Technical Manual Overtopping Protection For Dams
Technical Manual Overtopping Protection For Dams
Technical Manual Overtopping Protection For Dams
Preface
Preface
The original design of a dam may be reevaluated for a number of reasons,
including the occurrence of an incident or unusual load, the availability of new
information, the refinement of certain design requirements or guidelines, the
adoption of risk-based criteria, or as part of a regular dam safety program. During
this process, the design flood may be revised, resulting in a flood that is larger
than was used for the original design. In many cases, analysis may show that the
revised flood will result in the dam being overtopped due to insufficient reservoir
storage and/or release capabilities.
There are many methods available for accommodating larger revised floods.
However, some of the more common methods, such as increasing reservoir
storage by raising the dam crest or increasing release capability by increasing the
spillway discharge capacity, can often be cost prohibitive or impractical. To
address this situation, new design approaches have been developed that may allow
for the dam to be safely overtopped. The design and construction of overtopping
protection for dams is increasingly being viewed as a viable alternative to larger
spillways as developing watersheds or changing hydrology produce higher peak
flows and the need for additional spillway discharge capacity for existing dams.
Overtopping protection may be an attractive alternative because of its potential
economic advantages and may offer an economical solution to a hydrologic
deficiency that would otherwise not be addressed. Maintaining the existing
hydraulic conditions at the dam to the extent possible is also increasingly
important as downstream river corridors are developed in close proximity to the
channel. This document assumes that a hydrologic deficiency exists at a dam and
that traditional approaches to safely accommodate a larger design flood have first
been investigated.
The decision to pursue overtopping protection for an existing dam must give
strong consideration to the potential risk of failure of the protection system, which
could quickly lead to a full breach of the dam. This is especially true for
embankment dams, in the sense that a small defect or design flaw could lead to
catastrophic failure once the embankment is exposed to the overtopping flow. An
evaluation of this type of risk must be incorporated into the decision-making
process, whether qualitatively or quantitatively.
A decision to use overtopping protection in place of improving the service
spillway, imposing a reservoir restriction, raising the dam crest, or constructing an
auxiliary spillway cannot be made lightly. Overtopping protection should
generally be reserved for situations with some combination of very low annual
probability of occurrence (e.g., 1 in 100), physical or environmental constraints
on constructing other methods of flood conveyance, and prohibitive cost of other
alternatives; or where downstream consequences of dam failure are demonstrated
i
to be low. A careful analysis of all potential failure modes for the dam and
appurtenant features must be performed for both the existing (baseline) conditions
and for the proposed modified conditions.
Alternatives for overtopping protection may use a variety of different materials,
such as roller-compacted concrete, cast-in-place concrete, precast concrete blocks,
gabions, vegetative cover, turf reinforcement mats, synthetic turf revetments,
flow-through rockfill, reinforced rockfill, riprap, and various types of
geosynthetic materials including geomembranes, geocells, and fabric-formed
concrete. Not all materials are applicable in every situation. Significant research
and hydraulic testing has been conducted on many of these materials, but since
most overtopping protection is designed to function at an infrequent recurrence
interval, practical experience on constructed projects that have been subjected to
overtopping flows is limited to date. New materials and methods of analysis are
always being developed, so designers may need to rely upon manufacturers
design recommendations for these new materials, always mindful of the
limitations of product testing and analysis. Independent analysis should always be
considered as appropriate.
Many organizations, such as the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), have conducted extensive model testing
on a variety of overtopping protection alternatives. In addition, these
organizations have completed evaluations of the performance of full-size,
prototype structures and have modified designs to accommodate overtopping.
Often, the results of these studies are not well known outside of these
organizations. Due to the absence of any single recognized standard for
overtopping protection alternatives for dams, there is some inconsistency in the
design and construction rationale. In an effort to correct this problem, this manual
has been prepared to collect and disseminate information and experience that is
current and has a technical consensus. The goal of this manual is to provide a
nationally recognized source to promote greater consistency between similar
project designs, facilitate more effective and consistent review of proposed
designs, and aid in the design of safer, more reliable facilities. This manual is not
intended to provide detailed design procedures for all potential applications.
Information on dam overtopping alternatives is dispersed in a variety of sources
such as text books, handbooks, and reference manuals. These sources may not
reflect recent advances in research and design, published professional papers, and
lessons learned from constructed projects. The authors reviewed most of the
available information on dam overtopping protection alternatives in preparing this
manual, and have attempted to condense and summarize the body of existing
information, and provide a clear and concise synopsis of todays best practices.
Where conflicting information was available, the authors focused on what they
judged to be the best practice and included that judgment in this manual. Where
detailed documentation exists, the authors cited it to avoid duplicating extensive
technical details. Where applicable, the reader is directed to other consensus
ii
Preface
accepted references for additional guidance. This manual is intended for use by
personnel familiar with dams, such as dam designers, inspectors, construction
oversight personnel, dam safety engineers, and decision-makers.
Designers should continue to explore and investigate the subject of overtopping of
dams. No single publication can cover all of the requirements and conditions that
can be encountered during design and construction. Therefore, it is critically
important that when an overtopping protection alternative is considered, the
designer must clearly understand all aspects of its design, construction, and
anticipated future performance.
The authors caution the users of this manual that sound engineering judgment
should always be applied when using references. The authors have strived to
avoid referencing any technical material that is considered outdated for use in
modern designs. However, the user should be aware that certain portions of
references cited in this manual may have become outdated in regards to design
and construction aspects and/or philosophies. While these references still may
contain valuable information, users should not assume that the entire reference is
suitable for design and construction purposes.
The authors used many sources of information in developing this manual,
including:
Published design standards and technical publications of the various
Federal and State agencies and organizations involved with the
preparation of this manual.
Published professional papers and articles from selected authors, technical
journals and publications, and organizations.
Experience of the individuals, Federal and State agencies, and
This manual is available from FEMA in digital versatile disc (DVD) format. The
DVD includes built-in Adobe Acrobat Reader software, hyperlinks, and search
capabilities. A hyperlink is a highlighted word or image within the manual which,
when clicked, takes the user to another place within the manual or to another
location altogether. Hyperlinks are especially useful when the user wants to see
the full reprint of a cited reference or the exact location in a reference from which
the material was cited. The DVD contains the manual and portable document
format (PDF) copies of selected cited references available in the public domain.
For other references, users may want to contact the author or publisher directly for
reprint information.
iii
This manual can also be downloaded from the FEMA website at:
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/damfailure/publications.shtm.
This manual is intended solely for noncommercial and educational purposes.
Suggestions for changes, corrections, or updates to this manual should be directed
to:
Bureau of Reclamation
Denver Federal Center, Bldg. 67
6th Avenue and Kipling Street
Denver CO 80225-0007
Attention: Tony Wahl (86-68460)
[email protected]
Please reference specific pages, paragraphs, or figures within the manual, together
with proposed new material in any convenient format. Sources of proposed new
material should be completely cited. Submission of material signifies permission
for use in a future revised edition of this manual, but credit for such new material
will be given where appropriate.
The material presented in this manual has been prepared in accordance with
recognized engineering practices. The guidance in this manual should not be used
without first securing competent advice with respect to its suitability for any given
application. The publication of the material contained herein is not intended as
representation or warranty on the part of individuals or agencies involved, or any
other person named herein, that this information is suitable for any general or
particular use, or promises freedom from infringement of any patent or patents.
Anyone making use of this information assumes all liability from such use. Any
use of trade names and trademarks in this manual is for descriptive purposes only
and does not constitute endorsement. The information contained herein regarding
commercial products or firms may not be used for advertising or promotional
purposes and is not to be construed as an endorsement of any product or firm.
iv
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as the lead agency for the
National Dam Safety Program (NDSP), sponsored the development of this
manual in conjunction with Reclamation. The primary authors of this document
were Chuck Cooper, P.E.; Robert Dewey, P.E.; Bill Fiedler, P.E.; Kathy Frizell,
P.E.; Tom Hepler, P.E.; ; and Tony Wahl, P.E, of Reclamation. Additional
contributions were made by Elizabeth Cohen, P.E.; Christopher Ellis, P.E.;
Dennis Hanneman, P.E., and Tracy Vermeyen, P.E, of Reclamation. Additional
technical assistance was provided by Cynthia Fields, Cindy Gray, and Gia Price.
Peer review of this manual, in whole or in part, was provided by Dave Gillette,
P.E. and Bill Engemoen of Reclamation; Sal Todaro, P.E., USACE; Paul
Schweigher, P.E., Gannett Fleming; Rafael Morn and Miguel Toledo, and
Technical University of Madrid.
Member of the National Dam Safety Review Board (NDSRB) reviewed this
manual prior to issuance. The NDSRB plays an important role in guiding the
NDSP. The NDSRB has responsibility for monitoring the safety and security of
dams in the United States, advising the Director of FEMA on national dam safety
policy, consulting with the Director of FEMA for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining a coordinated NDSP, and monitoring State implementation of the
assistance program. The NDSRB consists of representatives appointed from
Federal agencies, State dam safety departments, and the U.S. Society on Dams
(USSD). The NDSRB Research Work Group and the Interagency Committee on
Dam Safety (ICODS) provided additional review. A number of additional
engineers and technicians provided input in preparation of this manual, and the
authors greatly appreciate their efforts and contributions. The authors, peer
reviewers, and their associated agencies and organizations contributed
information and materials for use in this manual. The authors extend their
appreciation to the following agencies and individuals for graciously providing
permission to use their materials in this publication:
Armortec
vi
Concrib
Donnelly Fabricators
Envirocon
DX2 Geosyntex
GabionBaskets.net
Juntong Guanda
Maccaferri Inc.
Presto Geosystems
City of Seattle
Acknowledgements
Synthetex
Sweetwater Authority
WEBTEC, Inc
vii
Contents
Contents
Page
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. General Considerations for Embankment Dams .................................. 7
ix
Contents
xi
Figures
No.
page
Figure 1-1.Typical hydraulic conditions during embankment overtopping. ........................ 9
Figure 2-7.Plan of RCC overtopping and abutment protection partially constructed. ......... 42
Figure 3-3.Mean uplift pressure, sharp-edged geometry, sealed cavity, -inch gap. ......... 57
Figure 3-4.Mean uplift pressure, sharp-edged geometry, vented cavity, -inch gap ......... 57
Figure 3-5.Mean uplift pressure, sharp-edged geometry, vented cavity, -inch gap.......... 58
Figure 3-7.Unit discharge for joint/crack, sharp-edged geometry, -inch gap ................. 59
Figure 3-8.Defensive design measures for concrete chutes to prevent uplift failure ......... 61
or cinder blocks............................................................................................... 77
xii
Contents
Figure 5-2.Typical unfilled gabion basket on left and mattress on right. ......................... 94
Figure 5-3.Example of welded wire gabions filled with various rock sizes........................ 94
Figure 5-4.Example of gabion spillway crest structure ................................................ 94
Figure 5-5.Example of a gabion channel and drop structure ........................................ 95
Figure 5-6.Gabion erosion protection on slope of embankment.
Zamoly Reservoir, Hungary. ............................................................................... 95
Figure 5-7.Unit head loss over plain gabion steps. ................................................. 101
Figure 5-9.Laboratory test facility at the University of Bari, Italy .................................. 103
Figure 5-12.Example geotextile bedding layer for gabion construction ........................ 108
Figure 5-13.Gabion baskets on slope being filled with rock, Milltown Dam
Figure 5-14.Example gabion structure without and with proper downstream anchor ...... 112
Figure 6.1.HydroTurfTM Outfall Structure with St. Johns River Water Management
Figure 6-2.CIRIA velocity-duration curves for plain and reinforced grass ...................... 126
Figure 6-4.Virginia Kendall Dam in Ohio after 3 hours of overtopping flow .................. 133
Figure 7-2.Pit No. 7 Afterbay Dam, looking at downstream face, toward right
abutment spillway. Dam crest has been capped with concrete. .............................. 139
Figure 7-5.Reinforcement detail for the downstream toeDes Arc Bayou site No. 3. ...... 142
Figure 8-1. Dumped riprap placement on 6-inch bedding layer for Upper Stoneville
Figure 8-2.Rock chute spillway on Little Washita Site 13 in Grady County, Oklahoma.. .... 154
xiii
Figure 9-1.Examples of a perforated and solid geoweb system with various fill
materials (a) Geoweb; (b) TerraCell .............................................................. 171
Figure 9-2.(a) Filter Point fabric form pumped with concrete (b) Filter Band
fabric form pumped with concrete ; (c) Uniform Section fabric form. ..................... 173
Figure 9-3.Profile along the centerline of the spillway showing the location of
Figure 9-7.Fabric forms being filled with fine aggregate concrete. .............................. 182
Figure 11-2.Free jets (a) overtopping a dam, (b) issuing from an orifice through a dam,
(c) definition sketch for parameters of a free falling jet. ........................................ 201
Figure 11-3.Sectional view of the final trajectory profile for the PMF though a dam
Figure 11-4.Footprint of the trajectory with no spread of the jet for the PMF
Figure 11-6.Jet diffusion in a plunge pool for two-phase shear layer and a highly
Figure 12-2.RCC buttress for Camp Dyer Diversion Dam during overtopping in
January 1993. ............................................................................................... 220
Figure 12-3.Concrete overtopping protection for Santa Cruz Dam in New Mexico. .......... 221
Figure 12-4.Service spillway flows confined by training walls on stepped downstream face of
Santa Cruz Dam ............................................................................................ 222
Figure 12-5.RCC buttress construction within the original spillway plunge pool for Pueblo
Figure 12-6.Mechanical anchors being installed through the RCC toe block into the
foundation for Pueblo Dam spillway, to improve sliding resistance. ......................... 223
Figure 12-8.RCC placements followed curvature of existing arch dam, Santa Cruz Dam
Figure 13-1.Crest of concrete dam with splitter piers for overtopping flows .................. 230
xiv
Contents
Figure 13-5.Concrete channel using guide wall to convey overtopping flows ............... 232
Figure 15-2.Definition sketch for parameters of a free falling jet into a plunge pool.. ...... 257
Figure 15-3.Variation of mean dynamic pressure coefficient versus ratio of pool depth
Figure 15-4.Probability that erosion will occur based upon the available flow energy or
stream power and the characteristics of the rock in terms of the erosion index.
Probability of erosion by logistic regression for Annandales regression line. ............. 265
Tables
No.
page
Table 6-1. Properties of grass channel linings having good uniform stands of
Table 16-1 Summary of concrete dam overtopping protection case histories ......................271
xv
AB
articulating block
ACB
ACI
ANCOLD
AOS
ARS
ASCE
ASDSO
ASR
alkali-silica reaction
Caltrans
CCM
CCS
CCTV
CIRIA
CMU
CRB
CRCP
CRCS
CSPE
chlorosulfimated polyethylene
CSU
DTHM
EPDM
Fahrenheit
FAO
FEMA
FHWA
GERCC
HCFCD
HCR
HDPE
ICODS
ICOLD
IDF
LLDPE
LNEC
MCE
MSA
NCMA
NEPA
NDSP
NDSRB
NRCS
PCA
PGR
partially-grouted riprap
PMP
PMF
PP-R
reinforced polypropylene
PVC
polyvinyl chloride
Reclamation
Bureau of Reclamation
RCC
roller-compacted concrete
SOP
UCS
USACE
USDA
USDOT
USFS
USGS
USSD
UV
ultraviolet
xviii
Conversion Factors
Conversion Factors
By
To obtain
acre-feet
1233.489
cubic meters
cubic feet
0.028317
cubic meters
0.028317
cubic inches
16.38706
cubic centimeters
cubic yards
0.764555
cubic meters
degrees Fahrenheit
(F-32)/1.8
degrees Celsius
feet
0.304800
meters
0.304800
gallons
0.003785
cubic meters
gallons
3.785412
liters
0.000063
0.063090
inches
2.540000
centimeters
miles
1.609344
kilometers
pounds
0.453592
kilograms
16.01846
4.882428
6.894757
kilopascals
6894.757
pascals
square feet
0.092903
square meters
square inches
6.451600
square centimeters
xix
ASTM Standards
ASTM
Standard
Title
A974
A975
C88
C127
C131
Standard Test Method for Resistance to Degradation of SmallSize Coarse Aggregate by Abrasion and Impact in the Los
Angeles Machine
D413
D751
D 1241
D 4354
D 4759
D5101
D5567
xx
D6684
D 6884
D7276
D 7277
G7
G147
xxi
Websites
Websites
xxiii
Introduction
Introduction
Inadequate spillway capacity is a common problem with many dams. Thousands
of dams throughout North America have been determined to have inadequate
spillway capacity and would be overtopped during the inflow design flood (IDF),
which is often equated to the probable maximum flood (PMF) or to some
frequency flood associated with a particular return period. The PMF is defined as
the flood that may be expected from the most severe combination of critical
meteorologic and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably possible in the
drainage basin under study (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA],
2004). Reservoir inflow from storm events which exceeds the available storage
and/or spillway discharge capacity can result in the dam being overtopped. Dam
failure from overtopping can lead to a potential for loss of life and significant
downstream damages.
Many early dams were designed to accommodate floods based on the largest
experienced local flood or a standardized PMF considered appropriate at that
time. Over the years, significant technological and analytical advances have led to
better watershed and rainfall information, improvements in the analysis of
extreme floods, and tools for evaluating hydrologic events in a risk-based context,
which have resulted in the reclassificat ion of some dams as being hydrologically
deficient (Richards et al., 2013). Guidance for the evaluation of the hydrologic
safety of dams, including guidelines for determination of the IDF for both new
and existing dams, is provided by FEMAs new manual, Selecting and
Accommodating Inflow Design Floods for Dams (FEMA, 2013).
This document assumes that a hydrologic deficiency exists at a dam and that
traditional approaches to safely accommodate a larger design flood have first been
investigated. Designers and dam safety personnel should fully evaluate all options
available when dam overtopping is a possibility. While choosing an alternative
that avoids flow over the top of the dam has clear engineering benefits, providing
project-specific protection during dam overtopping can be a viable method in
some instances to safely convey large flows downstream from the dam.
Overtopping protection should generally be reserved for situations with some
combination of very low annual probability of occurrence (e.g., 1 in 100),
physical or environmental constraints on constructing other methods of flood
conveyance, and prohibitive cost of other alternatives, or where downstream
consequences of dam failure are demonstrated to be low.
A major concern with overtopping protection is that if the protection fails during a
flood event and the underlying embankment is exposed, erosion and headcutting
in the embankment materials could progress rapidly. This could lead to a breach
of the dam during the flood event, with no potential for preventing the failure. A
careful analysis of all potential failure modes for the dam and appurtenant features
must be performed for both the existing (baseline) conditions and for the proposed
modified conditions.
Where applicable, overtopping protection may involve all or a portion of the dam
crest. This may be more cost effective than constructing an auxiliary spillway on
either abutment at dams where increased hydraulic capacity is required. However,
this depend upon many factors, including the site conditions; dam characteristics;
magnitude, depth, and duration of the overtopping flow; and the type of
overtopping protection selected.
Techniques used to analyze the impacts of overtopping on embankment and
concrete dams differ greatly. Hence, the protection alternatives available to
accommodate overtopping also differ. The following provides a brief discussion
of the overtopping protection alternatives presented in this manual:
Part 1 (Embankment Dams).These chapters provide general guidance on the
design and construction considerations, site implications, depth and duration
factors, and vulnerabilities associated with the overtopping protection alternatives
for embankment dams. Chapters addressing overtopping protection for
embankment dams are:
Chapter 1 (General Considerations).One of the most common
deficiencies for embankment dams is inadequate spillway capacity.
Economical methods to significantly increase the hydraulic capacity of
such facilities are needed to preserve dam safety. Before considering any
type of overtopping protection for an existing dam, site investigations and
analyses should be performed as described in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 (Roller-Compacted Concrete and Soil Cement).Roller
Introduction
Introduction
flow will enter the tailwater below the dam (either created naturally or
through the excavation of a plunge pool) and may disperse before
impinging on the rock surface. If an adequate tailwater pool depth is
provided, then insufficient energy will remain to erode the rock material
on the sides or base of the pool. If not, scour may occur depending upon
the rock materials. For guidance on abutment and plunge pool erosion
potential, see Chapter 15.
Chapter 16 (Summary).The various overtopping protection alternatives
for concrete dams presented in this manual are summarized in Chapter 16.
Part 1
The National Dam Safety Program (NDSP) was first implemented in the late
1970s. The NDSP, which is led by FEMA, is a partnership of States, Federal
agencies, and other stakeholders established to encourage individual and
community responsibility for dam safety. One of the most common deficiencies
identified for embankment dams was inadequate spillway capacity. This was due
to new design criteria for IDFs, new regulatory standards, and in many cases,
changes in hazard classifications due to downstream development. The spillway
capacity that was required for many dams was found to be significantly greater
than the capacity of the existing spillways.
Various Federal and State agencies have different systems for rating the hazard
potential of dams. Each of the hazard potential classification systems groups dams
into categories based on the potential for loss of life and downstream damage in
the event of failure. The hazard potential classification does not reflect in any way
on the current condition of the dam itself (i.e., safety, structural integrity, or flood
routing capacity), but rather on the conditions downstream of the dam. FEMA has
a hazard classification system that is clear and concise, and this system was
adopted for the purposes of this manual. The reader is directed to FEMA 333,
Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Hazard Potential Classification Systems for
Dams (FEMA 2004), for a complete description of their system. The FEMA
document uses three hazard potential levels to classify dams. These levels are
summarized as follows:
Low hazard potential.Dams assigned the low hazard potential
classification are those where failure or misoperation results in no
probable loss of human life and low economic and/or environmental
losses. Losses are principally limited to the dam owners property.
Significant hazard potential.Dams assigned the significant hazard
potential classification are those dams where failure or misoperation
results in no probable loss of human life, but can cause economic loss,
environmental damage, or disruption of lifeline facilities, or can impact
other concerns. Significant hazard potential classification dams are often
located in predominantly rural or agricultural areas, but could be located in
areas with significant population and infrastructure.
High hazard potential.Dams assigned the high hazard potential
classification are those where failure or misoperation will probably cause
loss of human life.
Eq. 1-1
Where:
C=
10
an auxiliary spillway1, with service spillways provided to pass the more frequent
floods. When planning to use embankment dam overtopping protection as an
auxiliary spillway, the designer should consider the limitations and risks of
conveying spillway flow over an earthen embankment. Important engineering
design considerations include:
Significant quantities of concentrated flowing water may be introduced
over erodible materials, such as an earthen embankment or foundation
material at the abutment contacts.
Higher static loading on an embankment dam may result in slope failure.
Uncontrolled leakage from the overtopping protection could cause
Debris carried in the flood flows may damage the overtopping protection.
Numerous overtopping protection projects have been constructed, but few
have seen significant useand none has been tested for full design flood
conditions.
Overtopping protection typically involves a significant change to the
visual appearance of the structure.
When larger spillway capacity is required for an existing dam, the hydraulic
capacity of the existing service spillway should generally be maintained before
operation of an embankment overtopping spillway. For example, if an existing
service spillway is capable of passing a 500-year flood without overtopping the
dam, then the planned overtopping protection would generally not be designed to
begin operation more frequently than the 500-year flood event. However, if the
embankment crest must be lowered to accommodate the overtopping protection,
the overtopping protection may experience flows before the original design
capacity of the service spillway is achieved. This can potentially change the
downstream risks to affected properties as well as the potential liabilities due to
flooding, and this lowering should only be considered for infrequent events. At a
minimum, the outflow conditions should usually not be increased for events more
frequent than a 100-year flood event (PCA, 2002). This is intended to ensure a
low probability of occurrence and avoid potential impacts on flood insurance
within the 100-year floodplain. The need to assess upstream and downstream
flooding conditions should be evaluated for each project. Environmental impacts
must be evaluated in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and in accordance with applicable Federal and State regulatory
requirements.
The term emergency spillway is discouraged, to avoid the implication that an emergency exists
when its use is required (FEMA, 2013).
11
12
13
14
16
Collect and control infiltration of water through cracks and joints in the
overtopping protection
Under normal reservoir condit ions, seepage can develop through the embankment
and foundation, as well as through the foundation beneath a spillway. If the
overtopping protection provides a low permeability barrier to seepage, excess
water pressures could build up beneath the structure and cause uplift damage, or
redirect general embankment and foundation seepage to the locations of cracks or
joints in the overtopping protection. This could result in higher seepage gradients
at the cracks or joints, which could allow piping (or internal erosion) of the
embankment and/or foundation soils to develop. Blockage of seepage exit points
could also result in increased pore-water pressures in the embankment and
foundation soils which in turn could decrease the stability of the embankment.
If the existing embankment or foundation includes adequate seepage collection
and control features upstream of the location of the overtopping protection, then it
may not be necessary to include seepage collection and control features in the
design. For example, if an embankment includes an upstream chimney and
blanket drain, then it is not likely that uncontrolled seepage would reach the
underside of an overtopping protection structure. Similarly, if an embankment
contains an effective clay core, seepage may not reach the downstream face where
the overtopping protection would be constructed. However, the lack of visible
seepage on the downstream slope of an existing dam may not be sufficient to
conclude that a drainage system is not needed. The possibility exists that the
amount of seepage that reaches the face is sufficiently small and evaporates into
the open air, but could build up beneath a structure. If the overtopping protection
is constructed downstream of existing seepage collection and control features, the
design must include means for the discharge from those systems to safely pass
through or around the structure. Field investigations and instrumentation readings
should be used to confirm the actual seepage conditions in the embankment and
foundation for design of overtopping protection using standard steady-state
seepage analysis methods (PCA, 2002).
17
designer is cautioned to carefully review the test conditions and range of loadings
evaluated for these tests, compared to those for a particular project.
General design considerations when selecting an overtopping protection system
for a particular project may include:
Unit discharge
Embankment materials
Flow velocity
Shear stress
Cavitation potential
Aesthetics
Economics
Energy dissipation
Downstream consequences
Constructability
Maintenance requirements
Risks
These design considerations are addressed in the following chapters for each type
of overtopping protection system and are used as a basis of comparison in Chapter
10 for all of the overtopping protection systems considered in this manual for
embankment dams.
18
19
Roller-compacted concrete (RCC) and soil cement have been used in dam
construction since the late 1970s. These materials are similar since they both have
zero-slump consistency and are placed and compacted with equipment typical of
earth-moving or paving operations. The use of RCC and soil cement usually
results in a shorter construction schedule due to higher production rates compared
to conventional or mass concrete construction. A shorter construction schedule
minimizes the hydrologic risks involved with dam construction and allows the
contractor to reduce contingency costs for potential flood damages. A detailed
discussion of the similarities and fundamental differences between RCC and soilcement is provided by Choi and Hansen (2005).
The terms roller compaction and roller-compacted concrete are defined by the
American Concrete Institute (ACI, 2005) as follows:
Roller compaction: A process for compacting concrete using a roller, often a
vibratory roller.
Roller-compacted concrete: Concrete compacted by roller compaction;
concrete that in its unhardened state will support a roller while being
compacted.
The development of RCC technology has provided a successful method of erosion
protection of embankment dams, which has proven to be cost effective while
affording a number of other advantages. RCC construction is normally very rapid
compared to conventional concrete construction, with minimal project disruption.
In most cases, construction for overtopping protection is limited to the dam crest
and downstream slope, with little to no impact to reservoir operations. Depending
upon the site conditions and discharge requirements, the entire length of the
embankment dam can be used by armoring the crest and downstream face with
RCC, or a selected portion of the embankment crest can be lowered for use as an
RCC-lined spillway. However, lowering the embankment crest can potentially
change the downstream flood risks and potential liabilities, and this lowering
should be evaluated for each project.
RCC spillways generally consist of non-air-entrained concrete, without
reinforcement, water-stopped joints, or anchorage, but with underdrain systems
similar to conventional concrete spillways. For structures that impound water,
such as earth embankments, designing RCC overtopping protection is generally
limited to auxiliary spillways that would only operate for flood return periods of
100 years or greater (PCA, 2002). Greater return periods may be required
21
22
23
2.1.2 Location
RCC spillways can be located in three general areas:
(1) On an abutment separate from the dam embankment
(2) As overtopping protection over the entire dam ernbankment
(3) As overtopping protection over a portion of the dam embankment
Spillway location is one of the most important decisions of spillway design due to
the potential implications for dam and public safety, as well as for hydraulics
(including energy dissipation), aesthetics, cost, and maintenance. When
determining the location of the spillway, the designer should give preference to a
location that is separate from the dam embankment whenever possible, would not
cause excessive erosion along the abutment groins or at the downstream toe, and
is aligned with the downstream channel to minimize erosion and safely convey
spillway releases away from the dam.
The width of RCC overtopping protection on an embankment dam is normally
determined by both technical and economic considerations. Issues to consider
when deciding the length of dam crest to be used for overtopping protection
include:
Energy dissipation.Wider overtopping protection can usually improve
spillway performance by decreasing the depth of flow, decreasing the unit
energy at the downstream end of the spillway, and increasing energy
dissipation. Flood routings for various frequency floods are used to
determine magnitudes and durations of spillway flows, and water surface
profiles are used to calculate flow depths and velocities for design. Energy
dissipation requirements become more important as the height of the dam
and unit discharge increase. High-head and/or high-unit-discharge RCC
spillway designs should generally be avoided or will need special design
considerations. Maximum RCC applications to date have been for dam
heights up to about 100 feet and for unit discharges up to about 340
ft3/s/ft.
Existing dam crest length.Extending the RCC overtopping protection
across the entire crest of the existing dam, and down the abutment groins,
can maximize the available spillway crest length and decrease the
maximum reservoir water surface level. Conversely, the designer may
want to limit the crest length of the overtopping protection to decrease the
amount of flow along the abutment groins of the embankment, and to
provide a better transition from the spillway channel to the natural
channel. A narrow spillway may be preferable if the downstream channel
is significantly narrower than the dam crest. A converging spillway can be
used to provide a longer crest length and better fit a narrow downstream
24
26
The following discussion of the design of sloped spillway chutes is intended for
RCC placed in horizontal lifts, although much of this information could also
apply to RCC placed parallel to the slope.
The thickness of the sloped RCC chute is commonly measured perpendicular to
the slope. The required thickness is based upon the slope of the spillway,
constructability requirements for placement of the RCC, and structural
requirements to resist potential uplift pressures and other loading conditions. The
thickness of a stepped chute will also be dependent upon the lift width. A
minimum 8-foot-width is normally required for the horizontal lift surface to
operate standard placing and compacting equipment. This provides an effective
concrete thickness of 2.3 to 3.2 feet for embankment slopes of 2:1 to 3:1,
respectively. A 5-foot-width of RCC, with a 3-foot-width of pervious fill, was
placed in horizontal lifts on a 2:1 slope for South Dam in Ohio, using a split
spreader box (Hill, 1997). Lifts wider than 8 feet may be needed to provide
additional weight if required to resist potential uplift pressures on the RCC slab
during overtopping. The location of the maximum uplift pressure beneath the slab
is often found near the bottom of the slope just above the base of the spillway or
adjacent to the downstream apron or basin slab. Most designers have adopted a
minimum slab thickness of 2 feet for a sloped chute. The slab thickness is
generally increased as the overtopping depth increases. Additional design
guidelines for uplift loadings on spillway slabs may be found in Design of Small
Dams (Reclamation, 1987a) and Hydraulic Design of Spillways (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers [USACE], 1990).
Unformed RCC chutes are usually less expensive and take less time to construct
than formed RCC chutes, and are therefore used more commonly. Unformed RCC
is usually end dumped by trucks or placed by a loader and spread by a dozer.
Compaction is performed by single- or double-drum vibratory rollers. During
compaction, the unrestrained face can result in RCC that is not fully compacted
near the outside of the edge, which can ravel and erode over time. Raveling would
generally be limited to the depth to the more densely compacted RCC. In an
unformed chute, this zone of lower density should be considered as sacrificial
concrete and should not be considered as part of the wearing surface, nor be
included in the concrete mass for stability analysis. An unformed RCC face can
have the appearance of rough, irregular-shaped concrete, with exposed aggregate
and possibly rock pockets. To some, an uncompacted RCC surface can have the
appearance of poorly constructed or damaged concrete, while to others, the rough,
irregular appearance blends into the natural surroundings. If a smoother finish
surface is an important project requirement, the exposed RCC edge can be
compacted or trimmed to give a more uniform appearance.
Compaction of the exposed RCC face will increase the RCC density and reduce
raveling; however, scattered rock pockets may still be encountered. Wetter RCC
mixes are generally not well-suited for unformed steps. These mixes tend to
spread out when compacted, making it difficult to maintain the proper thickness at
27
the outer edge. Because unformed steps are constructed on a flatter angle, the
amount of energy dissipation on the sloped chute surface is reduced from that of
formed steps.
When vertical forms are used to restrain the outside edge of the RCC lift during
spreading and compaction, higher RCC densities can be achieved near the edge
and a stepped surface is provided. Advantages of forming the outside edge of the
RCC lift include:
(1) Increased energy dissipation on the sloped chute surface
(2) Higher RCC densities and strength at the outside edge of a lift, which
reduces raveling and increases freeze-thaw resistance
(3) The improved appearance of a formed surface when well constructed
Placement of RCC against a vertical form requires a more workable RCC mix
than for a non-formed surface. Enhanced workability is required for consolidation
of RCC against the form to produce a smooth finished surface and to minimize
rock pockets. The workability of the RCC near the form can be increased by:
(1) Providing an RCC mix with a higher cementitious content
(2) Using pozzolan or additives
(3) Increasing the water/cement ratio
The workability of the RCC adjacent to the forms has also been improved by
enriching the RCC near the formed surfaces with a cement grout (Tatro et al.,
2008). Disadvantages of forming include:
(1) Decreased RCC placement rates
(2) Increased requirements for laborers and carpenters to install, strip, and
move forms
(3) Special compaction using smaller equipment
(4) Increased project costs
Joint surfaces naturally occur between succeeding horizontal lifts of RCC. The
need to treat a joint depends upon the location of the joint and specific project
requirements for bonding joints. Normally, it is desirable for the sloped chute to
become a large monolithic mass to resist potential uplift pressures and to provide
few paths for water to seep beneath the chute during overtopping flows. One
approach to the design of horizontal RCC lifts is to require that a bedding mix be
used between each lift to improve bonding. However, with proper curing and by
maintaining a clean lift surface during construction, bonding of lift surfaces
28
usually occurs naturally. Although the degree of bonding between RCC lifts for
overtopping structures is largely empirical, some research has been conducted on
bonding of successive layers of RCC (Tayabji and Okamoto, 1987). Generally,
delamination of RCC lifts in overtopping spillway applications has not occurred,
with the possible exception of one project in the southwestern United States
reported by PCA, where delamination apparently occurred between the top two
lifts of an in-stream grade control structure on the Salt River in Phoenix, Arizona.
In many cases, monolithic action may not be structurally required, and RCC
overtopping protection can be designed to resist potential uplift pressures based
on its dead weight alone. Seepage through RCC lifts can be safely handled by a
properly designed and filtered drainage system beneath the sloped RCC chute.
The decision to require bonding on cold joint lift surfaces (commonly defined as
more than 6 hours old) at present, depends upon project requirements and
engineering judgment. The minimum joint treatment generally recommended
would be:
(1) Cleaning lift surfaces less than 6 hours old using compressed air or
(2) Removing contaminants, damaged RCC, or RCC that has not properly
cured by appropriate methods
(3) Removing laitance using high-pressure water jetting or sand blasting
(4) Placing a bedding mix on joint surfaces more than 24 hours old, and
between each lift of the approach apron and downstream apron only, if
required
(5) Evaluating the need to provide a bedding mix on joints between 12 and
24 hours old. Ambient air temperatures are also often considered in
addition to age when determining the requirements for treatment of joint
surfaces
Contraction joints3 may be placed in wide RCC spillways to control the location
of cracks caused by thermal contraction of the RCC. Contraction joints are
intended to reduce random cracking, improve the appearance of the project, and
reduce maintenance. Most completed RCC overtopping projects have been
designed without using contraction joints and have been allowed to crack freely.
Performance histories have not been compiled on the effectiveness of using
contraction joints. Spacing between contraction joints should be determined based
upon the exposure conditions of the project and performance of other similar
projects. Where contraction joints have been constructed for RCC overtopping
3
Contraction joints are oriented normal to the dam axis and parallel to the flow and are also
referred to as longitudinal joints. Transverse joints are oriented parallel to the dam axis and
normal to the flow. Some sources may reverse these conventions.
29
30
heights. A 1:8 scale was used to minimize scale effects related to viscous forces
and surface tension.
Model unit discharges ranged from 1.2 to 8.9 ft3/s/ft. Water surfaces, bed
surfaces, flow velocities, and air concentrations (or void fractions) in the flow
were recorded. The inception point was defined as the location where the
turbulent boundary layer (or flow region affected by the stepped surface) reaches
the free water surface, and where significant flow bulking first occurs in the flow.
Flow bulking is the increased flow depth above the normal expected (or clear
water) flow depth in the stepped chute, resulting from the entrainment of air. Flow
bulking within the chute directly impacts the required height of the chute training
walls.
The inception point moves downstream with increasing unit discharge, and may
be located by observation or by equation (Hunt and Kadavy, 2009a). Additionally,
the inception point moves downstream for a given unit discharge as the step
height is reduced. Velocity profiles were found to transition from nearly uniform
at the crest and approached a one-sixth power law distribution at the inception
point. Average velocities beyond the inception point were based on the equivalent
clear water depths without air. The computed average flow velocities are used to
determine the relative energy loss on the spillway chute. Energy dissipation at any
location within the chute was defined as the ratio of head loss to total head,
expressed in percent, and was found to vary linearly from near zero at the
downstream edge of the crest to approximately 30 percent at the inception point
(at distance Li), increasing in a logarithmic fashion beyond the inception point to
a maximum of approximately 73 percent (at distance 3.5*Li).
Christodoulou (1993) found that the two most important parameters governing
energy dissipation are the ratio of the critical depth to the step height and the
number of steps. Increasing the step height was shown to increase the energy
dissipation within the chute. Knowing the energy dissipation in the spillway chute
and the incoming flow velocity in the stilling basin is needed to size the stilling
basin for a non-converging stepped spillway. The step height can also affect the
cost, constructability, and accessibility of the RCC structure. Step heights for
RCC spillways generally use 1- to 2-foot-high vertical forms. Higher step heights
(3 feet or more) have been used on RCC gravity dams to provide increased energy
dissipation for large spillway discharges, and/or to inhibit public access on the
downstream slope. As the step height increases, the form strength and the bracing
requirements will become greater. Greater step heights can also result in larger
RCC volumes (PCA, 2002).
31
depths of overtopping relative to the crest width. Increasing the efficiency of the
spillway crest section can reduce the required crest length of the spillway and/or
the overtopping depth, which typically reduces material quantities. A narrower
spillway chute can also better match the downstream channel geometry. Total
project costs are often reduced by using a more efficient spillway crest section
with a higher discharge coefficient. Conventional concrete can be used to provide
an ogee-shaped crest, a flat-curved crest, or a sharp-crested weir to improve the
spillway discharge coefficient and reduce the upstream water surface, but will
increase the cost of the concrete placement and may limit future access. The
discharge coefficient of all weirs will vary with the approach channel conditions,
approach depth (or crest height), depth of flow over the weir, and tailwater
conditions. Design guidelines for spillway crest control structures are provided in
general design references (Reclamation, 1987a and USACE, 1990).
The following should be considered when selecting the spillway crest design:
Broad-crested weir.This design configuration consists of paving the
embankment crest with RCC. The efficiency of this type of crest improves
as the ratio of the depth of flow to the crest width increases. The discharge
coefficient is affected by the approach conditions to the crest and the
tailwater conditions below the crest.
Sharp-crested weir.A sharp-crested weir can be constructed as an
extension of an upstream cutoff wall and can significantly increase the
efficiency of the spillway with minimal effect on the placement of the
RCC.
Ogee crest and other curved crest designs.The ogee crest shape is a
highly efficient spillway crest section constructed of conventional concrete
on an RCC apron and is discussed in Design of Small Dams (Reclamation,
1987a). Modified or non-standard curved crest designs (such as flat
curves) are discussed in Engineering Monograph No. 9, Discharge
Coefficients for Irregular Overfall Spillways (Reclamation, 1952).
The approach apron slab is located upstream of the spillway crest control section
and sloped chute. The function of the approach apron is to:
Reduce channel erosion
Establish the crest height for the control section
Increase the length of the under-seepage path
Reduce the seepage that could occur from the reservoir beneath the
spillway chute
32
The approach apron should be compatible with the internal geometry of the dam,
and the apron should extend far enough upstream so that the length is sufficient to
reduce the potential for piping or excessive seepage from occurring through the
dam, beneath the apron slab, crest section, and sloped chute. An upstream cutoff
wall is an important design feature to increase the seepage path beneath the
approach apron and also to prevent erosion at the upstream edge of the RCC
apron. Seepage beneath the approach slab and sloped chute can cause excessive
uplift pressure, or saturation and instability of the embankment. Seepage analysis
of the embankment may be required to determine the apron length upstream and
the depth of the cutoff wall to control seepage and potential uplift pressures.
The thickness of the approach apron is controlled by the requirement to provide
adequate weight to resist uplift. When determining the minimum thickness of
RCC, the designer should consider freeze-thaw and long-term weathering
protection, and frost heave. Two 12-inch lifts of RCC should be considered as a
minimum thickness for constructability and serviceability of an RCC approach
apron. In regions where the frost depth (or depth to which the groundwater is
expected to freeze) exceeds two feet, the designer should consider increasing the
minimum apron thickness or installing a gravel underdrain beneath the apron and
downstream of the cutoff wall.
33
channel hydraulics and foundation conditions. The hydraulic conditions that can
occur at the toe of an embankment dam are usually less than ideal and physical
modeling may be required. Erosive lateral flow and eddy currents can occur along
the groins, and the downstream tailwater may be insufficient for the flow
conditions, resulting in potential sweepout of the basin. Additional erosion
protection may be required at the groins.
The downstream apron must be designed for uplift pressures that are more severe
than for the upstream apron due to the high differential water pressures that may
exist at the downstream end of the spillway chute (or upstream end of the apron).
The designer needs to determine the tailwater depth at the downstream end of the
apron slab, and the depth of flow at the upstream end of the apron slab, for the full
range of spillway discharges, in order to evaluate the potential uplift loading
conditions on the downstream apron. The critical uplift loading condition for
design often occurs at flows less than the maximum spillway discharge. For
further discussion, refer to spillway and stilling basin guidelines in Design of
Small Dams (Reclamation 1987a) and Hydraulic Design of Spillways (USACE
1990). Based on typical construction conditions, a minimum thickness of three
feet should be considered for the downstream apron for most projects.
Cutoff walls are typically located at the upstream and downstream ends of the
RCC spillway, as shown in Figure 2-1. The primary function of the downstream
cutoff wall is to prevent undermining of the spillway from channel erosion and
degradation. The downstream cutoff wall should extend into competent bedrock,
or to a depth below the estimated depth of erosion that could occur from the
spillway design flow, and should not interfere with the drainage system. Scour
and/or channel degradation studies may be required to determine the required
depth of the cutoff wall, as well as post-scour stability analyses of the cutoff wall.
Cutoff walls are generally constructed of conventional concrete or RCC. Cutoff
walls can be designed as non-structural elements, constructed by excavating a
trench and backfilling the trench with conventional concrete, with or without
reinforcement. Cutoff walls can also be constructed as formed reinforced concrete
walls, which would require a larger excavation than trenched wall construction for
installing the concrete form work. A formed wall design will require that the
excavated slopes be laid back as required for trench safety, and then backfilled
and compacted to grade. RCC cutoff walls require a larger trench excavation than
for conventional concrete cutoff walls because of the minimum width
requirements for placing and compacting RCC, and the need for side slopes of
1:1 or flatter for worker safety. RCC cutoff walls may be preferred for projects
where conventional concrete would not otherwise be required. RCC can also be
placed over the entire crest of the dam and extend down the upstream face of the
dam. This design serves as a cutoff wall as well as minimizing the potential for
contraction scour on the upstream face of the dam.
34
Sheet piling can also be used to construct upstream or downstream cutoff walls.
Some advantages of driven steel sheet piling are that excavating trenches,
dewatering, and placing compacted fill in the trench are not required. However,
the use of driven sheet piling may only be suited to larger projects that can justify
the higher equipment mobilization expenses. Driven sheet piling also requires
foundation conditions conducive to pile driving, such as the absence of cobbles,
boulders, and interbedded hard or cemented layers. Sheet pile cutoff walls can be
constructed in rocky foundations by placing steel or plastic sheet piling in an
excavated trench and then backfilling against the sheet piling, and these sheet pile
cutoff walls should not interfere with the drainage system. Care must be taken
during construction, as any gaps in the sheet pile cutoff wall can concentrate
seepage flow.
End sills, chute blocks, and impact blocks can be added to the downstream apron
to improve the hydraulic performance of the energy dissipator and shorten the
apron length. If a hydraulic jump-type stilling basin energy dissipator is used,
adequate tailwater will be required for these features to function as designed. If
chute or impact blocks are used, capping the downstream apron with a
conventional concrete slab should be considered to expedite construction of the
blocks. The end sill can easily be incorporated with a conventional concrete or
RCC cutoff wall. Riprap is often placed downstream of the RCC apron to protect
the downstream edge of the RCC, and to transition to the downstream channel.
Additional discussion of the design of terminal structures for RCC overtopping
projects is provided by Paxson (2007).
35
outlets, to both prevent flow from entering the drain and induce drainage of the
system. If underdrain pipes are included as part of the design, methods for
cleaning, inspecting, and maintaining the system should be provided. Providing
two access points (or cleanouts) to drain lines can facilitate closed circuit
television (CCTV) inspection and maintenance activities. Cooper (2005) provides
guidance on designing underdrain pipe systems to accommodate CCTV
inspection equipment.
During flood events, there is a potential for uplift pressures to develop beneath the
RCC layer, either within a permeable drainage layer beneath the RCC or at the
boundary between the RCC and less-permeable underlying foundation (if no
drainage layer is present). If the uplift pressures exceed the combined weight of
the overlying RCC and flowing water, the RCC could be displaced. Movement of
the RCC layer during flow over the RCC can lead to foundation erosion,
undermining, and failure of the RCC overtopping protection.
Uplift pressures can develop from two sources. The reservoir can either come into
direct or near-direct communication with the area beneath the RCC from erosion
at the upstream end of the RCC, or water pressure can be transmitted through
cracks and/or joints in the RCC during overtopping flows, producing a stagnation
pressure. Pressure from direct connection with the reservoir by way of seepage is
of particular concern, because of the potential to transmit the full reservoir head to
the area beneath the RCC. This is normally mitigated by constructing an upstream
cutoff wall, and by providing drainage materials beneath the RCC.
For pressures to develop beneath large areas of the RCC slab due to overtopping
flow, hydrostatic pressures must be transmitted through open cracks by
infiltration, and then spread laterally beneath the slab. The potential for pressure
development would increase as the spacing of the cracks decreases, since the
distance over which the pressure must be transmitted decreases. Consequently, an
RCC design that results in more widely spaced cracks is less prone to
development of this condition.
The potential for pressure development beneath the RCC needs to be considered
for steady-state seepage under normal pool conditions, for conditions during an
36
overtopping event, and for conditions immediately after overtopping ceases. If the
seepage cannot drain from beneath the RCC quickly enough, a condition could
develop whereby uplift pressure is trapped beneath the RCC without the gravity
load from water on top of the RCC, and heave of the RCC could result. This could
also occur under normal conditions due to a plugged or inadequately-sized
internal drainage system or due to a rapid loss of tailwater resulting from
sweepout in the stilling basin. Additional drainage capability can be provided by
using formed holes through the RCC or by drilling holes from the downstream
face after the RCC has been placedprovided appropriate filter material is
already in place beneath the RCC. Drain holes should be located and configured
so as to avoid the potential introduction of excess hydrostatic pressures into the
foundation.
For low height dams, the weight of the RCC layer may be sufficient to resist the
full reservoir head, even at the toe of the dam. However, for higher RCC
structures, it may be necessary to include specific design features to address any
potential uplift loads beyond those that can be resisted by weight alone. The
primary design feature to reduce uplift pressure is a pervious underdrain layer
with pipe outfalls to limit the development of unbalanced pressures. Control of
seepage and uplift pressures needs to be considered not only for the sloping
portion of the RCC spillway or overtopping protection, but also for any RCC
apron that extends beyond the toe of the slope. Since reinforcing steel, waterstops,
and anchors used in conventional concrete are generally not practical in RCC, the
design should include:
(1) Sufficient drainage to limit/prevent uplift pressures
(2) Adequate RCC mix designs to develop sufficient compressive and bond
strength to meet all loading conditions
(3) Widely-spaced contraction joints as needed to limit cracks and allow for
larger monolithic sections
Unlike the case of steady-state seepage through an embankment dam, the method
of analysis for uplift beneath an RCC slab is not well established. The combined
weight of the RCC mass and the water on top of the RCC must be sufficient to
resist the uplift pressure beneath the RCC. The weight of the RCC is relatively
easy to calculate. The depth of water on top of the RCC would typically be
calculated using water surface profile models, or computed from the unit
discharge and flow velocity. The water pressure beneath the RCC is the result of
transient flow and seepage conditions. Because of the uncertainty in the analyses,
uplift pressures are not often analyzed in detail. Since few RCC spillways or
overtopping protection structures have been tested by significant flows, not much
field data are available. It is likely that more appropriate analysis methods will be
developed as installed systems are tested by overtopping events. In the interim,
PCA (2002) has recommended that RCC spillways and overtopping protection
installations include underdrains or pressure relief systems spaced approximately
37
every 10 vertical feet. Typical details for an underdrain system are illustrated in
Figure 2-4. Pipe drains that extend through sloping RCC sections should be
designed to provide aspiration at the outlet end, so that they drain properly during
flow over the RCC. Pressure relief systems should also be included beneath
horizontal aprons located at the downstream ends of RCC spillways and
overtopping protection sections, as is customarily done with spillway stilling
basins.
Including a filter zone immediately beneath the RCC is generally advisable to
control the potential for loss of fines through open cracks or joints. Flow through
open cracks or joints could result from steady-state seepage, from the release of
water that infiltrated beneath the RCC slab during overtopping, or from
precipitation events. Geotextiles have been used to serve the filter function in
some RCC spillway and overtopping protection applications. However, the
history of using geotextiles for these types of applications is short, relative to the
experience with sand and gravel filters. Since the potential for long-term
deterioration or plugging of geotextiles has not yet been firmly established, it is
not recommended that geotextiles be used in an application where their function is
critical to dam safety (FEMA, 2008). Non-critical applications may be reasonable,
subject to consideration of the limited access to the geotextile for repair or
replacement in the future. This is true for any overtopping protection system.
38
39
40
References for determining wall height are given in Design of Small Dams
(Reclamation 1987a) and Hydraulic Design of Spillways (USACE 1990). RCC
spillway surfaces are typically rougher than conventional concrete chutes, and
bulking of flow due to greater air entrainment in the flow must be considered in
determining the maximum depth of flow. This is especially true for stepped
spillway chutes.
Determining the height of converging (or contracting) spillway walls is more
difficult due to the potential for the development of cross-waves; however, if the
convergence angles of the walls are within guidelines (Reclamation 1987a),
standard design aids can be used to estimate wall height. Sharply converging
walls may require the use of numerical or physical model studies to evaluate
complex three-dimensional flow conditions to predict spillway performance and
41
to determine the required wall height. Additional guidance on wall heights for
converging chutes is available from Hunt and Kadavy (2008a and 2008b).
RCC training walls can be constructed by modifying the geometry of the RCC at
each side of the spillway to contain the flow on the spillway surface, as shown on
Figure 2-7. Structural concrete training walls can be constructed after the RCC
placement is completed, and do not complicate the lift geometry nor interfere with
RCC placement operations.
42
43
The decision to cover the RCC spillway should be based upon specific project
requirements, including frequency of spillway use, aesthetics, and operation and
maintenance requirements. The dam owner should be made aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of soil cover so an informed decision can be made
concerning using a soil cover for an RCC spillway.
44
45
46
The RCC protection for Ocoee No. 2 Dam near Benton, Tennessee, has
been subjected to periodic overtopping since completion in 1980 to
accommodate whitewater rafters downstream, and has remained
undamaged by water flows and weathering where the RCC was wellcompacted.
North Fork Toutle Dam, located in southern Washington, was designed as
a debris retention dam with RCC service spillway and operated
continuously for 11 months in 1981 under overtopping flow conditions,
including volcanic ash and debris from Mt. St. Helens. The RCC was
reinforced with steel mesh, and performed well despite some abrasion
damage.
The RCC protection for Brownwood Country Club Dam near
Brownwood, Texas, completed in 1984, has overtopped several times with
maximum flow depths up to 1 foot (Hansen, 1989).
Abdo and Adaska (2007) cite several other RCC overtopping protection projects
that have performed well with overtopping depths of up to 10 feet, with damage
limited to surface erosion and minor spalling. These limited examples do not,
however, include performance under high unit discharges and high heads, and
therefore would not have had the potential to develop significant uplift pressures
relative to the weight of the structure, or erosion sufficient to damage the surface.
More recent performance of RCC overtopping protection occurred in Gwinnett
County, Georgia in September 2009 (Hudock and Semerjian, 2010). The Upper
Yellow River Watershed Dam Nos. 14, 15, 16, and 17 were the first projects
constructed by the NRCS and Gwinnett County as part of a capital improvement
project to upgrade fourteen NRCS flood control structures within the watershed to
bring them into compliance with modern dam safety criteria for a high hazard
classification. New subdivisions were built very close to the embankment dams,
which ranged in height from 30 to 40 feet, and this would not permit conventional
dam modifications to meet the new hydrologic design criteria Therefore, RCC
spillways were constructed for overtopping protection of the existing dams. The
first four Yellow River RCC spillways were completed between 2003 and 2008,
and consisted of a straight or angled ogee weir with a converging stepped
spillway chute and basin.
On September 21, 2009, a storm event occurred in the Upper Yellow River
Watershed that resulted in more than 10 inches of rain in a 24-hour period, with
an estimated return period of greater than 500 years. Each RCC spillway
performed as designed, with overtopping flow depths averaging approximately
2 feet and for durations of nearly 30 hours. Peak unit discharges ranged from 4 to
13 ft3/s/ft of spillway width. The structures were closely monitored during and
following the flood event and were found to have sustained no noticeable damage
aside from aesthetic concerns and some riprap displacement in the downstream
47
channel. Soil covers at two of the dams were significantly eroded and were to be
repaired.
48
at the downstream end. The floor slab of the chute is 8 inches thick and
reinforcement is not continuous across the joints. The discharge capacity
of the spillway is unknown.
Dry Creek Dam.This dam is in Utah. The spillway includes a 24-foot
wide open channel concrete chute on the downstream face of the dam. The
floor slab of the chute is 10 inches thick and reinforcement is not
continuous across the joints. The discharge capacity of the spillway is
2,800 ft3/s, for a unit discharge of 117 ft3/s/ft. The spillway was reported
to have operated in 1972 with a maximum release of 400 ft 3/s.
Green Canyon Dam.This dam is in New Mexico. The spillway includes
a 120-foot-wide open channel concrete chute on the downstream face of
the dam. The thickness of the spillway chute floor slab is 15 inches, with
no reinforcement across the transverse joints. The total discharge capacity
is 52,400 ft3/s, which includes both the concrete spillway and an unlined,
600-foot-wide auxiliary spillway.
Guaremal Dam.This dam is in Venezuela and consists primarily of
compacted river gravels with a thin clay core. The spillway includes a
295-foot-wide open channel concrete chute on the downstream face of the
dam. The floor slab of the chute is 12 inches thick and reinforcement is
continuous across the joints. The discharge capacity of the spillway is
16,500 ft3/s, for a unit discharge of 55.9 ft3/s/ft.
Kinzua Project Upper Reservoir.This dam is in Pennsylvania. The
upper reservoir is operated for a pumped storage hydroelectric project.
The spillway was designed to operate only if the upper reservoir was in
danger of overfilling. The spillway contains an earthen fuseplug section,
which must erode before the spillway operates. The spillway includes a
100-foot-wide open channel concrete chute on the downstream face of the
dam. The floor slab of the chute is 6 inches thick and reinforcement is
continuous across the joints. The discharge capacity of the spillway is
6,200 ft3/s, for a unit discharge of 62 ft3/s/ft.
Loud Thunder Dam.This dam is near Rock Island, Illinois and consists
of a homogeneous clay embankment. The spillway includes a 60-foot
wide open channel concrete chute on the downstream face of the dam. The
floor slab of the chute is 9 inches thick and reinforcement is not
continuous across the joints. The discharge capacity of the spillway is
6,500 ft3/s, for a unit discharge of 108 ft3/s/ft.
Regadera Dam.This dam is near Bogata, Columbia. The spillway chute,
located on the downstream face of the dam, transitions from 394 feet wide
at the crest to 295 feet wide at the downstream end. The floor slab of the
chute is 6 inches thick and reinforcement is continuous across the joints,
50
51
The flow depths are used to size training walls at the sides of the
overtopping protection to retain the flows, or used with the flow velocities
to evaluate the impact of overtopping flows on the rock abutments. If the
abutments have limited erosion resistance and the energy of the
overtopping flows is high enough, the erosion potential of the abutments
should be evaluated.
The flow depths and velocities are used to evaluate the potential for
stagnation pressures occurring at transverse joints within the concrete
overtopping protection, and for the design of drainage features.
The flow depths and velocities are used to estimate the potential for
cavitation damage to the surface of the concrete overtopping protection,
for the determination of allowable concrete surface tolerances and
potential aeration requirements.
52
Spillway discharges generally pass through critical depth at the dam crest and
enter the downstream slope at supercritical flow. The overtopping flow may be
uniform or it may be accelerated or decelerated, depending on the slopes and the
dimensions of the channel and on the total drop to the river channel. Flow at any
point along the overtopping protection will depend on the specific energy, d + hv,
available at that point, where d is the flow depth and hv is the velocity head. The
velocities and depths of open channel flow in a channel conform to the principle
of the conservation of energy, expressed by Bernoullis theorem, which states that
the absolute energy of flow at any cross section is equal to the absolute energy at
a downstream section plus intervening losses of energy. This relationship can be
expressed by Equation 3-1:
Z + d1 + hv1 = d2 + hv2 + hL
Where:
Z =
d1 =
hv1 =
d2 =
hv2 =
hL=
Eq. 3-1
The ZPROF computer program computes the water surface profile using the
Standard Step method for gradually varied flow. In this method, the distance
between stations is known and the correct depth at each station is determined in
the computations. The computation is carried forward in a series of steps,
beginning with a known depth of flow (such as critical depth) at the first station.
The depth of flow is used in the computations to obtain area, velocity, velocity
head, and hydraulic radius. The Chezy equation is solved for the friction slope.
The loss in head due to friction is then computed by multiplying the friction slope
by the length of the reach. The ZPROF program uses the Chezy equation for
friction slope rather than the Manning, Scobey, or Hazen-Williams equations, as it
has a theoretical development and the others are empirically derived. The
empirical equations were developed primarily for channels of small slope,
subcritical flow, and fully turbulent flow. The Chezy coefficient (C) depends on
the Reynolds number and the boundary roughness.
53
calculate. The stream power represents the erosive power of the overtopping
flows, and is much more complicated to compute. This method is described
further in Chapter 15.
54
56
57
Figures 3-6 and 3-7 provide unit discharges for variable flow velocities, joint
offsets, and joint gaps. The discharges represented in Figures 3-6 and 3-7 are
based on the pressure and drain conditions reflected in the companion curves
provided in Figures 3-4 and 3-5. The unit discharges provide estimates of flow
through the joint that are consistent with the uplift pressures shown in Figures 3-4
and 3-5, with the flow controlled by the valve used to model the vent in the
experiments. The unit discharge values can be used to help assess whether the
underdrain system capacity is adequate to reduce uplift pressures to those levels
indicated in Figures 3-4 and 3-5.
An interesting result of the tests is that the test configurations with the smallest
joint gap (see Figure 3-6) resulted in more flow through the joint as compared to
test configurations with larger gaps (see Figure 3-7). A smaller gap can also
produce higher uplift pressure than a larger gap for the smaller offsets (about
1
/4 inch and less). The postulated reason for this is that a recirculation zone is
created at the point of the gap entrance that is more effective in blocking flow and
transmission of stagnation pressure at larger gaps. The details of the joint were
also varied in the studies. Sharp-edged joints were tested as well as joints with
chamfered and rounded corners. The chamfered and rounded corners with small
gaps performed in a similar manner to sharp-edged joints with wider gaps.
58
59
There have been no specific tests for a joint that is not offset into the flow, or for
smaller gaps; however, it would seem possible that some flow and pressure could
develop without an offset. Note that the stagnation lines (in black) in Figures 3-3
through 3-5 represent an upper bound or theoretical pressure that could be
developed by converting the velocity head entirely to pressure. Additional
conditions have been evaluated in the model tests, and are presented in
Reclamation (2007b).
After flow rates are determined for various flood frequencies, water surface
profiles can be developed to determine flow depth and velocity. Both may be
important factors. In general, Reclamation studies have indicated that pressures
and flows into offset joints and cracks increase with flow velocity (Figures 3-3
through 3-5). For a given flow, there may be portions of the overtopping
protection that experience velocities that are high enough to cause damage, while
other portions do not. If the portions of the overtopping protection experiencing
the potentially damaging velocities are not prone to failure because they have
adequate defensive measures (described below), then the lack unfavorable joints
or cracks, and/or lack offsets into the flow, failure is not likely to initiate.
However, as flows increase, other portions of the slab without adequate protection
may experience conditions that can initiate failure. Therefore, there may be a
specific flow for different sections of the slab that will represent an initiating
failure condition. Depth of flow may be important when there is an increasing
offset between two training wall segments that increases with height, or where
damage has occurred above the slab invert.
3.2.3.2 Defensive Design Measures
Defensive design measures can help prevent this potential failure mode from
initiating or from developing. These examples of defensive design measures are
listed in order of decreasing effectiveness):
Waterstops (which block paths for water flow through joints in slabs)
Transverse cutoffs (which prevent vertical offsets at transverse joints and
limits path for water from the flow surface to the foundation)
Longitudinal reinforcement or smooth dowels across floor joints (which
minimize width of cracks and openings at joints and may help prevent
offsets)
Anchor bars into foundation (which provide additional resistance to uplift
pressures on concrete slabs; use soil anchors for earth foundation)
Filtered underdrains (which relieve uplift pressures that can be generated
beneath slabs and prevents movement of foundation materials into
drainage system and initiation of foundation erosion)
60
Rigid plastic foam insulation (which insulates the drainage system and
reduces the potential for freezing. It also prevents frost heave locally).
An absence of these defensive design measures can allow initiation and
progression of this potential failure mode. Figure 3-8 shows these defensive
design measures. Keyed joints are an additional defensive measure sometimes
used but not shown below.
.
Figure 3-8.Defensive design measures for concrete chutes to prevent uplift failure
(Reclamation, courtesy of Bill Fiedler).
61
with joints that are primarily vertical, tight and healed to open and spaced from
1-foot to several feet apart. A zone in the foundation below the spillway inlet
structure contains open joints and bedding planes, which allowed reservoir water
to seep under the spillway chute floor. The spillway chute was designed with an
underdrain system and anchor bars, but waterstops and continuous reinforcement
were not provided across the floor joints (Reclamation, 1987b).
Deterioration of the concrete slab occurred shortly after the dam was put into
service. Cracking occurred in the chute slabs due to excessive water and ice
pressures along the foundation-concrete slab interface and some of the slabs
heaved and were displaced off the foundation, creating offsets into the flow. The
spillway operated from 1957 to 1983 without incident, but a chute floor slab
failed in June 1983, due to uplift pressures from flows of 400 ft3/s (Hepler and
Johnson, 1988). The failure did not progress beyond the spillway slab failure,
primarily due to the erosion resistance of the underlying foundation relative to the
energy of the spillway flows, and the magnitude and duration of the flood.
Calculations were performed to confirm that the failure was the result of
stagnation pressures being generated under the chute slab. The Big Sandy Dam
spillway chute slab failed between stations 4 + 66.87 and 4 + 85.85, during
spillway discharge of 400 ft3/s. Failure was initiated by an offset into the flow at
station 4 + 66.87 (depth of flow0.3 ft; velocity31 ft/s). Assuming a -inch
open joint and a vertical offset of an inch and anchor bars that are only
50 percent effective, the calculations predicted the slab would fail. The
calculations also showed that with anchor bars fully effective, the slab would not
have failed. The uplift pressures assumed in the calculations were estimated from
extrapolated laboratory tests (Hepler and Johnson, 1988). The analysis of the slab
for uplift pressures evaluated a one foot wide strip of the chute slab between
stations 4 + 66.87 and 4 + 85.85, assuming that the stagnation pressures would be
constant over this area. From observations after the failure, it was observed that
the anchor bars exposed beneath the slab had been pulled out of the soft sandstone
foundation, with little evidence of the original grout encasement, indicating that
the anchor bar capacity was not fully developed.
Hyrum Dam Spillway.Hyrum Dam is on the Little Bear River, about 9 miles
southwest of Logan, Utah. The 116-foot-high zoned earthfill embankment dam
was completed in 1935. The spillway is located about 900 feet from the dam on
the right abutment and consists of a concrete-lined inlet transition, a gated crest
structure regulated by three 16-foot-wide by 12-foot-high radial gates, and a
concrete-lined spillway chute and stilling basin. The foundation of the spillway
consists of Lake Bonneville sediments (described as clay and gravelly loam) to a
depth of about 90 feet below the spillway crest. The spillway chute was designed
with an underdrain system, although a filter was not provided between the gravel
drain envelope and the fine-grained foundation material. The spillway chute was
constructed with a single layer of reinforcement that is not continuous across the
joints. Waterstops were not provided at the joints. The spillway had significant
62
problems associated with cracking and slab movement. Long horizontal cracks
developed in the sides of the trapezoidal spillway chute, and bulging of the lining
was noticeable. In 1980, an inspection revealed water spurting through a crack in
the left chute wall (indicating water pressure behind the wall) and open horizontal
cracks. In 2003, ground penetrating radar, drilling, and closed circuit television
examination of the spillway underdrains and drill holes were used to identify
voids underneath the spillway chute. A continuous channel, over two feet deep in
places, was identified beneath the steeper portion of the chute. The erosion that
occurred in the spillway foundation was attributed to the introduction of flows
through the cracks and joints in the slab and piping of foundation materials into
the unfiltered drainage system (Reclamation, 2005a).
3.2.4 Cavitation
Cavitation is the formation of vapor cavities in a liquid. Cavitation occurs in high
velocity flow, where the water pressure is reduced locally because of an
irregularity in the flow surface. As the vapor cavities move into a zone of higher
pressure, they collapse, sending out high pressure shock waves (see Figure 3.9). If
the cavities collapse near a flow boundary, there will be damage to the material at
the boundary. Cracks, offsets, and surface roughness can increase the potential for
cavitation damage.
Cavitation damage can occur along flow surfaces exposed to high velocity flow if
surface irregularities exist and if the flow durations are long. For a new design, it
should be expected that the flow surface will be in good condition, but the design
should consider that defects along the surface will likely develop over time. If
there is potential for cavitation damage to occur along the concrete overtopping
63
P Pv
V 2
2
Eq. 3-2
Where:
P = pressure at flow surface (atmospheric pressure + pressure related to
flow depth)
Pv = vapor pressure of water
= density of water
V = average flow velocity
In most cases, there is the potential for cavitation damage when the cavitation
index, , is 0.5 or less at a concrete surface. For large structural features that are
introduced into the flow abruptly, cavitation damage can occur when the is as
high as 1.0 or greater.
Routings of specific frequency floods provide discharges and durations for a flood
with a given return period. This information can be used to generate probabilities
for certain discharge levels. Water surface profiles can be calculated for
discharges that are obtained from the routings of frequency floods. The water
surface profiles can provide depths of flow, velocities, and cavitation indices at
64
selected stations along the overtopping protection. If the cavitation indices are not
calculated by the water surface profile program (which is an option with
Reclamations water surface profile program ZPROF) cavitation indices can be
calculated at any location along the concrete overtopping protection where the
depth and velocity of flow are known (Reclamation, 1990a). The cavitation
indices at offsets or irregularities along the flow surface will help determine the
potential for cavitation damage to initiate. If durations of overtopping flows are
limited, failure of the concrete overtopping protection may initiate but there may
not be time for a breach of the reservoir to develop.
3.2.4.2 Cavitation Damage
The initiation of cavitation damage requires irregularities or roughnesses along
the flow surface and a low cavitation index associated with an overtopping flow.
Typical examples of irregularities in hydraulic structure flow surfaces include:
Delaminated surfaces
For all of these occurrences, cavitation is formed by turbulence in the shear zone
(interface between high velocity and low velocity flow) which is produced by the
sudden change in flow direction at the irregularity. The location of the shear zone
can be predicted by the shape of the roughness. Cavitation bubbles will collapse
either within the flow or near the flow boundary, depending on the shape of the
roughness. Surface irregularities can be identified by a thorough examination of
the concrete overtopping protection. If a recent examination has not been
performed or if the concrete overtopping protection is being designed, it may be
reasonable to evaluate the potential risk of cavitation damage assuming both
favorable and unfavorable conditions. The difference in risk between these two
conditions may provide justification for further characterization of the flow
surface.
Water surface profiles can be used to calculate cavitation indices at key locations
along the flow surface. These key locations would include any areas where
surface irregularities or offsets have been identified or where it is expected that
these features might exist. Lower cavitation indices indicate a higher potential for
cavitation damage. The cavitation index will decrease with an increase in flow
velocity and a decrease in the pressure at the flow surface. For a given flow, there
may be portions of the concrete overtopping protection that are vulnerable to the
initiation of cavitation, while other portions may not be vulnerable. As flows
65
moles of water (Stinebring, 1976). At high air concentrations of about 0.07 moles
of air per moles of water, damage was found to be completely eliminated over a
2-hour test period (Peterka, 1953). The introduction of air into spillway flows
reduces the potential for cavitation to damage concrete surfaces by reducing the
damage that occurs from collapsing vapor cavities. If the flow is not naturally
aerated, measures can be taken to introduce air into the flow at critical locations
along the concrete overtopping protection by constructing air slots or ramps.
Overtopping flows can be self-aerating when the turbulent boundary layer from
the floor intersects the water surface. If an air slot or ramp has been designed to
introduce air into spillway flows, air entrainment is likely downstream of the slot
or ramp. Model study results or actual field testing of the air slot/air ramp can be
used to estimate the downstream effectiveness of the air entrainment. If air has not
been intentionally introduced into the flow, it should be conservatively assumed
that the flow is not aerated.
67
Flow
dimenSymbol Irregularity sions Data source
Triangles
Hall, 1960
0.361 0.196
0.152
Circular arcs
Hall, 1960
0.344 0.267
0.041
Hemispheres
Benson,
1966
0.439 0.298
0.0108
Cones
Benson,
1966
0.632 0.451
0.00328
Cylinders
Benson,
1966
0.737 0.550
0.00117
Slots
(grooves)
Bohn, 1972
0.041 0.510
0.000314
Xb
Rx
V
68
69
70
71
efforts. The drain pipes must be open and functioning during and at the
completion of construction, without debris or damage.
72
73
Precast concrete blocks can be used over earth materials to provide a hard surface
for flow to pass safely without eroding the underlying surface, and are commonly
referred to as articulating concrete blocks (ACB) when used for this purpose. An
ACB system is comprised of a matrix of individual concrete blocks placed
together to form an erosion-resistant revetment with specific hydraulic
performance characteristics. The term articulating implies the ability of the
matrix to conform to minor changes in the subgrade while remaining
interconnected with geometric interlock and/or additional system components
such as cables or anchors. These systems have also been referred to as cellular
concrete mats (CCM).
There are many types of precast concrete blocks, each with its own geometry,
useful application based upon hydraulic performance and erosion prevention,
installation procedures, aesthetic value, and cost. Of most importance for
providing overtopping protection is to select a product that has been tested under
the flow conditions expected during overtopping. Applications for overtopping
protection typically include high velocity flows, steep slopes, and possibly energy
dissipation on the flow surface.
The four main types of articulating concrete blocks are described below.
Cable-tied.Concrete block units that are individually formed with or
without open areas, and laced together with cables into large, sometimes
uniquely-shaped mattresses for installation. The blocks are normally
cabled together (both longitudinally and laterally) at the manufacturing
plant and are delivered to the site on flat-bed trucks for placement as a
mattress with a crane. Examples of cable-tied block manufacturers include
Armortec (a subsidiary of Contech, Inc.), Petraflex, Inc, and
International Erosion Control Systems.
Articulating Block (AB) mats are fabric-formed, cable-reinforced,
concrete mattresses that are cast in place. The AB fabric form consists of a
series of compartments linked by an interwoven perimeter. Grout ducts
interconnect the compartments, and high-strength revetment cables are
installed between and through the compartments and grout ducts. Once
filled with grout or small aggregate concrete, the AB mats become a
mattress of pillow-shaped, rectangular concrete blocks. The interwoven
perimeters between the blocks serve as hinges to permit articulation. The
cables remain embedded in the concrete blocks to link the blocks together.
AB mats include Hydrotex products manufactured by Synthetex, LLC
and Texicon products manufactured by Donnelly Fabricators, Inc. These
systems are discussed further in Chapter 9 as fabric-formed concrete.
75
76
All products require placement over a smooth subgrade with a geotextile and/or a
bedding or drainage layer between the subgrade and the block system. Installation
requirements and techniques vary with the product and affect product
performance. Product performance in overtopping or high velocity flow
conditions down steep slopes varies significantly. Only products that have been
tested in like conditions of the design application with flume or field test
conditions should be considered for use.
77
78
were developed for use with higher velocity flows on steeper slopes for passing
flood flows over spillways or embankment dams.
Early work on individual precast concrete blocks was performed in the former
Soviet Union in the 1970s with overlapping slabs forming wedges, and then with
wedge-shaped blocks. Most of the tests were prototype installations on farm dams
and then a high head power station (Powledge and Pravdivets, 1994 and Matos et
al., 2001). The success of these Russian installations led to more comprehensive
laboratory and field testing of a wedge-shaped block in England in the 1980s.
Laboratory and field tests were performed at the University of Salford and at
Brushes Clough (Baker, 1992, 1995, 2000a, and 2000b), respectively. These tests,
sponsored by the Construction Industry Research and Information Association
(CIRIA), Lancashire, England, led to the development of design guidance for
wedge-shaped blocks based upon block thickness (Hewlett et al., 1997).
In 1983 and 1986, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), U.S.
Forest Service (USFS), and Reclamation funded a research program at Colorado
State University (CSU) using a large outdoor facility to investigate the
performance of various overtopping protection methods including cable-tied and
interlocking ACBs (United States Department of Transportation [USDOT],
1988 and 1989). Additional field tests were conducted in England during the late
1980s at Jackhouse Dam of several different cable-tied ACBs with various
percent open areas to permit the growth of vegetation (Hewlett et al., 1987).
These test programs and ACB performance results were summarized in the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Journal of Hydraulic Engineering
by Powledge, et al. (1989) and by Frizell et al. (1991) in Hydro Review
Magazine.
The first application of cable-tied ACBs for overtopping protection on major dam
embankments in the U.S. was for three National Park Service dams on the Blue
Ridge Parkway (Wooten et al., 1989). The dams ranged in height from 28 to
40 feet with crest lengths of 270 to 530 feet, with unit discharges from about 7 to
30 ft3/s/ft and with computed flow velocities up to 26 ft/s (Powledge and
Pravdivets, 1994).
Federal research continued into the 1990s in Reclamations Denver laboratory and
in a 50-foot-high concrete flume facility at CSU that provided further test data on
an optimized wedge-shaped block that could not be failed up to the capacity of the
facility (Slovensky, 1993; Frizell et al., 1994; and Gaston, 1995). International
interest in the wedge-shaped block continued with large-scale testing on a
saturated embankment (Relvas and Pinheiro, 2008).
After the successful and promising initial works and testing was completed in the
United States and abroad, private companies saw the value of ACB products as a
means to protect some types of waterways. Private companies saw opportunities
for broader applications, particularly of the easy-to-install ACB cable-tied
systems. Additional knowledge was required concerning performance under
79
steeper slopes with anticipated flow conditions that would produce higher
velocities, higher shear stresses, and an increased potential for erosion.
Subsequently, most recent testing and performance criteria that has been
developed is proprietary, but in some cases may be found in literature from the
companies and organizations that provided the funding for the tests (e.g.,
Thornton et al., 2006 and Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), 2001).
Schweiger (2002) provides a good summary of research on cable-tied and wedgeshaped blocks with design considerations.
80
angle, and roughness of the block system. Figure 4-3 shows a typical force
balance on a single unit in a cable-tied ACB system. These forces are
similar for an interlocking block system. The drag force on the blocks
should be computed by including both form drag and frictional drag. The
destabilizing force from form drag should also include the direct impact of
a vertical projection of the upstream face of a block to account for
imperfections during installation. Blocks on a side slope of a channel
require a separate analysis for the side slope because of the different
angles involved in the analysis. These computations lead to shear stresses
and safety factors that the project system must meet to ensure no loss of
intimate contact with the subgrade. Flow velocities have been measured
and shear stresses computed by the testing agencies or manufacturers. To
date, non-proprietary data for typical cable-tied systems suggest that
velocities down the revetment slope should not exceed 26 ft/s on
2:1 slopes. Mannings n values average between 0.026 0.033 for
unvegetated systems. Vegetation corrections would need to be considered
as necessary.
Equations for performing stability calculations that are based upon the factor of
safety method have been provided by Simons, Li & Associates (1990), Clopper
(1991), HCFCD (2001), and the National Concrete Masonry Association
(NCMA) (2006 and 2010). The stability analysis has been improved over the
years to include side slope stability (as described below). The NCMA documents
are used as the current design and installation standards for ACBs.
82
83
Case studies are provided in the Appendix of wedge-shaped blocks based upon
the CIRIA design guide that bases block stability on block thickness with a
minimum thickness of 4 inches (Hewlett et al., 1997). The blocks in the two case
histories were 4-feet-long by 3 feet-wide by 0.8 feet on the upstream end with a
0.6-foot step height. Based upon further testing in the United States as mentioned
previously, these size blocks seem excessive unless a special situation exists. The
CIRIA design guide (Hewlett et al., 1997) is recommended for addressing the
sizing of vents at 2.5 to 5 percent of the exposed block area, and this guide
includes a good procedure for determining geotechnical stability and
underlayment material design.
No tapered wedge block system has failed in laboratory or large-scale flume
testing situations up to the capacity of the systems. Prototype applications that
have operated in the former Soviet Union provide varying flow situations and
construction techniques that were not very idealized. One installation that failed,
Jelyevski Dam in the Ukraine, was found to have been placed on an abutment
consisting of improper fill. The failure occurred with the loss of the underdrain
and embankment material through the vent holes during first operation (Baker,
2000b). Because systems have not failed due to hydraulic forces, it has been
difficult to determine failure stresses as described in the cable-tied installations.
The wedge-shaped system would be considered stable as long as 1) the overlap
remains, and 2) the hydraulic connection remains between the separation zone and
the underlayment (i.e. the vents remain open). Reclamation is currently
developing further design guidance for wedge-shaped block applications.
Interlocking block systems have also been tested under the ASTM protocol and
have proven successful under the conditions tested (Leech et al., 1999 and Abt et
al., 2001). Additional information was not available, other than the case history
for the Tri-lock system provided in the Appendix.
84
85
86
87
Wedge-shaped blocks and interlocking blocks are delivered to the site on pallets
and placed by hand. ArmorWedge blocks have been cabled after placement as an
extra precaution from vandalism or potential settlement of the dam (see the
Barriga Dam case study in the Appendix). The applicable ASTM standards for
ACB revetment systems should be followed for construction and installation of
any system.
ACB units and individual concrete blocks are precast at the factory and should be
in good condition and meet specification requirements when delivered to the site.
Subgrade preparation is critical to proper installation of the designed system. The
foundation should be free of all obstructions such as roots and projecting stones,
and should be graded to provide smooth slope transitions. Proper placement of
bedding layers, drainage layers, and compatible filter layers or comparable
geotextiles, where specified, is essential. Attachment points are critical to the
entire system and must be properly secured. ASTM D 6884-03, Installation of
ACB Revetment Systems, should be closely followed during construction.
4.3.1 Materials
Most concrete block products are dry cast at a factory or manufacturing plant near
the site using a mold supplied by the manufacturer. Some are wet cast (using a
higher water-cement ratio) if uniquely shaped (e.g., Barriga, Bruton, Fitzwarren
case studies). All products should meet the requirements of ASTM D6684-04,
Standard Specification for Materials and Manufacture of Articulating Concrete
Block (ACB) Revetment Systems. The materials used to manufacture the concrete
blocks should meet all applicable ASTM standards. A minimum concrete
compressive strength of 3,500 lb/in2 is typically specified for block products
delivered to the site, in accordance with ASTM D6684.
The critical subgrade design and preparation for ACB systems should follow
ASTM D1241-00, Standard Specification for Materials for Soil-Aggregate
Subbase, Base, and Surface Courses.
Final acceptance of the geotextile materials, if used, will be dependent upon the
geotextile performance when tested in accordance with ASTM D5101-12,
Standard Test Method for Measuring the Filtration Compatibility of SoilGeotextile Systems, or with ASTM D5567-94, Standard Test Method for
Hydraulic Conductivity Ratio (HCR) Testing of Soil/Geotextile Systems.
The cables used for the cable-tied systems are usually stainless steel, galvanized
steel, or polyester. All have performed competently in testing and field
installations and must meet applicable ASTM standards as specified by the ACB
manufacturer.
88
89
Erosion occurs at an open joint in the system, (e.g., toe, crest, side, or
An improperly placed or lifted block exposes the upstream edge of the block
to high velocity flow that is redirected beneath the system.
Failure of individual blocks or cabled mattresses may cause the system to unravel
from that point downstream. Erosion of the foundation will occur and a headcut
will advance to the crest if the duration of the overtopping event is long enough.
Failure caused by hydraulic loading should be avoided by a competent hydraulic
analysis and by careful site inspection during construction. A closed-cell ACB
system failed and drained Kingstowne Park Reservoir in Fairfax County, Virginia,
during a heavy rain in 2010 (Kravitz, 2010).
Failure caused by deformation of the foundation would occur by the following:
Water during operation of the system saturates the subsoil leading to a
Shallow slip along a plane parallel to the face of the embankment caused by
down-slope forces on the blocks and an adjacent layer of soil exceeding the
local shear resistance along the underside of the soil layer
Settlement of the block system caused by removal of the drainage layer
beneath the blocks through the vents in a wedge block system, or through the
openings of an interlocking block system
Older ACB systems were anchored using rigid soil anchors. It is difficult to
determine the benefit of these and they potentially prevent a system from
conforming to a slightly deformed or settled subgrade. If anchors are used, a cable
90
anchor that would allow system flexing may be preferable. Also, anchors can
puncture a geotextile if used beneath the system, creating a potential path for
piping. The potential foundation failure modes should be addressed by a
competent geotechnical engineer.
91
If vegetation is called for as part of the design and integral to the system
performance, then it should be maintained to the level called for by the
specifications. No woody plants or trees should be allowed to grow through the
blocks. Evidence of any invasive animal activity should be noted and addressed.
The inspection should identify any cracked or broken blocks. Testing of some
ACB systems has shown that cracked or even broken individual blocks that are
still interlocked with the adjacent blocks may not produce a failure. For example,
cracked interlocking open-celled Tri-Lock blocks placed for overflow channels on
3:1 slopes were shown in a field installat ion at the Richmond Hill Mine in South
Dakota to not fail during flows producing velocities up to 17 ft/s and maximum
shear stresses exceeding 9 lb/ft2 (greater than assumed for design) (Jacobs et al.,
2004). However, cracked or broken blocks should generally be replaced as part of
a proper maintenance program. If the owner decides a block must be replaced, an
individual block may be broken and removed, and most likely replaced with cast
92
Chapter 5 Gabions
Chapter 5. Gabions
93
Figure 5-2.Typical unfilled gabion basket on left and mattress on right. Each is
formed with compartments to minimize rock movement within the gabion and
deformation of the overall structure. Hexagonal woven steel wire mesh gabions are
shown (Reclamation, courtesy of Chris Ellis).
Figure 5-3.Example of welded wire gabions filled with various rock sizes.
(Courtesy of GabionBaskets.net, all rights reserved).
94
Chapter 5 Gabions
Gabion baskets are typically divided into cells by diaphragms (often at 3-foot
centers) to reduce rock movement that can cause deformation. To reinforce the
structure, the corners and edges of the baskets are tied and reinforced with heavier
gauge wire to prevent unraveling and minimize deformation. Heavier gauge wire
and ties are also used to join the adjacent gabions, forming one continuous
structure.
Gabion baskets and mattresses are available in a variety of sizes, convenient for
forming a range of geometries. The empty baskets are generally light and can be
placed by hand. Once assembled, the gabions form flexible, permeable, rugged,
95
However, permeability may reduce over time as the voids in the rockfill become
progressively filled with silt, promoting vegetation growth.
Some disadvantages of gabions include appearance, since the wire is exposed
(although the use of attractive stone, colored wire coating, and vegetation may
alleviate this concern) and durability, since the wire mesh may be subject to
abrasion and corrosion damage (although special resistant coatings and materials
are available to increase the design life). Gabions are also more susceptible to
damage from debris and from vandalism compared to other types of dam
overtopping protection, such as RCC or ACBs, requiring more frequent
maintenance and repair. As for other types of overtopping protection, gabions can
make detection of changed seepage conditions within the embankment and
abutment more difficult.
Design considerations for gabions as embankment dam overtopping protection,
including hydraulic energy dissipation and erosion protection, are described in
this chapter. Additional design and construction considerations, advantages, and
disadvantages are also provided.
96
Chapter 5 Gabions
emplacements and reinforce river banks. The U.S. military continues to use
modern gabions as temporary barriers for blasts or small arms fire.
The use of wire-bound sausages was introduced by Maccaferri in 1894 to repair
the breach of the River Reno at Casalecchio, Italy. The USACE and others
initially investigated the use of gabions for stream bank stabilization and erosion
protection and found that they require less material and are significantly more
stable and cost effective than loose riprap. Significant research investigating the
use of gabion baskets or mattresses for water storage and flood passage while
preventing erosion were carried out by Stephenson in the late 1970s, using
hydraulic model studies involving flume tests of stacked gabion baskets.
Stephenson provided some information on energy dissipation (1979a) and
stability (1980). In 1982, an experimental study of gabions under high velocity
flow was conducted at Colorado State University (CSU) for Maccaferri (Simons
et al., 1984). Dodge (1988) and USDOT (1988) also performed hydraulic studies
on gabion mattresses and stacked gabion baskets under high velocity flows
similar to those expected in overtopping flows.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has used
gabions to build spillways for earthen dams in developing countries (Charman et
al., 2001). The FAO developed a guide for designing small earthen dams with
gabion spillways, intake weirs for irrigation channels, river revetments, and
erosion protection measures. The emphasis of the FAO design guide is on
empowering local communities without engineering expertise and therefore
includes careful discussion of all aspects of the project design and construction
using simple means. De Marinis et al., (2000); Fratino (2004); Chinnarasri and
Wongwises (2006); Chinnarasri et al., (2008); and Fratino and Renna (2009) have
conducted studies of the influence of rock size, shape, and void fraction on gabion
performance and have made comparisons of flow conditions and energy
dissipation for gabions versus concrete stepped spillways.
Hydraulic capacity
Energy dissipation
Anchoring details
Stability
Foundation preparation
97
deep, and was placed on a non-woven filter fabric. The mattresses were laced
together at each seam and filled with 3- to 6-inch rounded stones. The mattresses
were relatively stable during testing, although two failures occurred due to loss of
the crest anchorage. As with the Reclamation tests, basket deformation was
reported as a result of migration of the rockfill to the downstream end of each
compartment (USDOT, 1988). Smooth gabion mattresses placed on a slope
should probably be limited to a unit discharge of 10 ft3/s/ft to minimize the
potential for damage (Peyras et al., 1992).
Chapter 5 Gabions
3.3- by 3.3- by 9.8-foot hexagonal mesh baskets filled with 6- to 9-inch (scaled)
stones and placed in various stepped configurations. Overtopping flows from
7.5 to 30 ft3/s/ft were discharged over slopes of 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1, on embankments
from 10 to 16 feet high. This research permitted the evaluation of different types
of overtopping flow, and provided downstream head measurements to quantify
the amount of energy dissipation for stilling basin design (ASCE, 1994).
These model studies revealed two basic types of overtopping flow: nappe and
skimming. In nappe flow, energy is dissipated upon impact with the lower step
and within the turbulence resulting from dispersal of the nappe, with or without
formation of a hydraulic jump. At higher discharges, the nappe disappears and
skimming flow occurs as the flow velocity accelerates to a maximum or terminal
velocity under uniform flow conditions (18 to 20 ft/s in the tests). The flow skims
over the step lips and bottom rollers, and turbulence develops as air is entrained
(ASCE, 1994). Nappe flow and skimming flow may be predicted with the same
equations as for smooth concrete steps. Energy loss equations were developed by
Chamani and Rajaratnam (1994) and Fratino (2004) for predicting nappe flow,
and by Chanson (2005) for skimming flows, including adjustments for aeration to
represent the greater energy dissipation occurring on the gabion steps compared to
smooth concrete steps.
The key parameters governing overtopping flow for gabions are slope, drop
height, step profile, unit discharge, and gravitational acceleration. Based on the
experimental results from Peyras et al. (1992) for plain gabion steps, design
curves were developed for the head loss, E, between the crest and toe, and for
the flow depth at the downstream toe, d1. The equation (Equation 5-1) for
predicted head loss, E, is:
E/H = 1 a1Db1
Eq. 5-1
Where:
D=
q=
H=
g=
99
The equation (Equation 5-2) for flow depth at the downstream toe, d1, is:
d1/H = a2Db2
Eq. 5-2
Where:
D=
H=
100
Slope
a1
b1
a2
b2
1:1
4.195
0.526
0.313
0.263
2:1
5.918
0.654
0.314
0.247
3:1
4.808
0.647
0.342
0.248
Chapter 5 Gabions
Figure 5-7.Unit head loss over plain gabion steps (Adapted from Peyras et al, 1992).
101
Figure 5-8.Depth at toe of plain gabion spillway (Adapted from Peyras et al, 1992).
102
Chapter 5 Gabions
Fratino and Renna (2009) also investigated the influence of rock size, shape, and
packing or porosity on the energy dissipation characteristics of stepped gabions.
Testing was conducted within the 2-foot-wide flume shown in Figure 5-9, with
ten gabion steps each 8-inches-thick forming a 4:1 slope, and subjected to a unit
discharge of up to 4.5 ft3/s/ft. This testing revealed that stone size and shape do
not significantly influence the flow conditions on the stepped gabion slope for
both nappe and skimming flow. The earlier work by Peyras et al. (1992) regarding
energy dissipation on gabion steps was therefore confirmed.
A stilling basin for a gabion spillway may be designed for a given drop height, H;
unit discharge, q; and slope by determining the flow depth, d1, at the downstream
toe (as defined above), the conjugate depth, d2, for the hydraulic jump, and the
tailwater elevation. The conjugate depth (Equation 5-3) may be determined from
the Froude number, F, at the downstream toe, with F = q / (gd13)0.5, as follows:
d2 = 0.5 d1 [(1 + 8F2)0.5 1]
Eq. 5-3
The required stilling basin floor elevation may be determined by subtracting the
conjugate depth from the tailwater elevation for the design condition. The length
of the stilling basin (or downstream apron) may be estimated as 6 times the
conjugate depth for a 1:1 slope, with greater lengths required for flatter slopes (up
to 15 percent longer for a 3:1 slope) (Peyras et al., 1992).
103
The model tests by Peyras et al. (1992) indicated some deformation of the gabions
due to movement of the stones (see Figure 7-6 in Chapter 7). Tightly packed,
angular stones at least 1.5 times larger than the mesh size (but less than the
thickness of the mattress) are recommended. For flows greater than 15 ft3/s/ft, the
mesh and lacing should be stiffened by adding diaphragms to reduce compartment
loads. Potential debris loads may require the addition of 2 to 4 inches of
protective concrete on the step surfaces. For increased stability and energy
dissipation, the gabions may be tilted upstream about 10 percent to provide a
rising lip. Design overtopping flows should generally be limited to 32 ft3/s/ft
(Peyras et al., 1992).
104
Chapter 5 Gabions
105
A granular bedding layer is generally placed and compacted in preparation for the
gabion construction (Figure 5-11). The bedding layer will serve as a foundation
for the gabions and as a filter to prevent migration of embankment materials into
the gabion rockfill. Selection of the appropriate bedding material gradation should
consider the underlying embankment materials gradation (base soil) and the
selected gabion rockfill size. Filter compatibility analysis and selection of an
appropriate bedding gradation should be completed using procedures outlined in
FEMAs Filters for Embankment Dams manual (2011). Thickness of the bedding
layer(s) should allow for compaction with heavy equipment and be thick enough
to have confidence there are no thin areas or flaws in the filter section. The
bedding material immediately beneath gabions should also be resistant to
hydraulic forces during overtopping that might cause the material to migrate
upwards into the gabion rockfill. A bedding compatibility check should be
performed using procedures outlined in Reclamations Design Standard No. 13,
Chapter 7, Riprap Slope Protection, (Reclamation, 2014)4.
This Reclamation design standard was being updated at the time of this manual preparation. The
reader may also refer to the 2001 version of Design Standard No. 13, Chapter 7, but note there are
additional bedding criteria considerations provided in the updated 2014 version.
106
Chapter 5 Gabions
Where the embankment has internal filter and drainage zones, a compatible
downstream coarse rockfill zone, or where seepage analysis shows that it is
unlikely for seepage to exit beneath the gabion structure, then a filter compatible
bedding layer may not be required. However, for a fine-grained homogeneous
embankment, the bedding layer may need to be a multiple-stage filter (i.e. two or
more), transitioning from a sand material to a gravel material. The potential for
migration of the underlying material into the gabion rockfill during overtopping
should always be considered.
Where locally borrowed sand and gravel filter materials are not available or where
commercially-produced materials are cost prohibitive, a geotextile may be
considered (Figure 5-12). The geotextile should be carefully selected to prevent
the underlying embankment materials from migrating into the gabion rockfill
while providing adequate drainage capacity. In the United States, geotextiles are
not commonly accepted as filters in dam construction or used as the primary
defense against internal erosion. If the geotextile could be considered critical to
the safety of the dam, then a granular bedding material should be used instead.
Additional concerns related to the use of geotextiles are provided in FEMAs
Filters for Embankment Dams manual (2011). Where the embankment has an
engineered filter zone and the geotextile would be a secondary line of defense
against internal erosion, then geotextiles may be appropriate and likely costeffective. Procedures for selecting the appropriate weight, durability, and apparent
opening size (AOS) are provided in FEMAs Geotextiles in Embankment Dams
manual (2008). Special care should be taken during construction to avoid
puncturing and/or tearing the geotextile.
107
5.2.5 Stability
Gabions used for the side walls of a spillway chute or stilling basin should be
analyzed as a gravity retaining wall. Conventional earth pressure design
procedures should be used to determine lateral forces that act against the
unsupported section of the gabion structure. Stability calculations for sliding and
overturning should be completed for each unique wall cross section. Bearing
capacity should also be analyzed. Where stability is questionable, either:
108
Chapter 5 Gabions
5.3 Availability
There are a number of gabion manufacturers in the United States providing full
service designs and manufactured products. The designer is encouraged to contact
a number of manufacturers and suppliers when considering the appropriate
product for their project. Proximity to the project site, lead time, and cost should
also be considered.
The rock fill can represent a significant portion of the gabion construction cost.
Rock may be quarried and processed at the project site or imported from
commercial sources. Rock availability will vary greatly, depending on the
location.
Gabion assembly and filling instructions should be developed and included in the
specifications. These are often available from the manufacturers and suppliers and
may be used to help develop the specification requirements. Procedures should
cover basket placement and alignment, cross-tie and stiffener placement, rock
placement, and securing the lids.
5.4.1 Materials
There are a number of wire mesh gabion basket manufacturers available. Due to
the often lower cost provided by double-twisted hexagonal mesh (DTHM)
gabions, their usage has become commonplace in the United States. DTHM
gabions should conform to ASTM A975. Materials used to make the gabion mesh
include hot-dipped galvanized wire, which can be classified by the amount of zinc
coating into common (50 g/m2) and high (250-270 g/m2); electro-galvanized wire;
and Galfan steel wire, which uses a Zn-Al alloy low carbon steel wire (either 5 or
10 percent). Galfan gabion mesh has a high corrosion resistance performance,
which is about 2 to 3 times higher than that of the common galvanized gabion
mesh under any conditions. Galfan gabion mesh also has a high ductility and
deformability. It can withstand the test of winding and twisting under powerful
deformation processes, and the zinc coating will not peel off. Galvanized wire
baskets can be expected to have a life of up to 40 years and examples exist over
80 years old (Charman et al., 2001).
110
Chapter 5 Gabions
A PVC coating may be applied to the wire to provide additional protection for use
in polluted, contaminated, or aggressive environments: in salt, fresh water, acid
soil, or wherever the risk of corrosion is present. The PVC coating typically has a
nominal thickness of 0.02 inches (0.50 mm), and the coating can be applied after
either electro-galvanizing or hot-dipped galvanizing. A variety of colors are
available, such as grey, grass green, and dark green.
Welded wire gabion baskets are also available, constructed with heavier gauge
wire and available in stainless steel and even copper mesh. Welded wire gabion
baskets are typically more rigid, allowing for construction of more uniform lines,
and have more resistance to deformations. Welded wire gabions may be more
advantageous when forming spillway sidewalls or steps along the slope. Welded
wire gabions should conform to ASTM A974. It should be noted that the strength
of the welded wire connections are somewhat less than what is provided by
double-twisted mesh gabions. If large deformations, excessive abrasion, or impact
loads are expected, DTHM gabions should be considered. Corrosion-resistant
galvanized or PVC-coated welded wire mesh gabions are also available.
Rock used to fill the gabions must be of high strength and quality and not likely to
degrade or abrade over time. Specifications for hardness, durability, and specific
gravity of the rockfill should be established. At a minimum, the following should
be specified.
111
Figure 5-14.Example gabion structure without and with proper downstream anchor
(Reclamation, courtesy of Chris Ellis).
112
Chapter 5 Gabions
113
continue to expand then the gabion structure will conform to the void. These
deformations may negatively affect the hydraulic performance of the gabion
structure.
If excessive deformation occurs, one of two methods can be applied:
Restore the gabion structure to its original shape by placing additional
gabions on top of the settled areas. This method may be preferred if the
gabions have settled into a stable position.
If continued settlement and deformation is expected, it may be preferable
to remove and replace the damaged gabions with new ones on an
improved foundation and bedding layer.
A case history of a gabion spillway constructed on an embankment dam (West
Cornfield Dam) is provided in the Appendix.
114
115
of fabrics, meshes, or mats that allow the grass plant to grow through the
reinforcement, so that grass roots bind around the geotextile fibers to create an
integrated geotextile/soil/root mass, and the established surface has the
appearance of 100 percent grass. Synthetic turf revetments consist of engineered
synthetic turf underlain by a structured geomembrane and infilled with a special
blend of cementitious materials for ballast. Chapter 4 deals with precast concrete
block protection systems, which include block placements having open cells filled
with soil and grass.
116
117
118
Figure 6.1.HydroTurfTM Outfall Structure with St. Johns River Water Management
119
Eq. 6-1
Where:
Q=
total discharge
n=
A=
channel area
R=
S=
slope of the energy grade line = sin , where is the slope angle
from horizontal
If calculations are carried out on a unit discharge basis, and with the assumption
of a hydraulically-wide channel (i.e. with R = D), the flow depth can be
determined directly from Equation 6-2:
/ /
Eq. 6-2
Where :
D is the depth of flow and the other variables are known.
If a wide channel is not assumed, then A and R in Equation 6-1 must be replaced
by appropriate functions of flow depth for the specific channel shape and the
depth can be determined by iterative solution knowing Q, S, and n.
Mannings n is determined as a function of the stem length and density of the
vegetal cover and the unit discharge on the slope. Temple et al. (1987) provide
general relations that incorporate effects of soil particle roughness, boundary form
roughness, and vegetal roughness, but for practical purposes simplifies the key
relation down to (Equation 6-3):
n e .
. ..
Eq. 6-3
Where:
CI = a retardance curve index that must satisfy the requirement
0.0025CI2.5 VR 36
V = flow velocity, computed knowing the discharge, flow depth, and
channel shape
R = hydraulic radius
120
2.5
Eq. 6-4
Where:
h=
M=
For a hydraulically-wide channel, both A and R are equal to the flow depth, D,
and the combination VR is equal to the unit discharge q, allowing Mannings
equation and the full system of equations just presented to be solved directly. For
a channel with a finite width (or less than about 6 times the flow depth), an
iterative solution is required as indicated above.
Once the flow depth down the slope has been determined, the gross hydraulic
stress, o, and the erosionally effective hydraulic stress, e, can be determined
using Equations 6-5a and 6-5b:
Eq. 6-5a
Eq. 6-5b
Where:
o =
e =
d=
S=
CF =
ns =
n=
The parameters of these equations are discussed by Temple et al. (1987). For finegrained material typically found on vegetated embankment slopes, the soil grain
roughness, ns, has a value of 0.0156. If the grass cover is uniform, the cover
factor, CF, varies with the type of cover (as characterized by grass species and
stem density) as shown in Table 6-1. Three uniformity classifications are
recognized: uniform cover, minor discontinuities, and major discontinuities. If
uniform cover exists, the value of CF can be taken from Table 6-1.
121
Table 6-1. Properties of grass channel linings having good uniform stands of each
cover (Temple et al. 1987).
Cover factor, CF
Covers tested
0.90
bermudagrass
500
centipedegrass
500
buffalograss
400
kentucky bluegrass
350
blue grama
350
0.75
grass mixture
200
0.50
weeping lovegrass
350
yellow bluestem
250
alfalfa2
500
lespedeza sericea2
300
common lespedeza
150
sudangrass
50
0.87
0.50
0.50
Notes:
1Multiply the stem densities given in the table by 1/3, 2/3, 1, 4/3, and 5/3, for poor, fair,
good, very good, and excellent covers, respectively. The equivalent adjustment to CF
remains a matter of engineering judgment until more data are obtained or a more analytic
model is developed. A reasonable, but arbitrary, approach is to reduce the cover factor by
20 percent for fair stands and 50 percent for poor stands. CF values for untested covers
may be estimated by recognizing that the cover factor is dominated by density and
uniformity of cover near the soil surface. Thus, the sod-forming grasses near the top of the
table exhibit higher CF values than the bunch grasses and annuals near the bottom.
2For
the legumes tested, the effective stem count for resistance given in the table is
approximately five times the actual stem count very close to the bed. Similar adjustment may
be needed for other unusually large-stemmed, branching, and/or woody vegetation.
discontinuities the entire hydraulic stress is borne by the soil surface (Equation
6-5b, with CF=0). Major discontinuities completely negate the value of the
protective vegetation, and the erosionally effective hydraulic stress is then set
equal to the gross hydraulic stress (Equation 6-5a). Examples of minor
discontinuities (Temple and Irwin, 2006) are narrow trails perpendicular to the
flow direction with a width comparable to or less than the vegetal stem length or
flow depth. Trails perpendicular to the flow direction should be considered major
discontinuities if their width exceeds the vegetal stem length or flow depth. Trails
parallel to the flow direction would be major discontinuities that not only expose
the soil surface to erosion but allow concentration of flow in the exposed area,
regardless of their size. Clearly, to receive any protective benefit from vegetation,
major discontinuities cannot be allowed to occur. Other serious discontinuit ies to
be avoided include trees, utility poles, buildings, and other structures within the
flow surface.
When embankment conditions allow adequate rooting of the vegetal cover, the
allowable hydraulic attack involves both the erosionally effective hydraulic stress
and the duration of flow, and is given by (Hanson and Temple, 1994) (Equations
6-6 and 6-7):
0.2 1
Eq. 6-6
and
13.5 lb/ft
Eq. 6-7
Where:
PI = plasticity index of the soil in which the cover is rooted
t=
time in hours
In all cases, is restricted to values of 13.5 lb/ft2 or less. This represents a stress
level sufficient to cause direct instantaneous destruction of the vegetal cover
through uprooting or tearing and removal of the leaves and stems. Considering a
range of typical grass properties and embankment dam slopes ranging from 2:1 to
4:1, this puts a practical upper limit on the overtopping unit discharge of about
6 to 24 ft3/s/ft. Equation 6-6, which incorporates soil properties and duration of
flow, could indicate that even lower unit discharges are allowable for long
duration events or on soils with little plasticity.
These relations are unit dependent, and apply to natural vegetative systems only,
for a wide range of grass species. The erosionally effective hydraulic stress must
be expressed in lb/ft2, and the integral must be evaluated over the duration of the
routed overtopping flow with time expressed in hours. When either the
accumulated or instantaneous hydraulic attack exceeds the levels indicated by the
equations, failure of the grass cover occurs.
123
124
125
1 Minimum
2 Installed
within 0.75 inch below soil surface, or in conjunction with a surface mesh.
126
Creeping
Red Fescue
Smoothstalked
Meadow
Grass
Roughstalked
Meadow
Grass
Creeping
Bent
General
purpose
40
30
20
10
Low
maintenance
normal sites
70
20
10
Low
maintenance
dry sites
75
25
Low
maintenance
wet sites
40
30
30
128
Ahring and Davis in USDA Agricultural Handbook 667 (Temple et al., 1987)
focus on applications in humid and subhumid areas of the United States and
identify several tight-sod-forming grasses for use as vegetal channel linings.
These include bermudagrass, bahiagrass, buffalograss, intermediate wheatgrass,
Kentucky bluegrass, reed canarygrass, smooth bromegrass, vine mesquitegrass,
and Western wheatgrass. They provide an extensive table that includes more than
two dozen different grass species and gives characteristics relating to growth
habit; root structure; site and soil adaptability; establishment rates from either
seed, rhizome, or stolons; and height at maturity.
129
130
the grass cover develops. Once established, a good grass cover cannot be
sustained without regular, effective maintenance, primarily mowing operations to
keep the cover from becoming too tall and patchy in its growth habit, and to ward
off the infiltration of woody plants that would produce non-uniform flow and
concentrated stresses. Hewlett et al. (1987) address many of these issues in the
context of reinforced turf protection, but most of the guidance is also applicable to
plain grass.
Geotechnical factors can be very important in the design of a vegetative
protection system. Hewlett et al. (1987) discuss possible failure modes that are
somewhat independent of the vegetative protection, including:
Deep slip failures of the soil mass beneath the vegetated slope following
its operation
Shallow surface slips when grass roots have failed to sufficiently penetrate
the subsoil
They outline field investigation programs and testing that should be conducted to
identify the potential for these problems, and offer design suggestions for dealing
with slope stability, settlement, drainage, plasticity, and soil shear strength
problems of the underlying embankment.
Long-term performance of reinforced turf systems is obviously affected by the
degradation of reinforcement materials due to weathering effects such as
ultraviolet (UV) exposure, wetting and drying, freeze-thaw cycling, and chemical
reactions involving the materials and the surrounding soil and water. This is a
research area that has not been fully explored, as many of these materials were
only first developed in the last 20 to 30 years.
A good inspection program is essential to ensuring the long-term performance of
any overtopping protection system. For grassed waterways, Hewlett et al. (1987)
emphasize that visual inspections should address the following topics:
Quality and uniformity of the grass cover
Soil shrinkage which creates gaps at junctions between grassed waterways
and rigid structures
Differential settlement between rigid structures and adjacent grassed
waterways
Crest settlement or crest features that lead to flow concentration
Exposed leading edges of reinforcement mats
131
132
Proper maintenance is also required of the synthetic turf revetment system. This
includes regular inspections to evaluate performance and potentially damaged
areas. Damage to synthetic turf and the ballast infill can be repaired or patched by
removal and replacement of the damaged sections as follows:
(1) Saw cut through the cementitious infill and synthetic turf to the limits of
damage
(2) Break up and remove the cementitious infill
(3) Remove the synthetic turf and the underlying structured geomembrane
down to the subgrade
(4) Heat weld a new piece of geomembrane to the existing geomembrane.
(5) Heat weld a new piece of synthetic turf to the existing synthetic turf
(6) Infill the synthetic turf with cementitious materials and hydrate
If there are cracks or damage to the infill but not to the underlying synthetic turf
and geomembrane, fill these cracks or damaged areas with cementitious infill
materials and hydrate.
133
134
Chapter 7 Rockfill
This chapter discusses the use, analysis, and design of flow-through rockfill and
reinforced rockfill dams in the context of embankment dam overtopping
protection. All of the following information comes from:
(1)
(2)
(3)
136
Chapter 7 Rockfill
water discharging through the cracks of the impervious core. The analysis
approach of Leps (1973), described below, was applied for this design. Not only
was the rockfill expected to remain stable under these flow conditions, it was also
designed to be filter compatible with the downstream-most filter zone
immediately adjacent to it. A similar approach would have been taken to reduce
hydrologic risks of dam overtopping during a large flood event.
Rockfill can also be used to slow the erosion rate and delay dam failure,
effectively reducing risk. Such an application could provide more time to allow
for the safe evacuation of the downstream population and greatly reduce the
consequences of dam failure.
downstream slope of 2:1, and a toe berm of reinforced rock about 20 feet
wide. The downstream slope is reinforced with a surface grid of No. 7 and
No. 8 steel bars, tied back at 3-foot vertical intervals with hooked, 37-foot
long, No. 7 bars. The pullout resistance is mobilized along the entire 37-foot
long anchor bars to hold the surface mesh in place. All rock within 4 feet of
the surface is at least 12 inches in size and the rock in the toe-berm has a
minimum size of 24 inches.
After a little over 3 years of successful operation of the dam, there was some
wear and dislocation of the bars, and about 1,400 yd3 of rock had been washed
away from the downstream face. In addition, there was a slight bulging of the
lower part of the downstream slope and some sagging of the upper part,
neither of which had exceeded 3 feet. The lost rock was replaced in 1968, and
additional No. 8 bars were incorporated in the grid on the downstream face to
inhibit further loss of rock.
The bulging and sagging mentioned in the paragraph above likely indicates mass
instability. The anchor bars may have prevented a complete stability failure. The
loss of 1,400 yd3 of rock would have represented about 2 percent of the total
estimated volume of the dam. With a crest length of 555 feet, normal flows would
produce a unit discharge between 3.6 and 12 ft3/s/ft, and maximum flows would
produce a unit discharge of 153 ft3/s/ft. Figure 7-2 provides a close-up view of the
reinforced rockfill surface as it appeared in June 2007.
138
Chapter 7 Rockfill
Figure 7-2.Pit No. 7 Afterbay Dam, looking at downstream face, toward right
139
Figures 7-3, 7-4, and 7-5 depict the reinforcement of a central core, zoned rockfill
dam at Des Arc Bayou Site No. 3 in Arkansas that was constructed for the NRCS
(formerly Soil Conservation Service)6. The design and construction, as described
by Henry (1977) is of a dam with a height of 131 feet, an upstream slope of 2:1, a
downstream slope of 1.8:1, and reinforcement on the downstream face to a height
of 75 feet above the toe. The design for this dam is intended to allow water to pass
through the dam when the reservoir level rises above the impervious core, then
safely flow through Zones 2 and 3 of the downstream shell. The anchor lengths
are uniform and relatively short compared to the height of the dam, indicating that
the anchor bars are primarily there to hold the surface mesh and not to enhance
global slope stability. Assuring internal filter compatibility between the
embankment zones, especially between Zones 2 and 3 for this dam, is an
important design requirement.
Stability of this dam is primarily provided by the Zone 4 rockfill. If the
impervious core of this dam (or the crest of any rockfill dam) is overtopped,
internal pore water pressures would rise and seepage forces would act within the
rockfill to decrease stability. Such a decrease in stability can normally be
countered in design by flattening the slopes. Flattening the downstream slope to
increase stability is generally more efficient than increasing the length or amount
of reinforcement, and more assured than changing the rockfill gradation. Neither
the design analysis nor the performance history of Des Arc Bayou No. 3 Dam
were reviewed for this manual.
No example of using reinforced rockfill to modify an existing embankment dam
to withstand overtopping flows or flow-through conditions was found in the
literature. While reinforcement is sometimes used for new rockfill dams and
reinforced rockfill is used to stabilize concrete structures, it does not appear to
have been used as slope protection for modification of existing earthfill
embankment dams, nor does it appear that reinforcement has been added to zoned
embankment dams with existing downstream shells considered to be rockfill.
Note that all figures from Henry 1977 are reprinted with permission from Rockfill Dams Designed
for Overtopping During Construction" by J. F. Henry. ASAE Paper No. 772536. Copyright 1977
American Society of Agriculture Engineers.
140
Chapter 7 Rockfill
141
Figure 7-5.Reinforcement detail for the downstream toeDes Arc Bayou site No. 3
(Courtesy of Henry, 1977, all rights reserved)..
diameter particles would behave more like an earthfill, and the flow through such
material may be laminar. The slow flow-through rates for earthfills can be
142
Chapter 7 Rockfill
Defined by Leps (1973) for a given volume of rockfill particles as the volume of voids divided
by the total surface area of the rockfill particles, or the void ratio divided by the surface area per
unit volume of solids.
143
permeameters can be used for this purpose (Zou, et. al., 2013; Siddiqua, et. al.
2011; and Morn, 2013).
144
Chapter 7 Rockfill
Research at the Technical University of Madrid in Spain (Toledo, 1998) has been
published addressing the critical issue of mass slope stability of rockfill dams.
Many physical tests were performed in this research on rockfill dams and toe
buttresses. Simplified formulas are presented; however, caution is advised in their
useconsidering the complicated nature of the problem. Conservatism can be
incorporated with sufficient safety factors.
embedded into the embankment beyond the critical shear surface to a depth
sufficient to transfer the design loads in the bars to the surrounding rockfill and
eliminate the possibility of premature pullout. Mass slope stability analysis should
also be performed to determine the required depth of embedment.
Alternatives to embed the anchors into the rockfill include crank-shaped anchors,
anchors fixed to grouted dowels in the fill, and inclined anchors (Brown and Pells,
1983). Figure 7-6 depicts alternatives for anchorage at the ends of typical
reinforcing bars, although reinforcement can take many other shapes. Vertical
spacing of the tie-back bars is not an exact science. Spacing should be close
enough to prevent the critical shear surfaces from circumventing the
reinforcement by exiting between the horizontal layers of reinforcement. The
reinforcement system is connected to the foundation and abutments with rock
bolts or another solid means to keep it in place along the edges where the erosive
forces may be the most aggressive.
146
Chapter 7 Rockfill
To resist through flow, reinforcement should extend well above the height of the
predicted seepage exit elevation. To resist flow over an embankment, the
reinforcement should extend over the entire downstream face, abutment to
abutment, unless the embankment has been shaped to direct overtopping flows
through a limited area. Designs should also assure crest stability during
overtopping. Rockfill would be largest and reinforcement would be heaviest at the
downstream toe of an embankment dam subject to overtopping.
As noted previously, the methodology for the design of rockfill reinforcement is
rather empirical. Designs are often copied from previous successful dams
performing similar functions. One valuable source of information on past designs
includes 50 reinforced rockfill dams and cofferdams in the report prepared by
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) (1982). Of these 50
mostly Australian dams, 18 were overtopped by flood flows and 5 of these failed.
As described previously, Pit No. 7 Afterbay Dam and Des Arc Bayou Site No. 3
have successfully withstood overtopping many times.
Corrosion shortens the life of steel reinforcement and must be considered for
design. Carbonaceous rockfill materials should be avoided due to their galvanic
effect and because of their high electrical conductivity. If reinforcement is buried
within saturated soils, corrosion would be influenced by the quality and pH of the
water, soluble salt content of the overlying soil, and aeration. Conventional
practices to fight against corrosion include:
Cathodic protection
For steel, the first line of defense against corrosion is the use of protective
coatings such as zinc or fusion-bonded epoxy. Zinc, in the form of galvanized
coatings, has a limited life since it sacrifices itself to protect the steel. In addition,
zinc is conductive and would require more electrical energy if cathodic protection
were ever added as part of the protection scheme. Epoxy would be expected to
have discontinuities that would still leave some small areas of steel exposed to
corrosion. A corrosion monitoring system can be implemented which could tell
when cathodic protection might be necessary if all other types of protection do not
work.
147
148
Chapter 7 Rockfill
149
Chapter 8 Riprap
Chapter 8. Riprap
151
years, riprap has been specified for this purpose on small, low hazard dams, and
has been successfully used on low drop structures with flat slopes in low hazard
situations. The use of riprap for high flow rates and steep slopes generally
becomes cost-prohibitive due to the large size of rock required.
Applications of riprap protection specifically designed for overtopping flows on
new significant or high hazard dams have thus far been very limited. One
example, however, is for the Khasab embankment dams on the Musandam
Peninsula of Oman (Taylor, 1991). Three high hazard embankment dams were
designed with flattened 4:1 downstream slopes to be armored by large
(20- to 66-inch) riprap over bedding, for protection against overtopping by large
floods up to the PMF. The design was based on theoretical calculations and
1:50 scale model tests, and included a maximum design unit discharge of nearly
55 ft3/s/ft for the main dam embankment. The quarried limestone riprap was to be
dumped and reworked in place to produce the required packing or density. During
construction, there were some difficulties obtaining sufficient quantities of large
size rock, and it was challenging to achieve placement uniformity and packing
specifications. These are typical of large riprap construction efforts and are not
believed to have impacted the quality of the final constructed project.
An example of the addition of riprap protection to an existing high hazard dam is
Upper Stoneville Reservoir Dam in Massachusetts (Wooten and Wood, 2002).
This 20-foot- high, 400-foot-long embankment received riprap protection
designed to resist a 50 percent PMF flow of 14 ft3/s/ft. The downstream slope of
the embankment was flattened from 2:1 to 4:1 to reduce the required stone size.
The riprap blanket was designed using the procedures in Frizell et al. (1998) and
was composed of rock with D50=1.5 feet dumped in a 6-foot-thick layer
(4*D50 thick) over a bedding layer of non-woven geotextile and 6 inches of
1.5-inch crushed stone (Figure 8-1). The dam has not experienced overtopping
flow since the modifications were completed.
A somewhat non-typical application of riprap for overtopping flow protection
arises in the decommissioning of watershed flood control dams. The NRCS has
undertaken a number of these projects in which the reservoir contains significant
accumulations of sediment. To avoid releasing the sediment downstream, the dam
is only partially breached by excavating a spillway channel through the
embankment just down to the elevation of the stored sediment. Flow is then
conveyed through a riprap-lined rock chute that protects the breached section and
the remaining embankment from erosion.
152
Chapter 8 Riprap
Figure 8-1. Dumped riprap placement on 6-inch bedding layer for Upper Stoneville
Reservoir Dam, Massachusetts (Wooten and Wood, 2002, Courtesy of ASDSO and
The design basis for decommissioning of watershed flood control dams is the
testing by Robinson et al. (1998). One example of this application is the rock
chute spillway constructed on Little Washita Site 13 in Oklahoma, shown in
Figure 8-2. This dam was decommissioned due to a troublesome karst foundation
condition. The rock chute was designed to convey a routed 25-year flood
discharge of 1,740 ft3/s within the chute. Larger discharges will be spread over a
400-foot wide section of the remnant embankment. The drop height of the chute is
12 feet, and the channel slope is 4.75 percent. The chute is nominally 50 feet wide
with 3:1 side slopes, and includes a 10-foot-wide riffle-and-pool channel on the
left side for very low flows. The riprap layer is 3 feet thick and the rock has a
maximum size of 36 inches and D50 of 24 inches. Riprap is placed onto a non
woven geotextile overlaying a 6-inch deep sand layer, and the chute is anchored
by sheet pile cutoffs at the upstream and downstream ends. Three such projects
have recent ly been constructed in Oklahoma, and NRCS has used an additional
seven rock chutes of similar configuration for grade control in the Sugar Creek
watershed in Caddo County, Oklahoma.
153
154
Chapter 8 Riprap
ensure the riprap layer does not fail. Empirically-derived design criteria offer the
best approach for design (Frizell et al., 1990). Studies of riprap design include:
Riprap design to resist overtopping flow is dependent upon the material
properties (median size, shape, gradation, porosity, and unit weight), the
hydraulic gradient or embankment slope, and the unit discharge
(ASCE, 1994).
Robinson et al. (1998) and Peirson and Cameron (2006) provide two
valuable summaries of the historical investigations that have led to presentday design guidance for riprap subjected to overtopping flow.
Isbash (1936) conducted some of the earliest studies on the stability of
large rock in flowing water, considering the placement of large rock into
flowing water as a means for constructing rockfill dams.
Olivier (1967) studied through-flow and overflow of rockfill dams and
developed rock stability equations calibrated with small-scale data from
flow over and through gravel on slopes from 8 to 45 percent. Olivier
defined threshold flow where incipient stone movement occurs, and
collapse flow where stone failure occurs. This work did not incorporate the
effects of aeration which are significant with larger-size rock and typical
embankment slopes.
Stephenson (1979b) modified Oliviers work slightly by incorporating a
porosity term.
Hartung and Scheuerlein (1970) recognized the importance of aeration at
larger scales and developed stability equations based on the work of Isbash
(1936) and their own tests of aerated flow over fixed rocks, but they did not
test riprap placements to the point of failure.
Knauss (1979) combined the aerated flow concepts of Hartung and
Scheuerlein (1970) with the work of Olivier (1967) and developed a
simplified set of design equations. Knauss developed a rock stability
function based on unit discharge, slope, rock packing, and air concentration
for sizing riprap, and determined that flow aeration increases the critical
velocity for which riprap on a steep slope remains stable.
A design procedure focused on applications for relatively flat slopes (i.e.,
flatter than typical embankment dam slopes) was provided in the USACEs
Hydraulic Design of Flood Control Channels (EM 1110-02-1601)
(USACE, 1994).
Several investigators have studied the effect of material properties other than
stone size. Anderson et al. (1970) developed design methods for riprap-lined
drainage channels using rounded stones on relatively flat slopes. Later work (Abt
155
et al. 1987; Abt and Johnson 1991) showed that rounded stones could withstand a
unit discharge about 40 percent lower than angular stones, leading most
subsequent investigators to focus only on angular riprap. Anderson et al. (1970)
studied various riprap gradations and found that uniformly-sized (or poorlygraded) riprap remained stable at higher flow rates than non-uniform (or wellgraded) riprap , but that non-uniform riprap provided better protection of the filter
and bedding materials located beneath the riprap layer. Wittler and Abt (1990)
further quantified the effects of stone gradation and confirmed that uniform
(or poorly-graded) materials withstood higher flow rates than non-uniform (or
well-graded) rock with the same D50. They also found that uniform materials
(D60/D10 = 1.1) failed more suddenly than non-uniform materials (D60/D10 = 2.2)
when the riprap layer became unstable. Riprap gradations with a wide range of
sizes typically experience problems with size segregation during placement. So
for best performance under overtopping flow, a rock of relatively uniform size is
generally desired, while gap-graded materials and mixes with a very large range
of sizes (D85/D15>7) are generally avoided.
Research has tended to consider steeper slopes and larger stone sizes over time as
the upper limits of riprap applicability have been pushed and as interest in the
protection of embankment dams against overtopping flows has increased.
Maynord (1988) performed overtopping tests at slopes of 2 percent or less. Abt
and Johnson (1991) ran tests at slopes of 1 to 20 percent with median rock sizes
up to 6.5 inches and unit discharges up to about 5 ft3/s/ft. Robinson et al. (1998)
tested and developed design procedures for rock chutes constructed on slopes of
2 to 40 percent (2.5:1) using rock as large as 11 inches median diameter and unit
discharges up to 17.5 ft3/s/ft. Both Abt and Johnson (1991) and Robinson et al.
(1998) found the allowable unit discharge to be a function of the embankment
slope and the median rock size. They probably did not identify porosity as a
parameter because by this time most investigators were concentrating on angular,
uniformly-sized rock mixes, and thus porosities of the rock mix were relatively
constant at around 0.45. Robinson et al. (1998) found that riprap sized for stability
on the slope would also be stable in the exit area of the chutes he studied, even
with minimal tailwater, suggesting that for an embankment dam application no
special treatment of the toe of the slope was needed other than continuing the
riprap protection beyond the end of any expected hydraulic jump.
Chang (1998) found the Robinson et al. equation to be accurate at the steep end of
its range (40 percent slope, or 2.5:1) but overly conservative at low slopes (less
than 10 percent). Chang resolved this with a more complex equation using the
embankment slope and angle of internal friction (angle of repose) of the rock
material. Chang also provided a good discussion of the typical two-stage failure
process observed for riprap on steep slopes:
(1) The threshold or motion stage, where there is initiation of stone movement
leading to consolidation and strengthening of the armor layer
156
Chapter 8 Riprap
(2) The collapse or failure stage in which the stones are already interlocked
and the eventual movement of one or a few stones leads to total collapse
of the protective layer
The difference between the threshold discharge and the failure discharge tends to
increase with stone angularity and slope (Olivier 1967 and Abt and Johnson
1991).
Mishra (1998) and Frizell et al. (1998) reported on overtopping tests with median
rock sizes from 10.5 to 26 inches on a 2:1 slope (50 percent) at unit discharges up
to 10 ft3/s/ft. At such steep slopes, flow takes place primarily through the rock
rather than over the rock, and a variety of multiphase flows can occur as noted by
Peirson and Cameron (2006) including aerated water, water through rock, and
potentially air and water through rock. Flow conditions were observed through
clear acrylic windows in the side of the test flume. Flow depths were measured
with piezometers embedded in the rock layer, and salt injectors and conductivity
probes were used to measure interstitial velocities. Failures of the riprap slope
occurred when measured flow depths were still below the top of the rock layer.
(Most recent investigators have been consistent in defining riprap failure to have
occurred when the bedding material is exposed.)
Highly aerated flow was also observed above the rock surface, but this aerated
flow did not register at the piezometers and was only a small fraction of the total
flow. Results of the tests were used to develop a design procedure that could
determine the appropriate rock size and layer thickness to safely protect against a
given unit discharge of overtopping flow. The relations developed include the
coefficient of uniformity, Cu=D60/D10, and the porosity of the rock mix,
recognizing that in large-size rock mixes, porosity can vary significantly
depending on placement methods and other factors. The procedure allows for
riprap layer thicknesses of 2 to 4 times D50, the former being the minimum
necessary to protect the bedding material and the latter being a practical upper
limit for effective placement. At slopes steeper than 4:1, the procedure requires
the entire computed flow to be conveyed interstitially. For flatter slopes, a portion
of the flow can be conveyed above the rock surface, with a check that the surface
flow will not exceed the critical shear stress limit for the rock. The testing also
explored the question of toe stability, with a variety of measures employed in
attempts to produce a test in which failure occurred at the toe of the slope, but no
toe failure ever occurred. Neither this work nor that of Robinson et al. (1998)
looked at the issue of increased protection for groin areas where embankment
slopes meet converging abutments. The increased unit discharge in these areas
may require larger stone sizes and an increased riprap layer thickness.
Two recent efforts have been made to integrate the data and design procedures
developed for the different slope ranges discussed above with the objective of
applying them to embankment overtopping protection applications. Peirson and
Cameron (2006) revisited the stability equations of Hartung and Scheuerlein
(1970), Olivier (1967), and Stephenson (1979b) and considered their effectiveness
157
using the test data obtained by Abt et al. (1987), Abt et al. (1988), Abt and
Johnson (1991), and Robinson et al. (1998). They derived a new equation based in
part on Olivier (1967) and Stephenson (1979b) and an analysis of incipient
motion of individual stones, but found it to be much too conservative for steep
slopes. As an alternative, they proposed a modified form of the Hartung and
Scheuerlein (1970) equation, incorporating a new rock slope stability term
borrowed from the incipient motion-based equation. They tested this equation
using just three data points from Robinson et al. (1998) (8, 22, and 40 percent
slopes) and showed that for these three data points the new relation provided a
conservative design method that reproduced the essential dependence of riprap
performance on slopes, up to slopes of 40 percent. However, they did not test
their relation with or cite the work of Mishra (1998) and Frizell et al. (1998) at a
50 percent slope.
Temple and Irwin (2006) suggested applying the relations developed by Abt and
Johnson (1991), Robinson et al. (1998), Mishra (1998), and Frizell et al. (1998)
within slope ranges corresponding to the majority of the tests performed in each
study. This approach was reasonable, but a problem arose in the treatment of the
Mishra/Frizell work when they used a relation that calculated allowable unit
discharge based on interstitial flow but did not include a second rock-size design
equation that is often the limiting factor in the Mishra/Frizell iterative design
process. The equations presented in the following section for design and analysis
purposes follow the strategy suggested by Temple and Irwin (2006), but these
equations are modified to include the Mishra/Frizell rock-size design equation.
Notably, this method as described here has been incorporated into the WinDAM
B computer program USDA developed to simulate overtopping flow and
breaching of embankment dams (Visser et al., 2012). WinDAM B computes the
discharge needed to initiate failure of riprap on the downstream slope of an
embankment dam, the first step in a sequence of events that can lead to dam
breach.
Research to determine boundary roughness of riprap placements has been less
extensive. Anderson et al. (1970) proposed a relatively simple relation between
the Manning roughness coefficient and the stone size. Abt et al. (1987) and Rice
et al. (1998) developed relations that used both the stone size and the bed slope to
predict the Manning roughness coefficient. Rice et al. (1998) also developed a
relation for estimating the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor as a function of the
relative submergence of the riprap stones. The reader is referred to these
references for details of the equations.
Use of the equations and accurate estimation of flow profiles requires making
practical determinations of such things as the effective top of riprap and the flow
split between interstitial and surface flow. Robinson et al. (1998) provided an
example demonstrating such calculations using the boundary roughness relations
of Rice et al. (1998), and Frizell et al. (1998) demonstrated the determination of
interstitial flows and velocities for a steep-slope situation.
158
Chapter 8 Riprap
St= the embankment slope expressed as the tangent of the slope angle (i.e.,
for 2:1 slope, St=0.5)
D50= the riprap diameter for which 50 percent by weight of the material is
finer (ft m)
np= the porosity of the riprap
hrr= the riprap thickness normal to the slope (should be in the range of
2*D50 to 4*D50), (ft)
Cu= the coefficient of uniformity, Cu =D60 / D10
g=
Gs=
Kx=
Parameter
K1
3.26
K2
0.516
K3
4.3
K4
0.462
K5
0.5245
The Abt and Johnson (1991) relations apply to flat slopes of 50:1 to 10:1
(2 to 10 percent).
159
1 0.768
1.786
50
Eq. 8-1
0.02 St 0.1
50
2 0.56
0.43
The Robinson et al. (1998) relations apply to slopes of 6:1 to 2.5:1 (17 to 40
percent), which is the range of interest for most embankment dams.
3 0.58
1.89
50
Eq. 8-2
0.167 St 0.4
50
4 0.53
0.307
6/4 10 /4
Where:
Z=
X
Eq. 8-3
0.1 St 0.167
For embankments with slopes in the range of 2.5:1 to 2:1 (40 to 50 percent) the
equations developed by Mishra (1998) and Frizell et al. (1998) are used. The
allowable unit discharge is:
min
Eq. 8-4
2.4850 0.58
2.22
1.923
0.75
1.11
50 0.25
sin
5
cos 1cos tan sin
0.4 St 0.5
with the first expression based on limiting interstitial flow through the rock and
the second based on rock stability. These equations, unlike those of Abt/Johnson
and Robinson include factors to account for variation of the specific gravity of the
rock, porosity, angle of repose, and coefficient of uniformity.
160
Chapter 8 Riprap
To determine rock size for these slopes, the corresponding equations are:
Eq. 8-5
50 max
2.22
2.48
0.58
1.11
5 0.52
sin
0.25 0.75 cos 1cos tan sin
0.4 St 0.5
To apply Equation 8-5 for design purposes, D50 is unknown at the outset, so the
riprap thickness, hrr, is also unknown. Initial estimates must be made and the
equations checked iteratively to determine a suitable rock size. The riprap layer
thickness can also be adjusted within the range of 2*D50 to 4*D50. Again, the first
expression in Equation 8-5 is related to the requirement that all flow be contained
in the interstitial zone, and the second expression is based on rock stability. In the
40 to 50 percent slope range, it is typically the second expression that controls.
These equations are all applicable to angular riprap with D50 less than
approximately 2 feet (the upper limit of available test data), dumped randomly on
appropriate bedding material in a layer at least 2*D50 thick. It should be noted
there are no safety factors applied in these equations, and discharges above the
computed allowable level should be expected to cause riprap failure. A designer
should add a safety factor depending on the application and organizational
policies. Abt and Johnson (1991) stated that the equation they developed would
compute a rock size that would resist a discharge 35 percent greater than that for
the desired inception of failure, but that safety factor has been backed out of the
equation presented here so that all of the equations are consistently computing the
discharge at inception of failure.
To illustrate the general behavior of these equations over a range of embankment
slopes, they were applied to two hypothetical situations. In the first case (Figure
8-3), the equations were used to determine the allowable unit discharge, qa, for
riprap with stone sizes D50 = 1, 1.5 and 2 feet, over slopes ranging from 1 to
50 percent. In the second case (Figure 8-4), the equations were used over the same
slope range to determine the stone size required to give overtopping flow
protection at unit discharges of 10, 20, and 30 ft3/s/ft. Since the Mishra/Frizell
equations adjust for varying rock properties, to enable a comparison to the other
simpler equations, assumptions representative of typical riprap were made:
Porosity, np = 0.45
161
Angle of repose, = 42
162
Chapter 8 Riprap
8.2.3 Bedding
Reclamations Design Standards No. 13, Chapter 7 Riprap Slope Protection
(2013) provides design guidance for the bedding layer(s) required beneath a
riprap protective layer. The bedding layer acts as a filter to protect against the loss
of underlying embankment materials, and bedding layers themselves must be
filter-compatible with the overlying riprap layer so that the bedding is retained by
the riprap. To provide for the retention of the bedding particles by the overlying
riprap layer and for the retention of the material underlying the bedding layer, the
gradation of the bedding material should conform with the following filter criteria
(Equation 8-6) if the embankment materials are of low or no plasticity (PI<7):
D15B < 5(D85E)
D85B > D15R / 5
Eq. 8-6
Where:
D15B = the 15 percent passing size of the bedding
D85B = the 85 percent passing size of the bedding
D85E = the 85 percent passing size of the embankment material to be
protected by the bedding
D15R = the 15 percent size of the riprap
163
1224
2736
12
Over 36
15
Chapter 8 Riprap
Cutoffs are provided upstream and downstream to prevent seepage into the
bedding layer, and a toe drain exiting through the toe wall or the face of the
downstream slope relieves pressure buildup below the riprap. Armoring is
extended into the groin or up the abutment slopes to contain all of the expected
flow within the armored area. For design guidance, the State of New Jersey has
directed engineers to USACE, 1992: ETL 1110-2-334, Design and Construction
of Grouted Riprap. None of these projects has experienced overtopping flows
since they were completed (Shaffer, 2014).
Although there is currently no research to support its use for overtopping
protection, the greatest potential for future use of grouted riprap in dam
overtopping applications appears to be for the placement procedure known
alternately as partially-grouted riprap (PGR) or matrix riprap. For this placement
method, riprap is randomly dumped over bedding material and partial grouting is
performed with the intent that grout should primarily be placed at the points of
contact between stones, but should not fill the entire void space. Typically, grout
might fill about one-third to one-half of the total void space. The objectives of this
placement method are threefold:
(1) To produce conglomerated riprap particles that are effectively much larger
than the base size of the stones and are tightly interlocked with adjacent
conglomerates of riprap
(2) To produce a riprap layer that remains flexible and able to adjust itself to
future settlement and shifting of the underlying materials
(3) to produce a riprap layer that is porous and able to relieve any buildup of
pore-water pressure that might occur beneath the riprap when flow takes
place over and through the riprap
This placement method has seen widespread use in Europe for several decades,
especially in Germany and Switzerland, primarily for scour protection around
bridge piers and abutments.
Lagasse et al. (2009) presents detailed design guidance for the use of partiallygrouted riprap for bridge pier scour protection. Rather than basing stone size
specifically on equations related to flow parameters, the typical practice is to
select a stone size in the 9 to 15 inch range, as this facilitates effective placement
of grout (Clopper, 2013). Smaller stones cause void spaces to be too small to
allow access into the pore spaces by the grouting equipment, while larger stones
cause voids to be so large that grout cannot be effectively kept in the contact areas
between stones, but instead the grout settles to the base of the riprap layer. There
is no analytical sizing of the stone for a partially-grouted riprap installation, and it
should be noted again that the equations in Section 8.2.2 would not apply to any
type of grouted riprap.
165
Lagasse et al. (2009) cites two recent research programs that conducted flume
studies of partially-grouted riprap. One series of tests completed at CSU in 2005
demonstrated effective performance of partially-grouted 6-inch diameter (Class I)
riprap around a prototype bridge pier with local velocities of 11 ft/s. In a test in
Germany (Heibaum, 2000), partially-grouted riprap was stable and undamaged in
a flow of 26 ft/s, but that test did not involve a bridge pier.
Until research specifically focused on overtopping flows can be conducted,
partially-grouted riprap is not recommended for protection of embankment dams.
Fully grouted riprap is also not recommended, since it suffers from the problems
that partially-grouted riprap is designed to address, namely the lack of flexibility
and inability to relieve high pore-water pressures.
166
Chapter 8 Riprap
167
168
169
9.1.2 Geocells
Geocells are CCS products that are lightweight, flexible mats made of HDPE
strips and represent a synthetic cellular confinement soil stabilizer. The HDPE
strips are ultrasonically bonded together to form an extremely strong, honeycomb
configuration, or geocell. They are useful in a variety of applications that require
a barrier or structural foundation including slope, channel, and ground
stabilization. The product confines a variety of native or select fill materials,
including soil, sand, aggregate, and concrete. Concrete fill is generally preferred
for erosion control structures that could be subjected to severe or persistent flows
or to hydrodynamic forces from high velocity flows. In concrete revetment or
lining work, the CCS functions as a placement form, able to render large expanses
of poured concrete flexible and permeable. A geomembrane or geotextile is often
placed beneath the CCS for ease of construction or for redundant erosion
protection.
Most products are available in various heights and cell sizes in solid wall or
perforated wall (to allow flow between cells) styles. Cell depth typically ranges
from 4 to 8 inches. Typical expanded section sizes range from 8 by 2.6 feet to 8
by 40 feet. There are many manufacturers of geocells, all trademarked products,
with examples of solid wall and perforated wall products shown in Figure 9-1.
170
Figure 9-1.Examples of a perforated and solid geoweb system with various fill
materials (a) Geoweb; (b) TerraCell (Courtesy of WEBTEC, Inc, all rights reserved).
velocity over a dam crest, or reduced wave run up on the upstream face of a dam.
In addition to erosion protection, these surface characteristics impart stability to
the system by reducing velocities, and allow the designer to affect the flow
characteristics of a channel, creating the opportunity for an engineered
hydraulic system.
By choosing the correct type of fabric form, overtopping flow can be slowed,
reducing downstream velocities and discharge turbulence, or a hydraulicallyefficient, relatively smooth form (such as Hydrotex Uniform Section) can be
chosen to maximize the drainage from a given area.
Filled-in-place fabric forms accommodate themselves to uneven contours, curves,
and subgrades at the time they are filled, so the soil and the concrete protection
are in intimate contact, reducing the chance of erosion beneath the protection.
Some forms create discrete concrete units, attached to each other with fabric
perimeters and/or embedded cables, and these units can articulate to adapt to
uneven settlement. If settlement is a critical design consideration, care in choosing
the right mat is necessary to avoid bridging or the development of voids beneath
the mat.
Specifics on the fabric and final weights and dimensions of these products can be
obtained from the product manufacturers and do not vary much between
manufacturers. An applications chart from one manufacturer shows Filter Point,
Filter Band, and Uniform Section fabric-formed concrete as appropriate for
spillway and flow channel use.
Cellular confinement and fabric-formed concrete systems are provided by
companies that have proprietary claims on product manufacturing, testing, and
application designs. As such, it is difficult to obtain detailed data regarding
performance and applicability as an overtopping protection method. The authors
of this manual have provided their best judgment as to the applicabilit y of the
available design data.
172
Figure 9-2.(a) Filter Point fabric form pumped with concrete (b) Filter Band
fabric form pumped with concrete ; (c) Uniform Section fabric form
173
Material properties, hydraulic performance, and installation for each of the three
product types are described in the following sections.
tested passed ASTM test methods D751 and D413 for material and seam strengths
before and after exposure to the elements. See also ASTM D4354 and D4759 for
sampling and testing methods. Similar materials used today include Hypalon
(CSPE), PP-R, and EPDM rubber.
9.3.1.2 Hydraulic Performance
The only known geomembrane-lined spillway channel that has been designed and
constructed was located on the right abutment of Cottonwood Dam No. 5 in
Colorado (when discussed in Timblin et al. in 1988). It had a trapezoidal-shaped
cross section with a 12-foot bottom width and 2:1 side slopes forming a channel
3 feet deep (Timblin et al., 1988). The maximum slope in the channel tested was
0.17 (6:1) and supercritical flow occurred throughout the channel. The overall
drop in the test case was 21.5 feet between the spillway crest and the downstream
apron. The material selected was a 36-mil reinforced Hypalon sheet.
For design purposes, a Mannings n value of 0.015 was used in the test case (see
the case history of Cottonwood Dam in the Appendix). This assumed roughness
value proved to be too high as the field measured velocities exceeded those
expected, suggesting less energy loss, but performance was not compromised. A
maximum design flow of 25 ft3/s and flow velocities up to 26 ft/s were
experienced by the test case (Timblin 1985 and Timblin et al., 1988). The
hydraulic shear stresses associated with these velocities must be accounted for in
the design material strength and anchoring systems (Chow, 1959). The differential
head across the membrane and the uplift pressure must also be determined. The
geomembrane was overlapped by 5 feet (without seaming) in the test case to
allow for release of uplift pressures that may build up underneath the liner.
The hydraulic jump should occur downstream of the liner section at the location
determined from the computed channel velocity and expected downstream
tailwater. If necessary, the designer should provide a terminal structure or an
energy dissipating basin to prevent erosion and undermining of the lined channel,
as described in Reclamations Engineering Monograph, Hydraulic Design of
Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators (1978).
A geomembrane-lined spillway would typically be considered for a low-head
application and would not be subject to velocities high enough to cause cavitation.
Any new designs for a geomembrane-lined spillway or flow channel for
overtopping protection should fall within the hydraulic design values of the test
case (Timblin et al., 1988), unless additional testing is performed.
9.3.1.3 Installation
The sheet liner should be attached to an upstream and downstream concrete cutoff
sill to prevent migration of the liner. The sheets along the channel should then be
overlapped shingle-fashion by a significant amount, such as the 5 feet provided in
175
the field test. The liner is placed in trenches along the sides that are then
backfilled and compacted. The method chosen to provide energy dissipation must
be constructed downstream from the liner. The liner would not be capable of
resisting the pressure fluctuations associated with a hydraulic jump. Figures
9-3 through 9-5 (with dimensions in feet and slopes in H:V) show design and
installation features for the test case and may be generally used by a designer to
specify details of the liner installation.
The sheet liner is installed by hand placing it over the prepared subgrade and
folding it into the trenches and attaching it with redwood furring strips to the
concrete cutoff walls. Machinery is used to place the granular soil cover and
spread it to a minimum thickness of 12 inches.
176
blankets, showing a) upstream end of the spillway at the dam crest; b) typical section
along the spillway showing the overlap of about 5 ft; and c) downstream end of the
177
9.3.2 Geocells
9.3.2.1 Material Properties
Cellular confinement systems (CCS), or geocells, are typically filled with granular
material or soil. However, for steep slopes and high flows, they are most often
filled with concrete to provide a hard articulating armor that can conform to
possible differential settlement. When filled with concrete, no soil cover would be
necessary unless selected for aesthetic purposes. However, a concrete-filled
geocell may be subject to potential uplift pressures if proper drainage is not
provided.
Geocells have been developed since the basic sheet liner application reported by
Timblin et al. (1988). These materials meet thickness, strength, weight, and UV
protection criteria outlined by the various manufacturers.
9.3.2.2 Hydraulic Performance
The lateral confinement of CCS combined with anchoring techniques ensures the
long-term stability of slopes using vegetated topsoil, aggregate, or concrete
surfacing (if exposed to severe mechanical and hydraulic pressures). The
enhanced drainage, frictional forces, and cell-fill-plant interaction of CCS limit
downslope movement and the potential impact of rainfall, channeling, and
hydraulic shear stresses. Perforations in the cells allow the passage of water,
nutrients, and organisms within the fill. This encourages plant growth and root
interlock, which further stabilizes the slope and soil mass, and facilitates
landscape rehabilitation. CCS filled with concrete forms a flexible slab that
accommodates minor subgrade movement and minimizes cracking. In mediumand low-velocity flows, CCS with geomembranes below and gravel cover can be
used to create impermeable channels, thereby eliminating the need for concrete
(Caltrans, 2006).
Proprietary testing was performed on the Presto GeoWeb CCS at CSU on a
2:1 slope for a combined system that featured a vegetated reinforced turf over the
top of a CCS (Bathurst et al., 1993; Crowe et al., 1989). The following was
obtained from the manufacturers brochure:
No system instability was observed for shear stresses up to 15.9 lb/ft 2 and for
average velocities up to 26.5 ft/s with peak velocities over 29 ft/s. Due to
facility constraints that prevented testing higher velocities than those reported,
system failure limits were never found. The test results for the integrated
system far exceed the limits of separately reported values of the Geoweb
cellular confinement system and turf reinforcement mats with
topsoil/vegetated soil.
178
9.3.2.3 Installation
CCS installation procedures vary by product and are detailed by the
manufacturers. The following information is from DX2 Geosyntex for
TerraCell. Other manufacturers will have similar requirements.
If it has been determined that TerraCell is the most appropriate solution to a slope
erosion control problem, it is necessary to select the proper cell height, cell size,
and fill material using Figure 9-6, which was developed for moderate site
conditions. Nominal TerraCell dimensions are 9.6- by 8-inches for the standard
cell, 13.7- by 12-inches for the mid-cell, and 19.2- by 16 inches for the large cell.
The maximum size of the fill particles should not be larger than one-third the
height of the cell, which may determine cell height. Moderate conditions are
characterized by modest precipitation and some overtopping flow, without a good
ground cover.
179
Proper anchoring of the TerraCell is critical to how well the product will perform.
Factors to consider for selection of the anchoring method and materials include
degree of slope, length of slope, external loads (such as snow), angle of internal
friction of the fill material and of the slope surface material (using the smaller of
the two), unit weight of the fill material, cell height, and presence of a
geomembrane on the slope.
When considered for overtopping protection, hydraulic parameters must also be
included. The upper edge of the TerraCell should be buried in an anchor trench to
prevent surface water from undermining the installation and to anchor the
TerraCell to the top of the slope. Staking or pinning the TerraCell to a slope is the
common anchoring method when there is no geomembrane present and where the
soil has adequate strength to retain the anchor pins. Steel reinforcing bars bent
into J-hooks, with a length equal to three times the cell height are typically used.
Adjacent sections of TerraCell can be joined together using stainless steel staples
or hog-rings. Tendons and restraint pins are used on steep slopes where additional
support is needed, or where the use of anchor pins is prohibited (such as for a
geomembrance liner or on a rock base), and for very long slopes when more than
one section of TerraCell is required. Tendons usually consist of high-strength
polyester webbing or cord, and must be durable and resistant to creep. The design
load and spacing of the tendons is determined by the force to be supported. A
large number of lighter tendons is preferable to a smaller number of heavier
tendons. Batten strips or large washers are needed at the bottom of the installation
to avoid stress concentrations. The tendons must be securely attached to a support
structure or dead-man within the anchor trench located beyond the crest of the
slope.
180
181
182
release, this could lead to failure of the embankment dam and/or release of the
reservoir.
184
10
There are many different types of overtopping protection systems that have been
considered or used for embankment dams. The preceding chapters describe each
of them in some detail, including a historical perspective of their development and
use, design and analysis guidance, construction considerations, and a discussion
of their potential vulnerabilities and risks, including summaries of their
performance to date and potential failure modes. Selected case histories of these
various types of systems have also been provided in the Appendix. The following
sections provide a brief assessment of each of these systems using physical,
hydraulic, and socio-economic factors as a means of comparison. This
information is intended to provide a quick reference to identify the various
similarities and differences, and potential advantages and limitations, of each of
the overtopping protection systems presented in this manual, and can be used to
help determine the various systems that may best apply to a given situation and be
suitable for further study. These overtopping protection alternatives would then be
studied further, either analytically or with laboratory model studies, for the
selection of the preferred alternative and for preparation of final designs.
As defined by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). Dam crest length,
reservoir storage capacity, and spillway discharge capacity are also considered in the ICOLD
definition.
185
(e.g., CSU flume), which includes various types of precast concrete blocks
(ACBs), riprap, and turf systems. The remaining system types (gabions and
geosynthetics) would seem to be limited to drop heights up to about 25 feet.
The downstream slope of the dam will directly affect the hydraulic shear stress on
the system during operation (steeper slopes producing higher shear stresses), and
may have significant effects on the construction and maintenance of the system.
Most embankment slopes range between 1.5:1 and 4:1, and the systems covered
here have generally been considered for use on slopes within this range, with the
possible exception of geomembrane liners (at 6:1). Most laboratory testing of
overtopping protection systems has included testing on a 2:1 slope (e.g., CSU
flume). Rockfill and reinforced rockfill slopes can be as steep as about 1.5:1.
Gabion baskets have been tested to a slope of 1:1 for low drop heights. RCC
placed in horizontal lifts has been frequently used for downstream slopes of 0.6:1
or steeper in concrete dam applications (producing a thicker section with steeper
slopes). Vegetated slopes are generally used on flatter slopes to accommodate
mowing and other maintenance operations. Any abrupt changes in the
downstream slope may create a flow disturbance and require special attention in
the design. Structures that protrude into the overtopping flow may cause
turbulence and scour, and should be avoided.
The crest length of the dam will determine the total discharge capacity possible
for a maximum allowable unit discharge, or permit a reduction in unit discharge
by fully utilizing the available crest length. The relation of the crest length to the
downstream channel width will affect the amount of flow convergence required if
fully ut ilized, resulting in potential air bulking and standing waves on the
downstream face of the dam, with larger dams having longer crests in relation to
the downstream channel width.
Where camber is provided on the dam crest, overtopping flows may be
concentrated at the ends of the dam where crest elevations are lower, and along
the downstream groins. All overtopping protection systems require a uniform
crest to avoid flow concentrations. Any potential future settlement of the dam
embankment could concentrate overtopping flows near the central portion or
maximum section of the dam and should be accommodated by the system design.
Additional protective measures and more robust overtopping protection system
designs are required where flows may concentrate.
The age and composition of the dam should also be considered in the selection of
an overtopping protection alternative. Newer dams that are subject to future
consolidation or settlement may require a system that can conform to such
movement, such as rockfill, riprap, gabions, vegetative cover, articulating
concrete blocks, and some geosynthetic systems. Rigid systems, such as RCC,
CRCS, grouted riprap, and fabric-formed concrete, may either crack with
embankment settlement or span localized areas of settlement, producing
undesirable voids beneath the protective system which may remain undetected.
186
Rigid systems may also be more vulnerable to seismic loads. Most embankment
dams will require some provisions for drainage and pressure relief at the
downstream face from existing or future seeps. The composition of the
downstream face of the dam may affect filter requirements and system anchor
design where required. The overtopping protection system must be filter
compatible with the underlying embankment materials to prevent piping, which
may require multiple zoned layers between a rockfill embankment and the system.
Installation of anchors within an existing rockfill surface may also be difficult.
187
The performance of most overtopping protection systems in the field under design
loads is largely untested due to the remoteness of the design flood events. All
systems included in this manual have been tested in the laboratory, or to some
degree in the field, and the design parameters of any overtopping protection
system should be within the limits tested. Numerous RCC overtopping protection
projects have been shown to perform well for long durations and for overtopping
depths of up to several feet. Some overtopping of cable-tied ACBs (e.g., for a
temporary cofferdam at Portugues Dam in Puerto Rico) and non-cable-tied ACBs
(e.g., for downchutes at Richmond Hill Mine, in Appendix) have been reported.
Since embankment dams normally have a downstream slope that is either
vegetated or composed of rockfill, any overtopping of embankment dams can
provide information as to their performance up to the maximum conditions
sustained, with or without failure (see discussions of Virginia Kendall Dam in
Section 6.5 and the four dams on the Yellow River in Section 2.4.1, which all had
a vegetated overflow surface). The potential vulnerabilities and risks of each
system should always be carefully evaluated before selection for final design and
construction.
Some overtopping protection systems use geotextiles as the primary component,
or to provide for filtration, drainage, or added erosion protection of the underlying
soils. While the use of geotextiles is gaining acceptance for some dam
applications, many regulatory agencies (including Reclamation) would not use a
geotextile in an embankment dam where its poor performance could lead to
failure of the dam or require costly repairs. The filtration function of a geotextile
located beneath an overtopping protection system is usually critical to the
successful operation of the system. Geotextiles may tear with the placement of the
overtopping protection units or displace under the high velocity and turbulent
flows of the overtopping event. In some cases, system failure at one small
location can cause complete failure of the dam. Overtopping protection systems
that rely on a geotextile as an essential line of defense to protect against scouring
of the underlying soil materials during overtopping of an embankment dam
should be designed with special attention to the durability and longevity of the
geotextile or should be avoided.
A terminal structure is normally required at the downstream end of the system to
provide energy dissipation for the overtopping flow. Stepped systems, such as
RCC placed in horizontal lifts, tapered wedge blocks, and stacked gabions, or
systems with high surface roughness, such as rockfill, riprap, and most fabricformed concrete, will provide some energy dissipation before reaching the toe,
which can result in the design of a smaller terminal structure. Most systems
require some additional strength or capacity to resist the larger hydraulic forces
normally associated with a hydraulic jump, such as an increased thickness or
additional reinforcement, while other systems must avoid the occurrence of a
hydraulic jump on the surface entirely.
188
Maintenance requirements will also vary with the system. All systems should be
inspected regularly to the extent possible for signs of deterioration or damage.
Buried systems will still require the maintenance of the vegetative or soil cover.
Vegetation must be maintained in good condition and mowed to a height between
2 and 6 inches to remain effective. Trees, shrubs, or other woody vegetation
should never be permitted on the overtopping protection, to avoid potential
damage by roots, allow proper inspection, and avoid flow disturbance during
operation. Exposed concrete surfaces should be inspected for cracks and open
joints. Drains should be periodically inspected and outlets should be maintained
open and free-draining. Systems relying upon steel components, such as gabions
and reinforced rockfill, must be periodically inspected for corrosion or abrasion
damage. Proprietary systems should be maintained in accordance with the
manufacturers instructions.
coefficient
189
Flow velocity (or terminal velocity in some cases) is a function of the unit
discharge, drop height, and surface roughness
Shear stress is a function of the flow depth (which is related to the flow
velocity), downstream slope, and unit weight of water
The highest unit dischargesand highest design headsof all of the overtopping
protection systems evaluated for this manual are associated with the RCC and
CRCS systems. Attachment 1 indicates maximum unit discharges of
316 and 340 ft3/s/ft, and maximum overflow depths up to 20.4 feet, for RCC
overtopping protection projects in Texas and Tennessee.
The average design unit discharge for all RCC overtopping protection projects in
the United States is about 80 ft3/s/ft. Reclamation prepared designs for a CRCS
system requiring a maximum unit discharge of 280 ft3/s/ft, with a corresponding
maximum overflow depth of about 18 feet for A. R. Bowman Dam (see the case
history in Appendix).
Of the precast concrete block (or ACB) systems, cable-tied mats have been tested
to a unit discharge of about 30 ft3/s/ft (or an overflow depth of 4.2 feet), while
tapered wedge blocks have been tested to a higher unit discharge of about 42
ft3/s/ft (or an overflow depth of 5.5 feet).
One reinforced rockfill dam (Pit No. 7 Afterbay Dam) has sustained overtopping
flows of up to 153 ft3/s/ft (or an overflow depth of 14 feet) with some damage,
while most flow-through rockfill and riprap installations are generally limited for
design to much lower unit discharges between about 10 and 24 ft3/s/ft (or
overflow depths between about 2 and 4 feet).
Gabions have performed satisfactorily for unit discharges of up to 32 ft3/s/ft, with
similar performance for reinforced turf.
Natural grass systems are extremely dependent upon the type and quality of the
grass cover, and composition of the underlying soil, and will have design unit
discharges ranging between 6 and 24 ft3/s/ft (or overflow depths between about 1
and 4 feet). Unlike the other systems, natural grass systems are also limited by
overtopping duration to a period of hours, depending upon the erosionally
effective stress and clay content of the soil (see Chapter 6).
Many of the systems have been tested to a drop height of up to 50 feet, and have
corresponding maximum flow velocities between 20 and 30 ft/s. Applications of
RCC and CRCS for higher dams will result in higher flow velocities. Of generally
greater importance to performance of these systems is the associated shear stress,
or the product of the slope, flow depth, and unit weight of water. At any given
location on the slope, the unit discharge is equal to the product of the flow depth
and flow velocity. The unit weight of water is typically 62.4 lb/ft3. The maximum
allowable shear stresses of systems reporting shear stress as a factor range from
190
about 9 lb/ft2 (without failure) for synthet ic turf revetments, to about 16 lb/ft2 for
a vegetated geocell, and 35 lb/ft2 for a gabion. Fabric-formed concrete reported an
allowable shear stress of 60 lb/ft2. Natural grass systems under optimum
conditions are limited to a shear stress of 13.5 lb/ft 2 or less, beyond which
instantaneous failure of the vegetal cover would occur through uprooting or
tearing and removal of the leaves and stems (see Chapter 6).
191
(Section 4.1), included a soil cover with grass to blend with the surroundings.
Synthetic turf revetments are designed to look like natural grass to improve the
appearance of a site that perhaps could not sustain grass. Gabions and geocells
can be vegetated, and geomembrane liners require a soil cover for protection.
Rockfill and riprap placements also have a natural appearance and can blend in
with rocky landscapes. For proper performance, CRCS and tapered wedge block
installations are normally not covered with soil and will therefore retain the
appearance of concrete. Although uncommon, colored concrete or concrete stains
could be considered for these installations if necessary.
Hazard potential classification is based on the probability of life loss, and the
extent of property damage, in the event of dam failure. Dams located in or near
populated areas will generally have a significant or high hazard potential
classification. Some of the overtopping protection systems considered in this
manual may not be considered appropriate for use for significant or high hazard
potential dams by some regulatory agencies, at least until more performance data
are collected. For example, Reclamation is developing a document that would
limit the use of tapered wedge blocks (specifically ArmorWedge blocks for which
Reclamation holds the patent) to low hazard potential dams at this time. A similar
concern may exist for the use of geomembrane liners and geocells, due in part to
concerns for their durability and longevity. It is also currently Reclamations
position that there is too much uncertainty and too great a chance of dam failure
with a rockfill protection system, whether or not it is reinforced, to employ it as
the only means of protection from floods that overtop a (new or modified) high or
significant hazard earthfill embankment dam. The designer of any overtopping
protection project must determine whether there are any regulatory requirements
or constraints that may limit the types of overtopping protection systems available
for further consideration.
192
Chapter
Dam
height
(feet)
100-200
150-200
40
Unit
discharge
(ft3/s/ft)
316-340
240-280
30
Overflow
depth
(feet)
20
20
4.2
Flow
velocity
(ft/s)
20-30+
80+
26
Shear
stress
(lb/ft2)
RCC
2
CRCS
3
Cable-tied
4
19+
ACBs
Wedge
4
50-60
42
5.5
45
blocks
Gabions
5
25
30-40
4.5
24-30
35
Grass
6
25-50
6-24
1-4
9
13.5
Reinforced
6
40-50
32
5
20
grass
Synthetic turf 6
40-50
30
5
29
9+
Reinforced
7
140
153
10-14
rockfill
Rockfill
7
50
10-24
2-4
Riprap
8
50
10-24
2-4
Geo liners
9
25
2
1
26
Geocells
9
25
29
16
Fabric9
25
60
formed
concrete
Notes:
Typical embankment slopes assumed (1.5:1 to 3:1)
See reference chapter for more information.
Natural grass systems assume good cover and are time dependent (i.e., for short
durations).
Rockfill and riprap systems are size and gradation dependent (i.e., larger rock of
uniform size performs best)
193
Part 2
11
195
196
197
Figure 11-1.Scour downstream from concrete dam showing potential for daylighting
of foundation discontinuities (Reclamation).
198
199
The trajectory of the jet will be a function of the overtopping depth, the geometry
of the dam and foundation and the details of the dam crest (whether or not parapet
walls are provided on the crest of the dam and the details of the parapet wall).
The jet characteristics must be carefully determined to adequately predict the
erosion or scour potential. The flow overtopping a concrete dam is shown in the
definition sketch, Figure 11-2(a). Important parameters are the initial angle of
issuance, which will typically be zero for dam overtopping flows, and the initial
jet thickness as the jet leaves the top of the structure (brink depth). The brink
depth and initial velocity are computed from the discharge over the dam.
200
Figure 11-2.Free jets (a) overtopping a dam, (b) issuing from an orifice through a
201
Eq. 11-1
Where:
C=
L=
H=
The critical flow depth is computed by the relationship, shown in Equation 11-2,
dc = (q2/g)1/3
Eq. 11-2
Where:
q=
g=
The brink depth can be determined using relationships developed between the
critical depth and the brink depth by Rouse (1936) and Delleur et al. (1956) (see
Wahl et al. (2008) for details of both studies).
The trajectory of overtopping flows can be computed using the equation of
motion, assuming no aerodynamic influences on the jet. The equation (Equation
11-3)for the bottom edge of the trajectory of a jet issuing horizontally from the
top of the dam due to dam overtopping is:
y = -gx2/((2)Vi2)
Eq. 11-3
Where:
Vi =
A more general equation (Equation 11-4) allowing for the initial jet to be inclined
at an angle is (Wahl et al., 2008):
tan
Eq. 11-4
Where:
202
hv =
K=
The upper edge of the jet is defined by adding the initial depth or jet thickness to
the bottom edge of the jet. These basic equations provide a general indication of
the impingement points of the overtopping flows. The impingent point will also
vary, depending on the downstream geometries. Higher on the abutments, the jet
will impinge a shorter distance from the dam crest, since the vertical distance to
the foundation is less. The trajectory of the overtopping flows can be calculated
for a number of dam cross sections and the impingement locations then plotted in
plan view. This is useful for identifying the portion of the overtopping flows that
will discharge into the downstream tailwater, and if overtopping protection is
already in place can be used to determine if the extent of the overtopping
protection is adequate. Figure 11-3, 11-4, and 11-5 provide examples of this.
Changes in jet characteristics take place as the jet falls through the air to the
impact point with the foundation or with tailwater (see Figure-11-5). An inner
core of the jet remains unaffected by aeration, but diminishes in size as the jet
travels through the air, while the outer part of the jet begins to aerate and grows in
size. A first refinement in the modeling of overtopping jets is to predict the
dimension of the inner jet core and outer jet spread. Using the continuity equation,
Ervine et al. (1997) developed an equation (Equation 11-5) for the diameter of the
core of a round jet (Dj):
Dj = Di(Vi/Vj)1/2
Eq. 11-5
Where:
Di and Vi are the initial depth of overtopping and the initial velocity of the jet
and Vj is the velocity at the location of impact (Equation 11-6):
Vj = (Vi2 + 2gZ)1/2
Where:
Z=
Eq. 11-6
A similar equation (Equation 11-7) can easily be developed for a rectangular jet
by applying the continuity principle:
tj = ti(Vi/Vj)
Where:
tj =
ti =
Vi =
Eq. 11-7
203
Figure 11-3.Sectional view of the final trajectory profile for the PMF though a dam
section aligned with the river channel (the concrete surface line identifies the
downstream edge of the concrete overtopping protection from the upper abutment of
the dam down to the maximum section of the dam) (Reclamation 2006).
204
Figure 11-4.Footprint of the trajectory with no spread of the jet for the PMF
overtopping. Note the location of the footprint extends beyond the right abutment
protection between contour elevations 4660 and 4710. The tailwater for the PMF is
shown on the plan view in blue at Elevation 4670 (Reclamation 2006).
205
206
Ervine and Falvey (1987) studied circular jets and found that the rate of spread of
the outer portion of the jet depends on the turbulence intensity and the distance
traveled by the jet through the air. This leads to an equation (Equation 11-8) for
the outer diameter Dout (Annandale, 2006).
Dout = Di + 2*0.38(TuLj)
Where:
Tu =
Eq. 11-8
Lj =
the distance traveled by the jet along the trajectory arc as it falls
through the air to the impingement location.
Bollaert (2002) suggests turbulence intensity ranges from 0 to 0.03 for a free
overfall condition. Lj, the distance traveled by the jet can be determined from
(Equation 11-9):
Eq. 11-9
This integration can be performed in closed form for any given horizontal position
Let A = 2Khvcos2 ()
Then,
1 1
Eq. 11-10
The outer spread of the jet can also be calculated by an alternate method
developed by Ervine et al. (1997) (Equation 11-11):
1 1
Eq. 11-11
where Fri is the Froude number of the initial jet and Vi is the initial velocity of the
jet. Note that this equation was presented in Ervine et al. (1997) using the velocity
at the point of jet impact, rather than the initial velocity, but the form shown here
is correct. Although this equation was also developed primarily from studies of
circular jets, it could be applied to a rectangular jet to calculate the outer
dimension, Dout, as (Equation 11-12):
Dout = ti(Vi/Vj) + 2
Eq. 11-12
207
1.14
Eq. 11-13
The equations above can be solved for Lb by trial. An appropriate value for the
turbulence intensity factor, Tu, for a thick jet overtopping the dam is 0.03.
From experimental data, an alternative equation for calculating the jet break up
length for a round jet directly is (Equation 11-14):
.
.
Eq. 11-14
Eq. 11-15
208
Eq. 11-16
Where:
H = the drop height from reservoir pool to tailwater.
The thickness of the jet affected by aeration and spreading is computed as:
2
4
Eq. 11-17
Castillo (2006) suggests ho should be about 2 times the energy head upstream
from the dam crest, whereas Annandale (2006) suggests that ho be taken as the
overflow depth. Frizell (2009) obtained reasonable results using the brink depth in
place of ho. The parameter is estimated as (Equation 11-18):
1.07
Eq. 11-18
.
.
Eq. 11-19
. .
Where:
K
Cd =
0.85
the discharge coefficient for the dam crest.
This equation requires the use of consistent metric (S.I.) units for the unit
discharge, q, and gravitational constant, g. The discharge coefficient must be
given in units of m1/2/s.
209
Castillo (2006) also developed an equation for the distance to jet breakup
(Equation 11-20):
.
.
Eq. 11-20
This equation is similar in form to that suggested by Ervine et al. (1997) from
experimental data for circular jets, except that the constant in the numerator will
lead to shorter breakup distances for rectangular jets.
11.4.3.3 Jet Plunge Pool Characteristics
For flows discharging into tailwater, there is additional jet spread and core
diffusion after the free falling jet enters the pool. The characteristics of a jet as it
plunges into and through a plunge pool are shown in Figure 11-6 for the jet entry
condition of a highly turbulent jet with very significant aeration and turbulence at
the jet boundary. If the jet has not fully broken up in the air, the core of the jet
will continue to dissipate or contract in the water; the outside of the jet will also
continue to disperse. The streampower density of the overtopping jet will decrease
as the jet expands.
To apply Figure 11-6, if the jet retains a core at tailwater impact, that core can be
expected to diminish in size at approximately the 8 angle shown (use Equation
11-5 to calculate the inner core thickness at tailwater impact). This will allow
estimation of the depth at which the core is dissipated. If the core does not
dissipate before the plunge pool floor is reached, then the energy density in the
core could be estimated assuming no breakup of the jet (i.e., estimate the
impingement area based on just the contraction of the jet due to gravity). If the
core is broken up before the boundary is reached, then the impingement area can
be estimated assuming the 14 spread of the outer edge of the jet, starting from
the estimated spread of the jet in the air (use Equation 11-12 to calculate the outer
dimension of the jet at tailwater impact). This impingement area would be used to
compute the stream power intensity. Note that Figure 11-6 shows an increased
widening rate at some point in the pool, but does not define how to estimate the
depth at which this begins. Since the change in spread angle is relatively small,
this is probably not an important refinement to include. A 14 spread angle could
be assumed for all depths.
210
Figure 11-6.Jet diffusion in a plunge pool for two-phase shear layer and a highly
turbulent plunging jet (adapted from Ervine and Falvey, 1987). This case is typical of
almost all prototype flows and most model-scale flows.
211
detail. Once the jet characteristics have been defined, the potential for scour due
to the impinging jet may be determined (Equation 11-21). The scour potential
may be quantified by determining the erosive stream power. The stream power is
the rate at which energy is applied after the jet has travelled through a vertical
distance, Z, to a location on the surface or in a pool.
Pjet = QZ
Eq. 11-21
Where:
Pjet = the total stream power of the jet
= the unit weight of water
Q=
the total discharge
The stream power per unit area, Ai, is determined by dividing the total stream
power by the footprint of the jet at the point of impact. If the jet has not broken
up, the area should be based on the inner core thickness (Equation 11-7). If the jet
has broken up, the area should be based on the outer dimension of the jet
(Equation 11-12). The stream power per unit area or stream power density of the
jet is (Equation 11-22):
pjet = QZ/Ai
Eq. 11-22
and may be used with the threshold curve to determine whether erosion will occur
or not as a function of the erodibility of the material or rock. The unit area of the
jet changes with the fall both above and below the tailwater.
This approach can also be used to evaluate the ability of concrete overtopping
protection to resist the energy of overtopping flows, by calculating an erodibility
index for the concrete and comparing it to the streampower of the overtopping
flows.
Another consideration for overtopping flows is potential for erosion due to
surface flows. For flow down a slope, the rate of energy dissipation (P) is a
function of the flow depth, flow velocity and the energy slope (Equation 11-23):
P UhS
Where:
=
U=
h=
S=
Eq. 11-23
The rate of energy dissipation is small as the flow just comes over the crest and
increases as the water velocity increases. The analysis of erosion stability is
performed at the location where the value of energy dissipation is the highest. The
energy slope is assumed to be approximately equal to the bed slope and flow
212
depths are taken to be equal to the normal depth computed for steady-state flow
conditions.
213
eliminating the discharge capacity of one or more of the gates during the flood
routing to test the vulnerability of the operations to this type of failure.
RCC overlays
Rock reinforcement
Tailwater
These systems can be used as single elements or can be combined. The different
systems are discussed in detail in:
214
215
11.8 Vulnerabilities
Overtopping protection can improve the ability of a dam foundation to withstand
overtopping flows but overtopping protection is not foolproof. The protection
may not be effective in certain situations.
217
218
12
219
required for the downstream face of the dam and dike to increase the dead load
and sliding resistance of the modified structure. RCC was selected over
conventional concrete for its relative economy and ease of construction.
Construction was completed in 1992 (Figure 12-1). The structure performed well
during overtopping in 1993 (Figure 12-2). Details of this modification can be
found in Hepler (1982).
Figure 12-2.RCC buttress for Camp Dyer Diversion Dam during overtopping in
220
Santa Cruz Dam is a cyclopean concrete arch dam located about 25 miles north of
Santa Fe, New Mexico on the Santa Cruz River. The dam was completed in 1929
with a height of 150 feet, a crest length of 500 feet, and a radius of 300 feet. The
dam had safety concerns related to the maximum credible earthquake (MCE) and
the PMF, and was experiencing severe concrete deterioration due to freeze-thaw.
An RCC buttress was constructed on the downstream face of the dam to address
the seismic concerns related to the MCE, and the entire dam crest was designed
for overtopping to address the hydrologic concerns related to the PMF (see
Figures 12-3 and 12-4). Completed in 1990, the Santa Cruz Dam modification
was the first RCC project to use an air-entraining admixture to improve freezethaw durability. Details of this modification can be found in Metcalf et al (1992).
Figure 12-3.Concrete overtopping protection for Santa Cruz Dam in New Mexico.
Splitter piers were provided for overtopping of the entire dam crest (Reclamation).
221
222
surfaces were capped using conventional reinforced concrete, and concrete impact
blocks were provided to improve stilling basin performance. The large RCC
placement was expected to crack as it contracted during cooling. Concrete
cracking was controlled by installing vertical contraction joints in the RCC at
specified intervals (based on predicted RCC temperatures and joint openings
using thermal analyses) and grouting the open contraction joints. Details of this
modification can be found in Reclamation (2002).
Figure 12-5.RCC buttress construction within the original spillway plunge pool for
Figure 12-6.Mechanical anchors being installed through the RCC toe block into the
foundation for Pueblo Dam spillway, to improve sliding resistance (Reclamation).
223
deep overtopping flow. The hard rhyolite bedrock at the downstream toe
was sufficiently erosion resistant so that a concrete apron or terminal
structure was not required. Pressure grouting of the existing masonry dam
was required prior to buttress construction to improve its structural
integrity and reduce reservoir seepage. Any remaining seepage would be
collected by a series of vertical flat drains spaced on 10-foot-centers at the
dam/buttress contact. Surface treatment at the dam/buttress contact
consisted of cleaning using a high-pressure water jet, and the placement of
conventional leveling concrete ahead of the RCC. No mechanical
anchorage was used for the RCC buttress.
224
225
Santa Cruz Dam.The RCC buttress for Santa Cruz Dam maintained the
curvature of the existing arch dam, and provided 2-foot-high steps on the
downstream face for energy dissipation of overtopping flows (Figure
12-8). The stilling basin at the downstream toe was designed assuming a
75 percent reduction of the total energy resulting from the steps. The
design requirements for the RCC included a minimum compressive
strength of 3,000 lb/in2 at 1 year, cohesion between the RCC and existing
concrete dam of 50 lb/in2 at 1 year, and freeze-thaw durability of 500
cycles (ASTM C666). The use of an air-entraining admixture significantly
improved the freeze-thaw durability. Leveling concrete was used around
the perimeter of the RCC placement, so that adequate bond would be
obtained with the existing dam concrete surface. No mechanical anchorage
was provided at the RCC buttress/dam contact.
Pueblo Dam.For the design of the Pueblo Dam buttress, Reclamation
originally assumed a cohesion value of 290 lb/in2 (based on 85 percent of
the surface being bonded) and a friction angle of 45 degrees for the RCC
lift lines, based on the proposed RCC mix design. However, the
Consultant Review Board (CRB) suggested that a safety factor of 3.0 be
applied with cohesion, ultimately resulting in a design cohesion value of
90 lb/in2. The CRB also suggested a safety factor of 1.5 be applied for use
of the friction angle without cohesion, resulting in a value of 30 degrees.
The final designs used the safety factors for the potential foundation
sliding surfaces that were reinforced by RCC and rock bolts, based on the
CRB recommendations. Mechanical anchorage for the RCC toe block
consisted of rock bolts placed through the apron. The rock bolts were
double corrosion protected, and consisted of 1-3/8 -inch-diameter high
strength bars, grouted into polyethylene sheaths. Drainage pipes were
provided beneath the stilling basin floor to relieve potential uplift
pressures. Contraction joints were provided in both longitudinal and
transverse directions for crack control. Design and construction
considerations for RCC can be found in Reclamation (2005b).
226
Extensive testing was performed by Reclamat ion for the conventional concrete
overlay for the modification of Theodore Roosevelt Dam in Arizona to
demonstrate the effectiveness of these treatment methods, without the requirement
of mechanical anchorage. Grouting of the existing dam may be necessary to
reduce potential seepage at the contact surface, and the installation of a drainage
system at the contact surface may be necessary to ensure that potential future
seepage can be collected and drained (as was required for Camp Dyer Diversion
Dam).
The stepped downstream face for an RCC buttress subjected to overtopping flows
may be constructed using standard forms with steel pins and custom brackets,
with external bracing as required. Flat strap tiebacks were used on the upper lifts
of the dike buttress for Camp Dyer Diversion Dam. RCC was hand shoveled
against the forms to minimize segregation and rock pockets, and compacted by a
power tamper and plate vibrator. Surface repairs were generally not required
following form removal. If the buttress is constructed against a sloping dam face,
the buttress width may be fairly constant and may affect RCC construction for the
full height of the placement. When the RCC placements became 15 to 25 feet
wide at Santa Cruz Dam, a crane with a 2-yd3 bucket was used to place concrete.
Some of the main concerns during construction of the Pueblo Dam buttress and
toe block included the quality of RCC lift lines in the stilling basin area, the
compaction of RCC in the sloping toe block, finish tolerances of the sloping
portion of the conventional concrete overlay for spillway flows, and installation of
the mechanical anchorage. Pull-out tests indicated that some of the rock bolts did
not meet specification requirements due to manufacturing problems and had to be
replaced. Core testing was performed after construction for evaluating lift line
integrity, which raised concerns related to RCC lift line bond strength. It is
believed that some damage occurred below the lift lines when construction traffic
was allowed on the compacted lift surface approximately one day after placement.
A weak, somewhat porous zone within 2 inches below the lift surface was
identified in the cores taken from the RCC in the stilling basin. The lift surfaces
were also suspected of being too dry when the subsequent lift was placed due to
windy conditions at the site. The rounded aggregates and a lower paste content
used in the RCC mix may also have contributed to the problem. However, it was
finally concluded that the lift lines and the weak zones beneath the lift lines would
provide adequate strength for sliding resistance of the structure.
227
Potential failure modes for RCC overtopping protection for a concrete or masonry
dam could include:
Undermining of the downstream end of the RCC protection due to
inadequate energy dissipation resulting in erosion or scour within the
outlet channel
Inadequate coverage of RCC protection, resulting in erosion or scour of
the foundation due to impact from the overtopping flow
Deterioration or cracking of the RCC protection, resulting from poor
compaction, freeze-thaw damage, or thermal stresses
Inadequate bond at lift surfaces, resulting in insufficient sliding resistance.
Proper design and construction methods should ensure that these or other
potential failure modes do not represent an unacceptable risk to the completed
structure.
228
13
13.1 General
Conventional or mass concrete can be used to provide overtopping protection in
the form of concrete overlays that protect the underlying rock foundation at the
downstream toe of the dam and along the downstream abutment. The overlays
protect the rock from overtopping flows that could pluck rock blocks from the
rock foundation or that could scour and remove material along shears or faults
within the dam foundation. Splitter piers are often used in conjunction with
concrete overlay overtopping protection to aerate the overtopping flow jet and
prevent it from being pulled close to the toe of the dam (see Figures 13-1 and
13-2). Concrete overlays can protect the foundation from impinging flows or from
overtopping flows that collect and flow down the groin of the dam to the river
channel (see Figures 13-3 and 13-4). In addition to providing concrete overlays to
protect the foundation, concrete walls are often constructed to contain
overtopping flows and direct them to the downstream river channel (see Figure
13-5). Concrete overlays can be constructed of either conventional or mass
concrete. Conventional concrete overlays are thinner (2 to 2.5 feet thick), are
continuously reinforced to ensure structural integrity, generally have MSA of 1
inches or less, and typically have a 28-day compressive strength of at least 4,000
lb/in2.
Mass concrete is defined as any large volume of concrete cast-in-place, generally
as a monolithic structure. Dimensions of the structure are of such magnitude that
measures must be taken to cope with the generation of heat and the resulting
volume changes and cracking. Mass concrete may not be reinforced (and if so, the
reinforcement may only be temperature steel to control concrete cracking);
maximum aggregate size may approach 6 inches or more; and thicker placements
would typically be used (greater than 3 feet). A typical mass concrete mix may
have a design of 3,000 lb/in2 at one year.
229
Figure 13-1.Crest of concrete dam with splitter piers for overtopping flows
(Reclamation).
230
231
232
235
237
and preventing high velocity flow from entering joints and fractures in the rock
and initiating plucking of the foundation rock. To be effective, the overlays will
need to extend over the areas impacted from overtopping flows and the collective
flows which travel down the groin of the dam (which will change with the depth
of overtopping flows and will be a function of the flood magnitude) and will need
to remain intact during large flood events and be able to withstand the
environmental conditions. Hydraulic studies of the overtopping flows will be
needed to ensure that the coverage of the overlays is adequate. Good quality
control measures during foundation preparation and concrete placement and
regular inspections of installed concrete overlays will be needed to ensure that the
overlays are capable of withstanding overtopping flows.
Updated frequency floods.This may result in a change of flood
magnitude for the design return period. This change in magnitude may
result in overtopping flows impacting beyond the concrete overtopping
protection, with the potential for erosion to initiate. If the design flood
return period must be maintained to ensure acceptable risks for potential
failure modes related to the dam foundation eroding during flood events,
then additional overtopping protection may be needed.
Weathering or deterioration of concrete protection.If good quality
concrete is initially provided, the concrete should be durable and able to
withstand the elements. If localized damage occurs, then repairs should be
considered, especially if the damage has exposed reinforcing steel that
could deteriorate if left exposed or if cracking exists which could lead to
breakup and removal of the concrete protection. If damage to the
overtopping protection concrete is extensive, then an assessment will have
to be made on the ability of the overtopping protection to function as
intended. In some cases, the overtopping protection concrete may have to
be replaced.
Plugging of drainage system.Drainage systems can become plugged
over time due to calcium carbonate, iron bacteria, migration of sands and
gravels in the dam foundation, or from other mechanisms. The drainage
system should ideally be designed to allow access for an inspection
camera, so that the condition of the underdrain system can be periodically
checked. This may require designing a number of access points into the
drainage system where a camera can be inserted. Drain flows should be at
least visually monitored and if drain flows have visibly decreased, a
camera inspection should be initiated. If drains are plugged, drain cleaning
should be initiated. For guidance on monitoring, inspecting and cleaning
underdrain systems, see Reclamation (2004).
Inaccurate prediction of jet trajectory.A potential issue with concrete
overtopping protection is that the trajectory of the overtopping flows may
be estimated incorrectly. These inaccurate predictions could be due to the
239
240
14
241
242
243
Protection (Reclamation)
244
245
247
248
249
250
251
15
This chapter describes the hydraulics of a free-falling jet from concrete dam
overtopping into a plunge pool of rock material. The jet will either impinge into
the pool below the dam and disperse into the pool before impinging on the rock
surface or it will not disperse. If the jet will disperse because of adequate tailwater
pool depth, then no energy remains to erode the rock material on the sides or base
of the pool. If not, then scour may occur, depending upon the rock materials. If
scour is predicted and is determined by the designer to be unacceptable, a
protective measure, such as a downstream weir may be constructed artificially
raise the tailwater pool depth and prevent scour at the toe of the dam.
Tailwater effects should be a consideration when evaluating a concrete dam for
overtopping flows. Even without any special design measures in place, tailwater
will help dissipate the energy of overtopping flows and may reduce the need for
or eliminate the need for other forms of overtopping protection. The downstream
dam foundation areas protected by tailwater will be limited, however. An
additional limitation on the protection provided by tailwater is that tailwater levels
can be reduced for a given discharge if downstream channel degredation occurs.
If tailwater by itself is not effective in reducing the energy of overtopping flows,
the designer must then determine an appropriate protective measure (e.g., adding
a reinforced concrete liner to a previously unprotected rock plunge pool or adding
a feature to the top of dam or release structure to break up the jet).
Eq. 15-1
H=
q=
253
Yildiz and zcek (1994) present a modified version of the Veronese equation
(Equation 15-2), including the angle, , of incidence from the vertical, of the jet:
YS = 1.90H0.225q0.54cos
Eq. 15-2
d=
g=
K=
6.42-3.1H0.10
d=
0.25m
v=
0.3
w=
0.15
x=
0.6-H/300
y=
0.15+H/200
z=
0.10
Eq. 15-3
Unlike the Veronese and the Yildiz and Uzucek equations, the Mason and
Arumugam equation includes a material factor, d. Although it is an attempt to
acknowledge the role that material properties play in resisting scour, it is unlikely
that this factor adequately represents the variety of material properties found in
foundation materials. In addition, the materials in the movable beds of the
hydraulic model studies may not scale very well to the rock material at a
particular site. In most cases these equations are likely to result in a conservative
estimate of maximum plunge pool scour depth, but not in all cases, particularly if
the rock is likely to break into platy slabs or smaller blocks. Progression of
erosion upstream also may not be realistically predicted for some rock geometries.
Pioneering work on plunge pool geology was conducted by Spurr (1985). He
proposed a procedure that compares the hydraulic energy with the erosion
resistance of the rock mass. The concept of using a rock mass index to correlate
with the power it would take to remove the rock was original developed by
Kirsten (1983) to characterize the rip-ability of earth materials using mechanical
equipment and its associated horsepower. This was extended to examine the
removal of rock from flowing water, and at that time the term erodibility index
was coined. This index was correlated empirically to the erosive power of flowing
water, or the energy rate of change, termed stream power. Data from the
254
performance of unlined spillways in both soil and rock were used to calibrate the
method for erosion potential. Thus, this method can also be used for either soil or
rock, but this section focuses on its use for estimating rock erosion.
Initial attempts to use the stream power-erosion relationship for predicting rock
erosion began with investigation of continuing erosion below the spillway at
Bartlett Dam, Arizona. The stream power-erosion relationsip was also applied to a
new spillway design for Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona that called for
replacing the existing spillways with superelevated spillways that would direct
jets to impact each other and then fall into an unlined rock plunge pool below the
dam. (Reclamation, 1990b and 1993 and Frizell,1990).
The initial plots of erodibility were of soil materials, primarily from NRCS
database. When the erosion resistance of rock was added to the chart, questions
arose about the applicability of the method. Since then, many investigations have
been performed comparing existing prototype rock erosion, primarily from
spillway releases from high dams, with the methodology (Annandale, 2006).
Good agreement has generally been found.
Overtopping of Gibson Dam occurred in 1964, Figure 15-1. Based on a detailed
evaluation, the erodibility index of the dolomite abutment rock was estimated to
be between 5,100 and 12,000 and the stream power was estimated to be between
43 kW/m2 on the upper abutments and 258 kW/m2 on the lower abutments. With
these values, the stream power versus erodibility index would predict a
probability of erosion of at most a few percent. In fact, there was very little
erosion observed (see case history summary in the Appendix).
The erosion associated with overtopping is caused by a free-falling rectangular jet
as the jet impacts on the abutments or into the tailwater pool below. This section
will discuss only this type of jet and subsequent application related to
impingement onto the exposed rock and into a tailwater pool. The hydraulic
characteristics and erosive power associated with other types of flow and
erosional applications will not be discussed.
255
256
The series of equations that are used to determine the jet characteristics of a
rectangular jet are provided by Annandale (2006), and Castillo (2006). Jet spread
and the presence of a water core are determined from Ervine and Falvey (1987)
and reported in Annandale (2006). A more detailed discussion of the hydraulic
characteristics of overtopping jets is provided in Chapter 11.
257
Stream Power
The stream power of the falling jet (Equation 15-4) is then determined from:
qZ
P= d
Eq. 15-4
Where:
=
q=
Z=
d=
the depth of the jet as it flows over the structure (the brink depth,
shown as Di in Figure 15-2) assumed to be the thickness of the jet as it
impacts the rock (m)
This equation does not account for the contraction of the jet or the cushioning
effects of tailwater (more cushioning with deeper tailwater) which occurs where
the jet impacts on tailwater. For additional discussion on the effects of tailwater
and a more detailed approach to calculating stream power, see Chapter 11.
Tailwater Pool
Bollaert (2002) and Annandale (2006) describe the behavior of the jet entering the
plunge pool and provide a methodology to determine the impact pressure and
potential for pressure fluctuations that may cause rock scour in the pool. Ervine et
al. (1997) presented the basic relationship between the average dynamic pressure
and dimensionless depth below the plunge pool water surface for round jets with a
breakup length ratio (the ratio of the length of the jet divided by the breakup
length) of 0.5 as shown in Figure 15-3.
The mean dynamic pressure coefficient, Cp, can be used to calculate the average
dynamic pressures at the base of a plunge pool, using Equation 15-5:
P = Cp Vj2/2g
Where:
Cp =
=
258
Eq. 15-5
Other work by Castillo provides guidance on rectangular jets. Ervine (1997) and
Bollaert (2002) provide equations and graphical results for predicting pressure
fluctuations based upon turbulence intensity of the jet and aeration of the jet
entering the pool.
Erodibility Index
The rock properties are expressed as a function of the block size, Kb, material
strength or mass strength, Ms, shear strength of joints, Kd, and relative ground
structure number, Js.
259
The erodibility index, K, (Equation 15-6) is the product of these four factors:
Eq. 15-6
Where:
Ms= the mass strength, usually defined as the uniaxial compressive strength
(UCS) for rock (expressed in MPa) when the strength is greater than
10 MPa, and (0.78)(UCS)-1.05 when the strength is less than 10 MPa.
Kb defines the particle or fragment size of rock blocks that form the mass, which
can be determined from joint spacing or rock mass classification parameters.
The simplest and most straight forward relationship is shown in Equation 15-7:
Kb = RQD/Jn
Eq. 15-7
Where:
RQD = the rock quality designation and is measured by the percentage
recovery of core in lengths greater than twice the core diameter
Jn = a modified joint set number, shown in Table 15-1.
Kd describes the interblock strength and is usually taken as Jr/Ja
Jr and Ja are based on joint surface characteristics defined by Barton's Q-system
(1977) shown in Tables 15-2 and 15-3.
The relative shape and orientation of the blocks is accounted for by the Js
parameter. This represents the ease with which the water can penetrate the
discontinuities and dislodge the blocks. Table 15-4 can be used to determine Js.
The stream power -erodibility index method can be used to estimate the likelihood
of rock erosion initiating. The erodibilit y index (and its possible variability)
represents how erodible the foundation material is. It is relatively simple to
calculate. The stream power represents the erosive power of the overtopping
flows and is much more complicated to rigorously compute. This method will
provide an indication as to the likelihood that erosion will initiate, and if so,
additional judgment is needed as to whether the erosion will progress to the point
of undermining and failing the dam. This requires evaluating the likelihood of
erodibility at various depths and locations. The duration of overtopping flows
should also factor into the judgment on the potential for reservoir breach.
260
Table 15-1.Modified Joint Set Number Values (adapted from Annandale, 2006).
Jointing Description
1.00
1.22
1.50
1.83
2.24
2.73
3.34
4.09
5.00
Joint Condition
Joint Roughness
Number
Discontinuous
Smooth, undulating
Slickensided, undulating
1.5
1.5
Smooth, planar
1.0
Slickensided, planar
0.5
1.0
1.0
261
262
Joint Condition
Tightly healed, hard, non-softening filling (quarts
or epidote)
0.75
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
Joint Alteration
Number
8.012.0
5.0
6.0
8.0
8.012.0
10.0
13.0
13.020.0
263
1:1
1:2
1:4
1:8
1:1
1:2
1:4
1:8
1.14
1.09
1.05
1.02
1.14
1.09
1.05
1.02
1.50
1.33
1.19
1.10
0.78
0.85
0.90
0.94
1.39
1.23
1.09
1.01
0.73
0.79
0.84
0.88
10
1.25
1.10
0.98
0.90
0.67
0.72
0.78
0.81
20
0.84
0.77
0.71
0.67
0.56
0.62
0.66
0.69
30
0.63
0.59
0.55
0.53
0.50
0.55
0.58
0.60
40
0.53
0.49
0.46
0.45
0.49
0.52
0.55
0.57
50
0.49
0.46
0.43
0.41
0.53
0.56
0.59
0.61
60
0.50
0.46
0.42
0.40
0.63
0.68
0.71
0.73
70
0.56
0.50
0.46
0.43
0.84
0.91
0.97
1.01
80
0.67
0.60
0.55
0.52
1.26
1.41
1.53
1.61
85
0.73
0.66
0.61
0.57
1.39
1.55
1.69
1.77
89
0.78
0.71
0.65
0.61
1.50
1.68
1.82
1.91
90
1.14
1.20
1.24
1.26
1.14
1.20
1.24
1.26
264
Figure 15-4.Probability that erosion will occur based upon the available
flow energy or stream power and the characteristics of the rock in terms of
the erosion index. Probability of erosion by logistic regression for
Annandales regression line (Courtesy of Wibowo, 2005, USACE).
265
266
16
267
268
holes and outlets. Drainage systems must protect against the development of uplift
pressures.
The performance of most overtopping protection systems in the field under design
loads is largely untested due to the remoteness of the design flood events. Some
RCC overtopping protection projects have been shown to perform well for long
durations and for overtopping depths of up to a few feet. The potential
vulnerabilities and risks of each system should always be carefully evaluated
before selection for final design and construction.
A terminal structure may be required at the downstream end of the system to
provide energy dissipation for the overtopping flows. Most systems require some
additional strength or capacity to resist the larger hydraulic forces normally
associated with a hydraulic jump, such as an increased thickness or additional
reinforcement.
Maintenance requirements will also vary with the system. All systems should be
inspected regularly to the extent possible for signs of deterioration or damage.
Trees, shrubs or other woody vegetation should never be permitted on the
overtopping protection, to avoid potential damage by roots, allow proper
inspection, and avoid flow disturbance during operation. Exposed concrete
surfaces should be inspected for cracks and open joints. Drains should be
periodically inspected and outlets should be maintained open and free-draining.
Systems relying upon steel components, such as rock reinforcement must be
periodically inspected for corrosion or abrasion damage.
269
270
scope of this manual and will depend on the site characteristics and the foundation
area downstream of the dam requiring protection.
Aesthetics may play an important role in the final appearance of an overtopping
protection project. Although uncommon, colored concrete or concrete stains could
be considered for RCC, conventional concrete or mass concrete installations if
necessary.
Hazard potential classification is based on the probability of life loss, and the
extent of property damage, in the event of dam failure. Dams located in or near
populated areas will generally have a significant or high hazard potential
classification. The designer of any overtopping protection project must determine
whether there are any regulatory requirements or constraints that may limit the
types of overtopping protection systems available for further consideration.
State
Boundary Dam
WA
Coolidge Dam
AZ
Gibson Dam
MT
Railroad Canyon
Dam
CA
Sweetwater Dam
CA
Tygart Dam
WV
no
no
Hydraulic
Model
Study
Notes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
271
References
References
The following references have been specifically cited in this manual.
An * indicates that this report is available on this DVD.
Abdo, F.Y. and W.S.Adaska. 2007. Performance Review of RCC Spillways and
Overtopping Protection. Proceedings, 2008 Lawrence Kansas Dam Safety
Conference, Portland Cement Association, Skokie, Illinois.
Abt, S.R. and T.L. Johnson. 1991. Riprap Design for Overtopping Flow. Journal
of Hydraulic Engineering, 117(8), pp. 959 - 972.
Abt, S.R., J.R. Leech, C.I. Thornton, and C.M. Lipscomb. 2001. Articulated
Concrete Block Stability Testing, Journal of the American Water Resources
Association, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp.
27 -34. February 2001.
Abt, S.R., J.F. Ruff, R.J. Wittler, and D.L. LaGrone, 1987. Gradation and Layer
Thickness Effects on Riprap. Proceedings, National Conference on Hydraulic
Engineering, ASCE, New York, pp. 564 - 569.
Abt, S.R., R.J. Wittler., J.F.Ruff., and M.S. Khattak. 1988. Resistance to Flow
over Riprap in Steep Channels. Water Resources Bulletin, 24(6), pp. 1193
1200.
American Concrete Institute (ACI), 2005. ACI 116R-00: Cement and Concrete
Terminology, Reapproved 2005.
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 1994. Alternatives for Overtopping
Protection of Dams, Hydraulics Division Task Committee on Alternatives for
Overtopping Protection for Dams, New York, New York, 140 pages.
Anderson, A.G., A.S. Paintal, and J.T. Davenport. 1970. Tentative Design
Procedure for Riprap Lined Channels. Report No. 108. Highway Research
Board, National Academy of Sciences-National Academy of Engineering.
Washington, D.C.
Annandale, G.W. 2006. Scour TechnologyMechanics and Engineering Practice,
McGraw-Hill Civil Engineering Series, First Edition.
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD). 1982. Report on
Mesh Protection of Rockfill Dams and Coffer Dams. March 1982.
Baker, R. 1992. Concrete Blocks for Dam Spillways. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Salford, United Kingdom.
273
Baker, R., 1995. Building Blocks, International Water Power & Dam
Construction. November: 1618, 1995.
Baker, R. 2000a. Field Testing of Brushes Clough Stepped Block Spillway,
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Hydraulics of Stepped
Spillways, Zrich, Switzerland, H.E. Minor & W.H. Hager (eds). Balkema:
pp. 13 - 20.
Baker, R. 2000b. The CIRIA guide for the design of stepped-block spillways,
Proc Intl. Workshop on Hydraulics of Stepped Spillways, Zrich, Switzerland,
H.E. Minor and W.H. Hager (eds). Balkema: 15516.
Barton, N. 1977. Estimating the Shear Strength of Complex Discontinuities,
International Symposium on the Geotechnics of Structurally Complex
Formations. Vol. II, pp. 226 - 232, Capri.
Bass, R.P. and K.D. Hansen. 1998. RCC Overtopping Protection Turns 50,
Proceedings, ASDSO Annual Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada.
Bathurst, R.J, R.E.Crowe, and A.C. Zehaluk. 1993. Geosynthetic Cellular
Confinement Cells for Gravity Retaining Wall. Richmond Hill, Ontario,
Canada, Geosynthetic Case Histories, International Society for Soil
Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, March 1993,
pp. 266 - 267.
Bollaert, E.F.R. 2002. Transient Water Pressures in Joints and Formation of Rock
Scour due to High-Velocity Jet Impact.Communication 013, PhD Thesis No.
2548, Edited by Professor Dr. A. Schleiss, Lausanne, Switzerland, Ecole
Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne.
Bollaert, E.F.R. 2004. A Comprehensive Model to Evaluate Scour Formation in
Plunge Pools, International Journal of Hydropower & Dams, pp. 94 - 101.
Bollaert, E., A. Schlesiss. 2003a. Scour of rock due to the impact of plunging high
velocity jets Part I: A State-of-the-Art Review, International Association of
Hydraulic Engineering and Research, Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol 41,
No. 5, pp. 451 - 464.
Bollaert, E., A. Schlesiss. 2003b. Scour of Rock due to the Impact of Plunging
High Velocity Jets Part II: Experimental Results of Dynamic Pressures at Pool
Bottoms and in One-And Two-Dimensional Closed End Rock Joints.
International Association of Hydraulic Engineering and Research, Journal of
Hydraulic Research, Vol 41, No. 5, pp. 465 - 480.
Brown, B.S., and P.J.N. Pells. 1983. Analysing Anchor Loads in Rockfill Dams,
Water and Power Dam Construction, pp. 50 - 53.
274
References
Clopper, P.E. 1991. Protecting Embankment Dams with Concrete Block Systems,
Hydro Review, Vol. X, Number 2, April 1991.
Cooper, C. R. 2005. Closed Circuit Television Inspection of Outlet Works and
Spillway Conduits and Toe Drains, ASDSO.
Cox, A.L. 2010. Moment Stability Analysis Method for Determining Safety
Factors for Articulated Concrete Blocks, PhD. Dissertation Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, Colorado, Summer 2010.
Crowe, R.E., R.J. Bathurst, and C. Alston. 1989. Design and Construction of a
Road Embankment Using Geosynthetics, Proceedings of the 42nd Canadian
Geotechnical Conference, Canadian Geotechnical Society, Winnipeg,
Manitoba, Canada, October 1989,
pp. 266 - 271
CSU. 2013. Personal Communication. Summary of Overtopping Tests.
Memorandum from C.I. Thornton, Director, CSU Engineering Research
Center and Hydraulics Laboratory, to Bradford Cooley, Watershed
Geosynthetics, LLC, May 13, 2013.
de Marinis, G., U. Fratino, A.F. Piccinni. 2000. Dissipation Efficiency of Stepped
Spillways, Proceedings International Workshop on Hydraulics of Stepped
Spillways, Minor and Hager eds., Balkema: pp. 103 - 110.
Delleur, J. W., J.C.I. Dooge, and K.W. Gent. 1956. Influence of Slope and
Roughness on the Free Overfall. Proceedings of ASCE, Vol. 82, No. HY4,
Paper No. 1038, pp 1038-30 - 1038-35.
Ditchey, E. J. 1992. Rehabilitating Small Earth Embankments With RCC, Roller
Compacted Concrete III, ASCE, New York, New York, February 1992.
*Dodge, R.A. 1988. Overtopping Flow on Low Embankment DamsSummary
Report of Model Tests. REC-ERC-88-3, U.S. Department of Interior,
Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, August 1988.
Engel, P. and G. Flato. 1987. Flow Resistance and Critical Flow Velocities.
Prepared for GEOWEB Erosion Control System, Research and Applications
BranchNational Water Research Institute Canada Centre for Inland Waters,
Burlington, Ontario, Canada, March 1987
Ervine, D.A. and H.R. Falvey.1987. Behaviour of Turbulent Water Jets in the
Atmosphere and in Plunge Pools, Paper 9136, Water Engineering Group,
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Part 2, Volume 83, pp. 295
314.
276
References
277
Frizell, K.H., J.F. Ruff, and S. Mishra. 1998. Simplified Design Guidelines for
Riprap Subjected to Overtopping Flow. In: Dam Safety 98, Proceedings of
the Annual Conference of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Las
Vegas, Nevada.
Frizell, K.H., D.H. Smith, and J.F. Ruff. 1994. Stepped Overlays Proven for Use
in Protecting Overtopped Embankment Dams, Proceedings of the Association
of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO), 11th Annual Conference, USA.
Gaston, M.L. 1995. Air Entrainment and Energy Dissipation on a Stepped
Blocked Spillway. M.Sc Thesis, Colorado State University, Fort Collins,
Colorado, 1995.
Gonzalez, C.A. and H. Chanson. 2006. Flow Resistance and Design Guidelines
for Embankment Stepped Chutes. Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Dams in the Societies of the 21st Century, ICOLD, Leiden,
Netherlands, June 2006.
Goodman, R.E. and G.H.Shi. 1985. Block Theory and Its Application to Rock
Engineering. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Hansen, K.D. 1989. Performance of Roller-Compacted Concrete Dam
Rehabilitations, Proceedings of the 6th Annual ASDSO Conference,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 1989.
Hansen, Kenneth, 2014. Personal Communication from Kenneth Hansen, P.E.,
Individual Consulting Engineer to Tom Hepler, Civil Engineer, Technical
Service Center, Reclamation.
Hanson, G.J. and D.M.Temple. 2002. Performance of Bare-Earth and Vegetated
Steep Channels under Long-Duration Flows. Transactions of the American
Society of Agricultural Engineers. 2002. Vol. (45)3: pp. 695 - 701.
Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD). 2001. Design Manual for
Articulating Concrete Block Systems. Prepared by Ayres Associates, Project
No. 32-0366.00, September 2001.
Hartung, F. and H.Scheuerlein. 1970. Design of Overflow Rockfill Dams.
Proceedings of the 10th ICOLD Congress, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Q36,
R35, pp. 587 - 598.
Heibaum, M.H. 2000. Scour Countermeasures using Geosynthetics and Partially
Grouted Riprap. Transportation Research Record 1696, Vol. 2, Paper Number.
5B0106, pp. 244 - 250.
278
References
Henry, J.F. 1977. Rockfill Dams Designed for Overtopping During Construction.
Presentation at the winter meeting of the American Society of Agriculture
Engineers, December, 1977.
Hensley, P J. and C.C. Hennig. 1991. Overtopping Protection for A.R. Bowman
Dam. ASCE Proceedings of the 1991 National Conference on Hydraulic
Engineering, Nashville Tennessee, August 1991.
Hepler, T E. 1992. RCC Buttress Construction for Camp Dyer Diversion Dam.
1992 Annual Conference Proceedings, Association of State Dam Safety
Officials, Lexington, Kentucky, September 1992.
Hepler, T E. and P.L. Johnson. 1988. Analysis of Spillway Failures Caused by
Uplift Pressure. Proceedings of National Conference on Hydraulic
Engineering and International Symposium on Model-Prototype Correlations,
ASCE, August 812, 1988.
Hewlett, H.W.M., R. Baker, R.W.P. May, and Y.P. Pravdivets. 1997. Design of
Stepped-Block Spillways. Special Publication 142, Construction Industry
Research and Information Association (CIRIA), London, England.
Hewlett, H.W.M., L.A.Boorman, and M.E. Bramley. 1987. Design of Reinforced
Grass Waterways. CIRIA Report 116, Construction Industry Research and
Information Association, London, England, 116 pp.
Hill, D.M. 1997. Alternative Materials for Overtopping Protection. Proceedings of
the 1997 International Conference on Hydropower, ASCE, New York, New
York, August 1997.
Horeni, P. 1956. Desintegration of a Free Jet of Water in Air, Sesit 93, Praha,
Pokbaba.
Houston, K.L. 1987. Hydraulic Model Studies of Upper Stillwater Dam Stepped
Spillways and Outlet Works, REC-ERC-87-6, Reclamation, Denver,
Colorado.
*Houston, K.L. and A.T. Richardson. 1988. Energy Dissipation Characteristics of
a Stepped Spillway for an RCC Dam, International Symposium on Hydraulics
for High Dams, Beijing, China.
Hudock, G.W. and J. Semerjian. 2010. Performance of the Yellow River Roller
Compacted Concrete Overtopping Spillways During the September 2009
Georgia Floods, Dam Safety Proceedings, ASDSO, Seattle Washington.
Hunt, S.L. and K.C. Kadavy. 2008a. Velocities and Energy Dissipation on a Flat
Sloped Stepped Spillway. ASABE Paper No. 084151, St. Joseph, Michigan.
279
280
References
Leech, J.R., S.R.Abt, C.I. Thornton, and P.G. Combs. 1999. Developing
Confidence in Concrete Revetment Products for Bank Stabilization, Journal of
the American Water Resources Association. Vol. 35, Number. 4, August
1999, pp. 877 - 885.
Leps, T. M. 1973. Flow Through Rockfill. Embankment Engineering
Casagrande Volume, edited by Hirschfeld, Ronald C. and Poulos, Steve J.,
Wiley & Sons, New York pp. 87 107.
Mason, P.J. and K. Arumugam. 1985. Free Jet Scour below Dams and Flip
Buckets. ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 111, No. 2, February
1985.
Matos, J., A. Pinheiro, and Q.A. Carvalho, and Frizell, K.H. 2001. On the Role of
Stepped Overlays to Increase Spillway Capacity of Embankment Dams,
International Journal of Hydraulic Research.
*Maynord, S.T. 1988. Stable Riprap Size for Open Channel Flows. Technical
Report HL-88-4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment
Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Melville, B., R. van Ballegooy, and S. van Ballegooy. 2006. Flow-Induced
Failure of Cable-Tied Blocks, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering,
March 2006.
Metcalf, M., T.P. Dolen, and P.A. Hendricks. 1992. Santa Cruz Dam
Modification. ASCE Third Conference on Roller Compacted Concrete,
February, 1992.
Miller, S. P., and D.C. Ralston. 1987. Embankment OvertoppingCase Histories.
Hydraulic Engineering, Proceedings of the 1987 National Conference, ASCE,
New York, New York.
Mishra, S.K. 1998. Riprap Design for Overtopped Embankments. PhD Thesis,
Colorado State University, Department of Civil Engineering, Fort Collins,
Colorado.
Morn R., and Toledo M.A. 2008. Wedge-Shaped Blocks Spillway upon Barriga
Dam (Burgos), Proceedings of VIII Jornadas Espaolas de Presas, Crdoba,
Spain. Ed. SPANCOLD.
Morn R, and Toledo M.A. 2013a. Design and Construction of the Barriga Dam
Spillway through an Improved Wedge-Shaped Block Technology. Canadian
Journal of Civil Engineering.
281
Morn, R., 2013b. Improvement of the Safety of Rockfill Dams During Throughflow Processes Using Downstream Rockfill Toes, PhD. Thesis, Technical
University of Madrid, Spain.
Moyle, J.H. 1996. Submittal and Review Requirements for Overtopping
Protection Utilizing Articulated Concrete Blocks (ACBs), New Jersey Bureau
of Dam Safety and Flood Control.
National Concrete Masonry Association (NCMA). 2006. Articulating Concrete
Block (ACB) Installation. Tek 11-13.
National Concrete Masonry Association (NCMA). 2010. Design Manual for
Articulating Concrete Block (ACB) Revetment Systems. Second Edition.,
TR220A, 2010. 76 pp.
*Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). 2007. Use of Articulating
Concrete Block Revetment Systems for Stream Restoration and Stabilization
Projects. Technical Supplement 14L, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 210-VI
282
References
*Portland Cement Association (PCA). 2002. Design Manual for RCC Spillways
and Overtopping Protection, Prepared by URS Greiner Woodward Clyde,
Skokie, Illinois.
Powledge, G.R., D.C. Ralston, P. Miller, Y.H. Chen, P.E. Clopper, and D.M.
Temple. 1989. Mechanics of Overflow Erosion on Embankments. I: Research
Activities and II: Hydraulic and Design Considerations, American Society of
Civil Engineering, Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 115, Number. 8,
August 1989.
Powledge, G.R. and Y.P. Pravdivets. 1994. Experiences with Embankment Dam
Overtopping Protection, Hydro Review Magazine, February 1994.
*Reclamation. 1952. Discharge Coefficients for Irregular Overfall Spillways.
Engineering Monograph No. 9, Denver, Colorado, March 1952.
*Reclamation.1978. Hydraulic Design of Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators.
Engineering Monograph No. 25, Denver, Colorado.
*Reclamation. 1980. Air-Water Flow in Hydraulic Structures. Engineering
Monograph No. 41, December 1980.
*Reclamation. 1987a. Design of Small Dams.
Reclamation.1987b. Design Summary, Big Sandy Dam Safety Spillway
Modification. Eden Project, Wyoming, March 1987b.
*Reclamation. 1990a. Cavitation in Chutes and Spillways. Engineering
Monograph No. 42, Technical Service Center, Denver, Colorado, April 1990a.
Reclamation.1990b. TM No. TR-3620-09. Theodore Roosevelt DamFlip
Bucket Foundation Stability for Theodore Roosevelt Dam Modification.
Denver, Colorado, June 22, 1990b.
Reclamation. 1993. Plunge Pool Performance StudyProject Data
Review/Literature Search - Theodore Roosevelt Dam. Prepared for BOR by
Harza Engineering Company, PAP-713, U. S. Department of Interior,
Reclamation, Technical Services Center, Denver, Colorado.
Reclamation, 1997. Guide to Concrete Repair. Technical Service Center.
Materials Engineering and Research Lab.
http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/materials_lab/repairs/guide.pdf
Reclamation. 1998. Engineering Geology Field Manual, Second Edition, Volume
1, Denver, Colorado.
Reclamation. 2002. Report of Findings, Pueblo Dam Modification, FryingpanArkansas Project. Denver, Colorado.
283
284
References
Rice, C.E., K.C. Kadavy, and K.M. Robinson. 1998. Roughness of Loose Rock
Riprap on Steep Slopes. Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, 124(2),pp. 179
185.
Richards, G.L., A. Miller., P.G. Schweiger, J.E. Demby, and A.J. Hess. 2013.
Selecting and Accommodating Inflow Design Floods for Dams: Beyond the
Guidelines. The Journal of Dam Safety, ASDSO, Volume 11, Issue 4.
Riley, R.C. 1986. A Procedure for Evaluating Permissible Limits of Overtopping
of Vegetated Earthen Embankments. In: Dam Safety 86, Proceedings of the
1986 ASDSO Annual Meeting, Austin, Texas, October 1986.
Robinson, K.M., C.E. Rice, and K.C. Kadavy. 1998. Design of Rock Chutes.
Transactions of the ASAE, 41(3), pp. 621 - 626.
Roskie, G.F. 2014. Photograph of Gibson Dam, Sun River, Montana.
https://water.usgs.gov/osw/images/2011_Photos/Disaster/11-014_02.jpg.
Accessed 3/5/2014.
Rouse, H.R. 1936. Discharge Characteristics of the Free Overfall, Civil
Engineering, Volume 6, Number 4.
Schrader, E. 1995. Roller Compacted Concrete Cavitation and Erosion
Resistance, March 1995.
Schweiger, P.G. 2002. The State-of-the-Art of Armoring Embankment Dams
Using Articulating Concrete Blocks, Proceedings Association of State Dam
Safety Officials (ASDSO).
*Scott, G.A. 1999. Guidelines for Geotechnical Studies for Existing Concrete
Dams, Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, September 1999.
Shaffer, Darin, 2014. Personal Communication from Darin Shaffer, Supervising
Engineer, New Jersey Bureau of Dam Safety & Flood Control to Tom Hepler,
Civil Engineer, Technical Service Center, Reclamation, July 9, 2013.
Sherard, J.L. 1972. Guaremal Dam Design Review, AppendixSpillways
Constructed on Top of Earth Dams, June 1972.
Siddiqua, S., J. A.Blatz, and N.C. Privat.2013. Evaluating the Behaviour of
Instrumented Prototype Rockfill Dams. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 50(3),
pp. 298 - 310.
Simons, D.B., Y.H. Chen, and L.J. Swenson. 1984. Hydraulic Test to Develop
Design Criteeria for the Use of Reno Mattresses, Civil Engineering, Colorado
State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, March 1984.
285
Simons, Li & Associates. 1988. Full Scale Hydraulic Studies of GEOWEB Grid
Confinement System for Minimizing Embankment Damage During
Overtopping Flows, Report to Presto Products Company, February 1988
Simons, Li & Associates. 1990. Designing Stable Channels with Armorflex
Articulated Concrete Block Revetment Systems, Copyright Armortec.
Slovensky, G.G. 1993. Near-Prototype Testing of Wedge-Block Overtopping
Protection. Thesis, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Spurr, K.J.W. 1985. Energy Approach to Estimating Scour Downstream of a
Large Dam. Water Power & Dam Construction, Vol. 37, Number 11, pp. 81
89.
Stephenson, D. 1979a. Gabion Energy Dissipators. Proceedings 13th ICOLD
Congress, New Delhi, India, Q. 50, R. 3, pp. 33 - 43.
Stephenson, D. 1979b. Rockfill in Hydraulic Engineering. Developments in
Geotechnical Engineering 27, Elsevier, New York, pp. 50 - 51.
Stephenson, D., 1980. The Stability of Gabion Weir. Water Power and Dam
Construction, April 1980.
Stephenson, D. 1991. Energy Dissipation Down Stepped Spillways. Water Power
and Dam Construction, 43 (9), pp. 27 - 30.
Stinebring, D.R. 1976. Scaling of Cavitation Damage. Masters Thesis,
Pennsylvania State University, August 1976, 160 pp.
Tatro, S.B., J.K. Hinds, and J.L. West. 2008. Properties of Grout Enriched Roller
Compacted Concrete. The Journal of Dam Safety, ASDSO, Lexington
Kentucky, Vol. 6, Issue 3.
Tayabaji, S.D. and P.A. Okamoto. 1987. Bonding of Successive Layers of Roller
Compacted Concrete, Construction Technologies Report to U.S. Department
of Interior, Reclamation.
Taylor, E. H. 1991. The Khasab Self Spillway Embankment Dams. Proceedings
of the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), Vienna, Austria,
Question Number 67, Response Number 12.
Temple, D.M. 1987. Vegetal Protection of Embankments and Spillways. In:
Hydraulic Engineering, Proceedings of the 1987 ASCE National Conference
on Hydraulic Engineering, Williamsburg, Virginia, August 3-7, 1987, p. 745
750.
286
References
*Temple, D.M., K.M. Robinson, R.M. Ahring, and A.G. Davis. 1987. Stability
Design of Grass-Lined Open Channels. USDA Agriculture Handbook
Number 667, 167 pp.
Temple, D.M., K.R. Cook, M.L. Neilsen, and S.K.R. Yenna. 2003. Design of
Grass-Lined Channels: Procedure and Software Update. American Society of
Agricultural Engineers, 2003 Annual International Meeting, Las Vegas,
Nevada, July 27-30, 2003.
Temple, D.M., and W. Irwin. 2006. Allowable Overtopping of Earthen Dams. In:
Dam Safety 2006. Proceedings of the Association of State Dam Safety
Officials Annual Conference, September 1014, 2006, Boston, Massachusetts.
2006 CDROM.
Thornton, C.I., M.D. Robeson, D.R. Varyu. 2006. ArmorWedge Data Report
2006 Testing for Armortec Erosion Control Solutions, Inc., Colorado State
University, Engineering Research Center, Fort Collins, Colorado, April 2006.
(Confidential and proprietary).
*Timblin, L.O. 1985. The Use of Geomembranes for Emergency Spillways.
Water Power and Dam Construction, December 1985.
Timblin, L.O., P.G. Grey, B.C. Muller, and W.R. Morrison. 1988. Emergency
Spillways Using Geomembranes, REC-ERC-88-1, U.S. Department of
Interior, Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, April 1988.
Toledo, M. A. 1998. Safety of Rockfill Dams Subject to Overtopping, Dam
Safety: Proceedings of the International Symposium on New Trends and
Guidelines on Dam Safety, Barcelona, Spain; published by A. A. Balkema,
Rotterdam, Netherlands.
*U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 1990a. Hydraulic Design of
Spillways, EM 1110-2-1603, Washington D.C.
*USACE. 1990b Construction with Large Stone. Engineering Manual. EM 1110-2
2302, Washington D.C.
*USACE. 1992. Design and Construction of Grouted Riprap. Engineering
Technical Letter ETL 1110-2-334, August 1992.
*USACE. 1994. Hydraulic Design of Flood Control Channels. Engineering
Manual. EM 1110-02-1601.
*U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 2004. General design and construction
considerations for earth and rock-fill dams. Engineering Manual. EM-1110-2
2300, Appendix C.
287
288
References
289
(in.)
Cement + Fly
Ash
(lb/cu yd.)
Ocoee #2 (1980)
Ocoee, TN
27
4,450
Castle Dale, WA
38
18,000
1-1/2
500 + 0
Brownwood, TX
19
1,400
1-1/2
310 Type IP
24.7
5.5
53
4,840
1-1/2
225 + 0
44.4
4.5
18
2,300
1-1/2
285 + 0
91
10
20
6,500
1-1/2
232 + 39
60
48.5 &
56,700
1-1/2
292 + 244
2.2
41
4,000
1-1/2
195 + 195
24
35
4,200
360 + 0
9.1
2.4
46
3,500
1-1/2
300 + 0
101
10
ASI-RCC
31
4,100
439 + 0
24
3.6
30
2,730
1-1/2
330 + 0
30
4.3
Versatile Const.
15
1,000
3/4
250 + 190
1.5
60
6,300
1-1/2
228 + 174
56
110
11,100
1-3/4
117 + 125
54
6.6
60
7,700
3/4
300 + 100
122
12
17
3,050
295 + 0
65
4,230
1-1/2
330 + 0
95
10
31
2,800
2-1/2
300 + 0
20
1,000
295 + 0
1.4
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Owner/Engineer
RCC Volume
MSA
(ft.)
(cu yd.)
Max Unit
Discharge
(cfs/ft)
Max
Overflow
Height (ft)
Gunnison, CO
Bailey, CO
Big Spring, TX
Houston, TX
Bishop, CA
Nederland, CO
City of Boulder
Estes Park, CO
New spillway
City of Greeley
Kemmerer, WY
City of Kemmerer
Amarillo, TX
City of Amarillo
White Cloud, MI
HDR Engineering
OMM Engineering
Combined principal and emergency
spillway
Saltlick (1991)
Borough of Shenandoah
Ashton, ID
Mays Landing, NJ
Atlantic County
Murray, Utah
Breckenridge, CO
Marshall, TX
Rockaway, NJ
GEARS, Inc.
Crested Butte, Colorado
PHA Const.
Cologne, New Jersey
Gannett-Fleming
Ashton (1991)
Smalley Const.
Scottville, Michigan
Gannett-Fleming
Johnstown, PA
El Camino Const.
Ringtown, PA
Fresno, California
Houston, Texas
GEARS, Inc.
Montrose, Colorado
Edward Shaw
Comanche Trail (1988)
Prime Contractor
Bozeman, Montana
Freese & Nichols
Ringtown #5 (1991)
14
City/State
Max Height
PHA Const.
Cologne, New Jersey
Camp Gordon, GA
43
9,150
1-1/2
223 + 162
137
13.2
Horsethief (1992)
Rapid City, SD
65
6,250
325 + 0
17
4.24
GEARS, Inc.
Ten Sleep, WY
28
2,550
325 + 0
118
10.25
Atlanta, Georgia
US Forest Service, Denver
US Forest Service, Denver
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
City/State
Philipsburg #3 (1992)
Philipsburg, PA
Copperhill, TN
Owner/Engineer
PA - American Water Co.
Max Height
RCC Volume
MSA
(in.)
Cement + Fly
Ash
(lb/cu yd.)
(ft.)
(cu yd.)
Max Unit
Discharge
(cfs/ft)
Max
Overflow
Height (ft)
20
1,400
295 + 0
14
6.9
35
4,500
1-1/2
170 + 110
340
20
85
43,230
1-1/2
225 + 37
316
20.4
54
14,800
417 + 0
61
9.3
33
4,700
131 + 151
55
40
28,500
1-1/2
330 + 0
216
17.5
35
7,700
200 + 170
167
16
GEARS, Inc.
18
4,700
1-1/2
295 + 0
50
6.5
45
9,500
200 + 170
190
17
Prime Contractor
Wichita Falls, TX
Atlanta, Georgia
Rosebud, SD
Canyon, TX
Ponca (1993)
Herrick, SD
He Dog (1994)
Paramalee, SD
Borough of Lehighton
Barberton, OH
PPG Industries
St. Clairsville, OH
Anawalt (1994)
Anawalt, WV
Wellington, CO
Waxahachie, TX
Kildeer, ND
28.5
3,100
250 + 150
15.6
2.5
35
6,000
1-1/2
197 + 142
40
2,200
250 + 0
16
Beaver Excavating
34
3,000
361 + 0
61
7.83
40
2,400
350 + 0
30
62
52,000
1-1/2
48
6.25
38
3,850
1-1/2
312 + 0
58
Loudenville, Ohio
Canton, Ohio
Triad Engineering
Smith Geotechnical
Petes Excavating
Torrington, Wyoming
Gannett Fleming
Lake Dorothy (1994)
ASI-RCC
Buena Vista, Colorado
Petes Excavating
Torrington, Wyoming
GEI Consultants
Petes Excavating
Torrington, Wyoming
270 + 0
Central Plains
Shawnee Mission, Kansas
GEI Consultants
Fort Ritchie, MD
40
10,000
1-1/2
200 + 100
44.4
Wardensville, WV
38
3,100
1-1/2
350 + 0
127
12
Stamford, CT
25
2,100
1/1/2
200 + 128
22
3.8
John J. Brennan
92
8,600
325 + 0
125
10
60
25,300
308 + 0
58
5.6
21
3,000
1-1/2
280 + 0
91
58,600
171 + 0
167
12.5
Baltimore, Maryland
Triad Engineering
Meeker, CO
Garrisonville, VA
Shelton, Connecticut
Denver, Colorado
Throckmorton, TX
City of Throckmorton
Decker, MT
Roanoke, Virginia
Branch Hwys.
Nobles Road Const.
Abilene, Texas
Barnard Construction
Bozeman, Montana
City/State
Owner/Engineer
Marion, VA
Douthat (1997)
Clifton Forge, VA
Marble Falls, TX
Mona (1997)
Juab County, UT
Current Co.
Williamsport, MD
Corps of Engineers
Dulce, NM
Max Height
RCC Volume
(ft.)
(cu yd.)
MSA
(in.)
Cement + Fly
Ash
(lb/cu yd.)
Max Unit
Discharge
(cfs/ft)
Max
Overflow
Height (ft)
40
16,450
1-1/2
350 + 50
50
6.6
45
15,000
1-1/2
292 + 0
105
160,000
1/4
230 + 230
14
43
3,400
350 + 0
ASI-RCC
20
3,900
180 + 180
C.J Merlo
1-1/2
325+0
Madison, Virginia
Portsmouth, OH
Portsmouth, OH
McBride (1999)
Portsmouth, OH
Bozeman, Montana
4,920
1-1/2
325+0
63.9
7.9
GEARS, Inc.
25
3,363
1-1/2
300 + 0
20.4
4.1
Lo-Debar Const.
23
2,141
1-1/2
300 + 0
32.1
3.6
Lo-Debar Const.
22
1,944
1-1/2
300 + 0
20.8
2.5
20
4,500
1-1/2
291 + 0
55
4.7
36
26,000
1-1/2
275 + 50
6.5
Thalle Construction
49
9,102
320+0
8.1
T-C Inc.
35
3,700
1-1/2
350 + 0
81
21
3,600
1-1/2
309 + 0
72
4.63
28
2,300
1-1/2
325 + 0
28
5,800
361 + 0
12
45
6,200
1-1/2
280 + 70
7.1
Barnard Construction
23
9,200
1-1/2
375 + 0
3.5
30
10,000
225+0
260+0
Newark, Ohio
Newark, Ohio
Clark Township, NJ
Clark Township
Fort Rucker, AL
Gunnison (2000)
Gunnison, UT
Jackson County, OH
Longmont, CO
Barbour County, WV
NRCS, OH
Indianapolis, Indiana
Fawell (2000)
Naperville, IL
Dupage County
Bridgeport, CT
State of Connecticut
Zuni, NM
Pueblo of Zuni
US Bureau of Reclamation
Bozeman, Montana
URS Corp.
Racine, Wisconsin
Spartanburg, SC
Arvada, CO
McKinney (2001)
Hoffman, NC
70
5,600
43
8,900
1-1/2
425 + 0
92
8.4
17
1,570
1-1/2
450 + 0
47
D V Morin Construction
Meriden, Connecticut
79
GEI Consultants
Lake Blalock (2001)
DeFalco-Lee
Longmont, Colorado
Lo-Debar Const.
Newark, Ohio
Many Farms, AZ
Nordic Ind.
Salt Lake City, Utah
BBC&M Engineers
Lo-Debar Const.
Newark, Ohio
Schnabel Engineering
Lake Tholocco (2000)
Barnard Construction
45
Robinsons Branch
Barnard Construction
Bozeman, Montana
Boulder, CO
Branch Hwys.
Roanoke, Virginia
Prime Contractor
W&L Paving & Contracting
URS Corp.
ASI RCC
Buena Vista, Colorado
Atlas Resource Management
City/State
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87, 88
89
90
91
92
93, 94
95, 96
Owner/Engineer
Max Height
RCC Volume
MSA
(ft.)
(cu yd.)
(in.)
Cement + Fly
Ash
(lb/cu yd.)
Max Unit
Discharge
(cfs/ft)
Max
Overflow
Height (ft)
Ironton, OH
45
10,000
360 + 0
35
5.7
T C Inc.
26
4,770
1-1/2
375 + 0
74
7.3
DPS Ind.
39
5,655
1-1/2
330 + 0
120.6
9.3
35.5
5,675
1-1/2
303 + 0
33.4
3.8
35
1,400
3/4
300+0
10
2.4
44.5
2,953
29
4,000
330+0
167
7.7
39.5
4,850
1-1/2
250+250
82
7.4
27.3
2,500
300+0
7.5
33.5
4,500
15,000
37.4
4,000
300+0
104.4
13
2,500
44.5
2,950
13,055
157 + 78
16.4
2,320
35.9
4.1
1-1/2
210+210
34.5
Bureau of Reclamation
Potato Creek No. 6 (2002)
Thomaston, GA
Upson Co. and Towaliga River Soil & Water Conservation Dist.
Flint, MI
Chillicothe, OH
Indianapolis, Indiana
Golder Associates
Marietta, Georgia
Saginaw, Michigan
McAfee, NJ
Newtonsville, OH
Ohio DNR
Prime Contractor
Fayetteville, North Carolina
Lawrenceville, GA
Gwinett County, GA
Newark, Ohio
Akron, OH
Thalle Construction
Hillsborough, North Carolina
Golder Associates
Willowdale Lake (2003)
Lo-Debar Const.
Burgess Niple
Sweet Arrow (2003)
Pineview, PA
Schuykill County
WJP Engineers
Nesquehoning, PA
Ivyland, Pennsylvania
Geauga, OH
Homeowners Assoc.
Stillwater, NJ
Community of Stillwater, NJ
McKinney, TX
Carlsbad, NM
Brunswick, OH
City of Brunswick, OH
Ritacco Construction
Belleville, New Jersey
M & E Engineering
Hackberry Draw 1 (2003)
C J Natale, Inc.
Hudson, Ohio
BBC&M Engineers
Paulins Kill (2003)
(auxiliary spillway)
Brunswick Lake (2004)
MS Consultants
Bear Creek #11 & #12 (2004)
Goldsboro, NC
(auxiliary spillways)
Yellow River #17 (2005)
Newark, Ohio
23 & 19
2,538 + 885
Gwinnett County, GA
Ridgeway, VA
NRCS, Virginia
Hope, NJ
John P. Neufville
Marilla (2007)
Bradford, PA
46
10,600
1-1/2
280+190
143.4
12.9
ASI Constructors
25
1,600
3/4
350+0
33
4.8
GEARS, Inc.
8,500
400+0
4,300
360+0
12560 + 3,000
GAI Consultants
Deegan and Hinkle (2007)
Bridgeport, WV
(two dams)
Yellow River Y15 and Y16 (2008)
City of Bridgeport, WV
Gwinnett County, GA
Golder Assoc. (Y15), Schnabel Engineering (Y16)
ASI Constructors
6,700
Schnabel Engineering
Locust Lake (2005)
Thalle Construction
30
Lo-Debar Const.
(in.)
Cement + Fly
Ash
(lb/cu yd.)
30
15,600
1-1/2
400+0
35
47
6,111
1-1/2
362*
60.15
6.68
C. Watts Construction
Butler, PA
42
14,070
1-1/2
200+200
54.3
Wise, VA
Town of Wise, VA
45
5,400
250+150
59
6.1
Grayson, GA
Gwinnett County, GA
Golder Associates
ASI Constructors
Preblo West, Colorado
Donegal Township, PA
City/State
Owner/Engineer
Centre County, PA
Stilwell, OK
Max Height
RCC Volume
(ft.)
(cu yd.)
MSA
Max Unit
Discharge
(cfs/ft)
Max
Overflow
Height (ft)
Schnabel Engineering
Prime Contractor
Jay Fulkroad & Sons, Inc.
McAlisterville, Pennsylvania
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Gannett-Fleming
Tarentum, Pennsylvania
Jonesville, Virginia
-
42
7,500
400+0
Golden Triangle
49
11,000
1-1/2
200+200
128
9.8
Joseph B. Faye
56
10,000
250+150
76
74
8,580
1-1/2
350+0
90
9.5
Micheal Baker
Fox Creek #4 (2011)
Flemingsburg, KY
Bedford, VA
City of Bedford, VA
Imperial, Pennsylvania
Russelton, Pennsylvania
Schnabel Engineering
Schnabel Engineering for Thompson & Litton
T Nelson Elliott (2011)
Manassas, VA
City of Manassas, VA
Waynesburg, PA
Butler Co., PA
Morgan Corporation
Spartanburg, South Carolina
URS Corp.
Wisecarver (2011)
Estes Brothers
ASI Constructors
Pueblo West, Colorado
40
D'Appolonia
33
14,150
300+100
60
10
33
3,000
1-1/2
450(1S)+0
48
4.9
101
38,000
1-1/2
200+200
120.5
12.58
Schnabel Engineering
Lower Owl Creek (2012)
Tamaqua, PA
KC Construction
Ivyland, Pennsylvania
Nesbitt (2012)
Lackawana County, PA
Akron, OH
21.5
2,400
250+120
3.4
Coalgate, OK
53.4
8,820
1-1/2
203 + 68
86.69
7.9
Wynn Construction
Keyser, WV
114
26,000
1-1/2
200+200
140
13
46
11,974
Gannett Fleming
ASI Constructors
Pueblo West, Colorado
Akron, Ohio
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Gannett Fleming
Mountain Creek #10 (2014)
Midlothian, TX
NRCS - Texas
ASI Constructors
Pueblo West, Colorado
Bainebridge, OH
22
67,200
28.2
3.2
Pike County, OH
25
5,355
42.4
Renwick (2014)
(RCC spillway and RCC road)
PembinaCo., ND
49
19,718
air entrained
1-1/2
377 + 94
110
11.1
Scroto County, OH
19.5
5,300
140
8.9
South Akron, OH
29
12,500
1.5
250+120
21
15.1
22.7
5,500
Trucco Construction
Delaware, Ohio
Sunesis Construction Co.
West Chester, Ohio
Ayers Associates
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Location
Type of System
Page A-
Texas
RCC
Oregon
CRCS
Baldhill Dam
North Dakota
CRCS
Barriga Dam
Spain
ArmorWedge ACB
2
England
3
Colorado
Geomembrane liner
4
Empire Landfill
Pennsylvania
Geocell
5
Friendship Village
Missouri
ArmorWedge ACB
Googong Dam
Australia
Reinforced rockfill
South Dakota
Non-cable-tied ACB
6
Pennsylvania
RCC
Colorado
RCC
7
Indiana
Cable-tied ACB
7
Montana
RCC
New Mexico
Gabions
8
Location
Type of System
Page A-
Boundary Dam
Washington
Coolidge Dam
Arizona
Gibson Dam
Montana
1
California
1
Sweetwater Dam
California
12
Tygart Dam
West Virginia
1
AppendixCase Histories
Part 1: Embankment Dams
AppendixCase Histories
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-1
Figure Addicks and Barker-1. Aerial view of Barker Dam outlet works (Courtesy of USACE).
References:
Munn, W.D. 1988. Sloping Roller Concrete Faces Earthfill Dams, Highway and
Heavy Construction magazine, September 1988.
A-2
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
The flood routing for the 1988 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) for A.R.
Bowman Dam indicated the dam will be overtopped by up to 20 feet for about
4.5 days. The 1988 PMF has a peak inflow of 263,000 ft3/s and a 15-day volume
of 964,000 acre-feet. Overtopping of the dam would be initiated by a flood whose
volume was about 23 percent of the PMF volume, which corresponds to about a
500-year event.
Corrective actions were evaluated for A.R. Bowman Dam, including a dam raise
to increase the surcharge space, construction of an auxiliary spillway, breaching
of the dam, and overtopping protection alternatives. Overtopping protection was
selected as the preferred alternative based on cost, environmental considerations,
and maintenance of project benefits.
A-3
A-4
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Due to these technical advantages, and the fact that the costs of the RCC
and CRCS options were essentially equal, the CRCS option was selected
as the preferred alternative (Hensley et al., 1991).
Design Details
The CRCS protection was designed to be a minimum of 12 inches thick and
extend over the entire downstream face of the dam. The slab would follow the
existing slopes of the dam with a 2:1 upper slope and a 4:1 lower slope. The slab
thickness was increased in the transition area between the two slopes. This was
done to add protection to the slab in this area from flood debris impacts. Based on
the limited potential for open cracks to develop through the CRCS and the
drainage system to be provided underneath the slab, it was concluded the 12-inchthick slab would be stable.
The slab was underlain with a crushed rock drainage layer that would convey
seepage to a line of drain outlets. The drain outlets would be vented on the surface
of the slab by the pressure differential created by the flow over the ramp or
eyebrow located over the drain outlets (see Figure Bowman-2). The pressure
differential at the drain outlets also ensures that the outlets will not introduce
additional water underneath the concrete slab. The aspirating drain outlets are
located just above the toe of the hydraulic jump. The model study indicated that
the hydraulic jump would be below elevation 3110.4 feet mean sea level for all
flow conditions.
Three weep holes were provided at the toe of the dam to allow steady state
seepage to pass through the concrete slab protective overlay, in the area of the
hydraulic jump. Flap valves were provided at the weep holes to prevent backflow
of water due to pressures from the hydraulic jump. A header system was not
planned for these lower valves. If one of the flap valves were to fail, this would
limit the weep hole to a point source and minimize the amount of water
introduced under the slab.
The design included a reinforced concrete cap on the dam crest to protect against
seepage at the crest reaching the underside of the overtopping protective slab (see
Figures Bowman-3 and 4). Concrete blocks were placed at the upstream and
downstream edges of the crest to support the dam crest concrete slab and the
upstream end of the concrete slab on the downstream face of the dam. The
upstream and downstream blocks are embedded in impervious zone 1 material.
The dam crest concrete slab is underlain by a crushed basalt drainage blanket. A
toe block was included at the downstream toe of the dam to anchor the CRCS to
the foundation rock.
A-5
One of the design concerns was for the groins of the dam and the interface with
the overtopping protection. The continuously reinforced concrete slab was
anchored into the bedrock on the left abutment and was restrained by a concrete
gravity wall placed against the left wall of the existing spillway on the right
abutment. The concrete gravity wall was added because the existing spillway wall
was determined to be inadequate to reduce the forces that would be generated as
the slab expands under temperature loads as well as the loads from increased fill
heights. Another factor was that the vertical contraction joints in the existing
spillway chute walls do not have waterstops. This created the potential for flow in
the existing spillway to be introduced under the CRCS and contribute to uplift
pressures.
Additionally, some of the rock in the abutments consists of fractured basalt which
is considered erodible. If erosion occurred in these areas, the overtopping
protection slab could be undermined. A 1:48 scale hydraulic model was used to
A-6
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
evaluate the feasibility design of the CRCS. The hydraulic model study evaluated
the erosion potential, and the intent was to line the vulnerable areas with concrete.
It was also planned to shape the abutments to provide smooth flow lines and to
minimize turbulence along the groins.
A major design consideration was ensuring the concrete slab was adequately
protected from undermining or other mechanisms that could lead to failure along
the perimeter of the slab. The continuously reinforced slab will be supported and
restrained at the dam crest, at the downstream toe block, along the left wall of the
service spillway chute along the right abutment, and at the left abutment of the
dam. These connections were designed using information from the hydraulic
model study and from the design approaches that were employed. See Figures
Bowman-4 and 5 for other design data.
Before a final decision was made on the CRCS option, two primary concrete
overtopping protection alternatives were considereda stepped RCC overlay and
the CRCS alternative. For the RCC alternative, an RCC apron was planned to
protect the downstream toe of the dam. The RCC alternative would be relatively
simple to construct and would have the advantage of dissipating energy on the
steps, which would reduce the size of the downstream apron. One of the
challenges of the RCC overlay was to design it to safely withstand uplift and
hydrodynamic loads in order for the protection to remain stable during all
overtopping events. Temperature loads, shrinkage, freeze-thaw damage and the
potential for settlement of the underlying embankment were all considerations in
the RCC overlay design. Cracking of the RCC overlay would be likely, so
measures would be needed to prevent erosion of the underlying embankment
materials should overtopping flows enter the cracks. A gravel filter layer
underneath the RCC overlay was planned to provide drainage and reduce
potential uplift pressures.
Hydraulic model studies were conducted to further evaluate the stepped RCC
alternative. The tests were conducted in a 1:12 scale, 2:1 sloping flume that was
1.5 feet wide. The flume was capable of studying overtopping of embankment
dams up to 165 feet high, overtopping heads of up to 30 feet and unit discharges
up to 500 ft3/s/ft. The initial tests were conducted with a 2-foot step height with
horizontal tread. A tailbox provided at the toe of the flume allowed for adjustment
of the tailwater and for return flows to the main channel. The model studies were
used to optimize the step geometry for A.R. Bowmans overtopping range of 5 to
21 feet.
A-7
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-8
Figure Bowman-4.Drainage and toe details of A.R. Bowman proposed overtopping protection
(Reclamation figure republished in McGovern and Frizell, 1991).
A-9
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-10
A-11
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
To design the CRCS, a better understanding of the flow conditions over the slab
and of the hydraulic jump at the downstream toe of the dam was needed. Flow
conditions from the crest of the dam to the stilling basin were investigated in the
hydraulic model. The flow over the downstream face of the dam converges as it is
bounded by the existing spillway on the right abutment and by the contact with
the rock on the left abutment. The crest length at the top of the dam from the
existing spillway to the left abutment of the dam is 840 feet. The width of the
overtopping protection at the toe of the dam is 380 feet. Discharge curves were
developed from the hydraulic model study and included flow over the dam only;
dam overtopping and flows through the existing spillway; and dam overtopping,
existing spillway flows, and flows over the right abutment of the dam. The
discharge curves are shown in Figure Bowman-7.
The Continuously-Reinforced Concrete Pavement (CRCP) computer program
developed at the University of Texas at Austin (Ma and McCullough, 1977) was
used to design the concrete overtopping protection slab at A.R. Bowman Dam.
The program models the response of the slab for various loading conditions,
considering the properties and dimensions of the concrete slab, the gradation of
the subgrade materials, and limiting criteria selected for crack width, crack
spacing, and the stresses in the reinforcing steel. For A.R. Bowman Dam, a target
crack width of 0.003 inches was selected for a slab temperature of 32qF. Based on
daily temperature readings for Prineville, the minimum expected temperature is 33qF. The predicted crack width for this temperature is 0.025 inches. This
maximum crack width is a concern because of the potential for blowups in the
slab, which could occur if incompressible materials fill the cracks when they are
at their maximum opening. When temperatures increase and the slab expands,
large compressive forces can be introduced into the slab, potentially leading to
localized failure. This has only been a problem in CRCP when the crack widths
have exceeded 0.1 inches (McCullough, 1991).
Another important consideration in the design of the CRCS was the crack spacing
that would be expected to occur. For CRCP design, a minimum crack spacing is
recommended to prevent punchout failures of the slab and to provide adequate
development length within the reinforcement across the cracks (McCullough,
1991). The minimum crack spacing for the A.R. Bowman design was set as
2.0 feet. This was designed to limit seepage during the PMF condition and was
achieved by providing sufficient reinforcement in the concrete slab.
Based on the assumed crack widths and crack spacings, seepage volume through
the slab under a PMF condition was estimated, assuming laminar flow through the
cracks.
A-12
The following formula was used to estimate the seepage through cracks in the
CRSC (Amadei et al., 1989):
Q
w
[ gb 3 h
12Q C L
Eq. A-1
C = 1 + 8.8 (k/Dh)1.5
Where:
Q = discharge through the cracks (ft3/s)
g = acceleration of gravity (ft/s2)
b = aperture (width) of crack (ft)
= kinematic viscosity of water (ft2/s)
h = difference in hydraulic head through crack (ft)
L = thickness of concrete (ft)
w = length of crack (ft)
= degree of crack separation (varies between 0 and 1)
C = roughness coefficient
A-13
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-14
Figure Bowman-8.Water surface profiles over CRCS from start of 4:1 slope to the stilling
basin (Reclamation figure republished in McGovern and Frizell, 1991).
Figure Bowman-9.Tailwater elevation and water elevation underneath CRCS during PMF
(Reclamation figure republished in McGovern and Frizell, 1991).
A-15
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-16
The data indicate that the pressure spikes tended to be of short duration and
limited lateral extent. The plots also indicate that except for a few limited spikes,
the pressures are in the downward direction, indicating that uplift pressures are
not significant.
The model study indicated areas that warrant additional erosion protection and
these included the downstream groins of the dam. Due to the converging flow
down the face of the dam, the depth of flow and the turbulence was concentrated
at the groin areas. It was also identified that the existing spillway stilling basin
right wall would need to be modified to withstand the hydraulic jump from the
overtopping flows.
As part of the hydraulic model studies, flow through the existing spillway was
evaluated. Under the modified dam configuration and during the PMF event,
maximum flows through the spillway would be increased from 8,100 ft3/s to
21,900 ft3/s. The model study indicated the spillway chute walls would be
overtopped and that the backfill behind the right chute wall would be quickly
eroded and then the spillway could be undermined. The erosion could then extend
to the dam and cause failure of the overtopping protection. To prevent this, it was
planned to remove the backfill behind the chute walls and replace it with mass
concrete. On the abutments, a layer of shotcrete was planned above the mass
concrete to protect against flows coming down the abutment.
The overtopping protection at A.R. Bowman Dam was never constructed due to
changes to the hydrologic loads and estimated risks. Despite this, the hydraulic
model studies and analyses performed provide valuable information for designing
concrete overtopping protection.
References
Ma, James and McCullough, B. Frank. 1977. CRCP-2, An Improved Computer
Program for the Analysis of Continuously Reinforced Concrete Pavements,
Research Report 177-9, Center for Highway Research, The University of
Texas at Austin, August 1977.
Houston, Kathleen L, and Richardson, Alan T, 1988. Energy Dissipation
Characteristics of a Stepped Spillway for an RCC Dam, International
Symposium on Hydraulics for High Dams, Beijing, China, 1988.
Amadei, B.; Illangasekare T.; Morris, D.; and Boggs, H. 1989. Estimation of
Uplift in Cracks in Older Concrete Gravity Dams: Analytical Solution and
Parametric Study, ASCE Journal of Energy Engineering, Vol. 115, No. 1.
April 1989.
A-17
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-18
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-19
stilling basin included two rows of baffle blocks for additional energy dissipation
and to reduce the length of the stilling basin. The combination of the existing
service spillway and the proposed gated auxiliary spillway provided adequate
overtopping protection but a second more economical alternative was considered.
Figure Baldhill-1.Baldhill Dam, with service spillway at the right end of the dam (looking
downstream) and the uncontrolled auxiliary spillway on the downstream face of the dam
(Courtesy of USACE).
A-20
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
The existing spillway capacity the crest of the auxiliary spillway is over 4
times the peak of the 100-year flood (10,000 ft3/s). This indicates that the
auxiliary spillway would only operate under extreme floods.
The coefficient of discharge for the auxiliary spillway crest was determined
to be 3.2, based on the model study. This exceeds the theoretical coefficient
for a broad-crested weir (3.07) but was attributed to the slight rounding at
the downstream end of the weir as well as the supercritical slope of the weir.
The original 1,200-foot design length of the spillway can likely be reduced
to 880 feet.
The original stilling basin design length of 60 feet was reduced to 35 feet, based
on the hydraulic model study. This was the result of a couple of factorsfirst,
that the hydraulic jump was shown to form at the toe of the spillway chute for
low flows and move up the chute for higher flows due to the tailwater resulting
from the combined flow of the service and auxiliary spillways. Second, the
Bureau of Reclamation Type III stilling basin used for the model study
(Reclamation, 1978) had baffle blocks and an end sill, but no chute blocks. The
blocks resulted in the basin performing well over a range of spillway flows and
tailwater conditions with the reduced length.
Based on the performance of the uncontrolled auxiliary spillway and cost
advantages of this alternative, it was chosen as the preferred alternative.
The cost of the auxiliary spillway was estimated to be $17 million, based on May
1990 prices. This represented a substantial savings from the estimated cost of the
gated spillway alternative.
A-21
Figure Baldhill-2.Plan of overtopping protection for Baldhill Dam (Courtesy of Association of State Dam Safety
A-22
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
(Courtesy of Association of State Dam Safety Officials [ASDSO] Eggers, 1990, all rights reserved).
A-23
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
References
Eggers, Gregory; Newberry, Michael and Gemperline, Eugene. 1990. The
Rehabilitation of Baldhill Dam, N.D., Twice the Spillway at Half the Price,
Proceedings of 7th Annual ASDSO Conference held in New Orleans, Louisiana,
October 1990.
Oswalt, Noel R. 1991. Overtopping Flow Spillway for Baldhill Dam, Sheyenne
River, North Dakota, Hydraulic Engineering, Proceedings of the 1991 National
Conference on Hydraulic Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers,
New York, New York.
Reclamation. 1978. Hydraulic Design of Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators,
Engineering Monograph No. 25, Denver Colorado.
A-24
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-25
Figure Barriga-3) were investigated. The blocks were placed over a compacted
earth fill and drainage layer in the model and provided additional support for the
Barriga Dam design (Frizell, et. al., 2000 and Pinheiro, 2000).
Of primary concern is the joint between the crest and first row of blocks, the chute
invert and side slopes, and the last row of blocks and the toe structure. In addition,
drainage must be adequate to ensure drainage of the underlayer beneath the blocks
to reduce uplift. Two filter-compatible gravel layers were designed and installed
over the rock fill of the damthe bottom layer preventing migration from the dam
body, and the bedding layer beneath the blocks preventing removal of the gravel
through the block vents. Each layer was about 8 in thick. Figures Barriga-4 and
Barriga-5 show the design drawings for the critical block sections.
A summary of these studies is provided in Frizell et al. (2005); Couto et al. (2006);
Morn et al. (2008); and Morn et al. (2010).
The larger block size for Barriga Dam (1.6 times the standard block of 12 inches
wide by 18 inches long) had to be wet cast with special forms made for the project
in the U.S. and shipped to a pre-cast factory near the site for manufacturing
(Figure Barriga-6). Figures Barriga-7 through Barriga-13 show the spillway section
under construction in 2007.
Figure Barriga-1.Overall view of the completed Barriga Dam water storage project showing the
membrane-lined reservoir and stepped block spillway in the lower left hand corner
A-26
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Barriga-2.(a) Prototype two-dimensional flume testing of the standard ArmorWedge block
performance at CSU (upper left) (courtesy of CSU).
(b) Laboratory testing of full three-dimensional flow conditions with simulated block surfaces in
Portugal (lower right) (courtesy of Morn and Toledo, 2006).
air concentration, depths, pressures on the surface and in the drainage layer, and drainage
flows have been accomplished with the data used for the Barriga project
A-27
Figure Barriga-4.Close up of transition concrete design between the invert and side slopes
(courtesy of PYPSA, S.L., and Junta Castilla y Len, 2006, all rights reserved).
Side views of the a) reinforced concrete crest cap overlapping blocks, and
(courtesy of PYPSA,S.L., and Junta Castilla y Len, 2006, all rights reserved).
A-28
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Barriga-6.a) Concrete block being finished in the plastic mold using a wet cast.
c) Blocks stacked at dam site on top of compacted spillway crest in preparation for placement
A-29
Figure Barriga-7.Completed flip bucket toe block and drainage with initial
Figure Barriga-8.Views of the two filter-compatible gravel layers beneath the block system, (a) top
A-30
Figure Barriga-9.Crane passing down a block and placement of the first block at the flip bucket (courtesy
of Morn and Toledo, 2006, all rights reserved).
Figure Barriga-10.View of
a) Block delivery by crane with straps on
steel rod through block and
A-31
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Barriga-11.View of block placement on side slope (left) and close up of rope in joint
(right) (courtesy of Morn and Toledo, 2006, all rights reserved).
A-32
Figure Barriga-13.View of top caps for the side slope blocks on left and of the completed crest
cap on right (courtesy of Morn and Toledo, 2006, all rights reserved).
Costs
The larger block for Barriga Dam (with approximate dimensions of 19 inches wide
by 29 inches long and up to 8 inches thick, and with a weight of 245 lbs) was wet
cast rather than dry cast, and reportedly cost 20 euros per block. There were 1,760
full blocks and 96 half blocks used in the construction of the block spillway. The
estimated cost of the installation of the blocks with the 2 gravel layers was reported
as 60,000 euros. Prices were based upon 2006 estimated values. If the standard size
block with a steel dry cast mold could have been used, the cost would have
probably been less.
Performance Data
The spillway has operated annually since March 2008 with flows that are a very
small percentage of the design flow, on the order of 350 to 530 ft3/s. No settlement
has been observed. Some abrasion from the flow has produced rounding of the
sharp corners of the blocks, but this was intended to be done in the manufacturing
anyway. There has also been some light deposition of calcium or other film on the
surface of the blocks (per personal communication with Rafael Morn, designer).
Measurement points were installed on selected blocks within the channel in 2009 to
monitor settlements; however, these data are proprietary and not available for
review. Figures Barriga-14 through Barriga-17 show the completed spillway and
operation.
A-33
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-34
A-35
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Lessons Learned
The standard-sized block would likely be more cost effective and easier to
manufacture and place, since it would be dry cast and not weigh more than a single
person can handle. The layers beneath the block must be carefully designed and
placed, since they are critical to the system performance by having these layers
provide support and free drainage of the blocks under flow conditions. This
installation is a rock fill dam; whereas testing has been performed on compacted
soil fill. Successful operation to date under small flow rates has provided short-term
data supporting the block system design and construction on a new rockfill dam.
References
Couto L. T., Pinto Magalhes A., Toledo, M.A., Morn R. 2006. A New Solution
for a Concrete Spillway over a Rockfill Dam. Hydraulic Model Study of
Barriga Dam in Spain, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Dam Engineering.
ISBN: 978-981-05-7585-4.
Frizell, K.H., Matos, J., Pinheiro, A.N. 2000. Design of concrete stepped overlay
protection for embankment dams, Proceedings International Workshop on
Hydraulics of Stepped Spillways, Zurich, Switzerland, H.E. Minor & W. H.
Hager (eds), Balkema: 155161.
Frizell, K.H. 2006. ArmorWedge Analysis Report: Block System Scaling for
Barriga Dam, Spain, U.S. Department of Interior, Reclamation, Water
Resources Research Laboratory, December 2006. (Proprietary and confidential).
Frizell, K.H., Kane, R., Morn, R, and Toledo, M. A. 2005. Barriga DamThe
Worlds First ArmorWedge Articulated Concrete Block Service Spillway,
Dam Engineering. (Unpublished).
Morn R., Toledo M.A. 2008. Wedge-Shaped Blocks Spillway upon Barriga Dam
(Burgos), Proceedings of VIII Jornadas espaolas de presas, Crdoba, Spain.
Ed. SPANCOLD.
Morn R., Toledo M.A. Design and Construction of the Barriga Dam Spillway
through an Improved Wedge-Shaped Block Technology, Canadian Journal of
Civil Engineering. (Under review).
Pinheiro, A., Relvas, A. 2000. Non-Conventional Spillways over Earth Dams. An
Economical Alternative to Conventional Chute Spillways, Dam Engineering,
Vol. 10, No. 4, February, United Kingdom.
Thornton, C.I., Robeson, M.D., Varyu, D.R. 2006. ArmorWedge Data Report
2006 Testing for Armortec Erosion Control Solutions, Inc., Colorado State
University, Engineering Research Center, Fort Collins, Colorado, April 2006.
(Confidential and proprietary).
A-36
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-37
The design was completed in 2007 by Black and Veatch Ltd, and construction was
undertaken between April and September 2008 by Jackson Civil Engineering, using
blocks manufactured by CPM Ltd.
Design Considerations and Details
The Petraflex spillway was subsequently overlaid with large overlapping wedgeshaped blocks. Each application is different with the CIRIA manual design. These
blocks were designed to withstand the expected hydraulic jump on the spillway due
to high tailwater caused by a downstream bridge. The hydraulic design of the
blocks was accomplished using the CIRIA publication, using thicker blocks to
withstand the hydraulic forces of the jump. The wedge-block spillway was designed
to fit over the existing spillway and was 157-foot-wide over a 30-foot-high dam
with a 23-foot hydraulic height.
The blocks were placed over a geotextile on top of the Petraflex blocks and soil,
then the 1-foot-thick drainage layer of 0.2 to 1.5 inches material, then another layer
of geotextile. The geotextile next to the blocks was required because the contractor
did not think that he could meet tolerances while laying the blocks over the required
size drainage material. The crest, toe, and two side joints in the spillway were
completed using reinforced concrete (Figure Bruton-2).
A-38
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Bruton-2.(a) Crest detail and (b) toe detail (metric units)
(Courtesy of Pether et al., 2009, all rights reserved).
A-39
A-40
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-41
Figure Cottonwood-1.Overall plan view of Cottonwood No. 5 Dam and emergency spillway
(Reclamation figure republished in Timblin et al., 1985).
Construction
The Hypalon liner material selected for the field study was a 0.04-inch thick
reinforced Hypalon sheet, fabricated to 38 by 40 feet, and 38 by 23 feet. Because of
the remote location and weather conditions, no seams were constructed in the field.
Figures Cottonwood-5 through Cottonwood-11, at the end of this case study, show
the construction of the geomembraned-lined channel. The upstream and
downstream ends were stabilized with concrete sills. The liner was trenched in
along the sides with compacted backfill, and the subsurface was cleared of large
A-42
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
rocks and debris. The geomembrane was protected by one foot of loose soil cover,
which was expected to be washed out.
Performance Data
Figures Cottonwood 12 through Cottonwood 17, at the end of this case study, show
the membrane-lined channel operating under a total flow of up to 25 ft3/s and a flow
velocity up to 26 ft/s. The total drop of the spillway was 21.5 feet. The soil cover
eroded as expected, and the material showed only a few locations of minor
abrasion. There was one puncture of the liner that was assumed to have occurred
during construction. The overlapped field joints performed well.
Lessons Learned
Future designs should use a curved bottom in cross section rather than a flat
trapezoidal section to minimize the amount of cover washed away at low flows.
Vegatative earth cover could provide additional reinforcement and less erosion at
low flows, thus reducing the need to recover. Reasonable care must be taken in
preparation of the subgrade and it should be free of stones and rocks.
Figure Cottonwood-2.Profile along the centerline of the spillway showing the locations of the
geomembrane liner (Reclamation figure republished in Timblin et al., 1985).
A-43
liner, showing (a) upstream end of the spillway at the dam crest
(b) typical section along the spillway showing an overlap of approximately 5 feet
A-44
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
geomembrane liner, the soil cover, and the extent of the sides of
A-45
A-46
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-47
A-48
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
operation. View looking upstream towards the crest with the flat bottom
A-49
A-50
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
The material was in excellent condition after the test with only
A-51
References
Timblin, L.O. 1985. The use of geomembranes for emergency spillways, Water
Power & Dam Construction.
Timblin, L.O., P.G. Grey, B.C. Muller, and W.R. Morrison, 1988. Emergency
Spillways Using Geomembranes, REC-ERC-88-1, U.S. Department of
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado.
A-52
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-53
A-54
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
167 ft3/s
Unit discharge
10 ft3/s /ft
Crest Elevation
608.95 feet
28 ft/s
0.024
A-55
Performance Data
No performance of this spillway has been reported. Viewing the few construction
photos and information provided raises the question as to whether the joint between
the invert and the side slopes is adequately constructed. The joint appears tight, but
the blocks are butted up along the joint without any apparent grouting or additional
support or structure to prevent a potentially continuous plane for water to flow into
the subgrade during operation.
Figure Friendship Village-1. Overall view of the ArmorWedge auxiliary spillway for the
Friendship Village Project nearing completion. The spillway is converging near the top, with
three slope changes. The flow will enter an energy dissipating basin shared with the
A-56
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Top left photo is of ArmorWedge block placement over graded bedding material near toe
Bottom left photo is of the block placement with equipment used to survey
Bottom right photo is of the placement at the sidewall joint with the invert
A-57
A-58
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-59
a maximum total discharge of 20,000 ft3/s) for 17.5 hours, and again 7 hours later
by up to 4.9 feet for 16 hours. During both flood peaks, the 16-foot-diameter
diversion tunnel was flowing full with a capacity of about 7,800 ft 3/s.
Just prior to the initial overtopping, the embankment with rock reinforcement had
been completed to 66 feet above streambed and with a crest length of about 460
feet. The resulting nappe was generally smooth, except where debris became caught
on the wire mesh (see Figure Googong-1). Following overtopping, all 20 mm
sloping face bars and sloping mesh wires were found to be in good condition, while
the horizontal mesh wires had broken in several locations and been pushed down
the slope by debris. Smaller rock had been washed away in local areas, producing
scattered voids beneath the wire mesh up to 1.6-feet-deep, with maximum areas of
about 3.3 by 6.6 feet. Some scour was observed along the concrete abutment
protection. To repair the overtopping damage, approximately 200 yd3 of dental
concrete was pumped into substantial cavities behind the wire mesh and along the
abutment contact, and around 70 new sheets of wire mesh held by 20 mm face bars
were added where the mesh had suffered the most damage. The remainder of the
embankment construction was completed without further overtopping (ASCE,
1994).
A-60
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Lessons Learned
Much of the damage sustained by the rockfill reinforcement system during
overtopping was due to debris carried in the flow. Efforts to minimize debris
potential within the overtopping flow, such as installing a floating log-boom on the
reservoir upstream of the dam, should be considered. The 8 mm horizontal wires
were particularly susceptible to damage, which could have been minimized by the
use of heavier reinforcing bars as used for the sloping face and anchor bars.
References
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 1994. Alternatives for Overtopping
Protection of Dams, Hydraulics Division Task Committee on Alternatives for
Overtopping Protection for Dams, New York, New York, 140 pages.
Engineering Heritage Australia. Lakes and DamsGoogong Dam, Chapter 4.
http://www.engineer.org.au/chapter04.html. Accessed 3-18-2014.
Fokkema, A., Smith, M.R., and Flutter, J. ND. Googong Dam Flood Diversion and
Embankment Protection During Construction, Technical Session on Flow over
Rockfill Dams: 17th A.G.M., Adelaide, Australia.
A-61
A-62
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-63
Figure Richmond Hill 1.A downchute for conveying stormwater runoff from the
A-64
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Table Richmond Hill-1. Project design parameters with hydraulic computations for the extreme
storm event in May 1995
Design Values
(Storm 4.8 inches in 24 hours)
Downchute
Slope
Peak
Runoff
(ft3/s)
Velocity
(ft/s)
Flow
Depth
(ft)
Shear
Stress
(lb/ft2)
Peak
Runoff
(ft3/s)
Velocity
(ft/s)
Flow
Depth
(ft)
Shear
Stress
(lb/ft2)
#1
3:1
19
12
0.24
4.97
44
16
0.39
8.09
#2
3:1
23
23
0.27
5.56
54
17
0.44
9.1
#3
2.5:1
13
13
0.19
3.98
30
15
0.29
7.33
Construction
Photos of the installation are shown in Figures Richmond Hill-3 through 5. The
Tri-lock blocks were manufactured with 4,600 lb/in2 concrete.
After construction and prior to inspection, the downchutes had been densely
covered by up to 12- inch-high grasses as shown in Figure Richmond Hill-6.
A-65
Figure Richmond Hill-4.Typical sideslope termination with sides of mat anchored into the stockpile
(Courtesy of Jacobs et al., 2004, all rights reserved).
The upstream end of the Tri-lock mat was not anchored as it would be in todays installations. The sides of
the mat were anchored into the overburden stockpile cover material
A-66
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Performance Data
The focus of the reference paper (Jacobs et al., 2004) was on performance of the
downchutes at the ROS. During the storm events, the downchute sections
experienced significantly higher velocities and nearly double the shear stresses of
the design parameters as listed in Table Richmond Hill-1. The inspection was
performed in 2001, so the systems had been in place for 7 years.
A summary of findings is:
The geofabric beneath the blocks was intact and resistant to penetration with a
metal probe.
The same metal probe was used as a pry bar to attempt to remove a few broken
blocks and they could not be removed from the block matrix.
Vegetation was growing between open spaces in the blocks and between the
cracked blocks.
Cracked or broken blocks were not generally protruding from the mat surface.
Site personnel had tamped back down one block.
The steeper downchute of 2.5:1 slope experienced more block cracking and
breakages due to the higher velocities and forces. The mat remained intact
even with localized block failures.
Movement of rocks and debris down the chutes and invasive animal activity
has caused some damage but, in this installation, these factors did not cause
system failure.
Project personnel are pleased with the installation performance after experiencing
many flows.
Lessons Learned
Good quality assurance on the foundation preparation is critical for long-term
durability of the mat systems. Continuous contact between the ground surface and
the geotextileand between the geotextile and the blocksallows the system to
function optimally.
A-67
References
Ayres Associates (formerly Resource Consultants and Engineers). 1993. Hydraulic
Stability of Trilock 4010 Revetment in High Velocity Flow, Performed for the
American. Excelsior Co., Ayres Project No. 92-0857, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Abt, S.R., Leech, J.R., Thornton, C.I. and Lipscomb, C.M. 2001. Articulated
Concrete Block Stability Testing, Journal of the American Water Resources
Association (37):1.
Jacobs, M., Rotter, A., Cazier, T., Clopper, P. 2004. Performance of Articulated
Concrete Block on Steep Slopes Following Extreme Storm Events, Erosion
Control Magazine, July-August 2004.
A-68
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-69
Reference
Bingham, W.B., Schweiger, P.G., and Holderbaum, R.E. 1992. Three Innovative
Approaches to Modify the Spillways of Existing Embankment Dams to
Accommodate Larger Floods Using RCC, USCOLD Annual Meeting, Fort
Worth, Texas, April 1992.
A-70
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-71
Figure Spring Creek-1.RCC overtopping protection placed on downstream face of Spring Creek
Dam between left abutment groin and right abutment service spillway (shown operating in
foreground). (Courtesy of Colorado Department of Natural Resources)
A-72
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-73
A-74
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Strahl-3.View of a typical lateral joint between mats with the cables
A-75
Figure Strahl-4.Close up view of a typical tied joint prior to filling with grout
(Courtesy of Contech Engineering Solutions, all rights reserved).
A-76
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure Strahl-6.Completed view of the cable-tied ACB system at Strahl Lake Dam for
A-77
A-78
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-79
Figure Tongue-2.Aerial view of Tongue River Dam in Montana, with service spillway shown at
A-80
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
Figure West Cornfield-1.Sectional view of the gabion spillway constructed for West Cornfield Dam, New
A-81
&RQVWUXFWLRQ
Figures West Cornfield-2 through West Cornfield-6 show the construction of the
gabion and gabion mat spillway section on Cornfield Dam in New Mexico.
A-82
AppendixCase Histories
Embankment Dams
A-83
References
Maccaferri, Inc. 2004. Dam Structure Controls Erosion, West Cornfield, New
Mexico, USA, Case History, Dams and Reservoirs, USA041-Rev:00, Issue
Date December 22, 2004.
A-84
AppendixCase Histories
AppendixCase Histories
Part 2: Concrete Dams
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-85
A-86
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Design Alternatives
A number of alternatives were considered for addressing the potential for
abutment erosion due to overtopping flows. The alternatives included:
x
The first alternative was selected as the preferred alternative based on cost
A-87
placement of the shotcrete was also considered, in order to improve the flow
conditions over the abutments. Figure Boundary-3 shows a typical section
through the overtopping protection.
Figure Boundary-3Erosion Protection for Dam Abutments (Sharma, et al., 1995, with
permission from American Society of Civil Engineers, all rights reserved).
Lessons Learned
Extensive geologic data collection and topographic modeling along with a
hydraulic model study were used to optimize the designs and to ensure adequate
protection for overtopping flows on the dam abutments. Steeper areas of the dam
abutments were protected with shotcrete, as the use of conventional concrete
would not have been practical.
References
Sharma, Ram P., Jackson, Harry E., Davis, Walter L., and Gwilyn, Donald. 1995.
Abutment Erosion Control System at Boundary Dam, Water Resources
Engineering, Proceedings of the First International Conference, San Antonio,
Texas, August 14-18, 1995.
City of Seattle, 2006. Boundary Dam Water Spill video.
https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=108008842604245. Accessed
March 23, 2014.
A-88
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-89
A-90
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Coolidge -2.Plan, Elevation and Section View of Coolidge Dam (Courtesy of BIA archives).
A-91
Figure Coolidge -3.Plan View of Coolidge Dam Modifications (Courtesy of BIA archives).
A-92
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Floods greater than 35 percent of the PMF would begin to overtop the dam
crest
Routing 100 percent of the PMF resulted in a maximum water surface at elevation
2557 feet, 22 feet above the crest of the dam. The dam would be overtopped for a
total of 70 hours, assuming the dam and spillway did not fail during the flood.
The total peak discharge from the spillways and over the dam, assuming no
failure, would be 459,000 ft3/s.
Foundation Stability Evaluations
Foundation stability analyses of the abutments indicated that there is marginal
stability against sliding of abutment foundation blocks under normal operating
conditions and factors of safety less than unity for loadings under MCE and PMF
conditions (Reclamation, 1988a). Flood routing studies and analyses indicated
that the dam will fail when subjected to 25 percent of the PMF due to overtopping
and/or failure of the spillway walls, failure of the spillway inverts, and subsequent
severe erosion and failure of the dam abutments. Overtopping of the dam crest
would occur at 35 percent of the PMF, which would accelerate dam failure. Flood
routing studies indicated that even if the reservoir were drained at the beginning
of the PMF, the dam would be vulnerable to structural and erosional failure. The
dam abutments are sedimentary sandstones and quartzite and would be expected
to erode by water flowing over the spillway walls and dam crest.
Preliminary studies were performed to evaluate the static and seismic stability of
the dam foundation and abutments. The rigid block method of analysis was used
to investigate the stability of potential failure wedges in the abutments. Four static
loading combinations were investigated: the winter and summer normal loading
conditions, the winter PMF, and the summer PMF. The seismic loading condition
was evaluated in combination with the winter normal loading condition.
A-93
The foundations of both abutments contain claystone beds which are continuous
and planar in nature. The preliminary stability analyses assumed that potential
failure wedges can be formed from the intersection of the claystone bedding
planes and the nearly vertical joint sets that form side planes, with shears forming
the release planes. Rock mechanics testing of cored samples provided strength
parameters for the analysis. Forces from the structural analysis of the dam were
used to calculate the forces transmitted by the dam into the foundation. A number
of potential failure wedges were identified in each abutment. Uplift forces acting
on the wedge planes were estimated using differential head contour maps of each
abutment, developed using piezometric and surface seepage data.
The preliminary stability analysis of the Coolidge Dam foundation revealed
several areas of concern. Exploration drill holes had indicated the possibility of a
fractured zone just below the concrete-to-foundation contact for both main
buttresses.
A worst case scenario would be if this fractured rock actually extended over the
entire base of each buttress, creating a potential failure plane. The preliminary
stability analyses performed on the main buttress foundation for this scenario
indicated that factors of safety against sliding at the base were less than the
Reclamation criteria of 4.0 for usual loading conditions, and 2.7 for unusual
loading conditions, but was acceptable for the extreme loading condition with a
required factor of safety of 1.3. The second area of concern was the left abutment.
Stability analyses indicated that there is marginal stability against sliding of
potential failure wedges under normal loading conditions, and factors of safety
less than unity for hydrologic and seismic loadings. The final area of concern was
the right abutment. Preliminary stability analyses show that for normal reservoir
operations during the winter months, the factor of safety against sliding of a
potential failure wedge does not meet Reclamation criteria. During hydrologic
and seismic loadings, the factors of safety fall below one.
As a result of these preliminary analyses, additional investigations were
recommended for the abutments to further define the geology and material
properties. Additional investigations were also recommended under the main
buttresses to assess the continuity of the assumed fractured rock zone.
Initial assessment of the instability of rock mass wedges located in the left and
right abutments of the dam was based on limited rock strength data and the use of
averaged joint surveys, which identified the potential critical geologic
discontinuities. Instability could be due to sliding from the weight, dam and water
loadings, and assumptions made concerning continuous joint surfaces and the
amount of cohesion. Failure of these wedges would lead to instability of the
smaller buttresses supporting the left and right domes of the dam.
Based upon the init ial assessment, the decision was made to collect additional
geologic and geotechnical data to further define the wedges and shale beds in the
abutments for the stability analyses. This additional exploration included cleaning
A-94
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
and scaling the left and right abutments immediately downstream of the dam to
expose the rock units for examination and mapping. Figures Coolidge-4 through
Coolidge-7 show the abutments in various stages of foundation clean up. The
primary purpose of stripping the abutments of overburden materials were to
identify and map specific geologic features that would be used in updated stability
analyses, to provide a good understanding of the critical wedge failure planes, and
to determine a more realistic estimate for the percent of intact rock. The stability
analyses of the left and right abutment rock mass wedges were updated and
revised as appropriate using the results of additional exploration, laboratory
testing, and detailed geologic mapping of both abutments following the clean up
efforts. The additional geologic investigations and revised stability analyses
indicated that the two critical wedges on the right abutment were stable and that
only one of the critical wedges on the left abutment required stabilization. A large
conventional mass concrete buttress wall was the preferred alternative for
stabilization of the left abutment. It was also recommended that a system of deep
drains be installed to relieve any uplift pressures that could develop within the
rock.
Updated exploration and analyses of the foundation of the two main buttresses
indicated that it did not appear that there was a continuous, horizontal zone or
layer of fractured rock at or near the foundation contact that would form a single
low strength sliding plane. A significant amount of intact rock would have to be
sheared for sliding of the main buttresses to occur and, therefore, the main
buttresses appear to be stable. The foundation area of the two main buttresses
would be subject to impingement by overtopping flows and should be protected
against erosion. Severe erosion of the abutments could also take place during
overtopping which in turn could undermine the stability of the dam.
Modification Decision
In June 1988, the decision was made to modify Coolidge Dam to eliminate the
potential for failure due to static or seismic loadings and to safely accommodate
the PMF. Structural modifications to Coolidge Dam were recommended to correct
the safety deficiencies that existed. In addition to the safety modifications,
stabilization of a large potential rockslide on the right abutment was also
evaluated. The existence of a large potential rockslide on the right abutment of
Coolidge Dam had been of concern for some time. The rock mass consists of very
large limestone blocks resting on a shale foundation, which is weathering and
losing the capability to support the blocks. The rock could fail by toppling or
sliding from its current location above the dam and right spillway. The
recommended corrective actions included realigning and replacing the spillways,
stabilizing the abutments with post-tensioned anchors, armoring the downstream
rock surfaces with a concrete mat to provide protection during dam overtopping,
and stabilizing a rock mass above the right spillway.
A-95
Figure Coolidge- . Photo of left abutment before any material was excavated or
vegetation removed (Reclamation).
A-96
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
\
Figure Coolidge-6. Left abutment cleanup. Note bedding planes in abutment rock
(Reclamation).
Figure Coolidge-7. Photo of lower right abutment of dam and right spillway chute. Right
abutment overtopping and excavation and cleanup in progress (Reclamation).
A-97
A-98
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
The hydraulic model study determined that over the full range of overtopping
discharges, the horizontal velocity components are small compared to velocities
generated by the vertical fall over the dam. Consequently, dam overtopping flows
drop nearly vertically to the tailwater or ground surface below the dam. No direct
overtopping flow impinges on the power plant tucked beneath the center dome.
Tailwater elevations increase greatly with overtopping, and the lower portions of
both spillway chutes become submerged and the power plant becomes inundated.
The model study showed that tailwater elevations at the base of the dam,
immediately downstream of the powerhouse, are strongly influenced by the flow
exiting the spillway chutes. Flows exiting from the spillway chutes tend to sweep
downstream reducing tailwater elevations between the spillway chutes and the
dam. As the tailwater pool becomes deeper at higher discharges and dam
overtopping, the sweeping influence of the spillway flow is reduced. At high
discharges, the high tailwater levels greatly reduce the area of free flow over the
abutments and in the lower ends of the spillway chutes.
The model study indicated that as the reservoir releases reach 150,000 ft3/s just
before the dam is overtopped, the tailwater depth is approximately 40 feet. As
reservoir releases reach 459,000 ft3/s during the PMF, the tailwater depth is
approximately 120 feet. The model study indicated that the tailrace area would
experience erosion from overtopping where unprotected by adequate tailwater.
Armor stone was chosen to provide erosion protection of the tailrace area. The
armor stone eliminated complicated concrete placements in the tailrace area and
will help reduce potential uplift pressures from developing under the main
buttresses. Geometrically scaled armor stone was modeled and was found to
perform satisfactorily in the model study.
The cavitation potential within the spillway chutes was evaluated using a
computer model and aeration ramps were developed to reduce the cavitation
potential, using both a computer model and the physical model (Reclamation,
1997). The discharge capacities of the spillways and outlet works were also
evaluated.
Concrete Chute Repairs
The concrete in the spillway chutes was in need of repair. There were numerous
areas of concrete delamination, cracking, exposed rebar, and spalling on both the
spillway floors and walls, with most of the damaged areas occurring in the steep
portions of the chutes. These damaged areas were due to poor concrete
construction techniques (horizontal lift lines at the joints created feathered edges
in the floor slabs), weathering, rockfalls, and alkali aggregate reaction (much of
the spillways were originally constructed using a highly alkaline cement). Both
spillways were expected to continue to degrade as exposed rebar, alkali reactive
concrete, and damaged concrete surfaces continued to be exposed to weather and
spillway discharges. Future large spillway discharges were expected to cause
A-99
significant damage to the flow surfaces, especially in the steep portions of the
chute where the flow velocities would be high. A cavitation analysis of the
spillway chutes indicated that when chute velocities exceed 90 ft/s, the existing
irregularities on the chute surfaces are sufficient to trigger major cavitation
erosion. Thus, the lower 100 feet of the spillway chutes where higher flow
velocities would occur appeared to be susceptible to major damage. Concrete
overlays and aeration ramps were recommended to be placed in both spillway
chutes to prevent significant cavitation erosion at the numerous abrupt offsets in
the damaged concrete surfaces.
Overtopping Design Details
Overtopping protection was provided by placing a conventional reinforced
concrete slab, with a minimum thickness of 2.5 feet, on the left and right
abutments and by placing armor stones in the tailrace area. The concrete
overtopping protection was laid out to provide a thickness of concrete as required
by the design loading conditions, to minimize the volume of concrete, to provide
ease of construction, and to direct flows away from the dam during an
overtopping event. To shape the concrete overtopping protection for good
hydraulic performance, an actual thickness greater than 10 feet was required at
some locations. The concrete overtopping protection was designed to resist the
static uplift due to seepage through the abutments, the dynamic uplift occurring
during dam overtopping, the dynamic impact occurring during dam overtopping,
and temperature loads. Flat drains and anchor bars were provided to help resist
uplift. Control joints with waterstops at 20-foot spacing, each way, were provided
to limit the number and minimize the size of temperature and shrinkage cracks.
Most of the concrete overtopping protection extends from each spillway down to
the tailrace area. An access road along the upstream portion of the outside chute
wall of the right spillway was also protected from overtopping with a concrete
slab. Concrete overtopping protection was also provided on top of a rock ridge
just to the right of the right chute wall of the left spillway. Overtopping protection
was provided in an area just to the left of the left chute wall of the left spillway
with a concrete slab. A vertical concrete buttress wall covers the large cliff area
near the bottom of the dam on the left abutment and extends to the downstream
end of the left spillway.
Overtopping protection in the tailrace area immediately downstream of the power
house consists of armor stone to provide erosion protection around the main
buttresses of the dam. The hydraulic model study determined the size of the armor
stone and indicated that a layer of armor stone, approximately 7 feet thick,
extending approximately 240 feet downstream from the power house for the
entire width of the river channel, was found to be sufficient to protect against
erosion. The armor stone, weighing between 2,000 and 4,000 pounds in the
overtopping impact area, was defined as blocks of hard, intact rock, lacking
obvious fractures and with a maximum volume of approximately one cubic yard.
Alluvial material in the tailrace area was excavated down to competent rock and
A-100
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
armor stone was placed so that the larger armor stones were uniformly distributed
with the smaller armor stones filling in the spaces so that there was not a direct
open channel from the surface of the armor stone to the foundation. The
approximate size of the armor stone ranged from 6 inches to 60 inches in
diameter.
A large conventional mass concrete buttress wall was the preferred alternative for
stabilizing of the left abutment. It was also recommended that a system of deep
drains be installed to relieve any uplift pressures that could develop within the
rock.
Modifications to the spillways included concrete repairs, new concrete overlays,
and aeration ramps to minimize the potential for cavitation. The new overlays
extended the full width of each chute and consisted of a continuously reinforced
concrete slab wit h a minimum thickness of 8 inches. The concrete overlays were
placed continuously from the bottom of the spillway to the top without the use of
contraction or expansion joints to provide a better flow surface.Construction
joints were permitted and were used during the construction of the overlays.
Damaged and deteriorated concrete on the existing chute floors and walls to be
covered by the concrete overlays were removed before applying the overlay. The
surface of the new overlays were first determined from surveys of the existing
chute floor surfaces and then adjusted to minimize the thickness and provide a
smooth surface with minimal discontinuities and undulations.
Cracking of the new overlays was expected to occur, but the width, frequency,
and distribution of the cracks was expected to be minimized by using a
continuous single layer of reinforcement to provide adequate crack control. The
reinforcement was located in the upper portion of the concrete overlays with a 2inch cover to control surface cracking. Anchor bars were used to tie the new
overlays to the existing spillway chute floors. The anchor bars were designed to
resist the hydrostatic uplift pressure between the existing concrete and the new
concrete overlays, as well as resist the weight of the new overlays from sliding
down the steep portion of the chutes. A system of lateral and collector flat drains
was provided between the existing concrete and the concrete overlays.
Aeration ramps and slots were incorporated into the concrete overlays to reduce
the cavitation potential in the spillways during major releases. The aeration ramps
and slots were investigated in the hydraulic model study and are located high
enough in the chutes to insure no tailwater influence. The aeration slots draw air
to beneath the flow using side wall ramps on both sides of each chute. Flow
impingement into the aeration slots in the chute floors is only expected to occur at
small discharges where cavitation potentials are low. Damaged and deteriorated
concrete was also removed and replaced in areas of the spillway chute floors and
walls not covered by the concrete overlays. These repair areas were done using
either epoxy-bonded concrete for repair of thicknesses less than 6 inches or
concrete replacement for repair of thicknesses 6 inches or more.
A-101
Long-term stabilization of the rock slope on the right abutment above the existing
access road was not done, per a decision by BIA. Failure of the rock mass would
damage the right spillway, but would not affect the safety of the dam and would
not result in a catastrophic loss of reservoir storage. Instead, only short-term
stabilization was used to provide worker safety during construction of the
modifications and the access road to the dam was rerouted around the right
abutment. The short-term stabilization consisted of scaling to remove loose
material, rock bolting, rockfall netting, a rock trap, and a rockfall fence. The rock
trap, consisting of a uniformly-graded 3-foot layer of sand, was placed over a
critical portion of the abandoned access road and held in place with median
barriers. The 10-foot high rockfall fence, consisting of steel posts, steel wire
cables, and rockfall netting, was constructed between the rock trap and the right
spillway. Near the end of construction, the rock trap and cables were removed.
At the request of the BIA, preliminary designs included installing new 50-footwide by 12-foot-high radial gates on both spillways. Installation of these gates
would replace the inoperable drum gates and require modifications to the ogee
crests and piers. Installation of the new spillway radial gates was eliminated from
the modifications due to the lack of funding. During the 1993 flood, when the
water surface rose above the spillway crests, it was noted that vertical joints in the
dams superstructure caused numerous leaks near the top of the dam. If the
spillway gates were ever installed and the normal water surface rose above the
spillway crest, these leaks would become commonplace.
Construction
Modifications were performed in a prime contract awarded June 30, 1992 and a
completion contract awarded July 13, 1995. During the prime contract, the left
abutment stability was increased to an acceptable level with the construction of a
massive gravity stability buttress at the postulated failure plane exposure beneath
the left dome. The abutments were protected from overtopping flows with a
reinforced concrete cover and armor stone was placed in the tailrace area. The
roadway on top of the dam on the right abutment was also protected from
overtopping by placing a reinforced concrete roadway surfacing adjacent to
spillway chute. A temporary rock fence and a rock trap were also installed on the
right abutment to protect workers during the modifications from falling rocks and
construction traffic was re-routed around the right abutment.
The spillway chutes were rehabilitated by repairing damaged areas in the upper
portion of the chutes, where low velocities occur, and covering the lower, steep
portions of the chutes with continuously reinforced concrete overlays and aeration
ramps where high velocities could cause cavitation damage. Scaling and rockfall
protection were installed on the left and right abutments above the spillways.
The modifications performed under the completion contract included
miscellaneous construction and repairs to the top of the dam, the spillway piers,
A-102
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
the power plant roof, and the tailrace wall. Figures Coolidge-8 through Coolidge10 show the completed modifications.
Figure Coolidge-8. Photo showing finished right spillway concrete overlay and
overtopping protection on lower right abutment of dam (Reclamation).
A-103
Lessons Learned
A hydraulic model study was used to define tailwater levels for a range of
overtopping flows, to:
x Predict the jet trajectory and jet characteristics from overtopping flows
x Identify impact pressures on the abutments form overtopping flows
Design details were added to insure the integrity of the concrete overtopping
protection, including anchor bars, underdrains, waterstops, and reinforcement
across the concrete joints.
References
Reclamation. 1997. Design Summary, Coolidge Dam, Safety of Dams
Modification, Coolidge Dam, Bureau of Indian Affairs, San Carlos Irrigation
Project, Arizona, Denver, Colorado, December 1997.
A-104
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-105
A-106
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-107
Site Geology
Gibson Dam is located in the Sawtooth Range in northwestern Montana on the
easterly flowing North Fork of the Sun River. The area is characterized by a series
of steep ridges of Paleozoic sedimentary strata separated by sedimentary
Mesozoic beds. The ridges were formed by thrust faults which trend north and dip
from 40 to 70 to the west. The thrust faults are considered inactive.
The river has cut a mature valley across the tilted rocks, and the tributary streams
have opened relatively wide valleys in the weaker shale zones between the sharp
ridges of limestone. These ridges were first cut through by an east-moving glacier,
and later by streams, forming what are called water gaps. Gibson Dam is built
on one of the water gaps where the rock formation is all crystalline limestone and
dolomite. The foundation is a crystalline limestone in regular beds which strike
normal to the river and dip upstream. The valley has been smoothed and the
valley bottom widened as a result of an eastward-moving glacier. The dam is
founded on the lower member of the Castle Reef Dolomite (Reclamation, 2006).
The foundation varies from beds a few inches thick to massive beds eight to ten
feet thick. Orientation of the beds is extremely regular, striking 5 to 8 west of
north and dipping to the west at angles ranging from 70 to 86. The bedding dips
upstream and is favorably oriented with respect to the arch of the dam.
The rock is broken by several fissures (more erodible shaly beds) which follow
the bedding planes. Between these are cross fissures or large joints. In addition,
there are a large number of bedding joints or numerous cross joints that break
beds into small blocks. This condition is most evident in the right abutment
(Figure Gibson-3) later in this case study.
On the right abutment, solid rock was excavated from 5 to 30 feet deep before the
joints were sufficiently tight to serve as a foundation for the dam. The major joint
system on the right abutment strikes about N10E and dips about 16SE, whereas
on the left abutment, it strikes about N62E and dips moderately to steeply
southeast. There is a continuous low angle joint set on the right abutment which
crosses the foundation excavation and corresponds to the major joint system. On
the right abutment, the original contour of the rock was nearly radial, which
required little shaping. The rock in the left abutment was more massive and of
better quality but required more shaping for the fit of the arch.
A board of consultants recommended using a gravity tangent or thrust block on
the upper right abutment to tie into the foundation at a more favorable orientation,
since the grouted contours nearly parallel the arch tangent in this location;
however, this was not done. A toe trench was excavated upstream from the axis of
the dam. Grouting was performed and a complex system of piping and manifolds,
with right angle bends, connects the foundation drains to horizontal pipes
extending to the downstream face of the dam. The nature of the piping makes it
virtually impossible to maintain and clean the drains. The grouting and drainage
curtain depths do not extend as deep as would be required by current practice.
A-108
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Landslide potential around the reservoir is considered low. The site geology was
considered in the determination of erodibility of the abutments during overtopping
flows.
Overtopping Event
On June 8-9, 1964, the dam was overtopped during a rain-on-snow flood event for
about 20 hours to a maximum depth of 3.2 feet above the top of the parapet wall
(or 6.7 feet above the dam crest). At the time of overtopping, two of the spillway
gates were completely closed, one was open 9 feet, one was open 11 feet, and two
were completely open at 12 feet. The maximum discharge over the parapet wall
was estimated to be about 18,500 ft3/s, and the maximum outflow from the dam
was about 56,400 ft3/s. Figure Gibson-2 shows the dam being overtopped.
The dam likely would have been overtopped even if all the spillway gates had
been fully opened as early as June 1. Although some erosion damage occurred on
the left and right abutments just downstream from the dam, no significant damage
occurred to the dam, its appurtenances, or to either abutment. However, this flood
clearly pointed out the inadequate capacity of the spillway and outlet works to
A-109
prevent overtopping. Concern existed for larger floods which could overtop the
damresulting in loss of foundation or abutment stability.
Overtopping Protection Modifications
Modifications to Gibson Dam were completed in 1981 to permit safe overtopping
of the dam of up to 12 feet over the parapet walls. These modifications included
excavation of unstable rock on both abutments just downstream from the dam,
installation of groutable rock bolts to reinforce and stabilize the jointed rock in the
abutments, and placement of concrete caps on both abutments to help protect
them during overtopping. The concrete cap is very extensive over the right
abutment as shown in figure Gibson-3.
Figu
ure Gibson-3.Construction of the overtopping protection on the right abutment.
(Reclamation, 2006).
A-110
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
The cap on the right abutment was designed with a minimum thickness of
2.5 feet. The design aspects of the cap are undocumented,(i.e., no information
regarding the selection of the rock bolt pattern, length of bolts, specifics on actual
slab thickness or extent). In addition, there are no waterstops between slab joints
and no drainage of the concrete overlay.
It was concluded that the rock on the left abutment was not erodible, except for
two weaker beds which were reinforced with 2.5 feet of concrete and pairs of
anchor bars on each side of the beds which are embedded 10 feet into rock on
5-foot centers. A couple of joints in the left abutment were grouted. Fully grouted
rock bolts were also installed on the downstream left abutment to tie the rock
together. Weep holes were installed through the concrete on the left abutment.
In addition, to help protect the top of the dam and the downstream face, eight
splitter piers were constructed at even intervals along the top of the dam to divide
the flow of water over the crest and allow aeration beneath the nappe.
Reevaluation of Overtopping Protection
The overtopping protection was reevaluated in 2006 (Reclamation, 2006) to
determine if the protection would be adequate for discharges that exceeded the
design discharge. A new hydrologic hazard study was conducted in September
2005 (Reclamation, 2005a), in which floods up to the one-million year event were
defined. The one-million year event, having a peak of 243,545 ft3/s and a 7-day
volume of 567,400 acre feet was equivalent to the 2005 General Storm Rain-onSnow probable maximum flood (PMF). Routings of the frequency flood were
performed (Reclamation, 2005b). While the 100,000 - year event (peak inflow of
153,394 ft3/s and 7-day volume of 327,692 acre-feet) resulted in similar depths
and magnitude of overtopping (10.4 feet of overtopping and overtopping
discharge of 107,436 ft3/s) as compared to the design parameters (12 feet of
overtopping and overtopping discharge of 99,800 ft3/s), the 1 - million year flood
exceeded the design overtopping depth by almost 3 feet (14.7 feet of overtopping)
and the design discharge by about 80 percent (overtopping discharge of 182,580
ft3/s). These results led to a reevaluation of the adequacy of the overtopping
protection.
As part of the evaluation of the existing overtopping protection, tailwater
elevations for the PMF condition were estimated by using a MIKE 11 1D model.
Overtopping but no breach of the dam was assumed. The modeling extended
about 3 miles downstream, and included 22 cross-sections. Tailwater elevations
were obtained at time increments throughout the routing of the PMF. The
evaluation of the overtopping protection then included the following
considerations:
x
The jet characteristics including the jet trajectory, spread of the jet, and the
location of the impingement both above and below the tailwater
A-111
The trajectory of the flow over the dam crest during an overtopping situation was
computed using the brink depth, the velocity, and the velocity head. The
trajectory of the jet overtopping the dam during the PMF is shown in Figure
Gibson-4. The trajectory through the air shows the simple jet trajectory from the
equation of motion. No spread of the outer diameter of the jet is shown or with the
footprint of the jet on the abutments and or impact into the tailwater pool. The
plot of the concrete surface shows the distance radially downstream from the dam
parapet and the elevations of the concrete surfaces. Where the trajectory intersects
or goes beyond the surface is where the jet will impact on the downstream rock.
Figure Gibson-5 shows the predicted footprint of the jet as it would impinge on
the rock or concrete overlay on the abutments and into the tailwater pool at
elevation 4670 (max tailwater during the PMF). The area of concern was the
portion of the abutments above the tailwater elevation, where the jet impinges on
the unprotected rock. The jet will impinge on the rock abutment beyond the
concrete protection between elevation 4710 and elevation 4670 feet (maximum
tailwater for the PMF). The jet will not break up as it travels through the air
because the length predicted to break it up is much greater than the height of the
fall. The free-falling jet will, however, experience spread due to turbulence and
contraction of the core due to gravity. As the jet enters the tailwater, other factors
will combine to influence the dispersion of the core and the spread of the outer
edges of the jet.
Calculations were performed to adjust the width of the jet shown in Figure
Gibson-5, to account for contraction of the core of the jet, the spread of the
outside of the jet due to turbulence and the velocity of the jet at various locations.
Calculations were then repeated for overtopping flows representing different
return period floods. Additional calculations were performed to determine the
characteristics of different jets as they plunged into and through the plunge pool.
The core of the jet will dissipate or contract until the energy no longer remains to
impact a surface and the outside of the jet will disperse. Both the core and outer
diameter of the jet will change as a function of the incoming velocity and
turbulence. It was assumed that the core of the jet would dissipate at an angle of
8 degrees as it falls through the tailwater. It was calculated that the core of the jet
would be fully dissipated in 10 feet. Based on this, it was concluded that there
would be no impact on the rock of the abutments in the tailwater pool below
elevation 4660 feet. The outer edges of the jet were assumed to disperse at an
angle of 14 degrees. As the jet spreads, the extent of the impact zone on the dam
abutments will increase, but the energy of the impinging jet will also be diluted,
as it is spread over a larger area.
A-112
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Gibson-4 - Sectional view of the final trajectory profile for the PMF
(the concrete surface line identifies the downstream edge of the concrete overtopping
protection from the upper abutment of the dam down to the maximum section of the dam)
(Reclamation, 2006).
A-113
Figure Gibson-5 - Footprint of the trajectory with no spread of the jet for the PMF overtopping
(Reclamation, 2006).
A-114
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
The next step in the evaluation was to calculate the stream power of the impinging
jet. The stream power is the rate at which energy is applied after the jet has
travelled through a vertical distance, Z, to a location on a surface or in a pool. The
stream power of the jet is defined as:
=
Pjet QZ
Where:
Pjet = the total stream power of the of the jet (typically with the units of
kW/m)
=
The stream power per unit area was computed by dividing the total stream power
by the footprint of the area of the jet at the point of impact. The stream power per
unit area was used to determine whether erosion will or occur or not as a function
of the erodibility of the rock or material. There is a threshold of erosion based on
a body of empirical data (see Figure Gibson-6).
The erodibility of the material that the jet impacts on is determined by analysis of
some key physical characteristics of the rock and is expressed as an erodibility
index, K. Ranges of erodibility indices were calculated for concrete, fractured
rock and sound foundation rock. Figure Gibson-6 presents the comparison of the
stream power values (representing a range of conditions above and below the
tailwater elevation) and the range of erodibility values for the different material
types. Points plotting above the erosion threshold line indicate the potential for
scour and points below the threshold line indicate that scour would be unlikely.
Figure Gibson-6 presents the results for overtopping of Gibson Dam during the
PMF. This is a worst-case condition and, even though there is the potential for
scour, (even for portions of the jet that impinge on the concrete protection and the
sound foundation rock), this may not lead to a high probability of dam failure.
Also, overtopping flows for floods less than the PMF will have less or no
impingement directly on the foundation rock and the stream power will also be
reduced. To fully evaluate this situation, a risk analysis would be needed. The risk
analysis would consider the progression of a potential failure mode once scour
initiated and would evaluate a full range of floods up to the PMF.
A-115
Figure Gibson-6.Relationship between stream power and erodibility index for the PMF
overtopping of Gibson Dam. Estimates shown include stream power above and below the
tailwater (Reclamation, 2006).
Lessons learned
Although the dam itself experienced some damage during the 1964 overtopping
event, the consequences downstream were much more damaging. The very large
uncontrolled releases, combined with flows from other tributaries, caused heavy
flooding in nearly all rural and urban areas throughout the entire Sun River
Valley.
Concrete dams are not threatened by crest erosion during overtopping, but there is
concern about the loss of foundation and abutment support which could lead to
dam failure.
A-116
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
References
Annandale, George W. 2006. Scour Technology Mechanics and Engineering
Practice, McGraw-Hill Civil Engineering Series, ISBN 0-07-144057-7.
Reclamation. 2005. Gibson Dam, Montana, Hydrologic Hazard, Flood
Hydrology Group, D-8530, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation,
Denver, Colorado, September 2005a.
Reclamation. 2005b. Gibson Dam Frequency Flood Routings for Corrective
Action Study, Sun River Project, Great Plains Region, Technical Service
Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, November 2005.
Reclamation. 2006. Hydraulic Investigations of the Erosion Potential of Flows
Overtopping Gibson Dam Sun River Project, Montana, Great Plains Region,
Hydraulic Laboratory Report HL-2006-02, April 2006.
A-117
A-118
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-119
Initial studies for Railroad Canyon Dam focused on developing an updated PMF.
The design PMF had a peak of 126,000 ft/s and a runoff volume of 305,000 acrefeet. Due to the relatively small volume of the reservoir, there is limited surcharge
space, and flood routings result in peak outflows very similar to the peak inflows.
Routings of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and a set of frequency floods
indicated that the dam could only pass 28 percent of the PMF before overtopping
would occur (Marsh et al., 1995). The PMF routing resulted in the dam parapet
walls being overtopped by up to 10.7 feet, with a duration of overtopping of about
30 hours. For this level of overtopping, there was concern that the fractured and
weathered foundation rock along the downstream portion of the dam would erode
and possible result in undermining and breach of the dam. The foundation for
Railroad Canyon Dam consists of slate interbedded with thin layers of argillite
and quartzite. The upper abutments are closely fractured and highly weathered
near the surface, with the joint spacings from 0.5 to 6 inches. The foundation rock
near the base of the dam is more massive, with joint spacings ranging from 3 to
24 inches. Results of core drilling performed in the 1960s showed that the rock
does not improve with depth below the highly weathered zone at the surface.
As a result of the overtopping potential at Railroad Canyon Dam, alternatives
were explored that addressed this issue. The reservoir behind Railroad Canyon
Dam is surrounded by luxury homes. This was a consideration in evaluating
alternatives for the dam overtopping issue.
Evaluation of Alternatives
A number of alternatives were evaluated for preventing an overtopping failure of
the dam. There were four issues that were identified in the alternative study
(Marsh et al., 1995):
x
As part of the alternative study, the PMF for Railroad Canyon Dam was
reevaluated. The final PMF had a peak of 167,000 ft3/s.
Five spillway configurations were evaluated as part of the alternative study. The
first spillway configuration resulted in the least modification to the dam and also
had the largest reservoir surcharge and resulted in the lowest construction cost.
This alternative consisted of allowing overtopping of the entire dam with
extensive overtopping protection provided on the downstream slope. The other
A-120
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Railroad Canyon-2.Plan View of Railroad Canyon Dam Overtopping Protection (from
Marsh et al., 1995, with permission from American Society of Civil Engineers [ASCE]).
A-121
Design Details
The overtopping protection consisted of 24-inch thick reinforced concrete
overlays with rock anchors on the downstream portions of the abutments.
Training walls are provided on each abutment, extending from the thrust blocks to
the concrete apron. The protective channel apron was extended with a 5-foot
thick, 1,000 lb/in concrete slab. Both the concrete overlays on the abutments and
the concrete apron included an extensive underdrain system. The analysis of the
thrust blocks and wing walls for their raised condition and new PMF and seismic
loadings indicated that additional stability measures were needed. The thrust
blocks were stabilized by adding four 48-strand post-tensioned anchors. The
raised wing walls were stabilized with the addition of six 27-strand post-tensioned
anchors.
Other improvements of the dam included installing three new outlet works intake
slide gates and trashracks, installing two new butterfly valves, installing a new
water supply outlet system, and constructing a new control building for the new
electrical and hydraulic control system.
Studies, Model Tests
The dam was analyzed for the new PMF loading condition and for seismic
loading resulting from an updated Magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the nearby
Elsinore Fault using a three-dimensional finite element model. A response spectra
analysis was performed for the seismic loading case. The arch dam was found to
be stable but the need for additional stability measures was identified for the
thrust blocks and wing walls.
Rough Costs
Bids for the modifications to Railroad Canyon Dam were received in early 1995
and the low bid received was $5.4 million. Construction of the modifications
began in 1995.
Lessons Learned
The selected design for modifying Railroad Canyon Dam balanced risk reduction
from a flood overtopping potential failure mode with construction costs and the
avoidance of additional flooding of lakefront property along the reservoir rim.
The overtopping protection focused on limiting overtopping of the dam to the
central portion of the dam and protecting these areas.
Reference
Marsh, Gordon, MacDonald, Tom, Hoagland, John, Wong, Noel. 1995. Railroad
Canyon Dam Overtopping Protection, Water Resources Engineering
International Conference; 1; pp. 155 - 158.
A-122
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-123
Dam Overtopping
In 1895, a rain of six inches in a 24-hour period created a catastrophic flood. The
result was that Sweetwater Dam was overtopped for a period of 40 hours, with the
highest reservoir level reaching 22 inches over the elevation of the parapet (Figure
Sweetwater-3). The dam remained stable during this event, but the cascading
water caused erosion downstream of the structure and washed away some of a
pipeline and other facilities. Following this flood, the parapet was raised two feet,
but 200 feet in the middle of the dam were left unraised as an overflow weir or
spillway. An additional spillway was added on the left abutment of the dam.
On January 14, 1916 it rained for 6 days, and the dam overtopped again. Another
storm drenched the county on January 24 that same year, and the lake rose 3 feet
above the top of the dam, creating a huge waterfall as it spilled over the entire
span of the dam. This overtopping caused flows to impinge on the downstream
abutments. Scouring progressed rapidly as the overtopping flows cascaded over
the steep abutments and the upper portion of the reservoir was released through
newly created channels around the dam. The dam was left standing, but both
abutments were breached by scour and the reservoir releases, which continued to
flow around the dam for days. The torrent of water rushed down the Sweetwater
Valley, causing extensive damage. It was reported that eight people died as a
result of the partial breach of the reservoir behind Sweetwater Dam (Reynolds,
2008).
A-124
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Sweetwater-4 shows the dam after the collapse of the upper abutments.
Overtopping Protection
A massive retrofit of Sweetwater Dam was undertaken in 1918 - 1919 to repair
damage caused by the 1916 flood. The spillway capacity was increased to
45,000 ft3/s by enlarging the existing spillways and constructing a massive siphon
spillway with six rectangular siphon tubes on the left abutment. Parapet walls at
the ends of the dam were raised by 13 feet to protect the abutments from
overtopping flows and to restrict flows to the center of the river channel. Concrete
overlay protection was added to the rock abutments between the spillways and the
center of the river channel. The south dike (a quarter mile east of the dam) was
replaced by a new higher dike. A low buttressed arch dam in the center of the
river channel, constructed 275 feet below the toe of the dam to provide a stilling
pool was added for spillway releases. The stilling weir was backfilled with large
rock (placed between the weir and the toe of the dam). The rock was intended to
dissipate energy for flows overtopping the dam and to protect the toe of the dam
and the downstream river channel immediately downstream of the dam.
A-125
In 1939 - 1940, the upstream parapet wall of the dam was removed and replaced
with a rounded spillway crest. In the 1990s, additional modifications to
Sweetwater Dam included the replacement of surficially cracked concrete on the
abutments with a reinforced concrete overlay.
A-126
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Lessons Learned
Although the dam survived overtopping in 1916, erosion of the upper abutments
led to breach of the reservoir along both sides of the dam. Modifications were
performed in 1918 - 1919 to accommodate future large flood events. The
ends of the dam to prevent overtopping in those areas and direct overtopping
flows to the center of the dam, and constructing a concrete arch weir across the
A-127
A-128
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
A-129
The overtopping protection consisted of concrete channels and paving which will
guide high velocity overtopping flows (which will flow over the downstream
parapet walls and then along the downstream face of the dam before collecting in
the downstream channel) along the downstream toes of the dam and into the
stilling basin and river channel. The channels vary from 30 feet wide and 5.5 feet
deep at the top of the slope to 80 feet wide and 8 feet deep at the bottom.
Walls were also added at the downstream end of each abutment to prevent
overtopping flows from flowing past the ends of the dam. Additional features of
the overtopping protection included replacing all doors and windows of the
houses on the dam crest with watertight units or providing them with waterproof
covers and reinforcing the entrances to adits at the toe of the dam and providing
watertight doors. These measures were taken to prevent flooding of the interior of
the dam, which would possibly leave the structure inoperable for a period of time.
Figures Tygart-1 and Tygart-2 show the downstream features that were added to
provide overtopping protection.
A-130
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Tygart-2.Concrete Paving and Channel Along Downstream Left Abutment (Courtesy of
USACE)
Determine modifications needed to the stilling basin and exit channel for
the increased flows from the new PMF.
The investigation was conducted using a 1:60 scale physical model. The model
included approximately 2,000 feet of the approach channel length, the dam and
approximately 2000 feet of the exit channel. The initial experiments were
conducted to observe and verify discharge capacities for the spillway and outlet
works. Four different designs were then evaluated which included:
x
A-131
roadway opening. The flow is conveyed along the access roadway before
spilling back down the abutment.
x
A-132
AppendixCase Histories
Concrete Dams
Figure Tygart-3.Type 2 design, damage resulting from PMF flow for 1 hour (Courtesy of
USACE, 1999).
Figure Tygart-4 Type 4 design, PMF overflow on right side of dam (Q = 373,120 ft3/s)
(Courtesy of USACE, 1999)
A-133
Lessons Learned
A hydraulic model study was critical to the design of overtopping protection at
Tygart Dam. Overtopping protection was provided at the toe of the dam but just
as critical was designing guidewalls to contain the overtopping flows as the
travelled down the groins of the dam to the tailrace. A key design consideration
was how to accommodate the overtopping flows into the existing stilling basin.
The model study was used to optimize flow conditions while protecting the
backfill for the stilling basin from erosion.
References
Turner, Herman O. Jr. 1999. Dam Safety Assurance Model Study of Tygart
Dam, Tygart River, Grafton, West Virginia, Technical Report CHL-99-7,
USACE, Waterways Experiment Station, April 1999.
USACE. 1995. Dam Safety Assurance Evaluation Report, Tygart Dam West
Virginia, Pittsburgh District, November 1995.
Zaitsoff, Mark P. 2003. Overtopping Modifications to Tygart Dam,
Proceedings, USACE Watershed Systems Conference, Portland, Oregon, May
13-15, 2003.
A-134