Inkel v. Conn 421 F. Supp. 2d 513
Inkel v. Conn 421 F. Supp. 2d 513
Inkel v. Conn 421 F. Supp. 2d 513
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421 F.Supp.2d 513
(Cite as: 421 F.Supp.2d 513)
[1] Federal Courts 170B 265 [2] Federal Courts 170B 269
erly train their employees concerning entry into Robert William Clark, M.J. McCarthy, Attorney
private residence to pursue abuse or neglect invest- General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
igation, despite allegations that state trooper had
improperly threatened landlord to permit search,
that agency employees told another landlord that RULING AND ORDER [DOCS. 50, 80, 92, 93,
parents were drug addicts and child abusers, and 102]
that agency employees caused police to enter home
without judicial authority, where trooper was not ARTERTON, District Judge.
trained or supervised by DCF or DSS, employees'
visit did not unlawfully interfere with parents' rela- Pro se plaintiffs Phillip Inkel and Meredith LaBella
tionship with their children, and there was no evid- bring this action on behalf of themselves and their
ence that agency personnel instructed or were eight minor children, alleging violations of their
trained to condone police damage to property dur- constitutional rights in connection with certain state
ing course of search or child protection home visit. child welfare proceedings and investigations and
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. actions by the Connecticut Department of Children
and Families (“D.C.F.”) and Department of Social
[15] Infants 211 17 Services (“D.S.S.”) relating to those proceedings.
Defendants, the Commissioners of D.C.F. and
211 Infants D.S.S. and D.C.F. employees, have moved to dis-
211II Protection miss the complaint, and, for the reasons that follow,
211k17 k. Societies, Agencies, and Officers their motions will be granted.
in General. Most Cited Cases
State child welfare officials did not unlawfully in-
terfere with parents' constitutional right to care, I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
custody, and control of their children by bringing GROUND
child neglect proceedings against parents, where ju-
Plaintiffs' original complaint was filed in forma
venile courts upheld temporary custody of children
pauperis in January 2004. On October 19, 2004,
on grounds of likelihood of abuse, neglect, or aban-
this Court issued a ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
donment, and parents alleged no facts that would
1915(e)(2)(B), [Doc. # 30], dismissing some of the
have led to different result.
claims and defendants. Plaintiffs were instructed to
[16] Infants 211 17 file an amended complaint and serve the remaining
defendants. The Amended Complaint was filed
211 Infants January 12, 2005 [Doc. # 54], and service on the
211II Protection original defendants*516 as well as some additional
211k17 k. Societies, Agencies, and Officers defendants appears to have been completed in June
in General. Most Cited Cases 2005. The majority of the defendants moved to dis-
State department of children and families (DCF) miss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and
was not liable for alleged abuse of children by 12(b)(6), [Docs. 93-94], and then Patricia Wilson-
foster parents, absent allegation that agency offi- Coker, the Commissioner of D.S.S., subsequently
cials knew or should have known of any abuse per- moved to dismiss on the same grounds. [Docs.
petrated by foster parents, or of any ongoing pattern 102-103]. Plaintiffs then filed an objection to the
of abuse by foster parents. motion to dismiss. [Doc. # 104].
*515 Phillip Inkel, East Haddam, CT, Pro se.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) alleges
Meredith Labella, East Haddam, CT, Pro se. the following facts, which will be accepted as true
for the purpose of ruling on the motions to dismiss. further conspired to intimidate and extort compli-
On March 10, 1999, defendants Wax and Barber, ance and authorization from Meredith LaBella to”
employees of D.C.F., acting on allegedly false in- administer medications to Aaron Baker. Id. ¶ 22.
formation from a witness named Timothy Baker These D.C.F. personnel further refused “voluntary
that Phillip Inkel assaulted Aaron Baker, inter- placement” for Aaron Baker, and submitted “false
viewed Meredith LaBella and threatened her that if petitions and affidavits” with the Superior Court for
she did not force Phillip Inkel to move out of the Juvenile Matters at Waterford, Connecticut, for an
family home, D.C.F. would take custody of her order of temporary custody for the child. Id. ¶¶
children. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4. Since then, “D.C.F. Ra- 24-25. LaBella alleges she was never served with
gaglia, Wax and Barber made good on their threats an order to show cause concerning this matter, and
... D.C.F. has repetively [sic] created false reports, that a state Marshall, not a party to this action, fals-
false petitions, have initiated malicious prosecu- ified a return of service. Id. ¶ 26. The order of tem-
tions, gained wrongful judicial orders, miscarriages porary custody was granted on April 5, 2002, and
of justice, have assaulted the family, broken into on that date “D.C.F. abducted Aaron Baker from
the family's homes on multiple occasions, s [ei]zed I.O.L. and placed him to a place unknown ....” Id. ¶
their children, abused the children while in D.C.F. 27-28.
custody, neglected the children and have acquired
false medical diagnos[e]s and false medical treat- LaBella alleges she then contacted the office of
ment plans without due process of law.” Id. ¶ 5. former Governor Rowland, whose staff “directed
Plaintiffs allege that in April 1999 defendants Wax D.S.S. and D.C.F. with the cooperation of the Con-
and Snow filed false affidavits and reports in Con- necticut Superior Court for Child Support enforce-
necticut juvenile court in an attempt to put ment to imprison and hold incommunica[d]o ...
plaintiffs Aaron and Abigail Baker in D.C.F. cus- Phillip Inkel without any meaningful due process of
tody. Id. ¶ 7. law.” Id. ¶ 32.
office in Norwich, Connecticut, Alexander Inkel a hammer and back his car into the Inkels' van,
was denied access to a bathroom by D.C.F. causing whereupon, in response to the sound of the car
him to urinate in his pants. Alexander Inkel has crash, *519 Meredith LaBella “ran down the stairs,
been potty trained since age 2 1/2 and has not had slipped and fell” and hurt her ankle. Id.
an accident in his pants until his removal from the
Inkel parents' home. Alexander now wears diapers In November 2003 another search by defendants
where he has not worn diapers in over 1 1/2 years.” Lenney and Corsini and unnamed state troopers res-
Id. ¶ 77. ulted in plaintiffs' eviction from their home after
defendants told their landlady that plaintiffs “are
LaBella also alleges that Andrew and Alexander drug addicts and that Phillip Inkel had sexually ab-
Inkel and Abigail and Aaron Baker were coached used Aaron Baker.” Id. ¶ 56.
by defendant Lenney and others to say “that their
mother Meredith LaBella Inkel is mean and rude.” In May 2004 defendants Lenney and Suroviak and
Id. ¶ 75. an unidentified state trooper went to the Inkel's new
home “and demanded entry, without a warrant....”
Id. ¶ 63. The landlord refused, and the state trooper
C. Searches of Family's Home “ speaking on behalf of himself and D.C.F.
threatened [the landlord] that if entry was refused
Plaintiffs allege several unlawful searches of their
then the state trooper would come back with more
various residences between 2002 and the present.
state troopers and ‘make this place look like Bag-
First, as discussed above, in August 2002, certain
dad [sic].’ ” Id. The landlord then permitted a
defendants allegedly caused the police to enter
search of the Inkels' bedrooms. Id.
plaintiffs' home, in connection with Aaron Baker's
custody proceedings, and to cause property damage. On October 5, 2004, defendant Suroviak, another
Id. ¶ 35. In February 2003, plaintiffs allege another D.C.F. agent and law enforcement agents went to
search occurred “under the direction of Darlene the Inkels' home to conduct an evaluation that res-
Dunbar, Susan Wax” and unnamed D.C.F. agents. ulted in the committal of Alexander, Anastasia and
Id. ¶ 57. Plaintiffs allege that the agents searched Andrew Inkel to the custody of D.C.F., id. ¶ 64, but
the property at 95 Stanavage Road, Colchester, plaintiffs do not specify the circumstances they be-
“because they were very concerned about the Inkel lieve rendered this home visit unlawful.
children. On one such occasion [a state trooper]
drew his pistol while searching for the Inkels just
moments after he was ordered to leave the property D. Claims and Relief Sought
for the fourth time that day.” Id. ¶ 57. Also in Feb-
Plaintiffs allege that the various defendants have
ruary 2003, D.C.F. made disparaging remarks about
conspired to violate their civil rights, committed
the Inkels to a “mentally unstable” individual who
“larceny by defrauding the public,” “racketeering,”
lived at the same 95 Stanavage Road address, caus-
perjury, witness tampering, obstruction of justice,
ing this individual to threaten Phillip Inkel's safety.
“misprisons of felonies,” and have “kidnaped [sic]”
Id. ¶ 59.
the children. Compl. ¶ 78-82. They also allege that
Plaintiffs also allege that “it is believed that D.C.F. defendants “[Wilson-]Coker, Ragaglia, Dunbar and
told Timothy Baker,” presumably the biological Chief Court Administrator Joseph Pel[l]igrino have
father of Aaron Baker, “a mentally unstable and vi- caused, condoned, required, authorized, impliedly
olent person, that Phillip Inkel sexually assaulted authorized the unlawful conduct and constitutional
Aaron Baker.” Id. ¶ 61. This information allegedly deprivations described in this complaint by failing
caused Timothy Baker to threaten Phillip Inkel with to train, monitor, supervise, discipline ... and
through direct participation, control and authoriza- Defendants move to dismiss the various aspects of
tion of the described unlawful conduct.” Id. ¶ 83. the complaint on a number of grounds, including
failure to state a claim, sovereign immunity, quasi-
Plaintiffs seek “an injunction against the defendants prosecutorial immunity, witness immunity, statute
ordering them to opperate [sic] lawfully, effectively of limitations, lack of personal involvement in the
and consistent with the scope of their respective au- events alleged, and failure to serve certain defend-
thorities” and ceasing “the unlawfull [sic] conduct ants.
described in the body of [the] complaint.” They
also seek compensatory and punitive damages,
FN1 A. Racketeering Claims
costs, and attorney fees.
FN1. The Inkels are appearing pro se. This Court previously held in its Ruling Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), [Doc. # 30] at 9-10, that
plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient to state a civil
II. STANDARD RICO claim. Plaintiffs' current complaint adds no
new factual allegations that would support a claim
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.
of the existence of a racketeering enterprise or a
12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded
pattern of racketeering activity, and therefore all
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
claims for racketeering or racketeering conspiracy
inferences in favor of the pleader. Hishon v. King &
will be dismissed for the reasons stated in the
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81
Court's previous Ruling.
L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.1991). To survive the
motion, the plaintiffs must set forth “ ‘a short and B. Service on Defendants Hetu and Corsini
plain statement of the claim’ that will give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is Despite several extensions of time to do so,
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. plaintiffs have not served Defendant Hetu, and all
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 claims against him therefore will be dismissed. The
(1957) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Swi- record contains no return of service for Defendant
erkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. Corsini, but she has appeared through counsel in
992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). A “complaint should her official capacity. See Appearance [Doc. # 90].
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it Any claims against her in her individual capacity
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove will be dismissed.
no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 C. Section 1983 Claims Arising Prior to 2001
S.Ct. 99 (footnote omitted); see also Jaghory v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d As this Court held in its previous Ruling, the statute
Cir.1997). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will of limitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is en- See Ruling at 13. Thus any of plaintiffs' claims
titled to *520 offer evidence to support the claims. arising prior to January 15, 2001, three years before
Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings the initiation of this lawsuit, are time barred. Spe-
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that cifically, all claims relating to the actions of de-
is not the test.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, fendants Ragaglia, Wax, Barber and Snow arising
236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). from the March 1999 investigation concerning
Aaron Baker are dismissed. Because the only
claims against Barber and Snow stem from this in-
III. DISCUSSION
cident, these two defendants must be dismissed F. Damages Claims Against Judge Pellegrino
from the case.
Plaintiffs have sued Judge Pellegrino, Chief Ad-
ministrator of the Connecticut Courts, in his official
D. Claims Against D.C.F. and D.S.S. and personal capacities. Reading the complaint in
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it appears that
[1][2] The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for in-
the only allegations against Judge Pellegrino stem
junctive or declaratory relief and damages against a
from his supervisory role over several Superior
State or an arm of a State, unless the State specific-
Court judges who have ruled against the Inkel par-
ally waives or Congress abrogates its sovereign im-
ents concerning various child protection matters.
munity. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91, 102
Plaintiffs thus appear to allege that Judge Pel-
S.Ct. 2325, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); Edelman v.
legrino has failed to properly supervise these other
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-69, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39
judges and thereby has permitted these judges by
L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
their rulings to deprive the Inkels of their rights in
10-11, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Mancuso
the course of juvenile court hearings. See Compl. ¶
v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d
82-83.
Cir.1996); Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v.
Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1993). It cannot be [3][4] “Judges enjoy absolute immunity from per-
disputed that the Connecticut Department of Chil- sonal liability for ‘acts committed within their judi-
dren and Families and Department of Social Ser- cial jurisdiction.’ ” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51
vices are arms of the state. Plaintiffs have asserted (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
no causes of action under which it could be found 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)); see
that the State has waived, or Congress has abrog- FN2
also Ruling [Doc. # 30] at 20. Plaintiffs' claims
ated, its sovereign immunity. Therefore all claims for damages against Judge Pellegrino, which are
against D.C.F. and D.S.S. as state agencies are dis- addressed to the substance of family court rulings
missed. issued by other judges, must be dismissed because
they are within “judicial jurisdiction.”
E. Claims of Harm by Third Parties
FN2. There is no absolute judicial im-
As defendants argue, any claims for damages munity from prospective injunctive relief.
arising out of actions by individuals who are not Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42,
named as defendants must be dismissed. Thus, the 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984).
claims involving law enforcement officers who par-
ticipated *521 in searches of the Inkels' home will G. Damages Claims Arising from False Testi-
be dismissed. The allegations against individual mony
D.C.F. workers, state court employees, marshalls,
judges, and attorneys who are not named as defend- Plaintiffs claim that the orders of temporary cus-
ants also must be dismissed. Any claims for harm tody that were entered for Aaron Baker (April
due to the actions of Timothy Baker, the allegedly 2002), Abigail Baker (November 2003), and Ana-
mentally unstable individual who attempted to as- stasia, Alexander, and Andrew Inkel (October
sault Phillip Inkel and damaged his car, are like- 2004), were obtained by fraud and false testimony
wise dismissed. Finally, any claims for harm per- presented by D.C.F. employees and accepted and
petrated against the children by their foster parents condoned by defendants Pellegrino and Pisani, a
will be dismissed, as those individuals are not deputy clerk for the Connecticut Superior Court for
named defendants. Juvenile Matters at Waterford. Defendants argue
that claims arising out of false testimony or false court determined the issues before it erroneously.
affidavits are barred by the Rooker- Feldman doc- Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107
trine, and the Court agrees. S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (plurality op.);
Ashton v. Cafero, 920 F.Supp. 35, 37
[5] The Rooker- Feldman abstention doctrine holds (D.Conn.1996).
that “federal district courts do not have jurisdiction
over claims that have already been decided, or that [7][8] “Rooker-Feldman applies not only to de-
are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues that have cisions of the highest state courts, but also to de-
already been decided, by a state court.” Mitchell v. cisions of lower state courts.” Ashton, 920 F.Supp.
Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting at 37 (citing Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc.
Bridgewater Operating Corp. v. Feldstein, 346 F.3d Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep't, 973
27, 29 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam)). See generally F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.1992)). It applies to
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, “challenges to final and interlocutory state court
460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 decisions.” Id. (emphasis added).
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Thus, the [9] Here, plaintiffs' claims that D.C.F. personnel
“Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the lower submitted false evidence and thereby obtained un-
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a warranted orders of temporary custody over the
case if the exercise of jurisdiction over that case children are “inextricably intertwined” with the ju-
would result in the reversal or modification of a venile court proceedings themselves. The state
state court judgment.” Hachamovitch v. DeBuono, court judges who issued the custody orders evid-
159 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir.1998). The doctrine ently credited the information presented by D.C.F.
“holds that, among federal courts, only the Supreme Plaintiffs now ask this Court to second-guess the
Court has subject*522 matter jurisdiction to review state courts' factual and credibility findings.
state court judgments.” Johnson v. Smithsonian Plaintiffs' remedy for an incorrect or unfair juvenile
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir.1999) (citations court decision is to appeal that decision to higher
omitted). state courts, not to seek federal court intervention
by way of a civil rights action. Therefore any
[6] Additionally, the doctrine “bars federal courts claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to
from considering claims that are inextricably inter- the submission of false testimony or information to
twined with a prior state court determination.” Id. at state court must be dismissed.
185 (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “the Supreme
H. Vexatious Litigation
Court's use of ‘inextricably intertwined’ means, at a
minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an op- [10] Alternatively, to the extent that plaintiffs in-
portunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding (as tend to assert a common-law tort claim for vexa-
either the plaintiff or defendant in that proceeding), tious litigation by their allegations that D.C.F.
subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred un- workers submitted false evidence to the juvenile
der the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be courts, this claim must fail on the merits. “In a ma-
barred under the principles of preclusion.” Moccio licious prosecution or vexatious litigation action, it
v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, is necessary to prove want of probable cause,
199-200 (2d Cir.1996). Stated another way, a feder- malice and a termination of the suit in the plaintiffs'
al claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state favor..... It must ... appear that the litigation
court judgment if the relief sought may be granted claimed to be vexatious terminated in some way fa-
only on the federal court's finding that the state vorable to the defendant therein.” QSP, Inc. v. Aet-
na Cas. and Sur. Co., 256 Conn. 343, 361 773 A.2d plaintiffs and therefore all claims against them must
906, 918 (Conn.2001) (internal quotation marks, be dismissed. However, as the Second Circuit has
citations and alterations omitted). held,
[11] Here, plaintiffs cannot show that any of the ju- A defendant may be personally involved in a con-
venile court proceedings terminated in their favor. stitutional deprivation within the meaning of 42
Rather, in each proceeding, the state court found by U.S.C. § 1983 in several ways. The defendant
a preponderance of the evidence that an order of may have directly participated in the infraction.
temporary custody of the children was necessary A supervisory official, after learning of the viola-
and would be continued for some period of time. tion through a report or appeal, may have failed
see Def. Mem. of Law at 16 & Ex. C, D. Although, to remedy the wrong. A supervisory official may
as defendants indicate, id. at 16 & Ex. B, Anastasia, be liable because he or she created a policy or
Alexander and Andrew were returned to their par- custom under which unconstitutional practices
ents in May 2005, this decision was made on the occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to
basis of changed circumstances in the family home, continue. Lastly, a supervisory official may be
and it did not *523 imply reversal of the initial de- personally liable if he or she was grossly negli-
termination that temporary D.C.F. custody was gent in managing subordinates who caused the
warranted in October 2004. Thus any tort claim for unlawful condition or event.
vexatious litigation must be dismissed.
Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d
Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). Therefore the
I. Claims for Damages Against Commissioners fact that the Commissioners were not personally in-
Ragaglia, Dunbar and Wilson-Coker volved in decisions concerning the placement of the
Inkel children is not dispositive. Construing the
As defendants note, Kristine Ragaglia no longer is
complaint in plaintiffs' favor, they also allege that
the Commissioner of D.C.F., Def. Mem. of Law
these defendants failed to adequately train and su-
[Doc. # 94] at 17, and therefore she no longer may
pervise the caseworker defendants and created a
be sued in her official capacity. Defendant Dunbar
policy or custom in which caseworkers would
is the current Commissioner of D.C.F. and Defend-
routinely falsify court records, testimony, and other
ant Wilson-Coker is the Commissioner of D.S.S.
documents, and enter homes without proper author-
They are sued in their individual and official capa-
ization.
cities.
[12] The Second Circuit has established a three-
Construing the complaint in a light most favorable
prong test for determining whether an official is li-
to plaintiffs, their claim that “[Wilson-]Coker, Ra-
able for failing to train or supervise his or her em-
gaglia, [and] Dunbar have caused, condoned, re-
ployees. The plaintiff must show that: (1) “a policy-
quired, authorized, impliedly authorized the unlaw-
maker knows ‘to a moral certainty’ that her em-
ful conduct and constitutional deprivations de-
ployees will confront a given situation;” (2) “the
scribed in this complaint by failing to train, monit-
situation either presents the employee with a diffi-
or, supervise, discipline” the other defendants,
cult choice of the sort that training or supervision
Compl. ¶ 83, will be read to allege a § 1983 claim
will make less difficult or that there is a history of
for failing to properly train and supervise the case-
employees mishandling the situation;” and (3) “the
workers who were involved with the Inkel family.
wrong choice by [an] employee will frequently
The Commissioners argue that they were not per- cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional
sonally involved in the harms allegedly caused to rights.” Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293,
297-98 (2d Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted).
Fourth, the plaintiff must show that the alleged fail- dangerous conditions-namely an unsecured, loaded
ure to train or supervise caused the plaintiff's in- shotgun and a knife as well as a gas camping stove-
jury. Id. at 298. in locations in the Inkels' home where they could
have harmed these three children, who were ages 4,
Here, reading the complaint in the light most favor- 33 months, and 11 months at the time. See Mem. of
able to plaintiffs, it can be assumed that they have Decision, 12/15/04, Def. Ex. C. On January 21,
made out the first three elements. They have al- 2003, Judge Driscoll issued a written decision after
leged facts from which it can be inferred that trial committing Aaron to D.C.F. custody “until fur-
D.C.F. and D.S.S. knew that their workers would ther court order” due to Meredith LaBella's unwill-
*524 confront situations in which child abuse or ingness to care for him at home on the terms re-
neglect has been alleged and they are put in a posi- commended by the Institute of Living, and the fact
tion of investigating the allegations and presenting that she visited him only once in the nine months
the results of those investigations to the juvenile since D.C.F. had obtained the order of temporary
court. Second, the determination of whether a child custody over him. The judge also noted Aaron's
is at risk in his or her current living situation or “intense dislike for and distrust of Phillip....” Mem.
placement could present a difficult decision or of Decision, 1/21/03, Def. Ex. D. Plaintiffs also
choice of whether D.C.F. should seek an order of state in their complaint that Phillip Inkel was ac-
temporary custody or attempt to remedy any child cused of sexually abusing Aaron and that Meredith
protection concerns in some less drastic way. Third, LaBella refused to cooperate in Aaron's mental
an erroneous decision carries with it a likelihood health treatment because she refused to authorize
that the parents of a child who is placed involuntar- administration of anti-depressants or any D.C.F. in-
ily with D.C.F. could be deprived of constitutional volvement with the family at all.
rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120
S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (“[T]he interest Plaintiffs also allege that they left Abigail Baker in
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their the care of her grandmother for an extended period
children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental of time, which apparently eventually led to D.C.F.
liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] involvement in her case as well. As is evident from
Court.”). Judge Taylor's decision, as of the time the com-
plaint was filed in this case, Abigail remained with
[13] However, plaintiffs have not alleged facts from her grandmother after D.C.F. obtained an order of
which it could be inferred that any failure of train- temporary custody over her.
ing or supervision on the part of these defendants
caused plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Plaintiffs state Reading the complaint in the light most favorable
that D.C.F. workers submitted “false” information to the pleaders, plaintiffs do not allege the existence
to the courts, but they do not specify the content of of any information they believe D.C.F. should have
this “false” information. The complaint makes no considered and provided to the juvenile courts that
allegation that the minor plaintiffs were not aban- would have resulted in the Inkel parents retaining
doned, neglected or abused by the parents and custody of their children. Their conclusory allega-
states that the juvenile courts upheld the orders of tion that the orders of temporary custody were
temporary custody. The Hon. Carl E. Taylor of the based on false information, without any allegation
Child Protection Session at Middletown, Connectic- of what additional or correct information should
ut, issued a decision after a full trial on the merits have been submitted, or how such information
held in October 2004, upholding the orders of tem- would have resulted in the juvenile court reaching
porary custody for Alexander, Andrew and Ana- different conclusions, is insufficient to state a claim
stasia on the grounds that a state trooper observed against the *525 Commissioners for failure to train
and supervise the staff concerning provision of in- improper behavior alleged during a search of the
formation to the juvenile courts. On the contrary, plaintiffs' residence in February 2003 was that a
the information in the complaint and stated on the state trooper drew his pistol and refused to leave
record in the juvenile court proceedings indicates after being asked four times; there is no allegation
the courts' grounds for affirming the orders of tem- that any D.C.F. worker was responsible for the
porary custody over the Inkel and Baker children. trooper drawing his weapon, or was aware that
plaintiffs wanted them to leave. There is also no al-
[14] Likewise, plaintiffs fail to state a claim against legation that plaintiffs had refused permission for
the Commissioners for failure to properly train em- the home visit when it began. Finally, plaintiffs al-
ployees concerning entry into a private residence to lege that in February 2002, various D.C.F. defend-
pursue an abuse or neglect investigation. With re- ants caused the police to enter plaintiffs' home
spect to the October 5, 2004 “search” that ended in “without judicial authority” and cause property
D.C.F. taking temporary custody of Anastasia, An- damage. There is no allegation, however, that
drew and Alexander Inkel, plaintiffs do not allege D.C.F. personnel actually instructed or were trained
that they refused to consent to this home visit or to condone police damage to property during the
that there were any other circumstances rendering course of a search or a child protection home visit.
the visit unlawful or unwanted. There are also insufficient allegations from which
the Court can infer that plaintiffs had refused to
With respect to the May 2004 home visit in which a
consent to this search.
state trooper, allegedly speaking for D.C.F.,
threatened the landlord that he would “make this For these reasons, plaintiff's complaint fails to state
place look like Bagdad [sic],” there is no allegation sufficient facts from which it could be inferred that
that the state trooper was trained or supervised by the Commissioners failed to properly train or super-
D.C.F. or D.S.S., or that these departments in any vise their employees to carry out child protective
way gave him permission to speak for them; it is responsibilities, including home visits, or that such
not a reasonable inference that the Commissioners failure would result in harm to plaintiffs. The
of D.C.F. and D.S.S. are responsible for supervising claims against the Commissioners for damages on
the actions of a state police officer. Moreover, the this basis therefore are dismissed.
threat is alleged to have been made against the
landlord, not the plaintiffs. There is no allegation
that the plaintiffs even were present at the home at J. Claims for Damages Against Corsini, Lenney,
this time, or that they refused to consent to the Suroviak, Barber, and Jennings
search. Cf. State v. Brunetti, 276 Conn. 40, 52, 883
[15] For the same reasons, plaintiffs fail to state a §
A.2d 1167, 1175 (Conn.2005) (when joint occu-
1983 cause of action *526 against D.C.F. employ-
pants both are present, both must assent for the con-
ees Corsini, Lenney, Suroviak, Barber or Jennings.
sent to search to be valid). Rather, the complaint
First, the claims concerning submission of false
suggests that the Inkels were not present at all,
testimony and documents to the state courts have
which is why the trooper was addressing the land-
been dismissed. Second, plaintiffs have failed to al-
lord.
lege facts from which it could be inferred that these
Similarly, plaintiffs allege that defendants Corsini defendants unlawfully interfered with the parents'
and Lenney told another landlord that plaintiffs constitutional right to the care, custody and control
were drug addicts and child abusers, resulting in of their children, because they have alleged no facts
plaintiffs' eviction. However, they do not allege that which, if proved, could support the inference that
this home visit led to any unlawful interference their children were not, in fact, abused, neglected or
with their relationship with their children. The only abandoned. As discussed above, plaintiffs have ac-
knowledged that the juvenile courts upheld the tem- K. Claims for Injunctive Relief
porary D.C.F. custody of these children on the
grounds of a likelihood of abuse, neglect or aban- Plaintiffs demand a broad injunction ordering de-
donment, and they have alleged no facts which, if fendants “to opperate [sic] lawfully, effectively and
known to the juvenile courts, would have led to a consistent with the scope of their respective author-
different result. ities” and “perpetually enjoining all defendants
from engaging in the unlawfull [sic] conduct de-
[16] Additionally, to the extent plaintiffs' complaint scribed in the ... complaint.” Because plaintiffs
can be construed to allege a § 1983 claim that these have failed to state claims for any past violations of
D.C.F. defendants failed to protect the Inkel and their constitutional or common law rights, plaintiffs
Baker children from abuse in foster care, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that any defendant, in the fu-
have stated no facts from which it can be inferred ture, is likely to violate their rights or otherwise
that these defendants knew or should have known cause them harm that is legally redressable in feder-
of any abuse perpetrated by foster parents. The only al court. Therefore plaintiffs' demands for injunct-
specific allegation in the complaint is that LaBella ive relief must be denied.
found a bruise on Andrew Inkel but D.C.F. invest-
igated and found nothing. To the extent the com-
IV. CONCLUSION
plaint alleges any wrongdoing, it alleges that the
foster mother attempted to confuse D.C.F. person- Accordingly, defendants' Motions to Dismiss
nel by representing that Alexander was Andrew and [Docs. 93, 102] are GRANTED and the complaint
thereby hiding the bruise. The complaint fails to al- is dismissed in its entirety. The Motion to Seal the
lege any ongoing pattern of abuse by the foster par- juvenile court documents [Doc. # 92] is GRAN-
ents that D.C.F. personnel should have detected but TED.*527 Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for a Tem-
failed to discover. Cf. Doe v. N.Y. City Dept. Social porary Restraining Order [Doc. # 50] and Motion to
Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981) (child welfare Be Heard [Doc. # 80] are DENIED. The Clerk is
officials neglected to discover six-year pattern of directed to close this case.
cruelty and sexual abuse by foster father despite
routine home evaluations). IT IS SO ORDERED.