Aquinas' Theology of The God Who Is

ABSTRACT
Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is:

The Significance of Ipsum Esse Subsistens in the Summa Theologiae
Dr. Michael A. Hoonhout, PhD
For various contemporary theologians Aquinas claim

that God has no real relation to the world is taken to
mean that God is wholly remote and indifferent to it, a
misunderstanding that serves as sufficient justification
for overlooking his treatment of God in the Summa
theologiae. Yet Aquinas theology of God, a working out
of the implications that God is the pure Act of
subsistent existence itself (ipsum esse subsistens), leads to
an understanding of all created reality as profoundly
related to God. In its first section this paper presents
how Aquinas, by a consistent application of a double
theological hermeneutic of God as absolute simplicity
and the fullness of perfection, excludes any possibility
of change in God or a mutual relationship with the
world. The second section shows how divine absolute
transcendence allows for a real relation of the world to
God in which God is supremely immanent and active.
The world is understood as immersed in and
interpenetrated by the God who is Act, a relation of
participation which gives proper respect for the
integrity of the created order, but not at the cost of the
theological dimension of all reality.
Seat of Wisdom, Issue 1 (Spring 2010): 27-57
27
ARTICLE
Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is:

The Significance of Ipsum Esse Subsistens in the Summa theologiae
I.
Introduction
After a period of relative neglect following the Second Vatican Council,

the theology of Thomas Aquinas has undergone a revival of interest, to the point
that Aquinas has now become a resource for non-Catholic theologians too. Yet
while various areas of his corpus have drawn respect, his theology of God
receives a high degree of criticism. His position that God is immutable and has
no real relation to creation is dismissed by contemporary theology on several
justifications: as contrary to the biblical God intimately concerned with his
covenanted people, as epitomizing the domineering God of classical theism
rejected by modern atheism for threatening the autonomy of the world, and as
unable to support a genuine religious subjectivity that requires our relationship
with God to be fully mutual.1 Criticisms from process and feminist theologies on
his characterization of Gods attributes,2 and from contemporary Trinitarian
theology on the priority he gives the divine nature over the divine persons,3 have
1
Gerald Hanratty, Divine Immutability and Impassibility Revisited, in At the

Heart of the Real, F. ORourke, ed. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), 137-62, at 138.
Hanratty offers a concise and fair presentation of the various arguments against or
modifications of divine immutability in process philosophy and theology, and the
theologies of Hans Kng, Jrgen Moltmann, Eberhard Jngel, Heribert Mhlen, Jean
Galot and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
2
For the arguments of process thought that God changes, cf. Alfred North
Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1969); Ewert Cousins, ed.,
Process Theology: Basic Writings (New York: Newman Press, 1972); Santiago Sia, The
Doctrine of Gods Immutability: Introducing the Modern Debate, New Blackfriars 68
(1987): 226-29; and David Pailin, The Utterly Absolute and the Totally Related: Change
in God, New Blackfriars 68 (1987): 243-55. For a feminist critical reading of Aquinass
classical theism, see Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist
Theological Discourse (New York: Herder & Herder, 1993). For a theological reworking
of Gods attributes, see Colin E. Gunton, Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine
Attributes (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003).
3
The initial charge, since taken up by others, was offered by Karl Rahner in
Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate, Theological Investigations, vol. 4,
trans. K. Smyth (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 83-84, and The Trinity, Joseph Donceel,
trans. (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 15-21 & 45-46. For a response that explains the
Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is
28
likewise fostered a consensus that no matter how agile and penetrating Aquinas
can be on a wide range of theological problems, his basic theology of God is
fundamentally misconceived.
This judgment of the inadequacy of Aquinas theology of God has not
been an entirely external criticism offered by those whose philosophical premises
and theological approaches widely differ from his. Certain scholars of Aquinas,
too, in their engagement with the criticisms and concerns of process thought,
have sought to qualify Aquinas teaching on divine immutability and Gods
relation to the world.4 Although carefully correcting contemporary
misunderstandings of these notions and delineating the objectionable theological
implications that arise when either is denied of God,5 these writers suggest that
the reality and depth of Gods involvement with creation can be expressed in
Thomistic terms by saying that Gods knowing and willing of creation makes a
real difference in God. Exploiting Aquinas own distinction between the entitive
order of the divine essence itself and the intentional order of the divine knowing
and willing of creation, these writers claim that in his creative, conscious
intentions Gods relation to the world is more than merely rational and not
absolutely immutable.6 While their effort to use Aquinas to advance beyond him
is commendable, still their solution, in addition to being somewhat ambiguous,
has been questioned for its faithfulness to Aquinas.7 Their position also seems to
unity and trajectory of Aquinas discussion of God as three persons of one essence, see
Giles Emery, Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in Saint Thomas
Aquinas? The Thomist 64 (2000): 521-63.
4
Anthony J. Kelly, God: How Near a Relation? Thomist 34 (1970), 191-229;
W. Norris Clarke, A New Look at the Immutability of God, in God Knowable and
Unknowable, Robert J. Roth, ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1973), 43-72;
William J. Hill, Does the World Make a Difference to God? The Thomist 38 (1974),
146-64. Walter Stokes sought the same end by different means, by attempting a synthesis
between Thomistic and process metaphysics: Is God Really Related to the World?
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 39 (1965), 145-51. See also the
brief synopsis of the debate opened up by process thought in Sia, The Doctrine of Gods
Immutability, 229-32.
5
According to Hill, positing a real relation of God to the world would imply:
that God is inconceivable apart from the world; that he is ontically dependent upon
something other than himself; that the creative act is not free; that the creature no longer
is fully contingent in existing. In short, it would subordinate God to a whole prior to
and more ultimate than himself. (154-55)
6
Clarke, 52-53; Hill, 151-52.
7
How changes in Gods intentional relation to the world do not involve change in
Gods being is not very clear in their positions, given that Gods absolute simplicity
excludes any real distinction between the entitive and intentional orders in God. For a
Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)
29
suggest agreement with contemporary critics that absolute divine immutability

and a wholly one-way divine relation to the world are points of weakness in
classical theism, requiring some moderation in order for the world to have the
meaning and importance it ought to have for the Christian God.8
Other Thomistic scholars have replied to these criticisms and defended
both Aquinas predication of divine immutability and his denial that Gods
relation to the world is real. Gerald Hanratty offers a fine explanatory summary
of the arguments for divine immutability and impassibility offered by Thomas
Aquinas.9 Michael J. Dodds also explains the Thomistic reasons for predicating
divine immutability and the ways that motion may be properly said of God.10
Martin J. De Nys has argued that the notion that God does not have a real
relation to the world is a substantially defensible, rationally complex, and
interesting theological option with the inner-consistency and resourcefulness to
engage the concerns of contemporary theology.11 I agree, and wish in this article
to show this coherence and fecundity by taking a different approach than the
mainly philosophical defenses offered so far. Rather than focus directly on the
specifically problematic issues of divine immutability and its attendant denial
critical response to the Clarke and Hill articles cited above (n. 4, see Theodore J.
Kondoleon, The Immutability of God: Some Recent Challenges, The New
Scholasticism 58/3 (1984), 293-315. While I accept the validity of his criticisms, in my
opinion they apply more to Clarkes arguments than to Hills, as well as to Kellys
article, which Kondoleon does not engage.
8
Kelly, for example, claims classic theism (and Thomism is included explicitly
in this) lacks existential allure for the men of our time. (194) Supposedly because of the
existential repugnance of a statically indifferent Deity, (196) God must be conceived of
as genuinely related to the world and as really affected by our actions. (194) Clarke is
another who accepts without question the current assumption that the measure of our
value before God is how much we creatures make a difference in him (44-45, 56-57)
i.e., whether (and to what degree) we can change him. Yet this is a dubious standard by
which to measure Gods love, the inverse of the biblical touchstone where the depths of
Gods love for us rests upon what he has done for us. The problem of imperfection
inherent to this measure of how much we make a difference to God is the implication
that before you prayed, acted, suffered, or sinned, God had less regard and compassion
for you. Any difference that we can make in God presumes an initial divine indifference.
9
Hanratty, 148-62.
10
Michael J. Dodds, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Motion of the Motionless
God, New Blackfriars 68 (1987): 233-42. For a more extensive treatment see his book:
The Unchanging God of Love: A Study of the Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on Divine
Immutability in View of Certain Contemporary Criticisms of This Doctrine (Fribourg:
Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1986).
11
Martin J. De Nys, God, Creatures, and Relations: Revisiting Classical
Theism, Journal of Religion 81 (2001), 595-614, at 613-14.
30
of a real divine relation to the world, I intend to show in a more theological and
systematic way the deep and broad implications of Aquinas judgment that God
is the act of subsistent existence itself. By tracing the trajectory of his discussion
of God in the Summa theologiae I hope to indicate how his whole theology,
especially an understanding of reality as created, rests upon this foundational
claim and gives us a theological portrait of an unsurpassably active God. Because
this understanding of how created things relate to God is so fundamental to his
thought and so widely different from contemporary views, it is crucial that all
readers be familiar with it if they are to faithfully interpret his treatment of any
other theological topic within his great summary of theology.
Since the fundamental accusation against the immutable God of classical
theism is that his absolute perfections prohibit him from being in a mutual
relationship with the world, it is imperative to explain why Aquinas considered
his conception of Gods relation to the world as non-mutual to be fitting to God
and faithful to the Christian doctrine of creation. Though Gods relation to the
world is not real in the Thomistic sense of being necessary for God to be God,
nonetheless it is a dynamic relation of God acting on our behalf. Indeed in
contrast to process theologies, in Aquinas theology God is active for the world
with the eternal dynamism of the divine life itself, not with the mechanics of
causality found in this world. Yet to be able to show all this requires grasping the
richness of Aquinas theology of God as ipsum esse subsistens and the way it
allows for his theology of creation in which the world proceeds from, is directed
by, and returns to God.
In order to show the how Aquinas conception of Gods engagement with
the world surpasses contemporary alternatives, one must not defend the validity
of particular attributes but attend to the role his understanding of God plays in
the whole of his theologythat is, the way that Aquinas considers everything to
be what it is on account of God being God to it. In the Summa theologiae
discussion finds its ordering principle in God himself (sub ratione Dei), so that all
things are discussed in relation to God as their beginning and end.12 Given this
systematic grounding of all reality in the mystery of God, to fault Aquinas on his
12
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae [ST], 5 vol. (Ottawa: Studii Generalis O.

Pr., 1941 [Piana text of 1570 with some Leonine variants]), I, q. 1, a. 7. English
translation: Summa Theologica, 3 vol. Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (New York: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947). In the opening prologue to the
whole work Aquinas states his intention to organize theology according to the inner
dynamics of the subject matter (secundum ordine disciplin)that is, giving primacy of
discussion to what is first in reality (God) so that God may be the foundation of and
ultimate context for all that follows in later questions.
31
understanding of God and continue to mine his theology for wisdom on other
topics is thoroughly inconsistent with his overall intentions and liable to lead to
grave misinterpretations of individual treatments.13 Even a slight modification of
his theology of God, such as those that have been proposed above, runs the grave
risk of unmooring his understanding of creation, nature and grace from its stable
foundation in the God who is simply the act of existence.
Since Aquinas intentionally organizes theological discussion in his Summa
theologiae to reflect the order of all things in their relation to God, it is important
to pay close attention not only to what Aquinas says in individual articles but to
the overall manner in which he says it. Accordingly, this article, in two parts, will
trace his systematic reasoning in giving the reader an expansive appreciation of
Aquinas theology of God. The first section will present the theological meaning
of Aquinas judgment that God is ipsum esse subsistens given in the works
opening treatise on the one God, questions 2-26. The intent here is not to focus
upon any attribute or question in particular but to follow the weave of his
theological argument: how all that is predicated of God, including the Creatorcreation relation, depends upon Gods absolute transcendence as the act of
existence itself. The second section will indicate the ongoing significance of this
theology for what follows later in the work, showing how this foundational
theology of God remains operative in the explanation of created realities. Here
the purpose is to appreciate Aquinas theological understanding of all reality that
arises because created things participate in and are fundamentally ordered to
God as their principle, agent and end.
II.
The absolute simplicity and perfect fullness of ipsum esse

subsistens
The treatise on the one God begins with question two of the Summa
theologae, where Aquinas offers five ways for demonstrating the existence of God.
Doubtless the most discussed piece of all of Aquinas writings, still the interest
has for the most part been philosophical: how the arguments work and whether
they are convincing. Our concern, however, is with their theological significance.
13
This liability of misinterpreting sections of the Summa theologiae read in

isolation lies in the fact that the modern reader is not likely to relate created realities to
God in the manner Aquinas is careful to work out in his theology of God. Whether it is
the residue of deistic scientism, the modern predilection for making the autonomy of the
world absolute, or the panentheism increasingly accepted in theology today, the
contemporary reader of excised passages is likely to have an understanding of created
realities antithetical to the one presupposed throughout this work.
32
To read this second question theologically is to grasp its place within the larger
context of this treatise on God, and thereby to recognize the way its conclusion
becomes the principle and premise for what will be judged true of Gods essence
and operations. For immediately following and interlocked with question two
are the questions on the simplicity and perfection of God, where Aquinas
presents his fundamental characterization of God which will steer the course of
the discussion in the rest of the treatise. Indeed, because this characterization
depends upon what God must be as the reason for the universes existence, here
is also found the determinative principle for Aquinas understanding of the
relation creation has with its Creator.
Thus in appreciation of the systematic ordering of the questions
themselves, a reading of question two in the light of the subsequent discussion on
Gods simplicity and perfection makes it clear that in the five ways Aquinas does
not merely demonstrate that God exists. It is easy to assume, in the unending
debate over the demonstrative merits of the five ways (a debate which tends to
isolate question two from the movement inherent in the whole treatise), that all
that Aquinas intends here is simply to reason to an actually existing God. Much
more significantly for his theological project, Aquinas concludes to a God that is
actual existence itself. The only adequate cause to explain the existence of this
universe, in which the existence of each thing without exception is derived, is in
an Origin that has not received its existence from anything prior.14 God as pure
act, far from being an impairment to creating, is the absolute prolegomenon and,
literally, sine qua non for creating.15 To be truly adequate to the task of
14
The fundamental premise of the argument is stated twice in ST I, q. 2, a. 3:

quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est, and de potentia autem non potest
aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu. This undeniable metaphysical truth
to which Aquinas is here referringnamely, that every change or becoming requires a
pre-existent cause already possessive of the perfection it imparts to the effectseems to
be one completely missed by process thinkers. While in any process or change the state
of potency precedes the state of actuality in the effect, still the fact that the realization of
every potency always depends upon an already-in-act cause implies that act always
precedes potency. No potency realizes itself; nothing can pull itself up by its own
bootstraps. Although process thought claims to reach a more rationally consistent concept
of God (cf. n. 36 below), the truth is that in indiscriminately applying the process of
change to God these thinkers give potency an ontological and conceptual primacy that it
does not even have in this world of change.
15
Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre
Dame Press, 1999), 133. God cannot undergo any change in himself in acting for the
world both because God is pure act and because creation itself demands an immutably
pure act. (ibid.)
33
origination the ultimate principle must be outside the category of received

existence; he must be the the sheer unreceived Act of Being.16 Therefore the
theological import of question two is not so much that God must exist, but that
he must also be his own existence, or else this universe would not be. In contrast
to all created things that have their existence given to them, God alone is, not
has, existence.
As we will now show, this conclusion that God is his own actual existence
is the basis for all that Aquinas will say on the nature and operations of God. All
subsequent judgments about what is or is not true of God are compelled by
fidelity to this insight that God must be ipsum esse per se subsistens [the act of
subsistent existence itself] in order to be the explanatory cause this universe
requires.17 The way Aquinas does this is by first arguing that the God who is his
own act of existence must be both absolutely simple and perfect. Aquinas then
employs these two complementary truths to guide the rest of the discussion in
the treatise. To appreciate his theology of God as ipsum esse subsistens, therefore,
requires first grasping how Gods simplicity and perfect fullness arise from God
as the act of existence itself, and then seeing how these two truths flow into all
further claims about Gods attributes, knowledge and will. The first step will
involve a closer reading of Aquinas argument in questions 3-6. But due to the
length of the rest of the treatise (qq. 7-26), accomplishing the second step within
the limits of this paper will entail a more selective reading. To fit the overall
theme of this article, I will focus on those passages that help show how Gods
very active relation to the world is found in his simple and full act of existence.
In the pedagogically advantageous ordering he gives to the subject,
Aquinas immediately follows the argument of the five ways (q. 2. a. 3) with
demonstrations that God is wholly simple (q. 3) and the fullness of all perfection
or goodness (qq. 4-6). His reasoning very much depends upon the necessity that
the source of all things be the act of unreceived existence itself and hence beyond
even the possibility of having possibilities. As the transcendent I am,18 God is to
16
Hill, 154.
ST I, q. 44, a. 1; Deus est ipsum esse subsistens omnibus modis indeterminatum. (ST I, q. 11, a. 4) Note therefore that Aquinas does not argue in the fashion of
St. Anselm, deriving his theological conclusions in accordance with the logical axiom
that God is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Rather, Aquinas foundational
principle for demonstrating the reasonableness of the faith is the cosmological premise or
question of what this actually existing world requires for its ultimate ground and
terminus.
18
Like many of the patristic fathers, Aquinas explicitly refers to the revelation of
the divine name in Exodus 3:14. Since this reference occurs in the sed contra of ST I, q.
17
34
be identified with being in the most active of senses, and anything that implies a
kind of non-existence or non-actualityincluding potency, composition,
limitation, imperfection, and the process of becomingmust be excluded as
contrary to the divine nature. Or in positive terms, God must be wholly simple
and perfect in himself, and thus both transcendently other than creation (q. 4, a.
3) and yet entirely operative upon it (q. 6, a. 4).
Whatever is not simple can be divided so that each of its parts is not
identical with any other or with the whole. Since the real distinctiveness of each
part is assured only by a negation of it not being any other, this is not of the
part is antithetical of the absolute is that God must be for the universe to truly
exist. Division also introduces potentiality in the subject, not just the possibility
of corruption but also the necessity that each part receive qualification from and
thus stand in potency to the others distinctiveness (q. 3, aa. 1 & 2). Composition
is thus contrary to the one whose essence is to be existence itself. Although all
created things, no matter how simple, are composed of an essence with the act
of existence (since what they are cannot be identified with that they are), God in
contrast is beyond even this most basic and universal composition. If God cannot
be divided between his essence and his existence, he cannot be divided at all (q.
3, aa. 4 & 7). Theologically, his simplicity is important because it requires us to
affirm that anything true about God is true of him wholly and absolutely, not
partially or conditionally. Indeed, the many ways that God is great can be
encapsulated in the simply truth that God is, so that no addendum over and
above his essence need be admitted.
The divine simplicity of pure existence is infinitely rich in perfection. Now
what is most simple in our experience is a geometric pointindivisible yes, but
of very little substance. The simplicity of God, however, is of a richness of depth
and breadth beyond our comprehension. For the is of God that excludes any
imperfection also encompasses all perfections, for a thing is perfect in
proportion to its state of actuality.19 Furthermore, because the universe comes
from God, all the good found in it must in a greater manner pre-exist in the
Creator for him to be rightly regarded as its point of origin (q. 4, a. 2).
Consequently, the judgment that God is utter simplicity must be complemented
2, a. 3, on the basis of the argument offered here one could say that the entirety of
Aquinas theology of God explicates the meaning of the biblical name Yahweh, by far the
predominant designation of God in the Old Testament.
19
ST I, q. 4, a. 1; also q. 4, a. 2: Since therefore God is subsisting being itself,
nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are
included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have
being after some fashion.
35
by the judgment that God is the fullness of perfection, containing within himself,
without loss of that simplicity, the exemplary type of every sort of created good.
As created being exists because God is pure act, so created goodness exists
because God is absolute perfection. Of course, divine perfection is not an
attained state, the terminus of a process, as it is in all created things that are
perfected.20 With this negation, the term perfection is justifiably applied to God
because everything that is perfect is, as such, in act. The first active principle
must necessarily be most actual, and therefore most perfect. (q. 4, a. 1)
As the perfect one, however, God is not just the source of goodness in
creation. He is also the end of creation, the absolute goodness that gives all
change and activity in creation a direction and final intelligibility. For Aquinas,
just as this changing universe requires an absolutely transcendent Beginning, so
too does it require an absolutely transcendent End. Creation includes a two-fold
relation to God: a) only because God is its source is the universe not nothing; b)
only because God is its end is the universe not nonsense. Without telos order is
impossible; without resultant good change is meaningless.21 Each end of action is
a good sought only because its very desirability derives from its participation in
the goodness of God.22 Only because God is simple and absolute perfection is he
supreme goodness itself, in relation to which all other ends derive their character
20
In this sense the ordinary meaning of the word is misleading: perfection, from
the Latin perfectus, past participle of perficereto finish, to bring to completion; per,
through + ficere, combining form of facere, to make, do (Random House Websters
College Dictionary, New York: Random House, 1992). Perhaps this is the reason why
Paul S. Fiddes mistakenly describes Aquinas as saying that God has no potentialities
that he does not eternally actualize, and that there are no unrealized potentials in God.
(The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 50) Gods pure act is
not perfectly realized potentiality, but the absolute absence of potentiality.
21
ST I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2: Mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem...a termino
ad quem. Changes receive species and dignity...from the term to which [they tend].
Aquinas is convinced no change would occur at all without the specification of action
given by the end: Besides, if an agent did not incline toward some definite effect, all
results would be a matter of indifference for him. Now, he who looks upon a manifold
number of things with indifference no more succeeds in doing one of them than another.
Hence, from an agent contingently indifferent to alternatives no effect follows, unless he
is determined to one effect by something. So, it would be impossible for him to act.
Therefore every agent tends toward some determinate effect, and this is called his end.
(Summa contra gentiles [hereafter, SCG] Bk. III, chap. 2)
22
ST I, q. 6, a. 4. Furthermore, no such consistent direction of action which we
see in the patterns of nature is possible unless the good God has established for creatures
what they could not establish for themselves: their own proper end (SCG Bk. I, chap. 44;
ST I, q. 19, a. 4; cf. the fifth way of q. 2, a. 3).
36
as good.23 As we shall later see, the direction God gives to creation as the End of
all ends, the Goodness of all good, is an important element in his theology of
God as ipsum esse subsistens.
Now it is in the question on divine goodness that Aquinas first states that
God has only a logical but not a real relation to creation.24 From what has
already been said it is clear that a real and necessary relation exists from creation
to God.25 Aquinas is denying the reversethat God is necessarily related to
creationyet this does not mean that there is no divine relation to the world.26
23
Aquinas summarizes the relation of creation to Gods goodness in this way:

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first,
exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness. (ST I, q. 6, a. 4)
24
ST I, q. 6, a. 2, ad 1: Now a relation of God to creatures is not a reality in God,
but in the creature, for it is in God in our idea only. Aquinas clarifies the point more
thoroughly in ST I, q. 13, a. 7: Sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality,
while in the other extreme it is an idea only. And this happens whenever two extremes
are not of one order. An example of this kind of relation whose terms are of different
orders is the relation between things in nature and the same things as sensible and
intelligible. The relation of things sensed and understood to the actual existing things is
real, but the relation of actual things to their sensible and intellectual counterparts is only
a relation of reason, since a particular tree exists regardless of whether it is ever sensed or
understood. This same kind of disparity of orders is found in the relation between God
and creation. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really
related to God himself, whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but only a
relation of idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to him. (ibid.; cf. ST I, q. 28, a. 1, ad
3; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1) For an elucidation of this distinction and its significance, as well as a
clarification of an ambiguity in an example Aquinas uses to demonstrate it, see Thomas
G. Weinandy, Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation (Still River,
MA: St. Bede's Publications, 1985), 88-96. See also David B. Burrell, Aquinas: God and
Action (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 84-87.
25
It deserves elucidation that by relation Aquinas means a specific predication
of reference posited of a singular reality, not what today we call a relationship which
joins two participants in a common bond. Whereas in modern parlance one relationship
exists between two terms, in this Aristotelian usage a distinct relation is predicated for
each term, resulting in two relations or predications which may or may not be equivalent.
The Creator-creation pairing is such a case of non-equivalent relations; the relation of
creation to God is real or necessary (relatio realis) for its very existence, but the relation
of God to creation is only in idea (relatio rationis)i.e., necessary not for divine
existence but necessary for a truthful predication that God is Creator. Thus, saying that
God has no relation to creation cannot be equivalent to saying that God has no
relationship with it.
26
De Nys (599-600) points out that Aquinas denial of a real relation occurs in the
midst of his affirming and explaining the theological propriety of predicating relative
37
Granted that this non-necessary universe does indeed exist, not only must it be in
relation to God, but also God must be active towards it, extending, as it were, his
act of existence and goodness to it.27 Thomas Weinandy labels this nonnecessary, more than merely logical relation of God toward the world an actual
relation, in order to express that God is actually, if not necessarily, related to the
world because the world is really related to him.28 Actual is an especially fitting
term because the reality of Gods relation to the world is found not in the
necessity of Gods nature but in the act of all that God is freely willing and doing
for creation.
Having given the substance of what Aquinas means in insisting God is
absolutely simple and perfect, it is now vital to indicate how these claims work
as a double hermeneutic to shape the rest of his theology of God. Both of these
primary theological judgments work together and complement one another, so
that divine simplicity is not understood as insubstantial or vacuous, nor the
fullness of divine perfection (goodness) understood as implying multiplicity or
composition. Applied to our ideas about God, the first is principally exclusionary
and refining, the second predominantly expansive and enriching. For proper
theological language involves acts of judgment about what God is and is not
based upon the relation creatures have to God, a relation which entails the
negating truth that God is transcendently unlike creatures, and the affirming one
that all the good in creatures must be found more eminently in God. Predications
terms of God, for God is related to creatures in so far as creatures are related to him.
(ST I, q. 13, 7, ad 5: cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam que creatura
refer[a]tur ad ipsum) We speak truly when we call God Creator or Lord, because the
world has a real relation to God, and this only because God is truly in the act of eternally
knowing and freely willing the world. A lack of a real (necessary) divine relation to the
world is therefore not a denial of Gods engagement with the world; it is rather an
affirmation of it, one that is made in respect of the freedom of the creative act of One
who absolutely transcends the world.
27
ST I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action,
which is Gods essence, with a relation to the creature. Aquinas holds that given that
there is a creationa necessary supposition contingent upon divine freedomwe can
truly say that Gods essence is identical to the divine power that acts to effect creation.
(cf. ST I, q. 25, a. 1c. & ad 3) Power is predicated of God not as something really
distinct from his knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as
power implies a notion of principle putting into execution what the will commands, and
what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. (ST I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 4)
Therefore, although there is in God no reali.e., necessaryrelation to creation,
nevertheless the divine action by which there is a creation is nothing less than the divine
essence itself in execution. God is the Act by which creation is.
28
Weinandy (1985), 94-95.
38
of abstract names fall under the hermeneutic of divine simplicity, while

predications of Gods supereminence fall under the hermeneutic of divine
perfection.29 All these theological affirmations are analogical because the world
depends upon the ipsum esse subsistens, since analogy requiresthat God be in
act and that the creature exist in real dependence upon the divine actus essendi.30
In every subsequent judgment Aquinas makes about Gods essence in
questions 7-11, and about Gods operations in questions 14-26, the notions of
divine simplicity and perfection respectively purify and exalt all that is judged
true of God according to the theological exigency that he is subsistent existence
itself. On that basis, none of these subsequent predications of God in terms of
what he is (not) or how he acts introduce composition or imperfection in God.
This means first of all that the various divine attributes or operations
distinguished by us in God are never an added property which qualifies the
divine essence; rather, each is nothing other than identical to the divine essence
itself. Given that God is esse, the proper verb for theological predication is not
has but the verb that designates the act of subsisting: God is his own eternity,
God is his own knowing, etc.31 Secondly, whatever is rightly said about Gods
29
We know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence
and remotion. (ST I, q. 13, a. 1) As God is simple and subsisting, we attribute to him
abstract names to signify his simplicity, and concrete names to signify his substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express his mode of being,
forasmuch as our intellect does not know him in this life as he is. (ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2)
Thus whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to the relation of a creature
to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.
(ST I, q. 13, a. 5)
30
William J. Hill, On Knowing the Unknowable God [review of Knowing the
Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas by David Burrell], The Thomist, 51
(1987): 699-709, at 706. Affirming that in God essence and existence are absolutely
identical distinguishes God from the world, enabling the theologian to safeguard Gods
unknowability and at the same time, paradoxically, to indicate how he may be known.
(ibid., 704)
31
ST I, q. 10, a. 2: Not only is God eternal, but he is his eternity; whereas, no
other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is his own uniform
being; and hence as he is his own essence, so he is his own eternity. ST I, q. 14, a. 4: It
must be said that the act of God's intellect is his substance. For if his act of understanding
were other than his substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says [Metaphysics,
Bk XII], would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine
substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible;
because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding.
Now in God there is no form which is something other than his existence, as shown
above [q. 3]. Hence as his essence itself is also his intelligible species, it necessarily
follows that his act of understanding must be his essence and his existence.
39
essence or operations must be affirmed or else God would be less than perfect,
yet affirmed only in a way where no limitation, characteristic of created reality, is
introduced into the theology of God.
In order to complete this examination of Aquinas theology of God and its
systematic inner coherence, let us now attend to some instances which suitably
demonstrate how the rest of the treatise, under the rubrics of divine simplicity
and perfection, express that God is the act of subsistent existence itself. From the
remaining questions on the divine essence (ST I, qq. 7-11) we will focus not on
Gods immutability (q. 9), but on the question that immediately precedes it and
therefore gives it some context: question 8 on divine omnipresence. From the
questions on the divine operations (qq. 14-26), discussion will center on Gods
knowing and willing of creation, crucial for appreciating Aquinas take on the
divine-world relation and how his conception differs from what is put forth
today.
After Aquinas explains that God is infinite only in that manner
conformable with his simplicity and perfection,32 his next theological interest is to
discuss Gods active omnipresence in the universe (q. 7, prologue; q. 8). This
eighth question, together with significant portions of question 6 and questions
14-25 that concern the extension of the divine operations into the world, are prima
facie evidence that even in his effort to treat God in himself Aquinass
theological portrait is far removed from its contemporary caricature of a God
with little regard for the world. As the infinite act of existence, God is the active
presence underlying and permeating creation. Yet his presence throughout the
universe is not like some ether distended through space, for then his presence
would be divisible into parts. Since divine simplicity excludes division, God is
present primarily in every aspect of creation with the entirety of his being (q. 8,
a. 4). Indeed, his presence is not one of spatial occupation, but of universal
activity: Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essenti, vel sicut accidens,
sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit,33 per contactum virtutis.34 By his essential esse
32
Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but he is
his own subsistent being, as was shown above [q. 3, a. 4], it is clear that God himself is
infinite and perfect. (ST I, q. 7, a. 1) God is absolutely, essentially infinite (a. 2), without
limitations of any sort. His infinity is not a greatness of the kind found in creationi.e.,
that of an unending extension in size or number (aa. 3 & 4). His greatness is infinite
actual existence, not an unlimited potency (as in process thought). In sum, divine infinity
is another way of naming Gods simple and absolute perfection, a greatness wholly
without demarcation, augmentation, succession or number.
33
ST I, q. 8, a. 1: God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as
an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works.
40
God is present to all things as the unceasing cause of their being, and therefore
his universal presence must be absolute, since that to which Gods agency is not
extending is simply not existing.35
Worth highlighting about Gods universal activity is Aquinas
transcendent sense of its manner of operation. As question eight denies that God
is actively present in spatial terms, so the next two questions, on divine
immutability and eternity, forbid conceiving divine action as involving change or
time. God is the constant, changeless agent operative in the world, and while the
created effects of his agency vary over time and space (and are thus historical
and existentially experienced as changing and diverse), his agency is simple and
perfect. Being infinite, God does not even move to extend his power, which is
already perfectly extended to all its effects (q. 9, a. 1). Likewise, God is
universally operative in every moment, yet not successively, as that is another
form of division incompatible with his simplicity (q. 10, aa. 1 & 4). Thus Aquinas
teaches us to subordinate the conditions and categories of space and time to
Gods esse, for they are the effects of his creative action, not the conditions under
which he must operate. In contrast to process thought, Aquinas sees universal
change in the world not as an indication of a changing God, but of an immutable
God who is operative universally.36 The wonderful implication of all this is the
central biblical truth that as God is, so does God act for us. No change between
34
ST I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1: by contact of power.
ST I, q. 8, a. 3: Therefore, God is in all things by his power, inasmuch as all
things are subject to his power; he is by his presence in all things, as all things are bare
and open to his eyes; he is in all things by his essence, inasmuch as he is present to all as
the cause of their being. (cf. q. 8, a. 4) Note, therefore, that creations contact with
Gods agency is not just at its beginning, but continues as long as it exists.
36
Process theology considers itself to be philosophically rigorous in its
willingness to say God is subject to the same exact conditions that apply to our reality:
God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save
their collapse. (Whitehead, 1969, 405) As David Pailin explains, process metaphysics
seeks to determine the unconditionally necessary or eternal truths about existence
which therefore apply a priori to all possible (and hence all actual) modes of existence.
If, then, to be real is necessarily to be constituted by a temporally-oriented process, this
must be true of the divine reality. (246) Two points can be made in rebuttal, one
philosophical and one theological. 1) This axiom that universal features of our reality
apply equally to God cannot be consistently appliede.g., dissolution or death occurs to
everything that changes in our reality, yet process theologians exclude God from the
possibility, let alone the eventual actuality, of non-existence. 2) This axiom cannot be
reconciled with the Christian teaching that God is the Creator of all things, for any feature
of our world that is seen as necessarily applying to Gods being (like space and time)
cannot then be the work of his hand, but instead become a condition of that making.
35
41
primordial and consequent states is found in God; no intermediary exists

between the absolute God and the conditional world.37
In the second half of this opening treatise on the one God, concerning the
divine operations (ST I, qq. 14-26), Aquinas expands the understanding of divine
activity beyond the terms of general causality and into the more proper terms of
the personal operations of one who is both intelligent and free. Of course, the
hermeneutics of divine simplicity and fullness of perfection continue to apply;
God can be said to be understanding and willing because these operations
involve no composition (potentiality) or imperfection.38 In the case of God, since
he exists simply and perfectly, he understands and wills simply and perfectly.
Indeed, in God alone to exist is to understand and to will. To express it in a more
appropriate active tense: as God exists, so he understands, so he wills
necessarily, supremely, always, etc. No operations other than these two are
comparable in simplicity and perfection as the act of existing itself.
It is because God is the act of existence itself that God perfectly knows
himself with supreme comprehension and wills his own goodness with the
awesome fullness of love. Regarding divine knowing, Aquinas argument rests
37
It seems to me that the weakness of the Thomistic response to process thought

that emphasizes the distinction between the entitive order of Gods being and the
intentional order of Gods knowing and willing of the world is that it tends to assume,
and perhaps even promote, this idea that if God is truly immanent and active in the world
there must be a difference between God in himself and God for us. Yet even as it is
theologically proper to acknowledge the reality of change and diversity in what God
accomplishes for us in history, this does not mean that one must apply to God the
changes and conditions of how things occur to the way God operates. Since time and
space do not measure God, but he determines them, his reality and agency must not be
understood according to their exigencies, but in accordance with his own.
38
See the objections and responses to ST I, q. 14, aa. 1-5 & q. 19, aa. 1 & 2 which
deny any potency, composition, external movement or imperfection to these divine
operations; cf. also q. 14, a. 8 & q. 19, a. 4 which exclude a cause outside of God for
these acts. Aquinas also insists that these operations are immanent so that, for
simplicitys sake, their perfection lies in the act themselves, not in any external resultant
term (q. 14, prologue). Similarly, note Aquinas insistence that the act of understanding
involves no inherent dualism of the mind knowing and object known: intelligibile in actu
est intellectus in actu (ST I, q. 14, a. 2). Throughout his discussion of the divine
operations it is crucial to realize that though Aquinas will liken these internal operations
to movements (anticipating the discussion of the Trinitarian processions), yet they are not
movements involving change over space or time (ST I, q. 14, a. 2, ad 2). They are
dynamic in that activity is occurring, but said activity is without beginning, sequence or
end. For a discussion of how Aquinas felt free enough to predicate movement of the
immutable God, see Dodds, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Motion of the Motionless
God, 238-41.
42
on the truth that both the minds power to know (strength of intellect) and the
knowability of the object (depth of intelligibility) are directly proportional to
their degree of immateriality or actuality (ST I, q. 14, a. 1). Being unsurpassable in
act, the ipsum esse subsistens is thus simultaneously the pure power to
comprehend and the pure intelligibility of what is comprehensible: God is
perfect acuity of perfect lucidity.39 Similar reasoning is used to characterize
divine willing. Just as reality is the measure of a things truth and knowability, so
also is being the measure of a things goodness and desirability.40 Since there
cannot be anything more full of being, truth or goodness than the God whose
essence is subsistent existence, the divine will cannot love anything more than
the reality of God, the perfect good perfectly known. And since the act of God
excludes process, Gods willing cannot be a desiring of a good yet to be acquired,
but the loving of goodness already and always possessed as an ever is (ST I, q.19,
a. 1, ad 2). Gods willing of his own goodness is Gods restful act of delight in
being God.
As a theologian of the Creator, Aquinas is equally concerned with
explaining Gods knowledge and willing of creation. His key insight is to root
Gods understanding and willing of the world within his act of understanding
and willing himself.41 Once again it is divine simplicity and perfection that frame
Aquinas theological conception of how God knows and wills the world. Both
premises require that the world not be considered as another object adding to
Gods great wisdom or the willing of his own supremely resplendent goodness.
If the world could be said to inform Gods awareness and teach him what he
otherwise would not already know, his knowledge would be composite and
imperfect. Likewise, if the world could offer to God a desirable good not initially
and more eminently found in Gods own goodness, then the simplicity of the
divine will would be divided between two loves and the goodness of God would
be imperfect for being supplemented by something beyond him. God truly
knows and wills (loves) the world, but does so in the act of knowing and willing
39
ST I, q. 14, aa. 2-4; in Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species

intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem. (a. 4)
40
The faculty of the will is concomitant with understanding since, as intellectual
appetite or desire, to will is to love the good as known (ST I, q. 19, a. 1). The
interpenetration of the faculties of knowing and willing reflects the convertibility or
direct proportionality of being, truth and goodnessi.e., what exists, is true and good,
and conversely so (cf. ST I, q. 5, aa. 1-3; q. 16, a. 3; q. 79, a. 11, ad 2).
41
ST I, q. 14, aa. 5 & 6; q. 19, aa. 2 & 5. So as God understands things apart
from himself by understanding his own essence, so he wills things apart from himself by
willing his own goodness. (q. 19, a. 2, ad 2)
43
himself, for his essence contains all the intelligibility and goodness found by
likeness in creation.42 Denying that Gods knowing and willing is in any way
caused by the world not only maintains the necessity that God be the pure act
which the universe requires as its ultimate cause, it enfolds Gods creative
knowing and willing of us into the supremely blissful act of God being God.
Aquinas realizes that divine knowledge and will cannot depend even in
part upon a world that in its entirety depends upon God knowing and willing it
into existence. Divine knowledge is not derived from the universe, but rather,
like the artist, extends outward to produce it.43 Because the object of his selfunderstanding is the fullness of perfection, in knowing himself God knows all
there is to be known. For included in his knowing himself perfectly is Gods
knowing of himself as cause, and thus his knowing of all that he can effect. His
knowledge extends as far as his causality extends, which, because the proper
effect of his essence is being, means that God properly knows all things that exist
in any way, whether actually or possibly, down to the least minutiae.44 Thus in
his self-understanding God not only knows all that he actually creates, he knows
42
ST I, q. 14, a. 6: As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the

perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in
Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists
in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to
know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be
shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He
knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper
knowledge, in their distinction from each other. ST I, q. 19, a. 2: Thus, he wills both
himself to be, and other things to be; but himself as the end, and other things as ordained
to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers
therein. ST I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 2: Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself
only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything
else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from
Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by
willing His own goodness.
43
Charles Hartshorne has accused Aquinas of being inconsistent to the rules of
analogous theological predication on this point, arguing that since analogy requires some
likeness of our reality to the nature of God, then Gods knowledge must in some way be
dependent upon the world if our knowledge is going to reflect it in any way (Mans
Vision of God, and the Logic of Theism [Hamden, NY: Archon Books, 1964], 235-36).
Yet he seems to have reduced human knowledge to its acquisition, ignoring its retention
and application. The created analogy Aquinas gives for divine knowing is not human
learning, but the creative application of human knowledge in artistic productione.g.,
the house built in accordance with the architects originate idea for it (ST I, q. 14, a. 8).
44
ST I, q. 14, a. 11; cf. q. 14, a. 5 and q. 25, a. 3
44
all that his boundless power could create (ST I, q. 14, aa. 9 & 12). To know esse
essentially is to know whatever is, in all the senses and tenses is is used.
The operation of Gods willing of creation reflects the same dynamism:
what is properly willed is Gods own goodness, yet in that most sublime act all
that God wills other than himself is willed as well. His goodness is the reason of
his willing all other things. (q. 19, a. 4, ad 3) He freely wills the world in the
natural necessity of delightfully willing his own goodness. Thus in parallel to
how Gods knowledge causes, and is not caused by, created things, Gods will is
the cause of the good found in created things, rather than created goods
motivating the divine will to want them (q. 19, a. 5). His willing of creation in the
willing of his own goodness ensures that creation is a free, gratuitous, and
ordered act of Godfree because God necessarily wills only his own goodness (q.
19, aa. 3 & 4); gratuitous because God, infinitely satisfied with his own goodness,
seeks or needs nothing from creation (q. 20, a. 2); and ordered because God wills
creation on account of, and as a manifestation of, his own goodness (q. 22, aa. 1 &
2). In this way Aquinas conceives of the bountiful love of God for the world not
as a love that is attracted by created good, but as the love that causes the good
which makes created things lovable.45 It is pure gift-love, not acquisitional love.46
This theological conception of Gods relation to this world is simply the
working out of the implications of faiths claim that the world is Gods creation,
made from nothing by his power, in accordance with his wisdom, on account of
his goodness. The divine-world relation is not mutual, precisely because such
mutuality or reciprocity would mean that God is not really Creator. For example,
if God were to come to know what will happen in the world only from the actual
outcomes of contingent events, then the world could not spring forth from the
Creators knowledge and will. Part of it at least would proceed from his
ignorance, and as a consequence the whole of it could not be grounded in his
love. Or to say that God is affected by the world, and receives some good from
the world that he otherwise did not eternally possess, is to radically change the
reason for the world from the pure gratuity of the Creator to a utilitarian need on
45
ST I, q. 19, a. 2: To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence,
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that
God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the
cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we
will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness,
whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love.
46
ST I, q. 44, a. 4: But it does not belong to the first agent, who is agent only, to
act for the acquisition of some end; he intends only to communicate his perfection, which
is his goodness.
45
the part of God for some good (in process thought: divine actualization) he
cannot possess otherwise. It also removes the end of creation out of God himself
(where humanity comes to share and rest in unchanging divine life) into a neverending process of incremental aggrandizement of the God-world reality. The act
of creation cannot involve or lead to a mutual relation between God and the
world without contradicting the very nature of such an act as one of absolute
origination and ultimate culmination. Happily, given that it is only a God who is
pure act of existence, understanding, loving, perfection that can create, the
Creator-creature relation is truly dynamic even though it is not mutual.
To grasp how this relation is also dynamic on the side of creation
without making passive the God who is pure actwe must now see how this
theology of God grounds and shapes Aquinas understanding of all that
proceeds out from and returns back to God.
III.
Ipsum esse subsistens Foundation of the Summa theologiae
What impact does this theology of God have on the rest of the Summa
theologiae, as the inquiry moves on from discussing God himself to things in their
relation to God? Let me offer first a few general remarks that suggest its
influence in various ways, before specifically elucidating one important point
where this theology of God explicitly grounds the explanation Aquinas offers
that of the relation of creation to God in the third section of the Prima pars.
First of all, the theological characterization of God that Aquinas presents
in the opening treatise is clearly determinative for how the whole Summa
unfolds. We have noted that Aquinas orders all the subject matter in the Summa
theologiae according to realitys relation to God as its beginning and end. This
ordering of creation to God (and the corresponding arrangement of the theology)
is possible only if God is ipsum esse subsistens. Only as absolutely simplicity and
the fullness of perfection can God be the singular, ultimate origin of creation and
the sole exemplar of the grand diversity within it. His simple-perfect essence is
the simultaneous one and many the ancients realized the world required,
without any of the further, necessary emanations postulated in neo-Platonism.47
47
Because Aquinas identifies oneness, existence, goodness, understanding and

willing in God as the divine essence itself, his theology can transcend the thought of
Plotinus, whose supreme, the One, had to be conceived as above being, understanding
and goodness because the latter were held to involve some dualism. Cf. The Essential
Plotinus: Representative Treatises from The Enneads, trans. by Elmer OBrien
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1975; facsimile reprint of The New American Library
edition, 1964).
46
Likewise, at creations other pole, it is due to his radical simplicity and perfection
that God can be the end of all things, the one transcendent vanishing point to
which the multiple and various trajectories inherent in all things converge.
According to Aquinas, order is required when a diverse many proceed from one
source,48 and order is possible for the many and different only if all have a
common, transcendent end.49 The theology of God expounded in the opening
treatise intends to show how God meets both conditions for the order of the
world. With such a theology of God as origin and end, it makes eminent sense to
structure ones theological exposition in the pattern of an exitus et reditus.
Besides being responsible for the structure of the whole theological
presentation, this theology of God bears a general influence upon particular
points of discussion within each part of the Summa theologiae. In the Prima pars,
this theology of the one God is proper preparation for the treatise on the Trinity,
for only such a radical simplicity that is never simplistic or monadic can
adequately exclude a tritheistic understanding of the Trinity. Also, the
application of the hermeneutic of simplicity/perfection to the operations of God
is a necessary prelude to the discussion of the processions in the Trinity, which
are likened to these two conscious operations.50 In the Prima secundae, the
discussion of grace presupposes an understanding of how God is the Act behind
all created movements and perfections.51 Grace can be seen as the perfection of
48
ST I, q. 42, a. 3: ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod

principium. Order always has reference to some principle. Cf. ST I, q. 36, a. 2; II-II, q.
26, a. 1.
49
De potentia Dei, 7, 9; SCG Bk. III, 64. For Aquinas, the order of the universe is
twofoldthe intrinsic order of its many parts to one another and to the whole, and the
order of the whole to God (ST I, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3).
50
Unless the operations of understanding and willing are immanent, simple (not
requiring introduction of composite elements), and perfect in themselves (its good
consisting in the very act itself), they could not be fitting analogies for the Trinitarian
processions. Furthermore, Aquinas theological reach to identify God with his acts of
understanding and willing leads him to identify each Person of the Trinity with his
personal processional act: the Father is the act of begetting, the Son is the act of being
begotten, and the Holy Spirit is the act of love spirated.
51
ST, I-II, q. 109, a. 1: all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are
reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a
corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be
moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by
necessity of nature. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover,
but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the
intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first,
47
nature, not the violation of human freedom, only with a theological

understanding of created reality as dependent upon and directed by God who is
pure act. In the Tertia pars, implicit behind Aquinas understanding of the salvific
agency of Christ is a comparison to the universal agency of God. As God is First,
Exemplary, and Final Cause of creation, so Christ is the principle, form and goal
of salvation.52 Like the simplicity and perfection of the one God, there is an
emphasis upon the indivisible unity and the fullness of perfection found in
Christ. In both cases Aquinas knows that a principle must be both one and
perfect if it is to be the true and universal agent of a work of such grand scale, be
it creation or redemption. Finally, it is not a stretch to claim that the focus of
Aquinas sacramental theology upon the effective operation of these signs of grace
arises from his initial concern to treat God as act.
Now let us turn to the treatise on creation, where Aquinas develops an
understanding of creation in relation to God who is pure act. Here he again
speaks of the relation of the world to its Creator, this time with a focus upon the
created term, which is defined as the mirror opposite of the One who is ipsum
esse subsistens. Aquinas grasps the nature of our reality theologicallythat is, as
fundamentally related to God its origin, exemplar, principal cause of its
advancement, and final end. The truth of creations relatedness to God is the
foundational premise impacting every theological discussion of created realities
which follow in the rest of the Summa theologiae.53 Since this work follows the
dynamic movement of creation from God to God by the Act that God is,
understanding this relation is crucial for appreciating the profound
understanding Aquinas has of Gods engagement with creation. Consequently,
we will look first at how Aquinas defines creation as a relation to God, and then
draw out some of its theological and cosmological implications.
At the very beginning of the treatise on creation (ST I, q. 44, a. 1), Aquinas
explicitly reminds the reader of the foundational point of his theology: God is
ipsum esse per se subsistens. What grounds his theology of God will ground his
theological understanding of the world. In marked contrast to Gods subsistent
existence, created reality is participant esse, or esse per participationem. When a
inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it
is moved by Him to act.
52
Note Aquinas use of first, efficient, exemplary and final causality in discussing
Christ as the agent of our salvation, and his use of participation in explaining our share in
his headship and work, in ST III, q. 3, a. 8; q. 8, aa. 1 & 5; q. 24, aa. 3 & 4; q. 48; q. 56,
aa. 1 & 2; q. 57, a. 6.
53
Cf. Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas, trans. by J. Murray and D.
OConnor (New York: Pantheon, 1957), 47-50.
48
thing possesses some characteristic that it does not have on account of its own
essence, it must receive it by an act of participation in another being that does
have it as proper to its own essence. Participation occurs by the patient sharing in
what the agent is essentially. Aquinas likens the relation of the world having its
existence from God to a hot iron bar having its heat from the fire of the forgein
both relations the dependent receives only by partaking in what essentially
belongs to the diffusive agent alone. Just as the iron bar grows cold again when
removed from the fire, so too would removing creation from contact with Gods
power mean the loss of what it partakes inthe very act of existing.54 Since only
that which is as simple and as perfect as God can be the essence of self-subsisting
existence, the world exists only by continually receiving its actuality from God.
A relation of the participating subject to the diffusive agent is absolutely
necessary for that which exists by participation. This relation cannot be limited
merely to an initial act of origination, since participation requires an ongoing
immersion in the essential agents act. Hence Aquinas defines creation as a
relation: creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem, ut ad principium
sui esse.55 As the foundational truth, this notion of relation indicates that to exist
in our case is to necessarily and radically depend upon God: it must be said that
every being in any way existing is from God. (q. 44, a. 1) This relation is
fundamental and inalienable, always presupposed for all created reality, from
the universe as a whole to the smallest particle in it. One can say that in a way
similar to the truth that God is, and does not have, existence, so the universe is,
and does not have, a relation to God.
In this understanding of the relation of the world to God, whose
contrasting terms are ipsum esse subsistens and esse per participationem, the latter
stands as pure recipient to the unceasing activity of former. The relation is not
mutual, not a reciprocal exchange, for it involves the recipient taking on a share
of what the agent already is. In such relations, it is also necessary that the
participated reality be proper to the very essence of the diffusive agent,
otherwise it simply could not be the agent of such an effect. Only the God who is
the essence of existence can be the Creator diffusing existence. As fire heats by
54
ST I, q. 44, a. 1. Aquinas also uses the following analogy: Now every creature
may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun
possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so
God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence;
whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.
(ST I, q. 104, a. 1)
55
ST I, q. 45, a. 3: creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator
as to the principle of its being.
49
being naturally hot, so God creates by being what God naturally is, the essential
act of existence. Since participation is a sharing in what is proper to the agents
essence, the act of diffusing is not an addendum to the agents being, a
supplemental role over and above what it is essentially. As fire does not change
(neither becoming nor doing something else) when the iron begins to share in its
heat, so too does Gods creative act mean no change in what he naturally is when
creation begins to partake in his existence. Thus the act of creating, since it is
simply the act of existence extended to the created, does not involve an
additional or supraessential activity on Gods part. It is the participating
recipient, not the diffusive agent, which is altogether different because of the
relation.
As a consequence, one can see how the act of creating does not add
anything to Gods simplicity and perfection. He is not something else or
something more by creating, since the act of creating involves nothing over and
above his very act of being God. In contrast to many theologians who write
about the God-world relation today, Aquinas does not posit change or
augmentation to the Creator on account of his bringing the world into existence.
And yet, there is in his position the same truth which contemporary theologians
of a mutable God have great concern to affirmnamely that the act of creating is
essential to God being God.56 Creating is not an accidental divine act, neither
lightly entered into nor superficially performed. And yet only Aquinas can
uphold the freedom of God vis--vis creation without making the act accidental
or whimsical. God creates by his own essence (which he is necessarily), yet he
creates freely, not by necessity. This is the profoundest sense of loveto act with
ones whole being, not because one must, but because one graciously commits
ones whole self to doing so.
In addition to the theological implications of the relation of esse per
participationem to ipsum esse subsistens, there are further cosmological inferences
to make. Because the relation that creation is to God is absolute and necessary, it
neither changes nor lessens over time. It is as true of creations current and future
states as it is was of its initiation. Aquinas does not say that creation in the
creature is a relation as to the principle of its becoming or beginning, but relation
as to the principle of its being.57 In line with this point, existence by participative
relation to the Creator is as true of created effect as the created cause. That is to
56
By essential I mean by the very same essential act that God is God, not
necessarily. For a contemporary insistence on this point, see Fiddes, 71-75.
57
ST I, q. 45, a. 3; cf. ST I, q. 104, a. 1 for Aquinas explanation of the difference
between the causing of the becoming of an effect and the causing of its being.
50
say, a things dependence upon a natural cause for its becoming does not mean it
depends any less upon Gods essential existence for its being. Indeed, the
dependence of all things in this world upon prior causes for their existence is the
universal indicator that all created things are composites of essence and an act of
existence, and therefore in intimate need to participate in the fire of Gods
essential existence. While the form of an effect comes from the secondary, natural
cause, the actual existence can only come from the First Agent who is the act of
existence essentially.58 All this is only to say that natural causation (as well as the
scientific explanation natural causation makes possible) does not in any way
supplant the causation of God the first cause. Instead of increasing the distance
between created effects and the first cause, secondary causality only confirms the
absolute bond between any created thing of participated existence and the God
who is essential existence itself.
More than just the sustaining cause of all created existence, the God who
contains all perfections as ipsum esse subsistens is also the exemplary cause of all
created form, and the final cause of all things (ST I, q. 44, aa. 3 & 4). Here
Aquinas repeats the themes first brought to light in the discussion of Gods
perfection/goodness (ST I, qq. 4-6) and ideas (q. 15), only this time it is to
demonstrate not that God is truth and goodness itself but that creatures have
their intelligibility and teleological goodness by participation in Gods essence. In
addition to the act of existence, the intelligibility (form) and goodness (end) of
creatures depend upon Gods essential act.59 With his own essence as the
template for every pattern of intelligibility found in created things, God creates
58
Cf. ST I, q. 104, 1: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause.
But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the becoming of its effect, but not
directly of its being. Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the others form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form,
which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form
for as much as it is in matterin other words, it may be the cause that this matter receive
this form. And this is to be the cause of becoming, as when man beget man, and fire cause
fire. And ad 1: Being naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence
of divine action. Note that because created causes are insufficient on their own to cause
the existence of their effects, the theological option of deisma God whose activity is
restricted to merely an act of world originationis fundamentally impossible for a world
containing change. This is a case when the metaphysics rightly understood prevents a
false theological conclusion drawn from the scientific understanding of nature.
59
But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it
participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. (ST I, q. 15, a. 2) Now it
is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by
participation. (ST I, q. 103, a. 2)
51
a great diversity of kinds of beings so that the universe as a whole can best
suggest the depth and breadth of Gods own simple perfection.60 This wide-scale
diversity of forms given by God to beautify the universe in turn opens up,
through the dynamism of natural causality, to the pursuit of greater perfections
or further ends. As stated previously, the Good that God is essentially is the
cause of the goodness or desirability of the result pursued in created operations,
so that Aquinas can dare to say that every creature seeks God simply in acting to
attain that which it naturally desires as the fulfillment of its form.61 Thus, through
the initial perfection of a thing (its form), and all the subsequent perfections it
acquires (supplemental goodness), a creature relates to God as its exemplar and
end. There is no being, no intelligibility, no good in the universe that is not from,
by and for (unto) God as participated.
There is still one further aspect of creations relation to God, one which
above all else shows the active engagement of God with his creation. As pure
Act, God is the universal agent of all action in creation (ST I, q. 104, a. 5). By
Gods act all creatures are moved to operate because he is the Cause of all
causality; his Godness is the Event underlying all events in the world. In
contrast to a current tendency to think that potential agents can be selfactualizing, Aquinas holds that every single potency, including the potency to
act, requires an agent in act to bring it to realization. Because all created causes
are agents that come to act, they can reach the state of actually causing only by
being brought there by another already in act. Only the one who is ipsum esse
subsistens is always in act, and thus God alone is universal cause ultimately
bringing all potential agents to their act. Within creation, operationi.e., the
state of actually causingis a participated reality, requiring a sharing in the One
who is always in act. Et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis
ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo.62 God
60
ST I, q. 47, a. 1; cf. ST I, q. 22, a. 4.

ST I, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God
Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine
being. ST I, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some
good thing, whether this desire be intellectual, sensible, or natural (i.e. without
knowledge), because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in
the likeness to God. Cf. ST I, q. 103, a. 2.
62
ST I-II, q. 109, a. 1: Hence, no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual
nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God.
61
52
moves every creature to act in accordance with its own nature. In our case, he
moves us to know and to will.63
To fully explain how God as pure Act causes the integral acts of creatures
is beyond the scope of this paper.64 A warning can be given, though, about the
danger of trying to conceive it imaginatively as some kind of divine push or
charge energizing all created causes. In fact, the universal causality of God as
the pure Act actualizing creation is not just a matter of effective or efficient
causality, for it presupposes and involves all the distinct dimensions of the
creatures participative relation to God discussed above: God as the sustaining
cause of all created existence, the exemplary cause of all created forms, the final
cause of all ends pursued. Furthermore, that Gods causality is universal does
not mean that it is exclusivecrowding out the genuinely effective action of the
natural cause. Since in the act of creating God intends to diffuse his goodness by
a broad and rich participation, God acts to make creatures true causes of their
effects because the highest form of imitation of the One who acts for the good of
others is to make them to be a cause of anothers good. Aquinas affirmation of
the universal reach of Gods causation is not to the detriment of created causality,
but to uphold its integrity by relating it to its ultimate cause.
Thus God gives to the world not only its existence, order, goodness and
beauty, but even gives all causes their acts by which they fulfill their potential
and contribute to the worlds completion. Nothing in the world is or acts apart
63
What is true in terms of Aquinas cosmology is also true of his anthropology:

God acts so that the human person can act, intelligently and freely. God is the first,
exemplary and final cause of all our acts of understanding the true (ST I, q. 79, aa. 2-4; q.
105, a. 3) and willing the good (ST I, q. 83, a. 1; q. 105, a. 4). Both operations are
participations in the divine operations of understanding and willing that God is. This
double active participation is perfected through grace (faith and charity) and glory
(beatific vision), until men and women share most profoundly in the mysterious life of
God.
64
For a more detailed explanation on divine universal agency, see Bernard J.F.
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas,
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds. [Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,
vol. 1] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), I-4: St Thomass Theory of
Operation, pp. 66-93. Also requiring further explanation that cannot be supplied here is
how the universal agency of God in no way implies divine causality of evil (cf. ST I, q.
49). Aquinas attributes to God causal responsibility only of what exists, is true, and is
good. Evil, as a privation of proper good and a violation of the order of the universe to
God, is not itself a thing or act which as such requires divine exemplarity or agency. Evil
is rather the corruption of a thing or the disorder of an act. As the privation of being, it
does not have any cause per se, let alone the per se cause of existence itself (cf. ST I, q. 5,
a. 3, ad 2; q. 19, a. 9).
53
from God, the fundamental a priori of creation. God is the ultimate condition for
the very possibility of all things in the universe, precisely because he is ipsum
esse subsistens. While contemporary theologians have underscored the absolute
transcendence of Aquinas theology God, they have overlooked the radical
immanence of this God. But when understood correctly, the metaphysically
pure attributes of divine simplicity and perfection (as well as immutability,
infinity and the like) are as crucial for affirming the intimate, active presence of
God in creation as they are for affirming Gods transcendent otherness over the
world. Rightly understood, these attributes do not imply a God too remote to
care for or act in the world, but rather that divine concern and actionwhich are
proper to him because he is perfect actoccur in a transcendent manner
incomparable to any agency found in the world. Since God transcends space and
time, his transcendence cannot be an infinite distance from creation; since he
transcends change, the dynamism of his agency is not arrested in a static
immobility for being altogether immutable.
Here is where the notion of participation proves so valuable, for by
employing it Aquinas can convey the radically active presence of God in creation
without conceiving it in a manner that collapses divine agency into the categories
and confines of natural causation or processes. Creation is placed within Gods
dynamics, related to God as God is, rather than God made to fit the categories of
the world. Even as participation expresses the immersion of creation in Gods
act, it also allows for the proper distance of transcendence between God and the
worldnot in terms of special remoteness but in terms of non-identity or
reciprocity. Participation requires that each term of the relation be of an entirely
different order: the participating in relation to the essential. Creation, because
every perfection it possesses is by a thoroughgoing sharing, cannot be equivalent
in any way to God, who is what he is by his own essence. Participation keeps the
order of created reality distinct from the order of divine being, yet
simultaneously expresses the dependent, inseparable, immersed relation of
creation to God, as well as the active, transcendently immanent agency of God on
behalf of the world. At the same time the notion provides a theological
explanation of divine action in the world that in no way interferes with or
compromises the natural causality which science endeavors to explain without
reference to supernatural causes. The integrity of natural causality is preserved,
even as it is theologically understood to depend upon Gods universal action, not
his non-interference or inactivity. The world is suffused with the active presence
of God, and yet not by that presence prevented from being itself and acting
according to its own integrity.
IV.
54
Conclusion
It is a hallmark of his theology that Aquinas understands created things

with a genuine respect of and attentiveness to their own proper natural integrity.
Yet he also operates with a theological perspective that understands created
reality as a multifaceted real relation to God, the originating and sustaining
principle of its existence, the type of its intelligibility, the cause of its causal
action, and the ultimate goal of its perfection. This relation is one of created
participation in the divine essence of subsistent existence, which implies that
God is intimately involved in creation, and creation actively immersed in the
divine. To appreciate the profundity of this theological cosmology one must
understand and appreciate Aquinas theology of God. Admittedly this means
grappling with some subtle and demanding philosophical thinking that loses the
immediacy of the biblical God by abandoning the stage of salvation history. And
at first blush his use of Aristotelian metaphysics can seem to conclude to a selfsatisfied god remotely indifferent to the world. Yet his theology of the one God is
actually faithful to the biblical revelation of God as Yahweh, since it rests entirely
upon the judgment that God must be ipsum esse subsistens if this conditional
world is to exist at all. Working out the implications of the doctrine of creation,
Aquinas uses metaphysics to depict God in active relation to the world without
reducing Gods mystery to that relation, nor reducing the dynamics of that
relation to those found in the world. After all, space and time are Gods creation,
not his categories. God is fully divine without the world, and yet is his own
eternal act on behalf of the world. In this way, Gods ineffably exalted
transcendence, and his profoundly attentive and active immanence, are identical
in him as one simple and perfect act. God is, and God is the diffusive Fire at the
heart of all created things: the living Fire of the worlds birth, the powerful Fire
driving its advance, and the glorious Fire of its ultimate destiny.
Dr. Michael A. Hoonhout

Associate Professor of Systematic Theology
Seminary of Immaculate Conception
Huntington, NY
55
Bibliography
Aquinas, Thomas. Qustiones disputat de potentia Dei, 3 vol. English translation: On
the Power of God. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1932-34.
___________. Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three: Providence: Part I. Translation by
Vernon J. Burke. Summa Contra Gentiles. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1991.
___________. Summa theologiae, 5 vol. Ottawa: Studii Generalis O. Pr., 1941 [Piana text
of 1570 with some Leonine variants]). English translation: Summa Theologica, 3
vol. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York:
Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947.
Burrell, David B. Aquinas: God and Action. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979.
Clarke, W. Norris. A New Look at the Immutability of God. Pages 43-72 in God
Knowable and Unknowable. Edited by Robert J. Roth. New York: Fordham
University Press, 1973.
Cousins, Ewert, ed. Process Theology: Basic Writings. New York: Newman Press, 1972.
De Nys, Martin J. God, Creatures, and Relations: Revisiting Classical Theism. Journal
of Religion 81 (2001): 595-614.
Dodds, Michael J. St. Thomas Aquinas and the Motion of the Motionless God. New
Blackfriars 68 (1987): 233-42.
___________. The Unchanging God of Love: A Study of the Teaching of St. Thomas
Aquinas on Divine Immutability in View of Certain Contemporary Criticisms of
This Doctrine. Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1986.
Emery, Giles. Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in Saint Thomas
Aquinas? The Thomist 64 (2000): 521-63.
Fiddes, Paul. The Creative Suffering of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.Gunton,
Colin E. Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes. Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003.
Hanratty, Gerald. Divine Immutability and Impassibility Revisited. Pages 137-62 in At
the Heart of the Real. Edited by F. ORourke. Dublin: Irish Academic Press,
1992.
56
Hartshorne, Charles. Mans Vision of God, and the Logic of Theism. Hamden, NY:
Archon Books, 1964.
Hill, William J. Does the World Make a Difference to God? The Thomist 38 (1974):
146-64.
___________. On Knowing the Unknowable God. Review of Knowing the
Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas by David Burrell. The
Thomist, 51 (1987): 699-709.
Johnson, Elizabeth A. She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological
Discourse. New York: Herder & Herder, 1993.
Kelly, Anthony J. God: How Near a Relation? Thomist 34 (1970): 191-229.
Kondoleon, Theodore J. The Immutability of God: Some Recent Challenges. The New
Scholasticism 58/3 (1984): 293-315.
Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St
Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
Pailin, David. The Utterly Absolute and the Totally Related: Change in God. New
Blackfriars 68 (1987): 243-55.
Pieper, Josef. The Silence of St. Thomas. Translated by J. Murray and D. OConnor. New
York: Pantheon, 1957.
Plotinus. The Essential Plotinus: Representative Treatises from The Enneads. Translated
by Elmer OBrien. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1975; facsimile reprint
of The New American Library edition, 1964.
Rahner, Karl. Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate. Pages 83-84 in
Theological Investigations, vol. 4. Translated by K. Smyth. New York: Crossroad,
1982.
___________. The Trinity, Translated by Joseph Donceel. New York: Crossroad, 1997.
Random House Websters College Dictionary. New York: Random House, 1992.
Sia, Santiago. The Doctrine of Gods Immutability: Introducing the Modern Debate.
New Blackfriars 68 (1987): 226-29.
Stokes, Walter. Is God Really Related to the World? Pages 145-51 in Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Association 39 (1965).
57
Weinandy, Thomas G. Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation. Still
River, MA: St. Bede's Publications, 1985.
___________. Does God Suffer? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. New York: Free Press, 1969.

Aquinas' Theology of The God Who Is

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aquinas' Theology of The God Who Is

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aquinas' Theology of The God Who Is

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ABSTRACT

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is:

For various contemporary theologians Aquinas claim

Seat of Wisdom, Issue 1 (Spring 2010): 27-57

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is:

After a period of relative neglect following the Second Vatican Council,

Gerald Hanratty, Divine Immutability and Impassibility Revisited, in At the

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

suggest agreement with contemporary critics that absolute divine immutability

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae [ST], 5 vol. (Ottawa: Studii Generalis O.

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

The absolute simplicity and perfect fullness of ipsum esse

This liability of misinterpreting sections of the Summa theologiae read in

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

The fundamental premise of the argument is stated twice in ST I, q. 2, a. 3:

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

origination the ultimate principle must be outside the category of received

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Aquinas summarizes the relation of creation to Gods goodness in this way:

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

of abstract names fall under the hermeneutic of divine simplicity, while

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

primordial and consequent states is found in God; no intermediary exists

It seems to me that the weakness of the Thomistic response to process thought

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

ST I, q. 14, aa. 2-4; in Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

ST I, q. 14, a. 6: As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Ipsum esse subsistens Foundation of the Summa theologiae

Because Aquinas identifies oneness, existence, goodness, understanding and

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

ST I, q. 42, a. 3: ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

nature, not the violation of human freedom, only with a theological

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

ST I, q. 47, a. 1; cf. ST I, q. 22, a. 4.

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

What is true in terms of Aquinas cosmology is also true of his anthropology:

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

It is a hallmark of his theology that Aquinas understands created things

Dr. Michael A. Hoonhout

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

Aquinas Theology of the God Who Is

Seat of Wisdom (Spring 2010)

You might also like