JRPA

Lopez v. Orosa
G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, 103 SCRA 98

mortgages executed in the manner and form prescribed in the

statute.

Associated Insurance and Surety Company v. Iya

103 SCRA 972

In this case, the building where the rice-cleaning

machinery was installed was real property. The
mere fact that the parties dealt with it as separate
and apart from the land on which it stood does not
change its character as real property. Neither the
original registry of the building in the chattel
mortgage nor the annotation of sale of the
mortgaged property in the registry had any.

DOCTRINE:A building is an immovable property irrespective

of where or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.

AMD
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo
44 SCRA 630

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co.

G.R. No. L-11658

DOCTRINE:The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the

registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial
character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers
upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the
nature of any document of which registration is sought as a
chattel mortgage.

DOCTRINE:For while it is true that generally, real estate

connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could only mean one thing
that a building is by itself an immovable property

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the parties decided to deal

with the building as personal property does not change its
character as real property. Neither the original registry in the
chattel mortgage registry nor the annotation in said registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the
building.
The registry under Article 1473 of the Civil Code refers to
registry of real property and the annotation or inscription of a
deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry
cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry
of real property.
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates mortgages of
personal property. The sole purpose and object of the chattel
mortgage registry is the registration of personal property

CRF
Sibal v. Valdez
G.R. No. L-27532
DOCTRINE:For the purpose of attachment and execution, and
for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered
products" have the nature of personal property. (batasnatin)
MPF
Tsai v. CA
G.R. No. 120098
DOCTRINE: Even if the properties are immovable by nature,

nothing detracts the parties from treating them as chattels to

secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
An immovable may be considered a personal property
if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed
over it, as in the case at bar. While it is true that the
controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of
the contract of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage by
the parties gives a contrary indication. Both the trial and
appellate courts show that the intention was to treat the
machineries as movables or personal property.
Assuming that the properties were considered immovables,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to
secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
\ AMDG
Yap v. Tanada
G.R. No. L-32917
DOCTRINE: The Civil code considers as immovable property
among others, anything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object
GCG
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870
DOCTRINE: Movable equipment, to be immobilized in
contemplation of Article 415 of the Civil Code, must be the
essential and principal elements of an industry or works which
are carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus, where
the business is one of transportation, which is carried on
without a repair or service shop, and its rolling equipment is

repaired or serviced in a shop belonging to another, the tools

and equipment in its repair shop which appear movable are
merely incidentals and may not be considered immovables,
and, hence, not subject to assessment as real estate for
purposes of the real estate tax.
Fels Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, et al.
G.R. No. 168557
DOCTRINE: Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides
that docks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake, or coast are considered immovable property. Thus,
power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo
G.R. No. 40411,
DOCTRINE: Generally, machinery becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the plant or property. This rule does not
apply should the machinery be placed by any other person
such as a tenant or usufructuary.
Makati Leasing and Financial Corporation v. Wearever
Textile Mills, Inc.
G.R. No. L-58469
DOCTRINE:If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so
agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby,

there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is

movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped
from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO
10 SCRA 68
DOCTRINE: The steel towers or poles of MERALCO are not
real properties because 1) they are not adhered to the soil, 2)
they are not attached to an immovable property and can be
dismantled without breaking or deteriorating the material and
3) they are not machineries nor instruments or implements
intended for the industry or works on the land
FMM
Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. L-7057
DOCTRINE: When the machinery and equipment in question
appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the
concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in
such a way that the former could not be separated from the
latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object or that in order to remove said outfit, it became
necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but , also, to cut some
of its wooden supports and when, said machinery and
equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry" carried on said immovable and tended, it becomes
immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article
415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana
121 SCRA 331

DOCTRINE: Buildings are always immovable under the Civil

Code. Separate treatment by the parties of building from the
land in which it stood does not change the immovable
character of the building.
MCSS
Prudential Bank v. Panis
153 SCRA 390
Inclusion of building separate and distinct from land, in the
provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an
immovable property. A building by itself may be mortgaged
apart from the land on which it has been built.
Tumalad v. Vicencio
41 SCRA 143
DOCTRINE: The view that parties to a deed of chattel
mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property
for the purposes of said contract, "is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the
principle of estoppel.
Sergs Products and Goquiola v. PCI Leasing and Finance
338 SCRA 499
DOCTRINE: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real
or immovable property be considered as personal or movable,
a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin
obtained by the other contracting party.
Manarang and Manarang v. Ofilada and Esteban
99 SCRA 108
DOCTRINE: House is personal property for purposes of
chattel mortgage only; Remains real property. The mere fact
that a house was the subject of a chattel mortgage and was
considered as personal property by the parties does not make
said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be

given for its sale at public auction. It is real property within the
purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has
become a permanent fixture on the land, which is real
property.
Navarro v. Pineda
9 SCRA 631
DOCTRINE:Estoppel, in that "the parties have so expressly
agreed" in the mortgage to consider the house as chattel "for
its smallness and mixed materials of sawali and wood".
Manila Electric Co., v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals
114 SCRA 273
DOCTRINE:Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include
things which should generally be regarded as personal
property.
DJTV
Caltex Philippines v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals
114 SCRA 296
DOCTRINE: Gasoline station equipment and machineries are
permanent fixtures for purposes of realty taxation.
Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Jarque
G.R. No. 41506
DOCTRINE: Vessels are considered personal property under
the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are
personal property although occasionally referred to as a
peculiar kind of personal property. Since the term "personal
property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage
agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

PROPERTY IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE PERSON WHOM IT

BELONGS (ART. 419-426)
CRF
Villanueva v. Castaeda
154 SCRA 142
DOCTRINE: Article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public
use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and
town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service
supported by said towns or provinces. Such is outside the
commerce of man and cannot be the object of a valid contract.
(Article 1271)
Maneclang v. IAC
144 SCRA 553
DOCTRINE: Finding that subject body of water is a creek
belonging to the public domain,not susceptible to private
appropriation, a factual determination binding on the Supreme
Court.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
384 SCRA 152
DOCTRINE: Until now, the only way the government can sell
to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. However, there exists a
constitutional ban wherein private corporations are prohibited
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. These
corporations may only lease the lands from a period granted
by the law.
Republic v. Court of Appeals
281 SCRA 639

DOCTRINE: When the sea moved towards the estate and the
tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land
and passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly
cannot be a subject of a free patent.
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650
DOCTRINE: The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code,
the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
Lanzar v. Director of Lands
78 SCRA 130
DOCTRINE: Properties formed by accretion through the action
of the sea belong to the public domain unless the government
decrees otherwise.
Ignacio v. Director of Lands
108 Phil. 335
DOCTRINE: Citing Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article
366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:To the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it

refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of
rivers, while the accretion in the present case was
caused by action of the Manila Bay.
MRAM
Villarico v. Court of Appeals
309 SCRA 193

DOCTRINE: Private persons cannot own forest lands.

Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a
registrable title.
Villanueva v. Castaneda
154 SCRA 142
DOCTRINE: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man
and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.
Dacanay Jr. v. Asistio Jr.
208 SCRA 404
DOCTRINE: A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of men. The right of the public to use
the city streets may not be bargained away through a contract.
Laurel v. Garcia
187 SCRA 797
DOCTRINE: An abandonment of the intention to use the
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property
under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment and it cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve the property
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
Palanca v. Commonwealth
G.R. No. 46373
DOCTRINE: A private person may not acquire ownership of a
property of public dominion (such as navigable waters)
through prescription or even by virtue of a Torrens title.
MLAV
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440

DOCTRINE: Under the law of Municipal Corporations,
properties which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc.
Director of Lands v. MERALCO
153 SCRA 686

ABB
Bongato v. Malvar
387 SCRA 327
DOCTRINE: The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party deprived of the parcel of land may file either accion
publiciana; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to
recover ownership as well as possession.

DOCTRINE: Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of

alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land ceases to be public land and
becomes private property.

De La Cruz v. CA
286 SCRA 230

OWNERSHIP (ART. 427-439)

DOCTRINE: A positive act of the govt is needed to reclassify

land and until such reclassification, property remains part of
the forest reserve incapable of alienation and cannot be
acquired by prescription.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez
358 SCRA 489

JGY
Chiao Liong Tan v. Court of Appeals
228 SCRA 75
DOCTRINE: Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for
the possession of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to
authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties,
arising from or growing out of the main controversy.
Calub v. Court of Appeals
331 SCRA 55
DOCTRINE: Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without
its consent, cannot prosper.

DOCTRINE: Reconveyance is a remedy of those whose

property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed
of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for
value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property
should not have passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents v. Court of
Appeals
254 SCRA 220
DOCTRINE:
1. Injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo

of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or

threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
following requisites be present:
a. There must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; and
b. The act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right.
2. An Original Certificate of Title serves as a concrete and
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property. The
certificate of title vests not only ownership over the lot but also
the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the
right of ownership.
Lucero v. Loot
25 SCRA 687
DOCTRINE: When a final decree has been issued in a land
registration case, the issuance of a writ of possession is only a
matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor
of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to
the issuance of writ of possession.
Venciao v. Vano
182 SCRA 492
DOCTRINE: Writ of Possession may be issued not only
against the party defeated in the land registration case but
also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the
land, or any portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings up to issuance of final decree
Heirs of Vencilao, Sr. v. CA
288 SCRA 574

DOCTRINE: Tax declarations and receipts do not by

themselves conclusively prove title to the land.They only
constitute prima facie evidence of ownership or possession.
Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when
the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. However, the
vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is
anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property. Otherwise, his mere
refusal to believe that such defect exists, he will not be
deemed a purchaser in good faith should such title indeed be
defective.
RIGHTS OF ACCESSION (ART. 440-475)
Accession Industrial
RGGM
Depra v. Dumlao
136 SCRA 475
DOCTRINE: The owner of land on which improvement was
built by another in good faith is entitled to removal of
improvement only after land owner has opted to sell the land
and the builder refused to pay for the same. where the lands
value is considerably more than the improvement, the
landowner cannot compel the builder to buy the land. In such
event, a forced lease is created and the court shall fix the
terms thereof in case the parties disagree thereon.
Nuguid v. CA
452 SCRA 243
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to

appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the

proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor
in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary
and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made.
Pecson v. CA
244 SCRA 407
DOCTRINES:
1.
Article 448 of the Civil Code does not apply to a
case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale
or donation.
2.
The provision of Art. 448 on indemnity may be
applied by analogy to a case where one loses the
ownership of the land on which he earlier built an
apartment.
3. Technogas Phil. V. CA
4. 268 SCRA 5
5.

6. DOCTRINE: Possession acquired in good

faith continues to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired, until the
contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the
belief of the builder that the land he is building on
is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in
his title. The good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner
DJTV
Manotok Reality v. Tecson
164 SCRA 587

DOCTRINES:
Issuance of writ of execution is proper even if private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or peculiar
circumstances supervened; Option to retain the premises and
pay for improvements or to sell the premises to the builder in
good faith belongs to the owner of the property.
Where the improvements have been gutted by fire, the basis
for private respondents right to retain the premises has
already been extinguished without petitioners fault.
JGY
Ballatan v. CA
304 SCRA 34
DOCTRINE: In the event that the owner elects to sell to the
builder, planter or sower the land on which the improvement
stands, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value
at the time of payment.
Spouses del Campo v. Obesia
160 SCRA
DOCTRINE: When the co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of the defendants
occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
plaintiffs which the defendant obviously built in good faith, the
provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
In applying Article 448 of the New Civil Code, the
plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house
of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as
provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the
plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house. But if the price asked for is
considerably much more than the value of the portion of the
house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be

obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the
reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions
that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court
shall fix the terms thereof. The defendants may opt to
demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their
own expense, if they so decide.
FZC
Rosales, et al. v. Castellfort, et al.
G.R. No. 157044
DOCTRINE: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in
good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and
it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder
or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the
land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Ignao v. IAC, G.R. No. 72876
193 SCRA 17
DOCTRINE: When the co-ownership is terminated by a
partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile coowner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another
co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the
provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the
respective rights of the parties.
MWSS v. C.A.
143 SCRA 623
DOCTRINE: The right of a possessor in bad faith to remove

improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or

mere pleasure, provided the thing does not suffer any injury
and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by
paying their value at the time of his possession.
Alviola v. CA
289 SCRA 537
DOCTRINE: For Article 448 to apply, the construction must be
of permanent character, attached to the soil with an idea of
perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is transferable,
there is no accession, and the builder must remove the
construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action
to eject the builder from the land.
Accession Natural
AMDG
Reynante v. C.A.
207 SCRA 794
DOCTRINE: Granting that the lots were created by alluvial
formation and while it is true that accretions which the bank of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion
to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional are by another person through prescription
Vda. de Nazareno v. C.A.
257 SCRA 589
DOCTRINE: Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these
requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the

sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if

present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters.
Agustin v. IAC
187 SCRA 218
DOCTRINE: Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river .
Viajar v. CA
168 SCRA 405
DOCTRINE: Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect
of the current become the property of the owners of the banks
(Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such
accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect
are not affected by the Registration Act.
Binalay v. Manalo
195 SCRA 374
DOCTRINE: For accretion to take place as a mode of
acquiring ownership over the land, the land formed should be
directly adjacent to the land owned.
Republic v. CA
132 SCRA 514
DOCTRINE: Article 457 of the New Civil Code states that, To
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the

accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the

current of the waters.
Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before
an accretion is said to have taken place: (1) That the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers.
Republic v. CA
131 SCRA 532
DOCTRINE: Laguna de bay is a lake and that part around it
which becomes covered with water four to five months a year,
not due to tidal actions, but due to rains cannot be considered
as part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bar nor as a
foreshore land; Property being so, the land is registerable
under the LRA.
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to
"flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore
land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land
registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of
lands but only the registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.
Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has
been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty
(30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax
receipts.

Applicant has more than satisfied the legal

requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in his favor of said land.
Ronquillo v. CA
195 SCRA 433
DOCTRINE: The rules of accretion do not apply where the
drying-up of river is not due to a natural change in the course
of the waters. Herein, the change was man-made (pollution).
The dried-up portion belongs to the State as land of public
domain.
Baes v. CA
224 SCRA 562
DOCTRINE: If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation
for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when the
change in the course of the river is effected through artificial
means.
Jagualing v. CA
194 SCRA 607
DOCTRINE: Article 465 of the Civil Code -an island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner

thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than

the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure
to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the
length of their property along the margin of the river.
Payatas-Estate Improvement Co. v. Tuason
G.R. No. L-30067
DOCTRINE: Accretions, as contemplated in Article 366 of the
Civil Code, are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows
that registration does not protect the riparian owner against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in
the course of the adjoining stream.
DJTV
Santos v. Bernabe
54 Phil 19
DOCTRINE: Article 381 of the Civil Code states: If, by the will
of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case
the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner
shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part
belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.