Cir Vs CA and Alhambra Ind
Cir Vs CA and Alhambra Ind
Cir Vs CA and Alhambra Ind
declaring again that its decision was final. On 8 July 1991 private respondent paid under
protest the disputed ad valorem tax in the sum of P 520,835.29.
[2]
In its Decision of 1 December 1993 the Court of Tax Appeals ordered petitioner to
refund to private respondent the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Eight
Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos and Twenty-Nine Centavos (P 520,835.29) representing
erroneously paid ad valorem tax for the period 2 November 1990 to 22 January 1991.
[3]
The Court of Tax Appeals explained that the subject deficiency excise tax
assessment resulted from private respondents use of the computation mandated by BIR
Ruling 473-88 dated 4 October 1988 as basis for computing the fifteen percent (15%)
ad valorem tax due on its removals of cigarettes from 2 November 1990 to 22 January
1991. BIR Circular 473-88 was issued by Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos to
Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation allowing the latter to exclude the value-added tax
(VAT) in the determination of the gross selling price for purposes of computing the ad
valorem tax of its cigar and cigarette products in accordance with Sec. 127 of the Tax
Code as amended by Executive Order No. 273 which provides as follows:
Sec. 142. Cigar and cigarettes - x x x x For purposes of this section, manufacturer's or
importer's registered wholesale price shall include the ad valorem tax imposed in
paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) hereof and the amount intended to cover the value added
tax imposed under Title IV of this Code.
Petitioner sought to apply the revocation retroactively to
private respondent's removals of cigarettes for the period starting 2 November 1990 to 22
January 1991 on the ground that private respondent allegedly acted in bad faith which is an
exception to the rule on non-retroactivity of BIR Rulings.
[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals holding that the
retroactive application of BIR Ruling 017-91 cannot be allowed since private
respondent did not act in bad faith; private respondents computation under BIR Ruling
473-88 was not shown to be motivated by ill will or dishonesty partaking the nature of
fraud; hence, this petition.
Petitioner imputes error to the Court of Appeals: (1) in failing to consider that private
respondents reliance on BIR Ruling 473-88 being contrary to Sec. 142 of the Tax
Code does not confer vested rights to private respondent in the computation of its ad
valorem tax; (2) in failing to consider that good faith and prejudice to the taxpayer in
cases of reliance on a void BIR Ruling is immaterial and irrelevant and does not place
the government in estoppel in collecting taxes legally due; (3) in holding that private
respondent acted in good faith in applying BIR Ruling 473-88; and, (4) in failing to
consider that the assessment of petitioner is presumed to be regular and the claim for
tax refund must be strictly construed against private respondent for being in
derogation of sovereign authority.
Petitioner claims that the main issue before us is whether private respondent's reliance on a void
BIR ruling conferred upon the latter a vested right to apply the same in the computation of its ad
valorem taxand claim for tax refund. Sec. 142 (d) of the Tax Code, which provides for the
inclusion of the VAT in the tax base for purposes of computing the 15% ad valorem tax, is the
applicable law in the instant case as it specifically applies to the manufacturer's wholesale price
of cigar and cigarette products and not Sec. 127 (b) of the Tax Code which applies in general to
the wholesale of goods or domestic products.Sec. 142 being a specific provision applicable to
cigar and cigarettes must perforce prevail over Sec. 127 (b), a general provision of law insofar as
the imposition of the ad valorem tax on cigar and cigarettesis concerned. Consequently, the
application of Sec. 127 (b) to the wholesale price of cigar and cigarette products for purposes of
computing the ad valorem tax is patently erroneous. Accordingly, BIR Ruling 473-88 is void ab
initio as it contravenes the express provisions of Sec. 142 (d) of the Tax Code.
[5]
[6]
Petitioner contends that BIR Ruling 473-88 being an erroneous interpretation of Sec. 142 (b) of
the Tax Code does not confer any vested right to private respondent as to exempt it from the
retroactive application of BIR Ruling 017-91. Thus Art. 2254 of the New Civil Code is explicit
that "(n)o vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law x x
x x " It is argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that retroactive application cannot be
made since private respondent acted in good faith. The following circumstances would show that
private respondents reliance on BIR Ruling 473-88 was induced by ill will: first, private
respondent despite knowledge that Sec. 142 of the Tax Code was the specific provision
applicable still shifted its accounting method pursuant to Sec. 127 (b) of the Tax Code;
and, second, the shift in accounting method was made without any prior consultation with the
BIR.
[7]
[8]
It is further contended by petitioner that claims for tax refund must be construed against private
respondent. A tax refund being in the nature of a tax exemption is regarded as in derogation of
the sovereign authority and is strictly construed against private respondent as the same partakes
the nature of a tax exemption. Tax exemptions cannot merely be implied but must
be categorically and unmistakably expressed.
[9]
However, well-entrenched is the rule that rulings and circulars, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would have no retroactive
application if to so apply them would be prejudicial to the taxpayers.
[10]
The applicable law is Sec. 246 of the Tax Code which provides -
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Kapunan, and Hermosisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
[1]
CA Decision penned by Justice Quirino Abad Santos Jr., concurred in by Justices Antonio Martinez and
Godardo Jacinto, pp.1-2; Rollo, pp.50-51.
[2]
[3]
CTA Decision penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto Acosta with Associate Judges Manuel Gruba and
Ramon de Veyra concurring.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Telefunken Semiconductor Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 103915, 23
October 1995, 249 SCRA 401; Bank of America v. CA, G.R. No. 103092, 21 July 1994, 234
SCRA 302; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CTA, No. L-44007, 20 March 1991, 195 SCRA
444; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mega General Merchandising Corp., G.R. No. 69136,
30 September 1988, 166 SCRA 166; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burroughs, G.R. No.
66653, 19 June 1986, 142 SCRA 324; ABS-CBN v. CTA, G.R. No. 52306, 12 October 1981, 108
SCRA 142.
[11]
PAL v. Miano, G.R. No. 106664, 8 March 1995, 242 SCRA 235; Far East Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 108164,
23 February 1995, 241 SCRA 671; Samson v. CA, G.R. No. 108245, 25 November 1994, 238
SCRA 397; Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 346; Ong
Yiu v. CA, No. L-40597, 29 June 1979, 91 SCRA 223; Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, No. L18805, 14 August 1967, 20 SCRA 987.
[12]