.ions ~1nd leo.rn ns
    f.:'.i'.n::r <111Sr,''Jrs n,s po::wiblc. V,fit;1 luc1'" on his sido ho m~J,y -l".st th(j r.:ook
    out. If ho le.st" tho r:cck - he; 7:Hl h::w suuneno.ugh- lo.wned
    onough - md d 0l'.O onough - :en U [l O,1n nn.tur'll ':lay - to c;,rry him
    tLrnugh - from then on ind'Jf',.ni:':ol;'."

    h. BQl:l:tc~J;1ont Trdl!1..::lli.. P'J,'crts 1.)Cdic"\tG thC\trop1'1comonts, ,~1~hough


    improving, still nro mt .:. C"'083 s'lction 'of the rr:::m brougH, j.ntci the'servico.
    They frequently are in n lO'.;or AG c1~ssL'i.c:.ltiGn tost scoring bracket und do not
    mer.sure up to thG'lbov~ :\vcr"'\c'9 phyric'll sknd'lrd "'.'hieh should be Cl requirerrdint
    for nIl infantry units. All t.oo frc.q'c.r.'~" ",};L pJ.'lCC)S 'C.D ,\dlliticmnl burden on
    platoon lC~1.dD;r.s and nO.'1-co!!l:ni.ss'ic,ned offi.ce:!';.:; aD L~,jl1 o'f thij co.libGr do .llQ..~
    nlnays ho.vC! nn 3gg?~sive iT'1.ti~:.""..:.jVl; -y .rl J"'L~'::;_lt:j jon e'XcDsSivG c'lsu.'.ltit..:.s. In the
    maj 6rity 'of c~,~sop t}:lG unJ.Y trDJ.ning l::,c),:~.r~g is l}~,:~tlG ox"qorionco.. Ho', \;::vor nn
    excessive 'lcunCirity profoss' ignor:'lnce in U", nso of 'cGrtrcin \'Ie:lpcns. I t is the
    concensus of'o: ~nion of but-tl,} tr'5n,,(~' I..'Ji;1 II ,.itl-vconsider:1bleexpurio!1Co
    th'1t 'men 'lssignod to 'ln in',.mtry cor.;?,,,,::; ,,",u,s' bo [lolo t,) US} everT VI3'lPOn Clssigned
    to the compnl'\Y :lfJ they YJill be, :;orc~d j.nt.c " ~osition in "hich ttoy :nust use them
    sooner or b.tor.

    "I have foqnd tl:."lt recant rBP1ccc8::>onta lack s'.lfficient kwmledgll


    of :1\.1:r,cr;-;-: t ic ,:-:o':l.pO~G. T~.! 'i -::' .,:~E. ~ S ::. V..Jr:! irrlportant t;":;npon ':nd shaulj
    be Gtr'JssG~ 5.n bt~sic tra:1.n~ ::f~. :-7()ct replacements doni t h6.vG tho.
    sliChtost id3a of hOff "- !"ifl" cn,ck sowlds ;.;hon firod in his dir
    ection. Gormnn '.7crt~On~ oh-..'!.':. k~0. -:~sDd for this typo of trtlining
    so t}-~,.'l.t tho' indlvid'J.'-l.I 8()2->:'~':"~.'r (:0.n 6J<:'1+~~"'--'5sh thorn by sound, In
    oth-~r wcrds tr').i!:.icg s}wl.l.ld ~.nfJlc;dc ::::jre of battlo drills ~lith over
    hoced firiJJg.
    Lc.st bqt not '.GtRt, Ul0Y tuv.J D.'. ie!laonc,r t.o bunch up on thG
    mcrch or othu!' ;;'or:r:n.ticn,J. \1

    PrivdG First Chss DA!iIEI, R. BI.J;CK, 1?3:rd Inf~ntry.


    PrivntG First Cli.ss OLENN Ii. LtJ''E, 133rd b:::1ntry.
    lIi;.1":'.ny ot- thJ'-rri,jn that Cf):-.!C: t.,,, thi.s' COID:pc..~J t::'.:..J'o novor firtad the
    RHle'Grollade, Thuy sh'nld bo 1I'.e.deto firo t.his Vie~'0ori ~efor() ..
    boil1g ;3c~t. to co.mb .It! "units'.
    C?lC th1ng tl-! ... t is V~;T/ 5.rr:pr:-rtant in copb-:1t, is m::.p '1nd compass
    :Gc,di:?[C. Tho' inf'1l1trjronhccnllunt 'do6s not ge1J 'enough 'of this

    ':,r,dm.ng.
    - 93

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Fil-st Lieutenn.nt DONAW C. JCJ!NSONj 1:;5th Infantry.


    First LieutelJant CLIPTON 1I. FARNUN, 1.35th Infantry.
    "Thera is not enough training given for scouting. It takes a
    brave quick thinkltJg l!nrl'to be a ~oodscout." 'l'he type of men Vlhiob
    we are l'eceiving as' repl,'lcemontsnt present are very poor. It, seelIlll
    that fI'Xll"YlDan th.. . t is incompetQl)t in other type units is put in
    the ini'abtry. lM,1I r~lllts in the high percentage in ctUlUalties
    nmong platoon leaders and good non-e6mmissioned officers. The
    Plntoon Leader has ~o be first scout and also lead these rcplaoo~
    ments up to n fighting posit:J.on persoon'J.y or they seem to d:J.eappear
    nbout the t1ine you need them most. Half' of II\?' platoon at present
    has hnd different trainL~ 'than that of an infantry rifle company."
    First Lieutennnt ROBERT LOOER, 1.33rd Infantry.

    "All men in the squad ~ould be ,given an opportunity in train


    ing to lend the sqund. 'I'he replacement private of today is the
    hUO of tomorrow 'in cOr.lbat."

    k M9];;:W? It is believed that the \'Iord 'IDOrale' is the, most miil~used


    in the olTicta;L language of the U.S. Io.'rmy. 'today. Actually it is far more than '
    the
    snows. and do~hnuts,the 1<ord scums. to bring to mind. It is confi
    dence in seI:r, ~it esprit, apd a 17iH ,tocarrJ out orders all bound together
    by 1lll.pEll'io:r leadership. The former should 'b" properly called cntertaill!llent
    and haB its proPGr place as a modiua to role,x the individut:\l thus simplifying
    tho installc.tion of a high st'lte of morale. It is w(,ll to note that in vietory,
    h017ever su,.ll. the engagement, morale is highest, uhile in defeat it !S at its
    lowest ebb.
    '
    '

    u.s.o..

    SOllond Lieutclll\nt l'WY L. HUMPll!UYS' JR, 135th Infantry.,


    "There has been a lot written about morale since tho-startef
    this uar.
    I've seen the effoot ot U.S.O. shows, mail, food, etc,. ThGse
    aro all big items but the larg<lst factor in combat is leadership;
    eepecialJ.y that diBpl~yed by platoon leaders and IDO's.
    .
    an the front'there arc innumerabie diffioulties auch as bad
    , \'leather,' poor food, ~nd long m:lTches to mention a fGlw~ '. Y/l1en rl unit
    has baen on the line ~or a long time these' thip~s grow in importance,
    teadoo:-s, muat be ongunrd :and 1IIUSt nOt allorl thoir men to believe
    that they are getting a rrlTI deal 11
    ..
    ,
    Ii' the loaders can instill in their men an aggresBive spirit
    and maintain strict diBoitlline' thro\U!hout the cam'Paign they ..ill
    find the morale of their inen lot higher when the campaign nears
    a oonclus:!.on."

    g.

    Appointment. Promoti,lO, Al7nrds and

    Recl,o.s"ifi~ation.

    Lieutenant Colonel HARom L. ST!PP, Hendqual'ters 34th Infantry


    Division.
    " '
    ,

    ot

    "Enlillted men appoint.eq office:rs on the field ot battle because


    oute tanding performnnce of combat duties, have proved far more
    "

    94 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    competent than replacemont oficer~ recoived. This iSl;lot due to


    lack of ability in malW Meoa of replacement officers, but due to
    lack of experience ,'which can 'onlY' be gained On the battlefield.
    Reportl3 indicate that men are far more w:l.lling to folloTi battle tried
    enlisted men who are commissiotled, than a new replacement officer.
    Reported confidOOOe in lenders gained. frcm this source proves th",,'\'.
    fighting efficienoy of the small front line elements is ~catly "
    improved. E:l1:parience w,ithin this CO!lll1lll.nd has proven that no bc.tt,lc
    field appointeeh~s ever been re-classified for inefficiency or 'in
    experience. rlhile this is not trUG of officer replaoemonts received
    through normal, replacGment ohannels.
    There are a number or instances in which privates, prc's, and
    t.ho lower grade non-commissioned Officers are holdinl:l' down positions
    'Ihich c!l11 for o.\1igher grade Il,!ld that they havii' dOn.a so to7,' con
    sidorable periods of time. due, mainly to personnel of'the proPer
    grndE> beil)S rotllj,ned on the rolls of tho organiz:ltion lihile not
    nctUilUy present. This is belioved to b8 dUe to long term hosp~
    italizo.tior1, faiLtt'e to fill rob.tj.on '''::'Qanoi06, a)ld personnel on
    temporary duty to the Unit3d 6t'ites under the fUrlough policy. '
    This situ.':1'\;io)1 creates a sonse of unjustness when it occurs for a
    protracted period, also Q. l!Jenseof f:ltilitY' in th"t they perfol'ln
    their job under extremely h"z!l:,dr,IlS conditions yot oannot obtain
    the TC1'InTd fOT it. ));ru:isted personnel in front line elements are
    extremely con8cio'~s of this, and. it is believed th~,t general effici...
    onoy could be promoted by ost(\bl~Ung 'lsystem in uhich theso vacanw
    eies OOllld be fillod in Cl rOc)'s')r,e,bly .s1101"t time.
    601\10 roports received ;"nC!.io~,te (\ feeling th'lt an insufficient
    number of awards and deeoT,,:ti~!ls ',ro boing presol+ted to dosorving
    porsonn01. 4feel:i.ng hels ocr.mrred that meritorious awards are re
    jected because of teohnicc.l;l.tJ.es ar-d thl. t t,,,>o r".,Ilny reoommendations of
    n~ iU'i[ll'd 'are being rodUloo to 1GS Bel' ''lw~ds by tpe he C1aquarters
    ~"uthorized to'pc.Sl! an these matters. ' This. tendellcy ill often common
    to tho individual ';:hen not' eOl'lllideted in the lig;rt of the uhole
    co.mmand. It h'ls pOSSibly been true dthin this OO!lll1lll.nd to some
    extont. ~J!:treme a:(,:(,orts hwe peen exerted to oV'erO'Ollle' this' feel.
    ing, More and more awards I)ro boir,g oonsidered. and In9re and mo.re
    granted as time ~sscs. It has beon fo.ur~ necGssa~ to. inaugurate
    intensive selling, c,'lrtlpaigns to in~urc th'lt j)ersonnel ,of the command
    observe acts of hel'oism and make o.ppropl'ia"',e reconur'3nd'ltiollS. This
    campaign has rss\llted in llnUY f.\.\la:rds th::lt 'i/ould othorwil!e net have
    come t.o light~
    ,
    In ordorto. ,1e1d an effic~a."lt f~"ght~ ,1ln:!.t, thos", who arain~
    effectivo, IlIedioo:re, nOIll-agrsrJssiva, .,o.~~w;i:t,Jio~t' prqfessional !mo\1
    l(Jdge, must beel1Jll1nat'ild . ,Repo:t"CI1, $'oc9h~ed, !:rom bot.h offioer~, and
    men bnvo ISt:r;el:tsoo th1s 'p<'1int, and. believ~,t{lnt . a", mol'o liberal. sY'stem,
    of eliminating the t:'Pe Of o::t:icor ''ll:!9v~,:i:'Qf:ei':i:'ecFtol be ina.ugm'atad.
    It. is furth~ tb!;l concensus' of opi::d,cl'l~ c,,;>t' rQolas5!ific~t:\.on shoUld
    not qo.; USeda8 apUn:b!bmant, ':ihien ;it is g~kara!;Ly believed to bo~
    but' as Il method of. elilllitiation.f::;omthepO<\l1:tion' iO'i7hiob they can\,
    nail fill r,nd pla,cel!leot in one t.ha:t, they are a):ih .to handle. Howover,
    it iSa ~thel' opinioli\ th"t. they IIho~, ~ot1;le, given ISOW jobs Iln

    - -;5 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    rear echelons and oermittcd the advantages of rapid promotion.


    As in the cas; of' ofi'icars '" syetom should be esto.l:ll1a8Gd
    by ~hich misfits, incompetents, those ~ho haye let do~n beca~O of
    cxtreltlGly long periods in nct,ivo ,combat, can be rec.ssigncd to non..
    combatant units, eliminatod from the service, or other disposition
    mc.de of them, upon a recommendation of !l1dt 'commanderS concorned~
    This u111 insure a ~ximum efficiency in the front lines, creating
    greater drive and follow-through, resulting in the taking of ob
    jectives with less casualties. Thls has long been a fault in combat
    el()ments in which no adeqUate answer has yet been found and shout
    which tl1ere :l,s constant compla!nt and oriticism."

    - - - ....

    FIlfIS

    96 ..

    UNCLASSIFIED

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